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Quotes of the Day:
"I much prefer the sharpest criticism of a single intelligent man to the thoughtless approval of the masses."
– Johannes Kepler
“It’s not so much staying alive, it’s staying human that’s important. What counts is that we don’t betray each other.”
– George Orwell
"Nothing is impossible, the word itself says, "I'm possible!"
– Audrey Hepburn
1. C.I.A. Rejects Diversity Efforts Once Deemed as Essential to Its Mission
2. U.S. Special Operations Command hosts first ever International Commander's Forum to build generational relationships during Special Operations Forces Week 2025
3. JSOC commander likely to be SOCOM pick, sources say
4. How the Osama bin Laden Raid Gave China Its New Stealth Helicopter
5. Army to eliminate 2 Security Force Assistance Brigades, reassign experienced soldiers
6. Special Operations cyber officer regains health with help of SOF resources
7. Is AI the future of America's foreign policy? Some experts think so
8. In High-Stakes Negotiations, Trump’s Opponents Are Learning His Patterns
9. Cruz: Gift of Qatari jet to Trump ‘poses significant espionage’ concerns
10. HIMARS unleashed in Taiwan as China watches on
11. Army jailbreak foiled at Fort Leavenworth
12. The U.S. Once Built Airplanes Quickly
13. How the Ivy League Earned Donald Trump’s Ire
14. My Brush With Trump’s Thought Police
15. A.G. Sulzberger: A Free People Need a Free Press
16. Fire the Generals: Civilian control of the military is at stake
17. Asia without America, part 1: The cupboards are bare
18. How Qatar Bought America
19. Trump Clash With Library of Congress Sets Up Constitutional Fight
20. Dollar Likely a Long Way From Losing Reserve Status
21. The Strategic Blindfold: How Damaging Alliances Can Lead to Costly Mistakes
22. The West’s Intellectual Deficit in Modern War by Mick Ryan
23. A Clausewitzian Lens on Modern Urban Warfare
24. It’s Not Enough for France to Be Right About Strategic Autonomy
25. When Trade Wars Become Shooting Wars
1. C.I.A. Rejects Diversity Efforts Once Deemed as Essential to Its Mission
So will we eliminate the OSS from our history? It is after all the father of both the intelligence and special operations communities.
QUOTE It is not the first retreat from diversity in the history of American intelligence. The spy organization that preceded the C.I.A. prized diversity in a way that its successor did not in its early years.
Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, the director of the agency’s predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, recruited women and Black Americans to be among his “glorious amateurs” conducting covert operations during World War II.
In a speech after the O.S.S. was shuttered — and before the C.I.A. took its place — General Donovan highlighted the diversity of the group he had assembled.
“We have come to the end of an unusual experiment,” he said. “This experiment was to determine whether a group of Americans constituting a cross-section of racial origins, of abilities, temperaments and talents, could risk an encounter with the long-established and well-trained enemy organizations.”
While the Pentagon has begun purging material that celebrates the diversity of the armed services, the C.I.A. has not started editing its history. The agency’s website still has a page highlighting General Donovan’s quote and the contributions of Black, Japanese American, Hispanic and female O.S.S. officers.
“Bill Donovan recognized that diversity was our strength,” Mr. Blocker said.
But General Donovan’s commitment to a diverse force did not carry over when the C.I.A. was established in 1947.
“Despite Donovan’s best measures, it was basically: ‘OK little ladies, go back to the kitchen,’” Mr. Blocker said.
It was only after the fall of the Berlin Wall that change began on a larger scale.
John McLaughlin, a former deputy director of the agency, said perceptions about the agency’s needs began to shift.
“From that point on, it was commonly understood that diversity was not simply something nice to have, it was a business requirement,” Mr. McLaughlin said. “You really needed people who could blend in, in different parts of the world, and who didn’t look like me. I blend in in Ireland and that’s not useful to anyone." END QUOTE
C.I.A. Rejects Diversity Efforts Once Deemed as Essential to Its Mission
The Trump administration is dismantling programs that some former directors believed helped sharpen the agency’s competitive edge.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/13/us/politics/cia-hiring-diversity.html?referringSource=articleShare&smid=nytcore-ios-share&utm
“There are no D.E.I. officers, there are only intelligence officers at C.I.A.,” said Darrell Blocker, a former senior C.I.A. officer who led the agency’s training efforts.Credit...Madeline Tolle for The New York Times
By Julian E. Barnes
Reporting from Washington
May 13, 2025
Updated 1:39 p.m. ET
After the Cold War ended, and again after the Sept. 11 attacks, a string of C.I.A. directors and congressional overseers pushed the agency to diversify its ranks.
The drive had little to do with any sense of racial justice, civil rights or equity. It was, rather, a hard-nosed national security decision.
The agency’s leaders had come to believe that having analysts from an array of backgrounds would lead to better conclusions. Officers with cultural knowledge would see things others might miss. Case officers who reflected America’s diversity would move about foreign cities more easily without being detected.
“If there is one place that there is a clear business case for diversity it is at the C.I.A. and intelligence agencies,” said Senator Mark Warner, a Virginia Democrat who is a longtime senior member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. “You have to have spies around the world in all countries. They can’t all be white men, or our intelligence collection will suffer.”
But what was once a bipartisan emphasis on the importance of diversity at the agency is facing new pressure. Under the Trump administration, the C.I.A. has moved to dismantle its recruitment programs, especially those that have sought to bring racial and ethnic minorities into the organization, which is mostly white.
John Ratcliffe, the C.I.A. director, says those steps are about making a colorblind organization solely focused on hiring and promoting people based on merit.
Defenders of diversity recruitment say the battle to integrate the agency is being abandoned when it is only partially complete. In the 1980s, white men filled 90 percent of top leadership positions. Those numbers began to fall a decade later as the agency recruited, and promoted, more women and minorities.
The recruitment helped, though it did not result in a spy agency that looked precisely like America. Ten years ago, the last time the agency released detailed numbers, more women had ascended to top jobs. But people with racial or ethnic minority backgrounds made up only a quarter of the agency and representation in leadership roles lagged much further back.
Critics of the Trump administration’s moves fear that without aggressive recruiting of minorities, the C.I.A. will be less able to carry out its mission of working covertly in any country in the world and stealing secrets for the United States.
Image
John Ratcliffe, the C.I.A. director, middle, at a hearing in Washington, in March. With him are Tulsi Gabbard, the director of national intelligence, left, and Lt. Gen. Jeffrey A. Kruse, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.Credit...Kenny Holston/The New York Times
Mr. Ratcliffe not only shut down the diversity recruiting efforts but also started firing the officers assigned to them. Other high-ranking C.I.A. officials argued that the officers be allowed to transferred to other jobs at the agency, but they were overruled by Mr. Ratcliffe, who cited President Trump’s orders to roll back diversity, equity and inclusion initiatives.
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Suddenly, C.I.A. officers who had been assigned to help find the next generation of spy handlers — even those who had worked at recruiting at primarily white universities — were on the chopping block.
Liz Lyons, a C.I.A. spokeswoman, defended that decision.
“C.I.A. will be the ultimate meritocracy that employs, develops, empowers and retains officers who are steadfastly focused on our mission to recruit spies and collect foreign intelligence better than any other intelligence organization in the world,” she said.
A federal judge has halted the firings, putting in place a temporary injunction and then ordering the agency to hear appeals and consider the officers for other positions. Last week, the government appealed the judge’s order.
Defenders of the fired officers argue that there was no reason to let them go. They were not experts in human resources or diversity hiring. They were spies chosen for an initiative that was important to previous administrations.
“There are no D.E.I. officers, there are only intelligence officers at C.I.A.,” said Darrell Blocker, a former senior C.I.A. officer who led the agency’s training efforts and is Black.
The first Trump administration was not as hostile to efforts to diversify the agency. Under Gina Haspel, who, as the first woman to lead the agency, served as director for much of Mr. Trump’s first term, the C.I.A. continued recruiting diverse candidates.
In 2020, the agency created its first television streaming advertisement, to demonstrate to women and minorities that the agency valued inclusivity, according to one official at the time.
The one-minute ad shows a group of officers — people of color, women and white men — being brought into the agency. A veteran employee who lectures to the recruits is Black. A language expert is of South Asian descent. The senior officers who order an overseas operation are women. And a case officer who executes a brush pass with a source in the field is a Black woman.
Now, the C.I.A. has created a new recruiting video. It focuses on technology and showcases a whiter group of officers, according to people who have seen it.
It is not the first retreat from diversity in the history of American intelligence. The spy organization that preceded the C.I.A. prized diversity in a way that its successor did not in its early years.
Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, the director of the agency’s predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, recruited women and Black Americans to be among his “glorious amateurs” conducting covert operations during World War II.
In a speech after the O.S.S. was shuttered — and before the C.I.A. took its place — General Donovan highlighted the diversity of the group he had assembled.
Image
Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, the first director of the C.I.A.’s predecessor organization, the Office of Strategic Services, at the White House in 1945.Credit...Associated Press
“We have come to the end of an unusual experiment,” he said. “This experiment was to determine whether a group of Americans constituting a cross-section of racial origins, of abilities, temperaments and talents, could risk an encounter with the long-established and well-trained enemy organizations.”
While the Pentagon has begun purging material that celebrates the diversity of the armed services, the C.I.A. has not started editing its history. The agency’s website still has a page highlighting General Donovan’s quote and the contributions of Black, Japanese American, Hispanic and female O.S.S. officers.
“Bill Donovan recognized that diversity was our strength,” Mr. Blocker said.
But General Donovan’s commitment to a diverse force did not carry over when the C.I.A. was established in 1947.
“Despite Donovan’s best measures, it was basically: ‘OK little ladies, go back to the kitchen,’” Mr. Blocker said.
It was only after the fall of the Berlin Wall that change began on a larger scale.
John McLaughlin, a former deputy director of the agency, said perceptions about the agency’s needs began to shift.
“From that point on, it was commonly understood that diversity was not simply something nice to have, it was a business requirement,” Mr. McLaughlin said. “You really needed people who could blend in, in different parts of the world, and who didn’t look like me. I blend in in Ireland and that’s not useful to anyone.”
The push for a more diverse work force intensified after the Sept. 11 attacks, as the Middle East and terrorism became top priorities. Members of Congress criticized the agency for not having enough Arabic, Dari and Pashto speakers, and too few officers focused on the Middle East and Central Asia.
Mr. McLaughlin said the C.I.A. brought in analysts who had family ties and cultural knowledge of the countries and societies they studied, in addition to deep academic knowledge.
Teams of officers that include a range of experiences and backgrounds can be more adept at reading between the lines of pronouncements from authoritarian governments, and more aware of cultural differences in the way others express themselves.
“The point is, if someone has grown up in another culture or at least experienced it, they’re going to have a different perspective,” Mr. McLaughlin said. “And you want a variety of perspectives in the room.”
Not everyone buys the argument that Chinese Americans make better case officers in Beijing than anyone else.
When he was running the C.I.A.’s Near East Division, Daniel Hoffman, a retired senior clandestine services officer, said he worked hard to eliminate any bias in promotions and potential discrimination, and to ensure that promotions were based on merit.
That, he said, made for a stronger and more diverse agency.
But recruiting spies and stealing secrets overseas is all about good tradecraft and language ability, Mr. Hoffman said.
Mr. Hoffman, who developed fluency in four languages while serving at the C.I.A., said the agency had an impressive record of training non-Chinese American officers to master Mandarin.
For Mr. Hoffman, promoting people solely because they were female or from a minority background was counterproductive, but he said ensuring that no one was held back because of their sex, ethnicity or gender reflected the nation’s core values and made the C.I.A. stronger.
“We just need the best people at the agency,” Mr. Hoffman said. “We need to hire and promote the best people without any predisposed bias.”
Mr. Blocker said he did not disagree with the idea that any talented officer could be trained in good tradecraft and language skills. But he said the most effective stations he served in had a diverse group of officers.
Image
Mr. Blocker received a map of the African continent as a tribute to his career when he retired from the C.I.A.Credit...Madeline Tolle for The New York Times
He grew up on Okinawa and served in South Korea during a stint in the Air Force. When he came to the C.I.A. in 1990, he knew he wanted to work on Asian issues. He spent his first months as a Soviet weapons and tactics analyst specializing in North Korea.
He intended to make his career as an Asia specialist, until he met William Mosebey Jr.
“This guy knew more about Africa than anyone I’d have ever met,” Mr. Blocker said. Mr. Mosebey could get any African leader on the phone, hired a diverse bench of officers and taught them how to recruit any kind of source.
“As much as I didn’t want to be a Black dude going to Africa, after meeting Bill Mosebey, it changed my life,” Mr. Blocker said.
Mr. Mosebey, who was white, believed in the importance of having people of many perspectives in his stations, and persuaded Mr. Blocker to join his team.
“Black officers in the Africa division could blend in more easily than white officers of the past, but we always had, and needed, a good blend of people: Black, white, male, female,” Mr. Blocker said. “I have served in a number of stations. I have never served where they didn’t have another Black officer.”
Former officials said that, in essence, was why the C.I.A. tried to pursue diversity: to lean into the competitive advantage that American society offers.
“This is not kumbaya,” Mr. McLaughlin said. “The whole idea of wokeism is silly in this context. Diversity is not a nice to have, it is a business requirement.”
Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades.
See more on: John Ratcliffe, Donald Trump, National Intelligence Estimates
2. U.S. Special Operations Command hosts first ever International Commander's Forum to build generational relationships during Special Operations Forces Week 2025
SOF is the premier partnership force.
America First, Allies Always - Allies are America's Asymmetric Advantage.
If we want to win against China, in either strategic competition or war, we will need our allies.
It is all about relationships that are sustained over time.
Excerpts:
“In today's contested world SOF does not go alone. They go first, but they also go with partners. SOF's ability to work by, with and through international partners pays huge dividends on our border, in the Indo-Pacific and around the world,” said Hegseth. “Partners, as I see so many of our partners right here in the front, are central to how SOF works. They must believe that America is strong, that peace through strength is real, then they want to come into our orbit and be force multipliers. I'm talking about generational relationships that we have built with partner forces around the globe.”
"The fusion of what we have in this room — interagency, industry, academia, practitioners, and policymakers — is tied together and galvanized towards irregular and asymmetric options," said Fenton. "We're the scalpel, but when the time comes, we can bring the hammer too."
A special operations officer from Japan reflected on his relationship with U.S. SOF.
“My relationship with U.S. SOF has been built on trust, mutual respect, and shared experiences in the field. We’ve trained, planned, and operated together—not as separate forces, but as one team with a common mission. That connection has only deepened over time. Generational partnerships ensure that knowledge, values, and strategic alignment are passed down and sustained. I was surprised and deeply moved when I discovered that my jump buddy from 1st SFG ten years ago was now serving as J3-I Director, USSOCOM as my counterpart. In today’s rapidly evolving threat environment, it’s not just about the mission at hand—it’s about building a legacy of trust and collaboration that empowers future operators and leaders,” he said. “I want to express my deepest gratitude to the SOCOM community. Your commitment, humility, and professionalism have inspired me throughout my journey. To my partners—let’s continue building something greater than ourselves. The mission continues, and so does our unbreakable bond.”
U.S. Special Operations Command hosts first ever International Commander's Forum to build generational relationships during Special Operations Forces Week 2025
https://www.dvidshub.net/news/497641/us-special-operations-command-hosts-first-ever-international-commanders-forum-build-generational-relationships-during-special-operations-forces-week-2025?utm
Photo By Sgt. Cutler Brice | Gen. Bryan Fenton, commander U.S. Special Operations Command, and Command Sgt. Maj.... read more
TAMPA, FLORIDA, UNITED STATES
05.12.2025
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U.S. Special Operations Command kicked off Special Operations Forces Week 2025 with an International Commander’s Forum. The forum was attended by 311 participants from 61 countries with 78 Special Operations Forces units represented.
The Forum was incorporated this year directly based on recommendations after the 2024 SOF Week. USSOCOM’s international division recognized that the most valuable part of the week was the interaction between command teams. Maintaining strong networks, and developing generational relationships is strength of special operations.
Building generational relationships takes commitment. While SOF Week is fast paced, with the displays, panels, keynote speakers, so it was a deliberate effort to start the week with this Forum to set the tone. Gen. Bryan Fenton, commander U.S. Special Operations Command often says, “relationships are our competitive advantage.”
USSOCOM has always recognized the significant role that international partnerships play in accomplishing the mission of special operations forces around the globe. To grow and develop generational partnerships, the Command hosted more than 60 countries from around the world.
The conference was attended by King of Jordan Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein along with Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine and current and retired senior military leaders.
“In today's contested world SOF does not go alone. They go first, but they also go with partners. SOF's ability to work by, with and through international partners pays huge dividends on our border, in the Indo-Pacific and around the world,” said Hegseth. “Partners, as I see so many of our partners right here in the front, are central to how SOF works. They must believe that America is strong, that peace through strength is real, then they want to come into our orbit and be force multipliers. I'm talking about generational relationships that we have built with partner forces around the globe.”
"The fusion of what we have in this room — interagency, industry, academia, practitioners, and policymakers — is tied together and galvanized towards irregular and asymmetric options," said Fenton. "We're the scalpel, but when the time comes, we can bring the hammer too."
A special operations officer from Japan reflected on his relationship with U.S. SOF.
“My relationship with U.S. SOF has been built on trust, mutual respect, and shared experiences in the field. We’ve trained, planned, and operated together—not as separate forces, but as one team with a common mission. That connection has only deepened over time. Generational partnerships ensure that knowledge, values, and strategic alignment are passed down and sustained. I was surprised and deeply moved when I discovered that my jump buddy from 1st SFG ten years ago was now serving as J3-I Director, USSOCOM as my counterpart. In today’s rapidly evolving threat environment, it’s not just about the mission at hand—it’s about building a legacy of trust and collaboration that empowers future operators and leaders,” he said. “I want to express my deepest gratitude to the SOCOM community. Your commitment, humility, and professionalism have inspired me throughout my journey. To my partners—let’s continue building something greater than ourselves. The mission continues, and so does our unbreakable bond.”
A Jordanian special operations officer emphasized the strategic value of long-lasting relationships between allies.
“Our relationship is strategic, productive, and collaborative. This is an historical, long-lasting relationship that we will always maintain. Relationships continue to grow in unprecedented ways with an increase in joint combat operations and UAS development for both Special Operations organizations. Generational partnerships are also extremely important. We continue to build on our partnerships to reach a level of trust that leads us to greater interoperability, seamless integration, and eventual interdependence to fight together as force multipliers,” he said.
SOF employs a partnership model around the world to build partner nation security force capacity and capability. The intangible power of generational partnerships comes from thoughtful, deliberate, and persistent interactions that lead to partnerships, and this intentional effort is irreplaceable for advancing and protecting U.S. national security interests.
3. JSOC commander likely to be SOCOM pick, sources say
The only path to the Command of USSOCOM is through JSOC.
But this is an interesting possibility:
Chris Miller, a longtime special operator who served as acting defense secretary in the first Trump administration and remains close to the White House, also said Bradley is “likely” to be tapped. But Miller added that Bradley is also in the running for the nomination to become chief of naval operations. The CNO’s post has been vacant since January, when Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth fired Adm. Lisa Franchetti.
JSOC commander likely to be SOCOM pick, sources say
The White House “loves" Vice Adm. Mitch Bradley, but final decisions are not yet in.
By Patrick Tucker
Science & Technology Editor
May 13, 2025 09:30 PM ET
defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker
Vice Adm. Frank Bradley, center, and Command Sgt. Maj. Andrew Krogman, Joint Special Operations Command command team, lead a discussion at Kadena Air Base, Japan, on July 12, 2023. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
The White House “loves" Vice Adm. Mitch Bradley, but final decisions are not yet in.
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May 13, 2025 09:30 PM ET
By Patrick Tucker
Science & Technology Editor
May 13, 2025 09:30 PM ET
The Trump administration is expected to nominate Vice Adm. Frank “Mitch” Bradley to lead U.S. Special Operations Command, according to sources familiar with the matter.
Two former senior defense officials, a former senior military official from the special operations community, and a current senior military official said that Bradley, a Navy SEAL who now leads Joint Special Operations Command, is the frontrunner to replace Army Gen. Bryan Fenton, who took command of SOCOM in August 2022.
Chris Miller, a longtime special operator who served as acting defense secretary in the first Trump administration and remains close to the White House, also said Bradley is “likely” to be tapped. But Miller added that Bradley is also in the running for the nomination to become chief of naval operations. The CNO’s post has been vacant since January, when Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth fired Adm. Lisa Franchetti.
SOCOM officials declined to comment except to say that the choice rests with the White House.
Before he led JSOC, Bradley commanded Naval Special Warfare Development Group, better known as SEAL Team Six. He has also done “multiple tours in command of joint task forces, and was among the first to deploy into Afghanistan following the attacks of September 11, 2001,” according to his official bio. He holds a master’s degree in physics from the Naval Postgraduate School.
Several people who knew Bradley personally or professionally described him as highly competent, well-liked, and methodical in his approach to problems and the deployment of forces.
“You couldn’t ask for a better SOCOM commander at this time,” said one former defense official. “He understands both the use and the limitations of kinetic action in a way that I haven’t seen in other commanders. He knows when and when not to use” rapid, lethal force.
A former senior military official who remains close to SOCOM and the special operations community said the White House “loves Mitch because of what [naval special operations] are doing in Yemen. And he is a smart and personable guy.”
4. How the Osama bin Laden Raid Gave China Its New Stealth Helicopter
I do not recall any other reporting about this over the years.
Excerpts:
Unfortunately for the Americans, the destruction of the downed experimental stealth Black Hawk wasn’t total. The tail section—the part damaged in the initial crash—survived. It was extensively photographed and taken into custody by a Pakistani military that had just had its pride grievously wounded. More ominously, out of spite, the Pakistani military allowed for Chinese military scientists to closely inspect the tail section.
The tail section was a modified five-or-six-blade tail rotor, and had distinctive angular features that one would normally find on a stealth aircraft. The U.S. government has never publicly acknowledged the MH-X stealth helicopter program, although it is clear that these helicopters incorporated many lessons learned from developing the canceled RAH-66 Comanche stealth attack helicopter.
How the Osama bin Laden Raid Gave China Its New Stealth Helicopter
May 13, 2025
By: Brandon J. Weichert
The National Interest · · May 13, 2025
Topic: Security
Blog Brand: The Buzz
Region: Asia
Tags: China, Helicopter, Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan, and Technology
May 13, 2025
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SEAL Team Six accidentally crashed a helicopter during the famed 2011 raid. Out of spite for its own humiliation, Pakistan forwarded the wreckage to China—with disastrous results.
Fourteen years ago, one of the most daring raids in modern U.S. military history took place. Most have remembered it fondly as a necessary closure for the Americans who had lived through the terror of the 9/11 attacks. Historians typically agree it was President Barack Obama’s finest hour.
Yet we often view moments like these through rose-tinted glasses. And the Bin Laden raid on May 2, 2011, was one of those moments that had consequences far more significant than the death of the world’s most wanted terrorist. Notably, the raid resulted in the destruction of one of America’s most secretive stealth helicopters—and its remains were quickly handed over to China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which put it to use in building its own.
SEAL Team Six Lost a Helicopter During the Bin Laden Raid
Having tasked the Navy SEALs with flying from Afghanistan into neighboring Pakistan, the American special forces group flew in two previously classified stealth variants of the ubiquitous Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopter. The trip took around 90 minutes.
Once the SEALs got into Pakistan, they had to evade sophisticated radar networks. (Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh argues that the Pakistanis likely turned their radars off, as they were aware the Americans were coming and wanted plausible deniability. Others have rejected this explanation. It matters little today.)
What is clear is that the use of America’s previously-unknown stealth helicopters was key to avoiding Pakistani air defenses. And suitably concealed, the SEALs swiftly arrived at the compound where Osama bin Laden, the mastermind behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks, had holed up. Nestled in a walled compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan—just down the road from the Pakistani military’s version of West Point—the stealthy Black Hawks appeared overhead.
That’s when the first problems occurred. One of the helicopters hovered just above the courtyard at the Abbottabad complex. The experimental stealth helicopter, however, got too close to the high walls. Those walls, along with the unexpectedly high ground temperatures that night, conspired to trigger what’s known in the aviation community as a “vortex ring state” wherein the airflow was disrupted—prompting the Black Hawk’s tail to crash against the wall, rendering it unusable for takeoff.
Fortunately, the SEALs had planned for this redundancy by using two helicopters. Once the mission was complete—and bin Laden’s corpse had been secured—they went about pulling as much of the classified gear from the downed bird as possible, before destroying the body with plastic explosives.
Pakistan Sticks It to America—by Helping China
Unfortunately for the Americans, the destruction of the downed experimental stealth Black Hawk wasn’t total. The tail section—the part damaged in the initial crash—survived. It was extensively photographed and taken into custody by a Pakistani military that had just had its pride grievously wounded. More ominously, out of spite, the Pakistani military allowed for Chinese military scientists to closely inspect the tail section.
The tail section was a modified five-or-six-blade tail rotor, and had distinctive angular features that one would normally find on a stealth aircraft. The U.S. government has never publicly acknowledged the MH-X stealth helicopter program, although it is clear that these helicopters incorporated many lessons learned from developing the canceled RAH-66 Comanche stealth attack helicopter.
This, of course, leads to the larger question: why did Obama and his team believe that it was necessary to humiliate Pakistan, an American ally and partner in the Global War on Terror, by violating its airspace and conducting such a brazen raid?
It was inevitable that bin Laden would be targeted somehow. What we know today, though, is that there was a real dispute within the Obama administration as to how that action should be taken. Notably, then-Vice-President Joe Biden and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates favored simply using a drone to annihilate the compound in the dead of night, thereby minimizing America’s military footprint in the city where Pakistan’s version of West Point was based and avoiding any unintended complications.
But national security decisions do not happen in a vacuum. Obama wanted to make a political show by being the man who got Bin Laden. With the advent of a close 2012 re-election campaign approaching, Obama wanted to open that race by ensuring everyone knew it was his decision that led to the end of America’s greatest enemy. Having a raucous Navy SEAL raid, while riskier, was preferable from a political standpoint than simply dropping some bombs on the compound from a drone.
Now China Has Advanced Helicopters
Today, however, this short-sighted political decision lives with us. Especially since the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) unveiled what many Western analysts have described as a “clone” of the Black Hawk stealth helicopter, the Z-20 stealth helicopter.
China’s stealthy Z-20 will prove to play a critical role whenever Beijing finally decides to strike hard against neighboring Taiwan. And it seems clear that the Chinese stealth helicopter program was helped along significantly by their access to America’s downed stealth helicopter.
In short, we got bin Laden. But in the process, America handed over one of its most unique weapons to the enemy in its next big war, China.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Wikimedia Commons.
The National Interest · by Trevor Filseth · May 13, 2025
5. Army to eliminate 2 Security Force Assistance Brigades, reassign experienced soldiers
Excerpts:
“The reason that we’re cutting those is to make room for or get more noncommissioned officers into the force. That’s where we’re hurting the most,” said Col. Dave Butler, spokesperson for the Army Chief of Staff. “We’re trying to fill the ranks up of the operational force and we have a lot of NCOs and junior officers in the SFAB formations.”
When Army officials looked at the mission of the two units, they decided there were “redundancies” in their missions, particularly in 4th SFAB’s focus on Europe, according to Butler.
“We need more soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers in squads, platoons and companies,” he said.
Army to eliminate 2 Security Force Assistance Brigades, reassign experienced soldiers
Security Force Assistance Brigades were stood up in 2017 to train and advise the military forces of U.S. allies. The Army now plans to eliminate two of the brigades to free up the experienced soldiers assigned to them.
Patty Nieberg
taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg
The Army plans to shutter two of its Security Force Assistance Brigades, formations stood up nearly eight years ago to train and advise the militaries of American partners and allies, according to officials.
Army officials confirmed to Task & Purpose that the 4th and 54th Security Force Assistance Brigades, or SFABs, will be closed, though no timetable for the move has been announced, leaving the Army with four remaining brigades. The 4th SFAB, based at Fort Carson, Colorado, concentrates its missions in Europe, while the 54th is an Indiana-based National Guard unit that augments active duty SFAB units across the world.
A senior Army official told Task & Purpose that the move will free up seasoned soldiers from SFAB duty to be reassigned to traditional line units like infantry and armor. SFAB units are, by design, heavy on soldiers who are already several years into their Army careers.
