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Quotes of the Day:
"Our lives begin to end the day we become silent about things that matter."
– Martin Luther King Jr.
“He tried to make her understand. 'This was an exceptional case. It wasn't just a question of somebody being killed. Do you realize that the past, starting from yesterday, has been actually abolished? If it survives anywhere, it's in a few solid objects with no words attached to them, like that lump of glass there. Already we know almost literally nothing about the Revolution and the years before the Revolution. Every record has been destroyed or falsified, every book has been rewritten, every picture has been repainted, every statue and street and building has been renamed, every date has been altered. And that process is continuing day by day and minute by minute. History has stopped. Nothing exists except an endless present in which the Party is always right. I know, of course, that the past is falsified, but it would never be possible for me to prove it, even when I did the falsification myself. After the thing is done, no evidence ever remains. The only evidence is inside my own mind, and I don't know with any certainty that any other human being shares my memories. Just in that one instance, in my whole life, I did possess actual concrete evidence after the event -- years after it.’”
– George Orwell, 1984.
“If you want to go bomb somebody, there's remarkably little discussion about how much it might cost. But when you have a discussion about whether or not we can help assist suffering people then suddenly we become very cost conscious.”
– Andrew J. Bacevich, American historian.
1. Acting president resigns, indicates bid for June 3 presidential election
2. Supreme Court overturns DP presidential candidate's acquittal in election law violation case
3. Finance Minister Choi resigns before parliament reports his impeachment motion
4. U.S. Chamber of Commerce requests Trump's tariff exclusions for small businesses
5. Impeachment motion against prosecutor general presented to plenary session
6. Your Favorite New Coworker Is an AI-Enhanced Operative From North Korea
7. Caught Our Eye: South Korean defense company taps Ernst aide
8. Kim Jong Un Wants More Nuclear Weapons on North Korean Warships
9. S. Korea unable to prosecute foreign spies under current espionage law, NIS warns
10. South Korea stages major naval drills following North Korea’s warship reveal
11. What North Korea stands to lose if US Forces Korea expands mission to China
12. The first daughter has grown tall and North Koreans are watching3.
13. Book review: North Korea takes center stage in chilling look at new nuclear era
14. North Korean beer from border city looking to make mark in Russian market
15. Japan’s ‘one-theater’ defense concept rattles South Korea
1. Acting president resigns, indicates bid for June 3 presidential election
Can he capture the moderate middle of Korea and change the political landscape from domination by the two extremes?
(2nd LD) Acting president resigns, indicates bid for June 3 presidential election | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Hyun-soo · May 1, 2025
(ATTN: UPDATES with DP's commentary in paras 13-15; ADDS new photo)
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, May 1 (Yonhap) -- Acting President Han Duck-soo resigned Thursday, indicating he would run for the June 3 presidential election.
Han announced his decision in an address to the nation, ending weeks of speculation over whether he would enter the election triggered by the impeachment of his former boss -- former President Yoon Suk Yeol.
"Thinking of the weight of the responsibility I carry at this grave time, after thinking long and carefully about whether such a decision is in fact right and inevitable, I decided that if this is the only way, I must take it," he said from the government complex in Seoul.
Acting President Han Duck-soo announces his resignation at the government complex in Seoul on May 1, 2025. (Yonhap)
Han, who has been prime minister under both liberal and conservative presidents and also served as the South Korean ambassador to the United States, has been a favorite among conservatives to challenge Lee Jae-myung, the presidential candidate of the liberal Democratic Party.
Lee currently maintains a wide lead over his rivals with around 40 percent support in public opinion polls.
"I have two roads in front of me," Han said during the address, which was televised live. "One is to complete the important mission I currently have, while the other is to lay down that important mission and bear a greater responsibility.
"I ultimately decided to step down from my position in order to do what I can, do what I must, for us to overcome the crisis we face," he said, citing extreme political confrontation and the threat it is posing to the country's economy and industries.
Han has been expected to announce his presidential bid Friday.
A Han candidacy is certain to trigger merger talks with the conservative People Power Party (PPP), whose presidential candidate will be chosen Saturday.
The two final contenders -- former PPP leader Han Dong-hoon and former Labor Minister Kim Moon-soo -- have both expressed an openness to merging candidacies with Han.
The PPP has been considering various deadlines by which the merger must be finalized in order to maximize its chances in the June 3 election.
To start, May 7 is the deadline by which the National Election Commission must order printed materials for the race. May 11 is the deadline for candidate registration with the commission, while May 25 is the date that ballot printing begins.
Acting President Han Duck-soo leaves the government complex building in downtown Seoul after announcing his resignation on May 1, 2025. (Yonhap)
The Democratic Party (DP) denounced Han's impending presidential bid, warning it would raise concerns over his alleged electioneering while serving as acting president.
"Prime Minister Han, who was second in command under the 'insurrection government' and a suspect of the insurrection, pushed ahead with the resignation to run for president," Jo Seoung-lae, the DP's chief spokesperson, said in a written statement.
"Only the people's harsh judgment awaits Prime Minister Han, who has neglected state affairs, blinded by greed."
Meanwhile, with Han's resignation, Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Choi Sang-mok will take over as the acting president.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Hyun-soo · May 1, 2025
2. Supreme Court overturns DP presidential candidate's acquittal in election law violation case
I did not expect this. Will Lee be prevented from running? Will there be a constitutional crisis? Will there be protests from the extreme left?
What does this do for Prime Minister Hans's chance of being elected president? Perhaps he anticipated this and believes he is the only candidate who can currently unify South Korea.
(3rd LD) Supreme Court overturns DP presidential candidate's acquittal in election law violation case | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · May 1, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS parties' reactions in last 4 paras)
By Chae Yun-hwan
SEOUL, May 1 (Yonhap) -- The Supreme Court on Thursday struck down a lower court's acquittal of Democratic Party (DP) presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung on charges of election law violation, sending the case back to the appeals court.
In a televised decision, the top court overturned the Seoul High Court's verdict in March, which acquitted Lee of lying as a presidential candidate during the 2022 election campaign.
The Supreme Court's decision came about a month before the country will hold the June 3 presidential election. The top court has deliberated on the case in an unexpectedly swift manner, given that a final ruling could affect Lee's eligibility to run for office.
Lee is widely considered a front-runner for the upcoming election as he is leading opinion polls by a wide margin.
By law, those who receive a fine of 1 million won (US$700) or more for violating the election law are restricted from running for office for five years.
Democratic Party presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung makes a speech at the National Assembly in western Seoul on April 30, 2025. (Yonhap)
Lee has been indicted for lying during a media interview in December 2021 that he did not play golf with the late Kim Moon-ki, a former executive of Seongnam Development Corp., which was behind a corruption-ridden development project in Seongnam, south of Seoul, when Lee was the city's mayor.
Lee also faces charges of lying during a parliamentary audit of the Gyeonggi provincial government in October 2021 that he was under pressure from the land ministry to rezone the former site of the Korea Food Research Institute in Seongnam.
In March, the Seoul High Court overturned a lower court ruling that found him guilty and sentenced him to a suspended prison term, saying that his remarks did not qualify as false statements.
But the Supreme Court said the appeals court "misunderstood" the legal principles regarding the false statements, determining that Lee's remarks related to golf and pressure from the land ministry constitute the dissemination of false information under the election law.
With the top court's decision, the Seoul High Court should review the case for a retrial. There is a slim possibility that legal procedures for a final sentencing will be completed by the election date, but controversy over Lee's eligibility to run for presidency is expected to continue.
After the court's decision, Lee immediately expressed disappointment.
"It is a ruling that is in a completely different direction than what I thought," Lee told reporters after the ruling. "The law is an agreement by the people, and the will of the people is what is most important."
When asked about calls from political opponents for him to step down from presidential candidacy, Lee said politics is ultimately up to the people, adding that he would follow the "will of the people."
Supreme Court Chief Justice Cho Hee-dae attends the trial for Democratic Party presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung's election law violation case at the court in southern Seoul on May 1, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
The DP announced it will stand by its presidential hopeful. The party criticized the verdict as a "politically motivated ruling" and dismissed the possibility of replacing the candidate.
"Lee is the DP's presidential candidate elected through our primary, in which our party members and Korean nationals participated," DP spokesperson Jo Seoung-lae said. "We will not be swayed by any judicial attempts to upset our candidate."
Meanwhile, the conservative People Power Party (PPP) called for Lee's immediate resignation.
"It is a grave insult to the people to continue backing a presidential candidate even after the verdict was handed down," the PPP's interim leader Kwon Young-se said. "The DP should replace its candidate as soon as possible if it is a responsible party."
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · May 1, 2025
3. Finance Minister Choi resigns before parliament reports his impeachment motion
He did a good job as acting president. Perhaps when Prime Minister Han wins the election on June 3d he will choose Minster Choi to be his Prime MInister.
(LEAD) Finance Minister Choi resigns before parliament reports his impeachment motion | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · May 1, 2025
(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; ADDS more info throughout)
SEOUL, May 1 (Yonhap) -- Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok resigned late Thursday, just minutes before the National Assembly was set to vote on a motion to impeach him.
"I apologize to the people that I am unable to continue my duties amid grave internal and external economic conditions," Choi said in a statement released by the finance ministry.
Outgoing acting President and Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, who is widely expected to run in the upcoming presidential election in June, immediately accepted Choi's resignation.
Following Choi's resignation, the National Assembly halted proceedings on the impeachment motion.
South Korea has seen a string of temporary leadership changes in recent months, triggered by former President Yoon Suk Yeol's imposition of martial law in December and his removal from office on April 4.
Choi had initially stepped into the interim presidential role on Dec. 27, after acting President Han was impeached by the Democratic Party (DP)-controlled National Assembly.
The latest impeachment motion, led by the DP, accused Choi -- who was then serving as acting president -- of delaying the appointment of the ninth justice to the Constitutional Court, among other allegations.
Choi had been set to again resume the interim leadership role at midnight Thursday following Han's resignation.
Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok speaks at the National Assembly in Seoul on May 1, 2025. (Yonhap)
khj@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · May 1, 2025
4. U.S. Chamber of Commerce requests Trump's tariff exclusions for small businesses
I doubt this will have much impact.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce requests Trump's tariff exclusions for small businesses | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 1, 2025
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, May 1 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has sent a letter to the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump to give small business importers tariff exclusions for products that cannot be produced in the United States or are not readily available, the letter showed Thursday.
