Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results."

– Winston Churchill

"We write to taste life twice, in the moment and in retrospect."

– Anais Nin

"If your actions inspire others to dream more, learn more, do more and become more, you are a leader."

– John Quincy Adams

1. N. Korea fumes over U.N. Human Rights Council's adoption of resolution on N. Korea

2. Early-voting turnout for general elections hits record 31.28 pct

3. South Korean Election Commission Early Vote Count Greater than Number of Observed Voters

4. 2024 Election: 20-inch nails in Korean democracy’s coffin

5. Opinion | North Korea sends arms to Russia. Now Putin pays back Kim Jong Un.

6. North Korea’s millennial defectors now seek political power in the South

7. Author Who Defected From North Korea Wins Defamation Lawsuit

8. U.S. nuclear envoy to visit Romania, Poland, Sweden to discuss N. Korea's threats, ties with Russia

9. What Does ROK-NATO Cooperation Mean for Relations on the Korean Peninsula?

10. Korea’s Artificial Sun Just Shattered a Fusion Record

11. Why is China suddenly interested in holding trilateral summit?

12. South Korea to Launch Second Home-Grown Spy Satellite on Monday

13. What Does ROK-NATO Cooperation Mean for Relations on the Korean Peninsula?

14. The Biden-Kishida summit should set the stage for a unified U.S.-Japanese military command

1. N. Korea fumes over U.N. Human Rights Council's adoption of resolution on N. Korea

Human rights are a moral imperative, a national security issue, and an existential threat to the Kim family regime. Kim Jong Un must deny the human rights of the Korean people to remain in power.

N. Korea fumes over U.N. Human Rights Council's adoption of resolution on N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 6, 2024

SEOUL, April 6 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has bristled at the U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC)'s adoption this week of a resolution denouncing its human rights abuses, calling the resolution "nothing but a politically motivated fraud document."

Kim Son-gyong, vice minister for international organizations at the North's foreign ministry, criticized the resolution in a statement carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency on Friday.

The council adopted the resolution for the 22nd consecutive year at its 55th regular session in Geneva on Thursday (local time). It denounces the North's human rights violations and calls for countries to respect the principle of non-refoulement.

"I scathingly denounce the "human rights resolution", fabricated by the U.S. and its followers with the ulterior intention to overthrow the sovereignty of the dignified DPRK and its socialist system, as a grave infringement upon the DPRK's sovereignty and an act of interference in its internal affairs," she said in the statement.

DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Kim also claimed, "The 'resolution' invented on the initiative of the forces hostile to the DPRK is nothing but a politically motivated fraud document run through with all sorts of lies and tricks to unreasonably slander our state's policy on ensuring genuine human rights and its actual situation."

The UNHRC has adopted a resolution condemning the North's human rights abuses every year since 2003.

This image shows a resolution on North Korea's human rights violations at a session of the U.N. Security Council. (Yonhap)

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 6, 2024

2. Early-voting turnout for general elections hits record 31.28 pct

A pivotal election. This will be the main news from Korea for the next few days.

(5th LD) Early-voting turnout for general elections hits record 31.28 pct | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 6, 2024

(ATTN: CHANGES headline, lead; UPDATES, RESTRUCTURES with latest details in paras 2-3, 6)

SEOUL, April 6 (Yonhap) -- Turnout for the two-day early-voting period that wrapped up Saturday ahead of the parliamentary elections next week hit a record 31.28 percent, the election watchdog said.

A total of 13,849,043 out of 44,280,011 eligible voters cast their ballots at 3,565 polling stations during the early-voting period that ended at 6 p.m., according to tentative data from the National Election Commission. Those who missed the opportunity this weekend will have to vote on Election Day on Wednesday.

It marked the first time the early-voting turnout for general elections exceeded 30 percent since South Korea introduced the system in 2014. In the previous parliamentary elections in 2020, the turnout was 26.69 percent.

Voters cast their ballots during the early-voting period for the parliamentary elections at a polling station in Gwangju, 267 kilometers southwest of Seoul, on April 6, 2024. (Yonhap)

On Friday, about 6.9 million voters, or 15.61 percent, went to the polls, a record for the first day of early voting for parliamentary elections.

On the first day of early voting, turnout exceeded 10 percent in all 17 major cities and provinces nationwide, led by South Jeolla Province with 23.6 percent. The turnout in Seoul was 15.83 percent.

South Jeolla continued to lead the way on the second and final day of early voting with 41.19 percent. The southeastern city of Daegu brought up the rear at 25.6 percent. The turnout in Seoul reached 32.63 percent.

The quadrennial race is considered crucial for the ruling People Power Party as failure to regain a majority could potentially render President Yoon Suk Yeol a lame duck for the remaining three years of his single five-year term.

The main opposition Democratic Party, which enjoyed a landslide victory in the previous elections, aims to retain its parliamentary majority.

According to a survey conducted jointly by Yonhap News Agency and Yonhap News TV earlier this week, 80 percent of respondents expressed a definite intention to cast their votes.

Among those intending to vote, 39 percent planned to visit polling stations during the early-voting period, while 58 percent intended to vote on Election Day.

Voters cast their ballots at a polling station in Incheon, just west of Seoul, on the second day of early voting for the parliamentary elections on April 6, 2024. (Yonhap)

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 6, 2024

3. South Korean Election Commission Early Vote Count Greater than Number of Observed Voters

Critical l analysis form Dr. Tara O.

South Korean Election Commission Early Vote Count Greater than Number of Observed Voters

2024-4-5, Tara O

https://eastasiaresearch.org/2024/04/05/south-korean-election-commission-early-vote-count-greater-than-number-of-observed-voters/

South Korea’s general election is on April 10, 2024. This election will select 300 lawmakers for South Korea’s National Assembly, which is the Korean equivalent of U.S. Congress. Election day in South Korea is a national holiday, so people do not have to worry about getting to the voting locations in time after work. Despite this, “early voting” was introduced in 2010. This year, the early voting days are April 5 and 6, 2024 from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. in 3,565 early voting locations nation-wide. No prior notification is needed to vote early and the voters can cast their ballots at any of the early voting centers across the country.

Early voting is an extremely controversial topic in South Korea, along with the use of electronic vote counting machines. The National Election Commission’s count is displayed on a monitor of a computer that is connected to the NEC’s central server, which many voters do not trust.

On April 5, 2024, early voting began, and within hours there were numerous complaints of the National Election Commission reporting inflated numbers of votes cast at various early voting centers relative to observed voting at the polling locations.

Daemyeong 9-dong Neighborhood, Nam District, DAEGU (대구남구 대명9동), 2024-4-5, 8:10 a.m.

An election observer counted 95 voters by 8:10 a.m. on April 5, 2024, according to lawyer Park Ju-hyun (박주현). He then asked the election official on site for the number of votes tallied. However, the NEC server-connected computer monitor (which is televised for the viewers to see) displayed a different number. What the computer monitor showed was 137 local resident ballots counted and 30 non-local residents ballots counted, for a total of 167 ballots counted. (3:42) How can this be? 167 – 95 = 72 additional ballots. It shows that 72/95 = 76% more ballots counted in the NEC system than the number of voters who actually went to the early voting center.

Ballot Counts for Residents Only

TimeElection ObserverNEC ServerDifference%8:10 a.m.951374244.21%

Ballot Counts for Both Residents and Non-residents

TimeElection ObserverNEC ServerDifference%8:10 a.m.951677275.79%

The election observer at Daemyeong 9-dong neighborhood, Nam District in Daegu City sent this hand-written note to the local NEC Chairman to investigate the situation.

This is the situation only 2 hours into the 2-day early voting window.

