Korea has not been the only battleground since the end of the Second World War. Men have fought and died in Malaya, in Greece, in the Philippines, in Algeria and Cuba and Cyprus, and almost continuously on the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. No nuclear weapons have been fired. No massive nuclear retaliation has been considered appropriate. This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin--war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called "wars of liberation," to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.

John F. Kennedy, 35th President of the U.S.

Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military Academy, June 06, 1962

Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"All too often, when we see injustices, both great and small, we think, That's terrible, but we do nothing. We say nothing. We let other people fight their own battles. We remain silent because silence is easier. Qui tacet consentire videtur is Latin for 'Silence gives consent.' When we say nothing, when we do nothing, we are consenting to these trespasses against us."

– Roxane Gay

"Armies were like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. We might be a vapour, blowing where we listed...I knew the Turkish Army exactly, and even allowing for their recent extension of faculty by aeroplanes and guns and armoured trains (which made the earth a smaller battlefield) still it seemed they would have need of a fortified post every four square miles."

– T.E. Lawrence

An AI generated quote from de Tocqueville about American freedom: "When a nation has reached this point, it must either change its laws and mores or perish, for the well of public virtue has run dry: in such a place one no longer finds citizens but only subjects." De Tocqueville cautions that when a nation becomes indifferent to self-governance and merely obeys authority, it has lost its virtue and risks descending into servitude.

1. Brown, Top Special Warfare Official Underscore Power of Partnerships, Collaboration

2. Senior Leaders Discuss Future of Special Warfare at Annual Convention

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, May 9, 2024

4. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 9, 2024

5. What Does America Want in Ukraine?

6. Taiwan Wants Suicide Drones to Deter China

7. Can Russia Successfully Occupy Ukraine?

8. Army special mission aviators will field V-280: SOCOM

9. Listen to What They’re Chanting

10. Inside the Bunker With a Ukrainian Vampire Drone Squad

11. Blinken report expected to criticize Israel, but say it isn't breaking weapons terms

12. Report: State Department set to confirm Israel not breaking international law in Gaza

13. 40 years and counting: Special Forces warrant officers celebrate 4 decades of history, service

14. The Biden-Netanyahu relationship is strained like never before. Can the two leaders move forward?

15. Russia's jamming of American weapons in Ukraine is showing the US what it needs to be ready for in a future fight

16. Optimizing the Civil Affairs Task Force for the Army’s Global Missions

17. Trump-affiliated group releases new national security book outlining possible second-term approach

18. A Plan to Revitalize the Arsenal of Democracy

19. What Hamas Wants in Postwar Gaza

20. Russian Sabotage, Spying and Intimidation Is Spreading in Europe

1. Brown, Top Special Warfare Official Underscore Power of Partnerships, Collaboration

An interesting choice of terms selected by DOD news: "Special Warfare" and "Defense Department special warfare."

Excerpts:

Describing collaboration as "common people united by a common vision, working together to accomplish uncommon results," Brown said such a quality is "a key component" of the SOF ethos.

...

Brown and Maier both closed out their remarks by circling back to people and partnerships.

"Together, through collaboration and teamwork, common people can attain uncommon results," Brown said. "With such unity, I'm confident there are no limits to what we can achieve."

"No one can go it alone and be successful," said Maier, "and to fully actualize this potential, we need all of you."

It is all about "through, with, and by" the foundational Special Forces concept.

And just to re-emphasize the use of Special Warfare in the strategic context: Strategic competition is characterized by the national government conducting political warfare in the gray zone in the space between peace and war (all elements of national power employed to achieve national objectives short of war). Irregular warfare is the military contribution to political warfare. Special Warfare is the special operations contribution to irregular warfare.

Brown, Top Special Warfare Official Underscore Power of Partnerships, Collaboration

defense.gov · by Matthew Olay

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the principal civilian advisor to the secretary of defense for all matters related to Defense Department special warfare both underscored the importance of partnerships and collaboration during a pair of speeches today at the Special Operations Forces 2024 convention in Tampa, Florida.

Special Operations Forces 2024 Convention

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force Gen. CQ Brown, Jr., (center) talks with Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, Gen. Bryan P. Fenton (left), and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Christopher P. Maier (right), following keynote speeches by Brown and Maier at the Special Operations Forces 2024 convention in Tampa, Florida, May 9, 2024.

Download: Full Size (1.57 MB)

Photo By: Marine Corps Cpl. Henry Rodriguez

VIRIN: 240509-M-HV456-2230Y

Delivering back-to-back remarks followed by brief Q&A sessions, Air Force Gen. CQ Brown, Jr.; and Christopher Maier, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, emphasized the value of U.S. joint special operations forces working with partner-nation SOF communities, the defense industry and academia to tackle the challenges our nation faces.

Describing collaboration as "common people united by a common vision, working together to accomplish uncommon results," Brown said such a quality is "a key component" of the SOF ethos.

"Collectively, our single most significant strategic asset is our ability to work together," Brown told the crowd, adding that such work requires repeated engagements, increasingly complex exercises and numerous training evolutions.

"Collaboration is part of a core identity — your unwavering commitment to collective strength."

As one example of the U.S. and partner nations working together, both Brown and Maier noted that it has been 10 years since the 87-nation Global Coalition Against Daesh formed.

"I think our 10-year anniversary of the defeat-ISIS coalition serves to highlight — as Chairman Brown did, as well — the true power of our partnerships that we have built over nearly two-and-a-half decades now of generational SOF relationships on counterterrorism," Maier said.

Maier also explained that the U.S. and international SOF communities will have to work together more to meet the conflicts of the future.

"We are going to need to work together even more closely, especially as our missions expand," he said.

"No one has enough, and so we will need to find ways to share more — at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels."

For his own part, Maier has spent the majority of SOF 2024 sharing and contributing to the SOF collaborative effort by holding a series of eight bilateral engagements with eight partner and ally nations, including meeting with Jordanian King Abdullah II on Wednesday.

In addition to addressing the U.S. military's strong bonds with partner nations, Brown and Maier also addressed DOD's relationship with the defense industry.

"As the chairman of Joint Chiefs, I see it as my role to step back, look on and to think globally … to make some hard choices and make sure that we're pursuing the best tools," Brown said, adding that it's important to close "gaps and seams" in defense acquisition with the right balance of capability and capacity for both the U.S. and its partners.

"And this is something that we all need to work on to make sure that we have the tools to respond when a crisis arises," Brown said.

Special Operations Forces 2024 Convention

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Christopher P. Maier delivers a keynote speech at the Special Operations Forces 2024 convention in Tampa, Florida, May 9, 2024.

Download: Full Size (1.57 MB)

Photo By: Marine Corps Cpl. Henry Rodriguez

VIRIN: 240509-M-HV456-2072Y

Maier thanked members of the defense industry for their efforts in keeping the SOF enterprise well equipped, adding that DOD will need even more of the industry's efforts in the future.

"Walking the vendor floor in recent days, I am heartened to see so many companies — small, medium, and big — that are baking in the expectation of working across capabilities from other companies, and countries. We need you to do this even more," Maier said.

"SOF Week is, I hope, one of those essential places in which we can bring together our trusted industry partners with our acquisition and operational leaders, to continue to catalyze our ability to work at the speed of war and discuss how we must adapt to continue to dominate the battlefield — even as the character of war is clearly changing," Maier added.

Brown and Maier both closed out their remarks by circling back to people and partnerships.

"Together, through collaboration and teamwork, common people can attain uncommon results," Brown said. "With such unity, I'm confident there are no limits to what we can achieve."

"No one can go it alone and be successful," said Maier, "and to fully actualize this potential, we need all of you."

defense.gov · by Matthew Olay

2. Senior Leaders Discuss Future of Special Warfare at Annual Convention

Excerpts:

Another speaker on the panel explained that, while technology is no doubt going to continue developing in the future, the focus should be more on the people who are using it.

"Humans are more important than hardware, and that's not something that's going to change in the future," said Command Sgt. Maj. JoAnn Naumann, senior enlisted leader for U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Naumann added that, beginning with the small scale and then working to the large, it's important to look at what availabilities are needed on a team.

"Because, while I don't believe that technology itself will win or lose, I do believe that the people who best apply technology will win or lose."

...

Responding to the question about risk-taking, Naumann brought up the topic of sharing information.

"We can't have our own silos of excellence. We have got to be able to partner seamlessly," she said, adding that such sharing should be both internal with the joint force as well as with our foreign partners.

"That partnership has to be seamless. We have to be able to communicate … and we have to share until it hurts, because it is the only way we will win."

Senior Leaders Discuss Future of Special Warfare at Annual Convention

May 9, 2024 | By Matthew Olay, DOD News |

U.S. and allied country senior leaders discussed the roles that technology, relationships and additional topics play in developing special warfare teams for the future during a panel discussion Wednesday at the Special Operations Forces 2024 convention in Tampa, Florida.The first half of the hourlong panel focused primarily on how special operations forces, or SOF, will not only adapt to modern military technology becoming more powerful, less expensive, and more globally available to both allies and adversaries around the world, but also how SOF will be able to best incorporate some of those technologies into future battle spaces.

"We have to think about how we evolve … and think about our legacy systems and platforms that served us very well in a certain operating environment [but] that may or may not have utility going forward," said Rear Adm. Keith Davids, commander of U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command.

Explaining how examples from Ukraine, the Black Sea and the Middle East demonstrate how small, technologically agile teams can challenge larger conventional forces, Davids said that technologies such as human-machine teaming enable SOF to mass effects without massing forces, creating asymmetric advantages.

On the topic of artificial intelligence, Davids said he believes it can enhance the 'OODA loop' (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act), particularly in the "decide" phase, thus enabling SOF to operate faster than our adversaries.

Spotlight: Artificial Intelligence

"I think [the] decision advantage could be decisive going forward," he said.

Another speaker on the panel explained that, while technology is no doubt going to continue developing in the future, the focus should be more on the people who are using it.

"Humans are more important than hardware, and that's not something that's going to change in the future," said Command Sgt. Maj. JoAnn Naumann, senior enlisted leader for U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Naumann added that, beginning with the small scale and then working to the large, it's important to look at what availabilities are needed on a team.

"Because, while I don't believe that technology itself will win or lose, I do believe that the people who best apply technology will win or lose."

Along those lines, guest speaker Maj. Gen. Claudiu Dobocan, commander of Romania's special operations forces command, said that despite his organization's SOF technical innovation being in its infancy — the command was only recently established in 2018 — his personnel are still able to contribute to their country's other combat forces by testing out new equipment such as night vision goggles, radios and new types of body armor.

Spotlight: DOD Innovates

"We're kind of the test bed that permeates into the force; so, we're proud of that," he said.

Topics during the second half of the panel focused on the power of relationships and partnerships in the SOF community, as well as risk management.

Regarding the importance of maintaining good partnerships, Davids said that, in the era of strategic competition, the significance of partnerships has never been greater; especially during Phase Zero (an era of relative peace) when the military's goal is deterrence.

"[When] we think about the traditional partnerships we've had in the context of counterterrorism, they've been terrific," he added.

Responding to the question about risk-taking, Naumann brought up the topic of sharing information.

"We can't have our own silos of excellence. We have got to be able to partner seamlessly," she said, adding that such sharing should be both internal with the joint force as well as with our foreign partners.

Spotlight: Engineering in DOD

"That partnership has to be seamless. We have to be able to communicate … and we have to share until it hurts, because it is the only way we will win."

Jointly sponsored by Socom and the Global SOF Foundation, SOF Week — which runs through May 10 — is an annual conference for the international SOF community to learn, connect and honor its members, according to the event's official website.

The highlights of this year's event include several keynote speakers, professional development seminars, industry engagements and a live capabilities demonstration.

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, May 9, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-9-2024

Key Takeaways:

Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces are re-clearing parts of the northern Gaza Strip, demonstrating that Hamas remains active beyond just Rafah.
Iran: Iran and Zimbabwe have held a flurry of meetings in recent weeks to discuss economic, military, and political cooperation.
Southern Gaza Strip: US President Joe Biden said that the United States will stop supplying Israel with certain weapons if Israel conducts a major military operation into Rafah.
West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least one location in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed three attacks targeting Israel.
Syria: Israel was likely responsible for an airstrike targeting a Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba site in Sayyida Zeinab, Syria.
Yemen: Houthi supreme leader Abdul Malik al Houthi said during a speech that the Houthis would escalate attacks against Israel following Israel’s limited operation into Rafah.

IRAN UPDATE, MAY 9, 2024

May 9, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, May 9, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Johanna Moore, Kelly Campa, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Israeli forces are re-clearing parts of the northern Gaza Strip, demonstrating that Hamas remains active beyond just Rafah.[1] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched a clearing operation into Zaytoun neighborhood, southern Gaza City, on May 8, marking the third time that the IDF has conducted a clearing operation there.[2] The IDF began by conducting airstrikes targeting Palestinian militia observation posts, sniper positions and tunnels.[3] Three IDF brigades subsequently entered the area.[4] These brigades have since then engaged Palestinian militias, including Hamas, in Zaytoun as well as in nearby Sabra neighborhood and along the Netzarim corridor.[5] A Palestinian social media account reported that civilians are evacuating areas in and around Zaytoun since the Israeli clearing operation began there.[6]

This most recent Israeli clearing operation highlights that Hamas remains active and combat effective in the northern Gaza Strip, despite repeated Israeli clearing efforts there. Hamas infiltrated and began reconstituting itself in the northern part of the strip after the IDF withdrew from the area in December 2023.[7] Hamas has since then conducted dozens of attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around the northern Gaza Strip.[8] Hamas is almost certainly trying to reconstitute around Khan Younis since the IDF left there in April 2024.

Hamas’ remaining presence throughout the Gaza Strip supports CTP-ISW's assessment that Hamas expects that it would survive an Israeli clearing operation into Rafah.[9] Hamas likely calculates that it could rebuild itself in Rafah in the same way that it is currently in the northern Gaza Strip. This confidence has informed Hamas’ decision to maintain its maximalist ceasefire demands since December 2023.

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent noted that the IDF will need to continue to conduct clearing operations around the Gaza Strip until there are serious conversations about a replacement to Hamas as a local governing authority.[10] The absence of a governing authority, including a local security force besides Hamas, will provide Hamas space and time to reassert itself in the strip.

Iran and Zimbabwe have held a flurry of meetings in recent weeks to discuss economic, military, and political cooperation. Zimbabwean Science and Technology Minister Amon Murwira has most recently led a delegation to attend an international technology exhibition in Tehran between May 7-10.[11] The exhibition is at least ostensibly meant to promote business cooperation between Iranian and foreign companies. The Iranian Defense Industries Training and Research Institute is participating in the exhibition, suggesting that Iran wants to use the event to promote military cooperation as well.[12] The institute, which operates under the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry, is responsible for designing military equipment and systems and working with foreign partners to gain technical knowledge of advanced weapons systems.[13] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Director Mohammad Eslami previously served as the head of this institute.[14] Murwira met with the Iranian vice president for science, technology, and the knowledge-based economy on the sidelines of the exhibition on May 8.[15]

This exhibition follows other recent engagements between Iran and Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean Vice President Constantino Chiwenga met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, among other Iranian officials, in Tehran in late April 2024.[16] Zimbabwe also participated in the inaugural Iranian Nuclear Science and Technology Conference in Esfahan City between May 6-8.[17] [18]

Key Takeaways:

Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces are re-clearing parts of the northern Gaza Strip, demonstrating that Hamas remains active beyond just Rafah.
Iran: Iran and Zimbabwe have held a flurry of meetings in recent weeks to discuss economic, military, and political cooperation.
Southern Gaza Strip: US President Joe Biden said that the United States will stop supplying Israel with certain weapons if Israel conducts a major military operation into Rafah.
West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least one location in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed three attacks targeting Israel.
Syria: Israel was likely responsible for an airstrike targeting a Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba site in Sayyida Zeinab, Syria.
Yemen: Houthi supreme leader Abdul Malik al Houthi said during a speech that the Houthis would escalate attacks against Israel following Israel’s limited operation into Rafah.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Israeli forces continued to conduct a limited operation into eastern Rafah on May 9. Israeli forces have destroyed 10 tunnel shafts and killed around 50 Palestinian fighters since entering eastern Rafah, according to Israeli media.[19] Hamas detonated a tunnel shaft there, moderately injuring three Israeli soldiers.[20] Palestinian militias also fired small arms and conducted indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces entering eastern Rafah.[21] Commercially available satellite imagery from May 8 shows flattened terrain south of al Bayuk, indicating that Israeli armor and/or other heavy vehicles entered the area. A Palestinian journalist citing local reports said that the IDF sent bulldozers into eastern Rafah.[22] Israeli forces continue to control the now-closed Rafah crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.[23] The IDF estimates that around 150,000 Palestinians have evacuated eastern Rafah since the Israeli evacuation orders were issued.[24] A Palestinian journalist reported on May 9 that residents and displaced people civilians are moving toward Deir al Balah.[25]

US President Joe Biden said that the United States will stop supplying Israel with certain weapons if Israel conducts a major military operation into Rafah.[26] He said that, should Israel advance military operations into populated areas, the United States would not supply artillery shells, bombs for fighter jets, and other unspecified offensive weapons during a televised interview with CNN published on May 8.[27] Biden acknowledged that Israel using US-made bombs in populated areas has killed Gazan civilians. Biden added that the limited Israeli operation to control the Rafah crossing did not cross a “red line” that would shift US policy. He also clarified that the United States would continue helping Israel to defend against attacks from foreign actors. The interview with Biden came after the United States confirmed on May 8 that it paused a shipment of weapons to Israel due to US concerns over Israeli operations in Rafah.[28]

The Israeli war cabinet is set to meet to discuss Biden’s comments, according to an unnamed Israeli official.[29] An IDF spokesperson said after Biden’s interview that Israel has the weapons needed for operations in Rafah.[30]

Four unspecified US officials told NBC that Israel has refused to agree to a ceasefire deal with Hamas unless the IDF can proceed with a military operation into Rafah.[31] The officials said that the Netanyahu government wants to conduct military operations into Rafah even during a ceasefire. An Israeli official denied this report, citing recent remarks by Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, who said, "this operation will continue until we eliminate Hamas in the Rafah area and the entire Gaza Strip or until the first hostage returns."[32]

An unspecified Israeli official told Israeli media that Israeli negotiators left Cairo on May 9 with no planned return for further ceasefire talks.[33] Another unspecified Israeli source said that the negotiators submitted Israeli reservations about the recent Hamas proposal to the international mediators.[34] The source said that Israel will continue its military operations in Rafah and the Gaza Strip as planned.

An Israeli Army Radio reporter said on May 8 that the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) has refused to provide figures on the number of humanitarian aid trucks that have entered the Gaza Strip over the past two days.[35] COGAT is the Israeli body responsible for facilitating the flow of aid into the Gaza Strip. The reporter said that the number of aid trucks entering the Gaza Strip has been low in recent weeks. The reporter added that COGAT cannot fulfill Israeli promises to the United States that Israeli operations in Rafah would not disrupt the transfer of aid.

A US humanitarian aid shipment departed Cyprus on May 9 bound for the US-built floating pier off the Gaza coast, marking the first shipment of its kind.[36] The pier is not yet operational, however, due to inclement weather.[37] A US Department of Defense spokesperson said on May 9 that the US cargo ship that left Cyprus will transport the aid to another ship off the coast of the Gaza Strip.[38]

Hamas conducted a rocket attack from eastern Rafah targeting Kerem Shalom on May 8.[39] The first salvo of rockets fell short of Israel.[40] A second attack injured an Israeli soldier. The IDF separately reported on May 9 that an unidentified object launched from the Gaza Strip fell in Israel without causing damage.[41]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least one location in the West Bank on May 9.[42] The IDF detained 31 wanted individuals in the West Bank during overnight operations, including two Hamas fighter.[43] Israeli forces also confiscated incendiary materials. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades targeted Israeli forces in Qabatiya, Jenin governorate, with machine guns.[44]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on May 8.[45]

The IDF conducted a drone strike that killed four Hezbollah Radwan fighters in Balfiyeh in southern Lebanon on May 9.[46] Lebanese Hezbollah mourned the deaths of three of its fighters on May 9, presumably from Israeli strikes.[47]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed three attacks targeting Israel on May 9.[48] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed two drone attacks targeting Eilat and the IDF Nevatim base in Beersheba.[49] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also claimed one cruise missile attack targeting the Ashkelon oil port.[50] CTP-ISW cannot verify that any of the claimed attacks actually occurred. A Syrian journalist claimed on May 8 that the IDF intercepted an Iranian-made drone over western Daraa in southern Syria.[51] The IDF has not commented on any of the attacks at the time of this writing.

