Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:

"Specialists argue that North Korea’s propensity to revert to provocations is so deeply embedded that it is part of the country’s DNA."  
-(unknown but some Korea watcher I am sure)

"Far and away the best prize that life has to offer is the chance to work hard at work worth doing."
- Theodore Roosevelt

"There are sadistic scientists who hurry to hunt down errors instead of establishing the truth."
-Marie Curie


1. The next great free speech debate
2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 6 (PUTIN'S WAR)
3. Ukraine War Update - April 7, 2022 | SOF News
4. Russia’s Military Troubles in Ukraine Could Be America’s in the Pacific
5. Inside Russia’s Secret Anti-Putin Resistance Movement
6. U.S. FBI says it disrupted Russian hackers
7. Ukraine Is Not the Leadership Case Study You Think It Is
8. USS Gerald R. Ford's Captain On Why The Carrier's New Island Design Works
9. Is Genocide Occurring in Ukraine? An Expert Explainer on Indicators and Assessments
10. FY2023 Budget Request Includes $246 Million for SOCOM
11. Opinion: Is a coup against Putin possible? Russia’s history offers clues.
12. Ukraine seeks arms from NATO as fight looms on eastern front
13. Why Putin Underestimated the West
14. Ukraine’s War Has Already Changed the World’s Economy
15. Why does the media report on secretive defense programs? Should this tech be classified?
16. China warns U.S. against House Speaker Pelosi visiting Taiwan
17. Why Cyber Holds the Entire World at Risk
18. We’re All Being Manipulated the Same Way
19. FDD | The Ruthless Realpolitik of the United Arab Emirates
20. FDD | Why the IOC Doesn’t Deserve Gold for Its Olympics Campaign
21. Russia’s Floundering False-Flag Narrative
22. Disinformation To Conceal War Crimes: Russia Is Lying About Atrocities In Bucha
23. Putin’s War on History
24. Black Swans ARE the New Normal | McChrystal Group



1. The next great free speech debate

This will be more than a debate. It will be a knockdown dragout fight. I cannot wait for it to begin.


The next great free speech debate
Axios · by Jim VandeHei · April 7, 2022
We want to prepare you for the next frontier in America’s free speech argument: putting the power of what you read, see and hear in your hands alone.
  • The concept carries a pedestrian name: the "decentralized" web, or "web3." But its consequences are profound — rewiring the very foundation of social media and speech policing.
Why it matters: Elon Musk, Jack Dorsey (co-creator of Twitter) and many others believe that you — not the government or social media platforms — should decide who and what you get to read and hear online.
Think of it this way: Right now, Twitter decides if former President Trump can post on its platform, and whether to delete a post about vaccines if it and most scientists deem the post misinformation.
  • In a decentralized web, you would decide if Trump appears on the web3 equivalent of your Twitter feed — and set your own thresholds on vaccine information providers.
 Speedy history lesson: The decentralized web is what the web you know was when it started. It changed because big companies stepped in and gave people what a lot of them wanted, which was not to have to make these choices.
 What to watch: Musk just bought 9% of Twitter, in part to push the platform to stop playing speech cop and move to a world where its algorithm (the technology that decides what users see) is open to everyone to see and shape.
  • The Musk camp believes all social media should move into this new state of being.
  • Not to overcomplicate things, but this is very similar to how we explained cryptocurrencies to you: Basically, we build a completely public infrastructure for all to see and contribute to, pulling power away from centralized authorities, like the government or big companies.
The dangers: It would be the Wild West of speech and power.
The rule-makers America has relied on since its founding — government and business — would be replaced by a brave new world of astonishing individual freedom.
  • Critics, who are powerful and numerous, warn that unsuspecting individuals would be subject to more fake, false or unhealthy information and would be more easily manipulated by bad actors. Most people don't have the time to study what’s real and reliable, and history shows how susceptible most are to harmful misinformation campaigns.
  • Supporters counter that the government and big companies are lousy at — and biased in — policing speech so it's time for something radically new.
So pay attention, folks. Oh, and if you want to go deeper on this topic, these are two good reads:
  • The Guardian breaks down the decentralized web in a simple Q&A format.
  • WIRED explains how we got here.
 Editor's note: This article appeared in Axios Finish Line, a new newsletter in the Axios Daily Essentials package. Sign up here.
Axios · by Jim VandeHei · April 7, 2022



2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 6 (PUTIN'S WAR)

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 6 (PUTIN'S WAR)
Apr 6, 2022 - Press ISW
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 6
Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko
April 6, 5pm ET

Russian forces continued to redeploy forces to the Izyum-Slovyansk axis and eastern Ukraine in the past 24 hours and did not secure any major advances. Russian forces completed their withdrawal from Sumy Oblast, and Russian forces previously withdrawn from northeastern Ukraine continued to redeploy to Belgorod, Russia, for further deployment to Izyum or Donbas. The Ukrainian military reported that Russia plans to deploy elements from the Kyiv axis to Izyum, but these units will not likely regain combat effectiveness for some time.
Russian forces may be preparing for a larger offensive in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in the coming days, but are unlikely to generate the combat power necessary to break through Ukrainian defenses in continuing frontal assaults. Ukrainian officials and pro-Russian Telegram channels both reported additional Russian equipment arriving in Donbas from an unspecified location in preparation for a renewed offensive. Russian forces continued assaults in Mariupol, and we cannot confirm concrete control of terrain changes in the city. Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Izyum-Slovyansk axis but did not make any major territorial gains.
Key Takeaways
  • Russian forces with heavy air and artillery support continued assaults on Ukrainian positions in Mariupol in the past 24 hours.
  • Russian and proxy forces in eastern Ukraine are likely attempting to consolidate forces and material for an offensive in the coming days.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations from Izyum towards Slovyansk but did not make any major territorial gains.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted successful counterattacks towards Kherson from both the north and west.
  • Russian forces completely vacated Sumy Oblast.
  • Russian General Officers are reportedly instruction commanders to severely restrict internet access among Russian personnel in an attempt to combat low morale.
  • The US and NATO should take a strong stance on any Russian threat to use its military forces in Transnistria, the illegally Russian-occupied strip of Moldova bordering Ukraine.
Ukrainian Military Intelligence reported increasing Russian censorship in an effort to combat growing morale problems among Russian troops. Ukraine’s GUR reported that Russian officers are intensifying censorship of their troops and restricting access to the internet due to low morale.[1] The GUR claimed that Russian commanders complain about increasing Ukrainian influence over the information consumed by Russian soldiers. The GUR claimed to have intercepted an extract from an order issued by the Deputy Commander of the Western Military District for military and political work, which blamed low Russian morale on the internet and social media. The document reportedly instructs Russian officers to either ban or severely censor all messages received by personnel, as well as access to the internet. Draconian measures to restrict access to information among Russian personnel will likely further exacerbate low morale and desertion rates.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:
  • Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
  • Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
  • Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
  • Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.
Main effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate main effort – Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)
Russian forces with heavy air and artillery support continued assaults on Ukrainian positions in Mariupol in the past 24 hours.[2] The information environment in Mariupol remains restricted, and we cannot confirm any further territorial changes. Independent Ukrainian media reported that international Red Cross aid was unable to reach the city on April 6.[3]

Subordinate main effort – Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued unsuccessful operations to seize Popasna and Rubizhne and continued shelling along the entire line of contact in the past 24 hours.[4] Ukraine’s SBU claimed on April 6 that Ukrainian forces in Donetsk Oblast confirmed that Russian units in the area contain conscripts and cadets of the Moscow Higher Military Command School, indicating the low quality of ongoing Russian efforts to replace combat casualties.[5]
Russian and proxy forces are likely attempting to consolidate forces and material for an offensive in the coming days. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk urges civilians to evacuate on April 6 and stated it will be almost impossible to do so following a major Russian offensive.[6] Pro-Russian telegram channels shared several videos on April 6 of Russian forces arriving in Donbas via rail, and claimed the videos are several days old and the forces have already deployed.[7] The Ukrainian civilian head of Luhansk Oblast stated on April 6 that Russian forces are deploying additional equipment to Donbas and are preparing for an offensive in 3-4 days.[8] The redeployment of damaged Russian units from elsewhere in Ukraine and low-quality conscript replacements are unlikely to enable a Russian breakthrough.

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; and fix Ukrainian forces around Kharkiv in place)
Elements of Russia’s 20th Combined Arms Army and 1st Guards Tank Army continued offensive operations from Izyum towards Slovyansk but did not make any major territorial gains in the past 24 hours.[9] Russian forces consolidated their control of Brazhkivka, captured on April 5, and began assaults on Dovhenke but did not capture the town.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces additionally intend to conduct offensive operations southwest of Izyum towards Barvinkove.[11] Russian forces may intend to bypass Ukrainian forces currently defending the direct highway from Izyum to Slovyansk. Russia is increasing efforts to deploy reinforcements to the Izyum axis. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 6 that Russian forces began using the railway between Valuyki station (Russia) and Kupyansk station (Kharkiv Oblast), which Russian forces began repairing on Marh 21.[12]
Russian forces continued to shell Kharkiv Oblast in the past 24 hours, but the situation remains unchanged.[13]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern axis: (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Ukrainian forces continued successful counterattacks towards Kherson from both Mykolayiv and Kryvyi Rih on April 6.[14] Ukrainian counterattacks in northern Kherson Oblast made minor advances, recapturing Osokorivka, Dobryanka, Novovoznesenske and Trudolyubivka.[15] Ukrainian forces additionally conducted counterattacks towards Kherson along the Black Sea coast, with fighting ongoing in Oleksandrivka as of 6am local time on April 6.[16] Russian forces continued to shell Ukrainian positions in Zaporizhia Oblast but did not conduct any offensive operations.[17]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 6 that Russian forces are attempting to improve their tactical position in the southern direction and may use Transnistria, the illegally occupied Russian territory in Moldova, to support this effort.[18] Russian forces in Transnistria will not be able to independently threaten Odesa and Russian forces around Kherson are highly unlikely to renew offensive operations towards Mykolayiv and Odesa in the near future. However, the US and NATO should take a strong stance on any potential Russian military use of its illegally occupied territory in Moldova against Ukraine.
Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)
Sumy Oblast Governor Dmytro Zhyvytskyi confirmed on April 6 that Russian forces have completely vacated Sumy Oblast, confirmed by local social media users.[19]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 6 that Russian forces withdrawn into Belarus from the Kyiv axis continued regrouping and preparations to redeploy by rail, and some Central Military District units have already arrived in Belgorod to reinforce the Izyum axis.[20] The General Staff specified that the 38th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army is preparing to redeploy from Belarus to Belgorod.[21] Any Russian elements withdrawn from the Kyiv axis, such as the 35th Combined Arms Army, are highly unlikely to be combat capable after such a short period of rest and refit.

Immediate items to watch
  • Russian forces will continue reinforcing the Izyum-Slovyansk axis and attempting to advance to and through Slovyansk to encircle Ukrainian forces.
  • The Battle of Mariupol continues, and it is unclear how much longer the Ukrainian defenders can hold out.
  • Russian forces have fully vacated the Sumy axis and are regrouping in Belgorod for likely deploying to the Izyum-Slovyansk axis.
  • Some Russian forces are likely to return to home stations in Russia while others will re-enter the fighting in the east.
[3] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/obstril-kozyatina-ta-gumanitarna-katastrofa-na-hersonshini-situaciya-u-regionah-stanom-na-ranok-6-kvitnya.
[5] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/donbasse-unichtozhili-podrazdeleniya-rossiyskimi-1649233976.html.
[6] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/vlada-prosit-zhiteliv-harkivskoyi-doneckoyi-ta-luganskoyi-oblastej-evakuyuvatisya.
[7] https://t dot me/stranaua/35157; https://t dot me/istorijaoruzija/52215.
[8] https://t dot me/stranaua/35111.
[13] https://t.me/synegubov/2821https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/289180696728349https://hromadske dot ua/posts/obstril-kozyatina-ta-gumanitarna-katastrofa-na-hersonshini-situaciya-u-regionah-stanom-na-ranok-6-kvitnya.
[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/288811783431907https://hromadske dot ua/posts/obstril-kozyatina-ta-gumanitarna-katastrofa-na-hersonshini-situaciya-u-regionah-stanom-na-ranok-6-kvitnya.
[19] https://www.liga dot net/ua/politics/interview/glava-sumskoy-ova-rossiyane-brosili-trupy-svoih-orkov-zato-vyvezli-unitazy-i-jivyh-telyat; https://t.me/milinfolive/80304; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1511458442279538704



3. Ukraine War Update - April 7, 2022 | SOF News


Ukraine War Update - April 7, 2022 | SOF News
sof.news · by SOF News · April 7, 2022

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, Ukrainian defense, and NATO. Additional topics include refugees, internally displaced personnel, humanitarian efforts, cyber, and information operations.
Photo: Javelin Close Combat Missile System – Medium (CCMS-M) is a man-portable, medium-range tactical missile system that is used to defeat main battle tanks and other armored vehicles. The Javelin system (US Army Acquisition Support Center) consists of a reusable command launch unit (CLU) and a modular missile encased in a disposable lunch tube assembly. Read more about the U.S. military program to arm Ukraine with Javelin anti-tank missiles. (Connecting Vets, Mar 2, 2022).
The Javelin (Wikipedia), along with thousands of other anti-tank weapons systems provided by NATO allies, has had a devastating effect on the Ukrainian battlefields against Russian tanks and armored vehicles. There will soon be about ten anti-tank missile systems for every one Russian tank in Ukraine (Secretary Blinken interview). Watch a 2-min long video featuring the Javelin (DVIDS, 2017).
Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).
Military Situation
A Long War? Many international observers of the Ukraine War believe the stage is set for a long-term conflict in Ukraine. Putin’s goal of extending the Russian empire by incorporating all or most of Ukraine into Russia’s borders will not be side-tracked with the temporary set back his army has experienced during the ‘Battle for Kyiv’. During testimony before Congress this week, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Mark Milley, predicted that the conflict will likely last years.
Ground Campaign. Russia has abandoned its planned capture of the capital of Ukraine. Its forces have retreated or been pushed back by Ukrainian forces from the Kyiv area. They have repositioned to the north across the Belarus border to refit, reorganize, and resupply. These units will likely move in a circular, clockwise direction into Russia, and then into the Donbass region to continue to fight.
Video – Armed Resistance in Ukraine. The concept of national resistance is where individual citizens participate in an organized struggle under state leadership to resist an aggressor attacking that nation. Ukraine has taken that concept and put it into action. Stephen J. Flanagan, a Senior Political Scientist, explains in this 2-minute long video. (Rand Corporation, March 30, 2022.

Tactical Situation
Kyiv. The region around Kyiv and most of the northern part of Ukraine has seen the departure of Russian units. Left behind is a path of destruction, burned out Russian tanks and APCs, boobytraps and unexploded ordnance, and dead Ukrainian citizens.
Kharkiv. The city was once again shelled during the night hours of Wednesday into Thursday morning (Apr 6-7). The second largest city of Ukraine, Kharkiv, located in the northeast of the country.
Mariupol. According the the Mariupol City Council, Russia is using its crematoriums to erase evidence of its war crimes. The bodies of residents killed in the conflict are being collected and burned. The fight for the city is still ongoing, with Ukrainian defenders holding out long after most military observers had predicted its capture to the Russians.
Russian-Occupied Kherson. In Kherson the actions of the Russians have been brutal. Numerous protests have occurred in the city of almost 300,000 residents; activities that are usually broken by Russian soldiers firing live rounds, tear gas, and stun grenades. The Russians are hunting down the protesters and detaining them. There are numerous checkpoints, Russian looting of shops, and shortages of food. The Ukrainian army is attempting to mount a counter-offensive that will recapture the port city. “Tear gas, arrogance, and resistance: Life in Russia-occupied Kherson”, The Christian Science Monitor, April 6, 2022.
Situation Maps. War in Ukraine by Scribble Maps. Read an assessment and view a map of the Russian offensive campaign by the Institute for the Study of War. View more Ukraine SITMAPs that provide updates on the disposition of Russian forces.
Refugees, IDPs, and Humanitarian Crisis
Refugees, IDPs, and Humanitarian Crisis. Around 7.1 million people have been displaced internally in Ukraine. More than 4 million have fled the country seeking refuge in Europe. Another 4,000 people were evacuated from Ukrainian cities on Wednesday (Apr 6), many from Mariupol. Ukrainians continue to flow across Ukraine’s western borders into neighboring countries. More than two million are now being hosted by Poland. The New York Times (subscription) reports that at least 2,000 Ukrainians are in Mexico along the United States border awaiting entry; a process that shouldn’t be too difficult as there about 100,000 people a month crossing the southern border.
Europeans have been exceptionally welcoming to the Ukrainians fleeing the Russian invasion – many opening their homes to the refugees. Resources are appearing on the internet providing housing assistance to Ukrainian refugees. An interactive map by CrisisReady shows the population density changes in Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. The maps can be used as a “signal” about population changes related to the Ukrainian invasion.
UNHCR Operational Data Portal – Ukraine Refugee Situation (Updated daily).
Cyber and Information Operations
IO in Russia. The propaganda battle within Russia is being won by Putin. His popularity ratings in Russia has risen over the past few months. This is the result of a steady flow of disinformation from the Russian state controlled-media and the curb on private media organizations.
Informing Russians and Ending the War. Information operations will play a decisive role in the outcome of the war in Ukraine. Information can help the Russian population to realize the true case of the sanctions and the true cost of the war. But more needs to be done to get that message across to the people of Russia. Tod C. Helmus and Andrew Radin explain in “Keeping Russians Informed About Ukraine Could Help End This War”, The RAND Blog, March 14, 2022.
Shortwave Radio and the Narrative. FM and broadcast television can only travel to just beyond the horizon. However, shortwave can travel vast distances. A shortwave signal cannot be hacked, bombed, and is very difficult to jam. The BBC World Service has begun a daily shortwave broadcast directed to Ukraine but that can also be heard in southeastern Russia. Radio Free Europe played a key role in the Cold War providing truthful broadcasts to the Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Perhaps it is time for RFE to return to its roots and follow BBC’s lead in restarting shortwave services to Ukraine and southeastern Russia. “Why the BBC World Service’s New Ukrainian Shortwave Service Matters”, The RAND Blog, March 25, 2022.
General Information
Agricultural Commodity Prices Rise Worldwide. The last 18 months has seen wheat, corn, and vegetable oil prices rise dramatically around the world. The Russia’s invasion of Ukraine comes at a time when global food and energy prices are already elevated. Russia’s attack on Ukraine has disrupted Black Sea agricultural exports of fertilizer, grain, and other agricultural products. The prospects for spring planting and winter crop harvesting in Ukraine remain uncertain. Read an international agricultural trade report by the U.S. Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service on how the Ukraine conflict is contributing to high commodity prices and food insecurity published on April 6, 2022.
U.S. Foreign Fighters. The U.S. State Department says that is is not a crime under U.S. law for an individual to go abroad for the purpose of enlisting in a foreign army. However, if recruited or hired in the America then it could be a violation and result in the relinquishment of U.S. citizenship. In addition, DoS is advising against Americans to travel to Ukraine, noting that Russia intends to treat captured foreign fighters as ‘mercenaries’. Despite these warnings thousands of American citizens, most with military experience, are looking to go to Ukraine to participate in the fight against the Russian invasion. “Regardless of the Warnings: Some U.S. Veterans Look to Join the Fight in Ukraine: ‘This Is What I Do'”, People Magazine, April 4, 2022.
Security Assistance and Ukraine. Overhauling Ukraine’s procurement institutions has facilitated the recent surge of security assistance to Ukraine. A lot has change from seven years ago when Russia’s military seized Crimea. U.S. security assistance provided from 2014 to 2020 ($2 billion) has certainly made a difference. “The Ukrainian Military Has Defied Expectations. Here is How U.S. Security Aid Contributed”, The RAND Blog, March 29, 2022.
SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, defense, or the current conflict in Ukraine then we are interested.
Maps and Other Resources
UNCN. The Ukraine NGO Coordination Network is an organization that ties together U.S.-based 501c3 organizations and non-profit humanitarian organizations that are working to evacuate and support those in need affected by the Ukraine crisis. https://uncn.one
Maps of Ukraine
Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.
Ukrainian Think Tanks – Brussels. Consolidated information on how to help Ukraine from abroad and stay up to date on events.
Weapons of the Ukraine War.
sof.news · by SOF News · April 7, 2022


4. Russia’s Military Troubles in Ukraine Could Be America’s in the Pacific

Logistics wins wars.  And logistics forces should not be "below the line forces." (I don't know if we still use that outdated method of "above the line combat forces" and "below the line support forces" for prioritizing funding and resources but if we do then we are shooting ourselves in the foot.)

A sober warning:
A long war carries obvious risks for China, but Russia’s experience in Ukraine provides reasons for Chinese strategists to consider a long war and its costs if they try to seize Taiwan. Given America’s logistical issues, a long war may be China’s best bet. A year of economic brutality and sustained combat might wear the U.S. down and force capitulation.
Americans shouldn’t feel encouraged by Russian missteps in Ukraine. But Moscow’s mistakes should cause the U.S. to consider its own difficulties in defending its interests and values in the Pacific.
"There is no instance of a country having benefited from protracted warfare." - Sun Tzu (except perhaps Mao's China fighting the Japanese and the Nationalists! - He did write a book on protracted war)

Russia’s Military Troubles in Ukraine Could Be America’s in the Pacific
If the U.S. doesn’t improve its logistics, a defense of Taiwan against China is likely to fail.
WSJ · by Seth Cropsey

The Russian military didn’t invest enough in logistics, despite spending lavishly on the polished hardware that appears in military parades. The Russian military, like its Soviet predecessor, remains a conscript force and has neither enough professional noncommissioned officers to maintain equipment nor enough officers trained in logistics. In combat, there is a major difference between a military driver with three years of training and an 18-year-old conscript with a driver’s license. The Russians expected a Ukrainian collapse, but logistical incompetence prevented Russia from supporting multiple fronts simultaneously. Russia has now withdrawn its bloodied units from northeastern Ukraine toward the Donbas region and has abandoned a significant amount of armor and artillery in the process.
It is tempting to ascribe this failure to authoritarian conditions and assume that American and allied armed forces would be immune to such incompetence. But the U.S. military may encounter logistical problems at a similar scale to Russia if the U.S. defends Taiwan against an assault by China. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) isn’t the Russian military, nor does it face the same operational difficulties.
The U.S. has one crucial advantage over Russia: American forces designated for immediate engagement have more resources and are more capable than their Russian counterparts. The U.S. Navy’s carrier strike groups and submarines operate constantly in the Indo-Pacific, with two strike groups and some two dozen submarines deployed. These forces could defend Taiwan during a week of intense combat around the Taiwan Strait and West Philippine Sea. But after a week American advantages would decline.
Unlike Russia, China wouldn’t need to operate at a major scale in enemy territory. Taiwan is 14,000 square miles, compared with Ukraine at 233,000 square miles. The Taiwan Strait is about 110 miles wide. The PLA’s current difficulty is on land. It doesn’t have the amphibious capacity to sustain a beachhead from which ground operations on Taiwan can be launched. But it has built a navy capable of high-end combat, with a large, diverse missile arsenal that can bombard any target within the First Island Chain and provide cover for warships moving into the West Philippine Sea.
Because of Taiwan’s limited antiship missile arsenal and restricted naval capabilities, Chinese aircraft and warships could return to the mainland to rearm, defended by a comprehensive ground-based antiair network. China would need to project power only 300 miles from its coast using long-range missiles and submarines to keep U.S. forces at arm’s length as it assaults Taiwan after disabling the island’s air defenses.
In contrast, the U.S. would need to sustain forces across thousands of miles of open ocean sparsely dotted with islands. The most important is Guam, America’s crucial Indo-Pacific logistics hub, which is vulnerable to Chinese missile attack. Improved missile defenses, and a permanent offensive U.S. military presence on Guam and throughout the Marianas archipelago, would improve the island’s defensibility. Currently, Joint Region Marianas has five home-ported submarines, no permanent fighters or bombers, and a seasonally rotated surveillance drone unit. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has yet to deploy a permanent missile defense system on the island.
U.S. military equipment and support would need to be transported to Guam or further to U.S. forces operating in theater. American warships have more experience than any other nation’s with the refuel and resupply of warships at sea. But replenishment in an active combat theater is dramatically different than in peacetime, and the U.S. has had few logistical obstacles in conflicts since World War II.
The U.S. can’t sustain the flow of men and materiel to a combat zone for longer than a few months. The U.S. Military Sealift Command is designed for peacetime sustainment, not wartime support. The Chinese military would target MSC ships with missiles and perhaps with submarines. There are far too few American-flagged tankers to fill the logistical gap, and the U.S. can’t depend on foreign-flagged shipping.
Even if a vessel is “friendly” flagged, international maritime transport is a fluid business, and actors fair and foul often use shell companies to maximize transport consistency and flexibility. An allied-flagged merchant vessel could be under indirect Chinese or Russian ownership and refuse to transport American goods or be compromised for intelligence purposes. Of the U.S.-flagged fleet, a significant portion would need to remain dedicated to domestic transport between American ports during wartime.
The U.S. could turn to its National Defense Reserve Fleet, a group of mothballed merchant and transport ships kept floating for reactivation in a crisis. Allegedly, this fleet’s Ready Reserve Force of 41 ships could be activated within five to 10 days, and ideally in under 48 hours. During a 2019 test, however, only 60% of these ships were seaworthy within that time, and only 40% could leave port.
Ready Reserve Force ships would need to be manned by merchant mariners. But the U.S. Merchant Marine is shrinking: Poor pay, long hours, low funding, and outsourcing have created an aging workforce. This restricted labor pool would be exhausted in months. Then the U.S. would face a logistical crisis on par with Russia’s, though likely without the collapse of morale and command that have occurred in Ukraine.
A long war carries obvious risks for China, but Russia’s experience in Ukraine provides reasons for Chinese strategists to consider a long war and its costs if they try to seize Taiwan. Given America’s logistical issues, a long war may be China’s best bet. A year of economic brutality and sustained combat might wear the U.S. down and force capitulation.
Americans shouldn’t feel encouraged by Russian missteps in Ukraine. But Moscow’s mistakes should cause the U.S. to consider its own difficulties in defending its interests and values in the Pacific.
Mr. Cropsey is founder and president of Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy undersecretary of the Navy. His books include “Mayday: The Decline of American Naval Supremacy” and “Seablindness: How Political Neglect Is Choking American Seapower and What to Do About It.”
WSJ · by Seth Cropsey


5. Inside Russia’s Secret Anti-Putin Resistance Movement

What is the assessment of the resistance potential in Russia?  