“The reason that we’re cutting those is to make room for or get more noncommissioned officers into the force. That’s where we’re hurting the most,” said Col. Dave Butler, spokesperson for the Army Chief of Staff. “We’re trying to fill the ranks up of the operational force and we have a lot of NCOs and junior officers in the SFAB formations.”
When Army officials looked at the mission of the two units, they decided there were “redundancies” in their missions, particularly in 4th SFAB’s focus on Europe, according to Butler.
“We need more soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers in squads, platoons and companies,” he said.
Since their inception in 2017, soldiers assigned to SFABs have worn distinctive brown berets and specialized in training conventional forces of U.S. allies and partner nations, like how to operate together in different environments, use certain types of military equipment, or employ certain tactics for their own forces. The units are mostly concentrated on working with partners from geographical regions in the Middle East, South America and Asia, where many U.S. allies train smaller and sometimes less professional militaries.
The move to shutter the units was laid out in an Army executive order issued last week. The order did not include a timeline or specifics on the changes, but Butler said the Army is going to establish operational planning teams to work out details of the unit closures.
Butler said the mission of the 4th SFAB is not needed for the relationship the Army has with partners in Europe. Since the invasion of Ukraine, the 4th SFAB has supported training for Ukrainian armed forces outside of the country and worked on improving cooperation among European and NATO allies.
“These are long-term existing relationships. We’ve been training together, building together for decades without the SFAB,” Butler said. “Where we envision SFABs to be is in a place where those relationships and that training didn’t exist or needed to be bolstered — but Europe is not a place like that.”
The Army stood up the first of the six SFAB units in 2017 to advise Afghan, Iraqi, and Peshmerga forces. The concept of a brigade dedicated to military training was later expanded to support other U.S. partner forces. In the unit’s early days, officials acknowledged that the Army had trouble recruiting soldiers for the SFAB because of a “negative association” with similar efforts like the transition teams that trained Iraqi security forces and the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands program.
There are no plans to stand down the other SFAB units, Butler said, adding that the Army is focusing on “prioritizing the traditional operational force.”
Soldiers with 1st SFAB at Fort Benning, Georgia work with partners in South America; 2nd SFAB at Fort Bragg, North Carolina train with African nations; 3rd SFAB, based at Fort Cavazos, Texas, work with Middle Eastern partners; 5th SFAB at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington work with countries in the Indo-Pacific region.
An Army advisor with the 5th Security Forces Assistance Brigade (SFAB) and a member of the Maldives National Defense Forces. Army photo by Maj. Sara Ingrao.
The 4th SFAB consists of fewer than 1,000 soldiers, according to an Army official familiar with the plan.
That official told Task & Purpose that shutting down the 4th SFAB could impact the 10th Special Forces Group, which is also based out of Fort Carson and focused on Europe. Similar to the SFAB’s mission to train and advise U.S. allies, Special Forces soldiers are also tasked with training American allies.
“I’m pretty sure [10 SFG] in some respect, maybe appreciated the SFAB being there because some of that stuff, that’s the low-hanging fruit of partner-partner and ally work that SFAB is doing,” the official said.
‘How do you replicate that anywhere else?’
The 54th SFAB is authorized at a strength of roughly 800 soldiers who provide teams of roughly four to 12 National Guardsmen to augment active duty SFAB missions. They have also deployed as advisors to response teams for hurricanes, power outages and floods. They are headquartered in Indiana with battalions in Florida, Georgia, Texas, Ohio and Illinois.
No plans have been announced on where the 54th’s Guardsmen might be reassigned or offered other positions.
The 54th SFAB was stood up as a National Guard unit specifically designed to pull uniquely qualified soldiers from across the country. In fact, it was designated as the 54th to match the 50 states and four U.S. territories, “75% of which are represented in our brigade right now,” the unit’s Command Sgt. Maj. John Hoffman told Task & Purpose. In their civilian roles, he said, his soldiers are doctors, lawyers, and federal agents with the FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and the Drug Enforcement Agency. They even include a municipal judge.
“It’s a wide swath of America inside of that brigade and the reason it’s that way is because people come from all over the United States to join the brigade,” he said, adding that as National Guard members they skew older, meaning they understand risk better and have unique civilian experiences that pay off when advising partner nations. For instance, soldiers from his unit with experience working for Amazon and Walmart joined a mission in Moldova to help teach their forces about logistics.
“There’s nobody on any component of the Army that can tell you more about getting material in someone’s hand than Amazon or Walmart,” he said. “How do you replicate that anywhere else?”
Hoffman said SFABs are soldiers from conventional forces that teach skills “unconventionally” to foreign militaries.
“We teach it in an unconventional way because we don’t put an entire battalion on the ground to do it,” Hoffman said. “We put 12 bubbas and bubba-ettes on the ground to do it, and they come up with some innovative ways in order to teach these skills to our partners all around the world, bridging language and cultural gaps.”
SFABs were an initiative created under Gen. Mark Milley, the former Army Chief of Staff, who became embroiled in politics during President Donald Trump’s first term in office when he served as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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Patty is a senior staff writer for Task & Purpose. She’s reported on the military for five years, embedding with the National Guard during a hurricane and covering Guantanamo Bay legal proceedings for an alleged al Qaeda commander.
taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg
6. Special Operations cyber officer regains health with help of SOF resources
"Humans are more important than hardware" is not just a saying.
Special Operations cyber officer regains health with help of SOF resources
https://www.dvidshub.net/news/497824/special-operations-cyber-officer-regains-health-with-help-sof-resources?utm
Photo By Michael Bottoms | Lt. Cdr. Brandon Hill, Navy Maritime Cyber Warfare Officer (MCWO) assigned to U.S.... read more
TAMPA, FLORIDA, UNITED STATES
05.13.2025
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Life has its struggles. Its ups and downs. For U.S. Navy Lt. Cdr. Brandon Hill, his struggle was weight. Coming off an 18-month deployment from Bahrain, Hill gained a significant amount of weight. Checking into U.S. Special Operations Command he went through a physical assessment and the doctor told him he needed to make some lifestyle changes, and he join the Preservation of the Force and Family Program (POTFF) to assist.
The mission of POTFF is to optimize and sustain Special Operations Forces mission readiness, longevity and performance through integrated and holistic human performance programs designed to strengthen the Force and Family.
“POTFF helped in a myriad of ways, and, in a roundabout way, I want to explore how the Navy can implement something similar for non-SOF personnel. Physically, the facilities provided through two [Theater Special Operations Commands] helped fine-tune my personal strength and conditioning. By far, the gym facilities provided to SOCOM are some of the best I have trained at to date,” said Hill. “State-of-the-art equipment paired with a professional coaching staff who suggested certain movements and lifting techniques made me feel as if I was part of a top-notch college/professional football program. Psychologically, working with [U.S. Army] Maj. Maureen Mulholland has allowed me to focus on my emotional health to help me become the best version of me.”
The Goldsboro, North Carolina, native and U.S. Navy Maritime Cyber Warfare Officer (MCWO) became inspired to become a bodybuilder by his sister-in-law, Anna-Kate.
“She was living up the road in Savannah, Georgia, at the time working as a personal trainer and competed in multiple shows leading up to the OCB Tampa show, an amateur bodybuilding contest in November 2023. When she competed at OCB Tampa, I was going through very serious medical issues with my obesity. At my heaviest, I was 234 lbs. at 34% body fat and miserable. Joint pain, poor emotional health and terrible eating habits were the daily occurrence,” Hill said. “Case in point, I would leave SOCOM in the afternoons, find the nearest convenience store or Publix, snag two king-sized candy bars, and chow down over my afternoon commute. These poor habits led to very serious conversations with my [Primary Care Manager] about my health.”
Hill continued to explain how his sister-in-law motivated him to change.
“I arrived to SOCOM in very bad shape. When I watched Anna-Kate compete, a spark ignited within me like no tomorrow. While observing her and several other athletes, many of whom were other military members in the Tampa Bay area, I told myself, ‘2024, it’s my turn to get on that stage.’”
Hill began a year-long journey and gradually got in excellent shape and regained his good health.
“I became a client of local OCB legend and U.S Navy Veteran, Coach Marcus Harris – a Yorton Cup Champion, the Super Bowl of the OCB Federation. Under his coaching and guidance, he provided a rigorous diet and strength conditioning program tailored to my specific abilities. Within 11 months, I lost 65 pounds and 24% body fat,” said Hill.
Hill also credits his journey back to good health to the positive work environment at the command’s headquarters.
“Frankly, the best command I’ve been assigned to, period. First, I’ll start with the leadership at the very top. Let my story be an example of what it means to have great leaders. Great leaders directly correlate to increased morale, individual confidence and overall performance. I remember there was one morning where we did a command run. Gen. Fenton [commander of U.S. SOCOM] and Rear Adm. Sands [former Chief of Staff of U.S. SOCOM] were both in attendance,” said Hill. “I walked up to Rear Adm. Sands following our most recent leadership discussion to express how much I enjoyed his leadership talk. In that conversation, he asked about my time at SOCOM so far and I shared with him my weight loss journey. At the time, I had lost 40 pounds. As I am sharing this story, Rear Adm. Sands called over Gen. Fenton who was standing close to us to share my good news. The fact that both took time out of their busy morning to congratulate me skyrocketed my confidence.”
Additionally, Hill credits his direct supervisor for creating a positive work environment.
“The J3 Cyber and Electronic Warfare Chief, Col Alphanso “Fonz” Adams, is a leader who I aspire to be like one day. His leadership style is textbook when we talk about what it means to be a leader,” said Hill. “I have never witnessed him having a bad day. Far too often, we see leaders who put their emotions on full display. He is someone who arrives to work daily and greets the team with a smile or handshake, takes time to listen to concerns, and routinely engages in small talk to ask how things are going. The ‘human’ factor is very much prevalent with him and really makes life working in J3 Cyber and EW incredibly easy.”
Last, Hill is thankful for his wife, Candace’s, who also provided the support he needed to go from low self-esteem to the confidence he possesses today.
“Since Brandon started this personal voyage, I have been so proud to watch him change from the inside out. I watched him set a goal, stay committed and get his body ready for competition,” said Candace. “He went from low confidence and not knowing where to begin to being self-assured and currently encourages others who face similar struggles. He has proven if you want to see change you have to be willing to change.”
The command and POTFF stay true to the first SOF Truth – “Humans are more important than hardware.” Hill’s story is but one example of that truth.
7. Is AI the future of America's foreign policy? Some experts think so
My Q course classmate Russ Berkoff has long been at the forefront of defense technology innovation since the 1990s. He was always a man ahead of his time (and ahead of the rest of us).
Excerpts:
In one study, researchers at the lab tested eight AI models by feeding them tens of thousands of questions on topics such as deterrence and crisis escalation to determine how they would respond to scenarios where countries could each decide to attack one another or be peaceful.
The results revealed that models such as OpenAI's GPT-4o and Antropic's Claude were "distinctly pacifist," according to CSIS fellow Yasir Atalan. They opted for the use of force in fewer than 17% of scenarios. But three other models evaluated — Meta's Llama, Alibaba Cloud's Qwen2, and Google's Gemini — were far more aggressive, favoring escalation over de-escalation much more frequently — up to 45% of the time.
What's more, the outputs varied according to the country. For an imaginary diplomat from the U.S., U.K. or France, for example, these AI systems tended to recommend more aggressive — or escalatory — policy, while suggesting de-escalation as the best advice for Russia or China. It shows that "you cannot just use off-the-shelf models," Atalan says. "You need to assess their patterns and align them with your institutional approach."
Russ Berkoff, a retired U.S. Army Special Forces officer and an AI strategist at Johns Hopkins University, sees that variability as a product of human influence. "The people who write the software — their biases come with it," he says. "One algorithm might escalate; another might de-escalate. That's not about the AI. That's about who built it."
Is AI the future of America's foreign policy? Some experts think so
By
Scott Neuman
NPR · by By · May 12, 2025
President Trump and Vice President Vance meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office at the White House on Feb. 28. Researchers are testing AI's potential for coming up with agreements to end the war in Ukraine. Andrew Harnik/Getty Images
At the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, the Futures Lab is working on projects to use artificial intelligence to transform the practice of diplomacy.
With funding from the Pentagon's Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office, the lab is experimenting with AIs like ChatGPT and DeepSeek to explore how they might be applied to issues of war and peace.
While in recent years AI tools have moved into foreign ministries around the world to aid with routine diplomatic chores, such as speech-writing, those systems are now increasingly being looked at for their potential to help make decisions in high-stakes situations. Researchers are testing AI's potential to craft peace agreements, to prevent nuclear war and to monitor ceasefire compliance.
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The Defense and State departments are also experimenting with their own AI systems. The U.S. isn't the only player, either. The U.K. is working on "novel technologies" to overhaul diplomatic practices, including the use of AI to plan negotiation scenarios. Even researchers in Iran are looking into it.
Futures Lab Director Benjamin Jensen says that while the idea of using AI as a tool in foreign policy decision-making has been around for some time, putting it into practice is still in its infancy.
Doves and hawks in AI
In one study, researchers at the lab tested eight AI models by feeding them tens of thousands of questions on topics such as deterrence and crisis escalation to determine how they would respond to scenarios where countries could each decide to attack one another or be peaceful.
The results revealed that models such as OpenAI's GPT-4o and Antropic's Claude were "distinctly pacifist," according to CSIS fellow Yasir Atalan. They opted for the use of force in fewer than 17% of scenarios. But three other models evaluated — Meta's Llama, Alibaba Cloud's Qwen2, and Google's Gemini — were far more aggressive, favoring escalation over de-escalation much more frequently — up to 45% of the time.
What's more, the outputs varied according to the country. For an imaginary diplomat from the U.S., U.K. or France, for example, these AI systems tended to recommend more aggressive — or escalatory — policy, while suggesting de-escalation as the best advice for Russia or China. It shows that "you cannot just use off-the-shelf models," Atalan says. "You need to assess their patterns and align them with your institutional approach."
Russ Berkoff, a retired U.S. Army Special Forces officer and an AI strategist at Johns Hopkins University, sees that variability as a product of human influence. "The people who write the software — their biases come with it," he says. "One algorithm might escalate; another might de-escalate. That's not about the AI. That's about who built it."
The root cause of these curious results presents a black box problem, Jensen says. "It's really difficult to know why it's calculating that," he says. "The model doesn't have values or really make judgments. It just does math."
CSIS recently rolled out an interactive program called "Strategic Headwinds" designed to help shape negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. To build it, Jensen says, researchers at the lab started by training an AI model on hundreds of peace treaties and open-source news articles that detailed each side's negotiating stance. The model then uses that information to find areas of agreement that could show a path toward a ceasefire.
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At the Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT) in Spain, Executive Director Mark Freeman thinks that kind of artificial intelligence tool could support conflict resolution. Traditional diplomacy has often prioritized lengthy, all-encompassing peace talks. But Freeman argues that history shows this approach is flawed. Analyzing past conflicts, he finds that faster "framework agreements" and limited ceasefires — leaving finer details to be worked out later — often produce more successful outcomes.
A Ukrainian tank crew loads ammunition onto a Leopard 2A4 tank during a field training exercise at an undisclosed location in Ukraine on April 30. Researchers are looking into using AI in negotiations over the war in Ukraine. Genya Savilov/AFP via Getty Images
"There's often a very short amount of time within which you can usefully bring the instrument of negotiation or mediation to bear on the situation," he says. "The conflict doesn't wait and it often entrenches very quickly if a lot of blood flows in a very short time."
Instead, IFIT has developed a fast-track approach aimed at getting agreement early in a conflict for better outcomes and longer-lasting peace settlements. Freeman thinks AI "can make fast-track negotiation even faster."
Andrew Moore, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, sees this transition as inevitable. "You might eventually have AIs start the negotiation themselves … and the human negotiator say, 'OK, great, now we hash out the final pieces,'" he says.
Moore sees a future where bots simulate leaders such as Russia's Vladimir Putin and China's Xi Jinping so that diplomats can test responses to crises. He also thinks AI tools can assist with ceasefire monitoring, satellite image analysis and sanctions enforcement. "Things that once took entire teams can be partially automated," he says.
Strange outputs on Arctic deterrence
Jensen is the first to acknowledge potential pitfalls for these kinds of applications. He and his CSIS colleagues have sometimes been faced with unintentionally comic results to serious questions, such as when one AI system was prompted about "deterrence in the Arctic."
Human diplomats would understand that this refers to Western powers countering Russian or Chinese influence in the northern latitudes and the potential for conflict there.
The AI went another way.
When researchers used the word "deterrence," the AI "tends to think of law enforcement, not nuclear escalation" or other military concepts, Jensen says. "And when you say 'Arctic,' it imagines snow. So we were getting these strange outputs about escalation of force," he says, as the AI speculated about arresting Indigenous Arctic peoples "for throwing snowballs."
Jensen says it just means the systems need to be trained — with such inputs as peace treaties and diplomatic cables, to understand the language of foreign policy.
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"There's more cat videos and hot takes on the Kardashians out there than there are discussions of the Cuban Missile Crisis," he says.
AI can't replicate a human connection — yet
Stefan Heumann, co-director of the Berlin-based Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, a nonprofit think tank working on the intersection of technology and public policy, has other concerns. "Human connections — personal relationships between leaders — can change the course of negotiations," he says. "AI can't replicate that."
At least at present, AI also struggles to weigh the long-term consequences of short-term decisions, says Heumann, a member of the German parliament's Expert Commission on Artificial Intelligence. "Appeasement at Munich in 1938 was viewed as a de-escalatory step — yet it led to catastrophe," he says, pointing to the deal that ceded part of Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany ahead of World War II. "Labels like 'escalate' and 'de-escalate' are far too simplistic."
AI has other important limitations, Heumann says. It "thrives in open, free environments," but "it won't magically solve our intelligence problems on closed societies like North Korea or Russia."
Contrast that with the wide availability of information about open societies like the U.S. that could be used to train enemy AI systems, says Andrew Reddie, the founder and faculty director of the Berkeley Risk and Security Lab at the University of California, Berkeley. "Adversaries of the United States have a really significant advantage because we publish everything … and they do not," he says.
Reddie also recognizes some of the technology's limitations. As long as diplomacy follows a familiar narrative, all might go well, he says, but "if you truly think that your geopolitical challenge is a black swan, AI tools are not going to be useful to you."
Jensen also recognizes many of those concerns, but believes they can be overcome. His fears are more prosaic. Jensen sees two possible futures for the role of AI systems in the future of American foreign policy.
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"In one version of the State Department's future … we've loaded diplomatic cables and trained [AI] on diplomatic tasks," and the AI spits out useful information that can be used to resolve pressing diplomatic problems.
The other version, though, "looks like something out of Idiocracy," he says, referring to the 2006 film about a dystopian, low-IQ future. "Everyone has a digital assistant, but it's as useless as [Microsoft's] Clippy."
NPR · by By · May 12, 2025
8. In High-Stakes Negotiations, Trump’s Opponents Are Learning His Patterns
I would have thought a hallmark of the President's unconventional diplomacy is that it is unpredictable and without pattern.
In High-Stakes Negotiations, Trump’s Opponents Are Learning His Patterns
President Trump often takes maximalist positions, only to back down and declare a win. His opponents are catching on.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/13/us/politics/trump-ukraine-china-iran-negotations.html?utm
In recent weeks, President Trump has backed off, to varying degrees, on several of his plans.Credit...Eric Lee/The New York Times
By David E. Sanger
David E. Sanger has reported on national security issues for more than four decades at the Times and writes often on the revival of superpower conflict, the subject of his latest book.
May 13, 2025
Updated 6:43 p.m. ET
President Trump has long reveled in his reputation as a maximalist, issuing a huge demand, creating a crisis and setting off a high-pressure negotiation.
But increasingly often, he ends up backing down and simply declaring a win. His opponents appear to be catching on, sharpening their tactics based on Mr. Trump’s patterns and his unapologetically transactional attitude toward diplomacy.
The dynamic has played out repeatedly in recent weeks as Mr. Trump backed off, to varying degrees, on his plans to transform Gaza into the “Riviera of the Middle East,” turn Canada into the 51st state and beat China into submission with tariffs.
Now, two very different tests are emerging. One is over where Mr. Trump stands, with America’s biggest allies or with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, on preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty and safety in any cease-fire deal. The other, with Iran, may determine whether he is really willing to stand aside and let Israel bomb Iran — or join in, despite the risks — if he cannot extract a better nuclear deal than what President Barack Obama got, and cut off Iran’s pathway to a bomb.
Both those negotiations lack the numeric symmetries of tariff negotiations. Thousands if not millions of lives are potentially at stake. Both involve decades of grievance, dating back to the Iranian revolution and the breakup of the Soviet Union.
And Russia and Iran appear to be honing their strategies after watching Mr. Trump in action. Emissaries from those countries are hinting to Mr. Trump’s negotiator, Steve Witkoff, that there may be some investment opportunities for Americans if the United States eases off its demands. Mr. Witkoff, like Mr. Trump, has a history in real estate.
Image
Emissaries from Russia and Iran have hinted to Mr. Trump’s negotiator, Steve Witkoff, that there may be some investment opportunities for Americans if the United States eases off its demands.Credit...Eric Lee/The New York Times
China proved an interesting example of Mr. Trump taking a maximalist approach only to climb down later. And in that case, too, Beijing appeared to be watching and learning Mr. Trump’s patterns.
When Mr. Trump placed tariffs on Chinese-made goods more than a month ago, he warned Beijing’s leaders, and those of other nations on the receiving end of his “reciprocal” tariffs, “Do not retaliate.” Defiance was useless. The best deals would come for those who showed up in Washington early, with a list of concessions.
President Xi Jinping of China ignored that advice. He matched the tariffs and matched again, until the figure on China’s imports to the United States hit an eye-watering 145 percent. For five weeks, Mr. Xi followed the road toward mutually assured economic destruction. Inflation and shortages loomed. Cargo ships turned around.
It took Mr. Trump roughly 40 days to back down, agreeing to an initial 30 percent tariff — still punishingly high — with no consequential Chinese concessions other than an agreement to work things out over the next 90 days.
The climb-down was so striking that it set off a predictable market rally that has now stretched over two days, Mr. Trump’s ultimate measure of approval.
But it also clarified Washington’s goals. Ever since Mr. Trump began slapping tariffs on U.S. adversaries and allies alike, central questions have loomed: Were tariffs, in the president’s mind, a mechanism to reshape the global trading order? To force a re-industrialization of America, even to produce products it makes little sense to make in America? Or is he envisioning a new source of income intended to supplement taxes to pay for a government that for 30 years has spent far more than it takes in?
Our economics reporters — based in New York, London, Brussels, Berlin, Hong Kong and Seoul — are digging into every aspect of the tariffs causing global turmoil. They are joined by dozens of reporters writing about the effects on everyday people.
Here’s our latest reporting on tariffs and economic policy.
At various moments, Mr. Trump has suggested all three were at play. But it now seems evident that what really excites him is using the tariffs as a cudgel, and to make his minimum 10 percent tariff on all foreign goods look like a bargain, even if it is onerous to consumers. Everything above that number is highly negotiable.
“President Trump’s willingness to use whatever economic means necessary to bring our trading partners to the table appears to be working in the short term,” Michael B. Froman, who served as United States Trade Representative under Mr. Obama, said on Tuesday. “A slew of negotiations are underway, and concepts of a plan have been agreed to,” he said.
“The question is to what end, and at what cost?” asked Mr. Froman, now the president of the Council on Foreign Relations. “Will his negotiating tactics cause lasting damage, including making it more difficult to get partners to work with us on other important priorities, which undermines potential economic wins?”
In the case of China, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent set some narrow goals, which sounded very much like the Biden administration’s rationale for placing export controls on chips and chip-making equipment headed for China, and to block Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant, from the U.S. market.
“We do not want a generalized decoupling from China,” Mr. Bessent said Monday on CNBC. “But what we do want is a decoupling for strategic necessities.”
He now has 90 days to work out what that looks like, and to see if China cracks down further on exporters of fentanyl, another effort that dates back to the Biden era.
Image
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has set some narrow goals in the negotiations with China.Credit...Pete Marovich for The New York Times
While those talks drag into the summer — the 90-day period will expire in mid-August, unless it is extended — it seems likely that the critical moment will come in the negotiations with Russia and Iran.
Over the weekend, Mr. Trump reluctantly joined another big demand, this one against Russia. It was issued by Europe’s top leaders during a visit to Kyiv, after they called the American president and agreed on the language. It gave Russia until Monday to agree to a 30-day cease-fire.
Mr. Putin ignored the deadline, betting he would pay little price. Instead, he ordered drone attacks on Ukraine, and offered a negotiating session with Ukraine on Thursday in Istanbul. Mr. Trump leaped to endorse the idea, abandoning the condition that a cease-fire had to come first, so Ukraine was not negotiating while facing a Russian onslaught.
Mr. Trump had also offered on Monday to show up at the talks himself as he made his way home from the Middle East. But it seems unlikely Mr. Putin will be there, reducing the allure. On Tuesday, Mr. Trump said he would send Marco Rubio, now occupying dual roles as secretary of state and national security adviser, along with Mr. Witkoff and Keith Kellogg, his Ukraine adviser.
Mr. Putin clearly senses that Mr. Trump cares little about the sanctity of Ukraine’s borders or even who is responsible for the invasion. (Soon after taking office, Mr. Trump contended that Ukraine itself was responsible, contributing to the late-February blowup with President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office.)
Much of the conversation in Istanbul will focus on the control of territory that Russia now occupies, and whether Ukraine has to radically reduce its armaments, and whether NATO needs to pull back both troops and arms near Russian borders. Mr. Zelensky has vowed to attend, adding to the potential for a standoff. As Stephen Sestanovich, a Russia expert and longtime diplomat who wrote a book a decade ago entitled “Maximalist,” noted after a recent trip to Ukraine, ever since the Oval Office argument “the Ukrainians have found a way to combine gratitude with inflexibility and make it work for them.”
But in recent times, Mr. Putin, getting with the program, has dropped hints about joint Russian-American energy and mining operations, tempting a deal-hungry president to get something out of a Ukraine agreement, beyond his search for a Nobel Peace Prize. Mr. Witkoff sounded thrilled with that idea in an interview with Tucker Carlson.
Now the Iranians are trying a similar tactic.
After several weeks of conflicting statements about whether Iran could be allowed to continue enriching uranium, which can fuel a nuclear weapon, Mr. Witkoff said last week, in an interview with Breitbart, “we believe they cannot have enrichment, they cannot have centrifuges, they cannot have anything that allows them to build a weapon.”
The demands seemed pretty clear.
But the Iranians contend that Mr. Witkoff took a far more gentle approach in the negotiating room last weekend, and did not rule out allowing some nuclear activity in Iran. Meanwhile the Iranians, according to several Iranian and other officials, have begun floating ideas for nuclear energy joint ventures, perhaps with the United States, perhaps with Saudi Arabia, their regional rival. The key is all sanctions would be lifted and Iran would preserve some of the capabilities that Mr. Witkoff, and in recent days Mr. Trump, has suggested must be mothballed or dismantled.
On Tuesday in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, Mr. Trump said he was offering Iran “a new path and a much better path toward a far better and more hopeful future.” Then he said: “The time is right now for them to choose."
David E. Sanger covers the Trump administration and a range of national security issues. He has been a Times journalist for more than four decades and has written four books on foreign policy and national security challenges.
9. Cruz: Gift of Qatari jet to Trump ‘poses significant espionage’ concerns
I was surprised to read this from Senator Cruz. I think many of us had the same thought. But I would think that our counterintelligence personnel would have the technology to ensure there are no electronic devices or anything installed that could compromise the Air Force One.
Cruz: Gift of Qatari jet to Trump ‘poses significant espionage’ concerns
by Alexander Bolton - 05/13/25 11:52 AM ET
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/5297715-cruz-trump-qatar-air-force-one/?utm
Texas Sen. Ted Cruz (R) is warning that Qatar’s gift of a luxury Boeing 747-8 to the Trump administration to serve as the new Air Force One poses “significant espionage and surveillance problems,” a concern voiced by other lawmakers.
“I’m not a fan of Qatar. I think they have a really disturbing pattern of funding theocratic lunatics who want to murder us, funding Hamas and Hezbollah. And that’s a real problem,” Cruz said in an interview with CNBC’s “Squawk Box” Tuesday.
