|
Quotes of the Day:
"Some ideas are so stupide that only intellectuals believe them."
– George Orwell
"To suffer without complaint is the only lesson we have to learn in this life."
– Vincent van Gogh
"All war is a symptom of man's failure as a thinking animal."
– John Steinbeck
1. South Korea's coming chaebol turn to unification
2. Trump says he had 'great call' with South Korean leader, suggests deal possible
3. The Battlefield Lessons North Korea Has Learned Fighting Ukraine
4. South Korea Announces Emergency Support for Auto Sector Against U.S. Tariffs
5. Unification minister visits Japan for meetings with senior officials on unification, N.K.
6. N.K. leader's sister slams S. Korea-U.S.-Japan pledge to denuclearize North as 'most hostile act'
7. Trump's 'reciprocal' tariffs on S. Korea, other 'worst offenders' take effect
8. S. Korea to break ground in H1 for N. Korean human rights center in western Seoul
9. Ex-N. Korean commando dies at age 83
10. Drone-helicopter collision caused by sudden gust of wind: military
11. “Kim Yo-jong’s speech leaves open the possibility of dialogue while drawing a line on ‘denuclearization’”
12. The Rise of a New Axis: Great Power Struggle and the Future of Conflict
13. Corruption derails N. Korea's tech military recruitment: Officials demand dollars and electronics
14. N. Korean security agents recalled after work complaints, unlikely to face punishment
15. Editorial: South Korea must modernize its spy laws before it's too late
16. Why do conservative protesters wave American flags?
17. Kim In-su, NK-born US Special Forces commando, dies at 92
1. South Korea's coming chaebol turn to unification
Professor Robertson is one of the most provocative pundits and this is one of his most provocative columns I have read (probably because he is writing about unification).
He provides some interesting analysis from the South Korean political situation to a Chaebol/business centered unification process.
He brought up an interesting question. Can unification be the foundation for unity and a focus for the future?
Can this sentiment be exploited?
Excerpts:
The chaebol turn to unification is not about peace. It is about profit. And while that may sound cynical, it also reflects a core truth of South Korea’s post-war development and mercantilist diplomacy: capitalism, not ideology, has always led the way.
If the current political crisis continues to deepen, and if global economic pressures persist, the idea of North Korea as South Korea’s last frontier may shift from boardroom fantasy to policy blueprint.
In that future, unification will not be negotiated by diplomats. It will be planned, engineered, constructed and sold by financiers. It will be monetized in the boardroom by chaebol executives—one infrastructure contract at a time.
Commentary
South Korea's coming chaebol turn to unification
North Korea is a chaebol's wet dream: a terrain where state power and private profit align with minimal public accountability.
https://www.junotane.com/p/south-koreas-coming-chaebol-turn-to-unification?utm
Apr 08, 2025
In whispered conversations amidst executives behind the closed doors of corporate offices; amidst researchers at water fountains in strategy think tanks; and amidst political movers and shakers under the stained flaps of late-night soju tents; a new line of thinking on North Korea is gaining traction. North Korea may be more than a security liability or geopolitical puzzle—it may be the last great business opportunity of the Korean Peninsula.
Yes - what a weird time to be talking about unification! Seoul has just wound up a media circus of global attention with its constitutional crisis; there’s an election of mediocre middling candidates to get underway; and very soon Trump will be banging on the door of his ATM like a cashless marine past curfew in 1990s Itaewon. Tarry a while and read on, it actually makes sense.
Share Junotane
South Korea’s economy is heavily reliant on exports and activity is highly concentrated in a few conglomerates. It is feeling the squeeze. The global trade environment is becoming more protectionist with the United States’ tightening of technology exports, trade controls, and of course, tariffs. Meanwhile, Chinese firms are rapidly moving up the value chain in key industries, including in semiconductors, batteries, shipping, infrastructure, and electric vehicles—eroding South Korea’s once-comfortable lead.
South Korea faces sluggish growth, a declining birth rate, and rising generational discontent over inequality and housing. Political instability, including frequent scandals and politicization of the prosecution and courts, has further eroded the predictability of policy and long-term economic planning.
There’s growing skepticism toward the political class, and a rising tide of anti-chaebol sentiment among younger voters. After all, the chaebol are moving jobs off shore to make money at the cost of Gen-Z and every small business owner. Dissatisfaction is growing and the politicians and the chaebol are the targets. For the chaebol, accustomed to operating within a relatively stable system that favored their interests, the ground is rapidly shifting.
The chaebol are looking for a new narrative—one that allows them to appear nation-building, even patriotic. Amidst growing political turmoil in Seoul and the fracturing of South Korea’s long-standing development consensus, the country’s corporate giants—the chaebol—are beginning to look north.
For decades, unification with North Korea was a politically sensitive, diplomatically fraught, and largely abstract concept. So abstract, that an administration could label its central policy as “the audacious initiative” and the public wouldn’t give two f&^ks.
But as global trade restrictions tighten, China’s industrial growth crowds South Korea out of traditional markets, and domestic disillusionment deepens, unification is being reconsidered—not as a national project, but as an economic one. And not necessarily by the state, but by the corporate interests that have long dominated the South Korean economy.
In this environment, North Korea is being reimagined. Not as a hostile neighbor, but as a controlled frontier—a space to be developed, integrated, and ultimately absorbed.
The language of unification is being co-opted, not by peace activists or minjok nationalists, but by technocrats and business strategists. Unification is less and less a topic of progressives (there’s plenty of problems regarding inequality in South Korea without thinking about the North), and increasingly a topic for conservatives (money, money, money). The economic rationale is straightforward. North Korea offers:
- State-backed infrastructure projects: Unification would require massive investment in roads, rail, housing, telecom, energy, and sanitation. All of this would be government-funded—meaning predictable transfer of public funds to private coffers.
- You know every presidential administration has a “national” project that fills chaebol coffers - Sejong City, Incheon Airport, Incheon Bridge, Haeundae Bridge, Songdo International City, Four Rivers Project, KTX, Seoul (and Busan) Subway Expansions, and the Saemangeum Seawall Project. The scale of unification with North Korea would dwarf all of these - it would dwarf anything South Korea has seen since the post-war rebuilding.
- Cheap labor: Wages in the North are a fraction of those in the South, and while automation is rising, the demand for low-cost manufacturing and construction labor still exists, particularly in heavy industries and infrastructure projects. AND what about the Gen-Z unemployed turning to political extremism in the South? Give them jobs up North and that problem disappears!
- New markets: With a population of over 25 million and virtually no consumer economy to speak of, North Korea represents a blank slate. Beyond North Korea lies millions of more consumers in neighboring Chinese provinces.
- Access to resources and corridors: North Korea holds untapped mineral reserves and, just as importantly, offers geographic access to the Eurasian landmass. A rail corridor connecting South Korea to China and Russia via the North would fundamentally alter the logistics map of Northeast Asia.
In short, North Korea is a chaebol wet dream: a terrain where state power and private profit would align with minimal public accountability. Now, we’ve heard this before, I can hear you say.
During the early 2000s, the Roh Moo-hyun administration sought to shift South Korean public perception of unification with North Korea from being a financial burden to a strategic opportunity. Building on the Sunshine Policy of his predecessor, Roh emphasized the economic potential of inter-Korean cooperation, particularly through joint projects like the Kaesong Industrial Complex and proposed transportation links across the DMZ.
Roh’s administration framed unification not merely as a humanitarian or nationalistic goal, but as a catalyst for expanding South Korea’s economic reach into the Eurasian continent via North Korea’s geographic corridor to China and Russia. This approach aimed to reframe unification as a long-term investment in regional integration and growth.
There’s a difference today. Ideology in Korean politics is dead. Its last throes were the pathetic attempt of Yoon to paint China and North Korea as the impetus for a poorly timed and coordinated coup attempt. Nobody was buying this excuse outside that uncle everyone has, who used to work for a chaebol, then sold cars, now drives a taxi, and always falls asleep on the couch after lunch. Then the bored Gen-Zs joined in because, well because when you have no job, no prospect of a house, and no future, what are you going to do? Sure it was raucous and captured a few soundbites, but the ideological impetus was empty.
The greatest division in Korea today is less about ideology and more about economics. In much the same way as occurred in other democracies, the “left” doesn’t really care about workers or the working class, they care about ensuring their in-group has access to power in order to make money. The “right” doesn’t care about traditional values or rights, they care about ensuring their in-group has access to power in order to make money. All the issues that divided Korea’s politics by ideology in the past - North Korea Korea, unification, the U.S. alliance, China, Japan, chaebol reform, worker’s rights, and conscription have fizzled out, like soju thrown on the barbecue to check the heat.
Ideology is dead in domestic politics - all that’s left are two broad groups fighting for power and playing to the extremist elements when it suits them.
The driving force that unites progressives and conservatives is holding onto power and profit - and this explains the emerging chaebol interest in the North is not just economic—it is also a hedge.
Unification offers a grand project that could temporarily mute demands for political, structural, regulatory, and constitutional reform. It is a long-term play, but it carries echoes of past development models where public funds were used to fuel private sector growth under the banner of national interest. Remember when during the IMF Crisis, citizens were asked to turn in their gold to pay off the national debt? Well, your politicians want that sort of commitment so they don’t lose their jobs and graft.
Unification as an economic fix does assume a level of geopolitical stability that doesn’t currently exist. China and the United States have strategic stakes in the status quo. Japan remains wary. Russia disinterested. BUT, a blundering Trump administration, a more strategic China, a cautious Japan, and a still disinterested Russia, may be the bricks that fall into place to lay the foundations.
And if not, there are a myriad of diplomatic solutions that have never been followed because of political division in Seoul, concern in Washington, and caution in Beijing. Not all of them need to end the Kim Jong-un regime - and solutions that see amnesties and disbursements of state property to the ruling elite could even be welcomed in Pyongyang.
Subscribed
The chaebol turn to unification is not about peace. It is about profit. And while that may sound cynical, it also reflects a core truth of South Korea’s post-war development and mercantilist diplomacy: capitalism, not ideology, has always led the way.
If the current political crisis continues to deepen, and if global economic pressures persist, the idea of North Korea as South Korea’s last frontier may shift from boardroom fantasy to policy blueprint.
In that future, unification will not be negotiated by diplomats. It will be planned, engineered, constructed and sold by financiers. It will be monetized in the boardroom by chaebol executives—one infrastructure contract at a time.
2. Trump says he had 'great call' with South Korean leader, suggests deal possible
I hope the President is right that there is the "probability of a great deal for both countries."
Excerpts:
"I just had a great call with the Acting President of South Korea. We talked about their tremendous and unsustainable Surplus, Tariffs, Shipbuilding, large scale purchase of U.S. LNG, their joint venture in an Alaska Pipeline, and payment for the big time Military Protection we provide to South Korea," he said in the post. "They began these Military payments during my first term, Billions of Dollars, but Sleepy Joe Biden, for reasons unknown, terminated the deal. That was a shocker to all!" he continued.
...
"In any event, we have the confines and probability of a great DEAL for both countries. Their top TEAM is on a plane heading to the U.S., and things are looking good. We are likewise dealing with many other countries, all of whom want to make a deal with the United States. Like with South Korea, we are bringing up other subjects that are not covered by Trade and Tariffs, and getting them negotiated also. ‘ONE STOP SHOPPING’ is a beautiful and efficient process!!!" the president declared in the post.
