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Quotes of the Day:
“The point is that, as soon as fear, hatred, jealousy and power worship are involved, the sense of reality becomes unhinged. And, as I have pointed out already, the sense of right, and wrong becomes unhinged also. There is no crime, absolutely none, that cannot be condoned when our side commits it. Even if one does not deny that the crime has happened, even if one knows that it is exactly the same crime as one has condemned in some other case, even if one admits in an intellectual sense that it is unjustified – still one cannot feel that it is wrong. Loyalty is involved, and so pity ceases to function.”
- George Orwell, Notes on Nationalism, (1945).
"The propagandist's purpose is to make one set of people forget that certain other sets of people are human."
- Aldous Huxley, writer, philosopher
"The buying of books more than one can read is nothing less than the soul reaching toward infinity."
- A. Edward Newton
1. How to Avoid a Bad Take on a Hard Target: Analyzing North Korea the Right Way
2. 7 in 10 S. Koreans support gov't efforts to raise awareness on N.K. human rights: poll
3. Hardliner named chief of new defense innovation committee
4. South Korea will be vulnerable to North’s drones for years, leak warns
5. S. Korea proposes regular participation in US-led multinational cyber exercise
6. Dividends of summitry
7. How the Japan-South Korea Normalization Reshaped Both Countries
8. Kishida’s visit to South Korea and the triumph of geopolitics
9. [Translation] Korean and American Experts Advocate for ‘Human Rights Up Front’ Approach to Solve North Korean Nuclear Issue.
10. Yoon says he is considering establishing Strategic Command
11. German Chancellor Scholz to visit Seoul on May 21 for summit with Yoon
12. Yoon calls for 'massive' military upgrades at defense committee launch
13. S. Hamgyong Province mobilizes urban residents for corn planting
14. Military to let soldiers use phones more during weekdays
15. Korea urged to dive deeper into space industry, beef up partnership with US: experts
16. International Forum on One Korea: Congressional Roundtable and Policy Forum
1. How to Avoid a Bad Take on a Hard Target: Analyzing North Korea the Right Way
Good advice for analysts, Korea watchers, students of north Korea, and all those seeking to understand the hard target of the Kim family regime.
How to Avoid a Bad Take on a Hard Target: Analyzing North Korea the Right Way - War on the Rocks
MARKUS GARLAUSKAS, RACHEL MINYOUNG LEE, AND JONATHAN CORRADO
warontherocks.com · by Markus Garlauskas · May 11, 2023
The vexing security dynamic on the Korean Peninsula and the mysterious nature of the Kim family regime continue to whet the public and professional appetite for insightful analysis of North Korea. This attention, however, does not always translate to high-quality analysis. Too often, authors and readers alike fall prey to the same mistakes: They misunderstand Pyongyang’s messaging, engage in mirror-imaging and groupthink, misdiagnose context, fixate on the “America factor,” or mis-use sources.
These mistakes are understandable. North Korea has been famously dubbed a “hard target” by intelligence services. It is perhaps the most closed society in the world, and it has become even more isolated since the COVID-19 pandemic. Pyongyang does not provide regular press briefings and only discloses data in exceptional circumstances, such as when it released daily COVID-19 statistics following an outbreak. Furthermore, the power in autocratic North Korea is extremely concentrated — the inner workings and decision-making of Pyongyang’s leadership are closely guarded secrets. Most North Koreans lack internet access, and the select group of elites who use the internet provide limited results for U.S. attempts to harvest signals intelligence. The information North Korea does purposefully release is highly manicured public messaging, so the relevant implications need to be carefully gleaned from the subtext.
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But despite all this, getting North Korea right remains crucial. In order to effectively deter aggression, stabilize crises, and pursue opportunities for peaceful normalization, it is vital that the next generation of North Korea specialists have a nuanced understanding of Pyongyang’s modus operandi. Here’s how to get started. Emerging North Korea analysts should learn to read between the lines of propaganda, ditch their biases, work in teams, contextualize their sources, and expand their horizons beyond the peninsula.
Practice Proper Propaganda Analysis
Reading North Korean propaganda begins with learning how to see the value hiding behind the noise and repetition. This entails parsing Pyongyang’s public messaging from five different angles: who it is coming from, who it is intended for, when it is released, how it is presented, and what the context is.
Propaganda is worth deciphering precisely because it is so carefully controlled. North Korea exercises complete control over its public messaging to shape and manage domestic and international public opinion. And because propaganda is controlled, it relates to regime intent rather than fact. In that vein, the veracity of North Korea’s claims of “victory” against COVID-19 or its missile launch details, while valid questions for medical or military experts, are of little relevance to the North Korean propaganda analyst. The question of interest to the propaganda analyst is why North Korea is saying it.
North Korean articles and statements all sound similar because they parrot established language, which is often meaningless noise for analytic purposes. The trick, however, is separating the wheat from the chaff, identifying what is new, and figuring out the reasons for any changes. For instance, it is noteworthy that Kim Jong Un used the phrase “strategic and tactical cooperation” — an expression typically reserved for North Korea-China relations — in his letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin six months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The “who,” or source level, is significant because it reflects the degree of regime commitment to the message. Not everything coming out of North Korea is equally important. Thus the higher the level of communication, the stronger the regime’s commitment. For example, a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement is likely to be more closely aligned with North Korea’s foreign policy than a news report.
The “to whom,” or audience, is primarily a question of whether North Korea is making information available to both internal and external audiences, or just to external audiences. Pyongyang often uses internet-based sources like the Foreign Ministry website or Uriminzokkiri — a North Korean government website to which the average North Korean does not have access — to maintain policy flexibility or shield the domestic public from sensitive information while voicing its message.
The “when,” or timing, is about how quickly or slowly North Korean media report on or react to a development. The speed of coverage or reaction indicates the sensitivity the country feels over an issue. The faster the reaction, the greater the sensitivity. Quick or slow is relative to North Korea’s average response time to a certain issue or event.
The “how,” or tone, refers to the substance of North Korean messaging. This covers language, namely terminology, adjectives, adverbs, and conditionality, or omissions of language. It also covers photos and videos, as well as the placement of an article in a newspaper or newscast. North Korea can modulate or amplify its message as much or as little as it wishes through the use of words as well as visuals.
The “context” — everything else not covered by the four aforementioned elements — is the domestic and external circumstances in which the regime’s perceptions are formed and decisions are made and rolled out. We need to connect the dots of broader trends and patterns and establish a baseline of North Korea’s historical patterns to understand the context that may be driving Pyongyang’s behavior. For example, examining North Korea’s missile launches piecemeal may be meaningful to military experts, but they should be viewed along with North Korea’s domestic and foreign policy trends to understand regime intent.
Failure to contextualize North Korea’s public messaging can lead analysts astray. Cherry-picking data and exaggerating the significance of a statement or event that in fact may not be alarming, drawing conclusions based on the proximity of two events that may not be connected, comparing apples and oranges, or over-parsing a single data point — any of these can generate counterproductive speculation and misinformation.
Dos and Don’ts
Countering bias is a major aspect of prudent analysis. To do so, it’s important to work in teams, contextualize sources, consider the problem from the adversary’s perspective, and recognize and avoid groupthink.
Don’t Rush to Judgment: When Kim periodically recedes from public view, rumors swirl about his health. But smoke doesn’t always mean fire. In April 2020, an article used an unnamed U.S. government source to claim that Kim was in “grave danger” following a medical procedure. Earlier reports said Kim had received cardiovascular surgery. Not long after, Kim resurfaced, looking no worse for wear, and neither of those claims have since been verified. This is a lesson in patience and source management.
Check Your Biases at the Door: Analysis of North Korea is too often a Rorschach test, reflecting more about the analyst than the events they are striving to understand. Analysts sometimes fall into the trap of seeking evidence to fit a pre-existing belief. Analysts who are biased in favor of North Korea tend to give overly positive interpretations of regime intentions. Those biased against North Korea automatically assume Pyongyang will never change. Dueling accounts are constructed in which the two camps disagree on the basic proceedings of important turning points in the history of the peninsula, including all of the most significant attempts to transform the U.S.-North Korean relationship. This dichotomizing produces over-simplified policy debates on important questions such as denuclearization versus arms control and the sequencing of normalizing diplomatic relations, questions that demand more rigorous and unbiased debate.
Avoid Groupthink and Work in Teams: North Korea watchers can be a tribal bunch. It’s hawks versus doves, engagers versus deterrers, and human rights advocates versus humanitarian advocates. This competitive atmosphere, wherein advocates of particular approaches vie for primacy in a zero-sum contest, spoils a community spirit and is counter-productive to the enterprise of analysis. For example, it’s not necessarily true that human rights must be sidelined during periods of rapprochement, or that deterrence by punishment will always be more effective than deterrence by denial. Although many of these approaches are framed as diametric opposites, most can easily be complementary.
A flexible, issue-specific, and team-based approach can help to demonstrate this by bringing together analysts from opposite sides of these debates. An ideal team member strikes a balance between general knowledge and specialization. Hew too much towards the generalist camp and you’re spread too thin. Veer towards over-specialization and you’ve become the world’s leading expert on North Korean tank sprockets. Good analysts compensate for the inevitable appearance of blind spots by collaborating with partners who possess knowledge and skill sets that they lack.
