Quotes of the Day:
“Conformity is the jailer of freedom and the enemy of growth.”
- President John F. Kennedy, 1961 address to the United Nations
“I don't give a damn what others say. It's okay to color outside the lines.”
- Jimi Hendrix (1942-1970), musician
“Heresy is another word for freedom of thought.”
- Graham Greene (1904-1991), author
1. N. Korea slams U.S. over Ukraine crisis, calls Joe Biden 'old man in his senility'
2. ‘CVID should be maintained,’ says US Ambassador nominee
3. Warning against provocations (north Korea)
4. We need US nuclear arms to deter Kim, South Korea pleads
5. Failure to Launch: Why America Can’t Stop North Korean Missile Tests
6. U.S. continues to adjust readiness to meet N. Korean threats: Pentagon
7. U.S. urges N. Korea to engage in dialogue amid reports of possible nuclear test
8. North Korea Is Surviving the Pandemic Off Stolen Cryptocurrency
9. The forgotten nuclear threat of North Korea
10. The US Should Pay Attention to the China-South Korea Culture Clash
11. South Korea wants US strategic weapons on its soil
12. Explosion at N. Hamgyong Province chemical factory kills four, injures 30
13. Korean grand narratives: the problem of ideology
1. N. Korea slams U.S. over Ukraine crisis, calls Joe Biden 'old man in his senility'
Support to Putin and contributing to the conditions of tensions to extort concessions from the US?
N. Korea slams U.S. over Ukraine crisis, calls Joe Biden 'old man in his senility' | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, April 9 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Saturday condemned the United States for making the crisis surrounding Ukraine a human rights issue and imposing sanctions against Russia, denouncing U.S. President Joe Biden as "an old man in his senility" and a man of a "repeated slip of tongue."
A commentary carried by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said the Ukraine issue has suddenly become a human rights issue, as the U.S. and western media branded the case as a war crime, with a politically motivated plot to defame Russia and to achieve the collapse of its regime.
"The latest story is the U.S. chief executive who spoke ill of the Russian president with groundless data," the English-language article read. "Such reckless remarks can be made only by the descendants of Yankees, master hand at aggression and plot-breeding."
The North then called Biden "an old man in his senility" with "a problem in his intellectual faculty," and "the president known for his repeated slip of tongue," though it stopped short of putting Biden's name in the article.
"A big question is if he could ever have done anything right with such IQ during his florid 50-year political career," according to the commentary.
It also criticized the U.S. and the western nations for imposing sanctions against Russia over its invasion of Ukraine, claiming Washington is dreaming of "hitting the jackpot" in the ongoing crisis.
"The U.S.' 'sanction' and 'human rights' campaign against other countries will only bind its own hands and feet and reveal its unethical crimes to backfire on itself in the end," the article said.
It then said the U.S. is now fighting a losing battle and "the final loser will be the U.S."
North Korea has been under multiple international sanctions for its nuclear and missile tests, and has been under pressure by the U.S. for its human rights abuses.
graceoh@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. ‘CVID should be maintained,’ says US Ambassador nominee
We are holding fast to the (long-term) goal of denuclearization.
‘CVID should be maintained,’ says US Ambassador nominee
Posted April. 09, 2022 07:27,
Updated April. 09, 2022 07:27
‘CVID should be maintained,’ says US Ambassador nominee. April. 09, 2022 07:27. weappon@donga.com.
Philip Goldberg, nominee for U.S. ambassador to South Korea, on Thursday called North Korea a ‘rogue regime’ and said “complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization should be maintained decisively and continuously.” The Joe Biden administration is accelerating its move to shift to a hardline stance against Pyongyang, which is elevating its nuclear threat.
The career diplomat made the remarks during his confirmation hearing at the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the day, saying, “CVID expands and deepens the South Korea-U.S. alliance, and complies with U.S.’s deterrence policy aimed at defending (South Korea) from the North Korean rogue regime, which violates UN Security Council resolutions.” Pyongyang has been strongly opposing CVID, saying, “It is a unilateral demand for surrender.” The Biden administration has been using the expression ‘complete denuclearization’ in lieu of CVID at the request of the Moon Jae-in administration.
Goldberg made the statement at a time when the Biden administration has disclosed its hardline stance against the North, warning of the North’s possible provocations. The U.S. disclosed intelligence on the North’s moves to test-fire ICBMs and resume nuclear tests, before hinting at the possibility for Washington to seek additional UNSC sanctions and the deployment of strategic assets against Pyongyang.
3. Warning against provocations (north Korea)
We can deter war up to a point (when Kim believes he has no other option for survival) but we cannot deter provocations nor can we make concessions to prevent provocations. They are part of the regime's DNA (per Soctt Snyder). We need to turn the regime's provocations to our advantage through strategic influence by executing a superior form of political warfare.
Excerpts:
However, North Korea should bear in mind that it cannot acquire what it wants through military buildup. Military actions will only aggravate the situation and even lead to catastrophic circumstances. Given the growing security tensions, it is positive that a Korean delegation composed of senior lawmakers, such as Rep. Park Jin of the People Power Party (PPP), visited the U.S. to engage in in-depth discussions with ranking U.S. officials over feasible measures to counter possible threats from Pyongyang.
During a press conference, Park said the allies agreed on the need to manage the North Korean threats through diverse means, such as resuming the two-plus-two meeting of ministers of foreign affairs and defense. President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol also stressed the importance of the Korea-U.S. alliance while visiting the U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, in a very timely and appropriate manner.
Warning against provocations
Pyongyang should stop escalating regional tensions
The United States has warned against North Korea's moves toward military provocations, including a possible nuclear weapons test. "We are worried that, in connection with the upcoming April 15 anniversary, the DPRK may be tempted to take another provocative action," said Sung Kim, the special representative for North Korea policy at the U.S. state department.
During a phone briefing on Wednesday, Kim said, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, the official name of North Korea), could attempt a "nuclear test" though he didn't "want to speculate too much." Kim's remark drew attention, as it came amid escalating tensions over security on the Korean Peninsula, prompted by North Korea's test-firing of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) last month. Kim Yo-jong, the influential sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, further chilled the atmosphere with her remark Tuesday threatening South Korea after its defense minister highlighted the South's "preemptive strike" ability to counter the North's attack.
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman vowed to take strong measures "to let the North know that they can't just keep doing this without any consequences, that we take actions that show we have a credible deterrence against any attack by North Korea." During a House Foreign Services Committee hearing, she said the U.S. and South Korea are committed to strengthening the alliance and enhancing capabilities to counter such growing security threats.
We urge North Korea to pay close heed to the warnings by U.S. officials. Previously, North Korea attempted military provocations during times of power transition in South Korea. Yet its recent actions are considered to have crossed the "red line." Most recently, the North restored a tunnel entrance at its nuclear test site in Punggyeri, arousing speculation that it has begun efforts to develop small tactical nuclear weapons.
Officials of South Korea and the U.S. foresee that North Korea may attempt its seventh nuclear weapons test either on April 15, the anniversary of North Korea's founder Kim Il-sung's birthday, or on April 25, the 90th anniversary of the foundation of the North's People's Revolutionary Army. The North may seek such military maneuvering in a bid to be recognized as a nuclear weapons state in order to find a breakthrough amid its economic difficulties by securing more leverage in future negotiations.
However, North Korea should bear in mind that it cannot acquire what it wants through military buildup. Military actions will only aggravate the situation and even lead to catastrophic circumstances. Given the growing security tensions, it is positive that a Korean delegation composed of senior lawmakers, such as Rep. Park Jin of the People Power Party (PPP), visited the U.S. to engage in in-depth discussions with ranking U.S. officials over feasible measures to counter possible threats from Pyongyang.