Is it viable and if we think it is then what are our contingency plans if there is a rapid fall of Putin and any of the scenarios that could unfold from a similar leader, a more responsible leader, or chaos and instability? 

As an aside, given our 2 decades of counterterrorism focus does our intelligence community have sufficient expertise and depth and in the range of political resistance (from non-violent to violent)? Does USSOCOM, the Geographic Combatant Commands and the Services and for that matter our entire national security apparatus? Or is this the province of national security "hobbyists" outside the mainstream because the establishment does not like to focus on these types of activities?

Inside Russia’s Secret Anti-Putin Resistance Movement
RISING UP
They speak only in whispers, but growing numbers of Russians think their president has gone too far and will eventually be booted out of office.

Published Apr. 05, 2022 8:04PM ET 
The Daily Beast · April 6, 2022
Photo Illustration by Thomas Levinson/The Daily Beast/Getty
Tens of thousands of refugees have fled the brutal regime of Vladimir Putin as outspoken critics and quiet Russian dissenters sneak past border guards to escape the Kremlin’s ever stricter crackdowns.
One of those emigrés, who we’ll call Anna, arrived in Brussels just a few days after the invasion of Ukraine to seek shelter with her friend Elena, a young Russian who had moved to Belgium some years earlier.
It was a WhatsApp message from Anna that told Elena their world had just been turned upside down.
Anna, who lives in Moscow, messaged to say she was in the bank withdrawing all the money from her account. “The war has started,” she wrote. Elena spent the rest of the day crying, unable to believe that her country had really invaded Ukraine.
Within days Elena welcomed her friend into her apartment. As a Russian, she has no refugee rights in Europe, unlike the Ukrainians fleeing Putin’s horrific war.
The exact number is unknown, but thousands of Russians have left the country since the beginning of the war for fear of persecution or because they feel they can no longer live in their country. They feel suffocated.
Elena doesn't believe she will be able to return home until President Putin has gone.
Meanwhile, she helps her friend and also sees her other friends leaving Russia—some have gone to Armenia, others to Turkey and Georgia. A diaspora of Russian refugees is being formed.
Those who decide to stay—either with the intention of challenging the regime or because they have no means of leaving the country—report a climate of fear and desperation.
“Since February 24, life has changed,” said Inna, a psychologist whose son, at military age, could be called up at any time to fight. She’s been having trouble sleeping or focusing on anything “I try not to read the news anymore, but it’s impossible to close myself in the house like a snail and stop feeling and empathizing.”
Police officers detain a woman during an unsanctioned protest rally over Putin's invasion of Ukraine at the Pushkinskaya Square on Feb. 27 in Moscow.
Konstantin Zavrazhin/Getty
She said that she worries her son might be drafted, but also, Inna explained, “I don’t not want our boys from poor villages to go like cannon fodder and become murderers.”
Like many Russians, she has friends in Ukraine. One of them lost his wife and 10-year-old daughter in Mariupol.
“We were brought up in Soviet times, we grew up with the phrase ‘if only there was no war,’ and now I am shocked by how many of my compatriots support this war. Whenever possible, when ordinary people write to me from Ukraine, I ask for forgiveness. We are to blame for allowing this.”
But there’s room for hope. Inna says, with a hint of excitement, that “some of my acquaintances who previously supported Putin's policy began to realize what was happening.”
In St. Petersburg, Katya, an activist, said that day the war started “was a day of horror, fear and tears, the first message I wrote to family and friends: “‘Russia has invaded Ukraine, [the war] has begun.’ I wrote this with tears in my eyes, considering myself a fascist, that evening I went out into the street, shouting ‘no to war' until I was hoarse.”
“My country is doing horrible things that cannot be justified.”
She went out several times to protest and challenge the regime until she was arrested and interrogated by an agent of the federal security service (the dreaded FSB) and a counter-terrorism officer.
"They tortured me with brutal interrogation, tried to access my cell phone to find out what [Telegram] channels I participated in. They said I was one of the organizers of the protest, but I didn't organize anything. They said I was on their special list and threatened to sue me for spreading fake news, a crime in the country, if I opened my mouth to defend Ukraine," Katya said.
She spent 24 hours in detention without being able to even contact a lawyer and said that "it was a kind of horror.”
Police block Red Square ahead of a planned unsanctioned protest against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in central Moscow on Feb. 24.
Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty
Via Telegram, Sophia, a camera operator from Moscow, explained to The Daily Beast that "practically everything has changed" since the war began. In addition to the price hike, almost all foreign stores have closed.
Dozens, if not hundreds of brands and companies have left Russia with no prospect of return. The biggest losers are ordinary citizens. “This all sounds very apocalyptic,” Sophia exclaims, also saying that “it feels like you have to get used to living with a depression-like feeling.”
She said she felt “incredibly ashamed because my country is doing horrible things that cannot be justified. It is a terrible crime that will not be easily forgiven or forgotten.”
The feeling is like “if a big part of you has died, you keep doing your things in automatic mode, but you see no purpose. You wake up and find that you have no more future and at the same time you understand that you're not the one being bombarded, that there are people suffering much more at this time,” she said.
And despite all the hardships Sophia opposes the war and Putin saying that he destroyed two countries, Ukraine with bombs and the Russian economy, “and our future.”
Hiding in an undisclosed location, opposition politician Aleksei Miniailo talks hurriedly on the phone. Nervous, he knocks over what he had on the table while frantically typing messages on his computer to friends and other activists.
Miniailo wants his name to be published as “it’s a way to protect myself, after all I’m a public person.” But it is hard to know if he will have any kind of protection if he is caught by the police. A historian from Moscow State University, he joined the hunger strike organized by Lyubov Sobol, a lawyer and close aid to Alexei Navalny in 2019. In the same year, Miniailo was jailed for two months on charges of promoting protests.
Now, he works with a group of academics, researchers, activists, and professionals carrying out a project in which they analyze opinion polls critically.
"We survey public opinion in Russia and explain it. The raw numbers are misleading because the country is at war, because in autocracies and dictatorships polls are not really representative of public opinion," he explained.
Miniailo’s day-to-day life is one of trying to stop the war. From his hiding place he talks to people, tries to persuade them to act and stop the war before Russians face even more dire consequences.
An inscription reading “No to war” is seen on an advertisement board as riot police officers stand guard nearby during a protest against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in central St. Petersburg on March 2.
Olga Maltseva/AFP via Getty
"Putin thought he was going to win this war in Ukraine in a few days, but he miscalculated. What I see now is more like the war in Chechnya in 1994," Miniailo said.
To him, the main problem is that “Ukraine is the closest country to Russia, it's a brotherly people. 20 percent of Russians have relatives in Ukraine. And if we can't dialogue with Ukraine, but prefer to launch rockets, how can we find common ground with any other country?”
This is why he is dedicated to digging deeper into the opinion polls. He believes that people are terrified, they cannot understand what is happening.
“All is not lost.”
In Reutov, in the outskirts of Moscow, journalist and human rights activist Evgeny Kurakin also asked for his name to be published. “I have been persecuted for my professional activities for 11 years,” he said with a certain indifference, adding that he has already been recognized as a political prisoner by the human rights organization Memorial—an organization that has been forced to shut down in one of Putin’s latest crackdowns.
“After being thrown out of the Council of Europe, we have been deprived of the right to appeal the decisions of Russian courts: The prospects in Russia have become completely bleak,” Kurakin said.
Whispers are heard everywhere. Even if they cannot raise their voices, society discusses the events and is not satisfied. The consequences are very heavy, and the propaganda is so blatant that people begin to distrust the authorities.
“I can speak based on my friend, I provide them with alternative information, and today they are already starting to question and ask the right questions. All is not lost,” he says with undisguised joy.
Like Sophia, he views the situation with some pessimism for the immediate future but believes that “the regime has hastened its demise,” and that it will not be sustained forever.
The Daily Beast · April 6, 2022

6. U.S. FBI says it disrupted Russian hackers

We need more of this.

U.S. FBI says it disrupted Russian hackers
Reuters · by Sarah N. Lynch
WASHINGTON, April 6 (Reuters) - The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation has wrested control of thousands of routers and firewall appliances away from Russian military hackers by hijacking the same infrastructure Moscow’s spies were using to communicate with the devices, U.S. officials said on Wednesday.
An unsealed redacted affidavit described the unusual operation as a pre-emptive move to stop Russian hackers from mobilizing the compromised devices into a “botnet” - a network of hacked computers that can bombard other servers with rogue traffic.
"Fortunately, we were able to disrupt this botnet before it could be used,” U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland said.
The Russian Embassy in Washington did not immediately return an email seeking comment.
The targeted botnet was controlled through malware called Cyclops Blink, which U.S. and UK cyberdefense agencies had publicly attributed in late February to “Sandworm,” allegedly one of the Russian military intelligence service’s hacking teams that has repeatedly been accused of carrying out cyberattacks.
Cyclops Blink was designed to hijack devices made by WatchGuard Technologies Inc (WTCHG.UL) and ASUSTeK Computer Inc (2357.TW), according to research by private cybersecurity firms. It provides Russian services with access to those compromised systems, offering the ability to remotely exfiltrate or delete data or turn the devices against a third party.
Watchguard issued a statement confirming it worked with the U.S. Justice Department to disrupt the botnet but did not disclose the number of devices affected - saying only that they represented "less than 1 percent of WatchGuard appliances."
AsusTek, better known as Asus, did not immediately return messages seeking comment.
FBI Director Chris Wray told reporters the FBI, with court approval, secretly reached into thousands of routers and firewall appliances to delete the malware and reconfigure the devices.
"We removed malware from devices used by thousands of mostly small businesses for network security all over the world," Wray said. "We shut the door the Russians had used to get into them."
The affidavit noted that U.S. officials launched an awareness campaign “to inform owners of WatchGuard devices of the steps they should take to remediate infections or vulnerabilities” and yet less than half the devices had been fixed to expel the hackers.
The affidavit noted that the FBI had carried out its work in cooperation with WatchGuard.
The announcement came amid a flurry of new sanctions announced against Russian banks and elites, days after grim images emerged of the bodies of civilians shot at close range in the town of Bucha. read more
Russia says its "special military operation" is aimed at demilitarizing and "denazifying" Ukraine, and it has denied targeting civilians.

Reporting by Sarah N. Lynch. Writing by Raphael Satter. Satter and Christopher Bing also contributed reporting; Editing by David Gregorio
Reuters · by Sarah N. Lynch

7. Ukraine Is Not the Leadership Case Study You Think It Is

The power of the narrative.

This is perhaps good advice for all those who try to apply military and warfare concepts to business (e.g. Clausewitz and Sun Tzu for business). Business is not a life death struggle: "The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected." -Sun Tzu

Conclusion:

Zelenskyy’s superpower wasn’t to “take risks” or “seize the moment,” as the social media posts and listicles claim. Instead, the Russia-Ukraine conflict provides a case study on the appeal of a powerful narrative and how to execute it to a country’s advantage. Think of Zelenskyy comparing his nation’s plight to the Holocaust in a speech to the Israeli Knesset or addressing European Union on February 24 and saying, “This might be the last time you see me alive.”

You’re not going to learn the playbook for effective propaganda in a business seminar or leadership retreat. When your country is in an existential fight for its survival, narratives matter more than charisma.

Ukraine Is Not the Leadership Case Study You Think It Is
Posted on April 6, 2022 by Dan Spinelli
Posted in Europe & Central Asia, Russia, United States
georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org · by View all posts by Dan Spinelli · April 6, 2022
Photo Credit: Boris Baldinger/World Economic Forum
Soon after Russia invaded Ukraine at the end of February, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy became, at home and abroad, a symbol of heroic resistance to Vladimir Putin. Through bold addresses from Kyiv and emotional, heartbreaking appeals to other foreign leaders, Zelenskyy gave a human face to the impact of Russian aggression—and burnished his own brand.
Zelenskyy’s remarkable rise did not go unnoticed by a legion of business leaders and social media influencers in the United States, who found in Zelenskyy a perfect example of #leadership. “This is a man who wants his people to know he is willing to make any sacrifice to defend his ‘company’ (the country of Ukraine),” read one typical post on the networking platform LinkedIn. Likewise, an Axios article urged readers to “be like Zelensky” with tips to “seize the moment” and “take risks.”
Business leaders have often drawn inspiration from military strategy. “Age-old principles of war can help keep your organization focused and motivated, improving its chances of achieving objectives,” a report from management consulting firm McKinsey noted in 2020. Even in mass culture, Americans have a tendency to compare almost anything to war—from professional football to “The Bachelor.” Our language itself is cluttered with war metaphors.
An idealized notion of war can make for a sturdy rhetorical device. There are heroes, villains, and boundless opportunities for courage and bravery. But real war, the kind being fought in Ukraine, is not some bloodless undertaking or fodder for a leadership seminar.
The choices required of a leader like Zelenskyy are unfathomable and reflect the uniquely pernicious way war cleaves our sense of morality from the customary frameworks we apply in peacetime. When you’re fighting for your survival, anything goes. And the more we start to think of war as a metaphor or noble abstract, the less we will understand its painful reality.
As On War author Carl von Clausewitz wrote, “To someone who has never experienced danger, the idea is attractive rather than alarming.” That same principle applies to social media, where the version of war that is easiest to consume tends to be the one that fits a simple, heroic narrative.
Many of us cheered the most powerful stories of Ukrainian resistance, such as the 13 soldiers telling a Russian warship to “f*** off” before fighting to their deaths and a fighter pilot known as the “ghost of Kyiv,” but these turned out to be tall tales. Even Ukraine’s most visible display of propaganda—those videos of Russian prisoners of war condemning their role in the invasion—are ethically dubious at best and probably violate the Geneva Conventions.
This wartime messaging, if not factually true, still reflects a certain kind of collective pride that must be powerful for Ukrainians. It certainly is for Americans. Already plenty of U.S. veterans have gone to Ukraine to fight. “It’s a conflict that has a clear good and bad side, and maybe that stands apart from other recent conflicts,” former Army officer David Ribardo told the New York Times. “A lot of us are watching what is happening and just want to grab a rifle and go over there.”
Zelenskyy’s superpower wasn’t to “take risks” or “seize the moment,” as the social media posts and listicles claim. Instead, the Russia-Ukraine conflict provides a case study on the appeal of a powerful narrative and how to execute it to a country’s advantage. Think of Zelenskyy comparing his nation’s plight to the Holocaust in a speech to the Israeli Knesset or addressing European Union on February 24 and saying, “This might be the last time you see me alive.”
You’re not going to learn the playbook for effective propaganda in a business seminar or leadership retreat. When your country is in an existential fight for its survival, narratives matter more than charisma.
georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org · by View all posts by Dan Spinelli · April 6, 2022

8. USS Gerald R. Ford's Captain On Why The Carrier's New Island Design Works

A lesson in carrier operations for me. A lot here I did not know.
USS Gerald R. Ford's Captain On Why The Carrier's New Island Design Works
USS Gerald R. Ford's skipper tells us about the pros and cons of a smaller island set farther back than on the Nimitz class.
BY HOWARD ALTMAN APRIL 6, 2022
thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · April 6, 2022
For Navy Capt. Paul “Paulie” Lanzilotta, 140 feet makes a world of difference.
That’s how far the island superstructure of the $13 billion USS Gerald R. Ford has been moved to the aft on the 1,106-foot long vessel, which leads a new class of aircraft carriers, compared to what's found on the previous Nimitz class.
Lanzilotta, who took command of the Ford a little more than a year ago, told The War Zone Tuesday that the design greatly increases the efficiency of launching aircraft, but also presents some challenges as well.
USN
Capt. Paul “Paulie” Lanzilotta talking to sailors in front of USS Gerald R. Ford's island.
The reason that extra real estate in front of the island superstructure is so valuable, said Lanzilotta, is because it allows more room for aircraft to line up and prepare to launch.
The Navy uses “cyclic flight operations to continue to generate sorties over many hours a day,” said Lanzilotta, speaking to The War Zone after wrapping up a panel on the history of aircraft carriers at the Sea Air Space symposium. “And we do that by launching the cycle and then recovering that cycle.”
It’s a very synchronous effort and if an aircraft has an equipment malfunction or some other problem that interferes with its ability to take off, such a pause on older carriers, where the islands are closer to the bow, can impede the process.
“If you're a little bit late, you need to troubleshoot, maybe it's just reset a system that's built into the aircraft, you reset the system and off you go, you can taxi to the catapult,” said Lanzilotta. “If you're parked after the island on the older ships, you need a break in the recovery in order to do that because everything we do happens very, very quickly, very efficiently.”
USN
The larger expanse in front of the island on Ford allows for more parking and marshaling of aircraft into launch positions. Here, T-45s and a C-2 make use of the ample space.
On the Ford, that extra 140 feet allows more efficient operations in the event of problems.
“So on my ship? Less likely that you're going to need that break and a lot more likely that I can refuel you and rearm you more efficiently. It’s based on the design of where the island is plus the weapons elevators and the way we fuel aircraft.”
Unlike other carriers, the Ford - which achieved initial operational capability last December - has three elevators instead of four, but they are designed to be more efficient.
The new design, however, means less room to the aft.
USN
A great comparison of the massive difference in the island design from the Nimitz class to the Ford class.
Lanzilotta does not see that as much of a problem.
“I still have room back there to park aircraft. Fly helicopters back aft of the island when we want to work and park airplanes back there.”
Another bonus with the new design, said Lanzilotta, is that the island is smaller overall.
“So if anything, I probably gained overall area on the flight deck,” he said.
USN
the CVN-78 design has three elevators instead of four, but the Navy says those elevators are in better positions and can work quicker, making the overall ability to move aircraft from the hangar to the flight deck, and vice-versa, enhanced compared to the Nimitz class.
There is, however, a minor downside to moving the island closer to the stern of the carrier, said Lanzilotta. “From a ship handling perspective, being further away from the bow kind of increases the shadow zone forward,” he said. This refers to the blindspot of sorts to the front of the ship that is exacerbated by how far the island is set back on the Ford class.
That’s a challenge that “we just manage, organically,” he said, “whether it's a sensor forward, to watchstanders that are forward, and additional assets that we naturally have with us all the time, like our helicopters, and our security boats and stuff like that... I’m amazed by how well we’re able to move in the narrow channel in San Diego Bay. It’s a great bay, but a busy one."
There’s another asset that Lanzilotta has at his command as well.
Nuclear power.
USN
There is no doubt about it, the Ford class provides an impressive and unique silhouette with its island set so far back.
“Because the ship's nuclear powered, I can stop my ship very, very quickly,” he said. “And very smartly, where I've got plenty of power to handle the ship. If I want to accelerate, I can accelerate well. When we're in a restricted waters transit, and I've got long shadows in front of me, I know that I've got, well, a lot more power than I need to promptly stop.”
That comes in handy, he added, when boaters try something stupid.
“Sometimes there are mariners out there that aren’t very smart, and they think it's smart to cross the bow of an aircraft carrier in tight quarters,” he said. “And I don't know how great his engineering plant is, you know, if you're on a small sport fisherman or something like that, if you lose your diesels right in front of me, I need to be able to stop and I know I can.”
USN
For the world's largest warship, CVN-78 is surprisingly nimble, thanks largely in part to the massive amount of power at her crew's disposal thanks to her twin nuclear reactors.
Sometime later this year, Lanzilotta will finally get a better idea of just how well the new island design will work on the carrier’s first operational cruise, and what, if any, challenges it will create.
“I think so,” he said when asked about whether the new island design will prove more efficient. “But when we deploy later in the year we're going to learn more and improve more. And that's an important mindset.”
When asked what lessons he anticipates learning during that deployment, Lanzilotta waxed philosophical.
“The sailors are smarter than most of us old guys,” he said. “You know, I've been doing this for 28 years. So I have my own predisposed notions of how things are going. I've got sailors that are younger, super-intelligent, and always thinking like ‘hey, why don't we do it like this?’ Or ‘let's try something like that.’ So that I'm gonna stay open-minded on it. So I don't drive the solution too much.”
Still, that doesn’t mean he doesn’t have questions about how things will go.
“I think maybe just you know, how fast can I go?” he pondered., “Not speed to the water, but how quickly can I generate sorties? What is our limiting factor? Can we work on that?“
Contact the author: Howard@thewarzone.com
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thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · April 6, 2022


9. Is Genocide Occurring in Ukraine? An Expert Explainer on Indicators and Assessments

A useful tutorial.

We cannot revert to "whataboutism" or the trope that "bad things happen in war." Yes they do but that does not mean we can't try to prevent them and when they occur hold the right people accountable.

But can we do more?

Conclusion:
There is consequently an urgent need for both greater preventive action and greater data gathering by the international community in tandem with Ukraine. The shift of frustrated Russian forces into a more consolidated occupation zone in east and southeast Ukraine is engendering a potentially catastrophic situation for the remaining civilian population. Readily releasing satellite and intelligence data in the buildup to the invasion was a wise move by Ukraine’s supporters, weakening Putin’s ability to legitimate his invasion internationally. This strategy should be continued to keep a constant spotlight on the Russian military activities in occupied Ukraine.
More robust action against the Russian military by Ukraine’s supporters is difficult, given fear of nuclear escalation. But the severe risk of worse atrocity crimes should intensify material support for Ukraine. In almost all cases of mass atrocities, the only truly effective tool to prevent or halt the violence is to defeat the perpetrators and/or push them out of their victims’ territory. These remain urgent and crucial tasks for addressing the situation in Ukraine.



