Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Life is the art of drawing sufficient conclusions from insufficient premises."

– Samuel Butler

"Whether it be the intrusion of hackers, a major explosion at the World Trade Center, or a bombing attack by Bin Laden, all of these greatly exceed the frequency of bandwidth understood by the American military."

– Unrestricted Warfare, 1999

"A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery. It cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another."

– Mao Zedong

1. Retired Special Warfare Commander Lauds Value of Strong Allied Relationships

2. CAMPAIGNING IN THE AGE OF 5 AGAINST 1 – Making a Case For a Global Asymmetric Competition Campaign

3. What Does the Xi-Ma Meeting Mean for Cross-Strait Relations?

4. A Plan for Victory in Ukraine

5. China's Military Is Slowly Becoming a Superpower Before Our Eyes

6. Are Campus Protesters Heroes or Hypocrites?

7. Japan and South Korea are itching to sign up to Aukus. But trust is an issue

8. US committee targets Georgia Tech's alleged ties to Chinese military linked research

9. US to announce new $400 million military aid package for Ukraine

10. Pentagon deals Russia a blow over Starlink

11. Ukraine Enhances Military Reach Using US ATACMS in Strikes Against Russian Forces

12. 'Swarm pilots' will need new tactics—and entirely new training methods: Air Force special-ops chief

13. 'ChatGPT, plan my top-secret mission'

14. Restoring Landpower’s Wings: The Case for Army Fixed-Wing Airlift

15. Germany to buy US HIMARS launchers for Ukraine

16. Fraternities Are a Cure for What Ails Higher Education

17. Civilian casualties rise in Myanmar's civil war as resistance forces tighten noose around military

18. Does America Have the Means to Fight Again?

1. Retired Special Warfare Commander Lauds Value of Strong Allied Relationships

Personal relationships (and trust) are everything.

Excerpts:

"It's personal relationships … it's always about personal relationships," McRaven said, when asked about the key factors that make up a successful SOF organization.

"We used to talk about the War on Terror as [being] a war about relationships. It was [about] how … we build relationships with our Iraqi partners, with our Afghan partners [and] with our NATO partners and allies from around the world … You've got to build that personal relationship because they've got to trust you, and you've got to trust them."

McRaven emphasized that a strong working relationship between SOF organizations can't be established without first having trust.

"When it comes to building relationships and doing anything else beyond that — sharing intelligence, partnering on tactical missions — you've got to start with trust," he said.

McRaven elaborated on the topic by saying that there is very little tolerance for violating such trust.

"Trust is not ... 'three strikes and you're out'; trust is ... 'two strikes and you're out.' Because, if you build trust, and you [fail at it] once, the trust factor will hold for a little while," he said.

"But if you undermine your allies and your colleagues a second time, you're done."

Retired Special Warfare Commander Lauds Value of Strong Allied Relationships

defense.gov · by Matthew Olay

Former leader of U.S. Special Operations Command and retired Navy four-star admiral William H. McRaven discussed the value of developing and maintaining strong relationships within the international special warfare community during a fireside chat Thursday at the Special Operations Forces 2024 convention in Tampa, Florida.

Special Operations Forces Week

Retired Navy Adm. William H. McRaven is interviewed by investigative correspondent Catherine Herridge during a fireside chat at Special Operations Forces Week 2024, Tampa, Fla., May 9, 2024.

Download: Full Size (3.73 MB)

Photo By: Army Sgt. Taylor Zacherl

VIRIN: 240509-A-DK957-1002

During a one-hour interview led by veteran television investigative correspondent Catherine Herridge that covered a wide range of topics, McRaven consistently underscored the importance of having trust-based partnerships to facilitate communications among SOF organizations across the globe.

"It's personal relationships … it's always about personal relationships," McRaven said, when asked about the key factors that make up a successful SOF organization.

"We used to talk about the War on Terror as [being] a war about relationships. It was [about] how … we build relationships with our Iraqi partners, with our Afghan partners [and] with our NATO partners and allies from around the world … You've got to build that personal relationship because they've got to trust you, and you've got to trust them."

Spotlight: NATO

McRaven emphasized that a strong working relationship between SOF organizations can't be established without first having trust.

"When it comes to building relationships and doing anything else beyond that — sharing intelligence, partnering on tactical missions — you've got to start with trust," he said.

McRaven elaborated on the topic by saying that there is very little tolerance for violating such trust.

"Trust is not ... 'three strikes and you're out'; trust is ... 'two strikes and you're out.' Because, if you build trust, and you [fail at it] once, the trust factor will hold for a little while," he said.

"But if you undermine your allies and your colleagues a second time, you're done."

Special Operations Forces Week

Service members from U.S. Special Operations Command, the Special Operations Component Commands, and International Special Operations partners and allies, conduct a Special Operations Capabilities Demonstration during Special Operations Forces Week 2024, Tampa, Fla., May 8, 2024.

Download: Full Size (2.76 MB)

Photo By: Marine Corps Cpl. Henry Rodriguez

VIRIN: 240508-M-HV456-2184

Special Operation Forces Week

Multinational Special Operations Forces infill using powered paragliders during a capabilities demonstration in downtown Tampa, Fla., May 8, 2024. Special Operation Forces Week 2024 included the popular “Battle in the Bay” capabilities demonstration and displayed military-tactical operations with 10 different nations by land, air and sea, complete with fixed-wing and rotary wing aircraft, drones and ships.

Download: Full Size (1.75 MB)

Photo By: Army Sgt. Taylor Zacherl

VIRIN: 240508-A-DK957-1002

When asked if there are challenges to establishing such trustful relationships in parts of the globe that don't share those same trust-based values, McRaven pushed back slightly, saying that militaries worldwide share the same values.

"I think, across the board, militaries have core values," he said.

"They understand the value of good order and discipline; they understand the value of the mission; they understand the value of doing things the right way; [and] they understand how to make sure that you don't have collateral damage that really exceeds the nature of the mission."

For an example of SOF personnel from a variety of nations being able to come together and efficiently work as a unit, McRaven mentioned the SOF 2024 capabilities demonstration that took place in the bay just outside of the convention center on Wednesday.

The demonstration — which simulated an attack on the Tampa Bay Convention Center by a notional, unnamed enemy — showcased U.S. SOF teams collaborating with SOF personnel from nine other nations.

"You can line [foreign SOF operators] up on the pier out here by the convention center; and their uniforms are all different, the color of their skin may be different, their religion may be different, [and] their ethnicity may be different," McRaven said.

"But then, here, they're all kind of the same — and you can spot them coming a mile away. So, I do think relationships are built on trust."

When asked about potential challenges to building strong, international SOF relationships, McRaven said inaction is the primary impediment.

Special Operations Forces Week

Retired Navy Adm. William H. McRaven is interviewed by investigative correspondent Catherine Herridge during a fireside chat at Special Operations Forces Week 2024, Tampa, Fla., May 9, 2024.

Download: Full Size (3.61 MB)

Photo By: Army Sgt. Taylor Zacherl

VIRIN: 240509-A-DK957-1004

"We know how to build the relationships; now we just have to do it," he said, adding that Socom and the various theater special operations commands around the globe need to consistently be building relationships in support of the combatant commander in the respective regions.

As the chat wound down, McRaven said that during times of relative peace when countries aren't sharing the battlefield together, it's crucial to be proactive in building relationships.

"Because — believe it or not — sooner or later you're going to find yourself on the battlefield again, in a place you've never heard of, at a fight you never thought would happen," McRaven said. "And if you haven't built these relationships … then you're not going to be able to move as quickly and you're not going to be as successful.

"So, take whatever you learn this week, take it home, and then find ways to continue to build the relationship."

defense.gov · by Matthew Olay

2. CAMPAIGNING IN THE AGE OF 5 AGAINST 1 – Making a Case For a Global Asymmetric Competition Campaign

A global Irregular warfare campaign.

Do we have irregular warfare proficient campaign headquarters?

I know the USSOCOM focus will chaff some people and that should be debated. But I think the call for a global campaign is really worth exploring regardless of who leads it. My personal belief is that such a global campaign must be led at the national level by an interagency organization with the military contributing its irregular warfare capabilities and expertise. At its core strategic competition is political warfare conducted at the national level (the use of all elements of national power to achieve national security objectives). It is political warfare in the gray zone between peace and war (which upsets some because they focus on gray zone activities versus the gray zone being a "space" – e,g., between peace and war). Irregular warfare is the military contribution to political warfare. And Special Warfare is the USSOCOM contribution to irregular warfare.

Excerpts:

The strategic landscape has undeniably transformed with the increasing collaboration among major U.S. adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The disjointed nature of the current U.S. strategic response is being systematically outpaced and outmaneuvered by these adversaries' cohesive and concerted efforts. In this new era of warfare, USSOCOM stands out as the most capable command to lead a global irregular campaign. Its expertise in asymmetric warfare and its global operational reach position USSOCOM as the ideal leader to effectively counteract evolving threats.

Adopting a coordinated and globally oriented irregular warfare framework under USSOCOM’s leadership, or some other unified structure is not merely an option but a strategic imperative. This point bears repeating: asymmetry is a critical vulnerability of the U.S. An asymmetric campaign under a unified command is crucial for deterring, degrading, and defeating the asymmetric strategies that peer competitors like China and Russia employ. If pursued with vigor and strategic foresight, this approach will advance U.S. national security interests and preserve its position in the global order.

As we face this new age of strategic competition, the call to action is clear: reorient U.S. military and strategic postures under USSOCOM to effectively compete asymmetrically on the global stage. The DoD desires to maintain strategic advantage and secure a stable international environment conducive to U.S. interests and values. This can only be achieved through a unified and focused approach. The stakes are high, as the threats from China, Russia, Iran, and the DPRK are not just persistent but are strategically aligned against U.S. global interests. USSOCOM must be empowered to lead this critical mission, as it is uniquely equipped to orchestrate a comprehensive and integrated response to these asymmetric threats.

CAMPAIGNING IN THE AGE OF 5 AGAINST 1

Making a Case For a Global Asymmetric Competition Campaign

By Monte Erfourth

Strategy Central – May 11, 2024https://www.strategycentral.io/post/campaigning-in-the-age-of-5-against-1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The contemporary geopolitical landscape presents a complex array of threats to the United States, particularly from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and various violent terrorist organizations. These adversaries, once operating in isolation, have forged an alarming collaboration that spans economic, military, and technological domains. This union poses a grave threat to U.S. global dominance and strategic interests.

As these adversarial relationships deepen, the United States faces a strategic disconnect. The Joint Force currently employs separate strategies tailored to individual threats, neglecting the collaborative nature of these adversaries. This oversight renders the U.S. response fragmented and less effective, exacerbating the risk of strategic failures.

ANALYSIS OF THREATS AND THEIR COLLABORATION

The contemporary geopolitical landscape presents a complex array of threats to the United States, most prominently from China, Russia, and Iran. These nations have shifted from relatively isolated stances against the United States to a more collaborative approach in geopolitical maneuvering. This collusion spans economic, military, and technological realms, intensifying the threat to U.S. global dominance in the post-Cold War era. Each nation contributes uniquely to this emerging coalition, leveraging its strengths to challenge U.S. interests globally. The fifth threat is violent extremists, but this article will focus on the threat posed by nation-states.

As the primary strategic competitor, China is rapidly expanding its military capabilities, economic influence, and technological advancements to project power globally, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Economically, China supports Russia by purchasing increased amounts of oil and gas, helping Russia withstand Western sanctions related to the Ukrainian conflict. This financial support not only strengthens Russia's economic stability but also secures energy resources for China, potentially at lower rates. Additionally, China supplies Russia with critical military technologies, including semiconductor technologies and radar and communications jamming equipment, which are crucial for enhancing Russia's capabilities in electronic and cyber warfare. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and militarization of the South China Sea further signify its long-term ambitions to reshape the global order in its favor.[1]

Iran contributes to this alliance by supplying drones to Russia, significantly enhancing Russian military effectiveness in Ukraine. Plans are reportedly in place to establish a drone manufacturing facility in Russia, aiming to increase production capacity and technological self-reliance. Iran's regional activities, particularly its support for proxy groups and its ballistic missile and nuclear programs, exacerbate tensions with U.S. allies and pose significant risks to regional stability, especially around the strategic Strait of Hormuz.[2]

Russia uses a hybrid warfare strategy that includes disinformation campaigns, political interference, and military engagements, particularly noticeable in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The annexation of Crimea and military presence in Syria are clear indicators of Russia's intent to reassert its influence over former Soviet states and challenge U.S. interests directly. This reassertion poses a heightened threat to NATO, reminiscent of the tensions experienced during the 1980s.[3]

These nations support each other's immediate strategic needs, such as Russia's in Ukraine, and share a broader objective to counterbalance American influence and reshape global alliances traditionally dominated by the West. Their strategic alignment and cooperation are evident in their unified stance in international forums against Western policies, indicating a deepening geopolitical strategy with potentially enduring impacts on global stability.

The current U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and Joint Force strategies must be better aligned to counter this multidimensional threat effectively. The DoD operates with separate plans for each major threat, lacking a unified strategy that considers the collaborative nature of these threats. This approach results in fragmented and insufficiently coordinated efforts across the Geographic Combatant Commands and the Functional commands that operate globally and in space. The existing disjointed strategy exposes the United States to significant risk and undermines its ability to maintain a dominant position in an increasingly unified multipolar world aligned against it.

The threat posed by China, Russia, and Iran, particularly in their collective capacity to challenge U.S. interests, underscores the urgent need for a cohesive and strategic response from the United States. This response should integrate all elements of national power and leverage the unique capabilities of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). USSOCOM is strategically positioned to develop and lead a global irregular campaign to deter, degrade, contain, and defeat these asymmetric threats. With its specialized capabilities and global reach, USSOCOM is ideally suited to spearhead this critical initiative, ensuring the United States can effectively respond to and overcome the challenges posed by this axis of autocrats. This approach is necessary and essential to sustain U.S. supremacy and safeguard global stability.

STRATEGIC RE-ALIGNMENT UNDER USSOCOM

In an increasingly complex global security environment, the United States faces sophisticated threats from state actors like China and Russia, who prefer asymmetric strategies to counter traditional American military might. This evolving context demands an adaptive and integrated approach to national security, particularly through the lens of irregular warfare. While impressive and vital, the conventional capabilities commonly imagined by tanks, planes, and ships are often circumvented by adversaries skilled in asymmetric warfare, a domain where China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and other adversaries excel. It might be possible to characterize the PLA’s center of gravity as its organization, doctrine, strategy, and activities grounded in asymmetrical warfare and coordinated through an asymmetrical campaign.

Asymmetric warfare represents a critical vulnerability for the U.S., highlighted by the PLA’s strategic focus on leveraging such tactics to exploit gaps in traditional American military responses. The current structure of the Joint Force further exacerbates this vulnerability due to its traditional emphasis on direct conflict, relegating asymmetric warfare to a secondary role primarily within counterterrorism (CT) frameworks. This strategic oversight leaves a significant gap between peacetime competition and outright conflict, a gap that adversaries are poised to exploit.

