Quotes of the Day:
"The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable."
-Sun Tzu
"Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival."
- Winston Churchill
"The genius of the United States is not best or most in its executives or legislatures, nor in its ambassadors or authors or colleges, or churches, or parlors, nor even in its newspapers or inventors, but always most in the common people."
- Walt Whitman
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 5 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. Special Operations News Update | SOF News
3. Iran’s Master Class in Evading Sanctions
4. Pentagon kept hypersonic test quiet amid Russia tensions
5. Argument over ‘woke-ism’ in the military erupts in House hearing
6. Biden to nominate first uniformed woman to lead a military service
7. Ukraine’s Zelensky Calls for Removing Russia From U.N. Security Council After Alleged War Crimes
8. Right-wing Azov Battalion emerges as a controversial defender of Ukraine
9. What are war crimes, and how are they prosecuted?
10. Opinion: How the U.S. can support a war crimes investigation into Russia
11. Opinion: What’s happening in Ukraine is genocide. Period.
12. New phase in war opens up as Ukraine defeats Russia in battle of Kyiv
13. Are US Troops Still Training Ukrainians?
14. Hackers flood internet with what they say are Russian companies' files
15. Taiwan is not Ukraine, and China is not Russia — but Biden is still Biden
16. China's Phoenix TV faces closure in Taiwan
17. Would Young People Fight for America?
18. China's envoy to U.N. calls images of dead civilians from Bucha 'very disturbing'
19. What You Need to Know about U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Wartime
20. A coup against Putin: wishful thinking or a real possibility?
21. The Price of Hegemony: Can America Learn to Use Its Power?
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 5 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 5 (PUTIN'S WAR)
Frederick W. Kagan, George Barros, and Karolina Hird
April 5, 4:30 pm ET
Russian forces continued to reposition to continue their invasion in eastern and southern Ukraine, having abandoned the attack on Kyiv. They have largely completed their withdrawal from the Kyiv area and are reportedly redeploying some of the withdrawn combat forces from Belarus to Russia. Ukrainian forces are moving to regain control over segments of the state border in Chernihiv, having already done so in Kyiv and Zhytomyr Oblasts. Russian troops are pulling back toward Russia along the Sumy axis as well, but it is not yet clear if they intend to retreat all the way back to the border or will try to hold some forward positions on the Sumy axis.
Russia has not yet committed forces withdrawn from the Battle of Kyiv back into the fighting in eastern Ukraine. Russian reinforcements continuing the drive southeast from Izyum toward Slovyansk are from elements of 1st Guards Tank Army units that had been in the Kharkiv-Sumy area. Russian units that retreated from Kyiv will not likely regain combat effectiveness for some time, and it is not clear that the Russians intend to return them to the fight soon. That said, an unconfirmed Ukrainian military intelligence report suggests that Moscow could soon send the 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, a unit that reportedly committed war crimes in Bucha, into the fight in eastern Ukraine in the hopes that guilty members of that brigade and witnesses of its war crimes are killed in combat with Ukrainian forces.[1]
Belgorod continues to emerge as the primary concentration area for Russian forces regrouping and refitting after their retreat from Kyiv and in preparation for onward movement to their home stations or to join the fighting in the east. Elements of the Central Military District pulling back from Chernihiv Oblast are reportedly on their way to Belgorod.[2] Their final destination is not yet known.
The Battle of Mariupol continues, with Russian forces continuing to pound the city using artillery and airpower. The constrained information environment in Mariupol prevents us from assessing concrete changes in control of terrain, but Ukrainian forces appear to be sustaining organized resistance in parts of the city.
Russian offensive operations southeast from Izyum toward Slovyansk continued on a small scale and made limited progress. Russia has not yet attempted to mass large concentrations of forces on this axis but continues instead to send individual battalion tactical groups to advance on their own.
Key Takeaways
- The withdrawal of Russian forces from around Kyiv is nearing completion.
- Russia has not yet introduced forces withdrawn from western Ukraine into the fight in the east.
- Ukrainian forces continued to put up organized resistance in parts of Mariupol.
- Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations on the Izyum-Slovyansk axis.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:
- Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
- Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
- Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.
Main effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate main effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)
Ukrainian forces continued to conduct an organized defense of parts of Mariupol in the past 24 hours. Russian forces conducted an intense artillery and airstrike campaign against the city and targeted Ukrainian positions around the Azovstal Plant. The information environment in Mariupol remains restricted, however, and we cannot confirm further territorial changes over the last 24 hours.[3]
Subordinate main effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued operations to seize Popasna and Rubizhne, roughly 240 kilometers southeast of Kharkiv, in the past 24 hours, focusing primarily on air and artillery attacks, likely including the one that destroyed a nitric acid tank in Rubizhne on April 5.[4] Russian forces also reportedly dropped petal mines on Popasna on April 5.[5]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast, and fix Ukrainian forces around Kharkiv in place)
Russian forces continued to bombard settlements in Kharkiv Oblast in the past 24 hours, and the situation around Kharkiv remains generally unchanged.[6] Multiple sources report that Russian forces fired a long-range multiple launch rocket system from somewhere in Kharkiv Oblast toward an unspecified location in Mykolayiv Oblast on April 4, killing 10 and wounding 46.[7]
Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army continued efforts to advance southeast from Izyum toward Slovyansk. Russian forces advanced seven kilometers southwest of Izyum in the direction of Barvinkove, about 47 km southwest of Izyum, and took control of the village of Brazhkivka, about 25 kilometers south of Izyum.[8] One battalion tactical group (BTG) of the 1st Tank Regiment of the 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division attempted to seize the village of Sulyhivka (about 28 km south of Izyum) but was not successful.[9] The advance to the southwest may be part of a Russian effort to bypass Ukrainian forces that recently conducted a successful counterattack along the direct highway from Izyum to Slovyansk. Pro-Russian sources reported that elements of both the 1st Guards Tank Regiment of the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division and 13th Tank Regiment of the 4th Guards Tank Division are operating in the vicinity of Izyum as of April 4.[10]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern axis: (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 5 that Russian forces attacked Oleksandrivka, about 40 kilometers west of Kherson, likely in an effort to retake it after a successful Ukrainian counter-attack had seized it in mid-March.[11]
Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)
Russian forces continued to withdraw from Chernihiv Oblast, and Ukrainian forces continued clearing Romny Raion on the Sumy axis on April 4.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported on April 5 that withdrawn Russian forces in Belarus are beginning to ship their equipment back to Russia.[13]
Immediate items to watch
- Russian forces will continue reinforcing the Izyum-Slovyansk axis and attempting to advance to and through Slovyansk to encircle Ukrainian forces.
- The Battle of Mariupol continues, and it is unclear how much longer the Ukrainian defenders can hold out.
- Russian forces will likely abandon the Sumy axis entirely and fall back to regroup around Belgorod.
- Some Russian forces are likely to return to home stations in Russia while others will re-enter the fighting in the east.
[1] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rosiiskykh-viiskovykh-iaki-chynyly-zvirstva-v-buchi-znovu-povertaiut-v-ukrainu.html
2. Special Operations News Update | SOF News
Special Operations News Update | SOF News
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.
Photo: A Member of 1-10 Special Forces Group (Airborne) participates in drills in preparation for their participation in Exercise Cold Response 22 in Sweden in February 2022. 1-10 SFG(A) attended the Swedish Armed Forces Subarctic Warfare Center in order to prepare for the exercise. Certification included maneuvering on skis, snowmobiles, and on foot in austere environments like the high north. This training in support of Cold Response ensured all allies and partners were able to face the demanding training scenarios encountered throughout the exercise in Norway. (U.S. Army photo by Cpt. Margaret Collins, SOCEUR)
Cold Response 22 brings together around 30,000 troops from 27 countries to train in a cold weather environment on land, in the air, and at sea in Norway and surrounding areas during March and April 2022. Read more about Exercise Cold Response 22 (NATO).
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Ukraine War Update
SOF News will return to its coverage of the conflict in Ukraine tomorrow. Here are some highlights of the past 24 hours in Ukraine until then. Almost 4,000 people were evacuated from conflict areas on Tuesday (Apr 5), many of them from Mariupol. Over 120,000 people are still trapped in the city. The Russians have withdrawn from much of northern Ukraine – Kyiv will not be captured. The fight comes now in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine. Mykolaiv and Kharkiv experienced heavy shelling. Turkey and Estonia will return their embassy staff to Kyiv.
SOF News
The Nation’s Naval Commando Force. Rear Admiral H. W. Howard, III writes about the new initiatives that are placing a renewed emphasis on undersea and seabed warfare with the Naval Special Warfare community. He outlines the NSW’s organizational transformation and modernization priorities in progress – that include personnel changes, tactical changes, experimentation, concept development, and more. “Frogmen Solve Hard Problems – From and on the Sea”, Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, April 2022.
919th SOW Anniversary. The Air Force’s only special operations wing celebrated its 50th anniversary on April 1-3, 2022. The 919th has supported the Gulf War, Operations Just Cause, Enduring Freedom, Inherent Resolve, and many others. “919th SOW celebrates 50th Anniversary”, Air Force Reserve Command, April 4, 2022.
CSAF Visits AFSOC. The Air Force Chief of Staff visited Hurlburt Field and Air Force Special Operations command on Monday, April 4, 2022. He got briefed up on AFSOC’s Force Generation Model, Mission Sustainment Teams, Aviation Special Operations Task Units, and Special Operations Task Groups. “CSAF visits Hurlburt Field”, DVIDS, April 5, 2022.
Arrow Security & Training, LLC is a corporate sponsor of SOF News. AST offers a wide range of training and instruction courses and programs to include language and cultural services, training, role playing, and software and simulation. https://arrowsecuritytraining.com/
Another A-29C Super Tucano for AFSOC. A third Super Tucano has been delivered to U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command. The aircraft is intended for the AFSOC’s Combat Aviation Advisor (CAA) mission which is designed to build international partner capacity. The first two A-29s were delivered early in March and are already being used in training operations. “US special ops command receives A-29C Super Tucano aircraft”, Defence-Blog.com, April 2, 2022.
Navy SEAL Class Gifts. One of the traditions of the Navy SEAL selection and training classes is the presenting of a class gift to their instructors and staff at the school. Read more about these memorable gifts in “The Wild History of Navy SEAL Class Gifts”, Coffee or Die Magazine, March 28, 2022.
NSW Training Halted by Judge. Navy SEALs can no longer train in Washington state parks based on a judge’s ruling made on Friday (Apr1). This court action provided a victory to environmentalist who fought the military’s use of public lands. The SEALs have conducted cold water training and other special operations exercises in the state’s coastal parks for more than 30 years. “Navy SEALs Must Stop Training in Washington State Parks, Judge Rules”, Coffee or Die Magazine, April 1, 2022.
International SOF
Saudi SF Host U.S. Soldiers at Their Mountain School. Royal Saudi Land Forces Special Forces hosted U.S. soldiers from the 172nd Infantry (Mountain) of the Vermont National Guard at the RSLF Mountain Warfare School in Saudi Arabia. About 70 U.S. Army soldiers attended the training a few months ago. “Vermont Soldiers hone mountain skills with Saudi Special Forces”, National Guard News, April 1, 2022.
Nepal and US SOF Training. The Nepali Special Operations Forces and a U.S. special operations unit are conducting a month-long joint training exercise focused on enhancing the capabilities for peacekeeping operations. This Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) is being conducted at the Ranger Battalion’s Singh Mahavir camp and Ranger Training Center in Nagarkot. “Nepal Army and US Special Operations Command conducting month-long training”, Khabarhbu.com, April 3, 2022.
Russians Elite VDV – Taking a Beating. The elite airborne force of the Russian army, the VDV, has been at the center of the Kremlin’s campaign against Ukraine. However, the unit has struggled in the conflict and its vaunted reputation is taking some hits. Russia’s paratroopers have experienced heavy losses in several key engagements. “Russia’s failures in Ukraine have dented the ‘elite’ status of its paratrooper force”, Business Insider, April 3, 2022.
Philippine’s SOCOM. The military of the Philippines observed the fourth anniversary of the creation of the Special Operations Command on April 1, 2022 in Fort Magsaysay. Philippine’s SOCOM is being recategorized from being an AFP-wide Service Support Unit to a Combatant Command. “The SOCOM is a joint special operations command that is responsible for planning, conducting, and supporting special operations of the military.” The primary units of SOCOM are the Special Forces, Scout Rangers, and the Light Reaction Company. “Centino recognizes Special Ops Command’s growth on 4th anniversary”, Manila Bulletin, April 2, 2022.
SOCOM Cdr Visits Norwegian SOF. General Richard Clarke, commander of USSOCOM visited Norway and met with the commander of Norway’s Special Operations Command. The Cold Response 22 exercise involving over 30,000 NATO troops is currently underway in the Norway region. “U.S. Special Operations Commander Visits Norway”, USSOCOM Public Affairs, April 1, 2022.
SOF History
OSS Lessons. One of the greatest underground special operations units ever was the World War II era Office of Strategic Services or OSS. The head of the OSS was “Wild Bill” Donovan. He was awarded the Medal of Honor in World War II. He became a successful Wall Street lawyer and businessman, an advisor to high-level politicians, and then finally the leader and driving force behind the OSS. Read more in “What the OSS Taught us About Modern Warfare”, SOFREP, March 27, 2022.
Vietnam Era MoH Recipient – Gary Beikirch. The life of a Special Forces medic who was awarded the Medal of Honor for his courageous actions during a fierce battle in Vietnam is described in this article. “Medal of Honor Monday: Army Sgt. Gary Beikirch”, DoD News, April 4, 2022.
Event on SOE. A panel of for historians and experts will compare and contrast the work of the British Special Operations Executive across different theatres of the Second World War. The SOE was formed to support local resistance movements, conduct sabotage, espionage, and reconnaissance against the Axis powers. will take place on April 22, 2022 at the National Army Museum (UK).
1st African-American Master Diver. A Navy enlisted man took the plunge in 1954 to become the first African-American to graduate from the US Navy Diving & Salvage School. In 1966 he was on a diving mission to recover a missing MK28 Hydrogen bomb that fell from a B-52 into the Mediterranean Sea after the aircraft went down after a mid-air collision. He was injured during an accident that eventually required the amputation of one of his legs. He would eventually return to diving duty – overcoming a host of obstacles. “Against All Odds: Carl Brashear Became the Navy’s First-African American Master Diver”, SOFREP, April 2, 2022.
National Security and Defense
Don’t Forget COIN! Todd Moulton, a Navy intelligence planner with U.S. Second Fleet, reminds us that the U.S. military will still need to keep its counterinsurgency doctrine and TTPs current. Although the DoD has shifted its focus to ‘Strategic Competition’ it will more likely than not be faced with countering insurgents – either directly or through proxy forces. Read his perspective in “Preparing for Future Conflicts: Refining Conventional and Counterinsurgency Doctrine“, Small Wars Journal, April 1, 2022.
Rebalancing the Army. “The Army now finds itself in the early stages of another post-war rebalancing effort following the post-9/11 wars, and, so far, the Army seems to be repeating its previous postwar alterations. If it shifts too far to refocus on large-scale combat operations, the Army might once again find itself out of balance to accomplish its myriad missions across the competition continuum.” “Rebalancing the Army for Military Competition”, Modern War Institute at West Point, April 5, 2022.
SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, or defense then we are interested.
Books, Podcasts, Videos, and Movies
Book Author Interview – Code Over Country. Matthew Cole is interviewed about the narrative the U.S. Navy would like you to believe and the facts behind the public image of the U.S. Navy SEALs. Since 9/11, the combat experience and accomplishments of SEAL Team 6 have piled up, so have the scandals. He provides a description of his new book – Code Over Country: The Tragedy and Corruption of SEAL Team 6 (2002). “America Loves the Navy SEALs. It Hasn’t Been Good for Them”, by Rebecca Onion, SLATE, March 28, 2022.
Publication – The Mini-Manual for the Urban Defender. John Spencer has updated his recent publication that is a guide to the strategies and tactics of defending city. Originally published in February 2022, he has provided new content to this more recent edition (Version 4). It is available in English, Ukrainian, Latvian, and Japanese. PDF, 76 pages.
Movie Trailer – The Contractor. An Army Special Forces NCO gets booted out of the Army for using unauthorized pain killers for his damaged knee. Debts mount up and he turns to ‘contractor work’. But that gets a bit dangerous. Watch the movie trailer.
Videos – SOCOM, SO/LIC, and Cybercommand Funding Testimony Before Senate. The Senate Committee on Armed Services spoke with Christopher Maier, assistant secretary of defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Army Gen. Richard Clarke, U.S. Special Operations Command commander, and Army Gen. Paul Nakasone, U.S. Cybercommand commander and National Security Agency director, about the posture of United States Special Operations Command and United States Cyber Command in review of the defense authorization request for fiscal year 2023 and the Future Years Defense Program. Senate Committee Reviews Posture, 2023 Authorization Request, DVIDS, April 5, 2022. Part 1 and Part 2.
Video – What Is a Marine Raider? The Marine Corps special operations unit is featured in the video. The newest addition to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) was established in 2006. It’s critical skills operators were officially designated “Raiders” in 2015, reflecting the history of the Marine Raiders of World War II. Coffee or Die Magazine, YouTube, March 31, 2022, 3 minutes.