Is Genocide Occurring in Ukraine? An Expert Explainer on Indicators and Assessments
justsecurity.org · by Jonathan Leader Maynard · April 6, 2022
April 6, 2022
(Ця стаття також доступна українською мовою тут.)
In the month since the International Criminal Court formally opened an investigation into possible Russian war crimes in Ukraine, evidence of severe abuses against civilians by the Russian military has continued to accumulate. This week, shocking images emerged from Bucha, on the outskirts of Kyiv, with civilian corpses strewn openly across streets, and the discovery of at least one mass grave containing dozens, and potentially hundreds, of bodies. On Sunday Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy publicly accused the Russian government of committing genocide in Ukraine, a view endorsed by leading Holocaust scholar Eugene Finkel, himself born in Ukraine.
What exactly do we know, at this stage, about the nature of the violence committed by Russian forces against Ukrainian civilians? As a scholar of genocide and armed conflict, I am wary of expressing absolute confidence in any claim about violence while it is still ongoing. When we are inside the “fog of war” it is extremely difficult to piece together a reliable picture of events occurring along combat fronts or in occupied territories. Nevertheless, it is increasingly clear that the Russian military has committed serious atrocity crimes in Ukraine involving both a) the indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas, including via cluster munitions; and b) targeted killings and rapes of civilians by Russian forces. On the Ukrainian side, there is some evidence of much more limited law-of-war violations by Ukrainian troops such as the mistreatment of Russian prisoners of war, but Ukrainian authorities have denounced such violations, said any such actions must cease, and are currently investigating the allegations.
Contrary to the apologists for such abuses, these sorts of atrocities are not simply an inevitable part of war. Studies have shown that states directly target civilians in roughly 1/5 to 1/3 of all armed conflicts – an unacceptably high figure, but one which highlights how most states, most of the time, make serious attempts to respect the legal principles of distinction and non-combatant immunity.
The fact that Russian forces have committed such atrocities in Ukraine is nevertheless unsurprising, for three key reasons. First, the Russian military has a nasty record of either directly targeting or indiscriminately victimizing civilians in both Chechnya and Syria. Second, the Kremlin has wrapped itself in a hardline ultranationalist ideology that sees a West-leaning Ukrainian state as illegitimate and a significant political and cultural threat to Russia – shattering the longstanding myth that President Putin is pragmatic and not ideological. This is precisely the kind of worldview commonly associated with atrocity perpetrators, and, as pointed out by leading historian Timothy Snyder, involves the effective erasure of any sense of Ukraine’s independent national identity, which Putin presents as an artificial deviation from a mythically unified Russian nation. Third, Russia’s war-effort has degenerated into a stagnant campaign in which conventional tactics have failed to achieve Putin’s aims. This represents a classic scenario – one similar to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989 – in which sufficiently brutal governments will often resort to atrocities as a way to terrorise their opponents to surrender.
The atrocities that Russian forces have committed against civilians already constitute war crimes and probably also crimes against humanity (for the latter they need to be part of a “widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack,” as specified in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court). This does not automatically equate to “genocide,” however, which has a distinct set of legal conditions laid down in the 1948 Genocide Convention, namely:
“[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”
These are complex criteria: in particular, the notion of “intent to destroy [a] group, as such” is fairly demanding, and has generated substantial legal and scholarly debate as to its correct interpretation.
In many ways, of course, the specific label we apply to atrocities in Ukraine really shouldn’t matter that much. While genocide is commonly referred to as “the crime of crimes,” atrocities against civilians are atrocities whether they are genocidal or not. The international community has acknowledged, at least since the 2005 World Summit, a responsibility to protect civilians from atrocities irrespective of whether those atrocities take a genocidal form. It is hardly surprising, moreover, that Zelenskyy would employ the language of “genocide” as part of his efforts to highlight these atrocities to the international community.
Nevertheless, “genocide” is a concept with legal particularities and implications, and one that is frequently misused by politicians – most obviously by Putin himself as a false pretext for his invasion of Ukraine. The term may also distort our understanding of ongoing atrocities, potentially in ways that impede effective efforts to halt or respond to them. It is therefore important to be clear on when we are talking about genocide, when we are talking about other kinds of atrocities, and when we are just not sure.
To firmly conclude that a given episode of violence is genocide, we need to piece together a complex mix of evidence on both the specific attitudes of the perpetrators, the pattern of violence they perpetrate, and the links between the two. Concerning specific attitudes, we do have mounting evidence of support for genocidal ideology amongst the Russian political elite. Most obviously, the rambling and historically inaccurate speech with which Putin launched his invasion effectively denied Ukraine’s existence as an independent nation, an idea he and other senior Russian officials have propagated for years. Importantly, on April 3, 2022, the Russian state-owned news agency RIA Novosti published an editorial that called for the Ukrainian people to be killed in large numbers on the ground that they were all essentially Nazis. “Denazification,” the author wrote, “is inevitably also De-Ukrainianization.” This is classic genocidal ideology: matching the kinds of justifications found in the Holocaust, the Rwandan Genocide, Armenian Genocide, and all other major cases.
The growth of such genocidal rhetoric is alarming in the extreme, especially given broader historical legacies of Russian and Soviet violence in Ukraine. But it does not itself provide direct evidence of policymaking or military planning. We cannot just point to military forces committing atrocities, then point to extremist government rhetoric, and straightforwardly conclude that these are two sides of a unified operation. Government rhetoric might be largely a means for mobilising public support, for trying to pressure the opposing side to capitulate, or for some other purpose and audience, with quite different motives or intentions actually guiding violence “on the ground.” Fifty years of research on genocide and atrocity crimes consistently highlights how a wide range of motives can underpin such violence, in ways often disconnected from official proclamations.
Data on the exact pattern of violence perpetrated by Russian forces in Ukraine, meanwhile, remains extremely messy. Even years after a war ends, it is often difficult to conclusively pin down the exact character of the violence: scholars still debate, for example, how far the killing of around 200,000 civilians, primarily indigenous Maya, in Guatemala’s 1966-1996 Civil War was driven by genocidal ambitions. It is even harder when atrocities and war crimes are ongoing. We know that Russian forces have committed atrocities, but we cannot reliably estimate their exact scale. We have alarming signs of possible planning for civilian massacres, including initial reports of the Russian army moving mobile crematoria into Ukraine, but many details remain unconfirmed. We know practically nothing about the actual orders behind specific killings of civilians and are only starting to get a sense of how organized and systematic the violence has been. It is no coincidence that leading NGOs responsible for monitoring genocide occurrence and risks – such as GenocideWatch or the Early Warning Project of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum – have not issued a genocide risk warning alert for the Ukraine, yet. (It’s worth noting that they do have such alerts active for other states receiving little attention in the world’s media: including in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and India).
Consequently, on the basis of available evidence, we are not currently at the stage where we can confidently confirm (or disconfirm) that the Russian government is committing genocide in Ukraine. But – and this is crucial – we can reach two equally critical conclusions. First, Russian forces are committing atrocity crimes in Ukraine and the international community has a responsibility to respond to such crimes. Moreover, these crimes are highly likely to constitute mass atrocities: typically used to refer to cases with 1,000 or more direct civilian victims of atrocity crimes (note that this excludes the larger number of civilians killed or injured in the conflict by other means). Any large-scale atrocity crimes of this kind should be of massive moral and political concern to the world and generate urgent condemnation and responsive action.
Second, the risk of more expansive atrocities in Ukraine, including outright genocide, is escalating. There has been a visible increase of genocidal rhetoric in government-approved outlets, coupled with the ongoing failure of major Russian advances. Putin’s regime is deeply entrenched yet desperately fearful. This combination of factors is exceptionally dangerous. We should expect to see substantially more evidence of Russian forces’ violence against civilians emerge over the coming days and weeks, as the Ukrainians retake control of areas previously occupied or under assault. It is possible that this evidence may either show that genocide has already been committed, or that previous violence is now escalating toward the point of genocide.
There is consequently an urgent need for both greater preventive action and greater data gathering by the international community in tandem with Ukraine. The shift of frustrated Russian forces into a more consolidated occupation zone in east and southeast Ukraine is engendering a potentially catastrophic situation for the remaining civilian population. Readily releasing satellite and intelligence data in the buildup to the invasion was a wise move by Ukraine’s supporters, weakening Putin’s ability to legitimate his invasion internationally. This strategy should be continued to keep a constant spotlight on the Russian military activities in occupied Ukraine.
More robust action against the Russian military by Ukraine’s supporters is difficult, given fear of nuclear escalation. But the severe risk of worse atrocity crimes should intensify material support for Ukraine. In almost all cases of mass atrocities, the only truly effective tool to prevent or halt the violence is to defeat the perpetrators and/or push them out of their victims’ territory. These remain urgent and crucial tasks for addressing the situation in Ukraine.
Image: A man gestures at a mass grave in the town of Bucha, northwest of the Ukrainian capital Kyiv on April 3, 2022. Ukraine and Western nations accused Russian troops of war crimes after the discovery of mass graves and “executed” civilians near Kyiv, prompting vows of action at the International Criminal Court (Photo by SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images).
Jonathan Leader Maynard (@jleadermaynard) is a Lecturer in International Politics at King’s College London, where he works on genocide, atrocity crimes and ideological dynamics of political violence. His new book, Ideology and Mass Killing: The Radicalized Security Politics of Genocides and Deadly Atrocities, will be released by Oxford University Press in June 2022.
justsecurity.org · by Jonathan Leader Maynard · April 6, 2022


10. FY2023 Budget Request Includes $246 Million for SOCOM
Nine aircraft does not seem like it could provide sufficient coverage for 270 SF ODAs and 48 SEAL platoons and some number of Marine Special Operations Teams and associated AFSOC STS, CCT, etc, potentially operating in very dispersed locations around the world.

This will be a low density high demand asset that will likely only be used for the highest priority operations among certain units.

Excerpts:
This year's budget request includes funding for U.S. Special Operations Command to advance efforts to put smaller aircraft, uniquely suited to Special Operations Forces needs, in the skies over special operators.
"The budget ... supports the 'Armed Overwatch' program to ensure our SOF have the required support in remote and austere environments where they operate," said Christopher P. Maier, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, during testimony Tuesday before the Senate Armed Services Committee.
About $246 million for nine aircraft was requested this year to support procurement within USSOCOM’s Armed Overwatch program so that SOF deployed to remote locations can get the close air support, precision strike capability, airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities they need to execute their missions. 
"The investment into the Armed Overwatch program will ensure that this dedicated capability exists, allowing high-end fighter aircraft to orient towards other critical needs," wrote Maier in submitted testimony to the SASC. "The Armed Overwatch platform will deliver a capability that ensures our SOF can continue to operate wherever we need them, whenever they are needed."

FY2023 Budget Request Includes $246 Million for SOCOM
defense.gov · by C. Todd Lopez
Special operators need an eye-in-the sky to look out for them as they operate in dangerous environments across the globe. And it's not always practical for that overwatch to come from high-end combat fighter jets, which are better suited for countering threats from nation states.

Field Training
Students in the Special Operations Combat Medic Course at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School react to simulated enemy fire during field training at Fort Bragg, N.C., March 24, 2020.
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Photo By: K. Kassens, Army
VIRIN: 200324-A-OP908-927
This year's budget request includes funding for U.S. Special Operations Command to advance efforts to put smaller aircraft, uniquely suited to Special Operations Forces needs, in the skies over special operators.
"The budget ... supports the 'Armed Overwatch' program to ensure our SOF have the required support in remote and austere environments where they operate," said Christopher P. Maier, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, during testimony Tuesday before the Senate Armed Services Committee.
About $246 million for nine aircraft was requested this year to support procurement within USSOCOM’s Armed Overwatch program so that SOF deployed to remote locations can get the close air support, precision strike capability, airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities they need to execute their missions.
"The investment into the Armed Overwatch program will ensure that this dedicated capability exists, allowing high-end fighter aircraft to orient towards other critical needs," wrote Maier in submitted testimony to the SASC. "The Armed Overwatch platform will deliver a capability that ensures our SOF can continue to operate wherever we need them, whenever they are needed."
The budget request also seeks funding to support SOF Undersea program, Maier said, which includes both manned and unmanned underwater systems to provide intelligence and transport capabilities to special operators.
"We are working with the Department of the Navy to ensure the integration of modernized SOF operational concepts and investments intended to facilitate access in denied areas and greater range for longer periods of time with less risk to the operator," Maier said.
Maier told lawmakers this is the first year that both the Armed Overwatch and the Undersea programs have been formally designated as "special interest" acquisition programs.
"[This ensures] more comprehensive oversight so that any problems or issues may be identified early and rapidly remedied," Maier said.

Parachuting Exercise
U.S. Marines board a CH-47 Chinook to perform a high-altitude parachuting exercise as part of Operation Emerald Warrior, May 6, 2014, at Stennis International Airport, Kiln, Miss. Operation Emerald Warrior is a multinational, joint force training exercise sponsored by Special Operations Command.
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Photo By: Army Spc. Connie A. Jones, National Guard
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Also part of the budget request, Maier said, is continued funding to support USSOCOM's most important asset, which are its people.
"As reflected in the FY23 budget, we continue to invest in the health and well-being of our SOF warriors and their families," he said. "Our flagship Preservation of the Force and Families program, or POTFF, complements service-administered programs to address the unique physical, cognitive, psychological and spiritual health needs of our SOF community."
Maier also thanked lawmakers for allowing the POTFF program to be extended to Gold Star families — the families of SOF servicemen and women killed while on duty. Congress made that possible through language in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022.
"[This will] enable the SOF enterprise to extend the POTFF family support program to our Gold Star families and embrace surviving families as important members of the SOF community," Maier said.
defense.gov · by C. Todd Lopez


11. Opinion: Is a coup against Putin possible? Russia’s history offers clues.

Excerpt:

Although Putin seems to have his bases covered, the fates of Beria and Khrushchev have shown that loyalties can shift when the Kremlin is in crisis. Bortnikov could conceivably become another Semichastny and switch camps to save his own skin. Even Shoigu and Zolotov, faced with a coalition of Putin’s opponents, might consider jumping ship, just as Beria’s lieutenants did. But one thing seems certain: Any coup attempt against Putin would probably be the most perilous, high-risk operation in Kremlin history.


Opinion: Is a coup against Putin possible? Russia’s history offers clues.
By Amy Knight
Yesterday at 4:25 p.m. EDT
Amy Knight is the author of six books on Russian history and politics, including, most recently, “Orders to Kill: The Putin Regime and Political Murder.”
Vladimir Putin has never faced a serious challenge to his power. But his disastrous war in Ukraine could change that.
The chances of a popular uprising against the Kremlin remain low. A recent poll from Russia’s independent Levada Center shows that 83 percent of Russians approved of Putin’s performance as president in March, up from 71 percent in the previous month. Most Russians have minimal access to information outside of state-controlled propaganda, and anyone who dares to take to the streets faces draconian punishments.
The most likely threat to his rule comes from within the regime. Russia’s history offers some insights.
There have been two successful coups d’état since the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917 — the overthrow of Stalin’s dreaded secret police chief Lavrenti Beria in June 1953 and the ouster of Communist Party First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev in October 1964. Aside from the execution of Beria and six of his associates, these coups were relatively bloodless. In both cases, the support of the security services and the Soviet military were crucial to their success.
After Stalin’s death in March 1953, Beria’s fellow Presidium members, led by Khrushchev, became alarmed over his increasing power and his anti-Stalinist policies. But getting rid of Beria was a challenge, because he headed the powerful Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), which combined both the regular police and the security services. The plotters were able to rely on Soviet military leaders, including Defense Minister Nikolai Bulganin and Marshal Georgy Zhukov, who had a deep animosity toward Beria and the MVD, for support in arresting an unsuspecting Beria at a hastily convened leadership meeting.
Although the operation was successful — Beria was tried and shot the following December — it was highly risky, and the Khrushchev group faced considerable danger as they subdued potential opposition from the Beria camp over the days following his arrest. But they managed — with promises of promotions — to persuade Beria’s two seemingly loyal deputies, Sergei Kruglov and Ivan Serov, to betray their boss and keep rank-and-file MVD officers in line.
Khrushchev’s ouster 11 years later was an equally perilous operation for Leonid Brezhnev and his Politburo colleagues, who had decided that Khrushchev was overstepping the bounds of their collective leadership. Brezhnev was reportedly so terrified that his plan would backfire that had the commander of his personal guard spend nights outside his door with an automatic weapon. And there were vacillations: Before agreeing to go along with Brezhnev, key Politburo members Aleksei Kosygin and Mikhail Suslov demanded assurances that the plot had the backing of both the military and the KGB.
KGB chief Vladimir Semichastny played a pivotal role. He met Khrushchev at the airport upon his return from a Black Sea vacation and informed him that he was out of his job. Flanked by a group of KGB guards, Semichastny warned Khrushchev not to resist. Khrushchev, who had appointed Semichastny to his KGB post and considered him a close ally, felt deeply betrayed, but he accepted his fate and the transfer of power took place smoothly.
Efforts to depose Putin would require either active or passive support from three key organizations — the military, the FSB (successor to the KGB) and the National Guard (“Rosgvardiya”). Putin has firm allies in place in all of these institutions. FSB Chief Aleksandr Bortnikov belongs to Putin’s Leningrad/St. Petersburg clan of former KGB officers and is a direct protege of Putin and National Security Council chief Nikolai Patrushev, who Bortnikov replaced as FSB chief in 2008. The FSB has its own special troops and a vast network of counterintelligence officers to watch over the military.
Although not from St. Petersburg or a KGB veteran, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has worked closely with Putin for years, first as minister of emergency situations and since 2012 in his defense job. Putin and Shoigu have displayed their friendship publicly, filmed for television as they vacationed together in Shoigu’s native Siberia. And at the Russian Security Council meeting in February, Shoigu, whose army numbers around 900,000 active personnel, endorsed the invasion of Ukraine wholeheartedly.
Russian National Guard chief Viktor Zolotov probably has Putin’s greatest trust. Zolotov first met Putin in the early 1990s while working as a bodyguard for Putin’s boss, St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak. From 2000 to 2013, he headed the Presidential Security Service, the agency responsible for the president’s personal protection. When Putin created the National Guard in 2016, he placed Zolotov at the helm. The MVD’s internal troops were transferred to this new agency, along with other special forces, giving it a troop strength of around 340,000 and the potential power to keep both the masses and elite in line.
Although Putin seems to have his bases covered, the fates of Beria and Khrushchev have shown that loyalties can shift when the Kremlin is in crisis. Bortnikov could conceivably become another Semichastny and switch camps to save his own skin. Even Shoigu and Zolotov, faced with a coalition of Putin’s opponents, might consider jumping ship, just as Beria’s lieutenants did. But one thing seems certain: Any coup attempt against Putin would probably be the most perilous, high-risk operation in Kremlin history.

12. Ukraine seeks arms from NATO as fight looms on eastern front

De Oppresso Liber: Help the oppressed (or those threatened with oppression) free themselves.

Excerpts:
“My agenda is very simple… it’s weapons, weapons and weapons,” Kuleba said as he arrived at NATO headquarters for talks with the military organization’s foreign ministers about Ukraine’s fight to defend itself.
“The more weapons we get and the sooner they arrive in Ukraine, the more human lives will be saved,” he said.
Some NATO nations worry they may be Russia’s next target, but the alliance is striving to avoid actions that might pull any of its 30 members directly into the war. Still, he NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg urged member nations to send Ukraine more weapons, and not just defensive arms.
“Ukraine is fighting a defensive war, so this distinction between offensive and defensive weapons doesn’t actually have any real meaning,” he said.


Ukraine seeks arms from NATO as fight looms on eastern front
AP · by ADAM SCHRECK · April 7, 2022
KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Ukraine told residents of its industrial heartland to leave while they still can and urged Western nations to send “weapons, weapons, weapons” Thursday after Russian forces withdrew from the shattered outskirts of Kyiv to regroup for an offensive in the country’s east.
Russia’s six-week-old invasion failed to take Ukraine’s capital quickly and achieve what Western countries say was President Vladimir Putin’s initial aim to oust the Ukrainian government. Russia’s focus is now on the Donbas, a mostly Russian-speaking region in eastern Ukraine.
In Brussels, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba urged NATO to provide more weapons for his war-torn country to help prevent further atrocities like those reported in Kyiv’s northern suburbs. Ukrainian authorities are working to identify hundreds of bodies they say were found in Bucha and other towns after Russian troops withdrew and to document what they say were war crimes.
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“My agenda is very simple… it’s weapons, weapons and weapons,” Kuleba said as he arrived at NATO headquarters for talks with the military organization’s foreign ministers about Ukraine’s fight to defend itself.
“The more weapons we get and the sooner they arrive in Ukraine, the more human lives will be saved,” he said.
Some NATO nations worry they may be Russia’s next target, but the alliance is striving to avoid actions that might pull any of its 30 members directly into the war. Still, he NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg urged member nations to send Ukraine more weapons, and not just defensive arms.
“Ukraine is fighting a defensive war, so this distinction between offensive and defensive weapons doesn’t actually have any real meaning,” he said.


Western countries have provided Ukraine with portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, but they have been reluctant to supply aircraft or tanks plus any equipment that Ukrainian troops would have to be trained to use.
Asked what more his country was seeking, Kuleba listed planes, land-based missiles, armored vehicles and air defense systems.
A U.S. defense official speaking on condition of anonymity said Russia had pulled all of its estimated 24,000 or more troops from the Kyiv and Chernihiv areas in the north, sending them into Belarus or Russia to resupply, reorganize and likely prepare to return to fight in the east.
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Growing numbers of Putin’s troops, along with mercenaries, have been reported moving into the Donbas, where Russia-backed separatists have fought Ukrainian forces for eight years and control two areas.
Ahead of its Feb. 24 invasion, Moscow recognized the Luhansk and Donetsk areas as independent states. Military analysts have said Putin also could be seeking to expand into government-controlled parts of the Donbas.
Donetsk Gov. Pavlo Kyrylenko said at least five civilians were killed and another eight were wounded by Russian shelling on Wednesday. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk urged civilians to evacuate to safer regions before it was too late.
“Later, people will come under fire, and we won’t be able to do anything to help them,” ,” Vereshchuk said.
Another Western official, also speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence estimates, said it may take Russia’s battle-damaged forces as much as a month to regroup for a major push on eastern Ukraine.
Oleksandr Shputun, spokesman for the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, reported Thursday that near Donbas, Ukraine’s second-largest city, Kharkiv, remained blockaded. He said Russian forces also were carrying out “brutal measures” in the southern Kherson region, which they hold.
In his nightly address to the nation late Wednesday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine, too, was preparing for battle.
“We will fight and we will not retreat,” he said. “We will seek all possible options to defend ourselves until Russia begins to seriously seek peace. This is our land. This is our future. And we won’t give them up.”
In areas north of the capital, Ukrainian officials gathered evidence of Russian atrocities amid signs Moscow’s troops killed people indiscriminately before retreating.
Ukrainian authorities said the bodies of least 410 civilians were found in towns around Kyiv, victims of what Zelenskyy has portrayed as a Russian campaign of murder, rape, dismemberment and torture. Some victims had apparently been shot at close range. Some were found with their hands bound.
Western officials warned that similar atrocities were likely to have taken place in other areas occupied by Russian troops. Zelenskyy accused Russian forces of trying to cover up war crimes in areas still under their control, “afraid that the global anger over what was seen in Bucha would be repeated.”
“We have information that the Russian troops have changed tactics and are trying to remove the dead people, the dead Ukrainians, from the streets and cellars of territory they occupied,” he said in a nighttime video address. “This is only an attempt to hide the evidence and nothing more.”
Switching from speaking Ukrainian to Russian, Zelenskyy urged ordinary Russians “to somehow confront the Russian repressive machine” instead of being “equated with the Nazis for the rest of your life.”
He called on Russians to demand an end to the war, “if you have even a little shame about what the Russian military is doing in Ukraine.”
In reaction to the alleged atrocities outside Kyiv, the U.S. announced sanctions against Putin’s two adult daughters and said it is toughening penalties against Russian banks. Britain banned investment in Russia and pledged to end its dependence on Russian coal and oil by the end of the year.
The U.S. Senate planned to take up legislation Thursday to end normal trade relations with Russia, paving the way for higher tariffs on some imports, and to codify President Joe Biden’s executive action banning imports of Russian oil.
The European Union is also expected to take additional punitive measures, including an embargo on coal.
The Kremlin has insisted its troops have committed no war crimes and alleged the images out of Bucha were staged by the Ukrainians.
Bodies were still being collected in the city. On Wednesday, The Associated Press saw two in a house in a silent neighborhood. From time to time, the muffled boom of workers clearing the town of mines and other unexploded ordnance interrupted the silence.
Workers at a cemetery began to load more than 60 bodies into a grocery shipping truck for transport to a facility for further investigation.
Police said they found at least 20 bodies in the Makariv area west of Kyiv. In the village of Andriivka, residents said the Russians arrived in early March, taking locals’ phones and detaining and then releasing some people. Others met unknown fates. Some described sheltering for weeks in cellars normally used for storing vegetables.
“First we were scared, now we are hysterical,” said Valentyna Klymenko, 64. She said she, her husband and two neighbors weathered the siege by sleeping on stacks of potatoes covered with a mattress and blankets. “We didn’t cry at first. Now we are crying.”
In the southern port city of Mariupol, Mayor Vadym Boichenko said that of the more than 5,000 civilians killed during weeks of Russian bombardment and street fighting, 210 were children. Russian forces bombed hospitals, including one where 50 people burned to death, he said.
Boichenko said more than 90% of the city’s infrastructure was destroyed. The attacks on the strategic city on the Sea of Azov have cut off food, water, fuel and medicine and pulverized homes and businesses.
British defense officials said 160,000 people remained trapped in the city, which had a prewar population of 430,000. A humanitarian relief convoy accompanied by the Red Cross has tried to get into the city for days, without success.
Capturing Mariupol would allow Russia to secure a continuous land corridor to the Crimean Peninsula, which Moscow seized from Ukraine in 2014.
___
Oleksandr Stashevskyi and Cara Anna in Bucha, Ukraine, Edith M. Lederer at the United Nations, Yuras Karmanau in Lviv, Ukraine, and Associated Press journalists around the world contributed to this report.
___
Follow the AP’s coverage of the war at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine
AP · by ADAM SCHRECK · April 7, 2022

13. Why Putin Underestimated the West

But can the West sustain the response or will it get bored and lose interest especially as the war evolves into a quagmire.

Excerpts:
For Biden’s approach to succeed, however, the West’s unified front against Russia’s invasion must not be allowed to weaken or erode as the war progresses. Many obstacles stand in the way: Putin will doubtless attempt to exploit divisions within the alliance; disputes could arise over what steps to take next or what concessions to offer; and the burden of punishing Russia will inevitably fall unequally across countries, fueling resentment and disagreement. These problems will be multiplied if, as Kennan warned, democracies react with so much fury they not only damage the adversary but also themselves—as could be the case if the objective morphed from restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence to a policy of active regime change in Russia. It is possible to do too much as well as too little.
These challenges will require skillful diplomacy to resolve. As leaders in Washington, Brussels, Tokyo, and other capitals navigate such problems, they should be looking to formalize the cooperation that Putin’s brutality has prompted by creating the core of a new alliance of democracies that many have long called for. In the years to come, there will likely be more geopolitical threats, such as Russian revanchism, and they will need to be countered with strong, institutionalized cooperation among the major democracies. Because unity generates strength, Western countries should improve their mutual defenses and deepen their economic relations, including by bringing the United States and the EU into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and negotiating a transatlantic trade and investment pact. As a first step, they should expand the G-7 to include Australia, South Korea, and the European Union. That would bring the major advanced democracies of North America, Europe, and Asia under a single umbrella and provide a powerful counterweight to the pressures buffeting all democratic countries. The West should dig in for a longer fight now: Putin’s challenge to Western interests and values will by no means be the last.




