Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“The point is that, as soon as fear, hatred, jealousy and power worship are involved, the sense of reality becomes unhinged. And, as I have pointed out already, the sense of right, and wrong becomes unhinged also. There is no crime, absolutely none, that cannot be condoned when our side commits it. Even if one does not deny that the crime has happened, even if one knows that it is exactly the same crime as one has condemned in some other case, even if one admits in an intellectual sense that it is unjustified – still one cannot feel that it is wrong. Loyalty is involved, and so pity ceases to function.”

- George Orwell, Notes on Nationalism, (1945).

"The propagandist's purpose is to make one set of people forget that certain other sets of people are human."

- Aldous Huxley, writer, philosopher

"The buying of books more than one can read is nothing less than the soul reaching toward infinity."

- A. Edward Newton

1. How Special Operations Forces Must Meet the Challenges of a New Era

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 10. 2023

3. Managing the New Era of Deterrence and Warfare: Visualizing the Information Domain

4. China pours cold water on bilateral meeting with US defence secretary

5. Exploring "White Sun War"

6. From 'Victory Day'... to running away! Footage shows humiliating Russian retreat in Bakhmut after Putin was forced to scale back annual military parade due to his army's devastating losses

7. Navigation tools, electric-powered fleet top of mind for special ops

8. Avril Haines: New ODNI Office Oversees Intelligence Community's Fight Against Disinformation

9. To Counter China, the U.S. Is Expanding Its Footprint in the Pacific

10. Rethinking a Conservative Foreign Policy

11. Opinion | Taiwan is urging the U.S. not to abandon Ukraine

12. Ukraine Makes Gains Near Embattled Bakhmut, a First in Months

13. Defense budget bill hit with delay over debt ceiling fight

14. Bipartisan Group Aims to Fix ‘Hopelessly Obsolete’ Classification System

15. Biden to host India's Modi with human rights in mind -White House

16. Zelensky says Ukraine needs more time for counter-offensive

17. In Defense of Bean Counting: Why Material Measures of National Power Matter

18. It’s Time To Rethink Aerial Warfare

19. New guns means new bullets, suppressors and tech for special ops

20. Drones, planes need new weapons and sensors, says special ops official

21. Hyper-enabling special ops will transform missions

22. Too Many Lawyers - Why Legalism is Undermining Ethical Conduct in the SOF Community

23. The Utility of Deterrence

24. Navy SEALs Long-Awaited Dry Sub in Operation by ‘Memorial Day’

25. The Opponents of Marine Reform Have Lost, But Won’t Move On by Robert Work

26. Russian Guerrillas Are Trying to Violently Overthrow Putin

1. How Special Operations Forces Must Meet the Challenges of a New Era

Excerpts:

As a result, strategic competition has long been in SOF’s DNA. Quite deliberately, much of SOF is purpose-built to help the U.S. compete and prevail by campaigning prior to, or in the absence of, armed conflict. We have decades of experience in persistent global engagement with allies and partners, especially in complex or dangerous environments that demand a light U.S. footprint, while cultivating durable networks of personal and operationally invaluable relationships in the process.

...

Whether the challenge is in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, or anywhere else; whether it is strategic competition, crisis response, or countering terrorism; or whether it is military or paramilitary, economic or political; wherever the cause of freedom and our collective interests are being threatened, U.S. SOF and its global SOF partners must be optimally ready and able to do our part. Our citizens, and our belief in liberty, prosperity, and security for our people, demand no less of us.

How Special Operations Forces Must Meet the Challenges of a New Era

To the commander of U.S. SOCOM, what matters most is whether we solve the problem our nation needs solved.

defenseone.com · by Gen. Bryan P. Fenton

Discussions and debates about how U.S. and allied SOF must become more capable and ready for an era of growing strategic tensions and conflicts are central to this year’s SOF Week conference in Tampa, Florida. For U.S. SOF, the National Defense Strategy priorities of integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantages highlights the direction we must take, but it is our people, and partners, who must ensure our thinking, investments, training, and mindset are optimal for the demands of this strategy: to win without fighting when we can and prevail in combat when we must.

Here is our start point for SOF Week. History shows SOF is at its very best when we define ourselves by “how well” we solve extraordinarily complex, wicked, and sometimes lethal problems. Some of these require us to win by fighting, but in today’s environment, the challenges our nation faces globally are often not solved by kinetic power alone.

While recognizing the strengths SOF has always displayed in combat, what truly made SOF “special” historically has been our ability to generate disproportionate strategic effects in highly complex and contested environments via small and uniquely skilled teams. Certainly, in many instances this required our forces to show incredible combat proficiency. What is less well understood by the general public, yet something we must never forget, is not only how well we can deliver precise kinetic force, though that is certainly important; what matters most is whether we “solve the problem” our nation needs solved, and not necessarily whether the solution requires lethal action.

This is not new. The rejuvenation of SOF, begun by the 1987 Nunn-Cohen Amendment, was a public acknowledgement, and a clarion call to the SOF practitioner, that the United States needed a permanent, fully capable, always ready, and sophisticated special operations force capable of solving problems no one else can. Our emphasis on ideas, such as quality over quantity, and the skill and ingenuity of our people (military, civilian, contractor) is more important than the power of our hardware and has made us the world’s premier SOF community. We have augmented our community with years of emphasis on creating genuine military, interagency, and international integration, creating “networks of networks” across government that made every participant more capable and effective than they could be alone. Our traditional emphasis on “with, by, and through” our global allies and partners is not just a SOF slogan, it is a chosen lifestyle through which we ensure strategic success. All of these are directly applicable in today’s confrontation with strategic competitors and continue to make SOF a national advantage.

Though often obscured by the volume of combat that SOF has recently experienced, the preponderance of our activities since 1987 has been for the purpose of working with our allies, thereby strengthening collective efforts to meet shared national-security concerns. Just as important, these efforts developed networks of personal relationships with our partners, creating mutual understanding and robust channels for continuous cooperation, something priceless in today’s strategic competition. We cannot build trust in a crisis. Relationships forged today are investments that can be decisive in preventing or prevailing in crisis tomorrow.

As a result, strategic competition has long been in SOF’s DNA. Quite deliberately, much of SOF is purpose-built to help the U.S. compete and prevail by campaigning prior to, or in the absence of, armed conflict. We have decades of experience in persistent global engagement with allies and partners, especially in complex or dangerous environments that demand a light U.S. footprint, while cultivating durable networks of personal and operationally invaluable relationships in the process.

To be sure, we and our international SOF partners must remain proficient in counterterrorism because, while the physical manifestation of terror has been degraded, we must remain vigilant. Aside from the threat terrorists pose to the United States, they are just as often a threat to many of our allies.

Yet while we sustain our unmatched counterterrorism skills, we must also strengthen our ability to contribute to the United States’ contest with great-power adversaries. We must prioritize and modernize our traditional activities such as Foreign Internal Defense, Security Force Assistance, Special Reconnaissance, Unconventional Warfare, and Military Information Support Operations; re-emphasize the importance of language and cultural skills found within our formations; and develop even newer methods applicable to strategic competition. These methods, employed by U.S. and NATO SOF to train Ukrainian SOF after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, clearly illuminate what U.S. and partner-nation SOF can contribute. Today’s battlefield prowess, and the resulting psychological inspiration, that Ukrainian SOF is providing to their military and their population is due in part to the decades-long efforts of U.S. and NATO SOF.

Of course, as proud as our community should be of our abilities and contributions, we cannot become complacent or harbor illusions that we are somehow more important, or deserve more attention, than our partners across both the military and interagency. All of them are courageous, skilled, professional, and have long and proud traditions of safeguarding and advancing U.S. interests. Instead, what we seek is to build on the extraordinary operational integration, the networks of cross-government relationships, and the sense of “all being in this together” that blossomed so strongly during the past 20 years of combat. These networks of relationships are something we must never take for granted and must deliberately and collectively build and strengthen, making our integration and collaboration even better, and ensuring its centrality in everything we do for integrated deterrence. We were already an impressive team of teams, but the challenges we now face require us to make that team even stronger, faster, better.

The tragedy in Ukraine today illuminates the fact that America and our global allies face daunting and quite dangerous global challenges. Our adversaries will not wait, they will not hesitate, and are willing to use their instruments of power (all the DIME—Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic) with no regard for the rule of law or human decency, just like we are witnessing in Ukraine. U.S. SOF brings much to bear “left of conflict” or in the gray zone. We are certainly not alone in this journey, but we must now emphasize our own readiness for the unique and vital roles that only we can play.

Whether the challenge is in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, or anywhere else; whether it is strategic competition, crisis response, or countering terrorism; or whether it is military or paramilitary, economic or political; wherever the cause of freedom and our collective interests are being threatened, U.S. SOF and its global SOF partners must be optimally ready and able to do our part. Our citizens, and our belief in liberty, prosperity, and security for our people, demand no less of us.

Gen. Bryan P. Fenton currently serves as the 13th commander of U.S. Special Operations Command.

defenseone.com · by Gen. Bryan P. Fenton

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 10. 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2023

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces conducted successful limited counterattacks around Bakhmut on May 9.
Pervasive issues with Russian combat capabilities, exacerbated by continued attritional assaults in the Bakhmut area, are likely considerably constraining the ability of Russian forces in this area to defend against localized Ukrainian counterattacks.
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck a command center where Ukrainian military commanders and officials were located, likely to support an ongoing effort to frame Russian operations as constraining Ukrainian capabilities to launch a counteroffensive.
The US Department of Defense (DoD) confirmed that Ukrainian forces successfully shot down a Russian missile using the Patriot missile defense system. The Biden administration also announced a new $1.2 billion military aid package to Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Kreminna areas.
Russian and Wagner Group forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut on May 10, despite Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s previous threat that Wagner would withdraw from the area at midnight.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front.
Russian forces conducted airstrikes on Ukrainian positions in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an annual decree calling up citizens from reserves for military training.
Russian occupation authorities are continuing the removal of Ukrainian residents from their homes in occupied areas under the guise of humanitarian evacuations.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 10, 2023

May 10, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Layne Philipson, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

May 10, 2023, 4pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Ukrainian forces conducted successful limited counterattacks around Bakhmut on May 9. Geolocated footage published on May 9 and 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely conducted successful limited counterattacks north of Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut) and northwest of Bila Hora (14km southwest of Bakhmut) and made marginal advances in these areas.[1]Ukrainian sources claimed on May 9 that Ukrainian forces destroyed the 6th and 8th companies of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 3rd Army Corps near Bakhmut and advanced 2.6km along a 3km frontline in the area, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these reported wider Ukrainian advances.[2] A prominent Russian [3]milblogger claimed on May 10 that the Ukrainian forces tried to advance further in the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade’s zone of responsibility in the Bakhmut area following Ukrainian counterattacks on May 9 but that formations of an unspecified Russian paramilitary company (PMC) prevented a Ukrainian breakthrough.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) are constraining the actions of Ukrainian forces on the flanks around Bakhmut.[5] ISW has previously assessed that reports of Ukrainian counterattacks throughout Donetsk Oblast appear to be a part of an ongoing pattern of localized and limited counterattacks.[6]

Pervasive issues with Russian combat capability, exacerbated by continued attritional assaults in the Bakhmut area, are likely considerably constraining the ability of Russian forces in this area to defend against localized Ukrainian counterattacks. The 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade itself is emblematic of many of the endemic force generation issues constantly faced by the Russian military. ISW reported on August 7, 2022, that the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade was forming in Orenburg Oblast as part of the 3rd Army Corps, a new formation created in 2022 and largely comprised of volunteer battalions.[7] Forbes reported in September of 2022 that the 3rd Army Corps deployed to Kharkiv Oblast and that the Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast counteroffensive largely destroyed the corps’ constituent elements, likely including the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade.[8] Ukrainian media suggested that the surviving elements of the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade may have redeployed to Mykolaiv Oblast following the Kharkiv Oblast counteroffensive, where they once against suffered losses during Ukraine’s southern counteroffensive in October 2022.[9] ISW cannot confirm where the 72nd Brigade deployed to following the withdrawal of Russian forces from the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River, but it is highly likely that whatever elements of the 72nd Brigade that deployed to the Bakhmut area more recently are not operating at anywhere near full strength. The Russian military command’s apparent commitment of elements of a formation that has suffered two successive defeats to the Bakhmut axis alongside already attrited Wagner elements likely offer Ukrainian forces opportunities to exploit with limited counterattacks. A Russian milblogger, citing a Wagner commander active in the Bakhmut area, additionally reported that the alleged withdrawal of the 72nd Brigade was the result of severe miscommunication between command of the 72nd Brigade and the Wagner Group.[10] Issues with the ad hoc commitment of various depleted force groupings to the Bakhmut axis, alongside apparent command and control failures, are likely preventing Russian forces in the area from conducting sound defensive operations.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck a command center where high-ranking Ukrainian military commanders and officials were located, likely to support an ongoing effort to frame Russian operations as constraining Ukrainian capabilities to launch a counteroffensive. Russian milbloggers claimed on May 10 that Russian forces struck the command post near Chasiv Yar (12km west of Bakhmut), killing Ukrainian Chief Advisor to the Directorate for Domestic and Humanitarian Policy Alexei Titarenko.[11] Russian milbloggers speculated that the strike may have killed other high-ranking Ukrainian commanders and officials and stated that the strike has prompted completely unsubstantiated rumors, which Ukrainian officials have explicitly denied, that it killed Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Valery Zaluzhnyi.[12] Milbloggers acknowledged that the strike likely did not kill Zaluzhnyi but argued that it may be affecting his decisions to attend certain events.[13] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that all the Ukrainian commanders in question are alive and that claims about the killing of Ukrainian commanders are a part of a Russian information operation aimed at degrading Ukrainian morale.[14] ISW assessed that Russian ultranationalists recently claimed that Russian forces struck a vehicle carrying Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces Commander General Ihor Tantsyura to frame Russian operations as limiting Ukrainian abilities to conduct counterattacks in the Bakhmut area.[15] Russian sources have also largely framed increasingly routine series of Russian air and missile strikes as similarly constraining potential upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[16] There is no evidence to support these Russian claims.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) confirmed on May 9 that Ukrainian forces successfully used the Patriot missile defense system to shoot down a Russian missile for the first time.[17] Ukrainian Air Force Commander Mykola Oleshchuk had reported that Ukrainian forces used the Patriot system to shoot down a missile in the air over Kyiv Oblast at night on May 4.[18] The Biden administration also announced a new $1.2 billion military aid package to Ukraine on May 9.[19] The package includes additional air defense systems, 155-mm artillery rounds, and equipment to integrate Ukrainian air defense systems with Western-supplied equipment.[20]

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces conducted successful limited counterattacks around Bakhmut on May 9.
Pervasive issues with Russian combat capabilities, exacerbated by continued attritional assaults in the Bakhmut area, are likely considerably constraining the ability of Russian forces in this area to defend against localized Ukrainian counterattacks.
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck a command center where Ukrainian military commanders and officials were located, likely to support an ongoing effort to frame Russian operations as constraining Ukrainian capabilities to launch a counteroffensive.
The US Department of Defense (DoD) confirmed that Ukrainian forces successfully shot down a Russian missile using the Patriot missile defense system. The Biden administration also announced a new $1.2 billion military aid package to Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Kreminna areas.
Russian and Wagner Group forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut on May 10, despite Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s previous threat that Wagner would withdraw from the area at midnight.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front.
Russian forces conducted airstrikes on Ukrainian positions in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an annual decree calling up citizens from reserves for military training.
Russian occupation authorities are continuing the removal of Ukrainian residents from their homes in occupied areas under the guise of humanitarian evacuations.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Kupyansk on May 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction attempted to improve their tactical positions and conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Masyukivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk) and Stelmakhivka (33km southeast of Kupyansk).[21] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Sergey Zybinsky claimed that elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) struck Ukrainian force concentrations in the Kupyansk area.[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted positional battles near Hryanykivka (25km northeast of Kupyansk) and Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk).[23] Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov stated that Russian forces struck Kupyansk itself with Iskander short-range ballistic missiles.[24]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Kreminna on May 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near the Serebrianske forest area and Bilohorivka, both about 10km south of Kreminna.[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that fierce fighting is ongoing in the industrial zone in Bilohorivka.[26] Ukrainian Severodonetsk City Head Roman Vlasenko stated that Russian forces are using S-300 surface-to-air missiles to strike Ukrainian-controlled territory in Luhansk Oblast.[27] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty noted that Russian forces writ large are less active along the entire Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and that only three combat clashes occurred in this area over the past day.[28]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian and Wagner Group forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut on May 10, despite Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s previous threat that Wagner would withdraw from the area at midnight. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions within Bakhmut and in the direction of Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) and Stupochky (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[29] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that there were 28 combat clashes in the Bakhmut area.[30] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian assault detachments continued offensive operations to capture blocks in northwestern and western Bakhmut.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also conducted assaults in the direction of Chasiv Yar (12 km west of Bakhmut).[32]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front on May 10. The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia published geolocated footage on May 10 likely confirming previous Russian claims that Russian forces captured Kamianka (5km northeast of Avdiivka) as early as March 20.[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting is ongoing north of Avdiivka and that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults in Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka), near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and on the southern approaches towards Avdiivka.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka and Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[35]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 10.[36]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces conducted airstrikes on Ukrainian positions in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts on May 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted airstrikes along the frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast and struck Hulyaipole, Mala Tokmachka, Orikhiv, and Stepnohirsk, as well as Kizomys and Stanislav, southwest of Kherson City.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted strikes using high-explosive FAB-500 and KAB-1500-LG-F bombs on Ukrainian storage facilities in Kherson Oblast in an attempt to prevent Ukrainian forces from potentially crossing the Dnipro River.[38]

Russian sources continue to speculate about potential Ukrainian counteroffensive preparations in southern Ukraine. A Russian milblogger amplified claims that Ukrainian forces hold positions on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River despite another milblogger claiming that Ukrainian forces had no presence on the east (left) bank.[39] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces along the Zaporizhia frontline are pulling artillery and personnel back to regroup, which is affecting the density of fire.[40] Geolocated footage published on May 9 confirms that artillery elements of the 503rd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are active in this area near Nesterianka (11km southwest of Orikhiv).[41]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an annual decree calling up citizens from the reserves for military training on May 10. The law states that reservists can be called for training no more than every 3 years for no more than two months, privates and sergeants can be called for training up to the age of 35, junior officers up to the age of 50, and senior officers up to the age of 55.[42] The law also states that failure to show up for training is an administrative offensive punishable by fine. The reservists will undergo training in the Russian Armed Forces, the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia), the Federal Security Service (FSB) and other state security agencies. Russian opposition news outlet Mobilization News claimed that Russian authorities may attempt to coerce individuals who show up for training into signing contracts with the Russian military.[43] A Russian media aggregator Baza reported that Putin signed a similar decree on February 18, 2022.[44]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities are continuing the removal of Ukrainian residents from their homes in occupied areas under the pretext of humanitarian evacuations. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 10 that Russian occupation authorities have evacuated the families of Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) workers located in Enerhodar but continue to prohibit ZNPP personnel from leaving the city.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian occupation authorities are luring Ukrainians to evacuate to recreation centers and hotels in Berdyansk and Kyrylivka, Zaporizhia Oblast, but in actuality are bringing them to “tent towns” in Rostov Oblast, Russia.[46] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov continues to claim that evacuated citizens will receive one-time payments and comfortable accommodation.[47]

Russian sources claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) thwarted a Ukrainian partisan attack in Zaporizhia Oblast on May 10. Russian sources claimed that the FSB arrested a Ukrainian citizen under accusations the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) ordered him to assassinate occupied Kyrylivka police department head.[48]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on May 10 that the 103rd Vitebsk Separate Guards Airborne Brigade conducted combat training exercises as a part of ongoing combat readiness checks.[49]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

3. Managing the New Era of Deterrence and Warfare: Visualizing the Information Domain

Download the 25 page report here: https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Managing%20the%20New%20Era%20of%20Deterrence%20and%20Warfare-%20Visualizing%20the%20Information%20Domain.pdf

MANAGING THE NEW ERA OF DETERRENCE AND WARFARE: VISUALIZING THE INFORMATION DOMAIN

May 10, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

By Brian Babcock-Lumish

The Institute for the Study of War and the IBM Center for The Business of Government have concluded our three-event series, “Addressing the New Era of Deterrence and Warfare: Visualizing the Information Domain.”

This report is the capstone of a series that our two organizations led over the past year, which convened leaders from allied, partnered, and U.S. militaries, governments, academia, and industry to envision and shape future strategic advantages through visualizing information operations.

Additional authors include: Leendert van Bochoven, Stephen Gordon, Tim Hofmockel, Frederick Kagan, Nils Peterson, and Noah Ringler

The three events gathered experts and practitioners to discuss the topic from a theoretical perspective, as it pertains to the case of Russia, and finally of China.

U.S. and allied leaders increasingly need new solutions for achieving and maintaining a common operating picture that integrates information operations with air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains. This report addresses the unique challenges of understanding and visualizing the information domain and its importance in managing modern defense and intelligence activity. The report also puts forward criteria for how such visualizations could be developed in the future to support managing information activities at the operational, analytical, and decision-maker levels.

We hope that this report helps to increase understanding and collaboration around developing information visualizations that can help the U.S., allies, and partners address ever-accelerating challenges.

Click here to read this blog on the IBM Center for The Business of Government main site.

4. China pours cold water on bilateral meeting with US defence secretary

Excerpts:

Bonnie Glaser, a China expert at the German Marshall Fund, said south-east Asian nations were increasingly uneasy with the intensity of the competition between the US and China and the lack of high-level dialogue. She said such countries would be “shocked” if Austin and Li attended Shangri-La without meeting.