Daegu’s Daemyeong 9-dong Neighborhood is not the only place where extra ballots were shown in the NEC system, but not observed at the early voting centers.

Where does the NEC’s central server ballot numbers come from and why are they much higher than the actual observed voters (and their ballots) on site?

Seongbuk District, SEOUL (서울 성북구), 2024-4-5

An election observer noted that he counted the ballots each time a voter placed his/her ballot in the ballot box. Every 1-3 hours, he compared the numbers to the numbers from NEC server provided to him by the election official on site, and discovered major discrepancies: (0:20)

TimeElection ObserverNEC ServerDifference%7 a.m.11511610.87%10 a.m.630689599.37%11:30 a.m.9451030858.99%The election observer’s hand written note to the election commissioner in charge of the Early Voting Center in Seongbuk District of Seoul, 2024-4-5.

Jungwang 2-dong neighborhood, SHIHEUNG City, Gyeonggi Province (경기도 시흥시 중왕2-동), 2024-4-5

In Jungwang 2-dong neighborhood of Shiheung City in Geyonggi Province, an election observer noted more discrepancies as follows: (2:03)

TimeElection ObserverNEC ServerDifference%6:00 – 8:00 a.m.20820800.00%8:01-10:08 a.m499523244.81%10:09-11:15 a.m.663697345.13%11:16 a.m.-12 noon748797496.55%

Shinjeong 1-dong neighborhood, Nam District, ULSAN City (울산 남구 신정1동), 2024-4-5, morning

In the Shinjeong 1-dong neighborhood of Nam District in Ulsan City in southeast Korea (near Busan), an election observer noted more discrepancies in the ballot numbers counted. The election observer noted that the NEC server-connected computer monitor showed 40 more ballots counted at 9 a.m., 58 more by 9:30 a.m., and 96 more by 11 a.m.

TimeElection ObserverNEC ServerDifference%11 a.m.5946909616.16%

At 11 a.m, the NEC’s computer monitor connected to the NEC’s server showed 690 ballots counted, while the election observer counted 594. (2:49)

Gangseo District, Seoul, 2024-4-5

In Gangseo District in Seoul, an election observer tried to take a photo of a barcode on the ballot (not yet voted) that was missing the numbers below the barcode, as evidence of a strange ballot. The NEC official told her she couldn’t take photos (legally she can) and forced her to leave the premise.

As she walked out of the building, she asked the policeman who was just outside the early voting station. He checked his cell phone and told her that she needed to leave. She asked to see what he read on the phone. He showed it to her. It said taking photos is a violation of Section 166 of the election law, that taking photos illegally can be fined up to ₩4,000,000 (~$3,000), and that the record of it can prevent employment with the police in the future.

In her phone conversation with Lee Sang-ro (이상로), a veteran journalist formerly of MBC and a professor, on his YouTube channel, she shared what she discovered about the law. It turns out that taking photos inside the voting centers, as long as it is not in the voting booth where the actual marking of ballots occurs, is allowed by law, so she did not do anything illegal. (11:13) Thus, both the NEC official and the policeman removed her from the early voting center by giving her false information. Until January 2016, it was legal to take photos inside the voting booth, but for some reason, a new clause was added to forbid taking photos in the voting booth.

On Line Comments regarding the situation:

– The Republic of Korea is in big trouble. We can’t hold the election as it is. Stop voting altogether. First, investigate the NEC. Arrest Roh Tae-ak (노태악) (the National Election Commission Chairman and simultaneously a Supreme Court Justice) immediately.

– Who would investigate? They’re all in it together. The country is rotten and it is on its way to ruin. I don’t see any hope.

– What are President Yoon and Han Dong-hoon (de facto leader of the People Power Party) doing? Is this happening only in those places? Stop the early voting right away.

– Dismantling the National Election Commission is the answer. Arrest and investigate.

– What kind of country is this? What do you mean an advanced country? It’s embarrassing. This country is still at the level of 70 years ago.

– To the National Election Commission officials!!! Why do we have fraudulent elections??? I believe there must be some righteous public servants who would protect our suffrage. Please prevent fraudulent elections~~~

– The corrupt National Election Commission must be dismantled and punished for its crimes!!

– Hahahaha, did it happen just once or twice????? It’s normalized now, hahahaha. The people have already given up hahahaha.

– So (they’re saying) they’ll stuff (the ballots into the ballot boxes) as many as the inflated numbers. Eyes open, but blind People Burden Party (a pejorative name for People Power Party for not taking any measures to investigate or prevent this situation)

– Fraudulent election was expected, so why didn’t the president and Han Dong-hoon proactively do anything?

– Now I realize what is going on. I knew long time ago about ballot count inflation, but now I know why the National Election Commission insisted on printing the (signature-equivalent) stamps (on the ballot before the voters cast votes), and discarded (the method of the National Election Commission official stamping his/her personal stamp on each ballot real time at the site after the voters vote) the personal stamp.

– So they’ll make fake ballots equivalent to the inflated numbers…

– They already knew that the election fraud prevention citizen groups would monitor carefully, but they are bulldozing through. They must know something.

– The early voted ballots must be counted on site (before removing and storing them for days with questionable security) after the end of voting to prevent election fraud.

– I’m dumbfounded (by the politicians, the media) who encourage early voting.

– I had a lot of expectations and hopes after President Yoon was elected, but nothing has changed. It seems election fraud is here to stay forever.

– Shouldn’t the election be stopped?

korea kontext

Insights into Korea news by ex-BBC journo

2024 Election: 20-inch nails in Korean democracy’s coffin

koreakontext.com

This year’s ballot paper for proportional representation is more than 51cm (20 inch) long.

In this year’s election, a total of 59 parties are asking for a vote.

Does the biggest-ever number suggest the height of South Korean democracy? I’m a bit skeptical.

How many of them are really serious? I took a count of the number of leaflets included in the official election packet sent by the election commission.

Out of the 38 parties aiming for proportional representation, only 9 parties managed to include their parties’ leaflets in the packet.

Well, printing leaflets for every voters in the nation takes a lot of money. Even if you’re dead serious about the election, your budget may not be so.

So I looked into the election commission website. 15 parties didn’t even bother to submit it digitally.

When Minjoo pushed for the amendment of the election law in 2019, which paved the way for this pandemonium, some “progressive” commentators dismissed the concerns over an election overrun by a torrent of haphazardly established parties.

Once again, all proportional representation ballots will be counted manually because voting machines can’t process ballots this long, as they were in 2020, which was the first election since the “election reform.”

Too many joke parties and having to count votes around the clock wouldn’t be a serious harm to democracy themselves. But the true consequences of the reform are.

The election reform accomplished just the opposite of its aim.

It was said the new proportional representation system will improve the diversity of the National Assembly by allocating more seats to minor parties.

But the proposed (and eventually passed) bill had one glaring loophole: satellite parties, which will be technically also minor parties. Critics repeatedly warned from the beginning this will allow the opposite of what the reform sought to accomplish.

Minjoo kept ahead, however, and succeeded with help of the minor parties such as the Justice Party, which soon fell prey to the reform it supported.

First, it will eat up Justice Party.

It didn’t even take much time to see how it unfolds: in less than four months since the bill passed, Minjoo and its satellite party, which it promised not to establish, had the biggest win of all time—180 seats out of 300—in the 2020 election.

Justice Party managed to keep its seats in total—6—last time, but it might not survive this time. Its approval ratings have been below 3% threshold in many polls.

It is hard to understand, with all the issues that had been glaring from the day it was proposed, why the Justice Party voted for the reform bill. Sim Sang-jung, who’s been leading the party for years in practice despite the official titles, appears to be hooked on the idea. (From what I’ve heard from people, Sim tend to put her personal network first in deciding something, rather than her own party.) With her party on the verge of withering away, Sim’s own local constituency is about to ditch her as well—an end she deserves.