Why Putin Underestimated the West
And How to Sustain Its Newfound Unity
April 7, 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay · April 7, 2022
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine has proved to be a strategic miscalculation of historic proportions. Having failed to produce a quick victory for Moscow, the unprovoked invasion faces a ferocious Ukrainian insurgency that has already caused some 15,000 Russian combat fatalities, roughly the same number that the Soviet Union lost in its entire nine-year campaign in Afghanistan. The Russian economy has been battered by extraordinary international sanctions. Calls for Putin to be tried as a war criminal have echoed around the world. It is safe to say that none of this was what Putin expected when he launched his attack.
How did Putin get things so wrong? In part, he clearly overestimated Russian military power and underestimated the Ukrainian resistance. But just as important was his misreading of the West. His long personal experience—observing the weak international response to Russia’s wars in Chechnya and Georgia, its annexation of Crimea in 2014, and its support for Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad—convinced him that the West would abandon Ukraine. Given Europe’s concerns about Washington’s commitment to European security in the wake of both the Trump presidency and the Biden administration’s botched withdrawal from Afghanistan, he may also have anticipated that the invasion would divide the United States and its European allies, thus delivering a larger strategic victory than simply the installation of a puppet government in Kyiv.
Had Putin been a better student of how Western democracies have responded to vital threats to their security, he would have understood why these assumptions were wrong. True, one lesson of the past century is that Western democracies have frequently ignored emerging security threats, as many of them did in the lead-up to the two world wars, the Korean War, and the September 11 attacks. As the U.S. diplomat and historian George Kennan once put it, democracies are like a prehistoric monster so indifferent to what is happening around him that “you practically have to whack off his tail to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed.” But an equally important lesson of the past century is that when their tails are whacked hard enough, Western democracies react with speed, determination, and strength. For the United States and its European allies, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—which in size and scope constitutes the largest use of military force on the European continent since 1945 and poses a direct threat to NATO territory—has provided just such a case.
Yet even though the Western response has been surprisingly robust, it is far too soon for the West to declare victory. If democracies are capable of forming a swift and united front against exceptional threats, they have also long been prone to shifting priorities and turning attention inward once the immediate crisis has passed. For Western leaders, then, having quickly closed ranks to confront Putin’s aggression, the challenge now is how to sustain that unity. U.S. President Joe Biden stressed that point in Warsaw in March: “We must remain unified today and tomorrow and the day after and for the years and decades to come.” This is no easy task. To achieve that goal over the long term, the United States and its allies must overcome the political polarization, shifting economic burdens, and changes of leadership that have often fragmented the West in the past. Otherwise, the unity over Ukraine could turn out to be short-lived, leaving the West once again divided and autocrats strengthened.
PUTIN’S MISTAKE
It is not surprising that Putin would have assumed that the West would respond to a Russian invasion of Ukraine with harsh rhetoric but not much more. In 2008, when Putin sent Russian forces to dismember Georgia, French President Nicolas Sarkozy rushed to negotiate a cease-fire that kept Russian gains in place, while the United States and other European countries declined to back up their official dismay with even symbolic sanctions. The reaction six years later to Putin’s annexation of Crimea and his instigation of a separatist war in eastern Ukraine was only slightly tougher: although Russia was evicted from the G-8 and subjected to limited sanctions, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and U.S. President Barack Obama both ruled out sending lethal military aid to help Ukraine defend itself.

In similar fashion, Washington and its European partners refused to impose meaningful penalties on Russia after it intervened in the Syrian civil war in 2015, indiscriminately bombing civilians, targeting hospitals, and eventually leveling the city of Aleppo. In recent years, attempted assassinations of Putin’s opponents at home and abroad with nerve agents prompted only the imposition of small-scale sanctions and the expulsion of some Russian diplomats from Western countries. And when Russia interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Western democracies and media outlets criticized the Kremlin but did little else.

How did Putin get things so wrong?
The behavior of European leaders in the months leading up to the attack on Ukraine suggested that the West was likely to stick to this pattern. Dismissing the evidence presented by the U.S. and the British governments of an imminent invasion, many European leaders assumed that Putin was amassing troops near Ukraine for leverage to negotiate new security arrangements. Several of them traveled to Moscow looking to cut a deal. The German government in particular recoiled at the prospect of responding forcefully to Putin’s mounting aggression, blocking attempts to activate the NATO Response Force and denying NATO allies permission to send Ukraine lethal equipment of German origin. At a White House press conference in early February, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz pointedly refused to pledge to terminate the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline should Russia invade Ukraine. The apparent divisions of the West were so obvious that Biden openly worried that a “minor incursion” might lead to a Western “fight about what to do and not do.”
These developments reinforced Putin’s conviction that the West was a spent force. “There is also the so-called liberal idea,” the Russian leader told the Financial Times in 2019, “which has outlived its purpose.” Chinese President Xi Jinping, Putin’s collaborator in a strategic partnership “with no limits,” undoubtedly encouraged that thinking. The Chinese president’s mantra had long been: “The East is rising, the West is declining.” But such calculations failed to account for what would happen when Russia undertook a blatant, unprovoked invasion of a sovereign European democracy—an act that went well beyond any of Putin’s earlier aggressions.
CLOSING RANKS
Rather than splitting the West, Putin’s assault against Ukraine united it. Within days of the invasion, the United States and its allies joined forces to impose a sweeping sanctions regime on Russia, making it the most sanctioned country in the world. Russian banks were barred from using the SWIFT money exchange mechanism, Russian central bank reserves in foreign countries were frozen, and exports of critical technologies were banned, affecting 50 percent of Russia’s technology imports and 20 percent of all imports. Putin, senior officials in his administration, and a host of Russian oligarchs were sanctioned and their assets seized. Russian aircraft were banned from entering the airspace of 33 countries. Germany shelved Nord Stream 2, the United States and other countries cut off imports of Russian oil, and the EU moved to reduce its reliance on Russian energy. Nearly 500 Western companies have left the Russian market. The West’s intent, as French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire put it, was to “cause the collapse of the Russian economy.”
Western countries also mobilized against Russia politically. The UN Security Council voted 11–1, with three abstentions, to condemn the invasion, although Russia’s lone veto blocked its enforcement. The UN General Assembly followed suit, voting 141–5 to demand that Russia withdraw from Ukraine. The International Court of Justice ordered Russia to halt all military operations in Ukraine. International cultural and sporting organizations, such as FIFA, world soccer’s global governing body, also joined in by banning Russian participation in their activities.

Rather than splitting the West, Putin’s assault against Ukraine united it.

The West’s military response was equally impressive. Rather than withdraw forces from eastern Europe as Putin had demanded, NATO doubled its combat presence in the region, activated its Response Force, and placed 40,000 troops under its command. More than 35 countries began or increased weapons shipments to Ukraine. This aid ranged from the basic—rifles, ammunition, helmets, Kevlar vests, artillery shells, and grenade launchers—to the sophisticated—Stinger antiaircraft missiles, U.S. Javelin antitank missiles, Swedish AT-4 rocket launchers, British next-generation antitank weapons, and armed drones. The United States has contributed over $1.7 billion in aid to the Ukrainian military since the start of the war, and the EU committed 500 million euros to the Ukrainian defense, marking a first for the bloc, which had previously never provided military assistance to another country.
Support for these measures has also been broad and deep, including in countries that have historically been among the most reluctant to be drawn into international conflicts. Both Switzerland, the quintessentially neutral nation, and Singapore, a proud practitioner of great-power balancing, imposed economic sanctions on Russia. Japan, which has infamously strict immigration policies, opened its doors to Ukrainian evacuees. Most significantly, Scholz announced a Zeitenwende—a historic pivot—in which Germany committed to provide Ukraine with lethal aid, pledged to exceed NATO’s defense spending target of two percent of GDP, created a 100 billion euro defense fund to buy equipment for its depleted armed forces, and promised to rapidly end its reliance on Russian energy. “It is clear that we must invest much more in the security of our country, in order to protect our freedom and our democracy,” Scholz told the Bundestag on February 27. It was a sentiment widely shared in other Western capitals.
JOLTED AWAKE
Putin’s failure to anticipate this unified response reflects a misunderstanding of how democracies operate. His flawed analysis is partially rooted in the reality that given that they are responsible to their people, democracies tend to be more concerned about problems at home than about threats gathering abroad. Since the end of the Cold War, moreover, many European governments also seemed instinctively to doubt that other countries might resort to war to achieve their geopolitical aims and assumed that the economic integration and globalization of recent decades had rendered war on the European continent obsolete. Why fight when commerce and exchange are so profitable?
But as Kennan noted, although democracies are slow to anger, they react with fury when their interests are directly threatened. German Kaiser Wilhelm II never anticipated that his support for Austria’s ultimatum to Serbia would trigger war with France and the United Kingdom, a dynamic that repeated itself 25 years later when Adolf Hitler invaded Poland. Washington sought to sit out both world wars and joined them only after Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare and Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. The U.S. policy of containment, which sought to prevent the spread of communism during the Cold War, took root only after North Korea invaded South Korea. Western leaders eagerly embraced the peace dividend that came with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and they were only partially awakened from their slumber after 9/11.

The West’s unified front against Russia’s invasion must not be allowed to weaken or erode as the war progresses.
The tendency of democracies to switch from passivity to action is just that—a tendency, not a rule. Whether or not they do so is often determined by the choices that Western leaders make. Here Biden’s adroit diplomacy in the face of an exploding crisis was critical. He and his team used the threat posed by Putin’s aggression to make good on his long-standing vow to strengthen transatlantic relations and the broader democratic community. When U.S. intelligence concluded in late 2021 that Russian forces were preparing to invade Ukraine, Biden made two critical decisions. The first was that the United States would not defend Ukraine itself. The second was that he would work with NATO members and other partners to pursue a three-pronged strategy to impose massive economic penalties on Russia, bolster NATO’s posture in eastern Europe, and send more weapons to Ukraine to help it defend itself.
Beginning in mid-November 2021, Biden worked to build a collective Western response to Russia’s likely invasion. Top U.S. intelligence officials briefed allies on Putin’s plans, sharing sensitive information that even senior U.S. officials normally wouldn’t see. U.S. diplomats engaged with their counterparts to map out possible sanctions packages. U.S. military leaders met with NATO and other allies to discuss how to improve readiness and devise possible security assistance for Ukraine. This painstaking diplomacy reflected the conviction that making demands of allies would be counterproductive. Instead, Washington needed to give allies time and space to make their own decisions. Biden wasn’t seeking credit for his exceptional leadership; he was seeking to forge a united Western response that could meet the moment.
That initial objective was achieved because of the audacity of what Putin attempted. Had he simply seized another slice of Ukraine, as he did when he took Crimea, he might have left Biden facing a NATO alliance that remained split on whether or not a redline had been crossed. But by opting for a full-fledged invasion, Putin removed any doubt regarding the extremity of his actions.
STRONGER TOGETHER
For Biden’s approach to succeed, however, the West’s unified front against Russia’s invasion must not be allowed to weaken or erode as the war progresses. Many obstacles stand in the way: Putin will doubtless attempt to exploit divisions within the alliance; disputes could arise over what steps to take next or what concessions to offer; and the burden of punishing Russia will inevitably fall unequally across countries, fueling resentment and disagreement. These problems will be multiplied if, as Kennan warned, democracies react with so much fury they not only damage the adversary but also themselves—as could be the case if the objective morphed from restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence to a policy of active regime change in Russia. It is possible to do too much as well as too little.

These challenges will require skillful diplomacy to resolve. As leaders in Washington, Brussels, Tokyo, and other capitals navigate such problems, they should be looking to formalize the cooperation that Putin’s brutality has prompted by creating the core of a new alliance of democracies that many have long called for. In the years to come, there will likely be more geopolitical threats, such as Russian revanchism, and they will need to be countered with strong, institutionalized cooperation among the major democracies. Because unity generates strength, Western countries should improve their mutual defenses and deepen their economic relations, including by bringing the United States and the EU into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and negotiating a transatlantic trade and investment pact. As a first step, they should expand the G-7 to include Australia, South Korea, and the European Union. That would bring the major advanced democracies of North America, Europe, and Asia under a single umbrella and provide a powerful counterweight to the pressures buffeting all democratic countries. The West should dig in for a longer fight now: Putin’s challenge to Western interests and values will by no means be the last.

Foreign Affairs · by Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay · April 7, 2022


14. Ukraine’s War Has Already Changed the World’s Economy

Excerpts:

Before the Ukraine crisis, one would have said that the G-20 was the only forum within which one might have hoped for leadership. To counter its rich-country bias, Gallagher and Kozul-Wright propose that it should be made answerable to the Economic and Social Council of the U.N. If that was ambitious before the crisis, it is well-nigh unthinkable now. It will be surprising if the G-20 manages to convene at the leadership level this year.

In the current impasse, it may well be that the most positive impetus for action on global economic problems actually comes from geopolitical competition rather than cooperation. Given Russian intrusion into Libya and Mali, Europe can hardly look complacently at Tunisia’s difficulties. If Washington aims to have an Indo-Pacific strategy that amounts to anything, it should surely be engaged with India in addressing Sri Lanka’s difficulties. Sri Lanka, after all, is the place where the Western critique of China’s aggressive debt diplomacy was first crafted. Might the looming weight of China, finally push Western governments into engaging in active debt diplomacy of their own?

This, to be clear, is not an attractive prospect. The entanglement of great-power politics and debts is dangerous. But what is the alternative? The risk from the point of view of the most fragile and endangered societies is less that the world economy is being reordered in a competitive fashion and more that the intolerable status quo continues and nothing is done at all.

Ukraine’s War Has Already Changed the World’s Economy
Global economics will never be the same—but not in the ways you might think.
Foreign Policy · by Adam Tooze · April 5, 2022
Adam Tooze
By Adam Tooze, a columnist at Foreign Policy and director of the European Institute at Columbia University.
For NATO and the West’s relations with Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is clearly a historic turning point. The atrocities committed in occupied Ukrainian communities mark a ghastly breach of international law. But does Putin’s war mark a break in the development of the world economy?
Some have gone so far as to speculate that this war might mark a turning point in the history of globalization, on a par with 1914. Conflict and lack of trust, they surmise, will undercut investment and trade and unleash a general retreat from international interdependence. Others see Russia’s efforts to open channels for trade with India and China as harbingers of a new multipolar order.
It is very early to be making such prognoses. So far, the most remarkable thing about the war is, after all, Russia’s military frustration. Given Russia’s performance, it is far from obvious why anyone, even those once counted as Putin’s allies, would want to associate themselves more closely with his regime.
What demands more urgent attention than long-range prognosis is the shock wave that the war has triggered across the world economy, starting with the combatants, the wider region of Eastern and Central Europe, and global energy and food markets. One lasting story of this war could be the way that Europe uses it to launch its next stage of integration.
And yet it’s important to note the some of the deepest and potentially most consequential economic effects are being felt much farther from the theater of battle. Taken together with the uneven recovery from COVID-19, the surge in inflation, and the tightening of monetary policy, the war adds to an already inhospitable environment for fragile, heavily indebted low-income and emerging market economies. For the future shape of the world economy, how the world deals with debt crises triggered by this war in places as far apart as Sri Lanka and Tunisia are likely to be at least as important as Russia’s desperate efforts to circumvent sanctions in its trade with China and India. Rather than fretting about potential alternatives to the currency systems of the West, we should be concentrating on making those systems work.
A man walks past a currency exchange office in central Moscow on Feb. 28, as the Russian ruble collapsed against the dollar and the euro in response to Western sanctions over the invasion of Ukraine. ALEXANDER NEMENOV/AFP via Getty Images
From the point of view of the combatants—with a population of 190 million all told—the war is an unmitigated disaster. Ukraine’s economy shrank 16 percent in the first quarter of 2022 compared to last year’s first quarter, and it could be down by 40 percent by the end of the year. To survive, it will have to rely on outside aid.
Russia is reeling under dramatic economic sanctions. Though energy trade continues, Russia has been effectively cut off from global financial system. The ruble exchange rate may have nominally recovered to its prewar level. But the actual market value of the Russian currency is anyone’s guess. There no longer is a free market in rubles or in Russian financial assets. The Kremlin will be lucky if output contracts by only 10 percent this year. The withdrawal of Western companies from Russia has compounded the shock. And even if a cease-fire is reached, the prospects for Russia’s long-term development are dark indeed.
Beyond the two combatants, Europe will have to absorb a huge flow of refugees. The European Union will also have to deal with dramatic uncertainty with regard to both energy supplies and prices. Gas prices have of late fluctuated by as much as 70 percent on a single day. Economists estimate that if German imports of gas were cut off, which is now a distinct possibility, the economy may contract by somewhere between 2 and 4 percent. That would be a recession on the scale of the COVID-19 crisis.

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Germany is a rich country. Even in the event of a severe recession, it would have the resources to cope. Its Eastern European neighbors would be in a more difficult position. They have lower incomes. They are absorbing the majority of the refugees and they are more dependent on Russia for trade and energy. They would look for help from their richer partners in the EU. Mario Draghi, Italy’s prime minister, has been pushing since the start of the war for a collective spending package to cushion the crisis, speed up investments in energy independence, and reinforce Europe’s defenses that might run to more than $1.5 trillion. A package of anything like those dimensions would be a giant leap forward for the EU and would require months of high-stakes diplomacy to negotiate.
Europe is committed to breaking its dependence on oil and gas imported from Russia. In the medium term, the crisis will hopefully accelerate the push into renewable energy and away from the global trade in fossil fuels. But in the short run, the impact is not deglobalization but a search for new sources of supply. Liquefied natural gas tankers from around the world are plowing their way toward terminals in France and Spain. Robert Habeck, Germany’s minister for the economy and climate, recently inked a deal with Qatar. It takes a supply chain to beat a supply chain. Even if Europe succeeds in reducing its fossil fuel consumption as rapidly as planned, that will entail new imports of solar panels and rare-earth elements to build battery systems.
Meanwhile, what both the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB) will be concentrating on is getting a grip on the problem of surging prices. On top of the dislocation to global supply chains caused by COVID-19, they are now facing a severe spike in energy prices and tight commodity markets generally. Medium- and long-term expectations of inflation are inching up. Both bond markets and voters are clamoring for action. A round of interest hikes is now inevitable. Against a backdrop of years of low or zero interest rates and with debt levels at historic highs, any increase in interest rates is a delicate operation. It will squeeze heavily indebted governments and corporations. And the effect will be felt worldwide.

Motorcyclists line up at a gas pump in the morning to try to get fuel for their day’s run at the only station in town that has not raised the price of fuel in Bukavu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, on March 16, amid the widening economic consequences of Russia’s war on Ukraine. GUERCHOM NDEBO/AFP via Getty Images


Police prepare to patrol the streets after authorities imposed a nationwide weekend curfew to contain protests over a worsening economic crisis in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on April 3. GUERCHOM NDEBO/AFP via Getty Images

For all the stresses they face, Europe and the United States have wealth that means ultimately any stresses triggered by the shock of the Ukraine war can be cushioned by public spending. As they demonstrated when COVID-19 hit, rich countries have the means, if necessary, to support large parts of the workforce for months on end. By contrast, in emerging markets and low-income countries, especially those with large debts denominated in dollars or euro, the trade-offs are more painful.
Even before COVID-19, there were worries about increasingly unsustainable levels of debt. In 2019, there were 33 countries eligible for concessional funding on grounds of poverty that were classified by the World Bank as in, or at high risk of, debt stress. The COVID-19 shock of 2020 saw Lebanon, Argentina, Ecuador, and Zambia tumble into default. But those countries were all troubled before the pandemic. On balance, the damage done in 2020-2021 was less severe than many of us anticipated. That, however, should not encourage complacency. The fact that we did not see a larger debt crisis in 2020 was a function both of the reserves built up by some of the stronger emerging market economies and the relief to lower-rated borrowers by the ultra-loose monetary policy pursued by the Fed. With interest rates in the United States and Europe at zero, money flooded across the world economy looking for a positive rate of return. Meanwhile, America’s dramatic fiscal stimulus helped to boost imports, providing markets for producers all over the world.
In 2022, the signals are set very differently. Both the Fed and the ECB have announced that they are tightening monetary policy and raising interest rates. So far, admittedly, their rate hikes have been modest, and the yields on long-term borrowing are rising more slowly than those for short-term loans. But the direction of travel is clear. The era of zero rates or even negative rates is over. Together with rising energy prices and food prices, that presents a huge challenge to stressed debtor countries.
Right now, the World Bank is warning that the number of countries at imminent risk of debt distress has risen to 35 and as many as 12 countries may be unable to make debt payments by the end of the year. The U.N. Development Program’s list of countries at risk of immediate debt problems includes Belize, Grenada, Angola, Laos, and Gabon, all of which have considerable debts outstanding to private creditors.
Low-income countries today make up only 9 percent of the world’s population. They account for a negligible fraction of the world economy. But all told they are home to 700 million people, and their distress would send shock waves through their regions. The vast majority of the world’s population live in middle-income countries, and several of these countries have been in distress as well. Argentina, Lebanon, Venezuela, Zambia, and Ecuador have all already defaulted.
Pakistan is living from IMF program to IMF program. Tunisia is widely tipped by bank analysts to need to enter debt negotiations in coming months. Its foreign reserves are rapidly depleting. The cost of living is surging. Tunisia’s debts owed to foreign investors are overwhelmingly in foreign currency, which exposes it to huge financial pressures when its currency devalues. Negotiations with the IMF are not progressing as hoped for. The political system of Tunisia, once hailed as the sole democratic success story of the Arab Spring of 2011, is in turmoil.
Meanwhile, Sri Lanka is already at the point of no return. There are rolling 13-hour power cuts, rioting, and now the declaration of a nationwide curfew. The government has declared that it will continue to honor its debts. That is a mistake. To continue debt payments will further drain reserves while eventual default remains inevitable. It is good news that Sri Lanka has agreed to talk with the IMF over debt restructuring.
Whereas for the big economic powers such as China and India it may make sense to speculate about new patterns of globalization, for neither Tunisia nor Sri Lanka does a retreat from globalization offer attractive options. In the short run, they need concessions from their main creditors and a concerted effort to refloat their economies.
Were there actually an active competition for influence in the world economy right now between China and the West, debtor countries such as Tunisia or Sri Lanka might hope to play the sides against each other. But China is retrenching its foreign lending, and there is little appetite for public commitments from the West. The problem is not competition for influence but the fact that there is a vacuum where a global financial order ought to be.
The pandemic-related debt relief programs organized by the World Bank in 2020, known as the Debt Service Suspension Initiative, were derisory in scope and expired in 2021. The so-called Common Framework for debt restructuring agreed by the G-20 has attracted only three countries so far—Chad, Ethiopia, and Zambia—and progress on reducing their debts has been disappointing.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky addresses the United Nations Security Council via video link in New York on April 5. The European Union announced an import ban on coal in a wave of new sanctions in response to evidence of Russian atrocities in Bucha, Ukraine. Spencer Platt/Getty Images
In an ambitious new book, Kevin Gallagher and Richard Kozul-Wright make The Case for a New Bretton Woods. As they remark, “Almost eighty years since Bretton Woods, the world we live in bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the one its delegates hoped would be gone forever.” Responsibility for that unfortunate state of affairs—the suffering of heavily indebted countries and the unconstrained boom and bust of global credit—lies as they insist in the first instance not with populist politicians, or great power politics, but with the ordinary activity of capitalist political economy. Deeply vested interests dominate the architecture of the world economy. The increasing reliance on private credit for low-income countries has made it harder than ever to shape a rational regime for the rational restructuring of poor-country debt. To redress that balance is a matter not simply of uniting the West, or the other slogans triggered by the war in Ukraine. What they call for is a bottom-up push to renew public institutions and collective goals at the national level, as a preliminary to refounding a system of international cooperation and global leadership.
Frankly, the prospects of that seem slimmer even than when those lines were sent to press, a few months back. But they offer an important corrective to many commonplace constructions of our current moment. Putin’s war did not rudely disrupt an otherwise healthy and stable global economic order. The existing dollar system is a ramshackle improvisation that provides generous support to an inner core, while a large part of the world’s population is left to ride the terrifying rollercoaster of the global credit cycle.
Before the Ukraine crisis, one would have said that the G-20 was the only forum within which one might have hoped for leadership. To counter its rich-country bias, Gallagher and Kozul-Wright propose that it should be made answerable to the Economic and Social Council of the U.N. If that was ambitious before the crisis, it is well-nigh unthinkable now. It will be surprising if the G-20 manages to convene at the leadership level this year.
In the current impasse, it may well be that the most positive impetus for action on global economic problems actually comes from geopolitical competition rather than cooperation. Given Russian intrusion into Libya and Mali, Europe can hardly look complacently at Tunisia’s difficulties. If Washington aims to have an Indo-Pacific strategy that amounts to anything, it should surely be engaged with India in addressing Sri Lanka’s difficulties. Sri Lanka, after all, is the place where the Western critique of China’s aggressive debt diplomacy was first crafted. Might the looming weight of China, finally push Western governments into engaging in active debt diplomacy of their own?
This, to be clear, is not an attractive prospect. The entanglement of great-power politics and debts is dangerous. But what is the alternative? The risk from the point of view of the most fragile and endangered societies is less that the world economy is being reordered in a competitive fashion and more that the intolerable status quo continues and nothing is done at all.
Foreign Policy · by Adam Tooze · April 5, 2022


15. Why does the media report on secretive defense programs? Should this tech be classified?

Don't blame the media.

It is not hard to report on "secretive" defense programs when the contract process is public (because it has to be if you want competition for the best systems). And everything cannot be done through a "black budget."