...
The Biden administration made a deal with the U.S. ally after taking office in 2021.
"The contribution of the Republic of Korea for 2020 is 1.0389 trillion Korean Won," that 2021 deal stated. "The contribution of the Republic of Korea for 2021 is 1.1833 trillion Korean Won. The 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025 contributions shall be determined by increasing the contribution of the previous year by the ROK defense budget increase rate of the previous year."
Last year a State Department spokesperson said in an October statement that the U.S. and South Korea had "reached consensus on the proposed text of a new five-year Special Measures Agreement."
Trump says he had 'great call' with South Korean leader, suggests deal possible
The stock market shot up on Tuesday morning
foxbusiness.com · by Alex Nitzberg
video
Elon Musk says he hopes for a future where tariffs are no longer necessary for the U.S. and Europe.
U.S. President Donald Trump announced Tuesday morning on Truth Social that he had spoken with South Korea's acting president about various issues.
Trump is targeting South Korea and many other countries with tariffs.
But he indicated in the post that the U.S. is engaging in multifaceted negotiations with foreign nations.
SINGAPORE PM SAYS TRUMP'S UNIVERSAL TARIFF DOES NOT APPEAR OPEN FOR NEGOTIATION: ‘FIXED MINIMUM TARIFF’
President Donald Trump takes a question from a member of the media during a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Oval Office of the White House on April 7, 2025, in Washington, D.C. (Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images)
The president suggested that a deal with South Korea is possible.
"I just had a great call with the Acting President of South Korea. We talked about their tremendous and unsustainable Surplus, Tariffs, Shipbuilding, large scale purchase of U.S. LNG, their joint venture in an Alaska Pipeline, and payment for the big time Military Protection we provide to South Korea," he said in the post. "They began these Military payments during my first term, Billions of Dollars, but Sleepy Joe Biden, for reasons unknown, terminated the deal. That was a shocker to all!" he continued.
STOCKS JUMP AS TRUMP'S TARIFF NEGOTIATING BEGINS: LIVE UPDATES
video
U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent unpacks the state of U.S. trade negotiations on 'Kudlow.'
"In any event, we have the confines and probability of a great DEAL for both countries. Their top TEAM is on a plane heading to the U.S., and things are looking good. We are likewise dealing with many other countries, all of whom want to make a deal with the United States. Like with South Korea, we are bringing up other subjects that are not covered by Trade and Tariffs, and getting them negotiated also. ‘ONE STOP SHOPPING’ is a beautiful and efficient process!!!" the president declared in the post.
"China also wants to make a deal, badly, but they don’t know how to get it started. We are waiting for their call. It will happen! GOD BLESS THE USA," he concluded.
The stock market, which has taken a hit since Trump made his tariff announcement last week, spiked higher on Tuesday morning.
South Korea has long supported the cost of the U.S. military presence in its country, dating back to before Trump's first term.
Under a 2019 deal during the first Trump administration, the Republic of Korea agreed to contribute 1.0389 trillion Korean Won that year.
TRUMP'S TARIFF PLAN IS A ‘GENIUS MOVE’: RIC GRENELL
video
FOX Business host Charles Payne discusses how investors are reacting to President Donald Trump's tariffs on 'Kudlow.'
CLICK HERE TO READ MORE ON FOX BUSINESS
The Biden administration made a deal with the U.S. ally after taking office in 2021.
"The contribution of the Republic of Korea for 2020 is 1.0389 trillion Korean Won," that 2021 deal stated. "The contribution of the Republic of Korea for 2021 is 1.1833 trillion Korean Won. The 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025 contributions shall be determined by increasing the contribution of the previous year by the ROK defense budget increase rate of the previous year."
Last year a State Department spokesperson said in an October statement that the U.S. and South Korea had "reached consensus on the proposed text of a new five-year Special Measures Agreement."
Yonhap News Agency reported in November that the two nations had signed an agreement.
foxbusiness.com · by Alex Nitzberg
3. The Battlefield Lessons North Korea Has Learned Fighting Ukraine
The nKPA: a learning organization?
The Battlefield Lessons North Korea Has Learned Fighting Ukraine
Combat experience has taught the Russian ally modern warfare tactics that, combined with ideological fervor, make it a significant adversary for the Ukrainians
https://www.wsj.com/world/north-korea-russia-ukraine-combat-experience-3e043838?st=Xbpb8W&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
By Jane Lytvynenko, Dasl Yoon
Follow and Alistair MacDonald
Follow
April 8, 2025 9:00 pm ET
At first, it seemed like a typical Russian assault. Glide bombs smashed into the dugouts of Ukrainians from the 225th Separate Assault Regiment, then waves of enemy infantry advanced in small groups supported by artillery fire.
The infantry kept coming in such numbers through fields and forests that the Ukrainians were soon overwhelmed and pulled back across a river. But something was different in this February attack in the village of Sverdlikovo in Russia’s Kursk province.
As they took new defensive positions on the opposite bank, the Ukrainians tapped into their opponents’ radio channels and heard a language they couldn’t understand. Their adversaries were speaking Korean.
The decisive battles in the Kursk region, from which Ukraine’s army has now largely retreated, show how North Korean forces adapted their once outdated tactics for Europe’s biggest war since World War II with lightning speed.
Their first forays on the battlefield in December were in large groups without support from artillery, drones or armored vehicles, making them easy targets for Ukrainian defenders.
By February, their large numbers, physical endurance and willingness to advance under fire were combined with improved tactical awareness, such as moving in small groups, as well as support from the full Russian arsenal of weapons, from glide bombs to artillery and explosive drones. They became more integrated with Russian forces, and when the North Koreans finished their assaults, Russians would typically take over their positions.
“They kept advancing, advancing, advancing forward,” said Capt. Oleh Shyriaiev, commander of the 225th Regiment, which has been operating in Kursk since Ukraine’s move into the Russian territory in August last year. “We had a company stationed there, while they were attacking in battalions.”
Capt. Oleh Shyriaiev, commander of the 225th Separate Assault Regiment, which fought against North Korean soldiers in the Kursk region. Photo: Serhii Korovayny for WSJ
While the West has learned from the Ukraine war, including how to strategically use modern equipment such as drones, the fighting is providing the North Koreans with unmatched battlefield experience. Those skills can now be taken home and spread throughout the country’s massive army.
That unnerves North Korea’s own foes in Seoul and Tokyo—already contending with Pyongyang’s growing nuclear threat. Troops from South Korea and Japan, the U.S.’s top Asian allies, haven’t seen such large-scale action in decades, and the Trump administration has signaled a deeper focus on deterring China.
In recent months, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has called on his military to gain real combat experience during visits to military schools. Though Kim hasn’t acknowledged the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia, he called on his military to learn capabilities suitable for modern warfare as wars become commonplace around the world. South Korean officials said they detected signs that North Korean troops were learning drone operations and tactics from Moscow.
“They pay with blood,” said Shyriaiev, the Ukrainian commander. “But this experience will not go to waste.”
Situation in Kursk
Ukrainian forces in Russia
Russian forces in Ukraine
Kyiv
Area of
detail
UKRAINIAN
FORCES
AS OF SEPT. 10
Rylsk
current
Ukrainian
positionS
Sverdlikovo
Sudzha
KURSK REGION
Sumy
UKRAINE
RUSSIA
20 miles
20 km
Note: As of April 6
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Andrew Barnett/WSJ
‘World War II scenes’
Pyongyang was already furnishing its Russian ally with rockets, ballistic missiles and massive shipments of artillery shells when Ukrainian and South Korean intelligence agencies reported in October that thousands of North Korean soldiers were training at bases across Russia.
The soldiers, from elite units of North Korea’s 1.2 million-strong army, were pictured in satellite photos and videos verified by The Wall Street Journal that showed troops lined up neatly on a training ground and freshly dug training trenches, a throwback feature of the war.
“There are millions of them here,” says a man in one of the videos, in Russian, as he films North Korean soldiers walking through a training camp in Sergeevka, a small village 140 miles from North Korea in Russia’s far east.
The Russian soldier sounds amazed but scornful about their arrival, calling the new recruits “a horde.” The handful of videos show North Korean troops jogging across a training camp or receiving equipment and documents, all of them wearing brand-new Russian uniforms.
In December, the roughly 12,000 troops were sent to the Kursk province, where Russian forces were struggling to eject Ukrainian troops who had crashed across the border in August, embarrassing the Kremlin by seizing and holding dozens of towns and villages. Seoul’s military said North Korea dispatched an additional 3,000 troops this year.
At first, they were kept off the front lines, digging trenches and offering logistical support. But after thousands of Russian troops, many from elite units, were quickly chewed up in wasteful assaults, the North Koreans were deployed to the battlefield.
A North Korean soldier wore a new Russian uniform and carried a blade with a wooden handle. Equipment included an outdated night-vision device and phones.
Svet Jacqueline for WSJ
The soldiers quickly distinguished themselves with an ideological fervor and physical endurance far superior to their tactical awareness.
Videos shot from Ukrainian drones showed them trekking in the winter cold across barren fields in large groups with no support from artillery or armored vehicles. They proved easy targets for Ukrainian explosive drones and artillery. The soldiers would press forward even as their neighbors were cut down.
Soldiers from the 8th Regiment of Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces recounted an early battle with North Korean troops in mid-December.
The nine-person team, tasked with helping defend positions and obtaining proof of the presence of North Korean troops, joined a skirmish alongside other Ukrainian soldiers that was so intense it lighted up the night sky “like a laser show,” said a soldier with the call sign Bulat who took part in the battle.
The North Koreans were about 300 yards away from the Ukrainian positions, with a valley separating them. After the sun came up, they began attacking.
“It was impossible to count them, there were too many of them,” said Volodymyr, one of the men who fought them.
The North Koreans would push forward even as their compatriots were wounded or killed alongside them. Upon being attacked they would pull back slightly, regroup and press on again. They attempted to encircle the Ukrainians and the gunfire never stopped, sometimes giving the impression that 15 people were shooting at once.
“It was like scenes from World War II, they were just running,” Bulat said. “They charged ahead and shouted in Korean, there was a lot of shouting in Korean.”
The Ukrainians realized the Koreans weren’t using radios, and all the commands were given by shouts, which helped Ukrainians identify where they were.
After four hours of battle, one North Korean soldier got within about 20 yards of the Ukrainians, who shot him and took him prisoner. Four more hours later, the Ukrainian team had to withdraw after running low on ammo attempting to repel a powerful push from the North Koreans that followed the capture of the prisoner. The North Korean later died of wounds sustained during evacuation, when the Russian side had unleashed “a sea of fire” on the special forces soldiers attempting to get away.
Volodymyr and 'Pike' of the 8th Regiment of Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces, which fought North Korean soldiers in Kursk.
Twenty-one North Koreans were killed and 40 wounded in the battle, according to a count by the Special Operations Forces. All nine of the Ukrainian special-forces team made it out.
The prisoner wore a new uniform and boots that were unmuddied by the landscape, indicating he was likely sent into battle immediately after arriving at the front, the Ukrainians said.
While the North Koreans’ tactics weren’t sophisticated, the sheer number of soldiers charging at the Ukrainians was unsparing. After about three weeks in Kursk, the North Koreans had about 3,000 dead and wounded men, said Ukrainian and U.S. officials at the time. The North Koreans now have sustained around 5,000 casualties, with a third of those killed in action, according to one Western official.