Know Your Source: Besides reading primary North Korean sources — preferably the Korean-language reports or reports that were translated from the vernacular — it is important to take advantage of the essential and irreplaceable insights of people with direct personal experiences inside North Korea. Media outlets with sources on the ground, such as Daily NK, can provide invaluable information about North Korean life and insight into North Koreans’ interpretations of regime messaging. For example, a North Korean party daily article in 2016 covered South Korea’s candlelight revolution leading to the downfall of then-President Park Geun-hye. The article intended to criticize the South Korean government, but North Koreans were instead captivated by this rare glimpse of democracy in action. Humanitarian aid workers go where few others can. They have excellent insights and meaningful personal relationships with ordinary North Koreans. They tend to be careful because their continued access to helping the most vulnerable people inside North Korea is contingent upon them not publicly criticizing the regime. Foreign diplomats enjoy excellent access to North Korean personnel, but mostly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, far from the inner core of power brokers who really run the state. Refugees who have escaped North Korea are the single best source of information with regards to their own direct experiences and relationships. But too often, the media asks refugees to foresee impossible-to-predict outcomes — “When will the next nuclear test be?” — or speculate about the leadership’s psychology — “Does Kim Jong Un really trust Donald Trump?”
Avoid Mirror-Imaging: Many authors fall prey to the cognitive bias of mirror-imaging. For example, many analysts (and policymakers) believe that North Korea may be willing to denuclearize in exchange for economic benefits. It makes sense at face value: nearly half of the population are undernourished and GDP growth has stagnated due to the country’s self-imposed isolation. But the proposed rewards packages disregard North Korea’s unique political economy, in which a very narrow group of stakeholders enjoy a stranglehold over the country’s resources. Therefore, the regime perceives so-called economic inducements that undermine this delicate dynamic as poisonous carrots. Kim’s priority is not widespread economic development, but his own grip on power. To avoid mirror-imaging, it is essential to consider the problem from multiple perspectives in North Korea.
Expand Your Horizons
Obsessing over the uniqueness of the Korean Peninsula is counter-productive to rigorous analysis. It’s important for analysts to zoom out in time and space to place incidents inside the context of larger trends.
Not Everything Is About the United States: Authors too often assert that North Korea’s actions, ranging from weapons tests to key official statements, are to get “America’s attention.” Pyongyang’s actions are driven by a combination of domestic and external factors, and the United States may or may not be a top consideration. Sometimes, domestic factors are more at play. Kim Jong Il’s illness in the summer of 2008, and the need to assert his power at home and abroad, was presumably a key driving factor behind Pyongyang’s second nuclear test in May 2009. Sometimes tests are about the need to make progress in the country’s nuclear and missile programs. America is just one audience of many when North Korea publicizes its weapons tests. Similarly, the Kim regime first decided to develop a nuclear weapons program and still maintains it today not simply to deter the United States, but also to lessen security dependence on China (and the Soviet Union), compete with South Korea, and ensure the security of the regime. North Korea’s nuclear weapons support the Kim government’s maintenance of power. A trumped-up invasion threat legitimizes totalitarian control, and nuclear weapons are the symbol of the government’s capability to defend against this supposed threat. The unsavory implication of this rather inconvenient truth is that the United States and South Korea may therefore not be capable of giving North Korea’s leadership what it needs to denuclearize.
Confusing Causality: A classic example of this is ascribing the cause of all North Korean missile launches to U.S.-South Korean military drills. Most of these military exercises are regularly scheduled, with different permutations occurring at different times throughout the year. The Korean People’s Army Strategic Force conducts missile tests to further the development of its designs under the guidance of the Kim regime. It is true that both the joint drills and the missile tests have previously been paused to accommodate negotiations, but it is erroneous to assume that one is always a response to the other.
Know More than Just the Korean Peninsula: A single-minded focus on the Korean Peninsula to the exclusion of all else often leads to a tunnel view. For instance, we don’t have to wonder how North Korea might end its isolation and enter the global economic community — we can look at the journeys of other post-socialist states to help forecast the obstacles, opportunities, and priority areas of reform. A past report did just that. Such analysis is not possible without mobilizing functional knowledge and historical comparisons. Obsessing over the uniqueness of North Korea and declaring it the exception to every rule is the easy way out.
Don’t Assume Too Much Chinese Influence: U.S. analysts and policymakers sometimes overestimate the extent of Beijing’s influence over Pyongyang. Authors too often presume that North Korea is subservient to China and therefore that Beijing can get Pyongyang to behave. This fundamentally misunderstands the dynamic between China and North Korea, which is perhaps better characterized as mutual hostages rather than unquestioning allies. Analysts made the same mistake in 1950 when the consensus judgment was that the Soviet Union would restrain China from intervening in Korea.
Conclusion
North Korea eventually makes a fool out of most analysts brave enough to make a bold, specific prediction. However, this is no excuse to throw up our hands and declare “We cannot assess at this time.” It’s impossible to predict with certainty what specific actions North Korea will take and when, but good analysis reduces uncertainty by identifying patterns, interpreting symbols, and deciphering intent. This equips policymakers with the tools to create opportunities to redefine the relationship, avoid unnecessary conflict, and deter and defend against aggression.
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Markus Garlauskas is the director of the new Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, housed within the Atlantic Council. He is an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies. He served in the U.S. government for nearly twenty years, and was appointed to the Senior National Intelligence Service as the national intelligence officer for North Korea on the National Intelligence Council from July 2014 to June 2020.
Rachel Minyoung Lee is regional issues manager and senior analyst at the Vienna-based Open Nuclear Network and a nonresident fellow at the Stimson Center’s 38 North Program. She was a North Korea collection expert and analyst with the Open Source Enterprise of the U.S. government from 2000 to 2019.
Jonathan Corrado is director of policy for The Korea Society, where he produces programming and conducts research on the U.S.-Korean alliance and the Korean Peninsula. Beginning in autumn 2023, he serves as an adjunct lecturer at SUNY Stony Brook, teaching a course titled “North Korea: State, Society, Diplomacy, and Security.” He was previously a translator for Daily NK (Korean to English).
Image: The Kremlin
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Markus Garlauskas · May 11, 2023
2. 7 in 10 S. Koreans support gov't efforts to raise awareness on N.K. human rights: poll
Some popular justification for a human rights upfront approach.
7 in 10 S. Koreans support gov't efforts to raise awareness on N.K. human rights: poll | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이민지 · May 11, 2023
SEOUL, May 11 (Yonhap) -- Seven in 10 South Koreans support the Yoon Suk Yeol government's efforts to shed light on North Korea's dire human rights situation, a poll showed Thursday.
In a survey on 1,000 adults conducted by the Peaceful Unification Advisory Council (PUAC) from March 24-26, 70.5 percent of the respondents said they support the government's policy initiative to raise awareness on North Korea's human rights.
The PUAC, a presidential consultative body set up to draw up policies on democratic and peaceful unification, conducts the survey every quarter to gauge public opinion on unification.
By political preference, those who identified themselves as liberal voiced more support for the government's drive, with 77 percent of such people backing the move.
Among those who claimed they were politically conservative or neutral, 69.3 percent and 68.8 percent said they are in support of the government's stance, respectively.
The outcome appears to defy the conventional belief that liberals have negative views about the government's efforts to publicly highlight the North's human rights abuses on concerns that the move could provoke Pyongyang.
The result came as the conservative Yoon administration has taken a stern stance in dealing with the secretive regime's human rights violations since taking power in May last year.
South Korea co-sponsored a U.N. General Assembly resolution on the North's human rights in December last year for the first time in four years and disclosed to the public an annual report on its rights violations for the first time in March.
Despite the North's escalating missile and nuclear threats, nearly half of the respondents said they support the need to provide aid to Pyongyang and seek cooperation, the poll showed.
The portion of respondents who considered the North to be a potential counterpart for cooperation and support came in at 47.8 percent, the highest since 48.4 percent in the second quarter of 2019.
Nonetheless, 34.9 percent said they are pessimistic about an improvement in inter-Korean relations, the highest since the first quarter of 2015. The survey showed 44.2 percent expected no change in inter-Korean ties, while 19.3 percent anticipated bilateral relations would improve.
The poll has a margin of error of plus or minus 3.1 percentage points at a 95 percent confidence level.
This photo, taken from an observatory in the South Korean border city of Paju on May 10, 2023, shows a village in the North Korean town of Kaepung on the western front-line border with South Korea. (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 이민지 · May 11, 2023
3. Hardliner named chief of new defense innovation committee
Wednesday
May 10, 2023
dictionary + A - A
Hardliner named chief of new defense innovation committee
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/05/10/national/politics/Korea-Kim-Kwanjin-Yoon-Suk-Yeol/20230510170705810.html
Kim Kwan-jin
President Yoon Suk Yeol plans to appoint Kim Kwan-jin, a former defense minister known for his hardline stance against North Korean armed aggression, as the vice chairman of the soon-to-be-launched Defense Innovation Committee, according to presidential sources Wednesday.
Kim was convicted in 2019 of political meddling by ordering the military cyber command to post online comments supporting the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration during the 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections.
The Supreme Court in October last year upheld the guilty verdict regarding the political meddling charge against Kim but partially acquitted him on the charge of wrongful exercise of authority.
Yoon’s decision to appoint Kim as the vice chair of the Defense Innovation Committee, whose mandate is to guide the implementation of new technologies and cyber security protocols in the armed forces, signals his rehabilitation after a long period of criminal prosecution for his actions under previous conservative governments.
Kim was appointed defense minister under Lee in 2010 when North Korea shelled Yeonpyeong Island and the South Korean military faced criticism for its belated response to the bombardment.