Next, representative democracy.

The most critical harm the reform has done is the disruption of representative democracy.

Major parties, for all its flaws and stupidity, tend to take greater care in choosing their candidates. They also tend to take public opinion more seriously when issues are raised on their candidates.

The same can’t be said, however, for satellite parties. They don’t have histories and they don’t last long. The primary satellites, which are direct offshoots of the major parties, may be just fine, but when it comes to the secondary satellites—unofficial satellites often formed by those who seek partisan support from voters—the bar is nowhere to be seen.

The quality of representative democracy will take another plunge after this year’s election. Cho Kuk, the disgraced former justice minister is leading it.

Mr Cho is truly a fascinating figure: a man of contradiction who commands a cult-like following, I’d call him the progressives’ Trump. Unlike Mr Trump, Mr Cho is already found guilty in previous trials and likely to serve a sentence after the supreme court ruling.

This hasn’t changed his devotees’ mind. His makeshift party is enjoying tremendous ratings in polls—even surpassing the primary satellites in some cases.

If we translate the latest polls directly into actual votes, his party may get up to 17 seats. For a comparison, Democratic Labor Party민주노동당, the most successful progressive party in history, in its brightest days only managed to get 10. Looking at their roster of proportional representation makes me crave for Prozac.

What’s their flagship platform? Finishing the “prosecutor reform.” What does it even mean? Kicking asses of the bad guys dogging Mr Cho and his colleagues, including Hwang Un-ha, former Minjoo lawmaker who was found guilty for interfering the Ulsan mayor election, is the best I can guess.

Speaking of the prosecutor reform, it is now beginning to make a difference:

A disturbing account on how police investigations have been deteriorated since the 2021 amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act, which was part of Minjoo Party's prosecutorial reform. pic.twitter.com/7eGjnfOGW0

— Subin Kim 金秀彬 (@SubinBKim) April 1, 2024

The political landscape has changed. You’re gravely mistaken if you think conservatives still have the upper hand in South Korean politics. For some reasons including demographic shifts and socio-economic developments, now the “Minjoo progressives” are the dominant force. (If you want to dig deeper, I recommend Cho Gwi-dong’s The Road To Italy.)

The aftermath of the two major “reforms” will have lasting effects on the representative democracy and the rule of law. Minjoo will have to pay the price for this.

But with Pres Yoon campaigning for Minjoo, how can conservatives expect to win?

I already said President Yoon doesn’t care much about approval ratings. But I’d have to say, I didn’t expect him to be this bad at reading the room.

His terrible dealing with the revolting doctors and laggardly responses to his aides’ issues have given Minjoo the higher ground. Although I believe Minjoo’s seat won’t exceed their last election result—180 seats are the theoretical maximum of Minjoo’s support base—the ruling party remaining minority with a president at their side (um… it’s technically true) is a defeat in itself.

Running an election as a ruling party has been rather easy in Korean politics. All you have to do is showing some degree of remorse and promising you’ll get better. Do the kowtow if necessary. Voters love the sight of it.

Alas, Mr Yoon was not only the kind of guy who refused to kowtow to a boss when he’s wrong. He was also the kind of guy refused to kowtow to the public when they’re right.

My biggest miss in my previous write-up was Han Dong-hoon. I expected him to wield his dagger more liberally as the President is so unpopular.

I was wrong. Perhaps Yoon’s remaining three years of term deemed too long to be passed in conflict. Yoon loyalists managed to wring themselves into some of the most convenient constitutes.

The most notable case is Joo Jin-woo, former presidential aide who is running in one of the richest constituencies in Busan. A PPP candidate won by more than 20%p margin in the last election, but this time Joo is trailing behind a Minjoo candidate in polls.

Han does understand that this is going to be a defining moment in his political career, but his previous life as a prosecutor offer little help in how to navigate the dynamics of politics, it seems.

It’s the economy, stupid! (again and again)

The gaping void of “economy” in the campaign is another peculiarity of this year’s election. While Minjoo has been ranting about prosecutors, PPP has been obsessed to the “student activist establishment.”

Don’t we have an economy to fix?

Last year’s GDP growth explains (partly) why Pres Yoon is so unpopular:

(This is my first attempt at producing charts with Python )

Despite the tried-and-true history of Keynesian economics, Pres Yoon never attempted a budget deficit. Why? Because he belongs to the same school as Javier Milei?

More plausible explanations are 1) Yoon doesn’t want any compromise to Minjoo—such as appointing a special prosecutor to the suspicions on the First Lady—as any supplementary budgets will require a cooperation from the opposition who controls the legislative; 2) Yoon is held hostage to finance ministry technocrats who are firm believers of balanced budget.

The polarizing politics that is negligent in people’s actual livelihoods (I think “prosecutor reform” is the single biggest culture war front in Korea) leaves us little hope for a better future.

koreakontext.com

5. Opinion | North Korea sends arms to Russia. Now Putin pays back Kim Jong Un.

north Korea (and Russia) caught the attention of the Washington Post editorial board.

But a good overview of Russian and Chinese complicity with north Korean malign activities and the failures of 6 presidents.

Excertsp;

This was a gift by Russian President Vladimir Putin to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, undermining sanctions that the United Nations has imposed in recent years. More than that, it suggests yet another setback — again, perpetrated by Russia — to the post-Cold War struggle to curtail the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Putin is paying back North Korea for sending an estimated 10,000 containers of weapons and ammunition to Russia for use in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, filling three major storage depots near the front lines of the war, amounting to more than 3 million rounds. South Korea’s defense minister has said North Korea’s weapons factories are working around-the-clock to manufacture artillery shells for Russia. North Korean ballistic missiles have been fired by Russia at Ukrainian cities. The Financial Times, examining satellite photographs, reported that Russian vessels are delivering oil to North Korea in defiance of the sanctions, including at least five tankers in March, the first since the United Nations imposed a strict cap on oil transfers in 2017. Mr. Putin’s foreign intelligence chief, Sergei Naryshkin, visited Pyongyang March 25-27, in a bid to deepen cooperation, his agency announced. A visit by Mr. Putin is expected this year.

Opinion | North Korea sends arms to Russia. Now Putin pays back Kim Jong Un.

The Washington Post · by Editorial Board · April 5, 2024

For the past 14 years, a panel of United Nations experts has regularly reported on North Korea’s expanding nuclear and missile programs and its efforts to defy U.N. Security Council sanctions. Their latest report, March 7, offers 615 pages on North Korea’s activities, including 58 suspected cyberattacks on cryptocurrency-related companies between 2017 and 2023, netting about $3 billion to fund development of weapons of mass destruction. But now these eyes and ears have been removed.

In the Security Council on March 28, Russia vetoed an extension of the panel’s work, which it had previously supported. China abstained and 13 other members voted for it. As a result, the panel that monitored the sanctions against North Korea is to expire at the end of this month, and the rest of the world will know even less than it does now about North Korea’s quest.

This was a gift by Russian President Vladimir Putin to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, undermining sanctions that the United Nations has imposed in recent years. More than that, it suggests yet another setback — again, perpetrated by Russia — to the post-Cold War struggle to curtail the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Putin is paying back North Korea for sending an estimated 10,000 containers of weapons and ammunition to Russia for use in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, filling three major storage depots near the front lines of the war, amounting to more than 3 million rounds. South Korea’s defense minister has said North Korea’s weapons factories are working around-the-clock to manufacture artillery shells for Russia. North Korean ballistic missiles have been fired by Russia at Ukrainian cities. The Financial Times, examining satellite photographs, reported that Russian vessels are delivering oil to North Korea in defiance of the sanctions, including at least five tankers in March, the first since the United Nations imposed a strict cap on oil transfers in 2017. Mr. Putin’s foreign intelligence chief, Sergei Naryshkin, visited Pyongyang March 25-27, in a bid to deepen cooperation, his agency announced. A visit by Mr. Putin is expected this year.