Video – MARSOC demonstrates SABRES capabilities and benefits. Special Operations Assessment Baselining and Readiness Evaluation System is designed to test the feasibility of administering various assessment tools related to neurocognitive function and behavioral health for each service member, as well as gather opinions on each assessment tool. SABRES seeks to efficiently and comprehensively enhance service members’ spiritual, social, psychological and physical well-being to further develop strong ethical character and core values. DVIDS, December 3, 2021, 2 minutes.
Video – US and Philippine SF Conduct Parachute Jumps. Philippine Special Forces and U.S. Army Special Forces conducted freefall and static line jumps from a U.S. Air Force MC-130J Commando II during the Balikatan 22 exercise in the Philippines in March 2022. (YouTube, 6 minutes)
SOF News is not a ‘money making’ enterprise; but we do have administrative, operating, and publishing expenses. Individuals and businesses provide the funds to defray these expenses. Their contributions are deeply appreciated. Learn how you can support SOF News.
3. Iran’s Master Class in Evading Sanctions
I am sure north Korea could help as well.
Iran’s Master Class in Evading Sanctions
The ‘central banker of terrorism’ could coach Russia on how to diminish pressure from the West over the Ukraine war.
By Mark Dubowitz and Matthew Zweig
April 5, 2022 1:09 pm ET
The most important resource Tehran can share with Moscow is expertise in evading Western sanctions. Iran’s clerical regime reportedly is talking with the Kremlin about working together to get around the restrictions they both face. If the U.S. and its allies want to limit this sort of cooperation, they should learn from the mistakes they made while employing sanctions to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Iran’s sanctions-evasion techniques are sophisticated and sweeping. The Journal reported last month that Tehran has developed a “clandestine banking and finance system to handle tens of billions of dollars in annual trade banned under U.S.-led sanctions.”
Tehran could teach Moscow how to replicate this illicit financial architecture, or the clerical regime could serve as the Kremlin’s broker, taking a cut of the covert trade it facilitates on Russia’s behalf. The combination of Russian and Iranian expertise in illicit financial activities could produce the world’s most sophisticated and expansive sanctions-evasion network. If Western sanctions lose their bite, the pressure on Moscow to end its invasion of Ukraine and other threats would diminish.
The first lesson in dealing with Iran is that the government’s key financial institutions, such as the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), play a leading role in managing illicit activities, including the transfer of funds to Hamas, Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations. While serving as secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice labeled Iran “the central banker of terrorism.”
As part of the nuclear negotiations taking place in Vienna, the Biden administration likely will agree to lift sanctions on the CBI and other terrorist-supporting entities if Tehran accepts some temporary limits on its nuclear program. If the U.S. agrees to those terms, that will contradict Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s commitment to Congress to maintain terrorism sanctions on Iran and undercut its efforts to hold Russia accountable in Ukraine.
The CBI already received one get-out-of-jail-free card as part of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. Its illicit activities continued, yet the Obama administration didn’t hold it accountable, lest Tehran withdraw from the nuclear pact. But in September 2019, the Trump administration named the Central Bank of Iran a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224 for providing “billions of dollars to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps . . . its Qods Force . . . and its terrorist proxy, Hizballah.”
If the Biden administration wants to lift sanctions on the CBI, it should first prove that the bank has stopped funding terrorists and managing Iran’s sanctions-evasion efforts.
A second lesson for dealing with Iran is that the CBI’s terror funding wasn’t self-contained; it infected the country’s entire financial system. In 2007 the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, known as FinCEN, warned U.S. banks about the Iranian financial system’s links to terrorist activity and proliferation. In November 2011, FinCEN moved to designate Iran a jurisdiction of primary money-laundering concern under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act. In effect, FinCEN was warning that the threat of illicit finance had permeated Iran’s entire economy, so foreign banks doing business in the country should take precautions. The advice wasn’t binding, but major international banks followed it.
While the 2015 nuclear deal remained in effect, the Obama administration hesitated to finalize FinCEN’s Section 311 designation, which would have made it binding. The nuclear deal’s unintended effect was to protect Iran’s illicit financial networks, lest a push for accountability lead Tehran to withdraw.
In 2019, more than a year after the Trump administration withdrew from the nuclear deal, FinCEN issued a new evidentiary finding and a final rule that declared Iran a jurisdiction of primary money-laundering concern and imposed binding restrictions on U.S. banks.
A third lesson from dealing with Iran is that the U.S. should address Russian (or Russian-Iranian) illicit financial practices through the Financial Action Task Force. FATF is a 39-member intergovernmental body that establishes international financial standards. FATF cited Iran as a threat to the global financial system in 2007, noting its lack of “anti-money laundering/combatting the financing of terrorism” mechanisms.
In 2008 the group recommended that its members conduct enhanced due diligence when dealing with Iranian financial institutions, thus placing Iran on its “gray list.” Iran failed to shore up its weaknesses, and the following year FATF moved the country to its “black list.” If a jurisdiction is on the black list, other jurisdictions are required to implement due-diligence measures to protect their banks against the risk to the international financial system presented by the blacklisted jurisdiction.
The 2015 nuclear deal granted Tehran another reprieve. The Obama administration lent its support to an arrangement that would suspend FATF countermeasures against Iran for two years, during which Tehran would bring itself into compliance with FATF standards. Iran never made a good-faith effort to address money-laundering and terror-finance concerns, yet it took until 2020 for FATF members to agree to reimpose countermeasures. The lesson for Washington is that it should never grant leniency based on hope that rogue states will mend their ways.
Rather than learning from the past, the Biden administration is determined to repeat it. While declaring its intent to make Russia a pariah, the administration reportedly is also relying on Moscow to cajole Tehran into concluding a revised nuclear deal. Russia would be made the guarantor of the deal, responsible for taking Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium that it needs to produce a nuclear bomb. For Iran, the terms of the proposed deal are more favorable than the original one. Now there’s the added risk of Washington’s throwing Moscow a financial lifeline to ensure the deal keeps moving forward.
Given the administration’s stance, it is up to Congress to intervene legislatively to protect the U.S. and international financial systems. New legislation could require the president to certify annually that the CBI or other Iranian financial institutions aren’t involved in illicit and deceptive financial practices, including terrorism financing or facilitating Russian efforts to evade Western sanctions—and mandate sanctions if they are.
While the 2015 nuclear deal was in effect, Washington hesitated to confront Tehran about its provocations, from funding terrorism to attacking American troops and allies, to obstructing the work of nuclear inspectors. Now Vladimir Putin and Ali Khamenei are waiting to see whether a revised nuclear deal will give them a license to facilitate Russian sanctions evasion and Iranian terror financing.
Mr. Dubowitz is chief executive of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mr. Zweig, a senior fellow at FDD, has served in senior positions at the State Department and the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Appeared in the April 6, 2022, print edition.
4. Pentagon kept hypersonic test quiet amid Russia tensions
Excerpts:
“This Lockheed Martin HAWC flight test successfully demonstrated a second design that will allow our warfighters to competitively select the right capabilities to dominate the battlefield,” Knoedler said. “These achievements increase the level of technical maturity for transitioning HAWC to a service program of record.”
Hypersonic weapons can travel at tremendous speeds, more than five times the speed of sound, and are highly maneuverable. Because they are able to change course midflight, they are much harder to track and shoot down than conventional ballistic missiles, making them capable of penetrating enemy defenses.
The successful test gives Air Force hypersonics a win after a string of setbacks. The Air Force’s main hypersonic program, the AGM-183A Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon, or ARRW, saw testing failures and delays in 2021 that prompted Congress to strike nearly $161 million in procurement funds in the 2022 spending bill and divert half of that amount to research and development. The Air Force’s proposed fiscal 2023 budget seeks to increase funding for hypersonic prototyping, but doesn’t call for any procurement funds next year.
Pentagon kept hypersonic test quiet amid Russia tensions
WASHINGTON — The Air Force and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency quietly conducted a successful hypersonic missile test last month.
A defense official told Defense News the Pentagon chose not to announce the test of the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept, or HAWC, for about two weeks to avoid inflaming already-delicate tensions with Russia.
The free-flight test involved the version of the HAWC created by Lockheed Martin and Aerojet Rocketdyne and was released from a B-52 Stratofortress off the West Coast in mid-March, the defense official said.
A DARPA release Tuesday said the HAWC missile was boosted until its air-breathing, Aerojet-made scramjet engine ignited and quickly accelerated to speeds faster than Mach 5. DARPA said it maintained that speed for an extended period of time, reached altitudes higher than 65,000 feet, and flew for more 300 nautical miles.
The defense official said the HAWC test took place shortly after Russia said it used one of its own hypersonic weapons against Ukraine and was the same week as President Joe Biden’s trip to Europe, which began March 23.
He compared the Pentagon’s decision not to immediately reveal the test to its decision to postpone a Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile test in early March. That ICBM test was delayed after Russian President Vladimir Putin put his nation’s nuclear forces on higher alert, and the Pentagon said it wanted to avoid any possible misunderstanding over the Minuteman test.
Air Force Gen. Tod Wolters, head of U.S. European Command, confirmed in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing last week Russia had launched several hypersonic weapons against targets in Ukraine.
DARPA said the March test marked the second successful flight for the HAWC, following a September 2021 test of Raytheon Technologies’ version of the missile.
Andrew Knoedler, the HAWC program manager in DARPA’s Tactical Technology Office, said the program is now analyzing data from the flight test.
“This Lockheed Martin HAWC flight test successfully demonstrated a second design that will allow our warfighters to competitively select the right capabilities to dominate the battlefield,” Knoedler said. “These achievements increase the level of technical maturity for transitioning HAWC to a service program of record.”
Hypersonic weapons can travel at tremendous speeds, more than five times the speed of sound, and are highly maneuverable. Because they are able to change course midflight, they are much harder to track and shoot down than conventional ballistic missiles, making them capable of penetrating enemy defenses.
The successful test gives Air Force hypersonics a win after a string of setbacks. The Air Force’s main hypersonic program, the AGM-183A Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon, or ARRW, saw testing failures and delays in 2021 that prompted Congress to strike nearly $161 million in procurement funds in the 2022 spending bill and divert half of that amount to research and development. The Air Force’s proposed fiscal 2023 budget seeks to increase funding for hypersonic prototyping, but doesn’t call for any procurement funds next year.
Stephen Losey is the air warfare reporter at Defense News. He previously reported for Military.com, covering the Pentagon, special operations and air warfare. Before that, he covered U.S. Air Force leadership, personnel and operations for Air Force Times.
5. Argument over ‘woke-ism’ in the military erupts in House hearing
As I said I spent the past week on a military base and I spoke with military personnel.. Based on my observations and discussions the congressman's description of his view of wokism is unfounded.
Argument over ‘woke-ism’ in the military erupts in House hearing
In a heated exchange, Rep. Matt Gaetz, R-Fla., accused the Biden administration of starving America’s military by wasting time on “woke-ism,” telling Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin that the U.S. military is behind on hypersonic weapons, strategy and more.
Austin, along with Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley, testified Tuesday before the House Armed Services Committee on the fiscal 2023 budget request. President Joe Biden’s budget plan for 2023 includes $773 billion for defense spending, and Republicans have said that is not enough.
Austin defended the budget, calling America’s military the most capable combat force in the world.
A heated exchange between Rep. Matt Gaetz and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin during a House Armed Services Committee hearing on April 5, 2022. (CSPAN)
Gaetz questioned Austin’s leadership, at times speaking over Austin, asking how the Pentagon will use the funding to make more accurate assessments, pointing to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Taliban takeover when U.S. troops withdrew from Afghanistan.
The heated exchange included discussion of inaccurate intelligence assessments of foreign militaries. Gaetz pointed to the Department of Defense’s overestimation of Russia’s capability to invade Ukraine.
“You guys said that Russia would overrun Ukraine in 36 days,” Gaetz said.
“Has it occurred to you that Russia has not overrun Ukraine because of what we’ve done? And our allies have done? Have you ever even thought about that?” Austin responded.
6. Biden to nominate first uniformed woman to lead a military service
BZ, Commandant.
Some day the fact the Commandant is a woman will not be news. The only news will be that there is a new commandant.
Biden to nominate first uniformed woman to lead a military service
President Joe Biden plans to nominate Adm. Linda Fagan as the next commandant of the Coast Guard, making her the first uniformed woman to lead a military branch.
The news was first reported by USNI News. Officials with knowledge of the nomination confirmed the news ahead of the formal announcement, expected to come this week.
Fagan has been the vice commandant of the service since last June, when she became the first woman four-star admiral in Coast Guard history. If confirmed, she will replace Adm. Karl Schultz, who has served in the top service role since June 2018 and is set to retire in May.
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The wreck of a storied military ship that served in two World Wars, performed patrols in waters off Alaska for decades, and at one point was captained by the first Black man to command a U.S. government vessel has been found.
The potential gap in leadership between Schultz’s departure and his replacement’s confirmation has raised concerns among lawmakers in recent weeks. On Monday, Sens. Tammy Baldwin, D-Wisc., and Maria Cantwell, D-Wash., sent a letter to the White House urging the president to nominate a new Coast Guard leader as soon as possible.
“Ensuring continuity of leadership is of the utmost importance to our national and economic security,” the pair wrote.
“The Coast Guard is at the forefront of a number of strategic priorities for the United States, from the growing importance of security in the Arctic, to drug interdiction, environmental protection, and leading emergency response on the frontlines of the climate crisis.”
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The haul of illegal narcotics brought home by the Coast Guard cutter James was one of the biggest in recent memory.
Fagan has served in the Coast Guard for 36 years. Her prior commands include leading Coast Guard Defense Force West and deputy commandant for operations, policy and capability.
She has served in leadership roles on all seven continents, according to her official biography. She is also the longest serving active-duty Marine Safety Officer, and was awarded the service’s first-ever Gold Ancient Trident.
Congress is scheduled to break for two weeks starting this Friday, but could schedule confirmation hearings for Fagan in late April or early May.
Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.
7. Ukraine’s Zelensky Calls for Removing Russia From U.N. Security Council After Alleged War Crimes
I would vote in favor of that. But it would radically change the UNSC.
At least we are pushing for the removal of Russia from theUN Human RIghts Council.
Ukraine’s Zelensky Calls for Removing Russia From U.N. Security Council After Alleged War Crimes
Ukrainian president says newly discovered atrocities could be worse than those in Bucha
Updated Apr. 5, 2022 9:08 pm ET
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told the United Nations Security Council that Russia should be removed from the council or it should otherwise be dissolved, after warning that newly uncovered atrocities following the withdrawal of Russian forces near Kyiv could be worse than those in the city of Bucha.
“It is difficult to find a war crime that the occupiers have not committed,” Mr. Zelensky said during a virtual appearance at the council’s chamber Tuesday. He has previously said more than 300 civilians had been tortured or killed in Bucha.
Mr. Zelensky said civilians were “crushed by tanks in civilian cars in the middle of the road—for fun” as well as “raped and killed in front of their own children.”
Mr. Zelensky’s speech came as the U.S. and European Union prepared to impose broad new packages of sanctions on Moscow, with Washington planning a ban on all new investment in Russia and the European Commission proposing a ban on imports of Russian coal and sanctions on two daughters of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Biden administration is preparing to impose a second round of sanctions on Russia this week, including on two of its biggest banks and on Mr. Putin’s daughters, U.S. officials said.
The U.S. is expected to announce as soon as Wednesday sanctions on Sberbank, Russia’s largest, and Alfa Bank, one of Russia’s top private lenders, the officials said.
Zelensky Addresses U.N.; Satellite Image Shows Bodies in Bucha in March
Zelensky Addresses U.N.; Satellite Image Shows Bodies in Bucha in March
Play video: Zelensky Addresses U.N.; Satellite Image Shows Bodies in Bucha in March
A satellite image appeared to show dead bodies strewn across a street in Bucha during Russia’s occupation; Volodymyr Zelensky told the U.N. Security Council that the atrocities could be far worse elsewhere in Ukraine and called for Russia’s removal from the council. Photo Composite: Elise Dean
The Security Council hasn’t taken action because Moscow, as a permanent member, wields a veto that it has used to block binding resolutions on Ukraine. Mr. Zelensky told the council that Russia should be stripped of its seat to remove “a source of war from blocking decisions about its own aggression.”
“The U.N. system must be reformed immediately so that the right of veto is not the right of death,” he said. “There can be no more exceptions, privileges.”
Western diplomats and legal experts don’t see an easy way to remove Russia from the Security Council, since the council’s permanent membership is set in the U.N. Charter.
Moscow has denied any responsibility for atrocities in territories its army recently occupied in Ukraine, calling the video footage from Bucha staged. Russia’s ambassador to the U.N., Vasily Nebenzya, dismissed reports of slain civilians in Bucha as a provocation from Ukraine.
“We place on your conscience the ungrounded accusations against the Russian military, which are not confirmed by any eyewitnesses,” Mr. Nebenzya said in remarks directed toward Mr. Zelensky after his virtual appearance.
U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres said at the meeting that the war in Ukraine is one of the greatest challenges ever to the international order. Rosemary DiCarlo, undersecretary-general for political affairs, publicly acknowledged the reports of slain civilians in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, as well as the arbitrary detention and possible forced disappearance of Ukrainian civilians who resisted Russia’s occupation.
A spokesman for Mr. Guterres said he has “repeatedly pointed to the ways in which disunity in the Council prevents it from acting effectively” but that “any changes to the Security Council’s composition are to be handled by the member states.”