Scurvy, racial slurs
Facing the new enemy on the battlefield, the Ukrainians took measures to find out more about them. When they encountered a dead North Korean, special forces operators would clip hair and take cheek swabs to carry out tests, in part to prove the soldiers were North Korean. They would gather documents to be sent to South Koreans for translation.
Tests showed that many of the North Koreans had scurvy, an illness caused by the lack of vitamin C. Some of them had stuffed cheap sausages into their grenade pouches, a special forces operator said.
But even as the North Koreans made inexperienced moves on the battlefield, Ukrainians had difficulty taking them prisoner, because many chose death over capture.
Decades ago, North Korean special forces were trained to save one bullet in their sidearm for themselves and pull the trigger after shouting “Long live leader Kim Il Sung!” if they were captured. Now the tactic has changed to detonating a grenade, said Michael Madden, a nonresident fellow at the Stimson Center, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank.
In December, one North Korean soldier in Kursk, surrounded by Ukrainian special forces, detonated a grenade after shouting, “General Kim Jong Un!”
Video from a drone showed Ukrainian soldiers capturing a North Korean soldier. Photo: Ukrainian Presidential Press OfficE/Associated Press
Two prisoners Ukrainians managed to capture alive had to be coaxed out of taking their own lives.
The two men claimed they didn’t know why they were going to war. “I thought the South Koreans were among the Ukrainians,” said Ri, a 26-year-old North Korean prisoner held in Ukraine, in an interview.
Ukraine said North Korean troops faced scorn from Russian troops. Their intercepts of Russian communications show troops dismissing their Korean partners and using racial slurs, underscoring the uneasy alliance at the heart of Moscow’s attempts to oust Ukraine from Kursk.
In one intercepted radio communication, a Russian warns a fellow soldier to be careful in a village because their “allies” are wandering around unsure of who is enemy or ally. “I wanted to talk to them, but they all ran off somewhere,” the Russian soldier said on the recording, shared with the Journal by a Ukrainian military-intelligence official.
The soldier was asked which allies. “The ones that like eating dogs for breakfast,” he said.
Ri, a North Korean prisoner held in Ukraine, said he thought South Koreans were among the Ukrainians. Photo: Sasha Maslov for WSJ
Fighting drones
But the North Koreans were quickly adapting, according to military analysts, soldiers who fought them and documents taken off the troops by the Ukrainians.
One of the quickest adaptations came against the drones that litter the sky across the front lines. When first deployed, the North Koreans simply stared at the drones, not comprehending that they posed a threat. But, very quickly, they learned tactics to avoid or destroy them, videos posted by Ukrainian officials and documents analyzed by the Human Rights Foundation’s Korea desk show, such as using one man as bait while others shoot at the drone.
At least one North Korean soldier, possibly an officer, was found dead with a drone detector—which Russians use to detect drones and take evasive action. It is unlikely Kim’s troops knew how to use the technology when they were deployed to the battlefield in mid-December.
To avoid losses from Ukrainian drone attacks, the North Koreans learned to flank the enemy with one side engaging with the attacks while the other struck from the rear, the documents showed, and to break up into smaller groups to avoid being mowed down by the Ukrainians.
Satellite images showed freshly dug training trenches at a military camp housing North Koreans last fall. Photo: Maxar Technologies
“They encountered modern warfare, and they’re learning from it,” said Kot, a special forces soldier who has fought against North Koreans.
The documents taken from North Korean troops show careful reports of battlefield movements and a detailed accounting of the equipment used.
“Yesterday, a soldier from 3rd company 3rd platoon mistook an animal for a person and fired accidentally,” said a note dated Dec. 5 reviewed by the Journal. “Conduct soldier education to prevent accidental shootings, thoroughly investigate, and ensure proper duty performance.”
A North Korean soldier had copied a letter from Kim Jong Un encouraging troops on New Year's Eve. Phones used by the soldiers.
Svet Jacqueline for WSJ
The documents showed the North Koreans were struggling to integrate with Russian troops, noting they needed Russian intelligence on Ukraine’s drone launch sites or artillery positions to pre-emptively strike them and minimize casualties. Eventually, to help the North Korean infantry, the Russians used their own high-end drones, and dropped larger bombs on Ukrainian soldiers and on infrastructure and supply vehicles to cut them off.
At the end of March in North Korea, Kim inspected a new early-warning aircraft and small suicide drones that state media claimed incorporated artificial-intelligence technology. Analysts said North Korea likely converted a Russian-made cargo aircraft, while Seoul’s military said Moscow may have helped with the internal system and parts. Kim called on officials to make unmanned equipment and AI a top priority in modernizing the military, state media said.
Back in battle
After taking massive losses early on, North Korean troops withdrew from the Kursk battlefield in early January. They returned about a month later, as Russia was accelerating its efforts to oust Ukrainians from its territory. The Kremlin had made a win in the region a priority to deny Ukraine a bargaining chip in peace negotiations, and deployed some of its best drone operators there.
Since then, North Korean soldiers have been among the most valuable on the battlefield, as better integration with Russian forces and superior tactics combined with their endurance, Ukrainian soldiers and analysts said.
North Korean commanders sit with the Russians and pass instructions down in Korean, said an official at Ukraine’s military-intelligence agency. On the ground level, North Koreans understand elementary words of Russian that they would have learned in training.
In a war where drones have made the survival of infantry even more perilous, the North Koreans’ willingness to advance under fire is a crucial asset. “Because of the sheer mass that rushed forward, they began to gain some ground,” said Shyriaiev, the Ukrainian commander.
Ukrainian soldiers headed toward the Kursk region last year. Photo: Svet Jacqueline for WSJ
The village his men were defending was along one of the vital logistics routes used by Ukrainians to supply their armed forces on Russian territory.
The Russians had unloaded everything they had on the Ukrainians defending it. They used fiber-optic drones, which aren’t vulnerable to electronic signal jamming, a main defense against the aerial craft.
Their aviation dropped glide bombs—the big, cheap and hard-to-defend-against explosives usually reserved for targeting equipment—on positions where only two or three Ukrainians were defending.
“We couldn’t even approach them to find human remains, to identify them and give them a proper farewell,” Shyriaiev said.
With bridges bombed to cut the Ukrainians off, the North Korean infantry moved against the Ukrainians under cover of artillery fire. Pressing forward through fields and a small wooded area, they used tactics adopted by the Russian infantry, moving in smaller groups of three to five people, said Shyriaiev.
Similar scenes played out across Kursk in subsequent weeks, according to soldiers and analysts. The push that forced Shyriaiev’s troops back in the north of the Ukrainian-held territory was mirrored in the south, creating a pincer that allowed Russian drone pilots to strike vehicles used to supply Ukrainian forces.
By mid-March, the largely cut-off Ukrainians had mostly retreated from the Kursk region and were defending a sliver of hilly territory on the Russian side of the border.
Looking at the North Koreans’ unflinching advances under deadly fire made Shyriaiev realize a key advantage they hold over the Ukrainians: an apparent disregard for the value of human life, surpassing even that of the Russians.
“Why are the Koreans the ones storming? They are better prepared psychologically and they are better prepared physically,” he said. “In Kursk, they completed their mission.”
Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com and Alistair MacDonald at Alistair.Macdonald@wsj.com
4. South Korea Announces Emergency Support for Auto Sector Against U.S. Tariffs
South Korea Announces Emergency Support for Auto Sector Against U.S. Tariffs
The measures include more financial support, tax breaks, and subsidies for carmakers.
https://www.wsj.com/business/autos/south-korea-announces-emergency-support-for-auto-sector-against-u-s-tariffs-ded1ab1a
By Kwanwoo Jun
Follow
April 8, 2025 8:43 pm ET
South Korea’s car exports to the U.S. stood at $34.7 billion in 2024. Photo: Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images
South Korea’s government has announced emergency-support measures for the country’s auto sector, rushing to help ease the impact of U.S. President Trump’s tariffs.
The measures set forth by the trade ministry on Wednesday include more financial support, tax breaks and subsidies for carmakers.
The 25% tariff on cars and auto parts imported to the U.S. that Trump announced will cause “significant” damage to South Korean automakers and parts manufacturers, the ministry said.
To prevent a liquidity crunch in the auto sector, the ministry said Wednesday it would increase policy financing support, including cheaper loans, for automakers to 15 trillion won, equivalent to $10.09 billion, in 2025 from 13 trillion won currently.
The government will also lower taxes on new car purchases to 3.5% from the current 5% temporarily until June, as well as raise subsidies for electric vehicles and extend the period of available subsidies by six months until the end of this year, it said.
Separately, the government will help Korean automakers expand export markets into non-U. S. developing economies in Africa, Latin America and Asia, where demand for vehicles has been growing fast.
South Korea’s car exports to the U.S. stood at $34.7 billion in 2024, accounting for 49% of its total auto exports, according to the ministry.
Write to Kwanwoo Jun at Kwanwoo.Jun@wsj.com
5. Unification minister visits Japan for meetings with senior officials on unification, N.K.
It is imperative that Minister Kim solidifies the 8.15 Unification doctrine and support for it. While President Yoon was impeached the 8.15 Unification doctrine was not.
Unification minister visits Japan for meetings with senior officials on unification, N.K. | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 9, 2025
SEOUL, April 9 (Yonhap) -- Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho will travel to Japan on Wednesday for a three-day visit that will include meetings with senior officials to discuss policies related to inter-Korean unification and North Korea, his ministry said.
Kim's visit to Tokyo through Friday aims to strengthen South Korea-Japan cooperation on unification between the two Koreas and North Korea policy under the Shigeru Ishiba administration, according to the ministry.
During the visit, Kim plans to hold meetings with Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi and Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya, a ministry official said.
He also intends to brief the association of foreign correspondents in Japan on South Korea's policies on unification and attend a local forum.
The ministry said the minister expects his visit to Japan to strengthen Seoul-Tokyo cooperation on issues, including efforts to repatriate abductees held in North Korea.
The ministry also said the latest visit is expected to elevate the bilateral partnership to a higher level as the two countries mark the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations this year.
Including this visit, the ministry plans to pursue more high-level consultations with major countries regarding its unification and North Korea policies, the ministry noted.
Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 9, 2025
6. N.K. leader's sister slams S. Korea-U.S.-Japan pledge to denuclearize North as 'most hostile act'
The evil sister is always the regime's bad cop.
However, here is the thing: the Propaganda and Agitation Department uses our words about denuclearization to strengthen the legitimacy of the regime. Of course our leaders are going to be asked about denuclearization so they have to address it. But they must also address the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity. In fact they should never talk about decentralization without describing how Kim Jong Un must deny the human rights of the Korean people not only to remain in power but to build and sustain his nuclear weapons program. A basic theme and messages must always be built around the fact that the Korean people in the north suffer and sacrifice because Kim prioritizes nuclear weapons development over the welfare of the Korean people to ensure his own comfort, safety, and survival.
Our failure to address human rights gives Kim Jong Un a pass, allows Kim to strengthen control, and sentences the Korean people in the north to a life of suffering with no hope.