“The question is, will they blame the US or China? My sense is that there is recognition in much of the region that the US has been seeking to engage with Chinese counterparts but are being stonewalled,” Glaser added.

Jude Blanchette, a China expert at the CSIS think-tank, said the dispute illustrated how “political dynamics on both sides gum up the possible stabilisation” of Washington-Beijing relations.

“The longer Beijing refuses to meet with the US, the more countries in Europe and across Asia will come to see Chinese behaviour as intransigence,” Blanchette said.

Evan Medeiros at Georgetown University said the best way for the US to achieve its aim of “deterring and constraining China” was to show its Asian partners it was “always open to dialogue with Beijing”.

“The US needs to find a compromise solution for the sake of its strategic goals,” Medeiros added.

China pours cold water on bilateral meeting with US defence secretary

Stand-off is latest obstacle to top-level dialogue between Washington and Beijing

Financial Times · by Demetri Sevastopulo · May 10, 2023

China has told the US there is little chance of a meeting between the countries’ defence ministers at a security forum in Singapore due to a dispute over sanctions, the latest obstacle to top-level dialogue between the two powers.

US defence secretary Lloyd Austin wants to meet Li Shangfu, China’s new defence minister, at the Shangri-La Dialogue security forum in Singapore in June. However, arranging such a meeting is fraught with difficulty because Li was sanctioned by the US in 2018 in relation to Chinese imports of Russian arms when he was serving as a general.

The US has told China that the sanctions do not prevent Austin from meeting Li in a third country. But several people said it would be almost impossible for China to agree to a meeting while they remain in place. Li became defence minister in March.

There was no prospect of the Biden administration removing the sanctions, some of the people said. The White House declined to comment.

The latest stalemate in US-China relations comes as the countries struggle to arrange high-level visits by American cabinet secretaries to Beijing.

Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping agreed that the countries needed to stabilise relations when they met at the G20 in Bali in November. But early efforts to kick-start high-level engagement were derailed after a suspected Chinese spy balloon flew over North America in early February.

The countries are negotiating visits to China by secretary of state Antony Blinken, Treasury secretary Janet Yellen and commerce secretary Gina Raimondo. The US is also trying to arrange the first call between Biden and Xi since the spy balloon incident.

However, Beijing is reluctant to receive Blinken because of concerns that the FBI may release a report into the Chinese balloon.

Concern over the lack of engagement between the countries’ top military officials has mounted over the past year.

Admiral John Aquilino, head of Indo-Pacific command, has been trying to meet his Chinese counterparts for two years. General Mark Milley, chairman of the joint chiefs, has also not had any communication with his counterpart since the balloon episode.

The Shangri-La Dialogue, which is run by the International Institute for Strategic Studies think-tank, frequently serves as a venue for US and Chinese defence officials to meet. Austin last year had a bilateral meeting with Wei Fenghe, Li’s predecessor.

The Pentagon said it wanted “open lines of communication” with Chinese military leaders but blamed China for the impasse. “It has been the People’s Republic of China’s decision to ignore, reject, or cancel multiple US requests for senior-level communication,” it said.

The Chinese embassy did not respond to a request for comment.

Bonnie Glaser, a China expert at the German Marshall Fund, said south-east Asian nations were increasingly uneasy with the intensity of the competition between the US and China and the lack of high-level dialogue. She said such countries would be “shocked” if Austin and Li attended Shangri-La without meeting.

“The question is, will they blame the US or China? My sense is that there is recognition in much of the region that the US has been seeking to engage with Chinese counterparts but are being stonewalled,” Glaser added.

Jude Blanchette, a China expert at the CSIS think-tank, said the dispute illustrated how “political dynamics on both sides gum up the possible stabilisation” of Washington-Beijing relations.

“The longer Beijing refuses to meet with the US, the more countries in Europe and across Asia will come to see Chinese behaviour as intransigence,” Blanchette said.

Evan Medeiros at Georgetown University said the best way for the US to achieve its aim of “deterring and constraining China” was to show its Asian partners it was “always open to dialogue with Beijing”.

“The US needs to find a compromise solution for the sake of its strategic goals,” Medeiros added.

Follow Demetri Sevastopulo on Twitter

Financial Times · by Demetri Sevastopulo · May 10, 2023

5. Exploring "White Sun War"

I just started reading this book and already I can strongly recommend it

Exploring "White Sun War"

mickryan.substack.com · by Mick Ryan, AM

At the end of April my next book will be published by Casemate Publishers. Called White Sun War, it is a fictional account of a war over Taiwan that takes place in 2028. The narrator for the story is a future historian, looking back from 2038 on the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the war.

In this respect, it is similar in structure to the Pulitzer Prize winning book, The Killer Angels, which was written by Michael Shaara and published in 1974. In that book, Shaara explores the 1863 Battle of Gettysburg through the lens of key participants on both sides. The Killer Angels is a powerful narrative of higher-level military leadership and the impact of close combat in the mid-nineteenth century and features on the reading lists of many military institutions.

White Sun War is also a story told through the perspectives of its participants. Its key characters include:

A young US Army captain who commands a Cavalry Troop that is newly organised unit with a mix of humans and robotic ground combat systems (human-machine teaming).
A Taiwanese soldier working in the headquarters of a mechanised brigade from the Republic of China Army.
A US Space Force Technical Sergeant whose speciality is orbital warfare.
A Chinese Colonel who commands one of the People’s Liberation Army’s Marine Brigades that is sent to Taiwan.
A Colonel in the US Marine Corps commanding one of the new Marine Littoral Regiments in the Western Pacific that is dispatched to Taiwan.

These characters provide a mix of different viewpoints on modern and near future warfare, from both old and new military organisational constructs.

Why Fiction?

Some may question why I have turned to fiction as the follow to my previous non-fiction book, War Transformed, that was published in February 2022. There are a couple of reasons. First, I wanted to make the material as accessible as possible. Despite my best efforts, even the best written non-fiction books on war and competition contain a certain level of jargon that some find difficult to understand. I find that fiction allows the use more accessible language to examine some of the complexities of humans and technology in war.

A second reason for writing a fictional account is that it allows the exploration of alternate organisations and operational scenarios without compromising real world war plans or capabilities. Despite the open nature of democratic societies, some military technologies and future plans are by necessity kept secret. Fiction allows us to explore potential futures free from this security constraint. As Peter Singer and August Cole have described the application of narrative, which they call Useful Fiction, it can employ engaging and plausible storylines to introduce readers to novel trends and problems.

And finally, I wanted to use my imagination about some of the impacts of the Chinese military build-up in the western Pacific and the impacts of the war in Ukraine. One the worst things that an institution can be accused of is to have a failure of imagination. Such a concept has been the foundation of strategic failure in the past (it was explicitly mentioned in the 9/11 Commission Report). I hope that by using my imagination, and creating a worst case outcome in the Indo-Pacific security environment, it might inform today’s decision makers about the potential outcomes of such a conflict. And why it is so important to deter such a war.

Thinking About Future War

Many military institutions engage in thinking about, wargaming and planning for the next war. They often get it wrong. Often this is because the wrong lessons are taken from previous conflicts. This is because the context or political objectives of future warfare diverge from those of the conflict from which lessons were taken.

In White Sun War, I have attempted to apply knowledge of Chinese military strategy, speeches by President Xi about Taiwan and China’s build-up of military forces while mixing in observations from the ongoing war in Ukraine. There are many relevant lessons from the war in Ukraine that might apply to conflict over Taiwan in the future. These include:

The importance of narratives and strategic influence operations. While Ukraine has demonstrated a mastery of maintaining a strategic narrative that has resulted in significant foreign assistance, the Chinese government has also invested in its influence operations in the Western Pacific and beyond.
The importance of logistics and national industrial capacity. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that the era of mass, and the competition between industrial systems, has returned to war in the 21st century. It is very likely that any conflict over Taiwan will also place a premium on assured logistics, the productive capacity of the belligerents as well as the strategic and operational transportation systems to move people, equipment and supplies into and out of theatre.
Understanding that while technology is a vital part of war, it is the application of new technologies in conjunction with new organisations and new concepts of employment (tactics) that will ensure the best chance of military success.
The near transparency of war. One of the most transformative impacts of the war in Ukraine has been the explosion in open-source reporting on the war, and its meshing with government and military information to form a virtual meshed collection-analysis-dissemination cycle. This has involved governments releasing classified intelligence to pre-empt Russian activities as well as the widespread participation in information warfare by hacktivists and citizen journalists. This is likely to be the case in any Taiwan contingency, although China is almost certain to want to do everything it can to deny transparency of the war.
Both Ukraine and Taiwan are young democracies being preyed upon by large, technologically sophisticated authoritarian regimes who care little for human rights and freedoms. In this respect, there is great similarity in purpose in defending Ukraine and defending Taiwan.
Finally, the war in Ukraine has again demonstrated how importance leadership is. While Ukrainian President Zelensky is the best example, battlefield leadership, alliance leadership and national leadership from nations supporting Ukraine has also come to the fore. This is almost certain to play a major role in a war over Taiwan.

Despite these observations from Ukraine and their relevance for Taiwan, there are many differences between Ukraine and Taiwan which I make clear throughout White Sun War:

First, geography is the obvious difference. Not only is Taiwan smaller and geographically isolated from China, but it is much further away from nations that might be able to provide support to it during a war than is Ukraine. This would have a significant bearing on any conflict, particularly in the early days.
White Sun War, and any Taiwan contingency, will have a much more significant air and naval (including under water) components. While the air and naval aspects of the war in Ukraine are not insignificant, they are minor compared to the land campaign. This is not the case for Taiwan or for the story in White Sun War, which sees the vast majority of the story taking place in the urban littoral.
Likewise, the importance of space-based capabilities and on-orbit operations in Taiwan is vastly greater than in Ukraine. Notwithstanding the very important capability provided by StarLink terminals, Taiwan (and the White Sun War narrative) feature space operations heavily.
White Sun War, unlike Ukraine, features a multi-national combat force that is involved in the defence of Taiwan. While Western nations have provided billions in military and intelligence assistance to Ukraine, there is no ‘boots on the ground’. This is very different in White Sun War, and any likely scenario where there is a conflict over Taiwan.

A Future Campaign for Taiwan?

The great tragedy of any future war for Taiwan is that it is likely to be the result of a human miscalculation about the other side’s capabilities and willpower. Just as Putin miscalculated Ukrainian unity and resolve, as well as the interest and patience of the west in supporting Ukraine, it is very possible the Chinese Communist Party could make a similar miscalculation about the resolve of Taiwan or America.

A war in the western Pacific would be catastrophic for the region. Beyond the massive human and material costs suffered by the people of Taiwan, and the high causalities likely to be suffered by all combatants, it would introduce the spectre of nuclear war in the Pacific and would certainly produce a global economic shock that would take years to recover from.

A successful Chinese invasion, which would still cost tens of thousands (and probably hundreds of thousands) of lives would reorder regional and global politics. A failed Chinese invasion would be devastating for how China sees itself and would have severe consequences for President Xi. All of these issues are explored throughout White Sun War.

Far from glorifying war, the novel aims to demonstrate just how high the costs of such miscalculation might be in the hope that war over Taiwan can be avoided.

White Sun War will be released in April 2023 and is available for pre-order at Casemate, Amazon, WH Smith (UK), and Angus and Robertson (Australia) among others.

Thanks for reading Futura Doctrina! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.

mickryan.substack.com · by Mick Ryan, AM

6. From 'Victory Day'... to running away! Footage shows humiliating Russian retreat in Bakhmut after Putin was forced to scale back annual military parade due to his army's devastating losses

From 'Victory Day'... to running away! Footage shows humiliating Russian retreat in Bakhmut after Putin was forced to scale back annual military parade due to his army's devastating losses

Russian forces were overwhelmed by Ukraine's 3rd Assault Brigade, reports said
Footage showed them fleeing across an open field as Kyiv's troops advanced

By CHRIS JEWERS and WILL STEWART

PUBLISHED: 03:46 EDT, 10 May 2023 | UPDATED: 07:51 EDT, 10 May 2023

Daily Mail · by Chris Jewers · May 10, 2023

Russian forces made a humiliating retreat on Tuesday in the battle for Bakhmut, according to dramatic footage, on the same day Putin was forced to scale back his annual military parade due to his army's devastating losses.

The video appears to confirm reports that Vladimir Putin's regular forces 'turned and ran', with Ukraine claiming it is gaining ground around the fiercely contested city after months of incremental Russian advances.

Footage shows Russian forces fleeing the frontline around the eastern city after being overwhelmed by Ukraine's 3rd Assault Brigade.

This had been alleged first by close Kremlin henchman Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner mercenary army, as he blasted the performance of the Russian armed forces and especially their commanders in the battle that has raged on for months.

The footage of the Russian retreat was posted online - embarrassingly - as Putin in his annual Red Square Victory Day parade speech on Tuesday told his troops: 'Your combat activities now are of paramount importance. The country's security depends on you today as does the future of our statehood and our people.'

Russian forces made a humiliating retreat on Tuesday in the battle for Bakhmut, according to this dramatic aerial footage, on the same day Putin was forced to scale back his annual military parade due to his army's devastating losses

The footage of the Russian retreat was posted online - embarrassingly - as President Vladimir Putin, in his annual Red Square Victory Day parade speech on Tuesday (pictured), told his troops: 'Your combat activities now are of paramount importance'

A single Second World War-era T-34 tank is seen rolling through Moscow's Red Square on Tuesday as part of Vladimir Putin's Victory Day parade. The parade normally sees dozens of the most up-to-date military hardware Russia has in its arsenal on display

Ukraine claims that it eliminated 64 Russian 'occupant' fighters, and left 87 more wounded, while capturing many PoWs on the southwestern outskirts of Bakhmut.

According to the US-based think tank the Institute for the Study of War, Prigozhin claimed Russia's 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 3rd Army Corps abandoned a strategic position, resulting in 500 Wagner casualties.

What's more, reports say several depots of Russian ammunition including mortars were destroyed along with armoured personnel carriers.

The video - a combination of drone and first-person footage - showed Ukraine's forces advancing rapidly across an open field near Bakhmut.

The drone footage shows the tank rolling through a treeline while firing off a machine gun, as Russian soldiers are seen turning and running.

Ukrainian soldiers are then seen advancing through the trees, ruthlessly picking off any stragglers that have chosen to hold their positions.

Other Russian soldiers are seen running out of military transport vehicles and fleeing through another treeline, which they are chased into by Ukrainian forces.

One part of the footage shows Ukrainian artillery landing near a personnel carrier - one of four Russian vehicles sat in a line in the open field.

Meanwhile, the first person footage from a Ukrainian soldier shows a gun battle on the ground. Kyiv's troops are seen firing off shots as they move through a ditch as Putin's troops turn tails and run in the opposite direction.

Over many months pro-Putin forces have inched forwards in a stalemate battle that has cost thousands of lives on both sides.

Now, with Ukraine poised to stage another counter offensive, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's troops have scored a significant local victory.

'The advance of the [Ukrainian] 3rd Assault Brigade defeated units of the [Russian] 72nd Brigade,' said Colonel Andriy Biletsky, of the Ukrainian national guards, formerly head of the Azov brigade.

'The 6th and 8th companies of that [Russian] brigade were completely destroyed. The brigade's reconnaissance force is defeated,' he said.

'A significant number of BMPs [infantry fighting vehicles] were destroyed and many prisoners were taken. The so-called 3rd assault squad of the Wagner [Russian private military company] suffered significant losses.

'The offensive was conducted in an area 3 kilometres [1.9 miles] wide and 2.6km [1.6 miles] deep,' Biletsky continued.

'The entire area was completely liberated from the Russian occupying forces.'

In the video message he told his Ukrainian troops: 'It is a great honour to fight beside you, to serve with you, to command you. You are real warriors, real heroes who have shown what the Ukrainian fighting spirit is. Glory to Ukraine.'

The main Russian push in Bakhmut has been by Wagner forces, mainly mercenaries, volunteers and convicts freed from jail to fight by Putin.

Russian troops are seen fleeing across an open field away from advancing Ukrainian forces, who are said to have overwhelmed Russian positions near Bakhmut

A blast from an artillery shell is seen just feet away from a Russian military transport vehicle near the city of Bakhmut

Colonel Andriy Biletsky, of the Ukrainian national guards, gave an update on the situation around Bakhmut in a post on social media. He said Russia's '6th and 8th companies [...] were completely destroyed. The brigade's reconnaissance force is defeated'

In a desperate attempt to seize the city earlier in the conflict, Wagner employed 'human wave' tactics, crashing unit after unit against Ukraine's defences.

Estimates suggest as many as 40,000 Wagner fighters were killed.

Despite the massive push, Ukraine's defenders have managed to cling on to parts of the city and stopped Russia from advancing any further west in the region.

Prigozhin again threatened today to pull his forces out of Bakhmut due to a lack of ammunition supplies by the Russian defence ministry.

He was threatened with treason if he did so.

A furious Prigozhin savaged Putin's forces as a fish - rotting from the head.

He accused Russian commanders appointed by Putin of allowing their soldiers to die in vain. 'One of the Ministry of Defence's detachments ran away from one of the flanks,' said a raging Prigozhin. They abandoned their positions.

'All of them ran away' - leaving a key area of the frontline exposed.

'This is not the problem of soldiers, but of those who manage them and set their tasks,' said billionaire Prigozhin, nicknamed Putin's 'chef', who set up Wagner in support of the dictator.

He has repeatedly warned of the failures in Russia's high command, suggesting it can lead to losing the war to Ukraine.

'A fish rots from its head, and if decision-making is done through the ****, soldiers leave because there is no point to die in vain.'

Yesterday, he said his fighters had yet to receive ammunition promised to them by the military - but that they would continue to fight in the embattled eastern city of Bakhmut despite earlier threatening to withdraw them.

The threat of departure marked another flare-up in Prigozhin's long-running dispute with Russia's military brass over credit and tactics in the war.

On Tuesday, he contrasted the pomp of the May 9 celebrations, broadcast across Russia, with the reality on the ground.

'Victory Day marks the victory of our grandfathers; we did not deserve a single bit of this victory. The counteroffensive will be on the ground, not on television,' Prigozhin warned, adding that the Russian state is 'unable to defend the country.'

Prigozhin has become known for such inflammatory, headline-grabbing statements, particularly at key moments when attention is focused elsewhere - but issuing them on Victory Day was remarkably bold.

Hundreds of Russian servicemen march through Moscow's Red Square on May 9 after Putin's Victory Day address

Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu drives an Aurus cabriolet during a military parade on Victory Day, which marks the 78th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in World War Two, in Red Square in central Moscow, Russia May 9

Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems drive in front of the Kremlin in Moscow, May 9, after the parade

Footage of the retreat came after Putin hosted Russia's annual May 9 Victory Day parade to mark the 78th anniversary of the Soviet Union's defeat of Nazi Germany.

'Today civilization is once again at a decisive turning point,' Putin said at the annual commemorations 'A real war has been unleashed against our motherland.'

The Russian leader has repeatedly sought to paint his invasion of Ukraine as necessary to defend against a Western threat. Kyiv and its Western allies say they pose no such threat and that Moscow's war is meant to deter Western influence in a country that Russia considers part of its sphere of influence.

Putin has often used patriotic rhetoric that harkens back to the earlier war in an effort to rally his citizens and forces - and May 9 is one of the most important dates in the Russian political calendar.

But this year's celebrations were markedly smaller, at least partially because of security concerns after several drone attacks have been reported inside Russia.

Some 8,000 troops took part in the parade in Moscow's Red Square on Tuesday - the lowest number since 2008. Even the procession in 2020, the year of the Covid-19 pandemic, featured some 13,000 soldiers, and last year, 11,000 troops took part.

There was no fly-over of military jets, and the event lasted less than the usual hour.

'This is weak. There are no tanks,' said Yelena Orlova, watching the vehicles rumble down Moscow's Novy Arbat avenue after leaving Red Square. 'We're upset, but that's all right; it will be better in the future.'

The Kremlin's forces deployed in Ukraine are defending a front line stretching more than 600 miles, presumably thinning the ranks of troops available for such displays.

'This is supposed to be a showpiece for Russian military might. But so much of that military might has already been mauled in Ukraine that Russia has very little to show on its parade in Red Square,' said Keir Giles, a Russia expert at London's Chatham House think tank.

As a display of military hardware it was 'very underwhelming', said Michael Clarke, visiting professor of war studies at King's College London, noting that the T-34, the iconic World War II tank, was the only tank on display.

'Normally they show off all the really modern stuff, and they didn't have any of those. Nor did they seem to have armored fighting vehicles. So there was nothing new on display.'

Meanwhile, the traditional Immortal Regiment processions, in which crowds take to the streets holding portraits of relatives who died or served in World War II - a pillar of the holiday - were canceled in multiple cities.

'That seems to be for fear that those people who have lost their relatives in this current war on Ukraine might actually join the processions and show just the scale of the casualties that Russia has suffered in its current war,' Giles said.

Russian media counted 24 cities that also scrapped military parades - another staple of the celebrations - for the first time in years.

Regional officials blamed unspecified 'security concerns' or vaguely referred to 'the current situation' for the restrictions and cancellations. It wasn't clear whether their decisions were taken in coordination with the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, Russia's air defence forces shot down an 'enemy' drone in the Kursk region bordering Ukraine, its governor said on Wednesday, adding that falling debris damaged a gas pipeline and a house.

Ukrainian army Grad multiple rocket launcher fires rockets at Russian positions in the frontline near Bakhmut, Donetsk region, Ukraine, May 3

Ukrainian soldiers fire a cannon near Bakhmut, the eastern city where fierce battles against Russian forces have been taking place, in the Donetsk region, Ukraine, May 3

Smoke erupts following a shell explosion, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Bakhmut, Donetsk region, Ukraine, in a video released on May 7

'Debris fell in the village of Tolmachevo. No one was hurt,' the regional governor, Roman Starovoyt, said on the Telegram messaging app.