Six U.S. presidents have tried to restrain North Korea’s nuclear and missile program, largely without success. After the failed Hanoi summit with President Donald Trump in 2019, Mr. Kim appears to have given up any hope of normalization with the United States, accelerated the pace of his armament effort while deepening ties with Moscow.

Russia has thrown him a lifeline. But what if he wants more than just oil and a helpful veto at the United Nations? There is a worrisome possibility that he could seek assistance with nuclear weapons and missile technology from Russia. The director of national intelligence, Avril Haines, warned Congress recently that Russia’s needs could undermine “long-held nonproliferation norms.” Siegfried Hecker, the former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, has argued that Mr. Putin is breaking down the global nuclear order that existed for more than 70 years, including the concerted efforts (which Russia once supported) to control the spread of nuclear weapons. He has pointed out that North Korea might seek from Russia nuclear weapons test results. The Soviet Union conducted 715 nuclear tests, and North Korea has carried out only six. Even more unsettling, North Korea might ask Russia for information about missile or warhead designs, or — most worrisome — fissile material for fueling warheads.

China is North Korea’s major trading partner and while it voted for some U.N. Security Council sanctions, its banks have been complicit in violating them. Pressing China hard to restrain North Korea seems unlikely to succeed now, given all the other tensions between the United States and China. It is not yet certain how China will view Russia’s new coziness with Mr. Kim. But it is certain that Mr. Kim’s boisterous demonstration of his missiles will continue to unsettle U.S. allies Japan and South Korea. On Tuesday, Mr. Kim attended the launch of a new intermediate-range ballistic missile purportedly with a hypersonic glide vehicle. He has also announced that North Korea will switch to solid-fuel missiles, which are faster to launch.

The loss of the monitoring panel can be repaired, perhaps by establishing a new one supported by the Group of Seven. But the larger challenge is to come up with a new and effective strategy to deal with North Korea. U.S. policy has wavered between drift, incentives, Mr. Trump’s failed summitry and back to drift. As always in the atomic age, the danger is of disastrous miscalculation and misperception in a confrontation. Containing the danger is now even harder, as Mr. Putin — with a permanent Security Council seat — transforms Russia from a global actor that exercised at least a basic level of responsibility on some issues into a rogue state that makes common cause with the world’s worst regimes.

The Washington Post · by Editorial Board · April 5, 2024

6. North Korea’s millennial defectors now seek political power in the South

This is a useful message for Koreans in the north. It illustrates how those from the north can be successful and also demonstrates an alternative political system.

Excerpts:

Park and Kim are among a generation of millennials who grew up in North Korea in the 1990s as capitalism took root in the theoretically communist state. Activists say they are the greatest force for change in North Korea.

They are called the “Jangmadang Generation,” named after the markets that popped up after a devastating famine revealed that the state was unable to provide for its people. Those who survived did so by making, selling or buying food items at the markets.

This group has grown up with access to goods from China and South Korea — including TV shows and movies that opened their eyes to life in a major economy and freer society. They have become more exposed to the outside world and disillusioned with their own government, experts say.

“Even when I was in North Korea, the younger generation’s awareness was changing dramatically,” said Park, who left in 2009.

North Korea’s millennial defectors now seek political power in the South

The Washington Post · by Michelle Ye Hee Lee · April 5, 2024

SEOUL — Park Choong-kwon was once a ballistic missile researcher in North Korea, one of the prized minds entrusted with developing Kim Jong Un’s beloved weapons program.

Next week, he is set to become a South Korean lawmaker, becoming only the fourth escapee from authoritarian North Korea to serve in the democratic South’s legislature. He comes to the task with a mission.

“As a defector, I think I should play a role in inter-Korean relations,” said Park, 38, who is expected to enter the National Assembly in elections to be held Wednesday. He is a candidate for the conservative party led by President Yoon Suk Yeol — who takes a hard line on North Korea — and is set to win through the proportional representation system, which guarantees a party a certain number of seats based on the share of votes cast for the party.

“But I also want to fulfill my role as Park Choong-kwon, a young South Korean man. I want to do both.”

There are currently two North Korean defectors in the National Assembly: Tae Yong-ho, formerly a senior North Korean diplomat who is seeking reelection, and Ji Seong-ho, a North Korean human rights activist who is stepping down.

Park — together with a run by another escapee, Kim Geum-hyok, 32, who was also standing for the conservative party but dropped out after it became clear he would not get in this time — brought attention to the ambition of millennial North Korean escapees who aspire for leadership roles in South Korean society.

The two men want to set the agenda for inter-Korean relations and key issues facing future generations in both Koreas, and to be leaders who bridge the gap between the two halves of the peninsula should they reunify. They want other younger South Koreans to care about reunification, too, even though the majority of their peers say it’s unnecessary.

“I felt there is a certain limitation to how much can be accomplished through civil society alone when it comes to North Korean human rights … but can be accomplished through policymaking institutions,” Kim said, describing what motivated him to pursue politics.

The pair know what they’re talking about.

Park escaped from North Korea when he was 23, after his doubts about the North Korean regime became too much to bear. He had been studying at North Korea’s National Defense University, a training ground for engineers and specialists developing the country’s missile technology, which the regime views as critical to its survival and security.

Kim was one of the few students at the prestigious Kim Il Sung University who were given the opportunity to study abroad. The isolated regime taps top students to bring much-needed expertise from overseas, even though doing so exposes them to the outside world.

But while in China, he embraced outside ideas to the extent that he attracted the attention of North Korean security officials. At the age of 20, he decided to flee.

As members of North Korea’s ultra-elite who had proved their political loyalty to the regime, Park and Kim were afforded elusive privileges and were supposed to lead the future of the repressive country.

“To the extent that the regime was investing in them, they were North Korea’s future,” said Hanna Song, executive director of the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, a Seoul-based NGO that works closely with defectors.

They could have continued to live comfortably in the North. But instead, they risked their lives to flee. Now, they are trying to effect change within South Korea’s democratic system and bring their insights as millennials who grew up in both Koreas.

Song said they are showing what is possible when given the freedom to choose how to live one’s life: a right that North Koreans living under a totalitarian state do not enjoy.

“The fact that they’ve used, in a way, their experience in the North to turn that into something that they want [for] a brighter future for the entire Korean Peninsula could send really strong messages to both the North and South Korean young people,” she said.

Dual identities

Park and Kim are among a generation of millennials who grew up in North Korea in the 1990s as capitalism took root in the theoretically communist state. Activists say they are the greatest force for change in North Korea.

They are called the “Jangmadang Generation,” named after the markets that popped up after a devastating famine revealed that the state was unable to provide for its people. Those who survived did so by making, selling or buying food items at the markets.

This group has grown up with access to goods from China and South Korea — including TV shows and movies that opened their eyes to life in a major economy and freer society. They have become more exposed to the outside world and disillusioned with their own government, experts say.

“Even when I was in North Korea, the younger generation’s awareness was changing dramatically,” said Park, who left in 2009.

“When I was in the North, there were a lot of rumors about Kim Jong Un [as the nation’s potential successor]. Other younger North Koreans were a bit skeptical,” Park added. “He is about our age, yet North Korea was spreading rumors that he is a great genius. It was hard to believe.”