Excerpts:
Each year, the Defense Department’s budget gets passed with hundreds of billions of dollars allocated to various efforts all around the force. Within that larger pie, tens of billions of dollars are cut out for classified initiatives hidden behind Special Access Program security protocols. You’ll often hear these funds referred to as the “Black Budget.” There are a lot of programs funded through these secretive lines of accounting. In fact, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reports that in 2019, the DoD’s budget request included $81.1 billion dollars for classified intelligence programs alone. As Tim Mcmillan and Tyler Rogoway reported for The Warzone, that’s more than most nations spend on their entire defense apparatus.
With Navy patents filed in recent years for things like containerized cold fusion and plasma hologram projectors, declassified programs aimed at fielding flying submarines for Navy SEALs, and even discussions about things like spacetime modification weapons all finding their way through Uncle Sam’s declassification process, one can’t help but wonder… what kinds of weapons, systems, and capabilities remain hidden behind that shrowd of classified funding?
The truth is, we may never know. But in the meantime, don’t worry about guys like me opining on the latest juicy details the Pentagon reveals about their new fighters, bombers, tanks, warships, or whatever else. Analysts like us may not always get things right, but in a real way, our coverage is still just a part of the plan.
Why does the media report on secretive defense programs? Should this tech be classified?
sandboxx.us · by Alex Hollings · April 6, 2022
Here at Sandboxx News, we devote a lot of time and effort to analyzing new developments in US defense programs, particularly aviation efforts like the Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance and B-21 Raider stealth bomber. But throughout our coverage of these and similar program, one question appears in the comments on social media and beneath articles more than any other: Why are we revealing details from these secretive programs to America’s enemies?
While defense journalists tend to respond to these comments with rolled eyes, that dismissiveness is based on a thorough understanding of the US defense apparatus and the role media plays in geopolitical discourse. From the outside looking in, it’s a pretty reasonable question. After all, national competitors in China, Russia, Iran and elsewhere have access to the same internet that we do (at least, their intelligence agencies do), and surely these nations can leverage the information and analysis presented by writers like me to inform their responses to American defense efforts.
National competitors really are paying attention
One thing’s for certain, these nations are paying attention. If you search my name on Google while specifying Russian domains (.ru), you’ll get a long list of Russian-based news outlets discussing my analysis of Russia’s stealth fighter, the Su-57, citing me by name.

If Russian media is discussing what I have to say about their stealth fighter, it’s safe to say the Russian military could get their hands on our breaking stories about new developments in American stealth fighter and bomber development.

So, if we know nations like Russia are paying attention to our coverage of stealth programs, and we’re aware Russia’s own stealth efforts are lagging far behind America’s, I can understand why many Americans would prefer we kept our coverage of these systems vague and the details of these programs out of the hands of nations that may mean us harm.
But here’s the thing… the details that defense outlets like ours report on are provided to us by the Department of Defense (DoD) and its contractors intentionally.
The Department of Defense releases information about advanced weapons programs on purpose
F35.com is a website operated by Lockheed Martin
The first and most obvious reason why the Pentagon releases information about these programs to the media is that the funding for these efforts comes directly from the American people. Every F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, F-22 Raptor, spy satellite, and XM-1147 Advanced Multi-Purpose tank round the US military has laying around was paid for with taxpayer dollars, and as such, the Department of Defense tries to keep the taxpayer informed about what they’re getting for their investment.
This isn’t just about showing your average American what they’re paying for. It’s also about accountability.
I know, I know, some of you just blew coffee out your nose when you read that. The idea that the Pentagon really cares about fiscal accountability doesn’t jive with other hot-button issues like how the Defense Department has never passed an audit. But the truth is, Defense officials aren’t only held accountable for their expenditures by the Pentagon brass, they’re also subject to pressure from the DoD’s political leadership in elected office. And that’s where popular public perception (i.e. your perspective) becomes incredibly important. I know, I know… you probably just shot coffee out your nose again, but your opinion really does matter.
Public opinion about defense programs really matters
New York Times article by Valerie Insinna from Aug. 21, 2019
Programs like the F-35, with repeated delays and cost overruns, seem like pretty conspicuous proof that the Pentagon doesn’t care if you think they’re wasteful with their money, but the truth is, the F-35 is a great example of how public opinion really does change the military acquisition process.
After all the very public blowback surrounding the F-35’s high costs, the DoD shifted its fighter acquisition strategy dramatically to ensure a similar spending debacle doesn’t happen again — from splitting design, production, and sustainment contracts to shifting to a new strategy that calls for cheaper, more frequent fighter programs that don’t have to last a half-century or more, the US is developing new fighters in very different ways these days.
These changes were brought about by internal discussions about what went wrong with the F-35’s acquisition process, but also through external pressure applied by popular opinion by way of media coverage and political discourse. Elected officials recognized the way Americans felt about the F-35 and pressed the DoD to change its ways.
America’s military has civilian leadership for a reason—because the defense apparatus ultimately answers to us, the American people. We vote for our lawmakers to represent us and our opinions in big decisions, and unpopular programs often get the ax or see significant changes as a result.
But the Pentagon isn’t just talking to the American people when it releases information about new fighters, bombers, warships, and the like. They’re also talking directly to their competitors.
The Pentagon wants its competitors to know what it’s up to
(U.S. Air Force photo)
We’ve already covered the Civics 101 reasons why the Defense Department and large and small contractors like Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and Hermeus release information to the public, but there is another important reason lurking just below the surface. Uncle Sam wants his opponents to know what he’s got in the works because that’s the only way new weapons can be an effective deterrent for future aggression.
America’s current National Defense Strategy, or the overarching goals of America’s military, is broken down into four priorities. Pay close attention to the first word in each of the following:
  1. Defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC (China)
  2. Deterring strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners
  3. Deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary, prioritizing
  4. the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific, then the Russia challenge in Europe
  5. Building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem
As you might expect, the very first word in the very first priority is defending, but the first word in both the second and third priorities is different: deterring. That’s where the release of information about these programs and the ensuing media coverage becomes an important part of America’s overall defense strategy (for better or worse).
Secret weapons can be incredibly effective in a fight because your opponent doesn’t know how to counter them, and that tends to be the reasoning you’ll see in comments about how outlets shouldn’t be reporting on new defense technologies. There’s one significant problem with that line of thinking, however: a secret weapon is only useful when you’re already at war.
Secret weapons may help win wars, but public ones can stop wars from starting
USAF Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies graphic
If America maintained a top-secret fleet of aircraft meant to overwhelm Chinese defenses that no one outside of the Pentagon knew about, it offers the United States no real value until the terrible day that war begins. But by advertising these sorts of programs, releasing information to the media, discussing upcoming efforts, and disclosing advanced capabilities, the United States is sending a very clear message to its competitors. Put simply, the message is, “if you start a war, we’re prepared to win it.”
Revealing details about the NGAD program’s efforts to pair crewed fighters with drone wingmen, or about the B-21 Raider potentially using advanced engines developed for the F-35 to minimize its heat signature, tells military officials in nations like Russia and China that the U.S. is not only maintaining its lead in stealth technology, it may even be expanding it. These nations, which are more aware of the limitations of their own defensive capabilities than anyone, see these programs and how they line up with their own and are forced to ask themselves some very tough questions.
Graphic created by Alex Hollings using DoD images.
Could we stop those bombers from reaching our shores? Could we stop those fighters from taking our skies? Could we really win a fight with the US? If we think we can… what would it cost?
Those questions, and the brutal arithmetic that follows, are powerful deterrents to war. The US has the largest defense budget, the most technologically advanced military apparatus, and the furthest reaching media of any nation on the planet—and these three things collectively help convince the populations of other nations, as well as their lawmakers and defense officials, that America is a nation not to be trifled with.
The F-22 Raptor may be the most capable air superiority fighter to ever reach the skies, but it’s never had to prove it. From a strictly combat-focused mindset, that may seem like a waste of the billions spent developing and building these jets… but from a deterrence standpoint, the F-22’s reputation as a highly maneuverable stealth fighter with a radar cross-section reportedly some 5,000 times smaller than Russia’s best stealth jets could be seen as a resounding success. Nobody wants to square off with America’s mighty Raptor if they can help it.
If the common fighter pilot sentiment is right that “dogfighting is dead”—it’s dead in no small part because insanely capable fighters like the F-22 killed it without ever firing a shot. That’s the power of deterrence.
Disclosing programs allows nations to influence how their competitors spend their money
F-22 Raptor (U.S. Air Force photo)
Disclosing new capabilities, technologies, and systems can also help force a shift in your opponent’s priorities. China and Russia have heavily invested in hypersonic technologies in recent years, and although the US may now be the frontrunner in fielding the most advanced sorts of these new weapons, public perception says America is behind—so the Pentagon is feeling pressure to invest more heavily into the effort.
That process works both ways, with nations like Russia and China working feverishly to develop comparable stealth technology, reusable spacecraft, integrated air defenses, nuclear reactors for warships and more all just to keep pace with what they know about America’s military capabilities. Their understanding of those capabilities are developed through a combination of espionage and—you guessed it—open-source reporting like you find here at Sandboxx News.
We’ve discussed how China manages to hide a great deal of military spending behind domestic programs before, but even when you consider that and the difference in purchasing power parity between nations (China can spend less to field similar things), the US still just has more money in its spending pool than the competition. That’s a problem for nations like Russia and China, who have to worry about global public perception of their military capabilities for the same reasons America does (deterrence). China and Russia haven’t developed their military modernization efforts in a vacuum—they’ve developed them with the US directly in their crosshairs, looking for vulnerabilities and then pouring resources into efforts that can take advantage of them.
So, when the US announces a new bomber that can defeat even early warning radar systems designed to spot stealth aircraft, these nations are left with hard budgetary choices to make. With only so many Russian rubles or Chinese yuans to go around, do you prioritize developing your new offensive weapons or are you forced to reassess your air defense capabilities in the face of America’s new stealth platforms? If you can’t even beat the F-22—a design from 1997—what will it take to compete with NGAD?
EurAsian Times story by Sakshi Tiwari from March 11, 2022
But all that’s not to say that Uncle Sam isn’t good at keeping secrets when he wants to. There’s plenty of stuff going on behind closed doors as well.
The Defense Department knows how to keep secrets when it wants to
B-2 Spirit (U.S. Air Force photo)
The Pentagon may release information about its advanced new programs to the media intentionally to help guide American opinions of their work, foreign perceptions of their capabilities, and global awareness of America’s military might… but they certainly don’t reveal everything.
Considering the Air Force now has six of its newest stealth bombers, the B-21 Raider, at some stage of production and they’ve even flown a full-sized technology demonstrator from their NGAD program… we still don’t really even know what some of these aircraft are going to look like. Likewise, America’s RQ-170, affectionately dubbed the “Beast of Kandahar,” is so secretive that it’s probably not even called the RQ-170. And these are programs we’ve been discussing for literally years now.
The RQ-170 has been flying since at least 2005, but we know very little about it.
Each year, the Defense Department’s budget gets passed with hundreds of billions of dollars allocated to various efforts all around the force. Within that larger pie, tens of billions of dollars are cut out for classified initiatives hidden behind Special Access Program security protocols. You’ll often hear these funds referred to as the “Black Budget.” There are a lot of programs funded through these secretive lines of accounting. In fact, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reports that in 2019, the DoD’s budget request included $81.1 billion dollars for classified intelligence programs alone. As Tim Mcmillan and Tyler Rogoway reported for The Warzone, that’s more than most nations spend on their entire defense apparatus.
With Navy patents filed in recent years for things like containerized cold fusion and plasma hologram projectors, declassified programs aimed at fielding flying submarines for Navy SEALs, and even discussions about things like spacetime modification weapons all finding their way through Uncle Sam’s declassification process, one can’t help but wonder… what kinds of weapons, systems, and capabilities remain hidden behind that shrowd of classified funding?
The truth is, we may never know. But in the meantime, don’t worry about guys like me opining on the latest juicy details the Pentagon reveals about their new fighters, bombers, tanks, warships, or whatever else. Analysts like us may not always get things right, but in a real way, our coverage is still just a part of the plan.
Read more from Sandboxx News
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sandboxx.us · by Alex Hollings · April 6, 2022


16. China warns U.S. against House Speaker Pelosi visiting Taiwan

Excerpts:

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian told reporters that Beijing firmly opposed all forms of official interactions between the United States and Taiwan, and Washington should cancel the trip.
"If the United States insists on having its own way, China will take strong measures in response to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity. All possible consequences that arise from this will completely be borne by the U.S. side," he added, without giving details.
In Taipei, Taiwan Foreign Ministry spokesperson Joanne Ou would only say that inviting U.S. officials and dignitaries had always been "an important part" of the ministry's work, and that it would announce any official visits at an appropriate time.
China warns U.S. against House Speaker Pelosi visiting Taiwan
Reuters · by Martin Quin Pollard
BEIJING, April 7 (Reuters) - China warned on Thursday it would take strong measures if U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan and said such a visit would severely impact Chinese-U.S. relations, following media reports she would go next week.
China considers democratically ruled Taiwan its own territory and the subject is a constant source of friction between Beijing and Washington, especially given strong U.S. military and political support for the island.
The possible visit has not been confirmed by Pelosi's office or Taiwan's government, but some Japanese and Taiwanese media reported it would take place after she visits Japan this weekend.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian told reporters that Beijing firmly opposed all forms of official interactions between the United States and Taiwan, and Washington should cancel the trip.
"If the United States insists on having its own way, China will take strong measures in response to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity. All possible consequences that arise from this will completely be borne by the U.S. side," he added, without giving details.
In Taipei, Taiwan Foreign Ministry spokesperson Joanne Ou would only say that inviting U.S. officials and dignitaries had always been "an important part" of the ministry's work, and that it would announce any official visits at an appropriate time.
Sunday marks the 43rd anniversary of the United States signing into law the Taiwan Relations Act, which guides ties in the absence of formal diplomatic relations and enshrines a U.S. commitment to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself.
The last time a House speaker visited Taiwan was in 1997, when Newt Gingrich met then-President Lee Teng-hui.
Pelosi, a long time critic of China, particularly on human rights issues, held a virtual meeting with Taiwan Vice President William Lai in January as he wrapped up a visit to the United States and Honduras. read more
Pelosi is one of the ruling Democratic Party's most high-profile politicians, and second in the U.S. presidential line of succession after the vice president.
Taiwan has been heartened by continued U.S. support offered by the Biden administration, which has repeatedly talked of its "rock-solid" commitment to the island.
That has strained already poor Sino-U.S. relations.
In March, a delegation of former senior U.S. defence and security officials sent by President Joe Biden visited Taiwan, a strong show of support coming soon after Russia invaded Ukraine. read more
Reporting by Martin Pollard; Writing and additional reporting by Ben Blanchard in Taipei; Editing by Raissa Kasolowsky and Nick Macfie
Reuters · by Martin Quin Pollard



17. Why Cyber Holds the Entire World at Risk

"Everything Is Cyber and Cyber Is Everything"

Excerpts:

Cyber/Nuclear Comparisons
The internet and digital infrastructure—websites, payments, applications, data centers, etc.—power services and benefit the world in the same way that nuclear reactors power cities. Certain tactics, tools, and procedures in cyberspace can grant unwarranted access into computer and information systems for research, reconnaissance, disruption, extortion, and destruction. Similarly, nuclear reactors are vastly used to produce electricity, and can also be used to enrich plutonium and uranium into weapons-grade fissile material.
In both cases, the technology is nearly identical, but the intent along with the tactics, tools, and procedures actualized are as different in practice as midnight and midday. In nuclear, however, the decision and intent to create a weapon is traceable and trackable, where the transfer and management of uranium and plutonium are inventoried, detected, counted, and monitored, and the building of reactors and weapons facilities is incredibly difficult to hide. In cyber, there is astonishingly less visibility and clarity into the decision and intent to both develop and deliver a cyber weapon, and what constitutes a destructive payload vs. a real cyber “weapon.”
Nuclear weapons policy is home to the “always, never” doctrine where weapons must be capable and effective to launch every hour of every day of every year but must never be triggered or launched by accident or miscalculation. The reason that nuclear weapons are the most well-secured technology on Earth is not because they are the most easily secured, but because they are the least tolerant of tampering and accidents. Throughout history, accidents have included a wrench falling through a silo, a warhead falling out of a plane, and sunlight messing with advanced warning sensors.
Nuclear energy, conversely, tolerates very little down time and prioritizes constant productivity, resilience, and redundancy of physical processes over the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data in operations. These operations, like many adjacent critical infrastructure and industrial sectors, have evolved over time to introduce network connectivity, increased digitization, and internet connectivity for operations and back-office activities to drive new insights and efficiencies and boost productivity. Because they are not military targets, they have all become potential targets for cyber weapons.



Why Cyber Holds the Entire World at Risk
Cyber policy today has created a world in which seemingly everything non-military can be held at risk—hospitals, trains, dams, energy, water—and nothing is off limits.
The National Interest · by Danielle Jablanski · April 5, 2022
“Cyber” as a field of study is riddled with poor analogies as takes on cyber strategy and statecraft continue to get hotter with no boiling point in sight. With the dawn of digitization, scholars and pundits alike began to predict a multipolar world in which digital interdependence of society and economy would hamstring great power competition. The truth is it only makes it uglier.
The United States maintains a posture in which persistent engagement and an ability to preemptively defend forward in cyberspace are vital, despite unknown answers to questions about cyber escalation and second-strike survivability. The idea is to curtail and diminish potential threats before a real attack. At the same time, there is a thriving global private sector for cybersecurity products and solutions which is increasingly lucrative and largely unregulated. As with anything based in technology, the largest hurdle for both is scalability.
At their core, cyber capabilities present individuals and nation-states with a fundamental cost-benefit analysis. For individuals, the benefits of good, bad, or in-between-motivated hacking (definition is dealers’ choice) might outweigh the costs or consequences. And for nation-states with full-spectrum offensive capabilities and plenty of resources, the potential for threat actors and adversaries to hold civilian infrastructure and private sector companies at risk has yet to cost or cause consequences that call into question the utility of those full-spectrum capabilities.
To date, one of the oldest analogies in cyber is to consider adversaries’ full-spectrum cyber weapons to be as destructive as nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Theorists postulate the applicability of mutually assured destruction and deterrence within the nature of cyber conflict despite the invisibility of code and data transfers; its transnational, borderless theater; and the spectrum and crowdsourcing of actors involved. However, cyber is much more akin to the regulation of nuclear energy than the use of nuclear weapons.

Cyber/Nuclear Comparisons
The internet and digital infrastructure—websites, payments, applications, data centers, etc.—power services and benefit the world in the same way that nuclear reactors power cities. Certain tactics, tools, and procedures in cyberspace can grant unwarranted access into computer and information systems for research, reconnaissance, disruption, extortion, and destruction. Similarly, nuclear reactors are vastly used to produce electricity, and can also be used to enrich plutonium and uranium into weapons-grade fissile material.
In both cases, the technology is nearly identical, but the intent along with the tactics, tools, and procedures actualized are as different in practice as midnight and midday. In nuclear, however, the decision and intent to create a weapon is traceable and trackable, where the transfer and management of uranium and plutonium are inventoried, detected, counted, and monitored, and the building of reactors and weapons facilities is incredibly difficult to hide. In cyber, there is astonishingly less visibility and clarity into the decision and intent to both develop and deliver a cyber weapon, and what constitutes a destructive payload vs. a real cyber “weapon.”
Nuclear weapons policy is home to the “always, never” doctrine where weapons must be capable and effective to launch every hour of every day of every year but must never be triggered or launched by accident or miscalculation. The reason that nuclear weapons are the most well-secured technology on Earth is not because they are the most easily secured, but because they are the least tolerant of tampering and accidents. Throughout history, accidents have included a wrench falling through a silo, a warhead falling out of a plane, and sunlight messing with advanced warning sensors.
Nuclear energy, conversely, tolerates very little down time and prioritizes constant productivity, resilience, and redundancy of physical processes over the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data in operations. These operations, like many adjacent critical infrastructure and industrial sectors, have evolved over time to introduce network connectivity, increased digitization, and internet connectivity for operations and back-office activities to drive new insights and efficiencies and boost productivity. Because they are not military targets, they have all become potential targets for cyber weapons.
Everything Is Cyber and Cyber Is Everything
Cyber policy today has created a world in which seemingly everything non-military can be held at risk—hospitals, trains, dams, energy, water—and nothing is off limits. The ubiquity of technology, devices, and data paired with the fluid and multi-agency nature of cyber exploitation have led to the targeting of sectors outside the historical boundaries of conflict.
The sixteen critical infrastructures in the United States represent everything from finance to communications to transportation to healthcare, electricity, manufacturing, food production, pharmaceuticals, and more. There are digital components and connectivity across each of these vital sectors and the potential for exploitation or accidents associated with each digital component directly or consequently. That includes hundreds of thousands of locations and entities at risk with millions of hardware and software components at play.
The nature of the risks associated with everything becoming cyber are simple and stagnant; Hardware and software vulnerabilities continue to manifest. Connecting critical assets, control systems, and devices to unmanaged or insecure networks continues unabated. Limited understanding of the threat landscape and outdated or static security policies are the rule rather than the exception. The incorporation of remote access without security controls, including by third-party providers of hardware and software for end users, is growing. And the widespread availability of tacit knowledge to effectively target and exploit hardware and software systems, either directly or in-part by attacking their supply chain, is vast.
Given this reality, the possible scenarios for catastrophe quickly become exponential. And given the cyber-physical nature of critical infrastructure—where data inputs and digital commands produce physical effects in the real world—the cybersecurity of industries we rely on to produce goods, resources, and services has come sharply into view. The question now is not how to reduce the threat landscape, but instead to introduce stop gaps in the places adversaries will likely exploit technologies, and to proactively fortify operations that are technically outside the realm of typical government oversight.
Messaging vs. Signaling
The credibility crisis that has faced American policy over the last two decades makes no exception when it comes to messaging vs. signaling in cyberspace. Messaging has taken on a larger-than-life doctrine of omnipresent willpower and capital to defend forward, with strong rhetoric to dissuade enemies and threat actors from crossing an imaginary red line in cyberspace. Economies that are heavily dependent on communications and digital transactions for banking and healthcare or airports and seaports for trade and transit continue to bolster their cybersecurity doctrine with determined rhetoric about threats and defense. In practice, however, the majority of sectors we consider critical are sitting ducks.
Signaling continues to transmit the perception that digital ecosystems and infrastructures all over the world are well understood, and fair game, even if unpoliced, while critical infrastructure anticipates its next ambush. This lack of credible definition and policing leads to a common operating picture of little actual understanding of threats, no real tripwire, and that the private sector must bear the brunt of attacks and pick up the pieces in the aftermath. At the same time, the material impacts of high-profile attacks—NotPetya, SolarWinds, TRISIS, the Colonial Pipeline—have become red herrings leading policymakers to fear hypothetical worse attacks instead of working back from the most realistic worst-case scenarios per sector. Cybersecurity in practice is just now shifting from conversations about the likelihood of being victimized, to the reduction of severity once attacked.
Target Practice
In the cybersecurity community, it is well understood that you cannot protect every piece of hardware, software, code, connectivity, privilege, and access at all times. Instead, security is baked into redundant compensating controls to thwart threat actors’ efforts in line with their overall objectives and cost/benefit calculations. Inventories of technologies, processes, and policies are analyzed against logged communications and security information from machines and platforms, sometimes automated, to identify gaps and address operational and functional risks.
Luckily, no payload in cyberspace is nearly as destructive as an atomic bomb. Unfortunately, the list of potentially devastating accidents or mishaps that overwhelm local resources and/or cause immense public panic is likely immeasurable. The targeting of nuclear weapons is extremely strategic, precise, and well understood. Experts argue that keeping missile silos operational is a net benefit because an adversary would need to target that silo in an attack to fend off a counterstrike, and that targeting would potentially save a city.
In cyberspace, there is and will continue to be constant probing and reconnaissance for target practice but gaining unadministered access does not directly correlate to malicious intent or attack. Adversaries in cyberspace do not simply throw darts at the wall to find and attack their next targets but do approach extortion and disruption in an ever-opportunistic fashion. The only solution is not to figure out the potential that a given target is the next victim, but to make the most critical targets continuously less attractive.
The next wave of cyber scholars and pundits will hopefully move away from the recent focus on cyber hygiene—which by definition is relative—to focus on the subjective nature of cybersecurity mechanism deployed to compensate for gaps and vectors in the massive cyber threat landscape. The only way to address cyber policy is with an overall effort to reduce the success or benefit of any cyberattack, and the government cannot do this alone. It is and should be demonstrably a shared responsibility across partner and vendor ecosystems. Creating less attractive and lucrative targets has a trickle-down effect across supply chains and interdependencies—rather than shifting liability and blame between technology developers and customers or operators. We should all take that responsibility very seriously.
Danielle Jablanski is an OT Cybersecurity Strategist at Nozomi Networks, responsible for researching global cybersecurity topics and promoting OT and ICS cybersecurity awareness throughout the industry. In 2022 she also joined the Atlantic Council as a non-resident fellow with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, focusing on operational technology and workforce development issues.


18.  We’re All Being Manipulated the Same Way

I never thought I would be able to say I know a Nobel Peace Prize winner. I have learned a lot from Maria Ressa over the years, from terrorism to social media, to culture and coimmunicaitons, to poltiical ressitance. I pay attention to what she says and writes.