Israel was likely responsible for an airstrike targeting a Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba (HHN) site in Sayyida Zeinab, Syria, on May 9. Local Syrian media reported that Israel targeted and destroyed an HHN-operated building.[52] The Syrian Defense Ministry similarly stated that Israel was responsible for the attack and caused material losses.[53] HHN released a statement acknowledging the attack on one of its sites and pledging a “sudden, strong, and effective” response against Israel.[54] [55]

The Houthis claimed on May 9 that they conducted ballistic missile and drone attacks targeting three Panamanian-flagged vessels in unspecified areas of the Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, and Arabian Sea.[56]

Houthi supreme leader Abdul Malik al Houthi said during a speech on May 9 that the Houthis would escalate attacks against Israel following Israel’s limited operation into Rafah.[57] Abdul Malik said that the group would target any ships related to supplying goods to Israel regardless of the ships’ destination. Abdul Malik said that this was the fourth stage of escalation in response to Israel’s operation in Rafah. The Houthis initially announced the fourth phase of escalation against Israel on May 3 by threatening to target ships in the Mediterranean Sea.[58] Abdul Malik added that the group is considering a “fifth and sixth stage” and that the Israeli operation in Rafah will be “met with greater action at all levels.”[59]

Iranian hardliners are continuing to normalize discussions about Iran’s ability to procure a nuclear weapon. Strategic Foreign Relations Council Chairman Kamal Kharrazi stated during an interview with al Jazeera on May 9 that Iran will have “no choice” but to change its nuclear doctrine if Israel threatens Iran’s existence[60] Kharrazi emphasized that Iran has not decided to pursue a nuclear weapon but warned that Iran’s “level [61] Kharrazi is a top foreign policy adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Kharrazi's decision to conduct the interview with al Jazeera suggests that he meant to send this message especially to the Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Kharrazi previously stated that Iran has the "technical means” to make a nuclear weapon but had not decided whether to pursue such a weapon during an interview with al Jazeera in July 2022.[62]

Other senior Iranian officials have similarly discussed openly Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon in recent weeks. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Nuclear Security and Protection Corps Commander Brig. Gen. Ahmad Haghtalab announced on April 18 that Iran will change its “nuclear doctrine and policies” if Israel strikes Iran’s nuclear facilities.[63] Haghtalab's statement preceded the Israeli airstrike on April 18 that targeted an Artesh Air Force base in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province, approximately 112 kilometers south of the Natanz Nuclear Complex.[64]

Iranian Ambassador to Belarus Ali Reza Saneyi discussed Belarusian-Iranian political and economic cooperation with Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian in Tehran on May 9.[65] This meeting follows Abdollahian’s meeting with Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali in Tehran on May 8.[66] Abdollahian and Jalali discussed Russo-Iranian transit, financial, and banking cooperation.

4. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 9, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2024

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin used his May 9 Victory Day speech to relitigate his belief that the West is attempting to erase the Soviet Union's contributions to defeating Nazi Germany during the Great Patriotic War (Second World War), a grievance that is at the core of Russia's adversarial perceptions of the West.
Putin seized on a recent meeting with the commanders of several frontline Russian formations to portray himself as an informed and effective Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces, aware of the intricacies of the frontline situation and involved in finding solutions to issues that plague Russian forces.
Putin surrounded himself with a number of foreign officials at the Victory Day parade, likely in order to posture himself as an effective statesman capable of galvanizing an alternative coalition to the power structures of the collective West.
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that the Moldovan government is engaged in a Nazi-like "genocide" in Moldova — a notable inflection in Kremlin officials' rhetoric about Moldova that is likely meant set conditions for a Russian effort to secure control over Moldova and not just some of its regions.
The leaders of the pro-Kremlin Moldovan Victory opposition electoral bloc attended the Victory Day parade in Moscow, further indicating that the Kremlin intends to use these actors to destabilize all of Moldova and attack Moldova's democracy and EU accession process.
Russian forces have markedly increased the rate of ground attacks in eastern Ukraine over the past month, likely reflecting current battlefield conditions and the intent of the Russian military command to secure gains before the arrival of Western military aid to the frontlines.
Russian border guards are withdrawing from much of Armenia as Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan continues to face domestic backlash for decisions regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Kremlin may seek to capitalize on opposition outrage in Armenia to punish Pashinyan for increasingly pulling away from Russia.
Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) conducted long-range drone strikes against Russian oil depots and refinery infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai and the Republic of Bashkortostan on May 9.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and Donetsk City.
Russian forces continue to struggle with discipline in their ranks, with some Russian soldiers reportedly killing other members of their units.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 9, 2024

May 9, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 9, 2024

Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

May 9, 2024, 7:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00pm ET on May 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin used his May 9 Victory Day speech to relitigate his belief that the West is attempting to erase the Soviet Union's contributions to defeating Nazi Germany during the Great Patriotic War (Second World War), a grievance that is at the core of Russia's adversarial perceptions of the West. Putin claimed during the Victory Day parade, which is held to commemorate the Soviet Union's victory and sacrifices during the Second World War, that "they," referring to the West, are attempting to "distort" the truth about the Second World War and "demolish" the memory of Soviet heroism and sacrifice.[1] Putin claimed that perceived Western efforts to rewrite the history of the Second World War and the West's supposed support of "Nazism" in Ukraine, another long-standing Kremlin narrative, are part of a wider Western effort to incite interethnic and interreligious conflict throughout the world. Putin claimed that while the West would like to forget the lessons of the Second World War, Russia remembers that the Soviet Union decided the "fate of humanity" during battles "from Murmansk to the Caucasus and Crimea." Putin similarly used his 2023 and 2022 Victory Day speeches to reiterate existing narratives about the West's war against Russia and absurdly to equate the threat of Nazi Germany with that of Ukraine.[2] Putin's willingness to repeatedly re-emphasize imagined Western efforts to discount the Soviet Union's contribution in defeating Nazi Germany suggests that Putin wholeheartedly believes that this is a genuine threat to the Soviet Union's legacy, and by extension the modern Russian state.[3] This belief is in line with Putin's repeated efforts to rewrite and rehabilitate the Soviet Union's aggression towards Poland, its brief alliance with Nazi Germany, and crimes committed against its own people before, during, and after the Second World War.[4]

Putin simultaneously used his Victory Day speech to present a picture of Russia as a bastion in the fight against Nazism. Putin claimed that Russia has never belittled the contributions of the other Allied powers in the Second World War and highlighted the courage of Allied servicemen, resistance fighters, and the people of China who fought against Japan's aggression.[5] Putin claimed that Russia will do everything possible to prevent a global conflict, but at the same time will not allow anyone to threaten the country. Putin framed Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine as a "difficult transitional period" that Russia must get through and as part of Russia's greater historical fight against Nazism.[6] The Kremlin routinely invokes the mythos of the Second World War to generate domestic support for its invasion of Ukraine and frame its conquest of Ukraine as part of a wider existential conflict with the West.[7] Putin's rhetorical efforts to frame Russia as both a victim of Nazi aggression and the leader of its imagined anti-Nazi coalition tread a thin line that Putin likely hopes will appeal to both his ultranationalist constituency and the wider Russian population.

Putin seized on a recent meeting with the commanders of several frontline Russian formations to portray himself as an informed and effective Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces, aware of the intricacies of the frontline situation and involved in finding solutions to issues that plague Russian forces. Putin met with the commanders of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 24th Spetsnaz Brigade (Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]), and 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) on May 7, and the commanders made several requests of Putin based on their combat experience.[8] The Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) publicized the meeting on May 9, likely to capitalize on the emotions surrounding Victory Day. Putin responded to the 24th Spetsnaz Brigade commander's question about increasing Russia's domestic drone production and claimed that "modern means of armed struggle" are changing at a very high speed. Putin claimed that Russia must always be one step ahead of its enemies if it wants to be successful in combat but conceded that Russia does not always succeed in this because Russia is fighting against modernized, Western equipment in Ukraine, admitting that it is difficult for Russian servicemen to operate while Ukrainian drones are constantly flying overhead. Putin noted that increased and improved drone production is critical to the Russian war effort and stated that the Russian MoD and defense industry is working on the issue, but that it is not an easy task. Putin is likely engaging in such tactical-level details for reputational effect. Putin then interrupted the commander of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade, who was attempting to ask about increasing domestic production of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), and claimed that he is aware that it was difficult for Russian forces to seize Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka) but that Russian forces "finally got it." Putin appears to have seized on comments by both commanders to present himself as more in tune with the battlefield situation than his own commanders. Putin bragged about the seizure of a frontline settlement with a pre-war population of 267 as part of a Kremlin effort to oversell the seizure of tiny frontline settlements to the general Russian population who have no concept of where or how big these settlements are.

Putin also attempted to present the previously ordered expansion of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade into a division as his own extemporaneous problem-solving. The commander of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade asked Putin to consider reorganizing the brigade into several groupings due to the fact that the brigade is "overstaffed."[9] The commander implausibly claimed that the brigade currently has over 11,000 troops (a brigade would normally have around 3,000 troops), to which Putin responded that the Russian military command will reorganize and expand the brigade into a division. Ukrainian forces have reportedly defeated and destroyed significant elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade in southern Ukraine several times during the war thus far, forcing the Russian military command to repeatedly reconstitute the formation.[10] It is highly unlikely that the 810th is staffed by over 11,000 troops unless as part of a reformation into a division already underway, and Putin's seemingly spontaneous decision to reorganize the brigade into a division is likely part of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) previously announced plan to reorganize seven motorized rifle brigades into motorized rifle divisions.[11] Putin has previously attempted to present himself as an effective Supreme Commander-in-Chief by engaging in minute tactical undertakings, such as seemingly spontaneously granting Russian military personnel leave in the presence of Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov during a December 2023 meeting and during his December 2023 Direct Line.[12] ISW assessed that the December 2023 interaction was likely staged in order to bolster Putin's reputation, and Putin's recent meeting with Russian commanders was likely also highly staged and publicized on May 9 to link Putin's involvement with tactical battlefield affairs to the reputations of Soviet military commanders during the Second World War.[13]

Putin surrounded himself with a number of foreign officials at the Victory Day parade, likely in order to posture himself as an effective statesman capable of galvanizing an alternative coalition to the power structures of the collective West. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel, Guinea-Bissau President Umaro Mokhtar Sissoco Embaló, and Laotian President Thongloun Sisoulith stood with Putin on the podium at the Victory Day parade.[14] It is customary for Putin to invite foreign officials to Victory Day celebrations, although Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has decreased the number of willing participants. In 2023, for example, a number of heads of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) partners, including Lukashenko, Tokayev, Japarov, Rahmon, Berdimuhamedov, and Miriziyoyev, were present on the podium alongside Putin.[15] Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was notably absent after attending last year, as Pashinyan has recently engaged in a concerted effort to distance Armenia from the Russian sphere of influence.[16] The presence of a tiny but relatively diverse set of heads of state from Central Asia, Southeast Asia, west Africa, and the Caribbean suggests that Putin is continuing to cast himself as an effective diplomat at the helm of a coalition of Russia-friendly states that ideologically oppose, or do not see a place for themselves within, Western-led alliance systems and political-economic blocs.[17] Putin sees Russia at the center of his envisioned new "multipolar world" and is likely trying to align himself with foreign heads of state whom he sees as receptive to this vision for the international system.[18] Representatives from Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) were notably not on the podium alongside Putin, however, which may suggest that Putin desires to reach past the leading states Russia has explicitly affiliated itself with in order to strengthen the image of an internationally popular Russian-led multipolar world order.

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that the Moldovan government is engaged in a Nazi-like "genocide" in Moldova — a notable inflection in Kremlin officials' rhetoric about Moldova that is likely meant set conditions for a Russian effort to secure control over Moldova and not just some of its regions. Zakharova gave a Victory Day interview to Kremlin newswire TASS in which she absurdly claimed that Moldovan President Maia Sandu and her administration are engaging in "eugenic" practices comparable to those of the Nazi Third Reich.[19] Zakharova focused heavily on the Moldovan government's policies towards Moldovan language, claiming that the Sandu government is replacing the Moldovan language with Romanian and that this constitutes "elements of genocide against an entire people." Zakharova claimed that Moldovan language, culture, and identity will remain after Sandu leaves office and that Sandu will leave "a dark spot in the history of Moldova," suggesting that the Kremlin expects a new administration that is unlike Sandu's Western-oriented government to come to power in the future. Zakharova notably did not lambast the Sandu government for its policies towards Russian speakers in Moldova as other Russian and pro-Kremlin Moldovan officials have done recently, focusing instead on the Moldovan language.[20] The Kremlin has repeatedly invoked its self-proclaimed need to protect Russia's "compatriots," particularly Russian speakers allegedly facing discrimination, to justify Russian aggression abroad, including in Ukraine and Moldova.[21] Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, have recently promoted the narrative that Russia is in an existential geopolitical conflict with an alleged modern Nazi movement that is purportedly prolific in the West.[22] ISW previously assessed that many people may not identify with Kremlin narratives about Russian "compatriots abroad" and that the Kremlin may have decided that claims of Western "neo-Nazism" may be more effective with a wider audience.[23] Moldova's two pro-Russian regions, the autonomous region of Gagauzia and the breakaway republic of Transnistria, are home to large Russian speaking populations, and the Kremlin's shift from allegations about persecution of Russian speakers to that of Moldovan speakers indicates that the Kremlin is likely trying to justify future Russian aggression in all of Moldova.

The leaders of the pro-Kremlin Moldovan Victory opposition electoral bloc attended the Victory Day parade in Moscow, further indicating that the Kremlin intends to use these actors to destabilize all of Moldova and attack Moldova's democracy and EU accession process. US-sanctioned Moldovan politician Ilan Shor, Governor of Gagauzia Yevgenia Gutsul, and US-sanctioned and close Shor affiliate Moldovan member of parliament Marina Tauber attended the May 9 Victory Day in Moscow reportedly at Russian President Vladimir Putin's invitation.[24] Shor, Gutsul, and Tauber are the principal leaders of the recently created Moldovan Victory electoral bloc, which will reportedly run a candidate in the October 2024 Moldovan presidential election.[25] Shor's, Gutsul's, and Tauber's attendance of the Victory Day parade is a notable public demonstration of the importance of these three Moldovan actors — and consequently the Victory electoral bloc — to Kremlin efforts in Moldova. Although Gutsul has personally met with Putin and other Kremlin officials recently and Russian-Gagauzian bilateral ties have notably increased in recent months, the inclusion of Shor and Tauber in the Moscow celebrations further indicates that the Kremlin's efforts in Moldova are not limited to Gagauzia.[26] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is engaged in efforts to destabilize all of Moldova and prevent Moldova's EU accession and is likely trying to exploit Gagauzia's and Transnistria's Kremlin ties and opposition to the Moldovan federal authorities as part of these wider efforts.[27]

Russian forces have markedly increased the rate of ground attacks in eastern Ukraine over the past month, likely reflecting current battlefield conditions and the intent of the Russian military command to secure gains before the arrival of Western military aid to the frontlines. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on May 9 that the number of combat engagements increased significantly from 84 on May 8 to 146 on May 9 and noted that most of the fighting occurred in the area of responsibility of the Khortytsia Group (the area from Kharkiv Oblast down to the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area).[28] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the rate of Russian attacks increased by 17 percent between March and April 2024 and that over 75 percent of reported ground attacks took place in the Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and Marinka directions.[29] UK MoD noted that the number of Russian attacks near Chasiv Yar increased by 200 percent between March and April. Voloshyn suggested that the current intensification of Russian attacks is a result of the fact that the soil has dried out after the spring mud season, which facilitates more rapid mechanized maneuver, and that Russian forces are trying to take advantage of Ukraine's relative weakness while it awaits the arrival of Western aid.[30] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will maintain the high rate of attacks across eastern Ukraine in order to make gains before the arrival of Western aid in Ukraine, which will likely stymie Russia forces' ability to maintain the high rate of attacks and tactical gains that they are currently able to pursue.[31] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky similarly stated on May 9 during a meeting with European Parliament Head Roberta Mestola that the arrival of Western aid to Ukrainian frontline units will allow Ukrainian forces to blunt Russia's initiative in eastern Ukraine.[32]

Russian border guards are withdrawing from much of Armenia as Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan continues to face domestic backlash for decisions regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on May 9 that Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed during a meeting on May 8 to stop Russian border guard operations in a number of Armenian regions due to "changed conditions," likely referring to Armenia's loss of Nagorno-Karabakh.[33] Peskov noted that Russian border guards will remain stationed on the Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Iranian international borders.[34] Meanwhile, thousands of protestors have completed a multi-day march to Yerevan, Armenia, where they are currently protesting in Yerevan's Republic Square against Pashinyan's decision to transfer control over four border villages in Tavush Province to Azerbaijan in the wake of Armenia's loss of Nagorno-Karabakh.[35] Armenian Apostolic Church Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, who serves as the Primate of the Tavush Diocese, has emerged as a leader of these protests and issued a public call on May 9 for Pashinyan to either resign within the hour or face a vote of no confidence in the parliament.[36] Galstanyan met with Armenian opposition parliamentarians after the deadline elapsed to discuss initiating a vote of no confidence to oust Pashinyan.[37] Armenia's constitution stipulates that at least a third of parliamentarians or the president must support a draft resolution of no confidence to bring a vote, and at least half of parliamentarians must then vote in favor of the final no confidence resolution.[38] The constitution also stipulates that the final vote of no confidence occur between 48 and 72 hours of the draft's initial submission. Pashinyan's ruling Civil Contract party holds roughly 54 percent of the seats in Armenian parliament, so it is unlikely that a vote of no confidence would oust Pashinyan without defectors from the Civil Contract party voting for the opposition.[39]

The Kremlin may seek to capitalize on opposition outrage in Armenia to punish Pashinyan for increasingly pulling away from Russia. Russian state media has closely followed the protests and is widely amplifying Galstanyan's calls for Pashinyan's resignation or a vote of no confidence.[40] A prominent, Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger has tracked the protest march from Kirash, Tavush Province to Yerevan and expressed support for the protestors.[41] This milblogger and other Russian officials and pro-Kremlin voices have frequently spread information operations accusing Pashinyan of "weakness" and incompetence for ceding territory to Azerbaijan after Russia failed to prevent the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh.[42] Pro-Kremlin actors may amplify reports of discontent or perpetuate ongoing Kremlin information operations in the wake of Armenian opposition protests to further pressure Pashinyan into mending relations with Russia.

Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) conducted long-range drone strikes against Russian oil depots and refinery infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai and the Republic of Bashkortostan on May 9. The Krasnodar Krai operational headquarters claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to attack an oil depot in Yurovka (near Anapa) with at least seven drones, and that Russian air defense suppressed six drones but at least one fell on the depot itself, causing a fire.[43] Some Russian sources reported that the strike damaged several oil tanks.[44] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reported that an "informed source" stated that this was an SBU operation targeting oil shipment points through which the Russian military supplies oil to troops in occupied Crimea.[45] Geolocated footage published on May 9 additionally shows a drone attack against the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat oil refinery in Salvat, Republic of Bashkortostan.[46] The Republic of Bashkortostan's Ministry of Emergency Situations reported that the strike damaged the building housing a pumping station at the refinery.[47] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne stated that its SBU sources took responsibility for the drone strike and reported that it damaged a catalytic cracking unit, which is used to refine crude oil into gasoline and other petroleum products.[48] Suspilne noted that this is a "record" distance for a Ukrainian strike on Russia, as Salvat is 1,500 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Ukraine recently conducted a long-range drone strike against the Republic of Tatarstan, which is 1,200 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, and the Bashkortostan strike therefore represents an inflection in Ukraine's long-range strike capability.[49]

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin used his May 9 Victory Day speech to relitigate his belief that the West is attempting to erase the Soviet Union's contributions to defeating Nazi Germany during the Great Patriotic War (Second World War), a grievance that is at the core of Russia's adversarial perceptions of the West.
Putin seized on a recent meeting with the commanders of several frontline Russian formations to portray himself as an informed and effective Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces, aware of the intricacies of the frontline situation and involved in finding solutions to issues that plague Russian forces.
Putin surrounded himself with a number of foreign officials at the Victory Day parade, likely in order to posture himself as an effective statesman capable of galvanizing an alternative coalition to the power structures of the collective West.
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that the Moldovan government is engaged in a Nazi-like "genocide" in Moldova — a notable inflection in Kremlin officials' rhetoric about Moldova that is likely meant set conditions for a Russian effort to secure control over Moldova and not just some of its regions.
The leaders of the pro-Kremlin Moldovan Victory opposition electoral bloc attended the Victory Day parade in Moscow, further indicating that the Kremlin intends to use these actors to destabilize all of Moldova and attack Moldova's democracy and EU accession process.
Russian forces have markedly increased the rate of ground attacks in eastern Ukraine over the past month, likely reflecting current battlefield conditions and the intent of the Russian military command to secure gains before the arrival of Western military aid to the frontlines.
Russian border guards are withdrawing from much of Armenia as Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan continues to face domestic backlash for decisions regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Kremlin may seek to capitalize on opposition outrage in Armenia to punish Pashinyan for increasingly pulling away from Russia.
Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) conducted long-range drone strikes against Russian oil depots and refinery infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai and the Republic of Bashkortostan on May 9.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and Donetsk City.
Russian forces continue to struggle with discipline in their ranks, with some Russian soldiers reportedly killing other members of their units.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on May 9, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk), towards Berestove (southeast of Kupyansk), and 300 meters near Novoselivske (northwest of Svatove), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[50] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Ivanivka and Berestove; northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka; southwest of Svatove near Tverdokhlibove; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Nevske, Novosadove, and Novolyubivka; west of Kreminna near Torske; southwest of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[51]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Siversk direction (northeast of Bakhmut) on May 9 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing south and southeast of Siversk near Rozdolivka and Vesele, but ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of Russian gains in this area.[52] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka.[53] Elements of the "GORB" detachment of the 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps (LNR AC) reportedly continue operating near Spirne (southeast of Siversk), and unspecified airborne (VDV) elements are reportedly operating near Vesele.[54] A milblogger posted footage on May 9 purportedly showing 2nd LNR AC elements conducting TOS-1A thermobaric artillery strikes on Ukrainian positions in the Siversk direction.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on May 9, but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted ground attacks in the Novyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar); east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are expanding their control of eastern parts of Chasiv Yar and increasing offensive pressure on the southern and eastern flanks of the settlement.[57] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets warned on May 9 that the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces (currently deployed between Siversk and the Marinka area) is regrouping to prepare for renewed attempts to break through to Chasiv Yar, which Mashovets noted explains the slight decrease in Russian attacks in this area over the past few days.[58] Mashovets suggested that the Russian command may be trying to push south of Chasiv Yar in the Stupochky-Bila Hora area in order to reach the eastern flanks of Kostyantynivka (just west of Chasiv Yar) via Chasiv Yar's southern flank, thereby presumably avoiding having to take Chasiv Yar itself. Mashovets stated that elements of the 331st Guards Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and 11th VDV Brigade are operating in the forest area between the T0504 Chasiv Yar-Kostyantynivka highway and the Novyi Microraion; that elements of the 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd LNR AC) and the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC) are fighting near Klishchiivka; and elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating near Ivanivske. Mashovets estimated that the Southern Grouping of Forces has as many as 15 motorized rifle brigades operating in the Chasiv Yar direction but noted that most of these brigades are comprised of no more than two combat-ready battalions.