Suzanne Clark, the president of the business lobby, sent the letter to Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer on Wednesday, calling for the government to take "immediate" action "to save America's small businesses and stave off a recession."
It requested that the administration establish a process that provides an automatic exclusion from new tariffs for any small business importer and gives automatic exclusions for all products that cannot be produced or are not easily available in the U.S.
It also requested the establishment of a process to expeditiously obtain exclusions in situations where companies can demonstrate that tariffs impose significant risks to U.S. employment.
"The chamber supports many of the president's policy goals, including eliminating unfair trade and non-trade barriers, and driving American investment. At the same time, we have heard from a historic number of small businesses who have made it clear: they need immediate relief from tariffs," Clark was quoted as saying in a release.
"As each day goes by, small businesses are increasingly endangered by higher costs and interrupted supply chains that will cause irreparable harm."
Clark noted that the chamber applauds the administration's efforts to negotiate new trade deals that expand market access for U.S. companies and benefit American workers, but she stressed that "these deals take time, and many businesses simply can't afford to wait while negotiations proceed."
This file photo, released by Reuters, shows a China Shipping container seen at a port in Oakland, California, on April 10, 2025. (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 1, 2025
5. Impeachment motion against prosecutor general presented to plenary session
The Democratic Party of Korea/Minjoo just cannot help itself. Its true colors should be apparent. It is not interested in governing for the good of Korea but instead in paralyzing the current government so it can gain power for itself.
Impeachment motion against prosecutor general presented to plenary session | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Hyun-soo · May 1, 2025
SEOUL, May 1 (Yonhap) -- An impeachment motion against Prosecutor General Shim Woo-jung was reported Thursday to the plenary session of the National Assembly led by the Democratic Party (DP) over his alleged role in former President Yoon Suk Yeol's failed martial law bid.
The decision came hours after the Supreme Court decided to strike down a lower court's acquittal of DP presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung on charges of election law violation.
The DP accused Shim of colluding with Yoon in the "unconstitutional and illegal" emergency martial law declaration on Dec. 3 and the armed insurrection riot that mobilized the martial law troops and the police.
Under the law, an impeachment motion must be either put to a vote or referred to the Legislation and Judiciary Committee for further review within 24 to 72 hours after it is reported to the plenary session.
The DP decided to send Shim's impeachment motion to the judiciary committee.
Lawmakers of the Democratic Party (DP) shout slogans denouncing the Supreme Court for its decision to strike down the acquittal of its presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung over election law violations on May 1, 2025. (Yonhap)
sookim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Hyun-soo · May 1, 2025
6. Your Favorite New Coworker Is an AI-Enhanced Operative From North Korea
We must not be deluded by the idea that north Korea is a backward country because of the iconic photo of no lights on in the north. When it comes to employment of the all purpose sword of cyber, north Korea is increasingly sophisticated. And it takes a long term view.
And as an aside, if north Korea can insert operatives in Western companies, how well do we think it is doing infiltrating operatives into South Korea to conduct myriad acts of espionage, influence, subversion, and sabotage?
Your Favorite New Coworker Is an AI-Enhanced Operative From North Korea
By Bobbie Johnson
The Big Story
May 1, 2025 3:00 AM
North Korea Stole Your Job
For years, North Korea has been secretly placing young IT workers inside Western companies. With AI, their schemes are now more devious—and effective—than ever.
Wired · by Bobbie Johnson · May 1, 2025
On paper, the first candidate looked perfect. Thomas was from rural Tennessee and had studied computer science at the University of Missouri. His résumé said he’d been a professional programmer for eight years, and he’d breezed through a preliminary tecoding test. All of this was excellent news for Thomas’ prospective boss, Simon Wijckmans, founder of the web security startup C.Side. The 27-year-old Belgian was based in London but was looking for ambitious, fully remote coders.
Thomas had an Anglo-Saxon surname, so Wijckmans was surprised when he clicked into his Google Meet and found himself speaking with a heavily accented young man of Asian origin. Thomas had set a generic image of an office as his background. His internet connection was laggy— odd for a professional coder—and his end of the call was noisy. To Wijckmans, Thomas sounded like he was sitting in a large, crowded space, maybe a dorm or a call center.
Wijckmans fired off his interview questions, and Thomas’ responses were solid enough. But Wijckmans noticed that Thomas seemed most interested in asking about his salary. He didn’t come across as curious about the actual work or about how the company operated or even about benefits like startup stock or health coverage. Odd, thought Wijckmans. The conversation came to a close, and he got ready for the next interview in his queue.
Once again, the applicant said they were based in the US, had an Anglo name, and appeared to be a young Asian man with a thick, non-American accent. He used a basic virtual background, was on a terrible internet connection, and had a single-minded focus on salary. This candidate, though, was wearing glasses. In the lenses, Wijckmans spotted the reflection of multiple screens, and he could make out a white chatbox with messages scrolling by. “He was clearly either chatting with somebody or on some AI tool,” Wijckmans remembers.
On high alert, Wijckmans grabbed screenshots and took notes. After the call ended, he went back over the job applications. He found that his company’s listings were being flooded with applicants just like these: an opening for a full-stack developer got more than 500 applications in a day, far more than usual. And when he looked more deeply into the applicants’ coding tests, he saw that many candidates appeared to have used a virtual private network, or VPN, which allows you to mask your computer’s true location.
Wijckmans didn’t know it yet, but he’d stumbled onto the edges of an audacious, global cybercrime operation. He’d unwittingly made contact with an army of seemingly unassuming IT workers, deployed to work remotely for American and European companies under false identities, all to bankroll the government of North Korea.
With a little help from some friends on the ground, of course.
christina chapman was living in a trailer in Brook Park, Minnesota, a hamlet north of Minneapolis, when she got a note from a recruiter that changed her life. A bubbly 44-year-old with curly red hair and glasses, she loved her dogs and her mom and posting social justice content on TikTok. In her spare time she listened to K-pop, enjoyed Renaissance fairs, and got into cosplay. Chapman was also, according to her sparse online résumé, learning to code online.
It was March 2020 when she clicked on the message in her LinkedIn account. A foreign company was looking for somebody to “be the US face” of the business. The company needed help finding remote employment for overseas workers. Chapman signed on. It’s unclear how fast her workload grew, but by October 2022 she could afford a move from chilly Minnesota to a low-slung, four-bedroom house in Litchfield Park, Arizona. It wasn’t fancy—a suburban corner lot with a few thin trees—but it was a big upgrade over the trailer.
The pandemic dramatically expanded the number of remote jobs, and Pyongyang saw the perfect opportunity.
Chapman then started documenting more of her life on TikTok and YouTube, mostly talking about her diet, fitness, or mental health. In one chatty video, shared in June 2023, she described grabbing breakfast on the go—an açaí bowl and a smoothie— because work was so busy. “My clients are going crazy!” she complained. In the background, the camera caught a glimpse of metal racks holding at least a dozen open laptops covered in sticky notes. A few months later, federal investigators raided Chapman’s home, seized the laptops, and eventually filed charges alleging that she had spent three years aiding the “illicit revenue generation efforts” of the government of North Korea.
For maybe a decade, North Korean intelligence services have been training young IT workers and sending them abroad in teams, often to China or Russia. From these bases, they scour the web for job listings all over, usually in software engineering, and usually with Western companies. They favor roles that are fully remote, with solid wages, good access to data and systems, and few responsibilities. Over time they began applying for these jobs using stolen or fake identities and relying on members of their criminal teams to provide fictional references; some have even started using AI to pass coding tests, video interviews, and background checks.
But if an applicant lands a job offer, the syndicate needs somebody on the ground in the country the applicant claims to live in. A fake employee, after all, can’t use the addresses or bank accounts linked to their stolen IDs, and they can’t dial in to a company’s networks from overseas without instantly triggering suspicion. That’s where someone like Christina Chapman comes in.
As the “facilitator” for hundreds of North Korea–linked jobs, Chapman signed fraudulent documents and handled some of the fake workers’ salaries. She would often receive their paychecks in one of her bank accounts, take a cut, and wire the rest overseas: Federal prosecutors say Chapman was promised as much as 30 percent of the money that passed through her hands.
Her most important job, though, was tending the “laptop farm.” After being hired, a fake worker will typically ask for their company computer to be sent to a different address than the one on record—usually with some tale about a last-minute move or needing to stay with a sick relative. The new address, of course, belongs to the facilitator, in this case Chapman. Sometimes the facilitator forwards the laptop to an address overseas, but more commonly that person holds onto it and installs software that allows it to be controlled remotely. Then the fake employee can connect to their machine from anywhere in the world while appearing to be in the US. (“You know how to install Anydesk?” one North Korean operative asked Chapman in 2022. “I do it practically EVERYDAY!” she replied.)
In messages with her handlers, Chapman discussed sending government forms like the I-9, which attests that a person is legally able to work in the US. (“I did my best to copy your signature,” she wrote. “Haha. Thank you,” came the response.) She also did basic tech troubleshooting and dialed into meetings on a worker’s behalf, sometimes on short notice, as in this conversation from November 2023:
xt hWorker: We are going to have laptop setup meeting in 20 mins. Can you join Teams meeting and follow what IT guy say? Because it will require to restart laptop multiple times and I can not handle that. You can mute and just follow what they say ...
Chapman: Who do I say I am?
Worker: You don’t have to say, I will be joining there too.
Chapman: I just typed in the name Daniel. If they ask WHY you are using two devices, just say the microphone on your laptop doesn’t work right ... Most IT people are fine with that explanation.
Sometimes, she got jumpy. “I hope you guys can find other people to do your physical I9s,” she wrote to her bosses in 2023, according to court documents. “I will SEND them for you, but have someone else do the paperwork. I can go to FEDERAL PRISON for falsifying federal documents.” Michael Barnhart, an investigator at cybersecurity company DTEX and a leading expert on the North Korean IT worker threat, says Chapman’s involvement followed a standard pattern—from an innocuous initial contact on LinkedIn to escalating requests. “Little by little, the asks get bigger and bigger,” he says. “Then by the end of the day, you’re asking the facilitator to go to a government facility to pick up an actual government ID.”
