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Quotes of the Day:
“Laws which prescribe what everyone must believe, and forbid, meant to say, or write anything against this, or that opinion, are often pass to gratify, or rather to appease the anger of those who cannot abide independent mines.”
– Baruch Spinosa.
“For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong.”
- H. L. Mencken
“A man is like a fraction who's numerator is what he is, and who's denominator is what he thinks of himself. The larger the denominator, the smaller the fraction”
– Leo Tolstoy
1. South Korea’s Democracy Is in Deep Trouble
2. How the world as we know it changes if China takes Taiwan
3. 60-day countdown begins: South Korea swings into election mode
4. How South Korea’s Democracy Prevailed Over a Reckless Leader
5. Kim Jong Un is Watching Trump’s Ukraine Diplomacy With Interest
6. DP calls on acting President Han to swiftly announce date of snap presidential election
7. Assembly speaker proposes referendum for constitutional revision held on snap presidential election day
8. N. Korea says 'proud' economic results achieved in Q1 after cabinet meeting
9. N.K.'s Kim inspects service facilities under preparation in Pyongyang's new town
10. US: “Respecting the Korean Constitutional Court’s Decision... Allied Forces’ Readiness Firm”
11. Foreign media: “Impeachment of Korean President, deepening political polarization”
12. “Information inflow to North Korea is important… South Korea should proactively expand support”
13. Editorial: S. Korea's top court warns of opposition power abuse amid Yoon's removal
14. Trump's Joint Chiefs pick opposes US military cuts in S. Korea, Japan
15. Korean green card holders in US fear traveling abroad
16. Constitutional Court’s ruling lauded for message of unity, democracy
1. South Korea’s Democracy Is in Deep Trouble
It pains me to read this.
But the one thing the author overlooks is the different views toward north Korea, China, the US, and Japan by both the liberals and conservatives (save for one comment from his father on north Korea). (and do not be fooled by calls for a strong defense by both parties).
Excerpts:
The absurd thing is that many outsiders would probably have difficulty telling the two sides apart. Both major parties invoke nationalism in calling for a strong South Korean defense, both have ties with the powerful family-controlled business empires known as chaebol, both worry about the nation’s plunging birthrate, and neither is progressive enough to champion the rights of sexual minorities like me.
The realization is dawning here that we may no longer even be living in a real democracy. In the wake of the martial law fiasco, Choi Jang-jip, a renowned scholar of Korean democracy, described South Korea as a “democracy without politics,” whose parties are in a state of “quasi-civil war,” and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s global democracy index lowered South Korea in February from a “full democracy” to a “flawed” one. Mr. Yoon’s nonsensical excuse for what he did illustrates how democracy has lost its meaning here: He says he sought to break the “legislative dictatorship” of the Democratic Party, which thwarted his agenda at every turn — in short, destroying democracy in order to save it.
...
Rather than jolt the country off this dead-end path, the Yoon saga has only further divided Koreans. For weeks while the Constitutional Court deliberated, the us-versus-them hostility played out on the streets in almost daily protests in which each side demonized the other. In addition to the generational divide seen in my family, South Koreans are split along gender lines: Demonstrations against Mr. Yoon have been notable for the many young women in their ranks, while young men seem inordinately drawn to pro-Yoon rallies. As a headline in a leading newspaper put it in March, “Families, Lovers and Friends Are Divided” over the affair.
...
The rot in South Korean politics is too deep to be cured by a single court ruling or election. If the country’s politicians and electorate can’t learn to reflect, talk and compromise, the “Game of Thrones” will rumble on, and democracy will wither away.
South Korea’s Democracy Is in Deep Trouble
April 5, 2025
Credit...Hwa’shin
Listen to this article · 6:54 min Learn more
By Se-Woong Koo
Mr. Koo, a South Korean-born writer and journalist, wrote from Seoul.
My South Korean parents and I have a great relationship. They have embraced my same-sex marriage — an unusually progressive attitude in our country — and join my husband and me on trips. We can openly discuss just about anything.
Except Korean politics.
They are convinced that Yoon Suk Yeol, South Korea’s conservative former president, did the right thing in December when, while in office, he tried to impose martial law and arrest opposition politicians. His move threw the nation into crisis, another chapter in the intense and often pointless political antagonism that has engulfed the country in recent years.
When I called my parents the day after Mr. Yoon’s failed attempt, that irreconcilable national divide was evident even in my otherwise harmonious family: I condemned the blatantly undemocratic power grab, which revived grim memories of past military rule; my father praised it as necessary to rein in the opposition, which he views as pro-North Korea.
Mr. Yoon’s half-baked plot fizzled within hours. He was swiftly impeached and suspended from office. A ruling on Friday by the nation’s Constitutional Court made his removal permanent.
The failure of Mr. Yoon’s bizarre scheme has been hailed in South Korea and abroad as a triumph for democracy. There is nothing to celebrate here. South Korea is as divided as ever, and the whole affair should stand as a stark warning for democracies everywhere about what happens when political polarization spirals out of control.
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South Korean politics has long been plagued by a deep rift that stems largely from the decades-long division of the Korean Peninsula between North and South. This split South Koreans into two opposing political camps — an anti-Communist one led by an authoritarian elite that favors a hard line against North Korea, and a leftist, pro-democracy camp that advocates working toward reconciliation with Pyongyang.
After decades of military dictatorship, South Korea finally achieved full democracy in 1987, and the nation prospered. But that basic underlying fault line has widened to the point that the two parties that now dominate politics — Mr. Yoon’s right-wing People Power Party and the center-left opposition Democratic Party of Korea — view each other as enemies locked in a fight to the death. It’s a battle fought with character assassination, indictments and now a chilling new precedent set by Mr. Yoon’s resort to martial law. The task of governing the nation has taken a back seat.
Mr. Yoon is just the latest in a long line of presidents brought down in this “Game of Thrones” environment. During the nation’s formative decades, electoral manipulation and coups (and one assassination) were the standard means by which presidents rose and fell. After democracy took hold, the tactics softened, but it remains essentially the same old game, an unending cycle of political vendetta more characteristic of a banana republic than a developed democracy.
Mr. Yoon is the third president since 2004 to be impeached (the first of those was overturned), and the four presidents before him have faced criminal investigations, typically spearheaded by the opposing party. Two of them went to prison, and another, Roh Moo-hyun, jumped to his death in 2009, a little more than a year after leaving office, as prosecutors closed in.
The absurd thing is that many outsiders would probably have difficulty telling the two sides apart. Both major parties invoke nationalism in calling for a strong South Korean defense, both have ties with the powerful family-controlled business empires known as chaebol, both worry about the nation’s plunging birthrate, and neither is progressive enough to champion the rights of sexual minorities like me.
The realization is dawning here that we may no longer even be living in a real democracy. In the wake of the martial law fiasco, Choi Jang-jip, a renowned scholar of Korean democracy, described South Korea as a “democracy without politics,” whose parties are in a state of “quasi-civil war,” and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s global democracy index lowered South Korea in February from a “full democracy” to a “flawed” one. Mr. Yoon’s nonsensical excuse for what he did illustrates how democracy has lost its meaning here: He says he sought to break the “legislative dictatorship” of the Democratic Party, which thwarted his agenda at every turn — in short, destroying democracy in order to save it.
Predictably, surveys show South Koreans have low levels of faith in the political system and the news media’s impartiality, which drives people to online sources like YouTube, where they gorge on fake news in their echo chambers.
Rather than jolt the country off this dead-end path, the Yoon saga has only further divided Koreans. For weeks while the Constitutional Court deliberated, the us-versus-them hostility played out on the streets in almost daily protests in which each side demonized the other. In addition to the generational divide seen in my family, South Koreans are split along gender lines: Demonstrations against Mr. Yoon have been notable for the many young women in their ranks, while young men seem inordinately drawn to pro-Yoon rallies. As a headline in a leading newspaper put it in March, “Families, Lovers and Friends Are Divided” over the affair.
New elections must be held within 60 days of the Constitutional Court ruling. But changing who’s in charge is unlikely to get the failing political establishment to set aside its inane squabbling and address urgent national concerns like a housing affordability crisis or how to navigate a dangerous world that President Trump is only making worse.
Polls indicate that a solid majority of South Koreans want a change of government. This is likely to favor the Democratic Party, whose leader, Lee Jae-myung, has been the driving force in frustrating Mr. Yoon in Parliament. As a result, Mr. Lee is reviled by the conservative camp. He was nearly killed last year by a knife-wielding man — who was radicalized by the nation’s politics — and has been indicted on bribery and other criminal charges by Mr. Yoon’s justice department.
The rot in South Korean politics is too deep to be cured by a single court ruling or election. If the country’s politicians and electorate can’t learn to reflect, talk and compromise, the “Game of Thrones” will rumble on, and democracy will wither away.
More on South Korea’s political crisis
How South Korea’s President Planned a Military Takeover, Then Blew It
Seoul Erupts With Emotion After Yoon Is Removed From Office
April 4, 2025
Se-Woong Koo is a South Korean-born writer and journalist. He founded Korea Exposé, an online magazine that focused on Korean news, and taught Korean studies at Yale University from 2013 to 2014.
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2. How the world as we know it changes if China takes Taiwan
Something to ponder on a Sunday. Sensational? Hyperbolic? Unrealistic? Unimaginable?
Please go to the link to view the map/graphic.
We cannot view Taiwan and Korea as discrete and separate security problems.
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14570749/The-world-China-takes-Taiwan-America-humiliated-Beijing-rules-new-world-order-Kim-Jong-strikes-South-Korea-chilling-vision-world-know-changes-President-Xi-finally-claims-island-nation.html?ito=rss-flipboard
How the world as we know it changes if China takes Taiwan
The world after China takes Taiwan: America humiliated. Beijing rules new world order. Kim Jong Un strikes South Korea. A chilling vision of how the world as we know it changes if President Xi finally claims island nation
By DAVID AVERRE
Published: 04:43 EDT, 5 April 2025 | Updated: 06:58 EDT, 5 April 2025
Daily Mail · by DAVID AVERRE · April 5, 2025
China deployed dozens of warships and planes to encircle the island nation of Taiwan in menacing, large-scale war games earlier this week.