Russian forces recently advanced west of Avdiivka amid continued offensive operations near the settlement on May 9. Geolocated footage published on May 9 shows that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) advanced into central Umanske (west of Avdiivka) north of Sonyachna Street.[59] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have seized the entirety of Umanske, although one milblogger disputed these claims and ISW has not observed evidence of further Russian advances into western or northern Umanske.[60] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced towards the outskirts of Novopokrovske (northwest of Avdiivka) and in field areas near Netaylove and Pervomaiske (both southwest of Avdiivka).[61] The Ukrainian Land Forces posted footage of Ukrainian forces destroying three tanks, one BMP-3, and one MT-LB in the Avdiivka direction on a recent unspecified date.[62] Elements of the Russian 80th "Sparta" Reconnaissance Battalion (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near Yasnobrodivka (west of Avdiivka).[63]

Russian forces recently advanced west of Donetsk City and reportedly secured additional gains in this area on May 9. Geolocated footage published on May 9 shows that Russian forces have advanced in eastern Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) along Tchaikovsky Street.[64] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Krasnohorivka along 1st of May Street and towards the Solnechnyi Microraion and Zapadna Street.[65] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn reiterated that Ukrainian forces still control the situation in Krasnohorivka and noted that Russian forces are using small infantry groups to attack the eastern outskirts of the settlement.[66] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka; southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka and Paraskoviivka; and northeast of Vuhledar near Vodyane.[67] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) reportedly continue operating in Krasnohorivka.[68]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are advancing in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid heavy ground attacks. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 1.15 kilometers along a 3.3-kilometer-wide front near Urozhaine and reached the southern outskirts of Staromayorske (both south of Velyka Novosilka) after heavy fighting.[69] ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of Russian forces on the southern outskirts of Staromayorske but has recently confirmed Russian advances into Urozhaine along the T0518 route.[70]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces reportedly advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 9, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Robotyne and north of the settlement.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using motorcycles to transport infantry in Robotyne.[72] Positional engagements continued northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[73] Elements of the Russian 392nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized unit) are reportedly operating in the western Zaporizhia direction.[74]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 9 that Ukrainian forces repelled several Russian attacks near Krynky in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.[75] Elements of the Russian 80th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD], formerly Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[76]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a mid-sized Shahed-136/131 strike against Ukraine on the night of May 8-9. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces launched 20 Shaheds from occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, 17 of which Ukrainian forces destroyed over Odesa Oblast.[77] One drone struck and destroyed a cultural institution in Mykolaiv Oblast.[78]

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash noted that Russia's modifications to their Kh-101/102 cruise missiles, which Russian forces launched at Kyiv City on May 8, do not make the missiles harder for Ukrainian forces to shoot down, but rather are intended to inflict maximum damage on targets.[79]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian forces continue to struggle with discipline in their ranks, with some Russian soldiers reportedly killing other members of their units. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on May 9 that the relatives of a Russian soldier reported that they had not heard from the soldier since April 10 and that Russian authorities have since informed the family that the soldier is accused of killing his commander and is detained in occupied Zaitseve, Luhansk Oblast.[80] Russian authorities have previously tortured detainees in a basement prison for Russian military personnel in occupied Zaitseve.[81] A Russian insider source claimed that another Russian soldier is accused of murdering six other military personnel near Oleksandrivka, Donetsk Oblast on May 4 in the area of responsibility of the 10th Tank Regiment (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]).[82] The insider source noted that the 10th Tank Regiment has many penal recruits and also has two regional volunteer battalions attached, and a Russian opposition source recently reported that the accused murderer was a Russian penal recruit.[83]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Dutch open-source group Oryx reported that it has visually confirmed that Russian forces have lost at least 15,724 vehicles and weapons systems in Ukraine between February 24, 2022 and May 8, 2024.[84] Oryx assessed that Russian forces are visually confirmed to have lost at least 3,000 tanks, including 2,001 destroyed, 514 captured, 329 abandoned, and 156 damaged. Oryx assessed that Russia has also lost at least 1,321 armored combat vehicles, almost 4,000 infantry fighting vehicles, 431 armored personnel carriers, 56 vehicles with mine protection, 137 helicopters, and 24 ships and submarines. The extent of Russian military vehicles and weapons losses is likely higher than what Oryx has visually confirmed in the open source.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev published an article for Victory Day on May 9 in which he promoted Kremlin narratives about "neo-Nazism" in Ukraine and the West as part of Kremlin efforts to justify its war in Ukraine and its larger geopolitical confrontation with the West. Medvedev claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine is only the "first step" in Russia's alleged mission to "finally" eradicate Nazism from the world and restructure the system of international relations.[85] Medvedev also claimed that Western countries are "feeding" and "inciting" "neo-Nazis" in Ukraine who want to "erase Russia from the map." Medvedev claimed that the US and United Kingdom (UK) were responsible for the rise of Nazism in the 1930s and notably ignored the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that briefly allied the Soviet Union with Nazi Germany to partition Poland and allow the USSR to seize the Baltic States, as Kremlin officials often do in their claims of the West's relations with Nazi Germany and supposed support for Nazism.[86]

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger promoted similar Kremlin narratives that the Georgian State Security Service (SUS) employed on May 8.[87] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian citizens living in Georgia will use statements that the Georgian "foreign agents" law is a Kremlin initiative in order to incite provocations similar to "color revolutions" in Georgia.[88] The milblogger claimed that most Georgians are satisfied with current Russian-Georgian economic relations, and these alleged provocations will thus fail.

Kremlin officials employed Kremlin narratives about historical revisionism and provocations on Russia's borders with Japan, likely as part of efforts to paint Russia as a Pacific power and support China against the US-led alliance system in the Indo-Pacific. Russian Ambassador to Japan Nikolai Nozdrev claimed on May 9 that Japan is engaging in "historical revisionism and revanchism" by "distorting history."[89] Nozdrev claimed that Russia is monitoring Japanese-American maneuvers on Russia's eastern borders and regularly warns Japan that Russia will have to take countermeasures to prevent any military threats to Russia should such maneuvers continue. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has previously objected to military exercises in Japan involving the Japanese military that are highly likely aimed at China, not Russia.[90]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

The Kremlin is continuing its reflexive control campaign using nuclear threats via Belarus to target Western decision-makers. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko announced on May 9 that Belarusian forces will participate in the second stage of Russia's ongoing nuclear exercises.[91] Lukashenko ordered Russian and Belarusian forces to conduct a joint inspection of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapon carriers, forces, and means under the Union State framework on May 7, and Putin instructed the Russian General Staff to prepare to conduct non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons exercises to "practice the preparation and use" of tactical nuclear weapons on May 6.[92] ISW continues to assess that Russia and Belarus are highly unlikely to use a tactical nuclear weapon on the battlefield in Ukraine or anywhere else.[93]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

5. What Does America Want in Ukraine?

Defense may be the stronger form of war, you cannot win without offense. Unfortunately, what may be incentivizing the priority of defense over offense is the insufficient and late support from the international community.

Excerpts:

Accordingly, U.S. leaders should encourage and incentivize Ukraine to prioritize defense over offense, a process that is already beginning. The last two years have demonstrated the ability of defenders to hold off motivated and more numerous attackers; both sides have experienced slow advances and limited gains when facing dug-in opponents. Washington should channel its assistance into ensuring Ukraine can protect itself, which means more basics like ammunition and fortifications and fewer high-tech offensive systems like ATACMS. It should also help Ukraine to rebuild its military-industrial base.

No less important, the time has come to encourage negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. If Ukrainian forces, buoyed by new aid deliveries, can stabilize the front line, then the summer of 2024 may prove to be a favorable negotiating window. Up to this point, the Biden administration has been wary of pushing Ukraine to negotiate for fear of appearing to signal a lack of U.S. commitment. In addition, negotiations can be slow, and Russia may not yet be willing to participate in earnest. But the proposition has not been tested, and it is worth trying, particularly because punting the decision to Kyiv, while supplying it with arms, has the perverse effect of discouraging Ukraine from talking. Neither side can truly gauge what it could obtain until it starts talking to the other, and recent revelations about prior negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow suggest that a settlement is not impossible.

Finally, Washington should lean on its European allies to spend the money and place the orders to equip Ukraine. America’s commitments may falter, whether because of popular dissatisfaction, a new president, or crises elsewhere in the world. Moscow, too, may eschew talks, reasoning that Ukraine’s position is only getting weaker. To mitigate these possibilities, Washington should shift more of the burden to European countries whose proximity to Russia give them a strong interest in Ukraine’s success. These states have already begun to step up; the Czech Republic, for example, has spearheaded an innovative ammunition initiative. But Europe can do much more: increase national funding for ammunition and rocket production, authorize emergency funds and improve cross-continent defense procurement through the European Union, and take over the organizational burden of coordinating aid.

This time, Congress eventually delivered. Next time, it might not. On both sides of the Atlantic, governments should prepare for U.S. aid to dry up and work to place Ukraine on a more strategic and durable footing. After all, current levels of support have not sufficed to put the worst outcomes—whether a Russian breakthrough, a destructive forever conflict, or an expanded war—out of view. Averting those outcomes requires opening the space to weigh difficult trade-offs now. You can take only so many all-or-nothing gambles until you end up with nothing.

What Does America Want in Ukraine?

Washington’s current approach is a strategic cop-out—and risks making another forever war.

By Emma Ashford, Joshua Shifrinson, and Stephen Wertheim

Foreign Policy · by Emma Ashford, Joshua Shifrinson, Stephen Wertheim

United States
Russia
Ukraine
Emma Ashford

May 9, 2024, 2:42 PM

Russia’s War in Ukraine

Understanding the conflict two years on.

Taiwan Wants Suicide Drones to Deter China

Taipei is seeking U.S.-made loitering munitions to help deter or ward off a potential Chinese invasion.

By Jack Detsch

Foreign Policy · by Jack Detsch

China
Taiwan
Jack Detsch

May 8, 2024, 2:58 PM

Taiwan is looking to buy U.S.-made loitering munitions—also known as suicide drones—which have become one of the signature weapons on the modern battlefield, from Nagorno-Karabakh to Ukraine, hovering over fighting for hours at a time before swooping in for the kill.

Taiwan—which has faced near-daily Chinese military exercises for the past three years, including People’s Liberation Army fighter jets flooding the island’s air defense identification zone and virtually erasing the median line that sits across the Taiwan Strait—is said to covet both variants of the AeroVironment Switchblade drone, according to four people familiar with the situation.

The Switchblade, which can fit in a backpack in its smallest form and also has a much larger variant that can be used to take out tanks and armored vehicles, costs about $50,000 per drone, according to the manufacturer. The U.S. Army has stopped buying the smaller variant, known as the Switchblade 300, but the new supplemental budget passed by Congress gives the Defense Department about $72 million to buy several hundred more of the larger variant, the Switchblade 600, and the service is expected to begin fielding the drones next year.

Taiwan’s interest in the U.S.-made drones is an increasing sign that Taipei is bowing to the U.S. push—which dates back to the Trump administration—to focus on buying munitions that would help deter or ward off a Chinese invasion of the island.

“This is all part of the U.S. push for asymmetry,” said Ivan Kanapathy, a nonresident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former National Security Council official during the Trump administration. “We were telling them, ‘You guys need to buy a lot more munitions.’”

Early loitering munitions date all the way back to the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, but they really came into fashion during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, when Israeli-made loitering munitions supported a lightning Azerbaijani ground offensive that overwhelmed a less technically savvy Armenian military that fought out in the open.

The AeroVironment Switchblade is the U.S. version. Manufactured in California and Utah, the Switchblade is fired out of a tube and has been used extensively by the Ukrainian military. About 1,100 U.S.-made Switchblades have been sent to Ukraine since the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion. The Kremlin has countered that with its production of the Lancet drone and supplemented it with Shahed drones from Iran that use satellite navigation instead of a radiation-seeker.

All of these variants have been effective on the battlefield and are now almost ubiquitous—although pocket-sized jammers used to disable them have become almost equally as ubiquitous. Their uses have been evolving, too. For years, China has fielded the so-called “Harpy,” an Israeli-made loitering munition that is designed to take out enemy radars. (The second generation of that weapon, known as the “Harop,” was Azerbaijan’s weapon of choice in the 2020 war.)

And over time, China’s advantage in the skies has only grown, as Chinese strategists have come to believe that the weapon can be effective in modern attrition warfare. Sky News recently reported that China now has tens of thousands of drone variants. The Taiwanese have about four drone types of their own.

But Taiwanese officials increasingly believe that the U.S.-made suicide drones—which are only good for one shot—would be effective at plunking Chinese ships if they come across the Taiwan Strait or hitting Chinese tanks and vehicles if they come ashore, said the people familiar with Taiwan’s interest in the drones, who spoke on condition of anonymity to talk about a pending military sale.

Taiwan has submitted a letter of request to the Defense Department for a drone that the Switchblade 300 would fit, although the people familiar with the request said AeroVironment was not specifically named. Taiwan has sent a second letter of request to the Pentagon for a larger drone variant, with competition between the Switchblade 600 and Anduril’s Altius-600, which can loiter over a target for four hours, longer than AeroVironment’s model.

A spokesperson from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, Taiwan’s de facto embassy in Washington, declined to comment, citing a practice of not talking about details of U.S. defense cooperation.

In an email, Lisa Lawrence, a Defense Department spokesperson, said the agency would not comment on proposed defense sales before they were notified to Congress. Anduril declined to comment, and AeroVironment did not respond to an emailed request for comment.

The Biden administration has started to make a dent in the $19 billion in backlogged military sales to Taiwan in the past several years, approving 13 congressional notifications for weapons sales since 2021. But the deals have been almost exclusively focused on items on the Pentagon’s integrated capabilities list, a register of cost-effective weapons that includes mostly munitions, and sustaining the weapons that they already have.

Taiwan’s outgoing president, Tsai Ing-wen, has made it a requirement for the island to field more than 3,000 military drones, and some 50 Taiwanese research teams are competing for more than $300 million in government contracts. Much of that money is focused domestically.

That investment has already had an impact. Taiwanese companies have unveiled their own home-built loitering munitions, which can hit targets up to 93 miles away. Taiwan has also started a quasi-government agency that is meant to function like the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, a defense technology incubator that claims at least partial credit for modern inventions such as GPS and the internet.

Heino Klinck, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense, said Taiwan’s long-term goal is to build weapons that are easily expendable and could be produced on the island, not just buy fancy U.S.-made weapons. “The Taiwanese have to be selective in how they invest,” Klinck said. “You need to be able to contend with the new normal that the Chinese have established and are continuing to establish almost on a daily basis.”

Foreign Policy · by Jack Detsch

7. Can Russia Successfully Occupy Ukraine?

Excerpts:

How strong popular resistance would be cannot be predicted, but assuming that controlling Ukraine would ruin Moscow is dangerous. Too much of the Ukraine War commentariat rests on the assumption that Russia can never succeed and benefit from the conflict. Nevertheless, dominating Ukraine is more likely than not to improve Moscow’s position in the European and global balance of power.

Regardless of one’s immediate policy preferences, acknowledging that Russian control over Ukraine would probably boost Russia’s long-term power base would lead to a healthier debate.

Can Russia Successfully Occupy Ukraine?

19fortyfive.com · by Dylan Motin · May 8, 2024

A widespread assumption in the foreign affairs community is that Russia would be unable to occupy Ukraine durably even if it won the war. Many believe that Moscow would find the cost of policing a large, hostile country like Ukraine too immense to bear. Therefore, defeating the Ukrainian state can only be a pyrrhic victory. Even if Russia prevails, it will inevitably lose over the long run because it can never pacify and digest Ukraine.

However, there is little evidence that a Russian occupation of Ukraine is bound to fail. The historical record suggests that occupiers usually succeed in controlling and extracting significant resources from conquered territories. In his authoritative study, Peter Liberman showed that twentieth-century occupying powers generally managed to extract large economic rewards and mobilize captured industrial resources. Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Cold War Soviet Union’s rule over their respective empires were generally sustainable. Popular resistance alone rarely forces an occupier to abandon a conquest.

For sure, occupying and policing Ukraine could be costly for Russia. However, the newfound economic resources, markets, and tax money would help improve the balance sheet. Moreover, a considerable number of Ukrainian men of military age already died in the war. Hence, relatively fewer potential insurgents will be left in the coming years.

Many noted that the 2022 invasion and ruthlessness toward civilians upset even pro-Russian constituencies and solidified Ukrainian nationalism. Yet, it is clear that the Ukrainian society still has many thousands of pro-Russian sympathizers, especially in the east and the south. These would form the backbone of Russia’s civilian administration and help anchor Russian influence in the long run.

Those who expect a heavy drain on Russian military personnel forget that occupation duties are done mainly by natives. Local authorities did the daily policing in former European colonial empires, Iraq, and Afghanistan, with foreign armies in support. In the parts Russia conquers, it will take control of Ukrainian police departments’ remnants. Furthermore, many young Ukrainians will still want to become police officers, like anywhere else in the world. Some will even join the military, either for the pay, for the uniform, or for pro-Russian sympathy. These will be Ukrainian people applying Russian laws and orders. Russian authorities will also have total control over the media space, which would be a solid tool to mold Ukrainians into Russian citizens in the long run.

Finally, Russia can use deportation to alter the demographic balance. It has reportedly sent numerous Ukrainians to faraway corners of the country. Immersed within Russian society and severed from their familiar neighborhood, these people have fewer opportunities to form resistance groups. They are likely to accept Russian authority in time. Indeed, the Kremlin’s hierarchs have been using deportation to break national solidarities for many decades.

Russia has a track record of successful subjugation in recent history. After a vicious civil war, the Kremlin reestablished control over Chechnya, which is now a significant supplier of troops for its Ukrainian campaign. Moscow has maintained stable rule over Crimea for an entire decade. Since pro-Russian forces seized parts of Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts in 2014, there is little evidence that the two ‘People’s Republics’ paid an unbearable price to remain in power.

Popular resistance to Russian rule in newly conquered areas like eastern Kherson and southern Zaporizhzhia appears small and never seriously threatened Russian military control. Economic activities continue despite Russian occupation. Significant parts of local authorities actually shifted to the Russian side, allowing a smooth transition. In that sense, Moscow has been clever enough not to repeat the American mistake in Iraq of ousting former Baath Party members from government positions.

A likely counterargument will be ‘Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.’ But in these three cases, the occupiers were not extracting economic resources for themselves. Policing and rebuilding these countries was only a net loss. In Ukraine, the cost of policing and rebuilding will be balanced by the added wealth, population base, and lands that the Kremlin considers highly strategic. Furthermore, Vietnam and Afghanistan’s terrains favored insurgencies. Rebel armies could use mountains and jungles to escape detection, regroup, and protect their logistical lines with neighboring countries. Ukraine is mostly a flat plain.

In Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam, occupiers had to garrison a distant, peripherical country. It was a painful tradeoff because they were not vital interests. However, Ukraine borders Russia’s main rival, NATO. Moscow considers the Ukrainian territory essential to defend Russia’s core and project power in Eastern Europe. It would not be dispatching its military to attempt regime change in a distant corner of the world but securing a vital military interest. Hence, the Kremlin will be less sensitive to occupation costs in Ukraine than the US or the USSR in these three countries.