By the time investigators raided Chapman’s home, she was housing several dozen laptops, each with a sticky note indicating the fake worker’s identity and employer. Some of the North Korean operatives worked multiple jobs; some had been toiling quietly for years. Prosecutors said at least 300 employers had been pulled into this single scheme, including “a top-five national television network and media company, a premier Silicon Valley technology company, an aerospace and defense manufacturer, an iconic American car manufacturer, a high-end retail store, and one of the most recognizable media and entertainment companies in the world.” Chapman, they alleged, had helped pass along at least $17 million. She pleaded guilty in February 2025 to charges relating to wire fraud, identity theft, and money laundering and is awaiting sentencing.
Chapman’s case is just one of several North Korean fake-worker prosecutions making their way through US courts. A Ukrainian named Oleksandr Didenko has been accused of setting up a freelancing website to connect fake IT workers with stolen identities. Prosecutors say at least one worker was linked to Chapman’s laptop farm and that Didenko also has ties to operations in San Diego and Virginia. Didenko was arrested in Poland last year and was extradited to the United States. In Tennessee, 38-year-old Matthew Knoot is due to stand trial for his alleged role in a scheme that investigators say sent hundreds of thousands of dollars to accounts linked to North Korea via his laptop farm in Nashville. (Knoot has pleaded not guilty.) And in January 2025, Florida prosecutors filed charges against two American citizens, Erick Ntekereze Prince and Emanuel Ashtor, as well as a Mexican accomplice and two North Koreans. (None of the defendants’ lawyers in these cases responded to requests for comment.) The indictments claim that Prince and Ashtor had spent six years running a string of fake staffing companies that placed North Koreans in at least 64 businesses.
before the hermit kingdom had its laptop farms, it had a single confirmed internet connection, at least as far as the outside world could tell. As recently as 2010, that one link to the web was reserved for use by high-ranking officials. Then, in 2011, 27-year-old Kim Jong Un succeeded his father as the country’s dictator. Secretly educated in Switzerland and said to be an avid gamer, the younger Kim made IT a national priority. In 2012, he urged some schools to “pay special attention to intensifying their computer education” to create new possibilities for the government and military. Computer science is now on some high school curricula, while college students can take courses on information security, robotics, and engineering.
The most promising students are taught hacking techniques and foreign languages that can make them more effective operatives. Staff from government agencies including the Reconnaissance General Bureau— the nation’s clandestine intelligence service—recruit the highest-scoring graduates of top schools like Kim Chaek University of Technology (described by many as “the MIT of North Korea”) or the prestigious University of Sciences in Pyongsong. They are promised good wages and unfettered access to the internet—the real internet, not the intranet available to well-off North Koreans, which consists of a mere handful of heavily censored North Korean websites.
The earliest cyberattacks launched by Pyongyang were simple affairs: defacing websites with political messages or launching denial-of-service attacks to shut down US websites. They soon grew more audacious. In 2014, North Korean hackers famously stole and leaked confidential information from Sony’s film studio. Then they targeted financial institutions: Fraudulent trades pulled more than $81 million from the Bank of Bangladesh’s accounts at the New York Federal Reserve. After that, North Korean hackers moved into ransomware—the WannaCry attack in 2017 locked hundreds of thousands of Windows computers in 150 countries and demanded payments in bitcoin. While the amount of revenue the attack generated is up for debate—some say it earned just $140,000 in payouts—it wreaked much wider damage as companies worked to upgrade their systems and security, costing as much as $4 billion, according to one estimate.
Governments responded with more sanctions and stronger security measures, and the regime pivoted, dialing back on ransomware in favor of quieter schemes. It turns out these are also more lucrative: Today, the most valuable tool in North Korea’s cybercrime armory is cryptocurrency theft. In 2022, hackers stole more than $600 million worth of the cryptocurrency ether by attacking the blockchain game Axie Infinity; in February of this year, they robbed the Dubai-based crypto exchange Bybit of $1.5 billion worth of digital currency. The IT pretender scam, meanwhile, seems to have been growing slowly until the pandemic dramatically expanded the number of remote jobs, and Pyongyang saw the perfect opportunity.
In 2024, according to a recent report from South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, the number of people working in North Korea’s cyber divisions—which includes pretenders, crypto thieves, and military hackers—stood at 8,400, up from 6,800 two years earlier. Some of these workers are based in the country, but many are stationed overseas in China, Russia, Pakistan, or elsewhere. They are relatively well compensated, but their posting is hardly cushy.
Teams of 10 to 20 young men live and work out of a single apartment, sleeping four or five to a room and grinding up to 14 hours a day at weird hours to correspond with their remote job’s time zone. They have quotas of illicit earnings they are expected to meet. Their movements are tightly controlled, as are those of their relatives, who are effectively held hostage to prevent defections. “You don’t have any freedom,” says Hyun-Seung Lee, a North Korean defector who lives in Washington, DC, and says some of his old friends were part of such operations. “You’re not allowed to leave the apartment unless you need to purchase something, like grocery shopping, and that is arranged by the team leader. Two or three people must go together so there’s no opportunity for them to explore.”
The US government estimates that a typical team of pretenders can earn up to $3 million each year for Pyongyang. Experts say the money is pumped into everything from Kim Jong Un’s personal slush fund to the country’s nuclear weapons program. A few million dollars may seem small next to the flashy crypto heists— but with so many teams operating in obscurity, the fraud is effective precisely because it is so mundane.
in the summer of 2022, a major multinational company hired a remote engineer to work on website development. “He would dial in to meetings, he would participate in discussions,” an executive at the company told me on condition of anonymity. “His manager said he was considered the most productive member of the team.”
One day, his coworkers organized a surprise to celebrate his birthday. Colleagues gathered on a video call to congratulate him, only to be startled by his response—but it’s not my birthday. After nearly a year at the company, the worker had apparently forgotten the birth date listed in his records. It was enough to spark suspicion, and soon afterward the security team discovered that he was running remote access tools on his work computer, and he was let go. It was only later, when federal investigators discovered one of his pay stubs at Christina Chapman’s laptop farm in Arizona, that the company connected the dots and realized it had employed a foreign agent for nearly a year.
Agents have even been known to send look-alikes to pick up a physical ID card from an office or to take a drug test required by an employer.
For many pretenders, the goal is simply to earn a good salary to send back to Pyongyang, not so much to steal money or data. “We’ve seen long-tail operations where they were going 10, 12, 18 months working in some of these organizations,” says Adam Meyers, a senior vice president for counter adversary operations at the security company CrowdStrike. Sometimes, though, North Korean operatives last just a few days— enough time to download huge amounts of company data or plant malicious software in a company’s systems before abruptly quitting. That code could alter financial data or manipulate security information. Or these seeds could lay dormant for months, even years.
“The potential risk from even one minute of access to systems is almost unlimited for an individual company,” says Declan Cummings, the head of engineering at software company Cinder. Experts say that attacks are ramping up not just in the US but also in Germany, France, Britain, Japan and other countries. They urge companies to do rigorous due diligence: speak directly to references, watch for candidates making sudden changes of address, use reputable online screening tools, and conduct a physical interview or in-person ID verification.
But none of these methods are foolproof, and AI tools are constantly weakening them. ChatGPT and the like give almost anyone the capacity to answer esoteric questions in real time with unearned confidence, and their fluency with coding threatens to make programming tests irrelevant. AI video filters and deepfakes can also add to the subterfuge.
At an onboarding call, for instance, many HR representatives now ask new employees to hold their ID up to the camera for closer inspection. “But the fraudsters have a neat trick there,” says Donal Greene, a biometrics expert at the online background check provider Certn. They take a green-colored card the exact shape and size of an identity card—a mini green screen—and, using deepfake technology, project the image of an ID onto it. “They can actually move it and show the reflection,” says Greene. “It’s very sophisticated.” North Korean agents have even been known to send look-alikes to pick up a physical ID card from an office or to take a drug test required by prospective employers.
Even security experts can be fooled. In July 2024, Knowbe4, a Florida-based company that offers security training, discovered that a new hire known as “Kyle” was actually a foreign agent. “He interviewed great,” says Brian Jack, KnowBe4’s chief information security officer. “He was on camera, his résumé was right, his background check cleared, his ID cleared verification. We didn’t have any reason to suspect this wasn’t a valid candidate.” But when his facilitator—the US-based individual giving him cover—tried to install malware on Kyle’s company computer, the security team caught on and shut him out.
Back in london, Simon Wijckmans couldn’t let go of the idea that somebody had tried to fool him. He’d just read about the Knowbe4 case, which deepened his suspicions. He conducted background checks and discovered that some of his candidates were definitely using stolen identities. And, he found, some of them were linked to known North Korean operations. So Wijckmans decided to wage a little counter exercise of his own, and he invited me to observe.
So far, everything matches the hallmarks of a fake worker—his virtual background, his slow connection, his good but heavily accented English.
I dial in to Google Meet at 3 am Pacific time, tired and bleary. We deliberately picked this offensively early hour because it’s 6 am in Miami, where the candidate, “Harry,” claims to be.
Harry joins the call, looking pretty fresh-faced. He’s maybe in his late twenties, with short, straight, black hair. Everything about him seems deliberately nonspecific: He wears a plain black crewneck sweater and speaks into an off-brand headset. “I just woke up early today for this interview, no problem,” he says. “I know that working with UK hours is kind of a requirement, so I can get my working hours to yours, so no problem with it.”
So far, everything matches the hallmarks of a fake worker. Harry’s virtual background is one of the default options provided by Google Meet, and his connection is a touch slow. His English is good but heavily accented, even though he tells us he was born in New York and grew up in Brooklyn. Wijckmans starts with some typical interview questions, and Harry keeps glancing off to his right as he responds. He talks about various coding languages and name-drops the frameworks he’s familiar with. Wijckmans starts asking some deeper technical questions. Harry pauses. He looks confused. “Can I rejoin the meeting?” he asks. “I have a problem with my microphone.” Wijckman nods, and Harry disappears.
A couple of minutes pass, and I start to fret that we’ve scared him away, but then he pops back into the meeting. His connection isn’t much better, but his answers are clearer. Maybe he restarted his chatbot, or got a coworker to coach him. The call runs a few more minutes and we say goodbye.
Our next applicant calls himself “Nic.” On his résumé he’s got a link to a personal website, but this guy doesn’t look much like the profile photo on the site. This is his second interview with Wijckmans, and we are certain that he’s faking it: He’s one of the applicants who failed the background check after his first call, although he doesn’t know that.