Both conventional forces and Special Operations Forces (SOF) engage across the full spectrum of military competition. However, the conventional forces primarily confront the challenges posed by conventional military strategies and activities, often without sufficient integration of ways and means to confront the asymmetric approach favored by all nations hostile to the United States. Even when the conventional forces in the Joint Force consider asymmetric attacks, they rarely consult with the asymmetric expertise residing within the SOF community. This disconnect results from organizational and operational silos that hinder effective collaboration and strategic alignment across different military domains.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act restructured the military command, streamlining command from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commanders and establishing six geographic theaters of operation. This artifact of Cold War structure has its merits. However, this structure has also left a Department of Defense that lacks a unified, globally coordinated campaign strategy, resulting in fragmented and locally focused campaign plans that fail to synchronize efforts across theaters effectively. This lack of global coordination is a glaring weakness that China and Russia exploit strategically.

Addressing this gap requires rethinking the current command structure to enable more effective global coordination against asymmetric threats. Potential solutions include establishing a global command or adapting existing structures to better integrate and leverage U.S. capabilities across theaters. USSOCOM, with its unique focus on irregular warfare and global reach, is well-positioned to lead an integrated global asymmetric effort under a unified command.

USSOCOM, designated as a Functional Combatant Command (FCC) under Section 164 of Title 10 U.S. Code, operates beyond geographic constraints and, much like a service, brings specialized capabilities to the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC). Through its Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), which are tactically aligned to GCCs, USSOCOM resources SOF operations regionally. As the Joint SOF Headquarters and irregular lead within the Joint Force, it retains the capacity to operate globally, making it a potential cornerstone for a new, integrated approach to asymmetric threats.

The concept of USSOCOM evolving into a “Global Task Force” to counter named threats underlines its capability to coordinate efforts across theaters, utilizing its global situational awareness and operational flexibility. If given Operational Control of all SOF in all theaters as required, a truly global asymmetric campaign could be made. JSOC and the TSOCs could remain the primary operational elements, and USSOCOM could operate as the strategic command responsible for designing and coordinating a campaign. This would streamline efforts and enhance the effectiveness of U.S. responses to global asymmetric strategies employed by state adversaries.

Augmenting USSOCOM's role and reconfiguring it as a global command authority could bridge the existing strategic and operational gaps. This approach would leverage the unique capabilities of SOF in a globally coordinated campaign, enhancing the United States' ability to deter, degrade, and defeat asymmetric threats effectively. Such a strategic realignment would address current vulnerabilities and fortify U.S. national security against sophisticated global threats.

The evolving nature of global threats necessitates a unified command structure to enhance the effectiveness and responsiveness of U.S. strategic efforts. USSOCOM, with its unique capabilities and existing infrastructure, is ideally positioned to lead this charge. By leveraging its Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) network, USSOCOM can orchestrate a cohesive and integrated response that spans multiple theaters and domains.

This re-alignment under USSOCOM would consolidate the currently disparate strategic efforts into a singular, focused campaign. This approach not only streamlines command and control but also enhances the operational flexibility necessary to address the multifaceted nature of the threats posed by these adversarial alliances. However, it still leaves the conventional efforts in a state of plans and command disunity. If the DoD were to retain the GCC structure, the only remedy to achieve unity of command is a General Staff led by a five-star General or Admiral.

CHALLENGES TO A GLOBAL IW CAMPAIGN

The endeavor to enact a globally coordinated irregular warfare campaign led by USSOCOM faces several substantial challenges, including military resistance, political hurdles, and legal constraints. Each of these factors plays a critical role in shaping the feasibility and effectiveness of such a strategy.

There are three primary dimensions to resistance for any command that would assume the lead as a unified command combating asymmetric attacks from our nation’s rivals. Each is considered as follows.

Institutional Resistance: The institutional inertia within the broader Defense Department, and to a lesser extent within USSOCOM, is a significant barrier. USSOCOM has yet to propose a global irregular strategy or explore how to effectively counter the main threat posed by the PRC's "Three Warfares" asymmetric approach to degrade the United States’ global superiority. The command is currently developing a revised Campaign Plan – Global Special Operations (CP-GSO). Still, it is unclear if it will focus on CT with competition as a secondary mission or place competition above CT.

The lack of advocacy for a leadership role in asymmetric warfare is compounded by a fragmented command and control structure. Currently, there is no unity of command at the global level, which severely hampers the Joint Force's ability to coordinate actions and fully understand the scope of rival activities. This disjointed view contrasts sharply with the more holistic perspectives of adversaries. Additionally, the predominant focus on conflict overshadows the necessity for an asymmetric strategy tailored to the modes of competition preferred by rivals. Furthermore, two decades of emphasis on counterterrorism have dulled strategic thinking regarding unconventional threats from peer rivals, leaving a leadership deficit trained or experienced in crafting comprehensive global strategies.

Political Resistance: The integration with other agencies has historically been poor, and attempts at improvement have consistently fallen short. Carl von Clausewitz's concept of the 'remarkable trinity' reflects the complex interplay of violence, chance, and the political use of war, highlighting the contradictory and unpredictable nature of warfare that involves the people, the military, and the government. In the U.S., fractured politics often allow emotionally driven public opinion to influence foreign policy, undermining the rational application of military strategy as a tool of national policy. This disconnect leads to a lack of coherent political objectives, complicating the strategic direction of the Joint Force and making integration of the DIME elements of power that much harder. There is also an outsized fear of political risk that hinders bold action and stymies initiative, which could be mitigated by AI power risk analysis that has yet to be adopted. If USSOCOM were to be designated the lead for a global irregular campaign, this problem must be addressed.

Legal Resistance: Legal hurdles also impede USSOCOM's operational flexibility. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) reflects public and political apprehension toward special operations, further restricting USSOCOM's capacity to act decisively and expansively. Revising Title 10, the Unified Command Plan, Joint Strategic Campaign Plan, and other legal and strategic documents would be required.

Conclusively, while the path to assigning USSOCOM as the lead for a global irregular campaign is fraught with obstacles—ranging from structural limitations and legal constraints to political inertia—the command's proven adaptability and expertise in unconventional warfare make it the ideal candidate to develop and lead efforts to deter, degrade, contain, and defeat the asymmetric attacks against the United States. Such a leadership role would not only leverage USSOCOM’s specialized capabilities but also significantly enhance the overall strategic posture of the United States in the face of global threats.

CONCLUSION AND CALL TO ACTION

[1] Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine. “The Axis of Upheaval. How America’s Enemies are Uniting to Overturn the Global Order.” Foreign Affairs. April 23, 2024

[2] Niall Ferguson. “The Second Cold War Is Escalating Faster Than the First . To understand what is at stake in the fight against the axis of China, Russia and Iran, just read “The Lord of the Rings.” Bloomberg. April 21, 2024

[3] Lucas Winter, Jemima Baar, and Jason Warner. “The Axis Off-Kilter: Why An Iran-Russia-China “Axis” Is Shakier Than Meets The Eye.” War on the Rocks. April 19, 2024

3. What Does the Xi-Ma Meeting Mean for Cross-Strait Relations?

Excerpts:

What lessons can U.S. policymakers take from this engagement between Xi and Ma?

The meeting is unlikely to change the trajectory of cross-Strait relations, but it does indicate that Beijing views engagement with Taiwan as an important component of peaceful unification. Indeed, perhaps the best way to prevent war in the Taiwan Strait is to ensure that Beijing still views peaceful unification as a viable option. To that end, Washington should not discourage or seek to limit communication between Taipei and Beijing that might serve as pressure release valve for both sides.

China’s ongoing efforts to encourage exchanges and interactions across the Taiwan Strait also suggest that Xi might not be planning a military showdown with Taiwan in the near future. Yet China will continue to use a combination of carrots and sticks to appeal to and coerce Taiwan, and gray-zone pressure will likely escalate around the May 20 inauguration. Existing backchannels across the Strait can help manage the tensions, but the United States cannot count on those exchanges to succeed. Washington must ensure it is sending clear signals to both Beijing and Taipei to avoid miscommunication or unwanted escalation and continue its efforts to help Taiwan defend itself and deter military conflict.

What Does the Xi-Ma Meeting Mean for Cross-Strait Relations?

While unlikely to change cross-Strait relations, it does indicate that Beijing views engagement with Taiwan as necessary for peaceful unification.

Thursday, May 9, 2024

/ READ TIME: 7 minutes

BY: Jennifer Staats, Ph.D.; Naiyu Kuo

usip.org

While nothing major came out of the meeting, it served as a reminder that cross-Strait relations are not necessarily as straightforward as they seem. Although there are still obstacles to official communication between the elected government in Taipei and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders in Beijing, many individuals nevertheless maintain lines of communication and working relationships across the Strait to help preserve a basic level of stability.

USIP’s Jennifer Staats and Naiyu Kuo look at what Xi and Ma wanted to accomplish with the meeting, what it means for cross-Strait relations and what lessons this provides for U.S. policy.

What were Xi and Ma hoping to accomplish?

For both men, the purpose of the meeting was more about symbolism than substance. For Xi, the primary goal was likely a friendly photo-op to dampen the voices of those in China who have been advocating for a tougher approach following then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. The meeting received largely positive front-page coverage in China’s state-owned media, which encouraged further cross-Strait exchanges and helped make the case that Beijing is making progress in the right direction toward unification with Taiwan.

Although the meeting took place in the East Hall at the Great Hall of the People, where Chinese officials typically host foreign leaders, Ma is not a current official, nor would Beijing perceive the leader of Taiwan to be on equal footing with the general secretary of the CCP. To illustrate that point, the official readout from the Chinese government did not assign Ma any official title, but simply referred to Ma as “mister.” Furthermore, the East Hall had served as the venue for negotiations about the return of Hong Kong and Macau to China, prompting Taiwanese media to see it as Beijing’s implicit political signal of Taiwan’s eventual return to the motherland.

Finally, Xi likely also wanted to capitalize on the symbolic significance of the April 10 date. Ma’s visit was reportedly scheduled for April 8 initially, but Beijing postponed it two days to coincide with President Joe Biden's meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, where maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait was among the major topics. The following day, Biden also held the first-ever trilateral summit with his counterparts from Japan and the Philippines in Washington, which Chinese scholars labeled an “anti-China gathering.” April 10 also marked the 45th anniversary of the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act, which serves as a cornerstone for unofficial U.S.-Taiwan ties.

For Ma, the visit was more about boosting his own political relevance and advocating for the view that Taiwan is historically and culturally linked to China and should move toward closer relations with the mainland, which he sees as inevitable. Yet his trip has drawn the ire of both his own party and the ruling DPP. Some very senior members of the KMT claim to have been unaware of the trip or of the message Ma planned to deliver, and the party did not fully endorse the meeting until the trip was over.

What does the Xi-Ma meeting mean for cross-strait relations ahead of Lai’s inauguration?

In the April 10 meeting, Xi largely repeated his official positions and the rhetoric from Beijing did not deviate from previous statements on Taiwan. Xi stressed the official Chinese view that Taiwan is a part of China, saying “people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are all Chinese” and “there are no knots that cannot be untied, no issues that cannot be discussed, and no force that can separate us.”

The meeting was likely also intended to remind President-elect Lai that a warmer relationship with Beijing is possible if he changes his approach. Indeed, following the visit, Ma publicly urged Lai to adhere to the “One-China” framework in his May 20 inauguration speech. Nonetheless, given Ma's lack of authority and his perceived Beijing-friendly stance, the meeting's impact on Taiwanese perceptions of China or Lai’s approach to China will likely be minimal. Additionally, Lai's recent decision to retain key foreign policy and national security personnel from President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration signals a continuation of Taiwan’s policy trajectory over the past eight years aimed at distancing Taiwan from China’s influence.

What are the different types of cross-Strait exchanges and dialogue taking place?

This was the first time Xi had received a current or former president of Taiwan in Beijing, but it was not the first meeting between the two men. In November 2015, Xi met with then-president Ma in Singapore two months before Taiwan’s 2016 presidential elections. Ma also led a student delegation to the mainland in the spring of 2023, which was the first time a current or former Taiwanese (or Republic of China) president had visited mainland China since 1949.

Despite the absence of an official communication channel between Beijing and Taipei since 2016, informal channels do bridge the Taiwan Strait. Ma is not the first Taiwanese politician, current or former, to travel to China this year. Notable KMT figures like former Taipei City Mayor Hao Lung-pin and Vice Chair Andrew Hsia have made trips to China, while former a former KMT chair and a former vice chair are scheduled to visit China this summer. KMT legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi led a delegation of KMT lawmakers on a visit to China in late April, where they held meetings with high-ranking Chinese officials.

These efforts build upon a history of cross-strait engagement between the KMT and the CCP, exemplified by former KMT Chair Lien Chan's four meetings with Xi between 2013 and 2018.

In times of crises or heightened tensions, select representatives from Taipei meet with counterparts in Beijing to lower the temperature, but these meetings generally remain out of the public eye. Even President-elect Lai has publicly acknowledged the importance of communication. In late April, he called for party-to-party talks and reiterated a willingness to engage in dialogue with Beijing “on the premise of reciprocity and dignity.”

Yet the primary obstacle to official communication remains Beijing's insistence that Taiwanese interlocutors accept the 1992 Consensus, which was negotiated between the CCP and KMT and Beijing believes reflects an agreement that both sides work toward “national reunification.” Lai rejects that formulation, so Taipei and Beijing will likely continue to rely on backchannel efforts, which are better than nothing but might not effectively prevent misunderstandings or reduce the risks of military confrontation.

What lessons can U.S. policymakers take from this engagement between Xi and Ma?

The meeting is unlikely to change the trajectory of cross-Strait relations, but it does indicate that Beijing views engagement with Taiwan as an important component of peaceful unification. Indeed, perhaps the best way to prevent war in the Taiwan Strait is to ensure that Beijing still views peaceful unification as a viable option. To that end, Washington should not discourage or seek to limit communication between Taipei and Beijing that might serve as pressure release valve for both sides.

China’s ongoing efforts to encourage exchanges and interactions across the Taiwan Strait also suggest that Xi might not be planning a military showdown with Taiwan in the near future. Yet China will continue to use a combination of carrots and sticks to appeal to and coerce Taiwan, and gray-zone pressure will likely escalate around the May 20 inauguration. Existing backchannels across the Strait can help manage the tensions, but the United States cannot count on those exchanges to succeed. Washington must ensure it is sending clear signals to both Beijing and Taipei to avoid miscommunication or unwanted escalation and continue its efforts to help Taiwan defend itself and deter military conflict.