Some would still argue that ‘this time is different.’ Maybe the Ukrainians are an incredibly rebellious people. Maybe social media will make it harder to contain protestation. Maybe Western underground support for partisans could undermine Russian control. My point is not that Russia will for sure succeed in absorbing Ukraine, but we cannot have confidence it will fail. If Russia conquers Ukraine, it stands a reasonable chance to seize and utilize its population, farmlands, natural resources, industries, and sea ports. It means more tax money and more soldiers in the long term. In addition, it will have gained the muscle memory of fighting a large-scale conventional war, something no Western country has.

How strong popular resistance would be cannot be predicted, but assuming that controlling Ukraine would ruin Moscow is dangerous. Too much of the Ukraine War commentariat rests on the assumption that Russia can never succeed and benefit from the conflict. Nevertheless, dominating Ukraine is more likely than not to improve Moscow’s position in the European and global balance of power.

Regardless of one’s immediate policy preferences, acknowledging that Russian control over Ukraine would probably boost Russia’s long-term power base would lead to a healthier debate.

About the Author:

Dylan Motin is a Ph.D. candidate majoring in political science at Kangwon National University. He is also a researcher at the Center for International and Strategic Studies and a non-resident fellow at the European Centre for North Korean Studies. He is the author of Bandwagoning in International Relations: China, Russia, and Their Neighbors (Vernon Press, 2024). You can follow him on Twitter or X: @DylanMotin.

19fortyfive.com · by Dylan Motin · May 8, 2024

8. Army special mission aviators will field V-280: SOCOM

Army special mission aviators will field V-280: SOCOM

flightglobal.com

Helicopters

By Ryan Finnerty2024-05-08T20:02:00+01:00

Procurement officials with US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) now confirm they plan to field Bell’s V-280 tiltrotor with the US Army regiment that provides rotary-wing aviation support to the USA’s elite commandos.

The SOCOM plan is separate from the army’s existing plan to acquire the vertical take-off and landing V-280 for its conventional aviation forces under the Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) programme.

That effort is meant to deliver a successor to the Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk, although the two aircraft now appear likely to overlap for potentially several decades.

Speaking at the annual SOF Week conference in Tampa on 8 May, US Army Colonel Mark Cleary revealed SOCOM’s plans, saying it intends to field V-280s with the army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR).

“FLRAA is set to come on to the 160th ramp in the middle of the 2030s,” says Cleary, a test pilot who manages aircraft sustainment and modernisation for the army’s special operations fleet.

Source: Bell

While the US Army’s conventional aviation forces will be the V-280’s primary users, the tiltrotor is being designed to be easily adapted for special operations needs

“FLRAA is going to come to the regiment,” adds Lieutenant Colonel Cameron Keough, who manages the MH-60 programme for SOCOM.

Acquisition documents indicate SOCOM plans to field its first special operations-configured V-280 in 2034, several years after the first standard V-280s are fielded to the army.

Created in the early 1980s after an aviation disaster in the Iranian desert scuttled a military effort to rescue American hostages in Iran, the 160th provides rotary-wing aviation support to US special operations forces across the military services. It primarily operates heavily-modified variants of standard army rotorcraft, including the MH-60 derivative of the UH-60 and the MH-47G special operations version of the Boeing CH-47.

Keough calls SOCOM’s modification process a “monster garage” – nodding to an American television series about custom automobile modifications. For the 160th’s aircraft, that process can include structural and electrical changes and fabrication of new fairings.

Source: Bell

The first conventional army unit will field the V-280 around 2030, with special operations aviators receiving their first aircraft in 2034

With other programmes, such extensive alterations are typically conceived after initial aircraft design, making them costly and time consuming to implement. But SOCOM has been working with Bell and the army during the initial FLRAA design process to streamline future special operations forces-oriented modifications.

Brigadier General Scott Wilkinson, head of US Army Special Operations Aviation Command, says the FLRAA design will be easily compatible with the needs of special operations forces.

SOCOM is working with the army to ensure the aircraft can be “rapidly configured for our use… with minimal modification to original airframe”, Wilkinson said in April.

He noted that no formal FLRAA acquisition decision has yet been made for special operations use.

However, rotary-wing procurement officials at SOCOM confirm that the final V-280 design will incorporate features allowing it to be altered quickly and at minimal cost with special operations features like an air-to-air refuelling probe and nose-mounted terrain-following radar.

“When it does come to us, it’s a vastly reduced effort,” says Keough. “We’re still going to monster-garage it, but now it’s going to be a lot more affordable.”

Bell tells FlightGlobal it expects to deliver the first test aircraft to the army around mid-decade. Special operations test pilots will not begin testing until roughly 2029, says Steven Smith, head of SOCOM’s rotary-wing procurement division.

“We’re closely nested with the army,” Smith says, noting SOCOM test pilots are embedded with the V-280 test team.

However, he says the army’s aviation procurement team will take the lead on the FLRAA acquisition, to include initial flight certification of the standard aircraft design.

Army officials say they expect to equip the first conventional army aviation unit with the V-280 between 2030 and 2031.

Ryan FinnertyRyan Finnerty is the Americas defence reporter for FlightGlobal.com and Flight International magazine, covering military aviation and the defence industry. He is a former United States Army officer and previously reported for America’s National Public Radio system in New York and Hawaii covering energy, economics and military affairs.View full Profile

9. Listen to What They’re Chanting

Excerpts:

And yet, the plain meaning of a chant has an impact, even if the chanters aren’t fully aware of it. A chant is particularly effective when its message echoes and explains the overall mise-en-scène. “Globalize the Intifada!” is an ironically apt chorus for students marching through an American campus under Palestinian flags, their heads shrouded in keffiyehs, their faces covered in KN95 masks. “We don’t want no Zionists here!” has the ring of truth when chanted at an encampment where students identified as Zionists have been forced out by a human chain.

The other day, I stood outside a locked gate at Columbia University, near a group of protesters who had presumably come to support the students but couldn’t get inside. From the other side of the gate, a bespectacled student in a keffiyeh worked them into a rage, yelling hoarsely into a microphone and, at moments of peak excitement, jumping up and down. She had her rotation: “Intifada revolution,” then “Palestine is our demand; no peace on stolen land!” Then “Free, free Palestine!” Then “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free!” Finally, “Intifada, Intifada!” No one stopping to watch could fail to get the message. The young woman wasn’t calling for a cease-fire or a binational confederation of Palestine and Israel. She was calling for war. Is that anti-Semitic? It depends on whether you think that the violent eradication of the state of Israel is anti-Semitic.

Chants may feel like spontaneous outbursts of political sentiment, but they almost never are. So where do they come from? Social media, of course—most chants are rhyming couplets; repeated a few times, they’re just the right length for an Instagram Story. Another source is the political-organizing manuals that are sometimes called toolkits. These function more or less as a movement’s hymnals.

The “rally toolkit” of the group Within Our Lifetime, a radical pro-Palestinian organization with connections on American campuses, lists 40 chants. I’ve heard almost half of them at Columbia, including “Say it loud, say it clear, we don’t want no Zionists here,” which, I learned from the toolkit, is a translation of a chant in Arabic. A fall-2023 Palestine Solidarity Working Group toolkit contains chant sheets from the Palestine Youth Movement and the U.S. Palestinian Community Network. (This word salad of names is in no way nefarious; political organizing is the art of building coalitions.) The lists overlap, with minor differences: The Palestinian Youth Movement’s sheet, for instance, includes several “Cross Movement Chants” that connect the Palestinian cause to others, such as “Stop the U.S. War machine—From Palestine to the Philippines.”

...

If a chant’s meaning changes according to the other ones being chanted at the same event, the signs being waved, the leader’s general affect, and so on, then today’s chants of “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free” are not beautiful messages of peace. A voice breaking the calm of a neoclassical quad with harsh cries of “Intifada, Intifada” is not a harbinger of harmonious coexistence. “We don’t want two states! We want all of it!” seems especially uncompromising when sung next to snow that’s been stained blood-red with paint. (I imagine that the red snow was meant to allude to the blood of Gazans, but sometimes a symbol means more than it is intended to mean.) Student protesters often say that all they want is for the killing to stop. That may well be true. But that is not what they’re chanting, or how they’re chanting it.

Listen to What They’re Chanting

A close look at the words being shouted at protests on campuses across the country reveals why some see the pro-Palestinian cause as so threatening.

By Judith Shulevitz

The Atlantic · by Judith Shulevitz · May 8, 2024

If you want to gauge whether a protest chant is genocidal or anti-Semitic or disagreeable in any other way, you have to pay attention to more than the words. A chant is a performance, not a text. A leader initiates a call-and-response or else yells into a bullhorn, eliciting roars from the crowd. Hands clap, feet stomp, drums are beaten. The chanting creates a rhythm that can induce a sort of hypnosis, fusing individuals into a movement. The beat should be no more sophisticated than Bum-bah bum-bah bum-bah bum-bah, as in, “There is on ly one so lu tion! In ti fa da, rev o lu tion!” To claim that a chant means only what it says is like asserting that a theatrical production is the same as a script.

You can start with the words, though. Take the chant about intifada revolution. Etymologically, intifada denotes a shaking-off, but in contemporary Arabic, it means an uprising: For instance, a 1952 uprising in Iraq against the Hashemite monarchy is referred to in Arabic as an intifada. But in English, including in English-language dictionaries and encyclopedias, the word refers primarily to two periods of sustained Palestinian revolt, the First and Second Intifadas. The first, which ran from 1987 to 1993, involved protests and acts of civil disobedience and was relatively peaceful, at least compared with the second, from 2000 to 2005, which featured Palestinian suicide bombings and targeted reprisal killings by Israeli forces; more than a thousand Israelis died in 138 suicide attacks. These intifadas received so much international press coverage that surely everyone in the world to whom the word means anything at all thinks of them first. The more general idea of insurrection can only be a poor second.

If that’s the association, then intifada is not a phrase that would indicate genocidal intent. Total casualties on both sides during these earlier periods of conflict run to somewhere between 6,000 and 7,000. At its most innocuous, though, it still implies violence. In the context of this particular chant, it might imply much more than that. Revolution doubles and intensifies intifada—an uprising is the beginning of a fight; a revolution is the wholesale destruction of a social order. “There is only one solution”: This has been deemed offensive on the grounds that “solution” evokes the Final Solution, the term used to describe the German decision to kill all Jews during World War II. The more salient point, it seems to me, is that the declaration rejects the idea that there is a political path to peace. It says that diplomacy is not an option, and compromise is not a possibility.

Of course, that’s just the chant on the page. The chant on college campuses is one slogan among many, taking on meaning from those that come before and after it. And, at the same time, it may be uttered by people who don’t care what they’re saying. At any given march or rally, some number of participants will have shown up in order to show up, to signal membership in a movement that they identify with much more than they agree with. When the protesters aren’t directly affected by the matter they’re protesting, the politics of identity frequently supersede the politics of ideas, as Nate Silver pointed out in his Substack newsletter last week. Participating in a political action becomes a way of fitting in, and a chant is the price of admission. As the police enter campus after campus, I’m guessing that the chants also channel rage at the authorities. “Free Palestine!,” sure, but also, Free my friends!

And yet, the plain meaning of a chant has an impact, even if the chanters aren’t fully aware of it. A chant is particularly effective when its message echoes and explains the overall mise-en-scène. “Globalize the Intifada!” is an ironically apt chorus for students marching through an American campus under Palestinian flags, their heads shrouded in keffiyehs, their faces covered in KN95 masks. “We don’t want no Zionists here!” has the ring of truth when chanted at an encampment where students identified as Zionists have been forced out by a human chain.

The other day, I stood outside a locked gate at Columbia University, near a group of protesters who had presumably come to support the students but couldn’t get inside. From the other side of the gate, a bespectacled student in a keffiyeh worked them into a rage, yelling hoarsely into a microphone and, at moments of peak excitement, jumping up and down. She had her rotation: “Intifada revolution,” then “Palestine is our demand; no peace on stolen land!” Then “Free, free Palestine!” Then “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free!” Finally, “Intifada, Intifada!” No one stopping to watch could fail to get the message. The young woman wasn’t calling for a cease-fire or a binational confederation of Palestine and Israel. She was calling for war. Is that anti-Semitic? It depends on whether you think that the violent eradication of the state of Israel is anti-Semitic.

Chants may feel like spontaneous outbursts of political sentiment, but they almost never are. So where do they come from? Social media, of course—most chants are rhyming couplets; repeated a few times, they’re just the right length for an Instagram Story. Another source is the political-organizing manuals that are sometimes called toolkits. These function more or less as a movement’s hymnals.

The “rally toolkit” of the group Within Our Lifetime, a radical pro-Palestinian organization with connections on American campuses, lists 40 chants. I’ve heard almost half of them at Columbia, including “Say it loud, say it clear, we don’t want no Zionists here,” which, I learned from the toolkit, is a translation of a chant in Arabic. A fall-2023 Palestine Solidarity Working Group toolkit contains chant sheets from the Palestine Youth Movement and the U.S. Palestinian Community Network. (This word salad of names is in no way nefarious; political organizing is the art of building coalitions.) The lists overlap, with minor differences: The Palestinian Youth Movement’s sheet, for instance, includes several “Cross Movement Chants” that connect the Palestinian cause to others, such as “Stop the U.S. War machine—From Palestine to the Philippines.”

Some observers believe that one toolkit in particular reflects outside influence. A lawsuit claiming that Hamas is working with the national leadership of two organizations, National Students for Justice in Palestine and American Muslims for Palestine, has just been filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Division of Virginia on behalf of nine American and Israeli plaintiffs, including six victims of October 7; it specifically cites NSJP’s Day of Resistance Toolkit as evidence. The chairman of AMP, Hatem Bazian, who was also one of NSJP’s founders, denies the claim, and told The Washington Post that the lawsuit is a defamatory “Islamophobic text reeking in anti-Palestinian racism.” The question remains to be adjudicated, but it is safe to say that the toolkit makes NSJP’s ideological affinities clear. The toolkit, released immediately after October 7, advised chapters to celebrate Hamas’s attack as a “historic win for the Palestinian resistance” and to lay the groundwork for October 12, “a national day of resistance” on campuses. Student groups across the country did in fact hold rallies and walkouts on October 12, two weeks before Israel invaded Gaza.

The Day of Resistance Toolkit is an extraordinary artifact, written in stilted, triumphalist prose that could have been airlifted out of a badly translated Soviet parade speech. “Fearlessly, our people struggle for complete liberation and return,” the document states. “Glory to our resistance, to our martyrs, and to our steadfast people.” NSJP includes graphics for easy poster-making; one of these is a now-notorious drawing of a crowd cheering a paraglider, a clear allusion to the Hamas militants who paraglided into Israel. And under “Messaging & Framing” come several bullet points; one group of these is preceded by the heading “When people are occupied, resistance is justified.” Under it, one finds the entire state of Israel, a recognized member-state of the United Nations, defined as an occupation, rather than just the West Bank, and its citizens characterized as “settlers” rather than civilians “because they are military assets used to ensure continued control over stolen Palestinian land.” If Israelis are not civilians, of course, then murdering them could count as a legitimate act of war. That heading, inverted (“Resistance is justified when people are occupied”), was soon being chanted by thousands of people around the country. The phrases did not originate with the toolkit, but it surely gave them a boost.

Many protest chants come across as unoriginal, but lack of originality is actually desirable. The more familiar a chant’s wording and cadence, the easier it is to pick up. A chant modeled on a much older one may also subtly advance a geopolitical argument. “Hey hey, ho ho! Zionism has got to go!,” which is an echo of “Hey hey, ho ho! LBJ has got to go!,” suggests a link between Gaza and Vietnam, Israeli imperialism and American imperialism. I don’t think that’s a stretch. The 1968 analogy is everywhere. Last week, I watched a Columbia protest leader praise a crowd by saying that they’re continuing what the anti-war protesters started. That night, dozens of today’s protesters did exactly that by occupying Hamilton Hall, also occupied in 1968.

I’m guessing that the Houthis—another Iranian-backed terrorist group, which controls a part of Yemen—provided a template for at least one chant. Around February, Columbia’s protesters were recorded chanting “There is no safe place! Death to the Zionist state!,” which struck me, in this context, as a taunting reply to Jewish students’ complaints about safety, followed by what sounded like a version of the actual, official Houthi slogan “God Is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, A Curse Upon the Jews, Victory to Islam.” And indeed, a month earlier, the crowd had openly chanted in support of the Houthis, who had been firing missiles at ships traveling through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The U.S. and Britain had just begun bombing them to stop the attacks, and the students sang, “Yemen, Yemen, make us proud, turn another ship around!”

Does support for the Houthis and alleged support for Hamas mean that the students also support the groups’ sponsor, Iran? I doubt that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the student groups exchange messages on Signal. But at the very least, the chants raise the possibility that some of the more extreme radicals on campus align themselves with the Iranian government’s geopolitical orientation more than with America’s, and have somehow persuaded their followers to mouth such views.

One slogan, however, has become emblematic of the debate over the possible anti-Semitic content of pro-Palestinian chants. Its stature can be attributed, in part, to Republican Representative Elise Stefanik, who infamously insisted, during hearings on campus anti-Semitism, that it amounted to a call for genocide. The slogan, of course, is “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free.” Israel’s supporters hear it as eliminationist: From the Jordan to the Mediterranean, which is to say, across the land that had been under British control before it was partitioned by the United Nations in 1947, Palestine will be free of Jews. Where are they supposed to go? Many Jews find the possible answers to that question very disturbing. Palestinians and their allies, however, reject the Jewish interpretation as a form of catastrophizing. They say that the chant expresses the dream of a single, secular, democratic nation in which Palestinians and Jews would live peacefully side by side, in lieu of the existing Jewish ethno-nationalist state. (It is hard to dispute that in this scenario, Jewish Israelis would lose the power of collective self-determination.)

Before “From the river to the sea” caught on in English, it was chanted in Arabic. It is not clear when it first came into use, but Elliott Colla, a scholar of Arabic and Islamic studies at Georgetown University, believes that it emerged during the First Intifada—or rather, two versions of it did. One was nationalist: “Min al-maiyeh lel mayieh, Falasteen Arabiya”: “From water to water, Palestine is Arab.” The other was Islamist: “Falasteen Islamiyyeh, min al-nahr ila al-bahr”: “Palestine is Islamic from the river to the sea.” At some point during the Oslo peace process, Colla says, a third chant appeared: “Min al-nahr ila al-bahr, Falasteen satataharrar,” or “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free.” “It is this version—with its focus on freedom—that has circulated within English-language solidarity culture from at least the 1990s,” Colla writes in a recent article.

Therefore, Colla writes, “Palestine will be free” should be considered a new chant expressing the ideal of a more inclusive state, not merely a translation of the older, more aggressive chants. It gives voice to a “much more capacious vision of a shared political project.” The problem with Colla’s benign reading of the slogan, however, is that the more nationalist or Islamist Arab-language chants are still in circulation; they share airtime with the English-language variant at American protests. In January, I started seeing videos of American students chanting “Min al-maiyeh lel mayieh, Falasteen Arabiya.” The menace implicit in the Arabic chant bleeds into the English-language version.

If a chant’s meaning changes according to the other ones being chanted at the same event, the signs being waved, the leader’s general affect, and so on, then today’s chants of “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free” are not beautiful messages of peace. A voice breaking the calm of a neoclassical quad with harsh cries of “Intifada, Intifada” is not a harbinger of harmonious coexistence. “We don’t want two states! We want all of it!” seems especially uncompromising when sung next to snow that’s been stained blood-red with paint. (I imagine that the red snow was meant to allude to the blood of Gazans, but sometimes a symbol means more than it is intended to mean.) Student protesters often say that all they want is for the killing to stop. That may well be true. But that is not what they’re chanting, or how they’re chanting it.

The Atlantic · by Judith Shulevitz · May 8, 2024

10. Inside the Bunker With a Ukrainian Vampire Drone Squad

So much to learn from our Ukrainian friends.

Inside the Bunker With a Ukrainian Vampire Drone Squad

WSJ accompanies a four-man team on an operation to replenish front-line troops’ essential supplies

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/inside-the-bunker-with-a-ukrainian-vampire-drone-squad-4249f8eb?mod=hp_lead_pos7

By Ian LovettFollow and Nikita Nikolaienko

Updated May 10, 2024 12:03 am ET

NEAR IVANIVSKE, Ukraine—For 48 hours, as the soldiers fought to hold a trench on Ukraine’s eastern front, their stores of water had been dwindling.

Now, they had only a few sips left. The roads to resupply them were effectively cut off—made impassable by attack drones. The Russians were just 200 yards away.

“How much water do you have?” their commanders asked on the radio.

A soldier called Grinch answered, “Enough for another day.” It was the same answer he always gave, as long as he still had at least a couple drops.

“We’ll send more,” one of the commanders said.

The question was how.

Two years into the full-scale war, resupplying the trenches at the front has become one of the most vexing problems in Ukraine.

Small, explosive attack drones swarm across the front line, making it all but impossible for vehicles—which are big, easy targets—to bring men and materiel all the way to the trenches closest to the Russians.