Nic’s English is worse than Harry’s: When he’s asked what time it is, he tells us it’s “six and past” before correcting himself and saying “quarter to seven.” Where does he live? “I’m in Ohio for now,” he beams, like a kid who got something right in a pop quiz.
Several minutes in, though, his answers become nonsensical. Simon asks him a question about web security. “Political leaders ... government officials or the agencies responsible for border security,” Nic says. “They’re responsible for monitoring and also securing the borders, so we can employ the personnel to patrol the borders and also check the documents and enforce the immigration laws.”
I’m swapping messages with Wijckmans on the back channel we’ve set up when it dawns on us: Whatever AI bot Nic seems to be using must have misinterpreted a mention of “Border Gateway Protocol”—a system for sending traffic across the internet—with national borders, and started spewing verbiage about immigration enforcement. “What a waste of time,” Wijckmans messages me. We wrap up the conversation abruptly.
I try to put myself in the seat of a hiring manager or screener who’s under pressure. The fraudsters’ words may not have always made sense, but their test scores and résumés looked solid, and their technical-sounding guff might be enough to fool an uninformed recruiter. I suspect at least one of them could have made it to the next step in some unsuspecting company’s hiring process.
Wijckmans tells me he has a plan if he comes across another pretender. He has created a web page that looks like a standard coding assessment, which he’ll send to fake candidates. As soon as they hit the button to start the test, their browser will spawn dozens of pop-up pages that bounce around the screen, all of them featuring information on how to defect from North Korea. Then loud music plays—a rickroll, “The Star-Spangled Banner”—before the computer starts downloading random files and emits an ear-splitting beep. “Just a little payback,” he says.
Wijckman’s stunt is not going to stop the pretenders, of course. But maybe it will irritate them for a moment. Then they’ll get back to work, signing on from some hacking sweatshop in China or through a laptop farm in the US, and join the next team meeting—a quiet, camera-off chat with coworkers just like me or you.
Let us know what you think about this article. Submit a letter to the editor at
ere
Wired
· by Bobbie Johnson · May 1, 2025
7. Caught Our Eye: South Korean defense company taps Ernst aide
Wise move by Hanwha.
Caught Our Eye
South Korean defense company taps Ernst aide
https://www.legistorm.com/pro_news/4284/south-korean-defense-company-taps-ernst-aide.html
Posted by Sean McGlinn on April 30, 2025
Hanwha Defense USA has deployed the former national security adviser to Sen. Joni Ernst (R-Iowa) to head its government relations operation in Washington, D.C.
Stephen Voline capped off more than two decades of military service with key roles guiding Army legislative affairs and supporting the Senate's work on defense modernization. After serving as a defense fellow and military liaison for Ernst, he became her principal adviser on national security and foreign policy issues and helped shepherd the senator's priorities through the annual National Defense Authorization Act.
Now at Hanwha, Voline will lead the company's government relations strategy as it pursues a long-term goal of becoming a prime contractor in the U.S. defense market. Hanwha Defense USA, the American subsidiary of South Korea's Hanwha Aerospace, is expanding its footprint in U.S. programs by localizing production of land systems — including artillery, unmanned ground vehicles and armored platforms — rather than relying solely on Korean exports. The company's McLean, Va., headquarters anchors this effort, which also focuses on building U.S.-based supply chains and high-tech manufacturing jobs.
To support this strategy, Hanwha Aerospace recently launched a $2.5 billion rights offering to fund global plant expansion, including new defense production facilities in the United States. The investment is aimed at enhancing Hanwha's competitiveness for long-term contracts in both U.S. and allied defense markets while reducing dependence on overseas manufacturing.
Voline holds a master's degree in legislative affairs from George Washington University and a bachelor's degree in public relations from the University of West Florida.
Subjects: Sen. Joni Ernst (R-IA); Stephen John Voline; George Washington University; University of West Florida; Hanwha Defense USA Inc.; Hanwha Aerospace
See full Caught Our Eye archive
8. Kim Jong Un Wants More Nuclear Weapons on North Korean Warships
Of course he does.
Kim Jong Un Wants More Nuclear Weapons on North Korean Warships
https://news.usni.org/2025/04/30/kim-jong-un-wants-more-nuclear-weapons-on-north-korean-warships?utm
Dzirhan Mahadzir
April 30, 2025 4:34 PM
Destroyer Che yong during weapons test this week. KCNA Photo
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un called for accelerating the nuclear weapon capability of the Korean People’s Army Navy as he saw the first day of weapons firing trials for newly launched multipurpose destroyer Choe Hyon (51) reported state media Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on Wednesday.
North Korean leader Kim visited the destroyer and swa the first test fire, according to KCNA He praised the strike capabilities that include supersonic cruise missiles, strategic cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles with its conventional defense capabilities.
Kim also said that it is time to make thevchoice to accelerate the nuclear armament of the Navy for the national defense and safeguarding maritime sovereignty from the current and prospective threats and set various tasks for that purpose, according to KCNA.
Earlier on Friday, in his speech at the launch of Choe Hyon, the full text of which was carried by KCNA, Kim stated that the launch of destroyer Choe Hyon will be a signal flare for the strengthening of the KPAN, “And the second signal flare will be the nuclear-powered submarine construction project,” said the North Korean leader.
KCNA in March reported on Kim visiting a shipyard and learning about the construction of a nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine along with releasing photos of the North Korean leader walking near a large hull submarine under construction. North Korea’s two Amnok class corvettes, along with Choe Hyon are already capable of launching cruise missiles with nuclear warheads but such surface ships are easier to track compared to a submarine hence North Korea’s pursuit of obtaining a ballistic missile submarine capability
The 5,000-ton destroyer Choe Hyon is North Korea’s largest warship ever built and was launched on Friday in a ceremony at Nampo Shipyard, which built the destroyer and is located on the west coast of North Korea. KCNA did not state where Monday and Tuesday’s trials took place but photos released by KCNA indicated it took place in Nampo and close to the shipyard where it was launched.
KCNA reported that the trials were carried out by the Missile General Bureau, the Academy of National Defense Science and the General Bureau of Detection and Electronic Warfare of the DPRK with Monday’s trials comprising of the test-firing of supersonic cruise missiles, strategic cruise missiles and anti-aircraft missiles and the test-firing of its 127mm caliber main gun while Tuesday’s trials comprise of the test firing of anti-ship missiles, various kinds of ship-based automatic guns, smoke dischargers and chaff dispensers took place.
In his Friday speech, the North Korean leader said that Choe Hyon is essential for strengthening the capability to thoroughly defend North Korea’s maritime sovereignty and will be a significant starting point in the course of pursuing an advanced maritime power, “Today’s launch of the destroyer is only the first step toward modernizing our maritime forces, but we have no regrets in demonstrating our ambition to strengthen our naval power in line with the prerequisites of national security and the global trend of naval force development.”, said Kim.
Choe Hyon KCNA Photo
The North Korean leader stated that the destroyer is equipped with anti-aircraft, anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-ballistic missile capabilities, as well as supersonic strategic cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles, and weapons systems that can maximize its land strike operation capability, enabling it to perform multi-purpose surface operations and increasing the KPAN’s direct intervention in land operations.
Kim also said additional destroyers of the class will be built along with North Korea planning to build larger ships and other designs, “We will of course build combat ships of this class next year as well, and we plan to build larger cruisers and various escort ships with higher operational capabilities as soon as possible, and are currently reviewing the ship’s overall design in the final stages.”, said the North Korean leader in his speech, adding that the multipurpose destroyers will be constructed on an annual basis.
Kim also took aim at the U.S. and South Korea in his speech, accusing them of carrying out provocative acts, which included military exercises and drawing up war plans against North Korea and stated that North Korea will take responsive actions, “If the United States continues to break records in its demonstrations of military power, we too will have no choice but to break records in the exercise of strategic deterrence.”, warned Kim.
The North Korean leader also stated that North Korea was now moving towards constructing an ocean-going operational fleet as the capability to conduct ocean operations as it was the most reliable means for actively and safely managing the military threats on the Korean Peninsula and for restraining and blocking North Korea’s enemy’s overseas forces’ attempts to reinforce on the Korean Peninsula in case of emergency.
Choe Hyon, according to KCNA’s Friday report on the destroyer’s launch has a tonnage of 5,000 tons. In comparison of tonnage, the Republic of Korea Navy’s latest destroyer, ROKS Jeongjo the Great (DDG-995) comes in at 10,000 tons while a Flight III Arleigh Burke destroyer’s tonnage is 9,900 ton.
Photos of Choe Hyon shows it having three banks of Vertical Launching Systems (VLSs) launchers, one fore and two aft, with 74 cells in total comprising of 4-5 different sized hatches, along with a covered structure amidship which is likely a housing for slant launched cruise missiles. The destroyer’s gun-missile combination primary Close in Weapon System (CIWS) resembles the Russian CADS-N-1 Kashtan system though it is possible the CIWS is an indigenous North Korea design. The primary CIWS is backed by two 30mm CIWS.The radar structure is a four face design and likely an active electronically-scanned array radar. Choe Hyon has a flight deck but a photo of its aft shows the two large doors being too small for helicopters and likely only to facilitate internal loading into the ship or possibly moving Unmanned Aerial Vehicles onto the flight deck or into the ship.
Despite being built at North Korea’s west coast, Choe Hyon has been assigned to the KPAN’s East Sea Fleet meaning that the destroyer will have to sail to the East Sea (Sea of Japan) from the Yellow Sea when to take up its operational posting.
Dzirhan Mahadzir
Dzirhan Mahadzir is a freelance defense journalist and analyst based in Kuala Lumpur Malaysia. Among the publications he has written for and currently writes for since 1998 includes Defence Review Asia, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Navy International, International Defence Review, Asian Defence Journal, Defence Helicopter, Asian Military Review and the Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter.
Follow @DzirhanDefence
9. S. Korea unable to prosecute foreign spies under current espionage law, NIS warns
Obviously this is a major strategic national security weakness. We should ask why the Democratic Party of Korea/Minjoo has prevented the necessary law from passing the National Assembly.