Reuters was not able to immediately verify the report.

Ukraine almost never publicly claims responsibility for attacks inside Russia and on Russian-controlled territory in Ukraine.

However, Kyiv has recently said that undermining Russia's logistics is part of preparation for a planned counteroffensive.

Daily Mail · by Chris Jewers · May 10, 2023

7. Navigation tools, electric-powered fleet top of mind for special ops

Excerpts:

Beyond current modifications, the rotary-wing fleet is expected to undergo major technology changes. For example, the Army is acquiring future vertical lift aircraft — the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft and the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft.

In 2022, command officials pushed industry on electric-powered options to replace the AH-6M for close air support and the MH-6M for troop transport. New aircraft should more than double the speed of the existing fleet, according to program requirements.

The aircraft is expected to continuously receive upgrades and use until 2033. Following that, the command seeks to sustain and divest by 2040.

The Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft will take over many mission needs as it enters the field, Downer noted.

Meanwhile, the electric-powered effort is proving difficult, Downer said.

Navigation tools, electric-powered fleet top of mind for special ops

Defense News · by Todd South · May 10, 2023

TAMPA, Fla. — Special operations rotary-wing pilots need to be able to navigate without GPS, and the fleet itself is in need of electric-powered aircraft, according to the program executive officer for U.S. Special Operations Command’s rotary-wing assets.

Those features are not simply nice to have, but are necessities to keep these crucial platforms flying in contested environments, Geoff Downer said Tuesday at the SOF Week conference in Florida.

“We know the window is closing to stay on GPS when denied,” Downer said, referring to technology that can prevent access to positioning systems. The military services are already trying to ensure navigation for the warfighter, but “flying 100-300 feet at 120 knots causes a unique problem for some solutions that are out there.”

Additionally, to expand the pilot’s situational awareness, the command is looking for better sensor data fusion — a recently funded objective. That effort would merge systems and draw different information from the same sensors, thereby reducing the payload of the aircraft, he explained.

For more than four decades each system added to nearly any aircraft did about one thing, which led to stovepiped features and the addition of evermore technology onto platforms that need to be lean and fast.

As an example, Downer noted that special operations personnel were able to cut 1,000 pounds from the MH-60M Black Hawk by changing wiring and making structural modifications. They increased the lift by 300 pounds using a 10% rotor tip modification.

That’s the sweet spot for SOCOM, Downer said, because often the organization takes what the services provide, and then get to work on modifications that fit mission sets.

That approach has proved its worth, as SOCOM continues to use airframes that date back to the Vietnam War, such as the MH-47G Chinook. Though nearly everything on those aircraft was replaced or upgraded multiple times.

Beyond current modifications, the rotary-wing fleet is expected to undergo major technology changes. For example, the Army is acquiring future vertical lift aircraft — the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft and the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft.

In 2022, command officials pushed industry on electric-powered options to replace the AH-6M for close air support and the MH-6M for troop transport. New aircraft should more than double the speed of the existing fleet, according to program requirements.

The aircraft is expected to continuously receive upgrades and use until 2033. Following that, the command seeks to sustain and divest by 2040.

The Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft will take over many mission needs as it enters the field, Downer noted.

Meanwhile, the electric-powered effort is proving difficult, Downer said.

So far, the technology isn’t providing the hover time needed for special operations missions. But the team is working with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency on a program for an electric-vertical-takeoff-and-landing platform, Downer added.

About Todd South

Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.

8. Avril Haines: New ODNI Office Oversees Intelligence Community's Fight Against Disinformation

Below the article is the legislation followed by the description from the ODNI web page.

I wonder how this will compare to the Active Measures Working Group established during the Raegan administration.

Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference

By Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb

https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-11.pdf

Avril Haines: New ODNI Office Oversees Intelligence Community's Fight Against Disinformation

executivegov.com · May 8, 2023

News

Avril Haines: New ODNI Office Oversees Intelligence Community’s Fight Against Disinformation

May 8, 2023

1 min read

Avril Haines

§3059. Foreign Malign Influence Center

(a) Establishment

There is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a Foreign Malign Influence Center (in this section referred to as the "Center").

(b) Functions and composition

The Center shall-

(1) be comprised of analysts from all elements of the intelligence community, including elements with diplomatic and law enforcement functions;

(2) have access to all intelligence and other reporting possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to foreign malign influence;

(3) serve as the primary organization in the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to foreign malign influence; and

(4) provide to employees and officers of the Federal Government in policy-making positions and Congress comprehensive assessments, and indications and warnings, of foreign malign influence.

(1) Appointment

There is a Director of the Center, who shall be the head of the Center, and who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.

(2) Role

The Director of the Center shall-

(A) report directly to the Director of National Intelligence;

(B) carry out the functions under subsection (b); and

(C) at the request of the President or the Director of National Intelligence, develop and provide recommendations for potential responses by the United States to foreign malign influence.

(d) Annual reports

(1) In general

In addition to the matters submitted pursuant to subsection (b)(4), at the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, but not less than once each year, the Director of the Center shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on foreign malign influence.

(2) Matters included

Each report under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the period covered by the report, a discussion of the following:

(A) The most significant activities of the Center.

(B) Any recommendations the Director determines necessary for legislative or other actions to improve the ability of the Center to carry out its functions, including recommendations regarding the protection of privacy and civil liberties.

(e) Termination

After December 31, 2028, the Director of National Intelligence may terminate the Center, but only if the Director of National Intelligence submits to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a determination that the termination of the Center is appropriate, which includes-

(1) a detailed description that other offices or entities within the intelligence community-

(A) have the capabilities to perform the functions of the Center; and

(B) will exercise the functions of the Center upon the termination of the Center; and

(2) a detailed description of-

(A) the actions the Director of National Intelligence will take to conduct an orderly wind-down of the activities of the Center; and

(B) the proposed timeline for such actions.

(f) Definitions

In this section:

(1) Covered foreign country

The term "covered foreign country" means the following:

(A) The Russian Federation.

(B) The Islamic Republic of Iran.

(D) The People's Republic of China.

(E) Any other foreign country that the Director of the Center determines appropriate for purposes of this section.

(2) Foreign malign influence

The term "foreign malign influence" means any hostile effort undertaken by, at the direction of, or on behalf of or with the substantial support of, the government of a covered foreign country with the objective of influencing, through overt or covert means-

(A) the political, military, economic, or other policies or activities of the United States Government or State or local governments, including any election within the United States; or

(B) the public opinion within the United States.

(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, §119C, as added Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LIII, §5322(a), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2129 ; amended Pub. L. 117–263, div. F, title LXIII, §6307(a)(1), (b), Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3504 , 3505.)

Editorial Notes

Amendments

2022-Pub. L. 117–263, §6307(a)(1)(A), struck out "Response" after "Influence" in section catchline.

Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 117–263, §6307(a)(1)(B), struck out "Response" after "Influence".

Subsecs. (e), (f). Pub. L. 117–263, §6307(b), added subsec. (e) and redesignated former subsec. (e) as (f).

Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries

Reference to Foreign Malign Influence Response Center

Pub. L. 117–263, div. F, title LXIII, §6307(a)(4), Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3505 , provided that: "Any reference in law, regulation, map, document, paper, or other record of the United States to the 'Foreign Malign Influence Response Center' shall be deemed to be a reference to the Foreign Malign Influence Center."

Foreign Malign Influence Center

ORGANIZATION

https://www.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-who-we-are/organization/340-about/organization/foreign-malign-influence-center

FMIC is organized around three lines of effort: Analytic Integration, Mission Management, and Partner Engagement. FMIC works closely with the National Intelligence Council, the National Intelligence Management Council, and our partners across the Intelligence Community.

Analytic Integration

FMIC’s analytic integration focuses on advancing strategic analysis on the FMI problem set, producing assessments of the global threat and U.S. response and warnings, identifying gaps in production, establishing common standards, and providing indications and warning.

Mission Management

FMIC’s mission management unit focuses on defining the FMI mission space, integrating with existing ODNI intelligence management functions, supporting robust collection, monitoring programmatic investments, and developing capabilities.

Partner Engagement

FMIC’s partner engagement unit works by, with, and through partners, such as the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to promote awareness of the FMI threat. Efforts include downgrading or declassifying intelligence as appropriate, furthering efforts to develop solutions to difficult and systemic problems, and helping strengthen resiliency efforts.

Foreign malign influence poses a significant threat to democracy and U.S. interests. The Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC) is charged with strengthening Intelligence Community (IC) efforts to counter the enduring threat posed by hostile foreign actors seeking to influence the U.S. Government, state and local governments, or public opinion and behaviors through overt or covert means. This can include efforts to expose foreign operations to influence U.S. public opinion, interfere in elections within the United States, or steer policy and regulatory decisions in favor of a foreign actor.

FMIC serves as the primary U.S. Government organization for integrating intelligence analysis and reporting pertaining to foreign malign influence, including election security. It utilizes expertise from all elements of the IC, including departments and agencies elements with diplomatic and law enforcement functions. FMIC is committed to protecting our democratic processes and institutions from foreign influence and interference. In particular, election security is a top priority for the IC.

HISTORY

The Foreign Malign Influence Center was activated on September 23, 2022. Chartered by Congress and established by the DNI, FMIC serves as the primary U.S. Government organization for analyzing and integrating all intelligence and other reporting possessed or acquired pertaining to foreign malign influence, including election security.

FMIC is the successor organization to the ODNI Election Threats Executive, which was established in 2019 to serve as the DNI’s principal advisor on election threats and related security matters. Election security remains a key mission of the FMIC, and the Director remains dual-hatted as the Election Threats Executive, serving as the coordinating authority for the IC on election security and reporting directly to the DNI.

MISSION

To counter enduring threats to democracy and U.S. national interests from foreign malign influence actors by integrating analysis, managing the intelligence mission, nurturing partnerships, and providing indications and warning of foreign malign influence.

VISION

FMIC protects U.S. citizens from hostile foreign influence, safeguards democratic institutions, and defends U.S. interests.

VALUES

Trust. Transparency. Partnership.

MOTTO

Exposing deception in defense of liberty.

Jeffrey K. Wichman

Jeffrey K. Wichman serves as the acting Director of the Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC) and the ODNI’s Election Threats Executive (ETE). In these roles, Jeffrey leads the Intelligence Community’s ongoing efforts to identify and assess foreign influence and interference in U.S. elections – a task that remains paramount amidst the other challenges facing the United States.

Jeffrey joined ODNI with more than 30 years of experience at CIA, where he most recently served as Chief of Analysis for the Counterintelligence Mission Center. He also served as Deputy Chief of Analysis and Chief of Analysis in the Center for Cyber Intelligence and held other analytic roles focusing on weapons and counterproliferation and counterterrorism. In addition, Jeffrey oversaw leadership and management training at CIA’s Sherman Kent School, where all CIA analysts hone their analytic tradecraft.

Jeffrey earned an M.S. in National Security Strategy from the National War College in June 2010 and B.A. degrees in Political Science and History from the University of Iowa in 1988.

9. To Counter China, the U.S. Is Expanding Its Footprint in the Pacific

A nearly 7 minute video at the link link. It features MG Joe Ryan, Commanding General of the 25th ID speaking from the Philippines as well as on a naval vessel with Army HIMARS and flying with the Marines on an MV-22, landing on islands north of Luzon.

https://www.wsj.com/video/series/shelby-holliday/to-counter-china-the-us-is-expanding-its-footprint-in-the-pacific/1C9CBB23-7382-43C6-BAA7-F1F4CFAA5F9E?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1

To Counter China, the U.S. Is Expanding Its Footprint in the Pacific

The U.S. strategy is part of a broader effort to strengthen its arc of alliances in the region

By Shelby HollidayFollow

May 10, 2023 5:30 am

The U.S. is trying to counter China’s militarization of the Pacific by strengthening alliances and gaining access to bases near Taiwan and the South China Sea. WSJ’s Shelby Holliday traveled to the Philippines to see how the strategy is playing out.

Shelby Holliday

Shelby Holliday goes in search of the little-known stories behind big business and news headlines, revealing the surprising ramifications for individuals.

10. Rethinking a Conservative Foreign Policy

Listen to the interview with Eldridge Colby at the link. Transcript below.

https://www.wsj.com/podcasts/opinion-free-expression/rethinking-a-conservative-foreign-policy/627e6201-fa78-4c55-a3f5-1eedcc9b3618?page=1

How can U.S. foreign policy succeed in a new age of great power confrontation? Does the challenge of an ascendant China mean U.S. support for a European war against Russia is a dangerous distraction? On this episode of the Free Expression Podcast, conservative foreign policy analyst Elbridge Colby tells Wall Street Journal editor at large Gerry Baker what's at stake for the United States if China invades Taiwan, why it's time for Europe to step up in support for Ukraine and how Donald Trump transformed Republican foreign policy thinking.

FULL TRANSCRIPT

This transcript was prepared by a transcription service. This version may not be in its final form and may be updated.

Speaker 1: From the opinion pages of The Wall Street Journal, this is Free Expression with Gerry Baker.

Gerry Baker: Hello, and welcome to Free Expression with me, Gerry Baker from the Wall Street Journal editorial page. Delighted you're joining us. If you're not already as subscriber, please do sign up wherever you get your podcasts. Over the next couple of weeks, I'm going to be taking a deeper look at the state of modern conservative thinking in America. Now, there's no doubt that the last decade has seen the fracturing of the political coalition built by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s that led the Republican Party and drove it for 30 years or more. That coalition composed very broadly of business interests, Evangelical Christians, national security hawks, developed a governing philosophy that matched its respective interests. Tax cuts and small government on the economy, social and culturally conservative approaches to issues such as abortion, and a very assertive and aggressive foreign policy. Disillusionment with the direction of the country in the last few years has seen that coalition fragment. At home, rising economic inequality and stagnation has cast doubt on the virtue of a single-minded, tax cutting, pro-business approach, the advance of progressive ideology through the major institutions has radicalized social conservatives, and the failures associated with foreign policy interventionism, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, have discredited neo-conservatives and revived an attraction to isolationism. In 2015, Donald Trump came along, and channeling many of the frustrations voters felt with Republican leadership, rested the party away from these groups and drove it in new directions. While Trump's politics remained singular and highly personal, his continuing appeal owes at least in part to his offering of a distinctly new form of populist conservatism. For some time, many conservatives have sought to rationalize and developed these new strands of conservatism to build a new governing philosophy. In our next episode, next week, we'll take a look at what this means for domestic policy, in economic and social policy especially. But this week we're going to examine the emerging contours of a new conservative foreign policy. My guest is Elbridge Colby, one of the leading modern conservative national security thinkers. Colby's a founding member of the Marathon Initiative, a think tank dedicated to preparing the US for a period of great power competition. He served in the Trump administration as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense, and was a leading figure in the formulation of the 2018 National Defense Strategy. He's written widely on these matters, including a book entitled The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, which The Wall Street Journal no less selected as one of the top 10 books of 2021. And Elbridge Colby joins me now. Bridge, thanks very much for joining Free Expression.

Elbridge Colby: Great to be with you Gerry.

Gerry Baker: So a lot to talk about across... I want to talk about your book and I want to talk about your overall take, obviously, on where US foreign policy, national security policy should be going. Let's start if we may, with just a quote from an article you co-wrote in Time Magazine quite recently, which I just think sort of summarizes your point about US policy in an era of great power confrontation. You say, "It's vital to frame correctly what a conservative approach to US foreign policy should be. This is to put the interests of Americans, their security, freedom and prosperity front and center. This doesn't mean disparaging the interests of others. To the contrary, it requires international collaboration. But it means forthrightly evaluating our foreign policy based on how it serves those concrete interests." Now, isn't that something that every patriotic American, everybody who wants to see America succeed in the world, isn't that the objective of everybody for US foreign policy? What is distinctive about the approach you think the US should be taking in this era of great power cooperation putting America's interest front and center in a way that others aren't?

Elbridge Colby: Well, thanks, Gerry. I mean, I think it is sort of agreed to in theory, sort of superficially, everybody eventually in the course of making an argument for whatever their preferred foreign policy is will say, "And this is in American's interest." So for instance, you'll hear Tony Blinken perorate on the rules-based international order and at some point he'll try to connect it to the American people's interests. But I think that's sort of frankly lame to be candid. And I think what's different is the term forthrightly. I think we used advisedly, which is to say, look, this is something more, and I think it's conservative, I don't think it's exclusively conservative, but I think the way conservatives sort of realistic look at the world is to say, look, I take care of my own issues first. That's my primary moral obligation. That's my responsibility as a fiduciary or a steward or whatever you want to use. And I'm going to look at that and I'm going to be unabashed about it. And that there's nothing wrong with taking care of your family first, your community first, et cetera, and you help others where you can. I do think that's a... and it's certainly a different attitude than you see in official and sort of old guard established Washington sort of post-1991. I think the connection with Americans' concrete interest has become very attenuated at best.

Gerry Baker: And the point you make in the book, and you've made in several other pieces too, and I know you were very influential in shaping the defense strategy document back in 2018 is in a sense the debates we've had in foreign policy in the last 20 years to some extent have had the polls of neo-conservative intervention remaking the world in America's likeness, the ideological zeal that behind a lot of what went on in Iraq and Afghanistan to some extent. That on the one hand. And the kind of, it's nothing to do with isolationism. On the other hand, we're not going to send a dime of American money and we're not going to lose a drop of American bloods pursuing interests any other part of the world. Tell us if you would, your conception sits between those two, doesn't it? In a very kind of a realist, traditional, almost traditional realist foreign policy approach?

Elbridge Colby: I think that's right. I think that's very well put, Gerry. And of course the only thing in the middle of the road is roadkill, but I think in this case it's a sort of a happy medium and Aristotelian medium if you will, which is between the extremes. I think Washington establishment or foreign policy since 1991 has been characterized by a hubristic approach to foreign policy and attempt to transform and sort of pacify the whole world. And whether or not that's a noble aspiration, I don't think it was realistic. Thus, it was not only unwise but not really optimally moral. But at the same time, I think there's this sort of the old isolationism and I think that term can be used as a slur sometimes, but so we'll use the term strong restraint, basically pull back from the world. I do think that's naive. I think it's actually closer to libertarianism, which is to say get the heavy hand of the state or whatever the power out of things and things will naturally equilibrate in a positive way. And I just don't think that's how human nature works. I don't think that's how societies work. So I think as you say, it's this middle course that says, "Look grounded always in concretely, let's try to be concrete and direct and in ways that are incredibly communicable to the American people. How is it that what we're talking about is practically in their interest?" And my argument is colloquial realism. I'm not talking about some academic theory, but just the basic ideal. The world's a tough place. You got to take precautions. You got to be strong when you need to be, et cetera, but you shouldn't overdo it. That kind of attitude. Then, so you look at the world that way. You say by far the top challenge is China, which is to say it's 10 times the size of Russia. I mean it's got an increasingly aggressive leader, so we don't even need to speculate about that. And the stakes are huge and I think this, Gerry, is where the rubber meets the road and where the argument is often falls across the chasm a little bit is I think Americans' concrete interests are really, really, really going to be determined by who controls Asia. I mean it sounds archaic, but I think that's ultimately what the Chinese are trying to pursue in the sense of a secure economic sphere. The stakes here economic, if the Chinese do that, you can bet they are going to make our lives here in the United States and others, in our allied countries a lot worse. Because why? They're going to make their country the top economy, the top universities, the top technology companies, the top military, the top source of information and news and media and opinion, et cetera. And that's going to be very bad for Americans. Doesn't mean we need to land on the shores of Fujian province and liberate China. I hate communism, but it doesn't mean we need to change their government. It does mean we need a balance of power. We need a situation in which Americans freedoms and economic prosperity are secure from that kind of hegemonic influence and ultimately threat.

Gerry Baker: One of the few areas where we have bipartisan agreement in this country is on this question of China. I think most people would agree with that characterization of China, of the Asia theater as the dominant theater for US foreign policy now in the next however many years, decade, half century, whatever, and that we've already entered a period of, call it Cold War 2.0 or whatever you want to call it. It's a period of rising tension between the US and China and the need for the US to deal with that effectively. But in practical terms, what does that mean? And are you being critical of what the US has done with regard to Russia in the last year supporting Ukraine, militarily and financially and with military support, with weapons and training and if all the assistance is given. But my question is, and largely on the grounds that China is the main threat, this is a distraction from China essentially. We've got to focus our resources, our attention and everything else on the China challenge, particularly Taiwan. And again, we can come to that. Why can't the US do both? Or as someone like Neil Ferguson would put it, the US doesn't have a choice. US can't say, "There's a strategic threat over there, but sorry, it's not the really big strategic threat that we're focused on, so we're not going to deal with it." Why isn't it right for the US to deal with the threat from Russia? Why is there a binary between the two?