In recent weeks, Ukraine has begun ferrying supplies using large drones—like the delivery service Amazon.com has tested but with bullets instead of toothpaste. The Wall Street Journal accompanied a four-man team from the Achilles drone battalion, from Ukraine’s 92nd Assault Brigade, on a mission to resupply Grinch and a few others.The Wall Street Journal accompanied a four-man team from the Achilles drone battalion, from Ukraine's 92nd Assault Brigade, on a resupply mission.

NIKITA NIKOLAIENKO/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The effort began one recent Saturday afternoon when six zinc ammunition boxes were delivered to the team at a house in Kostyantynivka, a town about 10 miles from the front. The boxes had been packed with water and a few other goods, covered in bubble wrap and sealed with tape. Each was marked with the position it was destined for.

It was the Achilles team’s job to get them there.

Until two months ago, the team had just run attack missions using large drones, known as Vampires because they strike at night. But increasingly, their work was shifting to resupply.

“Every time infantry go in by foot, it’s very dangerous—every time, there’s shelling, mortars,” the team’s commander, who goes by the call sign Azimuth, said. “This is an easier way to supply them.”

Easier, but not without risks. First, the team had to make it to a bunker, several miles back from the front line, where they would work from. To get there, they had to cross an open field where drones and artillery sometimes struck.

At dusk, the men crowded into an armored vehicle—Azimuth up front with the driver while the rest squeezed into the back with boxes of ammunition and drones. There was Maloy, the engineer; Frodo, the pilot; and Borsuk, a trainee pilot.

At first, the mood was light. The men insisted on stopping the massive vehicle to get coffee at a roadside stand, and ribbed each other at every opportunity—especially 32-year-old Borsuk, the newest addition to the team.

“I heard you should never say goodbye” before a mission, said Borsuk. The others agreed, saying it was better to part with a kiss. If an armored vehicle hit a dog, they added, it was bad luck to use it again.

As they turned off the road onto a dirt path, the men put their helmets on—at each rut in the ground, their heads hit the ceiling. They passed the carcass of another armored vehicle, lying by the side of the path. Electronic jammers—which emit signals to disrupt communication between attack drones and their pilots several miles away—hissed on the roof, melding with the trance music playing in the vehicle.

“Can you change the music?” Maloy, 25, said. “It sounds like we’re heading off to die.” The driver switched to Ukrainian pop.

Azimuth, Frodo and Borsuk, from left to right, carry their drone in the courtyard of the house near Kostyantynivka, eastern Ukraine. PHOTO: MANU BRABO FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Maloy holds training ammunition in a garage the team uses to store spare parts and drone materials. PHOTO: MANU BRABO FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Built into a hillside in the fields west of Bakhmut, the bunker was tight—about 15 feet long, with walls made of logs, some with the bark still on, plywood benches to sit on and empty ammo boxes stacked in the middle to make a table. It smelled of pine.

Azimuth was soon on the radio with his commanders, who had spotted a Russian foxhole just 200 yards from Ukrainian trenches near Ivanivske, a destroyed town west of Bakhmut that is now mostly controlled by Russian forces.

“Go f— them up,” a commander on the radio said. Resupplying troops could wait.

With its six rotors, the Vampire drone looks like an insect grown 2 feet tall. It can carry more than 20 pounds of explosives, allowing it to destroy positions that smaller drones can barely dent. The Russians call it the Baba Yaga, after a character from Slavic folklore that eats children.

Frodo, the 34-year-old pilot, grabbed a controller and set up a tablet in front of him with a live feed from the drone’s night-vision camera. He pushed a button, and the Vampire whirred into the air and headed over the hill. Azimuth, 29, watched its progress across a map on another tablet, occasionally giving directions.

The Russians try to down the Vampires in a variety of ways—electronic jammers cut communications, while smaller attack drones fly into the Vampires or dangle chains into their rotors. Azimuth said they lose a drone every two days or so.

This time, the sky was clear. After 15 minutes in the air, the drone had reached the Russian foxhole. Frodo hovered it over the target. First, he dropped a bottle of water, testing the wind. Satisfied, he dropped the antitank mine.

An explosion lighted up the tablet’s screen.

The team uses a tablet and other devices to fly the drones.

NIKITA NIKOLAIENKO/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

“If someone was in there, they’re f—ing dead now,” a voice on the radio said.

The team in the bunker didn’t react at all. Only once they had gotten the drone safely back to the bunker did they allow themselves a small celebration—fist bumps all around.

Then the resupply runs began.

When the team first started doing resupply, two months ago, they just dropped off boxes of ammunition to soldiers in the trenches. They have since flown in almost anything a drone can carry: medicine, food, bullets, power banks, cigarettes, antenna parts and in one case a fire extinguisher.

Azimuth asked what the troops needed this time. “Water,” the commander said. “They really need water.”

Outside, Maloy attached one of the packages to the drone, a cigarette dangling from his mouth. A hint of adolescence clung to him—his blond beard patchy, a bit of acne on his temple, fingernails overgrown and filthy. His call sign means “Little One.”

But he was the most experienced member of the team, having first joined the military at 19 and served two years. When the full-scale invasion began, he fled his home in the eastern city of Mariupol—and his job at the Azovstal steel plant, which later became the site of a prolonged siege—and was soon fighting in the infantry around Kyiv. His mother remains in Mariupol, which Russia captured in 2022, where she takes care of his grandmother.

As he worked, machine-gun fire rattled over the hill, then a massive explosion lighted up the horizon. He paid no attention, grabbing a couple of small blue glow sticks and taping them onto the package.

Short on Ammo, Russians Closing In: On the Front Line in Eastern Ukraine

Play video: Short on Ammo, Russians Closing In: On the Front Line in Eastern Ukraine

Russia is closing in on outgunned Ukrainian soldiers in the eastern city of Chasiv Yar. WSJ’s Ben C. Solomon travels to the front line as Kyiv awaits critical U.S. weaponry. Photo illustration: The Wall Street Journal

“They help the guys find the parcels,” he said. “Before that, about 30% of them were never found.”

A few minutes later, the drone lifted into the air again. As it approached the Ukrainian trench, Azimuth watched the live feed on the tablet and saw a figure emerge from a shattered tree line, waving. He had heard the drone.

On the radio, Azimuth warned the guys to take cover, then the drone dropped the box.

Grinch, 29, stepped out of the foxhole to collect the parcel.

“It’s hard to overstate the impact of delivering packages this way,” he said in an interview several days later, after returning from five days in the trenches. “People don’t have to risk their lives to bring stuff in.”

Before the drone resupply missions, he said, he had to hike the last couple miles to the trenches carrying nine liters of water, which weighed him down when he needed to dive for cover. Now he carries in a third as much.

Still, at the front even a few moments outside the trench are dangerous. A couple of weeks before, one of his comrades stepped out to collect a resupply package—but didn’t hear that a Russian drone was hovering above the Vampire. It dropped a grenade but missed, leaving the soldier unharmed.

Vampire drones can carry more than 20 pounds of explosives, allowing them to destroy positions that smaller drones can't.

NIKITA NIKOLAIENKO/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

On Saturday night, Grinch said, the parcel contained four 1.5-liter bottles of water, plus some energy bars, canned food and tea.

The water is essential, he said. But he hardly touches the food—anything that makes him need to use the bathroom is dangerous, because then he has to leave the trench. Instead, he takes pills to constipate himself before heading to the front, and eats jerky while there.

“By comparison, it’s easy to pee in a bottle,” Grinch said, adding that, in the dark of the trenches, it was sometimes hard to see which bottles were water and which were urine. “Nobody would confess to messing up which is which, but it’s happened.”

After the Vampire returned from the first resupply run, the team had five more packages to deliver, and soon settled into a rhythm: Commanders on the radio gave new coordinates; Maloy attached the next package to the drone; then it took off again.

Though the bunker was relatively safe—on the far side of the hill from the Russians—there were regular reminders of the dangers around.

Once, a series of explosions over the hill shook the bunker. At another point, Azimuth stopped midsentence: He heard something buzzing and worried it could be a Russian attack drone.

“It’s a Mavic,” Maloy said, referencing a Ukrainian surveillance drone. The attack drones, he said, “sound like mosquitoes,” and he began imitating the different drone sounds.

At one point, they heard over the radio that Russians had hit some Ukrainian trenches. Troops were calling for casualty evacuations.

With vehicles unable to make it to the front, wounded soldiers can languish in the trenches for days before their colleagues are able to carry them out. Sometimes, drone teams drop off painkillers and antibiotics, which comrades inject into the wounded soldiers.

“Sometimes it works. Sometimes people die,” Azimuth said. “You hear it in real time. After those nights, you feel so bad.”

Over the course of the shift, the team conducted three strikes and delivered five packages. A mission to deliver a sixth package was aborted when Russian forces began shelling the troops the drone was headed toward. No drones were lost on their shift.

Compared with the guys in the trenches, Azimuth said, he effectively has an office job—he can stop the armored vehicle for coffee on the way in and leave at the end of the night.

As the sun was coming up, he radioed for a ride out: “Please bring us a taxi,” he said.

The team’s commander, Azimuth, says that compared with the soldiers in the trenches, he effectively has an office job. PHOTO: MANU BRABO FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Write to Ian Lovett at ian.lovett@wsj.com

The War in Ukraine

News and insights, selected by the editors

Appeared in the May 10, 2024, print edition as 'Drone Squad Keeps Ukraine Front Supplied'.

11. Blinken report expected to criticize Israel, but say it isn't breaking weapons terms

6 hours ago -

World

Blinken report expected to criticize Israel, but say it isn't breaking weapons terms

https://www.axios.com/2024/05/10/israel-gaza-us-weapons-congress-report-blinken

Barak Ravid

Aid trucks carrying relief supplies from Turkey arriving in Gaza City as the Israeli attacks continue in Gaza City, Gaza, on May 9. 2024. Photo: Mahmoud Issa/Anadolu via Getty Images

Secretary of State Antony Blinken is expected to submit to Congress as soon as Friday a highly critical report about Israel's conduct in Gaza that stops short of concluding it has violated the terms for its use of U.S. weapons, three U.S. officials said.

Why it matters: The report assessing whether Israel complied with international law and restricted humanitarian aid to Gaza sparked the most contentious internal debate in the State Department since the Oct. 7 attack, U.S. officials said.

Local health authorities report nearly 35,000 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza and an April report from Amnesty International found Israel used U.S. weapons against Palestinian civilians in the enclave.

In recent months, the State Department has been engaged in an internal process to prepare the politically sensitive report required under a new national security memorandum issued in February by President Biden.

The State Department is reviewing the use of weapons by Israel and six other countries engaged in different armed conflicts.
If a country is determined to have violated international humanitarian law or impeded the delivery of U.S.-supported humanitarian aid, it could lead to suspension of U.S. military aid.

Driving the news: The State Department set its own deadline to submit the reports about the seven countries to Congress by May 8, but earlier this week said it would be delayed a few days.

A U.S. official said the delay was largely technical and was related to not all the seven reports being ready.
The White House's top Middle East advisor, Brett McGurk, told a group of Middle East experts from several think tanks on Thursday that the report will be submitted to Congress on Friday, according to people who attended the briefing.
A State Department official said it is a possibility, but added it could still change.

Behind the scenes: In recent weeks, there has been a tug of war within the State Department over the contents of the report about Israel and its conclusions.

The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and USAID recommended Blinken conclude that Israel has violated the terms of the national security memorandum, but other parts of the department pressed Blinken to certify that it didn't.

U.S. Ambassador to Israel Jack Lew and outgoing U.S. Gaza humanitarian envoy David Satterfield sent a memo to Blinken in recent weeks saying Israel isn't violating international law in its war in Gaza, two U.S. officials who read the memo told Axios.

Lew and Satterfield recommended Blinken certify in the report that Israel isn't hampering humanitarian aid, two U.S. officials said.
The two made clear that while Israel did restrict humanitarian aid in the past and created obstacles for aid to reach Gaza, it has changed its policy since April after President Biden presented Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with an ultimatum.
According to U.S. officials, Lew and Satterfield said that the situation today when it comes to Israeli policy regarding humanitarian aid has significantly improved and Israel isn't intentionally impeding aid.

Zoom in: Three U.S. officials said Blinken's report is going to list a series of incidents that took place during the war in Gaza and note that they raised serious concerns about violations of international law by Israel.

The officials said it is going to describe the situation in "very critical terms" and mention that the State Department is still looking into several of those incidents. At the same time, Blinken will stop short of concluding that Israel has violated international law in the context of the national security memorandum, the officials said.
A senior U.S. official said Blinken's report also adopted the conclusions of Lew and Satterfield and certifies that Israel isn't currently violating the national security memorandum when it comes to facilitating the delivery of U.S.-supported humanitarian aid.
Lew, Satterfield and the State Department declined to comment.

The big picture: Some Republican lawmakers have criticized the national security memorandum as "unnecessary bureaucracy" that "contributes to frustration from the partners and allies that count on U.S. security assistance."

But 88 Democratic lawmakers wrote to the president last week saying there is "sufficient evidence" that Israel's restrictions on aid violated U.S. law, drawing a harsh rebuke from the Israeli ambassador to the U.S.
The State Department report must be "seen to be based on facts and law, and not based on what they would wish it would be," Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), who pushed for the national security memorandum, said last week.

12. Report: State Department set to confirm Israel not breaking international law in Gaza

Reporting from Israel based on the Axios report.

Report: State Department set to confirm Israel not breaking international law in Gaza

Overdue filing, which could be sent as early as Friday, will use critical language to describe suspected violations, but won’t find Israel misusing arms or blocking aid, Axios says

By REUTERS and TOI STAFF

Today, 10:55 am

timesofisrael.com · by Reuters and ToI Staff Today, 10:55 am Edit

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken is reportedly expected to submit a report to Congress as early as Friday on Israel’s conduct in Gaza that criticizes the IDF’s conduct but stops short of concluding it has violated international law, according to a report presented by Axios on Thursday.

The report from US news site Axios Friday, citing three officials, claimed that the submission will include cases in which international humanitarian law was suspected of being broken, describing them using “very critical terms.”

However, the report will not conclude that Israel took actions that could disqualify it from US military aid, as required by a directive issued by US President Joe Biden in February requiring that Congress be notified if arms recipients are violating international humanitarian law.

The report was due to be filed by May 8; the State Department has insisted the submission is imminent even as it has blown the deadline.

A national security memorandum, NSM-20, issued by Biden in February, required the department to report to Congress by May 8 on the credibility of Israel’s written assurances that its use of US weapons does not violate US or international law, and that the provision of humanitarian aid is not being obstructed.

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According to Axios, the State Department is also reviewing the use of weapons by six other countries engaged in different armed conflicts under the directive.

Illustrative – IDF tanks are positioned in southern Israel near the border with the Gaza Strip on May 9, 2024. (Ahmad Gharabli/AFP)

The order does not place any tangible new conditions on foreign assistance, given that recipients have always been required to use the aid in a manner consistent with the laws of war; the White House has acknowledged that the memo was the result of pressure from progressive lawmakers who believe Israel might not be abiding by these terms.

The three unnamed officials told Axios the State Department report would note that some of the suspected violations in Gaza were still being probed, but would not conclude that Israel is in breach of international law.

It will also reportedly adopt findings sent to Blinken in recent weeks from Gaza humanitarian envoy David Satterfield and US Ambassador to Israel Jack Lew confirming that Israel is not violating international law in its war against Hamas in Gaza, sparked by the terror group’s October 7 massacre.

The two officials recommended in their memo to Blinken that he confirm Israel is not intentionally hampering the delivery of humanitarian aid to Palestinians in Gaza, where a humanitarian crisis has brewed amid the ongoing fighting, Axios reported. The memo noted that Israel had been hamstringing aid, but made changes following a call between Biden and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in April.

Defense Minister Yoav Gallant (left) and US ambassador to Israel, Jack Lew, are seen at an Arrow 3 battery in Israel, April 14, 2024. (Ariel Hermoni/Defense Ministry)

Blinken’s report is set to come hot on the heels of a White House decision to delay the transfer of 2,000- and 500-pound bombs over concerns that the IDF could use them in densely populated Rafah, as it has in other parts of Gaza. On Wednesday, Biden threatened that more arms shipments would be frozen if Israel launched a planned offensive in the Strip’s southernmost city.

Israel says it must enter Rafah in order to eliminate the remaining Hamas battalions in the city.

The war between Israel and Hamas broke out on October 7 when Hamas terrorists invaded Israel, killing nearly 1,200 people, mostly civilians, and kidnapping 252.

The ensuing Israeli offensive against Hamas has killed over 34,000 people, according to the Hamas-run Gaza health ministry. This figure cannot be independently verified and does not differentiate between civilians and members of terror groups. Israel says it has killed over 13,000 Hamas operatives within Gaza since the beginning of the war and 1,000 in Israeli territory on October 7.

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timesofisrael.com · by Reuters and ToI Staff Today, 10:55 am Edit

13. 40 years and counting: Special Forces warrant officers celebrate 4 decades of history, service

While NCOs are the backbone of the Army, Special Forces Warrant Officers are the nerve system of Special Forces. The networking and connectivity of Warrant Officers has always amazed me, They are extremely useful at reaching across the geographic combatant command boundaries and sharing information and expertise. They provide continuity at the team level and every level up the TSOCs and beyond.

Creating Special Forces Warrant Officers was probably one of the best decisions made by the SF community.

Photos at the link: https://www.army.mil/article-amp/276127/40_years_and_counting_special_forces_warrant_officers_celebrate_4_decades_of_history_service?

40 years and counting: Special Forces warrant officers celebrate 4 decades of history, service

army.mil

By Steve Morningstar U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Public AffairsMay 9, 2024

A Soldier from the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School signs a regimental lo ... READ MORE

Colonel David J. Haskell, Deputy Commander, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), presents the Distin ... READ MORE

Retired Special Forces Warrant Officers gather for the dedication of the CW4 Harry Rider conference ... READ MORE

Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute Cadre: at the Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute, For ... READ MOREBy Steve Morningstar U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Public AffairsMay 9, 2024

A Soldier from the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School signs a regimental logbook during a Special Forces Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Certification Course Appointment and Graduation Ceremony at Fort Bragg, North Carolina May 11, 2023. Soldiers who attended the course were educated, trained and certified for MOS 180A in operational and tactical requirements for planning and executing special operations worldwide and to serve as Assistant Detachment Commanders for a SFOD-A. (U.S. Army photo by K. Kassens)

Colonel David J. Haskell, Deputy Commander, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), presents the Distinguished Honor Graduate award to a student during a Special Forces Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Certification Course Appointment and Graduation at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina May 11, 2023. The Green Berets who attended the 18-week course were educated, trained and certified for MOS 180A in operational and tactical requirements for planning and executing special operations worldwide and to serve as Assistant Detachment Commanders for a SFOD-A. (U.S. Army photo by K. Kassens)

Retired Special Forces Warrant Officers gather for the dedication of the CW4 Harry Rider conference room in the Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute on the SWCS campus, on Nov 11, 2022, at Fort Bragg, NC.

Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute Cadre: at the Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute, Fort Bragg, NC, 2009

FORT LIBERTY, N.C. – “We have agreed, after careful assessment, that a separate career system for Special Operations personnel is feasible and appropriate for enlisted personnel, warrant officers, and commissioned officers.” When the former Honorable John Marsh, Secretary of the Army, signed this memorandum in 1984, the Special Forces Warrant Officer career field was created. The quote is the centerpiece of the entire memo. From those critical words, the Special Forces Warrant Officer career field was born and is now celebrating 40 years of service on May 15.

Special Forces warrant officers emerged from an Army study of special operations forces conducted by colonels John H. “Scotty” Crerar and Charles A. Beckwith in 1981. While the study was broad, its examination of the Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (SFOD-A) structure and leadership recognized the need for a seasoned Special Forces technician and tactician as the detachment executive officer or Assistant Detachment Commander. The gap the study identified was the lack of commissioned officers and the inexperience of the lieutenants being assigned to the SFOD-A. The study was conducted in the U.S. Information Agency Advisor's office at John F. Kennedy Hall at then Fort Bragg, N.C.

The Special Forces warrant officer was the answer to have an experienced officer providing mentorship and continuity to the Special Forces Operational Detachment - Alpha. The first class of selectees to attend training were senior non-commissioned officers including Sergeant Majors (E-9), Master Sergeants (E-8), and Sergeant First Class (E-7), with numerous years of experience. While adding an experienced officer to the Assistant Detachment Commander (ADC) position was the goal, Special Forces warrant officers proved to be much more and filled a larger role.

“[An SF warrant officer is] a subject matter expert, understanding unconventional warfare, and leaning into the irregular warfare space,” said Chief Warrant Officer 5 Gary Ostrander, Command Chief Warrant officer for the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. “The SF Warrant also serves as the mentor, not just to the enlisted side, leadership ‘down and in’, also mentoring the captain, leadership ‘up and out.’”

Ostrander added that “the SF warrant officer knows where to find the answers.”

Chief Warrant Officer 5 John R. Anderson III, Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute commandant, explained they “have a plethora of knowledge, tools, and capabilities that other warrant officers don’t even consider.”

“The systems we must work in intelligence, dissemination, and analysis, targeting cycle and operations; the SF Warrant has a piece in all of it,” he said. “They are educated in operational planning and, as they progress in the career field, their education keeps pace and is comparable to the position and level in which they are working.”