Chilling satellite pictures also revealed what appear to be Beijing's 'invasion barges' - gargantuan platforms that connect to form a mobile pier that could enable thousands of soldiers and hundreds of vehicles to land on Taiwan's shores.
The multi-day military drills forced Taipei to respond by scrambling fighter jets and warships of their own to dissuade any overzealous members of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) from posing a serious threat.
But these alarming exercises were just the latest addition to a worrying trend that has seen Beijing grow increasingly aggressive toward its island neighbour in recent years.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), headed by authoritarian President Xi Jinping, sees Taiwan as a renegade province to be brought back under Beijing's control, by force if necessary.
But Taiwan's elected Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presides over a self-governing, democratic society and has sought close ties with the US, hoping its political, military and economic heft will keep Xi's expansionist tendencies at bay.
American deterrence, the reliance of China's export economy on the West and the cost of a military operation to seize Taiwan has led most analysts to suggest Beijing is more likely to use less direct means to pressure Taipei.
But politicians, military chiefs and industry leaders the world over can no longer afford to ignore the prospect of a full-scale invasion - a scenario which would shake the foundations of the world as we know it and could well trigger a Third World War.
Now, as Donald Trump pushes Taiwan to pay more for its defence while slapping it with significant trade tariffs, concern is growing that the US President may begin treating Taipei - as one analyst put it - 'as a pawn to trade with China to achieve his interests'.
With the help of international security, development and Indo-Pacific experts, we examine what would happen if China were to pull off a successful storming of Taiwan and wrest back control of its island neighbour.
Chinese troops from the People's Liberation Army are seen patrolling with the Chinese flag on an exercise
This satellite image taken on March 25, 2025 and received on April 3, 2025 by Planet Labs PBC shows three Chinese barges connected via extendable bridges in waters off Zhanjiang city, in southern China's Guangdong province
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), headed by authoritarian president Xi Jinping , sees Taiwan as a renegade province to be brought back under Beijing 's control, by force if necessary
Taiwanese soldiers pose for group photos with a Taiwan flag after a preparedness enhancement drill in Kaohsiung City, Taiwan
Taiwan is a small island adrift in the South China Sea roughly 100 kilometres off China's southeastern shores, positioned at the crossroads of East Asia.
Measuring just 36,000 square kilometres, Taiwan is roughly 1/25th the size of mainland China, or about half the size of Scotland - but it is a territory of immense strategic and economic importance.
The island is a manufacturing and technological powerhouse that occupies a critical part of the global supply chain, while the Taiwan Strait - a narrow waterway separating it from mainland China - is a key trade route facilitating the movement of goods, electronics and oil throughout Asia and beyond.
Taiwan is also an integral member of the 'first island chain', a ring of territories running from Japan to the Philippines, each of which is to some degree allied with the US to form a natural barrier against Chinese military expansion into the Pacific.
For all these reasons and more, a successful invasion of Taiwan by China would herald the advent of a new world order, according to Professor Kerry Jones, Director of the Lau China Institute at King's College London (KCL) and former First Secretary at the British Embassy in Beijing.
China expands its control of Indo-Pacific
This world order would see China 'move from a challenger and competitor into an aggressor and an enemy of the political West', Jones said.
In sheer military terms, seizing Taiwan - or the Republic of China (ROC) - would afford the People's Republic of China (PRC) a strengthened platform from which it could further project air and naval power.
This in turn would allow Beijing to strictly police key transport and trade routes, thereby cultivating great influence over the economy of its neighbours and rivals, having shattered the first island chain.
Dr Philip Shetler-Jones, Senior Research Fellow in Indo‑Pacific Security at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think-tank, said: 'If the PRC controls Taiwan, it gains an advantage in controlling air, surface and sub-surface areas astride the main shipping and air routes connecting Japan and South Korea to their sources of critical imports -especially energy - and markets.
'It would be enabled to challenge the US Navy more effectively across the Pacific, because it could move submarines out past the first island chain with more security.'
Sean Kenji Starrs, Lecturer in International Development at KCL, added that such a scenario 'would probably mean the end of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait' altogether.
'These waterways account for the bulk of the world's electronics trade and much else, including to Western Europe and the United States. It would also make it much more difficult for the US to blockade the Straight of Malacca,' he said.
This strait, a stretch of water between Malaysia and Singapore, connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans and constitutes the shortest shipping route between East Asia and the Middle East on which China's export economy is heavily dependent.
Beijing is acutely aware of this vulnerability, fearing that a US blockade of the strait could deal a punishing blow to its economy.
As Starrs points out, taking Taiwan would mean Beijing would reduce the likelihood of this weak point being exploited.
'All of this would basically mean that China could become a peer competitor to the United States in East Asia, thus the end of US hegemony in East Asia,' he concluded.
Military equipment takes part in long-range live-fire drills in waters of the East China Sea, in this screenshot from a handout video released by the Eastern Theatre Command of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) on April 2, 2025
This handout photo from Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence shows Taiwanese soldiers operating tanks
Containers are seen at the Port of Keelung on April 04, 2025 in Keelung, Taiwan
US reputation is destroyed, influence in Indo-Pacific eroded
A successful Chinese invasion and annexation of Taiwan presupposes one of two seismic events - a total defeat of the US military in the Indo-Pacific theatre, or Washington abruptly abandoning a decades-long security partnership with Taipei.
Both scenarios would be catastrophic for America, and by extension, Western interests in the highly strategic region.
Washington's influence in the region would evaporate as Asian nations who have long sought to build strong strategic ties with America, both military and economic, would be forced into a drastic rethink of their allegiances.
Meanwhile, various Western-aligned transcontinental security alliances such as the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, US), AUKUS (Australia, UK, US)- not to mention NATO - would be left reeling from their disastrous failure to safeguard Taipei.
Starrs explained how an American defeat, or refusal to uphold its security commitments to Taiwan in the face of a Chinese attack, would dispel any notion that the US remains the world's dominant political and military power.
'National populations in Japan and South Korea, let alone Philippines, Indonesia and elsewhere would likely shift their opinion in favour of China due to the massive shift in power this would entail - otherwise they would risk being the next victim of Chinese attack.
'Political and economic elites of US allies would still want to integrate with the US, but they would be under pressure to have better relations with China,' he said.
'If the US lost and China successfully occupied Taiwan, then this would entail the military defeat of Japan and South Korea, and probably Australia and NATO as well.'
Starrs went on to posit that China could even seek to seize more territory if it were to take Taiwan without significant losses.
'Chinese military presence in Taiwan would significantly diminish Japanese and South Korean security and increase vulnerability to further attack. Certainly, China would go for the Japanese-controlled Senkaku/Daiyou Islands and perhaps more.'
North Korea emboldened
Just as a successful invasion of Taiwan would entail a collapse of the US military deterrent and a weakening of the West's allies in the region, it would only serve to embolden China's allies.
None more so than North Korea, whose dynastic, dictatorial leader Kim Jong Un maintains his grip on power by keeping his citizens perpetually fearful and hateful of the US and its allies - particularly South Korea, which Kim has called his nation's 'principal enemy'.
Pyongyang has in recent months cut itself off completely from the South, detonating the few roads and railways that kept the two connected while mining the frontier along the demilitarised zone.
Kim also continues to pour resources into military modernisation and arms manufacturing, up to and including his burgeoning nuclear arsenal.
Shetler-Jones was sceptical that Kim would seek to invade or strike South Korea, arguing that the endurance of his regime is contingent on keeping his subjugated population in a constant state of fear and anticipation of an existential clash, rather than actively pursuing a conflict.
But Starrs said North Korea could potentially play a key role in a Chinese ploy to seize Taiwan and would be compelled to act if such a conflict were to break out.
'I think the more likely scenario would be China encouraging or pressuring North Korea to invade South Korea in order to expel US troops... to open a new front against the US so that China could more easily take Taiwan,' he said.
Markus Garlauskas, a former US National Intelligence Officer for North Korea, has also argued that a conflict over Taiwan would 'almost certainly become a region-wide war' that engulfs the Korean Peninsula, with Pyongyang expected to seize the opportunity to 'settle scores with Seoul' and 'exploit the vulnerabilities of a distracted United States'.
Taiwan Air Force personnel conduct pre-flight inspection on Mirage 2000 fighter jets inside Hsinchu Airbase, in Hsinchu, Taiwan, 01 April 2025
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un aims a weapon as he visits the training base of the special operations armed force of North Korea's army at an undisclosed location in North Korea
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, his daughter and an official watch what it says is an intercontinental ballistic missile launching from an undisclosed location in North Korea
Fate of the Taiwanese People
Despite China's insistence that Taiwan is nothing more than a renegade province, opinion polls have consistently shown that the overwhelming majority of Taiwanese people feel they have a distinct identity.
Surveys conducted by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation in December 2024 and January 2025 showed 76.1% of adults aged 20 and above said they see themselves as Taiwanese.
Just 10.1% of respondents said they felt they had a Chinese identity, and 9% felt both Taiwanese and Chinese.
More than half (51.8%) want to see Taiwan secure full independence from China as an internationally recognised state, and another quarter (24.2%) want to maintain the status quo, in which Taiwan maintains its complete autonomy from China as a self-governing nation.
By contrast, just 13.3% of people said they'd like Taiwan to reunite with the mainland.
If China were to mount a successful invasion, we can say with relative certainty what would happen to the island's flourishing democratic society.
One only has to look at what transpired in Hong Kong after China passed its sweeping National Security Law in 2020 in response to widespread pro-democracy protests the year before.
Starrs said Taiwan would face a similar crackdown on personal freedoms, social and political thought and mobility - but to a far harsher degree, given that China would have had to seize the island by force.
'If China were to successfully annex Taiwan, they would have to shut down democracy as they did in Hong Kong after the passage of the National Security Law in June 2020.
