Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Man ultimately decides for himself! And in the end, education must be education towards the ability to decide."

– Viktor Frankel

Of course it is exhausting, having to reason all the time in a universe which wasn't meant to be reasonable."

– Kurt Vonnegut

“We must admit the vanity of our faults distinctions among men, learn to find our own advancement in the search for the advancement of all. We must admit in ourselves, and then our own children's future cannot be built on the misfortune of others. We must recognize that this short life can neither be ennobled or enriched by hatred or revenge. Our lives on this planet are too short and the work to be done to great to let the spirit flourish any longer in our land.”

– Robert F Kennedy, April 5, 1968

1. South Korea’s Martial Law Peripeteia

2. How the few freedoms North Koreans enjoyed have vanished since the pandemic

3. North Korean soldiers cross tense DMZ border, South Korea fires warning shots

4. Chinese teen who filmed Korean fighters says father is public security officer

5. DP leader Lee expected to step down from party chairmanship Wednesday

6. Top US, South Korean shipbuilders partner to bolster vessel production

7. ＜Inside N. Korea＞Even Housewives Being Mobilized - New "Women's League Shock Brigades" for Farm Labor as Kim Jong-Un Regime Demands Farms Cover Labor Costs

8. “North Korea Possible Expansion of Deployment of Russian Troops”

9. How Kim is grooming kids as young as 5 to be world's best hackers & target West

10. ＜North Korea Special＞What is the Reality of Kim Jong-un's Agricultural Policy Reform? (2) Enterprise-Style Farms Codified in Law - Has 'Juche Farming' Been Abandoned?

11. Editorial: Caught between blame and power, neither party is governing

12. Acting president appoints 9th justice to Constitutional Court, names successors to retiring judges

13. S. Korea voices 'strong' protest against Japan's renewed territorial claim to Dokdo

14. S Korea on edge as US hints at redeploying troops

15. Samjiyon's dark side: Forced relocations and deaths in Kim's showcase city

16. N. Korea officially bans American cultural icons: Cigarettes, Coca-Cola, and denim

17. North Korea orders political lectures to combat rising military desertions

18. Class divisions: N. Korean parents reject impoverished teachers for their children

19. Balancing Act: South Korea, The UNC, And The Growing Taiwan Crisis

20. Gov't formally sets presidential election for June 3

1. South Korea’s Martial Law Peripeteia

For those who have to learn a new word (as Dr. Lee often does provide additions to my vocabulary)

per·i·pe·tei·a

/ˌperəpəˈtē(y)ə,ˌperəpəˈtīə/

nounformal

a sudden reversal of fortune or change in circumstances, especially in reference to fictional narrative.
"the peripeteias of the drama"

But this is critical analysis from Dr. Lee that provides unique insight into the South Korean political situation.

Excepts:

An impeachment trial of an elected national leader is an inherently political affair; that is, its deliberation and even verdict are not impervious to the sway of public opinion. Yet, from the very next day, the DPK acted in ways strangely unhelpful to its own cause.

Instead of exercising self-restraint, Lee Jae-myung, the DPK leader, and his colleagues gloated in various public settings as they pushed for the arrest and removal of Yoon, whom they labelled the “insurrection ringleader.” To oppose impeachment was “treason against the people,” they declaimed. Posing for a group photo upon voting to impeach Yoon, they demanded “swift and severe justice.” They variously called for the death penalty, exhorted the police to take a bullet in the chest if they must in arresting Yoon, threatened to censor KakaoTalk – the most popular instant messaging app – and punish ordinary people who “share fake news about inciting rebellion.” They even sought to file a criminal complaint against a pollster that showed Yoon’s ratings had surpassed the 40 percent mark in early January.

How could an elected leader who thrust martial law on their nation – which conjures up images of bloodshed, arbitrary arrests, and torture under previous authoritarian regimes – who dispatched armed troops into the National Assembly, and who allegedly called for the arrest of key political figures possibly enjoy such a surge of support?

The DPK’s unbound imperiousness.

The party overreached at every turn. It called for Yoon’s arrest. Following a failed attempt in early January, law enforcement authorities marshalled some 1000 police officers in front of the presidential mansion by dawn on January 15. Later that morning Yoon submitted himself to their authority, as he said, to avoid bloodshed. It was history’s first arrest of a sitting – albeit suspended – head of state in a democracy.

South Korea’s Martial Law Peripeteia - The Royal Society for Asian Affairs

rsaa.org.uk · · April 7, 2025

https://rsaa.org.uk/blog/south-koreas-martial-law-peripeteia/

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Sung-Yoon Lee is a Korea expert and board member of The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.

Beyond platitudes like reaffirmation of the rule of law, what the ouster of Yoon Suk Yeol – South Korea’s conservative president impeached for declaring martial law last December – illustrates is that in politics it pays to eschew excessive hubris. This moral applies to both the Yoon camp and his political foes.

Last Friday, all eight justices of the nation’s Constitutional Court found Mr Yoon had gravely violated the Constitution by sending troops to parliament purportedly to block lawmakers from voting down his decree.

Despite the sundry procedural problems throughout the impeachment trial, for example, the admission of disputed testimonies and questionable evidence, the court ruled that the totality of Yoon’s actions warrants his permanent removal from office. A poll conducted the same day when emotions were still running high indicated extreme polarity rather than unity in the aftermath of the judgment: 52.2% of those surveyed accepted the unanimous court decision, while 44.8% replied they did not.

But the public must and shall accept the ruling. A snap election will be held within 60 days amidst clashing waves of jubilation and angst.

To the approximately 56 percent of South Koreans who called for Yoon’s removal, the verdict comes as, beyond sheer delight, a great relief. Just days after declaring martial law, Yoon’s approval ratings sank to a record low of eleven percentage points. But within a few weeks they surged to the high-40s, with some even in the low-50s. What had appeared to the anti-Yoon camp a certain victory became progressively an ominous uncertainty.

Lawmakers of the main opposition, liberal Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) deserve much praise for their courage and alacrity on the night of the crisis. Just two and a half hours after the martial law announcement on the night of December 3, 190 out of 300 lawmakers – mostly from the DPK – gathered in the National Assembly and unanimously voted against Yoon’s martial law decree, making it the shortest-lived in history. Thanks to their determined efforts and the restraint exercised by the martial law troops, the volatile situation ended without a single fatality, serious injury, or physical custody.

An impeachment trial of an elected national leader is an inherently political affair; that is, its deliberation and even verdict are not impervious to the sway of public opinion. Yet, from the very next day, the DPK acted in ways strangely unhelpful to its own cause.

Instead of exercising self-restraint, Lee Jae-myung, the DPK leader, and his colleagues gloated in various public settings as they pushed for the arrest and removal of Yoon, whom they labelled the “insurrection ringleader.” To oppose impeachment was “treason against the people,” they declaimed. Posing for a group photo upon voting to impeach Yoon, they demanded “swift and severe justice.” They variously called for the death penalty, exhorted the police to take a bullet in the chest if they must in arresting Yoon, threatened to censor KakaoTalk – the most popular instant messaging app – and punish ordinary people who “share fake news about inciting rebellion.” They even sought to file a criminal complaint against a pollster that showed Yoon’s ratings had surpassed the 40 percent mark in early January.

How could an elected leader who thrust martial law on their nation – which conjures up images of bloodshed, arbitrary arrests, and torture under previous authoritarian regimes – who dispatched armed troops into the National Assembly, and who allegedly called for the arrest of key political figures possibly enjoy such a surge of support?

The DPK’s unbound imperiousness.

The party overreached at every turn. It called for Yoon’s arrest. Following a failed attempt in early January, law enforcement authorities marshalled some 1000 police officers in front of the presidential mansion by dawn on January 15. Later that morning Yoon submitted himself to their authority, as he said, to avoid bloodshed. It was history’s first arrest of a sitting – albeit suspended – head of state in a democracy.

And it spectacularly backfired. Big pro-Yoon rallies in the tens of thousands sprouted across the nation. In February, the movement also spread to Gwangju, the hotbed of anti-right, anti-authoritarian protest movements. Police estimates placed the pro-Yoon crowd in Gwangju outnumbering anti-Yoon demonstrators some 80 yards away three to one. The numbers for Yoon and his party kept rising even with Yoon behind bars. The trend continued in the wake of his release from jail on procedural grounds on March 8.

Over the past four months, more and more young male voters in their twenties and thirties shifted away from the DPK toward the right. The near-daily roars by the crowds of Yoon supporters and the shifting demographics triggered hope. All that was needed for Yoon’s return to office was just three out of the eight justices on the bench voting to dismiss the case. It proved a chimera.

So, to the approximately 47 percent of the population who support Yoon, the court decision carries elements of an Aristotelian peripeteia, a stunning reversal of fortune. At first, most of them, too, were stunned by the live televised martial law declaration. Yoon mentioned “pro-North anti-state forces” within South Korea but offered no riveting details. Yoon dwelled on the DPK’s “legislative dictatorship” with its 22 impeachment motions, just two and a half years into his single five-year term, but did not clearly articulate their implications.

By and by, the public came to learn 14 of the 22 impeachments had been waged against senior prosecutors, some who had led criminal investigations against Mr Lee, who faces numerous criminal charges, including a conspiracy and third-party bribery charge of paying $8 million to North Korea. Since the founding of South Korea in 1948 to the launch of the Yoon administration in 2022, there had been all of 21 impeachments.

While “anti-state” organisation or forces sound awkward, they are legal terms in the National Security Act that refer to individuals and groups conspiring with North Korea against the South Korean government. During the trial, Yoon’s defence addressed the extensive collusion between the leaders of the South’s Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) and the North Korean regime.

The 2024 KCTU espionage case judgment shows that between 2017 and 2022 there had been 102 confirmed exchanges between the two sides, including 90 written instructions by North Korea. KCTU leaders, on Pyongyang’s directives, had collected intelligence on how to block electricity supply to the presidential office. They had illegally taken photographs of Camp Humpherys U.S. Army Base and Osan Air Base. Yoon’s defence also showed a high level of correlation – and in some cases verbatim wording – between Pyongyang-directed anti-Yoon political slogans and those actually used by the DPK to denounce Yoon following Japan’s 2021 announcement to release the Fukushima nuclear plant treated water and the 2022 Halloween crowd crush.

Thus, had it not been for Yoon’s December national wake-up call, his supporters say, most of the country would still be in the dark about the DPK’s machination. Lee’s public thanks to the KCTU chairman in February for “KCTU members playing the biggest role in the impeachment of Park Geun Hye and Yoon Suk Yeol” also raised eyebrows.

Whether Lee was exaggerating or not, the situation today does have parallels to the impeachment and ouster of the conservative party’s President Park in 2017. Back then, nearly 80 percent of the Korean population supported her impeachment for abuse of power. Today, the national divide following Yoon’s political demise is much more acute. The bitter division reflects to a substantial extent the perceived excesses of the DPK even in achieving its goal of removing Yoon from office.

Beyond the unrelenting zero-sum domestic politics, South Korea’s treaty ally, the United States, and other friendly nations around the world are likely less than overjoyed at the ruling. After all, Yoon had repeatedly affirmed his support for the alliance with the US and the rules-based international order. Whereas Lee has denounced his nation’s defensive military drills with the US and Japan as an “extreme pro-Japanese act” that is a “defence disaster,” Yoon has determinedly underscored the trilateral military partnership.