The young escapees have had a smoother transition into South Korean society than older defectors who struggled to adapt to capitalism. Many are finding ways to leverage their life experiences for positive change on the Korean Peninsula in various career fields and generate global attention on the plight of North Koreans, Kim said.

“As Jangmadang Generation, we have experiences from life in North Korea that South Korea’s millennials do not,” Kim added. “That means through those insights, we can come up with unique and new ideas.”

But they don’t want to be boxed in under a singular identity as a “defector.” For one, they have both forged dual identities as North Korean-born people who spent most of their adulthood as South Koreans, giving them a unique understanding of life on the Korean Peninsula, they say.

Also, their life experiences are not representative of the vast majority of the 34,000 North Koreans who have resettled in the South since 1998, most of whom are women and have not received university education. Most South Korean youths would also have a hard time relating to the elite education the two men received in both Koreas.

After escaping North Korea across its border with China and arriving in Seoul, Park earned a PhD in materials science and engineering at one of South Korea’s top universities and landed a coveted job as a senior researcher at Hyundai Steel.

In the National Assembly, Park wants to shape science, technology and tax policies that affect the engineering and industrial sectors, which fueled South Korea’s economic rise as a manufacturing powerhouse.

“As someone with experience in South Korea’s industrial sector, I believe innovation in our country’s corporate regulations and labor markets is absolutely necessary,” he said.

But he also said he agrees with Yoon’s hard-line approach toward the North’s provocations and his efforts to strengthen deterrence measures with the United States and Japan.

“North Korea, by its nature, is unable to stop provocations,” he said. “We have to help North Korea ultimately find another exit strategy … and become a normal country” under global standards.

Both men believe the Koreas will reunify, and that preparations must begin now, by studying North Korea’s internal changes carefully and preparing the South Korean public in its views of North Korea and its people.

“The only path to solutions for South Korea’s various problems, including population decline, economic crisis and polarization, is through reunification,” Kim said. “We need to expand our territory and our population, and develop markets.”

Kim — who has built a public persona speaking out about North Korean issues, regularly appearing on television shows and running a YouTube channel, since arriving in South Korea in 2012 — hasn’t been successful this time around.

But politics is where he really wants to shine. He worked on Yoon’s presidential campaign and transition team in 2022, and in 2023 joined the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs as policy adviser.

He already has his eyes on the next election in four years.

“I’m only 32. … I am using this [election cycle] to build experience,” Kim added. “In any case, as long as we don’t give up on democracy, there will always be another election.”

The Washington Post · by Michelle Ye Hee Lee · April 5, 2024

7. Author Who Defected From North Korea Wins Defamation Lawsuit

Author Who Defected From North Korea Wins Defamation Lawsuit

The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · April 5, 2024

Jang Jin-sung, known for his memoir “Dear Leader,” was accused of rape by a fellow North Korean defector. He sued her and a South Korean broadcaster and won.

Jang Jin-sung in London in 2012. Credit...Sylvia Hui/Associated Press

Reporting from Seoul

April 5, 2024

An author who defected from North Korea has won a defamation lawsuit that he filed in South Korea against a fellow defector who accused him of rape and the broadcaster that first reported her allegations.

The South Korean Supreme Court last month upheld a lower court’s ruling in favor of the author, Jang Jin-sung. Mr. Jang sued his accuser, Sung Sel-hyang, and the TV channel MBC in 2021, after MBC aired reports about Ms. Sung’s accusations.

The lower court’s October ruling found Ms. Sung’s allegations to be false and ordered her, MBC and two other defendants — an MBC reporter and Ms. Sung’s husband — to pay Mr. Jang a total of 47 million won, or $35,000, in damages. It also ordered MBC not to rebroadcast its 2021 reports about Mr. Jang or post them online.

Mr. Jang, who fled North Korea in 2004, is one of the most internationally recognized defectors from the North, best known for his 2014 memoir “Dear Leader.”

Ms. Sung, who also defected to the South from North Korea, said she was raped by Mr. Jang and by one of his South Korean associates not long after she first met Mr. Jang in 2016, when he was running a website that specialized in news about the North.

But the lower court found Ms. Sung’s allegations to be false, saying that her statements were inconsistent, untrustworthy and lacked supporting evidence, according to the court’s ruling, which was viewed by The New York Times.

Although MBC argued that its reports were in the public interest, the judges said the channel had been biased toward Ms. Sung and had intimated that her accusations were true despite a lack of evidence. The Supreme Court’s brief March 14 ruling supported the lower court’s findings.

“I have experienced the systems of both North and South Korea,” Mr. Jang, 53, said on Friday. “The evil in North Korea was its one-man dictatorship that created a network of prison camps. The evil in South Korea, I have learned, was fake news that tries to create prisons of public opinion.”

Ms. Sung filed a lawsuit accusing Mr. Jang and his associate of rape and other sex crimes and asking the police and prosecutors to bring charges against him. But they eventually declined to do so, citing a lack of evidence. Mr. Jang’s associate was also a plaintiff in the defamation suit; he was awarded 11 million won in damages.

Mr. Jang first gained attention in South Korea with his poems about hunger in North Korea. His best-selling memoir described his life as a propaganda writer in the totalitarian state and his eventual escape from it. The book has been translated into a dozen languages, and Mr. Jang appeared on the cover of a British magazine.

Mr. Jang is one of a series of prominent South Korean men who were accused of past sexual misconduct as the country’s #MeToo movement gained momentum. Many of them have been convicted of sexual assault.

Choe Sang-Hun is the lead reporter for The Times in Seoul, covering South and North Korea. More about Choe Sang-Hun

The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · April 5, 2024

8. U.S. nuclear envoy to visit Romania, Poland, Sweden to discuss N. Korea's threats, ties with Russia

Everything is connected. Everything, everywhere, all at once.

U.S. nuclear envoy to visit Romania, Poland, Sweden to discuss N. Korea's threats, ties with Russia | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 6, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, April 5 (Yonhap) -- The top U.S. nuclear envoy will visit Romania, Poland and Sweden next week to discuss North Korea's military threats and its growing ties with Russia, the State Department said Friday.

From Monday through Friday, U.S. Senior Official for North Korea Jung Pak is set to travel to Bucharest, Warsaw and Stockholm for talks on challenges from the North's "unlawful nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, malicious cyber activity, and deepening military and political partnership with Russia," according to the department.

"She will also discuss opportunities for promoting dialogue and diplomacy with the DPRK," the department said in a press release. DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"Her travel is part of ongoing U.S. efforts to coordinate closely with allies and partners on the global security implications of the DPRK threat," it added.

Her planned trip comes amid the growing need for tighter international cooperation to address North Korean threats following Russia's recent veto of a resolution on the annual renewal of a U.N. panel monitoring the enforcement of sanctions against the North.

Absent the resolution, the panel's mandate is set to end April 30.

This photo, taken on March 13, shows U.S. Senior Official for North Korea Jung Pak speaking during a celebration of the retirement of her predecessor, Sung Kim, in Washington. (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 6, 2024

9. What Does ROK-NATO Cooperation Mean for Relations on the Korean Peninsula?

I think ROK-NATO cooperation is a good thing for the ROK and the ROK/US alliance. Others may not think so. But we should not fear the backlash from north Korea, China, and Russia. We need to do what is best for our mutual security interests and strength is better than weakness.

We have to stop working about what north Korea, China, and RUssia might say or do and instead make sure they know what we are capable of doing and that we have the will to do it.

What Does ROK-NATO Cooperation Mean for Relations on the Korean Peninsula?