'They would have to ban free and fair elections, shut down or nationalise the media, reform the education system, increase control of the Internet, and - unlike in Hong Kong - would have to have a massive military presence to contain any potential insurgencies, mutinies or even just popular street protests.
'They probably would also have to significantly tighten immigration and emigration controls to try and prevent a brain drain, since many upper income and highly educated Taiwanese have a Green card, US or other citizenship.'
Shetler-Jones added: 'Given the long period over which Taiwanese have enjoyed de facto independence, it is likely that resistance to authoritarian governance would be stiffer and the crackdown would be more severe.'
Taiwan's elected Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), led by Lai Ching-te (centre), steadfastly argues it presides over a self-governing, democratic, capitalist society with overwhelming support from its people
Air Defense and Missile Command of Taiwan Air Force takes part in a military exercise, at an undisclosed location in Taiwan in this handout picture provided by Taiwan Defence Ministry and released on April 9, 2023
How could China take Taiwan?
Recent years have seen Beijing scale up the frequency and intensity of its war games around the island - as evidenced earlier this week.
Meanwhile, the PLA has warned that 'the theatre's troops are ready to fight at all times and can fight at any time to resolutely smash any form of 'Taiwan independence' and foreign interference attempts.'
Taiwan's alliance with the US has afforded it a bristling military arsenal equipped with state-of-the-art American air and sea defence systems, manned by highly trained troops.
But in a straight fight between the might of China's PLA and Taiwan's armed forces, Goliath would inevitably triumph over David - albeit at great sacrifice.
There are two scenarios that defence analysts tend to settle on when thinking about China's military options against Taiwan.
The first is a naval blockade - a tactic which would represent an enormous challenge for an island nation that is reliant upon its ports for survival, given it can only produce roughly a third of its food domestically.
Taiwan is within easy reach of the PLA Air Force, and China's navy would be capable of encircling the island as demonstrated by various war games and simulated blockades.
Beijing's warships operate a large quantity of anti-ship cruise missiles that would pose a major threat to Taiwan's naval forces. China can also equip its fighter planes with various weapons designed to take out naval vessels, while the country's land-based rocket forces wield the mighty DF-26B - which has a range of up to 2,500 miles.
The Chinese navy would likely launch dozens of missiles in salvos designed to arrive at the target location simultaneously while preventing any military or humanitarian aid from reaching Taiwan by sea.
This tactic would enable Xi's armed forces to deny Taiwan the vital food and minerals that the island relies upon, while simultaneously presenting a defensive nightmare for Taipei and any of its partners trying to break the blockade. The goal would be to coerce Taiwan into accepting China's will.
The second scenario is the one which sees China's vast army embark on an amphibious invasion of Taiwan in a similar fashion to the D-Day landings.
This scenario, which might happen as an extension of the naval blockade, would include an extensive preparatory period that Beijing would be unable to hide. An invasion would require – at a conservative estimate – between half a million, and a million personnel, as well as the transport ships to get them to Taiwan.
At some point, the airspace over the Taiwan Strait would be closed and China's army, air force, and navy would begin a massed air and missile attack.
Cruise and ballistic missiles would be directed at Taiwan's air defences, logistics hubs, airfields, and government buildings in the hope of decapitating its ability to maintain and coordinate resistance. Once the PLA's leadership was satisfied that Taiwan's defences had been sufficiently softened, it would begin the invasion in earnest.
The first wave may well include helicopter-borne special forces as well as the PLA Airborne Forces, which have their own armoured vehicles (APCs) designed to be parachuted into combat, and would likely consist of soldiers from the Chinese army's Eastern Theatre Command as well as the Marine Corps.
The APCs would be packed onto amphibious assault ships, and those that survive Taiwan's fierce defences would disembark their APCs to steam onto the target beach.
An animation provided by Chinese military officials to The Global Times showed a simulated attack on Taiwan
In this photo released by Xinhua News Agency, a missile from the rocket force of the Eastern Theater Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) takes part in operations during the combat readiness patrol and military exercises around the Taiwan Island on Friday, April 7, 2023
Ships of Taiwan Navy take part in a military exercise in Taiwan in this handout picture released on April 10, 2023
This satellite image taken on March 25, 2025 and received on April 3, 2025 by Planet Labs PBC shows three Chinese barges connected via extendable bridges in waters off Zhanjiang city
Once on the beach they would face fierce resistance from Taiwan's armed forces in prepared defences, but China has a huge advantage in terms of the number of bodies it can commit to the fight.
Now, China's 'invasion barges' make the prospect of an amphibious landing yet more alarming.
'These barges may enable Chinese forces to make landings even on the more challenging terrains of the Taiwanese coastline,' said Wen-Ti Sung, a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global China Hub.
This, he added, 'gives the Chinese military a greater selection of potential landing spots, and spreads Taiwanese defences thin'.
Satellite images from Planet Labs PBC obtained by AFP showed the system deployed in the waters off Zhanjiang city of Guangdong, southern China, at the end of March.
In a programme on state TV last month discussing the barges, military commentator Wei Dongxu touted their ability to transport large numbers of heavy equipment onto an island 'while keeping their feet dry'.
'Once the naval and air forces effectively control the air and sea, then this... barge will appear,' he said.
'It can be said that it is a sign of victory.'
Experts hope Taiwan will never see such violence. Starrs and Shetler-Jones both said the likelihood of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan remains very low.
Although they admitted that Beijing could pursue less drastic measures, such as a naval blockade of Taiwan, cyber attacks, economic sanctions and a ramping up of other diplomatic and political pressures, they felt that a full-scale attack would prove too costly for China's economy and trigger all-out war with America.
'(China taking Taiwan) would be so disastrous for the US that they would not allow it, they would bring the full spectrum of US power to prevent success, up to and including use of nuclear weapons,' Starrs said.
But Professor Brown stressed that Beijing's ongoing war games and increasingly antagonistic rhetoric over Taiwan increases the likelihood that one or a series of errors could quickly spiral, with cataclysmic consequences.
'These (blockades and military drills) are happening so regularly - it shows that China wishes to maintain psychological pressure on Taiwan and to continue to remind the international community of its claims and its resolve to see them ultimately fulfilled.
'The issue with these actions is that they create plenty of opportunity for miscalculation, misunderstanding and mistake.
'Nationalist sentiment in China is high at the moment, but the costs currently of moving against Taiwan are very, very high. Unless provoked, I cannot imagine that China would do this.
'But we are living in very worrying and uncertain times. Alas, this issue is now more dangerous than it has ever been before.'
Daily Mail · by DAVID AVERRE · April 5, 2025
3. 60-day countdown begins: South Korea swings into election mode
Actually 60 days should be the maximum length of all political campaigns.
60-day countdown begins: South Korea swings into election mode
koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · April 6, 2025
Clouds loom over the National Assembly building in Yeouido, Seoul. Im Se-jun/The Korea Herald
Assembly speaker proposes holding referendum on constitutional amendment on the same day as presidential vote
South Korea's two major parties are fast switching into election mode after former President Yoon Suk Yeol was removed from office Friday.
The Constitution dictates that a successor be elected within 60 days of a president's ouster from office — which means the parties have less than two months to decide on a candidate, assemble a team and hit the campaign trail.
The authority to declare the date for the presidential election rests with the incumbent president, or in this case, acting President Han Duck-soo.
Han is expected to announce the election date at a Cabinet meeting Tuesday. Considering the overlap with other holidays, Election Day is widely anticipated to fall around June 3.
Along with the presidential election, constitutional reform is also back on the table.
Amending the Constitution, last revised in 1987, should be held simultaneously with the race for the presidency, Woo Won-shik, the speaker of the National Assembly, said Sunday.
"I propose that we amend the Constitution the same day we elect the next president," the speaker said.
Under the 1987 Constitution, South Korea's presidents hold office for five years, without the possibility of reelection. The amendment being proposed by the speaker would let presidents serve a four-year term with the possibility of running for a second.
"We can no longer delay the most significant reform of the country's power structure," Woo said.
The People Power Party, which lost its ruling party status with Yoon's removal, held a plenary meeting gathering all of the party's lawmakers Sunday to discuss the coming election.
Unlike the Democratic Party of Korea, whose leader Rep. Lee Jae-myung has a huge edge over other potential candidates for the party's presidential nomination, the People Power Party does not yet have a stand-out contender.
Lee has yet to relinquish his post as the party's leader and officially launch a presidential bid.
The Democratic Party continued its offensive against Yoon on Sunday, calling on the People Power Party to evict the former president from the party.
"The People Power Party wants to move on like Yoon Suk Yeol is already in the past. But if the party is truly sorry, the party would disown and expel the president from the party immediately," Rep. Kim Yun-duck, the Democratic Party's secretary-general, told reporters.
"The People Power Party doesn't deserve a place in the presidential race if it does not recognize its responsibility for the distress its former president caused to the people."
The Democratic Party secretary-general added that Yoon's removal should not put the brakes on investigations of the former president and his wife, Kim Keon Hee.
Also on Sunday, minor liberal parties raised calls for a pan-liberal coalition against the People Power Party.
The minor Rebuilding Korea Party, founded by now-imprisoned Cho Kuk, who was justice minister for former Democratic Party President Moon Jae-in, called for an open primary involving all liberal party candidates.
"To ensure a victory against the conservative bloc, a liberal coalition is absolutely necessary," the party said in a statement Sunday.
The Democratic Party has not responded to the minor parties' requests.
arin@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · April 6, 2025
4. How South Korea’s Democracy Prevailed Over a Reckless Leader
Quite the hit job. I rarely criticize journalists or their newspapers but Mr. Choe has consistently shown his bias in Korean politics. His analysis should be questioned - while it appears mostly factual it is the interpretation that is troubling, starting with the headline and no recognition of how the opposition has contributed to this mess.