Special Forces warrant officers fill key positions across special operations forces commands, including 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), U.S. Army Special Operations Command, theater special Operations commands, joint and combined special operations commands, U.S. Special Operations Command, and key U.S. Army positions as versatile and innovative leaders, fully capable of operating in uncertain and challenging environments.

Now that the Special Forces warrant officer is established, an education system is necessary.

“When it originally began in 1984, SF warrant officer candidates attended a three-week officer orientation course after successful completion of Warrant Officer Candidate School,” said Guy Griffaw, Instructor – Writer for the Warrant Officer courses.

Early Special Forces warrant officer training was modeled after Military Intelligence warrant officer curriculum. Military Intelligence was tied to the Special Forces warrant officer for career progression purposes after detachment experiences. As the career field grew, positions and opportunities opened at levels above the detachment, resulting in additional professional military education being developed to meet the demand.

Through lessons learned and best practices since its inception from the past 40 years, the Special Forces warrant officer program evolved from courses and academy models to today’s Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute, established in 2007. It is in the new Volckmann Hall on the SWCS campus. It took on the designation of ‘institute’ due to its alignment with technical professional education.

Leadership education is a unique requirement for the Special Forces warrant officer.

“An SF warrant officer assumes an immediate leadership position as the Assistant Detachment Commander of an SFOD-A upon appointment,” Anderson said. “No other warrant officer in the U.S. Army serves in a combat leadership position, they serve as technicians and subject matter experts.”

Anderson added that “Special Forces warrant officers can expect to be in charge. They serve in a myriad of positions from ADC on a SFOD-A to staff positions as operations warrant officer at the company and battalion levels through the most senior level, as chief warrant officer 5.

“You will find a chief warrant officer 5 on a senior staff at a general officer-level command or sitting on his Commander’s Initiative Group (CIG) or be selected to the nominative position of command chief warrant officer,” he said.

A new initiative within the Special Forces branch to prepare senior warrant officers for staffs and future leadership positions is the Senior Warrant Officer Seminar.

“The Senior Warrant Officer Seminar is an executive-level leadership training and education to prepare senior warrants to sit on senior staffs and ascend to senior leadership positions,” Anderson said.

Ostrander added on the leadership SF and Aviation have shown the Warrant Officer career field.

“The terms senior warrant officer advisors and command chief warrant officer were only used by Special Forces and aviation. A MILPER (military personnel) message was issued in September 2023, where the terms and definitions were codified, and it directed the other warrant officer career fields to establish these positions.”

Anderson added that he doesn’t “see huge rudder changes. What we do and how we do it will always be rooted in the baseline, threat informed, operationally focused, and tactically driven.”

The Special Operations Force will see an expansion within the career field as robotics continue to integrate into the SOF enterprise. The Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute is helping develop the new career field of ARSOF robotics technician warrant officer. The field is being built with the same baseline of the Special Forces warrant officer.

To learn more about Special Forces warrant officers, check out https://www.swcs.mil/Schools/Special-Forces-Warrant-Officer-Institute

To learn about becoming a Special Forces Warrant, go to https://recruiting.army.mil/ISO/

For more information about the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, visit www.swcs.mil

army.mil

14. The Biden-Netanyahu relationship is strained like never before. Can the two leaders move forward?

What happens if they cannot move forward? Can Israel successfully defend itself without US support? Yes, but for how long?

The Biden-Netanyahu relationship is strained like never before. Can the two leaders move forward?

BY AAMER MADHANI, ZEKE MILLER AND JULIA FRANKEL

Updated 3:41 AM EDT, May 10, 2024

AP · by AAMER MADHANI · May 9, 2024

WASHINGTON (AP) — President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have long managed a complicated relationship, but they’re running out of space to maneuver as their views on the Gaza war diverge and their political futures hang in the balance.

Their ties have hit a low point as Biden holds up the delivery of heavy bombs to Israel — and warns that the provision of artillery and other weaponry also could be suspended if Netanyahu moves forward with a widescale operation in the southern Gaza city of Rafah.

Netanyahu, for his part, is brushing off Biden’s warnings and vowing to press ahead, saying, “If we have to stand alone, we will stand alone.”

“If we need to, we will fight with our fingernails. But we have much more than fingernails,” he said.

Biden has long prided himself on being able to manage Netanyahu more with carrots than sticks. But the escalation of friction over the past seven months suggests that his approach may be long past its best-by date.

With both men balancing an explosive Mideast situation against their own domestic political problems, Netanyahu has grown increasingly resistant to Biden’s public charm offensives and private pleading, prompting the president’s more assertive pushback in the past several weeks.

“If they go into Rafah, I’m not supplying the weapons that have been used historically to deal with Rafah, to deal with the cities, that deal with that problem,” Biden said in a CNN interview Wednesday, laying bare his growing differences with Netanyahu.

Biden aides nonetheless insist the president is unwilling to allow the U.S.-Israel relationship to truly rupture on his watch. They cite not only the political imperative — a majority of Americans support Israel — but also Biden’s personal history with the country and his belief in its right to defend itself.

The president’s aides, watching how pro-Palestinian protests have roiled his party and the college campuses that have been breeding grounds for Democratic voters, have mused for months that Biden could be the last classically pro-Israel Democrat in the White House.

Their optimism about their ability to contain Netanyahu may be falling into the same trap that has vexed a long line of American presidents who have clashed with the Israeli leader over the decades.

White House national security spokesman John Kirby on Thursday declined to say whether Biden informed Netanyahu of his decision to suspend shipment of 3,500 bombs when the leaders spoke earlier this week. But he said Biden has been “direct and forthright” with Netanyahu about his concerns.

Biden and Netanyahu have known each other since Biden was a young senator and Netanyahu was a senior official in Israel’s embassy in Washington.

They’ve hit rough patches before.

There were differences over Israel building settlements in the West Bank during Barack Obama’s administration when Biden was vice president. Later, Netanyahu vehemently opposed Biden’s push to resurrect the Iran nuclear deal sealed by Obama and scrapped by Donald Trump. Netanyahu chafed at Biden prodding him to de-escalate tensions during Israel’s bloody 11-day war with Hamas in 2021.

The leaders went more than a month earlier this year without talking as Biden’s frustration with Netanyahu grew over the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

The relationship remained workable despite such differences between the center-left Democrat and the leader of the most far-right coalition government in Israel’s history.

But with the Biden-Netanyahu relationship now coming under greater strain than ever before, it is unclear how the leaders will move forward.

Netanyahu is caught between public pressure for a hostage deal and hard-liners in his coalition who want him to expand the Rafah invasion, despite global alarm about the harm it could do to some 1.3 million Palestinians sheltering there. He’s made clear that he will push forward with a Rafah operation with or without a deal for hostages.

The Israeli leader vowed to destroy Hamas after its Oct. 7 rampage in southern Israel in which 1,200 people were killed and some 250 were captured and taken hostage. But his public standing has cratered since then, as he faces pressure to find a pathway to a truce that would bring home the remaining hostages and the remains of Israelis who have died in captivity.

He’s resisted an investigation into what led to the intelligence and military failures leading up to the Hamas attack. All the while, he’s still facing legal problems, including a long-running corruption trial in which he is charged with fraud and accepting bribes.

Netanyahu’s political survival may depend on the Rafah offensive. If he reaches a hostage deal that stops short of conquering Rafah, hardliners in his coalition have threatened to topple the government and trigger new elections at a time when opinion polls forecast he would lose.

“To keep his partners on board and prevent them from pre-empting an election, in which Likud will be decimated and he will be turned out of office, he needs to keep the ‘total victory’ myth alive – and that is only possible by avoiding a deal with Hamas,” wrote Anshel Pfeffer, a columnist and author of a Netanyahu biography, in the Haaretz daily.

Aviv Bushinsky, a former spokesman and chief of staff for Netanyahu, said the Israeli leader remains focused on the war’s primary goal – defeating Hamas – because of concerns about his image and legacy.

He said Netanyahu has spent his career branding himself as the “tough guy on terror.”

“He thinks this is how he will be remembered. He’s been promising for a decade to cream Hamas,” Bushinsky said. “If he doesn’t, in his mind he’ll be remembered as the worst prime minister of all time.”

Biden, meanwhile, faces mounting protests from young Americans, a segment of the electorate critical to his reelection. And he’s faced backlash from Muslim Americans, a key voting bloc in the battleground state of Michigan. Some have threatened to withhold their votes in November to protest his administration’s handling of the war.

Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders, a Biden ally who has been frustrated by the administration’s handling of the war, said Thursday Biden should go further and suspend delivery of all offensive weaponry to Israel.

“The United States does and should stand by its allies, but our allies must also stand by the values and the laws of the United States of America,” Sanders said. “We must use all of our leverage to prevent the catastrophe in Gaza from becoming even worse.”

At the same time, Biden is facing bruising criticism from Republicans, including presumptive 2024 GOP presidential nominee Trump, who say that his decision to hold back weapons is a betrayal of an essential Mideast ally.

“What Biden is doing with respect to Israel is disgraceful. If any Jewish person voted for Joe Biden, they should be ashamed of themselves. He’s totally abandoned Israel,” Trump told reporters on Thursday.

Idaho Sen. Jim Risch, the top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said Biden’s move is “simply a nod to the left flank” that is handing “a great victory to Hamas.”

Friction between the U.S. and Israeli leaders is not without precedent.

President George H.W. Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir’s relationship was strained as the Republican administration threatened to withhold $10 billion in loan guarantees to thwart new settlement activity in the West Bank. Obama and Netanyahu’s relationship was marked by mutual distrust over the Democrat’s effort to reignite the Middle East peace process and forge the Iran nuclear deal.

“There were always workarounds if the heads of government really don’t get along. We may get to that,” said Elliot Abrams, a senior national security official in the George W. Bush administration. “But of course, this may be a sort of problem that solves itself in that one or both of them may be gone from office” in a matter of months.

___

AP writers Mary Clare Jalonick in Washington and Adriana Gomez Licon in Miami contributed reporting. Frankel reported from Jerusalem.

AP · by AAMER MADHANI · May 9, 2024

15. Russia's jamming of American weapons in Ukraine is showing the US what it needs to be ready for in a future fight

Russia's jamming of American weapons in Ukraine is showing the US what it needs to be ready for in a future fight

Business Insider · by Chris Panella, Jake Epstein

Military & Defense

Analysis by Chris Panella and Jake Epstein

2024-05-09T21:19:32Z

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M142 HIMARS launches a rocket on Russian position on December 29, 2023 in Unspecified, Ukraine. Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images

Russia's electronic warfare has repeatedly foiled American precision weapons in Ukraine.
This highlights the need for the US to develop solutions before any great-power conflict.
Those may include different weapons, specific countermeasures, and the targeting of jamming systems.

Russian electronic warfare has created problems for some American-made precision weaponry in Ukraine, but Moscow is also showing its hand and telling the US what it needs solutions for to be ready for future fights.

Ukraine has employed US precision weapons, such as the HIMARS-fired Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems and air-launched Joint Direct Attack Munitions, throughout the war, but widespread Russian electronic warfare is regularly diminishing the effectiveness of these weapons.

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Lt. Gen. Antonio Aguto, who's serving as the commander of Security Assistance Group-Ukraine, addressed the problem in December, saying electronic warfare directed at some of the US's "most precise capabilities" was "a challenge." Other US officials have identified these issues as well, adding that the US and Ukraine were working on solutions.

Any fixes developed to effectively counter the challenge posed by electronic warfare won't just benefit Ukraine. They're also set to help the US solve problems it has long been concerned about as it prepares for the possibility of great-power conflict.

Mark Cancian, a retired Marine Corps colonel who's a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, explained to Business Insider that "the widespread GPS spoofing we see in Ukraine adds urgency to solving a problem DoD has long recognized: that wartime spoofing will reduce the effectiveness of its weapons."

Denis Abramov/Russian Defense Ministry via Mil.ru

Electronic warfare can be executed using cheap but effective technology, and both sides of the war are using it extensively. And these tactics are not used solely to foil precision-guided munitions. They can also be used to scramble the connection between an operator and a reconnaissance or strike drone.

Electronic warfare is a broad term that includes a variety of inexpensive options. Thomas Withington, an expert in electronic warfare and air defense who's an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, said jamming was relatively straightforward, explaining to BI that it involved "blasting a GNSS receiver with noise to cause it to lose the position, navigation, and timing signal that it received from the satellite."

Spoofing, on the other hand, involves sending false GNSS information to the weapon's navigation system, sending it off course or trajectory. Jamming is easier and can be done with cheaper equipment and engineers, while spoofing is likely to be used in more specific instances, such as hiding locations from the enemy.

Both serve different purposes, but in either case, the effects can be deeply problematic for precision weaponry.

Ukraine has managed to adapt to the challenge, in some cases, by engaging in jamming of its own or locating Russian electronic-warfare sites and destroying them. Relying on alternative systems that don't depend on GPS or use other guidance systems, such as an inertial guidance system, helps bypass the problem. That's not always an option, though.

Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images

Within the Russian military, there's probably been increased interest in employing electronic warfare in battle, especially over the past year or so, because it's so effective at countering US-provided precision weapons.

Precision systems — such as Excalibur and GMLRS, which can be fired from US-provided M777 howitzers and HIMARS, respectively — are seeing shockingly decreased accuracy because of jamming.

"The philosophy behind weapons like Excalibur and JDAMs was that their reliance on GNSS, to an extent, was supposed to provide a level of precision," Withington said.

He said the capability and accuracy of those much-vaunted weapons were now in question, adding that it "not only has tactical and operational ramifications for the Ukrainians," but it could also raise questions about "the wider confidence others have in those systems."

Optimizing the Civil Affairs Task Force for the Army’s Global Missions - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Walter Haynes · May 9, 2024

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To advance its global interests and fulfill its responsibilities, the United States dispatches its military forces around the world—a lot. Even after the conclusion of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan reduced the number of US forces abroad, there are two hundred thousand of them spread across a majority of the world’s countries. Moreover, the inconclusive outcomes of the wars that defined my generation’s military service have led to a pendulum swing away from large troop deployments toward smaller, primarily partnered missions, like the effort to defeat the Islamic State beginning in 2014, or less obviously military ones, like tasking units to support South America during hurricane season. This latter category will likely be the main focus of a large share of military deployments in the years ahead. While the National Security Strategy places competition with China and Russia at the top of its priorities, the US military will continue responding to crises that are not predominantly military in character. The Department of Defense will have to prepare for a large-scale conflict scenario—its chief responsibility—by increasing its lethality, modernizing its systems, and overcoming recruiting challenges while simultaneously being asked to deploy around the world for purposes besides combat.

A brief survey of the world bears this out. Despite DoD’s focus on strategic competition, the category of activities that used to be termed “military operations other than war” have not ceased. The Air Force is currently dropping food into Gaza, the Navy is tasked with constructing a floating dock on the Gaza coast, and the Army will build the pier, to take just one example. Besides conflict, extreme weather events caused by climate change are likely to lead to ever more military deployments to provide assistance.

Not all deployments require a brigade combat team, Marine air-ground task force, or special operations task force. Experience has shown, for instance, that when deploying a conventional battalion or brigade in these cases, like when the 82nd Airborne Division was sent to Haiti after a 2010 earthquake, there can be a mismatch between the unit’s enemy- and terrain-centric operations cycle and the actual operational requirements. On top of this, each of these prospective missions can be so complex that significant coordination, intelligence analysis capacity, and synchronization between disparate actors will be necessary to achieve any kind of sustainable outcome. When policymakers want to address problems without a predominant military character, they should be able to deploy a force that is not structured, equipped, and trained to seize terrain or destroy the enemy. A unit built explicitly for engaging with a mission’s prominent civil dimension should be a realistic option. The concept of a civil affairs task force (CATF) exists in the Army’s most recent Civil Affairs doctrine, but a more robust, flexible, and scalable version of it would meet the requirements of these missions without demanding growth in an Army actively reducing troop size. A CATF would be able to contribute to a multilateral mission even without putting US troops on the ground. It would instead ingest reporting from partners, analyze reports to identify the immediate threats to stability or civil needs, assist the State Department and other agencies translate understanding into influence, and provide access to US logistical capabilities. Properly employed, it will be a better option than expecting combat formations to be adaptable when dealing with missions they did not train for.

CATF Capabilities and Functions

The Department of Defense does not have a rapidly deployable unit capable of directly monitoring and leveraging elements of the civil dimension in support of operations. Geographic combatant commands, Army corps headquarters, and interagency partners cannot request or field this capability to respond to crises. One possible way to address this gap is by formalizing the CATF as a scalable unit responsible for directly monitoring and leveraging elements of the civil dimension during crisis or conflict. In a crisis, the CATF would rapidly deploy to coordinate with partners, increase information sharing, and direct limited humanitarian assistance or disaster relief if needed. Depending on its mission, it can also cede the lead role to a national or international partner, acting in support. The CATF can build on persistent diplomatic and military efforts conducted prior to a crisis while simultaneously providing situational awareness, access, and placement to inform military and civilian decision-makers. It would do this primarily by advancing three lines of effort.

First, it would integrate civil knowledge at echelon. Just like modern combat, where commanders receive more data than they can analyze, the amount of information in the civil dimension greatly exceeds any staff’s analytical ability to draw conclusions. Emerging applications of artificial intelligence, well-trained staffs, and fusion centers will be necessary. While DoD is currently focused on using technology to speed up the kill chain and share awareness, properly drawing out conclusions for a given area’s civil picture will be vital to understanding an operational environment. A robust civil knowledge integration section would collate, analyze, and disseminate relevant reporting and other pertinent information from the civil dimension to answer a commander’s information requirements, support operations, and increase situational awareness. This section’s products should all be made unclassified, which will simplify sharing them to other actors without the problem of overclassification endemic to military intelligence products.

Second, it would coordinate with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners through a civil-military operations center to increase engagement with civil elements that can support friendly force objectives and maneuver. Better knowledge of what other actors are doing in an area of operations is important for many reasons, from preventing tragedy to making better use of limited resources. The civil-military operations center can be located inside or outside of the area of operations, based on conditions and where the majority of partners are willing to deploy to.

Finally, it would direct subordinate civil affairs or other assigned units to support the previous two lines of effort. These forces are specifically tasked to engage with the civil component to enhance understanding or identify information requirements. If necessary, the subordinate units can also work closely with local stakeholders—such as partner militaries or governments—to set the theater to enhance friendly maneuver and support consolidation of gains. This may take a range of forms, from enabling airfield or seaport surveys by experts to validating assumptions made by logistics planners.

CATF Structure

Most operational-level Army and joint headquarters include a civil-military or similar staff directorate, often led by a civil affairs officer. These sections can assist commanders in understanding the civil dimension, but they lack the scale to properly analyze the necessary data to make useful recommendations for targeting or operations. To make the CATF a reality would require support from US Army Special Operations Command, which has five active duty civil affairs battalions and a single brigade capable of forming the Army core of a CATF. There is significantly more capacity in the reserve component, but mobilizing reserve units takes time that may not exist when responding to a crisis.

Currently, CATFs are described doctrinally as “temporarily task-organized formations,” which means they are formed for specific missions. The CATF model outlined here would not be a permanent formation, but would be an enhanced version of the current, ad hoc concept. Civil affairs units would train to execute the staff processes needed to conduct mission command and advance the lines of effort. Proper training will ensure the battalions or brigade can merge the capacity to process reporting from friendly units, employ forces tasked with engaging with the civil population, and engage with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners under a single commander. In a situation where the deployment is to a civil or humanitarian crisis, the CATF can integrate DoD capabilities with the expertise multinational and nongovernmental organizations bring to the table. Civil affairs teams and companies already do this every day, on every continent, but good staff work at higher echelons is hard and takes practice.

Civil Considerations in Wartime

The CATF’s value is not limited to nonconflict scenarios. Warfighting remains the core function of the US military, and the CATF can assist commanders tasked with conducting it. In large-scale combat operations, the CATF would deploy subordinate to a special operations joint task force, combined joint task force, or other headquarters as directed. As in a noncombat deployment, the civil knowledge integration and intelligence sections would ingest reporting from multiple sources—to include open-source information, relevant joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners’ data, and friendly forces’ reporting—to build a unified civil environment common operational picture. While conventional targeting working groups and cycles are common to all operations (including nonlethal targeting), the CATF’s analysis can help commanders understand second- and third-order effects of their decisions. It can also operate beyond the area of hostilities to identify potential challenges to lines of communication, as states along resupply routes may be hesitant to appear party to the conflict.

During large-scale combat operations and the following consolidation of gains, Army doctrine states that a CATF can assist unit commanders when their organic ability cannot meet the civil needs of their areas of operations. This doctrine is mostly theoretical and untested, since the Army ends most combat exercises, including combat training center rotations, with the conclusion of large-scale combat. Nor does it often invite units with civil-military expertise to participate, other than as very small teams or companies assigned to maneuver forces in a limited supporting role. For commanders who will end up controlling battlespace, this risks making the civil dimension something that can be ignored, until angry towns start disrupting supply convoys or harboring insurgents. While I am not advocating that a brigade combat team should have to share a training exercise with a CATF, more exercises should continue past the conclusion of hostilities.