“I also think the plane poses significant espionage and surveillance problems,” he warned. “We’ll see how this issue plays out, but I certainly have concerns.”
The value of the plane is estimated at $400 million, which Qatar’s royal family offered as a gift to the United States ahead of Trump’s first major foreign trip of his second term to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
Trump has argued that only a “stupid person” would not accept the gift, but some experts and lawmakers are questioning whether it could be fully swept for eavesdropping or other foreign intelligence equipment.
Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.), the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, warned that using the Qatari plane would “pose immense counterintelligence risks by granting a foreign nation potential access to sensitive systems and communications.
Sen. Dick Durbin (Ill.), the senior Democrat on the Senate Judiciary Committee, noted the plane’s extensive electrical system would be very difficult to check thoroughly for potential security vulnerabilities.
“It is completely negligent and, as far as I’m concerned, reckless to think that Air Force One where the president is asked to function as our commander in chief in a situation room, making life-or-death decisions, is on a plane given to us by a foreign government with 200 miles of wiring in it,” he said.
Asked if Durbin is concerned about espionage, he replied: “I certainly am.”
“Two hundred miles of wiring in this plane? We’re going to go through every square inch of that to make certain the Qataris or some other government doesn’t have access to the most important decisions made by our president? This is irresponsible,” he said.
Durbin said he wants to hear Attorney General Pam Bondi testify before Congress about the approval of the Qatari gift.
“Remember, she was a paid agent of the Qatari government, a lobbyist, before she became attorney general,” he said.
10. HIMARS unleashed in Taiwan as China watches on
With all their military assets in the region they must have had a front row seat for this demonstration.
HIMARS unleashed in Taiwan as China watches on
Newsweek · by Ryan Chan · May 13, 2025
Taiwan, a self-ruled island under China's threat of force, conducted its first live-fire exercise with the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) supplied by the United States.
Newsweek has reached out to the Chinese Defense Ministry for comment by email.
Why It Matters
Communist China has claimed that Taiwan is an "inalienable part" of its territory, while its leader, President Xi Jinping, has vowed that China will "never promise to renounce the use of force" against the sovereign democracy, a U.S. security partner in the Indo-Pacific region.
The U.S. has maintained an unofficial relationship with Taiwan, after establishing diplomatic ties with China in 1979. Washington has also continued to supply "defensive weapons" to Taipei under the Taiwan Relations Act, making it the island's largest source of foreign arms.
What To Know
The Taiwanese military on Monday conducted a live-fire drill at Jiupeng Base in southern Pingtung County, marking the debut of the HIMARS on the island and demonstrating its "rapid deployment and next-generation strike capabilities," Taipei's defense ministry said.
#HIMARS debuts in #Taiwan, showcasing rapid deployment and next-generation strike capabilities.#ROCArmedForces pic.twitter.com/n0Uikc8jCX
— 國防部 Ministry of National Defense, ROC(Taiwan) (@MoNDefense) May 12, 2025
Taiwan's Central News Agency reported that 11 HIMARS launchers participated in the drill, each firing three rockets. Taiwan ordered a total of 29 launchers from the U.S., with the first 11 delivered last year and the remaining scheduled for delivery next year, the report added.
According to U.S. defense contractor Lockheed Martin, each HIMARS launcher can fire two types of munitions: either six Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets or a single ATACMS ballistic missile, formally known as the Army Tactical Missile System.
The GMLRS rocket, armed with a 200-pound warhead, has a range of over 43 miles, while the ATACMS missile can strike targets up to 186 miles away with a 500-pound warhead.
The HIMARS, which has proven its effectiveness in Ukraine's war against Russia, could be deployed to target Fujian—a Chinese province facing Taiwan—in the event of a conflict across the 110-mile-wide Taiwan Strait, a strategic waterway separating China and Taiwan.
The Taiwanese military conducts its first High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) live-fire test launch at Jiupeng Base in Pingtung County on May 12, 2025. The Taiwanese military conducts its first High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) live-fire test launch at Jiupeng Base in Pingtung County on May 12, 2025. I-HWA CHENG/AFP via Getty Images
Citing Taiwanese Army Colonel Ho Chih-chung, who is the deputy commander of the 58th Artillery Command, Lockheed Martin has also dispatched its personnel to Jiupeng Base to assist with technical issues during the live-fire exercise, the Central News Agency reported.
What People Are Saying
The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency said: "[Taiwan] will use this capability as a deterrent to regional threats and to strengthen homeland defense. Acquisition of HIMARS will contribute to [Taiwan's] goal of updating its military capability while further enhancing interoperability with the United States and other allies."
The Chinese Defense Ministry said: "We urge the U.S. side to ... immediately stop arming Taiwan ... Several pieces of U.S. weaponry won't be the magic straw that can save a drowning man; they are nothing but easy targets on the battlefields."
Lockheed Martin said: "Adversaries around the globe are becoming more sophisticated ... The Lockheed Martin HIMARS is a strategic capability, improving homeland and important asset defense while reducing overall mission costs."
What Happens Next
It remains to be seen whether Taiwan will place additional orders for HIMARS, as the U.S. had suggested the island increase its defense spending to help deter a Chinese attack.
About the writer
Ryan Chan is a Newsweek reporter based in Hong Kong, where he previously had over a decade of experience at a local newspaper, covering China and current events around the world. His focus is on security and defense issues in the Western Pacific region. He is a graduate of Hong Kong Baptist University. You can get in touch with Ryan by emailing r.chan@newsweek.com.
Newsweek · by Ryan Chan · May 13, 2025
11. Army jailbreak foiled at Fort Leavenworth
I cannot recall the last time something like this happened.
Army jailbreak foiled at Fort Leavenworth
armytimes.com · by Riley Ceder · May 12, 2025
Two inmates at a Defense Department maximum-security prison attempted to escape from the facility several weeks ago, according to a spokesperson for the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center.
Correctional officers at the Fort Leavenworth Army Corrections Brigade in Kansas intervened April 29 when a prisoner duo made a run for it, successfully ending their efforts.
“Two inmates sustained injuries during the incident, were treated, and returned to custody,” the spokesperson said. “Public safety was maintained throughout the incident. The attempted escape is under investigation.”
After the incident, purported footage of the attempted escape was uploaded to an X account entitled “U.S. Army WTF! moments,” along with the incorrect name of one escapee said to be depicted in the shared photograph.
The image depicted a man whose feet were caught in barbed wire atop a chain-link fence, his pants falling below his waist with his underwear exposed. Two individuals in uniform look to be standing on the hood of a patrol car, hoisting the escapee up.
The spokesperson told Military Times that the post inaccurately identified the individual in the photograph. The Army did not provide any more details regarding the circumstances of the near abscondment or the identities of those involved.
“As a matter of policy, we do not release inmate information,” the spokesperson said. “Further details are unavailable due to the ongoing investigation.”
About Riley Ceder
Riley Ceder is a reporter at Military Times, where he covers breaking news, criminal justice, investigations, and cyber. He previously worked as an investigative practicum student at The Washington Post, where he contributed to the Abused by the Badge investigation.
12. The U.S. Once Built Airplanes Quickly
The U.S. Once Built Airplanes Quickly
At its peak, a Ford factory produced one B-24 bomber an hour during World War II.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/the-u-s-once-built-airplanes-quickly-7e526511
By Bob Greene
May 13, 2025 4:48 pm ET
A Boeing plane takes off from Palm Beach International Airport in Florida, Feb. 16. Photo: Ben Curtis/Associated Press
How long should it take to build an airplane?
The current controversy is about Air Force One. Boeing in 2018 signed a contract to manufacture two presidential planes, with a delivery date of 2024. The jets still aren’t ready and by some accounts may not be until 2029. While the high-decibel debate about the propriety of accepting a plane as a gift from the Qatari royal family escalates, the delay at Boeing drags on.
There was a moment in America when the question of how quickly planes could be built had life-or-death urgency. It didn’t entail the various security complexities involved in tailoring a 747 for the White House. Yet it is one of the most astonishing tales of ingenuity in manufacturing history.
As 1939 began, the U.S. had fewer than 2,000 military aircraft. With World War II looming, President Franklin D. Roosevelt knew the country desperately needed to remedy the situation. He turned to America’s top manufacturers for help.
One of them was the Ford Motor Co. Henry Ford owned farmland in a place called Willow Run, around 30 miles from Detroit. In 1940 workers began constructing an enormous manufacturing-and-assembly plant and an airfield on the bucolic property. It was finished within six months.
After the Pearl Harbor attack, the plant was ready to mass-produce B-24 Liberators: bombers that weighed 18 tons, were 67 feet long and had wingspans of 110 feet. Could massive warplanes be built with the same assembly-line method as family automobiles? It had never been tried before.
Ford’s production genius, Charlie Sorensen, was put in charge. Soon 42,000 workers filled the factory floors in around-the-clock shifts. With so many Americans off fighting in Europe and the Pacific, some of the men and women at Willow Run had never done manufacturing jobs before. So a school was set up near the plant: Some 8,000 employees a week were taught to build airplanes.
Those four-engine B-24s, according to documents from Willow Run, each contained 1.2 million parts held together by more than 300,000 rivets. “Rosie the Riveter” entered the American lexicon, as women who had never before done such work helped manufacture the Liberators.
How long should it take to build an airplane? By the time Willow Run was operating at full capacity, a B-24 was rolling off the mile-long rural assembly line every 55 minutes. A Liberator an hour. The nation needed those planes, and it got them. By war’s end, factories across the U.S. had built nearly 300,000 military aircraft.
The aviators, soldiers and sailors came home victorious, and they started families. Those of us who were their children, and who grew up hearing their stories, could be excused for allowing ourselves to believe that when this country’s back is against the wall, there is nothing it can’t accomplish.
Mr. Greene’s books include “Duty: A Father, His Son, and the Man Who Won the War.”
13. How the Ivy League Earned Donald Trump’s Ire
How the Ivy League Earned Donald Trump’s Ire
Too many instructors at Harvard, Columbia and elsewhere are less interested in teaching and more interested in student indoctrination.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/how-the-ivy-league-earned-donald-trumps-ire-higher-education-colleges-universities-96631031
By Jason L. Riley
Follow
May 13, 2025 5:07 pm ET
Harvard University in Cambridge, Mass., May 5. Photo: Mel Musto/Bloomberg News
Columbia University is being commended for its response to anti-Israel vandals who last week took over a library, defaced school property—“Columbia will burn 4 the martyrs”—and wounded two public-safety officers.
In contrast to how the university handled last year’s student occupation of another building on campus, the police were summoned quickly, arrests were made, and dozens of students were suspended. Still, I’ll hold my applause for now.
Schools can drop charges and quietly reverse disciplinary actions, as they’ve done in the past, which is one reason these disruptions have continued. It’s clear that the troublemakers don’t take the administration’s warnings seriously. According to the Columbia Spectator, at least one of the students who was detained last week and subsequently suspended from school has been suspended twice before.
It’s difficult to fathom such behavior being tolerated in other settings. Could unhappy Costco customers take over a store, intimidate employees and other customers, lock managers in their offices, damage inventory, scribble calls to violence on the walls, and then walk away without paying the consequences? Yet unlawful demonstrations are common on campuses nationwide, even after repeated promises by administrators to crack down on such lawlessness and protect the rights of students who are in school to get an education.
College ought to be about sharpening your critical-thinking skills in the search for knowledge and understanding. At too many elite schools, the priority seems to be providing platforms for trendy social movements. This reality is animating the Trump administration’s dispute with higher education, which continues to escalate.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is now investigating whether Harvard’s hiring practices violated civil-rights statutes that bar discrimination based on race and sex. The Washington Free Beacon reported that since-deleted messages on the school’s website “bragged about increasing the number of ‘women, non-binary, and/or people of color’ on the faculty.”
The EEOC is probing whether Harvard discriminated against job applicants who were white, male, Asian or heterosexual. Between 2013 and 2023, the nonwhite share of the university’s tenure-track faculty rose by 11 percentage points, while the share of tenure-track faculty who were white men fell by 14 points. Given that the Supreme Court in 2023 scored Harvard for unconstitutional discrimination in student admissions, this is hardly a fishing expedition.
Education Secretary Linda McMahon has accused Harvard of political bias and declared it ineligible for new federal research grants. President Trump has threatened to revoke the school’s tax-exempt status, and Harvard could lose $9 billion in federal funds unless it meets a list of demands that includes vetting “all existing and prospective faculty” to ensure “viewpoint diversity” in each department. On Tuesday, the administration canceled $450 million in grants on top of the $2.2 billion the administration already froze.
Harvard is suing the administration to lift the federal freeze on grant money, and it denies any institutional bias. “I must refute your claim that Harvard is a partisan institution,” Alan Garber, the university’s president, said in response to Ms. McMahon’s allegation. “It is neither Republican nor Democratic. It is not an arm of any other political party or movement. Nor will it ever be.”
Yet empirical studies on the political leanings of academics, particularly in the humanities, tell a different story. A Carnegie Foundation faculty survey in 1999 found that 12% of professors called themselves conservative, down from 27% in 1969. “These vanishing conservative thinkers have not been replaced by moderate ones,” according to Jon Shields, a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College. “Since the late 1960s, self-identified liberal professors have become increasingly common on college campuses.”
Conservative representation in the social sciences and humanities has “practically disappeared” from many areas outside of economics, Mr. Shields wrote in a 2018 article for National Affairs. “Nearly every recent survey of the university places the percentage of conservative and Republican professors in these fields in the single digits.” For example, “Republicans make up 4% of historians, 3% of sociologists, and a mere 2% of literature professors.”
Intellectuals as a group have long leaned to the political left. Given who is attracted to teaching, a true balance of political viewpoints probably isn’t in the cards on most college campuses. What has changed over the decades isn’t so much whether Democrats or Republicans choose academia as a profession. Rather, it’s been the indulgence of instructors who are less interested in teaching and more interested in student indoctrination.
Students who should be taught how to develop their own minds and reach their own conclusions are instead being spoon-fed the conclusions of proselytizing professors. Universities are supposed to be dedicated to the unbiased search for truth. How about more teaching and less preaching?
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Journal Editorial Report: Paul Gigot interviews Jason Riley about his new book.
Appeared in the May 14, 2025, print edition as 'How the Ivy League Earned Donald Trump’s Ire'.
14. My Brush With Trump’s Thought Police
An anecdote or a policy?
The pendulum swings.
Opinion
Guest Essay
My Brush With Trump’s Thought Police
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/13/opinion/stiglitz-trump-dei.html?referringSource=articleShare&smid=nytcore-ios-share&utm
May 13, 2025
Credit...Allie Sullberg
Listen to this article · 6:34 min Learn more
By Joseph E. Stiglitz
Mr. Stiglitz, a professor at Columbia University, is a Nobel laureate in economics.
The email arrived in early February from the U.S. Embassy in Copenhagen, carrying a blunt message. It informed the organizers of a Danish lecture series — one I was soon scheduled to speak at — that the final portion of American funding would be released only after they signed a statement essentially saying they were in compliance with a U.S. executive order banning diversity, equity and inclusion.
It was a head-spinning turn of events; under President Joe Biden, attention to D.E.I. issues had been a requirement for receiving the grant. Unwittingly, Denmark seemed to have been swept into America’s culture wars.
Before the organizers at the University of Southern Denmark could respond, the U.S. State Department sent an even blunter message: The grant was “being terminated for the convenience of the U.S. government.” It concluded by thanking the Danes “for your partnering with the Department of State and God Bless America.”
Some partnership!
The stakes here were relatively small. The lecture series was respected, but not overly prominent, and the savings amounted to a minuscule $10,000. Sometimes, though, a small story reveals a great deal — in this case, about the priorities and obsessions of the Trump administration.
First, the two notices suggested there might have been no communication between the State Department and the embassy in Copenhagen — an apparent lack of coordination that we’re likely to see more of as the administration hollows out the government. A recent New York Times/Siena College survey noted that two-thirds of Americans thought the word “chaotic” “described President Trump’s second term in office well.
Second, the cutoff of funding was followed nearly two weeks later by another message to the university. (I viewed copies of all the emails.) It said that a recent court hearing prevented the State Department from holding up congressionally appropriated foreign aid funds and ordered it to make the financing available. It further ordered the department to “provide written notice of this order” to recipients of grants. Notifying the Danish university was as far as the administration went in complying with the court. The remaining funds haven’t been released yet, organizers say — typical of the Trump administration’s defiance of the courts.
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Most important, the episode showed the Trump administration’s willingness — indeed its determination — to extend its control to the smallest of ventures, in this case the remaining $10,000 for a university lecture series funded by its own embassy.
Ultimately, the dean of the Faculty of Humanities stepped in to provide the necessary money and I will deliver my lecture on Wednesday. If the school hadn’t had the resources, I would have gone anyway.
Ironically, the subject of my talk is my recent book, “The Road to Freedom: Economics and the Good Society,” in which I explain my view of what freedom really means, why it’s so important and what must be done to achieve it. I also discuss ways in which freedom gets suppressed.
A core element of freedom is the ability of each person to live up to his or her potential. A liberal education is essential for this to happen, because it helps students develop their skills and capabilities to the utmost, frees them from shibboleths, and enables them to think critically. But this kind of approach is threatening to authoritarianism, which wants to impose particular views on a nation’s citizens.
In the case of the Danish lecture series, simply discussing diversity, equity and inclusion was apparently deemed threatening to the administration, which asserts that those qualities, by their very nature, are discriminatory against the majority of the population. But Mr. Trump’s “1984”-ish thought police have not stopped at D.E.I. Climate change and gender are other terms that are being expunged.
Another core element of freedom — indeed something essential to its survival — is that power must be limited; there have to be checks and balances not just within government but within society. I have long warned that the concentration of wealth among a small percentage of the population would provide a fertile field for a demagogue, and that there was an ample supply of people who might play the part.
Universities, which protect academic freedom, are as important to this system of checks and balances as other civil rights protections like freedom of the press.
One of the main justifications for tenure is that it gives professors like me the freedom to speak out when we see the government doing something foolish, like imposing high tariffs on our allies, or something that might impair our freedom over the long run, such as what the Trump administration is doing in areas like immigration and national security.
Over time, as the partnership between government and universities in producing basic research grew, legislators recognized that a cutoff of federal funding would be disastrous, so they carefully inserted provisions to make sure there was due process if funds were canceled. Little did they imagine, I’m guessing, that the government would try to bypass these provisions.
The purpose of the lecture series in Denmark is to reinforce “that the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark share core democratic values.” The Trump administration’s actions have led many Danes to question whether that is, in fact, the case.
Denmark saw the termination of the lecture series money for what it was: an attack on the core foundations of freedom.
And, of course, the episode has taken place against the backdrop of Mr. Trump’s aggressive posture toward Greenland, the vast island overseen by Denmark. On March 4, Mr. Trump declared that the United States would gain control of Greenland “one way or the other.” The barely veiled threat was not received well, either by our close NATO ally Denmark or by Greenland itself.
When I was a graduate student, I was lucky enough to be the beneficiary of a Fulbright fellowship, which allowed me to study overseas, so I understand the importance of international knowledge sharing, as well as how it can help to enhance America’s soft power.
For decades, that soft power has been far more important in extending the country’s influence than our military power, as the political scientist Joseph Nye, who died last week, has pointed out.
This episode with the lecture series has been a lesson in civics and where America is today, and that’s perhaps why it’s received such attention in the Danish press and media. The Danes have had a front row view of the erosion of America’s democracy.
One of the longstanding aims of programs such as the speaker series at the University of Southern Denmark has been to enhance the understanding of America and what is going on in the country. Unintentionally, in this case, it may have been truly successful.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, a professor at Columbia University, is a 2001 recipient of the Nobel Prize in economic science, chief economist of the Roosevelt Institute and the author of “The Road to Freedom: Economics and the Good Society.”
The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.
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15. A.G. Sulzberger: A Free People Need a Free Press
We either support a free press or we don't.
We either believe that the Fourth Estate is necessary to protect democracy and to support the republic or we don't.
I love the Notre Dame story.
Opinion
A.G. Sulzberger: A Free People Need a Free Press
May 13, 2025, 6:26 p.m. ET
Credit...Will Matsuda for The New York Times
Listen to this article · 32:24 min Learn more
By A.G. Sulzberger
Mr. Sulzberger is the publisher of The New York Times.
This essay was originally delivered as a talk at the Notre Dame Kellogg Institute for International Studies on Tuesday.
The role of a free and independent press in a healthy democracy is under direct attack, with increasingly aggressive efforts to curtail and punish independent journalism. I don’t believe it’s an overstatement to say that this anti-press campaign threatens the special formula that has made the American model so successful for nearly 250 years.
A free people need a free press.
Across the world, we’ve seen democracy in retreat. And for aspiring strongmen seeking to undermine the laws and norms and institutions that underpin a healthy democracy, the free press is usually one of the first targets. It’s no secret why. Once you’ve constrained the ability of journalists to provide independent information to the public about those in power, it becomes far easier to act with impunity.
From its beginning, our nation has recognized journalism as an essential ingredient for democratic self-governance. The founding fathers enshrined this insight in the First Amendment, making the press the only profession explicitly protected in the Constitution. The generations of presidents, lawmakers and Supreme Court justices that followed largely championed and defended press freedoms.
Behind their support was a bipartisan recognition that the press plays a crucial role in our success as a nation. Three roles, actually, each of which also maps precisely to current challenges undermining the nation’s civic health:
● As a historic surge of misinformation erodes our shared reality, the press ensures the flow of trustworthy news and information the public needs to make decisions, whether about elections, the economy or their lives.
● As polarization and tribalism strain our societal bonds, the press fosters the mutual understanding that allows a diverse, divided nation to come together with common purpose.
● As rising inequality and impunity undermine confidence in the American promise, the press asks the tough questions and exposes the hidden truths that enable the public to hold powerful interests accountable.
All over the world, we have seen escalating pressure on the ability of the press to play these roles.
A record number of journalists have been killed or jailed in recent years. Many more are subjected to campaigns of harassment, intimidation, surveillance and censorship. Those efforts have been perhaps most obvious and intense in authoritarian states like China and Russia. But a more insidious playbook for undermining the press has emerged in places like Hungary and India. Places where democracy persists but in a more conditional way under leaders who were elected legitimately and then set about undermining checks on their power.
The experience in those eroding democracies offers sobering lessons in how attacks on journalists are often precursors to attacks on a broader suite of democratic institutions, rights and norms, such as free expression, fair competition and the evenhanded administration of justice.
This anti-press playbook is now being used here in this country — and it could not come at a more difficult time for the American press.
The business model that funded original reporting is failing. About a third of all newsroom jobs have disappeared in the past 15 years. Hundreds of newspapers have gone out of business, and they continue to close at a rate of more than two a week. That economic pressure has been increased by the difficulty of operating in an information ecosystem dominated by a handful of tech giants. They control the flow of attention online, but most have shown something between apathy and open hostility to independent journalism and little concern about the quality of information they pass along to the public.
In short, a vastly smaller, financially weakened and technologically disintermediated profession now finds itself facing the most direct challenge to its rights and legitimacy, as well.
Some cheer this state of affairs. I’m all too aware that mine isn’t the most popular profession. Too much of modern media is devoted to entertaining rather than informing, to stirring up anger and fear rather than advancing understanding, to amplifying whatever is trending rather than focusing on what really matters. In a country with too many pundits and too few reporters, it’s not a coincidence that trust in the media has plummeted.
Even the best news organizations — the ones with the highest standards, the most rigorous processes, the best track record of putting the public interest first — don’t always get it right. At The Times we run a daily corrections section for good reason. And in our long history, you’ll find we’ve made our share of bigger mistakes, as well.
But independent journalism is designed to be self-correcting. We constantly ask the same questions of ourselves that we hear from our critics. Were we open-minded enough to unexpected facts? Were we skeptical enough of prevailing narratives? Have we taken enough time to really understand the issues and the communities we’re writing about? Were we too soft? Too tough? Did we double-check, triple-check, then check again? When we make mistakes, we try to own them, learn from them and do better.
And yet, even with its imperfections, the press remains essential.
I want to share a story about the relationship between two illustrious Notre Dame alumni. It offers a model for navigating the natural tensions between power and the press.
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On one side was the Rev. Theodore Hesburgh, who served as president of Notre Dame for 35 years. On the other side, an ambitious student journalist named Bob Anson, who helped found The Observer, a campus newspaper still going strong. Amid the political and cultural tumult of the mid-1960s, Father Ted — perhaps generously, perhaps hoping to cultivate a friendly voice in the student press — offered the young journalist a standing invitation to drop by the president’s office.
One might think that, given that access, and the imbalance of power between president and student, Anson would be eager to protect their relationship. But Anson understood the importance of journalistic independence, and he proved unafraid of wading into the most contentious campus issues. For Father Ted, The Observer became a persistent headache, one that went so far as to call for his resignation. For Anson, the university’s frustration with his journalism was so great that he faced calls for his expulsion.
The story could have ended with his graduation. But a few years later, Anson was captured by North Vietnamese soldiers while on assignment for Time magazine. Father Ted helped lead the push to secure his release, even appealing to the pope for help. Anson would later call Father Ted “my guardian angel,” who “moved heaven and earth trying to save my life.” Father Ted reached for a different spiritual metaphor. Freeing Anson, he quipped, was like getting “the devil out of hell.” And sure enough, it wasn’t long before Anson was back at Notre Dame, reporting a story that would cast an unflattering light on the university, its beloved football team and — once again — Father Ted.
But Father Ted never lost sight of the value of journalism, even though it challenged public figures such as himself. “You were a student editor,” he later told Anson, with whom he maintained a lifelong relationship. “All student editors are trouble. … Goes with the territory.”
The free press may be trouble, but it goes with the territory of a healthy democracy.
Even the most cursory read of the news shows that our democracy is undergoing a significant test.
Foundational laws and norms are being undermined or swept aside. Rule of law. Separation of powers. Due process. Intellectual freedom.
And the press is far from the only American institution that finds itself under pressure. We’re seeing direct efforts to go after government agencies, universities, cultural institutions, research organizations, advocacy groups and law firms. We’re even seeing challenges to the authority of Congress and the courts to serve as a check on executive power.
Like all of those institutions, the free press is imperfect. And like all of those institutions, the free press is a load-bearing pillar in a free society. In the words of President Ronald Reagan, “There is no more essential ingredient than a free, strong and independent press to our continued success in what the founding fathers called our ‘noble experiment’ in self-government.”
A subservient press, meanwhile, makes it easier for leaders to keep secrets, to rewrite reality, to undermine political rivals, to put self-interest above public interest and ultimately to consolidate and cement their power. In the words of the political director for Viktor Orban, the Hungarian prime minister often cited as a model for President Trump: “Whoever controls a country’s media controls that country’s mind-set and, through that, the country itself.”
Let me pause to say plainly that as a champion of independent journalism, I believe our job is to cover political debates, not to join them.
We’re not the resistance. We are nobody’s opposition. We’re also nobody’s cheerleader. Our loyalty is to the truth and to a public that deserves to know it. That is the distinct role that independent news organizations like The Times play in our democracy.
That means we will cover the Trump administration fully and fairly, regardless of what attacks it sends our way. We will continue to provide unmatched coverage of its abuses and failures. We will also cover its successes and achievements and explore its support across a large and diverse swath of the country.
Holding fast to our independence in the face of intimidation is not appeasement or acquiescence, as some would suggest. It’s certainly not a form of complicity. It’s a refusal to allow ourselves to be pressured by anyone into distorting our mission to follow the facts and bring the public the full story. However, as the steward of a leading news organization, I also have a responsibility to speak out about any efforts by the government to undermine the public’s right to know.
Over the decades, my predecessors and I have done so under both Republican and Democratic administrations. Those administrations have certainly had their complaints, as well. President Joe Biden and his aides, for example, frequently lashed out at journalists and news organizations who dared to ask questions about his age and fitness, even as they went to historic lengths to avoid unscripted exchanges with reporters. I know this firsthand, because Times journalists reported deeply on these questions and called attention to his evasion of the press. President Biden’s White House and his supporters attacked them for it constantly.
President Trump, in contrast, continues to make himself more available to reporters than previous presidents. Yet in every other respect, he has taken the naturally tense relationship between the White House and the press to an increasingly combative place. You can see this most clearly in the language he uses. He started with schoolyard insults such as “the failing New York Times.” That escalated to more direct attacks on integrity: “the fake news New York Times.”