During a press conference, Park said the allies agreed on the need to manage the North Korean threats through diverse means, such as resuming the two-plus-two meeting of ministers of foreign affairs and defense. President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol also stressed the importance of the Korea-U.S. alliance while visiting the U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, in a very timely and appropriate manner.
4. We need US nuclear arms to deter Kim, South Korea pleads
This may become a very important alliance issue that could cause some friction. This will take some deft diplomacy to manage. Of course the Korean leadership understands the US position on this and may only be making these statements for political reasons (both in the South and toward the north).
We need US nuclear arms to deter Kim, South Korea pleads
Friday April 08 2022, 1.00pm BST, The Times
South Korea’s president-elect, Yoon Suk-yeol, is keen to take a more hardline approach to North Korea and its dictator, Kim Jong-un
CPL. SEONG-YEON KANG /US ARMY VIA GETTY IMAGES
South Korea’s president-elect is pressing the United States to deploy its most powerful weapons, such as nuclear warheads, in the country for the first time since the Cold War, which would increase tensions in east Asia.
Yoon Suk-yeol, 61, who takes office next month, has sent emissaries to Washington to argue the case for the return of US “strategic assets”, a term that could include long-range bombers, nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers, and which implies they would have nuclear weapons.
“The deployment of strategic assets is an important part of building up extended deterrence against North Korea’s provocations,” Park Jin, leader of a delegation of Yoon’s aides, said after meetings with senior members of the Biden administration in Washington. “In that sense, the issue was included in the consultation.”
The president-elect’s liberal predecessor, Moon Jae-in, pursued a more conciliatory approach to the South’s neighbours
KOREA SUMMIT PRESS POOL VIA AP
Yoon is determined to break with the policy of engagement with Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s leader, that was pursued by Moon Jae-in, his liberal predecessor. This year the North has carried out an intensive series of missile tests. American and South Korean officials fear that it could test a new nuclear warhead next week.
South Korea remains under the protection of the US “nuclear umbrella” — the promise to use nuclear weapons if necessary in the country’s defence. However, America removed the missiles in 1991.
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The proposal that they should be returned reflects growing insecurity caused by the North’s rapid development in the past 16 years of nuclear warheads and the missiles to carry them.
The region’s other big American ally, Japan, is also beginning to debate its non-nuclear policy. In February Shinzo Abe, 67, the influential former prime minister, said the country should consider “nuclear sharing” similar to Nato countries, by which Germany, Italy and Turkey keep American nuclear weapons on their territory.
Yoon referred to North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile test this week when he visited Camp Humphreys, the command centre of the 28,500 US troops who are stationed in South Korea.
“Strong deterrence through the Korea-US military alliance and combined defence posture cannot be emphasised enough in a grave international security situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula,” he said.
He spoke of his “determination to increase the solidarity” of the alliance with America to strengthen deterrence against North Korea’s threats.
North Korea has ended a three-and-a-half year moratorium on the testing of long-range ballistic weapons
ALAMY
Yoon has also promised to “normalise” joint military exercises with the US, which were reduced or suspended by Donald Trump. Such exercises infuriated Pyongyang, which regarded them as rehearsals for invasion.
Tensions could rise further next week when North Korea has two notable anniversaries: the tenth anniversary of Kim’s inauguration on Monday and the Day of the Sun on Friday, marking what would have been the 110th birthday of his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, the country’s founding leader. Such celebrations are often marked with weapons tests.
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Sung Kim, Biden’s special envoy for North Korea, said the US feared “another provocative action” on the anniversary. “We obviously hope not,” he added. “But we will be prepared.”
America will be cautious about increasing tension in east Asia while the war in Ukraine continues. Washington would be under pressure to take action, however, if Kim staged a nuclear test.
After the failure of Trump’s summits with Kim, the Biden administration is ready to negotiate without preconditions at any time. Pyongyang refuses to do so until the US drops its “hostile policy”, a reference to the economic sanctions. The result has been more than three years of stalemate.
South Korean president-elect Yoon Suk-yeol with South Korean soldiers during his visit to Camp Humphreys
AP
None of Biden’s representatives has dismissed the proposal to return nuclear weapons to Korea. “We are going to continue to work with our South Korean allies on making sure that our capabilities are appropriate to the threat posed by North Korea and by their advancing ballistic missile programme,” John Kirby, the defence department spokesman, said. “We are constantly looking at what the readiness requirements are.”
Wendy Sherman, 72, the deputy secretary of state, said the US would “ensure that we take some strong action to let the North know that they can’t just keep doing this without any consequences, that we take actions that show we have a credible deterrence against any attack”.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the subject of intense analysis in east Asia for the lessons it offers to a region also facing an assertive authoritarian superpower in China. For North Korea, and some South Koreans, the lesson is that states have to be able to defend themselves . . . and a nuclear deterrent is the best way to do this.
Bunkers busted
Extreme-depth “nuclear proof” bunkers provide no guarantee of survival because of advances in weapons technology, according to research by the Chinese military.
The Army Engineering University of the People’s Liberation Army stated that a tunnel 2km below the ground could be destroyed with a precise storm of nuclear “buster-bunker” bombs that would trigger seismic activity, amplify the weapons’ power by up to 1,000 times and penetrate ten times deeper than previously thought.
Researchers admitted that mounting such an attack, and co-ordinating the explosions to ensure the correct shockwaves were created, would be “difficult”. However, if successful, the result would compact and then crush any structures in their way.
Such an attack would threaten the US’s command bunker at Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, which is about 610 metres deep.
The Russian government’s doomsday shelter was buried 300 metres deep in the Ural Mountains. The UK’s Kelvedon Hatch bunker, which was decommissioned in 1992, is 38 metres below ground in Essex.
China operates the deepest known bunker, the Central Military China Commission’s Joint Military Command Centre, located outside Beijing. The facility is about 2km underground and said to be able to hold one million people.
Estimates for the depths that existing bunker busters can penetrate vary. The US’s conventional 14,000 kg GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator is reported to go through 61 metres of 5,000 psi concrete. The 1.2 megaton B83 tactical nuclear bomb is reported to have the ability to destroy shelters up to 300 metres deep.
Last month, during its invasion of Ukraine, Russia said that it may deploy nuclear weapons in response to an “existential threat” to the country. It further heightened fears in announcing that it had deployed hypersonic missiles in Ukraine, a technology that could deliver nuclear warheads that no defence system can defeat.
The Chinese study was published in the Chinese Journal of Rock Mechanics and Engineering.
5. Failure to Launch: Why America Can’t Stop North Korean Missile Tests
The accusation of the incoming ROK administration as doing something unpredictable really means doing something with which the author does not agree.
Unfortunately Mr. Bandow's prescription of arms control is exactly what Kim wants - arms control, sanctions relief and continued development and possession of nuclear and missile capabilities while giving up possibly fictitious systems such as the Hwasong 17. The long con at ist best in support of regime political warfare with the goal of eventual domination of the peninsula. We must recognize the regime's strategy, understand it, expose it, and attack it (the strategy that is).
Excerpts:
The United States should prepare for ICBM and nuclear tests, as well as continued development of new and improved weapons. Alas, Washington has no answer. It complains about every test, demonstrating that it is unnerved by the North’s policy. Then the United States incrementally adds sanctions, without effect. And today the North refuses to even discuss denuclearization.
Moreover, a tougher ROK administration might move in unpredictable directions. A popular majority has supported a South Korean nuclear deterrent for years, with seven in ten currently in favor. Further recognition of allied impotence would likely fuel South Korean support for building an ROK bomb.
The Biden administration should consider a significant change in emphasis, from denuclearization to arms control. Since the latter—such as capping the North’s program, reducing the size of its arsenal, imposing proliferation safeguards, forestalling development of some weapons, and more—would move the peninsula toward the former, Washington need not admit that it had abandoned comprehensive and verifiable denuclearization. However, this appears to be the only practical means to forestall or at least limit a nuclear arms race on the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea has oft been said to be the land of only bad options. That is ever more so as the North rapidly moves ahead with missile and nuclear development. With the promise of the Trump-Kim summits an increasingly distant memory, the Biden administration needs to find a new approach. And quickly.
