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Quotes of the Day:
"Most people are not seeking truth – they are searching for comfort in illusions."
– Friedrich Nietzsche
“The reason facts don’t change most people’s opinions is because most people don’t use facts to form their opinions. They use their opinions to form their “facts.”
– Neil Strauss
“If knowledge can create problems, it is not through ignorance that we can solve them.”
– Isaac Asimov
1. Top US general in Korea talks maps, China, and getting Patriots back
2. A rising nuclear double-threat in East Asia: Insights from our Guardian Tiger I and II tabletop exercises
3. Presidential rivals sell economic policy visions around AI, deregulation, reshoring
4. Presidential candidates set to square off to woo voters in conservative strongholds
5. U.S.-China trade deal gives countries chance to seek deals without being singled out as choosing sides: expert
6. S. Korea, U.S. customs authorities hold high-level talks to boost cooperation
7. Strengthening Asia-Pacific Security: ASEAN, South Korea, And Japan’s Path To Collaboration
8. Lee Jun-seok: How a Harvard engineer became the king of Korea's young men
9. N. Korean security officials extort money from defectors' families
10. North Korea upgrades naval office to strategic combat agency
11. Behind the smiles: The hidden rules of meeting N. Korea's leader
12. The North Korean IT worker scheme infiltrated an American election campaign website
13. As rules relax, N. Koreans flock to Yalu River cruises near Chinese border
14. Presidential rivals offer conflicting visions for North Korea in policy pledges
15. State security agency drives North Korea's emerging vehicle rental business
16. When dictators go wild(life trafficking)
17. Lazarus Group’s Liquidation Spree Drops North Korea Below Bhutan in BTC Holdings
18. Australian warship sets sail to monitor North Korean sanctions evasion at sea
19. China spy ring pursued US-ROK secrets, including THAAD, nuclear plans
1. Top US general in Korea talks maps, China, and getting Patriots back
I wish journalists would ask questions about instability inside north Korea and our preparations to respond to that as well as other forms of conflict.. We are missing the forest for the trees in some ways.
Top US general in Korea talks maps, China, and getting Patriots back
Defense News · by Noah Robertson · May 13, 2025
Sitting at a desk in a remote Pentagon office, last Wednesday, Gen. Xavier Brunson has two maps displayed beside him.
One hung on the wall shows the entire world, displayed in a wide rectangle. Another, printed on a paper sheet in front of him, depicts Seoul and its distance from other nearby capitals: Tokyo, Taipei, Manila and Beijing, among others. Rather than showing the usual north-to-south view of Asia, from where Brunson sits this one depicts what the region would look like if peering out from China’s eastern coast.
Brunson has been sharing this second map in his many meetings in Washington, while arguing for the value of his command — overseeing the 28,500 U.S. troops in Korea. Seoul has one of Asia’s strongest militaries and sits inside the vital “first island chain” of countries that arc off China’s coast like a parenthesis.
“It begins with looking from an enemy’s perspective and then seeing where you are and how you might array your capabilities,” Brunson said.
But South Korea also has one of the world’s most alarming neighbors. In the last year, North Korea has traded troops and ammunition in exchange for Russian technology — on missiles, satellites, submarines, drones and most alarmingly a rogue nuclear program. Last year, North Korea conducted 47 ballistic missile tests, a number Brunson now expects to go down with Russia’s aid.
All this makes Brunson’s job — or jobs — harder. Alongside U.S. forces on the peninsula, he would also lead South Korean troops in the case of a war, an arrangement known as Combined Forces Command, or CFC. He also helms United Nations Command, the group of 18 countries that have helped keep the peace on the Korean Peninsula since 1950.
Brunson sat down with Defense News on May 7 to discuss the 75th anniversary of UN Command, the future of U.S. forces in Korea and the assumptions he’s trying to upend with the help of his maps.
This interview has been edited for brevity.
North Korea has changed its policies — more emphasis on sovereignty, a new view of the southern border. How does UN Command need to change as well?
The North Koreans have changed fundamentally. The associations amongst the adversaries — those authoritarian colluders, if you will — in China and Russia and the [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea], those relationships have changed and matured.
We have to do the same thing. What’s really in the offing is that year 76 forward is going to be different for UN Command. The mandate remains, but our composition, our posture even may change in the future. And we’ve got to be flexible enough to do that.
Do you expect big changes to posture or membership, potentially the addition of new member states?
I won’t mention these nations because those are bilateral things that are going on with the Republic of Korea, but there are nations that want to participate. We just recently got a New Zealand contingent that’s come to the peninsula. And if you talk about things that excite me, it’s when I talk to those ambassadors and they look at me and they say: ‘Hey, we’re working to get our soldiers here.’
I wanted to ask about one of the other hats that you wear, which is the CFC. Has the timeline for handing over operational control of South Korean forces moved up?
I’ve heard some mention of the urgency of that. My piece is to continue to talk to leadership about where we stand. We’re continually trying to assess where we are along the bilaterally agreed upon conditions-based [operational control] transfer.
If that decision is made, then my job is to now develop the strategy that lets us keep that policy moving forward. When leadership has made a decision, it’s my job to make it work.
To be clear, there’s no decision that has been made yet, though?
None that I know of.
There were a few Patriot air defense batteries that were brought away from the peninsula to help with the campaign in the Middle East. Now we’ve reached a ceasefire in Yemen, do you know when those are coming back?
No, I don’t know when exactly those capabilities are going to come back. But I do know that the [Indo-Pacific Command] commander has been able to ensure that we had other capabilities for an extended period of time within the Republic Korea. This is not the first time that capabilities have left the peninsula. In rough order, between 50 and 60 times, capabilities have gone to other places to support [military needs] around the globe.
My job is to ensure that we’re able to meet the strictures of the Mutual Defense Treaty. I can say unequivocally, we can do everything that we’re supposed to do. I just want the stuff back because those are my people.
The increasing adversary that people in this building are concerned about is China. How are you working with South Korea to reorient around that threat?
Nations are going to make decisions that align with their own interests — always.
There are economic relationships in the Indo-Pacific. There are security relationships in the Indo-Pacific. What I find is that our ability to see, sense, and understand in and around the peninsula is coming closer in alignment.
For example, in the West Sea right now, there are structures being erected by the Chinese. The Koreans see that. There are encroachments in and around the northern limit line by Chinese fishing vessels and Chinese naval vessels that cause concern to the Koreans.
They understand that those are threats that may have to be dealt with at some point in time.
South Korea has an election in June after the last president was impeached for declaring martial law. Regardless of who wins, do you think the recent work with Japan, South Korea will last?
I think it will survive because the threat will continue to metastasize. If there’s a thing that our adversaries have learned over time is the power of alliances, the power of proxies.
You can look in the Middle East and see a proxy fight that’s going on. You can look in our region now, and we’ve got North Korea sending troops and materiel to Russia to participate in the conflict, not their own. We see China is still a benefactor for North Korea.
The new leader in the Republic of Korea from 4 June forward has to take on the fact that his nation sits at the juncture of an alliance of sorts that he’s got to counter.
How many North Korean troops are now in Russia?
I think 10 to 12 [thousand] is where we throw our estimates at.
This alignment gives North Korea different options than they’ve had previously facing sanctions. How do you continue to counter that?
It’s capability on capability. What can our adversaries do? What do we need to be able to do?
That really leads me to a sort of integrated assurance. It’s using all the elements of power, of national power to assure our friends, partners and allies of our commitment to the alliance.
What we have that’s unique in South Korea is we have diplomacy, and we’ve got the military there, partnered for the past 70 years.
We have the means to continue to assure our ally that we are there. That also sounds the bell every day that we’re on the peninsula to Russia and China. We’re in the neighborhood.
About Noah Robertson
Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.
2. A rising nuclear double-threat in East Asia: Insights from our Guardian Tiger I and II tabletop exercises
Read the full report on line here: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-rising-nuclear-double-threat-in-east-asia-insights-from-our-guardian-tiger-i-and-ii-tabletop-exercises/
Download the full 24 page report in PDF at this link: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/A-rising-nuclear-double-threat-in-East-Asia-Insights-from-our-Guardian-Tiger-I-and-II-tabletop-exercises.pdf
Sobering summary below.
Report
May 12, 2025 • 8:00 am ET
A rising nuclear double-threat in East Asia: Insights from our Guardian Tiger I and II tabletop exercises
By Markus Garlauskas, Lauren D. Gilbert, and Kyoko Imai
DOWNLOAD PDF
Click on the banner above to explore the Tiger Project.
Guardian Tiger led me to realize that we need to rethink our operational and strategic Indo-Pacific posture. We have to be ready for a local fight to become a regional war with nuclear escalation and threats to the homeland. It’s scary, but we can’t assume it away. We could face China and North Korea simultaneously. Either of them could go nuclear before giving up.
—US government official, participant in the Guardian Tiger tabletop exercises, name withheld
A decade from now, the United States is very likely to face operational and strategic challenges in the Indo-Pacific even more complex and difficult than those it faces today. The nuclear capabilities of China and North Korea are growing rapidly, and the risk is increasing that a conflict with one would escalate horizontally to a regional conflict involving both.
By 2030, China will likely be a near peer to the United States in terms of strategic nuclear capabilities. Its amphibious, air, and strike capabilities could also dramatically improve its ability to project force to Taiwan and the surrounding region. China’s plans, intentions, and timeline for use of force against Taiwan remain topics of heated debate. However, in the next five to ten years, it is plausible that Beijing will consider conditions to be more favorable for a military resolution, even if it is not eager for a global war with the United States.
In this same period, North Korea is likely to field a wider range of more precise and effective nonnuclear escalatory options, as well as a robust, mobile, tactical nuclear-missile force—backed by a far more credible capability to retaliate against the region and the continental United States with thermonuclear weapons. These capabilities will provide Pyongyang with its own reasons to consider escalating its use of force against South Korea, though its aims will likely be far more limited than Beijing’s aims for Taiwan.