Before long, the president was attacking The Times with the very label Stalin used to justify crackdowns: “the enemy of the people.” If that was too subtle, soon the rhetoric was ratcheted up to include words that more plainly sit in the criminal code, like “treason.” Today he’s openly musing about jailing reporters and joking about the prospect of prison rape. “The publisher, too,” he likes to add. Shortly after I stepped into my role as publisher in 2018, I received an invitation to meet with President Trump. Despite his bombastic rhetoric, he is a longtime reader of The Times who loved chatting with our reporters and sending them signed clippings of articles that caught his eye. Removed from the rally stage, he admits to being an admirer of what he’s called “my newspaper” and “a great, great American jewel, a world jewel.”
In a civil meeting in the Oval Office and another there that followed, I challenged President Trump directly on his anti-press rhetoric. I told him he should feel free to continue to attack The Times — or me personally — if he liked. The Times wanted no favors. But I did want to make clear his rhetoric was playing a dangerous role in countries where democratic norms were more tenuous. All over the world, power-hungry leaders were greedily interpreting the American president’s attacks on the press as a sign that going after journalists was now fair game.
You may be unsurprised to hear that my argument did not win the day. Indeed, President Trump professed some pride at having popularized the term “fake news.” In the years since, more than 70 countries passed laws supposedly aimed at curtailing “fake news.” In reality, many of them took aim not at misinformation but at independent journalists who dare to provide the public with truthful reporting about the actions of those in power.
Since 2016, the number of countries deemed to have a “good” record of protecting press freedom by Reporters Without Borders dropped by more than half. Effectively, in his first term President Trump exported his anti-press rhetoric to illiberal leaders abroad. Those leaders took that rhetoric as permission to develop and implement an aggressive new playbook for cracking down on journalists. Now, in President Trump’s second term, this vicious cycle has been completed as the anti-press playbook he helped inspire has been imported back to the United States. That makes this a perilous moment — the shift from words to action.
My colleagues and I spent much of the last year studying the tools and tactics of this new anti-press playbook, which range from sowing distrust and normalizing harassment to misusing the civil courts and abusing state power. The overarching aim is straightforward. To undermine the social and financial standing of independent news organizations. To sideline journalists willing to ask tough questions and inform the public honestly. And to elevate media figures willing to echo the party line.
If the free press is designed to be a watchdog, the playbook’s goal is to tame it so it becomes a lap dog.
Consider the fate of Hungary. Prime Minister Orban’s allies now control more than 80 percent of the country’s news outlets, which effectively function as government mouthpieces. The pockets of independence that endure face intense political, legal and economic pressure. Messaging from pro-government media is so pervasive and so relentless that it’s the only thing most people read or hear. Corruption has gone largely unchecked. Businesses operate in an environment where political connections matter most. The rights of disfavored groups are steadily cut back. Yet a badly weakened opposition has struggled to even make these arguments to the public — let alone use them to win elections — because of its limited ability to reach voters through the media.
When I shared these insights in an essay in The Washington Post last September, my goal was to encourage the journalistic profession to prepare for what may come. We knew how ruthlessly effective this campaign against journalists had been in other countries, and we knew those in President Trump’s orbit wanted to implement it here. Even so, it’s startling to see how quickly these warnings have come to pass.
In March, President Trump gave an address in the Justice Department that was both familiar and remarkable. He offered his usual, trail-worn attacks on the press, even implying that journalists should be jailed. At a campaign rally, that might be dismissed as overheated rhetoric to fire up his base. Inside the headquarters of the nation’s most powerful law enforcement operation, these words could be fairly regarded as something closer to marching orders.
Indeed, within a week, the administration opened multiple leak investigations into reporting by The Times. One focused on our revelation that Elon Musk was set to be briefed at the Pentagon on secret plans the U.S. maintained in the event of war with China. The revelation was of obvious public interest, given Musk’s substantial business interests in the country and apparent lack of appropriate security clearances. The president, who professed not to know about the meeting, denied the story. But he also publicly acknowledged the clear impropriety, and the briefing was canceled.
That should have been held up as evidence of the power of good reporting. But the government instead took the unusual step of announcing it was opening an investigation into the leak. That tactic — publicly acknowledging an internal investigation — may seem counterproductive. Unless the real goal was to send a warning: If you are a journalist writing about government misconduct or if you are a source trying to expose it, we are coming for you.
Let me paint a fuller picture of what the anti-press campaign in this country looks like and why it matters to all of us. The playbook can be distilled into five self-reinforcing parts. Each is already being wielded against journalists in this country. Together they represent the most frontal attack on the American press in a century.
The first part of the playbook is sowing distrust in and encouraging the harassment of independent journalists and news organizations. This is largely a campaign of words that aims to demoralize and exhaust. Today reporters who write about powerful people or controversial subjects often find themselves deluged with thousands of angry, bigoted and threatening messages. That online noise can quickly spill into the real world. In the last few years, my colleagues have been doxxed, stalked and SWATted. They’ve had their identities stolen and been falsely accused of crimes. They’ve faced death threats. Even when they steel themselves against these attacks, many reporters find themselves profoundly unnerved when the threats spread to their kids at school, their spouses at work and their parents at home.
President Trump, as I described, has been unusually aggressive in his use of anti-press rhetoric, and his supporters have been equally aggressive in going after his targets. Their goal is not just to spook journalists. It’s to train people to dislike and distrust the media. It’s to condition people to believe that journalists deserve whatever comes their way. In the short term, this has a chilling effect on independent journalism, forcing reporters to ask themselves whether pursuing a story will be worth the inevitable blowback. Long term, it breeds a climate hospitable to crackdowns on press freedom.
The second part of the playbook is exploiting the civil courts to punish independent reporters and news outlets. Even the most frivolous lawsuit can be expensive, invasive and time-consuming to defend against. These cases redirect time and money away from journalism. They can also deter news organizations from even pursuing accountability reporting that might invite new fronts of legal exposure. Smaller news organizations, in particular, fear that they could be financially drained even if they win a case and bankrupted if they lose.
President Trump has long used the civil courts to punish those who challenge him. The Times and other independent news organizations have been frequent targets over the years. These are often libel cases, which President Trump has long pledged to make easier to win.
But lately he’s also embraced novel legal claims about reporting he doesn’t like. In one recent lawsuit, he accused The Des Moines Register of consumer fraud for running a poll that did not match the final result on Election Day. A court doesn’t even need to rule in his favor for him to claim victory. Musing in 2016 about a failed libel lawsuit against a former Times journalist, he said: “I spent a couple of bucks on legal fees, and they spent a whole lot more. I did it to make his life miserable, which I’m happy about.”
Since his re-election, President Trump has extracted multimillion-dollar settlements from companies like ABC, Meta and X. Many legal experts regarded these cases as weak, but executives at each company had good reason to believe that the president could use his power to go after them in other ways if they did not pay or to reward them if they did.
The third part of the playbook is abusing legal and regulatory authority to punish the parts of the press that exercise independence. The most obvious abuse of state power is prosecuting and jailing journalists for doing their jobs. But courts are better protected against abuse, and spurious criminal charges risk a public outcry. Subtler, more technocratic forms of executive power are often more effective and less likely to provoke public outrage.
These tactics exploit weaknesses in the nation’s system of governance like regulatory oversight, immigration enforcement, tax investigations and government contracts. This also allows officials to go after the press without appearing to, because many owners of news organizations also have substantial nonmedia holdings that contract with or are regulated by the government.
In President Trump’s first term, for example, his displeasure with the Jeff Bezos-owned Washington Post led him to try to upend Amazon’s shipping deal with the U.S. Postal Service and undercut the company’s defense contracting. This term we’ve seen ICE’s targeting of foreign students, including for an opinion essay published in a college newspaper, lead some student journalists to stop writing pieces that challenge the Trump administration and others to ask for their bylines to be removed from such work.
We’ve seen threats to use the I.R.S. to go after nonprofits the president dislikes, a point of obvious vulnerability for the growing nonprofit news landscape. We’ve seen efforts to defund or dismantle public media, such as local radio stations, PBS and Voice of America. The F.C.C., which regulates broadcast channels, has been most direct in going after the news organizations that President Trump has complained about. It opened investigations into PBS and NPR, as well as the parent companies of ABC and NBC News.
In one striking example, it opened an investigation into CBS over a routine editing decision that mirrors allegations made in a lawsuit President Trump personally filed last year. That investigation further increased the pressure on executives of its parent company to settle a case they reportedly believe has kept the government from approving a proposed merger. They, in turn, increased pressure on the famously independent “60 Minutes” newsroom, prompting the top producer to resign in protest.
The fourth part of the playbook is amplifying the government’s attacks on the press by encouraging wealthy or powerful allies to join in. In other countries, this has become a way for businesspeople to ingratiate themselves with the ruling regime. They attack disfavored journalists, including through the civil courts and the power of their companies. Ambitious allies in state and local politics use the levers of their governments to the same ends.
Many of President Trump’s closest supporters have pursued this route. Musk, the richest man in the world and a powerful member of President Trump’s inner circle, offers a particularly useful example of this dynamic. He regularly calls The Times everything from “propaganda” to a “threat to our democracy” — attacks that often come just before or just after we publish a major investigation into him or his companies. Meanwhile, his social media platform, X, has taken a variety of steps aimed at reducing the visibility of The Times to the broader public.
Finally, the fifth part of the playbook is about replacing. It is not enough just to dismantle the independent press. It’s better still to replace it with government-friendly media controlled by supporters. Such outlets appear to play a journalistic role while lobbing softball questions at press conferences, attacking the leader’s critics and faithfully repeating ruling-party talking points. The administration has repeatedly blocked The Associated Press, for example, for continuing to use the longstanding and internationally accepted term “Gulf of Mexico” while also acknowledging that President Trump has decided to call it the Gulf of America.
At the same time, the administration is expanding access for partisan news organizations, influencers and activists with a track record of repeating the president’s language and promoting his interests. Meanwhile, the administration announced that Voice of America, already gutted by cuts, will now be asked to air reports from the pro-Trump One America News Network.
These efforts are portrayed as an expansion of perspectives. That would be a worthy goal. But in reality they are attempts to replace skeptical questions with supportive ones, independent accounts with recitations of the party line. Such a strategy, as the Fox News correspondent Jacqui Heinrich said recently, “does not give the power back to the people; it gives power to the White House.” The administration seemingly confirmed this sentiment in a social media post, writing: “Since REAL journalism is dead. We will do it for you!” Last month it began its own faux news site, The White House Wire.
The initial reaction from media leaders has concerned those who recognize the importance of journalism in our democracy. Understandably so. Some, as I have noted, offered large sums to settle winnable cases out of court, which critics liken to paying a protection racket. Others adopted the president’s preferred language (like “Gulf of America”) or retreated from policies he opposes (like diversity initiatives), perhaps to win favor, perhaps just to avoid retaliation. Some have gone so far as to rein in the journalism itself — most notably how their opinion departments operate — in ways their employees see as designed to placate the president.
But there are also reasons for confidence, none more heartening than the actual journalism being produced. A number of outlets have shown continued willingness to follow the facts and publish pieces that may spark retaliation from the administration and its backers. The A.P., for example, deserves great credit not only for going to court to resist the administration’s efforts at intimidation. It also broke major stories on the Department of Government Efficiency’s questionable claims. The Wall Street Journal investigated the administration’s tumultuous approach to economic policy. The Washington Post exposed the haphazard handling of sensitive government data. Politico revealed dysfunction roiling the Pentagon. ProPublica probed the record of a top prosecutor, undaunted by his habit of threatening those who challenge the administration.
At The Times we continue to examine every element of the Trump presidency. Our beat reporters spend each day not just keeping up with the fire hose of news — an essential service itself. They also circle back to important stories and connect the dots between them to make sure readers understand their significance.
Meanwhile, our investigative reporters continue to build on what is already the single largest body of accountability reporting ever produced by a single news organization on a single subject. They exposed how President Trump and his family leveraged his office to benefit their cryptocurrency firm and other business ventures. They revealed the reckless communication habits of national security leaders. They painstakingly documented that dozens of supposed Venezuelan gang members sent to a Salvadoran prison had no established gang ties — or any criminal record at all.
The pressure we’ve faced from the Trump administration in response to our reporting so far has been fairly predictable. Names called. Access restricted. Government subscriptions canceled. Lawsuits threatened. Leak investigations opened.
The administration may have more serious action planned. But so far, the signs that have troubled me most have come from other public- and private-sector leaders too worried about the administration to stand up for their own rights and principles. Large companies, nonprofits and foundations long supportive of journalism now tell us they fear retaliation if they openly support news organizations. Leaders and academics who have long fiercely defended the rule of law now pull opinion pieces, lest their arguments attract the administration’s attention. The reaction has been dispiriting enough that we felt compelled to call our outside law firms to make sure they remained committed to defending our constitutional rights.
On the one hand, I understand all this caution. The Trump administration is abusing its vast powers to go after those it perceives as critics. People and institutions feel vulnerable.
On the other hand, your rights can hold only if you use them. The systems that protect against injustices can support you only if you turn to them.
Democracy, at its core, is based on the notion that power is best distributed. Each person’s willingness to wield his or her modest share of that power matters. Each retreat matters, too. Fear is contagious. But courage is also contagious. Standing up to power. Putting long-term principles above short-term self-interest. These are muscles that benefit from use.
In this moment of pressure, I count myself fortunate that The Times has 174 years of practice upsetting powerful interests of every type. We revealed details of the U.S.-Soviet arms race that so enraged President John F. Kennedy that the F.B.I. wiretapped our reporter’s home phone. We published the Pentagon Papers in defiance of legal threats from President Richard Nixon. We disclosed the warrantless surveillance of American citizens after President George W. Bush warned us we’d have blood on our hands. We exposed the hidden civilian death toll of reckless drone strikes authorized by a succession of presidents, suing the Biden administration when it unlawfully tried to hide records that documented these failures.
That isn’t an anomaly; no news organization takes the government to court more often to fight for the public’s right to know about its actions. Yes, we’ve learned over the years that following one’s principles sometimes comes at a cost. If fair and accurate coverage results in lost access or less advertising or canceled subscriptions, so be it. But we’ve also learned that when we stick to our values and do our job with rigor and fairness, we benefit from deeper trust and growing readership in the long run.
The Times will meet whatever comes by continuing to seek the truth and help people understand the world. We will do that work, as we have through every presidential administration since Abraham Lincoln, without fear or favor. If the press climate continues to deteriorate, The Times will draw on the lessons we’ve gained reporting from places without the safety net of established press freedoms. Places where our colleagues face constant surveillance or ever-present risks to their physical safety.
We know how to operate in tough conditions. And we’ve been drawing on those experiences to prepare our journalists for a more difficult environment at home, as well. Things like taking enhanced precautions to protect our sources in the face of surveillance and leak investigations. Maintaining pristine business practices to reduce exposure to abusive tax and regulatory enforcement. Increasing the budget for safety, security and litigation nearly tenfold.
Another critical step is supporting other news organizations when they face pressure. Our industry has a long history of competing on stories but uniting on the cause of press freedom. That will be necessary to avoid the divide-and-conquer strategy we’ve seen employed against law firms and universities. But in this moment of low trust for the press we also need to do more to explain why the broader public should care as well, regardless of their politics.
As we take all those steps, we must hold fast to our independence. This is a point that Andras Petho, a courageous Hungarian investigative journalist, has emphasized in describing his experience reporting in the face of relentless government pressure. He warns that nothing makes autocrats happier than reporters who portray themselves as crusaders against the regime — or victims of it. It provides ammunition for those in power who wish to portray journalists not as disinterested truth tellers but as members of the political opposition animated by partisan aims.
“If you act like an advocate, you should not be surprised if you become viewed as such,” Petho has said. “I’m not saying that nobody should speak up. On the contrary, I hope that lots of people — human rights defenders, advocacy groups or simply just average social media users — will do it. But if you are in the news business, your greatest possible contribution to saving democracies is doing your job and doing it well.”
Put another way: Democracy assigns different roles to all of us. The role of the press is to arm everyone else with the information and context they need to understand and meet the moment.
Without a free press, how will people know if their government is acting legally and in their interest? How will people know if their leaders are telling the truth? How will people know if their institutions are acting to the benefit of society? How will people know if their freedoms are being sustained, defended and championed — or eroded by forces that seek to replace truth and reality with propaganda and misinformation?
A strong and independent press is essential to self-rule, to personal liberty, to national greatness. That once radical insight, made law in the First Amendment, anchored a centuries-long, bipartisan tradition of supporting the rights of journalists. If broken, a free and independent press won’t be easy to rebuild.
As the free press and democracy more broadly face this period of pressure, I’d urge you to support both by seeking out news sources worthy of your trust. News sources that produce original, independent reporting in the public interest and that have a record of challenging power, no matter who wields it. Make room for this kind of journalism in your lives and routines. Read. Listen. Watch. Engaging with the news is one of the simplest, most essential acts of citizenship. This is not the time to tune out.
More from A.G. Sulzberger on press freedom
Opinion | A. G. Sulzberger
The Growing Threat to Journalism Around the World
Sept. 23, 2019
A.G. Sulzberger is the publisher of The New York Times.
The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.
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16. Fire the Generals: Civilian control of the military is at stake
Ouch.
Fire the Generals
Civilian control of the military is at stake
https://www.kenklippenstein.com/p/fire-the-generals
Ken Klippenstein
May 13, 2025
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Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s order to cut the number of four-star generals and admirals by 20 percent has gotten Washington into another one of its defend-the-system frenzies, mindlessly supporting the military brass.
Hegseth’s belief that the firings will improve the military’s “warfighting capabilities” by rooting out the cabal of Democratic Party ninja operatives is, of course, ridiculous. But this is a classic case of a broken clock being right twice a day. Today’s military brass suck at their jobs. They’re good at agitating for wars (and defending them in jargon-laden testimony to Congress); but ending them? Not so much.
And the military has become politicized, though not how Hegseth thinks. Ever since Bill Clinton chose a number of generals and admirals to populate his administration to bolster his national security “credentials,” presidents from Joe Biden to Donald Trump have reached into the senior ranks for positions that should rightly be held by civilians (like the Secretary of Defense).
It’s difficult to exaggerate the absurd amounts of deference Washington shows the military brass, seeing them in about the same way as the Ancient Greeks saw the deities on Mount Olympus. Consider the meltdown earlier this year over the removal of retired General Mark Milley’s portrait from the Pentagon. Or then-President Biden’s decision to preemptively pardon Milley to shield him from…what, exactly?
With the Ukraine War now in its third year, the war in Gaza not far behind, and the rest of the Middle East still a boiling pot threatening to spill over, the promised deterrence the Pentagon sells (for the low price of $850 billion/year) turns out to be about as legit as Elizabeth Holmes’ needle-free blood test. Uncommon as it is for white collar fraudsters to face consequences for their actions, it does happen sometimes. The same isn’t true of our hallowed military brass.
They bumble from one war to the next like Mr. Magoo, oblivious to the destruction in their wake which they stroll past on their way to corporate board positions and the paid speaking circuit where they make millions in “retirement” for the difficult work of things like telling bankers “thank you for your service,” as Gen. Milley did last year.
This week saw another reminder of their incompetence. Four star Gen. Michael E. Kurilla, head of Central Command, persuaded Trump to undertake a campaign to eliminate Houthi leadership in Yemen, culminating in targeted assassinations modeled off of Israel’s operation against Hezbollah, the New York Times reported. Slated to take 8-10 months, it lasted just days until Trump called it all off after two instances in which $100 million worth of U.S. fighter jets fell into the Red Sea from the USS Harry S. Truman.
Whoops
And it’s not just Kurilla at fault here, but also the dozen generals and admirals in the chain of command between him and the admiral who finally commands the carrier battle group of which the USS Truman is a part. The maintenance workers on the carriers will almost certainly be punished, but will anyone at the higher ranks lose their careers? Not likely.
Meanwhile, top Democrats in Congress are vehemently opposed to the reductions Hegseth is directing.
“I have always advocated for efficiency at the Department of Defense, but tough personnel decisions should be based on facts and analysis, not arbitrary percentages,” said Senator Jack Reed, ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Rep. Adam Smith, ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, took a similar tack, saying “I’m skeptical of Secretary Hegseth’s announcement of sweeping plans to cut military leadership across the Services because it lacks both data-driven analysis and an explanation of the desired end-state.”
“Arbitrary percentages” are exactly how virtually every major company implements layoffs. But for some reason the federal government sees the national security state as a privileged class to be protected from this reality. Why are they so special? Is it because of data-driven justifications of the value of “leadership” or arbitrary sentimentality that salutes without ever asking if it is deserved?
This kind of privileged status is endemic to national security officialdom.
The FBI is facing a budget cut for the first time in years (5%), as I wrote about yesterday, and there too Congress pitched a fit.
“Under your leadership, Director Patel, the FBI has been weaponized to go after Americans who disagree with the president,” Sen. Patty Murray, said before bafflingly warning that “budget cuts will reduce the FBI’s ability to counter threats of terrorism.” You know, “terrorists” like Tesla vandals and the like — the very same groups against whom the FBI has been weaponized.
Better give them more money!
Congress abdicates its oversight responsibilities — profound as they are in the case of the military, which is supposed to be subordinate to civilian government — in part because it faces so little pressure from a public that doesn’t seem to understand what the general and admiral class is.
Think of them as the CEOs of the military. Sure, occasionally a visionary like Steve Jobs comes along. But for the most part they’re empty suits. And when you talk to rank and file service members, they know this. Just about the only people who don’t are officials in Washington, who seem to regard the military brass as patron saints.
The deference is unhealthy. The military is supposed to be a snarling junkyard dog protecting the country. It’s natural that it’s always looking for a fight: it’s supposed to be aggressive! That’s its job. But because of its aggression, it needs to be leashed, with its owner the sole decider of when it’s unleashed. Not the dog.
But as the media sees it, any attempt to yank on the chain to pull the dog back is tantamount to a coup. Story after story casts the Trump administration’s attempts to remove the military brass as “purges” evoking Stalin, as attempts to replace them with dangerous loyalists. In actuality, presidents make their generals and admirals partisan by forcing them to work for their administrations in civilian roles.
And kind of nuance about military leadership, about the role of the military, about the inflation of ranks and about too many commands is almost completely absent from the media coverage of Hegseth’s proposed cutbacks, which has been comically petty about it all.
Take CNN’s interview of retired Maj. Gen. James Marks, opening with Defense Secretary Hegseth’s slogan that he favors “Less generals, more GIs.”
Marks begins by mocking Hegseth’s grammar, snarking that “My English teacher would’ve said minus 0.5, with the ‘less,’” (it’s supposed to be “fewer”).
Who cares!
Marks goes on to say how Hegseth should’ve handled the cuts, saying that he should’ve instead requested “recommendations” from the generals themselves:
“Come back to me with your recommendations. Don't state up front, we got a 20% reduction in four stars, which would be about eight to 10 personnel, and don't say we're gonna have an additional 10% across the board and all the other flags, which would be about an 80 to 90. Number of individuals reduced, come back and say, look, think, here's what we can do to solve this particular problem.
Then if you do that, the service chiefs own the solution. I mean, they're gonna be all in if it's coming from the top. It seems rather, it seems non-serious is what it seems to me. And there's not much, there's not a lot of, um. Real substance to what he's trying to achieve. I think he's flexing his muscles.”
Flexing his muscles? Whether you like Hegseth or not, that’s what the civilian control of the armed forces means. By saying Hegseth must take his cues from the “service chiefs,” Marks is saying that the military — not its civilian leader — should make the call. And lastly, he’s saying the generals themselves should get to decide if they (or their peers) get to keep their jobs.
Hmm, I wonder what they’d say!
“This is not the way you embrace the organization,” Gen. Marks grumbled in closing.
Embrace the organization? Does the General need a hug?
We’ll see if Hegseth is successful, but lucky for Marks, Congress is all for giving him and the entire general class a big warm hug.
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— Edited by William M. Arkin
17. Asia without America, part 1: The cupboards are bare
A depressing read. I wish it could serve as a wake up call. We need our silk web of alliances for our national security and if we want to win in strategic competition and war.
Excerpts:
Russia is challenging NATO in Ukraine, China is challenging the US in East Asia, Iran is challenging the US in the Middle East and god knows what Kim Jong Un is doing in North Korea. The neglected home front is awash in drugs, obesity, crime and mental illness. America, spread thin after decades of mindless war in Iraq and Afghanistan, now maintains what’s left of primacy though an alphabet soup of multilateral alliances (G7, NATO, AUKUS, the Quad).
These alliances are inherently unstable – pitting free riding against buck passing. The US is trying to do global hegemony on the cheap through alliance partners. An overstretched America wants to pass the buck – to offload the costs of its rules-based international order onto partners. Meanwhile, alliance partners want to free ride – to enjoy benefits of the rules-based order without chipping in.
For alliances to be stable, America must demonstrate that it is willing and able to shoulder all the costs – with or without partners.
The United States did this for most of the post-World War II era, as John F. Kennedy promised in his January 1961 inauguration speech:
While partners waxed and waned based on shifting domestic politics (for example, France, the Philippines, Thailand), America’s resolve had long been assumed, even if erroneously (for example, Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, Vietnam 1973, Lebanon 1984, Somalia 1993, Iraq 2011, Afghanistan in 2021).
But now, as President Trump abandons alliances and the capabilities of challengers grow, America’s resolve can no longer be assumed. The US is not just trying to pass the buck, it is all but telling Europe that the buck does not stop here. Asia is left in a lurch unsure what President Trump will decide. It could be anything – from an honest-to-god strategic pivot to Asia to trading Taiwan for flattery and a ham sandwich to anything in between. We just do not know.
What everyone does know is that China’s capabilities are growing and, over time, the costs of maintaining America’s position in Asia will rise. And if trends continue, buck passing will intensify and free riders will have uncomfortable decisions to make.
Asia without America, part 1: The cupboards are bare - Asia Times
We’re talking to you, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, about the collapse of America’s alliance system and the rules-based order
asiatimes.com · by Han Feizi · May 13, 2025
You can’t always get what you want
But if you try sometime
You’ll find
You get what you need
The rolling stones
History has multiple equilibria. Seemingly stable arrangements can turn on a dime. “There are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen,” Vladimir Lenin wrote in 2017, his last year in exile.
Or, as President Xi Jinping said at the door of the Kremlin after a 2023 meeting with Vladimir Putin, “Right now there are changes – the likes of which we haven’t seen for 100 years.” Within earshot of the press, President Xi slyly added, “and we are the ones driving these changes together.”
Let us not beat around the bush: We’re talking to you, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The changes that President Xi was referring to are the collapse of America’s alliance system and, along with it, the collapse of the rules-based international order.
Every nation should be prepared. The savviest actors will front-run events. When President Xi said “we are the ones driving these changes,” it was an open invitation to bet on and become part of the “we.”
Fast forward to 2025 and trends have only accelerated. President Trump, in his second term, has gratuitously insulted Europe, strong-armed Panama, threatened to annex Greenland and Canada and launched a chaotic trade war on the world.
This is not 4D chess, people. This is President Trump using whatever is left of American power to kick over the chessboard, hoping the scattered pieces magically rearrange themselves in advantageous positions. It is also sheer madness.
US President Franklin D Roosevelt responding to the Pearl Harbor attack. Photo: CBS News
In his book And Tomorrow the World: The Birth of US Global Supremacy, Stephen Wertheim tells the story of how, over just a few years preceding Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, institutions such as the Council on Foreign Relations and leaders such as President Franklin Roosevelt maneuvered America’s global posture away from wariness over foreign entanglements and towards global primacy.
Of course, none of this could be said out loud. As the new posture developed during and after World War II, it had to be buried in euphemisms like “liberal international order” and administered through neutered institutions including the World Bank/IMF (1944), the United Nations (1945), NATO (1949) and even the US Congress.
The Lansdowne portrait is an iconic life-size portrait of George Washington painted by Gilbert Stuart in 1796. It depicts the 64-year-old president of the United States during his final year in office.
All of this runs counter to the legacy many founding fathers hoped to bequeath the young republic fortunately separated from a fractious Europe by the Atlantic Ocean. In his valedictory address, George Washington famously warned against involvement in foreign wars and entanglements:
Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?
Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation?Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground?
It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements.