Failure to Launch: Why America Can’t Stop North Korean Missile Tests
North Korea has oft been said to be the land of only bad options. That is ever more so as the North rapidly moves ahead with missile and nuclear development.
Four years ago, President Donald Trump and Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un were preparing for their first summit. Trump had dropped his “fire and fury” campaign and Kim had suspended intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and nuclear tests. Although skeptics filled the ranks of Washington’s established Korea analysts, for the first time in decades there was a sense of possibility about the bilateral relationship.
The ensuing détente ended the following year with the failure of the Hanoi summit, though Kim maintained his testing moratorium. Last year, he indicated that Pyongyang was planning on ending its forbearance; in January, he unleashed a flurry of short-range launches, capped by a test of long-range missile components. Last month Pyongyang deployed its first ICBM in five years, though the regime apparently misrepresented the missile that was launched. And there is activity at the North’s nuclear site, suggesting a test there is imminent.
Speculation has focused on Kim desiring to force newly elected President Joe Biden to the negotiating table. That was the old model, with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) greeting every new U.S. administration with a reminder that Pyongyang was waiting for concessions. However, few Washington analysts believe that the DPRK is willing to abandon its nuclear capability, irrespective of any promised benefits for doing so.
After all, Kim, like his father and grandfather, appears to be brutally efficient in retaining power and presumably has seen the video of Libyan dictator Muammar el-Qaddafi’s ugly demise—after he traded away his nukes and missiles for America’s and Europe’s favor. They proved to be faux friends ready to betray Qaddafi at their first opportunity. Add to that the lesson of Ukraine: give up your nukes in return for an unenforceable security guarantee, and get invaded.
Which offers a darker purpose of the North’s accelerating tests. So far, Kim has indicated no interest in talking with Biden, even though the North’s economy is suffering badly, not only from U.S. and United Nations sanctions but self-imposed, coronavirus pandemic-induced isolation. It appears that Kim has decided that he is unlikely to get the sort of economic relief he was denied at Hanoi, so there is no current reason to negotiate. That is, he is unwilling to agree to Washington’s official objective of comprehensive, verifiable irreversible denuclearization, so why bother talking?
While Kim hasn’t said so explicitly, he appears to be determined to expand and improve his nuclear arsenal sufficiently to eventually force Washington to negotiate on his terms. He certainly has not been conciliatory of late. Earlier this month he explained: “Only when one is equipped with the formidable striking capabilities, overwhelming military power that cannot be stopped by anyone, one can prevent a war, guarantee the security of the country and contain and put under control all threats and blackmails by the imperialists.”
The most obvious target of his vitriol is the United States, of course. However, South Korea, with a new, more hawkish conservative government soon to take power, also has been subject to the North’s ire. In this case, Kim loosed his favorite attack dog, his sister, Kim Yo-jong: “In case [South Korea] opts for military confrontation with us, our nuclear combat force will have to inevitably carry out its duty … a dreadful attack will be launched and the [South Korean] army will have to face a miserable fate little short of total destruction and ruin.” She described the South Korean defense minister as a “scum-like guy” and his comments as the “hysteria of a lunatic.” He had threatened preemptive strikes if the North prepared to fire missiles at the Republic of Korea (ROK).
Relations with the ROK are likely to worsen when Yoon Suk-yeol assumes the presidency. He promised to take a tougher stand toward the North and work more closely with the United States. Although this approach is unlikely to achieve much more than President Moon Jae-in’s variant of the Sunshine Policy—no South Korean administration has ever caused anything more than a temporary improvement in bilateral relations with the DPRK—it is more likely to enrage Pyongyang. After all, taking Yoon at his word suggests that there will be no more craven concessions, such as banning private efforts to spread information to the North’s people.
What to do? The current administration’s strategy looks a bit like the Obama administration’s “strategic patience”—aka, kick the can down the road approach. If Pyongyang was doing no more than insulting Washington and Seoul, that strategy might work. However, the North appears to be moving forward full speed to expand its arsenal and, more important from Washington’s standpoint, extend its reach. In just a few years, the RAND Corporation and Asan Institute figure Pyongyang could have a couple of hundred nukes with ICBMs capable of hitting the U.S. homeland. That would be a game-changer.
Although it is impossible to know Kim’s mind, building up his military while refusing to engage Washington suggests he plans to create an arsenal too large for even the harshest DPRK critic to try to dismantle. Gaining the ability to strike U.S. targets would necessarily and dramatically limit America’s options. Washington’s involvement even in a conventional conflict could trigger nuclear retaliation. Yet despite the strong ROK-U.S. ties, they are not worth risking the destruction of American cities.
Washington cannot look to other nations for answers. Through 2017, the United States could rely on China to at least discourage the North’s most ambitious plans. For a few years, Beijing even approved and enforced a succession of new United Nations sanctions. However, Chinese president Xi Jinping switched course after Washington and Pyongyang announced their summit plans, which raised the possibility of a modus vivendi between the DPRK and United States, leaving the People’s Republic of China (PRC) behind. Xi met Kim for the first time and normalized what had been a cold friendship at best. Xi has since maintained that course.
Despite the slight fillip in Sino-American relations after Biden’s inauguration, these ties seem destined to head downward. Disputes over Xinjiang, Taiwan, the South China Sea, and more are no closer to resolution. Beijing’s soft support for Russia in the latter’s war on Ukraine is driving another wedge between the United States and PRC. Kyiv’s plight has captured public attention and energized the most hawkish elements of the increasingly reckless Republican Party, which already seemed comfortable with, if not quite determined on, war with both China and Russia.
Moscow also has influence in the DPRK, though Russia long has trailed Beijing in clout. Today the Putin government has no interest in assisting the United States against Pyongyang even if doing so theoretically advanced Russian objectives. Moscow is more interested in causing trouble for America than reducing trouble by North Korea.
Japan was a member of the six-party talks and could play a role, but the status of Japanese kidnapped by North Korean agents decades ago has long deadlocked negotiations with the DPRK. Tokyo’s ties with the South also are difficult, though the incoming ROK administration hopes to improve this relationship. One advantage of improved coordination between the ROK and Japan—both market-oriented democracies seeking peace and stability in Northeast Asia—would be effectively adding Tokyo’s economic and growing military clout to the inter-Korean balance.
Seoul has the most at stake in DPRK relations but has been left with little authority by the United States. Thus, the North treated even the Moon administration, which did its desperate best to conciliate and appease Pyongyang, with contempt after the collapse of the Hanoi summit. Only an American exit, vigorously opposed by South Koreans across the political spectrum, would force the North to treat the ROK more seriously.
Absent such a switch, Washington appears to have no option other than doing more of the same, which has consistently failed over the last three decades. Despite claims that additional sanctions might bring the North to heel, the Kim government has survived both the pre-2017 period of tougher and more seriously enforced penalties as well as almost complete isolation during Covid-19.
The prospect of conventional retaliation, especially against South Korea’s capital of Seoul, was enough to deter prior U.S. administrations, most notably that of Bill Clinton, from striking North Korean nuclear facilities. Despite Trump’s flirtation with military action during his “fire and fury” stage, the North’s presumed possession of two to three score nukes would have magnified the cost of U.S. military action many times. And while the war would have been “over there,” as the ever war-happy Sen. Lindsey Graham indecorously put it, the human costs would have been catastrophic and included plenty of Americans. As Pyongyang continues to work on a panoply of weapons, including hypersonic and submarine-launched missiles, it soon will be able to retaliate “over here” too, making U.S. military action an impossible option.