Elbridge Colby: A couple things. First of all, I think Putin's invasion of the Ukraine is an abominable act and the Ukrainian defense of their territory is a just act. And I think we have a strong interest in Ukraine's ability to resist Russian invasion, but it's not our primary interest. And my friend Neil Ferguson, for whom I have just the highest respect actually put it very well in his interview with Peter Robinson, he said, "We can't choose." But then immediately after he said, "Well, as Bridge points out, we don't have enough to go around." Okay, so right. I mean Neil is a brilliant man and I think if he were here with us, he actually can see the point because Neil's point is we should be pursuing Datong with China. Now my view is we can get to Datong once we've built up a position of strength, but the problem is power scarcity and this, Gerry is this crucial thing. And I would humbly submit to your colleagues at the Wall Street Journal oped page. I mean I'm a big admirer of them, but they're not grappling with reality. I mean, people who for the last 10 or 15 years have been decrying too little spending on defense are now saying that we can do everything. That's just not accurate. And now it doesn't mean that we can do nothing. And my position is that is not that we should do nothing in Ukraine. My position is Wall Street Journal's got a lot of readers and businesses, if you're going to meet your priority, you focus on your priority. It's a basic truism of successful executive management, and that's not what we're doing. Instead we're saying we can walk and chew gum. Now, it's one thing for John Kirby and the Biden administration to say that because they think that allies and resolutions are going to make a difference. It's really another thing for hawks to say that and it's been a big disappointment for me over the last year to be alone on this point of we don't have enough to go around. And for people who have been saying that for years, not reckoning with the reality, and I mean you mentioned the 2018 National Defense Strategy. The biggest shift there was a shift in what's called the Force Planning Construct because we recognized we were not in a position to fight simultaneous wars, especially in a great power context, and we needed to focus on one where we were losing the edge and it's eroded further, which is vis-a-vis China. Now, this doesn't mean that again, that we don't do anything, but it means we should actually be sending particular munitions and we could rattle them through the HIMARS, the NASAMS and Patriots and so forth, but also the attention of the industrial base, which is scarce. And The Journal has been doing a lot of great reporting on this, the scarce sub-components, and those are not going to be fixed soon. So we should be saying this is the priority. Money. We've sent a ton of money to Ukraine. How much of that money has gone to Ukraine? That Congress didn't even appropriate grants for Taiwan. Yes, Taiwan's a rich country, but they're way behind the threat. That's the reality. And I think actually Gerry, that my sense of the year, really the calendar year '22, there was almost a euphoric time dimension. I understand that at a human level, but strategy should not be based on euphoria and hope and sort of romanticism. Strategy should be based on reality and empirics. And I think now we're seeing, and the administration's making clear, I mean the Ukrainians themselves are saying the offensive is not likely to do well. I hope it does do well. It's possible they kick the Russians out, but then it probably will turn into cross border war. My view is Russia will remain a serious threat, but China's already talking about 2027, and a lot of these people, especially on the right, including your colleagues at the journal oped page, are saying, oh, things are getting better. But on the other side of the page they're saying, well, we can only build 1.2 submarines until 2028, or we can't build more than two frigates, et cetera. So it's time, time, time. And my view is let's get really real about this and prioritize accordingly.

Gerry Baker: I don't speak for the journal editorial page, but let me say what I think they would say in their defense. First of all, it's perfectly consistent to say, yes, we need to support this Ukraine assistance to Russia on the one hand. And secondly, yes, we absolutely do need to significantly increase our defense capabilities. I don't think there's necessarily an inconsistency there. In fact, the commitments we're making to Ukraine only highlight the defense gap that we have and enhance the need for us to redouble our efforts. That's the first thing. The second point they'd also say, and a lot of people very strongly support the Ukraine War would say is it's not an either or between Ukraine and Taiwan or Russia and China. It is actually an end because Russia is, as the two countries repeatedly demonstrate and declare, China's closest ally. They've committed themselves to this alliance without limits. Russia, Putin pretty well sought the approval of Xi Jinping, I think before he certainly forewarned Xi Jinping about his invasion of Ukraine before it happened. And defeating Russia or in even just inflicting massive military losses, which clearly Ukraine has already done, massive strategic setbacks for Russia in Ukraine, by the way, not the loss of any American lives, but just a lot, I agree with the expenditure of American treasure. Achieving that is an enormously effective blow in terms of improving America's strategic position, both vis-a-vis Russia, but also vis-a-vis Russia's great ally China.

Elbridge Colby: Right? Let me take this in sequence. One, the problem with that argument is time, time, time is central, right? So we are depleting and using up things that cannot be replaced for years. If you look at the CSIS weapons tracker, these things are not going to be replaced for sometimes up to close to 10 years. So that's the reality. And Xi Jinping's date, we don't know, but the orienting point is 2027, so things are very unlikely to be replaced. And that's the fundamental problem is that people who know about the defense industrial base know that those problems are not going to be quickly fixed. In fact, the situation may actually be getting worse before it gets better. So we need to live in the here and now, right? This is the critical important. Secondly, there are direct trade-offs. For instance, some people say that Taiwan would not be ground war. That's false. In fact, the CSIS study that I actually think was relatively sanguine on our performance said the number one thing is the performance of Taiwanese ground forces because we would have to assume that the Chinese would land substantial forces by air and sea on the island of Taiwan and air defense, which is a critical thing. By the way. I think one of the reasons that the administration may now be actually pushing towards negotiations is they realize this problem is becoming more acute, especially because we have depleted a lot of stockpiles and we are going to increasingly be cutting into bone. Your third point that China and Russia are connected, actually Gerry, I think this makes the case for focusing on China all the more, because 15 years ago, if China had asked Russia to distract the United States to help them with a Taiwan scenario, the Russians would've said, "Go take a hike." Five years ago. They might have said, "Hey, well maybe we'll consider it, but I don't think so." Now they have enormous leverage. And so clearly if you're thinking from Beijing's point of view, it's a godsend if you can keep the Americans tied down in Europe and depleting their capabilities, or you broker a deal, your Nobel Peace Prize and you drive wedges with the Europeans. So now I actually think if anything, that close alignment makes all the more important that we focus rigorously because we have to assume that they would act together. And I think the last point on victory, look, I hope the Ukrainians are victorious, but we need to make strategy based on reality, which is ultimately a victory, assumes the other side agree. Right? I mean, Fiona Hill, who knows that Russians very well, she said, I think in The Post, might have been The Journal the other day, "There's no evidence." And Putin gave a huge speech at VE day. So even if the Russians fall apart, and I hope they do, we can't expect that they're just going to roll over. And even if he gets shot in the back of the head, who's he going to be replaced by? And who's that person?

Gerry Baker: Right.

Elbridge Colby: What that means is that the Russians are going to continue to be a threat to Europe over the long haul. What's my solution? Not abandoning Europe, not zeroing out our support, but getting the Europeans to step up and take primary responsible for their own conventional defense, which is well within their economic and military capacity if they put their minds to it.

Gerry Baker: Let me take them immediately on that then I've read you talking about the important that Europe should do more in its defense, and I think everybody again agrees with that, but you say time, time, time. When it comes to the need to replenish US defense material that's being used in Ukraine and that it will take years probably to replenish some of those key weapons systems that we've been contributing to Ukraine, the US has been urging the Europeans to do more in their own defense for at least 50 years. It was the dominant story in NATO throughout the Cold War, and it's been the dominant story in NATO since then. We had this great turning point moment supposedly in Germany last year where the Ukraine War made them suddenly rethink and yes, they all had to do more in their own defense. It's words. Words, isn't it? I mean, if the US had not contributed what it has contributed to Ukraine over the last year, the European contribution, A would not have been there because they would almost certainly have sought peace with Putin because of their need for his energy, and B, they wouldn't even be beginning to build up the resources necessary now. So while you say you really hope the Ukrainians beat Russia, isn't the only way to give the Ukrainians a fighting chance there, is with the US weapons because nobody else is going to supply them.

Elbridge Colby: But Gerry, that policy will lead to a neglect of the Taiwan situation. And at the end of the day, there's a choice. And the fundamental fact is that Asia is more important and China's a far more formidable rival, far more, order of magnitude more formidable. So you make very good points in a vacuum, but there are trade-offs. We can't do everything. Where are we going to take risk? Your course and the course we've been pursuing is a course that takes on greater risk in Asia, and I think that's akin to saying we have acute migraine going on right now, very painful, might go to the hospital. That's what we're focused on, but we also have acute heart disease. Haven't had the heart attack yet, but if the heart attack happens, it could kill us, right? That's the big problem. The other thing about NATO is we did a much better job of burden sharing when European NATO was a lot smaller during the Cold War, the Europeans spent close to 50%. Why? While the threat was greater, but also, you know what? We put a lot of pressure on them. Remember the Mansfield amendment? Remember the balance of payments crisis. Eisenhower was not going to get fleeced by the Western Europeans. What's happened since then is, let's be honest, the Europeans have seen, look, we can demilitarize, it's very advantaged. We can put it into social programs. And the deal with the Americans is the Americans get to be the world leader. And Madeline Albright and George W. Bush get to say they're the indispensable nation. And so the Americans occasionally will come through and ask us for more money, but until Trump, they didn't actually believe it. And I think the critical, I think it's been a major failure of this administration, and I think some Republicans as well is not to put pressure on because we're not doing them any favors. But at the end of the day, if we come to a choice, we have to choose Asia first. I mean, if Taiwan falls, the whole situation could really be undermined. And it's not like we're just going to say, "Oh, we'll go along." And by the way, the Europeans are very unlikely to back us in that situation because their economies are fundamentally tied. I mean, every other week you read in The Journal of the FT, that German or French economic delegations going to China, and of course they have to. That's the world's largest market. What are they going to do? So we have to be really realistic about what we can expect.

Gerry Baker: If the US had not done what it's done in Ukraine in the last year and had not led NATO in its solidarity with Ukraine and had not committed all that military support to Ukraine, we can reasonably assume that that Russia would've achieved most of its at least immediate objectives. It might not have been able to completely control and occupy the country, but it would've had much more success than it has. Presumably Ukraine would be suing for peace or Zelensky would either be in a grave or in some sort of Russian prison. Given that you think that the support has been wrong, are you saying that it would be, I'm not trying to mischaracterize you here, we'd have to just accept the fact that Russia had essentially annexed Ukraine, would now be threatening other Eastern European countries, would be significantly enhanced in its strategic capabilities. We just have to accept that because Europe just doesn't matter as much as Asia?

Elbridge Colby: Well, no. That's not what I'm saying at all. I mean, in fact, the Ukrainians defeated the initial Russian foray, so I disagree with your characterization of what would've happened. The Ukrainians basically on their own, based on the arming and training that had happened long before in the years since 2014, which made a lot of sense, they defeated the Russian attempt to capitate the state. So we're basically talking about something happening in the relatively eastern portions of Ukraine where the lines had stabilized, not stabilized, but the lines had formed roughly by later spring, I would imagine of last year. So I don't agree at all with your characterization of what would've happened. They weren't going to march on Kyiv.

Gerry Baker: So you're saying that $100+ billion of USA has not only been a risk from the US point of view, but actually hasn't really contributed much to the war at all?

Elbridge Colby: No. No. What I'm saying... I think it's hard to know how much of an impact this made, but I think one of the points, this odd paradox in the line of argument, some of yours, is that the Russians are both incapable of breaking through even Ukrainian lines, despite hammering themselves with the Wagner and Bakhmut and stuff, but also are on the verge. If they crack the lines, they're going to march all the way to the Alp or something like that. The Russian military has been dramatically eroded, and that's a point that you made and that has been an advantage, but that advantage is diminishing marginal returns because the Russian military, especially in its longer range power, this is not Rundstedt, this is not Guderian like going through the Arden and breaking out in Northern France. They can't even sustain. Look all those trucks that got formed up north of Kyiv in the early part of the war. So my point of view is, and I don't have teams of analysts working for me with classified information, et cetera, I'm making my based on open sources and what I can read. So I can't give you precise, but what I would've done is I would've said, "We absolutely will zealously prioritize Taiwan and if it ever comes in contrast, we're going to focus on Taiwan and we are going to put a ton of pressure on Europe, particularly Germany, to step up and do what's right." And the administration has not done that at all. So I think actually what they've done wrong is the things that you are lauding, elements of it have been positive, but it's also completely taken the air out of any sense where Europe could actually really step up because it's like, "Oh, the Americans are back. It's going to be the good old days." And yeah, they say they pivot to China, but it's never going to happen. That's what they actually think.

Gerry Baker: We're going to take a break there, but when we come back, I'll have more with Elbridge Colby on the challenge from China and how the US should be facing it. Stay with us.

Speaker 1: You're listening to free expression with Gerry Baker. Don't forget, you can listen to the latest episode anytime on your smart speaker. Just say, play the opinion Free Expression podcast. Now, back to Gerry Baker.

Gerry Baker: I'm back with Elbridge Colby leading conservative foreign policy commentator, and we're talking about the threat from China and how the US should be dealing with it. What should the US be doing right now with regard to Taiwan? When Taiwan is the obvious flashpoint in the US-China relationship.

Elbridge Colby: Dramatically greater urgency for making sure that there's a denial defense of Taiwan, and that means basically the ability to defeat a Chinese invasion of the island because I think anything short of that is going to be too risky for China. They're not going to do it. If they're going to do it. One of the lessons of Ukraine, and Bill Burns has said the same thing is don't mess around, go big or go home. If we can stop them from going big, then they will stay home. And my fear is that we are cutting it way too close. This is one of the things where we get into specifics and people tend, their eyes plays over or they think it's not important. But I would go back to the tried and truism, you know, for want of a shoe, the kingdom was lost. Right? That's the thing. Again, to use the example of the Battle of France, it was a relatively narrow breakthrough in the Arden that allowed the whole Anglo-French forces, the battling forces, to be rolled up. If you have relatively marginal breakthroughs in conventional forces or advantages, they can have major, major effects. So that's what I would do, and that means we would focus zealously, consistent, bearing in mind the limits of what our defense industrial base can do. Press the Taiwanese especially to dramatically step up their self-defense efforts. I mean, I think it's unconscionable that they're only spending 2.5% when they're next to the first superpower to arise in the international... peer superpower, since the United States itself. The first peer economy of the United States in 150 years, and they're acting like it's no big deal. Much more pressure on Japan. At the same time though, Gerry, and this is where I'm different, I would say than a lot Republicans, thought I agree with them on a lot. I think there's a lot of peacocking. John Bolton is in The Journal pages lot. I think that's peacocking. Talking a big game, provocative, probably Xi Jinping, Hitler or what have you, without backing up, that's a really... if it's really Hitler, you better make sure that you're over prepared, right? And so I would actually say I'm actually supportive of some of the things like Neil and Graham Allison and even Kissinger are pointing to. So basically we should be turning down the temperature rhetorically, but strengthening our position in a manifestly defensive way. So I think of it as speak softly and carry a big stick if we're going to go back to classical American reels.

Gerry Baker: But aren't the Chinese much more likely to take a front or a fright at the big stick than to be pleased by the softened language? Isn't the risk here that if the US dramatically contributes to the hardening of Taiwan's defenses, that dramatically reduces the timescale in which China may be thinking they'll have to move very quickly before the risks of invading Taiwan are that much greater. So I appreciate there's a balance here, but isn't that the risk that you actually provoke China into going early because they want to go before you've really done all you can to support Taiwan?

Elbridge Colby: Well, yes, that is unfortunately a dynamic. That was the dynamic that I had hoped that we would avoid when I was doing the National Defense Strategy was to get ahead of the problem that we could strengthen our position in the Pacific so much that we would not face this problem. Now we are in a situation where we have essentially two choices. We can strengthen our position. The Chinese would very seriously think that they may have a closing window of opportunity, which is a real problem, and we can try to mitigate it, but we can't solve it. The alternative is not really to do anything and then just be vulnerable for the Chinese. Which I don't think is a prudent course of action. So I think the best we can do again, is to speak softly and carry a big stick and really focus our military investments and capabilities and what we do with our allies on things that would matter for this fight. So actually in a lot of ways, I think office is a positive achievement, but there's been a lot of attention. It's over the long haul. I actually think we need things that are much more in the next five to 10 years that are just going to make it very difficult for the Chinese to effectuate this. And I think my message to the Chinese to say, "Look, A, this is not about dismembering China." I think some of the hot rhetoric on the CCP is ill-advised. And I hate communism, but that's not the point. We don't want to turn this any more into an existential cage match. Then we absolutely have to. And the second point is, look, if you're China, this is a cosmic role of the dice. There are potentially enormous benefits involved. Absolutely, that is true, but you are also going to take on the Americans, and if we are capable and resolute and focused, there's a big chance that they could fail and that's going to go very badly for China and certainly Chinese leadership. So there are big downsides, but this test is not over yet.

Gerry Baker: Do you think the US political and diplomatic posture towards China and Taiwan needs to change too? Obviously it's maintained this rather curious strategic ambiguity for decades since essentially recognized the people's Republic back in the early seventies committed to itself to supporting the People's Republics' One China approach. Should China attempt to retake Taiwan by force than the (inaudible) reserve, the right to come to Taiwan's aid. Now seen in the last year, Biden has sort of walked all over that, wandered all over that strategic ambiguity by repeatedly saying the US would defend Taiwan and then it had to be walked back. Do you think the time has come for a much more direct repudiation of that strategic ambiguity and a much more direct expression of support for Taiwan?

Elbridge Colby: No, on a shift to the political status quo. So my view is American interests are best served by the political status quo defended by a stout military strand. So I don't think we should in any way signal any change to our political assessment of the island of Taiwan. Now, our view of the One China policy has always been that there are Chinese on both sides of the straight recognize there's One China. However, we have never taken a formal official position on the ultimate disposition of the island of Taiwan. That's important to maintain. I think we should stick to that position. I think that's part of what one of the steps for war avoidance is to try to communicate to the Chinese that this remains a live issue. One of the things that might precipitate them to war is if they say, "Look, we're never going to resolve this peacefully." And we should leave that door open. I think we want a future Deng Xiaoping to come back and say, "This is something that can be future generations can resolve." Xi Jinping was too hot, he was too aggressive. He caused us too many problems in the way that after Khrushchev in some sense, like Khrushchev and Datong. That kind of thing is what we want. I think what I would say is I support strategic ambiguity capital S, capital A. Which is a political arrangement that basically has its purposes, but small sc, strategic clarity. And I believe we are already there, which is that our military and our allied militaries understand that they should be prepared to fight to maintain the status quo. But I think the last thing we should be doing, and for instance just Fulton again, but was meeting with pro-independence groups on Taiwan. That is incredibly ill-advised because it's not an American interest. It's highly provocative to the Chinese. And I'm not saying that they're morally right, but if you really want to avoid a war, we should be judicious in where we take the provocations and those provocations should be ones designed to strengthen or stick our military, our defenses. And the other thing about the Chinese, yes, they're going to complain about it, but at the end of the day, the military that we're building is manifestly defensive. It's clearly designed to defend the first island chain perimeter. Now you could, the Chinese can say what they want, but this is not a military designed to land on the coast of Fujian and force the CCP out of power, or that's going to free Tibet. It's clearly not that. So at the end of the day, they're going to have their rhetoric, but they can see that they are not fundamentally threatened by it.

Gerry Baker: What message are we sending to the government and the people of Taiwan in this? Again, with your approach, sort of stepping up of Taiwan's defenses in the way that you describe diplomatically carefully, but without provoking the Chinese and the ways that you talk about. But are we not essentially in doing this, shifting further in this direction that you favor, giving the Taiwanese an implicit guarantee, engaging in a military guarantee that if they were to be attacked, then not only do they obviously have US missile systems and US warplanes and everything else, but actually the full capabilities of the US Pacific command would be brought to bear to help them defend themselves. Aren't we essentially sending them that message if we go down this route?

Elbridge Colby: It's sort of emboldening them, you mean?

Gerry Baker: Yeah, and again, pushing us more away from strategic ambiguity because it gives us a moral obligation. I mean, the more (inaudible) tone is you defend yourselves, and then it creates the moral obligation it places on us surely to come to their defense if and when they are attacked.

Elbridge Colby: Well, just on the specifics, I mean, I think if they declare independence, they should understand that's the most likely way to get us not to come to their defense. We'll make our decision based on what parameters. But they should not declare independence in my view, or get close to it. And actually in credit to President Tsai and her administration, they have not done that. Now, I don't know about future DPP administrations, but I think that's important that we communicate that we are not supporting Taiwan independence. On the other hand, that's more of a strategic issue, which is ambiguity is most tenable when there's a lopsided military balance, right? Because we could have this Kissingerian very confusing and Byzantine arrangement. The Chinese would barely leave port before they would all be sunk, until quite recently. Right? We could beat them with one hand tied behind the back and two of our fingers tied to our hands. Right? That was the reality. That has fundamentally changed in that situation ambiguity is very dangerous because ambiguity basically says, it gives you more flexibility notionally as the guarantor. But it also says to the potential aggressor, well, I can more reasonably calculate that they won't come, especially if the costs are high. This half pregnant idea, and this is why you've seen in the Cold War, why we have gone over time in these situations to sharp lines. So my view is it's worth defending Taiwan. It's natural. It's critical in the first island chain. It plays to our advantages as a military and society, power, which is aerospace and maritime and high technology power. On the other hand, Gerry, if we continue in the attitude where people think we can do everything all over the place, we are moving into the position where we may not be able to substantiate that commitment. And in that context, if we go back to the first principles of what's this is for? We cannot break our sphere in the defense of Taiwan. I mean, my favorite example of this is we all love Churchill, right? That Churchill wanted to send more Spitfires than hurricanes at the French request in the Battle of France in 1940. But the RAF said, "If you do that, we can't defend the home islands." We risk getting in that situation both because of our own, I would say hubris and unwillingness to reckon with reality, but also because of the Taiwanese lassitude. I mean, they should look like Israel or a minimum Finland, and that's not where they are. And that's very, very, very dangerous.

Gerry Baker: Do you think the American people would, if necessary support sending their sons and daughters to fight for and again, if necessary, die for the defense of Taiwan? Given everything that we've seen with regard to misadventures overseas in the last 20 years, where I entirely agree with you on the mistakes that have been made. Given what that's done to the way in which Americans view foreign engagements. Is Taiwan such a vital, vital part of American strategic defense that American people would support military action which could result in the loss of many, many, many American lives?