As defense minister, Kim ordered South Korea’s armed forces to adopt an approach of “shoot first, report later” to send a clear signal to the North that future provocations would not be tolerated.
The North’s state media referred to Kim with expletives and released photos of soldiers using posters of his face for target practice.
He continued to head the Defense Ministry under Lee’s successor Park Geun-hye until 2014 when he was named director of the Blue House National Security Office.
Kim remained in that post until Park was impeached and eventually removed from office by the Constitutional Court in 2017 in a massive influence-peddling scandal.
Both conservative presidents were eventually jailed on corruption charges, with Park being pardoned in December 2021, while Lee was pardoned in December last year.
Kim himself was indicted of political meddling and abuse of authority in March 2018, shortly after the liberal Moon Jae-in administration was elected and vowed to “root out deep-seated evils,” referring to cozy ties between conservatives, big businesses and the military and intelligence establishment.
In addition to trying to influence public opinion by fabricating online comments, Kim was also accused of pressuring Defense Ministry officials to scale down an internal investigation into the covert operations in early 2014.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
4. South Korea will be vulnerable to North’s drones for years, leak warns
South Korea will be vulnerable to North’s drones for years, leak warns
THE DISCORD LEAKS | An incursion late last year exposed extensive weaknesses and shortcomings in South Korea’s air defense, U.S. intelligence indicates
May 10, 2023 at 8:00 p.m. EDT
The Washington Post · by Alex Horton · May 11, 2023
An incursion of South Korean airspace by North Korean drones exposed Seoul’s lack of preparedness in defending against such threats, and it will likely take years for the military to correct its shortcomings, according to a classified U.S. intelligence assessment of the December incident.
The findings, outlined in a leak of U.S. secrets circulated on the Discord messaging platform and obtained by The Washington Post, spotlight the vulnerable state of South Korea’s air defense as its volatile neighbor’s aggressive development of a nuclear arsenal has Seoul and Washington on edge.
South Korea has prioritized its defenses to confront incoming missiles while investing heavily in growing its air and naval forces, but Seoul’s focus has come at the cost of neglecting other air defense needs, experts said — leaving the country vulnerable to a threat responsible for extensive carnage in Ukraine, Syria and elsewhere.
Five North Korean drones flew deep into South Korea on Dec. 26, including one that pierced the no-fly zone around Seoul’s presidential office. The military scrambled fighter jets and helicopters in response but failed to shoot any of them down; some of them disappeared from radar screens as they were being tracked, military officials said. The incident prompted political fallout for South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, who blamed the lack of preparedness on his predecessor and said he’d rush to activate a specialized anti-drone unit later this year.
The Discord Leaks
Dozens of highly classified documents have been leaked online, revealing sensitive information intended for senior military and intelligence leaders. In an exclusive investigation, The Post also reviewed scores of additional secret documents, most of which have not been made public.
Who leaked the documents? Jack Teixeira, a young member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, was charged in the investigation into leaks of hundreds of pages of classified military intelligence. The Post reported that the individual who leaked the information shared documents with a small circle of online friends on the Discord chat platform.
What do the leaked documents reveal about Ukraine? The documents reveal profound concerns about the war’s trajectory and Kyiv’s capacity to wage a successful offensive against Russian forces. According to a Defense Intelligence Agency assessment among the leaked documents, “Negotiations to end the conflict are unlikely during 2023.”
What else do they show? The files include summaries of human intelligence on high-level conversations between world leaders, as well as information about advanced satellite technology the United States uses to spy. They also include intelligence on both allies and adversaries, including Iran and North Korea, as well as Britain, Canada, South Korea and Israel.
What happens now? The leak has far-reaching implications for the United States and its allies. In addition to the Justice Department investigation, officials in several countries said they were assessing the damage from the leaks.
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End of carousel
Yoon’s office and the South Korean Defense Ministry declined to comment.
The Pentagon also declined to comment, saying it does not speak to “alleged intelligence leaks.” A spokesman did not address questions about whether the Defense Department believes South Korea’s vulnerabilities pose a threat to the thousands of U.S. service members and their families stationed there, or whether supplying substantial air defense systems to Ukraine has strained its ability to sell those systems to South Korea.
“The U.S. relationship with the [Republic of Korea] is stronger than ever,” Army Lt. Col Martin Meiners said, pointing to last month’s declaration of mutual defense that President Biden endorsed during Yoon’s visit to Washington.
The Discord leaks also include classified documents indicating the United States eavesdropped on South Korean officials’ private deliberations, including their consideration of a U.S. request that Seoul send artillery ammunition to Ukraine. South Korea has resisted doing so, citing the potential impact on trade with Russia and fears Moscow would retaliate by helping North Korea advance its weapons programs.
Those disclosures drew sharp backlash from Yoon’s critics, who demanded he confront Washington about the issue. Yoon’s office has said “the allegations of an eavesdropping breach are completely untrue,” but did not clarify which parts of the documents it deemed fabricated.
This latest intelligence assessment, which has not been previously disclosed, dates to early March and appears to be part of a briefing presentation for the U.S. military’s senior leadership. It sheds new light on why South Korean forces struggled to detect, track and destroy the drones during December’s incursion, pointing to an anemic air defense capability not attuned to emerging threats. Slow communication between ground radars and responding aircraft hampered the response, the document says, and South Korean commanders lacked clear rules of engagement.
The document also notes air defense coverage gaps that could be exploited by North Korean pilots looking for pockets of unsecured airspace. Concern over collateral damage was an additional factor, it says.
While Seoul has pledged to address these weaknesses and stand up a counter-drone unit later this year, it “likely will require 3-5 years to fully implement its plan” and acquire the requisite technology and armaments, U.S. officials surmise.
South Korean forces “very likely will be unable to consistently enact a coordinated response to [North Korean drone] incursions for at least the next 6 months,” the document says.
The incursion last winter was the first public incident of its kind since 2017, when a North Korean reconnaissance drone crashed near the border. The aircraft appeared to have taken photos of a new U.S. missile defense system in South Korea, Seoul said at the time.
South Korea has adopted some air defense capabilities, including its acquisition of Israeli early warning radars. The incident in December, though, was a “wake-up call,” said Ellen Kim, the deputy director of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank.
“South Korea has been really preoccupied with those missile programs and nuclear programs” in North Korea, she said. It appears North Korea took advantage of that oversight, Kim said.
Drones have for years been used by outmatched military forces as a cost-effective way to even the odds. In Syria, for instance, Iranian-backed militants have attacked U.S. bases using one-way unmanned aircraft. In Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian troops use smaller drones to conduct reconnaissance and crash into targets.
Those that are smaller and fly low are difficult even for advanced air defense systems to intercept. South Korean officials have acknowledged their struggle to detect drones with a wingspan smaller than 10 feet, though they have said larger, military-size drones are easier to see.
“That’s why North Korea has been focusing on the asymmetrical capability, just like nuclear weapons,” Kim said.
Uk Yang, a military strategy expert at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul, said South Korea lost the advantage it had after developing unmanned aircraft in the 1990s.
“The drone incursion raised questions in the presidential office about whether Seoul has been investing in its national defense in a right way,” Yang said.
The race to secure South Korea’s skies has put enormous pressure on its front-line troops, the leaked U.S. document says. Units already operate on high alert, and the newfound pressure to address failures exposed over the winter has contributed to “high levels of stress and exhaustion,” it states, warning of difficulties to come with keeping burned-out troops in uniform.
Yoon, a conservative who has taken a hard-line stance toward Pyongyang, told members of his cabinet after the incident that it had “clearly confirmed the need for more intense readiness and training.”
Kim reported from Seoul and Lee reported from Tokyo.
The Washington Post · by Alex Horton · May 11, 2023
5. S. Korea proposes regular participation in US-led multinational cyber exercise
S. Korea proposes regular participation in US-led multinational cyber exercise
The Korea Times · May 10, 2023
Choi Byong-ok, left, the director general of the defense ministry's defense policy bureau, shakes hands with Mieke Eoyang, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy, as they meet for the allies' Cyber Cooperation Working Group session at the ministry in Seoul, in this photo released by the ministry, May 9. Yonhap
South Korea proposed to regularly participate in a U.S.-led multinational cyber exercise during a session of the allies' cybersecurity dialogue earlier this week, Seoul's defense ministry said Wednesday.
The proposal to join the Cyber Flag exercise came as Seoul and Washington are seeking to deepen defense cooperation to counter growing North Korean threats from multiple domains, including cyberspace.
It was made during a two-day session of a bilateral working-level Cyber Cooperation Working Group (CCWG) in Seoul, which ended Tuesday. The U.S. side pledged to review it "positively," according to the ministry.
Hosted by the U.S. Cyber Command, the Cyber Flag exercise is designed to enhance readiness against the activities of potential malicious cyber actors and strengthen interoperability among the participating countries. South Korea participated in it for the first time last year.
At the latest CCWG session, Choi Byong-ok, the director general of the ministry's defense policy bureau, led the South Korean delegation, while the U.S. side was represented by Mieke Eoyang, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy.
The session marked the first in-person one in four years following a hiatus caused largely by the COVID-19 pandemic.
The CCWG was launched in 2014 to serve as a venue for the allies' key discussions on cybersecurity. Its outcomes had been dealt with at the two countries' annual defense ministerial talks, called the Security Consultative Meeting. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · May 10, 2023
6. Dividends of summitry
Let's prove Don Kirk and the conventional wisdom wrong.
Excerpts:
The critics still regard the deal that Yoon and Kishida reached in Tokyo in March for compensation of forced laborers as inadequate, almost a sell-out. Nor will Japan abandon its claim to Dokdo, which the Japanese call Takeshima.