The United States should prepare for ICBM and nuclear tests, as well as continued development of new and improved weapons. Alas, Washington has no answer. It complains about every test, demonstrating that it is unnerved by the North’s policy. Then the United States incrementally adds sanctions, without effect. And today the North refuses to even discuss denuclearization.
The Biden administration should consider a significant change in emphasis, from denuclearization to arms control. Since the latter—such as capping the North’s program, reducing the size of its arsenal, imposing proliferation safeguards, forestalling development of some weapons, and more—would move the peninsula toward the former, Washington need not admit that it had abandoned comprehensive and verifiable denuclearization. However, this appears to be the only practical means to forestall or at least limit a nuclear arms race on the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea has oft been said to be the land of only bad options. That is ever more so as the North rapidly moves ahead with missile and nuclear development. With the promise of the Trump-Kim summits an increasingly distant memory, the Biden administration needs to find a new approach. And quickly.
Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is author of several books, including Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World and co-author of The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea.
Image: Reuters.
6. U.S. continues to adjust readiness to meet N. Korean threats: Pentagon
Our adjustments will be upward. We will increase readiness above the levels of the past few years.
U.S. continues to adjust readiness to meet N. Korean threats: Pentagon | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, April 8 (Yonhap) -- The United States and South Korea continue to adjust their joint defense capabilities to meet ever increasing threats from North Korea's advancing nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, a Pentagon spokesperson said Friday.
Department of Defense Press Secretary John Kirby also highlighted the importance of South Korea-U.S. joint training exercises.
"All our training events are meant to improve our readiness," the spokesperson said when asked if a U.S.-South Korea joint military exercise, set to be held later this month, was meant to send a strong signal to the North.
"It's not about message sending. It's about readiness, and that's our commitment on the peninsula. That's our commitment to our South Korean allies," he added.
The remarks come after the South Korean defense ministry said it will discuss with the U.S. about the possible deployment of U.S. strategic assets to South Korea amid North Korea's continued missile launches.
Pyongyang staged 12 rounds of missile tests this year, including seven rounds in January alone that marked the largest number of missile launches it has conducted in a single month.
They also come after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's sister, Kim Yo-jong, said the North may use nuclear weapons if attacked by South Korea or the U.S.
"We are well aware of the North Koreans', their efforts to advance their nuclear ambitions, as well as to advance their ballistic missile capabilities," said Kirby.
"We don't need to hear threats and threatening comments from North Korean leaders to understand the actual threat that Pyongyang represents to the peninsula and to the region. And that's why we are continuing to adjust our posture as needed, to adjust our intelligence gathering posture as needed, and certainly to adjust our training and readiness with our South Korean allies," he added.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
7. U.S. urges N. Korea to engage in dialogue amid reports of possible nuclear test
Let me interpret our statement here: "Mr. Kim: we would like to give you the opportunity to act as a responsible member of the international community."
U.S. urges N. Korea to engage in dialogue amid reports of possible nuclear test | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, April 8 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. on Friday called on North Korea to refrain from further provocations and instead return to dialogue.
Jalina Porter, principal deputy spokesperson for the state department, made the remarks amid speculations that the North may be preparing to conduct its first nuclear test since September 2017, possibly next week when it will celebrate the 110th anniversary of the birthday of late founding leader Kim Il-sung.
"The Biden-Harris administration has no change in our policy and we continue to urge the DPRK to refrain from further destabilizing activities, and ... instead choose to engage in serious and sustained dialogue," she said, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
The spokesperson was responding to a question whether there has been a change in the U.S.' North Korea policy after Philip Goldberg, nominee for new U.S. ambassador to South Korea, said the U.S. must push for comprehensive, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) of the North.
The term, CVID, had often been used under previous U.S. administrations, but with the letter C standing for complete, instead of comprehensive.
Pyongyang had often strongly reacted to the term in the past, and the Joe Biden administration has been describing its objective as the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula instead since taking office early last year.
North Korea, however, remains unresponsive to U.S. overtures, while being increasingly engaged in provocations.
The country has staged 12 rounds of missile launches so far this year, including seven rounds in January alone that marked the largest number of missile tests it conducted in a single month.
Recent reports said the North also appeared to be repairing underground tunnels at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, indicating a possible nuclear test down the road.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
8. North Korea Is Surviving the Pandemic Off Stolen Cryptocurrency
Excerpts:
Despite exporting only $105.8 million in goods to China in 2020 and 2021 combined, North Korea had the resources to finance its $645 million trade deficit with China. According to a recent report by Chainalysis, North Korean hackers stole nearly $400 million in digital assets in 2021 and close to $300 million in 2020.
Chainalysis also found that North Korea still has $170 million in stolen cryptocurrency holdings, which in some cases date back to hacks from as early as 2017, and it has yet to exchange it into hard currency. Given that North Korea is sitting on such a relatively large sum of money five years after implementing UN sanctions and two years after the pandemic began suggests that its theft of cryptocurrency and other illicit ventures are robust enough to cover its weapons programs and trade deficit.
If the crypto space is to develop as a legitimate part of international finance, governments need to collaborate to push regimes similar to North Korea out of this budding arm of the financial system. That entails putting in place domestic legislation requiring cryptocurrency exchanges to implement the Financial Action Task Force’s know-your-customer rules and protections for banks in the traditional financial system that conduct financial services with cryptocurrency exchanges. There is space for governments to play a more active role. In the absence of stronger regulations and cybersecurity, North Korea and other problematic actors will continue to prey on cryptocurrency exchanges.
North Korea Is Surviving the Pandemic Off Stolen Cryptocurrency
In the absence of stronger regulations and cybersecurity, North Korea and other problematic actors will continue to prey on cryptocurrency exchanges.
by Troy Stangarone
North Korea’s self-imposed isolation during the pandemic has made it increasingly difficult for the regime to acquire the hard currency needed to fund its weapons programs and trade deficit. Exports have withered to only tens of millions a year, while the smuggling that the regime previously used to evade United Nations (UN) sanctions has also declined. In this unfriendly environment, Kim Jong-un’s regime has increasingly turned to the theft of cryptocurrency to cover its need for “hard currency”—an issue that will require greater attention from governments and international regulators as cryptocurrency investments become more popular around the world.
The recently released UN Panel of Experts report on North Korea emphasizes that cyberattacks that generate cryptocurrency “remain an important revenue source” for the regime. This 2022 report is consistent with the UN Panel of Experts 2021 report that found Pyongyang’s cryptocurrency hacks and other illicit activities “directly and indirectly support[ing] the country’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes.” An unclassified report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence also suggests that North Korea’s stolen cryptocurrency is “probably [used] to fund government priorities, such as its nuclear and missile programs.”
Due to the fungible nature of money, it is undoubtedly true that cryptocurrencies help North Korea finance its weapons programs. However, those same illicit activities are also a key source of hard currency for the regime to cover its trade deficit.
Most nations export goods and services to finance the purchase of the products that they import. When those exports cannot cover the cost of their imports, they import foreign capital through loans and investment to cover the deficit—two means of importing capital that are no longer an option for North Korea due to sanctions and its lack of credit. During the pandemic, however, North Korea’s cryptocurrency theft has become an increasingly important tool for the regime to finance its trade deficit.
North Korea has long run a chronic trade deficit. Before the imposition of sectoral sanctions by the UN in 2016, Pyongyang likely financed its trade deficit through a combination of legal means such as foreign aid, foreign direct investment, services trade, and remittances from North Koreans working abroad. This legal revenue was supplemented with income from illicit activities such as arms sales, drug trafficking, and counterfeiting.