S. Korea unable to prosecute foreign spies under current espionage law, NIS warns
Chinese espionage cases grow, but Democratic Party resists expanding spy law
https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/05/01/2FEPBLF3OVGPZIHCGGYRK2ZPGE/
By Yang Ji-ho,
Park Sang-ki,
Lee Jung-soo
Published 2025.05.01. 10:35
South Korea’s spy agency has reported a series of unauthorized recordings by Chinese nationals targeting military and government sites, highlighting legal blind spots that prevent the country from prosecuting foreign espionage. /Illustrated by Kim Sung-kyu
South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) told lawmakers on Apr. 30 that Chinese nationals had been caught filming South Korean military and key government facilities without permission on 11 occasions since June last year.
According to a closed-door briefing at the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee, the unauthorized recordings focused on sensitive sites including military bases, airports, seaports and government buildings—among them the NIS headquarters itself.
Most of those involved were short-term visitors to S. Korea, such as tourists and international students. Some were even minors, including high school students, the NIS said.
Although they claimed they were filming for personal travel records, authorities believe the individuals deliberately sought to skirt domestic surveillance laws—often operating just outside zones covered by the Military Base and Installation Protection Act and using high-powered cameras or radios to avoid detection.
In one case in June, Chinese nationals flew a drone over a U.S. aircraft carrier docked at the S. Korean Fleet Command in Busan. More recently, two teenagers—one reportedly the son of a Chinese public security officer—were caught in April secretly filming fighter jet operations at Suwon Air Base and Osan Air Base in Gyeonggi-do (Province). Police questioned and released them without detention.
Despite a growing number of such incidents, which intelligence and military officials see as potential espionage, most of the individuals involved have faced little to no punishment. Many are let off with warnings due to legal limitations. In fact, the same two teenagers were caught again just two days later, on Apr. 23, attempting to film another military facility.
“We believe they may be systematically recording the movements of South Korean and U.S. military aircraft to build a database,” a military official said.
Even when there is strong suspicion that foreign nationals are gathering information on S. Korean and U.S. military operations, authorities often cannot prosecute them under the country’s espionage laws. That’s because the current legal definition of espionage only applies to acts benefiting an “enemy state,” which in practice refers exclusively to North Korea.
Under Article 98 of the Criminal Act, espionage is punishable only when committed on behalf of an “enemy state”—a term interpreted to mean North Korea.
As a result, spying for any other country cannot be prosecuted under the same law. This has led to calls for revising the law to replace “enemy state” with “foreign country,” or to expand it to include both.
This legal gap means S. Korean nationals recruited by foreign intelligence agencies, including China’s, also cannot be charged with espionage.
In January, a 50-year-old civilian employee of S. Korea’s Defense Intelligence Command (KDIC)—identified only as A—was sentenced to 20 years in prison for leaking classified military information to China over seven years.
This included the identities of “black agents,” or operatives working under false identities. He was convicted under the Military Criminal Act for general pro-enemy activities but not charged with espionage, as prosecutors found it difficult to prove a direct connection to North Korea.
“The espionage law doesn’t make sense if someone who sells the identities of black agents isn’t prosecuted as a spy,” a military official claimed.
A similar case involved another civilian military employee who sold classified information to China and Japan in 2018.
He was sentenced to four years in prison last year, not for espionage, but for leaking military secrets—a lesser charge that carries a lighter sentence.
Under current law, espionage carries a minimum sentence of seven years and can lead to the death penalty, while unauthorized disclosure of military secrets is punishable by up to 10 years in prison.
Both the ruling People Power Party and the opposition Democratic Party sought to revise Article 98 of the Criminal Act last year to broaden the scope of espionage beyond “enemy states” to include “foreign countries or equivalent organizations.”
The People Power Party made the revision a formal policy goal and aimed for passage by the end of the year. The Democratic Party initially showed support as well. Lawmakers Park Seon-won, Kang You-jeong and Wi Sung-lac each introduced separate bills reflecting that position.
In November, a consolidated version of the amendment passed a subcommittee of the National Assembly’s Legislation and Judiciary Committee.
However before it could reach a full committee vote, the Democratic Party abruptly reversed course.
While it called for a public hearing to gather more opinions, sources said party leaders expressed strong objections to expanding the espionage law. The legislative discussion stalled further amid political turmoil following the Dec. 3 martial law controversy.
During the closed-door session on Apr. 30, the NIS again stressed the need to revise the law. Officials said S. Korea must be able to prosecute not only espionage involving North Korea, but also cases in which foreign entities attempt to obtain or expose sensitive information related to the country’s national defense, economy or strategic industries.
Many countries, including the United States, Japan and China, already have laws that penalize espionage on behalf of any foreign power.
In one recent example, a S. Korean national working for a Chinese company was detained in May by Chinese authorities under Beijing’s counterespionage law. He was accused of leaking semiconductor-related data to S. Korea.
Nam Sung-wook, a professor at Sookmyung Women’s University and former head of the Institute for National Security Strategy, said in a phone interview with The Chosun Daily, “S. Korea is the only member of the OECD where espionage law is limited to an enemy state. If we don’t act quickly, we risk turning the country into a haven for spies. Lawmakers across the political spectrum must push for reform.”
10. South Korea stages major naval drills following North Korea’s warship reveal
As it absolutely should. We must remember that north Korea will not attack into strength. It only seeks vulnerability and weakness. South Korea is demonstrating its strength which is key to deterrence.
South Korea has a far superior naval capability that the north will never catch up to (though it will try).
South Korea stages major naval drills following North Korea’s warship reveal
Exercise in waters around peninsula aims to showcase readiness with US as DPRK signals more assertive maritime posture
https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/south-korea-stages-major-naval-drills-following-north-koreas-warship-reveal/
Jooheon Kim May 1, 2025
A helicopter approaches the ROKS Wonsan (MLS, 2,600 tons) during a large-scale fleet combat exercise on April 29, 2025. | Image: ROK navy
South Korea’s navy carried out a large-scale fleet combat exercise this week in the Yellow Sea and water south of the peninsula, days after North Korea unveiled its largest-ever warship and conducted missile tests from the new destroyer under Kim Jong Un’s supervision.
The drills, which ran from Monday to Thursday, were aimed at bolstering operational readiness and demonstrating an “overwhelming posture of military preparedness” in response to rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula, according to the ROK navy.
The training involved more than 20 surface vessels and a range of air assets. The Second Fleet deployed about 10 ships including Daejeon and Seoul frigates (FFG-II class), a Hwacheon logistics support ship (AOE-I) as well as P-3 maritime patrol aircraft and AW-159 helicopters. U.S. AH-64E Apache attack helicopters also participated.
Training scenarios included maritime counter-infiltration operations, anti-submarine warfare drills and naval maneuvering logistics. The Third Fleet, defending the southern seas, conducted its own set of operations with vessels such as the Gyeongnam (FFG-II), Gwangju (FFG-I) and the mine-laying ship Wonsan. Joint maritime interdiction exercises were held with the Korean Coast Guard to simulate responses to illegal infiltration and regional sea threats.
The exercises followed a milestone development in North Korea’s push to revamp its long-negelected navy, with Kim Jong Un christening a new destroyer on Friday while calling for a more assertive maritime posture.
State media then reported that Kim personally oversaw tests of the warships weapons on Monday, including supersonic and strategic cruise missiles, anti-aircraft missiles and a 127mm automatic naval gun.
Koo Jong-soo, a military studies professor at Tongmyong University and former ROK navy officer, told NK News that Seoul’s response is not merely reactive, but a calculated signal of deterrence.
“As the North steps up its military posturing — whether through missile launches or unveiling new warships — we must clearly demonstrate that any ambiguous provocation will be met with readiness and strength,” he said.
The expert emphasized that unlike North Korea’s displays of new military hardware, which are often more symbolic than operational, South Korea possesses real-world capabilities to respond effectively. He added that the deterrence demonstration was backed by close coordination with U.S. forces.
While North Korea’s destroyer may signal new ambitions, Koo questioned the combat viability of the warship.
“North Korea often leads with appearances,” he said. “Missile hatches and radars don’t tell the whole story. Without proven propulsion systems, targeting capabilities and crew training, it remains to be seen how much of a threat this new ship actually poses.”
Later in the day, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) assessed that it will likely take more time before the DPRK destroyer becomes fully operational.
“Based on the weapons and equipment shown, there is a possibility that North Korea received technical support, funding, or other assistance from Russia,” JCS spokesperson Lee Sung-jun, adding that the JCS is currently conducting a more detailed analysis.
Koo concluded by noting that this week’s drills also addressed broader regional concerns, likely featuring training scenarios aimed at countering unauthorized Chinese activities such as the reported installation of maritime structures in contested waters.
“Those actions can be considered a form of implicit provocation, so it seems the drills also included elements to block such activities by the Chinese,” he said.
Edited by Alannah Hill
Updated at 6:10 p.m. KST with JCS assessment of North Korean destroyer
11. What North Korea stands to lose if US Forces Korea expands mission to China
This is not about expanding the mission to China at the expense of Korean security. It should be about the US AND its allies taking a holistic approach to the entire range of security challenges and threats in the Indo-Pacom region.
My thoughts:
America Must Stop Treating Taiwan and Korea as Separate Security Issues
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/04/america-must-stop-treating-taiwan-and-korea-as-separate-security-issues/
What North Korea stands to lose if US Forces Korea expands mission to China
Despite Seoul's fears of abandonment, a focus on Taiwan contingencies could entrench US military presence on peninsula
https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/what-north-korea-stands-to-lose-if-us-forces-korea-expands-mission-to-china/
Jeongmin Kim | Joon Ha Park May 1, 2025
A collage of U.S. Forces Korea soldier and ROK soldier with a map of the Taiwan Strait | Images: U.S. Forces Korea via Facebook, Wikimedia Commons via Wkthomson, edited by NK Pro
For over 70 years, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) has been at the center of joint efforts to deter North Korean aggression, with nearly 30,000 American troops now stationed in the South to defend against any attack.
But as the strategic landscape changes and the Trump administration remakes U.S. priorities, the prospect is growing that the military command established after the Korean War could soon expand its mission beyond the peninsula — and directly assert itself into the escalating great power competition between Washington and Beijing.
Since returning to office some 100 days ago, President Donald Trump has clearly focused U.S. policy in Asia on containing China, while signaling that America expects South Korea to do more to counter the DPRK nuclear threat.