By 2030, it is unlikely that Beijing and Pyongyang will have developed enough trust to enable them to coordinate a campaign of aggression to achieve their goals. However, their individual interests and their common animosity toward the United States and its allies will give each of these potential US adversaries strong incentives to escalate—opportunistically or reactively—in the event the other initiates a conflict. In 2030, each of these potential adversaries will also have much stronger incentives and capabilities to threaten or conduct a limited nuclear attack in the event that either adversary initiates such a conflict.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un shakes hands with China’s President Xi Jinping during Xi’s visit to Pyongyang, North Korea, in this undated photo released on June 21, 2019, by North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). Source: KCNA via REUTERS.
Meanwhile, two key US allies in the Indo-Pacific—South Korea and Japan—are investing to develop far more powerful militaries by 2030. These allies’ military capabilities, as well as their diplomatic, informational, and economic influence, could help counter and deter growing threats. However, these allies will also have greater motivation and capability to act unilaterally if their own interests are threatened.
Considering these trends, US military and government leaders will face some tough challenges in the Indo-Pacific a decade from now. With these in mind, the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI)—with the support of the Strategic Trends Research Initiative of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)—launched the Guardian Tiger tabletop exercise series to help prepare mid-level US government and military leaders for future key roles in addressing such threats. These initial Guardian Tiger exercises were also intended to develop analytic insights and actionable recommendations to help the United States start preparing for limited nuclear attacks by an adversary—work that is continuing today. This report summarizes and analyzes the first two Guardian Tiger exercises.
Key findings
- If the United States is engaged in conflict with either China or North Korea, it might not be able to deter the other adversary from escalating that conflict or initiating a separate one. As a conflict with an initial adversary escalates, it may become necessary—and even strategically or operationally advantageous—to accept the risk of such simultaneous conflicts against multiple adversaries rather than remain hamstrung by the costs.
- What it takes to prevent North Korea from escalating a conflict will differ significantly from what is required to prevent China from doing so. Credible threats of vertical escalation from Pyongyang, particularly threats of nuclear strikes, are likely to come early and often. Meanwhile, China has many strong incentives and non-nuclear options to escalate horizontally—across domains and geography, including in space, in the cyber domain, and against the US homeland—to disrupt Washington’s will and ability to support Taiwan. Each adversary’s distinct escalation pattern will require a tailored set of capabilities and approaches to anticipate, deter, and counter it.
- War in the Indo-Pacific may start over one flashpoint, but it will quickly become about much more. A war beginning over Taiwan is likely to become about far more than the status of Taiwan itself, including China’s overall regional and global position post-war, as well as the US homeland’s safety. Meanwhile, an escalating South Korea-US conflict with North Korea will likely become about the future of the global nuclear order, the credibility of US extended deterrence, and the potential unification of the long-divided Korean peninsula—not just about restoring the armistice.
- The United States should prepare for the possibility of a limited nuclear attack—with responses beyond just the threat of complete annihilation. The political and military choices necessary to better prepare for a limited nuclear strike, and to operate effectively in the aftermath, are hard. The tendency to avoid these hard choices may mean that the United States is left with no good conventional options if threats of disproportionate punishment fail to deter a limited nuclear attack. Meanwhile, US low-yield nuclear response capabilities are limited, potentially leaving only ineffective or excessive nuclear options in some circumstances.
- Effective deterrence of war and of escalation during war in the Indo-Pacific will require the United States to simultaneously coordinate laterally and at multiple echelons, including prior to the outbreak of conflict. This would involve establishing stronger combined (multinational), joint (cross-military service), and interagency command and control, coordination, informational shaping, and planning mechanisms between the United States and its allies across multiple military commands and government agencies, in advance of a crisis.
Methodology
Each of the first two Guardian Tiger tabletop exercises presented participants with a distinct scenario set in the year 2030, featuring conditions likely to lead to simultaneous confrontations involving the Korean peninsula and the risk of limited nuclear use.
The scenario for the first exercise, Guardian Tiger I, was premised on North Korea initiating a limited conflict that escalated to chemical weapons use and included potential drivers for China’s involvement. The scenario for the second exercise, Guardian Tiger II, was based on a conflict initiated by Chinese aggression against Taiwan, with the potential for that conflict to spill over into Korea through several potential pathways.
Although not truly “free play” with unlimited scope for changes, the exercises were designed to allow for a considerable degree of latitude for participants—within the bounds of plausibility and some general guidance from facilitators playing the roles of national leaders. The North Korea cells during each exercise, in particular, chose actions that had not been anticipated during the design phase. This required the facilitation team to adjust the pathways for the development of the scenarios for the exercise.
The more than sixty participants included US government officials, military officers, and leading nongovernment experts. Participants were organized into a US (blue) team and a control team. The blue team consisted of three cells of up to a dozen members each, representing different echelons: a national interagency cell (approximating National Security Council mechanisms), a national defense and military cell (addressing considerations for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the joint staff, and relevant joint combatant commands), and a cell representing the US military based in the Korean theater. The control team included the exercise project staff, as well as smaller cells that simulated North Korean and Chinese senior leadership and represented allies that varied in each of the two scenarios.
3. Presidential rivals sell economic policy visions around AI, deregulation, reshoring
And they are off....
Domestic/economic issues dominate. No significant mention of national security and foreign policy (yet).
Presidential rivals sell economic policy visions around AI, deregulation, reshoring | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · May 13, 2025
By Chang Dong-woo
SEOUL, May 13 (Yonhap) -- Promising to transform South Korea into a top artificial intelligence (AI) superpower, abolish regulatory hurdles and lure back overseas factories, key presidential hopefuls have made ambitious economic pledges the centerpiece of their campaigns, with the official election period having kicked off this week.
The two leading contenders, Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party (DP) and Kim Moon-soo of the People Power Party (PPP), alongside Lee Jun-seok of the minor New Reform Party (NRP), have unveiled their top 10 campaign pledges, all with a heavy focus on rebooting the sluggish economy.
In a policy overlap, both Lee and Kim vowed to help turn South Korea into one of the world's top three AI powers, with Lee promising to promote private investment of 100 trillion won (US$70.4 billion) and Kim pledging to create a joint public-private AI fund in the same amount.
This composite photo shows Lee Jae-myung (L), presidential candidate of the Democratic Party; People Power Party presidential candidate Kim Moon-soo (C); and Lee Jun-seok, presidential candidate of the minor New Reform Party. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
Lee says he will, if elected, work to significantly expand AI-related government budgets and secure more than 50,000 high-performance graphics processing units (GPUs), positioning the sector as a key engine to drive the country's economic recovery.
Kim promises to nurture up to 200,000 AI talents and expand enrollment in AI graduate schools and software-focused universities.
Outside of AI, Lee unveiled plans to cultivate defense industries as a national flagship sector, including the creation of a control tower for defense exports, expanded investment in defense-related AI and new tax incentives for defense export companies.
Lee is also betting on soft power and bold fiscal stimulus to drive the economic recovery. He has pledged sweeping state support for K-content industries and domestic over-the-top (OTT) platforms, setting a target of 50 trillion won in annual cultural exports.
Lee Jae-myung (C), the presidential candidate of the liberal Democratic Party, raises his hands during a ceremony to launch the party's central campaign committee in Seoul on May 12, 2025, as the 22-day official campaign period for the June 3 presidential election begins with seven hopefuls vying for the top elected office. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
Kim promises to overhaul corporate regulations and taxes that hinder private investment, and vows efforts to legislate a basic act on economic innovation to eliminate red tape in emerging industries and technologies.
The former labor minister also promises to lower corporate and inheritance tax rates while reforming the country's rigid 52-hour workweek system by introducing greater flexibility based on labor-management agreements.
The NRP's Lee Jun-seok is also betting on corporate regulatory reform, pledging to help companies deal with less regulation.
He has also promised to spearhead an initiative to bring back South Korean manufacturers that have moved their production overseas, promising incentives and support to revive domestic industrial regions.
In addition, Lee proposed introducing a special pension system for outstanding researchers and engineers as part of his science and technology talent strategy.
People Power Party presidential candidate Kim Moon-soo (C) visits a wholesale agricultural market in southern Seoul on May 12, 2025, as his first official campaign stop. (Yonhap)
He says he will offer diplomatic-level fast-track immigration clearance privileges at airports and ports to such top-tier talent in science, aiming to enhance their status and attract global talent to South Korea.
Recent economic data underscores economic challenges for the next president.
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), South Korea's potential gross domestic product (GDP) growth is projected to fall to 1.98 percent in 2026 from 2.02 percent this year.
The country's five major business lobbies, including the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) and the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), recently released an unprecedented 269-page joint policy recommendation for the incoming government.
In it, they warned that South Korea's economy is losing vitality amid entrenched low growth, aging demographics and global trade protectionism.
"Given the current decline in our economy's growth momentum, it is necessary to boldly explore and attempt new growth strategies that have not been tried before," a KCCI official said.
New Reform Party presidential candidate Lee Jun-seok dines with university students at a student cafeteria at Yonsei University in Seoul as part of a campaign event on May 12, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
odissy@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · May 13, 2025
4. Presidential candidates set to square off to woo voters in conservative strongholds
Lee Jae Myung just needs to split the conservative vote.
Presidential candidates set to square off to woo voters in conservative strongholds | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · May 13, 2025
By Yi Wonju
SEOUL, May 13 (Yonhap) -- Three presidential candidates were set to begin their second day of official campaigns Tuesday in the conservative strongholds in the nation's southeastern region, with the election just 21 days away.
The June 3 presidential election, triggered by the impeachment of former President Yoon Suk Yeol over his failed martial law bid in December, is seen as a three-way race among Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party (DP), Kim Moon-soo of the People Power Party (PPP) and Lee Jun-seok of the minor New Reform Party.
In various opinion polls, Lee of the DP is the front-runner with some 50 percent support.
Lee of the DP will seek to win the support of centrist voters as he plans to visit the cities of Gumi and Pohang in North Gyeongsang Province, as well as the southeastern cities of Daegu and Busan.
The trip to the traditionally challenging Yeongnam region in the country's southeast just three days after visiting the area is widely seen as an appeal to both regional and centrist voters.
Kim of the PPP is expected to seek conservative support as he plans to visit Daegu, Ulsan and Busan.