Yes the martial law decision was a tragic mistake but it was not intended as a return to military government though I recognize that that is a fear among many.. Journalists such as Mr Choe miss the point that it is in fact the opposition that is really responsible for the democratic failures in the South with know more than 30 frivolous impeachment attempts of government officials other than the president. They were preventing the proper exercise of democracy which is the reason for President Yoon's extreme action. In addition, it is the external influence (covert action and malign activities) from China and north Korea that is impacting South Korea's democracy.
But yes democracy and specially the democratic process has prevailed. But the question is whether the opposition will be allowed to continue to hinder ROK democracy as it was effectively doing prior to the martial law declaration?
How South Korea’s Democracy Prevailed Over a Reckless Leader
The rise and fall of Yoon Suk Yeol exposed a vulnerability in South Korean democracy, but also a resilience. Its people were always ready to fight for it.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/05/world/asia/south-korea-democracy-martial-law.html
By Choe Sang-Hun
When Yoon Suk Yeol was running for president, he had the word “king” written on his palm. South Koreans dismissed — and ridiculed — it as a shamanistic ritual that reflected his desire for top government office.
But after his inauguration in May 2022, it didn’t take long for them to see an authoritarian streak in Mr. Yoon.
On short notice, he moved the presidential office from the graceful Blue House to a drab military building. When he turned 63 in December 2023, his security team sang songs honoring him as “a president sent from Heaven” and describing his “845,280 minutes” in office so far as “a time blessed.” Two months later, a college student who protested Mr. Yoon’s decision to cut government budgets for scientific research was gagged and dragged out by the president’s bodyguards. When journalists published what he called “fake news,” prosecutors raided their homes and newsrooms to collect evidence.
Mr. Yoon kept pushing the envelope, until he made his fatal mistake: On Dec. 3, he declared martial law, threatening a deeply cherished part of South Korean life: democracy.
Image
Passengers at a bus station in Seoul watched Mr. Yoon declaring martial law on the night of Dec. 3.Credit...Ahn Young-Joon/Associated Press
To South Koreans, democracy has never been something given; it was fought for and won through decades of struggle against authoritarian leaders at the cost of torture, imprisonment and bloodshed. All the major political milestones in South Korea — an end to dictatorship, the introduction of free elections, the ouster of abusive leaders — were achieved after citizens took to the streets.
So when people saw troops sent by Mr. Yoon storming the National Assembly to seize the legislature by force, their response was immediate. But unlike those who fought government repression in the 1950s through the ’80s, South Koreans protesting in recent months had democratic institutions on their side.
The current Constitution, written in 1987 after a huge pro-democracy uprising, gave the National Assembly the power to vote down martial law and impeach presidents. The Constitutional Court, created under that Constitution, got to decide whether to remove or reinstate an impeached president. And leaders democratically elected under that Constitution imprisoned those who had earlier taken power by military force.
Younger generations, including the paratroopers Mr. Yoon sent to seize the Assembly in December, grew up learning of that history through box office-hit movies and novelists like the Nobel laureate Han Kang.
On Dec. 3, the troops hesitated before angry citizens blocking them with bare hands, allowing time for lawmakers, including some members of Mr. Yoon’s own party, to gather and vote to lift his martial law decree. The Assembly then impeached him, on Dec. 14.
And on Friday, the Constitutional Court’s eight justices, including those appointed by Mr. Yoon or his party, unanimously upheld that impeachment, putting an end to his military rebellion.
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Woo Won-shik, the National Assembly, speaker declaring the passage of an impeachment motion against Mr. Yoon on Dec. 14.Credit...Yonhap/EPA, via Shutterstock
To one observer, these events were a victory for the democratic institutions created in the late 1980s. “The response to Yoon’s attempted coup d’état displayed the maturity of Korean democracy — first of all, the resilience of civil society, which reacted immediately and massively to oppose the coup, most notably with the passion of Korean youth who were not alive in the 1980s and experienced the dangers of a return to autocratic rule for the first time,” said Daniel Sneider, a former journalist who covered South Korea back then and is now a lecturer at Stanford University.
“The fact that it was a unanimous decision of the Constitutional Court, with conservative appointees joining the decision, was a very important expression of not only the clarity of the case, but also the ability to overcome ideological polarization,” Mr. Sneider said.
Mr. Yoon’s power grab also exposed the vulnerabilities of democracy in South Korea. If such a thing can happen in a nation long considered an exemplary case of democratization in Asia, scholars warned, it can happen elsewhere, too.
Despite his removal, the deep polarization that led up to Mr. Yoon’s declaration of martial law persists. The partisan struggle between the left and right is likely to intensify in the next two months as the country lurches toward a presidential election.
But the past four months have also shown the resilience of South Korean democracy.
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Many people in Seoul on Friday reacted joyfully after South Korea’s top court removed Mr. Yoon from power.Credit...Jun Michael Park for The New York Times
Until Mr. Yoon came along, few South Koreans thought that a return to military rule was possible in their country, a peaceful democracy known globally for its cars, smartphones and K-dramas. Many of those who joined protests calling for Mr. Yoon’s ouster in recent weeks said they had been more proud of their democracy than of their cultural exports like the boy band BTS or the Netflix hit “Squid Game.”
When Mr. Yoon hurt that pride, he picked a fight he couldn’t win. During rallies, people shared a video clip of former President Kim Dae-jung, an iconic figure in South Korea’s democratization struggle.
“Democracy is not free,” Mr. Kim said in the clip. “You must shed blood, sweat and tears for it.”
If the Constitutional Court had voted to reinstate Mr. Yoon, South Korea would have seen a “second wave of democratization movement” and “a second Gwangju,” said Cho Gab-je, a prominent South Korean journalist who has covered the nation’s political evolution since 1971, referring to the brutally suppressed uprising against martial law in the southern city of Gwangju in 1980.
“We had our share of martial law, but Yoon Suk Yeol was the first president to send armed troops into Parliament,” Mr. Cho said.
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The scene near the National Assembly in Seoul hours after Mr. Yoon declared martial law. People rushed to the scene, blocking soldiers and giving lawmakers a chance to vote down the martial law decree.Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times
Mr. Yoon was once a hero among South Koreans. He built his national image as an uncompromising prosecutor when he helped imprison two former presidents for corruption. But he proved disastrous as a politician — unable to engage in the give and take of compromise with the opposition, which controlled the National Assembly.
He was accused of filling his presidential staff with officials too timid to speak up. He was nicknamed “Mr. 59 Minutes,” because that was how long he was said to speak during an hourlong meeting. He rarely apologized for his wife’s scandals or even for deadly disasters. He used his veto power to kill opposition bills. The opposition slashed his budgets and impeached an unprecedented number of political appointees in his government.
“A player busy playing on the field doesn’t look at the electronic scoreboard,” Mr. Yoon once said when asked about his dismal approval ratings.
Such an attitude allowed him to push unpopular efforts, such as improving ties with Japan and drastically increasing the number of doctors. But even many who sympathized with his struggle against the opposition didn’t see martial law coming.
“Koreans do not want the 1980s option, when martial law and tear gas made forcibly disappeared people painful to so many families,” said Alexis Dudden, a professor of history at the University of Connecticut. “Yoon and his advisers missed the mark of reading today’s South Korea in many obvious ways.”
Choe Sang-Hun is the lead reporter for The Times in Seoul, covering South and North Korea. More about Choe Sang-Hun
A version of this article appears in print on April 6, 2025, Section A, Page 6 of the New York edition with the headline: How South Korea’s Democracy Prevailed Over a Reckless Leader. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe
5. Kim Jong Un is Watching Trump’s Ukraine Diplomacy With Interest
One thing we can be pretty sure about is that Kim Jong Un pays close attention to every move the US makes around the world.
Conclusion:
Ultimately, all of these scenarios amount to guesswork at this early stage in the game. None of us know how patient Trump will be as negotiations proceed, whether the war will even end or how US policy will evolve (or not) if the diplomacy grinds down. But you can be certain that Kim Jong Un is not sitting still and waiting for answers—he is preparing for whatever answer arises and trying to determine how they impact his own policy with Washington.
Kim Jong Un is Watching Trump’s Ukraine Diplomacy With Interest
https://www.38north.org/2025/04/kim-jong-un-is-watching-trumps-ukraine-diplomacy-with-interest/
From March 23 to 25, US officials facilitated indirect negotiations between Ukraine and Russia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in an attempt to cement a short-term ceasefire in a war that crossed its four-year mark in February. The latest round of shuttle diplomacy occurred two weeks after Washington and Kyiv agreed to a 30-day truce on land, air and sea. Ideally, the pause in hostilities would not only freeze the conflict on the ground but provide the parties with an opportunity to begin addressing the systemic issues—Russian President Vladimir Putin’s expansionist ambitions; NATO’s enlargement toward Russian borders; Ukraine’s long-term relationship to Western political and security institutions—that have perpetuated the fighting. The Russians’ response was ambivalent; while Putin claimed he was sympathetic to the truce, he slow-walked the entire process by questioning how it would be enforced, who would determine violations and how violators would be penalized. After President Donald Trump ended his March 18 call with Putin, the 30-day truce was downgraded to a 30-day cessation of attacks on energy and infrastructure targets. Washington’s efforts to extend the ceasefire to the Black Sea is running into another roadblock from Putin, who is insisting on concrete sanctions relief before any pause.
To the average reader, all of this might seem like the boring, monotonous procedures of a diplomatic process that may not even succeed in the end. Yet it is unlikely North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his legion of experienced negotiators view it the same way. In fact, the opposite is likely the case—as the Trump administration engages with Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, the Kim regime will be watching the machinations from the sidelines and studying what strategy and tactics are most effective in eliciting concessions from Trump; whether resistance over time will compel Washington to discard its maximalist negotiating positions; and how committed Trump really is to diplomacy. South Korea is doing much the same, albeit for different reasons—depending on how much the US concedes to the Russians, how much pressure the Ukrainians feel during the course of negotiations and how Trump responds in the event of a diplomatic breakdown, policymakers in Seoul will either worry about what this all means for their own security or be partly reassured when time comes for their own negotiations with the Trump administration.