A move to change the U.N. Charter or expel Russia completely from the U.N. requires a vote in the broader General Assembly as well as support in the Security Council, where Russia has a veto.
The site of a mass grave in Bucha on Tuesday.
Bodies awaiting burial in a cemetery in Bucha on Tuesday.
PHOTO: FELIPE DANA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
White House press secretary Jen Psaki said Tuesday the U.S. shares Mr. Zelensky’s frustration that Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council, but she added, “We don’t see that changing.”
The scale of the killings prompted Western leaders to vow a wide-ranging investigation into potential war crimes and impose further penalties on Moscow as international outrage grows.
The U.S. and EU have said they would assist Ukrainian authorities in investigations, and Mr. Zelensky accused Russia of attempting to cover up evidence of its actions in other parts of Ukraine.
“Probably, now the occupiers will try to hide the traces of their crimes,” Mr. Zelensky said. “They didn’t do this in Bucha when they retreated. But in another area it is possible.”
“It is now 2022. And we have much more tools than those who prosecuted the Nazis after World War II,” he said.
Ukrainian authorities are now bracing for the discovery of more deaths in other cities and towns around the capital, especially Borodyanka. Officials have said the town, about 30 miles north of Kyiv, may have been the hardest hit by Russian forces of those near the capital, a fear Mr. Zelensky echoed.
“Now, there is information that in Borodyanka and some other liberated Ukrainian towns, the number of casualties may be even higher,” he said.
Russia had set up defensive positions throughout the city, which appears to have acted as a staging post on a main Russian supply route from Belarus, 50 miles to the north, to the edge of Kyiv, where Russian forces became bogged down.
A family in Bucha on Tuesday.
PHOTO: RODRIGO ABD/ASSOCIATED PRESS
The body of an elderly woman in a house in Bucha on Tuesday. The Bucha city council has updated the death toll to 320.
PHOTO: FELIPE DANA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
The Russians based themselves in public buildings, including the post office and the school, where they had dug trenches and put up signs warning: “Stop or we’ll shoot.” Throughout the town, they had marked buildings and vehicles they had commandeered with a large “V.”
Ukrainian forces took the village of Makariv to the south at the end of March and hammered Russian positions all around. Russia set up artillery in a field near the village of Andriyivka and parked armored cars in the yards of houses.
“They were using us as cover,” said Lidiya Vorobei, a resident who says she spent the past month mostly in the basement as Ukrainian artillery sought to blast the Russians out. Many of the houses in the village are badly damaged.
As the Ukrainians advanced, the Russians left early on Friday.
Soldiers and rescue workers continue to discover bodies in Bucha, and the city council updated the death toll to 320 on Tuesday.
“The number of victims has increased, literally every hour,” said Viktoria Liakhovets, spokeswoman for the Bucha city council. “As bomb technicians demine homes, they’re finding more corpses in apartments.”
Volunteers provide soup for Bucha residents on Sunday, after the withdrawal of Russian forces.
PHOTO: CHRISTOPHER OCCHICONE FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
A street in Bucha on Sunday.
PHOTO: CHRISTOPHER OCCHICONE FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Ms. Liakhovets said an effort was under way at the local morgue to identify the deceased, despite difficulties caused by the length of time some bodies were exposed to the elements.
“I would like to emphasize that we are interested in the most complete, transparent investigation, the results of which will be known and explained to the entire international community,” Mr. Zelensky said in his late-night address, released in the early hours of Tuesday.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the media frenzy around what he called fake accounts at Bucha was designed specifically to sabotage the Russian-Ukrainian cease-fire talks.
“We tend to think that the reason for it lies in the desire to find a reason to disrupt the ongoing talks,” Mr. Lavrov said, speaking in a video address posted by the Russian media service TASS.
Images taken by commercial satellite company Maxar on March 18, however, appear to show bodies lying on a road in Bucha while the city was occupied by Russian forces.
Images Show Russia Used Cluster Bombs, Hit Civilian Targets in Mariupol
Images Show Russia Used Cluster Bombs, Hit Civilian Targets in Mariupol
Play video: Images Show Russia Used Cluster Bombs, Hit Civilian Targets in Mariupol
A WSJ analysis of videos, photos and satellite images from four weeks in March reveals how Russian forces destroyed civilian infrastructure through a series of shellings, with remnants of weapons indicating the use of cluster bombs. Photo illustration: Laura Kammermann
Secretary of State Antony Blinken, arriving in Brussels late Tuesday for meetings with his North Atlantic Treaty Organization counterparts, said the reports of atrocities in Bucha “are more than credible; the evidence is there for the world to see.”
Mr. Zelensky, speaking to Ukrainian journalists on Tuesday morning, said he would have to set aside his personal feelings and negotiate with Russia to end the fighting, even if he and Mr. Putin might not meet in person.
Russian forces, meanwhile, continued their withdrawal from the Kyiv area and other parts of northern Ukraine as they reinforce their positions toward the east and south of the country.
“Low-level fighting is likely to continue in some parts of the newly recaptured regions, but diminish significantly over this week as the remainder of the Russian forces withdraw,” the U.K. Defense Ministry said in its latest intelligence assessment Tuesday. “Many Russian units withdrawing from northern Ukraine are likely to require significant re-equipping and refurbishment before being available to redeploy for operations in eastern Ukraine.”
Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry said Russian forces were regrouping in the Donbas area, where they aim to establish control over the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Portions of these areas broke away from Kyiv’s control in 2014 and are led by Russia-backed separatists. Mr. Putin recognized their independence before ordering the full invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24.
“Russian invaders continue to block Kharkiv, with constant artillery shelling destroying residential neighborhoods and city infrastructure,” the Defense Ministry said.
A grave containing several bodies next to an apartment building in Bucha on Monday.
PHOTO: CHRISTOPHER OCCHICONE FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Momentum is building for a broad-based investigation into war crimes allegations. French prosecutors Tuesday said they were investigating whether attacks occurred on civilians in Hostomel, a town adjacent to Bucha near the capital of Kyiv. The prosecutors said they were also probing possible war crimes in the northern city of Chernihiv and the southern port of Mariupol, which has been besieged by Russian troops.
The International Criminal Court, which hears war-crimes cases at its headquarters in The Hague, said in early March that it would begin an investigation into allegations of war crimes in Ukraine. Prosecutor Karim Khan traveled to western Ukraine and Poland and held a virtual meeting with Mr. Zelensky.
Ukraine previously agreed to the court’s jurisdiction, but any prosecution will likely be complicated by the fact that Russia, like the U.S. and China, isn’t a party to the court.
James Hookway, James Marson in Borodyanka, Ukraine, and Brett Forrest in Bucha, Ukraine, contributed to this article.
8. Right-wing Azov Battalion emerges as a controversial defender of Ukraine
This is problematic. It breathes air into the Russian arguments for justifying Putin's War. It may harm Ukraine's strategic influence campaign. Ukraine must maintain the moral high ground.
Right-wing Azov Battalion emerges as a controversial defender of Ukraine
Militia with far-right views says it welcomes all volunteers, regardless of ideology, in the fight against Russia
Today at 2:00 a.m. EDT
KYIV, Ukraine — Inside a warehouse, in a bustling section of this capital, the incessant cracking sound of gunfire echoed off walls. Men in olive-colored camouflage were training for war. Most wore helmets and bulletproof jackets. Some wore high-top sneakers. All clutched AK-47 rifles and waited for their turn to shoot at a round target 50 yards away.
It was centered with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s face — and peppered with bullet holes.
Invisible, yet palpable, was the shadow cast over this new regiment, like every unit of the Azov Battalion. Alexi Suliyma knew about its ugly past, but he joined anyway. Two friends were in the force, and he felt the Azov would best train him to defend his motherland.
“These are guys who simply love their country and Ukrainian people,” said Suliyma, 23, a former construction worker. “I never knew them to be Nazis or fascists, never heard them make calls for the Third Reich.”
Of all the Ukrainian forces fighting the invading Russian military, the most controversial is the Azov Battalion. It is among Ukraine’s most adept military units and has battled Russian forces in key sites, including the besieged city of Mariupol and near the capital, Kyiv. With Russian forces withdrawing from areas north of Kyiv last week and possibly repositioning in southern and eastern Ukraine, which Moscow has declared as its primary focus, the Azov forces could grow in significance.
Ukrainian members of the Azov Battalion practice shooting live bullets at a training site in Kyiv, Ukraine, on March 24. (Heidi Levine for The Washington Post)
But the battalion’s far-right nationalist ideology has raised concerns that it is attracting extremists, including white supremacist neo-Nazis, who could pose a future threat. When Putin cast his assault on Ukraine as a quest to “de-Nazify” the country, seeking to delegitimize the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian nationalism as fascist, he was partly referring to the Azov forces. While they are now fighting for a Jewish president whose relatives were killed fighting the Nazis, they have continued to be fodder for Russian propaganda as Putin seeks to convince Russians that his costly invasion of Ukraine was necessary.
Yet interviews with Azov fighters and one of its founders, as well as experts who have tracked the battalion from its beginnings, provide a more nuanced picture of its current state, which is more complex than what is conventionally known.
The battalion’s own leaders and fighters concede that some extremists remain in their ranks, but it has evolved since its emergence in 2014 during the conflict in eastern Ukraine against Russian forces and Moscow-backed separatists.
Under pressure from U.S. and Ukrainian authorities, the Azov battalion has toned down its extremist elements. And the Ukrainian military has also become stronger in the past eight years and therefore less reliant on paramilitary groups. Moreover, today’s war against Russia is far different than in 2014, fueled less by political ideology than a sense of patriotism and moral outrage at Russia’s unprovoked assault on Ukraine, especially its civilian population. Extremists do not appear to make up a large part of the foreigners who have arrived here to take up arms against Russia, analysts said.
“You have fighters now coming from all over the world that are energized by what Putin has done,” said Colin P. Clarke, director of research at the Soufan Group, an intelligence and security consulting firm. “And so it’s not even that they’re in favor of one ideology or another — they’re just aghast by what they’ve seen the Russians doing.”
“That certainly wasn’t the same in 2014,” he added. “So while the far-right element is still a factor, I think it’s a much smaller part of the overall whole. It’s been diluted, in some respects.”
Analysts also noted that Ukraine’s far-right movement is not just small in Ukraine, but also is dwarfed by far-right movements in other parts of Europe.
In an interview, the force’s co-founder and top commander, Col. Andriy Biletskiy, did not dispute his far-right ultraconservative leanings or the presence of some extremists in his units. But he rejected the allegations of Nazism and white supremacist views, describing such charges as Russian propaganda.
“We don’t identify ourselves with the Nazi ideology,” said Biletskiy, 41. “We have people of conservative political views, and I see myself as such. But, as any person, I don’t want my views to be defined by others. I’m not a Nazi. We completely reject it.”
Michael Colborne, who monitors and researches the far right and wrote a book about the Azov, said that he “wouldn’t call it explicitly a neo-Nazi movement.”
“There are clearly neo-Nazis within its ranks,” said Colborne, author of “From the Fires of War: Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the Global Far Right.”
“There are elements in it who are, you know, neo-fascist and there are elements who are maybe more kind of old-school Ukrainian nationalist," he said. "At its core, it’s hostile to liberal democracy. It’s hostile to every everything that comes with liberal democracy, minority rights, voting rights, things like that.”
The Azov rose up initially in the spring of 2014 as a volunteer force launched by the ultranationalist Patriot of Ukraine and the extremist Social National Assembly. Both groups engaged in xenophobic assaults on migrants, the Roma community and other minorities.
Biletskiy, who served as the leader of both groups, said in 2010 that Ukraine’s purpose was to “lead the white races of the world in a final crusade … against Semite-led Untermenschen [inferior races],” according to local reports. His supporters called him “Bely Vozd” — “White Ruler.”
Biletskiy denied the allegations of xenophobia, saying that Azov forces have attracted Jews from the Israeli Defense Forces as well as Muslim Chechens, which “doesn’t really go along with white supremacy.” Still, Biletskiy has been quoted in the past expressing white supremacist beliefs; he has denied making those statements.
The Azov force’s founder and top commander, Col. Andriy Biletskiy, left, speaks to fighters at a training site in Kyiv, Ukraine, on March 24. (Heidi Levine for The Washington Post)
In 2014, Biletskiy was elected to parliament, where he remained a lawmaker until 2019. In 2016, he created the far-right National Corps party, made up largely of Azov veterans.
The paramilitary unit was initially funded by wealthy Ukrainians and assisted by the nation’s then-interior minister, and the investment soon paid off. After the Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Azov fighters fended off Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region and kept the strategic port city of Mariupol in Ukrainian hands. “These are our best warriors,” Ukraine’s then-president, Petro Poroshenko, said publicly at the time.
Transnational support for Azov has been wide, and Ukraine has emerged as a new hub for the far right across the world. Both the Ukrainian and Russian sides have attracted neo-Nazis and far-right extremists, although Moscow’s use of them has attracted far less attention in the Western media. Men from across three continents, including members of American and European extremist groups, have been documented to join the Azov units to seek combat experience, engage in similar ideology and as a training ground for operations in their home countries.
Hans-Jakob Schindler, senior director at the Counter Extremism Project, an independent group following extremist organizations, said the war’s allure for far-right volunteer fighters is not surprising.
“There’s nothing shocking about it,” he said. “It’s the only conflict you can join.” He added: “Where you want to go? To Syria, where Muslims killing Muslims, to West Africa, where Black people kill Black people? As you’re a Nazi, that’s not the conflict you want to join.”
Biletskiy disputed this, describing stories about foreign fighters as “strongly exaggerated.” Azov’s forces are between 95 to 98 percent Ukrainian, he said, adding that most foreigners are from Georgia and Belarus with some Americans, Europeans and Canadians. They include, he said, “military adventurists,” “devoted anti-communists” and Americans and Europeans of Ukrainian origins fighting for “their ancestors’ motherland.”
Despite their military successes, the Azov continued to be criticized as adherents to neo-Nazi ideology. Even as they have consistently denied any Nazi affiliations, their uniforms and tattoos on many their fighters display a number of fascist and Nazi symbols, including swastikas and SS symbols. In 2015, Andriy Diachenko, the spokesperson for the regiment at the time, told USA Today that 10 to 20 percent of Azov’s recruits were Nazis.
In the following years, U.N. human rights officials accused the Azov regiment of violating international humanitarian laws; both the United States and Canada declared that its forces would not train the Azov fighters due to the unit’s links to neo-Nazis, though Washington has since lifted the ban. Some U.S. lawmakers have continued to urge for Azov to be designated a foreign terrorist organization.
Facebook, too, designated the Azov as a “dangerous organization” and banned it from its platforms two years ago. But after Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, Facebook reversed its ban, saying it would make “a narrow exception for praise of the Azov regiment strictly in the context of defending Ukraine, or in their role as part of the Ukraine national guard.”
The social media giant stressed that it had not lifted the ban on “all hate speech, hate symbolism, praise of violence, generic praise, support, or representation of the Azov regiment.” Today, the Azov battalion is getting much praise for strong stand against Russia in Mariupol. The battalion’s various Telegram channels post news of their exploits in addition to battlefield videos, detailing their victories in gruesome detail.
The battalion has more than a thousand fighters in Kyiv, Kharviv and Dnipro, and smaller units in six other cities and towns across the nation, said Biletskiy, who estimated the total number of Azov forces at little more than 10,000. In Mariupol alone, he said last week, there were roughly 3,000 fighters taking on 14,000 Russian troops “fighting on the ground, on water and in the Navy SEALs.”
Unlike them, the broader Azov political movement, which has a stronger extremist bent, is far less popular, judging by their performance in Ukraine’s last elections. Despite slickly produced videos that gave the impression of a massive movement, National Corps, the Azov political arm, won only about 2 percent of the vote, even though they ran on a united slate with other far-right parties. Most experts put the figures of their core adherents in the hundreds.
The Azov battalion is also not what it was in 2014. Ever since it was incorporated into Ukraine’s National Guard late that year, they “had to purge a lot of those extremist elements,” said Mollie Saltskog, a senior intelligence analyst at the Soufan Group. “There was much more control exerted over who is affiliated with the battalions.”
In contrast to the earlier conflict, many recruits are processed through the official conduit of the newly formed International Legion, where Ukrainian officials said they are properly vetted and asked to respond to questions about their ideology and political leanings.
A member of Ukrainian’s Azov Battalion rests after practicing with live bullets at a training site in Kyiv, Ukraine, on March 24. (Heidi Levine for The Washington Post)
The war in Ukraine today is also different than it was in 2014. It is attracting volunteers of all political stripes, including from the far left as well as the far right. For even the more hardcore elements in the Azov regiments, ideology has taken a back seat for the moment, analysts said.
“I honestly don't see them pushing a hard line right now,” says Colborne. “They want people who know how to fight, and that's going to include some people on the far right and some who don't come from far-right backgrounds.”
The Azov forces today, said Biletskiy, now include writers and other liberals, even members of the extreme left and antifascists. “We are at war for the very existence of Ukraine at the moment,” he said. “In the past month, I have never asked a person that came to join us about his political views. Today, Ukrainians have only one option of political orientation: for or against Ukraine.”
Russia, too, has a long history of supporting or turning a blind eye to neo-Nazi groups and individuals, and far-right figures in the United States and elsewhere have praised Putin since the invasion began. Putin has provided safe haven for the Russian Imperial Movement, a white supremacist militant organization that previously helped Russian-backed forces in eastern Ukraine, according to the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation. Members of the Wagner Group, a secretive Russian mercenary organization, also have neo-Nazi leanings and are now widely believed to be operating in Ukraine.