N.K. leader's sister slams S. Korea-U.S.-Japan pledge to denuclearize North as 'most hostile act' | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 9, 2025
SEOUL, April 9 (Yonhap) -- The powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has denounced a recent pledge by South Korea, the United States and Japan to denuclearize Pyongyang, calling it the "most hostile act" and saying it won't change the country's possession of nuclear weapons.
Kim Yo-jong, vice department director of the ruling party's central committee, issued the statement Wednesday in response to the outcome of last week's trilateral meeting of the three countries' foreign ministers.
South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya reaffirmed their commitment to denuclearizing North Korea on the margins of a meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) last Thursday.
Kim claimed the joint pledge only revealed the uneasiness of the three countries about addressing North Korea's denuclearization, saying they know it is only "a daydream that can never come true."
"If they frantically cry out for 'denuclearization,' really believing in it, they must be termed nonsensical," she noted in the statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
North Korea's status as "a nuclear weapons state" is "a result of the inevitable option which accurately reflected the hostile threat from outside and the change in the present and future world security mechanical structure," she also claimed. "So it does not change no matter how desperately anyone denies."
For North Korea, discussing the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons or reviving the "dead concept of denuclearization" only constitutes "the most hostile act of denying" its sovereignty and attempting to force it "to renounce its constitution and social system," according to Kim.
"If the U.S. and its vassal forces continue to insist on anachronistic 'denuclearization' while talking about 'threat' from someone, it will only give unlimited justness and justification to the advance" of North Korea's pursuit of the "strongest nuclear force for self-defense," she added.
The latest remarks mark Kim's first reported public statement in a month following her March 3 condemnation of the USS Carl Vinson, a Nimitz-class U.S. aircraft carrier, entering a naval base in South Korea's southeastern city of Busan.
This undated photo shows Kim Yo-jong, vice department director of the central committee of North Korea's ruling party. (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 9, 2025
7. Trump's 'reciprocal' tariffs on S. Korea, other 'worst offenders' take effect
Trump's 'reciprocal' tariffs on S. Korea, other 'worst offenders' take effect | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 9, 2025
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, April 9 (Yonhap) -- The United States' "reciprocal" tariffs, including 25 percent duties for South Korea, went into effect Wednesday, as America's trading partners are seeking to negotiate a deal to reduce tariff rates and minimize the potential impact of President Donald Trump's trade policy on their economies.
The reciprocal tariffs on nearly 60 countries took effect despite lingering concerns that new U.S. duties could lead to higher inflation and slower economic growth. Trump has been using tariffs to increase federal government revenue, reduce the U.S.' trade deficits and boost domestic manufacturing.
Last Wednesday, Trump unveiled a minimum 10 percent "baseline" tariff, which went into effect Saturday, as well as the reciprocal tariffs on what his administration called "the worst offenders," including South Korea, Japan and China.
The U.S. imposed 24 percent reciprocal tariffs on Japan, 32 percent on Taiwan, 20 percent on the European Union, 49 percent on Cambodia and 46 percent on Vietnam, to name a few.
For China, the Trump administration said the combined tariff rate for the Asian superpower jumped to 104 percent. The U.S. initially unveiled a 34 percent reciprocal tariff for China on top of its separate 20 percent levies on Chinese imports. It later announced an additional 50 percent tariff as China said it will slap a 34 percent retaliatory tariff on U.S. goods.
Some goods are not subject to reciprocal tariffs, including steel, aluminum, automobiles and key auto parts -- the targets of the already announced industry-specific tariffs, according to the White House.
The country-by-country tariffs were customized based on trading partners' tariff- and non-tariff barriers, as well as other factors, such as countries' exchange rate-related policies and practices, U.S. officials said.
U.S. President Donald Trump delivers remarks on tariffs in the Rose Garden at the White House in Washington on April 2, 2025, in this photo released by Reuters. (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 9, 2025
8. S. Korea to break ground in H1 for N. Korean human rights center in western Seoul
I hope this will be sustained by successive ROK governments.
Excerpts:
The plan to build the center in Seoul's western neighborhood of Magok has been conceived as a "hub" for addressing North Korean human rights issues, with completion targeted for next year under a 26 billion-won (US$17.5 million) budget.
The government also plans to establish an intergovernmental consultative body, potentially involving the unification and foreign ministries as well as the national spy agency, to support the entry of North Korean refugees residing in China or other foreign countries into South Korea.
S. Korea to break ground in H1 for N. Korean human rights center in western Seoul | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 9, 2025
SEOUL, April 9 (Yonhap) -- The government plans to begin the construction of a new national center for North Korean human rights in western Seoul within the first half of this year as part of efforts to improve human rights conditions in the country, the unification ministry said Wednesday.
The ministry announced the plan as part of this year's road map for implementing projects aimed at improving inter-Korean relations, which it is required to draw up every year, along with a broader five-year vision for enhancing inter-Korean ties.
The plan to build the center in Seoul's western neighborhood of Magok has been conceived as a "hub" for addressing North Korean human rights issues, with completion targeted for next year under a 26 billion-won (US$17.5 million) budget.
The government also plans to establish an intergovernmental consultative body, potentially involving the unification and foreign ministries as well as the national spy agency, to support the entry of North Korean refugees residing in China or other foreign countries into South Korea.
This image from Sept. 14, 2023, shows the unification ministry's Inter-Korean Relations Management Bureau located in central Seoul. (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 9, 2025
9. Ex-N. Korean commando dies at age 83
This should be a story told to the Korean people in the north. This illustrates a compassionate South Korean government and people. Even in 1968 Koreans in the South recognized what happens with the ideological indoctrination of soldiers in the north. But that indoctrination can be undone by freedom. The best antidote for authoritarian rule is freedom for the people.
Excerpts:
The former commando was allowed to settle as a civilian in the South and became a citizen in 1970.
He converted to Christianity and had been serving as a pastor since 1997.
Ex-N. Korean commando dies at age 83 | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · April 9, 2025
SEOUL, April 9 (Yonhap) -- Kim Shin-jo, a former North Korean special forces soldier who infiltrated South Korea on an assassination mission and later became a pastor, died Wednesday, his church said. He was 83 years old.
Kim passed away early in the morning, according to Sungrak Church in Seoul.
Trained in North Korea in the 1960s, Kim was one of 31 commandos sent on a mission to assassinate then South Korean President Park Chung-hee in 1968.
He was the only one in the squad to be captured alive, while another survivor fled to North Korea.
The former commando was allowed to settle as a civilian in the South and became a citizen in 1970.
He converted to Christianity and had been serving as a pastor since 1997.
This undated file photo shows Kim Shin-jo, a former North Korean commando who infiltrated South Korea on an assassination mission and later became a pastor. (Yonhap)
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · April 9, 2025
10. Drone-helicopter collision caused by sudden gust of wind: military
Drones must obviously be susceptible to high winds (perhaps light drones even to low winds). This is probably one area where manned unmanned aircraft are superior. The drone operator cannot "feel" the effects of the wind on his flight controls so that he can make slight adjustments (or can he?). A pilot would make instinctual adjustments on the flight controls. Can an algorithm do the same for a drone? Can the nuanced control a pilot has be programmed into drone operations?
Being neither a drone operator or a pilot I am curious about these things.
Drone-helicopter collision caused by sudden gust of wind: military | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · April 9, 2025
SEOUL, April 9 (Yonhap) -- A collision between a military drone and a helicopter last month was caused by a sudden gust of wind during the drone's landing, an Army official said Wednesday.
An Army investigation committee reached the conclusion after analyzing video recordings, surveillance camera footage and flight data from the March 17 collision between a Heron reconnaissance drone and a Surion helicopter at an airfield in Yangju, just north of Seoul.
"The committee did not identify any human error, equipment flaws, or problems with maintenance systems or military discipline," the Army official said.
The investigation found that a gust of wind pushed the Heron drone upward while it was trying to land in automatic landing mode. During its next landing attempt, another gust of wind combined with a cross wind to push the drone off the runway and into the parked helicopter.
In the wake of the accident, the Army will quickly install warning systems against rapidly changing winds and nets around the helicopter parking area.
The collision left both aircraft destroyed but no one injured.
Firefighters extinguish a fire at an Army base in Yangju, north of Seoul, on March 17, 2025, after an Army surveillance drone collided with a helicopter parked at an airfield, in this file photo provided by provincial newspaper the Gyeonggi Ilbo. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · April 9, 2025
11. “Kim Yo-jong’s speech leaves open the possibility of dialogue while drawing a line on ‘denuclearization’”
Dialogue yes, denuclearization no. Why would Kim want dialogue with the US? To gain political and economic concessions.
The desire for dialogue by the north must be viewed through the lens of its political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies.
This is a Google translation of an RFA report.
“Kim Yo-jong’s speech leaves open the possibility of dialogue while drawing a line on ‘denuclearization’”
Seoul-Handohyeong hando@rfa.org
2025.04.09
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in-focus/2025/04/09/kimyojong-denuclearization-north-dialogue-trump/
Kim Yo-jong, Vice Director of the North Korean Workers' Party. (Yonhap)
Anchor: Vice Department Director of the Workers' Party of Korea Kim Yo-jong stated in her statement that denuclearization is impossible, but avoided direct criticism of U.S. President Trump. Experts are analyzing that this means that while North Korea has reiterated its position that denuclearization is impossible, it has left open the possibility of dialogue. Reporter Han Do-hyung reports from Seoul.
North Korea's state-run media, Korean Central News Agency, and other sources reported on the 9th the content of a statement made the previous day by Vice Department Director of the Workers' Party of Korea Kim Yo-jong titled, "The anachronistic obsession with denuclearization by the US, South Korea, and Japan cannot have any influence on our country."
Vice Department Director Kim Yo-jong criticized the emphasis on North Korea’s will to denuclearize at the South Korea-U.S.-Japan foreign ministers’ meeting on the 3rd as “nothing more than an impossible fantasy.”
Earlier, Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Tae-yeol, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya met in Brussels, Belgium on the 3rd (local time) to attend the NATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting and announced that they reaffirmed North Korea's firm will for complete denuclearization.
Deputy Director Kim also claimed, “Not only is openly calling for the abandonment of nuclear weapons a common ploy, but the very attempt to revive the concept of denuclearization, which has already lost its effectiveness, is the most blatant hostile act that denies our country’s sovereignty and forces the abandonment of the Constitution and system.”
Vice Minister Kim's remarks came about a month after his criticism of the U.S. aircraft carrier Carl Vinson's entry into Busan on the 3rd of last month.
At the time, Deputy Director Kim stated his existing position that the second Trump administration had continued the hostile policy toward North Korea, and that “today’s reality further highlights the legitimacy, justification, and necessity of the path to strengthening nuclear weapons.”
Former Institute for Unification Studies Director Koh Yoo-hwan said in a phone call with Radio Free Asia (RFA) on the 9th, “We have made it clear to the Trump administration that dialogue and negotiations based on denuclearization are difficult during the second term.”
Furthermore, North Korea's position appears to be that repeating previous claims of denuclearization does not fit with the changed situation, as its strategic position has changed since the breakdown of the 2019 Hanoi Summit, including the advancement of nuclear missiles and the signing of a North Korea-Russia treaty.
Former Vice Chairman Ko interpreted the absence of direct criticism of U.S. President Trump in Vice Chairman Kim’s speech as North Korea stating its basic position while leaving open the possibility of future North Korea-U.S. dialogue.