Kim’s History with Trump
Kim is not a novice when it comes to Trump, of course. During the Trump administration’s first term, Washington and Pyongyang spoke to one another directly at the highest level. After about a year of fiery, childish rhetoric, Trump, at the encouragement of then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in, did what no other US president before him dared to do—he authorized top-down summitry with the Kim family. Trump’s national security advisers at the time were deeply skeptical of the outreach because previous bouts of US-North Korea diplomacy had the tendency to fall apart over conflicting interests, an inability to pare US economic and political concessions with North Korean nuclear rollbacks, or even different interpretations of what was agreed.
Unlike his predecessors, however, Trump was impatient for a high-profile deal and was not all that interested in the nuts-and-bolts of nuclear disarmament. Kim, eager to get out from under a growing US economic sanctions regime and a tightening anti-North Korea consensus at the United Nations (UN) Security Council, gave the top-heavy diplomacy a chance. Although light on specifics, the June 12, 2018 joint statement published after the first Trump-Kim summit demonstrated a willingness by two historical enemies to explore whether rapprochement was possible.
But it did not take long for those hopeful early days to be extinguished by the wet blanket of self-interest and competing priorities. Despite some informal arrangements designed to grease the skids for a comprehensive agreement—Pyongyang suspended nuclear and long-range ballistic missile tests, while Washington downgraded joint military exercises with South Korea—the talks eventually ran into the very same problem that stymied previous diplomatic efforts. The US, even under Trump, was not willing to countenance anything short of North Korea’s complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization, a position Kim paid lip service to but in the end was unlikely to concede even if talks progressed. Unfortunately, the talks did not really start; Washington and Pyongyang were unable to agree on which side should initiate the first move and what each subsequent step was worth in terms of corresponding concessions. The Hanoi Summit broke without a result after Trump refused to accept Kim’s offer of demobilizing the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in return for the US lifting the most powerful sanctions. Trump tried to resurrect his personal relationship with Kim in June 2019 with a get-together along the Demilitarized Zone (which Trump crossed) four months after the summit in Hanoi collapsed in mutual disappointment at the inability to sign a deal. Yet Kim’s experiences in Hanoi, topped by the humiliating journey back home after he walked away empty-handed, taught him to view anything Trump said with a giant grain of salt. In October 2019, working-level talks died after only a few hours, with Kim Myong Gil, Pyongyang’s chief negotiator, blaming Washington for recycling the same old position and uttering the same boilerplate talking-points.
Second Time’s the Charm?
Despite the disappointing track record, there’s no doubt Trump would like to pick up where he left off by resuming contact with Kim—if the North Korean dictator lets him. Days after beginning his second term, Trump replied in the affirmative when Fox News’ Sean Hannity asked whether he would reach out to Kim again. The 2018-2019 time-period clearly had an impression on Trump, who continues to remind people that his supposed good relationship with Kim helped prevent a war from breaking out on the Korean Peninsula.
Judging by the North Korean response, the resumption of diplomacy Trump claims to want seems nowhere on the horizon. At the moment, Pyongyang has expressed no interest in buying what Trump is selling, although has not publicly ruled it out either. Part of the reason may be that North Korea’s prior diplomatic attempt with Trump proved more style than substance. Another part may be that rhetoric notwithstanding, the Trump administration’s Asia policy thus far has been conventional and virtually indistinguishable from the Biden administration’s. In February, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio reaffirmed Washington’s “resolute commitment” to North Korea’s denuclearization as well as to the “ironclad commitments” to the defense of Japan and South Korea. On March 3, the USS Carl Vinson arrived in the South Korean port of Busan for joint military exercises. The fact that Trump sometimes rails against the inequities of the U.S.-South Korea alliance is cold comfort for Kim, who places more weight on actions than words.
Yet it would be a mistake to assume that US-North Korea relationship will be stuck in purgatory for the entirety of Trump’s term, for two reasons. First, Trump’s constant references over many months to the possibility of another discussion is not something Kim will ignore since it preserves his options. Second and related, Kim has proven himself to be pragmatic in his foreign relations and willing to upgrade (or downgrade) ties with foreign countries depending on the geopolitical circumstances of the time. If one lane is blocked, Kim adapts by searching for another. For example, it is difficult to envision Kim placing so many of his chips in the Russia basket if there was no war raging in Ukraine. That conflict has been a blessing for the North Koreans, who have exploited it to diversify the regime’s foreign relationships and lessen its relative isolation from the bad old days of 2017, when Beijing and Moscow were actually cooperating with Washington to penalize the North Korean economy for a barrage of WMD tests. At its core, Pyongyang’s strong partnership with Russia is about strategic considerations. Solidifying relations with another great power holds numerous benefits for the Kim regime—complicating US foreign policy in Northeast Asia, finding an alternative power-center to undermine China’s influence and scooping up the economic and political goodies associated with aiding Moscow in a war it regards as existential. A similar calculation drove Kim’s desire to participate in Trump’s diplomatic efforts nearly seven years earlier; cozying up to the US not only created the possibility of getting U and UN sanctions lifted but also forced Beijing, whose own relations with Pyongyang were faltering at the time, to seek to rebuild a rapport with Kim lest he sign a deal with Washington that was not in China’s interests.
How Ukraine Diplomacy can Impact the Korean Peninsula
In short, North Korea will keep all its options open because that’s what small powers do—they preserve their flexibility and adapt when the situation calls for it. The war in Ukraine was a building-block of a productive partnership between Pyongyang and Moscow, but Kim likely recognizes that the war’s end could slow this very same partnership down or even partially reverse it. In this scenario, Russia would no longer have urgent need for North Korean ammunition, missiles and personnel as it once did, translating into less leverage for Pyongyang and a heightened need to yet again reevaluate its foreign relations.
With Trump back in the White House, reviving nuclear diplomacy with the US could be a path for Kim if he’s pushed into a corner. Whether or not new negotiations happen with Washington will depend on a number of factors, including but not limited to the positions of the respective parties, who within the Trump administration is empowered to negotiate, whether North Korea’s still willing to engage in nuclear negotiations despite the numerous changes it has made to its own nuclear policy, and if it is, whether Washington and Pyongyang can find a suitable starting point down a long and tortured path toward denuclearization.
How Trump negotiates with Zelensky and Putin will be a factor in Kim’s mind as well. This might sound strange to some; after all, the war in Ukraine is separate and apart from the North Korean nuclear issue in terms of the main players involved and the history surrounding the dispute. Yet Trump’s behavior during peace talks, how he utilizes pressure to get what he wants and whether he proves to be successful at ending the war will help shape Kim’s perception about what a second term Trump can get done.
As it stands, the Trump administration is showing itself to be deadly serious about striking a peace settlement in Ukraine. Multiple rounds of diplomacy have already been conducted, with senior US officials sometimes meeting the Ukrainian and Russian representatives on the same day. Despite Moscow trying to slow things down, the talks have moved fast. Trump remains in a hurry to strike a comprehensive ceasefire by the Easter holiday on April 20.
More importantly, Trump has revealed himself to be someone who is not particularly concerned with the usual diplomatic niceties. Sticks and threats, not carrots and inducements, are his preferred tools of choice. This applies to partners as much as it does to adversaries. Zelensky, who appeared to take US military and political support for granted during the Biden administration, can no longer do so under Trump, who unleashed a rhetorical fusillade against the Ukrainian president during a February meeting in the Oval Office and suspended military and intelligence aid to Kyiv to coerce Zelensky into signing onto a truce. The pressure tactics worked. On March 2, the Ukrainians were still opposed to an immediate ceasefire. On March 11, a week after US aid was cut, Kyiv switched tact and catered to Trump’s position.
The full story has not been written. The ongoing diplomacy could go in any number of directions, and the North Koreans will be monitoring developments and tweaking their thinking depending on the outcome. If Trump essentially forces Zelensky into a settlement that caters to all or most of Russia’s terms, then Kim might make two conclusions: first, Trump is more interested in striking any deal rather than a good deal; second, if Trump can squeeze Ukraine into accepting a deal it does not want, then perhaps he could do precisely the same thing to South Korea if Seoul finds a U.S.-North Korea nuclear deal too weak. The South Koreans will be wondering the same thing for the opposite reason: if Trump can coerce Ukraine, what’s to say he would not coerce us too?
However, if the negotiations fall apart or Trump simply loses interest in the entire process, then Kim might think twice before authorizing an engagement policy with Washington. In the former, the North Koreans would be liable to view Trump as either a bad, inflexible or duplicitous negotiator, re-confirming an assumption about US policy that is already ingrained within the North Korean political elite. In the latter, Trump is at risk of being labeled by Kim as an unserious character more interested in the perception of historic dealmaking for domestic political purposes, not in crafting an actual agreement that resolves a long-standing security problem. Given his experience with the first Trump administration, it would not be surprising if this was Kim’s de-facto position today. South Korea will not be overjoyed if Ukraine peace talks fail but they may see a silver-lining in this scenario: that of an ally unwilling to throw a partner like Ukraine under the bus, even if it comes at the cost of a longer war or a failed diplomatic initiative.
Conclusion
Ultimately, all of these scenarios amount to guesswork at this early stage in the game. None of us know how patient Trump will be as negotiations proceed, whether the war will even end or how US policy will evolve (or not) if the diplomacy grinds down. But you can be certain that Kim Jong Un is not sitting still and waiting for answers—he is preparing for whatever answer arises and trying to determine how they impact his own policy with Washington.
6. DP calls on acting President Han to swiftly announce date of snap presidential election
It has to be around June 3d I assume.
DP calls on acting President Han to swiftly announce date of snap presidential election | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · April 6, 2025
SEOUL, April 6 (Yonhap) -- The Democratic Party (DP) on Sunday called on acting President Han Duck-soo to swiftly announce the date of a snap presidential election, triggered by the ouster of former President Yoon Suk Yeol.
Rep. Kim Yoon-deok, secretary-general of the DP, made the call, two days after the Constitutional Court ruled to remove Yoon from office over his brief martial law declaration in December.
