“Never fight unless you have to. Never fight alone. Never fight for long”

- Fox Conner

“Men have their choice in this world. They can be angels, or they may be demons. In the apocalyptic vision, John describes a war in heaven. You have only to strip that vision of its gorgeous Oriental drapery, divest it of its shining and celestial ornaments, clothe it in the simple and familiar language of common sense, and you will have before you the eternal conflict between right and wrong, good and evil, liberty and slavery, truth and falsehood, the glorious light of love, and the appalling darkness of human selfishness and sin. The human heart is a seat of constant war… What takes place in individual human hearts often takes place between nations, and between individuals of the same nation.”

- Frederick Douglass

"So this is the rationality paradox. Here is how it works: rationality is the opposite of certainty. Certainty is the opposite of wisdom. Why? Because wisdom is not the sum total of what you know, wisdom is the sum total of what you don't know. In other words, the capacity to reflect critically on your own assumptions. This is also why politicians want to sell you certainty and want to avoid rationality. Certainty is comforting, rationality is discomforting. Which means that to be rational is to question the basis of peoples' certainties."

- Julian De Medeiros

Note: Yesterday's unattributed quote is from the brilliant Korea specialist, Scott Snyder:  "Specialists argue that North Korea’s propensity to revert to provocations is so deeply embedded that it is part of the country’s DNA."  

• Russian forces claim to have successfully captured central Mariupol, but Ukrainian forces retain control of the port southwest of the city. Russian forces will likely complete the capture of Mariupol in the coming days.
• Russian forces are setting conditions for a major offensive in eastern Ukraine in the coming days, but damaged units redeployed from northeastern Ukraine are unlikely to enable a successful Russian breakthrough.
• Ukrainian forces repelled continuing Russian attacks from Izyum southeast toward Slovyansk and Barvinkove.
• Russian and Belarusian forces are conducting “demonstrative actions” to fix Ukrainian forces around Kyiv in place. However, these units are highly unlikely to launch new offensive operations, and Ukrainian units around Kyiv can likely safely redeploy to eastern Ukraine.
• Western sanctions are likely successfully disrupting Russia’s military-industrial base.

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
• Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
• Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

• Russian forces will continue reinforcing the Izyum-Slovyansk axis and attempting to advance to and through Slovyansk to encircle Ukrainian forces.
• Russia is likely cohering forces in Donbas to attempt a major offensive in the coming days or weeks.
• The Battle of Mariupol continues, and it is unclear how much longer the Ukrainian defenders can hold out.
• Russian forces have fully vacated the Sumy axis and are regrouping in Belgorod for likely deployment to the Izyum-Slovyansk axis.
• Some Russian forces are likely to return to home stations in Russia while others will re-enter the fighting in the east.

• The Administration is working around the clock to fulfill Ukraine’s priority security assistance requests, delivering weapons from U.S. stocks when they are available, and facilitating the delivery of weapons by allies and partners when their systems better suit Ukraine’s needs.
• All of the anti-armor and anti-air systems from the two packages of security assistance the President approved in March have been delivered.
• The Administration is continuing to work with allies and partners to identify additional weapons systems to help the Ukrainian military defend its country.
• At President Zelenskyy’s request, this includes helping Ukraine acquire longer-range anti-aircraft systems and munitions that they are trained to use.
• More than 30 nations have sent Ukraine security assistance, thanks in part to our diplomacy.
• On April 5, the Administration announced an additional $100 million in security assistance to Ukraine through Presidential Drawdown Authority. The Administration also announced $300 million in security assistance on April 1 under authorities provided by the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.
• These announcements bring the U.S. commitment to more than $1.7 billion in security assistance since Russia’s February 24 invasion, and $2.4 billion since the beginning of the Administration.
• United States security assistance committed to Ukraine includes:
• Over 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems;
• Over 5,000 Javelin anti-armor systems;
• Over 7,000 other anti-armor systems;
• Hundreds of Switchblade Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;
• Over 7,000 small arms;
• Over 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition;
• 45,000 sets of body armor and helmets;
• Laser-guided rocket systems;
• Puma Unmanned Aerial Systems;
• Four counter-artillery and counter-unmanned aerial system tracking radars;
• Four counter-mortar radar systems;
• Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles;
• Night vision devices, thermal imagery systems, and optics;
• Tactical secure communications systems;
• Commercial satellite imagery services;
• Explosive ordnance disposal protective gear;
• Medical supplies to include first aid kits.