The list of grudges in Korean-Japanese relations goes on and on. All that is clear is that the two need each other in the event of another shooting war with North Korea. Let us not forget that Japan, during the first Korean War, was a vital rear base area for American forces. Japan and Korea are obviously much closer now. Japanese and Korean air and naval forces have staged joint exercises together with the Americans.
One thing, though, is not going to happen. Japanese and Korean soldiers will not play war games on the ground in each other's country. The image of Japanese soldiers again in South Korea, or Korean soldiers on Japanese soil, is beyond imagination.
Dividends of summitry
The Korea Times · May 11, 2023
By Donald Kirk
The rapid succession of summits between President Yoon Suk Yeol and President Biden and then between Yoon and Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida should in theory open a new chapter in South Korea's two most important relationships with foreign countries.
Certainly, it was great to see these leaders getting together in what appeared to be the friendliest summits imaginable. On sober second thought, however, we have to recognize the downside of both these summits. The fact is South Korea did not quite achieve all it wanted in either of them.
The results of the White House summit were particularly ambivalent. No way, it seemed, was the Biden administration open to demands for South Korea to have nukes on its soil. That goes for nukes planted by the Americans on bases in the South, ready for firing back at the North in case Kim Jong-un makes good on his threats to unleash tactical nukes against the South.
Nor were the Americans the least receptive to South Korea fabricating its own nukes. We assume, after all, their success in making nuclear reactors for power plants, that Korean physicists and engineers could quite quickly produce nuclear warheads, but the Americans don't like that idea.
It's easy to appreciate American reluctance to endorse South Korea's emergence as the world's tenth nuclear power after North Korea. Japan and Taiwan would be the next to want to join the nuclear club and northeast Asia could become a battleground in which tactical nukes were the weapons of choice.
As for planting nukes on Korean soil, the late President George H. W. Bush ordered their withdrawal in 1991 in hopes of convincing the North that its nuclear program was a waste of time and money. Instead, Kim Jong-un's father, Kim Jong-il, invested still more money in nukes and missiles and the North staged its first underground nuclear test in 2006.
Those calling for the return of American nukes to South Korea note that the U.S. has planted nukes in five other countries that do not make them. These include Turkey, Italy, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, all NATO allies. Korea's status as an American ally strengthens the argument. No, there is no chance of Japan asking for American nukes. The Japanese, having suffered the atom-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, totally ban nukes on their soil.
President Biden sought to mollify South Koreans by selling them on extended deterrence and the formation of a nuclear "consultative group." Extended deterrence means nothing, however, other than greater but non-specific defense, and Americans and Koreans will talk about the North Korean nuclear menace whenever they wish, with or without the window-dressing of a "consultative group."
Nor did Biden's promise of a nuclear ballistic missile submarine visiting a South Korean port offer much consolation. Certainly, the sub would not be threatening North Korea. The sub more properly should be on patrol in the Pacific, ready for action when and where needed. A port visit would be irrelevant other than as an attempt to convince Koreans that they could count on America's "nuclear umbrella."
As for the first state visit of a Japanese prime minister to South Korea in 12 years, the idea no doubt was heartening to those who see trilateralism, that is, a de facto alliance of Korea, Japan and the United States, as vital for the region's defense. Beyond all the warm words, including the ritual Japanese apology for its 35-year rule over Korea, nothing much has really changed.
The critics still regard the deal that Yoon and Kishida reached in Tokyo in March for compensation of forced laborers as inadequate, almost a sell-out. Nor will Japan abandon its claim to Dokdo, which the Japanese call Takeshima.
The list of grudges in Korean-Japanese relations goes on and on. All that is clear is that the two need each other in the event of another shooting war with North Korea. Let us not forget that Japan, during the first Korean War, was a vital rear base area for American forces. Japan and Korea are obviously much closer now. Japanese and Korean air and naval forces have staged joint exercises together with the Americans.
One thing, though, is not going to happen. Japanese and Korean soldiers will not play war games on the ground in each other's country. The image of Japanese soldiers again in South Korea, or Korean soldiers on Japanese soil, is beyond imagination.
Donald Kirk (www.donaldkirk.com) covers the confrontation of forces in Asia from Seoul and Washington.
The Korea Times · May 11, 2023
7. How the Japan-South Korea Normalization Reshaped Both Countries
Excerpts:
It is clear that behind the Japan-South Korea diplomatic normalization negotiations, despite the lingering anti-Japanese sentiment, South Korea had a clear development strategy of export-led industrialization for economic growth and was seeking to transition from grant aid to Japanese loans. Initially, South Korea asserted its right to claim compensation from Japan, but Tokyo argued that it could send money for such a reason. Instead, Tokyo decided to provide support by combining exports and investments by Japanese companies to promote South Korea’s economic development, and further, to reduce poverty under the guise of economic cooperation. For the Park government, the framing of the money was less important than its arrival in South Korea. Thus the issue of compensation was declared “settled completely and finally” through economic cooperation.
The Park government did not necessarily require a noble aid philosophy on Japan’s part, and there was little systematic information gathering and analysis of South Korean voices given the nature of Park’s regime. The normalization process of Japan-South Korea relations, including the conclusion of the 1965 treaty, focused on how to build Japan-South Korea relations and cooperation amid the deepening Cold War situation, rather than addressing the important issue of settling historical issues stemming from Japan’s colonial rule. As a result, Japan’s attitude is sometimes criticized in South Korea as a self-centered one: giving money to buy forgiveness without saying anything. However, it cannot be ignored that the South Korean government at the time was eager to make that bargain. Japan’s approach was to listen to South Korea’s development needs and help move them toward realization.
The current relationship between Japan and South Korea has undergone significant structural changes, and both countries are expected to strategically advance development cooperation with third countries. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, who once said he was learning from President Park Chung-hee’s administration, confirmed the commitment to “promoting mutually beneficial cooperation for Japan and Korea” during a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio in March. The Japan-South Korea relationship has entered an era of cooperation that brings benefits to both countries, rather than the pursuit of individual national interests.
How the Japan-South Korea Normalization Reshaped Both Countries
Tokyo’s economic aid to Seoul laid the foundations of a new development model – but it had a dark side as well.
thediplomat.com · by Shu Fukuya · May 10, 2023
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Following the end of World War II, Japan and South Korea initiated negotiations to normalize diplomatic relations. However, these talks were complicated by a host of issues, including property claims, fishing rights, territorial disputes, and the treatment of Korean residents in Japan. The historical legacy of Japan’s 36-year colonial rule over Korea also presented a major obstacle, with the two countries holding fundamentally different views on the matter. Japan’s lack of reflection on its wartime actions and colonial rule, combined with the “Syngman Rhee Line” maritime boundary declaration and the Kubota Statement, further fueled tensions and contributed to a five-year suspension of negotiations.
The turning point in this deadlock came when the cabinet of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke was established in 1958. Partially due to pressure from the United States, the Japanese side suppressed its hardline stance toward South Korea and withdrew the Kubota Statement.
Then, in 1961, a sudden turning point also occurred on the South Korean side. Amid intense opposition within Korea, claiming that the normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan was a humiliating and traitorous act of diplomacy, South Korean President Park Chung-hee came to Japan at the end of the year and held talks with Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato. At the dinner party held at the prime minister’s residence, Park stated: “We, who have no experience, are eager to build our country with empty hands. We intend to escape from poverty and build a strong and prosperous nation.”
At the time, the view that South Korea’s economy was inferior to that of North Korea was prevalent in the international community. In fact, in the late 1950s, South Korea’s inflation rate exceeded 30 percent, and its GNP growth rate was less than 5 percent, lower than that of North Korea. Park, who was formally elected as president in 1963, after seizing power through a military coup in 1961, aimed to secure the South’s superiority over North Korea. The main task of the Park administration was to eliminate poverty, which had persisted since the Syngman Rhee era, and jumpstart the national economy.
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the successful normalization of diplomatic relations between the two was due in part to the relationship between Park and Kishi, even though the latter no longer held office. Park and Kishi first met in 1961 when the South Korean leader visited Japan. Prior to that, they had been exchanging letters, and Park had requested that Kishi visit South Korea as the Japanese representative in negotiations to normalize diplomatic relations between the two countries. Kishi’s visit did not happen due to Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda’s disapproval, but after diplomatic relations were normalized, they met frequently. The political-level consultation mechanisms played a vital role in this process.
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The Japan-South Korea agreements signed in 1965 were driven by various factors. From Japan’s perspective, supporting South Korea would benefit Japan’s national interests by expanding export markets and investment opportunities. Japan aimed to improve its international status through contributions to the “free world,” and saw development cooperation with South Korea as an opportunity, especially as Seoul faced off against an enemy communist regime. Additionally, Japanese fishermen were suffering due to the Syngman Rhee Line, making the treaty a pressing matter.
For South Korea, the task of the Park administration was to put the country on the track of economic development, with a focus on export-oriented industrialization. In that sense, Japan’s yen loans became a substitute for U.S. aid, and South Korea’s aid needs shifted from supplying reconstruction materials to development cooperation for production and exports.
From the U.S. perspective, the treaty normalizing Japan-South Korea relations was a framework for rear support for the Indochina War. The treaty created a mechanism through which Japan supported Seoul economically, in exchange for South Korea’s military contribution to the war in Vietnam.