Ukraine, too, may not be elated. Lee has openly derided President Volodymyr Zelensky as a “novice politician of six months” who incited Russia’s invasion. He has also strongly objected to South Korea even considering sending any non-humanitarian aid to Kyiv, while Yoon has provided economic and material support and pledged more in both value and kind. Accordingly, the leadership’s in Pyongyang, Moscow, and Beijing may not be displeased by Yoon’s downfall.

Among the many morals of this real-time, monthslong Korean drama, one surely is that in politics, hubris and solipsism only beget blunders both big and small. And the more elemental truth? The growing voice of the people – especially when it pours forth day after day like the rolling waves in the rough sea – commands respect.

Yoon, for all his follies, exits the political stage with one of the highest approval ratings of his truncated term, in no small measure thanks to his political adversaries. Who succeeds him and in which direction the vicissitudes of political fortune take the Republic of Korea in the next few years remain, for better or worse, a story still to be written.

The opinions expressed are those of the contributor, not necessarily of the RSAA.

How the few freedoms North Koreans enjoyed have vanished since the pandemic

The city of Hyesan, just over the river from China, once offered a glimpse of a more open North Korea. Now it exemplifies Kim Jong Un’s mounting authoritarianism.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/04/07/north-korea-kim-jong-un-freedom-dead/?utm

Today at 5:00 a.m. EDT

A photo taken March 1, 2024, shows a man walking through Hyesan, North Korea, as seen from Changbai in China's northeast Jilin province. (Pedro Pardo/AFP/Getty Images)

By Michelle Ye Hee Lee

SEOUL — The border city of Hyesan once offered a glimpse of a more open version of totalitarian North Korea. It was flourishing in a way that could almost be called capitalist, and residents could easily learn about the outside world in China, located just across a narrow river.

Not anymore. A city that once exuded hope now exemplifies how Kim Jong Un has dramatically expanded his authoritarian controls to erode North Koreans’ few freedoms, according to residents of and escapees from Hyesan.

Over the past five years, since the pandemic broke out, Kim has tightened his grip on trade across the border. This has limited ordinary people’s ability to make money and attain a level of autonomy from the regime.

“The market system is dead,” one Hyesan resident, a woman in her 40s who used to operate a wholesale business over the border, told The Washington Post through an intermediary. “The government is taking all the profits that those of us making money would have kept.”

Kim has also used the pretext of the pandemic to put up new barriers — both literally and figuratively — that have isolated Hyesan residents like never before: New fencing stops people crossing the river. Clampdowns on illicit phone calls made using Chinese cellphone towers have made it much harder for residents to call or text family and friends in China or South Korea, and mindlessly scroll through China’s version of TikTok.

These new restrictions are profoundly changing the way North Koreans go about their lives, both in Hyesan, a provincial capital of about 200,000 people, and across the country.

A photo taken from Changbai on Sept. 5, 2020, shows people at a market in Hyesan. (Kyodo News/Getty Images)

“Hyesan was once a rare opening, but draconian covid-era restrictions have slammed it shut, dragging the country backward by decades,” said Hanna Song, executive director of Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, a Seoul-based NGO. “Now, North Korea is more isolated and restrictive than ever.”

Following World news

Following

It is impossible to know exactly what is going on inside the totalitarian and reclusive state, let alone grasp a full picture of life in a certain city or region.

But in an effort to understand how life has changed since the start of the pandemic in January 2020 — when Kim hermetically sealed the borders, cutting off the flow of goods and information — The Post has tried to peer into Hyesan. The city theoretically should have been among the easiest to access, given its historical openness.

A photo taken March 1, 2024, shows a watchtower on the border in Hyesan, as seen from Changbai. (Pedro Pardo/AFP/Getty Images)

This article is based on interviews with three people who still live in Hyesan and 12 who escaped from it, most in 2019 just before the border crackdown, and maintain intermittent contact with their family or friends there. The residents and some escapees spoke on the condition of anonymity out of concerns for their or their relatives’ safety.

To reach residents in Hyesan, The Post partnered with Asia Press, an independent Japanese media outlet that has maintained a network of contacts inside North Korea for decades. They talk via Chinese mobile phones that can catch a signal over the river about things they know: their surroundings, prices at the markets and the impact of regime policies on their daily lives.

Asia Press sent The Post’s questions via text message to Hyesan residents and relayed the answers in Korean. The outlet told the three residents that the questions were from an American newspaper, and they were not compensated for answering these questions.

The Post also reviewed and geolocated satellite imagery and videos uploaded to Chinese social media sites.

The portrait that emerges is one of unprecedented restrictions that are making residents more isolated and dependent on the regime than ever.

Representatives at the North Korean mission at the United Nations in New York did not respond to a request for comment.

Life in Hyesan was not like this for most of the past three decades.

The city’s economy began growing in the late 1990s after a devastating famine ravaged North Korea, killing as many as 3 million and revealing that the state was unable to provide for the people. Residents began making, selling and buying items to survive, and this was tolerated as the Kim regime tried to let out steam — and avoid potential social unrest.

RUSSIA

CHINA

Hyesan

NORTH

KOREA

Sea of

Japan

(East Sea)

Pyongyang

SOUTH

KOREA

Yellow

Sea

100 MILES

Thanks to the city’s proximity to entrepreneurial China and the nominally communist Kim regime’s newfound willingness to let ordinary people make their own money, its markets became some of the best-stocked in all of North Korea.

For a time, Hyesan was even known as the “smuggler’s village” because it was so easy for people to buy and sell across the river, which is only 300-feet wide in places. Its markets used to be so flush with Chinese products that North Koreans joked they could buy everything there “except cat’s horns.”

When Kim, then just 27, took over from his father at the end of 2011, some analysts — and many North Koreans — hoped the millennial leader would open up the world’s most closed state. Some even thought he might follow China’s example and usher in market-oriented reforms that would give people greater economic agency.

A photo provided by North Korean state media shows North Korean leader Kim Jong Un during a visit to the Kim II Sung University of Politics in Pyongyang, North Korea, on Feb. 24. (Korean Central News Agency/Reuters)

Kim has confounded such hopes. In the 14th year of his rule, he is now projecting himself as a confident and assertive leader, apparently feeling stronger than ever thanks to the pandemic-era controls that he’s kept in place and his strategic alliance with Russia’s Vladimir Putin.

He could receive another boost with Donald Trump’s return to the White House. In his first term as president, Trump met with Kim on three occasions, calling him “very talented.” Although those talks did not go anywhere, the president has signaled he’d be willing to “reach out” to the North Korean dictator again.

But Kim, and North Korea, are in a very different position than the last time Trump was president.

It is now harder than any time in the past 33 years to get in contact with North Koreans, said Jiro Ishimaru, the founder of Asia Press. But what Ishimaru has heard from his contacts inside North Korea over the past four years is consistent: Life has gotten much harder. And it appears to be by design, he said, to increase residents’ reliance on Kim’s regime.

“The more people realized they could fend for themselves, they started to care less for what the Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un has to say,” Ishimaru said. “I believe that is why Kim took drastic anti-market measures to rein it all in.”

Hyesan, photographed March 1, 2024, from Changbai. For a time, it was even known as the “smuggler's village.” (Pedro Pardo/AFP/Getty Images)

Kim focuses on the border

The people of Hyesan used to say that one unofficial trader fed 13 people, so great were the flow-on effects from the post-famine cross-border trade that made the city hum.

Some of this happened on the sidelines of the official trade that took place across the border. More than 98 percent of North Korea’s trade goes to or through China, with North Korea exporting everything from coal to wigs.

Regime officials struck deals off the books and pocketed the profits, creating a rich entrepreneurial class with ties to the regime, known as donju, or “masters of money,” who became increasingly — and conspicuously — rich and powerful.

“The rich people live unimaginably well and do not treat ordinary people as humans, let alone talk to them,” said a woman who lives in Hyesan, this one in her 30s, who was also contacted through Asia Press.

But there were also plenty of scrappy North Koreans who bribed their way over the river, returning from China with goods — secondhand clothes, cheap electronics, action movies on DVD — they could sell in the markets. This turned Hyesan into a capitalist haven in a socialist nation that had failed them.

Lee Suk-jeong was one of those unofficial traders whose entrepreneurial zeal supported many. She paid suppliers for gold they’d mined, medicinal herbs they’d picked and soybeans they’d grown. Lee would sell these goods to Chinese buyers over the Yalu River, paying drivers to deliver them and bribing border guards to look the other way.

“All those people treated me very well. It’s how they made their living, too,” said Lee, who left in 2019, eight years after Kim took power.

Lee Suk-jeong, a longtime unofficial trader in Hyesan, left North Korea in 2019. She's seen here at her bar in Suwon, South Korea, on Oct. 26. (Tina Hsu/For The Washington Post)

Lee shows the only possession she has from North Korea. (Tina Hsu/For The Washington Post)

In the first years of his rule, the young leader had allowed the markets to continue and even encouraged wealthy entrepreneurs to invest in them so they expanded from his father’s days. This allowed a small fry like Lee to enjoy a limited but increasing amount of economic freedom.

But by 2017, Kim was apparently feeling more confident in his role: He was attracting global attention for the barrages of increasingly high-tech missiles his regime was firing, including from the White House. That year, Trump oscillated between threatening to rain down “fire and fury” on Kim to saying he’d be “honored” to meet the North Korean leader.

But the missile advances, and its seventh and most powerful nuclear test, brought international sanctions that affected North Korea’s already-limited ability to trade.

President Donald Trump and North Korea's Kim step over the demarcation line at the border village of Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone on June 30, 2019. (Susan Walsh/AP)

That may have prompted Kim to pay more attention to the border. The young leader began tightening controls by cracking down on unapproved trading, according to residents, escapees and economists in South Korea.

That also enabled him to direct more money toward his priorities, said Peter Ward, a research fellow at the Sejong Institute in Seoul who specializes in the North Korean economy.

These measures will “hurt a lot of households that were previously making a tidy income,” Ward said. “The government is not just going to be making more money, it’s also going to be able to control people’s lives much more directly.”

New restrictions since the start of the pandemic have limited cross-border trade in Hyesan. (Pedro Pardo/AFP/Getty Images)

Pandemic-era controls remain

North Korea gradually started opening its borders in 2023, more than three years after the pandemic began, and allowing some trade with China to resume — but under new rules, according to residents.

“Regular people can no longer earn money on our own,” said the Hyesan resident in her 30s. “Compared to the trading business we were able to do the past, it is night and day.”

Now, almost all cross-border sales are regulated by customs, inspections, trade officials and border guards, said a third Hyesan resident, also in her 40s: “It’s no longer what it used to be when business ran wild. … We can’t make any direct transactions without giving the government prior notice.”

While some unofficial trade has resumed on the sidelines, only activities approved by the regime are tolerated, according to three escapees who maintain contact with people in the city. That means used cars and engines are being let in, but Chinese clothes that can be sold at the markets are not.

This off-the-books trade is happening at significantly smaller scales than before the pandemic, they said.