However, after the UN Security Council turned to sectoral sanctions in 2016 to address North Korea’s accelerating ballistic missile and nuclear weapons tests, North Korea’s trade deficit significantly grew as sanctions restricted its exports. Between 2016 and 2019, North Korea’s exports to China, which account for more than 90 percent of North Korea’s overall trade, fell from $2.6 billion to $215 million—a decline of 92 percent. This decline, however, wasn’t offset by a similar decline in imports. Instead, North Korea’s imports from China only declined 19 percent during the same period to $2.6 billion.
Sanctions had a clear impact on North Korea’s trade deficit during this period. In 2016, North Korea’s trade deficit with China was only $558 million, and by 2019, it had expanded to $2.4 billion. The UN sanctions also required all North Koreans working abroad (which the U.S. government estimates earned North Korea $500 million a year) to be repatriated to North Korea by the end of 2019.
In addition to restricting North Korean exports, the UN sanctions also limited other avenues for North Korea to finance its trade deficit. Consider that the UN has also applied sanctions to financial transactions and joint ventures (UN Security Council Resolutions 2270, 2321, 2371, and 2375) that also constrained the regime’s ability to move hard currency.
North Korea was likely able to finance much of its growing deficit through this period by smuggling sanctioned goods such as coal, hacking banks and cryptocurrency exchanges, and garnishing wages of overseas laborers before the UN-imposed deadline for their repatriation. In 2018 and 2019, the smuggling of coal and North Korea’s financial hacks likely plugged 58 percent of its trade deficit. Reports also suggest that a more limited number of workers remain in Russia and China, helping sustain the regime’s coffers.
Once the pandemic began, North Korea introduced severe border restrictions to prevent the spread of Covid-19 domestically. While those restrictions appear to have successfully prevented infections domestically, hard currency became more difficult for North Korea to obtain. Early in the pandemic, the laborers still overseas were unable to work or had difficulty earning money. By last year, the situation improved for the North Koreans still working in China, but these are diminished assets for North Korea compared to before the pandemic and UN prohibition on North Korean workers abroad. The border controls also prevented smuggling across the border. The UN Panel of Experts has indicated that while coal smuggling continues by sea, it is at reduced levels
The strict border controls also impacted North Korea’s legal trade with China. In 2020, North Korea only exported $48 million in goods to China while importing $491 million. In 2021, exports to China increased to $57.7 million, but imports declined by nearly 50 percent to $260.1 million.
Despite exporting only $105.8 million in goods to China in 2020 and 2021 combined, North Korea had the resources to finance its $645 million trade deficit with China. According to a recent report by Chainalysis, North Korean hackers stole nearly $400 million in digital assets in 2021 and close to $300 million in 2020.
Chainalysis also found that North Korea still has $170 million in stolen cryptocurrency holdings, which in some cases date back to hacks from as early as 2017, and it has yet to exchange it into hard currency. Given that North Korea is sitting on such a relatively large sum of money five years after implementing UN sanctions and two years after the pandemic began suggests that its theft of cryptocurrency and other illicit ventures are robust enough to cover its weapons programs and trade deficit.
If the crypto space is to develop as a legitimate part of international finance, governments need to collaborate to push regimes similar to North Korea out of this budding arm of the financial system. That entails putting in place domestic legislation requiring cryptocurrency exchanges to implement the Financial Action Task Force’s know-your-customer rules and protections for banks in the traditional financial system that conduct financial services with cryptocurrency exchanges. There is space for governments to play a more active role. In the absence of stronger regulations and cybersecurity, North Korea and other problematic actors will continue to prey on cryptocurrency exchanges.
Troy Stangarone is the senior director for Congressional Affairs and Trade at the Korea Economic Institute of America.
Image: Reuters.
9. The forgotten nuclear threat of North Korea
Sure it is forgotten by the press, public, and select politicians and pundits. Of course we could make a political warfare case for ignoring Kim while improving readiness and ratcheting up real pressure (especially with strategic influence through information advantage) while always offering Kim the opportunity to act as a responsible member of the international community (I am a broken record I know). Interestingly the lack of a significant rhetorical response by the US may actually drive increased internal pressure from the elite and military on Kim which I believe is the only path to forcing change by the Kim family regime. And we should not be "self-deterring " (e.g., limiting our readiness actions as well as limiting enforcement of sanctions, execution of PSI, denying ship-to ship transfers to avoid sanctions, attack of global illicit activities and cyber operations) or showing fear from Kim's rhetoric and actions. Instead we should always be quietly demonstrating strategic reassurance and strategic revsolve.
Excerpts:
With North Korea due to mark several important anniversaries this year, Lee said it was likely that Kim would use those events to showcase more of the powerful weapons the country has developed under his rule. She pointed in particular to the 110th anniversary of his grandfather Kim Il Sung’s birth on 15 April, which is known as the Day of the Sun and celebrated as the country’s most important holiday. “Kim uses these milestone anniversaries to instil a sense of unity and to glorify his family and, by extension, himself, often with very provocative launches,” she explained. “It is an opportunity to bring the people back together and to show that he’s the right person to lead them, and I think he needs that now more than ever.”
As Kim resumes his long-range missile launches, the most notable difference so far is the comparative lack of interest they have attracted. Whereas five years ago, the growing threat from North Korea dominated international headlines and provoked urgent discussions at the UN, this time his behaviour has been overshadowed by Russia’s war in Ukraine and met with something closer to a shrug. “Washington is distracted, and the salience of North Korean nuclear developments is lower now than it was in 2017,” said Ankit Panda. “The seriousness of the threat hasn’t changed, but Washington seems somewhat resigned to tolerating these advances in North Korean capability.” That, in turn, could lead to an even more dangerous situation, as Kim is emboldened to carry out ever more ambitious tests, and all the while his formidable arsenal grows.
The forgotten nuclear threat of North Korea
Put to the test: Kim Jong Un oversees the launch of a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile in Pyongyang, North Korea, 24 March. Photo by KCNA/UPI/Shutterstock
Even by the bombastic standards of North Korean propaganda, the video that accompanied Pyongyang’s missile launch on 24 March was extraordinary. The opening sequence showed Kim Jong Un, apparently channelling the late 1980s and Tom Cruise in Top Gun, striding out of a hangar in slow motion, wearing a black leather bomber jacket and dark sunglasses. Kim checked his watch. His generals checked their watches. He checked his watch again. The footage cut back and forth between them as the dramatic soundtrack reached its crescendo. Kim removed his sunglasses, also in slow motion, and nodded.
While the action movie-style montage was somewhat dated, the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test that followed demonstrated significant, and seriously concerning, new capabilities. The missile, which South Korea claimed was an updated version of a previous model rather than the weapon shown in the video, reached a height of more than 6,000 kilometres, 15 times higher than the International Space Station, putting the entire US mainland within range if it was fired at a shallower angle. Kim congratulated his scientists and engineers on achieving “overwhelming military power that cannot be stopped by anyone” and vowed to continue developing North Korea’s “formidable striking capabilities” and “nuclear war deterrence”.
The last time Kim tested long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, in 2017, he brought the Korean peninsula to the brink of conflict. The then US president, Donald Trump, threatened him with “fire and fury like the world has never seen” as the North Korean leader launched three ICBMs and detonated what he claimed was the country’s first thermonuclear bomb. Trump later told the journalist Bob Woodward that war with North Korea had been “much closer than anyone would know”. According to Woodward, the US defence secretary at the time, Jim Mattis, had a flashing light and a bell installed in his home that would alert him to a North Korean launch, and slept in his clothes so that he would be ready to give the order to shoot down an incoming missile. Now Kim is clearly signalling his intention to embark on a new round of provocative weapons tests that could result in an even more serious crisis.
North Korea has steadily increased the pace and scale of its missile tests in recent months, launching newly developed weapons from submarines and trains, and test-firing what the regime said was its first hypersonic missile. This would be significant if confirmed as these highly manoeuvrable weapons, which travel more than five times faster than the speed of sound, can evade conventional missile defences. US officials have also warned that Pyongyang may be preparing to carry out an underground nuclear test – its first since 2017 – after satellite imagery recorded new activity at North Korea’s main nuclear facility, which it previously claimed to have destroyed.