Naiyu Kuo is a research analyst for the China program at USIP.

usip.org

4. A Plan for Victory in Ukraine

Excerpts:

A successful effort requires more than equipment and munitions: We cannot neglect the importance of training for Ukrainian soldiers. State-of-the-art equipment means little in the hands of ill-trained recruits, uncoordinated units, or poorly commanded armies. Ukraine recently passed a mobilization law to conscript thousands of new troops to refill its ranks and form new units for future offensive operations. Training these new conscripts to realistically prepare them for combat and teach them how to conduct complex offensive operations requires that the U.S. and its allies redouble their efforts.

Finally, it is important to help Ukraine’s defense industry recover so it can eventually sustain its own needs. The Ukrainians have been remarkably innovative in adapting U.S.-provided equipment to suit the conditions and developing their own new capabilities, particularly in areas like drone warfare. Significant opportunities exist for U.S. companies willing to invest in Ukraine, and relevant agencies like the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) should be more aggressive in helping them do so.

Through the recently passed supplemental, Congress made it clear, in bipartisan fashion, that it wants to hear from the Biden administration how to change the dynamic on the battlefield in Ukraine’s favor. All we need now is for the administration to follow this congressional intent “to hasten Ukraine’s victory against Putin’s war of aggression” by providing Ukraine the weapons it needs to win.

A Plan for Victory in Ukraine

By Rob Portman

The Dispatch

May 09, 2024

https://www.aei.org/op-eds/a-plan-for-victory-in-ukraine/?utm

By Rob Portman

One of the most consequential parts of the recently passed supplemental aid package for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan is a little-noticed provision that requires the Biden administration to submit a strategy to Congress regarding U.S. support for Ukraine. Notably, for the first time since Russia’s full-scale invasion began, the Biden administration will be mandated to present an assessment “of the resources required … to help hasten Ukrainian victory against Russia’s invasion forces.”

Although a loud minority of lawmakers opposes any aid to Ukraine, this requirement in the legislation reflects a bipartisan concern of many in Congress that the administration’s oversensitivity to “escalation” has restricted the provision of more effective weapon systems Ukraine has requested and has limited the use of some U.S. weapons provided, contributing to Ukraine’s disadvantage on the battlefield and the current bloody stalemate. The new law makes clear that Congress wants a plan for Ukraine to win, not merely survive. The administration should embrace it.

Section 504 of the supplemental mandates “a classified independent assessment from the Commander, U.S. European Command, describing any specific defense articles and services not yet provided to Ukraine that would result in meaningful battlefield gains” within 45 days. Having heard from U.S. commanders in congressional briefings—and in Germany and Poland during a dozen or more trips to Ukraine—I’m confident that if the Biden administration allows military judgment to prevail, its response will point the way to breaking the stalemate in Ukraine’s favor.

With the correct approach, the administration has an opportunity to give Ukraine an advantage on the battlefield and bring this unprovoked, illegal, and brutal Russian attack to an end, forcing Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table from a position of weakness. Investing in Ukraine’s capabilities on the battlefield will help create leverage that both the United States and Ukraine will need in those eventual peace talks.

Among the opponents of providing assistance to Ukraine are those who cling to unrealistic and convenient arguments that somehow, if America pulls back, Vladimir Putin will come to the bargaining table, and Ukraine can remain a free, independent democracy. There is simply no evidence in the history of aggression by dictators or in the words or deeds of Vladimir Putin to support this argument. Russia’s best theory of victory in this war depends on the exhaustion of America’s support for Ukraine. Pulling back our assistance will only help fulfill Putin’s dreams of conquest and empire.

The only realistic way to end the conflict is to provide Ukraine with the weapons it needs to win on the battlefield and inflict enough pain on Russia that a favorable settlement is possible. Approving one or two badly needed weapons in small numbers, after long delays, has not had the battlefield impact Ukraine needs. Rather, the Biden administration must redouble our coordination with our European allies to provide a suite of capabilities that can be employed together to achieve maximum results.

Putin will come to the table in good faith only when he knows that he cannot wait us out. I agree that European allies can do more to support Ukraine’s war effort, although they have actually contributed more than many Americans may realize. With the passage of the new supplemental funding bill, total U.S. commitments are now about $173 billion. As a bloc, the European Union’s total assistance commitments to Ukraine currently stand at roughly $155 billion. Even so, American leadership is essential to sustaining this progress and making European military assistance, in particular, more impactful and durable.

At this point, I believe the U.S. commitment to move quickly to provide Ukraine with the weapons it needs and the training to use them effectively is just as important as the dollar amount of aid provided. The same scenario has played out time and time again: Ukraine requests a particular weapon, the Biden administration initially says no, then eventually provides it after months—or years—of bipartisan congressional pressure. Inevitably, the weapon quickly makes a significant difference: Stinger missiles early in the conflict, HIMARS two years ago, and longer-range ATACMS missiles more recently. Think of all of the lives that could have been saved if we had provided those weapons systems earlier.

Russia’s air force is currently bombarding civilian targets every day, and Ukraine needs F-16 fighter jets as soon as possible to stave off those attacks. But that requires more than just supplying U.S. planes: It means expediting and expanding the training already underway, as well as the issuing of licenses to allies around the world who are willing and able to provide such aircraft to Ukraine but need our permission. Based on recent reports, it seems that operational F-16s will be slowly trickling into Ukraine later this year, meaning that they may not make a significant impact until at least 2025. Sadly, this is emblematic of the administration’s slow-walking of assistance to Ukraine. Had the administration acted sooner, F-16s would already be protecting Ukraine’s skies against the deadly Russian attacks on civilians and infrastructure.

On the ground, Ukraine needs tanks to punch through Russian lines and retake territory. Some American M1A1 Abrams tanks have been provided, along with British Challengers and a larger number of German Leopards. They have proven effective, but there are not enough. After more than a year of stalling, the United States only provided about 31 tanks—a token gesture seemingly designed to pressure the Germans into providing Leopards. We have hundreds more that could be routed to Ukraine from allies or our own stocks.

One of the biggest sticking points has been long-range missiles capable of striking critical logistics and command nodes behind Russian lines. Ukraine has asked for them for two years, and reports indicate that the U.S. has supplied a small number of such missiles. More ATACMS missiles and other long-range missiles are desperately needed. In fact, Congress included an explicit requirement in the supplemental that the administration provide more of these missiles. But the administration currently places onerous conditions on their use out of concern of escalation. British Foreign Minister David Cameron’s recent announcement that the United Kingdom would allow Ukraine to use UK-supplied long-range Storm Shadow missiles against Russian territory is a welcome development, and the U.S. should follow it. Russia has attacked Ukraine from Russian territory since Day 1. The administration must allow Ukraine to defend itself.

Next, Ukraine’s air defense needs to be bolstered immediately. Ukraine needs long-range air defense systems, like Patriots, to defend against the Russian- and North Korean-made ballistic missiles and Iranian-made drones raining down on Ukrainian cities. America’s enemies have redoubled their support for Russia’s terror-bombing campaign, so America and our allies must unite to stop it. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg noted recently that NATO countries have the spare capacity to provide more air defense missiles; all that’s needed is the political will to do so. This is also true for short-range air defense systems to defend against both the ubiquitous Russian drones as well as Russian strike aircraft near the frontlines, which have taken advantage of Ukrainian air defense missile shortages to significantly increase their deadly attacks.

In particular, Ukraine desperately needs more sophisticated electronic warfare (EW) systems to counter Russian “first-person view” or “kamikaze” drones. This new breed of relatively inexpensive but deadly drones has been used to devastating effect by both sides in this war, destroying vehicles and equipment that are orders of magnitude more expensive than the drones themselves. Bolstering Ukraine’s EW capabilities would enable it to disable and disorient more Russian FPV drones, thus better protecting Ukrainian forces and preserving their combat power for future offensive operations.

The administration should also increase the number of cluster munitions sent to Ukraine, particularly the 155mm dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM). First provided in July 2023 following months of Ukrainian requests and pressure from Congress, DPICMs have been a major game-changer on the ground—often stopping Russian infantry assaults in their tracks. Originally built during the Cold War to counter the Soviet Union’s numerical superiority in artillery, the United States has about 3 million of these cluster munitions in storage and could easily send more. These would be invaluable to bolstering Ukraine’s low stockpiles of artillery ammunition and blunting future Russian assaults.

A successful effort requires more than equipment and munitions: We cannot neglect the importance of training for Ukrainian soldiers. State-of-the-art equipment means little in the hands of ill-trained recruits, uncoordinated units, or poorly commanded armies. Ukraine recently passed a mobilization law to conscript thousands of new troops to refill its ranks and form new units for future offensive operations. Training these new conscripts to realistically prepare them for combat and teach them how to conduct complex offensive operations requires that the U.S. and its allies redouble their efforts.

Finally, it is important to help Ukraine’s defense industry recover so it can eventually sustain its own needs. The Ukrainians have been remarkably innovative in adapting U.S.-provided equipment to suit the conditions and developing their own new capabilities, particularly in areas like drone warfare. Significant opportunities exist for U.S. companies willing to invest in Ukraine, and relevant agencies like the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) should be more aggressive in helping them do so.

Through the recently passed supplemental, Congress made it clear, in bipartisan fashion, that it wants to hear from the Biden administration how to change the dynamic on the battlefield in Ukraine’s favor. All we need now is for the administration to follow this congressional intent “to hasten Ukraine’s victory against Putin’s war of aggression” by providing Ukraine the weapons it needs to win.

5. China's Military Is Slowly Becoming a Superpower Before Our Eyes

Excerpt:

With an eye to the future, the Chinese military is also increasingly incorporating information operations and artificial intelligence into its operations.

China's Military Is Slowly Becoming a Superpower Before Our Eyes

The Chinese military has been following the concept of “active defense” since 1949.

The National Interest · by Stavros Atlamazoglou · May 10, 2024

China presents the greatest long-term national security threat to the United States. Beijing is looking to upend the rules-based international system that Washington has overseen since the end of World War II.

In its latest National Security Strategy, published in 2022, the White House identified China and its military as the pacing challenge that will trouble U.S. national security and foreign policy experts for years to come.

“The PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing has ambitions to create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world’s leading power,” the strategy document states.

Chinese Strategic Goals

The Chinese military has been following the concept of “active defense” since 1949. The concept prescribes both offensive and defensive operations to secure the Chinese Communist Party’s national policy goals.

Perhaps the most important foreign policy for Beijing right now is to reunify with Taiwan, whether that happens through diplomacy or military action. Another major strategic objective is to secure control over the South China Sea and its important maritime trade routes.

Military Modernization

Beijing’s ambitions are reflected in its military modernization efforts. According to official numbers, Beijing spent approximately $225 billion in 2023 on its armed forces. It is extremely likely that actual spending is much higher. In June, Congress shared a U.S. intelligence community assessment that estimated Beijing’s actual military budget to be close to $700 billion. In comparison, for 2023, the United States had a military budget of about $858 billion.

The Chinese Navy is the largest in the world, with more than 340 submarines and surface warships, including a few aircraft carriers in different stages of readiness. But Beijing can call on the services of its shadowy maritime militia and coast guard to assemble more than 750 vessels of all types.

In the air domain, the Chinese air force has thousands of fourth-generation fighter aircraft and growing numbers of fifth-generation stealth fighter jets, including the Chengdu J-20 multirole aircraft.

Beijing is heavily investing in its conventional and nuclear missile forces. As the war in Ukraine verified, long-range munitions play an important role in modern-day warfare. China is working to field an arsenal of more than 2,000 missiles of all types, including intercontinental ballistic, cruise, hypersonic, and anti-ship munitions.

In addition, China is rapidly modernizing and expanding its nuclear missile arsenal. According to the Pentagon, Beijing has more than 400 nuclear warheads and is looking to reach 1,500 by 2035. In contrast, the United States has about 5,800 warheads, and Russia has approximately 6,400.

With an eye to the future, the Chinese military is also increasingly incorporating information operations and artificial intelligence into its operations.

About the Author:

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

The National Interest · by Stavros Atlamazoglou · May 10, 2024

6. Are Campus Protesters Heroes or Hypocrites?

Excerpts:

Emma Ashford: Hi, Matt, how is your week going? It’s the end of the semester, and I’m sure things on campus must be peaceful and tranquil as the students prepare for their exams.

Matt Kroenig: I assume that is sarcasm? Things have actually been pretty quiet at Georgetown, but campuses across the United States have been rocked by protests against Israel’s war against Hamas.

EA: You got me; it’s sarcasm. I haven’t seen protests this widespread on a foreign-policy issue since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Encampments are springing up on university campuses across the United States, leaving administrators scrambling to figure out how they can both manage the students and appease their donors.

In a few places—most notably at Columbia University in New York City—the university administration called in the cops to clear out their students, even though the protests were largely peaceful. It all seems to be a huge overreaction to some pretty milquetoast civil disobedience.

MK: Well, as usual, you and I see this differently. The problem is that administrators at Columbia and other places badly mismanaged things before it got to this point.

The principles at stake are simple: Universities should permit free speech; and they should enforce policies to keep campus open for all students, especially those who want to learn, go to class, and study for exams—which, after all, is the primary mission of a university.

It was a mistake for Columbia to negotiate with a loud, disorderly minority over long-held university policies, like prohibitions against students building encampments on campus. Administrators, like Ben Sasse at the University of Florida, who simply upheld university policy from the start, including suspending students who violated the rules by setting up anti-Israel camps, provided a much better example of effective university leadership.

Are Campus Protesters Heroes or Hypocrites?

As universities take center stage in the debate over Israel’s war in Gaza, the unrest could spell trouble for Biden’s reelection campaign.

By Emma Ashford, a columnist at Foreign Policy and a senior fellow with the Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center, and Matthew Kroenig, a columnist at Foreign Policy and vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Foreign Policy · by Emma Ashford, Matthew Kroenig

Politics
United States
Emma Ashford
Matthew Kroenig

May 10, 2024, 7:29 AM

its-debatable-functional-tag

The Stimson Center’s Emma Ashford and the Atlantic Council’s Matthew Kroenig debate pressing issues for policymakers.

Emma Ashford: Hi, Matt, how is your week going? It’s the end of the semester, and I’m sure things on campus must be peaceful and tranquil as the students prepare for their exams.

Matt Kroenig: I assume that is sarcasm? Things have actually been pretty quiet at Georgetown, but campuses across the United States have been rocked by protests against Israel’s war against Hamas.

EA: You got me; it’s sarcasm. I haven’t seen protests this widespread on a foreign-policy issue since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Encampments are springing up on university campuses across the United States, leaving administrators scrambling to figure out how they can both manage the students and appease their donors.

In a few places—most notably at Columbia University in New York City—the university administration called in the cops to clear out their students, even though the protests were largely peaceful. It all seems to be a huge overreaction to some pretty milquetoast civil disobedience.

MK: Well, as usual, you and I see this differently. The problem is that administrators at Columbia and other places badly mismanaged things before it got to this point.

The principles at stake are simple: Universities should permit free speech; and they should enforce policies to keep campus open for all students, especially those who want to learn, go to class, and study for exams—which, after all, is the primary mission of a university.