If the war drags on, the extremists’ presence and influence among the Ukrainians, however minute it is now, could grow, analysts said. Foreigners who joined the fight for other reasons could become radicalized from fighting alongside extremist individuals, the effects of post-traumatic stress syndrome or frustration at Western countries for not doing more to help Ukraine.
“Do these people go back to their countries of origin, particularly in Europe, with a newfound anger against their host nation governments?” asked Clarke of the Soufan Center.
Kyrylo, 35, a bespectacled soldier who wears an Azov patch on his sleeve, said he joined the nationwide call to arms because he wanted to protect his home city of Dnipro. He enlisted in Azov because he shared its far-right nationalist ideology. Before the war he gave “private historical lectures” for the group and previously served on Dnipro’s city council, he said.
“People who come to us already have a specific set of values,” he said, but he claimed that Azov is not neo-Nazi. “Would Nazis be fighting for the liberal democratic government in Ukraine?”
The pride of the Azov is its special forces battling in Mariupol, as Russian troops have put the city under weeks of siege, choking off supplies and cutting communications, water and electricity. Since Russian forces broke through their front lines earlier this month, they’ve been waging a guerrilla war against the Russian forces in the city.
“The guys are holding strong against the enemy and will never capitulate,” said Andriy, 26, who joined Azov when he was 18 years old and has a “Valhalla Awaits” tattoo stamped on his neck and now commands a unit. “They will fight to their last bullet and their last breath.”
Some desperate civilians who arrive in battered cars to the safety of Zaporizhzhia, 135 miles northwest, hailed Azov as “heroes” for holding the lines.
In Kyiv, Suliyma described the Nazi accusations as propaganda peddled by Russia. He said the only convictions that’s shared by all Azov fighters was to defeat Moscow. He and his unit, he said, had already engaged in clashes outside of Kyiv, including in Moshchun, a village north of the capital where they pushed the Russians out.
“Moshchun is Ukrainian now,” Suliyma said with pride.
Biletskiy said they are trying to weed out the neo-Nazi tattoos and other symbols among Azov fighters, but in the current war he cannot afford to lose any soldier because of political ideology, left or right.
“Every soldier that fights for Ukraine is of value now,” he said. “And of value to the Western world, because if Ukraine will break, the next in trouble will be the collective West.”
Elizabeth Dwoskin in San Francisco contributed to this report.
9. What are war crimes, and how are they prosecuted?
What are war crimes, and how are they prosecuted?
April 5, 2022, 7:58 a.m. ET
Iryna Venediktova, Ukraine’s prosecutor general, showed photographs documenting potential war crimes since the start of the war, during an interview in Lviv last month.
World leaders have vowed to hold President Vladimir V. Putin responsible for war crimes as evidence mounts that Russian forces killed civilians in Ukraine.
The Kremlin has denied the allegations and says that recent images from the Kyiv suburb of Bucha, which was liberated from Russian control in the past week, were staged. But President Biden has called him a war criminal. And President Volodymyr Zelensky has said Mr. Putin is responsible for genocide.
If past prosecutions of war crimes are any indication, the process is arduous and thorough, and takes years of investigations and litigation that are only decided decades after a conflict ends.
Here’s what you need to know:
What is a war crime?
A war crime is an act committed during armed conflict that violates international humanitarian laws designed to protect civilians. The rules of war are codified in various treaties, including the Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
The primary entity that can hold individuals accountable for war crimes is the International Criminal Court. It was established in 1988 through a treaty known as the Rome Statute that lists actions that can be prosecuted as war crimes, including willful killings, torture and intentional attacks on civilians. Some cases have been brought before special tribunals created by the United Nations.
What evidence is there of potential war crimes in Ukraine?
Ukraine’s prosecutor general, Iryna Venediktova, said the bodies of 410 people, apparently all civilians, have been recovered from the Kyiv region. Human Rights Watch said it had documented cases of rape, executions and looting of civilian property.
The New York Times has reported accounts of indiscriminate killings, torture and other violence against civilians. The I.C.C. had already launched a criminal investigation of possible war crimes in early March.
“What they did in Bucha, or the bombing of a hospital or a school, those are prima facie war crimes,” said Kwon O-Gon, an expert on international law who served as a judge on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
How are war crimes investigated?
War crimes are investigated as any criminal activity would be, through interviewing witnesses, reviewing photos or videos and collecting forensic evidence, including ballistics analysis, autopsies or DNA testing. Prosecutors need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that individuals knowingly committed the crimes.
Tougher to prove is how much a head of state knew and or was directly responsible for what happened under their command.
What are the chances Vladimir Putin will be held accountable?
The I.C.C. does not have its own police force or military. The court is reliant on states to hand over its owns citizens to the court for prosecution. That’s unlikely to happen with Russia’s high-level officials, much less Mr. Putin.
Russia-Ukraine War: Key Developments
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U.N. meeting. President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine addressed the United Nations Security Council, detailing the horrors he saw in Bucha, the Kyiv suburb where Russian troops have been accused of killing civilians, and laying out a powerful indictment of the U.N.’s failure to prevent the invasion.
On the ground. As Russian forces have retreated around Kyiv, Ukrainian and Western officials said that Russia appeared to be positioning troops for an intensified assault in the eastern Donbas region, where the port city of Mariupol remains under a brutal siege.
Mr. Kwon noted there are no statutes of limitations for war crimes. Evidence or insider information could emerge years later, and Putin or others could be handed over to the court to ultimately be held accountable.
“Even if it takes 10 years or 20 years, even if it’s after Putin is removed from power, he could be brought to the dock,” Mr. Kwon said.
Which heads of state have been tried for war crimes?
Slobodan Milosevic, known as the “Butcher of the Balkans,” was the first former head of state to be tried for such crimes in 2002. He died in his cell in The Hague as his four-year trial drew to a close, before a verdict was reached.
Charles G. Taylor, the former president of Liberia, was sentenced to 50 years in 2012 for atrocities committed in Sierra Leone during its civil war in the 1990s. Laurent Gbagbo, former president of Ivory Coast, was acquitted of crimes against humanity and other charges related to violence that followed the country’s presidential election in 2010.
The I.C.C. issued an arrest warrant for Libya’s leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, in 2011 accusing him of crimes against humanity, but he was killed that October before he faced trial.
Anushka Patil contributed reporting.
10. Opinion: How the U.S. can support a war crimes investigation into Russia
Opinion: How the U.S. can support a war crimes investigation into Russia
By Christopher J. Dodd and
John B. Bellinger III
Yesterday at 4:43 p.m. EDT
The authors are lawyers with Arnold & Porter. Christopher J. Dodd, a Democrat, served in the U.S. Senate from 1981 to 2011. John B. Bellinger III served as the legal adviser for the National Security Council and State Department from 2001 to 2009.
The gruesome images of numerous dead civilians in Ukraine have fueled international demands for investigation of Russia for war crimes. President Biden responded to the news by saying that Russian President Vladimir Putin should be held “accountable.” Secretary of State Antony Blinken had already said the U.S. government considered Russian attacks on Ukrainian hospitals, schools, apartment buildings and other civilian facilities to be “war crimes” and that the United States would share information about these offenses with appropriate international institutions.
But the Biden administration has not yet said whether the United States will assist the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, which opened an investigation last month into possible war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Potential U.S. assistance to the ICC is complicated by the fact that the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute, the 1998 treaty that created the ICC. In the years since, Republican and Democratic administrations have objected to the court’s claims of jurisdiction over U.S. personnel, and U.S. law severely restricts the executive branch’s ability to assist the court. But the law includes important exceptions, which both of us helped draft, that permit U.S. assistance in certain cases. The Biden administration should help the ICC investigate Russian war crimes and rely on these exceptions to provide intelligence, diplomatic and other support.
The Clinton administration ultimately voted against the treaty that created the ICC, based on Defense Department objections that the ICC prosecutor might conduct politicized prosecutions of U.S. military personnel, and the George W. Bush administration later declared that the United States would not join the court. In 2002, Congress went further still by enacting the American Service-Members’ Protection Act (ASPA), which prohibits U.S. agencies from providing financial, intelligence or other support to the ICC.
The U.S. relationship with the ICC reached a nadir during the Trump administration after the court opened an investigation into alleged U.S. war crimes in Afghanistan. In response, Trump officials imposed financial and other sanctions on ICC officials and threatened to bring criminal charges against them. President Biden lifted these sanctions last year.
We believe it is lawful and appropriate for the United States to assist the court’s investigation of Russian war crimes. One provision of the ASPA, drafted by one of us and known as the Dodd Amendment, specifically permits the United States to assist international efforts to bring to justice “foreign nationals” who commit war crimes and crimes against humanity. Another provision, added when the other of us was a White House lawyer, provides that the ASPA does not interfere with the president’s constitutional authority to take actions to help the Court in specific cases. These exceptions would clearly allow the United States to share intelligence information about Russian offenses, to allow expert investigators and prosecutors to assist, and to provide law enforcement and diplomatic support to the Court.
U.S. support for an ICC investigation of Russian war crimes would not constitute a double standard or be inconsistent with U.S. objections to the court’s claimed jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. The United States can help the court in appropriate cases while still strongly opposing ICC investigations (including of U.S. personnel) that do not meet the court’s strict threshold requirements. The ICC was created to prosecute only the most serious international crimes that are not addressed by the nations that commit them, not to investigate every allegation of misconduct.
Since Russian forces invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, they appear to have committed grave and widespread violations of the Geneva Conventions, killing more than 1,400 civilians in targeted or indiscriminate attacks; the United Nations has documented more than 75 attacks against medical facilities, including 50 hospitals. The most recent reports from Bucha suggest Russian forces committed crimes against humanity by torturing and executing civilians.
Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute. Neither is Ukraine, but Kyiv has accepted the court’s jurisdiction over offenses committed in Ukraine, and there is very broad international support for an investigation of apparent Russian war crimes. Moreover, unlike the United States, which has conducted multiple investigations of alleged offenses by U.S. personnel relating to Afghanistan, Russia has to date denied any wrongdoing in Ukraine.
The ICC now faces the greatest challenge in its 20-year history. Its newly elected chief prosecutor will be flooded with information about alleged Russian (and possibly Ukrainian) war crimes and will need to decide whether to bring indictments against senior Russian officials, potentially including Putin. Despite past and potentially future U.S. concerns about misguided ICC investigations, the tribunal is now doing exactly what it was set up to do.
Consistent with the long-standing U.S. commitment to international justice, the United States must assist the court’s work. It is our moral responsibility to do so.
11. Opinion: What’s happening in Ukraine is genocide. Period.
Opinion: What’s happening in Ukraine is genocide. Period.
By Eugene Finkel
Yesterday at 2:57 p.m. EDT
Eugene Finkel is an associate professor of international affairs at Johns Hopkins University and the author of “Ordinary Jews: Choice and Survival during the Holocaust.”
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, visibly shaken by evidence of the Russian military’s atrocities against Ukrainian citizens in the recently liberated suburbs of Kyiv, on Sunday condemned the slaughter as genocide. The Biden administration has been more cautious: On Monday, national security adviser Jake Sullivan said, “We have not yet seen a level of systematic deprivation of life of the Ukrainian people to rise to the level of genocide.” He promised to “continue to monitor” the situation.
Yet genocide is unfolding before our eyes. Often called “the crime of crimes,” genocide is considered the absolute nadir of human behavior. Activists and politicians tend to apply this label to anything they deplore, even to the vaccination of children against the coronavirus. That degrades the crime, cheapening it. As a scholar of the Holocaust and a descendant of Holocaust survivors, I am well aware of the need for caution, and in the past have criticized the governments of many post-Soviet states — including Ukraine, where I was born — for misusing the term. Not now.
Contrary to popular perceptions, shaped by the Holocaust and Rwanda, perpetrating genocide does not require large numbers of victims. The intent and logic of targeting are the key. The 1948 U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”
This definition is not without drawbacks. An updated version might expand protected groups to include those defined by gender, age or sexual identity. The document also does not define, in absolute numbers or percentages, when killings cross the line into genocide; “in whole or in part” is open to interpretation. And proving intent is difficult, especially if orders were given orally or were camouflaged by bureaucratic jargon.
The violence in Ukraine has none of these issues. Bucha, near Kyiv, is just one town, but the horrifying murders there are a part of a broader pattern. Deliberate targeting of Ukrainian civilians, especially those who self-identify as Ukrainians, with bombardment, murder and abduction have been recorded in other parts of Russian-occupied Ukraine.
The massacres near Kyiv are, according to Ukrainian authorities “just the tip of the iceberg,” and in the coming days, evidence of similarly appalling atrocities is likely to emerge as more areas are liberated. An isolated local massacre might be labeled a war crime; a series of massacres reflect a campaign intended to destroy Ukrainians as a national group, if not in whole, then certainly “in part.”
Yet massacres alone are insufficient to meet the genocide criteria; an intent to destroy a protected group is required. The inflammatory rhetoric of Russian propaganda and Russian President Vladimir Putin himself rejecting the very idea of Ukrainian statehood do not on their own constitute proof of an intent to destroy a national group. Trying to engineer regime change in Kyiv or Ukraine’s reorientation from the West toward Russia would not constitute genocide. The Russian invasion almost certainly originally aimed to achieve these goals.
But when Russian soldiers and leaders discovered, to their astonishment, that Ukrainian citizens had no desire to be liberated from the Western yoke and instead fought back ferociously, Russian thinking shifted from colonial to genocidal.
Though evidence of this shift is abundant, one of the most explicit examples is an article, titled “What should Russia do with Ukraine,” published on April 3 by the Russian state-owned media outlet RIA Novosti. Echoing the arguments made earlier by Putin and other Russian leaders, the article outlines a clear plan to destroy Ukrainians and Ukraine itself. After a Russian victory, it argues, Ukraine “is impossible as a nation state,” and its very name “likely cannot be retained.” The Ukrainian nationalist elite “need to be liquidated, its reeducation is impossible.” But a “substantial part of the populace” is “also guilty” and would require “reeducation” and “ideological repressions” lasting “at least a generation” and would “inevitably mean de-Ukrainization.”
It is hard to imagine a more actionable template to destroy a national group. The text’s publication on a major state media platform would have been impossible without explicit approval from above.
The combination of official statements denying Ukraine and Ukrainians the right to exist, and mounting evidence of deliberate, large-scale targeting of Ukrainian civilians, leaves little room for doubt. The threshold from war crimes to genocide has been crossed.
What are thepractical implications of applying the genocide label? In the longer term, it hould prompt a more comprehensive approach for collecting evidence and holding perpetrators accountable, along the lines of the International Criminal Tribunals established for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
But in the shorter term, acknowledging that a genocide is uderway might shift perceptions in the West, encouraging much tougher sanctions on Russia and more advanced weapons deliveries to Ukraine. The Ukrainian people cannot wait for “monitoring” the grisly evidence that grows by the day.
12. New phase in war opens up as Ukraine defeats Russia in battle of Kyiv
From the Kyiv Independent Newspaper.
New phase in war opens up as Ukraine defeats Russia in battle of Kyiv
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Members of Ukraine’s UNA-UNSO militarized group walk among the debris of destroyed Russian military vehicles on April 5, 2022. (The Kyiv Independent)
The battle of Kyiv is over, with Ukraine as its victor.
After nearly 40 days of fierce hostilities, by April 1 Russian forces had withdrawn from battlefields in northern Ukraine within just days.
Despite a massive effort, Russia failed to encircle the Ukrainian capital and install a blockade.
After sustaining heavy losses and accomplishing none of their key goals, Russian forces retreated, but not before inflicting devastating damage to Ukrainian towns and cities and committing numerous war crimes.
The political decision to give up on Kyiv reverberated around the country. Along with Kyiv Oblast, Russian forces in early April also left Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts.
These moves amounted to the first significant Russian defeat in its all-out war against Ukraine. But it also opened the war’s new phase, in which Russia will attempt to regroup to achieve narrower goals in Ukraine’s east and south.
The Battle of Kyiv may be over, but what comes next is the even more decisive and difficult Battle of Donbas. This fight is likely to define the war’s outcome.
Humiliating setback
The outcome of the operation to surround Kyiv became very clear in late March.
Following nearly two weeks of a protracted operational pause, Russian forces stationed west and northwest of Kyiv had yet to resolve serious logistical issues, particularly regarding food and fuel supplies.
By mid-March, Russia was still in control of all key transport points to the northwest, including the Bucha-Irpin-Hostomel triangle, as well as Borodyanka and Ivankiv. This afforded Russian forces an unchallenged long supply line between Belarus by way of the area around the Chornobyl nuclear power plant.
Russia also controlled parts of the E40 highway, effectively severing key communications channels running west. The goal was clear: to envelop Kyiv from the west.
But attempts to go further south of the E40 since mid-March made virtually no progress.
East of Kyiv, Russia also continued with fierce attempts to advance along the E95 and H07 highways running from Chernihiv and Sumy, respectively. But over the first month of the war, it also failed to seize any of the two cities, despite brutal fighting and heavy bombardment.
It also failed to secure firm control of its long supply lines, suffering from devastating Ukrainian attacks along highways near Ukraine’s northwestern woods. Ukrainian military and paramilitary units practicing hit-and-run tactics masterfully targeted hostile armored power and supply convoys, effectively wreaking havoc among Russian ranks.