Starting off his campaign stop by paying tribute at the National Sinam Memorial Park in Daegu, Kim will hold a ceremony to launch the party's regional campaign committee at the PPP's office in Daegu before heading to Ulsan to visit local outlets and traditional markets.
He will then visit the Busan International Finance Center and later attend an event by the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions at the PPP's Busan office. His campaign will conclude with a visit to Jagalchi Market in Busan.
Kim's move is seen as an effort to solidify conservative support in the Yeongnam region while highlighting his focus on boosting the local economy, which is his primary campaign pledge.
Meanwhile, Lee Jun-seok of the New Reform Party will start the day with a campaign rally in the streets of Daegu before having a meal with students at a cafeteria at Kyungpook National University.
He will then hold a policy meeting on health care at the Daegu Medical Association Hall and meet with merchants at Chilseong Market.
This combined photo taken May 12, 2025, shows the presidential candidates of South Korea's major political parties -- (from L to R) Lee Jae-myung of the liberal Democratic Party, Kim Moon-soo of the conservative People Power Party and Lee Jun-seok of the minor conservative New Reform Party -- making stump speeches in Hwaseong, south of Seoul; the southeastern city of Daegu; and Seoul, respectively. The 22-day official campaign period for the June 3 presidential election kicked off the same day. (Yonhap)
julesyi@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · May 13, 2025
5. U.S.-China trade deal gives countries chance to seek deals without being singled out as choosing sides: expert
A view from Korea.
(LEAD) U.S.-China trade deal gives countries chance to seek deals without being singled out as choosing sides: expert | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 13, 2025
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout)
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, May 12 (Yonhap) -- A trade deal between the United States and China gives other countries a chance to negotiate their own deals without being singled out as taking sides between the two superpowers, an expert said Monday, as South Korea and other countries are trying to reach agreements with Washington.
Following high-stakes negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland, Washington and Beijing announced the deal to temporarily reduce tariffs for 90 days. Under it, U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods will be lowered to 30 percent from the current 145 percent, starting Wednesday, while Chinese tariffs on U.S. exports will be cut to 10 percent from 125 percent.
When the changes come into effect, the two countries agreed to establish a mechanism to continue discussions on trade and other economic issues, where Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and He Lifeng, vice premier of the State Council of China, will represent each side, according to the White House.
The deal was keenly watched by South Korea and other countries that have been in talks with the U.S. in the hopes of avoiding or minimizing the impact of new "reciprocal" and sectoral tariffs rolled out by U.S. President Donald Trump's administration.
"It is too early to tell how negotiations on a broad range of issues will evolve over the next 90 days, but a process to address mutual concerns is an excellent first step," Rorry Daniels, managing director of the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) and senior fellow at the Center for China Analysis, said in her commentary.
"This also gives the rest of the world an opportunity to negotiate their own deals with the U.S. without being singled out as choosing sides between Washington and Beijing."
U.S. President Donald Trump takes questions during a press conference at the White House in Washington on May 12, 2025 in this photo released by EPA. (Yonhap)
The two superpowers' prohibitively high tariffs on each other have halted much of their trade, spawning concerns that countries, which seek to strike deals with the U.S. for sustained trade and economic cooperation, could run the risk of being seen as skewed toward America in the midst of an intensifying great-power rivalry.
But their deal helped eased the trade war and raised hope for more cooperation between Washington and Beijing at a time when concerns have grown that an escalation of the tariff war would lead to higher prices and slower economic growth.
While cautious optimism for talks between the U.S. and China has emerged, Daniels said that the "strategic mistrust" that underpins the Sino-U.S. relationship will influence how much concrete progress can be made in the 90-day window and beyond.
"The Trump approach is to seek big, breakthrough deals that come with major commitments and changes, but at this point in the relationship, an incremental and trust-building approach would be more stabilizing in the long term," she said.
Wendy Cutler, vice president of the ASPI, said that third countries, particularly Asian economies, will welcome the de-escalation between Washington and Beijing.
"However, they remain concerned about competing pressures from the U.S. and China," she said.
She cast the short-term trade deal as "better than expected."
"Both sides agreed to lower their high tariff rates by 115 percent, and importantly Beijing also agreed to unwind the non-tariff measures it had applied against the U.S.," she said.
"Furthermore, both sides have established a consultation mechanism, which could serve as an important channel of communication. That said, the U.S. will need to ensure that Beijing does not use this venue as a delaying mechanism," she added.
Cutler also pointed out that the three-month period is an "extremely short" amount of time to address the range of contentious trade matters between the U.S. and China, including excess manufacturing capacity, subsidization of Chinese firms, and transshipment efforts by Chinese companies.
"Similar negotiations typically take well over one year," she said. "The talks also come at a time when U.S. negotiators are already spread thin, negotiating with multiple other countries interested in forging deals with Washington to avoid the reciprocal tariffs assigned to them."
South Korea and the U.S. have been conducting trade consultations with a focus on tariff- and non-tariff measures; economic security; investment cooperation; and currency policy.
Seoul has stressed the need to conduct trade talks with the U.S. "without haste" in consideration of ongoing domestic situations, namely the June 3 presidential election as it seeks a "July package" deal over tariffs and economic and industrial cooperation before July 8 when Trump's 90-day pause on reciprocal tariffs ends.
Washington has been seen as striving to reach a deal in a more swift manner as it has a long list of countries for trade negotiations.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 13, 2025
6. S. Korea, U.S. customs authorities hold high-level talks to boost cooperation
S. Korea, U.S. customs authorities hold high-level talks to boost cooperation | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · May 13, 2025
By Kim Han-joo
SEOUL, May 13 (Yonhap) -- The Korea Customs Service (KCS) said Tuesday it held high-level talks with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) last week to enhance bilateral cooperation between the countries' customs authorities.
The meeting took place in Washington, D.C., on Friday (local time) between Park Hun of the KCS, and Ha Sung-h of the CBP and other officials, the KCS said in a press release.
The talks were arranged in response to the South Korean government's efforts to address challenges posed by the U.S. tariff policies introduced under President Donald Trump's administration.
During the meeting, the two sides shared their perspectives on key issues of mutual concern and explored ways to strengthen reciprocal customs cooperation.
The KCS also relayed concerns and suggestions collected from South Korean businesses operating in the United States, particularly regarding customs clearance difficulties.
The KCS said it will continue to bolster cooperation with U.S. customs authorities to help create a more favorable trading environment for domestic firms doing business overseas.
This photo, provided by the Korea Customs Service (KCS) on May 13, 2025, shows a meeting with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in Washington, D.C., on May 9, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
khj@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · May 13, 2025
7. Strengthening Asia-Pacific Security: ASEAN, South Korea, And Japan’s Path To Collaboration
We need a new security architecture in Asia.
Excerpts:
Addressing these challenges requires a multi-layered approach that reinforces ASEAN centrality and fosters deeper trilateral cooperation. Trust can be enhanced by establishing a permanent ASEAN–Korea–Japan secretariat tasked with coordinating strategic responses and dialogue during crises, extending beyond existing annual forums. Cooperation in functional domains, such as public health, can build confidence and interoperability through joint pandemic preparedness exercises. Historical reconciliation should be pursued through sustained cultural diplomacy and educational exchanges, including joint history curricula and youth programs that engage civil society.
Revitalizing ASEAN-led mechanisms, particularly the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, through streamlined decision-making and integrated defense and cyber planning, will accelerate collective action. The expanding digital economy partnership, which includes initiatives in 5G standardization and e-payment platforms, can promote inclusive growth and eliminate technological barriers throughout the region. Additionally, transparent planning—encompassing defense strategies and agreed-upon annual budget guidelines—can help mitigate arms race dynamics and create a more stable security environment, fostering lasting peace. Furthermore, multilateral development banks and regional infrastructure funds can enhance resource mobilization and improve resilience against external shocks.
Ultimately, collaboration provides a blueprint for balancing prosperity and power while addressing twenty-first-century security challenges. A trust-based strategic framework promises to secure regional peace and contribute to a more resilient and equitable global order.
Strengthening Asia-Pacific Security: ASEAN, South Korea, And Japan’s Path To Collaboration – OpEd
eurasiareview.com · by Simon Hutagalung · May 12, 2025
In an era marked by increasing power dynamics and fierce competition, the Asia-Pacific region has become a crucial arena for shaping security and prosperity in the twenty-first century.
ASEAN’s steadfast commitment to regional stability, highlighted by its central role in diplomatic efforts, combined with South Korea’s evolving stance and Japan’s strong economic and strategic capabilities, creates a unique opportunity to develop a collaborative security framework grounded in multilateralism and shared norms. The collaboration between ASEAN, South Korea, and Japan is essential for enhancing regional resilience and promoting a rules-based international order. However, ongoing tensions, historical strategic competition, and non-traditional threats present significant challenges that must be tackled through innovative diplomacy and the building of strategic trust. This analysis will evaluate policies and their implications for sustainable regional security.
Over the past decade, ASEAN has experienced consistent economic growth, averaging a 4.1 percent expansion in 2023, despite global challenges. During this period, its digital economy nearly doubled in value between 2020 and 2024. Additionally, two-way trade and investment have strengthened under frameworks such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
Meanwhile, the economies of South Korea and Japan remain closely linked, with ASEAN’s two-way trade reaching USD 241.1 billion with Japan and USD 196.6 billion with South Korea. This is complemented by foreign direct investment flows in 2023, amounting to USD 14.5 billion from Japan and USD 109 billion from South Korea. These figures underscore the economic importance of these stakeholders’ share in preserving and stabilizing open markets. The increasing strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China, along with the militarization of maritime domains, has created new uncertainty in regional security for ASEAN. This situation is forcing states to balance their relationships with major powers while striving to maintain neutrality.
Despite these pressures, shared interests foster strong incentives for collaboration. The foundational concept of a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality has long emphasized conflict avoidance and multilateral dispute resolution. South Korea’s “Global Pivotal State” strategy and Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision both support a rules-based system that aligns with ASEAN’s objectives. In practice, economic synergies are evident in foreign direct investment, with Japan contributing USD 14 billion and South Korea USD 10.9 billion to ASEAN in 2023. Additionally, ASEAN-Japan cooperation has led to significant gains in services trade, which surged by 16 percent to reach USD 933.6 billion in 2022, returning to pre-pandemic levels. Longstanding cultural and educational exchanges have revitalized the societal foundation for deeper mutual trust and understanding. Efforts in maritime security cooperation involve patrols, joint information sharing, and fostering familiarity and confidence among participating navies.