As a result, the current residents said, the flow of goods at the markets has become irregular and what is for sale has become more expensive.

Lee Young-bin, who fled in 2019, said she can’t fathom how the city’s economy can survive without its once-bustling unofficial trade: “If not for Yalu River, there’s no other option to make money. … If smuggling stops, people’s lives deteriorate.”

Previously, many people fed up with the deprivations of life in North Korea would try to escape. They would bribe brokers and guards along the border, and when the river froze in the winter, they would dart across in the middle of the night.

Before 2020, more than 1,000 North Koreans had arrived in South Korea every year for two decades. But last year, fewer than 200 North Koreans made it to the South, and the vast majority were already living in China or Russia before covid broke out.

This, like trade, has changed markedly. It is now almost impossible to sneak across the border anymore, thanks to increased fortification and heightened surveillance since the onset of the pandemic.

Woo Young-bok at a park by her home in Seoul on Oct. 26. She and her family defected to South Korea from the North in 2019 and live in temporary, government-provided housing on the outskirts of Seoul. (Tina Hsu/For The Washington Post)

A photo of Woo with her mother and two children. (Tina Hsu/For The Washington Post)

The North Korean regime has installed new fencing and watch towers along the border, at times adding a second layer of fencing in some areas, according to an analysis by Human Rights Watch. The organization found that between 2020 and 2023, the North built at least 300 miles of new fencing along border cities and enhanced another 162 miles of existing fencing with new structures.

Satellite images captured by Maxar from 2019 through summer 2024 show new fencing in the Hyesan area that did not exist in 2019. In one area near the Pochonbo Battle Victory Tower, about a mile from the statues of Kim’s father and grandfather in the city center, there were three layers of fences visible last year that were not there five years earlier.

June 2024

Yalu River

Guard towers

and posts

NORTH KOREA

CHINA

Barrier built or

upgraded after

Oct. 2019

Barrier built

before Oct. 2019

Hyesan

Because it is so difficult and dangerous to escape from North Korea, brokers — many are escapees themselves — coordinate when and where to cross the border, whom to bribe and whom to meet after they cross.

Their fees had been increasing as their work got harder, but now no amount of money can buy freedom.

June 2024

CHINA

NORTH KOREA

Barrier built or

upgraded after

Oct. 2019

Barrier built

before Oct. 2019

Yalu River

Guard towers

and posts

Hyesan

“I’ve been asking around for people [along the border] who can arrange an escape route,” said a man who escaped from Hyesan in 2015. “But they’re telling me that there’s just no way out from North Korea.”

The same brokers used to transfer remittances from people who’d escaped to South Korea; usually small amounts of money that made an enormous difference to the North Korean recipients’ lives.

Such activities were fraught with risks even before covid. But now, it has become so dangerous that brokers are charging inordinate fees to send cash into North Korea, making it difficult for people outside of North Korea to help their family or friends, escapees said.

Some brokers transferring remittances are now demanding commissions as high as 70 percent, a huge increase from about 30 percent pre-covid, escapees said.

“Most escapees can’t even afford to send money anymore” because of the fees, said Woo Young-bok, who fled in 2019 and talks to her uncle in North Korea once a year or so. “He tells me life has gotten hard, that it’s just so hard. … It breaks my heart.”

Pei-Lin Wu in Taipei and Hanna Park in Seoul contributed to this report.

What readers are saying

The comments primarily focus on drawing parallels between the authoritarian regime in North Korea, particularly in Hyesan, and the perceived authoritarian tendencies of Donald Trump in the United States. Commenters express concern over the erosion of freedoms and the potential... Show more

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By Michelle Ye Hee Lee

Michelle Ye Hee Lee is The Washington Post's Tokyo bureau chief, covering Japan and the Korean peninsula. follow on X@myhlee

3. North Korean soldiers cross tense DMZ border, South Korea fires warning shots

A probe to test South Korean military reaction?

A deliberate provocation?

A lost patrol?

Looking for food in the DMZ? (lots of animals to hunt)

An attempt to defect?

North Korean soldiers cross tense DMZ border, South Korea fires warning shots

South Korea’s military said about 10 North Korean soldiers returned to the North’s territory after the warning shots were fired

https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/3305682/south-korean-military-fires-warning-shots-after-north-korean-soldiers-cross-border?module=top_story&pgtype=homepage

Associated Press

Published: 5:40pm, 8 Apr 2025Updated: 6:11pm, 8 Apr 2025

South Korea’s military fired warning shots after North Korean soldiers crossed the rivals’ tense border on Tuesday, South Korean officials said.

South Korea’s military said in a statement that about 10 North Korean soldiers returned to the North after South Korea made warning broadcasts and fired warning shots. It said the North Korean soldiers violated the military demarcation line at the eastern section of the border at 5pm.

South Korea’s military said it is closely monitoring North Korean activities.

Bloodshed and violent confrontations have occasionally occurred at the heavily fortified border, called the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). But when North Korean troops briefly violated the border in June last year and prompted South Korea to fire warning shots, it did not escalate into a major source of tensions. South Korean officials assessed that the soldiers did not deliberately commit the border intrusion, and the site was a wooded area and military demarcation line signs there weren’t clearly visible. South Korea said the North Koreans were carrying construction tools.

United Nations Command soldiers (right) and a South Korean soldier (left) stand guard before North Korea’s Panmon Hall and the military demarcation line separating North and South Korea. Photo: AFP

The motive for Tuesday’s border crossing by North Korean soldiers wasn’t immediately clear.

The 248-kilometre-long (155-mile), 4-kilometre-wide (2.5-mile) DMZ is the world’s most heavily armed border. An estimated 2 million mines are peppered inside and near the border, which is also guarded by barbed wire fences, tank traps and combat troops on both sides. It is a legacy of the 1950-53 Korean war, which ended with an armistice, not a peace treaty.

Animosities between the neighbours are running high now as North Korean leader Kim Jong-un continues to flaunt his military nuclear capabilities and align with Russia over President Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine. Kim is also ignoring calls by Seoul and Washington to resume denuclearisation negotiations.

Since his January 20 inauguration, US President Donald Trump has said he would reach out to Kim again to revive diplomacy. North Korea has not responded to Trump’s remarks and says US hostilities against it have deepened since Trump’s inauguration.

South Korea, meanwhile, is experiencing a leadership vacuum after the ouster of President Yoon Suk-yeol last week over his ill-fated imposition of martial law.

4. Chinese teen who filmed Korean fighters says father is public security officer

Having their children do the dirty work to test Korean security and responses to espionage. What kind of actions are not being detected due to more sophisticated intelligence personnel using better tradecraft?

Chinese teen who filmed Korean fighters says father is public security officer | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yoo Cheong-mo · April 8, 2025

SEOUL, April 8 (Yonhap) -- One of the two Chinese teenagers, who were booked for illegally filming fighter jets near a major air base in Suwon, south of Seoul, last month, has allegedly told investigators that his father is a public security officer, police officials said Tuesday.

The two Chinese nationals are suspected of using their DSLR camera and mobile phone to film fighter jets taking off and landing at the Air Force's 10th Fighter Wing at around 3:30 p.m. on March 21, according to the police. They reportedly attend high school in China and arrived here on a tourist visa three days ahead of the incident.

The Gyeonggi Nambu Provincial Police Agency, the National Intelligence Service and the Defense Security Command have since formed a joint investigation team over the case.

In particular, the investigators are verifying the statement from one of the two that his father is a Chinese public security officer. If the statement is true, the investigators plan to closely examine whether the suspect received any specific instruction from his father.

This undated file photo, provided by the Air Force, shows a fighter jet. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

ycm@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Yoo Cheong-mo · April 8, 2025

5. DP leader Lee expected to step down from party chairmanship Wednesday

I think it is important that we remember the allegations and indictments surrounding Lee Jae Myung. I asked my AI friend to provide with an overview.

South Korean politician Lee Jae-myung, leader of the Democratic Party of Korea and a prominent opposition figure, is currently facing multiple legal challenges. Below is a summary of the crimes he has been accused of, along with their status and potential implications under U.S. laws:

Crimes and Allegations Against Lee Jae-myung

1. Misappropriation of Public Funds

Details: Lee is accused of misusing approximately 106.5 million won (around $72,399) in public funds during his tenure as governor of Gyeonggi Province (2018–2021). Allegations include using government-issued corporate credit cards for personal expenses such as laundry services, food, and family-related events.

Status: The trial began on April 8, 2025, in the Suwon District Court. His wife was also implicated but has not been formally charged due to limited involvement.

2. Bribery and Property Development Scandal

Details: Lee faces charges related to bribery and corruption during his time as mayor of Seongnam. This includes allegations tied to a controversial $1 billion property development project.

Status: These charges are part of ongoing trials at the Seoul Central District Court.

3. Election Law Violations

Details: Lee was previously convicted for providing false information during a parliamentary review in 2021 but was acquitted on appeal in March 2025.

Status: The appellate court overturned his conviction, allowing him to remain eligible for political office.

4. Illegal Remittances to North Korea

Details: Lee is accused of orchestrating an $8 million illegal remittance to North Korea between 2019 and 2020 through the Ssangbangwool Group while serving as governor of Gyeonggi Province. The funds allegedly supported a smart farming project in North Korea and facilitated a planned visit by Lee to Pyongyang.

Charges:

Third-party bribery

Violating South Korea's Foreign Exchange Transactions Act (FETA)

Violating the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act (IECA), which regulates economic activities with North Korea.

Status: Trials are ongoing, with proceedings set to resume on April 23, 2025. Lee denies the charges, claiming no connection between Gyeonggi Province and the remittance.

Do Any Crimes Violate U.S. Laws?

The illegal remittance to North Korea may potentially violate U.S. laws under certain conditions:

Violation of U.S. Sanctions on North Korea: The United States enforces strict sanctions on financial transactions with North Korea under its sanctions regime (e.g., the International Emergency Economic Powers Act). If any part of the $8 million transfer involved U.S.-regulated financial institutions or U.S. persons/entities, it could constitute a violation of U.S. sanctions.

Conclusion

Lee Jae-myung faces significant legal challenges in South Korea, including allegations of bribery, misuse of public funds, and unauthorized dealings with North Korea.

DP leader Lee expected to step down from party chairmanship Wednesday

Kim Eun-jung

Politics 11:38 April 08, 2025

SEOUL, April 8 (Yonhap) -- Democratic Party (DP) leader Lee Jae-myung is expected to step down from the party chairmanship on Wednesday, according to party officials Tuesday, with the nation gearing up for a presidential election following the ouster of former President Yoon Suk Yeol.

Lee, the presumed front-runner for the June 3 presidential election, plans to resign as DP leader after presiding over a meeting with senior lawmakers on Wednesday, party officials told Yonhap News Agency.

So far, Lee has kept a low profile on whether he would run for the presidential election.

Some DP officials expected Lee to announce his presidential bid sometime next week.

"He will decide on when to declare candidacy after considering various factors, including the timing of other candidates' announcements," a DP official said.

The presidential election will determine the successor to Yoon, who was ousted for his brief imposition of martial law in December.

Lee, who narrowly lost to Yoon in the 2022 election, has led early polls despite ongoing legal challenges, including multiple trials related to corruption and other allegations.