Since taking office in January, President Trump has repeatedly referred to North Korea as a nuclear power and expressed his willingness to engage in dialogue. These are the words of former Korea Institute for Unification Studies Director Koh Yoo-hwan.
[Koh Yoo-hwan, former head of the Institute for Unification Studies] In particular, since they have taken various measures necessary for their own survival through the North Korea-Russia treaty, making the same claims as before is not appropriate for the times. They have only revealed their basic position ahead of future talks, and have not specifically mentioned Trump by name or anything like that. So they are saying they will wait and see, but what they are saying now is that it does not match their basic position.
Related Articles
“North Korea Completes 7 Additional ‘Drone’ Hangars at Banghyeon Base”
South Korean Military: “North Korea, Russia Willing to Provide ‘Suicide-Proof Drones’”
Kim Yo-jong (left), Vice Department Director of the Workers' Party of Korea, looks on as North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump talk in Hanoi in February 2019.
Kim Yo-jong (left), Vice Department Director of the Workers' Party of Korea, looks on as North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump talk in Hanoi in February 2019. (Yonhap)
Experts have previously suggested that North Korea may seek to use its strengthened relationship with Russia to spread its position that denuclearization is impossible.
In a report titled “Analysis of the Implications of the Russian-Russian War Ceasefire Negotiations for North Korea” published on the 18th of last month, Sung Ki-young, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), a research institute under the National Intelligence Service (NIS), stated, “Even if US-North Korea talks open at a certain point, they will try to exclude denuclearization from the agenda by using Russia’s mouth to make the impossibility of denuclearization an established fact to the international community.”
Senior Researcher Sung also analyzed that the case of Ukraine, which lost territory to Russian invasion after giving up its status as a nuclear power, may have served to further strengthen North Korea's obsession with nuclear weapons.
However, Senior Researcher Sung also predicted that North Korea will adjust the level of criticism against the U.S. to avoid creating an unnecessarily hostile relationship with the Trump administration in the future.
[Seong Ki-young, Senior Researcher, Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS)] If Russia were to secure a certain amount of power like in the past in a structure where the Cold War structure is entrenched, it would likely be judged as helping North Korea overcome diplomatic isolation and strengthen its survival capabilities by joining Russia’s sphere of influence.
“North Korean Army MDL Violation and Kim Yo-jong’s Statement Are Unrelated”
Meanwhile, regarding the incident on the afternoon of the 8th where about 10 North Korean soldiers invaded south of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and then returned after South Korean military's warning shots, former Director Koh Yoo-hwan diagnosed that it was an accidental mistake by the North Korean military and had nothing to do with Vice Department Director Kim Yo-jong's remarks.
This is Han Do-hyung from RFA Free Asia Broadcasting in Seoul.
12. The Rise of a New Axis: Great Power Struggle and the Future of Conflict
I think this "fusion of foes" requires a new strategy that looks at these threats holistically rather than as separate ones. The IC's new Annual Threat Assessment recognizes this "adversarial cooperation." So we all should.
I think "great power struggle" may be a better descriptor than strategic competition and great power competition.
Excerpts:
The United States is operating in a different strategic environment today, facing a combination of peer power and major regional power opponents with a shared disaffection towards the American-led order. Adopting a policy and planning framework that is aligned to this reality in order to shape force investments and modernization is a prudent place for the Trump Administration to start. It is not within the scope of this brief discussion to detail what those changes might look like or cost, which at any rate has been illustratively set out recently by both the Strategic Posture Commission and the Commission on the National Defense Strategy.[19] However, addressing the most significant and consequential risks and threats posed by the ambitions of today’s autocratic entente, does point to a number of key areas requiring increased priority. These include space-counterspace, cyberspace, strategic and theater nuclear deterrent forces, homeland and regional missile defenses, advanced autonomous conventional systems and a revitalized defense industrial base responsive to an era of long-term multi-power competition. It is noteworthy that today, the United States spends around 3.5 percent of its GDP on defense, which is significantly lower than the Cold War average of around 10 percent. Adjusting defense spending upward to account for the new threats to American security is feasible. It is a matter of political will and leadership not affordability.
Taking seriously that our adversaries may be preparing for war, which must include measures to restore a defense posture, force structure and budget necessary to deter and defeat simultaneous aggressors, offers the greatest prospect for avoiding costly blunders and preserving peace.
Peppino DeBiaso, The Rise of a New Axis: Great Power Struggle and the Future of Conflict, No. 622, April 8, 2025
The Rise of a New Axis: Great Power Struggle and the Future of Conflict
https://nipp.org/information_series/peppino-debiaso-the-rise-of-a-new-axis-great-power-struggle-and-the-future-of-conflict-no-622-april-8-2025/
Dr. Peppino DeBiaso
Dr. Peppino DeBiaso served in a number of positions in the U.S. Department of Defense, including as Director of the Office of Missile Defense Policy. He has held research and teaching positions at the ANSER Corporation, California State University, and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He is currently Adjunct Professor in Missouri State University’s Defense and Strategic Studies Graduate Program in Washington D.C. and a Senior Associate (non-resident) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The views expressed here are his own.
Introduction
The Trump Administration has taken office during a period of perilous transformation that presages a new era in international security. This new era is unlike anything the United States has encountered since perhaps the period leading up to the Second World War. Its most prominent feature is the growing collaboration and coordination among revisionist and belligerent autocratic nations. They are building more lethal militaries while fueling crises and conflicts across Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. To a large degree, these regimes are aligned in their opposition to the United States and the post-World War II security order established in the wake of American leadership.
China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran are pursuing concerted actions to further a common strategic aim, namely, strengthening each countries’ military capabilities as a means, in the near term, to shift the balance of power in their respective regions, while in the longer term, altering the conditions under which future conflict with the United States and its allies would be waged. If this challenge is to be effectively countered, American political leaders must be clear on the nature of the strategic competition that is underway. While today’s adversaries have varying individual regional interests and goals, they recognize the struggle to forge an alternative order of power can likely be achieved only through an entente that erodes American military preeminence, which is at the core of its freedom of action to deter aggression and prevail in conflict with acceptable risks and costs.
For President Trump and his incoming national security team, the priority should be the formulation of a national defense strategy which takes into account the danger posed by the rise of this latter-day axis and concentrates on rebuilding American military capability and capacity to counter the ambitions of its potential opponents. These ambitions contain echoes of the Axis powers that launched World War II. That period illustrates, in no small measure, how the failure of Western democratic powers to grasp the wider significance of the events surrounding the military compact between Germany, Italy and Japan and its allies, contributed to the rising tide of aggression and the eventual collapse of deterrence culminating in global conflict waged on multiple fronts in Europe, East Asia and across the Pacific.
Axis Powers 1.0
It is said that while history doesn’t repeat itself, it often rhymes. In this regard, it is useful to briefly recall some of the more salient features associated with the rise of the Axis entente to illustrate where today’s developments might lead and how this might inform the administration’s strategy to address the prospect of conflict with multiple challengers of the status quo. Not unlike present-day revisionist regimes, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the lesser authoritarian states who tied their fate to the side they believed would be victorious, were collectively dissatisfied with the existing international order created by the Western democracies in the aftermath of World War I. This hostility towards the status quo was reinforced by their ideological compatibility which held democracy and the democratic powers in contempt. Despite differing geopolitical aims, the Axis powers would come to understand that their strategic ambition of establishing a new international order could only be achieved by breaking the hegemony of western powers. By 1936, the three powers, chafing under Western imposed economic sanctions by the League of Nations to halt their expanding aggression in Europe, North Africa, and East Asia, would draw closer together to end their isolation, evade international restrictions, and begin preparing for large-scale conflict to remake the international political system. They signed a series of strategic agreements over the next 18 months pledging to consult and coordinate with one another in the event of war. Henceforth, the Axis states aligned their general policies and actions, while accelerating the buildup of their respective armies, air forces, and navies, under the broad banner of eroding and then dismantling the post-World War I international system – a system largely constructed by the United States with the declared aim of securing a lasting peace through a new global order based on democratic governance and self-determination.
In a manner not unlike the various “strategic partnerships” being put in place today by China, Russia, North Korea and Iran, the Axis powers focused their shared enmity on the United States with the signing of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940. To bring forth a “new order,” they would “assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting powers is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.”[1] The central goal of the Pact was to deter the United States from entering the war against either the Germany-led axis nations in Europe or Japan in Asia by warning the American leadership that if they did so they must be prepared to fight all of the axis powers. Within a short period of time, the United States would find itself in a global conflict confronting multiple major powers who had laid the foundation for war years earlier through the pursuit of a wide range of military measures, and the accumulation of advantages, both small and large. Unfortunately, it would take a surprise attack on the homeland to learn the costs of failing to prepare for aggression in peacetime.
Axis of Autocracies Redux?
While caution should be exercised in drawing together too tightly historical parallels between axis powers past and present, such framing can offer useful insights to inform American and allied strategy and military preparation necessary to address the challenges posed by the emerging partnerships among today’s revisionist regimes. It can be argued, as some have, that the heightened military coordination and mutual support among China, North Korea, and Iran for Russia’s war on Ukraine is predicated on little more than an opportunistic alignment of like-minded anti-Western powers. According to this view, the alignment is either unlikely to outlast the resolution of the conflict or is vulnerable to fracturing through a Kissinger-esque diplomatic engineering of a modern-day Sino-Russian split.[2] However, the linkages being cultivated may belie a deeper and more enduring shift that should not be dismissed as isolated or transient events. Prior to 1936, the Axis states also operated quite independently of one another as they undertook their respective preparations for conflict in Europe and Asia. But this changed quickly as their shared antipathy towards the Western powers and the prevailing status quo hardened.
Today, there are two interrelated trends confronting the United States and its allies that are consequential. The autocratic powers are each challenging the status quo, seeking to compete across multiple domains of military power within the context of advancing their national aims while, concomitantly, coalescing their policies and actions into a common strategic front against the West.