• Asked whether Russia is experiencing "humiliation" given the loss of troops, generals and equipment, Peskov pushed back. "No, it's a wrong understanding of what's going on," he said.

• On March 23, a NATO official told reporters that between 7,000 and 15,000 Russian soldiers are believed to have been killed in Ukraine until that date.
• Russia's defense ministry estimated on March 25 that 1,351 Russian soldiers had been killed over the course of the invasion, per Reuters. Two days later, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said his country estimated that Russian troop losses amounted to more than 10,000.

• 60% of Finns now support joining NATO, according to a survey conducted last month — a 34-point jump from last fall, and the highest level since polling on the issue began in 1998.
• NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said this week he expects "all 30 allies to welcome" both Sweden and Finland to the alliance if the Nordic neighbors decide to apply, suggesting the process for membership would move rapidly.

• "You have to balance between realism and idealism. Realism is that you have a strong standing military as we have, and idealism is to try to cooperate with a big neighbor," Stubb said.
• "There has been this bona fide attempt to forge a functioning relationship with Russia, and now that people see that that is impossible — especially under [President Vladimir] Putin — they've changed their opinion."

• "I'm not saying it'll happen on Russian Victory Day (May 9), but it's coming pretty soon," Stubb quipped.
• Some Finnish lawmakers are pushing for an application before the NATO summit in Madrid at the end of June.

• Incorporating Finland into NATO would bring important capabilities and "strategic depth" to the "particularly exposed" Baltic region, says Ian Lesser, executive director of the German Marshall Fund's Brussels office.
• "Finland is a tough nut to crack. It would be and has been in the past, and Russians of course remember that," Lesser added, referring to the 1939-1940 Winter War in which invading Soviet troops suffered heavy casualties.

• "You can't be complacent about NATO's support outside of Article Five, no matter how big a stake Europe and the United States might have in your own security," Lesser told Axios.
• "I think the sentiment for most Finns is that we never want to be left alone again, as we were during World War Two," added Stubb.

• Stubb dismissed the Kremlin's threats as mostly saber-rattling, but cautioned that there will "obviously" be hybrid threats, such as cyberattacks or information warfare.
• Still, he insisted: "We've lived next to Russia throughout our existence. We know how to deal with Russia."

Like Israel in its early wars, Ukraine appears to have fended off an acute existential threat. But the war is far from over. By adapting their country’s mindset to mirror aspects of Israel’s approach to chronic security challenges, Ukrainian officials can tackle critical national-security challenges with confidence and build a similarly resilient state.

• Security first: Every Israeli government promises, first and foremost, that it will deliver security—and knows it will be judged on this pledge. Ordinary citizens, not just politicians, pay close attention to security threats—both from across borders and from internal sources— and much of the public chooses who to elect by that metric alone.
• The whole population plays a role: The Israeli model goes further than Zelenskyy’s vision of security services deployed to civilian spaces: Most young Israeli adults serve in the military, and many are employed in security-related professions following their service. A common purpose unites the citizenry, making them ready to endure shared sacrifice. Civilians recognize their responsibility to follow security protocols and contribute to the cause. Some even arm themselves (though under strict supervision) to do so. The widespread mobilization of Ukrainian society in collective defense suggests that the country has this potential. In his comments, Zelenskyy reflected this reality when he said security would “come from the strength of every house, every building, every person.”
• Self-defense is the only way: If there’s any single principle that animates Israel’s security doctrine, it’s that Israel will defend itself, by itself—and rely on no other country to fight its battles. The tragedies of Jewish history have embedded that lesson deep in the nation’s soul. Ukraine’s own trauma, forced to fight alone against a larger aggressor, reinforces a similar conclusion: Don’t depend on the guarantees of others.
• But maintain active defense partnerships: Self-defense doesn’t mean total isolation. Israel maintains active defense partnerships, chiefly with the United States, which provides generous military assistance, but also with other nations with whom it shares intelligence, technology, and training. While Ukraine will probably not join NATO any time soon, it can deepen security partnerships with Alliance members and receive aid, weaponry, intelligence, and training to bolster its self-defense.
• Intelligence dominance: From its earliest days, Israel has invested deeply in its intelligence capabilities to ensure that it has the means to detect and deter its enemies—and, when needed, act proactively to strike them. Ukraine will need to upgrade its intelligence services to compete against Russian capabilities and ensure that it’s prepared to prevent and repulse Russian attacks.
• Technology is key: Although it relies on US assistance, Israel also chooses homegrown technology solutions for many of its greatest challenges. Multi-layer rocket and missile defenses, counter-drone systems, and tunnel detection technology are just recent examples. Ukraine—already home to bright technological minds—will know what threats it faces more than any partner; investing in its own solutions will allow it to be most responsive and adapt to new threats.
• Build an innovation ecosystem: The training many Israelis receive in high-tech innovation in the military contributes to a civilian innovation ecosystem, which in turn promotes the development of new security technologies. Ukraine has no lack of talented coders and engineers (many of whom are employed by Israeli startups). Encouraging the free flow of talent and ideas between the civilian and security innovation spaces will pay long-term security and economic dividends.
• Maintain democratic institutions: Israel continues to face the challenge of ending its conflict with the Palestinians in ways that ensure both its security and the Palestinians’ self-determination. But within Israel itself, a constant focus on security hasn’t prevented the upholding of core democratic institutions and practices. Zelenskyy seems aware of this tension, which will require constant maintenance, but also that democracy is a prerequisite: “An authoritarian state is impossible in Ukraine,” he said.