As the continued plight of civilians in Gaza, Sudan, and Ukraine demonstrates, war is a tragedy for those who endure it. And as these and other conflicts prove time and time again, failing to address the needs of a civil population makes achieving acceptable political goals more difficult. The United States and its partners destroyed the Islamic State’s physical caliphate in Syria, but without the political will to deal with the refugee camp in al-Hol, Turkey’s enmity against the Kurds, and Bashar al-Assad’s de facto victory, the country remains wracked by violence. While no military element can overcome a failure of policy, the CATF stands a better chance of fusing together various stakeholders to make progress.

Opportunities and Limitations

As has been analyzed elsewhere, the Army’s 1st Special Forces Command recently reorganized its civil affairs and psychological operations battalions to place them under the command of their respective Special Forces groups. The intent is to subordinate all regionally aligned Army special operations to a single commander to improve unity of effort. This presents an opportunity. The current civil affairs brigade headquarters, now (mostly) relieved of its responsibility to train and support the battalions, should be able to train for operational deployments as described in this article.

The US Army has a well-deserved reputation for having a manual for everything, and stability operations are no different. This doctrine outlines the Army’s stability operations tasks: establish civil security; conduct security cooperation; support civil control; restore essential services; support to governance; and support to economic and infrastructure development. Training exercises should illuminate where the doctrine works, and where it needs changes. In addition, the Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at the Army War College is able to incorporate nonmilitary partners into tabletop and other exercises, which will have the benefit of increasing awareness of this capability, while helping military planners understand what prospective partners would expect in a crisis.

I am not advocating a return to military governance operations or arguing that the Department of Defense get back into the business of nation-building. The CATF is a concept built to respond to crisis, not long-term commitments like those in Iraq or Afghanistan. What distinguishes the CATF from other units typically assigned to respond to a crisis is that it can specially train to work with partners to address a problem that can’t simply be bombed into submission.

Major Walter Haynes is a civil affairs officer who most recently served as the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade training chief.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Staff Sgt. Sidney Sale, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Walter Haynes · May 9, 2024

17. Trump-affiliated group releases new national security book outlining possible second-term approach

The book is available at this link: https://americafirstpress.org/

Excerpts:

“We hope this is where he is. We’re not speaking for him, but I think he will approve,” said Fleitz, who formerly served as the National Security Council’s chief of staff.

He said he hopes the book will serve as “a guidebook that will be an intellectual foundation for the America First approach” to national security “that’s easy to use.”

“It’s a grand strategy,” added Kellogg. “You don’t start with the policies first. You start with the strategies first. And that’s what we’ve done.”

The group casts the current trajectory of U.S. national security as a failure, thanks to a foreign policy establishment it accuses of having embraced an interventionist and “globalist” approach at the expense of America’s national interests.

While short on specifics, the book offers some guideposts to how a future Trump administration could approach foreign policy issues such as Russia’s war against Ukraine. Trump has said, that if elected, he would solve the conflict before Inauguration Day in January, but has declined to say how.

Trump-affiliated group releases new national security book outlining possible second-term approach

BY LYNN BERRY, DIDI TANG, JILL COLVIN AND ELLEN KNICKMEYER

Updated 9:01 AM EDT, May 9, 2024

AP · by JILL COLVIN · May 9, 2024

1 of 3 |FILE - Former President Donald Trump speaks at an America First Policy Institute agenda summit at the Marriott Marquis in Washington, July 26, 2022. A group trying to lay the groundwork for a second Trump administration if the former president wins in November is out with a new policy book that aims to articulate an “America First” national security agenda. (AP Photo/Andrew Harnik, File)

LYNN BERRY

JILL COLVIN

Colvin is an Associated Press national political reporter covering the 2024 presidential campaign. She is based in New York.

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ELLEN KNICKMEYER

Foreign policy, national security, foreign policy & climate

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AP · by JILL COLVIN · May 9, 2024

18. A Plan to Revitalize the Arsenal of Democracy

Excerpts:

Recognizing that too few suppliers is a national security threat is the first step to remedying this situation. Additionally, Congress should double defense procurement spending. Third, the Department of Defense should rebuild the existing defense-industrial base and expand it by buying different capabilities — more autonomous and attritable systems that increase the mass on target, provide resiliency, and create confusion for adversary targeting. Fourth, to expand the supply base in a relevant timeframe, the Defense Department should source more commercially. Fifth, Congress should leverage America’s capitalist system to its fullest by providing strong and consistent demand signals with increased multi-year production orders. These actions will attract the best and brightest from innovation hubs across the nation to develop capabilities that warfighters need and make the nation safer.

Today’s consolidated defense industry took 30 years to unfold. Reversing this can be faster but will not be instantaneous. Addressing this threat means acting now since there is a long lead-time to change the structure and capability of defense suppliers. Roosevelt’s words from eight decades ago on the eve of World War II remain as relevant today as they were at that time. “Let not the defeatists tell us that it is too late. It will never be earlier. Tomorrow will be later than today.”

A Plan to Revitalize the Arsenal of Democracy - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Michael Brown · May 10, 2024

While most people probably understand we live in dangerous times, it’s easy to get complacent with the repetitive warning signs coming from Russia and China and underestimate how dangerous. Phillip Zelikow, in a forthcoming article in the Texas National Security Review, warns of “a serious possibility of worldwide warfare” in the next two or three years.

Is America ready? Unfortunately not. And the core of the problem relates to the U.S. defense-industrial base, which suffers from too much concentration, too little commercial technology, and an insufficient ability to produce munitions. It is therefore ill-prepared for the dangers of the present and future.

How did we get here?

The First Gulf War demonstrated the decisive power of U.S. technology applied to warfighting: precision-guided munitions, stealth aircraft, satellite-based intelligence, and advanced communications. These enabled the U.S. military to defeat the Iraqi military — the world’s sixth largest — in six days. Moscow and Beijing saw the vast technological gap between the U.S. military and their own forces. The Soviet Union would fall months later, but China’s struggle for global supremacy was only beginning. China responded by beginning the largest and fastest buildup of military capability since World War II.

In the United States, things began to move in the opposite direction. In 1993, then Deputy Defense Secretary William Perry invited executives to a Pentagon dinner since coined the “Last Supper.” Perry explained the implications of the peace dividend as a logical implication of winning the Cold War: dramatically lower defense spending that could not support the number of companies in the defense industry.

America’s 50 main defense suppliers consolidated to five. Today, the top six suppliers to the U.S. Department of Defense receive two-thirds of all procurement dollars. To be sure, these six suppliers are not the problem per se. All are vital to national security and must continue to be successful. However, depending on just six companies represents a bottleneck to defense capabilities. Thirty-three years after the U.S. military’s stunning display of military power in the First Gulf War, China commands a force that can rival the U.S. military power in the Indo-Pacific and credibly threatens a forcible seizure of Taiwan — the holy grail for the Chinese Communist Party. And Russia currently is pressing its advantages in Ukraine. This bottleneck, therefore, represents a major danger to the United States and its allies.

Unless Congress and the Defense Department act with alacrity, the preponderance of global military power will shift against America and its allies. Nothing less than the security of the free world is at stake. That is why Congress and the department ought to double procurement spending and require the procurement of items that complement large defense platforms commercially, at scale, and consistently. As a partner at Shield Capital, which invests in technology companies that seek to work with the Defense Department, our portfolio companies could surely benefit from these recommendations, but I’ve been calling for them since I was leading the Defense Innovation Unit because I believe in the mission.

The recommendations I offer here have long lead-times and should be deployed in combination to reverse the shrinking and decaying of the U.S. arsenal. The acquisition chief of the Department of Defense, Bill LaPlante, recently said, “We’re moving past the post-Cold War era and starting to get our industrial capacity up again where it needs to be. It’s not where it needs to be. It’s going to take years to do this. Everybody … is recognizing this.”

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Consequences of Defense Consolidation

Consolidation has made the U.S. defense industry less competitive and less able to surge to meet unexpected demand. Suppliers in specific categories have declined dramatically over the three decades since the end of the Cold War: tactical missile suppliers have declined from 13 to three, fixed-wing aircraft suppliers have declined from eight to three, satellite suppliers have declined from eight to four, surface ship suppliers have declined from eight to two, and 90 percent of missiles come from three sources. While there have been many stories in the press about single sources of supply resulting in price gouging, the real threat to national security is not the higher prices the Defense Department pays, but the lack of capacity to rapidly supply what the military would need in a conflict. This is the result of defense primes focusing on more efficient operations, such as just-in-time inventory levels and capacity optimized for low-rate production. Shareholders of defense primes demand a management focus on cash flow enabling stock buybacks instead of investment in new technology or production capacity.

This won’t change without a reliable, annual demand signal from congressional appropriators. This year was no exception as the defense appropriations came six months into the fiscal year. In fact, in the past 47 fiscal years, Congress has only passed a defense budget on time in three of those years. Exacerbating this trend, the Defense Department for many years prior to Ukraine had not forecast an ongoing need for munitions in its budget and instead reallocated spending away from missiles or 155 millimeter shells towards large defense platforms like submarines or fighter jets. With this action, the Defense Department sent a signal to munitions suppliers that there would be little ongoing demand. Experience from the First Gulf War and the Global War on Terror reinforced the belief that military inventories are not depleted quickly and there is time to replenish them during a conflict. In contrast, Ukraine shows future wars are not necessarily short and the outcome may depend more on the production capacity of ordinary items like munitions rather than submarines and fighter jets. In a potential conflict with China, whose manufacturing capacity already exceeds that of the United States in most areas, Washington will not have years to ramp production to make a decisive difference.

Rather than the world being a safer place that justifies a reduction in defense spending described at the Last Supper, the world has become more dangerous and the consolidated supplier base is a constraint rather than a benefit or necessity. In fact, the defense industry is far more consolidated than the average U.S. industry. In defense, the top six suppliers account for 67 percent of defense spending and the top 10 suppliers for 74 percent. Across all U.S. industries, the top eight suppliers represent only 44 percent of the market. In the industry with the most consequential implications for poor performance where America can least afford a lack of choice in offerings, low resiliency, inflexible capacity, and higher prices, defense leadership from three decades ago triggered consolidation that is now approaching twice the average for all U.S. industries.

Need for Increased Defense Procurement

If the U.S. government hopes to expand the supply base, Congress will need to increase defense spending and likely more than it has in the past few years. While the United States has increased its defense spending in nominal dollars more than tenfold from around $100 billion in the 1950s to nearly $1 trillion today, defense spending as a share of GDP has dropped from 15 percent in the 1950s to 3.5 percent today. Within the defense budget, the largest costs are personnel plus spending not typically thought of as defense, since the Department of Defense operates one of the world’s largest real-estate portfolios and one of the nation’s largest healthcare and school systems for military families. The result is that despite a growing defense budget America has a smaller military with older and less equipment than at any time in memory. The average fighter aircraft today is 28 years old — with some F-16s that began flying in the early 1980s and many that will be flying into the 2040s. The U.S. Navy is facing equally daunting challenges maintaining aging fleets.

According to the annual report submitted to Congress from the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey,

The cruisers are all closing in on their expected 35-year expected hull lives, and the first 27 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are not far behind them. Keeping the radars going … has been a particular challenge, as has maintaining the aging engineering plants.

On average, 70 percent of U.S. defense procurement dollars maintain old platforms because the United States keeps these platforms in service beyond their expected lives. This practice may be lucrative business for a few defense suppliers who have locked-in service contracts, but the result lessens the ability to buy more platforms or newer technology.

The Heritage Foundation’s annual assessment of U.S. military strength is sobering and reinforces these points. Five years ago, the assessment concluded that the armed forces were “too small, too old and not ready enough to support a credible two-war battle force.” Unsurprisingly, the 2024 report concludes much the same. Consequently, the “current U.S. military force is at significant risk of not being able to meet the demands of a single major regional conflict.” Bottom line: The United States is not providing a credible deterrent to adversaries.

To upgrade forces and equipment to the level needed to address global threats, defense spending on procurement should be doubling to about $335 billion per year, implying a 20 percent increase in total defense spending. At $1.02 trillion, defense spending would be 3.5 percent of GDP, well less than the 6 percent spent in the Reagan administration years. Eric Lofgren noted another important trend in the defense budget over the past 40 years: An increasing amount of the budget is dedicated to research and development projects for future weapons systems and less to procuring systems for today’s force. In the 1980s, of the spending for research and development and procurement combined, procurement was close to 75 percent. In the current budget, procurement is just over 50 percent of the total. While this increased research budget is important for future capabilities, the shift to lower procurement budgets shortchanges the replenishment and modernization of equipment and is less of a deterrent. This increased spending would go a long way to ensuring the largest suppliers remain healthy companies, to rebuilding America’s defense-industrial base to again become the arsenal of democracy, and to creating a credible deterrent to avoid a potential war with China estimated to cost $10 trillion globally.

Spending on Hedged Capabilities

To once again become the arsenal of democracy requires more than increased spending with the same vendors for the same platforms. Some of the money needs to be spent differently as a hedge to the large defense platforms of Ford-class aircraft carriers and F-35s. China, in particular, has stolen the designs of large U.S. platforms and observed American forces in operations with these platforms for decades. The United States needs to complement these platforms with the digital technologies that are changing the battlefield in a revolution that may have begun in the First Gulf War but has not stopped. The most advanced of these technologies — AI, cyber tools, autonomous systems, satellite data from space — come more from commercial suppliers and less from defense primes. In fact, the current chief technology officer of the Defense Department has identified 14 critical technologies for national security and 11 of these are being developed by commercial companies — not from government labs or defense primes. To illustrate how much progress needs to be made, in 2023, $406 billion of defense contracts were awarded to traditional defense suppliers while only $4 billion were awarded to venture-backed companies, which are most often the sources of digital innovation.

This hedged capability is recognized as a means to provide lower cost, attritable systems — in many cases autonomous systems — which add more mass in theater and also create targeting dilemmas for adversaries, since the force is more resilient and more widely distributed. Likely the best way to quickly change what the U.S. military fields and create credible deterrence would be to provide production orders to commercial companies who can supply more autonomy, satellites, resilient communications, and other digitally based capabilities. Commercial companies can respond to this demand signal quickly — within 2 years — whereas new defense platforms can take 17 years on average to field. We need both new platforms like Columbia-class submarines and commercial capabilities such as maritime autonomy, but only commercial capabilities can increase deterrence in the next two years. Additionally, new manufacturing technologies — robotics, advanced materials, computer-controlled processes, and 3D printing with multiple materials — enable the United States to again be competitive with onshore production.

The chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee this year called for up to $1 billion more in defense spending specifically on a hedge strategy of complementary capabilities. More recently, the Department of Defense has recognized the need for these capabilities in its Replicator initiative aiming to put thousands of attritable systems in the Indo-Pacific region in the next 18 to 24 months. In fact, leaders in the Indo-Pacific theater, at the Defense Department, and on the Hill are now all calling for these capabilities — promisingly, the newly-released defense budget includes the first demand signal for Replicator at $1 billion.

The Way Forward

The United States became the “arsenal of democracy” after President Franklin Roosevelt foresaw the need to build the defense-industrial base in another very dangerous time.

After winning World War II, the United States maintained superior military technology and production capacity throughout the second half of the 20th century. Much has changed, and not for the better. As I noted, in the decades since, the U.S. technology edge has been blunted and the defense-industrial base suffers from too much concentration, too little use of commercial technology, and too little production capacity.

The United States can once again be the arsenal for democracy, empowering the free nations of the world to chart their paths into the future in the face of authoritarian powers. But this will not be possible without bold and urgent congressional and Defense Department actions.

Commercial technology should be a part of the solution because it can be fielded faster, at greater scale, and from more suppliers than specialized military gear including for U.S. partners and allies. When partners and allies procure the same commercial solutions, these are interoperable when we fight together. Commercial products also mean buying the latest technology for our warfighters since these products iterate rapidly to improve performance, cost, and functionality — especially in software. Additionally, the incentives of increased military demand spurs suppliers to invest in more production capacity and investors to provide more capital to these companies. As observed in non-defense markets, an increased number of suppliers results in more choice, more competitive pricing, more resilient supply chains, and more investment from private capital. More private investment in national security means more solutions for warfighters instead of more dating apps or better ad-targeting.

Recognizing that too few suppliers is a national security threat is the first step to remedying this situation. Additionally, Congress should double defense procurement spending. Third, the Department of Defense should rebuild the existing defense-industrial base and expand it by buying different capabilities — more autonomous and attritable systems that increase the mass on target, provide resiliency, and create confusion for adversary targeting. Fourth, to expand the supply base in a relevant timeframe, the Defense Department should source more commercially. Fifth, Congress should leverage America’s capitalist system to its fullest by providing strong and consistent demand signals with increased multi-year production orders. These actions will attract the best and brightest from innovation hubs across the nation to develop capabilities that warfighters need and make the nation safer.

Today’s consolidated defense industry took 30 years to unfold. Reversing this can be faster but will not be instantaneous. Addressing this threat means acting now since there is a long lead-time to change the structure and capability of defense suppliers. Roosevelt’s words from eight decades ago on the eve of World War II remain as relevant today as they were at that time. “Let not the defeatists tell us that it is too late. It will never be earlier. Tomorrow will be later than today.”

Become a Member

Michael Brown is a partner at Shield Capital and is the former director of the Defense Innovation Unit at the U.S. Department of Defense.

Image: Midjourney

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Michael Brown · May 10, 2024

19. What Hamas Wants in Postwar Gaza

Excerpts:

Notwithstanding Hamas’s belated announcement in early May that it might approve some version of a hostage-for-prisoners deal, Biden administration officials have long blamed Hamas’s leadership for prolonging the war by not releasing the Israeli hostages and laying down arms. But they are not the only ones. There are indications that Gazans themselves, increasingly desperate after nearly seven months of devastating war, are losing patience with the movement and its failure to take steps to protect them from the Israeli retaliation Hamas was determined to provoke. “I pray every day for the death of Sinwar,” one Gazan told the Financial Times in April. Polling by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research suggests that over the past three months, Hamas’s popularity has dropped by about a quarter, from 43 percent to 34 percent. “Almost everyone around me shares the same thoughts,” a freelance journalist in Gaza told The Washington Post recently. “We want this waterfall of blood to stop.”

Hunkered down in their underground tunnels, Hamas’s leaders are surely aware that the civilians they have left unprotected aboveground are growing increasingly angry at the movement, which may account for the more moderate tone of some statements the movement’s leaders have recently released. But they are wary of agreeing to any swap of hostages for prisoners that does not come with a complete cease-fire and save the remaining Hamas battalions in Rafah. Indeed, poor polling numbers are only likely to underscore the importance of securing a position within whatever governance structure comes next—one in which Hamas will not be the only party ruling Gaza and therefore not the one blamed when things don’t go well. Hamas understands that after it releases the remaining hostages, the best leverage it will have is its remaining fighting cadre.

So as Hamas sees it, it must first secure a Hezbollah-style victory, simply by surviving. Then, it must adopt a Hezbollah model in its relation to the postwar governance structure that emerges—joining with the PLO and changing the Palestinian movement from within while maintaining Hamas as an independent fighting force. For Hamas, this would be a return to first principles: it could pursue its fundamental commitment to destroying Israel and replacing it with an Islamist Palestinian state in all of what it considers historic Palestine.

To arrest this plan before it is set in motion, it will be paramount for Israel, the United States, and their Arab and Western allies to keep Hamas out of whatever Palestinian governance structure is built. If they do not, the group could soon create a situation that is far more dangerous and destabilizing than the one that allowed it to launch the October 7 attack. The peril lies in the fact that both Hamas and Hezbollah truly believe that Israel’s destruction is inevitable, and that October 7 is simply the beginning of an irreversible process that will ultimately achieve just that. Anyone who truly supports the idea of securing a durable settlement to this conflict must oppose including Hamas in Palestinian governance for the simple reason that Hamas’ fundamental goals are incompatible with peace.

What Hamas Wants in Postwar Gaza

The Power to Fight Without the Burden of Governing

By Matthew Levitt

May 10, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God · May 10, 2024

On May 6, in an effort to forestall an all-but-certain Israeli operation in Rafah, Hamas leaders said that they might be prepared to accept a hostage-for-prisoners agreement with Israel. Coming after weeks of stonewalling by Hamas, the announcement raised hopes in Washington that some kind of deal might still be reached that could free dozens of hostages and bring about a pause in Israel’s offensive in the Gaza Strip. But even now, it remained unclear how committed Hamas was to carrying out this deal, or whether it was simply seeking a means to preserve its Rafah stronghold, where Israel believes its remaining brigades and Gaza-based leadership are holed up.

After seven months of war in Gaza, the Israel-Hamas conflict has caused untold devastation to the more than two million Gazans that Hamas claims to represent and has all but destroyed Hamas’s governance project in the strip. It is worth asking two basic questions: What are Hamas’s goals? And what is its strategy for achieving them?

With its heinous October 7 assault on Israel, Hamas sought to put itself and the Palestinian issue back at the center of the international agenda, even if that meant destroying much of Gaza itself. The attack was also meant to thwart a possible normalization pact between Israel and Saudi Arabia that would promote Palestinian moderates and sideline Hamas.