According to Wertheim, the thinkers and leaders who planned American primacy were not acting in bad faith; these were not Pentagon paper pushers angling for a retirement gig at Lockheed Martin. These were men genuinely fearful of a world where fascists controlled the Eurasian landmass. Wertheim writes:
Peace, however, came at an unprecedented price after Germany conquered France and briefly bestrode Europe. For the United States to maintain a hemispheric military posture could potentially leave Europe to the worst Europeans and Asia to the worst Asians – totalitarian dictatorships harnessing the tools of industrial modernity to achieve armed conquest and subjugation.
After saving Europe and Asia from fascist domination in WWII (or at least joining mop-up operations in act four), the US lost no time declaring itself leader of the free world in the long twilight struggle against the Soviet Union. George Kennan, in his famous long telegram, wrote:
The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.… Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence.
Primacy, it turns out, is a hard drug to quit. After the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union and China voluntarily joining the American led economic system, the US quickly appointed itself permanent world leader under the Wolfowitz doctrine:
Paul Wolfowitz. Photo: Hoover Institution
The US must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. In non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. We must maintain the mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.
It was around that time that “liberal international order” morphed into “rules-based international order.”
After the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the US updated the Wolfowitz doctrine with the Bush doctrine, an aggressive foreign policy posture that assumed the right to preemptively eliminate – through military means – nascent threats before they fully materialize. At West Point’s 2002 graduation speech, George W Bush said:
President George W Bush at West Point’s 2002 graduation. Photo: Paul Morse / National Archives
We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties and then systemically break them.
If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.
Our security will require transforming the military you will lead – a military that must be ready to strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.
The hangover from botched military adventures under the Wolfowitz/Bush doctrines has ignited calls for a foreign policy closer to what the founding fathers had intended, now pejoratively labelled “isolationism” by primacists. Some, like self-proclaimed realist Elbridge Colby, favor a husbanding of resources to specifically contain China – a Sino-only primacist, if you will.
As with everything else, President Trump’s foreign policy has been schizophrenic and incoherent. Let us not pretend there is a Trump doctrine. There is no plan. There is no strategy. There is no theory. He’s just making it up as he goes along, driven by appetites and constrained by resources.
American primacists deliberately reject that the purpose of regional hegemony is to not have to expend resources on the military. The nation had been amply warned and not just by George Washington. John Quincy Adams, 6th President of the United States, urged against searching for “monsters to destroy” in an 1821 speech:
Wherever the standard of freedom and Independence, has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy.… She well knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign Independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom. The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force.
America first heard the term “military industrial complex” from Dwight Eisenhower, 34th President of the United States, in his 1961 farewell address:
President Dwight Eisenhower delivers his farewell address. Photo: American Rhetoric
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience…. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications…. In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
Hegemonic dynasties coalesced in China specifically to divert resources away from fractious wars and towards public works projects (for example, the Dujiangyuan water diversion project, the Grand Canal, the Great Wall).
Dujiangyuan water diversion project. Photo: Islamic China Travel
The PRC dynasty is no different, spending less than 2% of its GDP on defense and getting the Three Gorges Dam, high speed rail, the South-North Water Transfer project and a national highway system in return.
The “freedom to roam,” popularized by John Mearsheimer, is demonstrably not a universal imperative of regional hegemons. Ming Dynasty China at the height of its power famously burned the imperial treasure fleet. The American impulse to roam is a legacy of European (mostly British) maritime imperialism which has long since outlived its utility, now incurring more costs than benefits.
Russia is challenging NATO in Ukraine, China is challenging the US in East Asia, Iran is challenging the US in the Middle East and god knows what Kim Jong Un is doing in North Korea. The neglected home front is awash in drugs, obesity, crime and mental illness. America, spread thin after decades of mindless war in Iraq and Afghanistan, now maintains what’s left of primacy though an alphabet soup of multilateral alliances (G7, NATO, AUKUS, the Quad).
These alliances are inherently unstable – pitting free riding against buck passing. The US is trying to do global hegemony on the cheap through alliance partners. An overstretched America wants to pass the buck – to offload the costs of its rules-based international order onto partners. Meanwhile, alliance partners want to free ride – to enjoy benefits of the rules-based order without chipping in.
For alliances to be stable, America must demonstrate that it is willing and able to shoulder all the costs – with or without partners.
Inaugural Address of John F. Kennedy, 35th President of the United States. Washington, DC 20 January 1961. Photo: US Army Signal Corps / John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, Boston / Wikimedia Commons
The United States did this for most of the post-World War II era, as John F. Kennedy promised in his January 1961 inauguration speech:
Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.
This much we pledge – and more.
While partners waxed and waned based on shifting domestic politics (for example, France, the Philippines, Thailand), America’s resolve had long been assumed, even if erroneously (for example, Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, Vietnam 1973, Lebanon 1984, Somalia 1993, Iraq 2011, Afghanistan in 2021).
But now, as President Trump abandons alliances and the capabilities of challengers grow, America’s resolve can no longer be assumed. The US is not just trying to pass the buck, it is all but telling Europe that the buck does not stop here. Asia is left in a lurch unsure what President Trump will decide. It could be anything – from an honest-to-god strategic pivot to Asia to trading Taiwan for flattery and a ham sandwich to anything in between. We just do not know.
What everyone does know is that China’s capabilities are growing and, over time, the costs of maintaining America’s position in Asia will rise. And if trends continue, buck passing will intensify and free riders will have uncomfortable decisions to make.
asiatimes.com · by Han Feizi · May 13, 2025
18. How Qatar Bought America
This is quite an expose. It is a long read as it covers a lot of ground.
05.13.25 — Foreign Policy
How Qatar Bought America
The tiny Gulf nation has spent almost $100 billion to establish its influence in Congress, universities, newsrooms, think tanks, and corporations. What does it want in return?
By Frannie Block and Jay Solomon
https://www.thefp.com/p/how-qatar-bought-america
On Wednesday, Donald Trump will travel to Qatar. On his trip, the president will visit Al Udeid Air Base, the largest American military facility in the region, and attend meetings with the ruling Al Thani family. Perhaps he will also thank them for the $400 million gift of a luxury Boeing 747-8 jumbo jet that will reportedly be retrofitted for his use, and then transferred to his presidential library.
The airplane deal was signed off by Attorney General Pam Bondi. She used to work at a Washington, D.C., lobbying firm that received $115,000 a month from Qatar to fight human trafficking, according to a 2019 contract reviewed by The Free Press.
She’s not the only one in the administration with ties to the Persian Gulf state.
President Trump’s chief of staff, Susie Wiles, led lobbying firm Mercury Public Affairs when it represented Qatar’s embassy in Washington. FBI Director Kash Patel worked as a consultant for Qatar, though he didn’t register as a foreign agent.
And then there is Steve Witkoff, president Trump’s longtime friend and senior adviser, who is accompanying him on his trip this week. For months now, Witkoff has served as Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East—and his name has been floated as a future national security adviser. Witkoff also happens to be a beneficiary of Qatar’s largesse: In 2023, Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund bought out his faltering investment in New York’s Park Lane Hotel for $623 million.
Meanwhile, the Trump Organization is hard at work planning a new luxury golf resort near Qatar’s capital, Doha, in partnership with a Qatari company. Trump’s son Donald Trump Jr. will speak next week at the invitation-only Qatar Economic Forum in a session titled “Investing in America.”
If you were just a casual reader of these facts—an ordinary American who doesn’t think much about the Middle East after America’s traumatic wars of the 2000s—you would think Qatar is a top American ally, a trustworthy partner, and a key hub of international commerce—a country in good enough standing that the president of the United States would use its plane as Air Force One.
But Qatar is also a seat of the Muslim Brotherhood, a crucial source of financing to Hamas, a diplomatic and energy partner of Iran, a refuge for the Taliban’s exiled political leadership, financier and cheerleader of Palestinian terrorism, and the chief propagandist of Islamism through its media powerhouse, Al Jazeera, which reaches 430 million people in more than 150 countries.
Key members of Qatar’s royal family have made their admiration for Islamism—and Hamas specifically—very clear. Sheikha Moza bint Nasser, the mother of Qatar’s emir and the chairperson of an educational nonprofit funneling millions into American schools, praised the mastermind of the October 7, 2023 massacre, Yahya Sinwar: “He will live on,” she wrote on X after his death last year, “and they will be gone.”
The question is: How did a refuge of Islamist radicalism, a country criticized for modern-day slave labor, become the center of global politics and commerce? How did this tiny peninsular country of 300,000 citizens and millions of noncitizen migrant workers manage to put itself smack-dab in the center of global diplomacy—and so successfully ingratiate itself within the Trump administration?
Over the past few months, The Free Press investigated these questions. What we found is that no obstacle, no history, no bad headline is too big for Qatar’s money.
Qatar has spent almost $100 billion to establish its legitimacy in Congress, American colleges and universities, U.S. newsrooms, think tanks, and corporations. Over the past two decades, it has poured those billions into purchases of American-made weapons and business investments ranging from U.S. real estate to energy plants. It built—and still pays for—the Al Udeid Air Base, even as the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have ended. Doha finances research and campuses at prestigious American universities. And its lobbyists have the connections needed to open all the right doors in Washington. Since 2017, it has spent $225 million on lobbying and public-relations efforts in the nation’s capital.
The Free Press reviewed thousands of lobbying, real estate, and corporate filings. We interviewed dozens of American, European, and Middle Eastern diplomats and defense officials. We also analyzed secret intelligence briefings and previously undisclosed government documents. Together, they explain how Qatar has amassed so many loyal allies in America.
(Sources: Government filings, Network Contagion Research Institute, reporting by The Free Press)
We sought comment from Qatar’s government numerous times, including from its embassy in Washington, which serves as Doha’s primary emissary in the U.S., as well as from PR officials and lobbyists whose firms represent or represented Qatar. Those efforts included detailed questions and the conclusions of this investigation. The Free Press never received a response.
Countries have always used money to advance their interests abroad, and recipients know that the bargain often includes realpolitik that requires them to hold their noses. Qatar is an extreme example of that geopolitical codependence.
The influence built by Qatar in the U.S. has no modern parallel, The Free Press found, whether compared with large American companies seeking to influence antitrust policy, energy firms trying to win new drilling rights, or other foreign governments aiming to shape U.S. policy—or shield themselves from it. For comparison, Qatar spent three times more in the U.S. than Israel did on lobbyists, public-relations advisers, and other foreign agents in 2021—and nearly two-thirds as much as China did, according to the government’s latest reports.
In President Trump and his friends and family, Qatar seems to have found a political leader and business partner who is unconcerned about keeping private and public interests separate.
The golf club and luxury villas deal announced by the Trump Organization last month appears to skirt a promise the company made to refrain from any business dealings with foreign governments during the president’s second term. The Air Force One deal also appears to violate the Emoluments Clause of the Constitution.
“I think it’s a great gesture from Qatar. I appreciate it very much,” the president said about the Qatari jet, dubbed the “palace in the sky.” He suggested that only “a stupid person” would turn down the offer of “a free, very expensive airplane.”
But of course, nothing is free. What Qatar hopes to achieve through its profligate strategy in Washington is nothing short of a remaking of the global order that secures America’s fidelity to Doha over other Gulf powers, namely Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, while neutering the U.S.’s ability to respond to Islamist threats and making our political class willing to overlook them. This compromises the ability of America’s political class to—as Saudi Arabia’s former foreign minister, Adel al-Jubeir, put it in 2018—understand that “the Qataris harbor and shelter terrorists. . . . The Qataris use their media platforms to spread hate.”
Host to the Muslim Brotherhood—and a U.S. Air Base
The U.S.’s entanglement with the Arab world began in the early 1800s with American naval battles against the Barbary pirates off the coast of North Africa. The Al Thani family, which now rules Qatar, was just a minor tribe over most of the past two centuries, dwarfed by the Al Saud family in modern-day Saudi Arabia, the Al Khalifa clan in today’s Bahrain, and the Al Nahyan family in Abu Dhabi.
As recently as the 1980s, diplomats and businessmen described Doha as a barren place with stifling heat. The economy was fueled largely by pearl farming. The Al Thanis promoted a conservative brand of Islam that left its women covered and the country largely dry of alcohol. From a distance, the only discernible building on Doha’s waterfront promenade was the pyramid-shaped Sheraton hotel.
“I mean, sleepy doesn’t really do it justice,” Sir John Jenkins, a former British diplomat focused on the Middle East, told The Free Press about his visits then. “There was nothing going on.”
Qatar’s economic fortunes soared when American and European energy giants, such as ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, developed the technology to exploit what turned out to be one of the largest natural gas reserves in the world. Qatar began exporting liquefied natural gas to Asia in 1997. Per-capita gross domestic product is now $121,610, among the highest in the world, compared with $89,110 in the U.S., according to the International Monetary Fund.
Money gave the Al Thanis an opportunity to follow the same playbook long used by Persian Gulf rulers: seeking a foreign patron to guarantee their security. Instead of the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain, Qatar turned toward Washington.
In the early 2000s, Qatar successfully wooed the U.S. away from the air base in Saudi Arabia, where it had been for more than a decade after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990. Qatar poured more than $1 billion into the runways, barracks, and hangars of Al Udeid. The facility can house thousands of American troops and is also a regional base for the UK’s Royal Air Force.
Of all of Qatar’s investments in the U.S., Al Udeid is widely agreed to be the shrewdest and most impactful. Steve Witkoff said this March that the Qataris “pay for every dollar of it,” more than $8 billion since 2013. As a result, Qatar has become an indispensable part of the U.S. national security system. Al Udeid is the Pentagon’s primary logistical hub in the Middle East—and the launch point for many U.S. military strikes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.
It was a brilliant move for a country looking to shield itself from its far more powerful neighbors. These include Qatar’s Sunni rivals in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and Iran’s revolutionary Shi’ite clerics. Qatar and Iran share a massive offshore gas field, giving Qatar another incentive to align with Washington. And the air base bought Qatar critical protection.
Qatar’s massive subsidies of the air base have also helped win the Al Thanis praise from the Pentagon to Congress to the White House. “You’ve been a great ally, and you’ve helped us with a magnificent military installation and military airport, the likes of which people haven’t seen in a long while,” President Trump told the Emir of Qatar at a dinner at the Treasury Department in 2019.
In 2022, President Biden declared Qatar a “major non-NATO ally” of the U.S., easing the way for more arms sales and greater U.S. military support. Last year, the two countries agreed to extend the lease on Al Udeid for another decade and discussed the possibility of joint-weapons production. “They’ve been an extraordinary partner to us, and Al Udeid Air Base remains a critical juncture for us in the Middle East,” said retired U.S. Army General Joseph Votel, who led the U.S. Central Command in the region from 2016 to 2019.
American diplomats have also expressed gratitude to Qatar for serving as a middleman between the U.S. and adversaries such as Iran, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Tehran’s proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah. That role has proven especially important during negotiations to release Israeli and American hostages seized by Hamas in 2023 and imprisoned in the Gaza Strip. In March, Steve Witkoff described Qatar’s leaders as “people who don’t have the old sensibilities, people who want to do business.”
But the intertwined relationship is also a source of growing concern among some current and former officials in the U.S. and Europe. They worry that, especially through the air base, the Al Thanis have far too much influence over Pentagon military strategy and operations at a time when a U.S. or Israeli conflict with Iran is a growing possibility, including potential strikes on Tehran’s nuclear sites. Indeed, maintaining the air base in Qatar comes with a significant string attached: The Gulf monarchy has said it would oppose military strikes on Iran from its soil.
Bruce Hoffman, a Georgetown University professor who has studied terrorism and insurgency for almost 50 years, publicly denounced Qatar’s long history of financing Hamas after it massacred 1,200 Israelis and kidnapped 250 more on October 7, 2023.
Hoffman told The Free Press that he soon heard from a “former very senior official” at the Defense Department, who offered some feedback from inside the Pentagon. “That comment wasn’t appreciated about Qatar, because we can’t do anything that endangers the air base,” Hoffman said he was told.
“Qatar has it both ways. They play both sides of the fence,” Hoffman said to The Free Press.
“I can’t think of a single dispute or conflict in the Middle East or Afghanistan that the Qataris made better,” said Sir Jenkins, the former British diplomat. He cited the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, despite years of mediation, by Doha’s support of Islamist militias and political parties in Syria, Libya, and Egypt.
Most troubling to Qatar’s critics is its deep, abiding relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, which was born in Egypt in the 1920s and later inspired militant organizations like al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and Hamas. A crackdown in the 1950s led to the migration of many Muslim Brotherhood leaders to the Persian Gulf states, including Qatar.
The Al Thanis welcomed them. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, widely seen as the Muslim Brotherhood’s most important spiritual and religious leader until his 2022 death, hosted a talk show titled Sharia and Life on the government-owned Al Jazeera broadcasting network. His religious edicts justified suicide bombings, condemned homosexuality, and rallied Muslims to fight occupying U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
“Martyrdom is a heroic act of choosing to suffer death in the cause of Allah, and that’s why it’s considered by most Muslim scholars as one of the greatest forms of jihad,” Qaradawi declared. In 2017, he was designated a terrorist by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, but not by Qatar.
That year, the same four countries also imposed a trade and travel embargo on Qatar, demanding that it sever all ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups. They told Qatar to stop its global television channel, Al Jazeera, from airing content that they saw as a threat to their stability.
The crisis eventually faded, partly through U.S. mediation. But Qatar continues to be an Islamist safe haven and to fund Al Jazeera, which aired in January a documentary titled What Is Hidden Is Greater. The film featured exclusive, embedded footage of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, as he evaded Israeli troops in the Gaza Strip. It also documented top military official Mohammed Deif planning attacks on Israeli targets alongside other Hamas terrorists.
“Why would you welcome into your country these forces that could be potentially destabilizing?” asked Steven Cook, a Middle East expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, about whether the haven Qatar provides to extremists is purely politics or a sign of religious devotion. “That’s where I go back and forth. And I think: ‘Well, maybe they are true believers.’ ”
What’s beyond dispute is that Qatar’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood projects its power across the Muslim world from Jordan to Indonesia. “The Qataris are using Islamism as a form of political leverage,” said Magnus Ranstorp, a longtime expert on Islamic movements and terrorism and a strategic adviser at the Swedish Defense University.
Stolen Emails and Smear Tactics
In 2021 alone, Qatar employed 35 registered lobbyists and public-relations firms at a total cost of more than $51 million. (Illustration by The Free Press)
In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Arab states launched a formal economic siege of Qatar, accusing the country of supporting terrorism and extremism and threatening the stability of their regimes. They demanded that Doha end its support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Jazeera. The Al Thanis saw the siege as an existential threat to their rule, Qatari officials have said.
The operation included attempts to sever Doha’s external sea and air routes, and there were rumblings of a Saudi cross-border ground invasion. Qatari nationals also worried about food shortages, necessitating emergency supplies from Iran at one point. As a result, Qatari royals and leaders flocked to Washington to demand that the first Trump administration intervene and negotiate an end to the conflict.
The Al Thanis also initiated one of the most aggressive lobbying and influence operations ever targeted on Washington. This transformed Qatar from a minor meddler in U.S. politics and public policy into a powerhouse that is both courted and feared.
Every foreign government employs lobbyists in the U.S. What is extraordinary about Qatar is its number of lobbyists, how much they’re paid, and their ability to operate within both political parties and across so much of elite Washington.
The U.S. government found that in 2021 alone, Qatar employed 35 registered lobbyists and public-relations firms at a total cost of more than $51 million. In comparison, the total expenditures for the UAE were $35 million. For Saudi Arabia, they were $25 million. The government hasn’t released newer totals.
To get a more complete picture, The Free Press sifted through every filing it could find since the start of 2017 by lobbyists and public-relations firms that reported being paid by Qatar. The Free Press calculated that Qatar has spent $225 million since then, or an average of more than $25 million a year.
*Note: Payments in 2025 are through April 10. Dates reflect when payments were reported to the government. (Source: Government filings)
Lawyers who specialize in foreign lobbying told The Free Press that these numbers are just part of the picture. Governments aren’t required to tell the Justice Department how much they spend on things like think tanks or hosting U.S. political and congressional delegations. In 2018, The Wall Street Journal reported that Qatar targeted a list of 250 people close to Trump aimed at “getting into his head as much as possible,” in the words of a lobbyist involved in the effort.
One of Qatar’s most loyal allies in the U.S. is former congressman Jim Moran. In his 24 years on Capitol Hill, the Democrat from Virginia played an important role in foreign affairs. He protested against the Sudanese government, opposed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, and stood out for criticizing what he called the corrupting power of the pro-Israel lobby, especially the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).
In 2017, Moran was the headliner at a National Press Club event titled “Fighting the Israel Lobby in Congress.” He and a fellow former congressman claimed Israel had the power to block the creation of an independent Palestinian state, undermine Lebanese sovereignty, and run out members of Congress who didn’t bow to Israel’s will. Most provocatively, Moran also said that AIPAC and Jewish Americans were critical players behind the George W. Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq.
“If the leaders of the Jewish community—particularly the pro-Israeli community—had a different attitude and were willing to get more engaged against the war, I don’t think we’d have a war,” Moran said.
A few months later, Moran signed on as one of Qatar’s lobbyists in Washington.
In coordination with other Qatari-paid lobbyists aligned with Republicans and Democrats, Moran began to promote a network of nongovernmental organizations and think tanks in support of Qatar’s positions on international affairs. Those institutions were often sharply critical of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel.
Public records show that Qatar also funded prominent, Washington-based think tanks to the tune of at least $9 million from 2019 to 2023. They included the Brookings Institution ($6 million), the Stimson Center ($2.3 million), RAND ($300,000), and the Middle East Institute ($380,000). In comparison, the UAE has spent $16.7 million on think tanks, while Saudi Arabia has spent more than $2.1 million.
After the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, Moran met in person with dozens of Democratic and Republican politicians on Capitol Hill to discuss “Qatar’s role as U.S. ally in the Middle East” and the country’s position “vis-à-vis [the] Middle East Conflict,” his lobbying records show. The big names included Maryland senator Chris Van Hollen and House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries.
A week after meeting with Jeffries, Moran donated $2,000 to a political action committee supporting Jeffries’ reelection campaign, according to a filing by Moran. Moran’s consulting firm and an outside contractor were paid $400,000 by the Embassy of Qatar for six months of work.
A person familiar with Van Hollen’s work in Congress said he has met with numerous countries, from Qatar to Israel, to learn more about their efforts to free the hostages and end the war.
Also in 2023, as the House neared a vote to possibly end the Biden administration’s use of Qatar to move unfrozen Iranian funds, Moran met with Minnesota Rep. Betty McCollum on the same day that he donated $500 to her campaign. (She voted against the bill, but it passed the House anyway.) In 2024, Moran met with McCollum again to discuss “Qatar’s constructive role in the Gaza conflict,” and he donated $1,000 to her campaign three days later.
McCollum told The Free Press that Moran “works with my office on critical defense innovation issues to improve and advance U.S. national security.” “I always put U.S. national security first,” she said. She also called Qatar “an important U.S. ally in the Middle East.”
Moran played a central role in helping Qatar acquire a marquee location for its new embassy in Washington. Qatar wanted to buy the Beaux Arts–inspired Carnegie Institute for Science’s building, over 120 years old and near the White House, but it wasn’t for sale. Moran told Washingtonian magazine that he and other people close to Qatar called Carnegie board members “at night” to encourage a sale.
Carnegie sold for $65 million, nearly triple the building’s assessed value, despite opposition from Carnegie employees who called Qatar an “oppressive, brutal, and misogynistic regime.”
In some of Qatar’s political dealings, its allies or beneficiaries crossed the line.
Retired U.S. Marine Corps General John Allen and former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan Richard G. Olson Jr., received gifts and consulting contracts from Qatar. In 2017, both men flew to Doha and back, then spoke with Trump administration officials on behalf of Qatar. Neither disclosed being paid for their work.
Olson eventually pleaded guilty to violating federal lobbying and ethics laws. Allen denied lobbying and was never charged. But he resigned from his position as president of the Brookings Institution in 2022.
Last year, prominent Republican lobbyists Barry Bennett and Douglas Watts admitted to failing to register as lobbyists for Qatar. Prosecutors said Bennett’s firm “covertly operated” an organization called Yemen Crisis Watch to highlight alleged war crimes committed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen. Qatar paid the two men $2.1 million for their first three months of work. Last year, they reached deferred prosecution agreements with the government to resolve the investigation.
Qatar also hired a consultant who hatched an audacious strategy to neutralize Qatar’s perceived political enemies in Washington that included smearing them.
Early in the first Trump administration, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE were competing for influence, and Qatar seemed to be on the defensive as a result of the 2017 siege. Republican members of Congress were seeking to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. That’s when a former CIA operative named Kevin Chalker approached Qatar with a plan.
Chalker and his private intelligence company, Global Risk Advisors, drafted a 12-page proposal titled “Project ENDGAME.” It was addressed to the “Qatar Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy” and the “Office of the Secretary General.” A copy of the proposal was reviewed by The Free Press. (You can read it here.)
“Endgame” was a code name for Yousef Al Otaiba, the UAE’s ambassador to the U.S., according to people briefed on the operation. “ENDGAME is the most powerful Ambassador in the U.S. He has allies and assets across Washington, D.C., ready to do his bidding,” the proposal said. “Qatar must act immediately because ENDGAME has infiltrated Trump’s inner circle.”
Chalker’s outfit warned that Qatar’s support for Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood was being used to undermine the Al Thanis. “An attack on Hamas is an attack on Qatar. An attack on the Muslim Brotherhood is an attack on Qatar,” the proposal said.
The proposal named four targets that might be interested in publishing articles based on Otaiba’s private information: The New York Times, The Intercept, Middle East Eye, and the editor of The Grayzone. “Many news organizations won’t publish ENDGAME content, so Qatar’s media assets must play a critical role,” it said.
Soon, some of the UAE ambassador’s emails began popping up on websites and in embarrassing news coverage. He had obviously been hacked.
“Hacked Emails Show Top UAE Diplomat Coordinating with Pro-Israel Think Tank Against Iran,” blared a headline in The Intercept in 2017. A follow-up article was titled “Diplomatic Underground: The Sordid Double Life of Washington’s Most Powerful Ambassador.”
Otaiba declined to comment to The Free Press. Lawyers for Chalker and Global Risk Advisors denied participating in any illegal activity on behalf of Qatar. The government of Qatar has also denied any role in hacking.
The stolen emails spread panic across Washington. One person who worked at a think tank told The Free Press that his bosses sought all of his emails to or from known hacking targets so that it could hunt for any that might be embarrassing.
“Qatar has never faced a threat this dangerous,” the Project ENDGAME proposal said. Now everyone knew how far Qatar would go to fight back.
Flipping Qatar’s Critics
Lindsey Graham, one of Capitol Hill’s staunchest hawks, told a Doha audience that Qatar is “more the solution than the problem.” (Illustration by The Free Press)
You couldn’t find a louder voice against Qatar in Washington over the past decade than Elliott Broidy. After raising money for Donald Trump’s first presidential campaign and inauguration, Broidy, a Republican political operative, used his connections to try to expose the fossil fuel–rich country’s bloody ties to Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other Islamist groups.
He helped pay for conferences at prestigious think tanks such as the Hudson Institute and Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Qatar was denounced in 2017 as a “welcome mat” and a “safe haven” for extremists. He solicited anti-Qatar opinion articles from prominent American diplomats and scholars. He leaned on his personal relationship with Trump to push the White House to back regional rivals Saudi Arabia and the UAE in their diplomatic and economic standoff with Qatar.
Most explosively, Broidy accused Qatar in a lawsuit in 2018 of engineering a computer hack of his devices. This eventually exposed his payoff to a former Playboy model who said he impregnated her, his work as a lobbyist for a Malaysian tycoon ensnared in a giant investment scandal, and his efforts to win a pardon from Trump for a convicted tax cheat.
“Elliott was sort of a one-man show focused on Qatar,” someone who worked with Broidy told The Free Press.
Instead of hiding from those humiliating headlines, Broidy spent tens of millions of dollars on lawyers and a team of public-relations and crisis-communications specialists, who doubled down on making Qatar look bad. In 2023, one of the Qatari lobbyists he sued admitted knowing about the hack and handed over incriminating emails. A judge demanded that he provide even more. It looked like Broidy might win his revenge.
Then he went completely quiet.