Elbridge Colby: I don't know, Gerry. And people sometimes say, "Oh, if you don't support Ukraine, are you sure they're going to support Taiwan?" I say, "No, I don't know." And that's why I'm out there making this case all the time. Because the best thing is what we did in the Cold War in Europe, which was to deter the war. And nobody knows. I mean, Ronald Reagan and others said afterwards that we never would've used nuclear weapons first, but it was sufficiently effective to keep the Soviets from invading Western Europe. Did it make sense to lose American cities to save West Germany and Denmark? Not really, but it was a sufficiently convincing strategy to deter them. That is what we want. And I think in a way it may not really be up to us because I think the Chinese are already anticipating that we would come to Taiwan's defense, and so they're likely to attack us preemptively and also our allies. And this is the key thing. It's not about Taiwan. If it were just about Taiwan, we might have a different strategy. It's about the whole position in Asia. And that's not like some geopolitical playing a game of risk or something that's like, who's the master of the world's largest economic area? Because if the Chinese defeat us in the Western Pacific, well, what's the Philippines going to do? Are Americans more willing to defend the Philippines than Taiwan? I don't think it's like... It's six of one, half dozen of the other. And in that context, it's going to be a lot harder to defend those situations because it's like if you've lost, pick your example, you're in a weaker position. So my view is we're best off holding the line where it is and being so strong and focused but also restrained at the same time that the other guy never tries it. That's. Gerry, I think core message, especially to (inaudible). Why are we taking the risk? Because these people, Xi Jinping is manifestly preparing for war and he is a brutal and ruthless guy who has purged his whole opposition. The China hands would say, well, he thinks that we're strangling him. Yes, he thinks he's acting defensively. That is the worst point. It's not like we could just throw him a couple of coins and he'd be satisfied. No, no, no. He thinks we're strangling him and he thinks this is existential. So shouldn't you be not even getting close to the edge of the cliff? And people, "Oh, well, we'll give the Ukrainians this and then we'll bomb Iran, and its nuclear program, and then we'll do this new stuff in Venezuela." Are you crazy? Really speaking, very frankly, we are really on the potential verge... Russia is not going to get to the English Channel, but China is this pure superpower. Shouldn't we act like it?

Gerry Baker: Setting aside Taiwan for the moment, the broader US China competition, the tension there, how do you see that? Again, I agree Taiwan is obviously the most important flashpoint and maybe if we do what you are describing, we can avoid outright conflict or confrontation with China. But the larger strategic challenge of a rising China, you've described it very well, much greater military capability than it had 30 years ago. Extraordinary economic growth by many measures, as big as the US. May get larger. Classic rising power, stable power, a situation. One particular question here is, how does the US navigate that given the economic integration of those two countries? Sorry to be very product, but when US companies left Russia after the invasion of Ukraine, it was a minor, minor blip in their finances. Right? That my favorite statistic is Starbucks I think had 200 stores in Russia. Starbucks has, I think there's something like 6 or 7,000 stores in China. This is the one small cultural example. The US and Chinese economies, financially, capital markets, manufacturing, and services trade are incredibly tightly intertwined. How does that play into this intensifying strategic competition that we're likely to see over the next five or 10 years?

Elbridge Colby: It's a great point, Gerry, and then actually one where I have a little bit of a heterodox view, actually, I'm more sanguine about trade than many. And the reason is because, and this is comes from my realist viewpoint, I actually think it's very difficult to turn economic leverage via things like sanctions into what I would call decisive political outcomes. If you want a country to give up it's independence or even like its WMD program, punitive WMD program in the case of Saddam Hussein or Cuba or North Korea. So that's been bad news for us. Bad news, the Russians are not changing their behavior based on our economic sanctions. But it's also good news in the sense that I actually think China will find it very difficult to bring other countries to its will in a really meaningful way through economic sanctions. We're already seeing, and The Journal has been reporting a lot about this very ably over the last few years where they're having difficulties, for instance, like BRI projects and there's resistance. Ecuador, even places like Kenya and Sri Lanka. By the way, they seem to want to make money off of these things, look at their blending in the development context where they're expecting to get paid back. So that's the good news. Bad news is it makes the military balance all the more salient because it becomes more attractive. But if we get the military balance, I actually think that we can have a fair degree of economic engagement. Now I would welcome and defer to my good friend Oren Cass and others if they were saying we should decouple for other reasons, but that's totally fine. But from a strategic point of view, the point is to be able to give us the autonomy and the basis to make decisions on our own turns. And if we can then decide the degree of decoupling from a strategic point of view, I think if we're basically not relying on them on semiconductors and pharmaceuticals and antibiotics, that kind of thing, then I think we should be okay. I mean we've seen this repeatedly. Cut off pineapple imports from Taiwan. What do the Taiwanese do? Well now the Taiwanese are more anti-China. Similar in the Philippines, similar in Japan with the rare Earths. Look at Australia, nobly standing up against a country to which it's really dependent as an exporter. So I think market participants need to be realistic and say there's a very militarily significant crisis if we're lucky, God forbid. So you take your risk, you should put a serious risk premium. And by the way, you don't even need to worry about that. Cause apparently the Chinese are like preventing you from getting accurate information.

Gerry Baker: Final question, Bridge, but I want to just turn it quickly to the politics. You served in the Trump administration at the Pentagon. We're seeing again a lively internal debate within the Republican Party and we've got Donald Trump and other candidates out there. Trump looking at the moment, the favor candidate. I don't want you to ask you to endorse a particular candidate cause I'm sure you're not going to do that anyway. But do you think from your experience of serving in the Trump administration, what you've seen of him and what you've seen of him since then and the things he's saying and doing about China and Russia and elsewhere. Do you think that the kind of approach that you favor, that Trump is essentially on side with that and that Trump is the most likely of the Republican field to actually execute that kind of a significantly different strategic approach within the next four years?

Elbridge Colby: Well, look, I'll say this. I mean, I think President Trump, I think the most important legacy on these kinds of things that he'll leave it is the shift on China that needed to happen. And there was rhetoric about it before, but especially the recognizing that China was a rival and being willing to be confrontation. That is in a century, I think that will be written about in a meaningful way. I mean, I can't speak for President Trump or any of the other candidates. What I do think is the next person is going to be President of the United States, is going to be president of the year 2027, and that person had better be ready. And I don't think that the right strategy is going to be one that hopes for the best and tries to do the freedom agenda again. I also don't think that saying, "Hey, Xi Jinping and I can cut a deal and that's reliable." that's going to work either. We're going to need to be really focused on a position of strength, being seen as really serious and formidable and not to be trifled with, but on the other hand, somebody you could deal with. And I think in that sense, we want to go back to the Republican Party before we lost our way. I would say maybe the late 90s, certainly by the time of Bush 43 administration and say Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan. I mean Reagan for all his rhetoric was pieced through strength, barely employed the military, was focused on the central theater. That's the kind of attitude that we need to go back to.

Gerry Baker: Elbridge Colby, very good way to end this. Thank you very much indeed for joining Free Expression.

Elbridge Colby: Well, thank you so much.

Gerry Baker: That's it for Free Expression this week. Thanks for joining me. Please join me again next week when we'll be looking at another aspect of the changed conservative thinking in the era of Donald Trump. We'll be looking at domestic economic and social policy. In the meantime, thanks very much for joining us and goodbye.

11. Opinion | Taiwan is urging the U.S. not to abandon Ukraine

Opinion | Taiwan is urging the U.S. not to abandon Ukraine

The Washington Post · by Josh Rogin · May 10, 2023

Some Republicans want to scale back U.S. military support for Ukraine, insisting that Taiwan’s defense should take priority. But those who claim to be for protecting Taiwan ought to listen to its leaders. They believe the island’s security depends on Washington standing firm in its support for Kyiv.

The notion that the United States must choose between fully supporting Ukraine or building up the defense of Taiwan has migrated from Fox News into the mainstream Washington foreign policy discussion. Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) has led the charge by arguing that extensive U.S. military aid to Ukraine detracts from the more urgent task of arming Taiwan to deter a Chinese invasion.

But if Taiwanese leaders don’t agree that that’s true, shouldn’t U.S. policy makers factor that into their analysis? Do these Republicans really think they understand Taiwan’s interests better than the Taiwanese?

“Ukraine’s survival is Taiwan’s survival. Ukraine’s success is Taiwan’s success,” Taiwan’s representative in Washington, Bi-khim Hsiao, told the McCain Institute’s Sedona Forum last weekend. “Our futures are closely linked.”

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The Taiwan argument is only the latest justification made by those on the right who want to reduce U.S. support for Kyiv. During a recent speech calling for the defense of Taiwan, Hawley said that as a first step, “We should cut off U.S. military aid to Ukraine.” Following Hawley’s lead, self-proclaimed “realist” think-tankers assert that U.S. support for Ukraine has no deterrent effect on Chinese President Xi Jinping.

“Ukraine is not going to drive Beijing’s decision whether to attack Taiwan. Instead, what’s most critical for deterring a war over Taiwan is the military balance in Asia,” former Trump administration Pentagon official Elbridge Colby argued during a recent Hudson Institute debate.

Again, Taiwan’s leaders beg to disagree. Hsiao said Taiwan doesn’t want to be an “excuse” for pulling the plug on aid to Ukraine. If the West abandons the Ukrainians now, she said, that will signal to the Taiwanese people that they are alone, which plays into Beijing’s propaganda.

“Support for Ukraine is relevant to us because, first of all, ultimately it helps to deter. It imposes costs on the aggressor,” Hsiao said. “International support for Ukraine is also essential in affirming the credibility and reliability of the United States and your allies.”

Congress will face another decision about whether to provide large amounts of aid to Ukraine this autumn. Former president Donald Trump and Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, the early favorites for the 2024 GOP nomination, have already questioned continued U.S. aid to Ukraine.

Plenty of prominent U.S. officials — some top Republicans among them — agree with Hsiao that the Ukraine effort isn’t undermining the defense of Taiwan. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) told me during an interview that he discussed lessons learned in Ukraine with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen last month in California.

“I don’t think there’s a tension [between aiding Ukraine and Taiwan],” McCarthy said. “What we need to do is expand the [weapons] manufacturing base here in America.”

To be sure, there is some overlap between the weapons being sent to Ukraine and those that Taiwan needs, such as Stinger antiaircraft systems. But as many have pointed out, a conflict over Taiwan would not look like a Ukraine-style ground war. A war involving Taiwan would depend more on the U.S. Navy and Air Force, as well as hybrid warfare tools that are used in information and cyber operations.

It’s true that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are lagging, and the Biden administration should do more to speed things up. But American military leaders in Asia are not calling for reducing military aid to Ukraine. They are calling for more concurrent investment in U.S. military capabilities in the Pacific.

“I do believe we can do both,” Indo-Pacific Command chief Adm. John C. Aquilino testified to Congress last month. “I believe we have to do both to maintain the peace.”

Overall, the notion of abandoning Ukraine to focus on Taiwan makes little sense because, unless Ukraine succeeds, the war in Europe will likely worsen — requiring more U.S. involvement, not less.

“Saying that we should prioritize Taiwan over Ukraine is like arguing that the firetruck should be parked at a house down the street to guard against a fire breaking out in the future instead of knocking down the fire at the burning house,” said John Walters, the president of the Hudson Institute, at his group’s debate.

Those who argue for abandoning Ukraine on Taiwan’s behalf are, in effect, claiming to be more pro-Taiwan than the Taiwanese. That is arrogance, not prudence. Taiwan’s leaders understand how to deter China and protect their country’s security better than GOP politicians and think-tankers.

Beijing’s extensive help for Vladimir Putin’s war effort shows that Xi believes a Ukrainian victory is bad for China. Russia and China are colluding in their support for autocratic aggression. The United States, Europe, Ukraine and Taiwan must all stand together to oppose them.

The Washington Post · by Josh Rogin · May 10, 2023

12. Ukraine Makes Gains Near Embattled Bakhmut, a First in Months

Ukraine Makes Gains Near Embattled Bakhmut, a First in Months

By Carlotta Gall, Anatoly Kurmanaev and Traci Carl

May 10, 2023

The New York Times · by Traci Carl · May 10, 2023

The leader of Russia’s Wagner paramilitary group confirmed the Ukrainian advance, and continued to air divisions among Moscow’s forces.

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Ukrainian soldiers in an armored vehicle near the front line around Bakhmut on Monday.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

May 10, 2023, 7:00 p.m. ET

KYIV, Ukraine — Ukrainian troops have broken through Russian positions outside the embattled eastern city of Bakhmut and forced Russian units back from a key position near a canal, military commanders on both sides said, in the first gains since March for Kyiv’s forces in the brutal fight for the city.

The advance was not large — roughly three square miles, southwest of the city, in an area of fields, ravines and thickets of trees — but it was acknowledged on Tuesday by Yevgeny V. Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner militia whose forces have been at the forefront of Russia’s fight for Bakhmut, and it was described on Wednesday by multiple Ukrainian military officials. Russia’s Defense Ministry did not comment on the reports.

Ukraine’s forces had not won any ground in the fight for Bakhmut since pushing Russian forces off a key access road two months ago, and it is far from clear that they can hold the terrain they captured this week or that it was a turning point.

But the 11-month battle for Bakhmut has taken on a symbolic significance that goes far beyond the city’s immediate strategic value and has come at devastating human cost for both sides. Both countries have invested resources and sacrificed soldiers in a high-stakes effort to wear each other down, with Russian forces slowly gaining control of most of the city and its surroundings.

The recent fighting there came amid an uptick in Ukrainian strikes behind Russian lines and reports of increased attacks in Russian regions bordering Ukraine, in advance of a major counteroffensive that Kyiv has said will begin soon. Ukrainian military officers said the advance near Bakhmut was an opportunistic strike as Russian Army troops were moving into position, one of several indications that it was not part of the broader push to retake Russian-occupied territory.

A still image taken from video and released by the Ukrainian military showing a Ukrainian artillery unit firing rockets in the Bakhmut area on Tuesday.Credit...Ukraine Armed Forces Press Service

Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, the commander of Ukraine’s ground forces, said in a statement that the Bakhmut attack was part of a “defensive operation” aimed at stalling the Russian assault on the city.

Ukrainian commanders from three units involved in the fighting gave details of the operation in interviews — the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, a special forces unit; the Adam Tactical Group; and the Ukrainian Volunteer Army, which includes civilian volunteers.

Andriy Biletsky, who has overarching command of the Ukrainian 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, among other units, said in a video statement released early Wednesday that his troops had seized Russian positions and inflicted heavy losses on Russian troops. Two Russian companies, units typically with about 100 soldiers each, and a reconnaissance team had been “completely destroyed” in the fighting, said Mr. Biletsky, a former far-right politician and co-founder of the Azov Brigade.

Mr. Prigozhin, known for his outspoken and often-self-serving criticism of Russia’s military, said in a video on Tuesday that the Russian flank had been broken.

A resident walking past the badly damaged apartment building in Siversk, a town near Bakhmut where he used to live, on Sunday.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

“Today they are tearing the flanks in the Artemovsk direction,” he said, using the Russian name for Bakhmut. He said that his forces would continue fighting in Bakhmut for now, though he threatened recently to pull Wagner mercenaries out of Bakhmut if they didn’t get more support from the Russian Army.

“We’ll keep pushing for a few more days,” he said. “Let’s fight.”

Mr. Prigozhin predicted, as others have, that the major Ukrainian counteroffensive would come in the Zaporizhzhia region, about 100 miles to the southwest of Bakhmut. The Ukrainian military has been regrouping in preparation for its assault, training troops to use newly delivered Western weapons and forming new units.

The Biden administration on Tuesday announced $1.2 billion in new military aid to Ukraine, including artillery ammunition and air-defense missiles, bringing the U.S. total since Russia invaded last year to about $37 billion.

The United States took a different kind of action on Wednesday, when the Justice Department said it had transferred millions of dollars seized from a Russian oligarch, Konstantin Malofeyev, for use in rebuilding Ukraine. It was the first action of its kind under a law enacted last year. Mr. Malofeyev is a prominent supporter of the war, and his assets were taken for violating economic sanctions.

Increasingly isolated from the West, Russia has tried to strengthen international ties where it can, including with the nation of Georgia, a former Soviet republic in the Caucasus that fought a brief war with Russia in 2008. On Wednesday, President Vladimir V. Putin ordered the restoration of direct flights from Russia to Georgia starting on Monday, and he abolished visa requirements for Georgian nationals to visit Russia, the latest sign of continued rapprochement.

But the Russian war effort continues to be plagued by internal dissension between Mr. Prigozhin and the regular military. In recent days, he has recorded graphic and expletive-laden videos accusing Russia’s senior generals of denying his forces necessary supplies, such as ammunition. On Tuesday, he appeared to take his attacks even further, publishing a video that some observers interpreted as a direct criticism of Mr. Putin.

Ukrainian weapons “kill our soldiers, while a happy grandpa thinks that everything is going well for him,” Mr. Prigozhin said in the video. Mr. Putin’s opponents commonly refer to him as “grandfather.”

On Wednesday, Mr. Prigozhin said that “grandpa” referred to a senior Russian military official whom he did not name. Mr. Prigozhin, a tycoon who earned his fortune in part through Kremlin catering contracts, has avoided direct criticism of Mr. Putin.

Mr. Prigozhin accused units of the 72nd Brigade of the Russian Army of abandoning their positions near Bakhmut. “Everyone fled and exposed a front almost two kilometers wide and 500 meters deep,” he said.

He added that his forces had to move in to prevent a further Ukrainian advance. “It’s good we managed to block it somehow,” he said.

Chasiv Yar, a town a few miles west of Bakhmut, where only about 1,500 residents remain of the prewar population of 15,000 people. Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

A video filmed by a drone and sent to The New York Times by a commander of the Adam Tactical Group appeared to show Russian soldiers running in disarray, apparently after an artillery strike on their position in a tree line. Amid mud, shell craters and smashed trees, it showed soldiers fleeing from a burning bunker, one with his uniform on fire.

Another video, filmed from a soldier’s body camera and released by the 3rd Assault Brigade, which said it came from the scene of the fighting, showed a unit walking through a shallow ravine, stepping past dead Russian soldiers.

Neither video could be independently verified.

Col. Yevhen Mezhevikin, the commander of the Adam Tactical Group, said in a recent interview that the role of the forces fighting in Bakhmut was to prevent Russian advances while new brigades were being trained and assembled to carry out the expected counteroffensive. They also said that they sensed that the Russian Army was demoralized and thinly stretched in places along the front line, making it vulnerable.

A midlevel commander in the 3rd Assault Brigade who asked to be identified by his nickname, Zayan, in keeping with Ukrainian military rules, said of what might come next in the fight for Bakhmut: “Anything is possible.”

Carlotta Gall reported from Kyiv, Ukraine, Anatoly Kurmanaev from Berlin and Traci Carl from New York. Maria Varenikova contributed reporting from Kyiv, Ivan Nechepurenko from Tblisi, Georgia, and Charlie Savage from Washington.

The New York Times · by Traci Carl · May 10, 2023

13. Defense budget bill hit with delay over debt ceiling fight

Defense budget bill hit with delay over debt ceiling fight

Defense News · by Bryant Harris · May 10, 2023

This story was updated May 10, 2023, at 2:35 p.m. ET.

WASHINGTON — The partisan fight over raising the debt ceiling has temporarily derailed Congress’ work on the annual defense authorization bill.

The House’s markup of the fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act — initially scheduled to begin this Thursday — is now postponed until Republicans and Democrats can reach a spending agreement as part of the gridlocked debt ceiling negotiations, Majority Leader Steve Scalise, R-La., told Defense News on Wednesday.

“I’m hopeful that as the speaker [of the House] meets with the president and the other congressional leaders on Friday that they can get some real specifics that get us closer to an agreement,” Scalise said at a news conference after the weekly Republican caucus meeting. “For now, we’re going to wait and see how that process plays out before starting the NDAA. But we’ve already been doing work on what those policies would look like on a national defense authorization.”

House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, R-Ala., announced in a last-minute statement on Tuesday that the NDAA markup would be postponed until “the near future.”

House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., met with President Joe Biden and other congressional leaders at the White House on Tuesday to discuss the debt ceiling, but the parties involved noted no progress was made on the issue.

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has told Congress that the U.S. will default on its debts by June 1 absent congressional action to raise the ceiling.

House Republicans passed a bill last month along party lines that would raise the debt ceiling in exchange for several concessions, including $130 billion in discretionary spending cuts. The defense budget accounts for roughly half of annual discretionary spending.

Democrats are arguing Congress should pass a clean debt ceiling bill as congressional Republicans did under former President Donald Trump.

After Scalise noted the delay was due to the debt ceiling fight, Rep. Mikie Sherrill of New Jersey became the first Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee to come out swinging against the postponement. She accused Republican leaders of “putting partisan politics and a right-wing agenda above our national security, military readiness and the wellbeing of our servicemembers” as part of their “irresponsible attitude toward the debt ceiling.”

“This bill is the legislative linchpin of our national security,” Sherrill said in a statement. “It’s how Congress sets our national security policy, exercises oversight of the Department of Defense, and invests in military research and innovation. It’s also the legislation that raises servicemember salaries and provides for childcare and healthcare for military families.”

Rep. Adam Smith of Washington, the top Democrat on the same committee, blamed McCarthy for the markup delay “because reality has come crashing in on this ridiculous, hypocritical fantasy.”

“Republican leadership has been arguing both that President Biden’s very substantial defense budget proposal is somehow billions of dollars less than it must be to meet our defense needs, and that we must make massive cuts to our discretionary budget to meet their idea of what fiscal responsibility would look like,” Smith said in a statement.

The Senate has not officially scheduled a markup for its version of the FY24 NDAA. Politico first reported on Tuesday that the House delayed the NDAA markup.