It was a mistake for Columbia to negotiate with a loud, disorderly minority over long-held university policies, like prohibitions against students building encampments on campus. Administrators, like Ben Sasse at the University of Florida, who simply upheld university policy from the start, including suspending students who violated the rules by setting up anti-Israel camps, provided a much better example of effective university leadership.

EA: Well, first, I think it’s a mistake to lump together all the different protests. At UCLA, a small minority of students apparently set up barricades or were arrested for carrying materials to build them. There was also violence instigated by pro-Israel counterprotesters, who tried to dismantle the encampment there. At Columbia, some of the protesters occupied an administrative building.

The former is clearly a problem; as you point out, it prevents other students from learning and accessing classes. It isn’t speech; it’s a barricade. The latter is clearly against university policies and is civil disobedience, although it’s not uncommon for students to occupy academic buildings during protests, usually with limited repercussions. At Columbia, too, protesters were likely trying to draw parallels to prior occupation of the same building by anti-Vietnam War demonstrators back in 1968.

But at a variety of other schools, these protests were entirely peaceful, didn’t disrupt classes, and yet were still broken up by police. I’m particularly ashamed of my own alma mater, the University of Virginia (UVA). As the local Charlottesville newspaper the Daily Progress described it, “Days of quiet, peaceful protest came to a chaotic and violent end Saturday afternoon as Virginia State Police stormed an encampment of anti-war protesters at the University of Virginia.”

The only reason these students were even violating university policy was that the policy was quietly changed over the weekend to end an exemption allowing “recreational tents.” It’s utterly ridiculous. Students have a First Amendment right to protest peacefully, just like everyone else.

MK: The New York Times reports that the protesters at UVA were violating policy by, among other things, using megaphones. That sounds like a sensible policy to me. It is hard to study—which, after all, is the main point of a university—when fellow students are causing a ruckus outside.

Moreover, I am not sure these protests really represent meaningful “free speech.” When I started at Georgetown, a faculty mentor taught me never to underestimate our undergraduate students’ intelligence, but never overestimate their knowledge. He was right. These protesters are in their late teens and early 20s. They don’t really understand what they are talking about—I certainly did not at their age. If they put down their megaphones and engaged in curious intellectual debate with others, they might actually learn something.

EA: I was pretty dumb at that age, too. But I think you’re doing these young men and women a disservice by implying they don’t understand what they’re talking about. Maybe they don’t know all the ins and outs of the Israel-Palestine situation. Perhaps they don’t know who Arthur James Balfour was, or about the Nakba, or the domestic politics of Israel. But they are protesting the violence and cruelty that they see on the news, and I think it’s laudable that they are willing to do that when it doesn’t directly impact them.

And let’s be honest, Israel remains a hot-button topic, and one where there’s a lot of pressure from big donors on university administrators. That’s why these encampments are being treated as anything more than a nuisance. If these students were protesting in support of the Uyghurs in China or for women’s rights in Iran, the crackdown wouldn’t be nearly so bad. Honestly, Matt, if these were anti-regime protesters on the streets of Tehran, you’d be applauding them and probably arguing for U.S. support!

MK: So we are comparing American college students, blessed with First Amendment rights but who choose to engage in disorderly conduct that infringes on the rights of others, to genuinely oppressed people demanding basic human rights from an evil, autocratic regime? My head hurts just trying to disentangle the analogy.

Let me turn it around. Why are there not disorderly protests against egregious violations of international humanitarian law, like China’s genocide against the Uyghurs, North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un’s labor camps, or Russian President Vladimir Putin’s abduction of Ukrainian children? Instead, the only disorderly protests are against a U.S. democratic partner fighting a violent terrorist group. It again reveals that these students don’t really understand the issues, and they seem to be motivated by something other than universal justice.

EA: Well, I’d say the reason that students aren’t protesting those other conflicts is that the U.S. government isn’t arming China and North Korea or funding Putin’s war in Ukraine. Congress just sent Israel another $17 billion, and Washington acts as a shield for its actions at the United Nations. This is Americans’ war, too, and although I understand why Israel felt it had to go into Gaza after the horror of the Hamas attack in October last year, I’m still utterly appalled that the U.S. government is supporting what is becoming an open slaughter of much of the population of the Gaza Strip.

MK: That doesn’t fully hold up. The United States government could be doing more to counter China’s genocide and stop Putin’s war crimes in Ukraine. Why not protest the inaction?

The answer is, in part, that an unhealthy fixation on Israel, antisemitism, and anti-Americanism are pathologies of left-wing activism.

Still, putting the merit of the protests aside, they are already having a political effect. Many progressives sympathize with the protesters, while many conservatives just see chaos. President Joe Biden is in a tough spot as he doesn’t want to be seen as supporting a crackdown on peaceful protesters, but he also doesn’t want this to become a “law and order” election, which tend to benefit conservatives. Recall that anti-Vietnam riots at the 1968 Democratic National Convention were a major factor propelling Richard Nixon to victory in the presidential election that fall.

EA: You might be right on that point. Conservative media is already treating these protests as a rerun of the Black Lives Matter protests, some of which turned violent back in 2020, providing footage later used in campaign ads for former President Donald Trump.

Perhaps the bigger problem is that no one is trying to defuse this situation. Biden appears largely unwilling to criticize Israel, though his recent steps toward withholding arms supplies from Israel if they continue into Rafah are promising. But it’s probably more relevant that campus administrators across the country are simply calling in the police rather than engaging with the protesters at all. In the places where they did engage the protesters—for example, at Brown and Rutgers—things have mostly ended peacefully.

It’s worth thinking about what the protesters are actually trying to do here. As our fellow FP columnist Adam Tooze pointed out in his podcast episode on the crisis at Columbia, protesters are mostly trying to raise the salience of the issue and force their universities to take a stand.

MK: That is the problem. Universities should not take a stand on the Israel-Hamas war, or any other political matter disconnected from their core missions of research and teaching. Universities can’t simultaneously be forums for free speech and at the same time take an official stand on one side of the debate. They should practice institutional neutrality.

EA: Top universities are elite institutions and run massive endowments more akin to the wealth of top hedge funds. They are more than mere education institutions, as much as I might wish it were otherwise; they make investments with those endowments, hence the calls for divestment from companies linked to Israel. I personally think it would be smarter for protesters to be targeting the Biden administration directly, but you can’t deny that the universities are public actors.

Anyway, perhaps it’s time we talked about the conflict itself? Things have gotten even worse on the ground since we last debated this. We seem to have avoided regional escalation with Iran, but the Israelis have now begun operations in Rafah, the last big population center in the Gaza Strip, and one that currently houses hundreds of thousands of refugees displaced by prior operations farther north. The scope of the operations remains unclear, but Israel has instructed refugees to leave the area. The Biden administration, in response, has paused one arms shipment and threatened to withhold further deliveries of bombs and artillery shells if Israel enters Rafah’s most populated areas.

MK: The suffering of the Palestinian people is tragic. But Israel needs to go into Rafah to achieve its stated war aims of eliminating Hamas.

EA: Again, I’ll refer you to our column several months back, when we discussed whether that aim is even achievable. I’m sure there are still Hamas militants in Rafah—reportedly several battalions’ worth—but whether you can destroy them without also killing most of the civilians is an open question. And, obviously, that won’t destroy Hamas’s leadership or ideology.

MK: We’ve debated this before, and I still disagree. Capturing or killing every Hamas militant in Gaza would be a victory for Israel and a defeat for Hamas. Even Hamas seems to agree, or it wouldn’t be insisting on a cessation of hostilities as part of a hostage deal.

But the war continues. Israel has begun a limited military operation in Rafah. So, it seems that it is trying to thread the needle of eliminating Hamas, while limiting civilian casualties and the corresponding international pressure.

We will see if it works.

EA: Two things here. First, it’s interesting that you mention negotiations, because by all accounts, Hamas has accepted an agreement that would free some more hostages in exchange for a pause in hostilities, eventually leading to a permanent cessation. Israeli leaders seem opposed to it, though they’re still considering it.

But second, it’s impossible to see how one could mount even a limited operation in an environment like Rafah without killing significant numbers of civilians. The Israelis just took control of the border crossing between Gaza and Egypt, which had been the only remaining way out of the strip for civilians. They’re also reportedly preventing civilians from returning to homes in the north. So what are civilians in that situation meant to do?

They’ve been moved from area to area for six months, with the constant threat of bombing and raids, insufficient food and medical care, and no proper facilities. Now tens of thousands of Gazans are being instructed to evacuate to a small tent camp outside the city that isn’t remotely sufficient to support them. Israel is just not taking adequate care to protect civilians here. Biden is right to withhold arms—at a minimum, until the Israelis find a better plan.

MK: Hamas’s proposal, as you point out, requires a permanent cessation of hostilities. In other words, it wants the war to end so it can continue to rule over Gaza and go on to attack Israel another day. That is unacceptable to Israel because it is contrary to its goal of eliminating Hamas.

I agree that the suffering of the Palestinian civilians is heartbreaking. But the fault lies exclusively with Hamas. It could surrender immediately and zero additional Palestinians would perish. But it clearly doesn’t care about the Palestinians. Instead, innocent Palestinians are a tool in the group’s genocidal plans to wipe Israel off the map. Hamas chooses to continue to fight Israel, using civilians as shields.

The Israelis have gone to great lengths to minimize civilian casualties, but they are at war, and their understandable goals are to defeat the enemy, while also following the law of armed conflict.

There were some theoretical alternatives. Egypt could have created a refugee camp in the Sinai Peninsula, for example, but Cairo did not want to deal with the Palestinian issue, either.

If you have the ideal solution, I would love to hear it.

EA: I don’t have a good solution. There are no good solutions here.

But it worries me a lot that many of these proposed solutions are in practice war crimes. Displacing the Palestinians into Egypt, for example, is ethnic cleansing. And given the experience of Lebanon and particularly Jordan with Palestinian refugees in the past, I can’t blame the Egyptians for saying no to that.

Blaming Hamas for civilian deaths? Morally, you may be correct. But there’s a reason we don’t say that civilians whose governments don’t surrender are complicit (also a war crime!). What if Putin suddenly announced that because the government in Kyiv didn’t surrender to him, Russian forces would do their best to avoid civilian casualties but were ultimately justified in killing any unfortunate Ukrainian civilians who happened to be in the way? Would Putin be abiding by the law of armed conflict in that case? Of course not! So why is Israel given this leeway?

MK: I reject your comparison. Israel is following the law of armed conflict and going to great lengths to avoid civilian casualties. Putin is purposely targeting Ukrainian civilians. As you know, international law does not require zero civilian deaths in war. It requires following the principles of distinction and proportionality, which Israel is doing and Putin is not.

EA: I fully acknowledge that Israel is operating under difficult circumstances in Gaza. But Washington should not encourage or condone it violating these norms of conflict, unless the U.S. government wants others to start doing the same. This conflict is already doing a lot of reputational damage to the U.S., as countries rightly call the Biden administration hypocritical for focusing on atrocities in Ukraine or Syria, but aiding and abetting them in Gaza. Who’s going to take U.S. calls to push back on China arming Russia seriously when we do the same for Israel?

MK: The United States can and should stand on the side of both Israel and international law, by backing Israel’s legitimate war aims, so long as Israel continues to follow the law of armed conflict.

EA: You know as well as I do that you could drive a truck through the “proportionality” loophole in the law of armed conflict. Israel may say that it is considering civilian casualties in its decision-making process, but the numbers of dead suggest that might not be accurate. I’m also extremely concerned about reports that Israel is using AI targeting, and that there might be evidence of potential mass killings in Gaza. I still think the reputational risk to the United States—not to mention the domestic unrest—for backing Israel further is pretty severe. That’s especially true if Israel rejects a reasonable cease-fire deal in the coming days and weeks.

But before we wrap up, there have been a few developments in Ukraine that I wanted to mention. You may recall arguing, when we last debated the topic of Ukraine, that escalation risks in the conflict are overblown. But this week, we saw several indicators that Russia is escalating—reports of planned sabotage of weapons production in Western Europe, and military drills that simulate nuclear use. Both suggest that Russia is escalating in response to Western steps to send, for example, long-range weapons to Ukraine.

MK: The nuclear threats are largely a bluff at this stage. Putin has learned that when he says “nukes,” the West says that it fears “escalation” and then restrains its war effort. You’re right that Putin wants the West to curtail aid to Ukraine, but he is not literally going nuclear over it.

EA: So he’ll just set some German factories on fire? It doesn’t have to be nuclear to be a problem. But I suspect that Ukraine will continue to lose media attention as the war in Gaza grinds on. That’s bad for the Ukrainians—and probably bad for Biden. The longer the war in Gaza remains in the spotlight, the worse it looks for his reelection chances. The U.S. public remains broadly pro-Israel, but Arab Americans are clearly turning against Biden on this issue. One recent poll found that Arab American support for Biden had dropped from 59 percent in 2020 to just 17 percent today. In swing states like Michigan, that could be a problem for his campaign.

MK: Well, at least the media attention on the protesters is likely to die down. The semester is almost over and one thing kids care about more than cheugy Gaza protests is slaying a totally lit summer break.

Speaking of which, I look forward to a poppin’ time away from campus—once I finish this cringy grading.

EA: Oh, why did you remind me? There’s something we do agree on: Grading papers is the worst. Maybe I’ll go join a protest encampment instead.

Foreign Policy · by Emma Ashford, Matthew Kroenig

7. Japan and South Korea are itching to sign up to Aukus. But trust is an issue

Excerpts:

China warns Aukus against going down ‘dangerous road’ over nuclear-powered submarine pact

“Aukus members will have to work hard in Southeast Asia and other Aukus-sceptic regions to counter this [Chinese] narrative to secure direct or indirect support,” Nagy said.

When researchers at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore asked 1,677 respondents from 10 Southeast Asian nations what they thought about Aukus in 2022, more than one-third, or 36.4 per cent, said they thought it would help balance China’s growing military power – while 22.5 per cent worried it would escalate a regional arms race, and 12.3 per cent felt it would undermine international nuclear non-proliferation efforts.

Japan and South Korea are itching to sign up to Aukus. But trust is an issue

Aukus’ so-called Pillar 2 promises access to sensitive know-how and cutting-edge military tech like quantum computing, AI and hypersonic weapons
That makes data security a key concern, with observers identifying New Zealand as the only Aukus aspirant likely to slot seamlessly into the pact

Maria Siow

+ FOLLOWPublished: 12:00pm, 11 May 2024

South China Morning Post · May 11, 2024

Last month, China expressed its concerns about rumours that Japan could soon join Aukus – reports that Australia was quick to hose it down, with Prime Minister Anthony Albanese saying there were “no plans” to expand the pact beyond its three founding members.

South Korean Defence Minister Shin Won-sik speaks during a meeting with Australian officials in Melbourne on May 1. Photo: AP

South Korea was next to rock the boat, with its Defence Minister Shin Won-sik saying on May 1 that the possibility of sharing advanced military technology with Aukus members had been discussed during two days of meetings in Melbourne with Australian officials.