“Kim has told us what he wants,” said Ankit Panda, a senior fellow in the nuclear policy programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the author of Kim Jong Un and the Bomb. “He wants better missiles, more precise missiles, and larger missiles capable of carrying multiple warheads.” Kim has also called for the development of tactical nuclear weapons, Panda told me, and the regime is likely to carry out new nuclear tests as it experiments with smaller warheads and more compact designs.
But unlike in 2017, when China and Russia worked with the US to impose tough UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea, the international outlook now is very different. As Washington DC’s relations with Beijing and Moscow deteriorate, the prospects for cooperation between the three powers in response to a new crisis are vanishingly slim. The regional security environment has also become more fraught, with Japan increasing military spending and South Korea buying American stealth fighter jets and building up its own missile arsenal. Whereas South Korea’s liberal president Moon Jae-in played a crucial role in defusing tensions five years ago by pushing for talks with North Korea, he will be replaced in May by the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol. A former prosecutor with no foreign policy experience, Yoon has indicated he will take a harder line on North Korea. He has also refused to rule out conducting pre-emptive strikes against Pyongyang.
John Delury, a professor of Chinese studies at Yonsei University in Seoul, told me he was concerned that in the coming months a dangerous cycle of escalation could return, with consequences that would extend far beyond the Korean peninsula. “The conservative government in Seoul would be inclined to react in a hawkish manner to each test,” he explained. The Biden administration, with its focus on the strategic rivalry with China and countering Vladimir Putin, would strengthen its security ties with South Korea and Japan. “Beijing and Moscow would naturally close ranks with Kim Jong Un,” Delury said. “Even if Xi Jinping might feel Kim is overdoing it, as in 2017, there would be acrimony rather than consensus at the UN Security Council.”
When Kim Jong Un first came to power following the death of his father in December 2011, there was a degree of optimism among some Western observers that he might take his isolated and impoverished country in a new direction. He was the third member of the Kim family to rule North Korea, following in the footsteps of his father and his grandfather, who had presided over the country since its founding in 1948. But the new leader was young – thought to be in his late twenties at the time, although his exact age wasn’t clear. He had also been educated at an expensive private school in Switzerland, where his classmates said he was obsessed with video games and basketball, the Chicago Bulls in particular, and so had seen what life was like beyond Pyongyang.
During an early speech in April 2012, Kim urged his officials to adopt a “creative and enterprising attitude” and stressed the importance of improving living standards and developing the “people’s economy”. He vowed to strengthen North Korea’s military, but he also promised that his citizens would “never have to tighten their belt again”, acknowledging at least some of the economic hardship they had endured in the previous decades. (Although he did not mention the terrible famine that devastated the country under his father’s rule during the 1990s, which is thought to have killed at least half a million people.) Kim announced what he called the Byungjin, or “parallel advance”, policy in 2013, which meant simultaneously pursuing nuclear weapons and economic development, even though the former brought sanctions that stifled the latter. He has long insisted that his weapons programmes are essential to securing the country’s survival, describing his nuclear arsenal as a “treasured sword” that protects North Korean citizens.
Following the long-range missile and nuclear tests that provoked the crisis of 2017, Kim abruptly declared his nuclear force complete in 2018 and announced he would shift his focus to economic development as he embarked on a diplomatic offensive that included a series of high-profile summits with Donald Trump. It was the first time a North Korean leader had held talks with a sitting US president, and the meetings were presented to Kim’s domestic audience as proof of his prowess as a global statesman and the country’s status as a nuclear power. But the talks between Kim and Trump broke down in 2019, and the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic the following year caused North Korea to seal its borders to the outside world. With the country in the grip of a new economic crisis, and fears that North Korea may be on the verge of famine once again, Kim has tried to shift the blame, insisting he is defending his citizens from their “imperialist” enemies (chief among them the US) and ramping up the pace of weapons tests.
“Kim has had in effect to apologise for his failure to deliver on promises of economic improvement, even crying as he spoke to the nation in October 2020,” Delury said. “For now, the rockets are once again the only thing he can really celebrate and do his best to convince the public to feel the same.” As the Pyongyang bureau chief for the Associated Press, Jean Lee saw first-hand how the Kim regime tried to increase popular support with the celebrations that followed missile tests. “When a major launch was announced, they would do it with so much fanfare and propaganda to create a real sense of pride,” recalled Lee, who is now a senior fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington DC. “It was designed so that North Koreans would look at these weapons and marvel at the fact that, even though they have so little in relation to the rest of the world, their country was clever enough to make these weapons. I do think that pride was genuine.”
With North Korea due to mark several important anniversaries this year, Lee said it was likely that Kim would use those events to showcase more of the powerful weapons the country has developed under his rule. She pointed in particular to the 110th anniversary of his grandfather Kim Il Sung’s birth on 15 April, which is known as the Day of the Sun and celebrated as the country’s most important holiday. “Kim uses these milestone anniversaries to instil a sense of unity and to glorify his family and, by extension, himself, often with very provocative launches,” she explained. “It is an opportunity to bring the people back together and to show that he’s the right person to lead them, and I think he needs that now more than ever.”
As Kim resumes his long-range missile launches, the most notable difference so far is the comparative lack of interest they have attracted. Whereas five years ago, the growing threat from North Korea dominated international headlines and provoked urgent discussions at the UN, this time his behaviour has been overshadowed by Russia’s war in Ukraine and met with something closer to a shrug. “Washington is distracted, and the salience of North Korean nuclear developments is lower now than it was in 2017,” said Ankit Panda. “The seriousness of the threat hasn’t changed, but Washington seems somewhat resigned to tolerating these advances in North Korean capability.” That, in turn, could lead to an even more dangerous situation, as Kim is emboldened to carry out ever more ambitious tests, and all the while his formidable arsenal grows.
This article appears in the 06 Apr 2022 issue of the New Statesman, Easter Special
10. The US Should Pay Attention to the China-South Korea Culture Clash
We can never study enough history.
Excerpts:
In this context, the dispute over cultural appropriation between Korea and China takes on a threatening tone. Beijing’s insistence, for instance, that the ancient Korean kingdom of Goguryeo is part of Chinese history is less about being inclusive of the ethnic Korean minority in China and more about asserting the view that the Republic of Korea is not a fully legitimate country deserving respect or sovereignty. Similarly, Beijing insists Koreans cannot take ownership of their own traditional clothing because the Korean people do not have claim to an independent cultural identity. These narratives affirm a Sinocentric East Asian space.
Sharp responses from the South Korean public against China’s historical revisionism suggest that they intuitively recognize these moves as threats to their present-day sovereignty. But U.S. observers and influencers appear to sidestep conversations about the deeper implications of China’s claim to cultural and historical dominance in East Asia. This facilitates Beijing’s push to entrench a narrative that foreshadows retaliatory actions toward neighboring countries that infringe on its revisionist worldview.
The U.S. foreign policy establishment cannot ignore this undercurrent. But a response first requires discerning what is being stated in these narratives – a task for cultural experts and historians. Their views would greatly benefit Washington D.C. today.
The US Should Pay Attention to the China-South Korea Culture Clash
China’s claims to great power status are strongly based on historical narratives. Navigating Asia thus requires Washington to study more history.
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Although clashes over cultural appropriation have seriously damaged relations between South Korea and China, foreign policy observers in Washington have stayed largely silent on the issue. This partly reflects the underrepresentation of historians and cultural experts in the U.S. capital, and it may soon prove to be a liability in Washington’s capacity to gauge and respond to the geopolitical climate in East Asia.