After secret talks in Qatar and Europe that included Broidy and senior aides to Qatar’s ruling Al Thani family, he agreed last year to a settlement that paid him more than $150 million, according to people intimately familiar with the deal. He also agreed to abandon his legal fight and any funding of efforts aimed at tarnishing Qatar. Representatives for Broidy declined to comment to The Free Press.
And Broidy is far from the only such story.
During his two decades in the Senate, South Carolina’s Lindsey Graham has made a name for himself as one of Capitol Hill’s staunchest hawks—a champion of U.S. military interventions in the Middle East, a defender of the American-Israel alliance, and a fierce critic of radical Islam.
So when Graham took to the stage at the Sheraton Grand Doha Resort in December 2023, just two months after Hamas’s invasion of Israel, the audience at the Doha Forum might have expected him to drop the hammer on the Al Thani family.
That day, though, Graham showed nothing but admiration and respect. “I want to thank you for what you’ve done for my country,” Graham said. “You get some criticism. Hamas is here. But I know why they’re here. They’re here so they can be talked to. You do things for the world that sometimes are not so popular. But I just want you to know that I appreciate what you do.”
Graham’s praise for Qatar didn’t happen in a vacuum.
Back in 2018, when Graham was known more for his vigorous support of the Iraq War and friendship with John McCain, the late Arizona senator, Qatar began investing hundreds of millions of dollars into Graham’s home state of South Carolina.
This came mostly through Qatar Airways’ purchase of 40 Boeing aircraft, including 787 Dreamliners made near Charleston that were part of an $11.7 billion order in 2016. Qatari-owned military technology company Barzan Aeronautical then announced plans to build spy drones at a new facility nearby.
Graham and South Carolina governor Henry McMaster also met with leaders of Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund to discuss additional investments in the state. Charleston and Doha became “sister cities,” and Qatar’s embassy donated $100,000 to Charleston for Covid relief aid. (It’s not just South Carolina: Qatar said it has invested more than $21 billion in Texas and $8 billion along the Gulf Coast to build energy plants and export facilities in recent years.)
Qatar never left Graham’s relationship to chance. In 2018, Barzan began paying $75,000 a month to a lobbying firm led by Christopher Ott. Ott and his colleagues met regularly with Graham and his staff to discuss Barzan and the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities being developed in South Carolina.
On the day of the 2023 Hamas attack, Graham took a phone call from Andrew King, a former deputy chief of staff to the South Carolina senator whose firm earns $50,000 a month as a lobbyist for Qatar’s embassy in Washington. Graham and King talked or met seven more times by the end of December, including the day when Graham stepped onto that hotel stage in Qatar.
Graham and King didn’t respond to questions from The Free Press. The lobbyist said in a government filing that they always talked about “U.S.-Qatar relations.” Graham told the Doha audience that Qatar is “more the solution than the problem.”
Al Jazeera and Influence Campaigns
The Al Thani family gave $50 million to the conservative news site Newsmax. Newsmax’s founder encouraged staff to soften their coverage of Qatar. (Illustration by The Free Press)
American newsrooms are meant to be above the political fray. Qatari money has still found a way to break through.
In 2019, Qatar was under immense criticism for exploiting low-wage migrant workers involved in building soccer stadiums for the 2022 World Cup hosted by the country. Human-rights groups and European media alleged it was equivalent to slave labor and that thousands died. Exposure of the quid pro quo by The Washington Post embarrassed Qatar.
It was right around that time that the Al Thani family gave $50 million to the conservative news site Newsmax. Newsmax’s founder encouraged staff to soften their coverage of Qatar.
Less well-known is Qatar’s investment in conservative radio commentator John Fredericks, who was vice chairman of Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign in Virginia and active in the 2020 campaign.
From 2017 to 2019, Fredericks’ company, Common Sense Media Holdings, was paid at least $180,000 by the Qatar-America Institute (QAI) to provide “regular show appearances by highly ranking Qatari officials” and to broadcast “live shows every other month at QAI to promote Qatar’s progress,” according to lobbying filings. QAI is a nonprofit organization funded by Qatar’s embassy.
Fredericks told The Free Press that QAI wasn’t registered as a foreign agent while he worked with the organization and reported the payment when it did register.
“My exposure to them was totally apolitical,” he said. “I mean, there was no politics that ever came into play. Even when I had the former ambassadors on, they would basically come on and tell you what was going on.”
Qatar also influences American media through Al Jazeera and a social-media news and storytelling project called AJ+. In 2020, the Justice Department said AJ+ had to register as an agent of Qatar, but Doha’s lawyers and lobbyists are contesting the decision.
For Hamas, Al Jazeera is the ultimate soft-power tool. According to documents shared by the Israeli military last fall, at least six Al Jazeera journalists were active members of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Al Jazeera denied the allegations and said the documents were fake.
“Could you imagine after 9/11 if bin Laden and al-Qaeda had a platform like Al Jazeera to shape attitudes toward America in the Middle East?” said Hoffman, the Georgetown professor. “The perception of both the U.S. and the war on terror could’ve been very different.” Al Jazeera didn’t respond to requests for comment.
Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, a former prime minister of Qatar, said in 2022 that the country “had journalists on our payroll.” “We would pay them every year,” he added. “Some of them received salaries,” and “all the Arab countries were doing this.”
The months after the October 7 Hamas attack presented a pressing PR challenge to Qatar—it had to role-play as an American ally while hosting the leadership of Hamas. It worked overtime to shape its image in the American press. Those efforts included about $570,000 in digital advertising for brand awareness, $170,000 to The New York Times and Clear Channel Outdoor, $110,000 to The Wall Street Journal’s parent company, $60,000 to Google and Meta, and more than $70,000 to NJI Media, a Virginia-based ad agency, for an “advertising campaign,” federal records show.
One of Qatar’s newest lobbyists is a co-founder of Washington Reporter, a newsletter “to provide right-of-center news and commentary to a D.C. audience.” Its founder, Garrett Ventry, is paid $80,000 a month to “promote a positive image” of Qatar, especially “the important role of the State of Qatar in international relations.”
Washington Reporter was started last May and is backed by more than $1 million from prominent funders, including Omeed Malik, the financier of Tucker Carlson’s new media venture. (Ventry resigned from the company’s board and executive leadership team in September after registering as a lobbyist for Qatar.)
Qatar is also positioning itself as a hub for Western news organizations in the Middle East. In February, CNN announced it would open a new “operation” this year in Media City in Doha, which describes itself as “a global hub for media companies” that helps them “in managing every aspect of their journey as they take their next steps to operate from Doha.” Media City has also announced partnerships with The Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg Media to stage news events in Doha.
Some journalists have accepted free travel and accommodations from Qatar, which is eager for them to participate in conferences and events sponsored by the country. The events often include speakers who praise Qatar’s role as a negotiator and mediator in the Middle East.
In May 2024, Ali Velshi, the Canadian journalist and MSNBC anchor, interviewed America’s ambassador to Qatar, Timmy Davis, at the Global Security Forum, co-hosted by the Qatari government and the Soufan Center, a global research and events organization headed by a former FBI counterterrorism expert, Ali Soufan.
Velshi, a former anchor at Al Jazeera America, told the room of journalists, diplomats, and policy professionals: “I would argue that everybody in this room understands. . . the role that Qatar is trying to play and is playing in this very serious issue we’ve got in the Middle East right now.”
The Global Security Forum paid Velshi’s travel and hotel costs, and it hosted an event to promote his latest book, Small Acts of Courage. Velshi’s wife, Lori Wachs, is a member of the Soufan Center’s board of directors.
Travel for outside speaking engagements by MSNBC anchors usually is covered by the organizer, according to a person familiar with the network’s practices. A Soufan Center representative said that the Global Security Forum “covers travel costs for some invitees, depending on factors such as the nature of their participation.”
Also, there was political and foreign-affairs commentator Steve Clemons, then an editor-at-large for Semafor, a new U.S. media company. Clemons hosts a talk show from Washington for Doha-based Al Jazeera English.
In an interview with one of Qatar’s lead diplomats and negotiators, Clemons said: “We’ve just heard some, I think, very important remarks about Qatar’s decision to be a kind of platform for problem-solving between antagonistic parties around the world, not just in Gaza.”
Conference organizers paid for Clemons and his husband to travel and stay at the event, Clemons told The Free Press. “I don’t, you know, buy everything” that Qatar says, he added. “But I do believe that they play an interesting role behind the scenes in massaging a lot of these things that, you know, we need to solve.” (Clemons left Semafor in June 2024.)
Qatar also relies on its vast network of lobbyists to directly influence media coverage. Sometimes that outreach goes nowhere, or leads to short phone calls or email conversations. Other times it has generated image-related wins for Qatar.
Andrew King, the former deputy chief of staff to Senator Graham, called Bill Bennett twice last July, according to a filing by the lobbyist. The former education secretary for the Reagan administration is now a conservative political commentator.
Four days later, Fox News’ website published an op-ed by Bennett with the headline “An American Education Partnership in Qatar Brings Surprising Benefits to the Middle East.”
Bennett denied in his article that there was a “Qatari influence campaign” on U.S. college campuses. He also promoted “Education City” in Doha, now home to the satellite campuses of six American universities. Bennett didn’t respond to requests for comment to The Free Press.
The Largest Foreign Funder of American Higher Education
Qatar is the largest foreign funder of U.S. colleges and universities in the world, spending more than $6.3 billion on contracts and gifts since the government started tracking the data in 1986. (Illustration by The Free Press)
Georgetown University, located in the heart of the capital of the free world, is one of the top colleges in the U.S. Its School of Foreign Service produces diplomats, thinkers, policymakers, and leaders, from former CIA director George Tenet (Class of ’76) to U.S. president Bill Clinton (Class of ’68).
So why does Georgetown have a campus in Doha?
Part of the answer is money. The Qatar Foundation, founded in 1995 by the former Emir of Qatar, gave Georgetown $760 million to open a satellite campus in 2005. And the money from Qatar never stops. From 2021 to 2024, Georgetown received about $248 million from Qatar, according to the Network Contagion Research Institute.
Qatar is the largest foreign funder of U.S. colleges and universities in the world, spending more than $6.3 billion on contracts and gifts since the government started tracking the data in 1986. In comparison, China spent about $5.6 billion, and Saudi Arabia spent $3.7 billion, NCRI said.
(Source: Network Contagion Research Institute)
Georgetown University in Qatar is located in Education City, a mega-campus that also includes a Cornell University medical school ($1.8 billion), Texas A&M University engineering programs ($700 million), and a Northwestern University outpost that offers journalism and communications degrees ($600 million).
Qatar’s track record on human rights and free expression—it is illegal, for example, to criticize the government or any member of the royal family—is challenging, to say the least.
In 2019, the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression ranked Georgetown’s Doha campus among the ten worst colleges for free speech after the campus canceled a planned debate on God that asked participants to argue whether “major religions should portray God as a woman,” inspired by a pop hit performed by singer Ariana Grande.
The debate’s promotional poster, which featured Grande in place of God in Michelangelo’s The Creation of Adam, sparked a wave of backlash on Arabic-speaking social media. Georgetown Qatar said the campus was “committed to the free and open exchange of ideas, while encouraging civil dialogue that respects the laws of Qatar.” Yet “blasphemy,” or criticism of Islam, is illegal in Qatar and punishable by up to seven years in prison.
Bruce Hoffman, the Georgetown professor who taught at the Doha campus for two years, said that he didn’t feel pressure to censor his course materials. But he was shocked to discover some of the students in his class on terrorism studies “doubted whether al-Qaeda was a terrorist group,” he said. The students were mainly diplomats pursuing master’s degrees.
He agreed to teach in Doha because “you’re teaching people and opening them up to different ideas and new perspectives,” he said, but would never do it again after October 7. “Qatar’s largesse enabled the attacks,” he said. “To me, it’s unacceptable.”
Qatar’s influence also trickles down to Georgetown’s main campus in the heart of D.C. Henrik Schildt Lundberg, who graduated with a master’s degree in foreign service last spring, told The Free Press that he and his classmates were invited to a lavish dinner at Qatar’s embassy with Majed al-Ansari, the spokesperson for the Qatar Ministry of Affairs.
When one Georgetown student asked al-Ansari about Qatari human-rights abuses of foreign laborers, al-Ansari responded by accusing the student of “colonialist thinking,” Lundberg said.
Lundberg, who served as a Persian translator for the Swedish Foreign Ministry in Iran for two years before attending Georgetown, told The Free Press that he viewed the dinner as part of Qatar’s strategy to strengthen its image among elite American college students.
“They know exactly which buttons to push and how to phrase an argument, how to engage in conversations with students who are especially progressive,” he said.
(Source: Network Contagion Research Institute)
Northwestern University art history professor Stephen Eisenman found a lot to be worried about when he visited its Doha campus in 2015. Faculty “enjoy limited academic freedom,” particularly because most of them do not have tenure, he wrote in a report about what he saw.
Students “appear to have internalized many speech restrictions and willingly operate within them,” and the campus struggles even to provide students with books that “violate censorship laws” in Qatar, the report added.
“There is little sign that the regime is becoming more liberal in its attitudes toward speech,” concluded Eisenman, then the president of Northwestern’s faculty senate. “If anything, just the opposite.”
He said he went back home feeling “very dubious. . . about the viability” of Northwestern’s mission to create a Western-style journalism school in Doha.
Eisenman said in his report that he believed the Doha campus “is run at no cost” to Northwestern and that it “makes money from the arrangement, though not very much.” The campus had 470 students from more than 70 countries in the 2024–25 academic year, and its 10-member “joint advisory board” includes Qatar’s deputy prime minister, secretary general, and the executive director of Al Jazeera. Georgetown’s advisory board in Doha includes the ruling emir’s sister.
The Free Press asked Eisenman whether he thinks anything has changed in the past decade. He responded, “I now feel that Al Jazeera is so valuable a source for information about the ongoing genocide in Gaza that Northwestern would be wise to maintain and even expand its affiliation with Qatar.”
Northwestern told The Free Press that its Doha campus is there “to educate future generations of journalists and those working in communications fields, representing more than 50 nationalities, to help positively impact the region.”
A year ago, Texas A&M’s board voted to close down its Doha campus by 2028 after The Free Press reported that the latest contract between the research institute and the Gulf state would have granted the Qatar Foundation ownership of intellectual property developed at the university’s Doha campus.
Texas A&M said that it was “false and irresponsible” to accuse it of sharing any sensitive information with Doha. Texas A&M told The Free Press that it complies with all U.S. laws and rules related to its international relationships, research, and export control. Texas A&M cited regional instability as the cause for the board’s decision to close down the campus in Doha.
Qatar says it isn’t using its money to buy credibility through U.S. colleges and universities. A “briefing pack” created and distributed by the country’s American lobbyists in June 2024 said that even the idea that Qatar is a “major foreign donor to American universities” is a “misconception.”
Qatar doesn’t donate to these schools, the document said. It just pays for the operating costs of the Doha campuses. “There is neither the intention nor the opportunity for Qatar to influence anything that happens on university campuses in the United States,” it said.
Qatar Foundation International (QFI), the U.S. arm of the Qatar Foundation, has given out tens of millions of grants to K–12 public schools to fund Arabic language and culture programs from New Haven, Connecticut, and Amherst, Massachusetts, to Arizona and California.
QFI gave nearly half a million dollars to the Minneapolis Public School District to fund salaries for Arabic teachers. The contracts often stipulate that teachers must attend QFI professional-development training as part of the grant.
Last year, The Free Press reported that QFI donated more than $1 million to the New York City Department of Education from 2019 to 2022, including support for an elementary school in Brooklyn to teach young students Arabic through art. The classroom hung a map of the “Arab world,” which excluded Israel.
The map was removed after The Free Press published its article about the map. In the “briefing pack” distributed by the lobbyists, Qatar said that it was not responsible for the map and that the organization “has no role in setting or influencing classroom content or management.”
Federal laws require colleges to report all gifts and contracts from foreign entities that exceed $250,000. Smaller contributions are much harder to track.
The Free Press reviewed emails from 2016 between Craig Cangemi, a program officer at QFI, and Emma Harver, a program coordinator for a joint program between the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Duke University for the study of the Middle East.
The emails describe a conversation between Harver and her supervisor about how public universities might be cautious about “taking QFI funds.”
“He thinks that some Title VI institutions might be wary of accepting money,” she wrote, and “because we are government-funded, we are often scrutinized on how we spend our money and our other funding sources.”
She told the Qatar official that her boss “thinks that non-Title VI funded programs (and especially private institutions) would be happy to apply to QFI for grants.”
In the same email, Harver thanked Cangemi for QFI’s support of UNC’s “Learning through Languages research symposium,” and then added, “and glad that we were able to accept this money via Duke.”
UNC’s Center for Middle East and Islamic Studies denied ever receiving any funding from QFI and said it “had no role in the academic content” of the event, which met the joint program’s “high scholarly standards.” Cangemi and Harver didn’t respond to requests for comment from The Free Press.
If the college leaders who accept so much money from Qatar ever feel nervous about how that looks, they avoid showing it. Last month, Georgetown and Qatar announced an agreement to renew their Doha partnership for 10 years.
Georgetown’s interim president, Robert M. Groves, also bestowed one of its highest honors on Sheikha Moza bint Nasser, the mother of Qatar’s emir and chairperson of an educational nonprofit that has funneled millions of dollars into U.S. schools. The award “is reserved for individuals whose contributions reflect the university’s deepest commitments,” Groves said.
Left unmentioned was her praise of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, mastermind of Hamas’s October 2023 massacre.
A Scandal in Plain Sight
Perhaps supporters of Qatar will be proven right, and it will liberalize and bring the region along with it. But what’s at stake is nothing short of American sovereignty and national security. (Illustration by The Free Press)
At present, Qatar’s influence in Washington is arguably at its strongest point since its independence in 1971. In amassing this power, Qatar’s government has denied paying any bribes and seems undeterred by any criticism of anything it does. In late March, Middle East experts in Washington were stunned when Roger Marshall, a senator from Kansas, pounced on Charles Asher Small of the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy during a hearing about antisemitism. Small had criticized Qatar for its support of Hamas and its ties to Iran and Afghanistan.
“It’s interesting, the prejudice that I hear coming out of your mouth,” Senator Marshall said. “Of the 120,000 people evacuated from Afghanistan. . . 60,000 of them came through Qatar. Without Qatar, we would have had thousands more deaths.”
In 2019, Marshall said that Qatar’s “blind eye” to terrorism undermines American security and calls into question the long-term security partnership of the U.S.-operated base in the Gulf country.
What changed his mind about Qatar? Starting in 2022, lobbyists for Qatar began contacting his office and invited him to visit Qatar, lobbying records show. The lobbyists helped pay for Marshall’s meeting in Doha with Qatar’s ruler in 2023, and they emphasized Qatar’s role in helping to evacuate Americans caught in Afghanistan with Marshall’s chief of staff.
When asked by The Free Press if Marshall’s comments at the hearing were drafted or shaped by lobbyists for Qatar, a spokeswoman said: “In agreement with both President Trump and Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff, Senator Marshall believes that Qatar has proven itself to be a key and strong ally to the United States in the Middle East over the last several years.”
Those aligned with Qatar will argue that the country is a force for stability in the Middle East and a diplomatic partner that is more transactional than ideological. They’ll admit that Al Jazeera is a problem, but insist that the Al Thanis are committed to liberalizing their society, but must go slowly.
These supporters believe that the U.S.’s relationship with Qatar allows Washington to limit its involvement in the region in a way that is more sustainable than it has been in the past.
They note, among other things, the crucial role Qatar played following the 2021 Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, when more than a third of the people evacuated by the U.S. transited through Qatar. Doha’s relationship with the Taliban—the Qataris hosted the Taliban’s political office from 2013 to 2021—also helped Qatar conduct its own evacuations and secure safe passage through the chaotic and terrorist-laden Kabul airport. Qatar’s supporters also point to the country’s role as a mediator between Israel and Hamas; Doha has been the principal facilitator of hostage-release and ceasefire deals between the two parties since the October 7 massacre.
Perhaps these supporters of Qatar and the Al Thani family will be proven right. Perhaps Qatar will liberalize and bring the region along with it. Perhaps Qatar will join with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to emphasize education and investment above ideology and extremism.
But what’s at stake is nothing short of American sovereignty and national security.
At a moment when so many political leaders, pundits, and ordinary Americans are reaching for explanations of—or entertaining conspiracies about—who really pulls the strings in Washington and beyond, many of them are ignoring a story in plain sight.
The Free Press’s Danielle Shapiro contributed to this report.
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19. Trump Clash With Library of Congress Sets Up Constitutional Fight
You would think there would now be more important issues than the culture war.
Trump Clash With Library of Congress Sets Up Constitutional Fight
White House moves to exert its influence, firing the top librarian and seeking to install members of the administration
https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/trump-library-of-congress-fight-a820d2dc
By Ken Thomas
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and Lindsay Wise
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May 14, 2025 5:00 am ET
Recent changes at the Library of Congress represent a power grab, according to Democrats. Photo: Kayla Bartkowski/Getty Images
Key Points
What's This?
- President Trump fired the librarian of Congress, seeking to place administration members.
- Justice Department officials arrived to install Trump’s acting librarian, leading to a standoff with library staff.
- Lawmakers are concerned about access to sensitive data, including the Congressional Research Service.
WASHINGTON—The Library of Congress—long a sleepy, noncontroversial staple of the nation’s capital—has become the latest battleground in President Trump’s power struggle between the branches of government.
Trump has moved to exert influence over the largest library in the world, firing the librarian of Congress and seeking to install members of his administration at the institution, which serves members of Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court. It is also home to the U.S. Copyright Office and the research arm of Congress.
The president’s influence led to a standoff of sorts this week, with officials from the Justice Department showing up to inform library staff that Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche, who was named acting librarian by Trump, would be taking charge.
Blanche, who previously served as Trump’s criminal defense attorney, met Tuesday with staff of the Senate Rules Committee after lawmakers, including some Republicans, said they were alarmed by Trump’s decision last week to fire Carla Hayden, the librarian of Congress, and Shira Perlmutter, the head of the U.S. Copyright Office.
Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R., S.D.) said it was important for there to be a consultation on nominees such as the librarian of Congress, whom he described as having a “hybrid role between…Article I and Article II branches of government.”
Asked if there had been consultation with the White House before the firing of the librarian last week, Thune replied, “Not exactly.”
Carla Hayden was dismissed last week from her post as librarian of Congress. Photo: al drago/press pool
Thune’s home-state colleague, Republican Sen. Mike Rounds, said he was trying to find out more. “Because I think these are congressional staff,” Rounds said, “I don’t think they’re subject to Article II,” the section of the Constitution that outlines the powers of the executive branch.
Aides and lawmakers said they have concerns about the information and records that Justice Department interim appointees or other unconfirmed individuals would potentially be able to access at the library. Some cited particular worry over the Office of Congressional Workplace Rights, which handles internal congressional office human-rights issues, and the Congressional Research Service, a nonpartisan team that handles confidential requests from members of Congress.
The Library of Congress also manages financial and other data for legislative-branch agencies such as the Capitol Police.
Democrats said the moves represented a power grab by Trump that usurped congressional authority over the library. “It’s the Library of Congress, not the library of the president,” said Sen. Alex Padilla (D., Calif.), the top Democrat on the Senate Rules Committee.
House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D., N.Y.) said during a news conference Tuesday that “litigation will be evaluated strongly.”
Some Democrats have alleged, without providing evidence, that Trump’s moves at the library could amount to another attempt championed by the Department of Government Efficiency to access sensitive government data. They argued that Trump has no authority to appoint an acting librarian or to terminate the leader of the copyright office.
Separate from the staffing changes, library officials have resisted efforts by members of DOGE to access data, according to a person familiar with the matter. Perlmutter’s office recently released a report on artificial intelligence that stoked fears that copyrighted materials could be used to train AI systems.
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President Trump is using the popular conservative ideology known as the ‘unitary executive theory’ to give more power to the executive branch. WSJ explains. Photo: Roberto Schmidt/AFP
“There is a strong fear that the data that is held very closely in the library—things like the Congressional Research Service, advice to Congress, even the things that Congress members are asking about—is kept very strictly confidential,” said Hope O’Keeffe, a former associate general counsel at the library.
The White House declined to comment and referred to remarks from press secretary Karoline Leavitt last week defending the move. Leavitt said Trump didn’t believe Hayden “fit the needs of the American people,” adding, “She has been removed from her position, and the president is well within his rights to do that.”
Two Justice Department officials, Brian Nieves and Paul Perkins, arrived at the library’s U.S. Copyright Office on Monday morning with a letter and some printed documents, according to a person familiar with the incident.
The letter informed library officials that Blanche had been appointed acting librarian of Congress, and a separate email said that Nieves had been appointed acting deputy librarian and Perkins the acting register of copyrights and director of the U.S. Copyright Office.
Capitol Police were called to the scene, and there was a discussion in the hallway with library staff, the person familiar with the incident said, adding that Nieves and Perkins agreed to leave.
The situation has created confusion about the leadership of the library, whose collections include millions of books, films and videos, along with audio recordings, photographs, newspapers and manuscripts.
The librarian of Congress is nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Hayden was nominated by President Barack Obama in 2016 to a 10-year term and confirmed by the Senate on a bipartisan basis. The position had been a lifetime appointment.
“I don’t understand why the administration just didn’t wait a year,” said Sen. Susan Collins (R., Maine), adding that there wasn’t much time left in Hayden’s term. Collins said she unsuccessfully attempted to reach Hayden over the weekend.
The librarian is the only presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed political appointee at the library. Other key offices, such as the register of copyrights, is appointed by the librarian.
Robert Newlen, who was principal deputy librarian and Hayden’s No. 2, was the top career person in the line of succession and has been acting librarian since Hayden’s dismissal.
He told staff in a Monday email, which was viewed by The Wall Street Journal, that they “may have read that the White House has appointed a new acting Librarian. Currently, Congress is engaged with the White House, and we have not yet received direction from Congress about how to move forward.”
In a Monday evening email to staff, Newlen wrote that members of Congress were continuing “to engage with the White House, and we have not yet received direction from Congress about how to move forward.”
Write to Ken Thomas at ken.thomas@wsj.com and Lindsay Wise at lindsay.wise@wsj.com
20. Dollar Likely a Long Way From Losing Reserve Status
Some excellent news for our economic and national security.
Dollar Likely a Long Way From Losing Reserve Status
https://www.wsj.com/finance/currencies/asian-currencies-consolidate-as-traders-assess-u-s-cpi-data-55637631
Updated May 14, 2025 4:49 am ET
0846 GMT – The dollar is unlikely to lose its status as the world’s reserve currency any time soon, MUFG Bank’s Derek Halpenny says in a note. There are “certainly examples of longer-term periods of dollar depreciation that does not necessarily mean the dollar’s reserve status is being lost.” Nevertheless, the dollar’s share of foreign exchange reserves could continue to fall gradually going forward, he says. The dollar’s depreciation and reduced dollar buying interventions by Asian central banks due to U.S. opposition reinforces that prospect, he says. There’s still “ample scope for the dollar to weaken without having to take the view that its reserve status is under threat.” The DXY dollar index falls 0.5% to 100.517. (renae.dyer@wsj.com)
Sterling Could Rise Ahead of U.K.-EU Summit
0805 GMT – The sterling is expected to strengthen on optimism ahead of talks between the U.K. and EU on Monday, ING analyst Francesco Pesole says in a note. The two sides are holding a summit on May 19, and markets are hoping this could lead to closer ties. The sterling should also receive support from the Bank of England’s cautious stance on interest-rate cuts, Pesole says. Tuesday’s jobs data showed wage growth eased, but it remains too high to make the BOE shift toward faster rate reductions, he says. ING expects the euro to fall below 0.8400 pounds ahead of the U.K.-EU summit. EUR/GBP is last 0.1% higher at 0.8415. (renae.dyer@wsj.com)
Euro’s Gains Likely to Remain Limited
0706 GMT – The euro rises against the dollar following Tuesday’s lower-than-expected U.S. inflation data but further gains could be limited, ING analyst Francesco Pesole says in a note. Markets are likely to retain interest on short-seller bets against the dollar ahead of expected weaker U.S. data, he says. However, the euro is “not particularly well positioned” to benefit from that as the European Central Bank continues to cut interest rates and markets might look for more interest in higher risk currencies on the back of improved risk sentiment. The euro rises 0.1% to $1.1194. (renae.dyer@wsj.com)
Czech Koruna Could Rise as Rate Cut Bets Look Overdone
0738 GMT – The Czech koruna looks set to strengthen in coming months as the Czech National Bank is unlikely to cut interest rates as much as the market predicts, ING analyst Frantisek Taborsky says in a note. The market expects the CNB to cut its policy rate to 3.0% by the end of its rate cutting cycle from 3.5% but this looks overdone, he says. “We believe we will only see one more rate cut in the base case scenario or rates may remain at current levels as a risk.” Risks are building towards more restrictive monetary policy in terms of inflation and the economy, he says. The euro trades flat at 24.9362 koruna.(renae.dyer@wsj.com)
Dollar Falls as Trump Repeats Rate-Cut Calls After Lower Inflation
0636 GMT – The dollar stays under pressure after President Trump repeated his calls for interest-rate cuts following Tuesday’s lower-than-expected U.S. inflation data. Trump again accused Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell of being “too late” to lower rates on his Truth Social platform. Inflation eased to 2.3% on year in April against the 2.4% expected by economists in a WSJ survey. At first glance, the dollar’s fall after the data seems logical given the prospect of faster rate cuts, Commerzbank’s Thu Lan Nguyen says in a note. However, it could also reflect the fact that Trump will feel vindicated given the lack of tariff effect in the data, she says. The DXY dollar index falls 0.1% to 100.895. (renae.dyer@wsj.com)
21. The Strategic Blindfold: How Damaging Alliances Can Lead to Costly Mistakes
An active duty Major speaks truth to power about alliances.