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The treaty reflected the shared interests of Japan, the United States, and South Korea, intertwining with U.S.-led military considerations and economic cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul. Japan’s funding of South Korea’s economic policy, in other words, was not limited to building economic relations but was also essential from a security standpoint.
The Seoul Subway Line 1 Scandal
In this way, the Japan-South Korea economic cooperation, which was thought to be a win-win for both parties, seemed to be successful, but it had a dark side as well. One such example is the Seoul Subway Line 1 project.
Traffic congestion in Seoul was a source of concern for the Park administration. The increases in automobile traffic in the 1960s hindered the tram system, and urban changes in the 1970s led to a rapid increase in car usage. Japan provided support for South Korea’s heavy chemical industrialization and the construction of industrial parks, housing complexes, and administrative and financial centers. To address issues of congestion and population growth, the Seoul Subway Line 1 was constructed in August 1974, financed by a 27.24 billion yen loan from Japan and built by a consortium of Japanese trading companies led by Mitsubishi Corporation.
In 1973, however, Japan’s development cooperation policy hit a turning point due to a scandal involving corruption allegations in the subway project. The scandal caused a stir in Japan’s Diet, with discussions focusing on the high prices of subway vehicles used in the project compared to those used by the Japanese National Railways. The validity of the prices was investigated by the Fair Trade Commission, and in 1977, members of the Diet alleged corruption in the inflated prices.
Suspicions arose that the South Korean government and Japan’s Korean lobby group had split a percentage of the transaction amount, shifting the focus to allegations of corruption with the South Korean government. The investigation focused on the inflated vehicle prices in Seoul and suspicion that the extra money was used as commissions paid to intermediaries on the Korean side. Executives from related companies of the Seoul Subway Line 1 project were summoned as witnesses.
In November 1978, it was revealed that $2.5 million had been transferred to a bank account in the United States under the name of S.K. Kim, and it was claimed that $1.2 million of it had been used for the Korean presidential election funds. It was also stated that a U.S. investigation report indicated that the rest – $1.3 million – was sent back to Japan, but there has been no confirmation of the publication of the investigation results regarding the recipient of that money.
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The Seoul Subway Line 1 incident in the 1970s brought the issue of collusion between Japan and South Korea to the forefront and led to a negative image of ODA taking root. As a result, Japan was pressured by the international community to reassess its development cooperation policy, leading to the promotion of an untied aid policy to improve transparency and put an end to collusion. This led to a change in Japan’s development cooperation model, with a shift toward international cooperation rather than just economic cooperation.
Japan’s support for South Korea in the 1960s and 1970s was a successful model believed to bring economic development to South Korea and lead to poverty reduction, and came to be established as Japan’s unique development cooperation model. It involved Japanese companies creating attractive projects in response to requests from the recipient country, with backing from the Japanese government. However, this model had to be reassessed amid the outcry over the Seoul Subway Line 1 project. This can be seen as a precursor to a major turning point in Japan’s development cooperation policy.
The exposure of collusion between Japan and South Korea provided an opportunity to thoroughly review the development cooperation system, and since then, Japan’s development cooperation has been gradually restructured despite twists and turns, and is now in a more organized state.
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The Question of Compensation
It is clear that behind the Japan-South Korea diplomatic normalization negotiations, despite the lingering anti-Japanese sentiment, South Korea had a clear development strategy of export-led industrialization for economic growth and was seeking to transition from grant aid to Japanese loans. Initially, South Korea asserted its right to claim compensation from Japan, but Tokyo argued that it could send money for such a reason. Instead, Tokyo decided to provide support by combining exports and investments by Japanese companies to promote South Korea’s economic development, and further, to reduce poverty under the guise of economic cooperation. For the Park government, the framing of the money was less important than its arrival in South Korea. Thus the issue of compensation was declared “settled completely and finally” through economic cooperation.
The Park government did not necessarily require a noble aid philosophy on Japan’s part, and there was little systematic information gathering and analysis of South Korean voices given the nature of Park’s regime. The normalization process of Japan-South Korea relations, including the conclusion of the 1965 treaty, focused on how to build Japan-South Korea relations and cooperation amid the deepening Cold War situation, rather than addressing the important issue of settling historical issues stemming from Japan’s colonial rule. As a result, Japan’s attitude is sometimes criticized in South Korea as a self-centered one: giving money to buy forgiveness without saying anything. However, it cannot be ignored that the South Korean government at the time was eager to make that bargain. Japan’s approach was to listen to South Korea’s development needs and help move them toward realization.
The current relationship between Japan and South Korea has undergone significant structural changes, and both countries are expected to strategically advance development cooperation with third countries. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, who once said he was learning from President Park Chung-hee’s administration, confirmed the commitment to “promoting mutually beneficial cooperation for Japan and Korea” during a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio in March. The Japan-South Korea relationship has entered an era of cooperation that brings benefits to both countries, rather than the pursuit of individual national interests.
GUEST AUTHOR
Shu Fukuya
Shu Fukuya is a doctorate of International Affairs candidate at Johns Hopkins University. Additionally, he was part of the Taskforce member for Think7 (T7) for the upcoming G7 Hiroshima Summit. His areas of focus include international political economy, global financial markets, and development finance. He holds a Master's degree in International Development Economics from Yale University and the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies at Waseda University, and a Bachelor's degree from Waseda University.
thediplomat.com · by Shu Fukuya · May 10, 2023
8. Kishida’s visit to South Korea and the triumph of geopolitics
Excerpts:
Kishida, under pressure from vocal conservatives who oppose any further Japanese apology or admission of responsibility for repression in South Korea, was hesitant to go that far. But he decided to make his personal sympathy for the victims clear — telling reporters that his ‘heart aches’ over their suffering. He also offered South Korea access to the Fukushima nuclear site to allay concerns over radioactive contamination in waters being released. According to Japanese media, Kishida wanted to offer some concessions to bolster Yoon against criticism within South Korea of his eagerness to give in to Japan without much in return.
The gestures met a divided response in South Korea — progressive politicians and media were dismissive and while conservative backers of Yoon were appreciative of Kishida’s apparent sincerity, they were not overwhelmed. Former foreign minister Yu said that ‘Kishida failed to apologise directly to the Korean people and obviously lacks the political courage to do so,’ but that President Yoon ‘believes that begging the other side to apologise is not politically correct’.
This leaves historical issues still buried like landmines, not far from the surface and ready to be set off. More court hearings on forced labour victims in a separate suit against Mitsubishi Heavy Industries are scheduled to start on 11 May 2023. For now, the imperatives of geopolitics will sustain the momentum created by early 2023.
Kishida’s visit to South Korea and the triumph of geopolitics
11 May 2023
Author: Daniel Sneider, Stanford University
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/05/11/kishidas-visit-to-south-korea-and-the-triumph-of-geopolitics/
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s visit to Seoul on 7–8 May 2023 represents a triumph of geopolitics over the search for historical justice. Both South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and Kishida are now driven by the ominous international environment, led by threats to the international order from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China.
Kishida remained cautious when responding to South Korean calls for an apology and compensation for the victims of Japan’s colonial and wartime forced labour system. These issues were compounded by later trade and security tensions. But he acted with urgency in restoring normalcy to South Korea–Japan relations and tightening cooperation on a wide range of shared concerns. These concerns spanned from regional security in the face of North Korean missile and nuclear advances to supply chain resiliency and controlling the flow of advanced electronic technology to China.
Both Japan and South Korea are embracing the strategic direction coming from Washington. They understand that their survival, both nationally and politically, depends on subordinating themselves to the US President Joe Biden administration’s global and regional priorities.
‘Korea cannot strengthen its alliance with the United States unless Korea maintains a good working relationship with Japan, and Yoon knows it very well’, former foreign minister Yu Myung-hwan, advisor to Yoon, told me. He added that ‘Chinese bullying might also have been a motivation to restore trilateral security cooperation’ and that ‘increasing North Korean nuclear threats are a good excuse for him to strengthen trilateral security cooperation’.
The compressed diplomatic calendar of early 2023 reflects the determination of both leaders — and their US backers — to accomplish the dramatic shift in relations. The shift in South Korea–Japan relations began in early March 2023 with Yoon’s decision to end deadlocked negotiations on the forced labour issue. Instead, Yoon used a South Korean fund to unilaterally offer compensation to survivors and their families who have gone to court, removing the demand for an apology and payments from Japanese companies. Within days of his decision, Yoon visited Tokyo and took important steps towards returning to a business-like atmosphere.
The Tokyo trip was necessary for Yoon’s state visit to Washington in April 2023. A diplomatic showcase of the alliance is embodied in a ‘Washington Declaration’ that strengthened extended deterrence in return for South Korea forswearing any nuclear ambitions.
There is some indication that the Biden administration now aims to create a trilateral extended deterrence dialogue. Yoon told reporters that Japan might be added to the Nuclear Consultative Group created under the Washington Declaration but his office weakened that formulation as it would undermine his achievement with South Korea. Yet a trilateral security dialogue between Japan, South Korea and the United States would convey a formidable response both to North Korea and to China, and even to a potential Chinese–Russian military axis. It would also lead to a June trilateral meeting between defence ministers which would reportedly formalise data sharing on missile defence — a goal set in 2023.
Both Yoon and Kishida made ample reference to geopolitical goals in their one public appearance together at a joint press conference. ‘We are the key US allies in Northeast Asia’, Kishida said. He also emphasised that Japan and South Korea are seeking to strengthen their deterrence and response capabilities to North Korea through a series of security alliances between Japan, South Korea and the United States.