BY: BO RAM KWON
APRIL 5, 2024

https://www.38north.org/2024/04/what-does-rok-nato-cooperation-mean-for-relations-on-the-korean-peninsula/

South Korea and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) seem destined for greater partnership. At the NATO summit in Vilnius in 2023, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg adopted the Individually Tailored Partnership Program (ITPP) that committed deepened cooperation in 11 areas ranging from non-proliferation to emerging technologies. In February, Defense Minister Shin Won-sik met with General Christopher Cavoli, commander of US European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in Seoul. They agreed to bolster cooperation between the military leadership and underlined NATO’s support to deter provocations by North Korea.

Amid heightened US-China strategic competition, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and North Korea’s persistent violation of international law with its ballistic missile testing and arms transfers, South Korea and NATO are building closer ties. However, while each side has much to gain from increased cooperation, it should be implemented prudently, as there are as many risks as there are opportunities to growing ties.

Drivers for Cooperation

South Korea and NATO understand that closer collaboration is needed to deal with shared security challenges in the Indo-Pacific and Eastern Europe. Inter-regional coordination is necessary to effectively deter and respond to North Korea’s ramped-up missile testing, nuclear threats, cyberattacks and cryptocurrency theft. In 2022, North Korea codified nuclear weapons use into law and in 2024, Pyongyang identified South Korea as its “clear enemy,” citing nuclear weapons reinforcement as a crucial component of its defense strategy. The country has continued to leverage its tactical nuclear weapons threat to maximize strategic impact through military training that rehearses the use of nuclear weapons, and Kim Jong Un has emphasized “war readiness posture” repeatedly since 2023. Policy coordination is most effective when there is agreement on the seriousness and wide-ranging impact of North Korea’s military provocations. Indeed, Europe demonstrated in the Vilnius Summit Communique of 2023 its stance on the issue when it condemned North Korea’s WMD and ballistic program and called for the abandonment of its nuclear weapons program.

Collective efforts to condemn Russia’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine and provide security assistance are also in high demand. The hot war is dragging on and neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces can continue fighting without external assistance. What further complicates the situation is North Korea supplying Russia with arms, such as missiles and artillery shells, in exchange for food aid, trade and much sought-after military technology. Sustained military and technology cooperation between Russia and North Korea, whether it is low-tech or high-tech, poses real challenges to both the security of Eastern Europe and the Korean Peninsula, which calls for a determined, collaborative response.

South Korea and NATO can also benefit diplomatically from increased issue linkages. For South Korea, the development of NATO-AP4 (the Asia Pacific Four including South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand) can create issue-specific networks that expand collaboration opportunities. For example, South Korea was the first Asian state to join NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), and participated in the annual Locked Shields military exercise in 2023. Leaning into interactions with NATO and also signals South Korea’s willingness to join and mobilize minilateral cooperation to deter China’s aggressive policies in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition to the revived ROK-US-Japan trilateral security partnership, this could provide a gateway for South Korea to join the likes of the G7 and play a more proactive role in global affairs.

In turn, NATO member states can ease their way into the Indo-Pacific region through issue-specific linkages with South Korea and its Indo-Pacific Strategy, which has entered its second year of implementation. This would help diversify trade and investment partners against pressures to de-risk from China as well as create a resilient supply chain for critical goods. Opportunities for joint military training and exercises would also increase.

South Korea and NATO may benefit from deepened cooperation in the defense industry that would reinforce alliance capabilities and capacity. South Korea’s comparative advantage lies in the ability to produce high-quality, cost-effective weapons such as munitions and mid-tier conventional arms that are interoperable with NATO. The recent surge in ROK defense exports to Poland and Norway were possible because of these underlying advantages. Due to the domestic market orientation of South Korea’s defense industrial base and rising global competition, smart collaboration with like-minded partners is essential to sustain this level of performance.

Lastly, robust inter-alliance relations can function to deter or weather the impact of major external shocks. The upcoming US Presidential election and polarized domestic politics are creating unease about its national security priorities and alliance policy going forward. It is even more unsettling as US experts publicly weigh the strategic option of prioritizing the defense of Taiwan over bolstered lethal military assistance for Ukraine. This discourse makes it desirable for Seoul and Brussels to engage in close consultation about reinforcing deterrence and role sharing in their respective contexts and project confidence about preserving regional security and rules-based international order.

Despite these advantages, the scope of South Korea-NATO cooperation remains ill-defined. Clearly, NATO members are aware of the economic and military challenges from China and the spillover effects of developments in the Indo-Pacific on European security. However, an agreement has not been reached on how far cooperation should go. Member states with strong economic ties with China have been reluctant to take a firm stance against its coercive behavior.

South Korea also needs to distinguish between national security priorities focused on North Korea as well as economic and regional interests that are wary of directly confronting China. Seoul forging closer ties with NATO is likely to be perceived by China as an extension of a US containment strategy, and may jeopardize South Korea’s relationship with both China and Russia. Furthermore, there is also a certain degree of mutual skepticism regarding how much real assistance NATO would provide should an incident occur on the Korean Peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait, and what South Korea could do if Russia decides to advance into the Baltics. In the end, promoting cooperation with NATO in abstract terms that creates more shadow than substance may not be worth the potential risks.

Implications for the Korean Peninsula

As South Korea and NATO increase cooperation, they are likely to face backlash from North Korea, China and Russia, which could negatively impact relations on the Korean Peninsula. China has been demonstrably opposed to the growing ties. It criticized the first AP4 attendance to the NATO Summit in 2022 where a new Strategic Concept was adopted and participants voiced concern over systemic threats such as China that “challenge our interests, security, and values and seek to undermine the rules-based international order.” Such efforts were perceived to be geostrategically driven to link the Indo-Pacific region with the North Atlantic to advance US interests. In other words, it was viewed by China as an extension of NATO’s offensive to “infiltrate the region for strategic benefits through the troubled pattern of instigating conflicts.”

Russia has claimed that the US created rumors about its military cooperation with North Korea to elicit military aid for Ukraine from an otherwise reluctant South Korea. It criticized the US for arming Ukraine in the short-term and developing a defense industrial infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific for the long haul. While China and Russia are currently strategically aligned against the Biden administration’s efforts to fortify its European and Asian allies under its integrated deterrence strategy, they do not have an alliance based on shared values or trust. This opportunity-based relationship could fray due to shifts in US policies toward Ukraine or Taiwan.

North Korea stands to gain the most from such Chinese and Russian ire and denial. Indeed, it will take advantage of their protests about “US hegemonic aspirations” and “irresponsibly provocative policy of Washington” in trying to “encourage regional allies to implement their aggressive plans, fraught with unpredictable consequences, in the military sphere.” Pyongyang will legitimize its military cooperation with Russia using the South Korea-NATO relationship as yet another excuse and capitalize on its newly obtained “military aid supplier status” to the fullest in domestic propaganda.

Furthermore, increasing cooperation between South Korea and NATO may push China, Russia and North Korea closer. Already, the upgrading of trilateral security cooperation among the ROK, US and Japan has been cited as a reason for greater alignment in Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang. Although the three parties are far from creating a formal or durable alliance, their growing cooperation can raise tensions in the region and hinder progress in diplomacy with North Korea. Increased joint military training between Russia and China in the East Sea and continued joint veto of any North Korea-related resolution in the United Nations Security Council are foreseeable. Most recently, Russia has blocked the renewal of the UN Panel of Experts that monitored North Korea sanctions compliance while China abstained its vote. Frequent skirmishes in near seas with Chinese, Russian and North Korea fishing boats are another possibility; and coordinated disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks may also increase.