“We will be prepared to pass a robust NDAA,” said Rep. Elise Stefanik, R-N.Y., the chair of the House Republican Conference and a member of the House Armed Services Committee. “The NDAA is the one bill that every single year we’ve been able to deliver and pass, certainly since I’ve been in Congress, but for decades.”

About Bryant Harris

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

14. Bipartisan Group Aims to Fix ‘Hopelessly Obsolete’ Classification System

Bipartisan Group Aims to Fix ‘Hopelessly Obsolete’ Classification System

Legislation aims to reduce over-classification and the mishandling of secrets.

defenseone.com · by Courtney Bublé

A bipartisan group of U.S. senators unveiled legislation on Wednesday to reform the information classification system in a bid to reduce over-classification and prevent the mishandling of classified documents.

“I’ve known for years that our system for classifying, safeguarding and declassifying national security information is hopelessly obsolete,” Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said during a press conference. “We’ve got a byzantine, bizarre, bureaucratic system that has not kept up with the times, has not moved at all to digitalization, so consequently we continue to vastly over-classify huge amounts of information, while at the same time not fully protecting our nation’s most important secrets.”

Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas, a member of the intelligence committee, said the discovery of classified documents in the homes or offices of former President Trump, President Biden and former Vice President Mike Pence brought this issue to light and got some thinking that when the government classifies too many documents, it’s easy to get lackadaisical with the handling of them.

One bill—the Classification Reform Act—would designate the director of national intelligence as the executive agent for classification and declassification, which would lead to “whole of government” reforms; ensure that information can only be classified when the national security harms outweigh the public interest to know; enforce a 25-year period for classification; “tax” agencies based on their use of classification; and require a security review of presidential and vice presidential records to make sure that documents with classified markers aren’t designated as personal records incorrectly.

This bill was co-sponsored by Sens. Warner, Cornyn, Ron Wyden, D-Ore., Jerry Moran, R-Kan., Angus King, I-Maine, Mike Rounds, R-S.D., Martin Heinrich, D-N.M., Michael Bennet, D-Colo., and Bob Casey, D-Pa.

The other bill— the Sensible Classification Act—would codify who has classification authority; promote efficient declassification of records subject to the Freedom of Information Act or Mandatory Declassification Review; require training for “sensible” classification; provide the Public Interest Declassification Board will more staff; and direct federal agencies to review how many security clearance holders they actually need.

The co-sponsors are the same as the other bill’s, plus Sen. Susan Collins, D-Maine, and James Lankford, R-Okla.

Wyden said during the press conference that when Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines responded to him and Moran in a letter last year, saying she agreed with them that there are issues with the current classified system, “we turned a corner” because “this was the first time anyone in her position said something like that.” Haines expanded on this during remarks she gave in January, stating that over-classification is an issue and it undermines democracy.

In addition to the Trump, Biden and Pence situations, the introduction of the bills also comes after a member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard was charged last month in connection with leaking hundreds of classified documents on social media. The Pentagon took some actions to prevent further leaks, but a senior Defense Department official who works in insider threat detection told Defense One the actions don’t get to the heart of the matter, which is that the government classifies too many documents and overestimates how long documents will stay classified.

When asked if the senators have spoken with Biden administration or White House officials about the bills, Warner said “they are very aware that this is coming.” He added that he believes some in the intelligence community might have “consternation” with the proposed changes, but “this is a debate whose time has come.”

defenseone.com · by Courtney Bublé

15. Biden to host India's Modi with human rights in mind -White House

Biden to host India's Modi with human rights in mind -White House

Reuters · by Reuters

WASHINGTON, May 10 (Reuters) - U.S. President Joe Biden will host Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for an official state visit on June 22, the White House said on Wednesday, as Washington works to deepen ties with the world's largest democracy.

"The visit will strengthen our two countries’ shared commitment to a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific and our shared resolve to elevate our strategic technology partnership, including in defense, clean energy, and space," Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said in a statement.

Biden has been eager to strengthen relations with India as part of his bid to win what he has framed as a contest between free and autocratic societies, especially China.

Asked about human rights concerns in India, Jean-Pierre defended the visit, telling reporters that Biden believes "this is an important relationship that we need to continue and build on as it relates to human rights."

During a February visit to Washington by India's national security adviser, Ajit Doval, the United States and India launched a partnership to deepen ties on military equipment, semiconductors and artificial intelligence.

New Delhi has frustrated Washington by participating in military exercises with Russia and increasing purchases of the country's crude oil, a key source of funding for the war in Ukraine. Washington has been pushing New Delhi to do more to punish Russia for the Ukraine invasion.

Ashley Tellis, a former U.S. government official behind U.S. efforts to engage more closely with India, caused a stir this month, arguing in the Foreign Affairs periodical that Washington's expectations of U.S.-India relations are misplaced particularly when it comes to China, despite shared concerns about Beijing’s growing power.

While the United States has focused on "contributions toward coalition defense," he wrote, "New Delhi sees things differently. It does not presume that American assistance imposes any further obligations on itself.”

The Biden administration had also overlooked India’s “democratic erosion” under Modi, and “its unhelpful foreign policy choices, such as its refusal to condemn Moscow’s ongoing aggression in Ukraine,” Tellis added.

Modi's relationship with Washington has evolved since 2005, when the administration of President George W. Bush denied him a visa under a U.S. law barring entry to foreigners who have committed "particularly severe violations of religious freedom."

That move stemmed from the killing of more than 1,000 people, mostly Muslims, in sectarian riots in the Indian state of Gujarat shortly after Modi became its chief minister. Modi denied wrongdoing.

Former President Barack Obama invited Modi to the White House in 2014, after his Bharatiya Janata Party and its allies swept India’s elections, putting him in position to be prime minister in a seismic political shift that gave the Hindu nationalist and his party a mandate for sweeping economic reform.

(This story has been refiled to say 'he,' not 'she,' in paragraph 8)

Reporting by Susan Heavey and Doina Chiacu;

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

16. Zelensky says Ukraine needs more time for counter-offensive

Excerpts:

The president, however, expressed confidence that the Ukrainian military could advance, warning of the risks of a "frozen conflict" which, he said, was what Russia was "counting on".

For Kyiv, any result that is seen as disappointing in the West could mean a reduction in military support and pressure to negotiate with Russia. With nearly a fifth of the country under Russian control, and President Vladimir Putin declaring the annexation of four regions his forces partially occupy, this would possibly include discussions about land concessions.

"Everyone will have an idea," President Zelensky said. "[But] they can't pressure Ukraine into surrendering territories. Why should any country of the world give Putin its territory?"

Zelensky says Ukraine needs more time for counter-offensive

BBC · by Menu

Published
1 hour ago

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky says his army needs more equipment ahead of counter-offensive

By Hugo Bachega

BBC News, Kyiv

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky has said his country needs more time to launch a much-anticipated counter-offensive against Russian forces, as its military awaits the delivery of promised military aid.

The expected attack could be decisive in the war, redrawing frontlines that, for months, have remained unchanged. It will also be a crucial test for Ukraine, eager to prove that the weapons and equipment it has received from the West can result in significant battlefield gains.

Speaking at his headquarters in Kyiv, President Zelensky described combat brigades, some of which were trained by Nato countries, as being "ready" but said the army still needed "some things", including armoured vehicles that were "arriving in batches".

"With [what we already have] we can go forward, and, I think, be successful," he said in an interview for public service broadcasters who are members of Eurovision News, like the BBC. "But we'd lose a lot of people. I think that's unacceptable. So we need to wait. We still need a bit more time."

When and where the Ukrainian push will happen is a secret. Russian forces, meanwhile, have fortified their defences along a frontline that runs for 900 miles (1,450km) from the eastern regions of Luhansk and Donetsk, to Zaporizhzhia and Kherson in the south.

Ukrainian authorities have tried to lower expectations of a breakthrough, publicly and in private. Earlier this month, a senior government official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the country's leaders "understood that [they] needed to be successful" but that the assault should not be seen as a "silver bullet" in a war now in its 15th month.

More on the War in Ukraine

The president, however, expressed confidence that the Ukrainian military could advance, warning of the risks of a "frozen conflict" which, he said, was what Russia was "counting on".

For Kyiv, any result that is seen as disappointing in the West could mean a reduction in military support and pressure to negotiate with Russia. With nearly a fifth of the country under Russian control, and President Vladimir Putin declaring the annexation of four regions his forces partially occupy, this would possibly include discussions about land concessions.

"Everyone will have an idea," President Zelensky said. "[But] they can't pressure Ukraine into surrendering territories. Why should any country of the world give Putin its territory?"

Mr Zelensky dismissed fears about losing US support if President Joe Biden, who has vowed to support Ukraine as long as it takes, is not re-elected in 2024. Ukraine, he said, still enjoyed bipartisan support in the US Congress. "Who knows where we'll be [when the election happens]?" he said. "I believe we'll win by then."

For now, there is no real possibility of talks to end the conflict, as both sides say they will fight until victory. President Zelensky has offered a 10-point peace proposal, calling for the return of all invaded territory, reparation payments for war-related damages and the creation of a special tribunal to prosecute Russian war crimes, a plan that Moscow has flatly rejected.

Western sanctions, the president said, were having an impact on Russia's defence industry, mentioning depleted missiles stockpiles and shortages of artillery. "They still have a lot in their warehouses but… we already see that they've reduced shelling per day in some areas."

Moscow, however, had found ways to bypass some of the measures, he said, and he urged countries to target those helping Russia circumvent the bans.

Mr Zelensky again rejected the Russian accusation that Ukraine was behind an alleged drone attack on the Kremlin last week, which was described by Moscow as an attempt to assassinate President Putin.

Media caption,

Watch: Ros Atkins on... the Russian social media videos appearing to show Kremlin drone attack

The Ukrainian leader said he believed the apparent attack could have been a false flag operation, carried out by Russia itself, and that the claim was being used as an "excuse" by Moscow to attack his country.

"They constantly look for something to sound like a justification, saying: 'You do this to us, so we do that to you,'" President Zelensky said. "But it didn't work. Even for their domestic public, it didn't work. Even their own propagandists didn't believe that. Because it looked very, very artificial."

The president spoke as the Eurovision song contest was being held in the English city of Liverpool, which was chosen as a host on behalf of Ukraine, the winner of last year's event.

He said he would have preferred to see the competition in a neighbouring country "to where our people could travel to and be very close" but that he had "lots of respect" for Britain, an "amazing country".

"The main thing is that the contest is taking place," he said. "Let the people show their talent."

Additional reporting by Rachael Thorn, Hanna Chornous and Dave Bull

17. In Defense of Bean Counting: Why Material Measures of National Power Matter

Excerpts:

For attempts to predict the outcome of battles—where contextual factors such as morale and operational art dominate—material measures of power have proven too abstract, too imprecise. In predicting overall war outcomes, their predictive abilities are imperfect, though considerably better. (The 80 percent accurate prediction of war outcomes is far better than a coin flip.)

However, material measures of power are most useful for providing a general understanding of the grand strategic situation in which countries and their national leaders find themselves. A country’s global share of GDP is far from a perfect predictor of any outcome, but it provides a fairly accurate sense of that country’s power status in the international system. Composite measures of economic, political, and security-based capabilities will miss much, but they also have proven capable of tracking our transition from a bipolar to a unipolar to a multipolar world order.

Context, of course, remains important. So too do materials and mass, even if these measures are inadequate for drawing policy-relevant conclusions when considered in isolation. Rather than choosing one over the other, material measures of power offer objective starting points for scientific analyses—leaving room for some alchemy thereafter.

In Defense of Bean Counting: Why Material Measures of National Power Matter - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by Collin Meisel · May 11, 2023

The rack and stack of Russian and Ukrainian forces prior to Vladimir Putin’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine left many analysts, myself included, convinced that by this time last year Putin and pals would be celebrating under a white, blue, and red flag in Kyiv’s Independence Square. This isn’t the first time that a material-based understanding of national power has failed.

Many military professionals and analysts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries attempted to quantify the battlefield and also largely failed. From Lanchester’s laws of relative military force strength to Dupuy’s Operational Lethality Indices to the US Army’s weapon effectiveness index / weighted unit value metric and beyond, many creative attempts to quantify military power have successively been championed and abandoned.

Now, the pendulum appears to have swung in the opposite direction, with analysts heeding the “alchemy of combat effectiveness” and dismissing comparisons of equipment and personnel counts as “bean counting.” Today’s critics of material measures of power have a point—if the goal is to measure combat outcomes. As military analysts Michael Kofman and Rob Lee often remind us, combat is contingent upon a myriad factors, some of which involve pure chance, even luck.

But material measures continue to offer an important guide to measuring power at the national level. In a more limited sense, they continue to be informative on the battlefield, provided such measures are assessed within broader situational contexts. Put simply, materials—and mass—still matter.

Mass in the Donbas

The war in Ukraine has been one of innovation, inspiration, and intrepidness. It has also been one of surging and dwindling inventories of ammunition, equipment, and personnel.

Although a “bean counting” of Ukrainian and Russian military equipment on hand at the time of Russia’s full-scale invasion would have shown a stark contrast that heavily favored the Russians, military aid that has been provided to Ukraine since has gone a long way in narrowing the material capabilities gap. Where masses of material capabilities have failed in terms of predictive capacity for the future, they hold immense explanatory capacity for the present. In Ukraine, Russia’s material advantages should have produced battlefield outcomes heavily in its favor, and the fact that they did not shows that a range of other factors that degraded Russian military effectiveness needed to be accounted for. But by flipping that around, we can see that all of those other factors were also mitigated by Russia’s material advantages.

What other force could have executed its campaign as miserably as the Russians in the early days of their full-scale invasion and still be in the fight today? Indeed, the Russian military arguably still has a chance of winning the conflict, though we can debate what winning means in this context given Russia’s undeniable geopolitical losses. Setting the question of combat performance scorecards aside, what can better explain the periodic operational pauses in the war so far than shortages of personnel, ammunition, and equipment?

Materially False

To be sure, quantitative measures of complex phenomena can fail us. As sociologist William Bruce Cameron cautioned, “Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted.” By focusing only on the easily measurable, we can become like the drunk searching for his keys under the lamppost because that is where the light is.

Quantifauxcation—or the “practice of assigning a meaningless number, then concluding that because the result is quantitative, it must mean something,” as defined by statistician Philip B. Stark—is another potential pitfall. The remainder of Stark’s quote, that “if the number has six digits of precision, they all matter,” describes the distinct but related problem of false precision.

Unfortunately, assessments that are fully divorced from the quantitative realities of our world fail too. Deeply ingrained cognitive biases lead us to be drawn in by vivid, tidy stories that communicate a clarity, consistency, and certainty—tending, as intelligence analyst Richards Heuer observed, to “disregard abstract or statistical information that may have greater evidential value.” In contrast, the “strict grammar” of mathematics, as political scientist John V. Gillespie wrote, allows for broad-based and objective comparison of alternatives and, in our case, national power.

The solutions to the problems of quantification include making an earnest attempt to measure previously unmeasured factors, and when numbers are assigned, to avoid assigning meaningless numbers. For example, the US intelligence community regularly uses the terminology of probability, including phrases such as “likely” and “probably,” even though their assessments are rarely if ever based on probabilistic statistical models. The phrases are meaningful, however, because analysts use these words with reference to a common scale of their best guess of a probability, where for example “likely” and “probably” communicate a 55–80 percent chance.

Of course, one cannot know with exactitude whether 55–80 percent is the correct likelihood, but it is far better than a shoulder shrug and disclaimer that anything is possible. And the intentionally broad range communicates that it is an inherently imprecise estimate.

Heuristics, Not Predictors

In a recent effort to quantify military power, political scientist Mark Souva created the material military power measure, which combines data across militaries’ land, air, sea, and nuclear capabilities. While far from perfect—as any coarse-grained measure will fail to capture important distinctions in specific contexts—Souva’s measure accurately predicts the outcome of 80 percent of the thirty-six wars between 1865 and 2007 cataloged by the Correlates of War project.

Across a broader set of instruments of national power, the Global Power Index—a composite measure of countries’ demographic, diplomatic, economic, military, and technological capabilities—has successfully tracked and forecasted the rise of the Global South. Its account of the widening and then narrowing gap in the distribution of power in the international system offers a measurement of the United States’ unipolar moment. In the line graph presented here in Figure 6, that period was roughly 1991 through 2009—an era bookended by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Great Recession.

The Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity Index has successfully tracked geopolitical influence in nations’ bilateral relations as well as among networks of international interactions. For example, in a forthcoming report from me and my colleagues with the Stimson Center, we note that the Middle East appears to have permanently left America’s sphere of influence in favor of its own or a more China-oriented sphere. Beijing’s latest diplomatic coup, reestablishing Saudi and Iranian ties with one another, and Saudi Arabia’s deepening ties with the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization are but two early indicators of this development. Long-term structural transitions—including shifts in global oil demand, with US demand peaking and Chinese demand forecasted to continue to grow substantially—will continue to push trends in this direction.

An index that will be more familiar to readers, gross domestic product (GDP), also offers a useful if imperfect general measurement of national power. As economist Paul Krugman illustrated earlier this year with a simple column chart, the vast disparity in GDPs for the United States and European Union relative to Russia goes a long way in explaining why Western-backed Ukraine has been so successful in resisting Russian domination (a fact that does not diminish Ukraine’s extraordinary and unexpectedly successful resistance). And, as political scientist Jacek Kugler and others note, GDP is particularly useful for “longer-term assessments because of [its] simplicity, availability, and forecasting potential.”

These measures are heuristics, not predictors. In the theoretical framework of political scientist Alexander Wendt, they speak to the “rump materialism” underlying international interactions. While the immaterial is important, the distribution of material capabilities, their sophistication and diversification, and their positions in the world (i.e., geography) conspire to constrain outcomes—independent from, though often in connection with, ideas, norms, and other immaterial factors.

Remaining Tensions

To some extent, measuring power means reifying a fundamentally relational concept. Beyond the difficult-to-measure features of a fighting force—intangibles such as the will to fight—power is an idea that emerges from “processes of social transactions.” In other words, in the language of quantitative social science, it is not a variable. To the extent that we can think of it as something concrete, it manifests in the connections between variables.

In plain language, power is not something that can be measured directly. It can only be measured by proxy. All measures of power, then, are abstractions that are necessarily divorced from some, though certainly not all, realities.

For attempts to predict the outcome of battles—where contextual factors such as morale and operational art dominate—material measures of power have proven too abstract, too imprecise. In predicting overall war outcomes, their predictive abilities are imperfect, though considerably better. (The 80 percent accurate prediction of war outcomes is far better than a coin flip.)

However, material measures of power are most useful for providing a general understanding of the grand strategic situation in which countries and their national leaders find themselves. A country’s global share of GDP is far from a perfect predictor of any outcome, but it provides a fairly accurate sense of that country’s power status in the international system. Composite measures of economic, political, and security-based capabilities will miss much, but they also have proven capable of tracking our transition from a bipolar to a unipolar to a multipolar world order.

Context, of course, remains important. So too do materials and mass, even if these measures are inadequate for drawing policy-relevant conclusions when considered in isolation. Rather than choosing one over the other, material measures of power offer objective starting points for scientific analyses—leaving room for some alchemy thereafter.

Collin Meisel is the associate director of geopolitical analysis at the University of Denver’s Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies. He is also a geopolitics and modeling expert at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, a Netherlands-based security and defense think tank.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Petro Poroshenko

mwi.usma.edu · by Collin Meisel · May 11, 2023

18. It’s Time To Rethink Aerial Warfare

Excerpts:

I refer back to Slife’s remarks because they prepared me for last Tuesday’s Air Force testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the fiscal 2024 budget when Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall III, in his prepared statement with Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., said something very similar.

“For over 75 years,” they said, “the Air Force has dominated opponents in the air…the family-of-systems needed to sustain our dominance in the air … is the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) platform, but this platform [a fighter aircraft] will be too expensive to be purchased in large numbers. The fiscal 2024 budget enhances funding to field un-crewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) to complement the NGAD [a future sixth generation fighter aircraft], F-35 [the costly, present fifth generation fighter], and possibly other current and new crewed platforms.”

The goal for CCAs, Kendall has said, will be to cost “some fraction” of the cost of an F-35. “We’re going to design around that,” he said. In another interview, Kendall said, “One way to think of CCAs is as remotely controlled versions of the targeting pods, electronic warfare pods or weapons now carried under the wings of our crewed aircraft.”

One reason for the new thinking, Kendall told the committee, is that the missions for the fighter aircraft platforms are expanding. “The mix is changing over time and as war becomes more about information domination than it does necessarily about kinetic power, we need things like ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance], and cyber and electronic warfare so we’re trying to move toward that world and get that mix right.”

It’s Time To Rethink Aerial Warfare

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column/fine-print/its-time-to-rethink-aerial-warfare

Fine Print

MAY 9TH, 2023 BY WALTER PINCUS | 0 COMMENTS

Pulitzer Prize Winning Journalist Walter Pincus is a contributing senior national security columnist for The Cipher Brief. He spent forty years at The Washington Post, writing on topics that ranged from nuclear weapons to politics. He is the author of Blown to Hell: America's Deadly Betrayal of the Marshall Islanders. Pincus won an Emmy in 1981 and was the recipient of the Arthur Ross Award from the American Academy for Diplomacy in 2010. He was also a team member for a Pulitzer Prize in 2002 and the George Polk Award in 1978.

View all articles by Walter Pincus

OPINION — “The Air Force we have employed for the last 20 or 30 years is not the Air Force we need to succeed in the environment we are facing today … We have to balance how much we are investing in meeting the requirements of today while also preparing for what may come upon us in the future.”

That was Lt. Gen. James C. Slife, Deputy Air Force Chief of Staff for Operations during a February interview with the Dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, USAF (Ret.).