South Korea should hold a snap presidential election within 60 days of the court's decision to uphold the impeachment of a president. Han is widely expected to hold a Cabinet meeting this week to set the date, with June 3 emerging as the most likely date.
Acting President Han "should swiftly announce the date of the presidential election and declare his political neutrality," Kim said during a press conference at the National Assembly.
He said Yoon's ouster does not immune himself from his responsibility for a criminal act, referring to Yoon standing trial on charges of inciting an insurrection through his martial law bid.
"A clear punishment should be handed down (to Yoon) to prevent an attempt to overthrow the democratic system in an unconstitutional and unlawful manner as well as by force, and to take away the people's lives and sovereign rights," Kim claimed.
Rival parties are gearing up for the upcoming election, possibly in June, to secure swaying voters amid deeply divided public sentiment over Yoon's impeachment.
DP leader Lee Jae-myung is likely to step down from party chairmanship around Wednesday to run for the presidential election. Lee, who narrowly lost to Yoon in the 2022 election, has been leading in early polls despite his own legal troubles.
Later in the day, the People Power Party plans to hold a meeting of its party members to discuss preparations for the upcoming election.
Rep. Kim Yoon-deok (L), secretary-general of the Democratic Party, speaks at a press conference at the National Assembly on April 6, 2025. (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · April 6, 2025
7. Assembly speaker proposes referendum for constitutional revision held on snap presidential election day
But what are the details of the specific Amendment?
Assembly speaker proposes referendum for constitutional revision held on snap presidential election day | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · April 6, 2025
SEOUL, April 6 (Yonhap) -- National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik proposed Sunday that a national referendum to revise the Constitution be held simultaneously on the day of a snap presidential election.
The move came as South Korea is gearing up for a snap presidential election after the Constitutional Court ruled to oust former President Yoon Suk Yeol on Friday over his brief martial law declaration in December. A snap election should be held within 60 days of the court's decision to uphold the impeachment of a president.
"I propose a national referendum for a constitutional revision be held simultaneously on the day of (the upcoming) presidential election," Woo said in a hastily arranged press conference at the Assembly.
"A constitutional amendment is necessary to further strengthen the pillars of the separation of powers to ensure popular sovereignty and national unity," he said.
South Korea has revised its Constitution nine times since 1948, when the South Korean government was established following the end of the 1910-45 Japanese colonial period.
Past attempts to revise the most recent Constitution, which was amended in 1987 to introduce a directly elected, single five-year term presidency, have failed due to the political power divide between a powerful presidency and a fractious parliament.
In South Korea, the president or the parliament can propose a constitutional amendment, which must be approved by a two-thirds majority in the Assembly and then by a majority in a national referendum, in which more than half of eligible voters participate.
Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik holds a press conference at the National Assembly on April 6, 2025, proposing a national referendum to revise the Constitution be held on the date of a snap presidential election. (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · April 6, 2025
8. N. Korea says 'proud' economic results achieved in Q1 after cabinet meeting
"Nothing from nothing is nothing." north Korea's sleight of hand or magic statistics.
That said, sales of weapons and ammunition and renting of nKPA soldiers to Putin is certainly having a positive economic effect for the regime.
N. Korea says 'proud' economic results achieved in Q1 after cabinet meeting | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 4, 2025
SEOUL, April 4 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has held a plenary cabinet meeting and concluded the country achieved "proud" economic achievements in the first quarter of this year, state media reported Friday.
The meeting was convened the previous day, presided over by Premier Park Thae-song, to assess the implementation of the country's economic plans for the first quarter, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
Vice Premier and Chairman of the State Planning Commission Pak Jong-gun reported to the meeting that "Proud outcomes have been achieved from the implementation of public economic plans in the first quarter," the KCNA said.
He also highlighted the need to combat "passive" and "self-preserving" attitudes among workers at workplaces, while childcare policies and farming issues were also discussed during the meeting, the report said.
In a report in January, South Korea's Hyundai Research Institute assessed that North Korea's economy appeared to have grown last year, marking the second consecutive year of growth. However, the growth was likely "limited" due to internal and external constraints, it said.
Seoul's unification ministry said last week that North Korea is believed to be receiving economic benefits worth US$3 billion from Russia in return for deploying troops to support its neighbor in the war against Ukraine.
Although this is insufficient to boost North Korea's entire economy, it is enough to fund leader Kim Jong-un's pet projects, such as the construction of hospitals, regional factories and other facilities for the public, the ministry said.
This file photo, published by the Korean Central News Agency on March 25, 2025, shows Pak Thae-song inspecting a farming house in Sinchon, South Hwanghae Province. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 4, 2025
9. N.K.'s Kim inspects service facilities under preparation in Pyongyang's new town
More smoke and mirrors?
N.K.'s Kim inspects service facilities under preparation in Pyongyang's new town | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 4, 2025
SEOUL, April 4 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has inspected major service facilities being prepared for operation in a newly developed town in Pyongyang, touting them as improvements for people's convenience, state media reported Friday.
Kim visited the service facilities in the third-stage section of the newly developed Hwasong area the previous day and provided field guidance on preparations for their operation, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) inspects service facilities in the third-stage section of the newly developed Hwasong area, in this photo published by the Korean Central News Agency on April 4, 2025. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Pyongyang's northeastern district of Hwasong, along with Songhwa, has been newly developed under a five-year plan unveiled by Kim in 2021 to build 10,000 housing units in the capital every year.
The first batch of 10,000 apartment units was completed in Songhwa the following year, along with 20,000 more units in the first- and second-stage sections of Hwasong from 2023-2024.
The third-stage section is currently being prepared for completion, with Kim claiming the completion of the final fourth-stage section would successfully resolve housing issues in the capital area.
The housing construction, along with another major construction plan to develop rural areas, known as the "Regional Development 20X10 Policy," is Kim's pet project aimed at improving the living standard of the people.
The KCNA reported the third-stage section encompasses various modern service networks, such as commercial, public catering, technical and recreation service facilities, designed "with strong symbolic and specific characters."
Kim, in particular, toured the Hwasong General Vehicle Service Center, where he reviewed operational preparations and remarked that its convenient processes would "satisfy the customers," according to the KCNA.
He also toured a 300-seat computer gaming center, North Korea's first public computer game facility to go into service.
He noted the ruling party considers it important to "steadily explore and expand a new service field in fresh forms" while implementing its policy to "radically improve the material and cultural well-being" of the people.
Photos released by the KCNA showed Kim's daughter, known as Ju-ae, accompanying him on the inspection, her first public appearance in about three months.
Wearing a tight leather jacket, she appears to have grown taller, standing nearly as tall as her father.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un inspects a service facility in the third-stage section of the newly developed Hwasong area in this photo published by the Korean Central News Agency on April 4, 2025. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (2nd from R) inspects a service facility in the third-stage section of the newly developed Hwasong area in this photo published by the Korean Central News Agency on April 4, 2025. Standing on the right side of Kim is his daughter, known as Ju-ae. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 4, 2025
10. US: “Respecting the Korean Constitutional Court’s Decision... Allied Forces’ Readiness Firm”
This is a Google translation of an RFA report.
US: “Respecting the Korean Constitutional Court’s Decision... Allied Forces’ Readiness Firm”
WASHINGTON-Park Jae-woo parkja@rfa.org
2025.04.04
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in-focus/2025/04/04/south-korea-impeachment-yoon-us/
Anchor: As former President Yoon Seok-yeol was impeached by a unanimous decision of the Constitutional Court of Korea, the U.S. government has stated that it respects Korea’s democratic procedures. It has also reiterated that the ROK-U.S. combined forces are firmly prepared. Reporter Park Jae-woo has more details.
The Donald Trump administration said it respects the unanimous decision by South Korea's Constitutional Court to impeach former President Yoon Seok-yeol, saying it followed due process.
The U.S. State Department responded to Radio Free Asia’s (RFA) request for comment on the same day, saying, “The United States respects Korea’s democratic system, legal procedures, and the Constitutional Court’s decision.”
He continued, “The United States remains committed to working with Acting President and Prime Minister Han Duck-soo and the government of the Republic of Korea until a new president is elected.”
He added, “The United States looks forward to a future of close cooperation that will bring security and prosperity to both our countries,” and “We reaffirm the enduring strength of the ROK-U.S. alliance and our ironclad commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea.”
Constitutional Court
Acting Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court of Korea Moon Hyung-bae speaks during the final ruling on the impeachment of President Yoon Seok-youl at the Constitutional Court in Seoul on April 4, 2025. (Reuters)
Earlier, the Constitutional Court of Korea unanimously dismissed President Yoon Seok-yeol.
This is the content of the announcement by Acting Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court Moon Hyung-bae.
[Acting Justice Moon] I hereby pronounce the order with the unanimous opinion of all the justices. Since this is an impeachment case, I will confirm the pronouncement time. The time is now 11:22 AM. Order, the accused President Yoon Seok-yeol is removed from office.
The U.S. Department of Defense also responded to RFA's inquiry that day, saying, "We reaffirm the continued strength of the ROK-U.S. alliance and our ironclad commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea."
“Our security commitment to the Republic of Korea is ironclad, and the combined forces of the ROK and the United States are a powerful deterrent to aggression on the Korean Peninsula and beyond,” said Pentagon spokesman John Supple. “Our forces remain prepared to respond to any contingency.”
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This stance is interpreted as a response to the possibility that North Korea may take advantage of the chaotic situation following the impeachment of former President Yoon to launch provocations.
South Korea’s acting president Han Duck-soo also convened an emergency National Security Council meeting immediately after former President Yoon’s impeachment, and said, “I urge you to maintain a watertight response posture against North Korea’s provocations and propaganda.” He also asked that “you actively respond to the impact of Russia-North Korea close ties on our security and consistently pursue efforts to promote the freedom and human rights of North Korean residents.”
Meanwhile, North Korean state-run media has yet to report news of former President Yun's impeachment.
When former President Park Geun-hye was impeached in 2017, North Korea quickly reported the news just 2 hours and 20 minutes after the Constitutional Court's decision.