Within the context of their own national agendas, China, Russia, North Korea and Iran are building up and modernizing their respective militaries, with Beijing and Moscow, in particular, constructing forces for global military campaigns.[3] China’s military modernization and growth now outpace that of the United States in terms of force size across land, sea, air, space-counterspace, and in the cyber domain.[4] Along with the largest army, navy and submarine fleet in the world, it is fielding long-range kinetic missiles, including hypersonic weapons, and non-kinetic weapons enabling the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to carry out conventional global strikes against targets in the United States. In parallel with the ongoing transformation of its conventional forces to support long-range operations, China’s strategic nuclear forces are undergoing rapid expansion. It is on a path to achieve at least deployed nuclear weapons parity with the United States by the mid-2030s. This change in the balance of nuclear power will provide Beijing with newly acquired “nuclear top cover” empowering the leadership with greater freedom of action to project military force and influence globally while pursuing more aggressive regional actions, particularly in areas like the South China Sea and Taiwan.[5] Russia, spurred on by its initial setbacks in Ukraine, is in the midst of a major rearmament program which also reinforces its broader revanchist ambitions to reclaim “lost territory” and establish a modern-day cordon sanitaire along its western European front. It is regenerating its conventional military posture while expanding its ground forces for high-intensity land warfare faster than American officials had originally forecast at the start of the conflict.[6] As part of the effort to rebuild its military for large scale operations, it is integrating space, counterspace, and cyber capabilities into its campaign planning to target NATO forces necessary to degrade the effectiveness of American and allied troops to project power into and across Europe during a conflict.[7]
Concurrently, Moscow continues upgrading and diversifying its arsenal of nuclear delivery systems, already the largest in the world, with advanced theater and strategic air-breathing and ballistic missile systems, including hypersonic weapons. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Russia’s leadership has lowered the threshold in their military doctrine to allow the employment of nuclear weapons in response to conventional attacks on Russian territory.[8] Moscow’s recent lowering of the threshold for nuclear use is made all the more dangerous by its threats to carry out limited nuclear strikes against the United States and its allies in order to weaken, through the West’s fear of escalation, U.S. and NATO resolve to oppose continued Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Beyond China and Russia, North Korea and Iran present enduring threats to American interests at home and abroad, especially with regard to their programs for nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Each seeks to position itself as the dominant disruptive regional military power committed to stoking crises, instability and conflict across, respectively, Northeast Asia and the Middle East. North Korea places the highest priority on its nuclear weapons and ICBM programs with the ability to threaten or strike the United States. Pyongyang is accelerating the testing and fielding of several new ICBM variants, which puts new pressure on U.S. missile defenses to protect the homeland against attack. Accompanying the qualitative and quantitative expansion in missile capabilities is an increase in the size of its nuclear stockpile which has been directed to grow by Kim Jong Un at “maximum speed.”[9] In tandem with its nuclear and missile programs, North Korea, despite being one of the poorest countries in the world, maintains the fourth-largest conventional military, with more than 1.2 million personnel, capable of inflicting enormous damage on South Korea. Regarding Iran, its anti-status quo strategy remains fueled by a blend of religious zeal and geopolitical ambition focused on fomenting upheaval across the Middle East. Beyond its role as the leading sponsor of state terrorism around the world and its direct support for proxy forces in conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Gaza and Iraq, its military modernization centers around advancing its nuclear weapons, space launch and ballistic missile programs. Iran is a virtual nuclear weapon state today, reportedly with the ability to produce several nuclear bomb’s worth of fissile material in a matter of weeks.[10] It possesses the largest missile force in the Middle East, which it employed in its first ever direct attacks on Israel in April and again in October 2024 when it launched some 300 and 200 missiles respectively (many of which were destroyed by American and Israeli missile defenses). Finally, Tehran remains committed to the development of a long-range ballistic missile to accompany its nuclear “breakout” potential. Building on its space launch vehicle program, which it is using to mask progress towards an ICBM, an Iranian long-range nuclear missile capable of holding American cities hostage to nuclear blackmail will likely arise quickly when the regime takes the political decision.[11]
Any one of these challenges to American security would be formidable on its own, but the accelerating military collaboration between Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran suggests a shift to a more direct and systemic confrontation with the United States and its allies. All are dissatisfied with the status quo and see it, and the United States in particular, in a state of decline. This is most notably reflected in a hardening of Russian and Chinese antipathy toward the U.S.-led post-World War II international security order. The current structure, in President Putin’s view, is “irreversibly passing away,” and an “irreconcilable struggle is unfolding for the development of a new world order.”[12] This existential struggle with the West is marked by a “rapidly growing potential for conflict and fragmentation” over the existing geopolitical system. China’s leaders hold views sympathetic to Russia’s on challenging U.S. military power and reshaping the global order underpinned by it. Xi Jinping speaks about how Washington and its allies defend and perpetuate “an unfair and exclusive status quo” and that the time has arrived to “construct” a new order, presumably under Beijing’s leadership.[13]
Within this shared strategic purpose among the aggrieved axis powers, is a deepening military and operational cooperation that is augmenting each countries’ capabilities in ways that impose new or additional costs, risks, and vulnerabilities on the United States and its allies that will be borne out in future conflicts.
The most substantial development in this regard is the agreement reached between Presidents’ Xi and Putin in February 2022 declaring a new strategic partnership that would know “no limits.” Over the past two years, the no limits collaboration has only accelerated, making each more dangerous. For example, within the framework of the pact, China is providing military aid in support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is transferring dual-use technology such as machine tools and microelectronics to assist with Moscow’s efforts to rebuild its conventional military and war supporting industry, including for the increased production of munitions, tanks, armored vehicles, and missiles.[14] This assistance not only advances Moscow’s current wartime objectives, but increases its battlefield proficiency in the event of a wider future conflict in Europe with NATO. In return, Russia is furthering China’s efforts to build advanced weapons through the transfer of technologies related to submarine operations, aeronautical design, including stealth that can be applied to manned and unmanned combat aviation, and improvements to missiles for more accurate targeting. The new technologies China is receiving boost its ability to wage high-intensity warfare against not just American ground, sea and land forces in the Pacific and staging bases such as Guam, but against the allied forces of Japan, Australia and South Korea.
Highlighting the expanding strategic cooperation are mutual defense pacts Russia has recently signed with North Korea and Iran linking their policies and actions to advance individual and joint military capabilities in support of common geopolitical aims. For instance, as a result of its deepening involvement in the war in Ukraine to redraw European territorial boundaries, Pyongyang is providing Russia’s army with desperately needed ballistic missiles, artillery and other weapons. In addition to the material support, North Korea now has 11,000 to 12,000 troops fighting alongside the Russian army in what is the largest joint combat operation in Europe since the end of World War II. In exchange, North Korea is reportedly seeking from Russia military technology and expertise to accelerate improvements to it its short-range nuclear weapons, reconnaissance satellites, ICBMs and missile launching submarines.[15]
This collaboration has a number of implications that expose the United States to greater risk. The augmentation of North Korea’s conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons, for instance, improves its ability to conduct a rapid, multi-layered attack against U.S. and South Korean forces. Additionally, these advances in both conventional and nuclear capabilities may embolden it to undertake (further) provocative military action against the South in a crisis, with unpredictable escalation dynamics that could well draw China into a conflict with American and South Korean forces, especially if Beijing intervenes to save its client from defeat.[16] At the same time, the military and technical assistance Russia is offering Pyongyang in the space and ballistic missile area generates additional risks to the United States by exacerbating the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland to North Korean nuclear missile blackmail and attack.
In tandem with the deepening strategic military ties described above, Tehran and Moscow are placing their wartime collaboration on a new and potentially more enduring footing. This is evident in the recent decision by Iran’s leadership to aid Russian combat operations by providing weaponized drones and ballistic missiles to target Ukraine’s troops on the battlefield and its critical civilian infrastructure. This cooperation is growing, and most recently includes the deployment of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Russian-occupied Crimea and Kherson for the purpose of conducting Shahed drone attacks, along with the establishment of a joint manufacturing facility in Russia to mass produce Iranian-designed armed drones. Russia, in return, is transferring to Iran sophisticated weapons such as the Sukhoi Su-35 fighters, helicopters, anti-ship missiles and advanced air defenses, which Iran desperately needs to modernize its forces and which have been hobbled by decades of western sanctions. The improvements to Iran’s air-defenses arising from this cooperation make it more difficult in a future crisis or conflict for the United States to blunt the regime’s employment of its large arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles, which will remain Tehran’s chief means of threatening U.S. and partner military forces in the region.[17]
Next Steps: Preparation and Adaptation
It is not necessarily the value of any individual development or particular advantage on the part of U.S. adversaries that should be accounted for when assessing changes that may alter the conditions under which a future war between the United States and its foes may be lost or won. Rather, it is the accumulated strategic effect arising from the many seemingly small and modest actions and advantages that can enhance military capability on one side while increasing risks and disadvantages on the other.
As the new administration formulates the nation’s defense strategy, it must be centered on a strategic fact that rises above all others when framing the scope and scale of the threat and preparing responses. Namely, there is an accelerating shift in the strategic-operational linkages and cooperation amongst today’s axis states driving regional instability and conflict across Europe, the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East, while simultaneously compounding the vulnerabilities to the American homeland. Not unlike the axis powers of the past, today’s opponents are signaling to the United States that if it chooses to confront the aggression of one state it may have to engage multiple states. Indeed, the military cooperation and ties among today’s revisionist powers are deeper and more expansive than those of Axis powers of World War II. What this suggests is that while the focal point of American defense strategy today on China as the “pacing” long term challenge is appropriate, it would be folly for U.S. policymakers to dismiss the prospect that our adversaries understand that dealing with the “American problem” requires that they collaborate and harmonize their actions during crises as well as in conflict.
It cannot be known whether the autocratic entente will fight together, or in what combinations. However, the current “one war” strategy and force posture that is centered on defeating a single major power disregards the axis nature of today’s threats, leaving the United States ill-prepared to deter conflict and prevail on the battlefield, or more likely, battlefields. American national security planners would do well to recall the warning of Leon Trotsky, the father of the Red Army, who famously observed, “you may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.” Being prepared to deter, defend against and defeat more than one adversary in more than one region is not beyond the capacity of the United States and its allies. During much of the Cold War, the United States fashioned its military strategy, operational plans and force size and composition around the overarching concept of being prepared to fight two large conflicts and one smaller in overlapping timeframes. Deterring adversaries was grounded in the principle of convincing them that the United States and its allies had the military power to defeat multiple enemies, including the possibility of opportunistic aggression, in multiple regions. This standard was largely abandoned at the end of the Cold War.[18]
The United States is operating in a different strategic environment today, facing a combination of peer power and major regional power opponents with a shared disaffection towards the American-led order. Adopting a policy and planning framework that is aligned to this reality in order to shape force investments and modernization is a prudent place for the Trump Administration to start. It is not within the scope of this brief discussion to detail what those changes might look like or cost, which at any rate has been illustratively set out recently by both the Strategic Posture Commission and the Commission on the National Defense Strategy.[19] However, addressing the most significant and consequential risks and threats posed by the ambitions of today’s autocratic entente, does point to a number of key areas requiring increased priority. These include space-counterspace, cyberspace, strategic and theater nuclear deterrent forces, homeland and regional missile defenses, advanced autonomous conventional systems and a revitalized defense industrial base responsive to an era of long-term multi-power competition. It is noteworthy that today, the United States spends around 3.5 percent of its GDP on defense, which is significantly lower than the Cold War average of around 10 percent. Adjusting defense spending upward to account for the new threats to American security is feasible. It is a matter of political will and leadership not affordability.
Taking seriously that our adversaries may be preparing for war, which must include measures to restore a defense posture, force structure and budget necessary to deter and defeat simultaneous aggressors, offers the greatest prospect for avoiding costly blunders and preserving peace.
[1] Details of the Tripartite Pact are available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/triparti.asp.
[2] Lawrence A. Franklin, “Cracks in the New ‘Axis of Evil’: China, Russia, North Korea, Iran,” Gatestone Institute, November 29, 2024, available at https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/21163/china-russia-north-korea-fracture. See also Eugene Rumer, “The United States and the “Axis” of Its Enemies: Myths vs. Reality,” Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, November 25, 2024, available at https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/11/the-united-states-and-the-axis-of-its-enemies-myths-vs-reality?center=russia-eurasia&lang=en.
[3] See Eric S. Edelman and Franklin C. Miller, “We Must Return to and Maintain the Two Theater Defense Planning Construct,” RealClear Defense, August 1, 2023, available at https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/08/17/we_must_return_to_and_maintain_the_two_theater_defense_planning_construct_973522.html.