The Pentagon’s temporary redeployment of multiple Patriot missile defense systems from South Korea to the Middle East appeared to underscore Washington’s shifting priorities, as did Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s statement that the U.S. could no longer be a “permanent guarantor” of security abroad.
These developments have not escaped notice in Seoul, where editorials in major newspapers have betrayed rapidly growing concern about the possibility of Washington repurposing the USFK for China contingencies like a Taiwan invasion, and leaving South Korea in the lurch in case of North Korean attack.
Experts say the writing has been on the wall for U.S. strategic changes for years, and some suggest that changes could even benefit Seoul as it faces pressure to pay more for the American military presence, giving Washington stronger incentives to maintain its military investment on the peninsula.
The key question is how North Korea will respond if such changes materialize, as broadening USFK’s role beyond DPRK deterrence would present both vulnerabilities to exploit and new challenges for a regime that has long sought the withdrawal of American troops.
U.S. and ROK marines train together in March 2025. | Image: ROK Marine Corps
HOW USFK’S POSTURE MAY CHANGE
The idea of repurposing USFK isn’t new. During Trump’s first term, some officials supported expanding its role beyond North Korea deterrence. The discussion has regained momentum as the Indo-Pacific becomes a “priority theater” for the Pentagon in its pivot to containing China.
More recently, Japan reportedly proposed a “one theater” concept that would integrate the Korean Peninsula, East China Sea and South China Sea under a unified operational zone — aligning with U.S. efforts toward theater-wide deterrence.
This follows the rise of the “deterrence-by-denial” doctrine promoted by Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, which calls for defending Taiwan even if it affects the U.S. strategic posture elsewhere, including in Korea.
Min Tae-eun, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), told NK News that the U.S. likely sees both the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan as key chokepoints in countering China, making a large-scale troop withdrawal from South Korea unlikely, even during a Taiwan emergency.
“If the U.S. were to send forces to Taiwan in a crisis … both Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula are strategic locations. Especially if China and North Korea are aligned, it would be a mistake [for the U.S.] to shift troops in a way that increases strategic vulnerabilities on the Korean Peninsula,” she said.
The expert emphasized the need to evaluate the true impact of possible redeployments on U.S.-ROK readiness, warning against alarmist responses.
Yang Uk, a military analyst at the Asan Institute in Seoul, echoed this view.
Expanding the scope of USFK’s remit to include China “is not really a huge change as the U.S. military had already been moving in this direction,” he told NK News.
Yang noted that manpower shortages have led the U.S. to reduce its forward-deployed troops and shift to a rotational deployment model for combat units. But he emphasized that support brigades, consisting primarily of multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and other artillery systems, remain in place despite such changes.
“There’s no urgent need to relocate equipment,” he said. “Rather, the focus has been on reducing ground forces while maintaining flexible, high-tech capabilities,” reflecting broader military strategy changes for more “adaptable” force structures.
U.S. President Donald Trump prepares to deliver his State of the Union address on March 7, 2025. | Image: The White House via X
NORTH KOREA IMPACTS
From North Korea’s perspective, repurposing USFK for China contingencies could create exploitable seams in the U.S.-ROK deterrence posture.
Pyongyang may judge that American forces preparing for multiple scenarios would be stretched thin, and any movement of resources away from North Korea-specific threats could theoretically provide the DPRK with greater operational freedom.
Redeployments for a Taiwan contingency, even temporarily, could also create windows for North Korea to test new weapons systems or engage in actions that it would otherwise deem too risky, such as deploying more assets near the maritime border to test U.S. support for the ROK.
Heightened U.S.-China tensions could also boost North Korea’s value to Beijing as a buffer state, potentially increasing Pyongyang’s leverage for enhanced economic support and diplomatic protection.
Finally, USFK’s shifting focus would provide North Korea with propaganda opportunities. State media could portray the changes as signs of U.S. abandonment or as proof that Seoul is sacrificing autonomy to remain aligned with Washington.
Despite these potential benefits, analysts cautioned that USFK changes would likely be incremental, limiting North Korea’s actual opportunities.
More significantly, the shift could entrench the long-term U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula — bad news for Pyongyang — as a dual-purpose USFK mission would offer Washington a stronger strategic justification to maintain forces in the South.
It also could deepen the ROK’s integration into U.S. Indo-Pacific security planning, raising the costs of miscalculation or aggression by Pyongyang, which could then trigger a broader theater-wide response.
Moreover, USFK changes could accelerate military modernization on the southern half of the peninsula. The U.S. could deploy new systems to deter China — like enhanced missile defense, surveillance tools and precision strike capabilities — that would also bolster readiness against the North.
Yang of Asan suggested that while North Korea may view a reduction in U.S. ground presence as favorable in the short term, the broader shift in warfare dynamics will give Pyongyang “mixed feelings.”
“North Korea knows the battlefield has changed,” especially after participating in combat in Ukraine defined by drone warfare, he said. “And the South Korean military no longer fights solely by relying on U.S. boots on the ground.”
What Pyongyang remains most concerned about against that backdrop is U.S. nuclear deployments in the region, he added.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un watches warship missile tests from Nampho | Image: KCNA (April 30, 2025)
NORTH KOREA’S LIKELY RESPONSE
North Korea will respond to the USFK’s evolving posture to mitigate related risks while maximizing opportunities from the changes.
In the short term, Pyongyang will likely ramp up rhetorical attacks, framing a potential shift as part of Washington’s “hostile policy” and portraying Seoul as complicit in U.S. military expansion beyond the peninsula. This messaging could serve as leverage for Kim Jong Un, particularly if he seeks to resume summit diplomacy with Trump.
However, North Korea’s actual response will likely depend on the pace and scale of changes to USFK rather than worst-case assumptions, leaving room for flexibility.
Strategically, North Korea will almost certainly work to deepen ties with China, viewing closer alignment with Beijing as insurance amid uncertainty surrounding the Russia-Ukraine war and U.S. regional planning.
Militarily, Pyongyang may test the evolving deterrence environment through selective weapons launches or drills that expose perceived vulnerabilities in the U.S.-ROK readiness, such as less detectable missiles, sea-based launches and deceptive drills.
Yang said that while Pyongyang is unlikely to significantly expand its conventional forces in the near term, its defense treaty with Russia points to a long-term pivot toward modern warfare.
“North Korea is making a long-term adjustment to avoid falling behind in conventional power. They’re responding calmly and steadily, modernizing with an eye toward future conflict environments,” the expert explained.
Lee Jae-myung, current presidential frontrunner and Democratic Party candidate, during the launch of his campaign team on April 29 | Image: Democratic Party of Korea
SOUTH KOREA’S OPTIONS
A U.S. push to expand the USFK’s mandate to China would place Seoul in a familiar but difficult position — stuck between its main military ally on one side and biggest trade partner on the other.
Yang of the Asan Institute said Seoul has been conducting capability assessments related to the ongoing transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from Washington, noting that these efforts predate recent political debates and began during the first Trump administration.
“It’s not that South Korea is unprepared [for changes to USFK]. But the public and political circles have been slow to grasp the broader context, which is why concerns about weakening alliances are rising.”
Looking ahead to the upcoming ROK presidential election, Yang said the outcome is unlikely to shift Seoul’s core strategy.
“No administration, whether progressive or conservative, will willingly provoke a direct confrontation with China,” he said.
“That said, it’s becoming increasingly difficult to maintain a balanced diplomatic stance between Washington and Beijing. Even a progressive government, despite some efforts to accommodate China, would likely remain aligned with the U.S. in the end.”
South Korea continues to be most concerned about a potential scale down in USFK troop numbers, but Min of KINU said this mindset has to change in light of how warfare itself has changed.
“In this era of AI and advanced technologies, I wonder whether [South Koreans] are overly fixated on troop numbers based on outdated ways of thinking,” she said, questioning whether partial reductions of troops would really pose “serious risks” in deterring North Korea.
Both experts argued that North Korea will face greater uncertainty as U.S. forces become more flexible and mobile across the region, with the prospect of rapid reinforcement from other theaters will complicate DPRK military planning.
Min added that significant U.S. troop reductions are unlikely unless Washington makes “a major strategic recalibration, not just tactical adjustments.”
Regardless of who becomes South Korean president after the June 3 elections, the expert emphasized the need for Seoul to remain calm when discussing the evolving U.S. force posture.
“It’s becoming harder for South Korea to keep reacting nervously every time the U.S. appears to consider pulling troops,” she said.
Edited by Bryan Betts
12. The first daughter has grown tall and North Koreans are watching
They grow up so fast don't they? :-)
Better living through chemicals? Is her growth being enhanced?
She grows while the Korean people in the north go hungry.
Is Kim really grooming her for succession?
What does Kim Yo Jong think about that?
The first daughter has grown tall and North Koreans are watching
Demand is rising for nutritional supplements as parents seek status and for their kids to grow like Kim Ju Ae.
https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2025/04/30/korea-kim-daughter-growth/
By Kim Ji-eun for RFA Korean
2025.04.30
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un walks with his daughter Kim Ju Ae in this series of government photos distributed, from left to right: November 2022; February 2023 and April 2025. (KCNA)
South Korean nutritional supplements are becoming a desired luxury among the North Korean elite with parents wondering how they can get their kids to grow as fast as the young teen daughter of the supreme leader, sources told RFA.
Kim Ju Ae made her latest appearance in state media on April 25, when she attended the launch ceremony for a North Korean warship at Nampo shipyard.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and daughter Kim Ju Ae at an event launching a "new multipurpose destroyer," in this North Korean government photo, April 26, 2025. (KCNA via Reuters)
In a photo of the event, where she’s pictured next to her father on the dockside, she appears about the same height as Kim Jong Un, who is believed to be about 5 feet 7 inches (170 centimeters) tall.
Even if Kim Ju Ae is wearing heels, that would make her significantly taller than most girls of her age. She’s thought to be 12 or 13. That’s based on an account from former NBA basketball star Dennis Rodman who says he saw Kim Jong Un’s daughter when she was a baby during a visit to the country in 2013.
Even in South Korea, where children are much better nourished, the average height of a 12-year-old girl is about 155 centimeters.
Ju Ae is certainly noticeably taller and appears more mature than in past photos. Her first public appearance was in November 2022, when as a chubby pre-teen, she accompanied her father on an inspection of what experts said was an intercontinental ballistic missile. She’s since cropped up at other events, including missile launches, official banquets and visits to troops.