Ways Forward

North Korea is poised to reap as many benefits as possible from its alignment with China and Russia while it pursues further advancement and institutionalization of its nuclear status. At the Central Committee meeting held in December 2023, Kim Jong Un called for “a new stand on north-south relations and reunification policy,” removing national reunification as an explicit goal for the first time. Having declared South Korea as the “number one enemy” in January 2024, what Kim Jong Un might be emboldened to do next as Washington is absorbed in the election cycle is of great concern.

Much structural and political uncertainty lies ahead. Since China and Russia can influence Pyongyang in positive ways, it is wise to preserve working relations with them for whatever diplomatic opportunities may come about. Further degradation of NATO-Russia relations could infiltrate the Indo-Pacific just as much as China’s woes in the Indo-Pacific could penetrate Eastern Europe. This would not be a desirable outcome for anyone involved. As such, Seoul must take deliberate steps to enhance issue-specific cooperation with NATO that has substance and is clear about its focus on North Korea.

10. Korea’s Artificial Sun Just Shattered a Fusion Record

I hope this is the game changer we have been waiting for.

Korea’s Artificial Sun Just Shattered a Fusion Record

Popular Mechanics · April 4, 2024

One of the hardest things in magnetic confinement fusion is containing plasma long enough to induce a fusion reaction.
The Korea Superconducting Tokamak Advanced Research (KSTAR) reactor successfully contained plasma for 48 second—18 seconds longer than its original record.
This improvement in containment comes from improved materials (such as a new tungsten invertor), as well as optimization models that helped avoid common plasma instabilities.

As the world eagerly awaits the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER)—the most ambitious nuclear project in human history—to achieve first plasma in late 2025, lots of tokamaks around the world are breaking fusion records like never before.

And one of those stars-in-a-bottle is the Korea Superconducting Tokamak Advanced Research (KSTAR) reactor in Daejeon, South Korea. In September of 2022, the KSTAR team wow’d the world when they successfully contained 100 degrees Celsius plasma (which is seven times hotter than the sun) for 30 seconds—not enough to generate the bootstrapping fusion needed to create energy, but an impressive feat nonetheless. But between now and then, the KSTAR reactor received a major upgrade by getting its carbon divertor switched out for a tungsten one. Thanks to this improvement, along with additional advancements in heating and controlling the plasma, KSTAR just broke its old record by a full 18 seconds.

The Differences Between Nuclear Fission and Fusion

“Despite being the first experiment run in the environment of the new tungsten divertors, thorough hardware testing and campaign preparation enabled us to achieve results surpassing those of previous KSTAR records in a short period,” Center Si-Woo Yoon, director of KSTAR Research, said in a press statement. “To achieve the ultimate goal of KSTAR operation, we plan to sequentially enhance the performance of heating and current drive devices and also secure the core technologies required for long-pulse high performance plasma operations.”

Divertors are incredibly important components in tokamaks—they’re a lot like a nuclear exhaust port that removes heat and helium ash from plasma. Because the divertor faces the ultra-hot plasma directly, it’s vital that it can withstand the heat flux of such a torturously hot environment. The previous carbon-based divertor worked well due to its high melting point, but tungsten’s larger atomic mass and high melting point means it’s much less likely for plasma particles to get stuck to its surface.

Because of this extra capability, tungsten will also be the material of choice for ITER. This will allow the KSTAR reactor will provide valuable data for both ITER and projects beyond, like the Demonstration Power Plant (DEMO)—ITER’s fusion successor.

Sunquakes May Be the Key to Nuclear Fusion

“This research is a green light for acquiring core technologies required for the fusion DEMO reactor,” Suk Jae Yoo, Korean Institute of Fusion Energy (KFE) president, said in a press statement. “We will do our best to secure core technologies essential for the operation of ITER and the construction of future DEMO reactors.”

Of course, 48 seconds is only the beginning of KSTAR’s ambitions. Earlier this year, the research center set a goal of reaching sustained plasma containment for 300 seconds (10 times its original record) by 2026. That goal will likely be achieved with material advancements (such as the tungsten invertor), but also through error-field optimization models that improve stability both in the center and at the edges of plasma. KSTAR’s partner, the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, successfully controlled for “tearing mode” instabilities in the DIII-D experimental fusion reactor in San Diego last month—a technique that appears to have proved successful in the KSTAR reactor as well.

For decades, fusion has been the technology of the future, but laboratories like KSTAR and eventually ITER are starting to show that the future is now.

Darren Orf

Darren lives in Portland, has a cat, and writes/edits about sci-fi and how our world works. You can find his previous stuff at Gizmodo and Paste if you look hard enough.

Popular Mechanics · April 4, 2024

11. Why is China suddenly interested in holding trilateral summit?

Strategic competition or political warfare. It wants to undermine ROK, Japan, and US trilateral cooperation.

Why is China suddenly interested in holding trilateral summit?

The Korea Times · April 5, 2024

gettyimagesbank

Three-way meeting expected in May

By Kim Hyun-bin

China's readiness to participate in the upcoming trilateral summit between South Korea and Japan is based on strategic motives, which are aimed at safeguarding its regional interests amid escalating pressure on Beijing from the U.S.-led alliance with Seoul and Tokyo, according to diplomatic observers.

According to the South Korean foreign ministry, the three nations are in talks to set a specific date to host a long-stalled trilateral summit next month. The trilateral summit has been on hold since 2019 and Korea is the current rotating chair.

"In recent years, China has been seeking to pull South Korea from the South Korea-U.S.-Japan alliance. However, despite their efforts, they have not yielded significant results," said Kang Jun-young, a professor of Chinese Studies at the Graduate School of International Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.

Beijing has made efforts to have Seoul distance itself from Washington as it perceives Korea as the weakest link in the U.S. alliance network.

In addition, given that the Yoon Suk Yeol administration was inaugurated (two years ago) and South Korea is scheduled to hold general elections next week, China seems to be actively trying to participate in the talks to explore relations with South Korea, according to Kang.

"China believes that a clear enhancement should take place even on a bilateral level with South Korea," Kang said.

Along with the goal, Kang said the envisaged meeting is less burdensome for China because it usually deals with economic, social and cultural issues rather than political and diplomatic ones.

"China will seek to minimize political and diplomatic discussions that could potentially align South Korea and Japan against China. South Korea should assert its interests while refraining from engaging in joint agendas with China and Japan during the trilateral summit talks," he said.

The agenda for the trilateral summit is expected to include North Korea's acceleration of its nuclear and missile development.

During this summit, South Korea and Japan may seek to utilize China's influence to exert pressure on North Korea to halt its nuclear and missile development programs — although it is unlikely to pay off.

"It's not like Xi Jinping is coming; the Chinese prime minister is coming. It won't have much impact on the Korean Peninsula. I think the meeting of the three countries' leaders is meaningful, but it's unlikely to create a turning point that will dramatically change the situation on the Korean Peninsula," said Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul.

"It would probably just be about confirming the existing differences in positions. In the current situation, trying to turn this confrontation on the Korean Peninsula into dialogue would be insufficient."

The South Korea-China-Japan summit, which has been convened since 2008 with South Korea, Japan and China alternating as the chair, last convened in December 2019 in Chengdu, China.

The Korea Times · April 5, 2024

12. South Korea to Launch Second Home-Grown Spy Satellite on Monday

South Korea to Launch Second Home-Grown Spy Satellite on Monday

A visitor uses binoculars looking toward the Naro Space Center in Goheung in May.Photographer: SeongJoon Cho/Bloomberg

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-05/south-korea-to-launch-second-home-grown-spy-satellite-on-monday?sref=hhjZtX76

By Jon Herskovitz

April 4, 2024 at 11:30 PM EDT

South Korea plans to launch its second domestically made spy satellite Monday on a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket, enabling it to keep closer tabs on threats from the likes of nuclear-armed North Korea.