[4] See Department of Defense, Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, December 18, 2024 available at https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF. Also see the Report on the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, July 2024, available at https://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/NDS-commission.html.
[5] The expansion of China’s nuclear forces has been described as “breathtaking” by the former Commander of US Strategic Command, Admiral Charles Richard. Remarks available at https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2729519/china-russia-pose-strategic-challenges-for-us-allies-admiral-says/.
[6] Noah Robertson, “‘They’ve grown back’: How Russia surprised the West and rebuilt its force,” Defense News, May 21, 2024, available at https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2024/05/21/theyve-grown-back-how-russia-surprised-the-west-and-rebuilt-its-force/.
[7] Report on the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, op. cit., p. 8.
[viii] Mark B. Schneider, “Russian Use of Nuclear Coercion against NATO and Ukraine,” Information Series, No. 521 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, May 2, 2022), available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/521-final.pdf.
[9] Jon Herskovitz, “North Korea Amends Constitution to Enshrine Permanent Growth of Nuclear Arsenal,” Time, September 27, 2023, available at https://time.com/6318150/north-korea-exponential-growth-arsenal-constitution/.
[10] One recent assessment concludes that Iran possesses sufficient weapons-grade uranium to construct its first nuclear weapon within a week and a total of six within a month. See “The Iran Threat Geiger Counter: Reaching Extreme Danger,” Institute for Science and International Security, February 2024, available at https://isis-online.org/uploads/isisreports/documents/Iran_Threat_Geiger_Counter_February_2024_FINAL.pdf.
[11] Robert G. Joseph and Peppino A. DeBiaso, “Homeland Missile Defense: Responding to a Transformed Security Environment,” p. 41, Journal of Policy & Strategy, National Institute for Public Policy, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2024, available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Analysis-Joseph-DeBiaso-4.2.pdf.
[12] Remarks by Vladimir Putin in the plenary session of the 21st annual meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. November 7, 2024, available at https://valdaiclub.com/events/posts/articles/putin-plenary-session-2024/.
[13] Ann Scott Tyson, “China’s new world order: What Xi’s vision would mean for human rights, security,” Christian Science Monitor, July 02, 2024, available at https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2024/0702/China-world-order-Xi.
[14] Remarks of Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell. Stuart Lau, “US accuses China of giving ‘very substantial’ help to Russia’s war machine,” Politico, September 10, 2024 available at https://www.politico.eu/article/united-states-accuse-china-help-russia-war-kurt-campbell/.
[15] Michelle Ye Hee Lee, “Kim Jong Un has sent North Korean troops to Russia. What’s in it for him?” Washington Post, November 1, 2024, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/01/north-korea-troops-russia-ukraine-kim-putin/. On September 13, 2023, Kim Jong Un met Russian President Putin at the Vostochny space launch facility in the Russian Far East. Asked whether Russia would help North Korea build its satellite launch capabilities, Putin replied, “That’s why we came.” Also see Guy Faulconbridge and Soo-Hyang Choi, “Putin and North Korea’s Kim discuss military matters, Ukraine war and satellites,” Reuters, September 13, 2023, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/nkoreas-kim-meets-putinmissiles-launched-pyongyang-2023-09-13/.
[16]Markus Garlauskas, “The United States and its allies must be ready to deter a two-front war and nuclear attacks in East Asia,” Atlantic Council, August 16, 2023, available at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-united-states-and-its-allies-must-be-ready-to-deter-a-two-front-war-and-nuclear-attacks-in-east-asia/.
[17] Courtney Kube and Carol E. Lee, “Russia is providing ‘unprecedented’ military support to Iran in exchange for drones, officials say,” NBC News, Dec 9, 2022, available at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/russia-providing-unprecedented-military-support-iran-exchange-drones-o-rcna60921.
[18] See David J. Trachtenberg, “How the Lack of a ‘Two-War Strategy’ Erodes Extended Deterrence and Assurance,” Information Series, No. 590 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, June 17, 2024), available at https://nipp.org/information_series/david-j-trachtenberg-how-the-lack-of-a-two-war-strategy-erodes-extended-deterrence-and-assurance-issue-no-590-june-17-2024/. Also see David J. Trachtenberg, The Demise of the “Two-War Strategy” and Its Impact on Extended Deterrence and Assurance, Occasional Paper, Vol. 4, No. 6 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, June 2024), available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Vol.-4-No.-6.pdf.
[19] For a broad range of recommendations on a U.S. military posture to address the prospect of conflict with multiple adversaries, see America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, October 2023, available at https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/Strategic-Posture-Committee-Report-Final.pdf; and Report on the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, July 2024, available at https://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/NDS-commission.html.
The National Institute for Public Policy’s Information Series is a periodic publication focusing on contemporary strategic issues affecting U.S. foreign and defense policy. It is a forum for promoting critical thinking on the evolving international security environment and how the dynamic geostrategic landscape affects U.S. national security. Contributors are recognized experts in the field of national security. National Institute for Public Policy would like to thank the Sarah Scaife Foundation for the generous support that made this Information Series possible.
The views in this Information Series are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as official U.S. Government policy, the official policy of the National Institute for Public Policy, or any of its sponsors. For additional information about this publication or other publications by the National Institute Press, contact: Editor, National Institute Press, 9302 Lee Highway, Suite 750, Fairfax, VA 22031, (703) 293- 9181, www.nipp.org. For access to previous issues of the National Institute Press Information Series, please visit http://www.nipp.org/national-institutepress/informationseries/.
© National Institute Press, 2025
13. Corruption derails N. Korea's tech military recruitment: Officials demand dollars and electronics
In this area about the assignments of soldiers, the problems the nKPA face are not unique. How many times have we sent a Korean linguist to an assignment in the MIddle East? We recruit military members with high levels of technological skills and assign them to occupational specialities that do not exploit those skills.
But the above is just bureaucracy. Fortunately we do not have this kind of corruption below. I don't think we have assignment personnel receiving bribes for jobs.
Excerpts:
Assignments to the independent intelligence units should prioritize recruits with specific skills. In reality, however, money trumps skills, undermining the original intention of these deployments to “cultivate personnel familiar with new technologies to digitize the army.”
With officials taking bribes for these desirable positions, assignments to the new units increasingly depend on the power and economic influence of recruits’ parents.
Corruption derails N. Korea's tech military recruitment: Officials demand dollars and electronics - Daily NK English
"New recruits with actual skills or technical prowess are often pushed into ordinary assignments because they lack connections," a source told Daily NK
By Jeong Tae Joo - April 9, 2025
dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · April 9, 2025
Bribery and corruption surrounding the deployment of new spring recruits to specialized units of the North Korean army is worse than in previous years.
In particular, officials from the Ministry of Defense’s Military Mobilization Replacement Bureau — similar to South Korea’s Military Manpower Administration — have turned the assignment of new personnel to newly expanded independent intelligence units attached to certain mechanized divisions into a lucrative business opportunity this year.
“Some officials from the Military Mobilization Replacement Bureau have been using the 15-day spring recruitment period for individual duties that began on April 1 to demand hefty bribes from wealthy parents, offering to send their children to the new independent intelligence units,” a Daily NK source in the North Korean military said recently.
Parents in Pyongyang with draft-eligible children have shown considerable interest in these independent units since personnel can serve their military service in relative comfort, learning computers and telecommunication skills without living communally with other soldiers.
Assignments to the independent intelligence units should prioritize recruits with specific skills. In reality, however, money trumps skills, undermining the original intention of these deployments to “cultivate personnel familiar with new technologies to digitize the army.”
With officials taking bribes for these desirable positions, assignments to the new units increasingly depend on the power and economic influence of recruits’ parents.
In fact, bribery and corruption have become so entrenched that officials from the Military Mobilization Replacement Bureau call the spring draft a “golden period where you can make a year’s income.”
“Officials accepted North Korean currency, liquor or cigarettes as bribes through last year, but this year, they are demanding dollars, notebook computers, smartphones and other high-priced electronics,” the source said. “Military Mobilization Replacement Bureau officials first approach certain parents, telling them that only a few spots in the new units are available.”
“New recruits with actual skills or technical prowess are often pushed into ordinary assignments because they lack connections,” the source said. “With the spring draft proceeding this way, the plan to cultivate skilled personnel to digitize the army is unlikely to succeed.”
The North Korean authorities have repeatedly emphasized efforts to eradicate corruption during the draft, but even officials from the Military Mobilization Replacement Bureau — which oversees recruitment efforts — widely cover for each other, tacitly approving and enabling corruption.
“The core purpose of the latest draft is to cultivate technical personnel in preparation for modern warfare, but now it’s become a bribery channel where money and power intersect,” the source said. “Bribery is getting worse, not better.”
dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · April 9, 2025
14. N. Korean security agents recalled after work complaints, unlikely to face punishment
I don't think we can fathom the amount of corruption that is taking place throughout the north. Though we should not be surprised given the hardships the entire society outside of the Kim family regime elite suffers.
N. Korean security agents recalled after work complaints, unlikely to face punishment - Daily NK English
dailynk.com · by Lee Ho Jin · April 9, 2025
North Korean workers wait for a flight to Pyongyang at the airport in Vladivostok, Russia, in December 2019. (Courtesy of Kang Dong Wan, professor at Dong-A University)
After Choi Sung Chol, a state security officer accused of violating the human rights of North Korean workers in Russia, was summoned to Pyongyang, two other state security agents in Russia were brought to Pyongyang for questioning at the Ministry of State Security, Daily NK has learned.
North Korean workers in Russia provided information about the state security agents who were recalled to Pyongyang, showing the significant impact of Daily NK’s reporting.
A high-ranking source inside North Korea told Daily NK recently that state security agent Han Kwang Jin (male, late 40s) was recalled to Pyongyang from Irkutsk in mid-January and that Song Myong Nam (male, mid-50s) was recalled from Vladivostok in late March.
While North Korea claimed the two agents had been summoned for a routine review, they were reportedly rushed onto a plane so abruptly they couldn’t pack their belongings—suggesting an arrest rather than a normal summons.
North Korea’s Ministry of State Security ordered managers to quietly gather reports from overseas workers in February 2024. Managers were even instructed to encourage workers to share grievances directly with them instead of contacting South Korean newspapers.
After Daily NK published an article in January 2024 accusing Choi Sung Chol of human rights violations based on tips from workers in Russia, North Korean authorities apparently sought ways to prevent similar incidents.
“When the Ministry of State Security reviewed workers’ reports, it found that agents’ corruption was worse than expected. Han Kwang Jin and Song Myong Nam were summoned because they were considered the most brutal agents in the field, given how frequently they were mentioned in workers’ reports,” the source said.
Little chance of punishment despite abundant evidence of corruption
Song Myong Nam extorted money and cigarettes from workers. When sick workers requested leave, Song would demand bribes, forcing them to hand over electronics or alcohol if they couldn’t afford to pay.
Han Kwang Jin was even more ruthless, following crews doing side jobs and taking a cut of their earnings. He reportedly even obtained a luxury car as a bribe from local construction brokers.
Han sent his accumulated earnings to his wife in Pyongyang, who used the money to buy several houses.
When Han’s corruption was exposed through tip-offs and he was summoned to the ministry, officials were stunned by his casual justification: “Everything is like that overseas. That’s just part of taking care of business,” he reportedly said.