Excerpts:
The government is in a ‘strategic blindfold,’ which makes Trump focus on making America very rich without considering how the trade and immigration policies are damaging alliances, which will eventually undermine national security and economic stability. The recent developments involving tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China have initiated trade wars with a serious potential of weakening alliances. Canada and China have already imposed retaliatory tariffs, and Mexico is in the process. The looming trade war will have adverse economic outcomes, making consumers pay higher prices for imported commodities. The tariffs will worsen the relationship between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, making the two neighbors reluctant to share intelligence or intercept illegal immigrants and drugs from reaching the U.S. border, which eventually undermines national security. As much as the tariffs are essential for advancing the interests of the U.S., the government must assess them to avoid ruining relationships with its most promising allies.
America must carefully manage its alliances, prioritize long-term strategic objectives, and foster cooperation with key partners to maintain its global leadership and protect its national interests. On February 1, 2025, a negotiation with Canada and Mexico led to the two nations committing to deploy 10,000 soldiers each to the border to prevent undocumented immigrants and illicit drugs. However, the U.S. sparked a tariff war on March 4, 2025, because the trade allies imposed retaliatory tariffs. This exemplifies how the U.S. has put on a ‘strategic blindfold,’ preventing it from engaging in productive negotiations with allies.
After the imposition of the additional 10% on existing levies on China on February 1, 2025, China took the moral high ground to paint the U.S. as a nation that does not follow the rules. China’s decision allowed it to understand how to respond to the U.S. Importantly, China was also open to negotiations with the U.S., meaning that the government should have seized the moment to discuss with China how to improve bilateral trade and national security, which is part of an amicable approach to advancing U.S. interests without the risk of entering a tariff war. However, the new developments involving an additional 20% tariffs on existing levies on China prompted the Chinese government to retaliate using tariffs while suing America in the WTO.
The U.S. and Chinese economies rely significantly on trade. Hence, the U.S. should avoid the ‘strategic blindfold’ approach of relying on trade tariffs and aggressive policies to advance its interests as a method to make America great again. It should enter peaceful negotiations that assure economic stability and prevent Americans from paying higher prices when the current cost of living already strains them. Nevertheless, these examples of national security and economic “strategic blindfolds” give a glimpse of what happens when our closest allies become our greatest liabilities. And we may be about to find out more. The key allies have become great liabilities because the U.S. still needs them as they contribute significantly to the economy and national security.
Essay| Opinion / Perspective| Policy Paper
The Strategic Blindfold: How Damaging Alliances Can Lead to Costly Mistakes
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/14/the-strategic-blindfold-how/
by Renika Pruitt
|
05.14.2025 at 06:00am
Abstract
The president has signed several executive orders, some of which will damage the relationship between the U.S. and key allies. New trade tariffs do not distinguish between allies and adversaries. The president has put on a ‘strategic blindfold,’ with his primary aim to make America very rich. The strategic blindfold refers to the approach whereby Trump is only focusing on making America rich while overlooking or failing to see the significance of mutual agreements with key allies on how to improve foreign trade and collaborate on preventing the entry of illicit drugs and undocumented immigrants. The president imposed 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico, yet these countries have been operating on free-trade agreements. He also imposed an additional 20% on existing levies on imports from China. In addition, aggressive immigration and deportation policies are negatively affecting America’s reputation as a champion of human rights. The key allies have retaliated with their tariffs, leading to a tariff-influenced war that will make Americans pay higher prices for imported goods, undermining economic stability. The other downside of the tariffs and immigration policies is that Mexico and Canada will stop intercepting illicit drugs and undocumented immigrants from reaching the American border, which compromises national security. President Trump’s approach to engaging America’s key allies appears to be a dumb idea that causes Americans to feel some pain economically. These tariffs and amped-up policies will make America’s key allies become liabilities, considering that imported products support 24% of America’s gross domestic product (GDP)
The Strategic Blindfold: How Damaging Alliances Can Lead to Costly Mistakes
President Trump promised Americans on the campaign trail to make America great again (MAGA), stating that he had the nation’s best interests at heart. He also promised to improve the economy and people’s livelihood by rapidly decreasing prices. Last year, millions of Americans experienced economic challenges due to the high cost of living. President Trump guaranteed that “Prices will come down,” “You just watch – they’ll come down, and they’ll come down fast.” Unfortunately, President Trump’s new executive orders have left Americans worried about the prices of commodities increasing due to the imposition of trade tariffs on our trading allies. He appears to have put on a blindfold, making him only focus on making America rich without considering whether the use of trade policies will increase the cost of living for Americans. The president admitted that the new wave of tariffs and policies could through increased prices of goods. The blindfold makes America dismiss how many essential goods America imports from Canada, Mexico, and China and how the trade with the countries affects our country’s GDP and economic stability. The blindfold also prevents Trump from seeing that a trade war could start, which will mean higher prices for essential products imported from the key allies.
It is the belief that the president is using trade tariffs and amped-up immigration policies to make America great again. According to the president, the immigration policies will intensify security in America, and the new tariffs will increase U.S. exports to the trade allies, making America “very rich and very strong.” However, this approach is a ‘strategic blindfold’ that prevents the government from critically evaluating the potential of the tariffs and policies destroying the good relationship between America and its three largest trade allies. While strategic alliances are essential for maintaining global stability and advancing national interests, damaging alliances by imposing tariffs and aggressive immigration and deportation policies will lead to costly mistakes that compromise national security and economic stability.
Trade Blindfold
China: History
It is crucial to look at recent history to understand how the U.S. put on a ‘strategic blindfold’ and how the current decisions will lead to costly mistakes that compromise national security and economic stability. In the first Trump administration, the president introduced new tariffs to limit U.S. imports from China and increase U.S. exports to China. He imposed a 10% tariff on China’s $300 billion imports. Introducing such tariffs led to a U.S.-China trade war in 2019, whereby Trump and Xi Jinping flexed their tariff ‘muscles’ as shown in the image below. China retaliated by imposing a 25% tariff on imports from the U.S. China and lowered its tariffs on imports from other nations. The retaliatory actions by China meant that some companies like Tesla and BMW had to set up manufacturing plants in China to avoid incurring additional costs while exporting to China or importing raw materials from China. The U.S. government also had to subsidize the agricultural sector using tens of billions of dollars of taxpayers’ money to cushion the industry against the declining exports to China.
Wearing a ‘strategic blindfold’ back then, the American government used trade tariffs to start a trade war that adversely affected its exports to China after President Xi Jinping’s retaliatory tariffs. The initial intent was for the trade tariffs to increase exports to China and reduce imports from China to create a trade balance. The U.S. later tried to settle the trade war with a demand for purchase commitments, whereby China was to spend an additional $200 billion on goods and services from America. However, China did not meet the requirements of such an agreement because they did not spend more than they did in the previous years. Mandating for purchase commitments only sowed distrust on the part of the U.S. in other like-minded countries that trade with America. As such, a temporary trade war led to long-term damage because the different countries whose tariffs were lowered continued to sell to China, increasing competition against the U.S. Surprisingly, there was an estimation that in 2020, without the trade war sparked by the tariffs, U.S. exports to China would have increased by 19%. It seems that we have not learned from our past mistakes. These past outcomes of a tariff-influenced trade war highlight the importance of maintaining strategic alliances through negotiation and mutual agreements instead of imposing punitive tariffs that might have long-term adverse effects.
Current Actions
According to Al Jazeera English, keeping up with all the executive orders coming out of the White House has been challenging since President Trump assumed the Oval Office this year. In one of the executive orders issued on February 1, 2025, President Trump introduced new tariffs to prevent the flow of illegal drugs and minimize imports from China. On March 4, 2025, President Trump announced that there would be an imposition of an additional 20% on existing levies on imports from China instead of the initial 10% that was announced on February 1, 2025. As earlier speculated, we are now in a tariff war because China retaliated with a “15% levy on chicken, wheat, corn, and cotton, and a 10% increase on soybeans, pork, and seafood,” restricted 25 American companies from doing business in China, and sued America in the WTO (World Trade Organization). This tariff-influenced war will interfere with economic stability, and the lack of cooperation with our allies will undermine national security.
What We Are Blinded To
China is currently the second-largest exporter to the U.S., which means a strategic alliance between the U.S. and China is essential for economic stability. Besides China’s importance to U.S. trade, China’s cooperation is critical to addressing security issues such as cyber threats. China has been advancing significantly in terms of cyber security, which implies that it has become a growing cyber threat. However, the American government has put on a ‘strategic blindfold’ that prevents it from perceiving the contributions of China to its economic stability and national security. Instead, it has focused on increasing exports to China to become very rich. Here’s a recommendation: instead of turning China into a rival through aggressive trade tariffs, America should seek a strategic alliance to develop a collective cyber defense system. The cooperation will ensure that U.S. cybersecurity is advanced, and China and America could share intelligence about North Korea’s nuclear program to prevent any attacks on the U.S. According to the Wall Street Journal, China signaled that it was willing to have great talks with President Trump on how to improve the strategic relationships. A negotiation between the U.S. and China would be crucial in ensuring that both nations reach a mutual agreement concerning how to conduct trade and improve national security through intelligence sharing.
The Trump administration is placing tariffs on imported products from China, such as steel and aluminum, which are used to make military equipment like helicopters, aircraft, submarines, and armored vehicles. The military relies heavily on this equipment to sustain operations and ensure prolonged endurance in conflict. This dependence is now positioning America not to be able to win the next war. The lack of trade collaboration and expensive military equipment will indeed undermine national security. These are some of China’s contributions to the U.S. economy and national security, which the current administration oversees or is blind to as it increasingly focuses on reducing imports from China.
Consequences
China claimed it would take countermeasures to safeguard its national interests and rights. China vowed to retaliate and is targeting U.S. companies together with the agricultural sector. China asserted that it would not bow to blackmail from America, stating that it has done enough to halt the flow of fentanyl into America. This indicates that the new tariffs have affected the relationship between the U.S. and China. Initially, China chose to take a moral high ground by challenging the tariffs in the WTO instead of introducing retaliatory tariffs immediately. China was trying to show its domestic and global audience that it was following the rules of WTO while America was not. As a result, the U.S. approach is a ‘strategic blindfold,’ preventing it from following the set trade rules. These new tariffs are sowing distrust against the U.S. globally that America cannot be trusted to follow the rules.
As President Trump paused the tariffs on Canada and Mexico for 30 days, the tariffs on China went into effect. The initial reason for imposing a tariff on China was “China’s intellectual property theft, forced technology transfer, and other unreasonable behavior.” China’s initial response, which involved challenging the tariffs at WTO, appeared reasonable and focused on avoiding a trade war that might affect each nation’s economic stability if supply chains are disrupted. Hence, the Chinese government understood that the U.S. sought a bilateral trade agreement. The decision not to first retaliate with a tariff on the U.S. showed that the Chinese government was not wearing a ‘strategic blindfold.’ It foresaw that such an action could eventually lead to a devastating trade war, like what happened in the first Trump administration, whereby none of the countries gained from the tariff war.
The tariffs are also a strategic blunder that upends supply chains. Manufacturing companies will incur higher production costs, which might prompt them to shift their manufacturing plants to other nations to avoid the additional taxes. The additional tariffs on the existing levies on goods imported from China imply that history will repeat itself. Even without China imposing retaliatory tariffs, U.S. companies will incur higher prices sourcing raw materials from China. The American automotive industry relies heavily on steel, aluminum, and automotive parts from China. As a result, U.S. companies might establish manufacturing plants in China and other countries where they source raw materials to avoid high importation costs, as Tesla and BMW did in the first Trump administration.
If the U.S. enters a trade war with China, the results will be worse than those experienced in the first Trump Administration. Manufacturing companies will shift their sites to non-tariff-affected countries besides the United States. Unfortunately, the Trump administration assumes that the trade-tariff approach will bring manufacturing back to the U.S. This is unlikely, considering that America relies on affordable products and raw materials such as steel and aluminum from China. China is also retaliating with tariffs against the U.S. while at the same time increasing its trade with Canada and Mexico. In this case, it appears Trump and Xi Jinping are entering a tariff war, as shown in the image below.
Canada: History
The U.S. and Canada are neighbors, key trade allies, and part of USMCA. Unfortunately, trade tensions between Canada and the U.S. had always existed, as evidenced in 2018-19 when the first Trump administration imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum from Canada. Canada retaliated by imposing tariffs on steel, aluminum, ketchup, and lawnmowers, among other imports from the U.S. The tariffs affected the U.S.-Canada relationship until the two nations reached a resolution in 2019. The U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), established in 2020, has always allowed the two countries to engage in free trade. However, it appears that Trump is escalating the trade tensions after he assumed office in 2025 by imposing trade tariffs on Canada despite witnessing the trade tariff war in his first term.
Current Actions
The Trump administration imposed a 25% tariff on Canadian imports. The tariffs affect Canadian goods, including natural gas, French fries, lumber, and maple syrup. Trump ascertained that the trade tariffs would protect American industries that produce products such as steel and aluminum, which are also imported from Canada. Canada also retaliated with a 25% tariff on imports from the U.S., meaning the two countries entered a trade war. These actions highlight a strained bilateral trade relationship. The good relationship between the two countries was because of the existing free-trade agreements, without which Canada would stop being an ally and focus on advancing its national interests through retaliatory tariffs and policies.
What We Are Blinded To
The trade tariffs on Mexican imports may protect U.S. companies from unfair competition; however, such a benefit blindfolds the Trump administration from noticing the interdependence of the U.S. and Canadian economies. The president is focusing on the short-term benefits of the trade tariffs, such as minimizing trade deficits. Unfortunately, such a focus blinds the U.S. from understanding that it needs Canada for essential products such as natural gas and electricity. Hence, focusing on making the U.S. rich and strong by addressing trade deficits using trade tariffs blindfolds the Trump administration from understanding how free-trade agreements significantly contributed to shared economic growth.
Consequences
After the 25% U.S. trade tariff imposition on Canada, the Canadian government retaliated with a 25% tariff on goods from America, threatened to cut energy supply to the U.S., and filed a dispute in the WTO. The Canadian companies will incur increased costs and have minimal access to the U.S. market. On the other hand, Americans will pay higher prices for goods imported from Canada. The tariffs also weaken the economic ties between Canada and the U.S. because of reduced trust and cooperation. Unfortunately, the consequences of Trump’s actions extend beyond the economic sector, as the Canadian government may stop cooperating with the U.S. on border security. Canada has been sharing intelligence with the U.S. on border security; however, it will stop sharing such information if provoked by aggressive tariffs and policies.
Mexico: History
Mexico and the U.S. have always enjoyed tariff-free cross-border trade since the establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. Mexico has also emerged as the leading U.S. trade partner as most industries in both countries, such as automotive, manufacturing, and agricultural sectors, rely on cross-border trade. The introduction of the USMCA was intended to modernize trade rules to ensure no trade tensions and that each country benefits from cross-border trade. However, the U.S. has expressed concerns that it experiences trade deficits, which is why Trump stated that Mexico owed the U.S. a lot of money due to trade deficits. The Trump administration appears to be using trade policies to address trade deficits and ensure that it exports more to Mexico.
Current Actions
In a recent executive order, Trump imposed a 25% tariff on imports from Mexico, citing that the initial free-trade agreement between the U.S. and Mexico led to unfair trade practices that significantly affected the U.S. The trade tariffs target steel, aluminum, raspberries, strawberries, avocados, beer, and tequila. According to Trump, the trade tariffs are a strategic approach intended to protect U.S. industries. However, critics argue that this is a ‘strategic blindfold’ approach that will create and escalate trade tensions while undermining the call for cooperation under USMCA.
What We Are Blinded To
The trade tariff on Mexican imports is a necessary measure that might help protect U.S. interests; however, this is a blindfold that complicates the U.S.-Mexico relationship. As the president focuses on making America very rich and making Mexico pay for the trade deficits, the U.S. government fails to discern how the tariffs harm U.S. companies and increase the cost of living for Americans. Many U.S. companies rely on raw materials imported from Mexico, meaning that such companies will have to incur higher costs when importing the raw materials and components. The imposition of trade tariffs to address the issue of trade deficits implies that the government is blindfolded to the extent of being unable to see the opportunities for collaboration that would benefit both the U.S. and Mexico.
Consequences
The immediate consequences of the trade tariffs include U.S. consumers and businesses incurring higher costs for imported goods. The tariffs also disrupt supply chains as importers must plan how to adjust to the new tariffs. Moreover, the tariffs strain the diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and Mexico. Mexican companies targeted by the U.S. tariffs will seek alternative markets, reducing trade reliance on the U.S., which can affect the U.S. GDP. The tariffs are also likely to instigate anti-U.S. sentiments in Mexico, which will undermine the efforts that Mexico established to ensure border security to minimize entry of illegal drugs and undocumented immigrants.
Recommendations on Addressing the Trade Blindfold
As the old saying goes, decisions have consequences, and the current administration should ask itself, what happens when our closest allies become our greatest liabilities? China was the largest exporter of goods to the U.S. for two decades; however, Mexico took the leading position in 2023. In 2024, Mexico exported goods worth $467 billion to the U.S., China exported $401 billion, and Canada exported $377 billion. The three countries accounted for slightly over forty percent of all the goods exported to the U.S. from across the world. In return, Canada imported goods worth $322 billion from the U.S., Mexico imported $309 billion, and China imported $131 billion, as highlighted in the chart below.
Figure 1: U.S. Trade with Top Partners: Exports vs. Imports (2024). Source: Picchi, CBS News
As John Donne said, “No man is an island,” America is connected to other nations and needs them for stability and prosperity. America relies on its trade partners to maintain economic stability since foreign trade contributes 24% of its GDP. Foreign trade also contributes to 73% of Mexico’s GDP, 67% of Canada’s GDP, and 37% of China’s GDP. The statistics confirm that the four trading partners (U.S., China, Canada, and Mexico) need each other for economic stability, and engaging in trade wars through punitive trade tariffs and immigration policies is putting on a ‘strategic blindfold’ that will eventually lead to poor decisions that harm the respective economies. America must forge strategic alliances with its three largest trade partners to ensure its continued supply of cars, natural gas, lumber, electronics, and fruits, among other imported goods. America also needs other countries to export its goods, including pork, vehicles, airplanes, and agricultural products. Based on this data, isn’t it clear that making America great again requires us to maintain strategic alliances that do not prompt a trade war or turn allies into adversaries?
The U.S. strategic relationship with other nations is crucial for maintaining global stability and advancing national interests. According to insights from financial experts, America is putting on a ‘strategic blindfold’ by implementing trade tariffs and immigration policies, which could eventually shrink the American economy. America could experience inflation as high as 4% annually. At the same time, the Canadian economy could shrink by 3.6%, whereas the Mexican economy could shrink by 2%. Will this really make America great again?… time will tell. The 30-day pause on trade tariffs on Canada and Mexico, which began on February 4, 2025, was a relief for American consumers, considering that almost all raspberries, strawberries, avocados, beer, and tequila come from Mexico. The pause provided some relief to American consumers, who did not have to pay higher prices for these commodities sourced from those two countries. Unfortunately, the trade tariffs went into effect on March 4, 2025, and a tariff war has started, meaning that Americans will pay higher prices for imported goods from Canada, Mexico, and China.
Strategic alliances also facilitate cooperation on security and political issues, enabling the U.S. and its allies to pool resources and share intelligence. Mexico and Canada play a crucial role in intercepting undocumented immigrants and illegal drugs before they can reach the American border. After removing the ‘strategic blindfold,’ the U.S. saw or understood that Mexico and Canada contribute significantly to border security. Strategic alliances formed through mutual agreements could ensure cooperation and intelligence sharing on matters affecting the U.S.
America needs its trading partners, and the three countries need the U.S. for global stability and advancing each nation’s interests. President Trump should understand that “There are no permanent alliances, only permanent interests.” – Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston. Imposing tariffs is a ‘strategic blindfold’ approach that will cause a tariff war and prevent cooperation on trade and security matters. Not meeting China’s, Mexico’s, and Canada’s interests affects our strategic alliances and partnerships and compromises national security and economic stability.
Foreign Policy Blindfold
Canada: History
The United States initially had the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), which Trump suspended after assuming office. The program allowed the immigrants seeking refuge in the U.S. to stay in Canada for at least 90 days, pending a review of their refugee or asylum claims. Canada would then accommodate these refugee claimants as they awaited their approval to enter the U.S. Trump has often stated that Canada needs to take greater action to protect the border. He claims that Canada does not protect the border, which leads to the entry of illegal drugs like fentanyl and undocumented immigrants.
Current Actions
The recent immigration and deportation policies imply that asylum seekers will increase in Canada. The U.S. also threatens to deport any asylum seekers awaiting a final court hearing. When Trump paused the tariffs on Canada for 30 days, the Canadian government deployed 10,000 soldiers at the border to prevent the entry of illegal drugs and undocumented immigrants. However, after the tariffs went into effect on March 4, 2025, Canada appears to have stopped cooperating with the U.S. on improving border security. The Trump administration is willing to overlook Canada’s cooperation on border security and instead give the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) the mandate to seal the border.
What are we blinded to?
As the president has put on a strategic blindfold, only focusing on preventing the entry of illegal drugs and undocumented immigrants, he fails to see how Canada can be helpful in such a process. The Canadian government understands the routes asylum seekers or refugee claimants use to access the United States. The U.S. government is blindfolded and unable to see that it could rely on intelligence shared by Canadian law enforcement to improve border security. A lack of cooperation only leads to a poor relationship between the U.S. and Canada, meaning that Canada might stop intercepting illegal drugs and immigrants before they can reach the U.S. border.
Consequences
The aggressive immigration and deportation rules will complicate U.S.-Canada relations. Deterring asylum seekers a safe refuge will also negatively affect the U.S. reputation, considering that the refugee claimants do not have a safe place to run to. Canada will also spend additional resources to accommodate the refugees and asylum seekers who will be denied access to the U.S. The American government will also lack critical information about the new routes that refugee claimants will use to gain illegal entry into the U.S.
Mexico: History
In the first Trump administration, resources were allocated to facilitate the construction of the U.S.-Mexico border wall. He claimed that a physical wall would be more effective in preventing illegal immigration and drug trafficking. He also added that illegal immigration was draining U.S. resources and that the physical wall would reduce significant costs. Mexico perceived such a proposal as offensive and claimed it would damage bilateral U.S.-Mexico relations. As a result, there were diplomatic tensions because Mexico felt that they were being primarily blamed for illegal immigration into the U.S. In February 2025, Mexico agreed to deploy 10,000 soldiers to the U.S.-Mexico border to prevent the entry of undocumented immigrants and illicit drugs. However, in March 2025, Trump decided to impose tariffs against Mexico, claiming that Mexico’s efforts to improve border security were ineffective. He blames Mexico for irregular migration across the U.S. border, arguing that Mexico is facilitating the invasion of the U.S.
Current Actions
The recent immigration policies are intended to prevent criminal aliens from entering the U.S. through the Mexican border. Regrettably, the immigration policies might even affect people seeking asylum, such as Maria, who fled Mexico due to threats from a drug cartel. Once she entered the country, she got a work permit and a driver’s license, but does not have legal documents, and her asylum hearing is scheduled for next year. Maria now fears that she might get deported if arrested without the legal documents. Recently, the president relaunched the “Remain in Mexico” program, which forces non-Mexican asylum seekers to wait in Mexico until the ruling of their cases in the United States. This ties back to the ‘strategic blindfold’ approach whereby America is expecting Mexico to bear the burden of hosting undocumented immigrants from the U.S., whether they are Mexicans or not. This is why, in January 2025, the Mexican government denied a C-17 transport aircraft from America permission to land in Mexico since it was carrying deported immigrants. The aggressive immigration and deportation policies are making America have unrealistic expectations even on its allies. The American government should instead follow the legal way of ensuring a fair trial for undocumented immigrants instead of rushing to deport them without the consideration of whether they are asylum seekers.
What we are blinded to
The Trump administration has put on a strategic blindfold, making it difficult to see the significance of Mexico in boosting border security. The allocation of 10,000 Mexican soldiers at the border was a good gesture on the part of Mexico, which the U.S. is blinded to and unable to see. This implies that with mutual agreement, Mexico can cooperate with the U.S. to prevent the entry of illicit drugs and undocumented immigrants. Unfortunately, the current strategic blindfold that makes America perceive Mexico as an enabler of illegal immigration is preventing the Trump administration from establishing strategic cooperation with the Mexican government. America is also blind to the fact that Mexico is a good neighbor, as witnessed during the California fire in January 2025. Mexico sent firefighters to help with controlling the fire, which shows that Mexico can offer support in critical situations, and the U.S. government should not treat Mexico as an enemy to the extent of intending to build a border wall.
Consequences
The implementation of immigration and deportation policies against Mexico and Mexicans in the U.S. will lead to a diplomatic fallout between the U.S. and Mexico. Deporting Mexicans who fled from their homes, such as Maria, due to threats from Mexican drug cartels is inconsiderate and inhumane on the part of the U.S. Mexico will also stop sharing intelligence with the U.S. government regarding illicit drugs and undocumented immigrants. The Mexican government will also withdraw the soldiers it had deployed at the border as it considers the American government ungrateful for the efforts of Mexico.
Repercussions of the Immigration and Deportation Policies on Global Relations
The aggressive immigration and deportation policies will complicate U.S. foreign relations. The massive deportation of individuals with long-standing ties to the U.S. might lead to diplomatic fallout with nations that might be forced to re-accommodate those individuals without adequate resources. Trump’s policies affect global relations because of the condemnation from foreign governments and international human rights organizations. The amplified policies are affecting even innocent immigrants who are not criminals but are seeking asylum in America, and deporting such asylum seekers back to the same place where their lives were threatened is inhumane. As a result, America has put on a ‘strategic blindfold’ whereby it does not consider how the ‘new’ policies negatively affect the American reputation as a champion of human rights. Consequently, other countries may be reluctant to work with the U.S. administration as they term it unpredictable and hostile.
America is also currently experiencing a strain on the system due to a backlog in immigration courts. The immigration and deportation policies indicate that America is shooting itself in the foot. There is an already existing backlog of more than 3.5 million cases pending in the immigration courts, meaning that cases will increase as more people are detained. The Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) department cannot deport all undocumented immigrants who have been arrested without undergoing a court trial unless such detainees have prior removal orders or criminal cases. The strain on the system will impact the U.S. economically due to the increased costs to run the courts. Hence, the decision to deport undocumented immigrants is a ‘strategic blindfold’ approach, preventing the U.S. from seeing the actual expenses of aggressively deporting undocumented immigrants.
Conclusion
The government is in a ‘strategic blindfold,’ which makes Trump focus on making America very rich without considering how the trade and immigration policies are damaging alliances, which will eventually undermine national security and economic stability. The recent developments involving tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China have initiated trade wars with a serious potential of weakening alliances. Canada and China have already imposed retaliatory tariffs, and Mexico is in the process. The looming trade war will have adverse economic outcomes, making consumers pay higher prices for imported commodities. The tariffs will worsen the relationship between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, making the two neighbors reluctant to share intelligence or intercept illegal immigrants and drugs from reaching the U.S. border, which eventually undermines national security. As much as the tariffs are essential for advancing the interests of the U.S., the government must assess them to avoid ruining relationships with its most promising allies.