Ressa: But again, I’ll go back to, like, you can’t debate anymore on these social-media platforms, right? Because in the age of abundance, and because the business model helps it to go this way, because they want you to stay on the site longest, the emotion that’s encouraged is moral outrage, and moral outrage becomes mob rule. It isn’t a free-speech issue; it is, again, what you amplify. Imagine if The Atlantic decided, “I’m going to make money at all costs, and I’m going to amplify the content that will make the most people angry because they will stay on my side the longest and they will share it the most.” We don’t do that because we have standards and ethics.

We have some platforms saying that, you know, it’s about the corporate shareholder. We’re here to make money for them. That’s immoral. So here’s the problem: Where is the line where immoral becomes evil?

LaFrance: Have we crossed that line?

Ressa: I believe so.

LaFrance: When?

Ressa: You know, I was with CNN when we grew from chicken-noodle news to the world’s breaking-news leader, so I know how difficult and overwhelming it can be to revamp—while the bus is going to change the tires, right? So I gave a lot of leeway. But now what we’re seeing is the platforms are doubling down, some of them. And they’re actually saying, you know, it’s up to you. But every day that there isn’t a law, that there aren’t guardrails in place, someone dies. Where’s the blind to evil when you know people die because you’re making more money, and you continue doing it? So, yeah, I’m very angry. I try not to be angry. Wait, optimism! There is optimism! The hope—where will the hope come from? Ukraine. Okay, this is horrific, what we’re seeing happening in Ukraine, and what Russia has done. But how quickly did the free world come together? Right? And all of a sudden the world seems to be righting itself, but the platforms haven’t really changed yet. And what sparked the change online? It wasn’t a government, it was [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelensky.

• Here are the hypersonic weapons Russia and China have in service
• Hypersonic weapons: What’s the difference between Boost-glide and Scramjet?
• Is America really losing the hypersonic arms race?
• Eyeing China, Indo-Pacific Command seeks $27 billion deterrence fund
• These are the hypersonic weapons Russia already has in service

• “What we’re focused on is making sure that we get to Ukraine the systems that they can use now and use effectively,” Blinken said. “At the same time, we’re looking at other systems — some of them larger, more sophisticated — that may be useful and important going forward.”

Lenin is reputed to have said that there are decades when nothing happens, and weeks when decades happen. As in 1918 and 1948, we are now living through challenging weeks that will define the prospects for international peace and security for decades. The West must resist aggression, but cannot be content with the defeat of aggressors. We must use these coming weeks and months to build a better peace for generations to come.

One hopes that the decision to end the China Initiative only represents a change in title and that its successor program will continue to prioritize China as a CI target. Assurances to that effect have reportedly been given to Executive Branch officials and to members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. But language means things. It serves to focus attention. Given the threat we face, we ought to be ramping up CI efforts directed against Chinese espionage organizations and operations. And we ought to be able to name the PRC’s espionage campaign against us for the threat it is, lest publication two or three decades from now of an effort akin to the Venona project, will document the scope of the Chinese spying directed against us.

• James M. Dubik: Putin’s war exposes the cracks in the world order — can we fix them?
• Dov S. Zakheim: What will it take to end Russia’s war in Ukraine? Creative diplomacy