“Three years ago, when the supreme leader’s daughter first appeared on TV, she still looked like a young child,” a source from North Hamgyong province, speaking on the condition of anonymity for security reasons, said.
“But recently, at the destroyer launch event, she had grown so much that her height was almost comparable to her father’s.”
“Residents, who have long struggled with food shortages, couldn’t focus much on their children’s growth,” the source continued. “But now, with the supreme leader’s child growing rapidly before their eyes, many residents have started to pay more attention to their own children’s development.”
Demand for South Korean nutritional supplements
According to the 2023 Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates released by UNICEF, WHO, and the World Bank, 16.8% of North Korean children under five were stunted due to chronic malnutrition as of 2022. This rate is nearly ten times higher than South Korea’s, where only 1.7% were stunted.
The stark contrast between the North Korean leader’s visibly well-nourished daughter and the malnourished general population has fueled some public resentment. But it has also stimulated interest in children’s height and physical development, multiple local sources say.
The source from North Hamgyong province said that interest has extended to nutritional supplements, particularly “Tenten chu” supplements from South Korea.
Tentenchu tablets from Hanmi Pharmaceuticals of South Korea. (Hanmi Pharmaceuticals)
Tenten was launched in 1994, marketed as a vitamin-rich growth aid for children and for immunity and recovery from fatigue among adults. Some criticize its high sugar content.
According to the source, Tenten currently sells at four times the South Korean price in North Korea - the equivalent of about 500 yuan or $69. Despite that high price, it’s still in high-demand among high officials and others who can afford it, the source said.
A source from North Pyongan Province, who also sought anonymity for security reasons, said there’s another reason why people want their children to be taller: social status.
In North Korea, young men are generally expected to join the military after high school. Those who do not meet the required height standard are often rejected from conscription.
“These days, residents are increasingly focused on their children’s height,” the source said. “Previously, children in North Korea were considered socially disadvantaged due to their short stature, especially when they graduated from high school at 17 and could not even reach 150 cm (5 feet).”
“Some children couldn’t even join the military and were instead sent to work in construction or on farms. Naturally, those with short stature tended to feel socially inferior,” the source said.
The source said residents are resorting to growth supplements, even if it means forgoing other necessities.
The source added that the supplements from South Korea are sometimes re-packaged as Chinese products before being smuggled into North Korea.
Edited by Sungwon Yang and Mat Pennington
13. Book review: North Korea takes center stage in chilling look at new nuclear era
Book review: North Korea takes center stage in chilling look at new nuclear era
Ankit Panda’s book 'The New Nuclear Age' lays bare a dangerous world with more nukes and shortage of diplomacy
https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/book-review-north-korea-takes-center-stage-in-chilling-look-at-new-nuclear-era/
Stephen Mercado May 1, 2025
Kim Jong Un and top military officials overseeing a launch of the nuclear-capable Hwasong-17 ICBM | Image: Rodong Sinmun (March 25, 2022)
In an era where nuclear tensions once seemed relics of the Cold War, Ankit Panda’s latest book delivers a sobering reality check: The world is now more nuclear, less predictable and far harder to control — with North Korea no longer a “pipsqueak,” but a fully armed player in a crowded atomic club.
Panda, a senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes in “The New Nuclear Age: At the Precipice of Armageddon” about the growing risks of a new nuclear age featuring a larger number of states capable of unleashing nuclear havoc upon the world.
North Korea, one of those nuclear powers, was the subject of Panda’s 2020 book “Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea.”
In the book under review here, the author includes Pyongyang as one nuclear power among many in his look at the world now “at the precipice of Armageddon.”
“The New Nuclear Age: At the Precipice of Armageddon” by Ankit Panda | Image: Polity, edited by NK News
JOURNEY TO NUKES
Nuclear security in the Cold War largely meant Washington, Moscow and Beijing acting with restraint and, in some cases, negotiating aspects of their nuclear arsenals in their common interest. Most of the other nuclear states of that earlier era — France, the U.K. and Israel — were allies of the United States. India, a great power, came relatively late to the game in joining the nuclear club in 1974.
Moreover, in those simpler days, Washington was able to pressure allies Seoul and Taipei to drop their covert nuclear weapon programs. South Africa abandoned its own program at the Cold War’s end.
Since then, Pakistan and the DPRK have become declared nuclear powers. Pyongyang, which joined the club in 2006, has been developing both nuclear weapons and the vehicles to deliver them to targets in the continental U.S., as well as to U.S. military facilities in Japan, Guam and elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region.
Readers of NK News will find much to ponder in Pana’s review of North Korea’s path to the bomb.
Pyongyang began its journey to nuclear weapons following the Korean War, when Washington threatened nuclear destruction. In addition to facing formidable U.S. and allied conventional forces deployed on the Korean Peninsula, in Japan and elsewhere in the region, as well as U.S. strategic nuclear forces, North Korea from 1958 to 1991 had to take into account Washington’s tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea. Its leaders have seen the need to deter a hostile nuclear superpower.
The DPRK has also worked to develop vehicles for delivering nuclear payloads to their targets. As Panda notes, the North Korean launch in 1998 of the Taepodong-1, a “satellite technology demonstrator” that overflew Japan, signaled a potential future of nuclear-tipped missiles capable of striking regional targets and the continental U.S.
Pyongyang’s growing nuclear capabilities both threaten Washington and undermine the credibility of its longstanding nuclear umbrella over Seoul and Tokyo. The author notes that both Asian allies must wonder, as France’s President Charles De Gaulle did in the Cold War, whether Washington would sacrifice American cities in defense of distant allies.
State media image of a Hwasong-15 ICBM flying upward from Pyongyang International Airport on Feb. 18 | Image: KCNA (Feb. 19, 2023)
ARRIVAL AS A NUCLEAR POWER
For readers most interested in DPRK issues, the heart of the book will be the subsection on “North Korea’s arrival as a nuclear power.”
Panda takes note of Pyongyang leader Kim Jong Un’s declaration in Nov. 2017, following the successful test flight of its Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile, that the DPRK nuclear deterrent was now “complete.”
Pyongyang reaching its goal in a quest dating from the years since the Korean War put to rest a dismissive view of North Korea long held among U.S. leaders and the American public. Panda recalls President Nixon deriding the DPRK in his day as a “fourth-rate pipsqueak” and the New Yorker magazine cover depicting Kim Jong Un a few years ago as a “toddler playing with missiles” after he conducted the country’s fourth nuclear test in Jan. 2016.
Also noteworthy is Panda’s recognition of North Korea as a nuclear state. He dismisses the policy of Washington, Seoul and Tokyo aimed at Pyongyang’s denuclearization as a “comfortable fiction.” He also doubts that North Korea would accept the sort of “intrusive verification” that made arms control between Moscow and Washington possible in years past.
Panda leaves readers with an alarming picture. Pyongyang, long subject to dire military threats from American presidents — from Eisenhower through Clinton to Trump in his first administration — now has a “complete” system of nuclear deterrence in place.
Washington can no longer engage in carpet bombing, as executed in the Korean War, or greenlight Seoul’s current plans for a preemptive decapitation strike and expect to escape nuclear reprisal against the homeland.
Worse, following the diplomatic roller coaster ride, which rose from the depths of President Trump’s “fire and fury” threat to his spectacular, ultimately failed summit meetings with Kim Jong Un, Pyongyang seems now firmly allied with Moscow. Diplomatic prospects at present appear poor.
A Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), seen here behind Kim Jong Un on Oct. 11 at a weapons expo| Image: KCNA, Oct. 12, 2021
FOOD FOR THOUGHT
The author ends his book with some suggestions for an age of heightened nuclear threats and diminished prospects for the sort of intrusive verification that led to arms control between Washington and Moscow in the Cold War.
Panda calls for “organizational change, introspection and adaptation,” suggesting that nuclear states and non-nuclear powers such as Japan and South Korea plan for military procurement, operations and doctrines in ways to lower the threat to adversaries.
For example, he suggests that planning to defend against missiles rather than to defeat them by such programs as cyberattacks prior to launch would help reduce the risk of, say, Pyongyang using nuclear missiles “without necessarily sitting down for a chat with Kim himself.”
Panda’s book shows us the enormity of today’s threat of nuclear conflagration and offers some ways forward. Apart from provoking in older readers a profound sense of nostalgia for the Cold War, let us hope it offers food for thought to readers in positions of influence to mitigate the danger.
Edited by Alannah Hill
About the Author
Stephen Mercado
Stephen Mercado is a retired officer of the CIA’s Open Source Enterprise (originally the Foreign Broadcast Information Service). A researcher primarily interested in Japanese intelligence history and Asian open-source intelligence, he earned a master’s degree in international affairs at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and is the author of "The Shadow Warriors of Nakano: A History of the Imperial Japanese Army’s Elite Intelligence School" (Brassey’s, 2002), several articles and a few dozen book reviews.
14. North Korean beer from border city looking to make mark in Russian market
People in America and around the world grow fat from drinking beer. But the Korean people in the north do not. (note sarcasm).
News
North Korean beer from border city looking to make mark in Russian market
Records show Vladivostok firm filed declaration to import brews from Rason Ryongson General Processing Factory
https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/north-korean-beer-from-border-city-looking-to-make-mark-in-russian-market/
Anton Sokolin May 1, 2025
A poster of Tumangang beer | Image: NK News
North Korean beer made in the border city of Rason could soon be available for Russian consumers, after a Russian company declared its intention to import what one expert called the DPRK’s best brew.
The Rason Ryongson General Processing Factory’s brewery, known for its Tumangang beer, has teamed up with Vladivostok-based Vostok-Energia, according to records from Russia’s Federal Service for Accreditation (FSA), with the Russian firm filing an import declaration for the brewery’s products on April 14.
Vostok-Energia lists gas extraction, construction, warehousing and logistical operations as part of its core activities, publicly available corporate data shows.
The company had only one employee as of this year, CEO Stanislav Busik, who is running it alongside incorporator Vladimir Baranov. Baranov runs five other firms operating in overlapping fields, all of which are registered under the same address in Vladivostok.
Vostok-Energia seeks to import “Tuman River 11 pale pasteurized filtered beer” with an alcohol content of 4.5 percent, according to the FSA filing.
Rowan Beard, a tour manager at Young Pioneer Tours who guided several tours to Rason this year including a visit to the brewery, explained that number 11 in the name refers to the density of the beverage.