This is useful supporting fires for the Axios article on free speech I previously forwarded (article 1 above)

Think hard about this excerpt (and the entire essay):

Think about it like this. All of our debate starts with content moderation. That’s downstream. Move further upstream to algorithmic amplification. That’s the operating system; that’s where the micro-targeting is. What is an algorithm? Opinion in code. That’s where one editor’s decision is multiplied millions and millions of times. And that’s not even where the problem is. Go further upstream to where our personal data has been pulled together by machine learning to make a model of you that knows you better than you know yourself, and then all of that is pulled together by artificial intelligence.
And that’s the mother lode. Surveillance capitalism, which Shoshana Zuboff has described in great detail, is what powers this entire thing. And we only debate content moderation. That’s like if you had a polluted river and were only looking at a test tube of water instead of where the pollutant is coming from. I call it a virus of lies.
Today we live in a behavior-modification system. The tech platforms that now distribute the news are actually biased against facts, and they’re biased against journalists. E. O. Wilson, who passed away in December, studied emergent behavior in ants. So think about emergent behavior in humans. He said the greatest crisis we face is our Paleolithic emotions, our medieval institutions, and our godlike technology. What travels faster and further? Hate. Anger. Conspiracy theories. Do you wonder why we have no shared space? I say this over and over. Without facts, you can’t have truth. Without truth, you can’t have trust. Without these, we have no shared space and democracy is a dream.


We’re All Being Manipulated the Same Way
Conservative or liberal, American or Filipino, everyone is a victim of tech platforms’ attack on the truth.
The Atlantic · by Maria Ressa · April 7, 2022
In the Philippines, we’re 33 days before our presidential elections. Filipinos are going to the poll and we are choosing 18,000 posts, including the president and vice president. And how do you have integrity of elections if you don’t have integrity of facts? That’s a reality that we’re living with.
I put all of this stuff together in a book, and this is part of the reason you’ll see these ideas over and over. And the question I really want to ask you is the question we had to confront: What are you willing to sacrifice for the truth? Because these are the times we live in. The prologue for the book—which I pushed in at the end of last year—started with Crimea and the annexation in 2014, because that’s when you began to see the splintering of reality that had geopolitical impact. And of course, I’ve had to revise it once Russia invaded Ukraine. And the question that goes through my head is, if in 2014, eight years ago, we did something about it, would we be where we are today? No, we wouldn’t be.
So here’s what I’m going to talk about today, really just three things: What happened? How did it change us? And what can we do about it? These are critical for me. It’s existential. I call it an “Avengers assemble” moment in the Philippines. And guess what? Your elections are coming up too. Ain’t so far away for you here.
I’ve said this over and over, that, really, this is like when 140,000 people died instantly in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The same thing has happened in our information ecosystem, but it is silent and it is insidious. This is what I said in the Nobel lecture: An atom bomb has exploded in our information ecosystem. And here’s the reason why. I peg it to when journalists lost the gatekeeping powers. I wish we still had the gatekeeping powers, but we don’t.
So what happened? Content creation was separated from distribution, and then the distribution had completely new rules that no one knew about. We experienced it in motion. And by 2018, MIT writes a paper that says that lies laced with anger and hate spread faster and further than facts. This is my 36th year as a journalist. I spent that entire time learning how to tell stories that will make you care. But when we’re up against lies, we just can’t win, because facts are really boring. Hard to capture your amygdala the way lies do.
Think about it like this. All of our debate starts with content moderation. That’s downstream. Move further upstream to algorithmic amplification. That’s the operating system; that’s where the micro-targeting is. What is an algorithm? Opinion in code. That’s where one editor’s decision is multiplied millions and millions of times. And that’s not even where the problem is. Go further upstream to where our personal data has been pulled together by machine learning to make a model of you that knows you better than you know yourself, and then all of that is pulled together by artificial intelligence.
And that’s the mother lode. Surveillance capitalism, which Shoshana Zuboff has described in great detail, is what powers this entire thing. And we only debate content moderation. That’s like if you had a polluted river and were only looking at a test tube of water instead of where the pollutant is coming from. I call it a virus of lies.
Today we live in a behavior-modification system. The tech platforms that now distribute the news are actually biased against facts, and they’re biased against journalists. E. O. Wilson, who passed away in December, studied emergent behavior in ants. So think about emergent behavior in humans. He said the greatest crisis we face is our Paleolithic emotions, our medieval institutions, and our godlike technology. What travels faster and further? Hate. Anger. Conspiracy theories. Do you wonder why we have no shared space? I say this over and over. Without facts, you can’t have truth. Without truth, you can’t have trust. Without these, we have no shared space and democracy is a dream.
Surveillance capitalism pulls together four things. We look at them as separate problems, but they’re identical. The first is antitrust: There’s three antitrust bills that are pending at the U.S. Senate. Then data privacy: Who owns your data? Do you? Or does the company that collates them and creates a model of you. Third is user safety: Do we have a Better Business Bureau for our brains? And the fourth: content moderation. As long as you’re thinking about content, you’re not looking at everything else.
This is how we discovered what social media was doing to democracy in the Philippines. In September 2016, a bomb exploded in Davao City, the home city of President [Rodrigo] Duterte. A six-month-old article, “Man with high quality of bomb nabbed at Davao checkpoint,” went viral. This is disinformation: You take a truth and twist it. The story was seeded in fake websites; one of them is a Chinese website today. And it was seeded on Duterte and [Bongbong] Marcos Facebook pages.
Rappler ran a story on the disinformation called “Propaganda War: Weaponizing the Internet.” It was part of a three-part series. The second part was “Fake Accounts, Manufactured Reality on Social Media.” One account we investigated was called Luvimin Cancio. And we looked at this account and found it strange that she didn’t have many friends, but was a member of many, many, many groups. And then we took the photo and did a reverse imaging scan. It was not this person.
And then we took a look at who she was following, who were her friends. This is 2016, so you could still get that. We checked everything about them and tried to prove whether it was actually true: where they went to school, where they lived. Every single thing was a lie. This was a sock-puppet network.
I wrote the last part of the trilogy in 2016, which is “How Facebook Algorithms Impact Democracy.” It didn’t get better. It got worse.
So what did we do? We realized it’s systematic, that it is taking a lie and pounding—that it is using free speech to stifle free speech, because when you are pounded to silence, you kind of shut up, unless you are foolish like me. We took all the data and gave it to our social-media team. Rappler is one of two Filipino fact-checking partners of Facebook. I’d say we’re frenemies. But I think tech is part of the solution.
After we published that “weaponization of the internet” series in 2016, we watched social media to see what would happen. Take the Facebook page of Sally Matay as an example. This has now been taken down, but it was a cut-and-paste account. We were still catching their growth. The data is pretty incredible. Everything I tell you is data-driven. We kept track of how many times they were posting in which Facebook pages. This is the first time we saw Marcos and Duterte disinformation networks working together.
I’m going to bring it back to you because the methodology is the same. The Election Integrity Partnership mapped the spread of “Stop the Steal.” This is the same methodology that was used to attack me. In “Stop the Steal,” you can see that the narrative of election fraud was seeded in August 2019 on RT, then picked up by Steve Bannon on YouTube. Then Tucker Carlson picks it up and then QAnon drops it October 7 and then President Trump comes top-down.
What happened to me in 2016? A lie told a million times became a fact. My meta-narrative? Journalist equals criminal. And then a year later, President Duterte came top-down with the same meta-narrative, except he did it in his State of the Nation Address. And then a week later, I got my first subpoena. That year, we had 14 investigations. In less than two years, by 2019, I got 10 arrest warrants, posted bail 10 times. It’s the same methodology. See how it is happening to you.
In 2020, my former colleague and I were charged in the first case of cyber libel, for a story that was published eight years earlier. The period of prescription for libel is only one year; lo and behold, it became 12 years. I was convicted, and so I’m appealing this at the Court of Appeals. The New York Times ran a story called “Conviction in the Philippines Reveals Facebook’s harms.” These are real-world harms.
This is happening to women. Women journalists. Mark Zuckerberg quotes Louis D. Brandeis all the time, saying, the way you get at bad speech is to have more speech. Brandeis wrote that in 1927, in the old days. In the age of social media, the age of abundance, we have to look back at Brandeis’s words. He also said that women are burned as witches. These words reminded me how gendered disinformation hits women journalists, politicians.
Social media brings out the worst of us. If you’re my age, you remember the old cartoon when you have a conscience and you have a devil and an angel trying to tell you what to do on each shoulder. But what social media has done, what American tech has done (well, you’ve got to include TikTok now) is it’s kicked off the angel, it’s given the devil a megaphone, and it’s injected directly into your brain.
In a UNESCO report called “The Chilling: Global Trends in Online Violence Against Women Journalists,” I was the example for the global South. Carole Cadwalladr, the British journalist who broke the Cambridge Analytica story, was the global North. ICFJ, the International Center for Journalists, said that 73 percent of women journalists experienced online abuse. Twenty-five percent received threats of physical violence like death threats. I get a lot of those. Twenty percent had been attacked or abused offline in connection.
What happens in the virtual world happens in the real world. That thing where people think they’re different, disabuse your mind of that. There is only one world because we live in both worlds.
The UNESCO report looked at almost half a million social-media attacks against me. There was a point in time when I was getting 90 hate messages per hour. Sixty percent were meant to tear down my credibility. There’s a reason why you don’t believe news organizations anymore; that is an information operation. And then the other 40 percent were meant to tear down my spirit. It didn’t work, but it’s really painful.
After the Nobel, I came back home and realized, Oh my gosh, I’m getting new attacks again. I just went through and found out where the attacks were coming from. We looked at the creation dates of the Twitter accounts, and they were all created around the time of elections. Did I mention it’s 33 days before elections in the Philippines?
It’s like 1986 all over again: Ferdinand Marcos Jr. is running against another widow, Leni Robredo. She’s our vice president. The pro-Marcos accounts had a big spike, but not the pro-Leni accounts. So you can see something that would be looking more organic versus something that looks artificial. We did a story and then we gave the information to Twitter, and then Twitter suspended over 300 accounts in the Marcos network. There’ll be more, which hopefully we will be seeing. If you are the gatekeeper, you cannot abdicate responsibility, because you subject all of us to the harms.
Here’s the solution: tech, journalism, community. Those are the three pillars of Rappler, even from the beginning. Part of the reason I’m here is because I testified at the Senate subcommittee on East Asian affairs and I asked for legislation. It’s not where I started in 2016, because I thought tech platforms were like journalists and could have self-regulation. They’re not. Technology needs guardrails in place.
Journalism needs to survive. We built Rappler’s platform. I spent a lot of money on it, and it took a long time because so much of our money was going to legal fees. But it’s rolling out in time for our elections. We’ve got to help independent media survive. And that’s part of the reason, before the Nobel, I agreed to co-chair the International Fund for Public Interest Media that’s asking democratic governments to actually put some money to help journalists survive.
Now I want to show you how they all come into effect, because we’re in the last 33 days before elections. I call it the #FactsFirst page. It’s a tech platform going through the four layers of this pyramid. We really started—this is kind of what I used the Nobel for—we started building this community in January. News organizations rarely share with each other, have never really in the Philippines. And so what we did is: 16 news organizations committed to fact-check the lies. We asked our communities, when you see a lie, send it to us on a tip line, and then we said, “All right, we’re going to meta-tag everything. It’s going to have the data, and then we’re going to be able to course it through the four layers of this pyramid.”
What are the four layers? Each of the newsgroups have links to each other—that’s good for search. And they also then share each other. Use your power. And then beyond that, it moves to the second layer. I call it “the mesh,” like in that movie Don’t Look Up, where the Planetary Defense system came together like a mesh. That’s kind of the way we have to live right now on social media, because meaning has been commoditized and each of us has to take our area of influence and clean it up. Then we connect it to each other, like a mesh. So all our human-rights organizations, our business groups, the church, environmental groups, civil societies, and NGOs are taking what the newsgroups are doing and sharing it with emotion.
And then after mesh, you go up to research. This was actually inspired by your Election Integrity Partnership in the U.S. Every week a research group will come out and tell Filipinos how we are being manipulated, who is gaining, and who is behind the networks of disinformation.
The last layer is the most important one, and they’ve been quiet for too long: legal groups. If you don’t have facts, you cannot have rule of law. These legal groups now are working hand in hand with the pyramid. They get the data pipeline and they then file both strategic and tactical litigation. I’ll tell you how it goes in 33 days, but it’s already working. Just on April Fools’ Day, and it wasn’t an April Fools’ joke, seven new legal complaints against me were thrown out. That’s good. But we also have 60 more new ones, so this isn’t ending. It’s still a whack-a-mole game, but we will win it. The one that I think is important is from the solicitor general, who really started the weaponization of the law, and he called fact-checking prior restraint. We’re going to win this.
What this world shows us is that we have a lot more in common than we have differences, believe it or not. As a journalist, I grew up looking at each country and every culture differently. But what the tech platforms actually showed us is the silver lining: We’re all being manipulated the same way. We have a lot more in common. So even things like identity politics, what happened in the U.S. in 2016, when both sides and Black Lives Matter was pounded open. Be aware. Think slow. Not fast.
The Atlantic · by Maria Ressa · April 7, 2022



19. FDD | The Ruthless Realpolitik of the United Arab Emirates

Conclusion:

It may not seem fair to suggest that the UAE avoid giving offense to Washington when so much of American policy is at odds with Emirati interests. What’s more, MbZ may bridle at the notion that he ought to distance himself from Assad while the Biden administration endorses energy deals that benefit Damascus. Yet practitioners of realpolitik know that fairness is rarely a characteristic of international relations. The United States is a superpower while the UAE is a petrostate with a few more than a million citizens. At least in this instance, doing what America wants entails doing the right thing, and that means rejecting reconciliation with the unrepentant war criminals in Damascus.

FDD | The Ruthless Realpolitik of the United Arab Emirates
fdd.org · by David Adesnik Senior Fellow and Director of Research · April 6, 2022
“We are grateful for and committed to the partnership we have with the UAE,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said last week after meeting with Mohamed bin Zayed (MbZ for short), the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and de facto ruler of the United Arab Emirates, in Morocco. The crown prince heard a very different message earlier this month after he became the first Arab leader to host Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since the Syrian civil war began in 2011. Sen. Jim Risch, the even-tempered Republican from Idaho and ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, tweeted that he was “sickened to see the mass murderer Bashar al-Assad on a visit to #Dubai.” Rep. Gregory Meeks, the Florida Democrat who chairs the House Foreign Affairs Committee, also had sharp words for the Emiratis, saying they had welcomed a killer.
These expressions of anger seem unlikely to sway MbZ, who has gradually but persistently escalated his engagement with the Syrian regime over the past four years. In 2019, the crown prince’s younger brother Abdullah, the Emirati foreign minister, explained that disagreements with Syria regarding its domestic affairs had become less important in light of growing Iranian influence in Damascus amid the “absence of a strong Arab role.” In other words, all could be forgiven (or at least forgotten) if there were a chance to create some daylight between Assad and his Iranian patrons.
The pace of Emirati engagement accelerates when the White House appears less interested in Syria and in holding Assad accountable for war crimes. Abu Dhabi reopened its embassy in Damascus in December 2018, only days after former President Donald Trump announced a sudden withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria (which he later rescinded). Assad’s visit last week follows the Biden administration’s tacit approval of Arab engagement with Damascus.
At first glance, the Emirati brand of realpolitik appears both savvy and ruthless. A closer examination shows that it is only ruthless. While MbZ may not respond to appeals to his conscience, he may want to reconsider whether drawing closer to Assad serves his interests. Arab governments have no real prospect of matching Tehran’s influence in Damascus; while the administration has signaled it will tolerate engagement with Syria, a congressional backlash could do lasting damage to Abu Dhabi’s relationship with Washington, as it did to Saudi ties with the United States.
What’s more, the Emiratis seem to be discounting the risk of antagonizing the White House even while counting on it to insulate them from the bad press generated by hosting Assad. Axios reported in late March that Assad’s visit to the UAE blindsided the Biden administration, which learned about the visit from news coverage. In contrast, both the Egyptians and Israelis received briefings. Also last month, MbZ rejected a White House request to speak with Joe Biden about the war in Ukraine, although the crown prince spoke with both Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky. Bilateral relations are at a historic low point.
Still, as the Emiratis likely expected, the Biden administration restricted itself to pro forma criticism of Assad’s visit to the UAE. State Department spokesman Ned Price pronounced himself “profoundly disappointed and troubled by this apparent attempt to legitimize Bashar Al-Assad.” Yet Price carefully avoided saying that the Biden administration would take any measures to hold MbZ accountable. As Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin wrote, the administration’s Syria policy “is one in which the United States publicly opposes normalization but privately looks the other way.”
In fact, the administration made the pivotal decision last year that set off a wave of outreach to Damascus by numerous Arab governments. In August, U.S. Ambassador to Beirut Dorothy Shea announced that Washington favored the inclusion of the Assad regime in a pair of regional energy deals worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Suffering from pervasive blackouts, Lebanon wants to buy gas from Egypt and electricity from Jordan, a plan that requires importing those purchases through Syria. Yet under the Caesar Act, which passed Congress with overwhelming bipartisan support in late 2019, the executive branch must impose sanctions on those who do business with the Assad regime, including foreign governments.
During its first months in office, the Biden administration warned Arab partners that the Caesar Act was the law of the land and enforcing it was mandatory. Yet amid persistent lobbying from Amman, Beirut, and Cairo, the administration chose to forgo enforcement. After Washington came out in favor of the gas and electricity deals, ministers from Arab governments began to take meetings with their Syrian counterparts after years of keeping them at arm’s length. King Abdullah of Jordan, who had been the first Arab leader to call on Assad to step down, even accepted a personal phone call from him. MbZ made his most visible move in November, sending his younger brother Abdullah, the UAE foreign minister, to meet with Assad in Damascus.
Washington’s pursuit of a nuclear agreement with Assad’s patrons in Tehran has also set the stage for Abu Dhabi to reconcile with Damascus. Given that Iranian troops and proxies played an integral role in the Syrian regime offensives that inflicted massive civilian casualties over the past decade, Emiratis may wonder how the State Department can say legitimizing Assad is out of bounds.
Biden’s pursuit of a revised nuclear deal with Iran despite the UAE’s deep reservations has also made the Emiratis less inclined to avoid provocations like hosting Assad. In their view, the pursuit of a deal has led the Biden administration to make concessions that damage Emirati interests, such as removing Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels from the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs). The Houthis responded by intensifying their war against Yemen’s internationally recognized government, whose principal supporters include the UAE.
In January, the Houthis struck the UAE itself with missiles, killing three civilians in Abu Dhabi. A week later, U.S. forces shot down a pair of missiles headed for Al Dhafra Air Base near the Emirati capital, where 2,000 Americans are stationed. The administration described the strikes as terrorist attacks but did not relist the Houthis as an FTO. Now, Washington may even remove Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from the FTO list—the Guards’ elite Quds Force is responsible for arming the Houthis and other proxy forces.
After Russia invaded Ukraine, the UAE abstained from voting on a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Moscow. The apparent cause was Abu Dhabi’s frustration with what it saw as the lackluster U.S. response to the Houthi attacks. MbZ’s refusal to accept Biden’s phone call followed shortly thereafter.
With the U.S.-UAE relationship at such a low point, and Washington engaging directly with Tehran, why shouldn’t Abu Dhabi attempt to limit Iranian influence in Damascus by reaching out to Assad? Western analysts have often suggested this is the natural policy for Gulf states to pursue. What these arguments miss is that Assad owes his survival to Tehran, which sent thousands of its own troops and tens of thousands of militia fighters to beat back rebel forces. Tehran also spent tens of billions of dollars to prevent a financial implosion of the Syrian regime. This support—especially the continuing shipment of oil—remains essential despite the advances Assad has made on the battlefield.
If MbZ hopes that Moscow—Assad’s other foreign patron—will compensate for any shortfall in Iranian aid, he should think again, especially now that the Kremlin must contend with wide-ranging U.S. and European sanctions as well as the cost of its war in Ukraine. Unlike Iran, Russia has never been willing to put a significant number of troops on the ground in Syria. Rather than bolstering Assad’s finances, Moscow has pushed for mineral rights and other forms of compensation for its military assistance.
Meanwhile, Arab states have proven themselves to be fair weather friends at best. They suspended Assad from the Arab League in 2011 and supported Syria’s armed opposition, with many sending weapons. The relationship between Damascus and Abu Dhabi is fated to be transactional. Syria would welcome reconstruction funding, but it would be hard for the Gulf states to match what Iran provides, especially if the United States lifts sanctions as part of a revised nuclear deal, clearing the way for Iran to earn tens of billions each year from oil exports. Moreover, substantial Emirati investments in Syria would require an open defiance of U.S. sanctions, a far greater provocation than hosting Assad.
For the UAE, the benefits of good relations with Washington are far more tangible. At the moment, Abu Dhabi is in the process of buying more than $29 billion of advanced weapons from the United States and hosts more than 3,500 U.S. military and civilian personnel. Yet arms exports can easily stall, especially if an aroused Congress chooses to stand in the way. Hearings on human rights and other difficult subjects may embarrass a foreign government at inopportune moments.
MbZ should learn from the uproar provoked by the Saudi murder of Jamal Khashoggi. Abu Dhabi should be wary of gestures like hosting Assad that suggest a divergence in values of sufficient depth to inflict lasting damage on bilateral ties with the United States.
It may not seem fair to suggest that the UAE avoid giving offense to Washington when so much of American policy is at odds with Emirati interests. What’s more, MbZ may bridle at the notion that he ought to distance himself from Assad while the Biden administration endorses energy deals that benefit Damascus. Yet practitioners of realpolitik know that fairness is rarely a characteristic of international relations. The United States is a superpower while the UAE is a petrostate with a few more than a million citizens. At least in this instance, doing what America wants entails doing the right thing, and that means rejecting reconciliation with the unrepentant war criminals in Damascus.
David Adesnik is research director and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Follow David on Twitter @adesnik. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by David Adesnik Senior Fellow and Director of Research · April 6, 2022


20. FDD | Why the IOC Doesn’t Deserve Gold for Its Olympics Campaign

Excerpts:
The insular nature of IOC politics was evident last year when the committee re-elected Bach with a vote of 93-1 and no opposition candidate on the ballot.
Working with existing members to change the culture of the IOC will be an uphill political battle but is one worth fighting. As it currently stands, voting members range from former athletes to businessmen and royal families, forming elite patronage networks across athletic, political and economic sectors. Existing members recruit new members perpetuating the external influence of autocrats and power brokers in the IOC. The United States should spearhead efforts to break this vicious cycle and restore credibility to the institution.
Even as the Olympics has wrapped up, it is imperative to hold the IOC accountable for its poor oversight of the Games. The IOC may have sold its soul, but with the help of Washington and its allies, it might yet be able to earn it back.

FDD | Why the IOC Doesn’t Deserve Gold for Its Olympics Campaign
fdd.org · by Zane Zovak Research Analyst · April 6, 2022
While more than 1 million Uyghurs and other minorities suffer mass detention, forced labor and torture in Xinjiang in western China, many of the world’s greatest athletes competed in Beijing at the 2022 Winter Olympics. The Chinese Communist Party must be held accountable for such abuses, but so should the International Olympic Committee, which has frequently dismissed criticisms of China’s human rights record and shown more deference to autocratic regimes than concern for its own athletes.
Nury Turkel, attorney and senior fellow at Hudson Institute, noted troubling similarities between the 1936 Olympics in Nazi Germany and the 2022 Winter Olympics in China. “By refusing to relocate the Olympics,” she said, “the IOC has condoned the Uyghur genocide by allowing the Games to take place in the shadow of concentration camps once again.”
This blindness to human rights should come as no surprise. Activists sounded the alarm over similar concerns prior to the 2014 Winter Games in Russia, but those pleas fell on deaf ears. When the IOC decided not to ban any Russian athletes after the 2014 doping scandal, Nancy Armour of USA Today declared that the “International Olympic Committee has sold its soul.”
The IOC even seems unwilling to protect its athletes from Chinese surveillance or political intimidation. Thus, coaches have instructed athletes on how to stay safe in Beijing by using burner phones and not speaking out on political issues. The IOC has met these developments with radio silence.
Likewise, last year, the IOC kowtowed to the regime in the case of former Chinese Olympian Peng Shuai’s sexual assault allegations against a former Communist official. “It was typical IOC: take the Chinese Communist Party at its word despite all evidence to the contrary,” said Kelley Currie, former U.S. ambassador-at-large for global women’s issues. Beijing rejected repeated external inquiries regarding Peng. Ultimately, it invited IOC President Thomas Bach and other IOC officials to a monitored video call with her; neither the video nor a transcript was made available. Bach and the IOC complied fully with this charade.
Perhaps most egregiously, when pressed to address evidence of genocide and forced labor in Xinjiang, the IOC refused to even meet with activist groups.
The IOC’s actions — or lack thereof — make a mockery of the Olympic spirit.
Fortunately, not everyone has proven to be so feckless. In an increasingly polarized political climate, the IOC’s neglect of athletes and burgeoning relationship with despots have done what few issues can: unite Washington.
Speaker Nancy Pelosi, for example, declared that the U.S. government had “an urgent moral duty to shine a bright light” on China’s human rights abuses, chastising the IOC and its corporate sponsors for turning a blind eye to support their bottom lines.
Representatives Michael Waltz, R-Fla., and Jennifer Wexton, D-Va., introduced a bill that would remove the IOC’s federal tax-exempt status. Rick Scott, R-Fla., introduced a similar bill in the Senate. Given that the IOC is based in Switzerland, the bills will have little practical effect, but they are a step in the right direction toward increasing scrutiny over IOC financing.
Congress should continue this momentum by holding investigations and hearings on IOC financing, as it has done previously for international sports bodies like FIFA. Lawmakers should also ask the IOC and its sponsors why they chose to green-light the Games despite various human rights concerns. The IOC is long overdue for such inquiries given that judiciaries in France and the United States have already implicated its officials in corruption.
Moreover, Washington should work with like-minded IOC members from the United States and abroad to reform the organization from within. Members typically make decisions behind closed doors and prior to voting, which, Maximilian Klein, representative of the independent German athletic association Athleten Deutschland, has described as a “legitimacy problem and the democratic deficit of the IOC leadership.”
The insular nature of IOC politics was evident last year when the committee re-elected Bach with a vote of 93-1 and no opposition candidate on the ballot.
Working with existing members to change the culture of the IOC will be an uphill political battle but is one worth fighting. As it currently stands, voting members range from former athletes to businessmen and royal families, forming elite patronage networks across athletic, political and economic sectors. Existing members recruit new members perpetuating the external influence of autocrats and power brokers in the IOC. The United States should spearhead efforts to break this vicious cycle and restore credibility to the institution.
Even as the Olympics has wrapped up, it is imperative to hold the IOC accountable for its poor oversight of the Games. The IOC may have sold its soul, but with the help of Washington and its allies, it might yet be able to earn it back.
Zane Zovak is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Zane Zovak Research Analyst · April 6, 2022


21. Russia’s Floundering False-Flag Narrative
Conclusion:
The historian Sir Michael Howard once observed that military professionals should seek to understand conflict within the social, human, moral, political, and psychological dimensions since all too often “the roots of victory and defeat … have to be sought far from the battlefield.” Undergirding Howard’s caution are the technological advances that have intensified the interaction between each dimension. As Robert Ehlers Jr. and Patrick Blannin rightfully reminds us, the battlefield of the 21st century is “particularly information dense,” transcending “geographic boundaries in ways not previously possible” and with “multiple information-heavy complex problems.”
For the moment, the West has performed admirably and has responded sensibly to the conflict. Seizing the initiative to unmask the Kremlin’s false-flag operation has avoided ceding the information environment to their propaganda. While it would be premature to conclude Russia has lost the information warfare fight, we can at least say for the moment that its false-flag narrative has floundered, portending to get worse. The West must continue to act (not respond) sensibly to counter any foreseeable signs of new emerging false-flag narratives or risks ceding IE superiority to the Kremlin.