While outside observers might dismiss controversies like the one on the origins of Korean traditional dress as outbursts of petty nationalism, they are part of Beijing’s efforts to frame East Asia as an inviolable part of the Sinocentric sphere to both domestic and international audiences. And given Russia’s use of history to justify its invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. foreign policy establishment ignores these identity issues at the peril of Washington’s ability to stay ahead of developments in the region.
Princeton University Professor Gilbert Rozman observed that South Korea faces particularly severe attacks on its identity from China, which seeks to assert the view that there is something inherently wrong with Seoul’s autonomous foreign policy and, by extension, its ties to the United States. The belief that Seoul is being “insubordinate” previously underpinned Beijing’s aggressive, albeit unofficial, response to South Korea’s decision to host a U.S. missile defense system in 2016.
Rozman locates Beijing’s view that Seoul belongs in a subordinate position vis-a-vis China in the history of premodern tributary relationships, such as the one that existed between the Korean Joseon kingdom and the Chinese Qing dynasty.
But this history is complex and multifaceted. While not purely ritualistic, like the Portuguese submission of tribute to Chinese emperors for commercial privileges, political actors in Joseon frequently instrumentalized the relationship with China to advance their own domestic interests. This brings into question the extent to which the relationship was performative versus a social reality. For instance, many Joseon monarchs reigned without first receiving formal confirmation from the imperial court in Beijing, as was nominally appropriate in a tributary relationship.
A similarly complex relationship existed between China and Vietnam, where sovereigns of the Nguyen dynasty corresponded with the Chinese emperor as “kings” but referred to themselves as “emperors” domestically and maintained their own separate suzerainty over neighboring countries in the region.
Research by Jeeye Song at the University of Florida adds that later Qing efforts to formalize a subordinate relationship with Korea through unequal treaties based on the examples set by Western colonial powers were unsuccessful. The Korean government, meanwhile, asserted its sovereignty by establishing its own independent diplomatic representation abroad, starting with the legation in Washington D.C. in 1888.
Historical interpretation became a conscious and active part of China’s diplomacy in direct response to the collapse of its international prestige. Unable to project real power in the face of setbacks ranging from the defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895 to the civil war between warlords after the Xinhai Revolution, the Chinese Republic at the start of the 20th century pursued a new diplomatic strategy. According to Oxford lecturer Yuan Yi Zhu, the Chinese representatives at the 1919 Versailles Conference argued that China should be recognized as a great power based on the merit of its geographic size, cultural contribution, and historic role as suzerain over East Asia.
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Western powers responded favorably to this line of argument (perhaps because Chinese diplomats lent rhetorical support to “peer” great powers’ real suzerainty over the Global South), setting the foundation of how successive Chinese governments would present themselves. This includes, as Zhu will emphasize in his forthcoming research, the Chinese Communist Party. In effect, Beijing still sees its great power status as partly contingent on the continuity of its historic role as regional hegemon.
In this context, the dispute over cultural appropriation between Korea and China takes on a threatening tone. Beijing’s insistence, for instance, that the ancient Korean kingdom of Goguryeo is part of Chinese history is less about being inclusive of the ethnic Korean minority in China and more about asserting the view that the Republic of Korea is not a fully legitimate country deserving respect or sovereignty. Similarly, Beijing insists Koreans cannot take ownership of their own traditional clothing because the Korean people do not have claim to an independent cultural identity. These narratives affirm a Sinocentric East Asian space.
Sharp responses from the South Korean public against China’s historical revisionism suggest that they intuitively recognize these moves as threats to their present-day sovereignty. But U.S. observers and influencers appear to sidestep conversations about the deeper implications of China’s claim to cultural and historical dominance in East Asia. This facilitates Beijing’s push to entrench a narrative that foreshadows retaliatory actions toward neighboring countries that infringe on its revisionist worldview.
The U.S. foreign policy establishment cannot ignore this undercurrent. But a response first requires discerning what is being stated in these narratives – a task for cultural experts and historians. Their views would greatly benefit Washington D.C. today.
CONTRIBUTING AUTHOR
Yong Kwon
Yong Kwon is fellow and director of communications at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI). Follow him on Twitter @ykwon88.
11. South Korea wants US strategic weapons on its soil
Perhaps we should understand that long range strategic assets should not be placed in short range artillery and missile range.
South Korea wants US strategic weapons on its soil
Seoul seeks redeployment of US bombers, carriers and nuclear submarines to deter Pyongyang’s new nuke threats
After a spate of North Korean missile tests in the first three months of this year – and fears of an impending nuclear test – South Korean President-elect Yoon Suk-Yeol wants a redeployment of US strategic assets in South Korea to bolster the country’s deterrence.
After a conference between US and South Korean officials in Washington on Tuesday (April 5), South Korean lawmaker Park Jin stated that “deploying strategic assets is an important part of strengthening extended deterrence” and that both countries “discussed the issue today in that sense.”
Among the US strategic assets South Korea wants to be redeployed to its territory are nuclear-powered submarines, aircraft carriers and long-range bombers. Apart from the redeployment of such strategic assets, both countries are also seeking new defense technology partnerships.
In a conference in February, Kang Eun-Ho, the Minister of South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration, said that South Korea’s commercial industries have made significant advances and the US could tap into them for the development of its own industry, focusing on fields such as AI, quantum computing and autonomous technologies.
He also added that South Korea has several tech industry-leading firms, such as Samsung, Hanwha and LG, and that South Korea could fill a critical US semiconductor supply gap.
Emphasizing the complementary nature of South Korean technology and US defense interests, Robert Brown, president and CEO of the Association of the United States Army, said that “dominance in key technology fields, such as AI, 5G capabilities, robotics, biotechnology and leveraging data is key to ensuring stability in the Indo-Pacific.”
A North Korean ballistic missile emerges from the waves in 2021 in what Pyongyang claimed was a successful SLBM test. Photo: AFP / KCNA
These moves come after a spate of North Korean missile tests in January, February and March this year. On January 15, North Korea tested two short-range railway-mounted ballistic missiles which traveled 430 kilometers at a maximum altitude of 36 kilometers after being launched eastward from the northern coast of the country.
North Korea subsequently conducted more missile tests on the 25th, 27th and 30th of January, with the last one possibly its longest-range missile test since November 2017, with a suspected Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile reaching an altitude of 2,000 kilometers and a range of 800 kilometers.
North Korea followed up these successive tests with another one on February 27. The missile was suspected to have been launched from Sunan, where Pyongyang’s international airport is located.
According to the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, the missile flew to a maximum altitude of 620 kilometers, with a range of 300 kilometers, indicating a lofted launch trajectory. Subsequently, North Korea’s state news agency KCNA claimed the launch was for the development of a reconnaissance satellite system.
North Korea tested yet another ballistic missile off its east coast on March 24. The missile was launched from Sunan near Pyongyang, reached an altitude of 6,200 kilometers and had a range of 1,080 kilometers. In response to the test, South Korea conducted its own missile tests from land, sea and air-based launch platforms.
In addition to these missile tests, North Korea could possibly soon resume nuclear testing, perhaps even next week in commemoration of the 110th birthday of its founder Kim Il Sung on April 15.
North Korea has conducted six known nuclear tests since 2006, the most recent being in September 2017.
The Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea in a 2012 file photo. Photo: AFP / GeoEye Satellite
Satellite imagery this month showed North Korea has allegedly resumed construction at its Punggye-ri nuclear test site, which was previously stopped in 2018 after North Korean leader Kim Jong Un pledged to halt nuclear weapons tests.
While the site was previously declared destroyed in 2018, with its test tunnels blown up and collapsed, it is believed the damage was only slight and could be easily reversible. While it is possible North Korea may be readying the site to resume nuclear testing, a full renovation of the test facility may take months or years, and the country may even build a new test site.
Yet another concerning development regarding North Korea’s nuclear program was reported in August last year when it allegedly restarted its Yongbyon nuclear reactor.