Still, unresolved issues of historical justice could not just be put aside. Leading up to the visit, progressive and conservative South Korean media expressed expectations that Kishida would go beyond previous statements and make a personal apology — perhaps opening the door to Japanese corporate payments to victims.
Kishida, under pressure from vocal conservatives who oppose any further Japanese apology or admission of responsibility for repression in South Korea, was hesitant to go that far. But he decided to make his personal sympathy for the victims clear — telling reporters that his ‘heart aches’ over their suffering. He also offered South Korea access to the Fukushima nuclear site to allay concerns over radioactive contamination in waters being released. According to Japanese media, Kishida wanted to offer some concessions to bolster Yoon against criticism within South Korea of his eagerness to give in to Japan without much in return.
The gestures met a divided response in South Korea — progressive politicians and media were dismissive and while conservative backers of Yoon were appreciative of Kishida’s apparent sincerity, they were not overwhelmed. Former foreign minister Yu said that ‘Kishida failed to apologise directly to the Korean people and obviously lacks the political courage to do so,’ but that President Yoon ‘believes that begging the other side to apologise is not politically correct’.
This leaves historical issues still buried like landmines, not far from the surface and ready to be set off. More court hearings on forced labour victims in a separate suit against Mitsubishi Heavy Industries are scheduled to start on 11 May 2023. For now, the imperatives of geopolitics will sustain the momentum created by early 2023.
Daniel Sneider is Lecturer of International Policy and East Asian Studies at Stanford University and a Non-Resident Distinguished Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute.
9. [Translation] Korean and American Experts Advocate for ‘Human Rights Up Front’ Approach to Solve North Korean Nuclear Issue.
[Translation] Korean and American Experts Advocate for ‘Human Rights Up Front’ Approach to Solve North Korean Nuclear Issue.
https://www.news1.kr/articles/5036194
Korean and American experts have suggested adopting an approach that prioritizes human rights in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.
David Maxwell, the Deputy Director of the CAPS and a former US Army Special Forces Colonel, stated at the Korean Peninsula Peaceful Unification Forum held by Peaceful Unification Advisory Council in Washington DC on the 3rd (local time), “The Korea-US alliance should adapt an approach that prioritizes human rights” and he said that “human rights are not only a moral mandatory but also a matter of national security.”
The Deputy Director Maxwell pointed out “Kim Jong-un, the General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party, inevitably denies the human rights of North Korean citizens’ to maintain power” and he highlighted that “the North Korean citizens are suffering as a result of Kim’s policy which consciously prioritizes nuclear and missile development over the welfare of the people.”
He argued that “the Korea-US alliance should develop and execute the comprehensive information and influence campaigns through which they should provide practical knowledge on how to mobilize collective action, the reality of North Korea, the truth about the outside world, and a universal understanding of humanity, ranging from entertainment to news, in order to drive change.”
He particularly emphasized that “Korea and the United States should address human rights issues together every time they respond to provocations from North Korea” and he pointed out that “while discussing the nuclear program would only enhance the legitimacy of the Kim Jong-un regime, raising human rights violation as an issue would actually undermine the legitimacy of the regime.”
Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), also stated that “human rights issues have been neglected and sacrificed for the over 30 years at negotiation tables discussing important issues such as North Korea policy and the nuclear and missile programs” and he argued that “It is now time to shift the paradigm to a human rights-centered policy towards North Korea.”
Executive Director Scarlatoiu commented that “It is remarkable that the Yoon Suk Yeol government has regained leadership on North Korean human rights at the United Nations,” and he advised that “the United States should once again demonstrate leadership and reclaim the advantage they had on North Korean human rights at the UN.”
He further stated, “Stronger resolutions from the UN General Assembly and UN Human Rights Council are needed, and the issue of North Korean human rights should be brought back to the agenda of the UN Security Council.” He added that “the United States should take the lead in efforts to hold North Korea accountable through path other than the International Criminal Court (ICC). Mechanisms like an international special prosecutor would be ideal.”
He said, “Progress in human rights through multilateral and international diplomacy is the key to solving the conundrum of North Korea, applying a diplomatic, informational, military, and economic approach with a human rights priority.”
Cha Du-hyeon, Senior Research Fellow at the Asian Institute for Policy Studies, stated that ensuring the implementation of shared values such as human rights in inter-Korean relations is a key challenge for Korea-US cooperation. He pointed out that lukewarm attitudes toward human rights violations in North Korea are acts that sacrifice Korea’s identity, which has long pursued democracy and a thriving market economy.
Research fellow Cha stated, "We should raise further questions regarding human rights in North Korea." He explained that while acknowledging the inevitable reality of different political and economic systems in South and North Korea is necessary for the development of inter-Korean relations, it should not be equated with accepting violations of universal values, such as human rights.
He emphasized, “The infringement and violation of human rights or international moral standards by North Korea should be timely pointed out, even during periods of smooth inter-Korean relations.” He added, “This is necessary not only as a means of exposing the propaganda efforts toward the North Korean regime but also to counter the temptation for North Korea to utilize provocations or criticism against South Korea for the sake of its internal political cohesion.”
In relation to this, Ambassador Cho Hyun-dong stated in his congratulatory speech delivered by Consul General Kwon Se-jung on this day, “The Yoon Suk Yeol government will present a future of freedom, peace, and prosperity in unification to our people and the world.” He emphasized, “Above all, it is important to accurately inform the reality of North Korea in order to achieve this.”
Ambassador Cho mentioned the recent release of the first-ever human rights report on North Korea by the Ministry of Unification, stating “This is not intended to shame or vilify North Korea, but rather to ensure that our North Korean compatriots, who are deprived of the freedoms they deserve and suffering from starvation, can enjoy their rights as universal human beings.”
He stated, “We hope to build a consensus on reunification and envision a future of reunification by fostering empathy among our people and the international community for the suffering of North Korean residents and sharing awareness of the need for improvement in North Korean human rights.”
Ambassador Cho added, “As the Ambassador to the United States, I will diligently seek out the tasks I can undertake with a sense of duty towards the improvement of North Korean human rights.”
On the other hand, at the forum, while discussing strengthening the Korea-US alliance to address the North Korean nuclear threat, there were also arguments raised that North Korea should promptly respond to the “bold proposals” of the Yoon Suk Yeol government.
In his keynote speech, Seok Dong-hyun, the Secretary-General of the Peaceful Unification Advisory Council, stated, “The South Korean government will firmly confront the ongoing security threats posed by North Korea with a strong defense posture” and emphasized that “the robust Korea-US alliance and the deployment of the combined forces will be the most effective means to ‘restrain’ North Korea’s reckless provocations.”
Secretary-General Seok also mentioned, “In response to North Korea’s repeated provocations, the government aims to ‘restrain’ and ‘discourage’ such provocations and create a strategic environment in which North Korea can return to denuclearization negotiations based on ‘dialogue’.” He referred to the bold initiatives of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration.
He explained, “The core of the bold initiative is to alleviate North Korea’s security concerns through dialogue and achieve denuclearization by gradually promoting inter-Korean prosperity, thereby making North Korea no longer feel the necessity of nuclear possession and use.”
However, he emphasized, “Just because North Korea’s denuclearization is essential does not mean that we impose unilateral sacrifices and demands on North Korea. We do not seek a forced change through coercion.” He further stated, “The government will uphold the firm principle of North Korea’s complete denuclearization but will continue to pursue diverse practical approaches without distinguishing between preconditions and post-conditions in order to create a cycle of momentum for achieving it.”
The Secretary-General Seok also expressed the expectation that the North Korean government would cease further provocations and respond positively to such bold proposals.
Ambassador Cho also urged North Korea to immediately cease provocations and respond earnestly to the bold initiatives. He highlighted that the leaders of South Korea and the United States reaffirmed their commitment to pursuing dialogue and exchanges with North Korea without preconditions as a means to advance the shared goal of achieving complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as stated in the Washington Declaration.
Translated by Nathan Choe, HRNK Intern.
10. Yoon says he is considering establishing Strategic Command
Excerpts:
He also said the government aims to transform the military's structure and make it fit for the internal and external strategic environment, so that it can "fight and win," or so that no one will "dare to challenge us to fight."
"In the face of North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, we must reinforce our military's active deterrence response capabilities," Yoon said, referring to reconnaissance assets and high-precision and high-power strike capabilities, among others.
"More than anything we must possess the overwhelming military power to deter North Korea's provocation mentality in advance," he said.
Yoon says he is considering establishing Strategic Command | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · May 11, 2023
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, May 11 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol said Thursday he is considering establishing a Strategic Command in the military to more effectively operate the three branches of the armed forces.
Yoon made the remark during the inaugural meeting of the presidential defense innovation committee, which was established under his administration to support its goal of a stronger military built on cutting-edge technologies.
President Yoon Suk Yeol speaks at the presidential office in Seoul on May 11, 2023, during a ceremony to launch the presidential Defense Innovation Committee, headed by the president and tasked with guiding the implementation of new technologies and cybersecurity protocols in the armed forces. (Yonhap)
"I am considering establishing a Strategic Command in order to strengthen the jointness of the three branches of the armed forces and combine and effectively operate the fighting capabilities spread across the services," he said at the presidential office, where he was joined by other committee members, including National Security Adviser Cho Tae-yong and Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup.
"We need to make extensive changes to the military's operating system, software and hardware, at a level seen during a military's founding," Yoon said.
"Only when there are extensive changes at a level similar to the second founding of a military can we build a strong, combat-centered military that can win and give confidence to the people," he added.