West of Kyiv, the Russian military was eventually bogged down in close-quarter combat in dense urban terrain, where Russian air and artillery power lost its efficacy.
The advancement, slow and painful, stalled, as Russian forces continued to sustain losses and supply shortages. Attempts to use the operative lull to regroup and reassess its campaign near Kyiv, it appears, also resulted in nothing.
Ukrainian servicemen stand on destroyed Russian tanks in the Dmytrivka village near Kyiv on April 3, 2022. (Kostyantyn Chernichkin)
Manpower shortage was also obvious: according to data collected by Ukraine, Russia had deployed nearly 20 battalion tactical groups to attack Kyiv, a well-defended city of at least 3.5 million.
Beginning on March 20, Ukrainian forces both east and west of the city launched a series of counter-offensive moves that started to bring new, but limited results. On March 22, Ukrainian forces liberated and gained a foothold in the town of Makariv west of Kyiv along the Zhytomyr Highway.
In the following, Russian positions weakened along the highway as well as in the Irpin-Hostomel-Bucha triangle. Social media posts began circulating in Ukraine about a potential pocket in the triangle, an act of fierce revenge for the ill-fated Ukrainian defeats of 2014.
According to the British Defense Ministry, after March 25, Russian forces east of Kyiv were sustaining losses and running out of supplies. The Ukrainian military, in a series of counter-attacks, also continued regaining towns and villages along the Sumy highway.
The Ukrainian victory in Irpin, the full liberation of which was publicly declared on March 28, was very likely a loud wake-up call for Russia.
The full withdrawal started shortly following the Russian Defense Ministry announcing a “drastic decrease in military activity in the Kyiv and Chernihiv directions” on March 29.
Contrary to expectations, units with Russia’s 29th, 35th, and 36th combined arms armies did not leave at least some of its forces entrenched for a long static war at key points. In late March, official statements from the British Defense Ministry still expected a new battle in the suburbs of Kyiv.
But it never came. The Russian military presence in Kyiv Oblast effectively evaporated within nearly 48 hours.
The Russian command simply backed away from many local military gains it had fought for weeks, having secured nothing.
It left Hostomel and Bucha, with multiple pieces of evidence of mass executions, torture, and rape revealed as the Ukrainian military retook the cities. It also left Borodyanka and Ivankiv, vital transportation points. It left scores of dead bodies and many documented instances of mass pillaging, which says a lot about the invading army’s morale and discipline.
As shortly as April 2, Ukraine’s military raised the Ukrainian flag above the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant, which had been seized by Russia in the earliest hours of Russia’s all-out invasion.
The whole of Kyiv Oblast was declared free of Russian forces later that day.
Map of Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine as of April 5, 2022. (LivemapUA)
Russia’s decision was far-reaching — within the next few days, Ukrainian forces also regained control of the Chernihiv Oblast, and on April 4, according to local authorities, there were no longer any cities occupied by Russia in Sumy Oblast either.
The Russian withdrawal from the north was also precipitated by successful Ukrainian counterattacks, like the one near the city of Trosytanets in Sumy Oblast on March 26.
Two major cities are no longer suffering from Russian attempts to isolate them. In many ways, their stubborn resistance relieved a lot of pressure from Kyiv and helped the capital city prepare for effective defense.
All told, the Kremlin has given up on nearly 40% of the territories it seized after Feb. 24.
This humiliating defeat for the Russian military has very likely put more strain on morale among its troops.
New phase
According to international monitors, Russian units withdrawing from northern Ukraine have sustained serious losses or have even been rendered combat ineffective.
Many of them are likely to require “significant re-equipping and refurbishment” if they can be thrown into battle again, according to British military intelligence from April 5.
According to the Institute for the Study of War, a U.S.-based think tank, the main body of Russian forces near Kyiv completed an organized retreat covered by artillery. But Russian retrograde has been so disorderly that some pockets of Russian forces were left behind.
In Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts, reports from local authorities also suggest that many of the remaining Russian pockets were cleaned up by advancing Ukrainian forces.
“The disorder of the Russian withdrawal suggests that at least some of the units now reconcentrating in Belarus and western Russia will remain combat ineffective for a protracted period,” the ISW said on April 3.
“Russian troops attempting to refit after pulling back from around Kyiv will likely have to reconsolidate into their units, identify which soldiers are still present, sort out their equipment and assess its combat readiness, and generally reconstitute before they can even begin to receive replacements and new equipment and prepare for further combat operations.”
According to Ukraine’s figures, as of April 2, up to 75 Russian battalion tactical groups were still operational. Meanwhile, up to 34 battalion tactical groups were being restored in Russia and Belarus, while 16 others were destroyed in combat. At the beginning of the all-out invasion, Russia was believed to have deployed nearly 120-125 battalion tactical groups against Ukraine.
Ukrainian servicemen walk past a destroyed Russian tank in the Dmytrivka village near Kyiv on April 3, 2022. (Kostyantyn Chernichkin)
A significant part of Russian forces is exhausted — and requires a lot of time and resources, including manpower, to return to action. But upon all estimates, Russia is still scrambling to amass more skilled manpower to compensate for losses, let alone amplify its power.
The Kremlin has not yet decided to declare partial or general mobilization for its so-called “special military operation” against Ukraine.
There are few doubts that Russia will redeploy those forces to Donbas, as well as to the Izium axe in Kharkiv Oblast to exert pressure against the largest Ukrainian military group in eastern Ukraine.
All signs point to this being the new pivotal epicenter of the war.
A successful breakthrough from Izium farther south will allow Russia to encircle Ukrainian forces in key cities of Donbas and then potentially defeat them, which would be a devastating blow to Ukraine.
To do so, the ISW believes, Russia would have to take Sloviansk and then move toward occupied Donetsk and Horlivka to the south to get a significant portion of the Ukrainian military surrounded.
“If Russian forces are unable to take Sloviansk at all, Russian frontal assaults in Donbas are unlikely to independently break through Ukrainian defenses, and Russia’s campaign to capture the entirety of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts will likely fail,” the ISW said on April 4.
Additionally, Russian reinforcements from northeastern Ukraine to Donbas are “highly unlikely to meaningfully change the balance of forces.”
“Russian forces withdrawn from the Kyiv axis are highly unlikely to be effectively deployed elsewhere in Ukraine and are likely a spent force,” the think tank said.
Charred bodies pictured on the E40 highway west of Kyiv on April 2, 2022. (Alexey Furman/Getty Images)
Meanwhile, the latest independent studies say Russia is nonetheless planning to immediately redeploy forces from the Kyiv Oblast to the Kharkiv axe.
Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), an online investigative project, said on April 4 that a train carrying troops had been spotted in Belarus on April 2 likely carrying BMD-2 vehicles of Russia’s 76th, 98th, and 31st airborne brigades that had been engaged in combat in Kyiv Oblast.
According to the CIT, the train was heading to Novy Oskol in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast close to Valuiki, a key military point of concentration for the Kharkiv axe of attack.
T-73B3 tanks likely coming from Russia’s Smolensk Oblast were also spotted on April 3 being transported to Valuyki.
“The new arriving hardware will likely proceed south via to Kupiansk and Izium (in Ukraine), which was recently seized by the Russian military, towards Sloviansk,” the ISW said.
“The redeployment of the withdrawn and possibly unused vehicles means that the Russian command is set on and the battle of Donbas is going to heat up in the coming days.”
Author: Illia PonomarenkoIllia Ponomarenko is the defense and security reporter at the Kyiv Independent. He has reported about the war in eastern Ukraine since the conflict’s earliest days. He covers national security issues, as well as military technologies, production, and defense reforms in Ukraine. Besides, he gets deployed to the war zone of Donbas with Ukrainian combat formations. He has also had deployments to Palestine and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as an embedded reporter with UN peacekeeping forces. Illia won the Alfred Friendly Press Partners fellowship and was selected to work as USA Today's guest reporter at the U.S. Department of Defense.
13. Are US Troops Still Training Ukrainians?
If not they damn well should be. Inside and outside of Ukraine. We should have a very select group of advisors on the ground in Ukraine. But the CJCS does not need to "clear this up."
Are US Troops Still Training Ukrainians?
The military’s top officials did not clear things up on Tuesday.
The Defense Department has provided several conflicting answers in recent days regarding whether or not U.S. personnel are training Ukrainians. On Tuesday, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley added their voices, but no particular clarity, to the discussion.
Last Wednesday, Gen. Tod Wolters told lawmakers that he did not “believe that we are in the process of currently training military forces from Ukraine in Poland.” The head of U.S. European Command and NATO’s supreme allied commander was testifying to the Senate Armed Services Committee.
The next day, Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville appeared to confirm that. “We are not training Ukrainians right now,” McConville told reporters at a Defense Writers Group event in Washington, D.C. “We don’t have teams over there showing how to use the equipment. They have people there that know how it works and they’re doing that themselves.”
Even though the U.S. is providing the equipment, McConville said, the “ship comes in and then goes out.”
On Tuesday, Rep. Mike Waltz, R-Fla., wanted to know: why aren’t U.S. troops training Ukrainians?
“My concern is that the NATO commander, General Wolters, testified that as a policy matter, we're not conducting any training on this new equipment. So, my question is, why not?,” Waltz asked Austin and Milley during a House Armed Services Committee hearing into the 2023 budget request.
Milley said he needed to “dig into that” and made a note on the notepad in front of him.
Austin suggested that Wolters might have meant the United States is not conducting any training in Ukraine.
Waltz responded that the general had testified that the U.S. was not training Ukrainians anywhere.
Replied Austin: “To use some of this gear, you certainly have to have training. And we’re doing that.”
As of mid-March, the U.S. had 8,750 troops in Poland. More than half were sent to the region in recent weeks in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
California National Guardsmen have trained with Ukrainian service members, both in California and in Ukraine, for the last 29 years. All U.S. troops were pulled out of Ukraine shortly before Russia’s invasion.
14. Hackers flood internet with what they say are Russian companies' files
A whole of society approach?
Hackers flood internet with what they say are Russian companies' files
The leaks are part of a larger ecosystem in which amateurs try to help Ukraine’s war efforts with their own keyboards.
NBC News · by Kevin Collier · April 5, 2022
Emma Best is used to dealing with leaked files from American organizations.
Best’s organization, Distributed Denial of Secrets, is best known for curating, publishing and promoting giant caches of files from a variety of sources, including U.S. police departments, the conservative social media platform Gab and the far-right Oathkeepers, a prominent group involved in the Jan. 6 riot.
But since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Best and her colleagues have been inundated with files that hacktivists say they’ve stolen from Russian banks, energy companies, government agencies and media companies. For weeks, the group has scrambled to translate, verify, format and upload files that they can assess are legitimate and new, with the caveat that they usually haven’t gone through every single file to assess if it hasn’t been altered or planted with malicious software.
“Frankly, we’ve never seen this much data out of Russia before,” Best said. “Russia has never really been a target like this before” by hacktivists.
The consequences may not be fully known for years as experts sift through the files.
“The hackers went for Russian state companies where they could inflict the most pain for the Kremlin,” said Agnia Grigas, a Russia and energy industry expert at the Atlantic Council, a think tank.
NBC News has not verified the contents of the leaks, many of which contain dozens of gigabytes worth of data. None of the organizations, including the state-controlled energy companies Transneft and Rosatom, government censor Roskomnadzor, the Central Bank of Russia, and state-owned media giant VGTRK, responded to email inquiries requesting comment. But there’s little doubt among people who study Russia and cybersecurity that they’re largely authentic.
The leaks are part of a larger ecosystem of amateurs trying to help Ukraine’s war efforts with their own keyboards. While Russia has conducted cyberattacks against Ukrainian internet service providers and tried to wipe Ukrainian government systems, the conflict hasn’t produced the kind of high-profile cyberattacks that some analysts had predicted.
March 22, 202203:12
It’s not clear, however, just who is behind these hack-and-leak operations. Just about every hacktivist uses a pseudonym online, and hacking communities tend to be informally organized if at all.
But Best said their motivations tend to be clear.
“Right now, leakers, hacktivists and the rest of the general public are screaming in response to the injustice of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the inhumanity of the war crimes committed by the invaders,” she said.
While Distributed Denial of Secrets might be the single best public repository of all the Russian files purportedly leaked since the start of the invasion, it’s only one of many places online to find alleged leaks from Russia.
Dozens of activist and hacktivist accounts on Twitter and Telegram post Russian files, some of which are repackaged from earlier leaks. Best has rejected multiple submissions of supposed leaks from Russia that didn’t pass her group’s verification process, she said.
Ukrainian authorities have also leaked remarkable sets of supposedly sensitive information. They’ve published the personal information of 620 Russian intelligence officers and lists of military personnel they accuse of war crimes. Someone gave the Ukrainian news site Pravda a list of alleged Russian soldiers and their personal information, which it published in full. Even the detailed workings of one of the most destructive ransomware gangs in history has been spilled onto the internet, after a Ukrainian hacker grew fed up with the Russians who ran it.
“There’s an intense desire to do something,” Best said, “but also to understand.”
Cybersecurity experts often urge caution in drawing conclusions from hacked and leaked documents from shadowy figures, as there’s some precedent for them to contain individually modified files to plant a false narrative. There’s also no way to guarantee the files are the full content of what an organization had. When WikiLeaks published its “Syrian Files” in 2012, for example, it conspicuously left out a major transfer with a Russian bank, something that went unnoticed for four years.
While a leak can seriously hurt businesses in normal circumstances, those in Russia probably currently have bigger concerns, said Michael Daniel, the president of the Cyber Threat Alliance, a cybersecurity industry trade group.
“Lord only knows how Russia’s going to handle that right now,” Daniel said. “That’s probably not their primary concern, although it could be. But in a normal country and organization it would be.”
Open-source researchers who pore through reams of information from Russia said it could take years before such leaks could reveal important information.
“I’ve gone through a few of them but honestly haven’t had time to [do a] really super deep dive,” said Aric Toler, a researcher at BellingCat, an investigative journalism group that has exposed several major Russian intelligence operations.
“This happens a lot, to where there is all this hype for mega flows of info than hardly anyone actually goes through it,” he said. “They really require specialist interest and expertise.”
Stefan Soesanto, a senior cyberdefense researcher at the Center for Security Studies, a Swiss think tank, said it was mistaken to think Russian officials or executives would somehow be shamed or deterred by having their files made public.
“To me it is unclear how these data leaks are supposed to affect the course of the war in Ukraine,” Soesanto said. They would likely have more of an effect on those organizations if they were deploying ransomware or destructive malware to their networks, he said, though that could require additional technical sophistication to pull off.
“The question that I would be interested in is to know why these groups are dumping all this largely worthless data instead of running wipers or ransomware campaigns,” he said. “Guess 99 percent simply don’t have the network access and privileges they want people to think they have.”
NBC News · by Kevin Collier · April 5, 2022
15. Taiwan is not Ukraine, and China is not Russia — but Biden is still Biden
Excerpts:
There are interesting parallels in the U.S. maritime presence in international waters near Russia and China. When Putin seized Crimea in 2014, the U.S. Navy significantly reduced its exercises in the Black Sea, and it played no role in deterring Russian sea-based attacks during the current invasion. Aircraft carriers are prohibited by an international treaty restricting vessel weights.
Similarly, after the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, which so traumatized the Clinton administration, Navy ships avoided passing through the strait because of China’s objections. Bush’s administration resumed transits in 2005, and under both Trump and Biden transits have continued on a regular basis. But no U.S. carrier has passed through since 2007, while China’s carriers periodically make the passage.
Considering the new Moscow-Beijing strategic partnership — even throughout Russia’s war on Ukraine — Biden will need to send a more convincing deterrent message to China’s Xi Jinping than he sent to Putin.
Taiwan is not Ukraine, and China is not Russia — but Biden is still Biden
BY JOSEPH BOSCO, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 04/05/22 10:00 AM ET
THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOT OF THE HILL
The United States and NATO had four policy paths potentially available to prevent or stop Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine. So far, they have not taken full advantage of any of them.
NATO membership
For more than two decades, Washington expressed a strong moral and quasi-legal interest in the security and sovereignty of Ukraine. In 1994, President Bill Clinton signed the Budapest Memorandum, which committed Washington, Moscow and London to “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine” in exchange for Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons.
The next U.S. president, George W. Bush, prevailed upon NATO to declare that Georgia and Ukraine would be welcomed into the alliance. Putin’s invasion of Georgia four months later, and his seizure of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea in 2014 during the Obama-Biden administration, might have motivated NATO to expedite their integration.
On the contrary, the aggression stirred fear of Russia and inhibition against defying Putin’s ambitions. Despite a series of symbolic advances in Ukraine’s status over a 14-year period, actual NATO membership was postponed indefinitely. Former President Trump, who
greatly admired Putin’s toughness, likewise did nothing to move Ukraine’s candidacy. Neither did President Biden. In the end, NATO’s “open-door” policy perversely opened the door to the current Russian invasion.
Military
Biden has now made official the West’s timidity on Ukraine, declaring, “We will defend every inch of NATO territory. Granted, if we respond, it is World War III, but we have a sacred obligation on NATO territory.” But the U.S. won’t directly defend Ukraine, even by establishing a no-fly zone. “We will not fight the third World War in Ukraine,” he has said.
It was precisely to avoid that security obligation that the Obama-Biden administration for eight years, and the Trump administration for four, declined to advance Ukraine’s NATO accession.