Yongbyon, a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor, is at the heart of North Korea’s nuclear program, producing the plutonium necessary for the country’s nuclear warheads. This was the first sign of activity at the nuclear reactor since December 2018, months after former US president Donald Trump met Kim Jong-Un in Singapore.
12. Explosion at N. Hamgyong Province chemical factory kills four, injures 30
Incompetence, accident, or sabotage?
Certainly no OSHA safety procedures.
Explosion at N. Hamgyong Province chemical factory kills four, injures 30
Workers say that there are often accidents of varying severity at the factory because managers insist on carrying out the party’s orders even when they are not feasible
Two accidents recently occurred at the Myonggan Chemical Factory in Myonggan County, North Hamgyong Province, during a trial run of a sodium carbonate production line that had been repaired and expanded.
“The Myonggan Chemical Factory had selected repairing and expanding its sodium carbonate production line as its goal for the first half of the year and had been devoting its efforts toward that project since January,” a source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Wednesday. “It’s already in its second trial run, but there have been several accidents that have caused many deaths and injuries, some mild and some more severe.”
According to the source, the Myonggan Chemical Factory had been researching a new technique in the carbon-one chemical industry on orders from the North Korean authorities and had carried out its first test for integrating that technique into its production line in mid-January.
During the test, however, there was an explosion in which more than 20 people were injured mildly or severely. While this was a major accident, no one died, so it did not present a legal problem, the source said.
But when the second test was carried out at the end of March, there was reportedly an even bigger explosion that claimed the lives of some workers.
“The explosion in the second test was much more powerful than before. In the end, four people died in the accident, while 10 were severely injured and 20 made it off with mild injuries. I think this is going to be a bigger problem for the factory,” the source said.
Significantly, the researcher who had been attempting to introduce the new technique onto the production line was seriously injured in the accident. The researcher was transferred to the provincial hospital but remains in critical condition and is in danger of permanent blindness. The other people who were seriously injured are all being treated at the provincial hospital, the source said.
Currently, the county branch of the Ministry of Social Security has dispatched officials to the scene to determine the cause of the accident, but they have only managed to determine some aspects of what happened, the source said. The problem is that all the people involved in the test (including the researcher) and the related officials have been hospitalized for their injuries.
The factory workers have reportedly complained that the factory managers did not learn their lesson or take the necessary precautions after the accident during the first test. Workers pointed out that the managers placed more of a priority on getting results than on protecting workers’ lives.
Workers said that there are often accidents of varying severity at the factory because the managers insist on carrying out the party’s orders even when they are not feasible and because they push their underlings hard so they can speed up the reports they send to the party.
“The tests have currently been suspended. The families of many of the injured workers are disappointed with the factory management,” the source said.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Jong So Yong is one of Daily NK’s freelance reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
13. Korean grand narratives: the problem of ideology
Narratives are all important but we do not pay enough attention to them.
Korean grand narratives: the problem of ideology
Courtesy of Memi BeltrameBy David A. Tizzard
Much of modern politics and discourse has become a question of morality. When people vote, they are not simply expressing a preference over economic policy or the correct distribution of limited resources. Instead they are seen as taking a side in a Manichean battle of good versus evil. This environment has been fostered by social media and is reinforced daily by ideologues on the right and left.
One of the reasons it has so successfully taken hold is because when things are a moral question, there is a simple and easy answer that doesn't require any deep contemplation or thought. There is no cognitive dissonance. There is no appreciation that most situations presented to us are highly complex and with no obvious answer. A more realistic perspective, however, would be that the world is, for the most part, gray. It is made up of squiggly lines that overlap and bleed into each other without clear demarcation. Moreover, there is no answer book nor any set procedure other than what we see as best for the current situation.
And there's the rub. The policy or idea that some people consider best will never be perfect. It will also have its weaknesses. Moreover, the policy that has been rejected will, simultaneously, also have its various strengths and merits. Why particular people favor certain approaches over the other might sometimes have little to do with the actual theory itself but rather their own upbringing, identity, or life experiences. Why, for example, do many North Korea defectors (or "freedom seekers" as some prefer to be called) seem to find a home in conservative parties and among right-wing associations, whether in South Korea, the United States or the United Kingdom? Is it because of something inherent in the views held by the right? Or is it more likely that the personal experiences of those who have lived, struggled, and then escaped North Korea have understandably affected how they now view the world?
The same applies to me. To you. And to every other member of South Korea. We are a collection of experiences, fractured memories, suppressed fears, fragmented personalities, meaningful connections, genuine love and lost dreams. These are all unique to us as individuals. We are, in a psychological sense, snowflakes. And each of us will subsequently come to rest on a set of ideas about how the world should operate in terms of finance, culture, gender and the depth of government control in our lives. It is a challenge to one's very sense of being, a deep existential threat, to consider that our ideas about certain things might have flaws or there might be other approaches with strengths ours do not possess.
In academia and among those with training in various fields such as economics, international relations, and sociology, the strengths and weaknesses of particular approaches, as well as their practical application in a living breathing context, can be quite freely discussed. The idea of "just asking questions" is generally welcome. However, when the conversation enters the public realm, it is no longer then a question of comparing various theories but instead simply a question of morality.
Now, the candidate or party with whom we disagree, despite being informed and educated by their own experiences, have obviously based their policies on a deep-rooted malevolence. To most, there is no substance or grounding to the decision other than to make people suffer in order that they might bring about either a communist revolution in Korea or the selling-out of the people's hard fought democracy and freedom to either Japan or the United States.
The conclusion to all of this should not be that we hand over sole responsibility to the academics. This is not an elitist tirade against those who have not had the good fortune or opportunity to experience higher education. The value of a country should be found in its people: in all people equally irrespective of class, gender, race, or political stance. Therefore, one aim might be to help foster a world in which we all confront our own biases and prejudices. To question why we so passionately and emotionally favor certain policies and ideas and vehemently reject others. And we do that not by demanding others do it first, but by doing it to ourselves.
That being said, I would always like to ask political candidates and those seeking power to speak on what they think their opponents' strengths are. And what do they think are the weaknesses of their own position in terms of economy and such forth. That would make for a far more interesting presidential debate, press conference, or discussion than we've come to expect of late. Recently, it's been either mudslinging or personal trumpet blowing and self-aggrandizement.
Over the past five years, I have no doubt that President Moon has acted in the best interests of this country and done his best to counter the skyrocketing housing prices, to alleviate the suffering felt by the elderly experiencing the OECD's highest poverty rates, to help the unemployed and lower classes find greater economic security by raising the minimum wage, to counter rising mental health problems and the suicide rate by reducing working hours, to reverse the world's lowest birthrate, to make South Korea a place of greater gender equality, and to reduce the corruption and collusion between government and big business. The president has also attempted to bring peace to the Korean Peninsula through engagement with Pyongyang and meetings with Chairman Kim Jong-un.
But where are we now on all those issues? Have we gone forward or backward? And not just in our minds but according to the actual data we can obtain through study, analysis, and brain breaking time spent at our desks. What have the policies enacted taught us? What can we learn? We can certainly gain from them because we can see what effect they have had on the real lives of those of us that inhabit the Korean Peninsula. We can then adjust and alter the next policies accordingly. It's not a case of morality. It's not a case of political allegiance or ideology. It's about looking at the results achieved and seeing how they can be improved going forward. After all, that's what we want. Isn't it?
Dr. David A. Tizzard (datizzard@swu.ac.kr) has a Ph.D. in Korean Studies and lectures at Seoul Women's University and Hanyang University. He is a social/cultural commentator and musician who has lived in Korea for nearly two decades. He is also the host of the Korea Deconstructed podcast, which can be found online. The views expressed in the article are the author's own and do not reflect the editorial direction of The Korea Times.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