Despite these achievements, the path to sustained collaboration faces significant challenges. Historical grievances between Japan and South Korea, unresolved wartime issues, and territorial disputes continue to erode mutual trust at both governmental and societal levels. Meanwhile, ASEAN’s principle of non-interference limits its capacity to address intra-regional security flashpoints, such as the South China Sea disputes, which arise when member states align with external powers. Geopolitically, the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry has created strategic ambiguity for ASEAN as its member states navigate the security guarantees offered by the United States alongside the economic incentives from China.
Furthermore, defense spending by Japan and South Korea has surged in recent years; Japan’s FY2025 defense budget reached a record 8.7 trillion yen (approximately USD 55 billion), while South Korea proposed a budget of 61.59 trillion won (around USD 46.3 billion) for 2025. These increasing defense expenditures are fueling perceptions of an arms race, complicating regional efforts, and contributing to militarization. Traditional non-threats such as pandemics, cyberattacks, and climate-induced disasters generate demand for cohesive responses. However, institutional fragmentation within ASEAN and East Asian forums often hampers rapid collective action. Building consensus across diverse political systems and strategic interests is a challenging and often painstaking process.
Addressing these challenges requires a multi-layered approach that reinforces ASEAN centrality and fosters deeper trilateral cooperation. Trust can be enhanced by establishing a permanent ASEAN–Korea–Japan secretariat tasked with coordinating strategic responses and dialogue during crises, extending beyond existing annual forums. Cooperation in functional domains, such as public health, can build confidence and interoperability through joint pandemic preparedness exercises. Historical reconciliation should be pursued through sustained cultural diplomacy and educational exchanges, including joint history curricula and youth programs that engage civil society.
Revitalizing ASEAN-led mechanisms, particularly the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, through streamlined decision-making and integrated defense and cyber planning, will accelerate collective action. The expanding digital economy partnership, which includes initiatives in 5G standardization and e-payment platforms, can promote inclusive growth and eliminate technological barriers throughout the region. Additionally, transparent planning—encompassing defense strategies and agreed-upon annual budget guidelines—can help mitigate arms race dynamics and create a more stable security environment, fostering lasting peace. Furthermore, multilateral development banks and regional infrastructure funds can enhance resource mobilization and improve resilience against external shocks.
Ultimately, collaboration provides a blueprint for balancing prosperity and power while addressing twenty-first-century security challenges. A trust-based strategic framework promises to secure regional peace and contribute to a more resilient and equitable global order.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.
References
- Lee, Shin-wha, and Jagannath P. Panda, eds. The United Nations, Indo-Pacific and Korean Peninsula: An Emerging Security Architecture. Routledge, 2023.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Diplomatic Bluebook 2023. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2023.
- Baru, Sanjaya, ed. The Importance of Shinzo Abe: India, Japan, and the Indo-Pacific. HarperCollins India, 2023.
eurasiareview.com · by Simon Hutagalung · May 12, 2025
8. Lee Jun-seok: How a Harvard engineer became the king of Korea's young men
Does youth have a chance?
Excerpts:
Lee barely meets the minimum required age to run for president, having turned 40 in late March, while many presidential hopefuls are in their 60s and 70s. He has called for Korea to “challenge itself with a spirit of the 40s,” citing former and late Presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung who were in their 40s when resisting Park Chung Hee's military leadership, and has branded himself a “successor” to the late Presidents Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, who refused to join coalition of three major parties in 1991.
But as the June 3 election approaches, Lee is streamlining his firebrand rhetoric away from the past and toward the future. Against veteran contenders from the nation's major conservative and liberal parties, will that strategy hold?
Monday
May 12, 2025
dictionary + A - A
Lee Jun-seok: How a Harvard engineer became the king of Korea's young men
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-05-12/national/politics/Lee-Junseok-How-a-Harvard-engineer-became-the-king-of-Koreas-young-men/2305082
Published: 12 May. 2025, 16:41
Updated: 12 May. 2025, 17:54
- LEE SOO-JUNG
- lee.soojung1@joongang.co.kr
Lee Jun-seok, presidential candidate from the Reform Party, outlines his campaign promises during a press conference at the National Assembly in western Seoul on May 12. [YONHAP]
Lee Jun-seok from the splinter conservative Reform Party on Monday promised to bring a new start to Korean politics as the youngest presidential candidate.
In a news conference at the National Assembly in western Seoul on Monday, Lee said the Reform Party is capable of “enabling Korean politics to have a fresh start and ending the corrupted [ …] bipartisan system in Korea.” Of the 300 parliamentary seats, the main conservative People Power Party (PPP) and the liberal Democratic Party (DP) controls 278. Lee's Reform Party holds three.
Related Article
Lee barely meets the minimum required age to run for president, having turned 40 in late March, while many presidential hopefuls are in their 60s and 70s. He has called for Korea to “challenge itself with a spirit of the 40s,” citing former and late Presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung who were in their 40s when resisting Park Chung Hee's military leadership, and has branded himself a “successor” to the late Presidents Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, who refused to join coalition of three major parties in 1991.
But as the June 3 election approaches, Lee is streamlining his firebrand rhetoric away from the past and toward the future. Against veteran contenders from the nation's major conservative and liberal parties, will that strategy hold?
Who is Lee Jun-seok?
Reform Party presidential candidate Lee Jun-seok, center, visits Yonsei University in western Seoul on May 12. His presidential campaign kicked off on the same day. [YONHAP]
Lee, former PPP leader, is the founder of the Reform Party, which has positioned itself as a centrist and moderate conservative party.
Lee graduated from Harvard University with bachelor's degrees in computer engineering and economics. He later ran a nonprofit educational organization for socially marginalized students.
At the age of 26, Lee entered politics as a member of the emergency steering council of the conservative Grand National Party, the predecessor of the modern PPP. Former President Park Geun-hye — interim chief of the party at the time — recruited him, leading to his nickname, “Park Geun-hye’s kid.”
Despite having Park's support, Lee did not stay loyal to her when she was ousted in March 2017 for corruption and abuse of power. At the 2021 PPP convention, during which he was elected as the party’s chief, Lee said Park’s impeachment was “appropriate.”
Lee helmed the PPP during the eighth local election in 2022, where the party won against the rival DP.
However, he faced a major setback after being accused of receiving sexual services as a bribe from a business owner in 2013 and attempting to tamper with the evidence. As the allegation surfaced, the PPP’s ethics committee suspended his party membership for six months in 2022.
His sharp criticism of former President Yoon Suk Yeol — calling Yoon a “wolf in sheep's clothing” — added a year to his suspension. Although the PPP lifted the suspension in November 2023, the party failed to fully embrace him, and he left it a month later.
Lee has made many brazen remarks targeting male voters in their 20s and 30s and become a figurehead for anti-feminism.
Last January, Lee founded the Reform Party and became its inaugural leader. In last year's April 10 general election, Lee was elected to represent Gyeonggi’s Hwaseong-B electoral district.
On Dec. 14 of last year, when the parliament impeached Yoon, Lee said he was taking “presidential candidacy seriously.” In March, he became the Reform Party's presidential candidate.
An alternative to the PPP and DP
Presidential campaign banners for Democratic Party's Lee Jae-myung and Reform Party's Lee Jun-seok hang in Gwanak District, southern Seoul, on May 12. [YONHAP]
Lee, whose presidential bid is his first, is determined to complete the race without compromising with major blocs. He called the prospect of merging his campaign with that of 73-year-old Kim Moon-soo, effectively dropping out of the race and diverting his campaign's resources to the PPP candidate, “impossible” during his speech at the National Assembly on Monday, appearing to criticize the party for electing Kim, who had defended Yoon's brief imposition of martial law.
“The calling of the times of this presidential election is that presidential power should be replaced, not an exchange of power between the two [major] parties,” Lee said.
Lee also criticized the DP for pressuring the judiciary and abusing immunity from arrest to safeguard their 61-year-old presidential candidate, Lee Jae-myung.
Lee Jae-myung was convicted of election law violation last November for making a false statement in 2021 he when emerged as a presidential candidate for 2022 election. He was acquitted on appeal on March 26, but the Supreme Court overturned that ruling on May 1, sending the case back to the lower court. The DP is now pressuring Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Jo Hee-de by summoning him to parliamentary questioning session on Wednesday.
Lee said “forces coercing the judiciary should be held accountable,” characterizing that opinion as a “public voice.”
Lee also outlined his presidential campaign promises during his speech on Monday.
He promised to reorganize governmental ministries and agencies to redirect authority from the executive branch and introduce prime ministers for security, strategy and social affairs.
Lee additionally vowed to bring overseas factories back to Korean soil in to revive domestic economies. He added that he would give municipal governments the autonomy to attract firms with corporate tax incentives.
While putting aside PPP's Kim, Lee Jun-seok said his competition against DP's Lee Jae-myung would be a race of “future versus past and new versus old.”
“The historic goal of this election,” Lee said, “is to hand over a baton for a new era, to a new party.”
BY LEE SOO-JUNG [lee.soojung1@joongang.co.kr]
9. N. Korean security officials extort money from defectors' families
N. Korean security officials extort money from defectors' families - Daily NK English
The intimidation has prompted families to surrender substantial sums, including one that handed over $1,970 last month
By Lee Chae Eun - May 13, 2025
dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Eun · May 13, 2025
FILE PHOTO: A sentry post on the Sino-North Korean border in Sakju County, North Pyongan Province. (Daily NK)
Security officials in North Korea’s northern border city of Hoeryong are pressuring families of defectors to confess receiving money from relatives abroad and surrender those funds.
Officers from the Ministry of State Security are threatening defectors’ families with relocation to remote mountain areas if they don’t cooperate, sources in North Hamgyong province told Daily NK recently.
“The security officials tell these families, ‘You can do as you please if you want to be on the deportation list,'” a source said. “Even being deported from a provincial area like Hoeryong means being sent to remote mountains where survival is difficult despite having money.”