Nevertheless, the source said neither Song nor Han is likely to face punishment because of their impeccable family connections.
“The two men’s family members and cousins are connected with senior officials on the Central Committee. Any attempt to punish them would trigger a flood of phone calls, causing problems at the Ministry of State Security. Their cases will probably be swept under the rug without any meaningful consequences,” the source said.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Lee Ho Jin · April 9, 2025
15. Editorial: South Korea must modernize its spy laws before it's too late
Interestingly the editorial board partially ties their argument to the US strategic focus on Taiwan.
Excerpts:
The United States Department of Defense recently identified deterring a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan as its top strategic priority. Should Beijing initiate an attack, American forces stationed in South Korea and Japan are expected to play a central role in the regional response. U.S. air assets based in South Korea are likely to be deployed toward Taiwan, and American aircraft carriers could use facilities in South Korea or Japan as operational hubs. As a result, intelligence-gathering activities targeting South Korea–U.S. military coordination are expected to become increasingly aggressive and sophisticated.
Despite the rising threat, South Korea is currently unable to prosecute Chinese nationals engaged in espionage under its existing anti-espionage legislation. Article 98 of the Criminal Act defines espionage solely in relation to “enemy states,” a designation limited to North Korea. A legislative proposal to revise the law and expand its applicability to include foreign countries has stalled in the National Assembly’s Legislation and Judiciary Committee.
Editorial: South Korea must modernize its spy laws before it's too late
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/04/09/YWWD5IUKORHQRMENK6Q4AREX7E/
By The Chosunilbo
Published 2025.04.09. 08:28
Two South Korean Air Force F-5 (Jegong-ho) fighter jets take off from Suwon Air Base in Gyeonggi-do. /Newsis
South Korean police apprehended two Chinese teenagers for illegally filming fighter jets taking off and landing at the Air Force’s 10th Fighter Wing Suwon, Gyeonggi-do. They were also found to have secretly recorded activities at the nearby U.S. Air Force base in Osan. Authorities discovered that the pair had booked transportation to a South Korean city where a U.S. aircraft carrier was scheduled to dock—an event whose details are rarely disclosed even to the South Korean public. The two entered the country last month on tourist visas, but are suspected of gathering intelligence on South Korea–U.S. combined military assets. One of them reportedly told investigators that his father works for China’s public security bureau. The incident has heightened concerns that China may be recruiting individuals of all ages and backgrounds for espionage.
Last month, a Chinese intelligence agent was arrested by the South Korean Defense Counterintelligence Command after attempting to recruit an active-duty South Korean soldier and obtain classified information related to joint military exercises. The agent was detained upon entering the country to pay for the acquired materials. In a separate case last year, a Chinese national was caught operating a drone near the headquarters of the National Intelligence Service. In another incident, three Chinese students were discovered filming a U.S. aircraft carrier docked at a naval base in Busan.
The United States Department of Defense recently identified deterring a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan as its top strategic priority. Should Beijing initiate an attack, American forces stationed in South Korea and Japan are expected to play a central role in the regional response. U.S. air assets based in South Korea are likely to be deployed toward Taiwan, and American aircraft carriers could use facilities in South Korea or Japan as operational hubs. As a result, intelligence-gathering activities targeting South Korea–U.S. military coordination are expected to become increasingly aggressive and sophisticated.
Despite the rising threat, South Korea is currently unable to prosecute Chinese nationals engaged in espionage under its existing anti-espionage legislation. Article 98 of the Criminal Act defines espionage solely in relation to “enemy states,” a designation limited to North Korea. A legislative proposal to revise the law and expand its applicability to include foreign countries has stalled in the National Assembly’s Legislation and Judiciary Committee.
Following last year’s revelation that a civilian employee of the Korea Defense Intelligence Command had leaked classified materials to a Chinese agent, both the ruling and opposition parties reached a consensus on the need to amend the law. The proposed revision passed a subcommittee in November, but the Democratic Party has since delayed further progress, citing concerns over potential abuse. The bill is intended to penalize espionage conducted on behalf of any foreign state—not only those officially designated as enemies.
All Chinese nationals arrested for photographing South Korea–U.S. military facilities have reportedly claimed to have acted out of “curiosity” or “personal interest.” Authorities believe these individuals are aware that, under current law, espionage charges cannot be pursued unless the activities are connected to North Korea. As global tensions over national security and emerging technologies continue to escalate, the question remains: how much longer can South Korea afford to leave its anti-espionage laws unchanged?
16. Why do conservative protesters wave American flags?
It is unfortunate that conservatives are vulnerable to this criticism. In general they need to politically organize more effectively. As for external support from the US, ironically, this may be compared to those in the South who take support from China and north Korea. Again it is unfortunate that this criticism of conservatives publically outweighs the criticism that should be taking place for those who accept support from China and north Korea which is much more dangerous to the Republic.
Why do conservative protesters wave American flags?
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/politics/20250409/why-do-south-koreas-conservative-protesters-wave-american-flags
textScalePopoverWrapper open
print
open image gallery
Supporters of former President Yoon Suk Yeol hold a rally in front of the presidential residence in central Seoul's Hannam-dong, Jan. 3, as the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials moved to execute a detention warrant against him over his Dec. 3 martial law declaration. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul
By Jung Da-hyun
- Published Apr 9, 2025 9:01 pm KST
- Updated Apr 9, 2025 9:01 pm KSTFor far right, Stars and Stripes symbolize strong alliance, idolization of US as guardian of democracy
When Korea was grappling with political turmoil following former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s abrupt declaration of martial law and subsequent impeachment, a familiar scene unfolded on the streets — conservative demonstrators waving American flags alongside Korea’s national flag of Taegeukgi.
This became a symbolic fixture at right-wing rallies, intended to reflect deep-rooted ideological and historical ties between Korea’s conservative factions and the United States.
For these groups, the U.S. is more than an ally. It represents a symbolic guardian of the liberal democratic system they believe is now under threat.
“We don’t see the current political crisis as a typical clash between conservatives and progressives,” said Kim Jin-il, former youth spokesperson for the conservative People Power Party’s South Gyeongsang Provincial Chapter. “This is a full-scale war of systems.”
Within this framework, the concept of "anti-state forces" has expanded to include not only North Korea but also China, reflecting a heightened sense of ideological threat.
“The American flag symbolizes the alliance between Korea and U.S. and it stands for the historic role the U.S. has played in defending Korea’s liberal democracy,” Kim said.
Especially among attendees at right-wing rallies, many belong to the generation that lived through the Cold War or inherited its strong anti-communist values.
They pointed to the U.S. liberating Korea from Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule and defending the country during the 1950-53 Korean War, portraying the U.S. as a steadfast protector of democracy.
Their unwavering glorification of the U.S. leaves little room for critical engagement, leading many to overlook or dismiss recent tensions such as U.S. tariff measures that are hitting Korean businesses hard.
The conservative evangelical view is also playing a powerful role in pro-Yoon rallies. Far-right pastor Jeon Kwang-hoon of Sarang Jeil Church is a prominent figure at many of these rallies, frequently taking a leading role in organizing and mobilizing supporters.
He and his followers often frame their protests not simply as part of a political dispute, but as a spiritual battle to defend Korea’s Christian heritage and liberal democratic values.
They also look to Syngman Rhee, South Korea's first president, as a national patriarch. They idealize his legacy of pro-American, anti-communist and Christian governance. Rhee, who earned his doctorate in the U.S. and rose to power with American support, is remembered by these groups as a leader whose presidency embodied unwavering pro-U.S. sentiment.
The presence of American flags at conservative rallies is not a new phenomenon. During the protests opposing the impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye in 2016 and 2017, demonstrators also marched with both the Taegeukgi and the American Stars and Stripes in hand.
Experts raise concerns about their growing influence, which was well displayed during the recent unrest at the Seoul Western District Court, where far-right protesters, some of whom were carrying American flags, reacted violently after the court issued an arrest warrant for Yoon.
“This shows how the far-right is evolving into a more politically organized force,” political commentator Park Sang-byung said.
Park emphasized that they may become more vocal and public in their stance, targeting not only perceived domestic enemies, such as progressive strongholds like the Jeolla regions, but also other countries. China could be one of the countries, as Yoon has cited Chinese interference in elections as one of grounds to send martial law troops to the National Election Commission on the night of the martial law imposition.
“They’re likely to grow louder in their anti-China rhetoric and push for the forced expulsion of Southeast Asian and Chinese migrant workers in the country,” he added.
Jung Da-hyun
Jung Da-hyun is a reporter at The Korea Times, covering social issues in Korea, including foreign residents, education, environment and politics. Driven by a deep interest in people’s stories, she focuses on investigative and feature reporting through direct interviews and field coverage. She received the Amnesty International Korea Media Award for her “Deepfake Crisis at Schools” series. Reach her at dahyun08@koreatimes.co.kr. Always open to hearing your stories.
17. Kim In-su, NK-born US Special Forces commando, dies at 92
The loss of a great Korean hero who was a member of one of the most overlooked units in the Korean War.
- Foreign Affairs
- North Korea
Kim In-su, NK-born US Special Forces commando, dies at 92
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/northkorea/20250409/kim-in-su-north-korean-defector-who-served-in-us-special-forces-unit-during-korean-war-dies-at-92
textScalePopoverWrapper open
print
open image gallery
Kim In-su poses in front of his house in Maryland, U.S., June 16, 2023. Yonhap
By Park Ung
- Published Apr 9, 2025 3:28 pm KST
- Updated Apr 9, 2025 5:04 pm KSTKim In-su, a former member of a U.S. Special Forces unit made up of North Korean defectors, has died. He was 92.
Kim died March 31 in Rockville, Maryland, according to the U.S.-based obituary site Tribute Archive. The cause of death was not disclosed, but the obituary described it as a "peaceful passing."
He served in the 8240th Army Unit, a U.S. Far East Command group that used islands off North Korea’s east and west coasts to launch special operations — gathering intelligence, disrupting supply lines and rescuing prisoners during the 1950-53 Korean War.
Although operated and overseen by the U.S. military, the unit was largely composed of young North Korean defectors familiar with the region's geography, culture and dialect. The unit, referred to in official U.S. military documents as “North Korean Partisans,” grew to about 22,000 members at its peak in 1953.
Born in Pyongyang — now the capital of North Korea — in 1932, Kim went into hiding to escape communist persecution of Christians in 1950 following the outbreak of the Korean War. He later joined the United Nations forces after they captured the city that October.
In a 2023 interview with Yonhap News Agency, Kim said he joined the U.N. forces because they "needed someone who could speak English," noting he learned the language from his grandfather.
In 1951, as China’s People’s Liberation Army entered the war, Kim retreated south with U.N. forces and joined the 8240th Army Unit. Assigned to the Tactical Liaison Office, he gathered intelligence on enemy movements, weapons and terrain. A Pyongyang Medical College graduate, he also treated patients at field hospitals.
After completing his mandatory military service and studying acupuncture and traditional medicine, Kim moved to the U.S. in 1965 and later became an American citizen. He opened a clinic in Washington, D.C., and treated patients for over 40 years before retiring.
In 2014, he received a certificate of appreciation for his wartime service from then–U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel.
In lieu of flowers, the family requested that donations be made to the Korean War Veterans Association, in honor of Kim’s memory and his membership in the organization.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