But Hamas’s leaders also have political aims that may at first seem counterintuitive. They are trying to relieve themselves of the sole burden of governing the Gaza Strip, which had become an impediment to achieving the group’s goal of destroying Israel. And as talks hosted by China in early May between Hamas and Fatah officials have underscored, the Hamas leadership is also trying to jump-start a process of reconciliation with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority (PA), which Fatah controls, despite years of fierce hostility between the two groups.

Those goals, in turn, serve a deeper purpose. In seeking to force a new governance structure on Gaza and to refashion the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in its own image, Hamas hopes to impose a Hezbollah model on the territory. Like Hezbollah, the heavily armed, Iranian-backed Shiite militant movement in Lebanon, Hamas wants a future in which it is both a part of, and apart from, whatever Palestinian governance structure next emerges in Gaza. That way, as with Hezbollah in Lebanon, it hopes to wield political and military dominance in Gaza and ultimately the West Bank without bearing any of the accountability that comes from ruling alone. To understand this larger Hamas project and its important implications for Israel and the region, it is necessary to examine the evolution of Hamas in the years leading up to the October 7 attack and what Hamas hoped to achieve by murdering and kidnapping scores of Israeli civilians.

CHANGING THE EQUATION

Four days after October 7, a Hamas official publicly acknowledged that the group had been secretly planning the attack for more than two years. After a brief war with Israel in May 2021, Hamas leaders reassessed their fundamental aims. At that point, they had ruled the Gaza Strip for 14 years—having seized full control from the PA in 2007, two years after an Israeli withdrawal—and could have continued to maintain the status quo. Notwithstanding intermittent skirmishes with Israel, Hamas was firmly ensconced in Gaza and sustained by hundreds of millions of dollars in aid from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, or UNRWA, and in funds from Qatar to cover public salaries.

But shortly after the 2021 war, Hamas’s leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, presented Israel with what he described as two alternative outcomes. In an appearance on Al Jazeera, the Qatari-funded satellite network, Sinwar stressed that Hamas continued to aim for the “eradication” of Israel but that he was amenable to entering a long-term truce with the country—provided that Israel agreed to a laundry list of demands, including dismantling all settlements, releasing Palestinian prisoners, and allowing a Palestinian right of return. But any such truce, he said, would be temporary and driven by the imperative of achieving unity among Palestinian factions, presumably meaning support for Hamas’ position of ultimately eradicating Israel.

Sinwar also boasted that Hamas was already in contact with its “brothers in Lebanon” (Hezbollah) and with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and suggested that these allies would have supported Hamas in the 2021 war if it had intensified. Soon, Hamas began meeting regularly with officials from Iran and Hezbollah. Four months later, Hamas also sponsored a conference in Gaza hosted by Sinwar himself that was devoted to plans for the “liberation of Palestine” once Israel “disappears.” The conference called for replacing the PLO with a new Council for the Liberation of Palestine that would include “all Palestinian and Arab forces who endorse the idea of liberating Palestine, with the backing of friendly forces.”

At the same time, instead of prioritizing its governance project in the Gaza Strip, Hamas began to secretly put in play a long-held but still notional plan to launch a ground assault on Israel and initiate what it hoped would be a chain reaction that would lead to the destruction of Israel. The group’s leaders pretended to be focused on governing Gaza and addressing the needs of Palestinians living there, while in fact they were stockpiling small arms and, as a Hamas official named Khalil al-Hayya later conceded, “preparing for this big attack.” Ultimately, as al-Hayya put it, Hamas concluded that it needed to “change the entire equation” with Israel.

NOW OR NEVER

With planning for the October 7 attack already well underway, Hamas leaders became increasingly convinced of the urgency of doing something drastic. First, the movement’s support in Gaza appeared to be eroding. Israel’s pre-October 7 strategy toward Hamas was based on buying calm by allowing Qatari funds to flow into Gaza in the hopes that this would decrease support for Hamas militancy among the Gazan population.

For all the criticism Israel has faced for this approach in the months since Hamas’s attack, there is some indication that it was working. Polling conducted in July 2023 by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, for example, revealed that 72 percent of Gazans agreed that “Hamas has been unable to improve the lives of Palestinians in Gaza” and that 70 percent supported the proposal that Hamas’s rival, the PA, take over security in Gaza. Looking at these numbers, Hamas could only have concluded that its governance project in Gaza was floundering.

Hamas knew the Israeli response would end its governance project in Gaza.

Hamas also feared Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were demanding that Israel take tangible and irreversible steps toward a two-state solution and that Washington enter into a formal security treaty with Riyadh; in exchange, the Saudis would formally recognize Israel. Most Palestinians likely saw progress on Palestinian statehood as a good thing, but not Hamas, which has always been dead set against a two-state solution and committed to Israel’s destruction. Hamas also understood that under a two-state solution both sides would be expected to clamp down on their respective violent extremists, which would not bode well for Hamas and its allies.

At the same time, Hamas likely saw prolonged instability in Israel as a golden opportunity. Alongside rising violence in the West Bank and clashes between Palestinian worshipers and Israeli security forces at Jerusalem’s al Aqsa mosque, Netanyahu’s right-wing government had faced months of protests over its proposed judicial reforms. The heightened tensions in the West Bank—driven in part by the efforts of Hamas’s external leaders, such as Salah al-Arouri, to instigate attacks against Israelis—the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had moved more resources there, leaving the Gazan border more vulnerable.

It was amid these developments that Hamas decided to launch its October 7 attack. Harking back to Sinwar’s 2021 conference, in which he had threatened to respond to actions that Hamas perceived as undermining Palestinian claims to Jerusalem, Hamas called the October 7 operation the Al Aqsa Flood.

“WE NEED THIS BLOOD”

From the outset of its planning, Hamas anticipated that its invasion of southern Israel would draw Israel into a larger conflict, one that it hoped Hezbollah and other members of Iran’s “axis of resistance” would quickly join. (It is now understood that Hamas kept the precise details of its attack, including the exact date, closely held, but Iran and Hezbollah were aware of the general concept.) Hamas leaders also planned for the possibility that the attack could achieve more, including a scenario in which Gazan-based Hamas militants would link up with fighters in the West Bank and follow up on the initial assault by targeting Israeli cities and military bases. To this end, when they broke out of Gaza on October 7, Hamas militants were carrying enough food and gear to last several days.

Israeli forces ultimately disrupted those maximalist plans, but before they could regain control of the border areas around Gaza, the Hamas attackers committed horrific atrocities, murdering around 1,200 Israelis and foreign nationals, taking more than 200 hostages, and recording and broadcasting their crimes. Hamas even used stolen phones to hijack victims’ social media and WhatsApp accounts, from which it livestreamed attacks, issued threats to victims’ families, and called for further acts of violence. Israeli forces later found documents on the bodies of slain Hamas attackers instructing them to “kill as many people as possible” and “capture hostages.” One document specifically directed operatives to target children at an elementary school and a youth center.

In orchestrating and sensationalizing this mayhem, Hamas sought to provoke Israel into a major land invasion of Gaza. A core pillar of this strategy was to start a war that would cause high numbers of Palestinian casualties, as Hamas’s political leader in Doha, Ismail Haniyeh, bluntly confirmed in a video address days after October 7: “We are the ones who need this blood, so it awakens within us the revolutionary spirit, so it awakens within us resolve, so it awakens with us the spirit of challenge and [pushes us] to move forward.”

It was not by accident that Hamas built more than 300 miles of tunnels in Gaza to protect its fighters but not a single bomb shelter to protect Palestinian civilians. Hamas knew full well that the Israeli response would lead to civilian Palestinian casualties—and that it would also end the Hamas governance project in Gaza, a responsibility that the group was eager to relinquish.

CATASTROPHIC SUCCESS

Despite its own maximalist aspirations to reach Tel Aviv and connect with fellow militants in Hebron, Hamas appears to have been unprepared for its initial success on October 7. Hamas was able to get far more of its fighters into Israel than it had expected, having anticipated that Israeli security systems and forces would kill and capture more attackers along the border than they did. Moreover, two additional waves of attackers followed as news spread in Gaza that Hamas had breached the border fence. The first included members of other terrorist groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; the second included unaffiliated Gazans, many of whom killed, kidnapped, and carried out other atrocities in Israeli communities near the border.

Although the attack went unchecked for hours, and it took Israeli forces days to apprehend or kill all the attackers and regain control of the border, it did not produce several of Hamas’s hoped-for outcomes. For one thing, Israel did not immediately launch a land war in Gaza, in which Hamas thought it would have a major advantage because of its tunnel network. Instead, Israel took a couple of weeks to plan its response, which started with a punishing air offensive followed weeks later by a combined air and ground offensive aimed at uprooting the military infrastructure Hamas had built within and under civilian communities.

Nor did Hezbollah and other members of the axis of resistance launch a full-scale attack on Israel. When Iran carried out a major attack in April in response to an Israeli strike on senior Iranian commanders in Syria, Israeli and allied air defenses largely neutralized what proved to be a one-off operation. Both Hezbollah and Iran, Hamas’s most powerful allies, were keen to join the fight, but neither wanted a full-scale war.

In short, the Israel-Hamas war has been devastating, but it has not set off a regional war that threatens Israel’s survival—and Hamas is fine with that, for now. For Hamas, strategic patience is a virtue. Although the group planned for the possibility of still greater success, its primary goal was to initiate a longer and inexorable process leading to Israel’s destruction. To do that, Hamas needed to get out from under the burden of governing the Gaza Strip, which it had concluded was undermining rather than enabling its attacks on Israel. Freed of that responsibility, Hamas could now pledge “to repeat the October 7 attack, time and again, until Israel is annihilated.”

THE HEZBOLLAH MODEL

In launching the October 7 attack, Hamas upended the status quo in Gaza. Less noted has been what it wants instead. In fact, as debate ensues over postwar administration of the strip, Hamas has begun to lay the groundwork for reconciling with and ultimately taking over the PLO, thereby guaranteeing that it is part of whatever governance structure emerges. Al-Hayya, the Hamas official who explained that his group wanted to change the whole equation, recently acknowledged this plan and has floated the idea of a five-year truce with Israel based on the armistice lines that existed before the 1967 war and on a unified Palestinian government that controls both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Indeed, since December, senior leaders from Hamas have been meeting with factions of Fatah that are opposed to Mahmoud Abbas, the deeply unpopular leader of the PA, to discuss just such a rapprochement. On April 21, Haniyeh explicitly proposed restructuring the PLO to include all Palestinian factions.

For a militant Islamist movement that has long disavowed the more moderate and secular Palestinian Authority, seeking to join forces with the PLO may seem surprising. But behind Hamas’s recent push is the more important strategic goal of emulating the Hezbollah model. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is nominally part of the weak Lebanese state, allowing it to influence policy and have at least some say in directing government funds, yet it maintains complete autonomy in running its own powerful military and in fighting Israel. Under a new arrangement for Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas hopes to exert the same influence and independence with its own movement and militia, neither beholden to nor controlled by a government.

Hamas has laid the groundwork for reconciling with and ultimately taking over the PLO.

In fact, Hamas’s leaders in Gaza looked to Hezbollah for guidance as they planned the October 7 attack, which came straight out of Hezbollah’s playbook. Although Hamas’s external leadership in Qatar, Turkey, and Lebanon has been more interested in bringing the war to a close, Sinwar—who holds most of the cards by virtue of being on the ground in Gaza and controlling the Israeli hostages—is fixated on absorbing Israel’s hits, surviving, and declaring “divine victory.” He is clearly looking to the 2006 war with Israel, in which Hezbollah became the first Arab army not to be destroyed by the IDF, despite heavy losses, and enjoyed a significant boost to its regional stature as a result. Surviving the Israeli military offensive, Sinwar appears to have calculated, would position him well for a senior position in a future Palestinian government.

Of course, the idea that Sinwar might have a future place in a Palestinian unity government is preposterous, and not only because of the heinous nature of what Hamas did on October 7. After all, as a longtime sworn enemy of Fatah and the PA, Hamas took over the Gaza Strip by armed force in 2007 after a civil war with Fatah. Moreover, the Biden administration has explicitly ruled out any postwar governance structure that includes Hamas. But without a concerted effort to fully dismantle the group’s political infrastructure in Gaza and build alternatives, Hamas may yet succeed in positioning itself to be one of several parties in control when the fighting stops.

Should that happen, Hamas might well adopt other aspects of the Hezbollah approach. Just as Hezbollah has used its haven in Lebanon to launch cross-border attacks on Israel as terrorist plots against Israelis and Jews around the world, Hamas could expand its military operations beyond the borders of Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip and carry out plausibly deniable terrorist attacks abroad. So far, Hamas has never carried out an international terrorist attack—though it has come close on several occasions. But since October 7, European intelligence agencies have discovered Hamas plots in Germany and Sweden as well as logistical operations in Bulgaria, Denmark, and the Netherlands.

PREVENTING A POSTWAR VICTORY

Notwithstanding Hamas’s belated announcement in early May that it might approve some version of a hostage-for-prisoners deal, Biden administration officials have long blamed Hamas’s leadership for prolonging the war by not releasing the Israeli hostages and laying down arms. But they are not the only ones. There are indications that Gazans themselves, increasingly desperate after nearly seven months of devastating war, are losing patience with the movement and its failure to take steps to protect them from the Israeli retaliation Hamas was determined to provoke. “I pray every day for the death of Sinwar,” one Gazan told the Financial Times in April. Polling by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research suggests that over the past three months, Hamas’s popularity has dropped by about a quarter, from 43 percent to 34 percent. “Almost everyone around me shares the same thoughts,” a freelance journalist in Gaza told The Washington Post recently. “We want this waterfall of blood to stop.”

Hunkered down in their underground tunnels, Hamas’s leaders are surely aware that the civilians they have left unprotected aboveground are growing increasingly angry at the movement, which may account for the more moderate tone of some statements the movement’s leaders have recently released. But they are wary of agreeing to any swap of hostages for prisoners that does not come with a complete cease-fire and save the remaining Hamas battalions in Rafah. Indeed, poor polling numbers are only likely to underscore the importance of securing a position within whatever governance structure comes next—one in which Hamas will not be the only party ruling Gaza and therefore not the one blamed when things don’t go well. Hamas understands that after it releases the remaining hostages, the best leverage it will have is its remaining fighting cadre.

So as Hamas sees it, it must first secure a Hezbollah-style victory, simply by surviving. Then, it must adopt a Hezbollah model in its relation to the postwar governance structure that emerges—joining with the PLO and changing the Palestinian movement from within while maintaining Hamas as an independent fighting force. For Hamas, this would be a return to first principles: it could pursue its fundamental commitment to destroying Israel and replacing it with an Islamist Palestinian state in all of what it considers historic Palestine.

To arrest this plan before it is set in motion, it will be paramount for Israel, the United States, and their Arab and Western allies to keep Hamas out of whatever Palestinian governance structure is built. If they do not, the group could soon create a situation that is far more dangerous and destabilizing than the one that allowed it to launch the October 7 attack. The peril lies in the fact that both Hamas and Hezbollah truly believe that Israel’s destruction is inevitable, and that October 7 is simply the beginning of an irreversible process that will ultimately achieve just that. Anyone who truly supports the idea of securing a durable settlement to this conflict must oppose including Hamas in Palestinian governance for the simple reason that Hamas’ fundamental goals are incompatible with peace.

MATTHEW LEVITT is Fromer-Wexler Fellow and Director of the Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is the author of Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God.

Foreign Affairs · by Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God · May 10, 2024

20. Russian Sabotage, Spying and Intimidation Is Spreading in Europe

Russian Sabotage, Spying and Intimidation Is Spreading in Europe

From London to Berlin, GRU seen as behind a series of attacks
The uptick in Russian intimidation comes ahead of EU elections
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-09/russia-backed-agents-believed-to-be-behind-attacks-in-uk-germany-poland?mc_cid=490f46df6a&mc_eid=70bf478f36&sref=hhjZtX76

By Bloomberg News

May 9, 2024 at 11:12 AM EDT

In Germany, two suspects hired by Russian intelligence to target military bases had come to the country as teenagers. In Estonia, young men with criminal records were recruited over Telegram to vandalize a minister’s car and national monuments for a bit of cash.

Elsewhere in Europe, government workers are advised to take precautions against a greater risk of violence by Russian-backed thugs. The hand of the GRU military intelligence service is likely behind a series of ever-more overt, frequent and coordinated incidents across the continent, according to officials familiar with the matter speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss open investigations.

The Russian Embassy’s compound in London’s Highgate. The UK deported Russia’s defense attaché.Photographer: Hollie Adams/Bloomberg

From Berlin to Vilnius, governments are coming to grips with the growing threat from Russian-sponsored acts of sabotage and violent intimidation on NATO territory ahead of European Union elections next month that alongside a determined campaign of disinformation is designed to test the continent’s support for Ukraine.

The sheer brazenness now of Kremlin-sanctioned activities — years after the Salisbury poisonings that the UK believe were likely ordered by Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Tiergarten killing in Berlin — has led one senior official to the conclusion that Moscow no longer cares if it’s caught carrying out hostile acts and has jettisoned more subtle forms of clandestine espionage with open brutality on Western targets.

In London on Friday, a British man will appear in court, accused of carrying out an arson attack against a Ukrainian-linked warehouse in East London. The UK expelled a top Russian diplomat as part of a crackdown on Russian spies in response.

In Poland, prosecutors arrested a man they accused of collecting information on an airport that serves as the main stopover point for officials traveling to and from Ukraine on suspicion of assisting in a Russian plot to assassinate President Volodymyr Zelenskiy.

One European official said several of the incidents in Europe were part of a GRU-coordinated operation with similar activities being carried out in various capitals. The response is focused on activity that has happened as opposed to the threat of activity that could happen – and demonstrating to Russia that the West knows what it’s doing and there are consequences, the official said.

“Russia has been sending death squads to Europe for years — Berlin, London, Salisbury, but also other places,” Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski said Thursday in Tallin, Estonia. “We had a Russian-recruited terrorist who tried to perform an act of terrorism in Poland a couple of months ago and I’m sure they’re trying to do that in other countries, too.”

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told journalists on Monday that allegations that Russia plans sabotage acts in Europe were “just another series of unfounded accusations against our country,” according to the Interfax news service.

In their aggressiveness, methods and scope, the Russian-backed actions represent a new threat emanating from the Kremlin and officials point out that the spate of recent attacks share common traits, often involving locals hired mostly online through intermediaries to hit targets in the West or carry out other malign tasks at Moscow’s behest.

It is highly likely that the strategy — aimed at Europe as a whole — has been signed off at the highest level in Moscow, one of the officials said. Russia has a deliberate strategy of sabotaging aid to Ukraine across Europe, recruiting locals to help their efforts, another official said.

Teija Tiilikainen, director of the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, sees behind all this Russia’s willingness to strengthen the role of authoritarian regime and is also possibly preparing itself for an escalation of its conflict with the West by testing its tools.

Baltic Crosshairs

Estonia arrested earlier this year around a dozen individuals suspected of working for Russian intelligence and that were part of a wider low-cost plan to gain influence abroad, according to Margo Palloson, who leads its Internal Security Service. Lithuania’s intelligence service warned this week that Russia is trying to employ residents in the Baltic states to carry out provocations or attacks.

“There’s an increased use of social platforms for this, with ads searching for people to recruit, for people willing to spy for a fee, to photograph infrastructure of military objects of strategic importance, to collect data on individuals and to carry out acts of sabotage or vandalism,” the agency said in a statement.

While the Baltics are NATO’s frontline with Russia, they are by no means alone in raising the alarm on how far Moscow is prepared to go with these tactics. In the past month, Germany arrested two men for plotting “possible sabotage actions” against military and industrial sites, including US installations. For example, the US military base in Grafenwoehr is where Ukrainian soldiers are being trained on Abrams tanks.

US Bases

Officials at Germany’s domestic intelligence service are concerned that Russian intelligence agencies are systematically targeting Russian-Germans living in the country via social media channels, a person familiar with the matter said on condition of anonymity.

The danger is especially high among countries with a Communist past or once formerly part of the Soviet Union because they consume Russian media and are most exposed to anti-Ukrainian and anti-European propaganda, the person added. Romania’s top defense council warned in a report about the potential infiltrations of Russian spies as Ukrainian refugees or even potential sabotages of military transport to Ukraine.

Romania is the EU member state that shares the longest border with Ukraine and has seen an increase in cyberattacks against some of its key institutions and politicians since the start of the war. During one of the attacks against the parliament’s database, the hackers have stolen the ID details of Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu and posted it on the dark web, forcing him to change his ID.

Beyond sharing intelligence and expertise, NATO’s tools to counter these hybrid threats are often limited and attribution is notoriously challenging.

As Tiilikainen said, by staying under the threshold of armed attack and NATO’s collective defense commitment known as Article 5, “Russia is trying to get the most out of its power while still avoiding counter reactions or immediate countermeasures.”

— With assistance from Alberto Nardelli, Natalia Drozdiak, Alex Wickham, Andrea Palasciano, Irina Vilcu, Michael Nienaber, Milda Seputyte, Ott Tammik, Natalia Ojewska, and Andra Timu

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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