Slife went on to say “the Air Force is involved in major modernizations with fighters, bombers, and tankers and trainers and more. But we’re not just acquiring new replacements for all these systems, we’re looking at entirely new ways of achieving mission results — collaborative combat aircraft.”

I refer back to Slife’s remarks because they prepared me for last Tuesday’s Air Force testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the fiscal 2024 budget when Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall III, in his prepared statement with Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., said something very similar.

“For over 75 years,” they said, “the Air Force has dominated opponents in the air…the family-of-systems needed to sustain our dominance in the air … is the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) platform, but this platform [a fighter aircraft] will be too expensive to be purchased in large numbers. The fiscal 2024 budget enhances funding to field un-crewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) to complement the NGAD [a future sixth generation fighter aircraft], F-35 [the costly, present fifth generation fighter], and possibly other current and new crewed platforms.”

The goal for CCAs, Kendall has said, will be to cost “some fraction” of the cost of an F-35. “We’re going to design around that,” he said. In another interview, Kendall said, “One way to think of CCAs is as remotely controlled versions of the targeting pods, electronic warfare pods or weapons now carried under the wings of our crewed aircraft.”

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One reason for the new thinking, Kendall told the committee, is that the missions for the fighter aircraft platforms are expanding. “The mix is changing over time and as war becomes more about information domination than it does necessarily about kinetic power, we need things like ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance], and cyber and electronic warfare so we’re trying to move toward that world and get that mix right.”

The CCA the Air Force has in mind would have “a common chassis, a common airframe” with modular mission equipment “optimized against the threat that you expect to face,” Kendall told reporters after his March 15 speech at the annual McAleese defense conference.

“A reasonable way to think about it is an airframe with different payloads that can be swapped out, depending on the mission,” he explained.

Last week’s Kendall/Brown statement said, “CCA inventory goals have not been established, but for planning purposes, we are assuming an initial inventory of 1,000 CCAs, with nominally two CCAs paired with each NGAD aircraft, and a portion of the F-35 inventory.”

The Air Force fiscal 2024 budget, now before Congress, requests $392 million for competitive

concept refinement, design, and development of a first-generation CCA and another $119 million for development of other possible platforms as well as ways to operate, maintain and sustain these novel platforms.

For example, the Air Force is seeking $50 million in the fiscal 2024 budget for the Viper Experimentation and Next-gen Operations Model project. In justification documents, the Air Force said this will “serve as a flying autonomy testbed” for the CCA program by testing of autonomy on a crewed aircraft to serve as early risk reduction for CCA autonomy.

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The idea of unmanned loyal wingmen has been in the works for a long time. Project Skyborg, for example, has been an effort to develop software, hardware, user interfaces and other aspects of the future CCA force that would be employed alongside manned jets.

Through Skyborg, military pilots would receive situation awareness information that detects potential air and ground threats, determines threat proximity, analyzes imminent danger, and identifies suitable options for striking or evading enemy aircraft.

As currently imagined, the first step would involve each manned aircraft being assigned one CCA, with their number increased further if the concept is proven, Kendall said at the 2023 Air & Space Forces Warfare Symposium on March 7. At that event, Air Force Air Combat Commander Gen. Mark D. Kelly said, “I can easily see one platform controlling one CCA doing one mission, whether it be sensing or jamming or something like that…A second drone capable of performing a different mission would then be added to the system.”

Meanwhile, as a halfway step to the future, the Air Force plans to spend $2.9 billion in fiscal 2024 by purchasing more upgraded F-15EXs, which will have sensors like the Early Passive Active Warning Survivability System. That will allow the F-15E/EX to survive in high threat environments by countering infrared threat systems with electronic countermeasures (jamming), chaff, and/or flares.

To help the Air Force pay for developing the new platforms and modernizing the latest F-15s, the plan over the next five years, Kendall told the committee, is to reduce by 14 percent the total number of aircraft from 5,100 to 4,400 by 2028, most of them fighter planes.

“The problem we have is the oldest fourth generation fighters are just not capable against the threat,” Kendall said, “and they go up against fifth generation aircraft they do not do well at all. We’ve done a lot of exercises to demonstrate that.”

The Air Force in the fiscal 2024 budget plans to retire 310 older aircraft to save money for next generation investment. Among the legacy systems planned for retirement are 42 A-10s (a 40-year-old close air support aircraft), 57 F-15C/Ds (an all-weather, tactical fighter), and some 20 F-22s (an all-weather, stealth tactical fighter) which the service said are not combat certified.

Last year, the Air Force sought to mothball 150 aircraft, including A-10s, F-22s and F-15s, E-3s (an airborne warning and control aircraft) and KC-46s (a tanker), but Congress pared back the request and prohibited divestment of the F-22s and F-15s.

Kendall told the Senators that “the recapitalization of the fighter fleet…is one thing, but part of a much deeper, richer fabric of things we are trying to do. We also have the Space Force which introduces a whole new set of capabilities as well – and in some cases space capabilities will be taking over some of the traditionally air capabilities that we have such as communications and surveillance for example. So that’s the picture we are dealing with and we’re trying to get to the new capabilities that we’ll want to field in greater numbers in the future as quickly as we can. That’s the priority for us as we sustain a reasonable sized current fleet.”

I cannot write about the Air Force and the future without mentioning troublesome issues related to the F-35, its fifth generation fighter, and the service’s most costly weapons systems to date.

Hours after Kendall’s testimony last Tuesday, Diana Maurer, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), laid out problems in operating and sustaining the F-35 before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness.

Maurer first pointed out, “The F-35 is DOD’s most ambitious and costly weapon system in history. Current DOD plans call for procuring 2,470 F-35s at an estimated total acquisition cost of just under $400 billion, leaving the majority of the estimated program costs, approximately $1.3 trillion, associated with sustainment of the aircraft.”

She then noted that over the past few years, the GAO had found “two key challenges—spare parts availability and maintenance—have resulted in the F-35 program not being able to meet its performance targets. While some improvements have been made, these challenges continue to prevent the program from meeting its minimum-performance targets, much less its performance

objectives.”

For example, according to the GAO, in 2021, the Air Force F-35A fleet was only 50 percent fully mission capable; the Marine Corps F-35B 19.5 percent; and Navy F-35C 9 percent. Meanwhile, as the fiscal 2024 budget shows, there are funds to upgrade F-35 hardware and

software to provide more robust performance in navigation, weapons, avionics, survivability, maneuverability, and maintainability. There are also funds to update early production aircraft and initial integrated systems so that there is a common fleet configuration in deployed F-35 aircraft.

There are other types of F-35 issues that will also come with the future’s sixth generation NGAD – training of pilots.

As Deputy Air Force Chief of Staff for Operations Lt. Gen. Slife put it last February, “Flying the platform is not the hard part. Increasingly with fifth generation aircraft it’s the employment of the mission systems, the integration of the sensors that becomes the more challenging part of that.”

It’s a new world, not only on the ground, but also in the sky.

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Fine Print

19. New guns means new bullets, suppressors and tech for special ops

New guns means new bullets, suppressors and tech for special ops

Defense News · by Todd South · May 10, 2023

TAMPA, Fla. — Special operators need a host of small arms, ammunition and explosive devices to outrange and strike adversaries in future missions on what the Pentagon anticipates will be a more competitive battlefield.

Lt. Col. John “Tosh” Lancaster, program manager for U.S. Special Operations Command’s lethality acquisitions, ran down the list of needs — from machine guns to suppressors and bullets — on Tuesday at the SOF Week conference in Florida.

“Toe to toe with an enemy weapons system, does our weapons system outrange it? Is it more accurate?” Lancaster said. “If you look at what we have on the battlefield right now, we can’t say that in every category.”

The lightweight medium machine gun, a .338 Norma Magnum weapon, is scheduled to field in fiscal 2026, Lancaster said. But users still need accessories and a new suite of ammo for the weapon. The machine gun itself will need a dedicated optic to see far-off targets.

Without disclosing specifics, Lancaster also pushed for nighttime range finders for snipers.

The lightweight machine gun-assault — a lighter version of the lightweight medium machine gun still under development — is meant to replace the legacy 5.56mm Squad Automatic Weapon, which has been in service for decades. The caliber hasn’t yet been selected, but Lancaster hinted that 6.5mm is leading the chase.

The command is also seeking new suppressors for machine guns and rifle/carbine small arms. There must be a reduction in flash, sound, heat and round disturbance for all suppressors, he said.

But those straight-line bullets can’t arc over berms, walls or hills the way mortars do. What’s more, mortars and low-flying, dedicated drones are not always an option; when they are, they’re an expensive way to destroy a target, he noted.

“We have all kinds of things to kill behind berms,” Lancaster said. “We don’t have a squad-level, low-cost option.”

He specified a need for a weapon that can be carried comfortably on a three-day foot patrol and still get the job done.

But sometimes a different kind of boom is on the menu. While special operators are at the top of their craft for breaching obstacles, they need something even better. The command wants to update its breaching and demolition kits with new remote firing devices and slap charges — strips of explosive that can be quickly “slapped” on an obstacle to penetrate in one blast.

Essentially, the command wants explosives that are more effective and have higher yield.

About Todd South

20. Drones, planes need new weapons and sensors, says special ops official

Drones, planes need new weapons and sensors, says special ops official

militarytimes.com · by Todd South · May 10, 2023

TAMPA, Fla. — More options and less strain on humans are key to modernizing fixed-wing systems for U.S. Special Operations Command, according to the program executive officer in charge of the effort.

Those themes extend to both piloted and uncrewed airframes, such as MC-130J Commando II and AC-130J Ghostrider aircraft as well as MQ-1C Gray Eagle drones, Air Force Col. Ken Kuebler told an audience Tuesday at the SOF Week conference in Florida.

Additionally, Kuebler noted, secure data transfer and communications are critical in these platforms. “Cybersecurity has to be burnt in from the beginning, and it goes across everything we’re doing,” he said.

In terms of drones, Kuebler said he’s focused on reducing the need for human support. Despite the “unmanned” aspect of drone technology, it is a “manpower-intensive platform,” he explained. For example, a single MQ-9 requires up to 200 personnel when accounting for all support from maintenance to flying.

Finding technology to help with that is paramount, he said.

And given the gunships that have served the special operations community for decades are still in demand, they’ve got their own challenges. Special Operations Command saw the last AC-130W retire in 2022, and the organization is nearly done upgrading older AC-130Js across the 30 currently in the fleet, he said.

The next steps include making the “gunship the premier platform for U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command,” Kuebler said, which requires finding ways to make the aircraft runway-independent and amphibious.

“It’s a really hard engineering problem,” he added.

The command is currently studying the impact of operating at sea on maintenance and support equipment, including the effect of water on airframes and how to incorporate floating support for aircraft.

Kuebler anticipates a float capability demonstration will take place within the next two to three years.

And like the drone family, the colonel wants more remote gunship autonomy in the platform, meaning automated systems to take care of extraneous tasks and watch the skies so crew members can focus on more essential mission requirements.

Kuebler’s office awarded a contract for the Armed Overwatch program in August 2022, Defense News previously reported, with the organization selecting L3Harris Technologies and Air Tractor as the winners for the plane portion, once called the AT-802U Sky Warden but later renamed the OA-1K.

That contract could produce as many as 75 Sky Warden single-engine turboprop planes in a deal worth up to $3 billion. The program adds a strike capability and gives the plane intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets as it replaces the legacy U-28A Draco and MC-12W Liberty aircraft, Defense News reported.

For the strike portion, the command saw BAE Systems’ Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System undergo testing.

The OA-1K’s armament will include 2.75-inch laser-guided rockets as part of the precision kill weapon system, AGM-114 missiles and the GBU-12 Paveway bomb, according to slides Kuebler showed.

The turboprop plane’s ISR assets will include full-motion video and Link 16 communications, among other features.

The key is for the plane to have a modular design; Kuebler wants to have the ability to swap out new tech in the same size package for a variety of missions, from close air support to sensing and electronic warfare.

Right now, Special Operations Command has 16 on contract and expects delivery of the first planes in October, he said. (Those won’t enter the field at that point, but rather begin initial operational capability testing.)

That combination compresses those features into a smaller aircraft that can fly low and support small teams in more austere and remote locations such as Africa, which lacks the robust logistical footprint on which special operators depended during recent wars in U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility.

Looking over the modernization horizon, Special Operations Command has teamed with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency on the X-Plane program, which aims to give fixed-wing platforms a vertical-takeoff-and-landing capability and the ability to exceed 400 knots (460 mph).

About Todd South

21. Hyper-enabling special ops will transform missions

I would like to hear a discussion among team guys (Special Forces NCOs) about these ideas for the future. I am sure they might debunk some but also provide thoughtful perspectives to inform the development of others.

Excerpts:

Prompted by an audience question, Mathews outlined a no-limits picture of what he’d love to put in that operator’s hands.

“I would like a fully-capable, human-machine teaming with an information system that had access to the whole of the Internet,” Mathews said.

The colonel isn’t delusional, he knows that technology isn’t here yet, but Mathews and his team are looking to industry to make it a reality.

“We want these operators to be super users of their environment,” Mathew said.

Hyper-enabling special ops will transform missions

militarytimes.com · by Todd South · May 10, 2023

TAMPA, Fla. — As special operations teams weave their way across more than 80 countries, they face daunting challenges, often without the high-level support they saw in previous conflicts.

Leaders such as Army Col. Jarrett Mathews, acquisition director of the SOCOM task force over the “hyper-enabled operator,” seek new tech to give even individuals the assets they need to see, sense, act and react to ever-changing conditions on the ground.

Mathews showed the audience here at the Global SOF Foundation’s SOF Week not a bearded, muscled operator kicking in doors and shooting but a business suit-clad “operator” navigating the streets of a foreign nation, deciphering spoken language, signage and even graffiti to sus out threats while running their mission.

Prompted by an audience question, Mathews outlined a no-limits picture of what he’d love to put in that operator’s hands.

“I would like a fully-capable, human-machine teaming with an information system that had access to the whole of the Internet,” Mathews said.

The colonel isn’t delusional, he knows that technology isn’t here yet, but Mathews and his team are looking to industry to make it a reality.

“We want these operators to be super users of their environment,” Mathew said.

The concept went public nearly three years ago, Defense News sister publication C4ISRNET previously reported. Since then, the team that Mathew now leads has advanced the language processing capabilities of its voice-to-voice program and started work on translating text via smartphone photo capture and eventually through other devices.

The voice-to-voice program is currently deployed in two undisclosed theaters of operation, Mathews told the crowd. And they’re working now to add languages to the software.

The team has also begun development on an augmented reality piece for viewing the environment with layers of data.

And he’s got some proof that they’re on the right path. As part of their program, the team set out to create a secure capability that can operate without Internet access called “Voice to Voice Language Translation.” The translation allows the user to speak into a smartphone and the software will translate that speech into the desired language and “speak” it aloud.

The team took a calculated risk in trying to demonstrate the software earlier in the day following the morning keynote address. It was clunky, not exactly translating word for word, and required some tech support – a signal that more work is needed.

But Mathews later noted that work with the Stanford Research Institute has allowed base-level translation on smart devices disconnected from the Internet with a higher quality than Google Translate.

The next phase is the Visual Environment Translation, through which a camera can decipher text, even graffiti, which is still in its nascent stages.

Using augmented reality technology, the team also looks to get past tourist-like smartphone photographing, which can draw attention. Instead, they would embed these features into something more inconspicuous, such as a Google Glass-like device that a user could wear, Mathews said.

For that operator running in an austere area with little access, or unsecured access to cloud computing, Mathews and his staff are pushing the boundaries of “edge computing” through a combination of radio frequency sensors and secure video/imagery “pipelines” that piggyback on existing WiFi and Bluetooth networks.

Working as kind of a second brain for the user, Mathews office is developing an “automate the analyst” program. The program aims to help users have not only those voice and text options but feeds from mapping software, social media and other feeds to have a clear picture on what’s happening around them.

The goal is to have all of that without the ever-present hovering “eye-in-the-sky” drones that may not be an option on some of these very small footprint missions.

About Todd South

22. Too Many Lawyers - Why Legalism is Undermining Ethical Conduct in the SOF Community

Excerpts;

The strongest counterargument to reducing legal team integration into the SOF community is that it’s naïve. There are lawyers at every level in the DoD, so removing legal teams from tactical SOF units only exposes those units to unfiltered scrutiny by higher legal teams. Wishing legalism away won’t solve problems in the SOF community, it will only compound them. Taken to its logical conclusion, one might suppose the best solution to this legal arms race would be to put a legal representative in every SOF team room, to ensure no team leader takes any action without the full concurrence of his legal advisor. That’s ridiculous of course, but as the community has increasingly withheld approval authority for tactical missions to higher levels, and increased the rank of forward commanders, the idea that every tactical SOF commander has an assigned legal counsel isn’t as farfetched as it should be.

The correct solution to this arms race is not to continue growing the SOF legal support structure, but to work to reduce the overall involvement of legal teams in the DoD as a whole. The START treaties showed the world that it was possible for the belligerents in The Cold War to reduce their stocks of nuclear warheads, surely the DoD can identify a similar solution to its own legal arms race?

From the first day of selection and assessment into the SOF community, owning your mistakes and being honest about what you’ve done are presented as critical to success. Legalism undermines those values by encouraging behavior that is counter to the basic tenants of honesty, candor, and trust on which the SOF community is built. The current saturation of legal representatives in the SOF community makes legalism hard to avoid, not because lawyers willfully cause problems, but because their obligation to provide commanders with legal counsel makes the problems inevitable. SOF needs to work to reduce the impact of legalism in the community by reducing the number of legal representatives present in its organizations and by employing those that are present more judiciously. By doing so, SOF can increase trust and honesty in its ranks and thereby reduce instances of ethical misconduct.

Too Many Lawyers - Why Legalism is Undermining Ethical Conduct in the SOF Community

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/05/10/too_many_lawyers_-_why_legalism_is_undermining_ethical_conduct_in_the_sof_community_898813.html

By Daniel Pace

USSOCOM graphics by Justin Moeller

Poster of the Special Operation Forces Truths, which are: Humans are more important than Hardware. Quality is better than Quantity. Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced. Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur. Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance.

In 300, the popular recreation of the Battle of Thermopylae, King Leonidas is told by the Delphic Oracle that he must not march to Thermopylae to declare war on Persians because doing so would violate Spartan religious norms. Leonidas’s response is to quibble a bit. He will not march to war. Instead, he and 299 of his close friends will go for a stroll to stretch his legs. If they happen to encounter Persians along the way, then so be it. The conversation portrayed in 300 resembles discussions between SOF operators and their legal teams today. Just as Leonidas did, modern SOF operators manipulate the language in CONOPs to secure legal top cover, and this tendency is contributing to the inculcation of dishonesty in the community.

The SOF community has become over reliant on legal advisors when dealing with ethical issues. The permeation of legal advisors into every level of the community has changed the tone of both operational decision making and command-directed investigations in an undesirable way, making both processes more legalistic. This breeds distrust and leads to an organizational culture of internal dishonesty and quibbling. If the SOF community hopes to see its operators make better ethical decisions, the community needs to stop allowing legalistic processes to undermine honest communication in its ranks.

In the operational decision-making process, lawyers serve as a combination of tribal shaman and ethics professor for the organization. After deciding what they want to accomplish, SOF planners carefully offer the JAG a CONOP containing the most lawyer friendly language of which they can think. If the lawyer blesses off on the operation, then the planners know they are probably safe from scrutiny by higher lawyers. If he does not, the planners must try to convince him to approve it by allowing him to replace their language with his own cryptic, legalistic incantations.

This process is not good for the SOF community. The reliance on lawyers to refine the language and approve the legality of SOF operations encourages hair-splitting and quibbling. It obfuscates the details, authorities, and intent of an operation behind a wall of legal language designed to protect access to funds and authorities and to avoid scrutiny. This leads to dishonest communication between leaders and their subordinates and increases the risk of catastrophic failure on the rare occasion an operation comes under direct, public scrutiny. (e.g. Niger) Honest, open communication between commanders and subordinates provides clearer communication of the intent and risk of an operation than carefully guarded, legal text. The SOF community needs to move toward the former and away from the latter.

Similarly, the effect of legal saturation muddies communication during command directed investigations. There are often lawyers on both sides of the nominally informal process. Lawyers on the investigated person’s side encourage careful, measured, communication to avoid accidentally giving information that could be held against the person. Lawyers on the commander’s side carefully review statements for incriminating information and advise commanders on what they should and shouldn’t say when talking to the investigated person to avoid creating future legal complications. The results of this legal involvement are that both sides are encouraged to avoid clear communication with one another. This flies in the face of a commander’s responsibility to maintain a close, trusting relationship with his subordinates as it encourages soldiers to keep things from their leadership, because a legal investigation necessarily results from any suspected impropriety. In most cases, all parties would be better served with an informal conversation between the commander and his subordinates, with neither side concerned that their statements could have legally incriminating implications. The commander can then move forward with formal investigation, nonjudicial punishment, or whatever other course of action he deems necessary.

As an example, take an investigation into suspected adultery – an allegation that appears with regularity across the SOF community. The commander receives a phone call making the allegation. Without speaking to the suspect, he appoints an investigating officer. The officer gets his JAG brief, speaks to all parties involved, then prepares his recommendations. Adultery is notoriously difficult to prove. So long as no party questioned confesses and no photographic evidence emerges, there is no legal way to establish it occurred. The commander and his JAG review the investigation, no proof is present, so the case is closed. Meanwhile, informal discussion between the commander and his subordinate leaders reveals that everyone in the unit, their families, and the surrounding community already know the adultery is happening and has been for some time.