Lee Jae-myung, leader of the main opposition Democratic Party, waves to his supporters during his appearance at the Seoul Central District Court for a court hearing on April 8, 2025. (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

6. Top US, South Korean shipbuilders partner to bolster vessel production

Good news. Partners in the arsenal of democracy (I know that saying gets old).

Top US, South Korean shipbuilders partner to bolster vessel production

militarytimes.com · by Zita Fletcher · April 7, 2025

America’s largest naval shipbuilder, HII, reached an agreement Monday to partner with South Korea’s HD Hyundai Heavy Industries to boost shipbuilding across numerous vessel classes.

The landmark agreement, signed as a memorandum of understanding at the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space Symposium at National Harbor, Maryland, covers not only military but commercial shipbuilding efforts, according to a HII press release.

“By working with our shipbuilding allies and sharing best practices, we believe this [agreement] offers real potential to help accelerate delivery of quality ships,” Brian Blanchette, HII executive vice president and president of Ingalls Shipbuilding, said in the release.

Won-ho Joo, chief executive of HHI’s naval and special ship business unit, called the agreement “a new milestone for both of our companies,” adding that the arrangement will provide South Korea “with the unique opportunity to expand our expertise in shipbuilding.”

Hyundai Heavy Industries owns the world’s largest shipyard, located in Ulsan, South Korea. The company, which boasts 10% of the world’s shipbuilding market, asserts it can “produce more than one [Aegis-equipped] ship per year, equivalent to the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyer,” HHI Specialized Ship Business Division Managing Director Woo-man Jeong told a South Korean news outlet.

“If maritime defense cooperation with the U.S. is in full swing,” Jeong added, “we will be able to build up to five ships per year, and there is room for further expansion.”

The agreement inked between HHI and its U.S. counterpart, which is headquartered in Newport News, Virginia, is the latest indication of increased naval collaboration between the two countries.

Last month, South Korea’s naval industry notched a significant first when the Military Sealift Command’s Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo ship USNS Wally Schirra completed a seven-month regular overhaul at a Hanwha Ocean shipyard in Gyeongsangnam-do.

The overhaul marked the first time a Republic of Korea shipyard bid on and won a contract of that scale, according to a U.S. Pacific Fleet release.

“The Republic of Korea’s ability to conduct large-scale maintenance to USNS ships within the Indo-Pacific Theater demonstrates the strong strategic partnership between the Republic of Korea and the United States,” Rear Adm. Neil Koprowski, U.S. Naval Forces Korea commander, said in the release. “Maintenance in Theater reduces downtime and costs, while enhancing operational readiness. This is a landmark achievement to be celebrated as a symbol of our strengthened partnership and ironclad commitment to the ROK-U.S. alliance.”

Monday’s U.S.-South Korea shipbuilding agreement comes on the heels of a recent Government Accountability Office report that described the state of U.S. shipbuilding over the past 20 years as lingering in a “perpetual state of triage.”

During a March 4 address to the nation, President Donald Trump promised to establish a new office of shipbuilding within the White House to inject life into the industry and revitalize U.S. naval strength.

“We used to make so many ships,” Trump said. “We don’t make them anymore very much, but we’re going to make them very fast, very soon. It will have a huge impact to further enhance our national security.”

About Zita Ballinger Fletcher

Zita Ballinger Fletcher previously served as editor of Military History Quarterly and Vietnam magazines and as the historian of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. She holds an M.A. with distinction in military history.

7. ＜Inside N. Korea＞Even Housewives Being Mobilized - New "Women's League Shock Brigades" for Farm Labor as Kim Jong-Un Regime Demands Farms Cover Labor Costs

The Korean people in the north are suffering because of Kim Jong Un's failed policies.

The root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the most evil mafia- like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.

＜Inside N. Korea＞Even Housewives Being Mobilized - New "Women's League Shock Brigades" for Farm Labor as Kim Jong-Un Regime Demands Farms Cover Labor Costs

asiapress.org

Women holding a meeting in a corn field. They appear to be "Women's League members" mobilized for harvest work. Taken from the Chinese side in late September 2023, showing a scene from Sakju County, North Pyongan Province. ASIAPRESS

Annual farm mobilization is about to begin in North Korea. Under the slogan "Everyone who can hold a spoon must participate," the entire population from high-ranking officials to elementary school students is mobilized for agricultural work including fertilizer transport, rice planting, and weeding. Starting this year, dedicated "shock troops" are being selected from housewives and intensively dispatched to rural areas. Additionally, farms are now required to cover the food expenses of mobilized workers, causing widespread controversy. Two reporting partners living in the northern region shared this information from late March through April. (HONG Mari / KANG Ji-won)

◆ Women's League Forming "Shock Brigades" for Farm Mobilization

Reporting partner A, who lives in Hyesan in Ryanggang Province, reports that once again, orders to "concentrate all efforts on agriculture" have been issued from the central government. She explains the latest developments in farm mobilization:

"Each neighborhood Women's League has selected 20 people to form 'shock brigades.' Those mobilized to rural areas as part of these 'Women's League Shock Brigades' are exempt from other service labor and political study sessions."

※The Women's League's official name is the "Korean Socialist Women's League," mainly composed of housewives without workplace affiliations.

Shock brigades typically refer to specialized labor units deployed for national construction projects. However, since the COVID-19 pandemic, the Kim Jong-un regime has been directing businesses and factories to create "agricultural shock brigades" to concentrate manpower on farm work. This year, they've expanded the scope to include housewife brigades.

◆ Farms Required to Cover Meals and Wages for Mobilized Workers

Another new system has emerged this year. Reporting partner B explains:

"Until now, people worked for free when mobilized to farms, but this year, farms must provide cash or lunch to those mobilized from the Women's League, institutions, and businesses."

Previously, when factories and businesses organized rural mobilizations, they covered meals and wages, but housewives and students typically had to pay for their own meals and transportation to farms. Starting this year, farms must provide either daily cash payments of 900 won (equivalent to about 20,000 won monthly wages) or meals to those mobilized through organizations.

※As of late March, 1,000 North Korean won was worth approximately 0.04 USD. Current average worker wages are about 35,000-50,000 won. One kilogram of white rice costs about 9,000 won.

asiapress.org

8. “North Korea Possible Expansion of Deployment of Russian Troops”

Renting the nKPA to Russia is business for Kim Jong un. And business is good.

This is an RFA translation of an RFA report.

“North Korea Possible Expansion of Deployment of Russian Troops”

Seoul-Hong Seung-wook hongs@rfa.org

2025.04.08

https://www.rfa.org/korean/in-focus/2025/04/08/north-russia-troop-dispatch-expand/

North Korean special operations forces are conducting various tactical training at a dedicated training base. (Yonhap)

Anchor: There is an analysis in South Korea that North Korea is making a kind of deal with Russia, which is in dire need of troop support, over the scale of additional troop deployment. There is also an outlook that General Secretary of the Workers' Party Kim Jong-un will visit Russia ahead of Russia's Victory Day. Reporter Hong Seung-wook reports from Seoul.

A press conference held for foreign media in Seoul on the 8th by Jin-ho Du, director of the International Strategy Research Center at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, a government-funded research institute in South Korea.

At the briefing session held on the topic of 'Outlook for the End of the Ukraine War,' the two directors assessed that North Korea is facing several strategic opportunities due to the dispatch of troops to Russia and is showing an intention to maximize its profits by taking advantage of them.

[Doo Jin-ho, Director of the International Strategy Research Lab at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses] General Secretary Kim must maximize North Korea’s interests by taking advantage of the unprecedented opportunity of sending troops to Russia, and circumstances are being identified where he is making deals with Russia for this purpose.

The two directors analyzed that the additional number of troops dispatched by North Korea early this year, estimated at up to 3,000, was insufficient for the Russian military, which needs to launch a major offensive, and that North Korea is making a deal with Russia over the number of troops dispatched.

It is explained that North Korea is considering extreme measures such as adjusting the scale of additional troop deployment and even withdrawing the deployment, while observing the implementation of countermeasures for the cost of troop deployment and the sacrifice of North Korean soldiers.

However, it was also diagnosed that North Korea's immediate discontent appears to have been put to rest, as sufficient sincerity was shown by the visits to North Korea by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Rudenko and then by Security Secretary Sergei Shoigu last month.

UN Human Rights Council Adopts Resolution on North Korean Human Rights Condemning Russia's Troop Deployment

South Korean Foreign Minister: “There should be no compensation to the North in the process of ending the Ukraine War”

Meanwhile, Director Doo Jin-ho said that the goal of General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea Kim Jong-un is to secure as much of a stake as possible in the armistice negotiations through continued troop dispatch and war contributions, and raised the possibility that the scope of troop dispatch could be expanded in the future.

[Du Jin-ho, Director of the International Strategy Research Center, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses] In a situation where the end of the war is becoming more visible, General Secretary Kim’s choice is to secure as much of a share as possible through the continued dispatch of North Korean troops and meaningful contributions to Russia’s special military operations. To this end, it is expected that the North Korean special operations forces’ activity radius will expand beyond the combat radius limited to Kursk to other regions such as Donetsk and Kherson.

Doo Jin-ho (center), director of the International Strategy Research Center at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, speaks at a press conference on “Outlook for the End of the Ukraine War” held at SFCC on the 8th.

“Kim Jong-un, possibility of visiting Russia before Victory Day in May”

Regarding General Secretary Kim's visit to Russia, it is expected to take place before Victory Day in May.

For General Secretary Kim, who is unfamiliar with the gathering of heads of state from various countries and has little experience in the field, a visit to Russia on the occasion of Victory Day could be burdensome, and for this reason, it is highly likely that he will choose to make a solo visit before Victory Day, when he will be able to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in a bilateral setting and receive less attention from the international community.

In particular, if Chinese President Xi Jinping attends the Russian Victory Day celebrations, this too could be an uncomfortable situation for both sides. Therefore, it is expected that General Secretary Kim will visit Moscow before Victory Day to seek to elevate North Korea's strategic status on an equal footing with President Putin and maximize the countermeasures for sending troops, etc.

Last June, President Putin visited North Korea and officially invited General Secretary Kim to Moscow, and in November, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov requested that North Korea attend the 80th anniversary of the Victory Day military parade.

South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yeol emphasized during a meeting with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte earlier this month that military cooperation between North Korea and Russia must be halted immediately and that there should be no compensation for North Korea's wrongdoings during the armistice process.

This is Hong Seung-wook of RFA's Free Asia Broadcasting in Seoul.

9. How Kim is grooming kids as young as 5 to be world's best hackers & target West

The all-purpose sword of cyber is critical to Kim's "fund raising" and ultimately to his survival.

Photos at the link.

How Kim is grooming kids as young as 5 to be world's best hackers & target West

Scroll down to find out how the children are recruited

Lydia Doye
Published: 8:02, 6 Apr 2025
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/34029861/kim-jong-uns-hackers-groomed-china-target-west/?utm

The Sun · by Lydia Doye · April 6, 2025

KIM Jong-un is recruiting primary school children and grooming them to become the world's best hackers, an intelligence analyst has warned.

The child prodigies are recruited from the age of five and channelled into specialist schools where they learn how to target the West with devastating hacks.