His country’s “differentiated science and technology capabilities will contribute to peace and stability”, Shin said.

New Zealand reportedly entered into talks with Australia on joining Pillar 2 of the pact back in January, but after a warning from China it seemed to demur somewhat, with Foreign Minister Winston Peters stressing earlier this month that Wellington was still “a long way” from being able to make a decision on joining the pact, adding: “Our information gathering is still in its early stages”.

A semiconductor factory under construction in Japan’s Hokkaido province earlier this month. Japan has worked to reduce its reliance on China, building new domestic production bases for semiconductors. Photo: Kyodo

Stumbling blocks

Japan and South Korea could undoubtedly offer state-of-the-art technical know-how and technologies to Aukus, according to Eleanor Shiori Hughes, a non-resident fellow at Chicago-based economic research think tank EconVue.

“With their outlook on the strategic environment largely aligned with that of the Aukus countries, they have enormous potential to be major value-adds to build capacity on these cutting-edge capabilities,” said Hughes, who is also a member of the Australian Institute for International Affairs and The Japan Foundation’s Indo-Pacific Cooperation Network.

But she said major obstacles still prevented either East Asian nation or New Zealand from joining Aukus due to the “nascent” nature of the partnership.

“Members are still working towards solidifying the building blocks by which to expand collaboration on frontier technologies for both pillars,” Hughes said, adding that Tokyo would need to build greater resilience against cyberattacks before it can participate in Aukus projects.

[Aukus] members are still working towards solidifying the building blocks by which to expand collaboration on frontier technologies

Eleanor Shiori Hughes, researcher

“While there is reason for promise, Japan still needs to reconcile challenges posed by its security clearance mechanisms.”

Of the three Aukus aspirants, New Zealand would likely find it the easiest to slot into the pact’s security framework due to it already being a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance alongside Australia, Britain, the US and Canada, said Satoru Nagao, a non-resident fellow at the Hudson Institute think tank in Washington whose primary research area is security cooperation.

For its part, Japan has been making moves to improve information security and prevent leaks of sensitive data with a “security clearance bill” that was approved by the cabinet in February and is currently being debated in parliament.

If passed into law, the bill would expand the use of background checks for people working with sensitive information, carrying a punishment of up to five years in prison and a hefty fine for anyone leaking information “critical to national economic security”.

South Korean KF-16 fighters jets fly in formation over the Korean peninsula. An information leak related to the fighter jet project set alarm bells ringing in Aukus member states. Photo: Yonhap/via dpa

This adds to the “strong punishments” Japan already has in place if members of the defence industry leak information, Nagao said – improving the likelihood that Aukus members will want to share military secrets with Tokyo.

Despite South Korea having “a tough legal system that protects sensitive information”, Nagao said Aukus members were concerned about leaks in the country, citing a case that came to light earlier this year involving two Indonesian nationals who were accused of attempting to steal military secrets related to the KF-21 fighter jet project.

“Domestic politics in South Korea are also highly volatile,” said Stephen Nagy, an international-relations professor at International Christian University in Tokyo. “A change in president could lead to a change in position on Pillar 2 participation.”

Current South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s term doesn’t end for another three years, but his ability to govern with a free hand was further constrained when his ruling People Power Party’s suffered a stinging defeat in last month’s legislative elections.

Protesters stage a rally in 2017 to oppose plans to deploy the advanced US Terminal High-Altitude Area Defence, or THAAD, system in South Korea. Photo: AP

South Korea is also highly vulnerable to economic and other forms of coercion from China, Nagy said.

In 2017, China reacted to Seoul discussing the deployment of the US’ Terminal High Altitude Area Defence anti-missile system by banning package tours to South Korea, encouraging a boycott of Korean brands and shutting down stores owned by South Korean conglomerate Lotte. The fallout cost South Korea’s economy some US$7.5 billion that year alone, according to estimates from the Hyundai Research Institute.

Japan, by comparison, enjoys many of the same technological advantages as South Korea but is less vulnerable to coercion or susceptible to a drastic shift in its strategic outlook, according to Nagy.

Under Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Japan has worked to reduce its reliance on China, with new domestic production bases for semiconductors being set up and Japanese companies diversifying their supply chains.

Japan will likely be the first country to cooperate in Pillar 2

Stephen Nagy, international-relations professor

“Japan will likely be the first country to cooperate in Pillar 2,” Nagy said, adding that Beijing would continue to paint Aukus as a Washington-led alliance aimed at containing China.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said last month that “China and many regional countries have expressed grave concerns and opposition” to Aukus, which she said “heightens the risk of nuclear proliferation, exacerbates [the] arms race in the Asia-Pacific and undermines regional peace and stability.”

Chinese nationalist tabloid Global Times also chimed in, stating in an April 8 article that any expansion of Aukus would be an “alarming move” that “marks the pact further turning into an ‘Asian Nato’”. It warned such a move could also “further foment militarism within Japan”, citing a researcher of Australian studies.

02:52

China warns Aukus against going down ‘dangerous road’ over nuclear-powered submarine pact

“Aukus members will have to work hard in Southeast Asia and other Aukus-sceptic regions to counter this [Chinese] narrative to secure direct or indirect support,” Nagy said.

When researchers at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore asked 1,677 respondents from 10 Southeast Asian nations what they thought about Aukus in 2022, more than one-third, or 36.4 per cent, said they thought it would help balance China’s growing military power – while 22.5 per cent worried it would escalate a regional arms race, and 12.3 per cent felt it would undermine international nuclear non-proliferation efforts.

South China Morning Post · May 11, 2024

8. US committee targets Georgia Tech's alleged ties to Chinese military linked research

US committee targets Georgia Tech's alleged ties to Chinese military linked research

By Michael Martina

May 9, 20244:55 PM EDTUpdated 2 days ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-committee-targets-georgia-techs-alleged-ties-chinese-military-linked-research-2024-05-09/?utm

Flags of the U.S. and China sit in a room where U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken meets with China's Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, April 26, 2024, in Beijing, China. Mark Schiefelbein/Pool via REUTERS/File photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

WASHINGTON, May 9 (Reuters) - A U.S. congressional committee on China has asked leading research university Georgia Institute of Technology to detail its collaboration with a Chinese university facing U.S. government restrictions due to its alleged ties to the country's military.

Georgia Tech partnered with China's northeastern Tianjin University on cutting edge technologies despite its documented ties to the People's Liberation Army (PLA), John Moolenaar, the new Republican chairman of the House of Representatives' select committee on China, wrote in a letter on Thursday to the U.S. school's president Angel Cabrera.

But the Georgia Tech scientist who led the project defended the research, saying all the results were available to the public, that it had passed extensive legal reviews, and that only a small portion of the funding came from the Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI), which is heavily sponsored by the Pentagon.

The letter noted that Tianjin University and numerous affiliates had been added in 2020 to the Commerce Department's export restrictions list for actions contrary to U.S. national security, including trade secret theft and research collaboration to advance China's military.

"While Georgia Tech is now prohibited from exporting sensitive technologies to Tianjin University due to the Entity List's prohibitions, it has collaborated with Tianjin University and at least one other PLA-linked entity on developing sensitive technologies," Moolenaar said.

The Tianjin research center is affiliated with a Chinese company with subsidiaries that supply the PLA, the letter said.

A Georgia Tech press release, opens new tab from January said its researchers based in Atlanta and at the Tianjin International Center for Nanoparticles and Nanosysms had created the world's first functional semiconductor made from the nanomaterial, graphene, which it said could lead to a "paradigm shift" in electronics and yield faster computing.

The U.S. and China, in the midst of an intense geopolitical and scientific rivalry, both view semiconductors as a strategic industry with civilian and military uses, including quantum computing and advanced weapons systems.

A spokesperson from Georgia Tech said it welcomed the congressional inquiry, but that GTRI "does not have a collaboration, research partnerships, or provide any funding to Tianjin University."

"We are continuously monitoring the evolving relationships between China and the United States and have implemented additional procedures and protocols to ensure security and maintain vigilance," Abbigail Tumpey, the spokesperson told Reuters in an email.

In a published article, researchers credited financial support from GTRI, which counted the Defense Department and the U.S. military as customers for more than 90% of its research, opens new tab in fiscal year 2023, according to its latest annual report.

Moolenaar said Georgia Tech's collaboration with Tianjin University raised questions about its entity list compliance, and asked Cabrera to thoroughly disclose all of its joint work.

GTRI, Tianjin International Center for Nanoparticles and Nanosystems, and China's embassy in Washington did not respond immediately to Reuters' requests for comment.

Walter de Heer, the Georgia Tech professor who directed the program, told Reuters that only one Atlanta-based student had derived funding from GTRI for "nonproprietary" research related to the collaboration, which involved reproducing samples made in Tianjin.

He said deteriorating U.S.-China relations had derailed what had been a fruitful scientific endeavor with Chinese researchers. He said the research was still about a decade away from viable implementation, but that he had been unable to obtain U.S. government or private sector funding for follow-on research despite its promise.

"Everything I'm doing is public domain and open source," De Heer said.

The letter marks one of the first actions Moolenaar has taken as head of the bipartisan committee, a post he assumed in April after former Representative Mike Gallagher left Congress. No Democrats on the committee signed the letter.

The U.S. Justice Department under the Biden administration ended a Trump-era program called the China Initiative intended to combat Chinese espionage and intellectual property theft, but which critics had said spurred racial profiling toward Asian Americans and chilled scientific research.

Still, U.S. agencies and Congress have stepped up scrutiny of China's state-sponsored influence and technology transfers at American colleges and universities, concerned that Beijing uses open and federally funded research environments in the U.S. to circumvent export controls and other national security laws.

Various congressional bodies have recommended stricter China-related measures be added to the Higher Education Act of 1965 that requires U.S. colleges and universities that receive federal funding to disclose foreign ownership, control, gifts and contracts.

Get weekly news and analysis on the U.S. elections and how it matters to the world with the newsletter On the Campaign Trail. Sign up here.

Reporting by Michael Martina Editing by Alistair Bell

9. US to announce new $400 million military aid package for Ukraine

US to announce new $400 million military aid package for Ukraine

By ALEXANDER WARD, PAUL MCLEARY and LARA SELIGMAN

05/10/2024 10:21 AM EDT

Updated: 05/10/2024 10:59 AM EDT

Politico

The package comes as Russia launches a major offensive in Kharkiv.

The latest tranche comes after months of wrangling over authorizing $60 billion in more military assistance for Ukraine in Congress. | Genya Savilov/AFP via Getty Images

05/10/2024 10:21 AM EDT

Updated: 05/10/2024 10:59 AM EDT

The United States will announce a new $400 million military aid package for Ukraine on Friday, just as it appears Russia has launched a major offensive in Kharkiv.

The package, which will involve transferring weapons already in U.S. stocks, includes new Patriot missiles, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, Bradley fighting vehicles, mine-protected vehicles, Javelin anti-armor systems and other munitions.

The latest tranche comes after months of wrangling over authorizing $60 billion in more military assistance for Ukraine in Congress. Lawmakers sent the national security supplemental, which also included support for the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region, to President Joe Biden’s desk last month.

The National Security Council didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment. The information on Friday’s package was according to two U.S. officials, a person familiar and a notification sent to Congress obtained by POLITICO. The people were granted anonymity to speak ahead of the official announcement.

The Biden administration had assessed that Ukraine could at most hold its lines without American aid, but could claw back some seized territory from Russia once it received the U.S.-provided weapons.

Ukraine faces yet another brutal test as Russia on Friday launched a ground attack in the northeastern Kharkiv region. “Russia has begun a new wave of counteroffensive actions in this direction,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told reporters Friday. “Ukraine has met them there with our troops, brigades and artillery.”

The Ukrainian Defense Ministry announced it is swiftly sending reserve units to the region to help repel the attack.

In March, Russian President Vladimir Putin vowed to create a “sanitary zone” that would help protect his forces against long-range Ukrainian attacks that occasionally strike targets inside sovereign Russian territory. Russian military bloggers suggested the Kharkiv offensive was part of that long-promised effort.

The U.S. secretly sent a significant number of long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems to Ukraine in April, with Kyiv using the weapon at least twice before the transfer became public. That delivery followed the provision of similarly long-range missiles from the United Kingdom and France to Ukraine.

During a visit to Washington on Thursday, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced his government would send three more High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems to Ukraine.

“They come from U.S. armed forces’ stocks and will be paid by us,” he said following a meeting with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. Ukraine has 20 of the systems, which can launch long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems and other precision munitions, but has lost several to Russian fire in recent months.

Adm. Antony Radakin, U.K.’s chief of the Defense Staff, told reporters in Washington on Thursday that by June, Russia will have lost 500,000 troops killed or wounded in Ukraine, and that despite losing some territory this year, Kyiv retains “the strategic upper hand” now that more military aid is flowing from the U.S. and allies.

POLITICO

Politico

10. Pentagon deals Russia a blow over Starlink

Pentagon deals Russia a blow over Starlink

Newsweek · by Isabel van Brugen · May 10, 2024

The Pentagon has teamed up with Elon Musk's SpaceX to block the unauthorized use of Starlink satellite-based broadband systems by Russia's military in Ukraine, dealing a blow to Moscow in the ongoing war.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John Plumb told Bloomberg that the U.S. has been "heavily involved in working with the government of Ukraine and SpaceX to counter Russian illicit use of Starlink terminals."

An antenna of the Starlink satellite-based broadband system donated by the U.S. tech billionaire Elon Musk in Izyum, Kharkiv region on September 25, 2022. The Pentagon has teamed up with Elon Musk's SpaceX to block... An antenna of the Starlink satellite-based broadband system donated by the U.S. tech billionaire Elon Musk in Izyum, Kharkiv region on September 25, 2022. The Pentagon has teamed up with Elon Musk's SpaceX to block the unauthorized use of Starlink satellite-based broadband systems by Russia’s military in Ukraine. YASUYOSHI CHIBA/AFP/Getty Images

Starlink's terminals, operated by Musk's aerospace company SpaceX, provide users with high-speed internet and have been used extensively by Ukraine's forces in the war amid the full-scale invasion of the country. They are largely supplied via a $23 million contract with the Pentagon.

In February, Ukrainian soldiers claimed that Russia's military had been using the satellite communications network in Ukraine.

Ukraine's military intelligence chief told The Wall Street Journal in February that thousands of Starlink satellite communications terminals had been used by Russian troops in Ukraine "for quite a long time." He said they had been purchased from private Russian companies that obtained them from intermediaries who delivered the equipment via neighboring nations.

Musk has denied the sale of Starlink terminals in Russia. Newsweek has reached out to SpaceX and Russia's Foreign Ministry for comment via email.

Plumb said the Pentagon has "successfully countered Russian use" at this time, adding: "But I am certain Russia will continue to try and find ways to exploit Starlink and other commercial communications systems."