This is not a healthy way for commanders to communicate with their subordinates. In the above case, the commander should simply speak to the suspected subordinate about the details of the situation, determine whether his actions were undermining the good order and discipline of the unit, and direct treatment, execute nonjudicial punishment, or take no action as required. Legally requiring leaders to exist in a state of doublethink where they know a problem exists, but don’t talk openly about the problem because doing so would requiring legal action, creates a culture of dishonesty in an organization that leads to a breakdown in internal communication.

The solution to these problems is to reduce legal team integration in the SOF community, particularly at the tactical level. Remove legal teams from the SOF battalions, reduce their presence at higher commands, and stop requiring legal involvement in the planning and conduct every operation and informal investigation. There is a role for legal advisors when planning near the margins of existing authorities and funding, and there is a need for legal review in serious instances of misconduct, particularly when civilian courts are involved, but legal resources should be applied judiciously rather than by default. This will improve honesty and candor during the operational planning process, and it will allow commanders to talk to their subordinates frankly about suspected misconduct.

The strongest counterargument to reducing legal team integration into the SOF community is that it’s naïve. There are lawyers at every level in the DoD, so removing legal teams from tactical SOF units only exposes those units to unfiltered scrutiny by higher legal teams. Wishing legalism away won’t solve problems in the SOF community, it will only compound them. Taken to its logical conclusion, one might suppose the best solution to this legal arms race would be to put a legal representative in every SOF team room, to ensure no team leader takes any action without the full concurrence of his legal advisor. That’s ridiculous of course, but as the community has increasingly withheld approval authority for tactical missions to higher levels, and increased the rank of forward commanders, the idea that every tactical SOF commander has an assigned legal counsel isn’t as farfetched as it should be.

The correct solution to this arms race is not to continue growing the SOF legal support structure, but to work to reduce the overall involvement of legal teams in the DoD as a whole. The START treaties showed the world that it was possible for the belligerents in The Cold War to reduce their stocks of nuclear warheads, surely the DoD can identify a similar solution to its own legal arms race?

From the first day of selection and assessment into the SOF community, owning your mistakes and being honest about what you’ve done are presented as critical to success. Legalism undermines those values by encouraging behavior that is counter to the basic tenants of honesty, candor, and trust on which the SOF community is built. The current saturation of legal representatives in the SOF community makes legalism hard to avoid, not because lawyers willfully cause problems, but because their obligation to provide commanders with legal counsel makes the problems inevitable. SOF needs to work to reduce the impact of legalism in the community by reducing the number of legal representatives present in its organizations and by employing those that are present more judiciously. By doing so, SOF can increase trust and honesty in its ranks and thereby reduce instances of ethical misconduct.

LTC Daniel Pace, U.S. Army, currently serves at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The views expressed in this article are the author's own and not that of the U.S. Army or DTRA.

23. The Utility of Deterrence

Excerpts;

Knight dismisses ample evidence from scholarly studies of the Berlin Airlift, Cuban Missile Crisis, and Vietnam Conflict, which show that a fear of escalation to nuclear war led to restraint; deterrence worked and World War III was avoided. Instead of challenging the work of historians with new scholarship, Knight suggests that deterrence theory is “hidden behind a thin veil of moral superiority that, when lifted, reveals white supremacy and racism.”

Rather than offering sound arguments to support her proposition that are based on supporting evidence, Knight relies on ad-hominem attacks against Caucasian males because they are today’s popular target; no evidence is required. As a female nuclear engineer about to defend my doctoral dissertation, I am thankful for the support and education given to me by my dissertation co-chairs, both heterosexual Caucasian men. Perhaps Knight should set aside her leftist advocacy and woke outrage and allow the facts to speak for themselves.

Any aspiring scholar or practitioner of nuclear deterrence must understand that the evidence will not always conform to your ideology. When it does not, it is not the facts that must change but your ideology.

The reality of nuclear deterrence is that the fear of escalation to nuclear war causes nuclear-armed adversaries to show restraint. We are seeing this very effect in the United States’ limited support for Ukraine right now.

Margaret Thatcher was right when she once said, “There are monuments to the failure of conventional deterrence in every village in Europe.” Perhaps Knight and her TikTok posse should remember that.

The Utility of Deterrence

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/05/11/the_utility_of_deterrence_898817.html

By Robyn Hutchins

May 11, 2023

UPI

It’s time to look closer at the peace, stability, and history behind deterrence theory.

In a recent Inkstick article, “The Privilege of Deterrence: It’s time to look closer at the privilege, white supremacy, and racism behind deterrence theory,” Middlebury Institute of International Studies student Mackenzie Knight uses responses to her TikTok posts to argue that deterrence theory is premised in white supremacy. In reply to her advocacy for nuclear disarmament, TikTokkers _fellas_in_paris_, boltyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy, smackhead_alek, irocktreefiddy, saiyanddrake, ladon_dracorex, and beakerfrog suggest that a proxy war in Vietnam, Afghanistan, or elsewhere is better than a nuclear war between Russia and the United States.

Knight attributes the views expressed in their posts to white supremacy and then claims that deterrence theory is born in racism. While Knight has a right to her own feelings, she does not have a right to her own facts. The simple truth is that on every point she makes in her tirade against social media rivals, Knight is wrong. Let me explain.

Nuclear deterrence is not premised on white supremacy. When it was developed by early deterrence theorists in the years and decades following World War II, it was designed as a way for the United States to deter the Soviet Union. American deterrence theory was certainly premised in anti-communism, but not racism. Knight’s willingness to assume she knows the motivation behind her TikTok detractors and then attribute her bias to the work of deterrence scholars and practitioners is lazy thinking.

Knight argues that because her TikTok detractors suggest they will accept a small proxy war to prevent a nuclear war makes them white supremacists. This is inaccurate. They may be nationalists, but so are the Russians, Chinese, and North Koreans, who all adhere to their own versions of deterrence theory. When Knight writes, “Nuclear superpowers like the United States and Russia get to laud the ‘success’ of deterrence while innocent lives in Vietnam, Korea, and Afghanistan (to name just a few) are lost in the proxy wars they started,” she fails to understand that great-power wars, which historically occur about twice per century, never remain solely between the great powers.

Thus, Korea and Vietnam were divided between Soviet-backed communists and American-backed anti-communists at the end of World War II. It is therefore puzzling that Knight wants to eliminate nuclear weapons and make the world safe for great-power war again. Perhaps she is unfamiliar with the consequences of World War I and II. More than 180,000,000 people perished as a result of these wars and the communist regimes they precipitated. Careful analysis of the conflict in Vietnam, for example, illustrates that the fear of escalation to nuclear war led American, Chinese, and Russian leaders to show restraint and avoid World War III.

By constraining the tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by both sides in Vietnam, lives were saved in Vietnam and elsewhere. It goes without saying that Korea and Vietnam were not divided because Caucasian communists and capitalists had racial animosity toward Asians. Let’s not forget that Germany was also divided by Americans and Soviets. A look at the borders between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact was largely a delineation between the countries liberated by the Soviets and those liberated by the Americans. The fight was never about race but about ideology. In all these cases, details matter—sweeping assertions do not.

Knight dismisses ample evidence from scholarly studies of the Berlin Airlift, Cuban Missile Crisis, and Vietnam Conflict, which show that a fear of escalation to nuclear war led to restraint; deterrence worked and World War III was avoided. Instead of challenging the work of historians with new scholarship, Knight suggests that deterrence theory is “hidden behind a thin veil of moral superiority that, when lifted, reveals white supremacy and racism.”

Rather than offering sound arguments to support her proposition that are based on supporting evidence, Knight relies on ad-hominem attacks against Caucasian males because they are today’s popular target; no evidence is required. As a female nuclear engineer about to defend my doctoral dissertation, I am thankful for the support and education given to me by my dissertation co-chairs, both heterosexual Caucasian men. Perhaps Knight should set aside her leftist advocacy and woke outrage and allow the facts to speak for themselves.

Any aspiring scholar or practitioner of nuclear deterrence must understand that the evidence will not always conform to your ideology. When it does not, it is not the facts that must change but your ideology.

The reality of nuclear deterrence is that the fear of escalation to nuclear war causes nuclear-armed adversaries to show restraint. We are seeing this very effect in the United States’ limited support for Ukraine right now.

Margaret Thatcher was right when she once said, “There are monuments to the failure of conventional deterrence in every village in Europe.” Perhaps Knight and her TikTok posse should remember that.

Robyn Hutchins is Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a PhD candidate in the Department of Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering at Kansas State University. She previously spent time at several labs in the nuclear enterprise.

24. Navy SEALs Long-Awaited Dry Sub in Operation by ‘Memorial Day’

Navy SEALs Long-Awaited Dry Sub in Operation by ‘Memorial Day’

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Stew Magnuson

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

5/10/2023

Defense Dept. photo

TAMPA, Florida — By the end of the month, Navy SEALs conducting clandestine underwater missions could arrive at their destinations bone dry rather than sopping wet.

The Dry Combat Submersible is expected to reach initial operational capability by Memorial Day, acquisition executives at Special Operations Command said May 10 during the SOF Week conference in Tampa, Florida.

“This morning we received an operational test report. So that means the Dry Combat Submersible is going to be operational by Memorial Day, and we’re coming to an end scenario,” said John Conway, undersea program manager at SOCOM’s program executive office-maritime.

“That ends a capability gap of 15 years — more than 15 years,” Navy Capt. Randy Slaff, program executive officer for maritime systems at Special Operations Command, noted during a panel discussion. While SOCOM is the end user of the system, the development is executed by the Navy.

Naval special operators needing to travel undersea must currently don wet suits and use the Seal Delivery Vehicle MK 11. The dry submersible is expected to give them more time underwater because they are not exposed to the cold.

The Dry Combat Submersible will soon be renamed the Submarine Launch Dry Submersible, SOCOM Acquisition Executive James Smith told reporters the previous day.

“I’m pleased with the progress,” Smith said. “We’re reliant on the Navy for the success of that program and really happy with how the relationship is progressing.”

The Navy “controls the destiny of the program” as to when it becomes fully certified, he noted.

For Navy SEALs, the delivery vehicle has been a long time coming. The concept for a dry submersible dates back to the early 1980s with a contract awarded to Northrop Grumman to build six of the Advanced Seal Delivery Systems in 1994.

After years of delays, the first prototype with a 60-ton displacement that could carry up to 16 SEALs was said to be too noisy and had difficulty generating enough power. It then caught fire in 2008 with the damage being too great to repair. By 2009, the Navy canceled the program after spending some $883 million.

Then came the short-lived Joint Multi-Mission Submersible, which also met its demise due to cost overruns in 2010.

Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor on the third attempt to develop a dry submersible for Navy special operators. This version is smaller at 39.4 feet long with a 30-ton displacement and can carry up to eight special operators plus two pilots. There is a lock-in/lock-out hatch for egressing or returning from mission in their combat wet suits.

Publicly available information states that the new sub can remain underwater for 24 hours, has a range of 60 miles and can travel at depths of 330 feet. It will be deployed via surface ships rather than larger submarines, as is the case with the “wet” submersibles. Its average speed is 5 knots, but the maximum speed remains classified.

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Stew Magnuson

25. The Opponents of Marine Reform Have Lost, But Won’t Move On by Robert Work

Read the entire article at this link: https://tnsr.org/2023/05/marine-force-design-changes-overdue-despite-critics-claims/

The Opponents of Marine Reform Have Lost, But Won’t Move On - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Robert Work · May 10, 2023

In the military, as in most public organizations, new leaders need to take stock. They are obligated to determine the state of the institution and its preparedness to execute its current missions, particularly during times of rapid technological change. Leaders must also assess whether the organization is ready to account for evident or anticipated changes in the foreseeable future. If they judge that the institution is not prepared for current or future challenges, then it is incumbent upon them to make the changes deemed necessary to make it so.

As he assumed the role of 38th commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. David Berger, the sitting commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, conducted just such an assessment. Upon completion, he concluded, “Significant change is required to ensure we are aligned with the 2018 National Defense Strategy and [Defense Planning Guidance] and prepared to meet the demands of the Naval Fleet in executing current and emerging operational naval concepts.” This was a difficult judgment to make for a decorated leader of a service as fiercely proud of its martial prowess as the Marine Corps. I understand this intimately, having served as a Marine artillery officer for 27 years. But Berger was convinced by the evidence that change was required, and he was intent on doing something about it. The “doing something about it” came in the form of Force Design 2030, which is both a case for change and a vision and a plan for a modernized Marine Corps that is ready to take on future challenges.

Berger’s plans were not met with universal acclaim. Indeed, the opponents of the commandant’s vision would give the Energizer Bunny a run for its money. They have lobbied on Capitol Hill and fired off a spate of opinion pieces with machine-gun rapidity in various periodicals that come off as if they were generated by ChatGPT. They describe Berger’s plans in the most heated of terms, depicting them as both destructive and possibly illegal. They’ve implied that Congress has failed over the last few budget cycles to provide proper oversight of the merits of the programs and budgets they have approved. Their stated objective is to get Congress to stop Berger from pursuing his plan until it holds hearings, presumably to discredit his reforms and then chart a path into the future that better suits their preferences. These dissenters have thus far failed to convince Congress of the merits of their case, but that has not discouraged them from continuing to disparage the commandant’s plans publicly and often. They just keep going … and going … and going.

Read the rest of “Marine Force Design: Changes Overdue Despite Critics’ Claims” by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work in the Texas National Security Review.

Image: U.S. Marine Corps, Sgt. Patrick King

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Robert Work · May 10, 2023

26. Russian Guerrillas Are Trying to Violently Overthrow Putin

Excerpts:

Popkov and Ponomarev—who sometimes appear together on the latter’s newscast, February Morning—both believe that peaceful methods have run their course and it is time for armed resistance. It is true that Russians who challenge Putin politically are often found dead, jailed, or exiled. (According to some estimates, at least 70 cases of treason have been launched since the start of the war, a major uptick even by Russian standards.)

But the potential for success of an armed resistance in a society tightly controlled by security forces is debatable. Alexandra Garmazhapova, the head of the Free Buryatia Foundation, a dissident group representing an ethnic minority in Russia, was declared a foreign agent by the Russian government and forced to flee to Czechia. Speaking to FP from Prague, Garmazhapova said she is “against violence,” and in any case didn’t think much of the armed resistance since, she feared, the FSB is very much “in control” of the situation. “No one can just carry out a bombing in Russia,” she said. “It is much more difficult than it seems.”

Changing the course of Russian politics is even harder than that. For all the attacks that have already taken place, the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine has not yet noticeably changed.

Russian Guerrillas Are Trying to Violently Overthrow Putin

The Russian president faces a growing threat from his own citizens.

Vohra-Anchal-foreign-policy-columnist18

Anchal Vohra

By Anchal Vohra, a columnist at Foreign Policy.

Foreign Policy · by Anchal Vohra · May 10, 2023

Roman Popkov dabbled in Russia’s far-left and far-right political scenes before devoting himself to the armed overthrow of Russian President Vladimir Putin in the name of democracy. In 2011, he moved to Kyiv after getting imprisoned in Russia for taking part in anti-Putin protests. His greatest success may have come last month, on April 2, when a noted Russian propagandist, Vladlen Tatarsky, was killed in a St. Petersburg cafe. Popkov is rumored to have recruited the assassin on behalf of Ukraine’s intelligence service and to have helped plan the killing.

In a lengthy chat with Foreign Policy via encrypted messaging, Popkov remembered Darya Trepova, the alleged recruit, as one of the “best people” he had ever known and described her as a “hero” for opposing Russia’s Ukraine invasion. He neither confirmed nor denied that he had personally played a role in the attack but admitted that the rebel network he works for, Rospartizan, was involved in the “liquidation of Putin’s propagandist and war criminal Vladlen Tatarsky.” He added that other Russian partisan groups collaborated as well. National Republican Army (NRA), another partisan group represented by former Duma deputy, Ilya Ponomarev, has also claimed to have carried out the attack.

It is hard to verify Popkov’s claims, but his commitment and self-righteousness were impossible to deny. Popkov expressed his conviction that a Russian-led guerrilla movement will be the only way to dispose of Putin, dismissing the nonviolent protestations of Russian exiles in Europe as ineffective, short-sighted, and even immoral. He did little to dispel the notion that the Russian opposition has deep strategic divides.

“We in Ukraine live under rocket attacks. Our comrades in Russia are risking their lives and freedom in the fight against tyranny. And the Russian political emigration in Europe sits in cafes and talks,” he said. Popkov added he wanted the West to “recognize the right of free Russians to fight evil. And treat it with respect.”

Since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, mysterious attacks have occurred across Russia. Explosives have derailed trains, blown up power lines, and damaged a bridge connecting Crimea to Russia. Arsonists have also thrown Molotov cocktails at military enlistment centers. Russian opposition groups later claimed credit for these attacks as part of a larger armed rebellion.

But who are these groups? How strong are they, and do they receive Ukrainian and Western support, as Russia has claimed? “Ukrainian special forces and their Western curators have launched an aggressive ideological indoctrination and recruitment of our citizens,” Alexander Bortnikov, the chief of the notorious Federal Security Bureau (FSB), or Russia’s interior intelligence agency, said last month.

The United States has rejected accusations of involvement and said it had no previous knowledge of any of the attacks that took place inside the Russian Federation, with intelligence officials whispering to reporters that their ally, Ukraine, may have kept them in the dark. Ukraine has neither confirmed nor denied its involvement, securing plausible deniability yet allowing rumors of a Mossad-style competence to linger.

Conventional wisdom says that, in the secretive game of covert warfare or undercover resistance, the full truth may come out only later, depending on who wins, but the theory of deduction could be deployed to try to make some sense of these events.

Foreign Policy’s conversations with Russian dissidents and open-source information indicate that some groups appear to have received some sort of support from Ukraine. But that seems not to detract from the sincerity of their commitment to the anti-Putin cause.

Ponomarev, the only Russian lawmaker who voted against Crimea’s annexation, told Foreign Policy that he is personally connected to about half a dozen Russian partisan groups inside Russia and was channeling Ukrainian support to help the groups in carrying out their missions. “I am helping them,” he said, elusively adding, “with certain things.” When asked if he was sending across weapons or explosives, he said, “I think it is pretty obvious what partisan groups need.”

There is determinable evidence of the presence of several such groups, including the Combat Organization of Anarcho-Communists (or BOAK, an acronym of its Russian name), Stop the Wagons (STW), Freedom of Russia Legion, and the far-right Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC). There are some doubts over the existence of the NRA, politically represented by Ponomarev, as it seems to be either operating in the shadows for security reasons or is simply nonexistent.

Among the more active groups is BOAK, whose co-founder, Dmitry Petrov, also known as Ilya Leshy, had also fought in Syria. BOAK carried out several attacks of sabotage including an explosion that damaged a section of the Trans-Siberian Railway in Krasnoyarsk in early January. Last year this month they blew up a railway line that regularly transported military equipment to a Russian military base north of Moscow, leaving their initials on the track. The group is on the list Ponomarev mentioned as receiving Ukrainian support. The group, nonetheless, is a genuine partisan entity that existed before the war started and fought at home for basic freedoms.

Petrov recently died in Bakhmut fighting for Ukraine’s Territorial Defense Forces, a Ukrainian military reserve force. In his obituary his associates described him as a Russian anarchist active since the 2000s who fought for workers’ rights, the environment, and alongside the Kurds in the Syrian war. In a farewell note he left behind, he wrote, “I did it for the sake of justice, protection of Ukrainian society and liberation of my country, Russia, from oppression.” These are words that indicate independent agency rather than coercion by or influence from another state to undertake subversion.

Denis Nikitin, the leader of the far-right RVC who is also known as Denis Kapustin, has been active for more than a decade. Nikitin roamed around in far-right circles in several European countries after moving to Germany in 2001 and befriended German soccer hooligans. He launched a white nationalist fashion brand called White Rex with Nazi symbols imprinted on clothing items.

On March 2, Nikitin’s men slipped into the Bryansk region of Russia through Ukraine and carried out a raid in which Russian officials said two civilians were killed. A video made available online shows two of their men, impressing on their compatriots that they came as liberators and not saboteurs and called upon fellow Russians to take up arms and fight against Putin, adding “death to the Kremlin’s tyrant” toward the end of the message as shots were heard in the background.

Nikitin told the Financial Times that the operation had been given the go-ahead from Ukrainian authorities to expose the weaknesses of Russia’s border security—and evidently also to encourage rebellion among Russians. Ukraine has denied providing any direct support to the group, aware that it could be used by Putin to strengthen his de-Nazification argument.

Popkov said that neither RVC nor BOAK is connected with Rospartizan, but that one should not be surprised that the far left and far right were both part of the resistance. Putin’s regime, he said, “is an absolute evil” and has “united a wide variety of people against itself.”

Among other partisan Russian groups is STW, which has no known links to Ukraine. It has derailed a number of freight trains supplying war material to Russian troops and perhaps slowed them down.

Popkov and Ponomarev—who sometimes appear together on the latter’s newscast, February Morning—both believe that peaceful methods have run their course and it is time for armed resistance. It is true that Russians who challenge Putin politically are often found dead, jailed, or exiled. (According to some estimates, at least 70 cases of treason have been launched since the start of the war, a major uptick even by Russian standards.)

But the potential for success of an armed resistance in a society tightly controlled by security forces is debatable. Alexandra Garmazhapova, the head of the Free Buryatia Foundation, a dissident group representing an ethnic minority in Russia, was declared a foreign agent by the Russian government and forced to flee to Czechia. Speaking to FP from Prague, Garmazhapova said she is “against violence,” and in any case didn’t think much of the armed resistance since, she feared, the FSB is very much “in control” of the situation. “No one can just carry out a bombing in Russia,” she said. “It is much more difficult than it seems.”

Changing the course of Russian politics is even harder than that. For all the attacks that have already taken place, the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine has not yet noticeably changed.

Foreign Policy · by Anchal Vohra · May 10, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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