Students attend a class at the Kang Pan Sok revolutionary school outside PyongyangCredit: AFP

Children march in formation through Songdowon International School Children’s Camp in Wonsan, North KoreaCredit: Getty

Kim Jong-un recruits primary school children for his shady hacking groupsCredit: Reuters

The shocking revelation comes after North Korea's shady Lazarus Group was accused of stealing $1.2billion in the largest heist in crypto's history last month.

News of the theft stunned the world, and left people wondering just how Kim pulled it off.

Now, an expert has revealed that the Supreme Leader handpicks his army of cyber warriors from primary schools.

North Korea analyst at Google Threat Intelligence Group, Michael Barnhart, told the Sun that North Korea has a “systematic approach to developing its cyber capabilities”.

He said there is significant evidence that prospective hackers are selected from as young as primary school age.

Barnhart said: “The process starts with identifying bright students in primary school who demonstrate aptitude in subjects like science and mathematics.”

The talented children are chosen in what Barnhart described as a “pyramid-like prodigy recruiting system”.

These talented children are selected through a "pyramid-like prodigy recruiting system"

Michael BarnhartGoogle Threat Intelligence Group

Once selected the budding hackers are channelled into specialist middle schools in the North Korean capital, Pyongyang.

The elite Keumseong 1 and 2 High-Middle Schools in Pyongyang are thought to be the main destinations for potential talent.

The gifted teens continue their education at North Korean technology universities including the prestigious Kim Il Sung University and Kim Chaek University of Technology.

Kim Jong Un blows up the ground in North Korea as part of a building project

After graduating, the hacking hopefuls head off to China or Russia for around a year.

There they gain the “practical hacking and technical skills” to target the West.

This part of their training is crucial, as for many it is their first exposure to the global Internet.

Internet access is not generally available in North Korea, and only a handful of high-level officials and foreigners are permitted to use the global Internet.

Most citizens only have access to a heavily censored intranet called Kwangmyong.

Kwangmyong includes a number of regularly-updated news sites, but these are filled with ludicrous propaganda about the great endeavours of the Supreme Leader.

After completing the final part of their training, the hackers return and are placed in various warfare units to serve as "cyber warriors".

Barnhart said: “This dedicated process illustrates North Korea's strong commitment to building its cyber capabilities by nurturing and rigorously training individuals from a young age, including providing them with crucial experience outside of the country."

But he added that throughout the entire process “vetting and loyalty to the regime is monitored closely and reinforced”.

The children are recruited from a 'pyramid-like prodigy recruiting system'

Children arrive at Kallimgil Primary School in Mangyongdae District of PyongyangCredit: AP

Children studying at Kallimgil Primary SchoolCredit: AP

Kim Chaek University of Technology in PyongyangCredit: Wikipedia

Kim Il-Sung university in PyongyangCredit: Times Newspapers Ltd

Ensuring loyalty: Perks and pride

Being one of the world's best hackers can't be easy - that's why Kim offers his precious cyber army a selection of perks.

For those who graduate with top grades, their parents could be in with the chance of upgrading their home.

Defector Kim Heung-kwang told Al-Jazeera in an interview that hackers' parents who live in the provinces are often given the sought-after opportunity to live in the capital.

Heung-kwang added that the regime also guarantees married hackers housing in Pyongyang.

This kind of pride, being part of the elite, is nothing to sneeze about

Kim Heung-kwangin an interview with Al-Jazeera

And what's more - they are provided with food subsidies and a generous stipend during overseas deployments.

But when the stakes are this high it's no wonder Kim treats his hackers so well.

It must be working as Heung-kwang seemed certain that the youngsters would stay loyal to their leader - even after being given access to the free Internet.

He said: “These kids have the confidence of the [ruling Worker’s] Party and have a certain standard of living guaranteed, not to mention a chance to live and travel abroad.

"This kind of pride, being part of the elite, is nothing to sneeze about.”

“They also don’t have any certainties that life away from the North will be any better than what they already have.”

View of the Taedong River and Juche Tower in Pyongyang, North KoreaCredit: Alamy

View of the May Day Stadium in Pyongyang, North KoreaCredit: Alamy

The Lazarus Group

The Lazarus Group - also known as Guardians of Peace and Whois Team - is one of North Korea's most notorious hacking groups.

While not much is known about the shady group it is thought to be responsible for some of the most damaging cyber attacks the world has ever seen.

The Lazarus Group was accused of stealing $1.2billion in the largest heist in crypto's history.

Hackers were able to gain control of an Ethereum wallet and rip all of its contents, in a theft that sent shock waves through the world of blockchain.

How did the heist unfold?

NORTH Korean hackers were able to wipe $1.5billion out of an online crypto account in the world's biggest digital money theft.

Bybit has surprisingly relied on free public software for its security, despite more specialised business options being available.

This system, by tech company Safe, was hacked by North Korean hackers.

These criminals were able to send a request to transfer money from the doomed crypto wallet to another.

After Bybit's CEO approved this request, the hackers were able to take control of the crypto account.

Hackers then moved the $1.5billion worth of crypto out of the account and into a location they could start turning the digital money into real cash.

But intelligence experts have revealed the group is likely to be more than just one cyber unit.

Senior manager at Google Threat Intelligence Group, Ben Read, said that Lazarus is actually an overarching term to identify a "wide umbrella of North Korean activity".

He explained that, in reality, the so-called Lazarus Group likely constitutes multiple cyber units.

These units are made up of high-profile, extremely skilled hackers who have, together, developed tried-and-tested ways of breaching security and stealing money.

Read said: "While these groups have overlapping goals and occasionally share tools, they operate in different ways."

But whatever the real identity of the Lazarus Group, one thing is for sure - it is a well-oiled machine.

The 'worst hack in history' saw the Lazarus Group steal $1.2billionCredit: AP

This is how it compared to the biggest crypto scams of all time

Kim's cash-starved regime

And what's more - the stolen money is thought to be going directly into Kim's pocket.

North Korea has been hit by many sanctions over the years, forcing its leader to think outside the box.

Now, the state relies on deadly cyber attacks on the West to fund its cash-starved regime.

A UN investigation in 2022 found that cyber attacks are an "important revenue source" for Pyongyang's nuclear and ballistic missile programme.

This came after an previous investigation proved that the state had accumulated $2billion for its weapons of mass destruction programmes through cyber attacks alone.

The shocking figure left the world wondering how they can better defend themselves against these attacks.

But with Kim's cyber kids beginning their training from as early as five, the West doesn't stand a chance.

Kim Jong-un overseeing the latest strategic cruise missile launching drill on February 26Credit: EPA

A missile was test-fired off the west coast of the Korean peninsulaCredit: AFP

10. ＜North Korea Special＞What is the Reality of Kim Jong-un's Agricultural Policy Reform? (2) Enterprise-Style Farms Codified in Law - Has 'Juche Farming' Been Abandoned?

There time is coming to the hard realization that markets work. Capitalism is superior to a state controlled economy where the party controls the means of production.

Juche doesn't grow food. And the people cannot eat ideology.

＜North Korea Special＞What is the Reality of Kim Jong-un's Agricultural Policy Reform? (2) Enterprise-Style Farms Codified in Law - Has 'Juche Farming' Been Abandoned?

asiapress.org

Farm workers harvesting corn. Taken from the Chinese side of Sakju County, North Pyongan Province in late September 2023 (ASIAPRESS)

＜North Korea Special＞What is the Reality of Kim Jong-un's Agricultural Policy Reform? (1) "Collective" Disappears from Farms　Major Revisions to Agricultural Regulations

◆ Farm Autonomy Expanding: Investigations Reveal Changes

Agricultural enterprises are being promoted as part of Kim Jong-Un's agricultural policy reforms, according to revised laws and on-site investigations. Farms have gained greater management autonomy, while principles of Kim Il Sung's "Juche farming methods" are being increasingly disregarded. This report examines the current state of farms from a production perspective. (JEON Sung-jun / KANG Ji-won)

◆ Farms Legally Designated as Enterprises

North Korean authorities revised the Farm Law for the fourth time in the 2020s in November 2021.

Article 2 of the law defines farms as follows:

"Farms are socialist agricultural enterprises that conduct agricultural production and management activities using land as the primary means of production."

This phrasing first appeared in 2015 with the term: "socialist agricultural enterprise."

Legally designating farms as enterprises appears intended to fundamentally change their status and nature as agricultural production entities. In other words, the regime aims to increase food production efficiency through the corporatization of farms.

ASIAPRESS has been investigating two farms in North Hamgyong Province to understand what specific changes have occurred in farm operations following these legal revisions.

Of the two investigators, Mr. A is a farm worker, while Mr. B is an urban resident who has been continuously monitoring a nearby farm. Both target farms are typical northern farms with approximately 500 workers each, primarily growing corn rather than rice.

◆ Greater Management Autonomy Brings Increased Responsibility

In early February, investigator A reported:

"Now farms are instructed to operate production activities independently and autonomously. Farms must use surplus production beyond state quotas to secure their own farming supplies, seeds, and fuel for agriculture."

This suggests a shift from the past principle of receiving all farming supplies from the state to fulfill plans, toward operating like businesses that must balance income and expenses. The expansion of farm management autonomy is resulting in reduced state involvement in agricultural production while strengthening farms' responsibilities and roles.

◆ Farms Now Choose Their Own Seeds

Regarding seed selection and field implementation—a crucial element of farming—investigator A reported in late February 2025 that farms have been given seed selection rights.

"The difference now is that farms are responsible for seed selection and grain management, handling these tasks independently to fulfill quotas. Previously, seeds were provided by the state, but now farms must purchase their preferred varieties directly from state-run seed farms."

Investigator B confirmed similar information in mid-March:

"This year, farms are directly visiting seed farms to secure seeds, exchanging 1.5kg of food for 1kg of seeds."

In a report sent in July 2024, B had noted:

"Early this year (2024), seed revolution was emphasized through directives from the Ministry of Agriculture, encouraging farms to boldly request seed changes based on local soil conditions."

This represents a clear change from the past when the state directly determined which crops to cultivate and supplied the seeds.

asiapress.org

11. Editorial: Caught between blame and power, neither party is governing

A frank assessment of both sides.

Editorial: Caught between blame and power, neither party is governing

https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/04/08/2YVXNU5EP5DI3IC2XUOBTF2R3Y/

By The Chosunilbo

Published 2025.04.08. 09:09

Interim People Power Party leader Kwon Young-se (left) and Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung speak at the National Assembly in Seoul on April 4, following the Constitutional Court’s ruling to remove President Yoon Suk-yeol from office. /News1

South Korea’s Democratic Party (DP) floor leader Park Chan-dae on April 7 said in a party meeting that the upcoming presidential by-election will come with a significant cost, adding, “The People Power Party (PPP), which caused this situation, has no right to field a presidential candidate.” During the same meeting, lawmaker Jeon Hyun-heui argued, “There are already more than enough reasons to dissolve the People Power Party as an unconstitutional party,” while Rep. Lee Un-ju demanded the expulsion of former President Yoon Suk-yeol, comparing the situation to the disbanded Unified Progressive Party (UPP). But in a recent Gallup Korea poll, 33% of respondents said they support the People Power Party. Is it reasonable to compare a party backed by one in three South Koreans to a pro-North party that was disbanded?