Similarly, successive U.S. administrations have slow-walked the transfer of critical weapons to enhance Ukraine’s self-defense capabilities. Once Russia invaded, the arms flow to Ukraine significantly increased, but it has fallen short of what Ukraine and Western military experts say it needs.
The Biden administration’s adamant refusal to approve urgently needed weapons systems that are readily available constrains Ukraine’s ability to repel Russia’s invasion. Despite Ukraine’s urgent appeals and the counsel of defense experts, Washington continues to block Poland’s transfer of MiG-29 aircraft to Ukraine and Slovakia’s delivery of S-300 surface-to-air
missiles. It is also withholding tanks and other heavy weapons Ukraine has requested.
Given Biden’s comment that it is up to Ukraine to make a deal with Putin to end the war, it is reasonable to suspect that the refusal of Washington and NATO to enable a more vigorous Ukrainian defense is intended as not-so-subtle pressure for a negotiated settlement.
Economic
Washington and other Western nations imposed sanctions on Russia for its 2014 aggression, but they obviously were not strong enough to change Putin’s expansionist plans. For several months starting last fall, Russia steadily built up its invasion force and demanded Ukraine’s capitulation, as the Biden administration repeatedly warned Putin of “unprecedented” sanctions. But they clearly lack the severity required to restrain Russia — and Biden now says he never really expected sanctions to work.
While Putin continues to expand his murderous tactics and the range of weapons to carry them out, the administration has yet to apply the full range of economic measures available to it — such as cutting Russia’s access to the Swift system, removing its Permanent Normal
Trade Relations status and sanctioning the 35 corrupt oligarchs named by jailed Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny.
Regime change
The fourth avenue to stop Putin’s rampage is to end his tyrannical rule, either through international means — war crimes tribunals — or an information campaign that tells the Russian people how Putin’s crimes are making Russia a pariah nation.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine carries implications far outside the European region, though historical and situational analogies are imperfect. Taiwan is not Ukraine and China is not Russia. But Biden is still Biden, with his proclivity for blurting out personal feelings that global audiences may see as considered policy statements, while he describes himself as “gaffe-prone.”
Like his predecessor’s incessant tweets, Biden’s impromptu remarks can undermine his administration’s deliberative policy choices. Biden can be ahead of his subordinates’ thinking on important questions, sometimes in a positive direction.
On China and Taiwan, he twice stated that the United States is obligated through the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to defend Taiwan. The open question now is whether he considers the TRA a “sacred obligation,” similar to the NATO Treaty, risking direct war with China, or merely a moral and quasi-legal obligation like Ukraine.
Biden’s administration calls the U.S.-Taiwan relationship “rock solid,” because it has followed and even enhanced the Trump team’s elevated diplomatic relations and arms transactions with Taiwan. But, as with its predecessors, this administration has shied away from giving Taiwan weapons systems that could be construed as “offensive.” And it refuses to declare officially that the U.S. will defend Taiwan, preferring to retain the strategic ambiguity that has not discouraged Beijing from planning to invade.
There are interesting parallels in the U.S. maritime presence in international waters near Russia and China. When Putin seized Crimea in 2014, the U.S. Navy significantly reduced its exercises in the Black Sea, and it played no role in deterring Russian sea-based attacks during the current invasion. Aircraft carriers are prohibited by an international treaty restricting vessel weights.
Similarly, after the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, which so traumatized the Clinton administration, Navy ships avoided passing through the strait because of China’s objections. Bush’s administration resumed transits in 2005, and under both Trump and Biden transits have continued on a regular basis. But no U.S. carrier has passed through since 2007, while China’s carriers periodically make the passage.
Considering the new Moscow-Beijing strategic partnership — even throughout Russia’s war on Ukraine — Biden will need to send a more convincing deterrent message to China’s Xi Jinping than he sent to Putin.
Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He served in the Pentagon when Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia and was involved in Department of Defense discussions about the U.S. response. Follow him on Twitter @BoscoJosephA.
16. China's Phoenix TV faces closure in Taiwan
China's Phoenix TV faces closure in Taiwan
(Image: Facebook/Phoenix TV)
06 Apr 2022 05:31PM (Updated: 06 Apr 2022 05:31PM)
TAIPEI: Taiwan's government declared Phoenix TV a Chinese-funded company on Wednesday (Apr 6), a move that will force the network to close its office on the island.
Taipei has imposed tighter restrictions on Chinese companies seeking to invest on the island amid lingering political and military tensions between the two sides.
Beijing has ramped up pressure since Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen came to power in 2016, as she rejects its stance that the island is part of "one China".
China views self-ruled democratic Taiwan as its own territory and has vowed to one day seize it, by force if necessary.
On Wednesday, the Mainland Affairs Council - Taiwan's top China policy-making body - said "stock transfers and personnel changes" had turned Phoenix TV into a de facto state-controlled entity.
Authorities have demanded the company either stop operating in Taiwan, pull its investment or "rectify" the situation, the statement said.
Phoenix TV's offices in Taipei and Hong Kong did not respond to requests for comment.
Headquartered in Hong Kong, Phoenix TV is partially state-owned and offers Mandarin and Cantonese language programming including news that hews to Beijing's government.
Its audience is mostly Chinese speakers in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan as well as the overseas ethnic Chinese diaspora.
Filings with the Hong Kong stock exchange show its largest shareholder is Bauhinia Holdings, a Chinese government-owned company.
Taiwan's Liberty Times newspaper reported Wednesday that Phoenix TV was planning to close its office in Taipei next month and lay off all 25 Taiwanese employees after a six-month-long negotiation with regulators made no headway.
Under Taiwan's regulations, a company is considered a Chinese investment if a Chinese entity owns more than 30 percent of its shares or has "effective control" over its operations.
Online marketplace Taobao Taiwan, registered as a foreign firm through its operator -- a UK venture investment company - was forced to close in 2020 after the government ruled that it was controlled by Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba.
17. Would Young People Fight for America?
It pains me to read the statistics about our own young people's views on their will to fight or flee. But there are some encouraging words below.
Would Young People Fight for America?
Students discuss how they would react if the U.S. were attacked.
Editor’s note: In this Future View, students discuss defending America. Next week we’ll ask, “After almost two years, MIT has reinstated standardized tests as a requirement for undergraduate applications. Should other colleges do the same? Are the SAT, ACT and other standardized tests useful measures?” Students should click here to submit opinions of fewer than 250 words before April 12. The best responses will be published that night.
Supporting Our Ideals
A recent poll suggests that a plurality of young people would flee from war if it came to the U.S., no doubt feeling discontented with America’s modern reckoning with the sins of its history. Perhaps they feel our national destruction is deserved. Worth noting is that it costs nothing to give a patriotic answer to a survey question. If a land invasion of the U.S. were to occur, we should probably expect an even higher percentage to flee.
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The poll’s dichotomy between fighting or leaving is not precise. A substantial proportion of the population would not be engaged in direct battle. The real distinction is whether we support or oppose the ideals of freedom, equality and representative government.
Given the global influence of the U.S., escaping the consequences of a war would be impossible no matter where one fled. I would choose to fight an invader on American soil without hesitation, although I hold no delusions as to my readiness or usefulness in doing so. No matter its faults, the U.S. is worth defending because it is the only nation in the world that has maintained a government and culture of individual rights for more than 250 years. Young people shouldn’t give up these ideals so easily and hand the nation over to authoritarians. They may never get it back.
—Sarah Montalbano, Montana State University, computer science
Fulfilling Our Duty
America has given me so much. Ever since I was adopted from China, my life has been blessed with opportunities, community and freedom. If my country is attacked, then I would stay to fight to keep my blessings. My family’s history of serving in the military also makes the decision even easier, with two active Air Force pilots and two scientists at national labs in my immediate family.
The youth of America tend to see only active soldiers as those fighting for their country. Defending America, however, also consists of researching new weapons, promoting morale and drafting new legislation. Everyone has a duty to protect our country’s lands, ideals and freedoms, and we should fulfill this duty.
—Therese Joffre, Hope College, chemistry
Ukraine Is a Mirror to See Ourselves
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has held a mirror up for Americans, forcing us to evaluate our beliefs, community, family and nearly everything else we stand for. I have had to grapple with unhappy thoughts about my nearly two years of military service while in the Army in Afghanistan, but watching this unjust invasion has made me realize I would not leave this country if it were attacked.
—Alexander Butler, University of Montana, law
Courage Reveals Itself in Crisis
I would like nothing more than to say that I would be courageous and stay to fight. America is my home, and I cannot imagine giving it up. I cannot make that promise, however, when I have never faced the threat of losing loved ones to a war or of my home being turned into rubble. We all have to ask the same questions: How can I protect the people and places most dear to me? How can I chart a path forward and rebuild once the war is over?
Even though courage makes a country’s best defense, we should not scorn those who say they would leave. Many who profess courage will flee when tested, and many who say they would flee will choose to stay, for courage often only reveals itself in times of crisis. I believe I should stay to defend my country. I can only pray that, should such a time come, I hold true to my word.
—Evan Carlisle, Ohio University, mathematics
Even A Pacifist Has a Place in a Fight
While it is certainly courageous and honorable to take up arms against invaders, there are other duties we can fulfill to defend our homeland and loved ones. Yes, the brunt of the fighting is done by soldiers facing gunfire on the frontlines, but the soldiers’ bravery also demands logistical efficiency at home.
Exemplified by America’s wartime economy during World War II, an effective war effort requires all hands, armed or not. This is what is happening in Ukraine today. Volunteer truck drivers are essential for delivering supplies and weapons from bases to combat zones. Journalists are risking their lives to document Russian war crimes. Medical volunteers are evacuating civilians and treating the injured.
As a Buddhist attending a Quaker school, I hold the values of pacifism. In the event of war, I would stay and help the fighters in every way I can, but I myself cannot hold a gun. And that’s all right. Whatever our religious or moral stance, our country’s resistance will have a place for us. Even during war, we can contribute without compromising our personal beliefs.
—Long Tran-Bui, Swarthmore College, politics, philosophy and economics
Click here to submit a response to next week’s Future View.
18. China's envoy to U.N. calls images of dead civilians from Bucha 'very disturbing'
To say the least.
China's envoy to U.N. calls images of dead civilians from Bucha 'very disturbing'
China's Ambassador to the U.N. Zhang Jun addresses the United Nations Security Council, amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City, U.S., March 14, 2022. REUTERS/Andrew Kelly/File Photo
UNITED NATIONS, April 5 (Reuters) - The reports and images showing civilian deaths in Ukrainian city of Bucha are "very disturbing", China's ambassador to the United Nations said on Tuesday, but added that the circumstances should be verified and any accusations should be based on facts.
Speaking at a Security Council meeting, Ambassador Zhang Jun repeated Beijing's stance that sanctions are not effective in solving the Ukraine crisis but instead they accelerate the economic spillover. He also called the United States, NATO and the European Union to engage in a dialogue with Russia.
Reporting by Humeyra Pamuk, Michelle Nichols; Editing by Doina Chiacu
19. What You Need to Know about U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Wartime
What You Need to Know about U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Wartime
Fine Print
Pulitzer Prize Winning Journalist Walter Pincus is a contributing senior national security columnist for The Cipher Brief. He spent forty years at The Washington Post, writing on topics that ranged from nuclear weapons to politics. He is the author of Blown to Hell: America's Deadly Betrayal of the Marshall Islanders. [...] Read more
OPINION — The Biden administration has made rational decisions on nuclear weapons in both policy – through the soon-to-be-release 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) – and in spending, as contained in the recently-released fiscal 2023 budget.
The anti-nuclear crowd will be unhappy that he has dropped the so-called “declaratory language” that Presidential Candidate Joe Biden campaigned on, which said, “the sole purpose of our nuclear arsenal should be to deter—and, if necessary, retaliate against—a nuclear attack.”
Instead, the NPR says, “The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners. The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners,” according to a summary released March 28.
That’s the same kind of ambiguous language adopted by earlier administrations and met the needs of European and other allies that are covered by the so-called U.S. nuclear umbrella.
Also troubling to the anti-nuclear group will be the Biden proposed fiscal 2023 budget. It sharply increases funding for facilities to produce so-called plutonium pits, the triggering element for new and refurbished thermonuclear weapons. Although the original goal had been production of 80 pits a year by 2030, the new, somewhat delayed goal is to hit that number “as close to 2030 as possible.”
The need for so many plutonium pits implies that the number of nuclear warheads in the U.S. arsenal will not be going down in the decades to come.
Meanwhile, proponents of more types of nuclear weapons will be unhappy that funds for Navy development of a new submarine-launched, nuclear cruise missile (SLCM-N) have been eliminated from next year’s budget along with money for continued refurbishment of the old, one-megaton B-83 bomb.
The SLCM-N, however, may not be dead.
At a House Armed Services Committee hearing last Thursday, Rep. Doug Lamborn (R-Colo.) questioned Air Force General Tod Wolters, Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander, U.S. European Command, about the usefulness of the SLCM-N.
When Lamborn asked whether continuing development of the SLCM-N “would be his best military advice,” the General answered, “It would.”
I am sure there will be efforts made to revive the SLCM-N as the fiscal 2023 budget goes through Congress, and it certainly will have the support of STRATCOM Commander Adm. Charles Richard as Rep. Lamborn mentioned, during last week’s hearing.
At issue is the old nuclear numbers game. The Russians have upward of 1,400 tactical nuclear weapons in the form of low-yield missile warheads and artillery shells. And they are building more. The U.S. has hundreds of low-yield nuclear tactical bombs and air-launched cruise missiles available for use in Europe.
Lamborn got Gen.Wolters to say, with regard to the SLCM-N, “having multiple [nuclear] options exacerbates the challenge for the potential enemy against us.”
That notion ignores the fact that any Russian first use of a nuclear weapon will draw a U.S. response where total numbers would not count, but targets and yields of weapons would. Remember, they are terror weapons to end wars, not weapons to actually fight wars since no one knows what would happen after the first ones were used.
Lamborn was also unhappy with the Biden NPR because, as he said, “The declaratory language for the use of nuclear weapons has been narrowed…There’s no mention of deterring non-nuclear, strategic attacks or to achieve any other U.S. objectives.”
However, I doubt any serious effort will be made to change the NPR’s declaratory language.
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Russian President Vladimir Putin’s repeated threats to use nuclear weapons as a coercive tool during the run-up to, and actual invasion of Ukraine, may justify the increased spending the Biden administration is seeking for nuclear weapons despite the President’s commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in defense policy.
As irrational and dangerous as they are, nuclear weapons are a permanent part of U.S. defense programs. To be honest, U.S. nuclear weapons are required as much for domestic politics as they are for realistic security concerns.
At the Defense Department, proposed fiscal 2023 spending for nuclear weapon delivery systems and operations of forces are put at $34.4 billion, up sharply from the $27.7 billion the Biden team sought for the current fiscal year.
That 2023 figure includes a variety of costs starting with those related to modernizing the Triad delivery systems — $6.3 billion for production of Columbia strategic submarines; $5 billion for ramping up production for the new B-21 strategic bomber; and $3.6 billion for development of the new ICBM, the so-called ground-based strategic deterrent. There is another $1 billion for the new Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) nuclear, air-launched cruise missile and $4.8 billion for upgrading nuclear command, control and communications.
Among the lesser, but needed items, is $70 million for developing aircraft to be aloft in the case of a nuclear attack against the U.S. called the Survivable Airborne Operations Center, it will replace the E-4B Nightwatch fleet of so-called Doomsday aircraft called the National Airborne Operational Center.
Although fine print details of the fiscal 2023 budget are not yet available, the low-yield W-76-2 warheads apparently remain deployed atop D5 Trident sub-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles (SLBMs) carried on some strategic submarines now on patrol. When he was President-elect, Biden called the W-76-2 warheads, a “bad idea” because he said their existence made the U.S. “more inclined to use them.”
During background briefings on the budget, a senior defense official said, there is “no change there,” when asked about the W-76-2.
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the agency whose facilities develop and build the actual nuclear warheads, is to get $16.5 billion for weapons activities in fiscal 2023, up from the $15.9 billion Congress recently approved for the current fiscal year.
While the Pentagon is rebuilding nuclear delivery systems, NNSA is carrying modernization of a handful of nuclear weapons. Full-scale production is underway for the B61-12 tactical bomb, which will eventually replace four older versions. More than 100 B-61-12s will be deployed to NATO partner air bases in Europe. Also in production is a new version of the W-88, a powerful strategic warhead for the D5 Trident SLBM.
Also near production is a refurbished W-80-4, the warhead for the new air-launched cruise missile. A modified warhead for the new ICBM, the W-87-1, is in development and a totally new ICBM warhead, the W-93, is in feasibility study.
NNSA, in addition to the $16.5 billion for weapons activities, gets another $4.9 billion for other activities. Of that amount, $2.1 billion is for Navy nuclear propulsion work “that starts with reactor technology development and design, continuing through reactor operation and maintenance, and ending with final disposition of naval spent nuclear fuel,” according to budget documents.
Another $2.3 billion is for the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) and the Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response (NCTIR) programs that are central to the U.S. strategy to reduce global nuclear security risks.
The Department of Energy (DOE) has one other major program relative to the nuclear weapons that is run outside of NNSA. It’s called Defense Environmental Cleanup for which a whopping $6.9 billion is sought just for fiscal 2023.