The committee is made up of 11 members, with the president as chair and eight civilians, including former Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin.
Yoon outlined security challenges posed by North Korea's advancing nuclear weapons program, saying the government's aim is to establish an "overwhelming response capability" against the threat.
He also said the government aims to transform the military's structure and make it fit for the internal and external strategic environment, so that it can "fight and win," or so that no one will "dare to challenge us to fight."
"In the face of North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, we must reinforce our military's active deterrence response capabilities," Yoon said, referring to reconnaissance assets and high-precision and high-power strike capabilities, among others.
"More than anything we must possess the overwhelming military power to deter North Korea's provocation mentality in advance," he said.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · May 11, 2023
11. German Chancellor Scholz to visit Seoul on May 21 for summit with Yoon
(LEAD) German Chancellor Scholz to visit Seoul on May 21 for summit with Yoon | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 황장진 · May 11, 2023
(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; CHANGES dateline; ADDS Seoul's announcement in last 2 paras)
SEOUL/BERLIN, May 11 (Yonhap) -- German Chancellor Olaf Scholz will visit South Korea on May 21 for a summit with President Yoon Suk Yeol, officials of the two countries said Thursday.
Scholz will make the trip after attending a Group of Seven summit in Hiroshima, Japan, on the same day.
Scholz will first visit the Demilitarized Zone, which separates the two Koreas, a senior German official said during a press briefing in Berlin.
He will then hold a bilateral meeting with President Yoon and attend a dinner hosted by Yoon before heading back to Germany. The German chancellor will be accompanied by his wife, Britta Ernst, the official said.
This file photo taken Sept. 21, 2022, shows President Yoon Suk Yeol (R) shaking hands with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz during their summit in New York. (Yonhap)
Scholz will be the first German leader to visit Seoul in 13 years since former Chancellor Angela Merkel's trip in 2010 to attend a Group of 20 summit.
He will also be the first German chancellor to visit Seoul for a bilateral meeting in 30 years since former Chancellor Helmut Kohl's visit in 1993.
Seoul's presidential office noted his visit comes as the two countries celebrate the 140th anniversary of the signing of the bilateral treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation in November 1883.
"This visit is expected to serve as a valuable opportunity to enhance economic and security cooperation, and deepen solidarity and collaboration in addressing regional and international issues with Germany, a long-standing friendly country that shares universal values," Yoon's office said.
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 황장진 · May 11, 2023
12. Yoon calls for 'massive' military upgrades at defense committee launch
There should be no question that South Korea is committed to its own defense.
Thursday
May 11, 2023
dictionary + A - A
Yoon calls for 'massive' military upgrades at defense committee launch
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/05/11/national/defense/Korea-defense-innovation-committee-inauguration/20230511171857810.html
President Yoon Suk Yeol, left, presents a letter of appointment to former Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin, who was appointed as vice chair of the new presidential Defense Innovation Committee, ahead of presiding over its inaugural meeting at the Yongsan presidential office in central Seoul on Thursday. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]
President Yoon Suk Yeol ordered a "large-scale change" in military hardware and software to create a "strong combat-type army" in the inaugural Defense Innovation Committee Thursday.
Yoon also reiterated his plan to establish a strategic command to better operate the three branches of the military in the face of North Korea's nuclear and missile threats as he formally launched the new presidential committee tasked with guiding the implementation of new technologies and cyber security protocols in the armed forces.
"The security environment is changing rapidly, such as North Korea's escalating nuclear threat, and science and technology are changing rapidly around the world," Yoon said presiding over the meeting at the Yongsan presidential office. "Above all, we must possess overwhelming power to suppress North Korea's provocations in advance."
Kim Kwan-jin, a retired four-star general known for his hardline stance against Pyongyang, was appointed as the vice chair of the committee in an inauguration ceremony ahead of the meeting. He served as defense minister in the Lee Myung-bak administration and later became Blue House National Security Office in the Park Geun-hye government.
Kim was convicted in 2019 of political meddling by ordering the military cyber command to post online comments supporting the conservative Lee administration during the 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections.
Yoon chairs the 11-member committee, established under a presidential decree last December, which is also comprised of his national security adviser, defense minister and experts from the private sector.
It is tasked with formulating defense innovation plans, facilitating policy coordination between ministries and communicating with public sectors and securing related budgets and legislations.
This is in line with the Defense Ministry's own Defense Innovation 4.0 initiative aimed at acquiring advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), to strengthen overall defense capabilities amid potential manpower shortages in the future.
"The best science and technology occur in the process of defense innovation and development, and is always applied first in the defense sector," said Yoon.
He noted the need for "massive reforms and changes" at the level of the founding of the military across all areas of defense operating systems, software and hardware.
"We will transform our military into an efficient military structure equipped with overwhelming response capabilities against North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile threats, in line with changes in the internal and external strategic environment, to become a strong military that can fight and win, or one no one will dare to challenge," Yoon said.
He called to "reinforce the military's active deterrence response capabilities" against Pyongyang threats, including through securing reconnaissance assets and analysis capabilities covering all areas of North Korea, high-powered ultra-precision missile capabilities that can accurately hit targets and integrated, multi-layered air defense capabilities.
He ordered improvements to the legislative process for introducing new technologies, better operation of unmanned aerial vehicles and robots, a revamping of military organizations and a drastic improvement of conditions for soldiers.
"After taking office as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, I came to think that reform and change were really urgent," said Yoon, who marked the one-year anniversary of his inauguration the previous day.
He said he had benchmarked the Pentagon's advisory panel, the Defense Innovation Board, previously chaired by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt.
Yoon said that the two main goals of defense innovation are "accurate recognition of dangerous situations and strengthening military power by applying state-of-the-art science and technology to our military," said Lee Do-woon, presidential spokesman, in a press briefing later that day.
He also emphasized that "we must clearly know our enemy."
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
13. S. Hamgyong Province mobilizes urban residents for corn planting
S. Hamgyong Province mobilizes urban residents for corn planting
Hamhung residents arrive at the farms at 8 AM everyday and work until 2 PM, a reporting partner told Daily NK
By Lee Chae Un - 2023.05.11 6:00pm
dailynk.com
Farmland in Chongsan-ri, between Nampo and Pyongyang. (Flickr, Creative Commons)
Urban residents of South Hamgyong Province are being mobilized to plant corn this spring, Daily NK has learned.
Speaking on condition of anonymity due to security concerns, a reporting partner in South Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Wednesday that the province received a Central Committee order in April calling for “city residents to provide active labor support to farms from grain planting to harvest to boost food production this year.”
In response, South Hamgyong Province designated Apr. 20 to the middle of May as a farm mobilization period and has moved to mobilize urban residents to plant corn.
In Hamhung, the city authorities convened meetings in each neighborhood watch unit to convey the order, with people heading to nearby farms to plant corn starting Apr. 20.
Hamhung residents arrive at the farms at 8 AM everyday and work until 2 PM, then they return home after receiving a certificate showing they have completed a day’s work from the farm they worked on. If they have no certificate, they cannot conduct business activities at the city’s markets, the reporting partner said.
“You can only enter the markets if you have a certificate and, in fact, if you’re just walking around without a certificate, you get sent to a labor brigade or a farm to do forced labor,” he said. “It’s not the first time [the authorities have mobilized people for farmwork], but nowadays, if you fail to make a daily wage, your family faces starvation for two or three days. This has caused people to compalin more than before because the farm mobilizations are eating into time they could be spending in the markets.”
The burdens of these farm mobilizations are particularly heavy on North Korean women, who typically provide for their families through business activities at markets.
“Women go straight to the markets to earn money after they finish planting corn,” the reporting partner said. “Many women are lamenting their situation, with their pain doubled when they were already heavily burdened taking care of their families.”
The reporting partner added: “Nobody would refuse to take part in general mobilizations if they actually boosted food production, but despite three general mobilizations to plant grain, the number of food-poor families is increasing compared to those who have enough food to eat. Public discontent is set to increase given the state is forcibly mobilizing economically distraught people for farmwork.”
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of reporting partners who live inside North Korea and China. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
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14.
Thursday
May 11, 2023
dictionary + A - A
Military to let soldiers use phones more during weekdays
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/05/11/national/defense/korea-military-conscripts/20230511170147655.html
The Ministry of National Defense on Thursday announced that conscripts could soon be able to use their cell phones during the day. [YONHAP]
Conscripts could soon be able to use their personal cell phones during the day.
The Ministry of National Defense announced Thursday that the military was planning to approximately quadruple the amount of time soldiers can use their cell phones on weekdays.
A trial run will launch later this year to examine the possible side effects, the ministry said.
Under the current system, all conscripts are allowed to use their cell phones for three hours a day during the weekdays, from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. During the weekends, cell phones are allowed for 12 and a half hours, from 8:30 a.m. to 9 p.m.
Under the proposed new rules, the military would allow soldiers to use their phones for nearly 14 hours during the weekdays, from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m.
As in the current system, however, soldiers won’t be permitted to use their phones when they are on duty. They also won’t be allowed to keep or use their phones during border patrols, on-duty shifts and large-scale training exercises.
The trial run will last from July to December on nearly 20 percent of all military units.
The Defense Ministry said it was also planning to allow new recruits to use their cell phones for an hour on weekends and national holidays, starting in July.
Conscripts have partially been allowed to use their cell phones since April 2018 during the former Moon Jae-in administration. When President Yoon Suk Yeol took office, he promised to expand usage time.
The ministry said it examined three different types of policies on cell phone use and held a trial run on each.