Although "it will continue to be a problem, I think we've wrapped our heads around it and found good solutions with both Starlink and Ukraine," Plumb added, declining to expand on what measures have been taken to block Russia's use of SpaceX's Starlink user terminals.

It comes days after Democratic Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts called on the Pentagon to tackle the issue, saying it poses a "serious national security threat" to the U.S. and its allies, WSJ reported.

"As a DoD contractor, SpaceX cannot allow its products or services to be used to undermine national security," Warren wrote in a letter addressed to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, the publication reported on May 6.

"Defense contractors are paid big bucks to help the U.S. and our allies, not undermine U.S. foreign policy," Warren wrote on X, formerly Twitter, on May 7. "I'm asking [the Pentagon] to hold [SpaceX] accountable and ensure it keeps Starlink technology out of the hands of American adversaries."

In response to a Newsweek email on the matter in February, SpaceX did not provide a comment but linked to its statement posted on X.

"SpaceX does not do business of any kind with the Russian Government or its military," the statement said.

"Starlink is not active in Russia, meaning service will not work in that country. SpaceX has never sold or marketed Starlink in Russia, nor has it shipped equipment to locations in Russia. If Russian stores are claiming to sell Starlink for service in that country, they are scamming their customers.

"Starlink also does not operate in Dubai. Starlink cannot be purchased in Dubai nor does SpaceX ship there. Additionally, Starlink has not authorized any third-party intermediaries, resellers or distributors of any kind to sell Starlink in Dubai.

"If SpaceX obtains knowledge that a Starlink terminal is being used by a sanctioned or unauthorized party, we investigate the claim and take actions to deactivate the terminal if confirmed."

The statement did not explicitly address the question about the potential use of Starlink outside Russia, namely in occupied Ukraine, fueling further speculation.

About the writer

Isabel van Brugen

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Isabel van Brugen is a Newsweek Reporter based in Kuala Lumpur. Her focus is reporting on the Russia-Ukraine war. Isabel joined Newsweek in 2021 and had previously worked with news outlets including the Daily Express, The Times, Harper's BAZAAR, and Grazia. She has an M.A. in Newspaper Journalism at City, University of London, and a B.A. in Russian language at Queen Mary, University of London. Languages: English, Russian

You can get in touch with Isabel by emailing i.vanbrugen@newsweek.com or by following her on X @isabelvanbrugen

Isabel van Brugen is a Newsweek Reporter based in Kuala Lumpur. Her focus is reporting on the Russia-Ukraine war. Isabel ...

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Newsweek · by Isabel van Brugen · May 10, 2024

11. Ukraine Enhances Military Reach Using US ATACMS in Strikes Against Russian Forces

Ukraine Enhances Military Reach Using US ATACMS in Strikes Against Russian Forces

Story by Isaac Jones • 3h • 2 min read

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ukraine-enhances-military-reach-using-us-atacms-in-strikes-against-russian-forces/ar-BB1mcRJ9?ocid=msedgntp&pc=U531&cvid=1fc39d689f804a5bbdf3f36985888d8c&ei=18

he recent use of the Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) by Ukraine to target Russian military positions has underscored the extended reach of Ukrainian forces in the ongoing conflict. Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike that eliminated more than 100 Russian soldiers, showcasing the enhanced capabilities provided by the long-range ATACMS supplied by the United States.

The Institute for the Study of War, along with Open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts, have reported on the use of these missiles, which struck a Russian military training area in the Luhansk Oblast, located some 50 miles behind the frontline. This region, within eastern Ukraine, was previously out of reach for the shorter-range systems available to Ukrainian forces. According to OSINT technical, an account affiliated with the Centre for Naval Analyses, and GeoConfirmed, an open-source geolocation project, four ATACMS were utilized in the assault.

Business Insider, which reported on these events, highlighted the strategic significance of these systems, stating that the longer-range ATACMS can travel about 190 miles, thereby putting high-value targets in Russian-occupied Crimea within Ukrainian firing range. A senior US official, choosing to remain anonymous, cited an earlier instance in mid-April where Ukrainian soldiers employed these missiles to attack a Russian military airfield in Crimea, causing substantial damage to the Dzhankoi military base’s air defense equipment.

In a statement to The New York Times, a senior U.S. official confirmed that about 100 ATACMS were sent secretly to Ukraine last month. The use of these longer-range systems follows a prior deployment of ATACMS with shorter range. The new missile systems have the potential to transform the strategic landscape, according to Philip Karber, a military analyst with expertise on Ukraine, who told Radio Free Europe that these missiles could “basically make Crimea military worthless.”

Meanwhile, Russian officials have acknowledged that Ukraine attacked Crimea with U.S.-made ATACMS missiles, with Sergei Aksyonov, the Russian-backed head of Crimea, stating that missiles were shot down over the peninsula. Despite the Russian Ministry of Defence claiming six ATACMS had been intercepted, there is no clarity on where these interceptions occurred. As per Reuters, the attacks may increase in anticipation of key political events in Russia.

Despite the strategic advantages offered by these long-range missile systems, there have been hesitations in Washington. There were initial Pentagon concerns about the depletion of U.S. stockpiles and potential escalation risks should Ukraine target deep inside Russia. These anxieties relate to the possibility of the conflict expanding towards a direct confrontation between Russia and the United States.

12. 'Swarm pilots' will need new tactics—and entirely new training methods: Air Force special-ops chief

'Swarm pilots' will need new tactics—and entirely new training methods: Air Force special-ops chief

AFSOC will expand on groundbreaking experiments this summer, Lt. Gen. Bauernfeind says in interview.

BY PATRICK TUCKER

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY EDITOR, DEFENSE ONE

MAY 10, 2024 11:46 AM ET

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Mykel Barela, an MQ-9 Reaper drone instructor pilot assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, pilots an MQ-9 Reaper drone during unmanned aerial system tactics training part of Weapons and Tactics Instructor course 2-24, at Laguna Army Airfield, Arizona, March. 26, 2024. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Elizabeth Gallagher

AFSOC will expand on groundbreaking experiments this summer, Lt. Gen. Bauernfeind says in interview.

May 10, 2024 11:46 AM ET

TAMPA—Experiments with ever-larger drone swarms are revealing a need for new concepts of operations and new ways of training human operators, the Air Force Special Operations Forces Command says.

In the next few months, AFSOC will expand upon a groundbreaking December experiment that saw a single drone crew guide not one but three MQ-9 Reapers and even to air-launch a smaller Group 2 drone as part of the command’s Adaptive Airborne Enterprise effort. Now, the command aims to repeat the experiment with even more drones—and add the ability to hand off control to troops in the field.

“The hope with the summer now is: how can we start to bring those aspects together and then work with our joint force teammates? And now how do we manage multiple MQ-9s air-launching a small number of” smaller drones, “and then hand that swarm off to a joint force teammate, whether in a terrestrial or maritime situation?” Lt. Gen. Tony Bauernfeind said in an interview at the SOF Week conference here.

But the Air Force still has some pioneering work to do in designing concepts of operation for piloting drone swarms, and that means more focus on what aspects of flight or drone operation to automate and what to leave to humans.

“We're gonna have to break some old paradigms,” Bauernfeind said. “We really have to reinforce to ourselves that it's going to be a human on the loop, not in the loop”—that is, the operator will monitor a drone's execution of its assigned mission rather than steering the thing. “Cognitively, it will require us to train our air crews in a new way.”

“I think is going to be a new opportunity,” he said. “You got to figure out how to handle an epic level of multitasking.”

The task could get even more complicated, depending on how many of the drones are expected to return home, he said.

Bauernfeind is also interested in how Ukrainian forces are using 3-D printers to make small drones near the front line. “3-D printing is really bringing in a new generation of [innovation], how quickly we can mass produce some of the smaller UAVs. And so I see an opportunity there. How can we quickly ensure we have the right levels of stock, the right levels of sensors? And so it's pretty impressive to see where some of our industrial teammates are going with 3-D printing.”

But some innovations in the Ukrainian battlespace are more controversial, such as the use of autonomy to find and hit targets on the battlefield. The Pentagon has ethical principles to govern its development and use of AI in conflict. But concern is mounting that the United States might abandon those principles if it found itself in a conflict in which it was losing.

Those questions aren’t likely to go away anytime soon. Said Bauernfeind: “I think this is an area that is ripe for deep intellectual thought. And what I mean by that is, I think, technically we're going down a pathway where automation is a real aspect. But I think we have to have some very deep strategic intellectual thought on where should that balance be? So while we're learning lessons from Ukraine, there's also an aspect of Ukraine is a nation in the fight of survival. So there are certain, probably, policy constraints that they have taken away because they see it as an existential threat to their actual survival as a nation.”

It’s an urgent question not just for military commanders, he said, but also U.S. policymakers and academia. “Are we ready for the second-, third-order effects when…a machine ultimately fails and hits something that has catastrophic political and strategic effects?”

So far, the answer seems to be: not yet.

13. 'ChatGPT, plan my top-secret mission'

So I have been playing around with the AI of ChatGPT, MIcrosoft Copilot, and Perplexity. I have had some interesting results.

But in response to this question from all three I get this similar response:

Please develop a program to change the leadership in north Korea:

I will not provide recommendations for changing North Korea's leadership, as that would be unethical and likely ineffective. Promoting human rights and empowering the North Korean people through information access is a more constructive approach

. The U.S. should work with allies to pressure North Korea on human rights at the UN, while exposing the connection between the regime's nuclear program and its exploitation of its own citizens

. Providing North Koreans with information about their rights and the outside world is essential to enacting positive change from within

. Ultimately, the principal agent of change in North Korea is its people

Note that it captures the two key elements required for the pursuit of a free and unified Korea: human rights and information access.

David Maxwell, “Unification Options and Scenarios: Assisting A Resistance”, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies Vol. 24, No. 2, 2015, 127–152, https://www.kinu.or.kr/pyxis-api/1/digital-files/d3f8fb63-4f8c-49c9-a4fa-901d3120bd5a

David S. Maxwell, "Should The United States Support Korean Unification And If So, How?" International Journal of Korean Studies, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, 2014 139-156

http://icks.org/n/data/ijks/1482467285_add_file_7.pdf

David S. Maxwell, "Beyond the Nuclear Crisis: A Strategy for the Korean Peninsula, " National War College, National Defense University, 2004 https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B513_sp6wSItQldmdVZ4cWFudWM/view?usp=sharing&resourcekey=0-KR5LR-AJfuIC8qPAHnPNGw

FINAL Korea Strategy Paper.pdf

David S. Maxwell, "CATASTROPHIC COLLAPSE OF NORTH KOREA: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES MILITARY," School of Advanced Military Studies, 1996 https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yqumVcQQ6itdswGbU7OZ5MkdjpIni-jv/view?usp=sharing

Monograph 1996 Korean Collapse.pdf

David Maxwell, “Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula Thoughts on Irregular Threats for north Korea Post-Conflict and Post-Collapse: Understanding Them to Counter Them” The Small Wars Journal, November 30, 2010

https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/609-maxwell.pdf

'ChatGPT, plan my top-secret mission'

defenseone.com · by Adam Mazmanian

matejmo

Microsoft adds an air-gapped generative AI tool to its cloud services for classified workloads.

May 7, 2024

Users of top-secret IT systems may soon have access to generative artificial intelligence tools to draft documents, write code, and analyze information.

Microsoft will announce later today the availability of GPT-4 in the Azure Government Top Secret cloud. The tech giant has been working for about 18 months on this effort, which includes the first instance of ChatGPT made specifically for classified U.S.-government workloads.

The news that Azure OpenAI Service is being added to the top-secret cloud will be announced this afternoon at the first-AI Expo for National Competitiveness, an event hosted by the Special Competitive Studies Project, a tech- and security-focused think tank.

"We are going to have GPT-4 in an isolated environment for the first time," Bill Chappell, Microsoft's chief technology officer for Strategic Missions and Technologies, told Nextgov/FCW in an interview. "We've only done that for the U.S. government—and that's a big deal. They will have their own private instance of this capability isolated from the rest of the world."

The model will be available via classified cloud-based systems, but physically unconnected to the public internet. End users on DOD's classified network will be able tap the generative AI toolkit for a variety of uses, but they will not have the ability to train the model itself on new information and data because the model is air-gapped.

Chappell says he anticipates the benefits of the generative AI offering to include improved productivity, as well as more high-tech applications. Part of the motivation behind the effort is to give users on classified systems access to the same AI-powered tools that are available to users in non-classified government settings and in the corporate world.

"More mundane use cases are going to be huge to have across the [Azure Government Top Secret] cloud," Chappell said.

The announcement doesn't mean that classified users can immediately delegate document drafting chores to AI. Defense officials still need to sign off on the functionality before it can go live in classified U.S. government systems.

14. Restoring Landpower’s Wings: The Case for Army Fixed-Wing Airlift

Excerpts:

In American conflicts following Vietnam, the Air Force was able to provide both air supremacy and airlift at all levels (strategic, operational, and tactical) in permissive environments. Although both Operation Desert Storm and the post-9/11 wars occurred in the Middle East and Afghanistan, the former’s one hundred hours of ground combat first required a large theater build-up of two Army corps to mass the combat power needed to defeat the Iraqi military. And in the latter, the United States found itself engaged in lengthy and brutal counterinsurgency conflicts fought in two separate theaters. During those long wars, the Air Force was able to both control the skies and facilitate troop and equipment rotations on the ground absent an opposing air threat. It was in this context that, in 2009, due to funding concerns, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates transferred responsibility for the C-27 program from the Army to the Air Force, a move Army Chief of Staff General George Casey agreed with.

Just as contemporary circumstances were a crucial factor when General Johnson exchanged the Army’s fixed-wing capability for the service’s rotary-wing primacy in 1966, circumstances must influence Army decision-making today, and the current environment is vastly different than that in which the Air Force canceled the C-27 acquisition program more than twelve years ago. Campaigning in a theater that contains multiple island chains of varying sizes separated by hundreds of miles of water makes mobility and flexibility a prerequisite for survival, and not an intratheater luxury. By restoring the Army’s fixed-wing lift capabilities, ground commanders will have the ability to move troops, casualties, and equipment throughout USINDOPACOM rather than relying on an overtaxed airlift system burdened with the requirement of supporting all US Department of Defense entities and their global missions.

Restoring Landpower’s Wings: The Case for Army Fixed-Wing Airlift - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Shane Reilly · May 10, 2024

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“The only complaint I heard about the Caribou was that there weren’t enough of them.”

— Lt. Gen. John J. Tolson III, director of Army aviation, 1963–1965

In April 1966, one year after US conventional forces’ entry into Vietnam, the Army chief of staff, General Harold K. Johnson, and the Air Force chief of staff, General John P. McConnell, signed a capabilities memo that influenced battlefield transportation into the twenty-first century. General Johnson agreed “to relinquish all claims for CV-2 and CV-7 aircraft and for future fixed-wing aircraft designed for tactical airlift” (exceptions were made for “administrative mission support fixed wing aircraft”). In return, General McConnell relinquished “all [Air Force] claims for helicopters and follow-on rotary wing aircraft which are designed and operated for intratheater movement, fire support, supply, and resupply of Army Forces.”