The overall program, begun in 1989, is for cleaning up the last of 107 sites in 31 states that were used for nuclear weapons development, testing and related activities during the Manhattan Project (1942-1946) that created the atomic bomb, and the later Cold War period (1947-1991), which saw development of an entire family of thermonuclear weapons.
According to the DOE, this is “the largest environmental cleanup program in the world,” dealing with land “equal to the combined area of Rhode Island and Delaware.”
As of 2019, the program was responsible for the cleanup of 91 sites at a cost of $177 billion, according to a National Academies of Science report. According to DOE, it will take until 2070 or beyond, and another $377 billion or more, to clean up the remaining 16 sites.
And that still is not the end of the issues.
DOE also has a Legacy Management program that, after environmental cleanup is completed, fulfills a post-closure obligation to reduce legacy pollution and protect human health. The program, for which $196 million is sought for next year, does continued surveillance of hazards at former sites and provides worker pensions and medical benefits to some 10,000 former DOE contractor personnel.
Both these programs should be publicized more because, in miniature, they show the problems and costs that would arise if nuclear weapons were ever used in wartime.
Sharing informed opinions is important. Opinion pieces represent the diverse views of The Cipher Brief audience and do not represent views of The Cipher Brief.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business
Fine Print
Pulitzer Prize Winning Journalist Walter Pincus is a contributing senior national security columnist for The Cipher Brief. He spent forty years at The Washington Post, writing on topics that ranged from nuclear weapons to politics. He is the author of Blown to Hell: America's Deadly Betrayal of the Marshall Islanders. Pincus won an Emmy in 1981 and was the recipient of the Arthur Ross Award from the American Academy for Diplomacy in 2010.
20. A coup against Putin: wishful thinking or a real possibility?
Again, from the Kyiv Independent.
It is amazing to me how many analysts and journalists are making a north Korean comparison. I guess north Korea has the best practices for repression of the people.
Excerpt:
Putin may preserve his power if he manages to switch to a North Korea-style totalitarian regime where all negative information is blocked, Oreshkin said.
There are signs that the shift to a North Korean scenario has already begun.
The Kremlin has shut down or blocked most of the remaining independent media and introduced prison terms of up to 15 years for spreading information on the war at odds with the government’s official line.
“He will need a Great Terror to preserve his power,” Oreshkin added. ‘If there is a defeat in Ukraine, Putin will need to purge the elite.”
There is evidence that Putin has already started a minor purge.
A coup against Putin: wishful thinking or a real possibility?
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Russian dictator Vladimir Putin chairs a Security Council meeting via a video link at the Novo-Ogaryovo state residence outside Moscow on April 1, 2022. (AFP via Getty Images)
Ukrainian intelligence has claimed that a coup is being prepared against Russian dictator Vladimir Putin.
Although such intelligence claims may be dubious, analysts can assess the possibility of a coup d’etat by taking into account the economic and political situation in Russia.
Some of them argue that a coup is highly unlikely, while others say it is almost inevitable due to Putin’s decision to unleash unprecedented aggression against Ukraine.
Support is still high in Russia for Putin and his invasion of Ukraine, and the Western sanctions have not yet destroyed the Russian economy. There are not many people capable of overthrowing Putin or wishing to do it in his inner circle, and a coup is extremely risky.
However, the likelihood of a coup may increase if the war against Ukraine becomes unpopular in Russia and if the Kremlin suffers major defeats in Ukraine. Further deterioration in the economic situation may also contribute to this scenario.
“Putin has become a symbol,” Russian political analyst Dmitry Oreshkin told the Kyiv Independent. “As soon as people are disappointed with the symbol, the whole system will collapse. The whole system is focused on him.”
Military intelligence
Ukraine’s military intelligence said on March 20 that a coup is being organized in Russia.
“In the Russian economic and political elite, a group of influential people opposed to Vladimir Putin is emerging,” the intelligence said. “Their aim is to overthrow Putin as soon as possible and restore the economic ties with the West that were destroyed as a result of the war against Ukraine.”
The military intelligence claimed that part of the Russian elite is considering Alexander Bortnikov, head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), as a potential successor for Putin. The dictator has been unhappy with Bortnikov due to the FSB providing him with incorrect information about Ukraine that led to military failures, according to the intelligence.
Gennady Gudkov, a retired FSB colonel and ex-lawmaker who has become a harsh critic of Putin, is skeptical about this data.
“This is wishful thinking,” Gudkov told the Current Time TV channel on March 24. “Any coup is prepared in a highly secretive environment. If it’s real, people find out about it post factum.”
Oligarchs‘ dissent
A major precondition for a coup is a split in the political elite.
The sanctions imposed on Russia for its aggression against Ukraine and its growing isolation from the outside world have already caused discontent in part of the Russian establishment.
Anatoly Chubais, a political heavyweight who had served Putin and his predecessor Boris Yeltsin for decades, resigned from the position of an aide to Putin and left Russia.
Arkady Dvorkovich, a former deputy prime minister and head of the International Chess Federation, has criticized the war against Ukraine and resigned as the head of the Skolkovo Foundation, a state-funded high-tech center.
Russian oligarchs, who had always toed the Kremlin line or remained silent on political issues, have also spoken out against the war.
Tycoons Mikhail Fridman, Alexei Mordashov and Vladimir Lisin have called the war a tragedy and called for peace. Aluminum tycoon Oleg Deripaska has called the war “madness” that would shame generations to come.
Russian political analysts Oreshkin and Georgy Satarov said that the oligarchs’ statements indicate a clear split in the political elite.
“(Oligarchs) have thought about a coup for a long time,” Gudkov said. “He (Putin) is so toxic and dangerous that they would prefer a replacement. But they are afraid to speak about it because they would be killed.”
However, Sergei Sazonov, a Russian-born political philosopher at Estonia’s Tartu University, countered that oligarchs do not play any role in Putin’s political system, in contrast with top intelligence and law enforcement officials.
Support for aggression
Another major factor that will determine Putin’s future is popular support.
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and virulent state propaganda on Kremlin-controlled television appear to have boosted support for Putin similarly to the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
The number of those who think Russia is moving in the right direction increased from 52% in February to 69% in March, according to a survey by Russian independent polling agency Levada. Putin’s approval rating rose from 71% in February to 83% in March, the poll showed.
According to a separate April 4 Levada poll, 65% of the Russian respondents feel pride, happiness or euphoria due to the war against Ukraine, and 31% have negative feelings about it.
Oreshkin believes that this poll reflects genuine trends. But Satarov told the Kyiv Independent that even independent opinion polls in dictatorships do not reflect the reality because respondents back Putin out of conformism rather than sincere belief.
Putin’s approval rating may drop as soon as more people become aware of Russian soldiers’ deaths in Ukraine and as the economic situation further deteriorates, Oreshkin said.
“The longer the war continues, the worse it is (for Putin),” he added.
Potential defeats in Ukraine may be especially painful for his dictatorship since Putin’s image of a strongman will be damaged, Oreshkin said.
Satarov argued that the prosecution of Russia’s war crimes at the International Criminal Court may encourage the Russian elite to overthrow Putin.
“They will present Putin as the main culprit and portray themselves as saviors of the country,” he said.
One commonly cited parallel is World War I: in 1914, the support for it in the Russian Empire was immense but by 1917 frustration with the war was so high that it led to the overthrow of the monarchy.
Are protests possible?
Oreshkin argued that large-scale protests as a result of the war and the economic crisis are possible. However, protests alone are unlikely to bring Putin down, he said.
He cited the example of the major 2020 protests in Belarus and Russia’s Khabarovsk Krai, which failed because there was no split in the elite.
But Oreshkin said that protests may contribute to Putin’s overthrow by emboldening potential conspirators and making a coup more feasible.
“If a coup does happen, it will happen only if Putin becomes unpopular and there are major protests,” Sazonov said.
Is a coup unlikely?
Putin’s aggression against Ukraine has often been compared with the launch of World War II by Adolf Hitler. About 40 unsuccessful assassination plots were organized against Hitler, with the most famous one by German army officer Claus von Stauffenberg in 1944.
However, some analysts doubt that a Stauffenberg exists in Russia.
Sergei Pugachyov, a banker and ex-associate of Putin who has fallen out with him, said on April 1 that Putin’s inner circle supports the aggression against Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Gudkov said that the war has a lot of support within the FSB, and a coup would be extremely risky.
“Any suspicion about disloyalty or intrigue may lead to death,” he said.
Sazonov also believes that a coup is unlikely. The political system remains internally stable, and the economy has so far suffered less than expected, he said.
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has prompted the population’s consolidation around the Kremlin, and many people blame economic and other problems on the West rather than on Putin, Sazonov said.
He also argued that the political system encourages the appointment of incompetent and loyal people – ones who are unlikely to organize a coup.
“The whole political system has been built in order to prevent a coup,” Sazonov said.
The Russian army, in contrast with Nazi Germany’s Wehrmacht, is incapable of organizing a coup d’etat, he said. Both the Soviet and Russian authorities have avoided appointing independent, ambitious and competent people to the military due to the fear that the army could overthrow the government, Sazonov argued.
If a coup happens, it is more likely to be organized by officials of the Federal Security Service (FSB), which is relatively more competent and independent than other agencies, he said.
Any conspiracy must also include employees of the Federal Protection Service (FSO) because they protect Putin, and it is the only way to get close to him, according to Sazonov.
Mobilization
Since defeat in Ukraine may have a devastating effect on Putin’s power, there is speculation that he will resort to mass mobilization to increase the invasion force and boost Russia’s war effort. However, he has not yet done so more than a month after the invasion began.
Sazonov argued that Putin may be afraid of mobilization because it is difficult to organize logistics for a much larger Russian army. He may be also afraid of provoking a political disaster, with a majority of conscripts trying to evade the draft, Sazonov added.
Putin is reluctant to begin mobilization because people will be disappointed with their relatives’ deaths in Ukraine, Oreshkin said.
“Mobilization is like pension reform – it concerns everyone,” he said. “It would be bizarre if Putin resorted to mobilization for something he calls a special operation. It would mean he has admitted his failure in Ukraine. It would be his last resort.”
North Korea scenario
Putin may preserve his power if he manages to switch to a North Korea-style totalitarian regime where all negative information is blocked, Oreshkin said.
There are signs that the shift to a North Korean scenario has already begun.
The Kremlin has shut down or blocked most of the remaining independent media and introduced prison terms of up to 15 years for spreading information on the war at odds with the government’s official line.
“He will need a Great Terror to preserve his power,” Oreshkin added. ‘If there is a defeat in Ukraine, Putin will need to purge the elite.”
There is evidence that Putin has already started a minor purge.
Russian investigative journalist Andrei Soldatov and Russian human rights activist Vladimir Osechkin said in March, citing their sources, that Sergei Beseda, head of the Federal Security Service’s (FSB) fifth department, and his deputy Anatoly Bolyukh had been placed under house arrest. They have allegedly been investigated for embezzling funds allocated for sabotage operations in Ukraine and for providing false information about the political situation in Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Roman Gavrilov, a deputy head of Russia’s National Guard, resigned in March.
Osechkin and Bulgarian investigative journalist Christo Grozev cited their sources saying that Gavrilov had been investigated in a case into leaks of information on Russian troop movements in Ukraine and failed Russian military operations. The National Guard has taken part in the war against Ukraine and suffered heavy casualties.
Oreshkin said, however, that this is not yet the beginning of a Great Terror but an attempt to find scapegoats.
Putin is trying to punish those who he thinks are responsible for the failure in Ukraine, he said.
Author: Oleg SukhovOleg Sukhov is a political reporter at the Kyiv Independent. He is a former editor and reporter at the Moscow Times. He has a master's degree in history from the Moscow State University. He moved to Ukraine in 2014 due to the crackdown on independent media in Russia and covered war, corruption, reforms and law enforcement for the Kyiv Post.
21. The Price of Hegemony: Can America Learn to Use Its Power?
Excerpts:
The United States would be better served if it recognized both its position in the world and its true interest in preserving the liberal world order. In the case of Russia, this would have meant doing everything possible to integrate it into the liberal order politically and economically while deterring it from attempting to re-create its regional dominance by military means. The commitment to defend NATO allies was never meant to preclude helping others under attack in Europe, as the United States and its allies did in the case of the Balkans in the 1990s, and the United States and its allies could have resisted military efforts to control or seize land from Georgia and Ukraine. Imagine if the United States and the democratic world had responded in 2008 or 2014 as they have responded to Russia’s latest use of force, when Putin’s military was even weaker than it has proved to be now, even as they kept extending an outstretched hand in case Moscow wanted to grasp it. The United States ought to be following the same policy toward China: make clear that it is prepared to live with a China that seeks to fulfill its ambitions economically, politically, and culturally but that it will respond effectively to any Chinese military action against its neighbors.
It is true that acting firmly in 2008 or 2014 would have meant risking conflict. But Washington is risking conflict now; Russia’s ambitions have created an inherently dangerous situation. It is better for the United States to risk confrontation with belligerent powers when they are in the early stages of ambition and expansion, not after they have already consolidated substantial gains. Russia may possess a fearful nuclear arsenal, but the risk of Moscow using it is not higher now than it would have been in 2008 or 2014, if the West had intervened then. And it has always been extraordinarily small: Putin was never going to obtain his objectives by destroying himself and his country, along with much of the rest of the world. If the United States and its allies—with their combined economic, political, and military power—had collectively resisted Russian expansionism from the beginning, Putin would have found himself constantly unable to invade neighboring countries.
Unfortunately, it is very difficult for democracies to take action to prevent a future crisis. The risks of acting now are always clear and often exaggerated, whereas distant threats are just that: distant and so hard to calculate. It always seems better to hope for the best rather than try to forestall the worst. This common conundrum becomes even more debilitating when Americans and their leaders remain blissfully unconscious of the fact that they are part of a never-ending power struggle, whether they wish to be or not.
But Americans should not lament the role they play in the world. The reason the United States has often found itself entangled in Europe, after all, is because what it offers is genuinely attractive to much of the world—and certainly better when compared with any realistic alternative. If Americans learn anything from Russia’s brutalization of Ukraine, it should be that there really are worse things than U.S. hegemony.
The Price of Hegemony
Can America Learn to Use Its Power?
May/June 2022
Foreign Affairs · by The Ghost at the Feast: America and the Collapse of World Order, 1900–1941 · April 6, 2022
For years, analysts have debated whether the United States incited Russian President Vladimir Putin’s interventions in Ukraine and other neighboring countries or whether Moscow’s actions were simply unprovoked aggressions. That conversation has been temporarily muted by the horrors of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A wave of popular outrage has drowned out those who have long argued that the United States has no vital interests at stake in Ukraine, that it is in Russia’s sphere of interest, and that U.S. policies created the feelings of insecurity that have driven Putin to extreme measures. Just as the attack on Pearl Harbor silenced the anti-interventionists and shut down the debate over whether the United States should have entered World War II, Putin’s invasion has suspended the 2022 version of Americans’ endless argument over their purpose in the world.
That is unfortunate. Although it is obscene to blame the United States for Putin’s inhumane attack on Ukraine, to insist that the invasion was entirely unprovoked is misleading. Just as Pearl Harbor was the consequence of U.S. efforts to blunt Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland, and just as the 9/11 attacks were partly a response to the United States’ dominant presence in the Middle East after the first Gulf War, so Russian decisions have been a response to the expanding post–Cold War hegemony of the United States and its allies in Europe. Putin alone is to blame for his actions, but the invasion of Ukraine is taking place in a historical and geopolitical context in which the United States has played and still plays the principal role, and Americans must grapple with this fact.
For critics of American power, the best way for the United States to cope is for it to retrench its position in the world, divest itself of overseas obligations that others ought to handle, and serve, at most, as a distant offshore balancer. These critics would grant China and Russia their own regional spheres of interest in East Asia and Europe and focus the United States’ attention on defending its borders and improving the well-being of Americans. But there is a core of unrealism to this “realist” prescription: it doesn’t reflect the true nature of global power and influence that has characterized most of the post–Cold War era and that still governs the world today. The United States was already the only true global superpower during the Cold War, with its unparalleled wealth and might and its extensive international alliances. The collapse of the Soviet Union only enhanced U.S. global hegemony—and not because Washington eagerly stepped in to fill the vacuum left by Moscow’s weakness. Instead, the collapse expanded U.S. influence because the United States’ combination of power and democratic beliefs made the country attractive to those seeking security, prosperity, freedom, and autonomy. The United States is therefore an imposing obstacle to a Russia seeking to regain its lost influence.
What has happened in eastern Europe over the past three decades is a testament to this reality. Washington did not actively aspire to be the region’s dominant power. But in the years after the Cold War, eastern Europe’s newly liberated countries, including Ukraine, turned to the United States and its European allies because they believed that joining the transatlantic community was the key to independence, democracy, and affluence. Eastern Europeans were looking to escape decades—or, in some cases, centuries—of Russian and Soviet imperialism, and allying with Washington at a moment of Russian weakness afforded them a precious chance to succeed. Even if the United States had rejected their pleas to join NATO and other Western institutions, as critics insist it should have, the former Soviet satellites would have continued to resist Moscow’s attempts to corral them back into its sphere of interest, seeking whatever help from the West they could get. And Putin would still have regarded the United States as the main cause of this anti-Russian behavior, simply because the country was strong enough to attract eastern Europeans.
To insist that Putin’s invasion was entirely unprovoked is misleading.