Park also said that Yoon should be investigated and charged for violating election laws, including allegations of illegal polling involving Myung Tae-kyun. “If Yoon’s win is ruled invalid, the People Power Party would have to return 39.7 billion won in campaign funds,” he claimed. This is the same Democratic Party that not long ago strongly opposed court involvement in politics, especially when its own leader Lee Jae-myung was at risk of losing his seat. The party also urged prosecutors to reopen investigations into Yoon and his wife Kim Keon-hee. At the same time, it asked Acting President Han Duck-soo to appoint constitutional court nominee Ma Eun-hyuk, while calling for a freeze on all other top government and public agency appointments until a new administration takes office. To many voters, the Democratic Party may appear to be acting like an occupying force, as if it has won the presidential election.

The People Power Party also seems out of touch with public sentiment. Interim leader Kwon Young-se said any actions that hurt the party during the election would be met with “harsh punishment.” His comment likely came after PPP lawmaker Kim Sang-wook proposed declaring the day of Yoon’s removal as “Democracy Day,” which angered pro-Yoon members and sparked calls for discipline. Both sides may have reasons, but is the party really in a position to be divided into pro-Yoon and anti-Yoon factions, unable to accommodate differing views?

To contain the infighting, former President Yoon himself must refrain from political activity. His declaration of martial law caused nationwide chaos and left the public bearing immense tangible and intangible costs. That crisis led to his impeachment and an early election. With so much already weighing on the public, Yoon’s appearance of engaging in behind-the-scenes politics from his private residence will upset many voters, and it will not help the party.

12. Acting president appoints 9th justice to Constitutional Court, names successors to retiring judges

(LEAD) Acting president appoints 9th justice to Constitutional Court, names successors to retiring judges | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · April 8, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with Han's remarks, details; CHANGES headline)

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, April 8 (Yonhap) -- Acting President Han Duck-soo on Tuesday appointed Ma Eun-hyuk as the ninth justice of the Constitutional Court, while nominating successors to two retiring judges.

In a statement to the nation, Han said he made the decision following careful consideration and after consulting with other Cabinet members as the issue of Ma's appointment has been a "source of much conflict until now."

Ma and two other justice nominees were confirmed by the opposition-controlled National Assembly late last year but only his appointment was delayed amid political wrangling over how the makeup of the nine-member bench would affect the impeachment trial of former President Yoon Suk Yeol.

Ma's appointment Tuesday came four days after the court -- with only eight justices -- removed Yoon from office.

With 10 days to go until the retirements of justices Moon Hyung-bae and Lee Mi-son, Han said he has nominated Lee Wan-kyu, minister of government legislation, and Ham Sang-hun, a justice of the Seoul High Court, as their replacements.

"This was done in consideration of the fact that an impeachment motion against the deputy prime minister for economic affairs could pass the National Assembly at any time," Han said, referring to Choi Sang-mok, who is accused by the former opposition of delaying Ma's appointment during his time as acting president.

"Under such circumstances, in the event there are delays in the Constitutional Court's decision (on Choi's potential impeachment) due to additional vacancies, I judged that serious disruptions would be inevitable to managing the presidential election, preparing an essential extra budget and responding to trade issues."

Meanwhile, Han said he has appointed Ma Yong-joo, a former senior judge of the Seoul High Court, as a Supreme Court justice.

The Constitutional Court's eight justices -- (from L to R, rear) Chung Kye-sun, Kim Bok-hyeong, Jung Jung-mi, Lee Mi-son, Moon Hyung-bae, Kim Hyung-du, Cheong Hyung-sik and Cho Han-chang -- are seated at the court in Seoul on April 4, 2025, to deliver the court's ruling on whether to dismiss or reinstate impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol over his short-lived imposition of martial law in December. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · April 8, 2025

13. S. Korea voices 'strong' protest against Japan's renewed territorial claim to Dokdo

One step forward and two steps back.

(LEAD) S. Korea voices 'strong' protest against Japan's renewed territorial claim to Dokdo | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 8, 2025

(ATTN: REWRITES headline; UPDATES with more info in last 2 paras; ADDS photo)

SEOUL, April 8 (Yonhap) -- The foreign ministry on Tuesday expressed "strong protest" against Japan's territorial claim to South Korea's easternmost islets of Dokdo in its latest foreign policy paper, calling for an immediate withdrawal.

Releasing this year's Diplomatic Bluebook earlier in the day, the Japanese government once again renewed its claim to the South Korea-controlled islets, as it did the previous year.

A visitor looks at a map of Dokdo at an exhibition hall operated by the Northeast Asian History Foundation in Seoul, in this undated file photo. (Yonhap)

"We strongly protest against the repetition of the unjust territorial claim to Dokdo, which is clearly our territory based on history, geography and international law," the foreign ministry said in a statement.

"We urged (Japan) to immediately withdraw this," it said.

The government also vowed to respond sternly to "any kinds of provocations by Japan" regarding Dokdo.

The ministry subsequently called in Taisuke Mibae, minister at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, to lodge a formal protest with Japan.

A stern-faced Mibae entered the foreign ministry's headquarters in central Seoul without responding to a flurry of questions from reporters about the territorial claim's impact on South Korea-Japan relations, among other issues.

Taisuke Mibae, minister at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, enters South Korea's foreign ministry on April 8, 2025, after being summoned regarding the Japanese government's territorial claim to South Korea's easternmost islets of Dokdo. (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 8, 2025

14. S Korea on edge as US hints at redeploying troops

It is time for all of us to grow up. No longer can we be single focused on separate security challenges.

First every country must prioritize its homeland defense.

In the Asia Pacific we need to recognize that the security challenges are intertwined, especially Taiwan and Korea. For the US and its allies, it is time to take a holistic approach to the security problems. Perhaps a new security architecture is needed that will allow for such a holistic view and approach.

Korea especially cannot look at necessary changes and interpret them as a weakening of allied commitments to mutual defense or as "Korea passing." Korea should be relying heavily on the 1953 Mutual Defense treaty and recognizing that it must contribute to Mutual Defense and not just the US contributing to the defense of Korea.

It is time for all our alliances to evolve.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes.

ARTICLE III

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp

S Korea on edge as US hints at redeploying troops

Secret Pentagon memo prioritizes protecting Taiwan, raising concern US forces in Korea may be moved or de-emphasized

asiatimes.com · by Lee Seung-ku

Concerns are mounting in South Korea over the evolving role of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) after a “secret” Pentagon memo directed the unit to prioritize “deterring China’s seizure of Taiwan” and “strengthening homeland defense” even at the cost of “assuming risks” in other regions.

The apparent new Pentagon policy could shift the primary mission of the 28,500 American troops stationed in South Korea from deterring North Korea to countering China—a move that, for Seoul, risks creating a security vacuum and straining already delicate relations with Beijing.

According to a March 29 Washington Post report, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth distributed a classified document titled “Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance” across the US Defense Department in mid-March.

The document reportedly outlines US President Donald Trump’s vision for preparing for and potentially winning a conflict against China while also defending US interests in the “near abroad” region, including Greenland and the Panama Canal.

The document, reportedly signed by Hegseth, aims to restructure America’s Indo-Pacific military initiatives, shifting focus away from North Korean threats to China’s potential aggression against Taiwan.

The shift comes despite North Korea’s recent provocations, including the development and brandishing of new long-range missiles capable of hitting the US mainland.

To address shortages in personnel and resources, the document states that the Pentagon “will assume risk in other theaters,” thereby pressuring allies in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia—including South Korea—to take on greater deterrence roles against regional adversaries such as Russia, Iran and North Korea.

This reflects a broader burden-sharing strategy that has defined Trump’s foreign policy since his first term. The shift could potentially increase South Korea’s defense spending, as the country reshapes it defense strategy to be less reliant on the permanent presence of US troops.

It’s unclear if the memo’s “other theaters” means the US is considering a new policy of basing American troops in Taiwan and perhaps moving them out of South Korea.

“[South Korea] says it respects USFK’s ‘Strategic Flexibility,’ but that is all just empty words. [South Korea] needs the USFK anchored on the peninsula,” said Lee Sang-soo, a visiting research fellow at the Jeju Peace Institute, in an interview with Asia Times.

Under North Korea’s nuclear threat, Seoul lacks the capability to contain its neighbor without US troops, according to Lee. This makes the USFK’s presence on the peninsula crucial for South Korea’s security, he said.

Redeployment risks

The idea of expanding the USFK’s role in the Indo-Pacific is not new.

In 2006, then-South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon—who later became the UN’s Secretary-General—and former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice first agreed on the concept of “Strategic Flexibility,” allowing for possible USFK deployments beyond the Korean Peninsula.

However, the US has historically recognized Seoul’s need for a constant security guarantee, embodied by the American troops who have remained in South Korea since the Korean War.

Now, concerns are growing that the Pentagon’s new guidance makes the USFK’s redeployment a realistic possibility.

“A security vacuum created by the USFK’s departure could lead North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to miscalculate,” said Kang Joon-young, a professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, in an interview with Money Today.

A reduced USFK presence could also be used as leverage by Washington in defense-cost negotiations, with the US potentially demanding greater financial contributions from Seoul.

“The US has consistently urged South Korea to contribute more to maintaining the USFK,” said Lee, the researcher. “It could also resort to economic pressure, such as tariffs, to extract what it considers a fair share for stationing troops.”

Lee’s concerns are now reality. On April 2, Trump unveiled his long-anticipated list of “reciprocal tariffs” to offset the “unfair” trade practices of countries that export to the US. South Korea was slapped with a new 26% tariff.

South Korea was given a special shout-out during Trump’s joint address to Congress on March 5 that outlined his logic behind reciprocal tariffs.

“South Korea’s average tariff is four times higher… And we give so much help militarily and in so many other ways to South Korea, but that’s what happens,” Trump said in the address, labeling South Korea as a country that unfairly treats the US.

Trump’s remarks, which associate tariffs with military aid, have sparked concerns in South Korea that the US could increase its tariffs further when defense-cost negotiations begin.

“Trump is trying to adopt a methodology where he links trade issues with security ones,” said Kim Dae-shik, floor spokesperson of South Korea’s ruling People’s Power Party.

“In the defense cost-sharing negotiations, South Korea needs a strategy that maintains a principled stance while also blocking any linkage to trade negotiations,” Kim added.

South Korea has already agreed to increase its annual defense contributions to US$1.3 billion by 2026, after which costs will increase annually based on South Korea’s Consumer Price Index.

However, Trump suggested on the campaign trail that he would demand as much as $10 billion annually from Seoul.

Taiwan dilemma

The Trump administration may also pressure South Korea to assume a more active role in Taiwan’s defense, said Andrew Yeo, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, a Washington-based think tank.

To be sure, US pressure on South Korea to clarify its stance on Taiwan is not new. Seoul’s reluctance to define its role in a Taiwan contingency involving Chinese aggression stems from its focus on North Korean threats and its economic dependence on Beijing.

However, the Trump administration may push South Korea into “more concrete discussions related to Taiwan,” according to Yeo.