Russia’s Floundering False-Flag Narrative | Small Wars Journal
Russia’s Floundering False-Flag Narrative
By Peter Wilcox
In 2016, Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews authored a paper titled “The Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood’ Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It.” The work leverages experimental research about persuasion and influence to arrive at several explanations for the characteristics that typify what Russia’s propaganda is, why it remains so effective, and what could realistically be done to blunt and contain its influence. As the crisis between Russia and Ukraine unfolded, it became clear that Russia’s propaganda model was at play, but interestingly the model seems to have had little success garnering significant support over the very claims used to justify Russia’s wanton and unfounded attack, which had the explicit aim for an outright invasion. Given the resounding unified international condemnation—to say nothing of Russia’s mass protest demonstrators, numbering in the thousands--and with no major super-global power supporting Russia at the moment, it appears its false-flag narrative has floundered. This essay reflects on some of the Kremlin’s current blunders to date in setting conditions in the information environment for a successful false-flag narrative that should have preceded its false-flag operation. These blunders should caution U.S. defense planners that those who ignore the impact of a hyperconnected global information environment on modern conflict do so at great peril.
Being First In The Information Environment Matters
More than a month before Russia launched military operations into Ukraine, U.S. intelligence reasoned—while closely monitoring tensions escalating between the two countries—that Russia was posturing for a major false-flag operation, the manufacturing of a fictitious event as a pretext for justifying military operations. Consequently, the U.S. Departments of State and Defense used the global news networks and social media platforms to alert Ukraine and the rest of the world to Russia’s intent. Although Russia’s false-flag narrative, loosely defined as a fictitious story or rationale used to justify the execution of a false-flag operation, remained hidden for some time, the knowledge that Russia was about to conduct such an operation proved reason enough for the U.S. to act. Britain’s foreign office closely followed the U.S. announcement with details concerning Russia’s aim to oust Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s president, and to replace him with someone more friendly to Russia’s interests. Shortly after, the overwhelming body of the United Nations denounced Russia’s aim to invade Ukraine for no reason other than to serve its own political aims.
On February 24, 2022, a day before conducting a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia amassed soldiers, tanks, and various military assault and air assets on the Ukrainian borders. Only then did Russia reveal its justification for its false-flag operation: the execution of a “special military operation” to protect the Donbas region with the objective of “demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine.” The Kremlin reasoned to its citizens that it sought to liberate Ukrainians from persecution. Digital fakes and manufactured videos were used to bolster this narrative. The plan involved fabricating an attack by Ukraine’s military on its Russian-speaking citizens in the east or on Russian lands so the Kremlin could publicize and demonstrate to the world acts of genocide. Problematic for the Kremlin was that the West seized the initiative to act first and fast to alert the global community across multiple domestic and international media channels of its intentions. In classic Boydian terms, the West seized the opportunity to disrupt and dislodge Russia’s ability to establish conditions in the information environment for a believable false-flag narrative.
According to Paul and Matthews, countering false-flag narratives effectively requires alerting the target audience at the outset of preliminary exposure to disinformation even if details of the narrative remain hidden or murky. The forewarning pre-emptively alerts the target audience to be ready so, when the narrative’s veil is lifted, the target audience understands that it is being deceived. The disinformation as Paul and Matthews observes, then occupies a role akin to suspicion or outright rejection: in a position of weakness qualified only by what the target audience already knows.
The West gained the initiative by being first to act and first to establish impressions in the information environment regarding Kremlin’s intention for its military incursion into Ukraine, thereby laying the foundation for exploiting and unmaking its false-flag operation well before the Kremlin could reasonably respond. In the information environment where the battle of narratives unfolds, it is more important than ever to proactively be the first to launch the firehose of falsehoods in order to seize the initiative for influencing human behavior. That a decent portion of Russia’s own citizens failed to agree with the Kremlin’s narrative, protesting by the thousands the invasion of Ukraine, exposes this blunder.
Donning “Raincoats” Early On Can Be Effective
It is not particularly surprising that the Kremlin’s primary target for the firehose of falsehood is its own citizens, followed by those residing in Ukraine and then those in the West. As the crisis endured, the Kremlin continued to leverage its media conglomerate and to press departmental secretaries to disseminate Putin’s repeated and false claims that the aim was to cleanse Ukraine of drug abusers and neo-Nazis, and that the fight was with those who have seized power, not the Ukrainian people. Indeed, reports do indicate Russian citizens with relatives in Ukraine have bought into the Kremlin’s false-flag narrative. And as a testament towards attempts to control the narrative, the Kremlin ramped up efforts to tamp down information about Ukraine available to its citizens.
Yet in the 21st century, information and communications technologies available to the average Russian citizen were not in short supply, assuring many were very much aware of events transpiring in Ukraine. The Kremlin failed to appreciate the difficulty in controlling the flow of information in and out of Ukraine because, after all, Russia is digitally and globally connected to the rest of the world. As The New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman observed: “This is the first war” that is “covered on TikTok by super-empowered individuals armed only with smartphones, so acts of brutality will be documented and broadcast worldwide without any editors or filters.”
News from the international global news networks and social media platforms, to say nothing of friends and family members residing on both borders, likely ensured raincoats were unwittingly donned early enough so the firehose of disinformation posed little chance in altering their perceptions or beliefs. Yes, the Kremlin banned Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms, but not until well after the invasion was initiated, thus allowing its citizens a chance to become familiar with events unfolding in Ukraine. Many Russians were arguably undermining the Kremlin’s own efforts to alter their behavior to align with the false-flag narrative.
Efforts of ordinary Russians to learn about the Ukrainian conflict are consistent with reports of the nearly 4,500 protestors who were arrested for attending anti-war rallies across Russia; this despite newly enacted legislation making it a crime to refer to Russia’s incursion into Ukraine “a war.” As of March 7, 2022, nearly 13,000 have been arrested. Although difficult to discern just how much of Russia’s population supports the conflict, one can conclude that many did not buy into the Kremlin’s disinformation. The inability of the Kremlin to appreciate just how hyperconnected the information environment is and the extent to which it could realistically control the flow of information into its country impeded its attempts to set conditions for a compelling false-flag narrative.
Do Not Be Surprised If The Battlespace Becomes Global
A third blunder the Kremlin made was a failure to understand the context, continuities, and consequences of an evolved information environment. At the moment, a surge of global legions of community volunteers, news networks, and international governments remains dedicated to unmasking Russia’s disinformation campaigns on an unpresented scale. Perhaps, as Charlie Warzel insists, the disturbing images of Ukraine’s severely damaged cities generated a crisis amongst the global community who sought to channel their efforts to debunk digital fakes in real time. It is one thing for the West to take the media stage to unmask Russia’s true purpose for its incursion into Ukraine. It is quite another when a crisis in a country almost the size of Texas generates a global response to actively debunk disinformation in real time. Forbes refers to those sources as an “army of hackers” devoted to countering Kremlin state media disinformation, to launching multiple synchronized cyber-attacks against Russia.
Social media platforms such as TikTok and Facebook have also banned Russia’s own state media from access in Europe. Elsewhere, information technology armies are countering Kremlin disinformation. Global news networks have debunked their share of manufactured videos, images, and social posts. Arguably, it may be impossible to fully counter Russia’s disinformation initiatives. However, the global response has aided in diminishing Russia’s ability to effectively solidify its false-flag narrative. These difficulties underlie the Kremlin’s neglect to understand the continuities of the information environment: namely, that it would avail legions of global cyber warriors the opportunity to frustrate the Kremlin’s process in achieving its political aims decisively and quickly. The invasion of Ukraine generated a global response like no other previous conflict has, soliciting the emergence of some the world’s savviest technologists and hackers to act, on behalf of Ukraine, as an agency for change dedicated to dismantling the Kremlin’s propaganda efforts.
Do Not Underestimate The Impact Of Super-Empowered Individuals
In 2002, Thomas Friedman coined the term “super-empowered individuals,” noting the ability of such people to “act more directly and much more powerfully on the world stage,” using technology and networks to generate significant impacts. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine elevated Zelenskyy, a former comedian, to a super-empowered status. The invasion warped the political fabric space; influenced able men and women to take up arms against Russia; rallied the international community to enact severe economic sanctions on Russia;influenced hundreds of businesses, corporations, and entertainment industries to shut their doors; and extracted weapons and billions in financial aid from the West to support the ongoing fight against Russia.
Across global news networks and social media platforms, Zelenskyy has become a symbol of a humble everyman elevated to hero status. When the U.S. first heard news that Russia’s military sought to execute him, they offered to extract him to safety; Zelenskyy replied, “The fight is here. I need ammunition, not a ride.” Like a modern version of David seeking to protect his people from Goliath, Zelenskyy’s constant real-time updates, tweets, and emotional pleas to the global community to support the preservation of his beloved country resulted in a galvanization of global support that is unprecedented in a modern era conflict. The Kremlin failed to understand that in a hyperconnected world information and communication technologies not only give rise to super-empowered individuals, but also increases their reach and power for projecting compelling narratives. Equally, Russia failed to account for the very idea that Zelenskyy himself would become a super-empowered individual.
Conclusion
The historian Sir Michael Howard once observed that military professionals should seek to understand conflict within the social, human, moral, political, and psychological dimensions since all too often “the roots of victory and defeat … have to be sought far from the battlefield.” Undergirding Howard’s caution are the technological advances that have intensified the interaction between each dimension. As Robert Ehlers Jr. and Patrick Blannin rightfully reminds us, the battlefield of the 21st century is “particularly information dense,” transcending “geographic boundaries in ways not previously possible” and with “multiple information-heavy complex problems.”
For the moment, the West has performed admirably and has responded sensibly to the conflict. Seizing the initiative to unmask the Kremlin’s false-flag operation has avoided ceding the information environment to their propaganda. While it would be premature to conclude Russia has lost the information warfare fight, we can at least say for the moment that its false-flag narrative has floundered, portending to get worse. The West must continue to act (not respond) sensibly to counter any foreseeable signs of new emerging false-flag narratives or risks ceding IE superiority to the Kremlin.
The views expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Peter Wilcox is an officer in the United States Army.

References:
Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, “The Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood’ Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It” (Perspectives PE-198-OSD, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2016).
Paul and Matthews, “Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood.’”
“Statement by President Biden on Russia’s Unprovoked and Unjustified Attack on Ukraine,” White House Statements and Releases, February 23, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/23/statement-by-president-biden-on-russias-unprovoked-and-unjustified-attack-on-ukraine/.
Natasha Bertrand and Jeremy Herb, “First on CNN: U.S. Intelligence Indicates Russia Preparing Operation to Justify Invasion of Ukraine,” CNN Politics, January 14, 2022.
Michael Holden, “U.K. Accuses Kremlin of Trying to Install Pro-Russian Leader in Ukraine,” Reuters, January 23, 2022.
Humeyra Pamuk and Jonathan Landay, “U.N. General Assembly in Historic Vote Denounces Russia over Ukraine Invasion,” Reuters, March 3, 2022.
Anton Troianovski, “Putin Announces a ‘Military Operation’ in Ukraine as the U.N. Security Council Pleads with Him to Pull Back,” New York Times, February 23, 2022.
“Russia Says Invasion to ‘Free Ukrainians from Oppression,’” Moscow Times, February 25, 2022.
Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Exposes What It Says Is Russian Effort to Fabricate Pretext for Invasion,” New York Times, February 3, 2022.
Barnes, “U.S. Exposes What It Says Is Russian Effort.”
Among other things, the strategist John Boyd’s Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop aimed to inspire decision-makers to constantly think through problems critically, to forecast threats, and to neutralize/paralyze the enemy’s cognitive processes, thereby forcing them to lose the initiative and momentum within the decision-making cycle.
Paul and Matthews, “Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood.’”
Paul and Matthews, “Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood.’”
Ivan Nechepurenko and Dan Bilefsky, “Thousands of Russians Protest President Vladimir V. Putin’s Assault on Ukraine: Some Chant: ‘No to War!’” New York Times, February 24, 2022.
Andrew Roth, “‘It’s Not Rational’: Putin’s Bizarre Speech Wrecks His Own Pragmatic Image,” The Guardian, February 25, 2022.
Valerie Hopkins, “Ukrainians Find That Relatives in Russia Don’t Believe It’s a War,” New York Times, March 6, 2022.
Steven Lee Myers, “With New Limits on Media, Putin Closes a Door on Russia’s ‘Openness,’” New York Times, March 7, 2022.
Myers, “With New Limits on Media.”
Thomas Friedman, “We Have Never Been Here Before,” New York Times, February 25, 2022.
Christopher Paul’s and Miriam Matthews’s “raincoat” metaphor insists that individuals exposed to good information backed by evidence, prior to disinformation, stand a chance of being immunized against propaganda.
Hopkins, “Ukrainians Find That Relatives in Russia.”
Brittany Shammas and Reis Thebault, “More than 4,500 Antiwar Protesters Arrested in One Day in Russia, Group Says,” Washington Post, March 6, 2022.
Rachel Treisman, “Russia Arrests Nearly 5,000 Anti-war Protesters This Weekend,” NPR, March 7, 2022.
Charlie Warzel, “The Information War Isn’t Over Yet,” The Atlantic, March 8, 2022.
Warzel, “Information War Isn’t Over.”
Elizabeth Dwoskin and Cat Zakrzewski, “Facebook and TikTok Ban Russian State Media in Europe,” Washington Post, February 28, 2022.
Drew Harwell and Rachel Lerman, “How Ukrainians Have Used Social Media to Humiliate the Russians and Rally the World,” Washington Post, March 1, 2022.
Thomas Friedman, Longitudes and Attitudes: Exploring the World after September 11 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002).
Andrew E. Kramer, “‘Everybody in Our Country Needs to Defend,’” New York Times, February 26, 2022.
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Jason Karaian, Sarah Kessler, Stephen Gandel, Michael J. de la Merced, and Lauren Hirsch, “How Economic Warfare Is Battering Russia,” New York Times, February 28, 2022.
Julie Creswell, “Food Companies, Long Symbols of the West in Russia, Pause Operations,” New York Times, March 8, 2022.
Amy Cheng, “Military Trainers, Missiles and over 200,000 Pounds of Lethal Aid: What NATO Members Have Sent Ukraine So Far,” Washington Post, January 26, 2022.
“Live Updates: Zelenskyy Declines US Offer to Evacuate Kyiv,” Associated Press, February 25, 2022.
Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” in The Causes of Wars, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 188.
Robert S. Ehlers Jr. and Patrick Blannin, “Integrated Planning and Campaigning for Complex Problems,” Parameters 51, no, 2 (Summer 2021): article 10.
Robert S. Ehlers Jr. and Patrick Blannin, “Making Sense of the Information Environment,” Small Wars Journal, March 3, 2020.


22. Disinformation To Conceal War Crimes: Russia Is Lying About Atrocities In Bucha




Disinformation To Conceal War Crimes: Russia Is Lying About Atrocities In Bucha


APRIL 07, 2022


The images of bodies strewn across the streets of Bucha, killed execution-style, show the true face of Putin’s Russia. These images speak louder than words about the nature and aims of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Still, the pro-Kremlin media bolstered by Russian diplomatic social media accounts are speaking, in an attempt to distract and obfuscate the facts of war crimes.
A Ukrainian provocation, a set-up to unleash World War III, a coordinated attack by the Western media, a distraction from “US biological laboratories” in Ukraine, a British plot – explained by the EU-sanctioned propagandist Vladimir Solovyov(opens in a new tab) with the resemblance of the name Bucha to the English word “butcher” – the excuses made by the pro-Kremlin media are as sickening as they are repetitive. (And they have been extensively debunked, see for example: BBC(opens in a new tab)Bellingcat(opens in a new tab), the Insider(opens in a new tab)MediaZona(opens in a new tab)NYT(opens in a new tab) and others).
The Kremlin is trying to occupy the information space by flooding it with contradicting “explanations” of the events. The goal is not only to deflect the blame for this particular atrocity against peaceful civilians, but also to pre-emptively shape narratives for countering and discrediting any evidence or investigation into Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Russian state-controlled news agency RIA Novosti(opens in a new tab) is working hard to fulfil this task already, alleging that Ukraine is preparing a “provocation” in Kherson, involving the deaths of civilians…
These tactics of flooding and preventively occupying the information space come straight out of the Kremlin’s disinformation playbook and were applied before, for example in the aftermath of Russia’s downing of flight MH17. The EUvsDisinfo database contains hundreds of examples of pro-Kremlin disinformation claims alleging, among other things, that like the killing of civilians in Bucha, the killing of civilians aboard MH17 was a provocation and a set-up to frame Russia, involving fake dead bodies (compare the claims in 2014(opens in a new tab) and now(opens in a new tab)).
Russian diplomatic accounts on social media used for disinformation
In contrast to 2014, the flooding of the international information space has become more complicated for the Kremlin, especially after the EU sanctioned RT and Sputnik(opens in a new tab). At the same time, Russian diplomatic accounts on social media have been playing a prominent role in the Kremlin’s communication strategy related to the invasion of Ukraine. In particular, Twitter accounts of Russia’s diplomatic missions acting in a coordinated network(opens in a new tab) have been trying to discredit the reporting of independent media from Ukraine, and amplify disinformation narratives justifying the invasion.
Now, the network of Russian diplomatic Twitter accounts is amplifying lies(opens in a new tab) about the Bucha killings, linking to a recently-created website(opens in a new tab) that spreads disinformation behind the façade of fact-checking.
Russian diplomats on Twitter are also taking an active part in shaping the narrative of global “Russophobia”. Claims that the world is unfair and hostile to Russia and Russians have been at the core of pro-Kremlin disinformation narratives for years, and continue to be deliberately stoked(opens in a new tab) in the context of war. On social media this has taken the shape of the “Stop hating Russians” campaign, distributed by Russian diplomatic accounts and portraying Russians as persecuted people because of their nationality (since the beginning of March a related hashtag was mentioned more than 24,000 times on Twitter).
A screenshot of a video shared by the Twitter account of Russia’s embassy in France. The videos shows a Russian person arrested by “Anti-Russian” law enforcement team.
On 5 April, Twitter announced(opens in a new tab) it “will not amplify or recommend government accounts belonging to states that limit access to free information and are engaged in armed interstate conflict”.
Support system for the war machine
As Russian diplomats are attempting to frame Russia as a victim of its own aggression against Ukraine – an effort that is likely to intensify amid calls supporting the investigation of Russian war crimes(opens in a new tab) and crimes against humanity – pro-Kremlin pundits are charting a way forward.
To boost the notoriously poor morale of the invading Russian forces (and, perhaps, distract them from looting(opens in a new tab) and marauding(opens in a new tab)), Russian state news agency RIA Novosti published a long-form article headlined “What Russia should do with Ukraine”. Among other things, the text is calling for mass repression of the Ukrainian population and a ban of the name “Ukraine” itself. You can find a more detailed analysis here.
It is in this context that disinformation trying to obfuscate the Russian atrocities in Bucha should be seen – as a support system(opens in a new tab) for Russia’s war machine and as a part of deliberate strategy to destroy Ukraine.



23. Putin’s War on History

Historical context is important.

Excer​pt​s:

Ukraine’s progress before the invasion should not be overstated. Shady oligarchs pulled strings behind the scenes, and the country was hobbled by pervasive corruption. (Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index puts Ukraine alongside Mexico and Zambia but ranks it as slightly less corrupt than Russia.) But for all of the country’s problems, its history since independence has been one of real changes of power, brought about by real elections, between real candidates, reported by real free media. For Putin, the Ukrainian example had become a direct political threat. What if Russia’s own population—and not just the urban intelligentsia—started demanding the same freedoms? In his “Historical Unity” essay, Putin explained away the fact that Ukrainian presidents change as being the result of a “system” set up by “the Western authors of the anti-Russian project.” Ukraine’s pro-Russian citizens, he wrote, are not vocal because they have been “driven underground,” “persecuted for their convictions,” or even “killed.” Whether he actually believes this is unclear, but it might explain the slightly ad hoc tactics used by the Russian army in the first week of his war on Ukraine. Putin may really have expected his tank battalions to be greeted as liberators.
As during the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2013–14 Maidan protests, which came to be known as the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine’s fierce self-defense today is a defense of values, not of ethnic identity or of some imagined glorious past. Putin’s obsession with history, in contrast, is a weakness. Although earlier in his presidency, banging the “gathering of the Russian world” drum boosted his approval ratings, it has now led him down what may turn out to be a fatal dead end. In terms of square mileage alone, Ukraine is the second-largest country in Europe, after Russia itself. If you placed it over the eastern United States, as The Washington Post recently observed, it would stretch “from Missouri to the Atlantic Ocean, and from Ohio to Georgia.” Occupying it permanently would be enormously costly in troops and treasure. Moreover, Putin’s war has unified Ukrainians as never before. And whether they are speaking Russian or Ukrainian, their sentiment is the same. Already, video clips have gone viral of babushkas telling Russian soldiers that they will leave their bones in Ukrainian soil and of Ukrainian soldiers swearing joyously as they fire bazookas at Russian tanks, all in the purest Russian. The war is likely to go on for a long time, and its final outcome is unknown. History, Putin may be learning, is only a guide when it’s the real sort.