Editor Kim Ji-soo
11. Foreign media: “Impeachment of Korean President, deepening political polarization”
This is a Google translation of an RFA report.
Foreign media: “Impeachment of Korean President, deepening political polarization”
WASHINGTON-Kim Ji-soo kimjis@rfa.org
2025.04.04
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in-focus/2025/04/04/south-korea-president-impeachment/
The Associated Press reported on the 4th that South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol was removed from office following the Constitutional Court's decision to uphold the impeachment. (AP website)
Anchor: Major foreign media outlets immediately reported the impeachment of the South Korean president, predicting that the deepening conflict between the two camps will not subside easily. Reporter Kim Ji-soo reports.
Major foreign news outlets, including CNN, the New York Times, and the Associated Press, reported the impeachment announcement of former South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol as breaking news on the 4th.
“The polarization between progressives and conservatives is deepening… It will be a task for the next president”
CNN reported on the same day that "this decision puts an end to a situation in which South Korea, a major global economy and a key U.S. ally, has lost its bearings during a period of international uncertainty due to a long-term political crisis."
He continued, “Former President Yoon rose to fame years ago for his involvement in the impeachment and imprisonment of former President Park Geun-hye, but now he is showing the remarkable downfall of a former prosecutor-turned-politician who has met the same fate.”
“South Korea’s Constitutional Court has removed President Yoon from office,” Reuters reported, “upholding the National Assembly’s motion for impeachment over the martial law declaration that triggered the worst political crisis in decades.”
CNN reported on the 4th that South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol was impeached.
CNN reported on the 4th that South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol was impeached. (CNN homepage)
The New York Times said that former President Yoon's impeachment was "the end of months of political turmoil," but added that "it has exposed deep fissures in South Korea's polarized politics, and the rift could be difficult to bridge."
The Associated Press forecast that South Korea's upcoming by-elections "will be one of the most tense since the country emerged from dictatorship in the late 1980s."
“South Korean voters are deeply divided along ideological lines, and this dismissal decision has deepened ideological polarization,” he said.
The Guardian said, “The next president will face the task of healing the current divisions and rebuilding trust in democratic institutions.”
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Chinese state-run media outlets such as Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television (CCTV) also immediately reported the impeachment on the same day.
The Global Times, a state-run media outlet that has been representing the Chinese government's position, quoted Lu Chao Liaoning, a senior expert at the Center for North-South Korean Studies at the Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences, as saying, "It will be difficult to resolve the deep-rooted problems of South Korean politics with the impeachment bill," and "There is a very high possibility that South Korea will face new instability and polarization within the next 60 days."
China's largest portal site Baidu and social networking service (SNS) Weibo also showed keen interest by ranking 'Yoon Seok-yeol's dismissal' as the number one real-time search term.
Major Japanese newspapers and NHK also reported on the impeachment of South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol.
The Yomiuri Shimbun said in particular, “There are concerns that the resignation of former President Yoon, who dramatically improved relations between South Korea and Japan, may also affect relations between the two countries.”
According to Japan's NHK broadcast, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba said at the House of Representatives Cabinet Committee on the same day, "We are not in a position to evaluate impeachment, but close cooperation between South Korea and Japan is very important not only for security, but also for regional peace and stability."
Editor Park Jae-woo
12. “Information inflow to North Korea is important… South Korea should proactively expand support”
I could not agree with this more, especially with the end of VOA and RFA. Though an alliance effort with both countries contributing would still be far superior.
This is a Google translation of an RFA report.
“Information inflow to North Korea is important… South Korea should proactively expand support”
Seoul-Handohyeong hando@rfa.org
2025.04.04
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in-focus/2025/04/04/north-information-resident-kimjongun-accountability/
Director Hwang Tae-hee, who is currently serving as the Director of the Unification Cooperation Bureau at the Ministry of Unification after taking a leave of absence from his position as a professor of political science and diplomacy at Yonsei University, speaks at the Sejong National Strategy Forum held in Seoul on the 3rd. (RFA)
Anchor: Experts have suggested that efforts to provide information to North Korean residents are very important, and that South Korea should take the lead in supporting related activities. Reporter Han Do-hyung reports from Seoul.
Director Hwang Tae-hee, who is currently serving as the Director of the Unification Cooperation Bureau at the Ministry of Unification after taking a leave of absence from his position as a professor of political science and diplomacy at Yonsei University, said at the Sejong National Strategy Forum held in Seoul on the 3rd, “It is very important to talk about human rights for the North Korean people and try to provide them with information.”
Director Hwang explained that if the North Korean people learn about their reality through the information provided and if General Secretary Kim Jong-un becomes aware that the North Korean people's perception is changing, a structure will be created in which General Secretary Kim will no longer be able to implement policies while ignoring the people.
[Hwang Tae-hee, Director of the Ministry of Unification’s Unification Cooperation Bureau (Professor of Political Science and Diplomacy at Yonsei University, on leave)] If the North Korean people know and know about their situation, an accountability mechanism will be created if Chairman Kim Jong-un knows that they know. If that happens, Chairman Kim Jong-un will not be able to do whatever he wants. It is actually very important to talk about human rights and to try to provide them with the information they need.
Director Hwang also evaluated that the August 15 Unification Doctrine proposed by the South Korean government last year accurately grasped the essence of the problem, saying that it was characterized by placing the North Korean people, not the North Korean regime, at its center.
He said that the case of German unification was also achieved through the choice of the East German people, and that it is important to strengthen the capacity of North Korean people and create a foundation for them to make their own choices.
Director Hwang also suggested that South Korea should proactively expand its support for North Korea-related information organizations, media organizations, and human rights groups, and establish strategies to strengthen the capabilities of North Korean residents.
[Hwang Tae-hee, Director of the Ministry of Unification’s Unification Cooperation Bureau (Professor of Political Science and Diplomacy at Yonsei University on leave)] I want to talk about people-centered, not the North Korean regime-centered. We need to separate the North Korean regime from the North Korean people, and create a foundation for the North Korean people to make their own choices. I think we need to take ownership and use this as an opportunity to proactively expand support for North Korean human rights organizations, North Korean information organizations, and related media outlets.
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“‘North Korea Radio Broadcasting’ Still a Key Means of Strategic Communication”
Sejong Institute visiting research fellows Andrei Lankov and Peter Ward also presented similar opinions in their report titled “Implications of the suspension of US VOA and RFA broadcasts and Korea’s policy response” on the 2nd.
They found that one of the most striking features of North Korea's information environment is that radio broadcasting remains a key means of strategic communication.
He also said that if one wants to induce change within North Korea, whether gradual or radical, strategic information provision through radio broadcasts is essential.
In addition, in the case of Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Voice of America (VOA), which are funded by the U.S. government, they have provided various information on the international community and life abroad along with content critical of the North Korean regime, and have played an important role in strategic communication between the U.S. and its allies toward North Korea for a long time.
They said that while the provision of strategic information is not necessarily intended to encourage revolution, if awareness of the inefficiency of the North Korean system spreads among North Koreans, the North Korean elite will also feel pressure to reform.
In addition, the North Korean reforms that will take place at this time are likely to lead to reforms within the system rather than a change of system, like the reforms promoted by the Communist Party in China and Vietnam (Vietnam), and as a result, it is analyzed that it can contribute to improving the quality of life of North Korean residents and alleviating threats to neighboring countries.
They added that the provision of strategic information played a major role during the Cold War, including the collapse of the communist bloc in the late 1980s, because it made people in the communist bloc aware of the affluence and freedom of the capitalist market economic system.
They said past cases “clearly demonstrate that international broadcasting is a powerful tool for expanding the flow of truth and raising awareness in closed societies,” and suggested that the South Korean government reexamine its support methods and management system for broadcasts to North Korea to ensure continued communication with North Korean residents.
The need to continue to provide information to the North Korean people has also been raised in the United States.
A public meeting held by the Public Diplomacy Advisory Committee under the U.S. State Department on February 26.
A public meeting held by the U.S. State Department's Public Diplomacy Advisory Committee on February 26. (RFA)
At a public meeting held in late February by the Advisory Council on Public Diplomacy (ACPD) under the U.S. State Department, Council Executive Director Vivian Walker emphasized that the work of Radio Free Asia is very important, saying that because the Internet is not available in North Korea, residents have to listen to broadcasts toward North Korea through the radio.
Julie Turner, the US State Department's special envoy for North Korean human rights issues, emphasized the importance of external information transmission at the 'Seoul Freedom Forum' held in South Korea on the 19th of the same month, and said that the influx of information into North Korea should be increased.
[Julie Turner, U.S. State Department Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues] Now is the time to focus our energies on increasing the free flow of independent information into North Korea so that the North Korean people can get the information they so desperately crave.
This is Han Do-hyung from RFA Free Asia Broadcasting in Seoul.
Editor Yang Seong-won
13. Editorial: S. Korea's top court warns of opposition power abuse amid Yoon's removal
An important insight and warning that most of the media has missed. It is very important that people understand what the Democratic Party of Korea/Minjoo party has been doing.
Editorial: S. Korea's top court warns of opposition power abuse amid Yoon's removal
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/04/06/XWIITYZIKRHADBR6SPFVWCGCGQ/
By The Chosunilbo
Published 2025.04.06. 09:30
Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung bows after delivering remarks on the Constitutional Court’s decision to remove President Yoon Suk Yeol from office at the National Assembly in Seoul on Apr. 4. From right are floor leader Park Chan-dae, Lee, and Supreme Council member Kim Min-seok. /News1
In its decision to remove President Yoon Suk-yeol from office, South Korea’s Constitutional Court also pointed to what it described as excessive impeachment drives and legislative overreach by the Democratic Party, which holds the majority in the National Assembly. The court said Yoon’s view—that the legislature’s use of its powers had paralyzed the administration—“must be respected.”