“The United States may push South Koreans outside of their comfort zone to provide more clarity and pledge robust support for the US-South Korea alliance in the event of a Taiwan Strait contingency,” Yeo wrote in a recent report.

Lee noted that if China invades Taiwan, the US may require South Korea to make high-risk commitments, such as deploying South Korean troops to Taiwan, permitting US forces to use South Korean air and naval bases, or assisting in logistics and reconnaissance operations.

Any overt South Korean commitments to Taiwan’s defense would inevitably strain economic relations with Beijing. China is South Korea’s largest trading partner, with exports to China reaching $133 billion in 2024, up 6.6% year on year.

Given South Korea’s export-oriented economy, China’s market will become all the more important in the wake of Trump’s new prohibitive tariffs.

“This will be a difficult balancing act, but South Korea must align its position on Taiwan closely with that of the United Nations. It must support Beijing’s ‘One China’ policy, while doing its full duty as an ally of the US,” Lee added. “[South Korea] needs to take into account its economic ties with China.”

China has reacted strongly when South Korea has previously deepened its strategic alignment with the US.

For example, when Seoul deployed the THAAD missile defense system in 2016, Beijing saw it as a threat and imposed unofficial economic sanctions, including a tourism ban, trade restrictions and consumer boycotts that cost South Korea billions in losses.

Geopolitical gamble

Despite these concerns, the South Korean government claims it is still confident in America’s commitment to deterring North Korea.

“There has been no official statement or confirmation from the US Department of Defense,” South Korea’s Defense Ministry stated a day after the Washington Post report on the secret memo was released.

“The peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula remain the USFK’s primary function, and that has not changed,” it said.

But as Washington reshapes its Indo-Pacific strategy, Seoul faces mounting pressure to align with emerging new US priorities while balancing its own security and economic interests.

Whether South Korea can maintain strategic autonomy or will be drawn deeper into great-power competition remains uncertain, especially amid ongoing political turmoil and the impending economic impact of Trump’s new tariffs.

With Pyongyang watching closely and Beijing poised to retaliate, the choices Seoul makes in the coming months could redefine its geopolitical standing and risks for years to come.

asiatimes.com · by Lee Seung-ku

15. Samjiyon's dark side: Forced relocations and deaths in Kim's showcase city

Dark side is right. The Kim family regime is pure evil.

Samjiyon's dark side: Forced relocations and deaths in Kim's showcase city - Daily NK English

North Korea apparently conducted these forced relocations to alter Samjiyon's demographics in keeping with the city's designation as a "revolutionary holy place"

By Lee Chae Eun - April 8, 2025

dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Eun · April 8, 2025

A panorama view of Samjiyon, Ryanggang Province. (Rodong Sinmun)

Some residents of Samjiyon were forcibly relocated to nearby Pochon county during North Korea’s three-stage reconstruction of the city as a supposed model of rural development. Behind the glossy propaganda in North Korean media portraying Samjiyon as the “standard of mountain cultural towns,” people have endured significant hardship and loss after being driven from their homes.

“People forcibly moved to Pochon county from Samjiyon’s Potae Workers’ District (now Potae neighborhood) during the Samjiyon beautification project three years ago still struggle to adjust to their new homes,” a Daily NK source in Ryanggang province said recently.

Most of those forcibly relocated to Pochon county belonged to “hostile classes” under North Korea’s social classification system, including relatives of defectors, according to the source. The regime apparently targeted “hostile class” residents for removal while promoting Samjiyon as an ideal model provincial city.

The issue is that relocated residents – particularly the elderly – cannot adapt to their new environment and suffer severe physical and psychological distress.

“Though Potae and Pochon county aren’t far apart, forcing elderly people to leave places they’ve lived for 50 or 60 years creates tremendous psychological stress,” the source said. “They also feel deeply deprived knowing someone else is living in a new home where they once lived, while they were moved to old, dilapidated housing.”

In other words, those forcibly relocated inevitably feel a sense of emptiness, alienation and deprivation.

The recent death of a man in his 60s who was relocated to Pochon has drawn attention. The man was reportedly added to the eviction list because one of his relatives had defected to South Korea.

Since being forcibly relocated in late 2021, he had expressed profound loss, complaining that he felt “uprooted and tossed onto barren land.” His health rapidly deteriorated, and he died last month.

“Even young people struggle to adjust to new surroundings, so it must be extremely difficult for the elderly,” the source said. “He might have been fine if moved to better housing in a nicer area, but they essentially banished him to an old home, causing his physical and mental health to decline.”

North Korea apparently conducted these forced relocations to alter Samjiyon’s demographics in keeping with the city’s designation as a “revolutionary holy place” following reconstruction. Essentially, some people are suffering because they were expelled from their homes to unfamiliar locations for the sake of regime propaganda.

“TV and newspapers boast of a nation of socialist civilization, portraying Samjiyon as impressive and beautiful, but in the shadows behind this, people are suffering,” the source said. “Those forcibly relocated due to their ‘hostile class’ status continue to barely survive day-to-day even now.”

North Korea carried out an extensive three-stage reconstruction project in Samjiyon over five years between 2016 and 2021 on orders from leader Kim Jong Un. During this project, North Korea elevated Samjiyon from county to city status and continues to promote it as a model national city.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Eun · April 8, 2025

16. N. Korea officially bans American cultural icons: Cigarettes, Coca-Cola, and denim

There are many forms of "information."

Why is Kim doing this now? Because information is having an effect. It is weakening regime legitimacy of the regime and changing people's understanding of the world and their plight in north Korea.

But he is getting an information reprieve with the shuttering of VOA and RFA.

N. Korea officially bans American cultural icons: Cigarettes, Coca-Cola, and denim - Daily NK English

However, "Coca-Cola" labeled drinks reportedly sold in North Korea suggest possible alternative import channels

By Mun Dong Hui - April 8, 2025

dailynk.com · by Mun Dong Hui · April 8, 2025

FILE PHOTO: Coca-cola-flavored beverages in a restaurant in Pyongyang. (Daily NK)

North Korea has implemented legal prohibitions against importing American cigarettes, Coca-Cola, and other U.S. products.

Daily NK recently obtained the full text of the “Customs Law Implementation Regulations” enacted in 2022.

Article 3 of these regulations details prohibited imports, notably including “American cigarettes, Coca-Cola, denim fabric and products made from it.” However, the regulations specify an exception: “excluding those carried by foreigners.”

While North Korea explicitly prohibits imports of these symbols of American capitalism and consumer culture—cigarettes, cola, and denim fabric used for jeans—they appear to avoid excessive control over items personally possessed by foreigners.

However, reports indicate that carbonated beverages labeled “Coca-Cola” are being sold within North Korea, suggesting the country may be importing these products through alternative channels or selling products that appropriate the name.

Article 3 also prohibits importing: ▲materials that could damage national authority ▲binoculars ▲long-distance recording devices ▲military items ▲printed materials that could negatively impact the country’s political, economic, military, cultural development or social order ▲products made in countries or regions banned from trade.

Article 4 specifically details prohibited export items.

These include: ▲items and materials that could damage national authority ▲materials and documents classified as state secrets ▲North Korean won currently circulating within the country. Tourists should note that attempting to take North Korean currency out of the country as souvenirs could violate customs law.

The prohibited items listed in the regulations suggest North Korean authorities are concerned not only about external information entering the country but also internal information leaving it. These regulations function beyond simple customs rules, serving as a means to maintain the regime by blocking information flow.

Some items may be imported or exported with special approval from relevant authorities.

According to Article 5, electronic and radio equipment—including computers and components, drones, wireless communication devices, wireless transmitters/receivers, wired/wireless combined telephones and components, and electronic storage media—requires approval from the National Radio Supervision Agency. Precious metals like gold, silver, and platinum for export must receive quality verification from the Central Bank.

Meanwhile, Article 2 of North Korea’s Customs Law Implementation Regulations specifies enforcement measures available to customs officials: detention, seizure, and confiscation.

“Detention” is defined as temporarily holding items, currency, or transport means that cannot be approved for border crossing. “Seizure” involves customs temporarily possessing items, currency, or transport means to investigate customs law violations. “Confiscation” means forcibly transferring items, currency, or transport means to the national treasury.

Regarding this, the regulations specify (Article 43) that goods will be confiscated for smuggling activities. Acts considered smuggling (Article 44) include ▲importing or exporting goods through routes without customs checkpoints ▲transferring or diverting goods that haven’t undergone customs inspection to other agencies or individuals.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Mun Dong Hui · April 8, 2025

17. North Korea orders political lectures to combat rising military desertions

Recall that the regime will collapse when the party no longer has the ability to govern all of the territory in the north from the center in Pyongyang. This must be combined with the loss of coherency and support of the military and security services.

Kim is recognizing the cracks in the 3 chains of control of the military and his only recourse is to plug those cracks with more ideological training. We must be observant for small units deserting together as this will be a substantive indication of a break of the 3 chains of control.

North Korea orders political lectures to combat rising military desertions - Daily NK English

While the military believes these programs will strengthen unity, some question whether this addresses the root problem

By Jeong Tae Joo - April 8, 2025

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · April 8, 2025

FILE PHOTO: North Korean soldiers are seen in Sakju County, North Pyongan Province. (Daily NK)

North Korea’s military plans to hold a series of political lectures to combat rising desertions that occurred during winter exercises from December to March.

“The General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army has ordered special political lectures throughout the military due to a serious increase in desertions during the winter exercises’ assessment phase. Lecture notes titled ‘Boosting political and ideological loyalty is the military’s first strategic task’ were distributed to political departments across all army units on April 1,” a North Korean military source told Daily NK recently.

The Bureau emphasized the need to instill ideological conviction in all ranks and transform soldiers into true patriots through these lectures. The goal is to use political indoctrination to strengthen military discipline and prevent further desertions.

According to the source, the bureau determined that desertions during winter exercises increased by 20% compared to last year, with more soldiers failing to return to their units.

The bureau believes that amid weakening control, failing to bolster troops’ ideological commitment could lead to a complete breakdown of military discipline. This prompted orders for three weekly special political lectures throughout April, when soldiers typically work outdoors on military farms and barracks construction.

The lecture title comes directly from Kim Jong Un’s orders. The phrase “countries with weak militaries are preyed upon by the imperialists” reportedly appears frequently in the materials.

The lectures call for soldiers to demonstrate “practical loyalty.” They reference an episode where Kim Jong Un, while inspecting front-line units years ago and checking on desertion status, expressed hope that absent soldiers would return.

The materials conclude by stating that “units with no deserters are the kind of high-impact units always ready to host our supreme commander.” They emphasize that the solution to desertion is always “training willpower.”

The bureau has attributed desertion to “inadequate willpower” and plans to significantly expand indoctrination programs, including trips to revolutionary sites.

While the bureau believes these programs will strengthen unity, some question whether this addresses the root problem.

“In reality, many units say what needs boosting isn’t indoctrination but rations. Many believe soldiers wouldn’t run away if they were better fed and not forced into civilian construction projects,” the source said.

“Unit political departments think April’s lectures will prevent desertions and reinvigorate soldiers’ commitment. But some commanders expect them to be just a flash in the pan—more of the same propaganda.”

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · April 8, 2025

18. Class divisions: N. Korean parents reject impoverished teachers for their children

I guess the Socialist Workers Paradise is not a classless society.