Putin’s War on History
The Thousand-Year Struggle Over Ukraine
By Anna Reid
May/June 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Borderland: A Journey Through the History of Ukraine. · April 6, 2022
On the evening of February 21, 2022, three days before Russian forces began the largest land invasion on the European continent since World War II, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave an angry televised speech. In it, he expressed familiar grievances about the eastward expansion of NATO, alleged Ukrainian aggression, and the presence of Western missiles on Russia’s border. But most of his tirade was devoted to something else: Ukrainian history. “Ukraine is not just a neighboring country for us,” Putin said. “It is an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.” Ukraine’s borders, he asserted, have no meaning other than to mark a former administrative division of the Soviet Union: “Modern Ukraine was entirely created by Russia.”
To many Western ears, Putin’s historical claims sounded bizarre. But they were of more than casual importance. Far from an innovation of the current crisis, Putin’s argument that Ukraine has always been one and the same with Russia, and that it has been forcibly colonized by Western forces, has long been a defining part of his worldview. Already during the Maidan popular uprising in Kyiv in 2013–14, Putin claimed that the people leading the huge protests were Western-backed fashisti (fascists) trying to tear Ukraine from its historical roots. (In fact, the protests caught the West by surprise, and although they included a far-right fringe, they were no fascist takeover.) And in July 2021, well before the buildup of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border, the Kremlin published a 7,000-word essay under Putin’s byline with the title “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians.” Both Russia and Ukraine, it asserted, have not only common roots in language and faith but also a shared historic destiny. Since its publication, the essay has become part of the required curriculum for all service members in the Russian armed forces, including those fighting in the current war. According to Putin’s logic, all divisions between Russia and Ukraine are the work of Western powers. From Poland in the sixteenth century to the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the nineteenth century and the Nazis in World War II, they have periodically coerced Ukraine or led it astray. In this reading, Kyiv’s pro-Western outlook over the past decade is only the latest form of external interference—this time by the European Union and the United States—aimed at dividing Russia against itself. Ukraine’s “forced change of identity,” Putin wrote, is “comparable...to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us.” In Putin’s meaning, “us” included Ukrainians. Ukrainians and Ukraine, in other words, aren’t just naturally part of Russia; they don’t even really exist.
A variation on the “Ukraine doesn’t really exist” theme is the Kremlin’s assertion that Ukraine is a foregone failure. According to this view—long echoed in a more sophisticated form by Western commentators—thanks to its geography and political history, Ukraine is forever destined to be riven by internal division or torn apart by more powerful neighbors. This was the core narrative of Putin’s propaganda the last time he invaded Ukraine, when he grabbed Crimea and the Donbas following the Maidan protests in Kyiv. Then, Russian state media reported that Ukraine was a failed state taken over by a neo-Nazi junta and that Russian forces were riding to the rescue. The close Putin adviser who directed all this propaganda, the bodyguard turned strategist Vladislav Surkov, reprised the theme in an interview with the Financial Times last year. Ukraine, he said, using an odd analogy, was like the “soft tissue” between two bones, which, until it was severed, would rub painfully together. (With Russian journalists, he was more straightforward: the “only method that has historically proved effective in Ukraine,” he said, is “coercion into fraternal relations.”)
As the extraordinary resilience and unity of the Ukrainian population in the current war have demonstrated, these Russian claims are nonsense. Saying that Ukraine doesn’t really exist is as absurd as saying that Ireland doesn’t exist because it was long under British rule, or that Norwegians are really Swedes. Although they won statehood only 31 years ago, the Ukrainians have a rich national history going back centuries. The idea that Ukrainians are too weak and divided to stand up for themselves is one they are magnificently disproving on the battlefield. As for the neo-Nazi insult, this is belied by the fact that Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, is Jewish and that in the most recent parliamentary elections, in 2019, Ukraine’s far-right party, Svoboda, won less than three percent of the vote. As Putin’s imagined Ukraine has increasingly diverged from Ukrainian reality, the myth has become harder to sustain, the contradictions too acute. But rather than adjusting his historical fantasy to bring it closer to the truth, Putin has doubled down, resorting to military force and totalitarian censorship in a vain attempt to make reality closer to the myth. He may now be learning that reality is hard to defy: the wages of bad history are disaster in the present.
Gathering Russia
Putin’s obsession with Ukraine’s past can be traced to the trauma of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Until 1991, most of today’s Ukraine had been ruled by Russia for 300 years—slightly longer, in other words, than Scotland has been ruled by England. And with a population that is today nearly as large as Spain’s, Ukraine was by far the most significant Soviet republic besides Russia itself. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former U.S. national security adviser, famously wrote, “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire.” This isn’t literally true. Russia today is still a vast multiethnic empire, taking in a 3,000-mile-wide slice of northern Asia and including more than a dozen Asian nationalities, from the 5.3 million Tatars on the Volga River to a few thousand Chukchis on the Bering Strait. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, Moscow lost its West.

For Putin, Russia’s European empire was all-important. Although there has long been an exoticizing streak to Russia’s self-image—“Yes, we are Scythians!” the hitherto gentle poet Aleksandr Blok declared after the 1917 revolution—the country has always seen itself as a European, rather than an Asian, power. Its great composers, novelists, and artists have been European in orientation; its historic military triumphs—against Napoleon and Hitler—made it a senior player in Europe’s “concert of nations.” By pushing Russia back into her gloomy pine forests, away from such ringing old place names as Odessa and Sevastopol, the loss of Ukraine, in particular, injured the Russian sense of self.
At the heart of Russia’s Ukraine problem, then, has been a war over history. The first battle is over where the story begins. Conventionally, the story starts with a legend-wrapped leader from the Middle Ages, Volodymyr (or Vladimir in Russian) the Great. A descendent of Norse raiders and traders from Scandinavia, Volodymyr founded the first proto-state in Kyiv toward the end of the tenth century. A loose but very large fiefdom known as Rus, it was centered on Kyiv and covered today’s Belarus, northwestern Russia, and most of Ukraine. Volodymyr also gave Rus its spiritual foundations, converting his realm to Orthodox Christianity.
As Putin sees it, the West has been pulling Ukraine away from Russia for centuries.
Although Russians and Ukrainians concur on Volodymyr’s importance, they disagree over what happened after his kingdom broke up. Through the eleventh and twelfth centuries, it disintegrated into warring princedoms, and in the thirteenth, it was overrun by the Mongols, under Batu Khan. In Russian accounts, the population—and, with it, true Rus culture—fled the violence, heading northeast, to Moscow and Novgorod. Ukrainians, however, argue that Rus culture remained squarely centered on Ukraine and that what emerged in Moscow was a separate and distinct tradition. To Western readers, the argument seems trivial: it is as though the French and the Germans were locked in battle over whether Charlemagne, the ninth-century founder of the Carolingian Empire, belongs to modern France or modern Germany. Ukrainians, however, understand the significance of the Russian claims. One of Kyiv’s landmarks is a large nineteenth-century statue of Volodymyr the Great, holding a cross and gazing out over the Dnieper River. When Putin put up his own, even bigger Vladimir the Great outside the Kremlin gates in 2016, Ukrainians rightly saw it not as a homage to a tenth-century king but as a blatant history grab.
In fact, for most of the next seven centuries after Volodymyr’s reign, Ukraine was outside Muscovite control. As Mongol rule crumbled through the 1300s, the territory of present-day Ukraine was absorbed by the emergent Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which in turn combined by dynastic marriage with Poland, so that for the next two and a half centuries, Ukraine was ruled from Krakow. Eventually, even Ukraine’s faith acquired a Western veneer: in 1596, the Union of Brest-Litovsk created the Greek Catholic, or Uniat, Church—a compromise between Catholic Poles and Orthodox Ukrainians that acknowledged the pope but was Orthodox in ritual and allowed priests to marry. A politically canny halfway house between the two religions, the union helped Polonize the Ukrainian nobility, part of what Putin sees as a long pattern of the West pulling Ukraine away from its rightful Orthodox home.
It was not until the late seventeenth century that Moscow forcefully entered the picture. A series of uprisings by Ukrainian Cossacks—militarized frontier groups, centered on the lower Dnieper—had weakened the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom. Then, following a long war with Poland over Ukraine, expanding Muscovy was finally able to annex Kyiv in 1686. For Ukrainians, it was an “out of the frying pan into the fire” moment: Polish rule was simply swapped for its harsher Muscovite counterpart. But in Putin’s telling, it was the beginning of the “gathering of the Russian world,” using an archaic phrase that he has resuscitated to justify his war against Ukraine today. Another century later, Poland itself was partitioned among Austria, Prussia, and Russia, with Russia ending up with what is today Belarus and central Ukraine, including Kyiv, and Austria with today’s western Ukraine, then known as eastern Galicia, which included Lviv.
State of Struggle
Ukraine’s modern national movement began in the 1840s, led by the first great Ukrainian-language writer, Taras Shevchenko. Born into an enserfed peasant family in a village near Kyiv, he exhorted Ukrainians to throw off the Russian yoke and excoriated the many who Russified themselves in order to climb the socioeconomic ladder. (These views earned him ten years in Siberia.) As the century progressed, and especially after Tsar Alexander II’s assassination by anarchists in 1881, tsarist rule became more repressive. Hundreds of Ukrainian socialists followed Shevchenko into exile, and Ukrainian-language books and education were banned. At this point, Ukraine’s east-west divide turned into an advantage—at least for those living in the western part—because in Austrian-ruled Galicia, Ukrainians were able to adopt the freer civic culture then taking root in Europe. In Lviv, they published their own newspapers and organized reading rooms, cooperatives, credit unions, choirs, and sports clubs—all innovations borrowed from the similarly Austrian-ruled Czechs. Although disadvantaged by a voting system that favored Polish landowners, they were able to form their own political party and sent representatives to Lviv’s provincial assembly, to which the typical Ukrainian deputy was not a fiery revolutionary but a pince-nez-wearing, mildly socialist academic or lawyer.

Ukraine’s reputation as a land cursed by political geography—part of the “bloodlands” in the title of the historian Timothy Snyder’s best-selling book—was earned during the first half of the twentieth century. When the tsarist regime suddenly crumbled in 1917, a Ukrainian parliamentary, or “Rada,” government declared itself in Kyiv, but it was swept away only a few months later, first by Bolshevik militias and then by the German army, which occupied Ukraine under the March 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. After the armistice that November ending World War I, Germany withdrew again, leaving the Red Army, the reactionary Russian White Army, the Polish army, a Ukrainian army under the socialist Rada minister Symon Petlyura, and an assortment of independent warlords to fill the power vacuum. In the chaotic civil war that ensued, the group worst hit was Ukraine’s Jews. Scapegoated by all sides, more than 100,000 were killed in 1919, in a series of massacres unmatched since the 1600s. Beaten by the Reds, Petlyura formed a last-ditch alliance with Poland, before fleeing to Paris when Poland and the Soviet Union made a peace that divided Ukraine again, the Russians taking the east and the center, the Poles the west. Two small borderland regions—today’s Bukovina and Transcarpathia—went to newly independent Romania and Czechoslovakia, respectively.
Not surprisingly, Petlyura is a hotly contested figure. For Russians, he was just another pogromist warlord. (That viewpoint saturates the Kyiv-bred but ethnic Russian writer Mikhail Bulgakov’s novel The White Guard, for whose characters Petlyura’s army is a frightening mob.) For Ukrainians, conversely, he led their country’s first stab at independent statehood, which might have succeeded had the Allies only given him the same diplomatic and military support that they did the Balts and (less successfully) the Armenians, the Azerbaijanis, and the Georgians. To accusations of ethnonationalism, they rejoin that the Rada government printed its banknotes in four languages—Ukrainian, Russian, Polish, and Yiddish—and that the leader of the Ukrainian delegation to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference was a distinguished Jewish lawyer, Arnold Margolin. Petlyura’s army rampaged, they concede, but he could not control it, and so did all the others. The controversy played out in 1926 in a Paris courtroom, after Petlyura was assassinated by a Jewish anarchist who claimed to be avenging family members killed by Ukrainian soldiers. The three-week trial was an international sensation, with the defense presenting a devastating dossier of evidence about the pogroms, while the prosecution sought to paint the assassin as a Soviet agent. After only half an hour’s deliberation, the jury declared him innocent, and debate over the affair still rages.
Between Stalin and Hitler
In fact, the violence and chaos of the Petlyura era were merely a prelude to much greater Ukrainian tragedies in the years that followed. Beginning in 1929, Joseph Stalin launched the Holodomor—literally, “killing by hunger”—a program of forced deportations and food and land requisitioning aimed at the permanent emasculation of Ukraine’s rural population as a whole. Rolled out in parallel with a purge of Ukraine’s urban intelligentsia, it resulted in the deaths of nearly four million Ukrainians. Covered up for decades, there is no doubt that this extraordinary mass killing was deliberate: the Soviet authorities knew that villagers were dying in great numbers, yet they persisted in food requisitioning and forbade them from leaving the famine areas for the towns. Why Stalin perpetrated the famine is less clear. An estimated three million Kazakhs and Russians also starved to death during these same years, but he chose to hit Ukraine hardest, probably because it embodied his twin demons in one: the conservative peasantry and a large, assertive non-Russian nationality. Even today, however, there is an ongoing effort by Russia to block international recognition of the Holodomor as a genocide. In his “Historical Unity” essay, Putin refers to the famine only once, in passing, as a “common tragedy.” Stalin’s name is not mentioned at all.
Less than a decade later, a new round of horror was visited on Ukraine following the signing of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Red Army occupied the Polish-ruled western part of the country—the first time Russia had ever controlled this territory. Two years later, however, the Wehrmacht marched in anyway, and two years after that, the Red Army returned. Both armies deported or arrested the Lviv intelligentsia—a rich mix of Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews—as they arrived and killed political prisoners as they departed. For a few months in 1943, a large ethnonationalist Ukrainian partisan army controlled most of northeastern Ukraine, establishing a primitive administration and its own training camps and military hospitals. Remarkably, small units of this army carried on an assassination and sabotage campaign for years after the war ended, with the last insurgent commander killed in a shootout near Lviv in 1950.
Overall, 5.3 million Ukrainians died during the war years, an astonishing one-sixth of the population. Again, many died of hunger, after Germany began confiscating grain. And again, it was Jews who suffered most. Before the war, they made up a full five percent of Ukraine’s population, or some 2.7 million people; after it, only a handful remained. The rest had fled east or lay in unmarked mass graves in the woods or on the edge of cemeteries. (In the fall of 2021, as part of an effort to commemorate these events, Zelensky presided at the opening of a new complex at Babi Yar, or Babyn Yar, the park next to a metro station where nearly 34,000 Kyivan Jews were massacred in September 1941. On the sixth day of Putin’s invasion this year, three Russian missiles landed in the park, causing damage to the Jewish cemetery there.)
5.3 million Ukrainians were killed during World War II.
For the Soviets, and for Putin today, the most important fact about the Ukrainians during the war was not their victimhood but their alleged collaboration with the Nazis. The most controversial Ukrainian figure of the period is Stepan Bandera, the leader of a terrorist organization in Polish-ruled interwar western Ukraine. Having already been sour when the area was under Austrian rule, Polish-Ukrainian relations dramatically worsened with the new government’s Polonization drive, in the course of which Ukrainian-language schools were closed, Ukrainian newspapers strictly censored, Ukrainians banned from even the lowliest government jobs, and Ukrainian candidates and voters arbitrarily struck from electoral rolls. The repression radicalized rather than Polonized, so that the largest Ukrainian parliamentary party, the compromise-seeking Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance, was increasingly squeezed out by Bandera’s underground nationalists. When the Wehrmacht entered western Ukraine in June 1941, Bandera joined forces with the Germans, organizing two battalions, Nachtigall and Roland, although he was almost immediately arrested by the Nazis, who found him too hard to control.
Ever since, Russia has used Bandera as a stick with which to beat the Ukrainian national movement. No matter that far more Ukrainians fought in the Red Army than in the Wehrmacht and that Germany was able to recruit tens of thousands of Russian prisoners of war, too. As in Soviet days, a standard epithet for Ukrainians in Russian state media today is Banderivtsi—“Banderites”—and Putin revisited the trope in an even odder than usual speech on February 25, the day after the Russian invasion began, in which he called on the Ukrainian army to overthrow the “drug addicts and neo-Nazis” in power in Kyiv.
After the end of World War II, and especially after Stalin’s death in 1953, Ukraine enjoyed several decades of relative stability. Compared with the other non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union, the Ukrainians were simultaneously extra repressed and extra privileged, making up the largest single group of political prisoners but also acting as Russia’s junior partner in the union. The Politburo was packed with Russians and Ukrainians, and in the non-Slavic republics, the usual pattern was for an ethnic national to be appointed first party secretary, while a Russian or a Ukrainian wielded real power as number two. When the Soviet Union collapsed, in 1991, Ukraine floated to independence without bloodshed, after its own Communist Party leadership decided to cut the tow rope to the sinking mother ship. It is this late-Soviet “little brother” relationship that Putin grew up with—and which he may believe (or have believed) Ukrainians would be ready to return to were it not for the West’s interference.
Westward or Backward
Ukraine’s political path in the three decades since independence has accentuated all of Russia’s fears. At first, it seemed as if Russia and Ukraine would move on parallel tracks in the post–Cold War era. Both countries were riding the rapids of economic collapse combined with new political freedoms; neither seemed interested in the past. In Ukraine, nobody bothered to take down Kyiv’s Lenin statue or rename its streets. Russia’s new ruling class, for its part, seemed more interested in making money than in rebuilding an empire. It was easy to imagine the two countries developing along separate but friendly paths: like Canada and the United States or Austria and Germany.

That happy illusion lasted only a few years. The two hinge moments of Ukraine’s post–Cold War history were two highly effective and genuinely inspirational displays of people power, both provoked by the Kremlin. In 2004, Putin tried to insert a burly ex-convict and regional political boss from Donetsk, Viktor Yanukovych, into the Ukrainian presidency, an effort that seems to have included having his pro-European electoral rival, Viktor Yushchenko, poisoned. After Yushchenko survived the attack (with his face badly scarred), the vote was blatantly falsified instead. Sporting orange hats and ribbons, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians poured into the streets in protest and stayed there until the electoral commission conceded a rerun, which Yushchenko won. For Putin, the protests, known as the Orange Revolution, were a plot orchestrated by the West.
Pro-European protesters during the Maidan uprising, Kyiv, December 2013
Valentyn Ogirenko/Reuters
In 2010, Yanukovych finally won the presidency, after the pro-European bloc rancorously split. For the next four years, he devoted himself to looting the Ukrainian treasury. But in November 2013, he went a step too far: just as Ukraine was about to ink a long-planned and widely popular trade deal with the European Union, he abruptly canceled it and, under pressure from Putin, announced a partnership with Russia instead. For Ukrainians, as for Putin, this was not just about how best to boost the economy but also about Ukraine’s very identity. Instead of heading westward—perhaps even one day joining the European Union—the country was being coerced back into the Russian orbit. Initially, only a few students came out in protest, but public anger grew quickly after they were beaten up by the police, whose upper echelons Yanukovych had packed with Russians. A protest camp on Kyiv’s central square, known as the Maidan, turned into a permanent, festival-like city within a city, swelling to a million people on weekends. In January 2014, the police began a violent crackdown, which climaxed with the killing of 94 protesters and 17 police officers. When the crowds still refused to disperse, Yanukovych fled to Moscow, and the contents of his luxurious private compound—Hermès dinner services, chandeliers the size of small cars, a stuffed lion—went on display in Ukraine’s National Art Museum. In the power vacuum that followed Yanukovych’s flight, Putin invaded first Crimea and then, via thuggish local proxies, the eastern border cities of Donetsk and Luhansk.
The land grab pleased the Russian public, but if Putin intended to pull Ukraine back toward Russia, his actions had the opposite effect. New presidential elections brought in another pro-European, Petro Poroshenko, a Ukrainian oligarch who had made his money in confectionary rather than corruption-ridden mining or metals. Then, in the years that followed, a mass civilian effort supported Ukrainian forces in a low-level but grinding conflict with Russia in and around Donetsk and Luhansk. (Until the Ministry of Defense was reformed, the previously neglected Ukrainian army was literally crowdfunded by direct donations from the public.) Ukrainian support for NATO membership rose sharply, and in June 2014, Ukraine signed a wide-ranging association agreement with the European Union. Most symbolic and popular—or, in Putin’s eyes, most cunning—was the EU’s 2017 granting to Ukrainians of bezviz, visa-free 90-day travel to the whole of the Schengen area. Russians still need visas, which are extortionately expensive and burdensome. The contrast grates: little brother has not only abandoned big brother; he is better traveled now, too.
Russian Bones, Ukrainian Soil
Ukraine’s progress before the invasion should not be overstated. Shady oligarchs pulled strings behind the scenes, and the country was hobbled by pervasive corruption. (Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index puts Ukraine alongside Mexico and Zambia but ranks it as slightly less corrupt than Russia.) But for all of the country’s problems, its history since independence has been one of real changes of power, brought about by real elections, between real candidates, reported by real free media. For Putin, the Ukrainian example had become a direct political threat. What if Russia’s own population—and not just the urban intelligentsia—started demanding the same freedoms? In his “Historical Unity” essay, Putin explained away the fact that Ukrainian presidents change as being the result of a “system” set up by “the Western authors of the anti-Russian project.” Ukraine’s pro-Russian citizens, he wrote, are not vocal because they have been “driven underground,” “persecuted for their convictions,” or even “killed.” Whether he actually believes this is unclear, but it might explain the slightly ad hoc tactics used by the Russian army in the first week of his war on Ukraine. Putin may really have expected his tank battalions to be greeted as liberators.
As during the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2013–14 Maidan protests, which came to be known as the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine’s fierce self-defense today is a defense of values, not of ethnic identity or of some imagined glorious past. Putin’s obsession with history, in contrast, is a weakness. Although earlier in his presidency, banging the “gathering of the Russian world” drum boosted his approval ratings, it has now led him down what may turn out to be a fatal dead end. In terms of square mileage alone, Ukraine is the second-largest country in Europe, after Russia itself. If you placed it over the eastern United States, as The Washington Post recently observed, it would stretch “from Missouri to the Atlantic Ocean, and from Ohio to Georgia.” Occupying it permanently would be enormously costly in troops and treasure. Moreover, Putin’s war has unified Ukrainians as never before. And whether they are speaking Russian or Ukrainian, their sentiment is the same. Already, video clips have gone viral of babushkas telling Russian soldiers that they will leave their bones in Ukrainian soil and of Ukrainian soldiers swearing joyously as they fire bazookas at Russian tanks, all in the purest Russian. The war is likely to go on for a long time, and its final outcome is unknown. History, Putin may be learning, is only a guide when it’s the real sort.

Foreign Affairs · by Borderland: A Journey Through the History of Ukraine. · April 6, 2022
24. Black Swans ARE the New Normal | McChrystal Group

Some might argue that if they are the new normal they are not black swans.

Excerpts:

The next Black Swan event is right around the corner. It may come in the form of a massive economic recession, an escalation of hostilities in Europe, or a new spike in a deadly coronavirus. It may also come in the form of a new economic boom from innovative monetary policies, new medical breakthroughs as a result of RNA advances, or a new period of worldwide peace and prosperity that comes from a global community united against oppression. In either case, Black Swans will continue to appear and those leaders who adopt a resilient approach will be ready.

Black Swans ARE the New Normal | McChrystal Group
BY
 
APRIL 5, 2022, 8:00 AM EDT
Black swan (noun) – an unpredictable or unforeseen event, typically one with extreme consequences.
"the bank industry's vulnerability to black swans"
Skyrocketing inflation, soaring oil prices, horrific war in the Ukraine, a heart-wrenching refugee crisis, record flooding in Brisbane for the second time in a decade, the emergence of yet a new variant of COVID-19… perhaps the most shocking thing is that we continue to be shocked.
Leaders and organizations move from crisis to crisis with an underlying, almost subconscious belief that we just need to survive this latest issue and then things will settle down and we’ll be able to focus on our strategy. Of course, that moment of peace never materializes, and our long-term initiatives become hijacked by the next existential challenge. This approach is unsustainable from a strategic perspective and an emotional perspective.
When you allow the urgent to eclipse the important week after week, you are sending the signal that there is no real plan, the stated priorities are artificial, and you are unreliable as a leader. It’s harsh, but true and it’s a recipe for poor morale and mass attrition. No one wants to stay on a ship that’s taking on water with a panicky Captain at the helm.
The answer isn’t to stubbornly bury your head in the sand, stay the course, and ignore the upheaval that surrounds your organization and your people. The answer is to adopt a new, more resilient approach.
SHIFT THE STORY
During an informal interview with my boss, General Stan McChrystal, US President Barak Obama said that one of the most critical functions he played as president was “Chief Storyteller.” It was essential that he shaped the story the American people, and the world, told about us as a country.
It is time for you to stop passively letting your story be shaped by circumstance. Reiterate where you are going as an organization, why you are going there, how you will get there, and what role your people will play in getting us there together. Contextualize the current challenges as part of the journey. Every epic tale has dark moments that call for brave individuals to take decisive action and if you begin proactively shaping that tale, your people will rise to the moment.
PRIORITIZE RUTHLESSLY
Most of us espouse an aspirational list of priorities. We don’t say it out loud, but it’s the list of things we ought to do and intend to do until the thunderheads roll in overhead. In that moment, we resort to our real list of priorities, doing the essential tasks to survive the storm. The problem is that this inconsistent prioritization wreaks havoc on our people – they can’t figure out what really matters and that paralyzes them from taking action when you need them most to be decisive.
It is time for you to make one single list of priorities that applies on sunny days and when then storm clouds blow in. The irony is that this ruthless prioritization will not only make you better in the midst of crisis, but it will actually help the organization be more focused and efficient when things are less tumultuous. Keep the list short. Use tangible verbs. Put it in writing. And keep saying it until everyone in the organization can repeat it verbatim.
BUILD IN BUFFER
There’s an old adage in the military, “two is one and one is none.” If you do not build in extra time, extra resources, and extra personnel, not only are you setting up your organization for failure, but you are also creating the conditions for burnout. We have long lauded “just-in-time” structures that maximize efficiency, particularly in our supply chains, but the last 2 years have clearly demonstrated the fragility of that model during crises.
This isn’t a license to encourage a bloated workforce or wasteful spending. Instead, thoughtfully consider where are my singular points of failure and where are my LIMFACs (limiting factors). Strengthen the organization’s resilience capacity by building in extra time and personnel around those two areas. Next, identify organizational “surge protectors” – resources in the organization that can be redistributed or redeployed as new challenges present themselves. Proactively identifying these surge protectors will allow you to react to crises more rapidly, while still maintaining the necessary focus on the long-term health of the organization.
The next Black Swan event is right around the corner. It may come in the form of a massive economic recession, an escalation of hostilities in Europe, or a new spike in a deadly coronavirus. It may also come in the form of a new economic boom from innovative monetary policies, new medical breakthroughs as a result of RNA advances, or a new period of worldwide peace and prosperity that comes from a global community united against oppression. In either case, Black Swans will continue to appear and those leaders who adopt a resilient approach will be ready.


V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
VIDEO "WHEREBY" Link: https://whereby.com/david-maxwell
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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