The justices noted that an “unusually large number of impeachment motions” had been filed, and for the first time in the country’s constitutional history, the opposition had unilaterally passed budget cuts without any increases through the National Assembly’s Special Committee on Budget and Accounts. The court also said that many of the Yoon administration’s core policies had been blocked by the Democratic Party, rendering them impossible to implement.
Against this backdrop, the court acknowledged that Yoon was under immense pressure to respond to what he perceived as a deepening crisis in governance. However, it emphasized that such political challenges must be addressed within the bounds of democratic principles. It concluded that Yoon had overstepped those boundaries by unlawfully declaring martial law and misusing his emergency powers.
Over Yoon’s two years and 11 months in office, the Democratic Party submitted 30 impeachment motions targeting figures in the administration. Of those, 13 were unilaterally passed and sent to the Constitutional Court.
During Yoon’s suspension, the party went further—impeaching the acting president and even submitting a motion against the deputy acting president. Among the 10 motions the court ruled on, nine were dismissed, with only the case against Yoon upheld.
The court also pointed out that all 41 bills vetoed by Yoon had been passed solely by the Democratic Party. It emphasized that the National Assembly should have respected minority voices and made greater efforts to engage with the administration through dialogue, restraint, and compromise. At the same time, it noted that the president, too, should have approached the legislature as a partner in governance.
While the court ruled that Yoon’s declaration of martial law constituted a serious violation of the law, it also recognized the Democratic Party’s abuses and overreach as threats to democratic order.
Shortly after the ruling, Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung acknowledged that both he and the broader political community needed to reflect deeply and take full responsibility. However, many of the party’s undemocratic actions were widely seen as driven by Lee’s personal efforts to shield himself from legal accountability. Now that Yoon is no longer in office, it is Lee who may have the most to reflect on.
Even in the wake of the court’s decision, some in the Democratic Party appeared to celebrate as if they had seized power. There was even talk of pursuing retaliatory impeachment motions against Acting President Han Duck-soo and Deputy Prime Minister Choi Sang-mok—remarks that drew criticism as politically motivated and deeply inappropriate.
Until a new administration is in place, Han’s caretaker government must contend with mounting external pressures, including tariff threats from the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump and broader national security concerns. To navigate this period, the Democratic Party will need to act with a heightened sense of responsibility and play its part in governance. That begins not with the posture of a victorious conqueror, but with a sober recognition of its role in bringing about a moment of national crisis.
Whether the Democratic Party now chooses to prioritize the national interest or to pursue its own political ambitions is something the public will be watching closely, and judging with increasing clarity.
14. Trump's Joint Chiefs pick opposes US military cuts in S. Korea, Japan
This was not even a blip on the media's radar screen.
Trump's Joint Chiefs pick opposes US military cuts in S. Korea, Japan
https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2025/04/02/2Z5QLN3OCBG7HAAS2PRQKNRYOI/
Caine calls for stronger US military presence in Asia, citing N. Korea's escalating threat
By Kim Eun-joong (Washington),
Park Su-hyeon
Published 2025.04.02. 15:21
“It is 9:48 p.m. in Beijing, 6:48 p.m. in Tehran, 4:48 p.m. in Moscow, and 10:48 p.m. in Pyongyang. As we sit here now, our nation faces an unprecedented rising global risk. Our adversaries are advancing, global nuclear threats are on the rise, and deterrence is paramount.”
U.S. President Donald Trump’s nominee for chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John Caine, called North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs an “immediate security challenge” and voiced strong opposition to significant reductions in U.S. military forces stationed in Japan and South Korea.
In a written statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 1, Caine warned that North Korea’s missile and nuclear capabilities pose a direct threat to the U.S. and its allies. “If confirmed, I will assess the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the President,” he said.
A retired brigadier general and former F-16 pilot, Caine emphasized the importance of continued U.S. military cooperation with Japan and South Korea, particularly through the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework. “If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for the Framework as a model for military cooperation, including joint exercises such as Freedom Edge and missile data sharing mechanisms,” he added.
Caine was nominated by Trump to succeed General Charles Brown, whom the president had previously removed from his post as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Lt. Gen. John Caine (Ret.) testifies during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on April 1, 2025, in Washington, D.C., as part of his nomination for promotion to general and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff./AP-Yonhap
When asked about potential cuts to U.S. military forces in South Korea and Japan, Caine highlighted the increasing security risks from North Korea, which has tested missile systems capable of targeting U.S. forces in the region, as well as key U.S. territories like Guam, Alaska, and Hawaii.
Caine also flagged North Korea’s persistent cyber activities—such as cryptocurrency theft and other illicit tactics—as a means to finance its missile and nuclear programs. “The DPRK conducts ongoing cyber activities, including cryptocurrency theft and adaptive cybercrime tactics, to fund and gather technical support for its military and WMD programs,” he noted.
Caine expressed concern over the 2024 strategic partnership between North Korea and Russia, stating it could further bolster North Korea’s military capabilities and destabilize the region. He warned that the growing alliance between Pyongyang and Moscow would increase the threat to U.S. interests and regional stability.
To bolster defenses against North Korea’s missile and nuclear threats, Caine called for closer coordination with U.S. military leaders, including the Secretary of Defense, Northern Command, Strategic Command, Indo-Pacific Command, and U.S.-South Korea Combined Forces Command.
Regarding the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) to South Korea, Caine emphasized that the decision would depend on South Korea’s operational readiness. He noted South Korea’s ongoing military advancements through multi-domain operations and trilateral training with the U.S. and Japan. If confirmed, he added, he would review existing plans and conditions before making recommendations.
15. Korean green card holders in US fear traveling abroad
What is happening to us?
Korean green card holders in US fear traveling abroad
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/20250406/korean-green-card-holders-in-us-fear-traveling-abroad
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International passengers line up to check in at Los Angeles International Airport, Nov. 27, 2024. Korean green card holders in the U.S. fear they may not be permitted to return to the country after overseas trips even if they have not violated any laws, amid heightened scrutiny at airports. AP-Yonhap
By Jane Han
- Published Apr 6, 2025 9:04 pm KST
- Updated Apr 6, 2025 9:15 pm KST
16. Constitutional Court’s ruling lauded for message of unity, democracy
Can there be unity or are the divisions too deep and wide?
Constitutional Court’s ruling lauded for message of unity, democracy
koreaherald.com · by Kim Da-sol · April 6, 2025
Court’s efforts to craft message of social cohesion may have delayed verdict, law experts suggest
From top left, clockwise: Constitutional Court of Korea Justices Moon Hyung-bae, Lee Mi-son, Kim Hyung-du, Cheong Hyung-sik, Chung Kye-sun, Kim Bok-hyeong, Jung Jung-mi and Cho Han-chang are seen during former President Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment verdict on Friday. (Yonhap)
The Constitutional Court’s unanimous decision on Friday to remove former President Yoon Suk Yeol from office is drawing praise for more than its legal reasoning. In its ruling, the court delivered a powerful statement on the importance of democratic principles, calling for national unity and reaffirming core values vital to protecting a constitutional democracy.
The 114-page verdict was written in clear, accessible language — an aspect legal experts say reflects the court’s intention to speak directly to the public. Observers also suggest that the time taken to finalize the ruling may partly reflect the care taken to craft this message of integration and democratic responsibility.
"Justices have shown a willingness to rule unanimously that the outcome will not vary based on the ideological leanings -- whether progressive or conservative -- of each justice," said former constitutional researcher Roh Hee-beom.
Customarily, an impeachment verdict comprises a short conclusion with three to four sentences — this was true in the cases of former Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Park Geun-hye and Prime Minister Han Duck-soo.
Instead, in Yoon’s verdict, the court detailed four different avenues Yoon should have pursued instead of using the armed forces, including seeking a political compromise within the institutional, political and judicial boundaries defined in the Constitution.
“It is difficult to see the conflict that arose between the defendant and the National Assembly as being the responsibility of one party, and this is a political issue that must be resolved in accordance with democratic principles. Expression of political views or public decision-making on this matter must be done within the scope that can be in harmony with democracy as guaranteed by the Constitution,” the verdict said.
In the verdict, the word “democracy” appears nine times, while “citizens” appears 13 times.
“Through a long period of deliberation and careful consideration, the decision was written in a logical and flexible manner that is easy for the public to understand, without being excessive. This respectful approach deserves praise,” the Korean Law Professors Society said in a statement.
Former Health Minister Ryu Si-min also commended the ruling for being written in “the language of everyday people,” which marked “a step forward” for the Constitutional Court.
Constitutional Court of Korea acting Chief Justice Moon Hyung-bae (left) leaves the courtroom with Justice Kim Hyung-du after delivering a unanimous verdict upholding the impeachment of former President Yoon Suk Yeol on Friday. (Yonhap)
Likely to be remembered as one of the most challenging cases in South Korea’s constitutional history, Friday’s ruling came 122 days after Yoon declared martial law and ordered the armed forces to storm the National Assembly. It also marked the longest impeachment deliberation in the country’s history at 38 days.
In the verdict's conclusion, the justices emphasized that the sovereign of a democratic republic is the Korean people.
Opening the conclusion, the justices cited Act 1, Clause 1 of the Constitution — “The Republic of Korea shall be a democratic republic” — with the following sentence defining the democratic system: “Democracy is based on a pluralistic worldview that trusts in the autonomous reason of individuals and assumes that all political views have relative truth and rationality, and is essentially based on cooperative public decision-making based on respect among equal fellow citizens.”
They concluded by stating how Yoon’s “unconstitutional and illegal acts are a betrayal of the people’s trust and constitute a serious violation of the law that cannot be tolerated from the perspective of protecting the Constitution.”
“As the president of all citizens, the defendant has a duty to unite society as a community beyond his support base. He failed to fulfill that duty,” the verdict read.
Following Friday's verdict, former President Yoon is set to leave the presidential residence in Hannam-dong, Yongsan-gu, Seoul, and return to his private residence in Seocho-gu where he lived before becoming president in 2022.
The conclusion section of the court's verdict on former President Yoon Suk Yeol (Constitutional Court of Korea)
ddd@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · by Kim Da-sol · April 6, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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