Perhaps it is more like Orwell's Animal Farm: "All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others"

Class divisions: N. Korean parents reject impoverished teachers for their children - Daily NK English

North Korean parents are highly concerned about which homeroom teacher their children get, believing this teacher will significantly impact their children's future

By Eun Seol - April 8, 2025

dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · April 8, 2025

Students at class in North Korea’s Pyongyang Elementary School. (Ryukyung website)

As a new semester begins at North Korean schools, parents appear to be judging homeroom teachers not for their teaching skills but for their standard of living, Daily NK has learned.

At an elementary school in Rason, parents of first-grade students were upset about their children being assigned to a homeroom teacher who is struggling financially.

“Parents observed a class after the opening ceremony at a Rason elementary school on April 1. In one first-grade classroom, parents watching from the back were vocally displeased with the homeroom teacher,” a source in North Hamgyong province told Daily NK recently.

In North Korean schools, the same homeroom teacher typically leads a class from their arrival until graduation.

Homeroom teachers are occasionally replaced when they relocate for marriage or become too ill to continue. However, these are rare occurrences, and homeroom teachers generally remain with their pupils for several years.

North Korean parents are highly concerned about which homeroom teacher their children get, believing this teacher will significantly impact their children’s future. This is especially true for parents of first-graders, whose homeroom teacher will guide them throughout all five years of elementary school—longer than at any other educational level.

Parents’ anxiety became evident while observing a class after the Rason elementary school’s opening ceremony. They were visibly disappointed by the sickly, shabbily dressed homeroom teacher nervously conducting the class.

“It’s absurd to leave our children with that kind of teacher for five years,” one parent reportedly said. Another parent walked out mid-class and complained directly to the principal.

Locals familiar with the homeroom teacher acknowledged her difficult financial situation. She lives with and financially supports her parents, and has very few clothes.

“Parents today openly prefer teachers who are well off. They claim poor teachers end up relying on students’ parents financially and focus more on making ends meet than on academics. Parents believe only financially comfortable teachers can provide proper education,” the source said.

“A teacher’s lifestyle, rather than teaching ability, is becoming parents’ primary assessment criterion. This erodes teachers’ authority and damages the trust between parents and teachers,” the source added.

“Well-connected families used their influence before the school year to ensure their children were placed with affluent teachers. As usual, this triggered disputes at the start of the school year over homeroom teacher assignments. But parents must be careful—if they complain to the principal, they risk being labeled troublemakers by both the school and the homeroom teacher for the entire five years their children attend elementary school,” the source concluded.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · April 8, 2025

19. Balancing Act: South Korea, The UNC, And The Growing Taiwan Crisis

These discussions are necessary. They need to be frank and pragmatic and based on the Mutual Defense Treaty as well as the UNSCRs for the UNC with a realistic understanding of the security and political conditions.

Excerpts:

The transformation of South Korea’s role in the broader regional security framework is not without precedent. Historically, South Korea has maintained a pragmatic approach to its foreign relations, evidenced by its decision in 1992 to sever formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of recognizing the People’s Republic of China. This practical recalibration aims to protect economic and political interests. However, the current security dilemma includes the potential deployment of military assets that could rekindle longstanding tensions between major powers. Analysts suggest that South Korea may be requested to provide rear-support intelligence, area-sharing assistance, and logistical and precision-guided munitions in the event of a Taiwan contingency, thereby transforming its traditionally defensive posture into one with greater operational complexity.

While the United States remains a steadfast ally under the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 and U.S. troops maintain a continuous presence on the peninsula, the evolving security dynamics necessitate open and candid dialogue between Washington and Seoul. The convening of the UNC State Member Ambassadors Roundtable in January 2025 by the new U.S. Commander, Army Gen. Brunson Xavier, highlights these ongoing discussions. The roundtable emphasized the importance of transparent communication among allied nations regarding the risks and responsibilities associated with any potential shift in regional strategy. Emerging data from these high-level exchanges indicate that a consensus decision to extend military support to Taiwan must be based on a comprehensive risk assessment, weighing operational benefits against the potential for exacerbating regional instability.

Balancing Act: South Korea, The UNC, And The Growing Taiwan Crisis – OpEd

eurasiareview.com · by Simon Hutagalung · April 6, 2025

The enduring mission of the United Nations Command (UNC) on the Korean Peninsula, established to enforce the 1953 Korean Agreement Armistice and maintain regional peace, now finds itself at the crossroads of evolving regional security dynamics in 2025.

The discourse surrounding South Korea’s role in a Taiwan contingency underscores an emerging challenge: balancing UNC’s core mandate with the strategic imperatives in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment. This essay argues that while the UNC remains primarily focused on the Korean Peninsula, the rising possibility of South Korea’s involvement in a Taiwan conflict introduces multifaceted challenges that necessitate careful recalibration of military strategy, diplomatic engagement, and management alliance.

Recent data and strategic analyses reveal that the fundamental objective of the UNC—to preserve the truce established after the Korean War—continues to be a cornerstone of regional stability. Evidence from early 2025 reveals a growing concern among South Korean policymakers that the country may inadvertently be drawn into a conflict centered on Taiwan. This concern stems from the possibility that U.S. military assets stationed in South Korea could be used as a launchpad for operations against Chinese forces. Such a scenario risks provoking a response from China, potentially destabilizing the entire region. Over the past year, intelligence reports and defense assessments have underscored that any escalation in the Taiwan Strait could significantly impact the security environment in Northeast Asia, prompting South Korea to carefully consider its strategic options.

The transformation of South Korea’s role in the broader regional security framework is not without precedent. Historically, South Korea has maintained a pragmatic approach to its foreign relations, evidenced by its decision in 1992 to sever formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of recognizing the People’s Republic of China. This practical recalibration aims to protect economic and political interests. However, the current security dilemma includes the potential deployment of military assets that could rekindle longstanding tensions between major powers. Analysts suggest that South Korea may be requested to provide rear-support intelligence, area-sharing assistance, and logistical and precision-guided munitions in the event of a Taiwan contingency, thereby transforming its traditionally defensive posture into one with greater operational complexity.

While the United States remains a steadfast ally under the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 and U.S. troops maintain a continuous presence on the peninsula, the evolving security dynamics necessitate open and candid dialogue between Washington and Seoul. The convening of the UNC State Member Ambassadors Roundtable in January 2025 by the new U.S. Commander, Army Gen. Brunson Xavier, highlights these ongoing discussions. The roundtable emphasized the importance of transparent communication among allied nations regarding the risks and responsibilities associated with any potential shift in regional strategy. Emerging data from these high-level exchanges indicate that a consensus decision to extend military support to Taiwan must be based on a comprehensive risk assessment, weighing operational benefits against the potential for exacerbating regional instability.

The situation in South Korea is complicated by several challenges, with the most significant being the inherent risk of escalation. If Beijing perceives U.S. military assets in South Korea as a precursor to offensive operations against China, it could lead to a recalibration of Chinese military doctrine, potentially resulting in a direct threat to South Korean territory. This is further compounded by North Korea’s steadfast adherence to the One China principle. North Korea’s longstanding recognition of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate representative of China, combined with its stance adversarial toward the United States, underscores the potential for a multifront security crisis. South Korea should be perceived as shifting from a defensive posture to an active one in participating in a conflict with Taiwan.

South Korea also faces the challenge of managing its international image and diplomatic relationships. Engagement with Taiwan could have significant implications for South Korea’s relations with regional partners and global institutions. Balancing longstanding alliances with the need to protect national interests is a complex and delicate task. This conundrum is heightened by the evolving nature of modern security threats, where cyber, economic, and hybrid warfare elements are increasingly intertwined with traditional military conflicts.

Given these considerations, a set of targeted recommendations emerges. First, South Korea should initiate strong and ongoing dialogue with both its U.S. allies and regional partners. The focus of this dialogue should be on defining clear operational parameters and crisis management protocols to prevent any military support from unintentionally escalating into a wider conflict. Second, South Korea should invest in enhancing its defensive capabilities to deter potential Chinese aggression, strengthening its security posture while contributing to regional stability. Third, a comprehensive review of alliance and commitments military deployments is necessary to identify vulnerabilities and force recalibrate posture in line with contemporary strategic imperatives. Lastly, diplomatic channels aimed at de-escalation and prevention of conflict in the Taiwan Strait are crucial as this would allow for multilateral efforts to address the root causes of regional tensions.

In conclusion, while the UNC remains dedicated to preserving the Korean Armistice Agreement, South Korea faces the growing challenge of potentially being drawn into a Taiwan contingency. Balancing regional stability on the Korean Peninsula with the changing security dynamics of Northeast Asia requires a nuanced approach that effectively combines dialogue, enhanced defensive measures, and proactive alliance management. As 2025 unfolds, decisions made by South Korea and its allies will be critical in shaping not only the environment security of the region but also the broader geopolitical landscape in an era marked by complex and interdependent security challenges.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.

References

Noja, P. (2024). Postwar World. The Hankyoreh Publisher.
Pacheco Pardo, R. (2024). North Korea: Survival of a Political Dynasty. Agenda Publishing.
Emmott, B. (2024). Deterrence, Diplomacy and the Risk of Conflict over Taiwan. IISS/Routledge.

eurasiareview.com · by Simon Hutagalung · April 6, 2025

20. Gov't formally sets presidential election for June 3

(LEAD) Gov't formally sets presidential election for June 3 | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · April 8, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with acting president's remarks; CHANGES photo)

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, April 8 (Yonhap) -- The government on Tuesday formally designated June 3 as the date of the next presidential election following the ouster of former President Yoon Suk Yeol.

The designation was made at a Cabinet meeting four days after the Constitutional Court upheld the impeachment of Yoon over his short-lived imposition of martial law in December.

The election date was also set as a temporary public holiday.

"I sincerely apologize for causing confusion and worries to the people over the past four months, and for having to face this regrettable situation of a presidential vacancy," acting President Han Duck-soo said during the meeting.

"Now we must quickly heal from the wounds and aftereffects and channel the nation's energy into propelling the Republic of Korea upward and forward."

Acting President Han Duck-soo speaks during a Cabinet meeting at the government complex in Seoul on April 8, 2025. (Yonhap)

Under the Constitution, the country is required to hold a new election within 60 days after a vacancy arises in the presidency. When former President Park Geun-hye was removed from office on March 10, 2017, the early election was also held exactly 60 days later, on May 9.

The National Election Commission began early candidate registration shortly after the Constitutional Court dismissed Yoon last Friday.

Candidates will be required to register by May 11, and the official campaign period will kick off May 12.

The law also requires a public servant running for president to resign at least 30 days before an election, making May 4 the deadline.

The new president will assume office immediately after the election without a transition team.

"I urge the interior ministry and other relevant ministries to work closely with the National Election Commission to ensure the election is fair and transparent more than ever and gains the people's trust," Han said.

To the Cabinet members, he added, "The time remaining for us to serve the nation and the people is around two months. We must complete our final callings solely for the people's safety, the recovery of people's livelihoods and to respond to the U.S.-led trade war, without being shaken in the least bit."

Han further called for cooperation from political circles.

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · April 8, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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