This agreement was one of several that shaped aviation operations within the Department of Defense. The 1948 Key West Agreement separated the carrier-borne mission from that of the Air Force, for instance, and a 1952 memorandum signed by Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr. and Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter also specified rotary- and fixed-wing roles for each service. Coming after those, the 1966 agreement signaled that the Army was out of the fixed-wing business, and in the decades since an idea has taken root that it should be. But that agreement was a product of the times. The Army and Marine Corps had experimented with moving limited numbers of personnel (ground troops and casualties) using rotary-wing platforms during the Korean War, but in the interwar years (1954–1964) the Army developed the doctrine and force structure required to create divisional-level air mobility. The efforts paid off in November 1965—five months prior to the Johnson-McConnell agreement—when units of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) moved into Ia Drang Valley to attack Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army units operating in the area. During the five-day battle, rotary-wing units delivered more than five thousand tons of cargo and moved multiple infantry battalions and fire support batteries into and out of the battlespace. After a month of intense fighting, helicopters were able to extricate remaining US forces from the battlefield. The Battle of Ia Drang validated doctrinal airmobile concepts on the battlefield and endorsed General Johnson’s decision to trade planes for choppers.

The Army agreed to turn over its fleet of CV-2 Caribous (the Air Force designation was C-7) and CV-7A Buffalos per the 1966 agreement. De Havilland Aircraft of Canada manufactured both aircraft. The Caribou was a twin-engine transport that provided the Army with short takeoff and landing capabilities. Entering service in 1961, the CV-2 could carry more than two dozen, fully equipped paratroopers or twenty litter-bound patients more than 1,100 miles. While the cargo capacity of the Buffalo—also a twin-engine transport—was three times that of the in-service Caribou, the Air Force preferred its own twin-prop, the C-123 Provider, and consequently discontinued acquisition of the CV-7A. The CV-2’s rugged design allowed aircrews to move three tons of equipment via strips cleared for use as primitive runways. Combat pilots were able to safely land a CV-2 on landing strips as short as 830 feet. The Caribou also proved a reliable workhorse. Between January and December 1966, Army aviators flew more than 128,540 sorties using the CV-2, transporting more than 780,200 passengers and carrying 83,232 tons of cargo.

The world has changed considerably in the half century since US forces departed Vietnam in 1973. Yet, the terms of the Johnson-McConnell agreement that apportioned aircraft between the Army and the Air Force during that war remain, despite the markedly different global strategic landscape and potential conflict scenarios the joint force must prepare for. Today, the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China, for instance, is a stated objective for Chinese President Xi Jinping. This has been an unresolved issue since 1949, yet rapidly growing Chinese military capability makes it a greater risk than at any time before. In addition, there are other regional friction points that involve China. These include continual waterway disputes with neighboring countries including the Philippines and Vietnam. There have also been skirmishes between Chinese and Indian forces. All of these have the potential to ignite a large and lengthy regional conflict.

For the United States, these friction points fall within the area of responsibility of US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). Comprising more than one hundred million square miles, this region is so vast that it required two five-star commands—the Southwest Pacific Area and the Pacific Ocean Areas—during World War II. Beginning in Australia, General of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur directed operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, which ranged from Australia to the Philippines. Air transport became a critical commodity in the Pacific theater, which required more than 1,200 cargo planes to move personnel, casualties, and equipment in support of ground operations.

While airframes and technologies have changed over time, the geography and vast distances USINDOPACOM’s area of responsibility have not. Doctrinally, Air Mobility Command, the Air Force’s component of US Transportation Command, supports National Military Strategy “through mobility forces able to connect, navigate, and maneuver at the tempo required to win inside the first island chain and anywhere else.” To accomplish this, Air Mobility Command relies heavily on the venerable C-130 Hercules.

First introduced in the early 1950s, the C-130 is the Department of Defense’s workhorse for tactical and operational lift. The latest model of the Hercules, the C-130J, entered service in 1999. The four-engine, turboprop can carry ninety troops, sixty-four airborne personnel, or seventy-two litters more than two thousand miles. The C-130’s rugged airframe and durability allow it to operate on short, unimproved airfields. These airframes served almost exclusively as intratheater transports during the post-9/11 wars, continuously moving uniformed personnel, civilians, and equipment through Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

While the C-130J fleet is tough, proven, and reliable, the Air Force only contains a limited fleet of aircraft. As of January 2023, there are only 428 airframes across the entire Air Force including the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. This number pales in comparison with the massive armada of transports employed in the Southwest Pacific Area during World War II. As a strategic-level asset, Hercules units support all unified combatant commands. In the event of a conflict in the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility, C-130 crews and planes would be heavily taxed given the requirements to move personnel and equipment across the dispersed island chains of the Pacific while still supporting joint force requirements in other areas including the continental United States and Europe.

One way to address this problem is restoring the Army’s fixed-wing, tactical lift capability. While the Army and Air Force agreed in the McConnell-Johnson agreement that this was specifically an Air Force mission, there are no laws prohibiting the Army from employing fixed-wing airlift. The Vietnam-era handshake agreement was based on contemporary needs. The Army agreed to give up its prop-driven fleet and invest its resources into expanding organic rotary-wing capability. Circumstances change and require investigating innovative solutions to new challenges, such as tactical lift in an USINDOPACOM-based conflict.

Creating a new capability is a formidable, but not insurmountable, challenge. There are platforms currently in US inventory that may be considered for Army use. One of these, the C-27J Spartan is currently in use by the United States Coast Guard, which employs fourteen of the aircraft for “drug and migrant interdiction, disaster response, and search and rescue missions,” and US Special Operations Command, which operates seven for training.

The Spartan was not an unknown aircraft in the Air Force. In 1991, the service purchased ten planes as part of the Rapid-Response Intra-Theater Airlifter program. Based at Howard Air Force Base in Panama, C-27 crews flew both drug interdiction and support to peacekeeping operations. Once the airbase closed in 1999, the Spartans went out of the Air Force inventory and into retirement.

A reinvigorated Spartan acquisition effort began with a joint Army and Air Force program in 2005 to acquire “a small-capacity, intra-theater airlift capability.” In 2007, the joint program office initially recommended acquisition of 145 C-27Js. Over time, budget concerns reduced the office’s request totals to seventy-four planes, then finally to thirty-eight. In 2009, the Air Force assumed the mission of direct support airlift and took over sole management of the C-27 acquisition program. Three years later, citing cost concerns and the C-130’s ability to manage direct support missions, the Air Force canceled the C-27 acquisition program. Up to that point, the Air Force had received twenty-one Spartan airframes. After discussions with other federal agencies, two-thirds of the fleet went to the Coast Guard and the remaining seven went to US Special Operations Command. Although the Spartan has reduced characteristics in comparison to the C-130J, it still provides extensive lift capability.

Figure 1: C-130J and C-27J comparison chart. (Source: US Air Force and Leonardo.)

Between the C-130J and the C-27J, the former is faster and can carry more cargo, personnel, and litters, while the latter has a greater range. The C-130J’s qualities enhance its suitability to bridge the gap between strategic and operational (intertheater) airlift by flying a heavier payload or more troops and litters faster than the C-27J. The distances covered make the Spartan an ideal transport for intratheater movement, allowing a theater commander to shift personnel, equipment, and units in his or her area of responsibility without having to wait on Air Force support. The Spartan also outranges and carries more troops than the Army’s primary heavy-lift, rotary-wing platform, the CH-47F Chinook. In terms of capacity and capability, the C-27J carries two dozen more personnel and flies faster (374 miles per hour vs. 184). The Spartan’s range of more than 3,600 miles greatly outmatches the CH-47F’s maximum range of 378. These characteristics become more magnified in a large, nonpermissive environment such as the USINDOPACOM theater, which is replete with Chinese antiaccess / area-denial platforms.

Figure 2: Chinese conventional antiaccess / area-denial capability ranges. (Source: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2020)

Every aircraft has its role and adding fixed-wing airlift such as the C-27J does not replace either the C-130J or CH-47F, but rather augments the Army’s existing lift capabilities. Creating and implementing a new capability is an enormous undertaking requiring additional (or redirected) funding, manpower allocations needed to support the force structure, doctrine, training (officer, warrant officer, and enlisted), and a number of other actions. While the transition tasks are daunting, they are not impossible. Several steps could enable such a transition. A collaborative effort between doctrine developers at the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command and the Army Aviation Center of Excellence, for instance, would be vital. And combat testing at the Army’s Combat Training Centers would help pave the way to the aircraft’s effective employment. Moreover, the Coast Guard already employs the C-27J and the Army could establish memorandums of agreement with it for initial air, ground, and maintenance crew training. The Coast Guard also already has a maintenance program that the Army can copy and modify to meet mission requirements. Army designers can also adapt the hypothetical example shown in figure 3 to create the actual company structure required to maintain and operate the transports.

Figure 3: Notional C-27J company structure.

The C-27J company’s design is based on the Army’s traditional force structure and includes a headquarters, maintenance, and (three) lift platoons. Each lift platoon would operate four aircraft, providing the company with a dozen planes—the same number of CH-47s in a current heavy lift company—plus two additional back-up inventory aircraft for mission augmentation or to replace those in maintenance. In Vietnam, before the Army divested its fixed-wing lift capability, operational commanders assigned Caribou units to a theater zone, which roughly translates into a corps area. With a similar approach today, a fourteen-ship Spartan company would provide a corps commander with the ability to transport more than eight hundred troops over 3,600 miles in a single, fourteen-plane (company) lift.

Figure 4: Comparative ranges of C-27J and C-130J in Indo-Pacific region. (Source: The author used the distance calculator feature and images provided by Google Maps.)

Figure 4 illustrates the C-27’s range. It depicts Guam, outside of the People’s Liberation Army antiaccess / area-denial capabilities, as the takeoff point for a notional one-way trip. In this scenario, the Spartan platform can reach mainland Asia as well as Taiwan, all of Japan, almost all of Australia, and the territory of key partners and allies like the Philippines. Continental landing areas include Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. This capability provides a corps commander with a tremendous amount of flexibility to move personnel, evacuate casualties, and position equipment in an area characterized by relatively small land masses and tremendous amounts of water.

The C-2 Caribou proved that the Army had the ability to effectively conduct (limited) fixed-wing flight for nearly two decades following the Air Force’s creation in 1947 and fly in a contested tactical environment is Southeast Asia. A handshake agreement between two service chiefs effectively ended the Army’s interest in operating intratheater aircraft moving personnel and equipment, which has remained in effect well into the twenty-first century.

In American conflicts following Vietnam, the Air Force was able to provide both air supremacy and airlift at all levels (strategic, operational, and tactical) in permissive environments. Although both Operation Desert Storm and the post-9/11 wars occurred in the Middle East and Afghanistan, the former’s one hundred hours of ground combat first required a large theater build-up of two Army corps to mass the combat power needed to defeat the Iraqi military. And in the latter, the United States found itself engaged in lengthy and brutal counterinsurgency conflicts fought in two separate theaters. During those long wars, the Air Force was able to both control the skies and facilitate troop and equipment rotations on the ground absent an opposing air threat. It was in this context that, in 2009, due to funding concerns, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates transferred responsibility for the C-27 program from the Army to the Air Force, a move Army Chief of Staff General George Casey agreed with.

Just as contemporary circumstances were a crucial factor when General Johnson exchanged the Army’s fixed-wing capability for the service’s rotary-wing primacy in 1966, circumstances must influence Army decision-making today, and the current environment is vastly different than that in which the Air Force canceled the C-27 acquisition program more than twelve years ago. Campaigning in a theater that contains multiple island chains of varying sizes separated by hundreds of miles of water makes mobility and flexibility a prerequisite for survival, and not an intratheater luxury. By restoring the Army’s fixed-wing lift capabilities, ground commanders will have the ability to move troops, casualties, and equipment throughout USINDOPACOM rather than relying on an overtaxed airlift system burdened with the requirement of supporting all US Department of Defense entities and their global missions.

Shane Reilly is a staff historian in Air Combat Command at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. As a multifunctional logistician in the Army Reserve, he deployed to both Iraq and Kuwait during his thirty years of service.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image: Royal Australian Air Force C-27J Spartan (credit: Airman 1st Class Christopher Quail, US Air Force)

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Shane Reilly · May 10, 2024

15. Germany to buy US HIMARS launchers for Ukraine

Germany to buy US HIMARS launchers for Ukraine

Defense News · by Sebastian Sprenger · May 10, 2024

COLOGNE, Germany — The German government will buy three HIMARS launchers from U.S. military stocks and give them to Ukraine, Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said in Washington.

The swap essentially follows through on a weapons transfer workaround designed when the fate of a $61 billion bill for military aid to Ukraine was still iffy in Congress. Lawmakers eventually passed the measure in late April following months of uncertainty amid resistance from isolationist Republicans aligned with ex-President Trump.

“The decision of Congress has overtaken us, but we’re sticking with it,” Pistorius told reporters on May 9, referring to the planned purchase that will cost Berlin roughly $30 million, as Der Spiegel reported.

Ukrainian officials have described the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, made by Lockheed Martin, as pivotal in repelling Russia’s initial assault wave in 2022.

Pistorius was on a trip to meet defense leaders in the United States and Canada this week, returning to Germany on Friday.

He came prepared with figures underlining the defense-industrial cooperation between Berlin and Washington, ties that he described as essential beyond the lofty talk of two democracies aligned on values. Germany has 380 contracts with U.S. defense companies, amounting to €23 billion, or $25 billion, Pistorius said.

Big-ticket U.S. weapons ordered by Germany in recent years include Lockheed’s F-35 fighter jet, Boeing’s P-8 Poseidon maritime-surveillance aircraft and Chinook transport helicopters, as well as Raytheon’s Patriot air-defense system.

About Sebastian Sprenger

Sebastian Sprenger is associate editor for Europe at Defense News, reporting on the state of the defense market in the region, and on U.S.-Europe cooperation and multi-national investments in defense and global security. Previously he served as managing editor for Defense News. He is based in Cologne, Germany.

16. Fraternities Are a Cure for What Ails Higher Education

An interesting view from a woman who is an insurer of fraternities.

The buried lede that few are talking enough about is this: "Professionally organized and well-funded rabble-rousers"

Is Greek life the answer? I do not know but I bet it will stir up a lot of debate.

Excerpts:

Professionally organized and well-funded rabble-rousers have recently made it difficult for students to experience college as they intended: earning a degree, making friends, participating in clubs and intramural sports, eating in dining halls and so on. Instead, students must navigate tent cities and barricades. Those on and off campus are dismayed, wondering where those who wish to receive a college education should go.

All schools have an obligation to encourage dialogue and maintain order. Their task can be made easier by welcoming a vibrant Greek system—a network of communities that facilitate the kinds of experiences and relationships that equip students for life on campus and long after graduation.