The intimidation has led some families to surrender substantial sums. Last month, one family handed over 10,000 Chinese yuan (approximately $1,970) while another surrendered 6,000 yuan ($1,180).
The crackdown comes amid Kim Jong Un’s intensified efforts to seal the country from outside influences, especially along the Chinese border region. Authorities have deployed additional security personnel and surveillance technology to detect unauthorized communications and money transfers, which the regime views as threatening to its ideological control.
North Korean authorities have intensified surveillance of defectors’ families, classifying them as “dangerous elements” for maintaining contact with “traitors who betrayed the homeland.”
Some families have begun refusing money from brokers who arrive with funds, telling them to leave immediately. “They would rather go hungry than live under constant surveillance,” the source said.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Eun · May 13, 2025
10. North Korea upgrades naval office to strategic combat agency
Kim has probably figured out that you cannot win a war without a strong navy.
North Korea upgrades naval office to strategic combat agency - Daily NK English
With this reorganization, various new departments are being established within the agency, including an "operational route design department," a source told Daily NK
By Jeong Tae Joo - May 12, 2025
dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · May 12, 2025
On April 25, marking the 93rd anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army, the Rodong Sinmun newspaper highlighted the Korean People's Army, claiming that "Our military always stands at the forefront of the struggle for the people." The photo shows North Korean naval personnel marching. (Rodong Sinmun·News1)
North Korea has begun reorganizing its Naval Hydrographic Office into a combat-oriented strategic operations agency following orders from leader Kim Jong Un to strengthen naval power.
The North Korean Naval Hydrographic Office collects, analyzes and documents maritime environmental information necessary for naval operations, functioning similarly to South Korea’s Naval Information Unit.
A military source inside North Korea told Daily NK on May 12, “A ‘comprehensive reorganization plan for the Naval Command’s Hydrographic Office’ was issued on May 2 following a decision by the Korean People’s Army Party Committee to implement the supreme commander’s (Kim Jong Un’s) orders.”
According to the source, this reorganization is upgrading the Naval Hydrographic Office into a core strategic agency leading maritime operations. The office will support not only integrated naval operations between the East and West Sea fleets but also joint operations with the air force and strategic forces.
This measure is an effort to overcome the difficulties in integrated maritime operations between the East and West Sea fleets due to geographical constraints. The source explained that establishing integrated routes between these fleets, considering their geographical separation, is the core of this naval reorganization.
“Building integrated routes between the East and West Sea fleets doesn’t simply mean connecting sea areas, but designing integrated routes for joint operations with other military branches such as the air force and strategic forces,” the source said. “The Naval Hydrographic Office is being reorganized into a theater-integrated organization to enable joint strikes and multiple command systems in maritime combat.”
The Korean People’s Army Party Committee emphasized repeatedly while issuing this reorganization plan that the Naval Hydrographic Office should no longer be just a department that produces nautical charts but should play a leading role as a core strategic operations agency for naval forces.
The source said that with this reorganization, various new departments are being established within the Naval Hydrographic Office, including an “operational route design department” responsible for designing underwater routes specialized for nuclear-powered submarines, building deep-sea infiltration zones, and analyzing routes with cruisers and new destroyers in mind.
Personnel changes have also been taking place since May 7, with many staff previously responsible for creating nautical charts and conducting surveys being transferred or discharged. Regarding this, the source said, “Personnel familiar only with existing tasks have been unable to adapt to rapid changes, so many have received re-education orders or been removed from the Naval Hydrographic Office.”
The source added: “This reorganization is not simply changing departments and replacing personnel; it’s being called a major transformation. Within the navy, this reorganization is being received as tearing down an old house and building a new one, as the Naval Hydrographic Office transforms into a core strategic agency that plans integrated routes for where, how, and with which military branches to conduct joint operations in preparation for actual combat.”
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · May 12, 2025
11. Behind the smiles: The hidden rules of meeting N. Korea's leader
And Koreans in the north are probably among the best actors in the world.
Behind the smiles: The hidden rules of meeting N. Korea's leader - Daily NK English
The instructions were clear: no initiating hugs, no firm handshakes, speak only when spoken to, avoid spraying saliva, and don't startle Kim's daughter
By Jeong Seo-yeong - May 13, 2025
dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · May 12, 2025
The Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported on April 16 that "the inauguration ceremony for 10,000 housing units in the Hwasong district was grandly held the previous day (April 15)." Leader Kim Jong Un attended the ceremony with his daughter Ju-ae. /Photo: Rodong Sinmun, News1
Attendees at the April 15 opening ceremony for Pyongyang’s Hwasong housing development were later summoned by police to write self-criticism letters after violating strict protocols during interactions with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Daily NK has learned.
According to a Pyongyang source recently, participants in the event celebrating 10,000 new homes faced consequences for failing to follow precise instructions on how to behave in the supreme leader’s presence.
The source said security preparations began approximately 10 days before the ceremony when select homeowners were secretly chosen to meet Kim Jong Un. Security personnel in black suits conducted physical screenings at a local police station, and participants underwent days of intensive training on proper protocol.
The instructions for meeting the North Korean leader were extremely specific: never initiate hugs with Kim, avoid firm handshakes, speak only when spoken to (preferably minimally), never speak before Kim does, avoid spraying saliva while talking, and don’t startle Kim’s daughter.
Security officials emphasized these points repeatedly, forcing participants to practice extensively. Those who appeared excessively nervous were replaced after warnings that “no mercy would be shown” for inappropriate behavior.
Despite the thorough preparation, several participants (especially elderly people and women) broke protocol. Violations included “hugging the supreme leader too closely” or “speaking first.” Offenders were summoned by city police and each had to write self-criticism letters exceeding 20 pages before release.
“People who met the supreme leader felt diminished by the experience, anxious and disheartened trying to follow the security team’s strict instructions,” the source explained.
After the ceremony, participants who met Kim received special gift boxes containing food items and fabric (velvet for women, suit material for men). City police emphasized that all participants must maintain absolute secrecy regarding the event and required thumbprint signatures on confidentiality agreements.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · May 12, 2025
12. The North Korean IT worker scheme infiltrated an American election campaign website
If they are trying to inflate the US election system they must surely be trying to infiltrate the South Korean election system. The question is, what have we missed?
The North Korean IT worker scheme infiltrated an American election campaign website
BYAmanda Gerut
May 12, 2025 at 7:00 AM EDT
https://fortune.com/2025/05/12/north-korean-it-worker-scheme-infiltrated-american-election-campaign-website/?acb313
Kim Jong Un, North Korea's leader, reacts while watching an honor guard before his departure to North Korea at the railway station in Vladivostok, Russia, on Friday, April 26, 2019.
Andrey Rudakov/Bloomberg via Getty Images
- Home remodeling and architectural design are among the new areas North Korean IT workers are expanding into in an effort to continue to make money to fund their country’s weapons of mass destruction program, a source told Fortune. The IT worker scam, which has collected billions for North Korea, is innovating beyond remote tech work after being disrupted by law enforcement; even the most mundane tasks are under threat.
A candidate for Oregon’s state legislature—who was later elected to represent southwest Portland and East Beaverton—had her team hire a designer for her campaign website last year. According to a staff member familiar with the work, the web developer was hired from freelance platform Upwork after a phone interview. There were no red flags during the interview process, nor did the developer indicate that there would be anyone else working on the website, the staffer said. The contract started May 10, the site went live around mid-July, and the contract ended on August 27. The budgeted cost was $2,000.
However, the web developer hired to design the site had a subcontractor handle minor edits at the end of the project. A North Korean information technology worker, known and tracked by cybersecurity professionals around the world, logged into the WordPress content management system on the backend of the campaign website using credentials linked to the web developer.
The hired developer told Fortune he had no knowledge of the North Korean IT worker scheme and wasn’t aware of the threat or the vast ongoing conspiracy perpetuated by authoritarian leader Kim Jong-Un to fund the regime’s nuclear weapons program. The developer denied any collaboration with North Koreans.
In a statement, Oregon state Rep. Dacia Grayber told Fortune the campaign website did not store any user data or sensitive details.
“As soon as we learned there was a suspicious login to the WordPress site, my team and I took steps to secure all login information, and ensure that no user data was put at risk,” Grayber told Fortune. “We appreciate being made aware of this larger trend, and find it deeply concerning that in such a tech-dependent world, traditionally trusted means of identity verification are still not enough to mitigate entities that may want to do America harm.”
In case you’re unfamiliar, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has deployed more than 100,000 workers to 40 countries around the world to work in sewing, construction, and other industries to avoid crushing financial sanctions. Jobs in information technology, the bowels of tech, have proven to be a reliable cash cow for the regime and a seismic challenge for Fortune 500 companies to thwart.
In sum: North Korean software developers are posing as Americans to get high-paying remote jobs in tech. The plan has been so successful they are trying out new ways to generate cash and crypto now that word has spread about the highly lucrative IT worker scheme.
Under the scam, trained DPRK IT workers steal or rent American identities, use generative AI to craft résumés and fake LinkedIn profiles, and then get remote jobs with U.S. firms under false pretenses and in violation of international laws. All told, the IT worker program reliably generates between $250 million to $600 million per year, according to the UN. DPRK authoritarian ruler Kim Jong-Un uses the money to fund the country’s illegal nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile program.
A UN report detailing the IT worker scheme revealed the North Korean developers make about $15,000 to $60,000 per month apiece, and all are required to earn a minimum of $100,000 a year through full-time and freelance tech work. While the IT worker scheme is generally grounded in making money for North Korea, it also yields intelligence that fuels the country’s flourishing criminal cyber-heist empire. Between 2017 and 2023, the UN estimates DPRK attacks yielded at least $3 billion in crypto. The crimes were allegedly carried out by North Korean Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors who operate under the Reconnaissance General Bureau of the Korean People’s Army.
DPRK IT workers, interrupted
The scheme has since been disrupted by numerous indictments, reports, and companies stepping up their game in terms of identity verification. Just this month, the U.S. Treasury financial crimes enforcement network (FinCen) launched a rule proposal that identified Cambodia-based Huione Group as a money-laundering concern. FinCen claimed Huione Group was behind money-washing related to at least $37 million in proceeds from DPRK cyber heists.