“So the higher the density the heavier the beer,” he told NK News, adding that this system is used both in China and North Korea.
“When I’ve asked both Chinese and Koreans about it, they say they use this as a meter that helps them decide if this beer will make them feel full or not,” he said. “It’s an alternative to eating.”
Ryongson General Processing Factory’s brewery and Tumangang beer varieties | Image: Foreign Trade of DPRK magazine, edited by NK News
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Beard highly praised the beverage, calling it the best beer in the DPRK and far superior to the more widely known Pyongyang-made Taedonggang beer.
“It has a super crisp taste and goes down really well,” he added.
The secret behind the flavor is the quality of the water used by the brewery, Beard said, citing the brewery’s project manager. “They sent samples to China to test it and China said it was incredibly high quality water.”
The brewery only opened in 2020, but its production base — the Ryongson General Processing Factory — has been around since 2016-2017, producing different types of products including instant noodles and medical masks during the pandemic.
Notably, the brewery used to use recycled Tsingtao bottles for packaging. Photos taken by Western tourists in Rason also show that the company still relies on recycled bottles from the multinational beer giant Anheuser-Busch InBev, which owns the Chinese-based brand Bingchuan, a familiar drink to many North Koreans.
With the new import declaration, Tumangang is likely to become the second North Korean beer brand to make a mark on the Russian market after another Vladivostok-based firm planned to import Taedonggang No. 2 made by Taedonggang Brewing Company in 2018.
Taedonggang Brewery registered its brand with Russian authorities in 2024 in a bid to enter the market, followed by a similar move by Naegohyang Trading Company late last year as it sought to export Korean traditional alcohol drinks like soju.
While Russian documents don’t show whether Ryongson has shipped its produce to the Vladivostok firm, Beard cited his contacts at the factory as saying that Tumangang has already started reaching the Russian market.
“Eighty percent of [beer] is for domestic consumption and 20 percent is exported,” he said, adding that China remains the main importer.
Edited by Alannah Hill
15. Japan’s ‘one-theater’ defense concept rattles South Korea
I can understand Korea's concerns. But we need to take an integrated approach to all the security challenges and threats in the region.
We do need a new integrated security architecture.
If we lose Korea to defend Taiwan or if we lose Taiwan to defend Korea it will be the loss of either that will cause catastrophic damage to the US and our allies. We cannot be myopically focused on a single threat. And we cannot afford to "lose" Japan either. Or the Philippines. Or Australia.
Japan’s ‘one-theater’ defense concept rattles South Korea
Seoul grows wary of Tokyo’s evolving security strategy in the region
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2025/04/30/japan/japan-one-theater-concept/?utm
Japan's proposed "one-theater" defense strategy, linking the East China Sea, South China Sea and Korean Peninsula has raised concerns, particularly in South Korea, about its implications for regional security. | REUTERS
By Brad Glosserman
Contributing writer
SHARE/SAVE
Apr 30, 2025
Listen to this article9 min
Several years ago, while making the rounds among Japanese defense officials, I was told that they viewed Northeast Asia as “a single operational theater.” As a proponent of a more prominent role for Japan in regional security affairs — and closer coordination and cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul in particular — that was a welcome and long overdue shift in thinking. It implied that Japan had to be involved in a Korean Peninsula contingency and that it couldn’t be shrugged off as unconnected to the nation’s security.
My confidence was quickly battered. A former senior U.S. defense official dismissed it, saying “I don’t know what that means.”
I’ve been revisiting those conversations in the wake of reports — almost completely missed in the press here and in the U.S. — that Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani proposed a “one-theater” approach to U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth during their meeting in Tokyo at the end of March.
Such a construct links the East China Sea, the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula and surrounding areas as a single theater, or area where military operations are conducted during wartime. Historically, those areas have been separated and military planning has proceeded from the assumption that a crisis in one location would not necessarily involve another.
Effectuating that strategy means that the Self-Defense Forces will be more actively engaged to counter regional threats. It demands that Tokyo work more closely with the countries that are most directly affected by a crisis. “Japan plans to deepen partnerships by viewing Japan, the United States, Australia, the Philippines, South Korea and others as a single theater,” Nakatani said, a proposal that was reportedly welcomed by Hegseth, who repeated the idea himself in a meeting later with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba.
Welcome though the concept might be, there are ample grounds for skepticism. First, it’s not as new as it might seem. Japan has been slowly expanding the SDF’s area of operations since the late 1990s. Then, the government (with the U.S.) formulated the idea of deploying forces to so-called Situations in the Area surrounding Japan as a way to expand SDF roles and missions in a regional contingency, in addition to the defense of Japan’s homeland.
That idea was refined in 2015 legislation that allows Japan to “proactively contribute” to peace and security in the region. That bill authorized the SDF to “provide necessary logistics support and search & rescue to armed forces of foreign countries” either when collectively addressing a situation that threatens international peace and security as recognized by a United Nations resolution or “in situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.” (The latter provision was limited to U.S. forces.)
Continuing expansion of SDF roles and missions is consistent with adoption of the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" construct that guides Japanese security policy and the insistence, in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, that security is indivisible.
It’s also consistent with U.S. thinking about regional threats. Corey Wallace, an associate professor at Kanagawa University who focuses on Japanese security policy, is inclined to see the proposal as “diplomatic signaling,” proof that Tokyo is taking the Trump administration’s strategic thinking seriously.
Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi, an associate professor at Tokyo International University, agreed, explaining via email that the concept is an effort by Japan to “try to align itself to what (could be) the U.S. strategy in the region.” Hegseth validated that thinking in his news conference with Nakatani when he said that he expects Japan to be “on the frontlines of any contingency” in the Western Pacific.
The question my friend posed about the meaning of this expansion remains unanswered, however. While the Asahi Shimbun reported that senior SDF and Defense Ministry officials developed the one-theater idea, its geographic scope has not been defined.
It’s assumed that a focus of Japanese thinking is China, but Tokyo officials have been cautious about providing clarity. An SDF official warned that “Ministry officials must have a consensus when using a new term, but the word is still not defined.” A senior defense official conceded that “details have yet to be worked out.”
One consistency among experts I surveyed is doubt whether Japan will muster the will to fill in those details. Wallace warned, “There’s still no internal consensus here that Tokyo would even deploy the SDF to the South China Sea if localized fighting broke out.” The SDF will be tested as it reorganizes to operate under a joint command; the first priority has to be defense of the homeland, and only after those plans are worked out can defense planners take on the new requirement to address regional contingencies.
The most strident reactions have come from South Korea. Rather than welcome the prospect of assistance in the event of a Korean Peninsula contingency, opposition has predominated and there is a fairly long list of objections.
First, there is fear that the concept will shift focus to China as the primary regional threat. This raises concern on the left (in particular, but not exclusively) that this will create friction with Beijing. Hankyoreh, a progressive newspaper, urged Japan “to stop unnecessarily stoking tensions with China and focus on dialogue” to promote better relations.
Second, there is fear of entrapment. Japan’s potential involvement in regional contingencies raises the stakes, potentially expanding any crisis, while also making it more difficult for Seoul to say no to requests to do the same. This, thundered the Korea Times, a conservative paper, could “compromise South Korea’s core defense posture. The Korean Peninsula is not a backwater theater; it is a primary front involving a nuclear-armed adversary. To subordinate Korean security to cross-strait dynamics is both strategically unsound and politically inflammatory.”
Joongang Daily, another conservative newspaper, warned that this “will inevitably change” the mission and nature of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and it could be “deployed in conflicts outside the Korean Peninsula, including a possible contingency in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea.” This, its editorial writers fumed, could deprive the country of the forces it needs for national defense.
The Korea Times editorial writer earlier put forth the argument that the one-theater construct “dangerously flattens political nuance in favor of operational efficiency. It treats sovereign nations not as independent actors with unique security needs, but as interchangeable assets within a broader strategic front defined by Japan and, potentially, the U.S.”
Invariably, weighing on South Korean calculations is the possibility that Japan’s embrace of the “one-theater” concept would recalibrate Washington’s assessment of the value of its regional allies. Once again, rivalry between the two neighbors raises its ugly head.
Combined with the rethinking of U.S. Forces Japan, the creation of a joint command in Japan and the inevitable restructuring of the Japan-U.S. alliance that is then necessitated, Joongang Daily warned that “Japan could gain the lead in U.S. force restructuring in East Asia.” Park Won-gon, professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University, suggested that “If South Korea doesn’t actively support U.S. strategy, Washington may lean further toward Japan.” This could lead, some South Koreans fear, to downgrading the top official at USFK, currently a four-star general, further reducing the weight accorded to Seoul's priorities in regional security decision-making.
Finally, there is the ever-present concern that the concept could result in Japanese troops on the Korean Peninsula, an unthinkable notion given the two nations’ history. The Korea Times was succinct: “Any framework that implicitly or explicitly involves Japanese military activity on or near the Korean Peninsula is politically incendiary. The legacy of Japan’s 1910-45 colonial occupation of Korea continues to cast a long shadow over bilateral relations. ... The idea of Japanese boots on or near Korean soil — however hypothetical — remains an emotional and constitutional red line. Even under the banner of collective defense, such a scenario would provoke fierce domestic backlash and could fracture regional unity.”
That fear is overblown. During the years of trilateral (Japan-U.S.-South Korea) extended deterrence dialogues that I ran at Pacific Forum during the 2010s, Japanese participants were extremely wary of any SDF presence on the peninsula for just that reason.
Professor Wallace urged Japanese policymakers to take South Korean concerns seriously, especially given the turmoil in politics there. “It might also provide the next, likely progressive administration a ready-made excuse to stall or walk back trilateral cooperation that has continued even with the change in administration in the United States and the political chaos in Seoul.”
But Wallace is supportive of this shift in Japanese thinking. “There is a major risk here of overpromising — the opposite of what Tokyo is usually accused of doing. As a long-term strategic goal, it makes sense in the context of the long arc of Japan’s recent national security and strategic evolution.”
We’ll all be watching closely to see whether it comes, at long last, to fruition.
Brad Glosserman is deputy director of and visiting professor at the Center for Rule-Making Strategies at Tama University as well as senior adviser (nonresident) at Pacific Forum. His new book on the geopolitics of high-tech is expected to come out from Hurst Publishers this fall.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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