The satellite will be launched from the Kennedy Space Center, the Defense Ministry said Friday. It is a synthetic aperture radar satellite, meaning it can use radar waves to produce ultra-high resolution images of objects on the ground, regardless of cloud cover or weather, according to Yonhap News.

The launch is planned to take place at 8:17 a.m. on Monday, in South Korean time, and 7:17 p.m. on Sunday local time in Florida, Yonhap said.

South Korea has relied on the US for space-based intelligence, but is now seeking to supplement that by stepping up its own reconnaissance capabilities with a series of launches aimed at putting five spy satellites in orbit by 2025. The spy probes are part of a broader effort to develop South Korea’s space program,including the launch in May last year of a Nuri rocket that transported eight satellites into orbit.

In December, a SpaceX rocket placed South Korea’s first homegrown reconnaissance satellite into orbit.

North Korea, which has a tendency to try to upstage its neighbor when it comes to space launches, fired off a rocket in late November that put its first spy satellite into orbit — after failing twice earlier in 2023 to do so. Kim Jong Un’s regime also appears to be readying its space launch facility for another mission, the 38 North specialist website has reported.

While officials in Seoul believe a North Korean spy satellite would be rudimentary at best, it could help Pyongyang refine its targeting as it rolls out new missiles designed to strike South Korea and Japan, which host the bulk of America’s military personnel in the region.

— With assistance from Shinhye Kang

13. What Does ROK-NATO Cooperation Mean for Relations on the Korean Peninsula?

We have to stop working about what north Korea, China, and RUssia might say or do and instead make sure they know what we are capable of doing and that we have the will to do it.

What Does ROK-NATO Cooperation Mean for Relations on the Korean Peninsula?

BY: BO RAM KWON
APRIL 5, 2024

https://www.38north.org/2024/04/what-does-rok-nato-cooperation-mean-for-relations-on-the-korean-peninsula/

Drivers for Cooperation

Implications for the Korean Peninsula

Ways Forward

14. The Biden-Kishida summit should set the stage for a unified U.S.-Japanese military command

They just announced a new 3 star to take command of USFJ. Will he be promoted to 4 star to assume this role? Will a combined command be established? What will be the actual command relationships among the forces? If anything I think the NORAD model might be better than the ROK/US CFC model if a combined command is going to be established. But what about the Japanese constitution? Or could this be away to circumvent the self (or MacArthur) imposed restrictions on offensive operations? When will the Japanese public and politicians begin to complain about sovereignty issues as some have done in Korea?

Excerpts:

The Biden administration is expected to announce that it will upgrade from three-stars to four-stars the command of U.S. forces in Japan. For his part, Kishida is planning to establish by 2025 a new Self-Defense Forces headquarters that would oversee all Japanese military operations. It too would be commanded by a four-star officer.

At a minimum, the American commander would be responsible only for joint exercises, training and information sharing with the new SDF headquarters. But there is a strong case for going further and creating a unified command that would incorporate both American and Japanese forces.

There is precedent for such a command. American and South Korean forces have been joined under the Combined Forces Command since 1978. The CFC has operational control over some 600,000 active-duty personnel from both countries, and currently would have wartime control over all South Korean forces and American units deployed to the country. The CFC, which is led by an American four-star general with a Korean four-star as deputy commander and has binational manning throughout the ranks, could serve as a model for a future U.S.-Japanese unified force.

The joint American-Canadian North American Aerospace Command (NORAD) offers another (though somewhat different) model of joint operations between America and one of its leading allies. NORAD focuses on operations related to but a single mission, the defense of American and Canadian air space. Moreover, unlike CFC, the NORAD top command consists of an American four-star general but a Canadian three-star.

The Biden-Kishida summit should set the stage for a unified U.S.-Japanese military command

BY DOV S. ZAKHEIM, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 04/05/24 9:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/4575664-the-biden-kishida-summit-should-set-the-stage-for-a-unified-u-s-japanese-military-command/

President Joe Biden and Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida review an honor guard during a welcome ceremony for President Biden, at the Akasaka Palace state guest house in Tokyo, Japan, Monday May 23, 2022. (AP Photo/Eugene Hoshiko, Pool)

President Biden will host Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Philippines President Bongbong Marcos next week in a trilateral summit intended to further strengthen ties among the three allies. Biden will also meet separately with both leaders, with Kishida on April 10 and with Marcos the following day.

Both Asian countries have committed to increasing their defense spending. Manila plans to spend an addition $35 million over the next decade, while Japan has committed to expending nearly ten times as much — $300 billion — by 2027. Tokyo’s defense program will nearly double the 1 percent of GDP that it currently allocates to defense.

Few doubt that Japan will realize its ambitious defense buildup by 2027. On the other hand, it is not at all clear that the country can sustain its planned level of defense expenditure well beyond the end of this decade, due to a reduced tax base resulting from Japan’s population decline.

The drop in the country’s population is a product of both low birth rates and an aging cohort. Japan’s population, which stood at 123 million in 2022, shrank by nearly 1.3 million over the past two years. The number of babies born in the country fell for the eighth consecutive year in 2023, with no immediate prospect of an upturn. By 2030, Japan’s population is estimated to stand at around 117.5 million, with an increased proportion of the elderly; the number of citizens over 65 will rise from 28.5 million to 29.6 million. As Japan’s tax base declines, demands for greater social welfare spending on its aging population will increase.

Moreover, Japan’s debt-to-GDP ratio currently stands at about 260 percent, second highest in the world after Venezuela. Although it is projected to drop somewhat in the next few years, that ratio will remain exceedingly high. All these developments will likely result in tremendous pressure on future governments to constrain the levels of defense spending to which the country is now committed.

Given likely future pressures on Japan’s defense budget, there is much to be said for increasing the synergies that could be realized from ever-closer cooperation with the United States, which faces its own long-term pressures on defense spending. Next week’s Biden-Kishida summit likely will outline a number of steps in that direction.

The Biden administration is expected to announce that it will upgrade from three-stars to four-stars the command of U.S. forces in Japan. For his part, Kishida is planning to establish by 2025 a new Self-Defense Forces headquarters that would oversee all Japanese military operations. It too would be commanded by a four-star officer.

At a minimum, the American commander would be responsible only for joint exercises, training and information sharing with the new SDF headquarters. But there is a strong case for going further and creating a unified command that would incorporate both American and Japanese forces.

There is precedent for such a command. American and South Korean forces have been joined under the Combined Forces Command since 1978. The CFC has operational control over some 600,000 active-duty personnel from both countries, and currently would have wartime control over all South Korean forces and American units deployed to the country. The CFC, which is led by an American four-star general with a Korean four-star as deputy commander and has binational manning throughout the ranks, could serve as a model for a future U.S.-Japanese unified force.

The joint American-Canadian North American Aerospace Command (NORAD) offers another (though somewhat different) model of joint operations between America and one of its leading allies. NORAD focuses on operations related to but a single mission, the defense of American and Canadian air space. Moreover, unlike CFC, the NORAD top command consists of an American four-star general but a Canadian three-star.

What both CFC and NORAD demonstrate in their different ways is that integrated operations between America and Japan are feasible and workable. Given their common perception of the growing Chinese threat and the budget pressures that both countries will face in coming years, Washington and Tokyo should not limit themselves to next week’s expected and welcome announcement of a new stage in their joint military efforts. Instead, they should begin to plan for the establishment of a unified command that would both strengthen their common defense and enhance the credibility of their joint deterrent against an increasingly hostile Beijing, which both countries view as a long-term threat to their national security.

Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

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