“Huione Group has established itself as the marketplace of choice for malicious cyber actors like the DPRK and criminal syndicates, who have stolen billions of dollars from everyday Americans,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent in a FinCen statement.
Bryan Vorndran, assistant director of the FBI’s cyber division, told an audience of cybersecurity experts in Las Vegas last week that he gets “many” calls from companies and highly sophisticated venture-capital firms with tech businesses in their portfolios that are dealing with the DPRK worker problem.
“The threat has evolved as industries and the government have tried to counter it,” said Vorndran, speaking at the RSAC annual security conference. “It’s very pervasive.”
Bill Pulte, director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency told Bloomberg TV in an interview that he referred North Koreans and Chinese workers at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to criminal authorities.
“I mean, what are the North Koreans and the Chinese doing in these companies,” Pulte said at the Milken Institute Global Conference in California.
Given the spotlight on the issue, DPRK IT workers are pivoting.
Michael “Barni” Barnhart, an investigator who leads DPRK efforts at security firm DTEX, told Fortune the specific area that IT workers have been testing involves an early-stage scheme to pose as heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) or remodeling and architectural specialists. The IT workers are posing as experienced engineers in Minnesota, Illinois and countries like Australia by fabricating licenses and then offering their services to people looking to get blueprints approved, Barnhart said. The IT workers have also faked permitting and design approvals for their own work.
Barnhart said the workers are targeting residential markets in Australia and the U.S. and the scheme takes place entirely online. The workers look up state government and municipal websites to find the certifications and approvals needed, copy profiles from real people to make their own appear legitimate, and then offer to provide designs and renderings from licensed professionals to people looking to improve their homes.
“They love doing cyber crime that is so far underneath the threshold of giving a damn about that it’s not reportable,” said Barnhart. “But when thousands of people do it at the same time, it’s quite profitable for the regime.”
By tracking known DPRK IT worker profiles, Barnhart said he found evidence that a restaurant in Chino, California, purchased plans online from a North Korean operative and used them to rebuild their outdoor patio.
DPRK workers selling plans used for homebuilding or commercial construction could easily go south if the plans are unsound or the workers get aggressive. And, potential involvement in campaign donations or U.S. elections is also concerning, he said.
“What if it was a bigger campaign?” said Barnhart. An IT worker embedded with an APT could have designed the website, added a tracker or malware to it, and used it for propaganda, he said.
Jef Green, president of compliance and merchant services provider C&E Systems, which handled the Grayber campaign’s donation collections, told Fortune there’s a complete separation between funding and the information the campaigns use to build their websites.
“If someone has access to her website, they never have any access whatsoever to the merchant page or the donation page,” said Green. “That is our software.”
These incidents appear minor and are focused on revenue generation, but they are still warning signs, said Barnhart.
“You can do all the right things to verify workers but the second you outsource something” there can be lapses in policies and procedures, said Barnhart. “They love to do these things through a third party.”
In a statement, Upwork told Fortune fraud prevention and compliance with U.S. and international sanctions are critical priorities. The company said it has invested in industry-leading security and identity verification measures.
“It represents a challenge that affects the entire online work industry, and Upwork is at the forefront of combating these threats,” the company said. “Any attempt to use a false identity, misrepresent location, or take advantage of Upwork customers is a strict violation of our terms of use, and we take aggressive action to detect, block, and remove bad actors from our platform.”
An Upwork spokesperson told Fortune the web developer profile who was hired to work on Grayber’s campaign has been deactivated from the platform.
About the Author
Amanda Gerut
News Editor, West Coast
Amanda Gerut is the west coast editor at Fortune, overseeing publicly traded businesses, executive compensation, Securities and Exchange Commission regulations, and investigations.
13. As rules relax, N. Koreans flock to Yalu River cruises near Chinese border
As rules relax, N. Koreans flock to Yalu River cruises near Chinese border - Daily NK English
dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · May 12, 2025
This photograph shows North Koreans on a pleasure boat on the Yalu River in Sinuiju, North Pyongan province, on May 1, which is Labor Day in North Korea. The merrymakers are seen waving toward Dandong, a city in China’s Liaoning province, and taking photos with their mobile phones. (Daily NK)
North Korea is increasingly promoting domestic tourism, with pleasure cruises along the Yalu River in Sinuiju becoming a popular attraction.
According to a source in North Pyongan province recently, a tour boat that began operating on Kim Il Sung’s birthday (April 15) continues to run, much to the delight of locals who marvel at the changes taking place.
Previously, these cruises were reserved for special occasions and limited to certain individuals. Even when technically available to others, obtaining tickets involved complicated procedures and passengers faced strict behavioral rules onboard.
Now, any North Korean with government ID can take the cruise for 20,000 North Korean won. While this is still expensive for many citizens, people have been lining up at the ticket office during major holidays like Labor Day (May 1).
“They plan to keep the boat tours running until further notice. It’s a win-win situation—people enjoy it and it’s profitable,” the source explained.
Interestingly, the tour boat now travels close to the Chinese side of the Yalu River near Dandong, Liaoning province. In the past, boats kept to the middle of the channel, maintaining distance from China. Today, passengers can clearly see Chinese buildings and people—an exciting experience for North Korean tourists.
The cruise route also showcases Wihwa Island and the villages of Sangdan and Hadan in Sinuiju, where new high-rise apartments were constructed after last year’s floods. The authorities seem eager to highlight these buildings, which the regime considers a source of pride.
Perhaps most notably, passenger behavior restrictions have been significantly relaxed.
“Before, passengers had to pretend not to notice Dandong’s bright lights and couldn’t show any interest or envy. Photography was strictly forbidden,” the source said. “Now, people can laugh, chat excitedly, and even wave back at Chinese people who wave at them.”
“These small freedoms have many people excited about the possibility of more open tourism. Some are even hoping we’ll eventually be allowed to travel freely throughout the country,” the source added.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · May 12, 2025
14. Presidential rivals offer conflicting visions for North Korea in policy pledges
These issues are not making news in the Korean press.
Excerpts:
Perhaps the most striking contrast between the two candidates was their positions on potential South Korean nuclear armament. While officially rejecting the idea of going nuclear, Kim stressed the need to strengthen Seoul’s “nuclear potential” and nuclear extended deterrence with the U.S. — a theme Lee avoided entirely.
...
However, neither Lee nor Kim addressed the thorny subject of Trump’s repeated threats to withdraw American forces from the Korean Peninsula, or how they plan to overcome his apparent deprioritization of the North Korea issue and joint deterrence with U.S. allies.
Presidential rivals offer conflicting visions for North Korea in policy pledges
Lee Jae-myung and Kim Moon-soo both call for strengthening US-ROK alliance but differ on need for nukes and engagement
https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/presidential-rivals-offer-conflicting-visions-for-north-korea-in-policy-pledges/?utm
Shreyas Reddy May 12, 2025
Kim Moon-soo (right) and Lee Jae-myung | Images: Kim Moon-soo via Facebook (May 6, 2025) and Lee Jae-myung via Facebook (Aug. 18, 2024), edited by NK News
South Korea kicked off the official start of campaigning for the upcoming presidential election on Monday, with the two leading contenders outlining how they plan to approach North Korea in a series of policy pledges.
Lee Jae-myung of the opposition Democratic Party (DP) and Kim Moon-soo of the ruling People Power Party (PPP) will face off in the June 3 election, with Lee heavily favored to win amid public backlash against impeached President Yoon Suk-yeol and his party.
As he has done so far on the campaign trail, Lee shied away from a dedicated focus on the DPRK in his agenda, instead embedding it within a broader foreign policy section in the top half of his priority list. But his brief mentions of North Korea showcased support for inter-Korean engagement.
In contrast, the conservative Kim — who secured the PPP nomination at the last minute after a series of twists and turns — dedicated an entire section to deterring North Korean threats, highlighting a more hardline approach reminiscent of the Yoon administration.
On top of that, Kim is eyeing greater South Korean control in nuclear-sharing with the U.S., seeking to capitalize on growing domestic support for nuclear armament to counter Pyongyang.
However, while both candidates backed stronger security cooperation with the U.S., their policies didn’t account for policy shifts under President Donald Trump, whose return to the White House has threatened to undo recent efforts to strengthen trilateral cooperation against the DPRK.
INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS
When it comes to engagement with Pyongyang, the two candidates’ DPRK-related pledges continue to highlight their parties’ contrasting approaches.
Kim entirely avoided mentions of engagement, while Lee backed a restoration of inter-Korean relations in order to “achieve sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula.”
The DP candidate pledged to transition to a strategy of “reconciliation and cooperation” with North Korea with the objective of denuclearizing the peninsula in a phased manner, alongside implementing measures to prevent accidental clashes, reduce military tensions and build trust.
Furthermore, he called for a return to inter-Korean humanitarian cooperation and exchanges, including reunions for families separated by Korea’s division. The two Koreas previously organized family reunions during periods of relative amity, but there have been no such events since 2018.
The presidential frontrunner did not elaborate on how he plans to kick-start engagement that has been stalled since 2019, especially now that Kim Jong Un has denounced the goal of unification.
However, Lee vowed last week to restore the 2018 inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement limiting military activities near the border, which both sides walked away from in recent years. He also called for halting propaganda loudspeaker broadcasts and the dissemination of anti-DPRK leaflets across the border.
Separated families reunite in Aug. 2018 during a period of detente | Image: ROK Ministry of Unification (Aug. 26, 2018)
DETERRING NORTH KOREAN THREATS
Both candidates endorsed policies of strengthening deterrence against DPRK nuclear threats, but they presented a clear contrast in the degree of emphasis they placed on this point.
The conservative Kim stressed the need to “create a nation that remains stable and secure in the face of North Korea’s nuclear threats” by bolstering South Korea’s defenses.
Like Yoon, Kim backed efforts to build up the Three-axis System aimed at countering Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile threats by securing preemptive deterrence capabilities.
For the system’s first prong, “Kill Chain,” he called for advancing cyber and electronic warfare technologies similar to U.S. “left of launch” operations, which rely on non-kinetic methods to carry out preemptive strikes.