Throughout their history, Americans have tended to be unconscious of the daily impact that U.S. power has on the rest of the world, friends and foes alike. They are generally surprised to find themselves the target of resentment and of the kinds of challenges posed by Putin’s Russia and by President Xi Jinping’s China. Americans could reduce the severity of these challenges by wielding U.S. influence more consistently and effectively. They failed to do this in the 1920s and 1930s, allowing aggression by Germany, Italy, and Japan to go unchecked until it resulted in a massively destructive world war. They failed to do so in recent years, allowing Putin to seize more and more land until he invaded all of Ukraine. After Putin’s latest move, Americans may learn the right lesson. But they will still struggle to understand how Washington should act in the world if they don’t examine what happened with Russia, and that requires continuing the debate over the impact of U.S. power.
BY POPULAR DEMAND
So in what way might the United States have provoked Putin? One thing needs to be clear: it was not by threatening the security of Russia. Since the end of the Cold War, the Russians have objectively enjoyed greater security than at any time in recent memory. Russia was invaded three times over the past two centuries, once by France and twice by Germany. During the Cold War, Soviet forces were perpetually ready to battle U.S. and NATO forces in Europe. Yet since the end of the Cold War, Russia has enjoyed unprecedented security on its western flanks, even as NATO has taken in new members to its east. Moscow even welcomed what was in many ways the most significant addition to the alliance: a reunified Germany. When Germany was reunifying at the end of the Cold War, the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev favored anchoring it in NATO. As he told U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, he believed that the best guarantee of Soviet and Russian security was a Germany “contained within European structures.”
Late Soviet and early Russian leaders certainly did not act as if they feared an attack from the West. Soviet and Russian defense spending declined sharply in the late 1980s and through the late 1990s, including by 90 percent between 1992 and 1996. The once formidable Red Army was cut nearly in half, leaving it weaker in relative terms than it had been for almost 400 years. Gorbachev even ordered the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland and other Warsaw Pact states, chiefly as a cost-saving measure. It was all part of a larger strategy to ease Cold War tensions so that Moscow might concentrate on economic reform at home. But even Gorbachev would not have sought this holiday from geopolitics had he believed that the United States and the West would take advantage of it.
His judgment was sensible. The United States and its allies had no interest in the independence of the Soviet republics, as U.S. President George H. W. Bush made clear in his 1991 speech in Kyiv, in which he denounced the “suicidal nationalism” of independence-minded Ukrainians (who would declare independence three weeks later). Indeed, for several years after 1989, U.S. policies aimed first to rescue Gorbachev, then to rescue the Soviet Union, and then to rescue Russian President Boris Yeltsin. During the period of transition from Gorbachev’s Soviet Union to Yeltsin’s Russia—the time of greatest Russian weakness—the Bush administration and then the Clinton administration were reluctant to expand NATO, despite the increasingly urgent appeals of the former Warsaw Pact states. The Clinton administration created the Partnership for Peace, whose vague assurances of solidarity fell well short of a security guarantee for former Warsaw Pact members.
It is easy to see why Washington felt no great compulsion to drive NATO eastward. Few Americans at that time saw the organization as a bulwark against Russian expansion, much less as a means of bringing Russia down. From the U.S. perspective, Russia was already a shell of its former self. The question was whether NATO had any mission at all now that the great adversary against which it was aimed had collapsed—and given just how hopeful the 1990s felt to most Americans and western Europeans. It was thought to be a time of convergence, when both China and Russia were moving ineluctably toward liberalism. Geoeconomics had replaced geopolitics, the nation-state was passing away, the world was “flat,” the twenty-first century would be run by the European Union, and Enlightenment ideals were spreading across the planet. For NATO, “out of area or out of business” was the mantra of the day.
Many Americans equate hegemony with imperialism, but the two are different.
But as the West enjoyed its fantasies and Russia struggled to adapt to a new world, the nervous populations lying to the east of Germany—the Balts, the Poles, the Romanians, and the Ukrainians—viewed the end of the Cold War as merely the latest phase in their centuries-old struggle. For them, NATO was not obsolete. They saw what the United States and western Europe took for granted—the Article 5 collective security guarantee—as the key to escaping a long, bloody, and oppressive past. Much like the French after World War I, who feared the day when a revived Germany would again threaten them, eastern Europeans believed that Russia would eventually resume its centuries-long habit of imperialism and seek to reclaim its traditional influence over their neighborhood. These states wanted to integrate into the free-market capitalism of their richer, Western neighbors, and membership in NATO and the European Union was to them the only path out of a dismal past and into a safer, more democratic, and more prosperous future. It was hardly surprising, then, that when Gorbachev and then Yeltsin loosened the reins in the early 1990s, practically every current, and soon former, Warsaw Pact member and Soviet republic seized the chance to break from the past and shift their allegiance from Moscow to the transatlantic West.
But although this massive change had little to do with U.S. policies, it had much to do with the reality of the United States’ post–Cold War hegemony. Many Americans tend to equate hegemony with imperialism, but the two are different. Imperialism is an active effort by one state to force others into its sphere, whereas hegemony is more a condition than a purpose. A militarily, economically, and culturally powerful country exerts influence on other states by its mere presence, the way a larger body in space affects the behavior of smaller bodies through its gravitational pull. Even if the United States was not aggressively expanding its influence in Europe, and certainly not through its military, the collapse of Soviet power enhanced the attractive pull of the United States and its democratic allies. Their prosperity, their freedom, and, yes, their power to protect former Soviet satellites, when combined with the inability of Moscow to provide any of these, dramatically shifted the balance in Europe in favor of Western liberalism to the detriment of Russian autocracy. The growth of U.S. influence and the spread of liberalism were less a policy objective of the United States than the natural consequence of that shift.
Russian leaders could have accommodated themselves to this new reality. Other great powers had adjusted to similar changes. The British had once been lords of the seas, the possessors of a vast global empire, and the center of the financial world. Then they lost it all. But although some were humiliated at being supplanted by the United States, Britons rather quickly adjusted to their new place in the firmament. The French, too, lost a great empire, and Germany and Japan, defeated in war, lost everything except their talent for producing wealth. But they all made the adjustment and were arguably better for it.
There were certainly Russians in the 1990s—Yeltsin’s foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, for one—who thought that Russia should make a similar decision. They wished to integrate Russia into the liberal West even at the expense of traditional geopolitical ambitions. But that was not the view that ultimately prevailed in Russia. Unlike the United Kingdom, France, and to some extent Japan, Russia did not have a long history of friendly relations and strategic cooperation with the United States—quite the contrary. Unlike Germany and Japan, Russia was not militarily defeated, occupied, and reformed in the process. And unlike Germany, which always knew that its economic power was irrepressible and that in the post–World War II order it could at least grow prosperous, Russia never really believed it could become a successful economic powerhouse. Its elites thought that the likeliest consequence of integration would be Russia’s demotion to, at best, a second-rank power. Russia would be at peace, and it would still have a chance to prosper. But it would not determine the fate of Europe and the world.
WAR OR PEACE
In the fall of 1940, Japan’s foreign minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, posed his country’s predicament starkly in a meeting with other senior officials. Japan could seek a return to cooperative relations with the United States and the United Kingdom, he noted, but only on those countries’ terms. This meant returning to “little Japan,” as the minister of war (and future prime minister), General Hideki Tojo, put it. To Japanese leaders at the time, that seemed intolerable, so much so that they risked a war that most of them believed they were likely to lose. The coming years would prove not only that going to war was a mistake but also that the Japanese would indeed have served their interests better by simply integrating themselves into the liberal order from the beginning, as they did quite successfully after the war.
Putin’s Russia has made much the same choice as did imperial Japan, Kaiser Wilhelm II’s Germany, and many other dissatisfied powers throughout history, and likely with the same end—eventual defeat. But Putin’s choice should hardly have come as a surprise. Washington’s protestations of goodwill, the billions of dollars it poured into the Russian economy, the care it took in the early post–Cold War years to avoid dancing on the Soviet Union’s grave—all this had no effect, because what Putin wanted could not be granted by the United States. He sought to reverse a defeat that could not be reversed without violent force, but he lacked the wherewithal to wage a successful war. He wanted to restore a Russian sphere of interest in central and eastern Europe that Moscow had lost the power to sustain.
The problem for Putin—and for those in the West who want to cede to both China and Russia their traditional spheres of interest—is that such spheres are not granted to one great power by other great powers; they are not inherited, nor are they created by geography or history or “tradition.” They are acquired by economic, political, and military power. They come and go as the distribution of power in the international system fluctuates. The United Kingdom’s sphere of interest once covered much of the globe, and France once enjoyed spheres of interest in Southeast Asia and much of Africa and the Middle East. Both lost them, partly due to an unfavorable shift of power at the beginning of the twentieth century, partly because their imperial subjects rebelled, and partly because they willingly traded in their spheres of interest for a stable and prosperous U.S.-dominated peace. Germany’s sphere of interest once extended far to the east. Before World War I, some Germans envisioned a vast economic Mitteleuropa, where the people of central and eastern Europe would provide the labor, resources, and markets for German industry. But this German sphere of interest overlapped with Russia’s sphere of interest in southeastern Europe, where Slavic populations looked to Moscow for protection against Teutonic expansion. These contested spheres helped produce both world wars, just as the contested spheres in East Asia had helped bring Japan and Russia to blows in 1904.
Russians may believe they have a natural, geographic, and historical claim to a sphere of interest in eastern Europe because they had it throughout much of the past four centuries. And many Chinese feel the same way about East Asia, which they once dominated. But even the Americans learned that claiming a sphere of interest is different from having one. For the first century of the United States’ existence, the Monroe Doctrine was a mere assertion—as hollow as it was brazen. It was only toward the end of the nineteenth century, when the country was able to enforce its claim, that the other great powers were grudgingly forced to accept it. After the Cold War, Putin and other Russians may have wanted the West to grant Moscow a sphere of interest in Europe, but such a sphere simply did not reflect the true balance of power after the Soviet Union fell. China may claim the “nine-dash line”—enclosing most of the South China Sea—as marking its sphere of interest, but until Beijing can enforce it, other powers are unlikely to acquiesce.
Putin at a meeting in Moscow, March 2022
Mikhail Klimentyev / Kremlin via Reuters
Some Western analysts nonetheless argued when the Cold War ended, and continue to argue now, that Washington and western Europe should have given in to Russia’s demand. But if Moscow could not enforce a sphere, then on what grounds should the West have acceded? Fairness? Justice? Spheres of interest are not about justice, and even if they were, consigning the Poles and other eastern Europeans to subservience to Moscow would have been a dubious justice. They knew what it was like to be under Moscow’s sway—the loss of independence, the imposition of rulers willing to take direction from the Kremlin, the squelching of individual liberties. The only way they would have accepted a return to Russia’s sphere was if they were compelled to by a combination of Russian pressure and the studied indifference of the West.
In fact, even if the United States had vetoed the accession of Poland and others to NATO, as some suggested at the time that it should have, the Balts, the Czechs, the Hungarians, and the Poles would have done everything they could to integrate themselves into the transatlantic community in every other possible way. They would have worked to join the global economy, to enter other Western-dominated international institutions, and to gain whatever commitment they could to their security—acts that almost certainly would have still antagonized Moscow. Once Putin began taking slices out of Ukraine (there would be no way for him to restore Russia to its previous great-power status without controlling Ukraine), the Poles and others would have come banging on NATO’s door. It seems unlikely that the United States and its allies would have continued to say no.
Russia’s problem was ultimately not just about its military weakness. Its problem was, and remains, its weakness in all relevant forms of power, including the power of attraction. At least during the Cold War, a communist Soviet Union could claim to offer the path to paradise on earth. Yet afterward, Moscow could provide neither ideology, nor security, nor prosperity, nor independence to its neighbors. It could offer only Russian nationalism and ambition, and eastern Europeans understandably had no interest in sacrificing themselves on that altar. If there was any other choice, Russia’s neighbors were bound to take it. And there was: the United States and its strong alliance, merely by existing, merely by being rich and powerful and democratic, offered a very good choice indeed.
Putin may want to see the United States as being behind all his troubles, and he is right that the country’s attractive power closed the door to some of his ambitions. But the real sources of his problems are the limitations of Russia itself and the choices that he has made not to accept the consequences of a power struggle that Moscow legitimately lost. Post–Cold War Russia, like Weimar Germany, never suffered an actual military defeat and occupation, an experience that might have produced a transformation of the sort that occurred in post–World War II Germany and Japan. Like the Weimar Republic, Russia was therefore susceptible to its own “stab-in-the-back myth” about how Russian leaders supposedly betrayed the country to the West. But although Russians can cast blame in any number of directions—at Gorbachev, at Yeltsin, and at Washington—the fact is that Russia enjoyed neither the wealth and power nor the geographic advantages of the United States, and it was therefore never suited to be a global superpower. Moscow’s efforts to sustain that position ultimately bankrupted its system financially and ideologically—as may well be happening again.
SOONER OR LATER
Observers used to say that Putin played a bad hand skillfully. It is true that he read the United States and its allies correctly for many years, pushing forward just enough to achieve limited goals without sparking a dangerous reaction from the West, up until this latest invasion. But even so, he had help from the United States and its allies, which played a strong hand poorly. Washington and Europe stood by as Putin increased Russian military capabilities, and they did little as he probed and tested Western resolve, first in Georgia in 2008 and then in Ukraine in 2014. They didn’t act when Putin consolidated Russia’s position in Belarus or when he established a robust Russian presence in Syria, from which his weapons could reach the southeastern flank of NATO. And if his “special military operation” in Ukraine had gone as planned, with the country subdued in a matter of days, it would have been a triumphant coup, the end of the first stage of Russia’s comeback and the beginning of the second. Rather than excoriating him for his inhumane folly, the world would again be talking about Putin’s “savvy” and his “genius.”
Thankfully, that was not to be. But now that Putin has made his mistakes, the question is whether the United States will continue to make its own mistakes or whether Americans will learn, once again, that it is better to contain aggressive autocracies early, before they have built up a head of steam and the price of stopping them rises. The challenge posed by Russia is neither unusual nor irrational. The rise and fall of nations is the warp and woof of international relations. National trajectories are changed by wars and the resulting establishment of new power structures, by shifts in the global economy that enrich some and impoverish others, and by beliefs and ideologies that lead people to prefer one power over another. If there is any blame to be cast on the United States for what is happening in Ukraine, it is not that Washington deliberately extended its influence in eastern Europe. It is that Washington failed to see that its influence had already increased and to anticipate that actors dissatisfied with the liberal order would look to overturn it.
For the 70-plus years since World War II, the United States has actively worked to keep revisionists at bay. But many Americans hoped that with the end of the Cold War, this task would be finished and that their country could become a “normal” nation with normal—which was to say, limited—global interests. But the global hegemon cannot tiptoe off the stage, as much as it might wish to. It especially cannot retreat when there are still major powers that, because of their history and sense of self, cannot give up old geopolitical ambitions—unless Americans are prepared to live in a world shaped and defined by those ambitions, as it was in the 1930s.
Americans are part of a never-ending power struggle, whether they wish to be or not.
The United States would be better served if it recognized both its position in the world and its true interest in preserving the liberal world order. In the case of Russia, this would have meant doing everything possible to integrate it into the liberal order politically and economically while deterring it from attempting to re-create its regional dominance by military means. The commitment to defend NATO allies was never meant to preclude helping others under attack in Europe, as the United States and its allies did in the case of the Balkans in the 1990s, and the United States and its allies could have resisted military efforts to control or seize land from Georgia and Ukraine. Imagine if the United States and the democratic world had responded in 2008 or 2014 as they have responded to Russia’s latest use of force, when Putin’s military was even weaker than it has proved to be now, even as they kept extending an outstretched hand in case Moscow wanted to grasp it. The United States ought to be following the same policy toward China: make clear that it is prepared to live with a China that seeks to fulfill its ambitions economically, politically, and culturally but that it will respond effectively to any Chinese military action against its neighbors.
It is true that acting firmly in 2008 or 2014 would have meant risking conflict. But Washington is risking conflict now; Russia’s ambitions have created an inherently dangerous situation. It is better for the United States to risk confrontation with belligerent powers when they are in the early stages of ambition and expansion, not after they have already consolidated substantial gains. Russia may possess a fearful nuclear arsenal, but the risk of Moscow using it is not higher now than it would have been in 2008 or 2014, if the West had intervened then. And it has always been extraordinarily small: Putin was never going to obtain his objectives by destroying himself and his country, along with much of the rest of the world. If the United States and its allies—with their combined economic, political, and military power—had collectively resisted Russian expansionism from the beginning, Putin would have found himself constantly unable to invade neighboring countries.
Unfortunately, it is very difficult for democracies to take action to prevent a future crisis. The risks of acting now are always clear and often exaggerated, whereas distant threats are just that: distant and so hard to calculate. It always seems better to hope for the best rather than try to forestall the worst. This common conundrum becomes even more debilitating when Americans and their leaders remain blissfully unconscious of the fact that they are part of a never-ending power struggle, whether they wish to be or not.
But Americans should not lament the role they play in the world. The reason the United States has often found itself entangled in Europe, after all, is because what it offers is genuinely attractive to much of the world—and certainly better when compared with any realistic alternative. If Americans learn anything from Russia’s brutalization of Ukraine, it should be that there really are worse things than U.S. hegemony.
Foreign Affairs · by The Ghost at the Feast: America and the Collapse of World Order, 1900–1941 · April 6, 2022
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