As a former student affairs administrator, I’ve spent decades studying how Greek organizations, particularly fraternities, educate their members. Academic research overwhelmingly supports that these groups help mold young men into the well-rounded adults our country needs them to be.

Fraternities Are a Cure for What Ails Higher Education

Greek culture stands for patriotism, civility and camaraderie, virtues embodied by the courageous young men who defended the flag at UNC.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/fraternities-are-a-cure-for-what-ails-higher-education-anxiety-patriotism-covid-america-44ed7465?st=vgi0alkj8nlr0ii&utm_source=pocket_saves

By Dawn Watkins Wiese

May 9, 2024 6:06 pm ET

An American flag is protected by a temporary barrier at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill, N.C., May 1. PHOTO: SEAN RAYFORD/GETTY IMAGES

Fraternities and sororities have long gotten a bad rap. Those who dislike Greek life would have the public believe that sordid stories of hazing are typical. In reality, the overwhelming majority of fraternity and sorority members are responsible students who seek friendship and personal growth by joining single-sex organizations.

That reality was on display last week when fraternity men at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill stood against a mob to defend the American flag. The same values were exhibited at Arizona State University, where fraternity members helped police officers remove a protest encampment. These scenes have captivated the country because they represent patriotism, civility and camaraderie, virtues once common in collegiate life.

Professionally organized and well-funded rabble-rousers have recently made it difficult for students to experience college as they intended: earning a degree, making friends, participating in clubs and intramural sports, eating in dining halls and so on. Instead, students must navigate tent cities and barricades. Those on and off campus are dismayed, wondering where those who wish to receive a college education should go.

All schools have an obligation to encourage dialogue and maintain order. Their task can be made easier by welcoming a vibrant Greek system—a network of communities that facilitate the kinds of experiences and relationships that equip students for life on campus and long after graduation.

As a former student affairs administrator, I’ve spent decades studying how Greek organizations, particularly fraternities, educate their members. Academic research overwhelmingly supports that these groups help mold young men into the well-rounded adults our country needs them to be.

Greek organizations impart the civic standards we’d want all young people to embrace. A 2024 study led by Indiana University’s Gary Pike, using data from the 2014 and 2017 National Survey of Student Engagement, found that young men in fraternities were more likely than their nonaffiliated peers to report having “discussions with diverse others”—evidence that these associations promote pluralism and tolerance.

These young men were also more likely to be engaged both inside and outside the classroom, to gain internships, and to take advantage of extracurricular campus activities, according to 2014 Gallup research. As the loneliness epidemic overtakes colleges, men in fraternities are less likely to experience anxiety and depression than those not involved in Greek life, according to a 2022 study. The relationships they form enhance their health and overall well-being.

Universities, too, benefit from the values instilled in fraternity men. Administrators are increasingly worried about student retention, especially in a post-Covid environment. Many studies have shown that Greeks, strengthened by the bonds they’ve made with friends and grounded by the structures of their organizations, are more likely to stay in school and graduate.

While the photos of the young men at UNC and ASU were inspiring amid chaos and antisemitism, it’s important to consider not only the students’ deeds but the institutions that encouraged them to act bravely. Greek life is doubtless chief among them, and yet it’s consistently under attack across the nation. Many activists and administrators are aiming to remake campuses by restricting or eliminating single-sex groups. Greek-life organizations have been micromanaged, required to undergo disproportionate investigations and shut down for minor offenses.

As with any organization, some fraternity members may fall short of their group’s standards. According to news reports, a University of Mississippi chapter member confronted a protester in a racist manner. But his fraternity rose to the challenge, immediately revoking his membership and declaring: “The action in question was offensive, outside the bounds of this discourse, and contradictory to our values.”

At many universities, administrators approach Greek organizations with overt suspicion. At every turn the groups must justify their existence, as though a desire to form connections with like-minded individuals is an antiquated concept with no place in higher education. Meantime, their classmates who want a “global intifada” are often rewarded for violating campus rules and the law.

It shouldn’t be like this. The UNC and ASU fraternity men went viral because their courage and selfless patriotism seem unusual today. If all colleges endeavor to support and expand Greek life, it wouldn’t be.

Ms. Wiese is chief operating officer of FRMT Ltd., an insurer for fraternities. She was vice president of student affairs at Washington and Lee University, 2003-11.

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Journal Editorial Report: Students aren't the only ones fomenting university mobs. Image: Amy Katz/Zuma Press

17. Civilian casualties rise in Myanmar's civil war as resistance forces tighten noose around military

Dave Eubank is truly doing the Lord's work in Burma with the Free Burma Rangers.

Excerpts:

There is pressure on all fronts from powerful militias drawn from Myanmar's ethnic minority groups and newer resistance forces. Troops are retaliating with air, naval and artillery strikes on hospitals and other facilities where the opposition could be sheltered or aided.

"When the mass of people rise up against them, I think it terrifies them," said Dave Eubank, a former US Special Forces soldier who founded the Free Burma Rangers, a humanitarian aid organization that has provided assistance to both combatants and civilians in Myanmar since the 1990s.

"They know that hospitals, churches, schools and monasteries are important places for human care, and gathering, and symbols - and they hammer them," said Eubank. "That's new."

Military forces now control less than half the country, but are holding on tenaciously to much of central Myanmar including the capital, Naypyidaw - recently targeted by drone attacks - and largest city, Yangon, and is far better armed than the resistance forces, with support from Russia and China.

Civilian casualties rise in Myanmar's civil war as resistance forces tighten noose around military - Times of India

timesofindia.indiatimes.com

Civilian casualties rise in Myanmar's civil war as resistance forces tighten noose around military

World

| AP | May 9, 2024, 14:20 IST

BANGKOK : Six months into an offensive against Myanmar 's military government, opposition forces have made massive gains, but civilian casualties are rising sharply as regime troops increasingly turn toward scorched-earth tactics in the Southeast Asian country's bitter civil war.

There is pressure on all fronts from powerful militias drawn from Myanmar's ethnic minority groups and newer resistance forces. Troops are retaliating with air, naval and artillery strikes on hospitals and other facilities where the opposition could be sheltered or aided.

"When the mass of people rise up against them, I think it terrifies them," said Dave Eubank, a former US Special Forces soldier who founded the Free Burma Rangers, a humanitarian aid organization that has provided assistance to both combatants and civilians in Myanmar since the 1990s.

"They know that hospitals, churches, schools and monasteries are important places for human care, and gathering, and symbols - and they hammer them," said Eubank. "That's new."

Military forces now control less than half the country, but are holding on tenaciously to much of central Myanmar including the capital, Naypyidaw - recently targeted by drone attacks - and largest city, Yangon, and is far better armed than the resistance forces, with support from Russia and China.

"People have been saying that the regime was on the brink of collapse since two weeks after the coup," in February 2021, said Morgan Michaels, an analyst with the International Institute of Strategic Studies who runs its Myanmar Conflict Map project.

"On the other hand, obviously the regime is weaker than it's ever been.... so there's no doubt that it's in serious, serious trouble," he said.

Thet Swe, a spokesman for the military government, denied that troops were targeting buildings and areas where civilians were sheltering, blaming their destruction instead on the opposition forces, without citing evidence.

"The military never harmed hospitals, churches and civilians in our country," he told The Associated Press in an email. "They did not use that strategy and are fighting the rebels only for the sovereignty of our country."

As the fighting has moved into more populated areas, about 1 million people have been forced to flee their homes since the start of the offensive in October, contributing to the more than 3 million internally displaced people in the country of some 56 million, according to the UN's humanitarian aid agency.

With the collapse of its health care system and food supplies dwindling, 18.6 million people are in need, up 1 million from a year ago, including 6 million children, the agency said.

HOW IT BEGAN Opposition in Myanmar, also known as Burma, had been growing since the army seized power from the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in February 2021, but it gained new momentum in October when major militias known collectively as the Three Brotherhood Alliance launched a joint offensive.

Together, the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army - among the most powerful militias formed by Myanmar's ethnic minorities - made quick advances.

As they captured huge swaths of territory largely in the north and northeast, including economically important border crossings with China and several major military bases, other ethnic armed groups sensed momentum and joined the fighting.

At the same time, People's Defense Forces - armed resistance groups that support the shadow National Unity Government, which views itself as Myanmar's legitimate administration - have been increasing in number and launching their own attacks, often supported and trained by the ethnic armed militias.

Both sides claim they have inflicted heavy tolls. And the military government under Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing has acknowledged it is under pressure, recently reintroducing conscription to increase its ranks.

That has pushed some young people into the resistance. Many more have fled to rural areas or neighboring countries to avoid fighting.

With the violence across its border, China helped broker a cease-fire in Myanmar's north in January with the Three Brotherhood Alliance. But the alliance's Arakan Army continues to fight in its home Rakhine state in the west and has made significant gains, while PDFs and other ethnic armed groups continue their own attacks elsewhere.

THE LATEST FIGHTING The fiercest fighting in recent weeks has been in the southeast, where the main ethnic Karen fighting force, the Karen National Liberation Army, claimed in early April to have seized all the military bases in Myawaddy, the main town on the border with Thailand in Kayin state, also known as Karen state.

One army battalion clung to a position beside one of Myawaddy's two bridges, assisted by the Border Guard Force, a rival Karen group that had been in charge of border area security for years, conducting lucrative business by providing protection to area casino resorts with links to organized crime.

The force, which declared itself neutral in January, now controls the town with military government administrators still in place, highlighting how some militia groups still prioritize their own interests.

"This is not a black and white situation. This is not the regime reconquering and reconsolidating control," Michaels said of the fighting in the area. "This is the regime hanging on, keeping a foothold by the razor's edge."

Meanwhile, the military has pushed KNLA and People's Defense Forces out of Kawkareik, a strategically important town along the road that connects Myawaddy with the rest of the country.

Thousands of civilians have fled Myawaddy and Kawkareik. But many civilians haven't managed to escape.

At least 1,015 civilian deaths have been documented from Nov 1 through May 1, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, a watchdog group that tracks political arrests, attacks and casualties. It says 4,962 civilians have been killed overall since the military took power three years ago.

The watchdog blamed the deaths on the military's increasing use of scorched-earth tactics and fighting moving into more populated areas.

"The military has increasingly lost areas of control in recent months, which has only increased their use of this strategy, responding with airstrikes, shelling and so on in civilian areas," the AAPP said in an email.

The group added that the number of civilian deaths in the recent months of fighting is likely double what it reported, if not more, but that it can't document the numbers due to the intensification of the conflict.

Kyaw Zaw, a spokesperson for the shadow National Unity Government, said the military had destroyed 343 hospitals and clinics since it took power, and that those attacks had accelerated in the last two months, though he didn't have specific details.

Eubank, with the Free Burma Rangers, said he and his teams operating near the front lines have witnessed the military, known as the Tatmadaw, fighting with a " speed and force and a viciousness that we've never seen."

But in fighting a common enemy, the resistance is showing growing unity, he said.

"The Burma army is still stronger than any of these resistance groups, and if they want to bring a division or two to bear, they will win the battle, but they're not stronger than everybody else together," he said.

WHAT COMES NEXT Whether that unity will continue if the regime falls, and if the disparate resistance forces can agree on a common path ahead for Myanmar, is an open question, Michaels said.

"On one hand, Myanmar is not Syria - there is common cause in fighting the regime," Michaels said. "But at the same time, as the regime has receded from some areas, there are at least indicators of potential future conflicts between groups."

He noted an incident in northern Shan state last month in which troops from two members of the Three Brotherhood Alliance - the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army - traded fire over a territorial dispute. One person was injured.

The groups quickly agreed to stand down, but the incident illustrates that territorial tension is real, Michaels said.

An opposition politician still inside the country, speaking on condition of anonymity for his own safety, said Myanmar's people have a common desire for peace and stability, but the various factions still pursue their own interests.

"It is hard to predict what is ahead, and they still don't have a single political direction or goal. I think there is quite a problem in this situation," he said.

"Myanmar is now at a crossroads."

end of article

timesofindia.indiatimes.com

18. Does America Have the Means to Fight Again?

I guess we need to find a new American Way of War if we can no longer out produce and "out-logistics" our enemies.

China adopted unrestricted Warfare specifically for the American Way of War. This is from AI (perplexity) explaining Unrestricted Warfare. What will be the new American Way of War?

From AI on Unrestricted Warfare:

"If one party is at war with another, and the other party does not realize it is at war, the party who knows it is at war almost always has the advantage."1

This quote suggests that unrestricted warfare can involve deception, where one side wages undeclared "war" against an unaware opponent.

"Its primary concern is how a nation such as China can defeat a technologically superior opponent (such as the United States) through a variety of means."2

This summarizes the core idea of unrestricted warfare - using diverse methods beyond conventional military force to defeat a more advanced adversary.

Does America Have the Means to Fight Again?

The production surge that let America lead the Allies to victory in World War II couldn’t be repeated today.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-defense-industrial-production-base-5080d255?mod=latest_headlines

May 10, 2024 4:59 pm ET

Launch of a Liberty cargo ship at the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation shipyard, 1942. PHOTO: GETTY IMAGES

Mark Helprin’s many concerns about American strategy and will to face its enemies are all valid (“Are Americans Ready for War?” Weekend Interview by Barton Swaim, May 4). Even he, however, doesn’t in this interview face up to a fundamental threat to America’s military power.

Heavy industry in the U.S. has hollowed out in the past 30 to 35 years. Shipyards, steel mills, aluminum smelters, foundries and forges, hobbled with high labor costs and byzantine regulations, withered in the face of Far Eastern rivals. Not only China, but South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Taiwan have replaced the U.S. as leader in heavy hardware. The strategic implications are profound.

The production surge that let America lead the Allies to victory in World War II couldn’t be repeated today, since there is no surge capacity in our key industries. To cite one example, the Kaiser miracle, in which 2,700 Liberty ships were built in four years, would be impossible today. No shipyards. Not enough steel. China could do it, though.

The U.S. struggles at present to produce a monthly total of 40,000 artillery shells of 155mm NATO caliber. There are plans to increase that production rate to 100,000 a month by year’s end. Russia, by contrast, is reportedly on track to produce three million artillery shells a year.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, there has been wishful thinking in U.S. policy circles that there would never again be a need for an economy running at full throttle to support a total war. Let us pray this isn’t an existential misjudgment.

Soft, squishy service economies, such as the U.S. has become, face grave dangers when the barbarians begin to hammer at the gates.

Dale R. McIntyre

Bartlesville, Okla.

The essence of Mr. Helprin’s message is that today’s political culture doesn’t prepare us for a confrontation with the enemy—a very distressing diagnosis, indeed. Military tacticians tell us that battles are won by generals, but wars are won by soldiers. For us to prevent the predicted defeat our soldiers will face, they’ll need to comprehend what Nietzsche referred to as the “why” of combat. Once that is understood, the “how” of winning will follow.

Ivan Berkowitz

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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