In the “minimum type,” soldiers were allowed to use their phones after daily morning calls, which are usually held for about 10 minutes from 7 a.m., to 8:30 a.m., and then from 5:30 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.
In the “medium type,” soldiers were allowed to use their phones after daily morning calls to 9 p.m.
The “autonomous type” allowed around-the-clock usage.
Conscripts and military officers responded most positively to the "medium type" policy, the ministry said.
BY LEE SUNG-EUN, LEE KEUN-PYUNG [lee.sungeun@joongang.co.kr]
15. Korea urged to dive deeper into space industry, beef up partnership with US: experts
Korea urged to dive deeper into space industry, beef up partnership with US: experts
The Korea Times · May 11, 2023
Yang Jae-seok, right an attorney at D'LIGHT Law Group, speaks during a space industry seminar in Seoul, Wednesday. Courtesy of D'LIGHT Law Group
By Baek Byung-yeul
Amid growing interest in space following the success of the Nuri launch vehicle and the Danuri lunar orbiter, experts said Wednesday that the space industry will be one of the major drivers of Korea's industrial development in the future.
While President Yoon Suk Yeol's state visit to the United States last month led to a decision to strengthen cooperation with Washington in the space sector, such as lunar exploration and deep space communications, they added Korea needs to further strengthen partnerships with the U.S., which leads the industry.
"The space industry has been dominated by the U.S. The reason for this is that the U.S. has the most space assets in the world and obviously it wants to control the hegemony of the space industry," Park Si-soo, CEO of Spaceradar, a local space market intelligence provider, said during a seminar on the current state of the space industry held in Seoul. The seminar was hosted by D'LIGHT Law Group.
The CEO, who promotes businesses between the overseas space industry and Korean space-related companies, described the current status of the space industry as the U.S. thoroughly isolating China in the global industry and Russia losing its rationale to cooperate with the international community by waging war on Ukraine, resulting in an industry increasingly led by the U.S.
"The U.S. is currently in the process of setting the rules for the space industry. Once these rules are in place, what will be the next step for the U.S.? Based on Washington's space strategy of a 'peaceful and sustainable use of outer space,' I think it is possible that they could introduce an ESG rating system like a space sustainability rating system," he said.
Park elaborated that such a rating system would incentivize companies to set their own rules, such as using cleaner fuels when launching satellites, or burning satellites safely when re-entering the Earth, and distinguish between countries and companies that can fit inside the fence that the U.S. has built and those that cannot.
"The government should step up efforts to include domestic companies in the U.S. information network on what standards Washington is pursuing," Park said. "Also, the government should not neglect keeping Korean companies informed of the U.S.' moves."
Speakers take part in space industry seminar in Seoul, Wednesday. From left are Park Si-soo, CEO of Spaceradar; Ahn Hyung-joon, a researcher at the Science & Technology Policy Institute; Seo Byung-su, a former analyst at Mirae Asset Securities; and Yang Jae-seok, an attorney at D'LIGHT Law Group. Courtesy of D'LIGHT Law Group
Seo Byung-su, a former analyst at Mirae Asset Securities, said Korea's space industry was not worthy of attention because its technological capability was not high, but the war between Russia and Ukraine changed the situation completely.
"The Russia-Ukraine war showed that it is important for all weapons systems to be connected to the satellite network. Without it, a country will lose no matter how much firepower it has," Seo said.
"In Korea, there is no industrial growth engine in sight. However, the government and military are actively investing in defense and space, and companies are adopting the space industry as a growth engine," he added.
He added that in five years, companies like Samsung, GM or Ford, which seem completely unrelated to space today, could be in the space sector, saying that the space business is becoming more and more promising.
To develop Korea's space industry further, experts from various fields need to be attracted to the industry, Ahn Hyung-joon, a researcher at Science & Technology Policy Institute, said.
"Around 2015, when there was a global push for a private sector-led NewSpace boom, I looked at whether it was possible for Korea, but I realized that our industry was too small. There will come a time when everything that happens on the ground will be done in space and all professionals will be able to do the same thing in space. It's been less than two years since a lot of space-related jobs have been created in Korea. I would like to see a lot of influx into the space industry from various sectors," Ahn said.
"There is also a lot of confusion for startups doing space-related businesses. There are no space-related laws. This is something that the country is currently working on," he added.
Yang Jae-seok, attorney at D'LIGHT Law Group, cited the launch vehicle business as an area where Korea is currently doing well.
"The space industry that stands out in Korea right now is the launch vehicle sector. It is great that we have locally-developed launch vehicles. If you look overseas, there are very few countries that can do this," the attorney said.
"The challenge is how much we can lower launch costs. If we don't overcome this, we'll be stuck in the old space. There's a lot of research being done by the government and private companies so that we can get to a point where we can reuse launch vehicles like SpaceX," he added.
The Korea Times · May 11, 2023
16. International Forum on One Korea: Congressional Roundtable and Policy Forum
See the properly formatted version of this announcement at this link: https://globalpeace.org/event/congressional-roundtable-and-policy-forum/
International Forum on One Korea: Congressional Roundtable and Policy Forum
RSVP at this link:
In Person: https://info.globalpeace.org/e/934473/m8vzQpMtfpbxUthxXX7mw-viewform/5wxf54/417568542?h=Et1kdKNvoYRs1lXP2OcduvcBtCehz1DSOKAXUyFa9Hw
Online: https://info.globalpeace.org/e/934473/DxSyKxIB4zMPkoow--registration/5wxf51/417568542?h=Et1kdKNvoYRs1lXP2OcduvcBtCehz1DSOKAXUyFa9Hw
This forum will honor the 70th Anniversary of the ROK/U.S. Alliance by assembling ROK and U.S. legislators, scholars, human rights activists including North Korean escapees, officials and civil society practitioners. The forum will examine how the Alliance will continue to advance the robust ROK and U.S. partnership through a comprehensive approach in pursuit of a free and unified Korea. The Biden-Yoon Summit joint-statement further amplified this opportunity: “The two Presidents are committed to build a better future for all Korean people and support a unified Korean Peninsula that is free and at peace.”
Date
May 17, 2023
Time
1:00 pm - 5:00 pm
Venue
Ford House Office Building H2-108 (Next to Federal Center SW Metro station)
Location
2nd St SW, D St SW, DC, DC, 20024, United States,
Venue Google Map Link
+ Google Map
Website
Register Here
1:00 PM: Opening Session
Emcee: Colonel David Maxwell (Ret), Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation; Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
David Maxwell is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel and has spent more than 30 years in Asia as a practitioner and specializes in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the Global Peace Foundation where he focuses on a free and unified Korea. He is a member of the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights In North Korea and is the editor of the Small Wars Journal.
Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC), Member, House Committee on Oversight and Accountability
Mr. James P. Flynn, International President, Global Peace Foundation
Mr. In-teck Seo, Co-Chair, Action for Korea United
1:30 PM: U.S. Congressional-ROK National Assembly Roundtable
Moderators: Mr. John Dickson, Senior Advisor, Global Peace Foundation
Mr. John Dickson is a Senior Advisor on Economy and Government Relations at the Global Peace Foundation and president of World Trade Partnership. He has founded World Trade Centers in Okinawa and Afghanistan, and advised on others. Mr. Dickson was the founding chairman of the World Trade Centers Association’s Committee on Peace and Stability through Trade, organizing initiatives highlighting the contribution of the private sector to peace and stability. John serves on the steering committee of the UN’s Alliance of NGOs for South South Cooperation and serves on the boards of several significant civil society organizations including the Latin American Presidential Mission. Mr. Dickson is a co-founder and chairman of the Global Young Leaders Academy.
Congressman Rob Wittman, Vice Chair, House Arms Service Committee; Chair, Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee; Member, House Committee on Natural Resources
Hon. Myoung-su Lee, Member (People Power Party), Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee
Hon. Woo-taik Chung, Deputy Speaker (People Power Party), ROK National Assembly (video)
Congresswoman Young Kim (R-CA), Member and Asia-Pacific Subcommittee Chair, House Foreign Affairs Committee; Co-Chair, Congressional Study Group on Korea
Hon. Sang-min Lee, Member (Democratic Party), Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee
Hon. Seung-joo Baek, Former Member, ROK National Assembly; Former Deputy Secretary of Defense of the Republic of Korea; President, War Memorial of Korea; Chair Professor, Kookmin University Graduate School of Political Science
Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (video)
3:15 PM: Policy Discussion Panel (Scholars, Practitioners, and Escapees from North Korea) Round Table
Emcee: Colonel David Maxwell (Ret), Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation; Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Mr. Hyun-seung Lee, Fellow on North Korea Studies, Global Peace Foundation
Mr. Cheol-hwan Kang, Author, “The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag”; Founder and President, North Korea Strategy Center
Ms. Seo-hyun Lee, Human Rights Activist; Graduate Student, Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs
Ambassador Robert Joseph, Senior Scholar, National Institute for Public Policy; Former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
Ambassador Morse Tan, Dean, Liberty University, School of Law; Former Ambassador at Large for Global Criminal Justice
Mr. Greg Scarlatiou, Executive Director, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
Dr. Yong-sup Han, Professor Emeritus and Former Vice President, National Defense University of the Republic of Korea; President, International Security Exchange Association
Dr. Jin Shin, President, Institute for Peace Affairs; Chairman of the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy and Director of the National Strategy Institute, Chungnam National University
Dr. Kyung-young Chung, Adjunct Professor, Hanyang University Graduate School of International Studies; Former Policy Advisor, National Security Office, Blue House
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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