To strengthen the second prong, “Korea Air and Missile Defense,” Kim pledged to expand on South Korea’s planned Iron Dome-style system and develop a new “Sky Dome,” along with laser interception weapons.
In addition, he vowed to secure “sufficient retaliatory capabilities” such as ballistic missiles to reinforce the third axis, “Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation.”
Much of Kim’s defense plan echoes Yoon’s approach to North Korea, which the former president viewed as Seoul’s “main enemy.”
South Korea’s Long-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (L-SAM) system is an important component of the country’s defense strategy against DPRK missile threats. | Image: NK News (Sept. 26, 2023)
Lee offered less detail than his rival on deterring the DPRK, but he also emphasized the need to develop a South Korean missile defense system and called for enhancing the ROK’s ballistic missile performance.
Unlike Kim, who avoided mentions of Yoon’s controversial martial law declaration on Dec. 3, Lee stressed the need to reform military intelligence agencies and “civilianize” national defense, as well as introduce personnel hearings for the heads of the armed forces’ three branches.
To prevent a repeat of the martial law crisis, Lee has pledged to appoint a civilian defense minister for the first time in South Korea’s post-democratization history and restructure the leadership of the Defense Security Command, which was allegedly involved in attempts to arrest opposition politicians during the short-lived state of emergency.
NUCLEAR ARMAMENT
Perhaps the most striking contrast between the two candidates was their positions on potential South Korean nuclear armament. While officially rejecting the idea of going nuclear, Kim stressed the need to strengthen Seoul’s “nuclear potential” and nuclear extended deterrence with the U.S. — a theme Lee avoided entirely.
The PPP candidate’s election manifesto calls for consulting with Washington on redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula, pursuing a NATO-style nuclear-sharing agreement and deploying U.S. nuclear weapons to Guam to help defend the ROK.
He has also backed the acquisition of nuclear weapon designs and technology in consultation with the U.S. and an amendment to the allies’ nuclear cooperation agreement to allow for uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies for peaceful use, at a level comparable to Japan.
Kim also vowed to pursue the addition of a “nuclear attack protection clause” in the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, ensure U.S. strategic assets are deployed to the Korean Peninsula on a quasi-permanent basis and upgrade joint Conventional-Nuclear Integration drills.
The PPP candidate’s positions may not appeal to Washington, which has long been reluctant to deploy its nukes to the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, a transition to ROK-hosted nuclear weapons would likely require extensive infrastructure development and time.
However, with the current U.S. government looking to place the onus on South Korea and Japan to lead deterrence against North Korea, Kim may feel the time is right for Seoul to push for greater control.
An undated photo of intercontinental ballistic missiles on display at the F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming | Image: U.S. Department of Defense website “America’s Nuclear Triad“
WORKING WITH PARTNERS
Former President Yoon was an ardent supporter of cooperation with Washington and Tokyo and played a leading role in advancing the trilateral partnership against DPRK threats alongside his U.S. and Japanese counterparts.
However, with none of those three leaders left in office, the next South Korean president may follow a very different path.
Kim’s manifesto pledged to build a “strong,” “reassuring” and “trusted” South Korea by forging a strong relationship with Washington, but revealed little of his actual plans for U.S. security cooperation beyond nuclear extended deterrence.
The PPP candidate’s pledges shed even less light on his approach toward Tokyo, with Kim entirely avoiding mentions of relations with Japan.
Lee also paid little attention to Japan, which he did not name at all in his agenda, but called for the pursuit of diplomatic relations with South Korea’s four neighbors — the DPRK, Japan, China and Russia — based on “national interest and pragmatism.”
Before Yoon’s ouster, Western observers feared that a Lee presidency would disrupt the budding trilateral partnership. But the DP candidate has since attempted to revamp his image and expressed support for relations with Japan and the trilateral partnership overall, although his campaign pledge offers little insight on his plans.
A U.S. aircraft carrier (center) flanked by Japanese (left) and South Korean Aegis destroyers during the trilateral “Freedom Edge” drills in 2024 | Image: ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (Nov. 13, 2024)
On the subject of U.S. cooperation, Lee offered more clarity with a pledge to seek “comprehensive deterrence capabilities” through the bilateral alliance.
In addition, he vowed to pursue the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) of South Korean forces from the U.S., a long-discussed move that would allow Seoul to take the lead in defending against North Korean attacks.
This plan may suit some in the Trump administration who have backed an OPCON transfer so that Washington can focus its attention on threats from China, while realizing South Korean progressives’ years-long push for greater control over domestic security.
However, neither Lee nor Kim addressed the thorny subject of Trump’s repeated threats to withdraw American forces from the Korean Peninsula, or how they plan to overcome his apparent deprioritization of the North Korea issue and joint deterrence with U.S. allies.
Edited by Bryan Betts
15. State security agency drives North Korea's emerging vehicle rental business
A public (party)-private partnership?
State security agency drives North Korea's emerging vehicle rental business - Daily NK English
The business model is noteworthy: wealthy entrepreneurs purchase and register vehicles for the service centers, then share profits with state institutions
By Lee Sang Yong - May 13, 2025
dailynk.com · by Lee Sang Yong · May 13, 2025
Photos from North Korean state media show that what was called the "Hwasong Vehicle Maintenance Center" during Kim Jong Un's inspection (reported by Rodong Sinmun on April 4, top image) was renamed to "Amisan Automotive Technology Service Center" less than a month later (reported by Rodong Sinmun on April 27, bottom image). (Photos: Rodong Sinmun/News1)
North Korea has begun piloting car rental services in Pyongyang’s Hwasong district, signaling efforts to develop new service industries.
Former vehicle repair centers are transforming into multipurpose service facilities offering car rentals, cautiously introducing the concept of vehicle sharing to the isolated nation.
According to a Pyongyang source who spoke with Daily NK recently, the Amisan Automotive Technology Service Center (formerly Hwasong Vehicle Maintenance Center) is pioneering hourly and extended-period rentals for passenger cars and electric vehicles.
The facility previously focused on car repairs, parts replacement and battery exchanges but is now expanding into rental services, the source explained.
Kim Jong Un, during an inspection of the center last month, praised it as “a new hub that can improve the quality of vehicle technical services and meet demand through its specialized comprehensive service base.”
The rental program operates under central government direction following Kim’s guidelines, with joint planning from the Workers’ Party Economic Department, Cabinet, Pyongyang People’s Committee and Hwasong District People’s Committee. Officials intend to promote it as a “capital-led model” emphasizing modern transportation culture.
Renting a passenger car in Hwasong district currently costs about $100 for 24 hours, with additional fees for driving beyond city limits.
Renters must present their citizen ID and driver’s license. Rental periods range from one day to one month, with 10-15% discounts available for long-term rentals, according to the source.
The business model is noteworthy: wealthy entrepreneurs known as “donju” purchase and register vehicles for the service centers, then share profits with state institutions.
“Only trading companies, special agencies and major donju can enter this business,” the source said. “There’s growing recognition that vehicle rentals and construction will become more profitable than earning small change at markets.”
The Amisan Automotive Technology Service Center is named after Amisan Mountain behind the Ministry of State Security, indicating the center operates under a trading company affiliated with the state security agency. While ostensibly improving “service convenience for the people,” it effectively serves as a revenue stream for the ministry.
The rental service remains limited by vehicle availability and restricted service areas.
“Currently, five rental service centers operate in Pyongyang, with pilot operations beginning in Hamhung and Wonsan regions,” the source said. “After 1-2 years of demand and preference surveys, authorities will likely decide whether to implement the service nationwide.”
Each service center currently operates independently without unified national regulations, though the Cabinet is discussing safety measures such as restricted roads and prohibiting driving after 10 p.m., according to the source.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Lee Sang Yong · May 13, 2025
16. When dictators go wild(life trafficking)
When dictators go wild(life trafficking) - Daily NK English
China's role as the primary international market for North Korean wildlife products is a concern, according to researchers
By English Language Editor - May 13, 2025
dailynk.com · by English Language Editor · May 13, 2025
Entrance in the shape of a Tigers head to the Korea Central Zoo in Pyongyang, the capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. (Alex Kuhni, Wikimedia Commons)
In a concerning revelation from University College London researchers, North Korea has been identified as a significant player in the illegal wildlife trade. The study exposes a troubling contradiction: while North Korea maintains a system of protected areas and species on paper, these protections are regularly violated—often with state involvement. It seems the country’s definition of “protected species” is more along the lines of “protected until needed for export.”
According to the researchers, the North Korean government not only turns a blind eye to wildlife exploitation but actively profits from the harvesting and trade of endangered species, including Asiatic black bears, long-tailed gorals, and Eurasian otters. This presents a sobering example of environmental legislation that exists in name only—rather like claiming to be on a diet while operating a secret cookie factory in your basement.
Perhaps most surprising is the finding that North Korea pioneered bear bile farming before the practice spread to China and South Korea. Behind the facade of isolation, the country operates wildlife farms for various species while sanctioning the hunting of protected animals.
The economic hardship that has gripped North Korea since the devastating famine of the 1990s has driven both state-sanctioned wildlife trade and a thriving black market. Citizens hunt to provide essential food resources and generate income, while the state uses wildlife products as yet another tradable resource to generate much-needed revenue. It’s capitalism with North Korean characteristics—if capitalism involved selling the last few members of protected species to your neighbor.
China’s role as the primary international market for North Korean wildlife products cannot be overlooked. Despite commitments to CITES, or the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, and U.N. Security Council resolutions prohibiting certain exports from North Korea, China continues to provide a market for these illegal goods. This relationship has created a wildlife black market that threatens species throughout the region.
As researchers call for immediate action to address this crisis, the outlook for North Korea’s biodiversity remains grim. Species like the sable are likely functionally extinct in the country, while Amur tigers and leopards face severe threats if they cross into North Korean territory. For these creatures, nuclear tensions might be the least of their problems.
While international attention often focuses on the country’s nuclear program and human rights issues, this environmental crisis demands equal concern. For the diverse species that call the Korean Peninsula home, the consequences of continued exploitation could be devastating, potentially hindering biodiversity recovery throughout Northeast Asia for generations to come. Conservation efforts in the region face an uphill battle—though still easier than getting straight answers from Pyongyang about anything, wildlife-related or otherwise.
Note: This is an opinion column offering a wry perspective on North Korea.
dailynk.com · by English Language Editor · May 13, 2025
17. Lazarus Group’s Liquidation Spree Drops North Korea Below Bhutan in BTC Holdings
Is the regime expecting action to be taken against its bitcoin activities?
Chart at the link.
News
Jamie Redman
16 hours ago
Lazarus Group’s Liquidation Spree Drops North Korea Below Bhutan in BTC Holdings
https://news.bitcoin.com/lazarus-groups-liquidation-spree-drops-north-korea-below-bhutan-in-btc-holdings/
After the Royal Government of Bhutan quietly rearranged portions of its bitcoin holdings—holding 7,486 BTC on May 2—some 4,576 BTC has since returned to its reserves, bringing the kingdom’s total stash to 12,062 BTC ten days later. Meanwhile, North Korea’s Lazarus Group has been actively trimming its holdings, falling below Bhutan in the hierarchy of nation-state bitcoin reserves.
Bitcoin Nation-State Rankings Shift as North Korea Slips
Roughly 57 days ago, North Korea ranked as the third-largest sovereign bitcoin holder. On March 16, Kim Jong Un’s Lazarus Group—an infamous hacking unit tied to the regime—held 13,562 BTC. Since then, the hacking group’s digital war chest has thinned, placing Bhutan ahead.
The Lazarus-controlled holdings have dwindled by 5,749 BTC over nearly two months. Arkham Intelligence data pegs North Korea’s bitcoin holdings at 7,813 BTC as of May 12. The United States leads by a wide margin, with federal reserves totaling 198,012 BTC—valued at $20.38 billion based on Monday’s prevailing exchange rate.
Top five nation states in terms of BTC holdings.
The United Kingdom claims second place, managing 61,245 BTC worth $6.29 billion, while Bhutan, after re-shuffling last week, now rounds out the top three with its 12,062 BTC stockpile. While North Korea has slipped into fourth position, its current reserves still exceed those of El Salvador.
If Lazarus-linked wallets continue to shed BTC, the nation could descend another rank. For now, El Salvador holds 6,174 BTC—leaving Pyongyang with a 1,639 BTC edge, at least temporarily. Lazarus-controlled bitcoin wallets are distributing bitcoin to unknown wallets every day so the El Salvador-North Korea flippening is closer than we think.
Pyongyang’s hacking group holds a diverse portfolio of digital assets, including $8.98 million in ETH, yet none approach the sheer value commanded by its bitcoin cache. As the global landscape of sovereign bitcoin holdings shifts, Bhutan’s strategic accumulation contrasts sharply with North Korea’s rapid divestment.
Though the U.S. and U.K. continue to hold commanding leads, the Lazarus Group’s steady depletion of reserves suggests that Kim Jong Un’s regime may lack any strategic appetite for maintaining a bitcoin position, opting instead for swift liquidation. As daily outflows persist, Pyongyang’s retreat seems all but certain—potentially clearing the way for smaller players like El Salvador to climb the crypto sovereign ranks.
Tags in this story
bhutan, Bitcoin (BTC), north korea
Image Credits: Shutterstock, Pixabay, Wiki Commons
18. Australian warship sets sail to monitor North Korean sanctions evasion at sea
The silk web of friends, partners, and alliances.
And we have not lost our focus on north Korean sanctions evasion and malign activities.
Australian warship sets sail to monitor North Korean sanctions evasion at sea
Deployment of HMAS Sydney for Operation Argos comes as multilateral sanctions team prepares to release first report
https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/australian-warship-sets-sail-to-monitor-north-korean-sanctions-evasion-at-sea/
Alannah Hill May 13, 2025
The crew of HMAS Sydney wave to the photographer as the warship sails through calm waters during Exercise Bersama Shield. | Image: Australia's Defense Ministry
An Australian warship has joined an operation to monitor the illegal shipment of goods to and from North Korea in violation of U.N. sanctions, according to Canberra, as a new sanctions-monitoring body prepares to publish its first report.
The Royal Australian Navy’s guided missile destroyer HMAS Sydney has been deployed for Operation Argos, supporting international efforts to enforce U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against the DPRK, the Australian defense ministry stated in a press release on Monday.
“Operation Argos supports the international community’s goal of the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea,” Vice Admiral Justin Jones, chief of Joint Operations, said in the press release.
Commanding officer of HMAS Sydney Ben Weller stated that the ship is operating in areas where suspected violations of sanctions are likely to occur, emphasizing the vessel is equipped with an MH-60R Seahawk helicopter and advanced sensors to detect and monitor suspected transfers of sanctioned goods.
Operation Argos is an international effort aimed at deterring and disrupting illegal ship-to-ship transfers at sea that are believed to support North Korea’s sanctioned trade in coal and petroleum products.
The deployment marks the 13th time an Australian naval vessel has joined the operation since it began in 2018. The HMAS Sydney last supported Operation Argos in Sept. 2024.
Australia also contributes to Operation Argos through aerial surveillance, with theRoyal Australian Air Force deploying a P-8A Poseidon to Japan from late March to mid-April for similar enforcement efforts.
Pyongyang has long relied heavily on ship-to-ship transfers to smuggle fuel to and from the country, and has allegedly carried out such transfers to supply weapons to Russia for its war against Ukraine on multiple occasions since 2023.
Regular patrols in the waters around the Korean Peninsula have played an important role in gathering evidence of North Korea’s maritime smuggling operations.
Australia is notably a member of the new Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team founded by the U.S. and its allies to track DPRK sanctions violations following the dissolution of the U.N. Panel of Experts. The team is reportedly in the final stages of preparing its first report for publication.
However, Australia’s deployments in support of sanctions monitoring have caused friction with China in recent years.
Last May, Canberra’s Department of Defense alleged that a Chinese fighter jet endangered Australian personnel by firing flares toward an MH-60R Seahawk helicopter monitoring North Korean activities in the Yellow Sea.
Beijing responded by accusing Australia of “approaching Chinese airspace to provoke and threaten China’s maritime and aerial security” under the pretext of enforcing U.N. sanctions.
Pyongyang also typically objects to such sanctions monitoring activities, including last year’s helicopter incident, as part of what it claims to be a U.S.-led strategy to target the DPRK and aggravate regional tensions.
North Korean authorities have in the past condemned Australia for pursuing “hostile acts” under U.S. guidance through these surveillance operations, while reiterating their firm rejection of “unlawful” international sanctions.
Australia is one of several countries contributing naval assets to monitor North Korean sanctions evasion in the region, with Italy deploying a warship to waters surrounding Japan earlier this month and New Zealand deploying its largest-ever military ship, the HMNZS Aotearoa, from Japan’s Yokosuka naval base in Aug. 2024.
Edited by Bryan Betts
19. China spy ring pursued US-ROK secrets, including THAAD, nuclear plans
No one should doubt China's extensive espionage activities in the ROK and around the world.
The ROK is a battleground in China-US Strategic competition.
National
China spy ring pursued US-ROK secrets, including THAAD, nuclear plans
South Korean counterintelligence ran six-month sting before arresting operative
https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/05/13/X4PLZRY43RBBZHDFP437FRRX5Y/
By Lee Min-jun,
Park Su-hyeon
Published 2025.05.13. 10:54
A Chinese intelligence agent was arrested in South Korea in March after attempting to obtain classified military information from an active-duty soldier, including details on the U.S. THAAD missile defense system, nuclear operations guidelines, and contingency plans for U.S. Forces Korea, a lawmaker said on May 12.
Rep. Joo Jin-woo of the ruling People Power Party said the agent, identified only as “A”, was working for the Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department under China’s Central Military Commission.
A was detained after arriving on the southern island of Jeju to meet the South Korean soldier he had allegedly recruited, according to an indictment reviewed by Chosun Ilbo.
The case traces back to April 2022, when A, a Chinese national who had studied in Taiwan, was recruited by a handler referred to as “B” to gather intelligence on anti-China groups. B reportedly led a 10-member unit that included recruiters, interpreters and finance staff.
By December 2022, the group shifted focus to the South Korean military. B, using multiple aliases, infiltrated military-themed social media groups to find targets. In July 2023, B contacted a soldier stationed in Yanggu County, identified as “C.”
Graphics by Lee Jin-young
B paid C 3.5 million won ($2,560) for information on a joint drill marking the 73rd anniversary of the Incheon Landing Operation. He later asked for more sensitive documents, including U.S. evacuation plans in case of war on the Korean Peninsula.
In October, B provided C with concealed recording devices disguised as jewelry and instructed him to photograph military documents. The two used “dead drop” techniques to exchange information and payments at prearranged locations. B described data on THAAD and U.S. forces as “the most desirable,” Joo said.
South Korean counterintelligence authorities discovered C’s activities around this time. When C became uncooperative, B dispatched agent A for a direct meeting to rebuild trust.
A entered South Korea on Feb. 31 and traveled to a pension on Jeju Island, where he believed he was meeting C. Instead, he met a counterintelligence officer posing as the soldier. Authorities did not arrest A immediately but launched a sting operation to gather more evidence.
Over the following six months, officials monitored A and B’s communications. During that time, B sent A a secure phone, cash card, and $5,000 in cash, requesting sensitive documents including nuclear operations guidelines and material related to the Ulchi Freedom Shield joint drills.
After South Korea declared martial law on Dec. 3, 2024, B grew increasingly urgent. In January, he told C he would send A for a final exchange in late March, requesting assessments of U.S.-South Korea drills and updates on joint operational plans in case of a North Korean invasion.
A returned to Jeju on March 27 and received a USB drive containing two classified files from an undercover officer. He was arrested on the spot.
Prosecutors indicted A on April 25. C, who remains on active duty, is being investigated by military prosecutors. Authorities say C handed over 21 classified documents in total and received 33.2 million won and $12,000 from B.
Espionage charges under South Korean law apply only to enemy states such as North Korea. A was charged with violating the Military Secrets Protection Act.
“Foreign espionage activities by countries such as China must be met with firm punishment, and preventive measures should be put in place,” Joo said.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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