America must carefully manage its alliances, prioritize long-term strategic objectives, and foster cooperation with key partners to maintain its global leadership and protect its national interests. On February 1, 2025, a negotiation with Canada and Mexico led to the two nations committing to deploy 10,000 soldiers each to the border to prevent undocumented immigrants and illicit drugs. However, the U.S. sparked a tariff war on March 4, 2025, because the trade allies imposed retaliatory tariffs. This exemplifies how the U.S. has put on a ‘strategic blindfold,’ preventing it from engaging in productive negotiations with allies.
After the imposition of the additional 10% on existing levies on China on February 1, 2025, China took the moral high ground to paint the U.S. as a nation that does not follow the rules. China’s decision allowed it to understand how to respond to the U.S. Importantly, China was also open to negotiations with the U.S., meaning that the government should have seized the moment to discuss with China how to improve bilateral trade and national security, which is part of an amicable approach to advancing U.S. interests without the risk of entering a tariff war. However, the new developments involving an additional 20% tariffs on existing levies on China prompted the Chinese government to retaliate using tariffs while suing America in the WTO.
The U.S. and Chinese economies rely significantly on trade. Hence, the U.S. should avoid the ‘strategic blindfold’ approach of relying on trade tariffs and aggressive policies to advance its interests as a method to make America great again. It should enter peaceful negotiations that assure economic stability and prevent Americans from paying higher prices when the current cost of living already strains them. Nevertheless, these examples of national security and economic “strategic blindfolds” give a glimpse of what happens when our closest allies become our greatest liabilities. And we may be about to find out more. The key allies have become great liabilities because the U.S. still needs them as they contribute significantly to the economy and national security.
Tags: alliances, tariffs, U.S. Policy
About The Author
- Renika Pruitt
- Renika (Re) Pruitt is a Major in the U.S. Army who earned her PhD in Organization and Management from Liberty University.
22. The West’s Intellectual Deficit in Modern War by Mick Ryan
Excerpts:
Israeli academic and author Yuval Harari has written that the “automation revolution will not consist of a single watershed event, after which the job market will settle into some new equilibrium. Rather, it will be a cascade of ever bigger disruptions. Old jobs will disappear, and new jobs will emerge…people will need to retrain and reinvent themselves not just once, but many times. In the 21st century they will need to establish massive re-education systems for adults.”
This phenomenon also applies to military institutions. These organizations need to constantly invest in challenging and redefining their understanding of war and different forms of battlespace. And they must also invest in the intellectual endeavours that produce the new ideas and organisations that leverage technology and people to succeed in modern war.
The military organisations that are able to develop and implement the processes for peacetime problem solving and adaptation stand a better chance of being able to adapt effectively in war. As Williamson Murray and Barry Watts have written, “military organisations that have trouble being scrupulous about empirical data in peacetime may have the same difficulty in time of war.”
Bad intellectual habits can carry over from peacetime into times of conflict. There are many examples of slow, risk-adverse thinking in western military institutions. But we need to change how we think quickly. Western military institutions may have little time remaining to resolve the challenges examined in this article.
The Future of War
The West’s Intellectual Deficit in Modern War
Western governments and military institutions face an array of contemporary warfighting challenges which require rapid solutions. What are they, and how might they be addressed?
https://mickryan.substack.com/p/the-wests-intellectual-deficit-in?utm
Mick Ryan
May 14, 2025
∙ Paid
Nearly 18 months ago, I explored the key intellectual challenges that had become apparent as the result of technological insertions into the Ukraine War. This includes the impact of drones and the democratisation of battlespace knowledge through digital command and control systems.
In that two-part series, I proposed that the Russo-Ukraine War had evolved into a more static ground because both sides were fighting a 21st century war with 20th century ideas. Most attention was being focussed on generating more munitions, more units, more territorial gains and more people. But I also proposed that even if Ukraine and Russia were to mobilise more people and industry, the trajectory of the war would not change significantly unless there was a mobilization of intellectual capacity to develop new warfighting ideas.
The period since those articles were published has proved this out. The ground war, with the exception of short periods of tactical energy such as the Ukrainian Kursk offensive, remains largely static in nature. Where advances have been made, they are achieved at very large costs in humans and equipment. The air, drone and missile war has more dynamism and is having an impact on the economy and warfighting capacity of both nations. However, this air and missile war is still yet to prove politically or strategically decisive.
More intellectual dynamism and innovation is necessary to develop more effective and survivable offensive military concepts for the modern technological and political environment. This is not just a military concern, however. Being able to threaten the use of offensive operations is central to a viable strategic deterrent. While nuclear weapons remain an important component of deterrents, conventional and cognitive options must also play their part. These two elements are currently a weakness in Western nations.
This article examples looks beyond the challenges facing Ukraine that were examined in the previous articles and looks more broadly at the big problems that all western nations face with modern warfighting concepts. The article proposes the key strategic challenges in contemporary warfare that require clever and affordable solutions.
However, before examining these challenges, it is important to appreciate the kinds of advantages that the global authoritarian movement now possesses, and how these magnify the problems faced by western governments and military institutions.
The Authoritarians Have Some Advantages
The warfighting challenges covered in this article are examined against the background of an alignment of authoritarian powers which currently appears to possess several strategic advantages over western nations.
The Authoritarian Learning Community. The first advantage is that in the last three years, an international collaboration and adaptation system has emerged among the authoritarian powers of Russia, Iran, China and North Korea. This has become the core of a learning culture in Russian and Iranian organisations, as well as a model for Russian sharing lessons with North Korea and China. This learning community assembles various sets of knowledge to build a much-improved knowledge base.
A key learning and adaptation grouping has developed between Russia and Iran, and by extension Iran and its proxies in the region. Coercion and precision are key subjects for this core learning community. Russia and North Korea also have a learning and adaptation system, largely based on the provision of North Korean munitions to Russia and the experiences of North Korean troops in Kursk combat operations. China has also been active in learning lessons from Russia. How much of this learning is through active sharing of lessons and how much is through vicarious learning is yet to be clarified. Chinese officers are reported to have visited Russia and have been reported behind the front lines in the Donbas region. You can read more on this authoritarian learning community here.
The Arsenal of Authoritarians. A second advantage is that the authoritarian nations appear to have collectively developed a superior military production capacity in terms of scale and speed. China’s production capacity is well documented, particularly in ship building. But it has also developed very advanced indigenous aircraft, armoured vehicle, drone and munitions capabilities. Most of these are probably already operate at a scale that outstrips most western nations combined. Chinese defence industry also delivers capability much faster than western nations. As a 2024 CSIS report notes, from initiating capability requirement through to delivery is about seven years in China and 16 years in the U.S. Four of the top ten largest defence conglomerates in the world are Chinese. While not without weaknesses, Russia too has stepped up defence production in the past three years.
Xi and Putin and press briefing in Moscow. Source: Government of Russia.
Authoritarian Cognitive Warfare. The 2024 Pentagon report on Chinese military capability notes that “the PLA is exploring a range of “neurocognitive warfare” capabilities that exploit adversaries using neuroscience and psychology.” As Dima Adamsky describes in The Russian Way of Deterrence, Russia’s operations in the information sphere - cognitive-psychological (CP) and digital-technological (DT) activities have seen increasing convergence. These activities aim to achieve informational deterrence, and the achievement of cumulative coercion. The key aims of authoritarian cognitive warfare, which basically align with an approach that could be described as ‘win without fighting’ are as follows:
- A principal objective of China and Russia in particular is to convince western societies that they cannot prevail against the advantages – military, economic, national will - of authoritarian powers.
- The west is in decline. This has long been a strategic message from President Xi but is also a key message in Russian messaging, particularly with regards to religion. There is also an economic dimension to this messaging, particularly from China in the wake of the disastrous flip-flopping on tariffs from the Trump administration.
- Another objective is to convince western citizens that western values and systems are not worth defending. This can manifest in lower defence budgets and in lower recruiting for military organisations. As we have seen in recent years, it also results in breaking down the cohesion of western communities by empowering small minorities with extremist views.
Given the demonstrated willingness of the big four authoritarians to share ideas and lessons, it should be assumed that developments in cognitive warfare in one will quickly be shared with other authoritarian regimes.
Authoritarian Will. Authoritarian leaders clearly believe that their time has come. They have watched the meltdowns in western societies since COVID-19, and the shortfalls in leadership and governance, and decided now is the time to exploit western weaknesses and assert themselves. They exhibit a confidence in their upwards trajectory. Xi described the role of Russia and China last week in Moscow, noting that “it is imperative that we remain the defenders of a world order in the spirit of equality and justice… China and Russia, as great world powers and emerging markets, have a noble mission to ensure global development in a more equitable and rational vein.”
Further back in 2020, Xi used a phrase more indicative of his views during the fifth plenary session of the 19th Central Committee of the CCP: "the East is rising, and the West is declining". The global authoritarian movement appear to have gained in confidence and may well have superior will to sustain their trajectory than western nations have to oppose it.
Our Intellectual Deficit is Not a New Problem
Fortunately, western nations and military institutions have deep historical familiarity with solving challenges in military affairs. Military institutions have always faced difficult problems, on the battlefield, during long campaigns and in the overall national efforts to fight wars. This has required formal and informal adaptation mechanisms, which sometimes produces transformative solutions to key battlefield and operational problems.
While military organisations have demonstrated innovation in tactics and equipment since military affairs begun, such innovation generally proceeded at a slow pace. That changed when the technologies that emerged during the First Industrial Revolution were applied in military organization and war. New technologies such as railways, massed manufacturing and the telegraph resulted in a disruptive change in the velocity of military innovation. The literature on military adaptation has its roots in the writings of military theorists of this period, which began at the start of the 19th century. Multiple theorists in different nations explored how military institutions might adapt as a result of technologies that emerged during the First Industrial Revolution and in the following Second Industrial Revolution in the early 1900s.
The interwar period, between the First and Second World Wars, was also a fertile period for examining the implications of new technologies, and how they might be applied to avoid the stalemates and massed attrition that occurred between 1914 and 1918. Theorists sought to consider the lessons of the First World War, while also attempting to produce new theories of for technologies such as aircraft, tanks and wireless communications, all of which appeared in the latter stages of that war.
Thus, there are historical examples we might purloin to assist us with the current challenges. What are the challenges against which such latent western intellectual capacity might be applied?
The Challenges for Modern War
I contend that western military institutions currently face five significant warfighting challenges which require solutions. These comprise the most compelling challenges for western military institutions. There is a significant body of evidence for these challenges from the war in Ukraine, and to a lesser degree, from the conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia, as well as from exercises and Chinese activities in the Pacific theatre. These challenges are interactive and apply equally to western military institutions and to the military organisations of authoritarian regimes.
Challenge 1: The Massing versus Dispersion Predicament. The new era meshed civil-military sensor frameworkhas produced an environment where all the signatures of military equipment, personnel and collective forces can be detected more accurately and more rapidly. When linked to the outcomes of the precision revolution, this significantly reduces the detection to destruction gap in military operations. The consequence is that massing military forces for ground combat operations, large scale aerial attacks or naval operations has become extraordinarily risky. And, even if an array of hard and soft kill measures are available to protect forces when they mass for decision events, they are almost assured of detection which makes achieving surprise difficult.
Massed forces die on the modern battlefield. Image from the Battle of Siverskyi Donets (2022)
As the Russians have found during the war in Ukraine, when they have massed forces in training or accommodation locations, or concentrated their logistics depots close to the frontline, the Ukrainians have been able to find and attack them. This has also driven both sides to conduct attacks with small teams to improve their ability to move to their lines of departure undetected. This was also a challenge for the Ukrainian 2023 counteroffensive. It was clear to the Russians, well before H-Hour, where the Ukrainian main effort would fall. Consequently, they were able to focus more of their forces on this region and assume risk elsewhere. It represents a signature battle and is a critical aspect of this warfighting challenge.
Modern military forces must be equally capable of operating in dispersed and massed forms, but they must be able to minimise their detection when they do mass in a way that offers an improved chance of surprise and landing a decisive blow against an adversary.
Experiments with distributed operations have indicated some elements of a solution to this challenge. But we may also require concepts that involve ‘flooding the zone’ to overwhelm defender sensors and engagement systems. It is also a method employed by Ukraine and Russia to penetrate the air, missile and drone defences of their adversary. Both sides use large numbers of decoy drones on strike operations to draw the defenders into firing scarce air defence missiles, while other drones are able to proceed to their targets. This might also inform future western operating concepts beyond strike operations.
Challenge 2: Lower the cost of defending against missiles and drones. While enormous investment has been made over the past couple of decades in the development of remotely controlled, autonomous and semi-autonomous uncrewed systems, the capabilities to counter them has – at least initially - lagged in investment. This has changed since the beginning of the Russo-Ukraine war, but there remains a gap between the capabilities of uncrewed systems and those that counter them. There is a also big disparity in the current costs of these systems.
Attack drones and missile represent an effective cost imposition strategy for the enemies of Ukraine, Taiwan and western countries more broadly. The aim should be to not only reduce the cost of hard and soft kill systems, but to entirely flip the cost equation. As such, a key aspect of addressing this challenge is to develop a variety of very low cost hard and soft kill against uncrewed vehicles and missiles which also imposes cost on those who use drones, not on those who defend against them. Cope cages on armoured vehicles and deployed artillery systems are unlikely to provide a singular solution against armed FPVs and loitering munitions.
New systems developed by the Ukrainians, including their Drone Fall program which uses interceptor drones, the expanded use of tactical radars to improve detection and improved electronic warfare have all started turning this situation around. However, Russian adaptation to these countermeasures pand new electronic warfare capabilities pose a constant challenge.
This is not just a tactical challenge. One of the implications of the new trend about more accessible long-range strike is that a strategic approach to protecting key military and national assets much further beyond the front line is required. Enormous investment has been made in development of remotely controlled, autonomous, and semiautonomous uncrewed systems. Countries like America and the UK have also made some progress in developing counter drone systems, although few of them have been tested in the crucible of war. Solutions to this problem will probably drive how successful military forces can be in the following challenge: survivably closing with and killing the enemy.
Challenge 3 (a): Closing with the Enemy (Tactical). Lawrence Freedman recently wrote in a terrific article that “the problem is not that the Ukrainians are unable to mount a decent offensive while the Russians can, but that both sides find offensives difficult. The defence is stronger.” Modern combat forces require new era techniques which are quicker, lower signature and more survivable at crossing the tactical spaces between them and their objectives.
The failings of current Western military doctrine was exemplified by Ukraine’s struggle to penetrate Russian minefields and defensive belts in southern Ukraine. These were a combination of traditional (read old) obstacle zones, minefields, trenches and pillboxes with meshed civil-military sensors, assessments, and fires. The technologies and techniques of combined arms breaches have barely changed in half a century but the defensive zone to be penetrated had changed drastically due to new technologies.
This issue has still not been resolved although the Russians on the eastern front in Ukraine continue to conduct a broad, and sometimes wacky, series of experiments to assemble their forces and ensure they can cross the ground between Line of Departure and the break into Ukrainian forward trenches. While turtle tanks, motorbikes and e-scooters have all been tried, the most successful method at present appears to be a combination of dismounted infiltration, heavy fires and glide bombs. However, this does not generate the kind of tempo needed to generate operational breakthroughs, and is at best, a tactical solution.
Modern combat forces require new-era techniques that are quicker, lower signature, and more survivable at crossing operational and tactical spaces between them and their objectives. Western military institutions need to develop new warfighting concepts to not only penetrate and fight their way through these defensive schemes, but to ensure they have sufficient combat power to exploit such breaches. As I wrote in a recent Foreign Affairs article, “a new-age Manhattan Project designed to discover new ways to rapidly detect and clear mines would help Ukrainian offensives down the line. It would also assist in clearing mines and unexploded ordnance from vast swaths of liberated Ukrainian territory.”
But there is another aspect of this challenge – operational maneuver.
Challenge 3 (b): Closing Vast Distances with the Enemy (Operational). This challenge of survivably closing the distance between friendly forces and an adversary is not just a problem on the land, and not only a tactical challenge. It is an operational and strategic problem in all environments. Allied forces in the Pacific and the Atlantic are likely to have to cross broad swathes of ocean in a low signature and survivable manner to be able to engage the enemy. New concepts are needed to achieve this, and at the same time, concepts are required prevent an adversary such as China doing the same. The meta-problem is ‘crossing denied, constantly surveilled spaces without being destroyed in detail’.
It took nearly three years to fight forward from Hawaii and Australia during the Pacific War: Image: West Point Atlases
Therefore, new warfighting concepts are needed to ensure that friendly forces can survivably mass and move to a start point for operations and tactical activities in friendly parts of a theatre. Deception may provide a crucial role in solving this challenge, but solutions will also involve investment in strategic force design and force options testing activities.
Challenge 4: The Right Balance of Long-Range Strike and Close Combat. Many nations have begun to increase their investment in longer range strike systems. Japan is developing a long-range counter-strike capability involving Tomahawk missiles. Australia is also developing its long-range strike systems with Tomahawk, JASSM and PRISM missiles. At the same time, Ukraine’s investment in a wide array of aerial and maritime long range strikes systems is maturing and showing results against Russian airfields, defence factories and oil and gas export infrastructure.
These are important capabilities in the arsenals of military institutions. But important as they are, they are not a silver bullet in modern war. The planning, conduct, assessment and adaptation of long-range strike across the domains must be carefully balanced with investment in close combat capabilities. There are several reasons for this. First, it forces adversaries to also make difficult choices about the array of military capabilities to develop and deploy, generating uncertainty. Balancing between the deep and close fights also provides redundancy in conventional deterrence systems. An enemy might be able to penetrate a long-range strike complex but may still have to close with a fight in combat. Not every nation wants to do this.
Today, an important warfighting challenge is achieving the appropriate balance between the deep battle and the close fight (with the appropriate support mechanisms for both). And not only must the balance of investment be ‘mostly right’, but there should also be an effective operational synchronicity between these two military endeavours.
And lest we weight our efforts towards long-range strike too much, a recent example provides useful insights on why this isn’t always a good idea.
The campaign against the Houthis has demonstrated again the role as well as the limitations of strike operations. If strike is used as part of an integrated, multi-domain campaign, they can provide excellent shaping and attrition activities against an enemy. However, if they are used as a stand-alone weapon - as has been the case against the Houthis - decisive outcomes are unlikely. This is why the U.S. government has now halted its military efforts against the Houthis. In some respects, modern debates about the effectiveness of strategic strike are similar to those in the interwar period where air power advocates believed the bomber would always get through and that bombing from the air could be singularly decisive. It was a theory disproved in World War Two. Do we really have to relearn that lesson?
Challenge 5: Survivable Sustainment and Logistics. Finally, even if all of the preceding challenges are able to be resolved, it will be for nothing if there is not a survivable way of sustaining military operations from the tactical through to the strategic levels. Unfortunately, military logistics and sustainment units, depots and networks are one of the most visible elements on the battlefield and in a theatre more broadly. Why would an enemy hit well camouflaged combat units when larger, higher signature sustainment organisations are easier to find and easier to hit?
This is already a challenge in Ukraine. Tactical resupply is extraordinarily difficult and dangerous as is the conduct of casualty evacuation. This is likely to also be the case in future conflicts. At the same time, strategic supply capabilities - airfields, ports, major logistics hubs and large-scale air and sea transportation systems - and defence manufacturing capacity is easier to find through commercial imagery and open-source information. It too is more vulnerable than ever given the proliferation of cheaper long-range strike systems.
The challenge is magnified in scenarios that involve cross-Atlantic or cross-Pacific campaigns. The distances involved, and relatively small naval and merchant marine fleets available to western military organisations make the challenge of protected logistics even greater.
In WW2 in the Pacific, one key capability drove the pace and orchestration of every major operation. What is the 21st century version of that critical – and targetable – vulnerability? Image: Australian War Memorial
A solution is required. There is no possibility of a successful conflict against Russian in Europe, or China in the western Pacific, without a much more dispersed and survivable logistics network that has vastly greater redundancy. The solution is likely to require closer collaboration between allies, between military and civil contractors, and massive expansion in the use of uncrewed maritime and aerial capacity to operational logistics over long distances.
*******
Cutting across these challenges are several concepts that will undoubtedly be part of the solution to each.
First, military institutions will require more effective and rapid integration of new technology with old technology. No military can afford full recapitalisation with new munitions and equipment, and it isn’t necessary. However getting the balance of old and new right has tactical, operational, strategic and institutional aspects. It will be reliant on better links between the military and industry, and a more rapid sharing of battlefield lessons within institutions and with defence industry partners. And this integration of the old and new must done at scale. But even if all these elements of the problems are resolved, it is insufficient to solve this just for friendly forces. The problem of how to degrade and destroy an adversary’s capacity to integrate new and old systems must also be addressed.
Michael Horowitz has described the challenges and opportunities of absorbing new technology into military institutions in his book, The Diffusion of Military Power. He proposes what he calls The Adoption Capacity Theory, and describes how:
Adoption-capacity theory posits that the financial and organizational requirements for adopting an innovation govern both the system-level distribution of responses and the way that individual actors make decisions, as well as the subsequent implications for international politics.
Horowitz examines multiple ways this might manifest in different organisations, and thoughts on best practice. These are the kind of ideas that will be a necessary element in addressing the warfighting challenges laid out above.
Another concept that will be important is the reinvigoration of military deception. Deception lies at the heart of Chinese military theory and has demonstrably played a key role in the war in Ukraine. Western military institutions must improve in this military art if they are to adequately address the warfighting challenges described above. This is because deception increases survivability and aids in generating surprise against an enemy force.
Finally, in solving these warfighting challenges, political input will be required. Indeed, without this political foundation, solving the warfighting challenges described in this article is probably for nought.
Political leaders will need a better understanding, and a better acceptance, of the threats posed to their societies from authoritarian regimes. They will need to possess a much-improved appreciation of how to integrate military, economic, cognitive and other sources of advantage at the national level. Importantly, the political classes in western nations must have honest conversations with their people and gain a social licence for increased defence spending, including the potential for mobilization and expanded resilience and civil defence measures. But most crucially, politicians and citizens will need to demonstrate greater will, and greater belief that our democratic systems are worth defending.
Military Innovation: are we running out of time?
Israeli academic and author Yuval Harari has written that the “automation revolution will not consist of a single watershed event, after which the job market will settle into some new equilibrium. Rather, it will be a cascade of ever bigger disruptions. Old jobs will disappear, and new jobs will emerge…people will need to retrain and reinvent themselves not just once, but many times. In the 21st century they will need to establish massive re-education systems for adults.”
This phenomenon also applies to military institutions. These organizations need to constantly invest in challenging and redefining their understanding of war and different forms of battlespace. And they must also invest in the intellectual endeavours that produce the new ideas and organisations that leverage technology and people to succeed in modern war.
The military organisations that are able to develop and implement the processes for peacetime problem solving and adaptation stand a better chance of being able to adapt effectively in war. As Williamson Murray and Barry Watts have written, “military organisations that have trouble being scrupulous about empirical data in peacetime may have the same difficulty in time of war.”
Bad intellectual habits can carry over from peacetime into times of conflict. There are many examples of slow, risk-adverse thinking in western military institutions. But we need to change how we think quickly. Western military institutions may have little time remaining to resolve the challenges examined in this article.
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A conversation about technology, ideas, people and their convergence in contemporary war and competition. Also covering issues related to the war in Ukraine, Chinese aggression against Taiwan and Indo-Pacific defence.
23. A Clausewitzian Lens on Modern Urban Warfare
Excerpts:
Cities have become the default terrain of modern war. From Kyiv to Gaza, the battles fought today are not anomalies—they are signals. Urban warfare is not an exception to Clausewitz’s theory; it is its most vivid and volatile expression.
Cities compress all the elements Clausewitz identified as fundamental to war: violence, chance, political purpose, friction, and uncertainty. They bring the political object, the will of the people, and military action into immediate proximity—requiring a level of harmony among these forces that is difficult to achieve but critical to sustaining strategic coherence. In this space, tactical actions instantly reverberate across strategic and political spheres. Every strike is a message, every misstep a liability.
Clausewitz would demand that today’s commanders and policymakers understand that war in cities is not just about maneuver and firepower—it is about narrative, perception, endurance, and will. Modern urban warfare is fought in full view of the world, under moral scrutiny, and amid civilian populations whose support or suffering can shape the outcome as much as any weapon system.
Victory in this environment requires more than technological superiority. It demands clarity of purpose, coherence between means and ends, disciplined execution, and moral restraint—the very fundamentals Clausewitz insisted upon. These are not optional in the urban century. They are decisive.
Clausewitz offers no checklist for success in cities, but rather something more valuable. What he offers is a way to think clearly, to adapt amid chaos, and to confront the true nature of war—a contest of wills, shaped by politics, distorted by chance, and fought in the dense, contested, and morally fraught terrain of the modern city.
A Clausewitzian Lens on Modern Urban Warfare - Modern War Institute
mwi.westpoint.edu · by John Spencer · May 13, 2025
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Among Carl von Clausewitz’s many poignant dictums, the most commonly cited is undoubtedly that “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on by other means.” While Clausewitz never fought in a city like Fallujah, Kyiv, or Gaza if the Prussian general and philosopher of war could visit the battlefields of the twenty-first century, he would recognize modern urban warfare’s core challenges—and would find that his theories about war’s objective and the considerations needed for victory remain strikingly relevant.
Clausewitz wrote that “war is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.” Its essential elements—violence, chance and probability, and subordination to policy—form what he famously described as a wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit, or “remarkable trinity.” Rather than being in conflict, these elements interact dynamically and, in successful systems like that of Napoleonic France, can operate in harmony. Clausewitz and his fellow Prussian reformers admired how the French system aligned popular will, military force, and political direction. Nowhere is the need for such harmony more acute than in modern urban warfare, where civilians, combatants, and national objectives share the same congested terrain. This environment tests the limits of military doctrine, challenges the notion of strategic clarity, and often leaves combatants with ambiguous definitions of victory.
In my work on urban warfare, from my book Understanding Urban Warfare to the numerous case studies I have authored and the field research I have conducted, I’ve seen the truths Clausewitz described play out on concrete streets and in bombed-out buildings. Urban warfare has become the norm, not the exception, and Clausewitz’s insights are not relics of Napoleonic Europe—they are essential tools for understanding the future of conflict.
Historical Context: Urban Warfare in Clausewitz’s Era
While Clausewitz never commanded modern urban battles, his military career immersed him in conflicts where cities played central strategic and symbolic roles. As a young officer in the Prussian Army, he fought in the Rhine campaigns (1793–1794), including the siege of Mainz, where revolutionary France defended the city against a Prussian-Austrian coalition. This early exposure to urban siege warfare—marked by fortified positions, complex logistics, and the suffering of civilians—gave Clausewitz firsthand insight into the unique challenges of fighting in and around cities.
Clausewitz’s later experiences reinforced the political and psychological weight of urban centers. As aide-de-camp to Prussian Prince Augustus Ferdinand, he was present during Napoleon’s 1806 victory in the battles of Jena and Auerstedt, which led to the French occupation of Berlin. He later served with the Russian Army during France’s 1812 invasion of Russia, taking part in the Battle of Borodino—a prelude to the burning of Moscow that serves as a powerful example of a capital’s strategic and symbolic significance. In 1815, having reentered Prussian service, he participated in the Battles of Ligny and Wavre, fighting on terrain where towns, roads, and rivers constrained operations and shaped outcomes.
Clausewitz drew clear conclusions from these experiences. In Principles of War, he argued that “public opinion is won through great victories and the occupation of the enemy’s capital.” He understood cities not only as symbolic centers of national will but also as logistical and operational hubs, writing of the importance of targeting “principal cities, storehouses, and large fortresses.” Though he did not witness the dense, protracted urban warfare of the modern era, Clausewitz’s strategic emphasis on cities foreshadowed many of the dynamics seen in today’s urban battles.
The Urban Trinity, Fog, and Friction: Clausewitz’s Theories in Concrete and Steel
Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity”—violence and hatred (the people), chance and probability (in military action), and reason and policy (the government)—finds its most visceral expression in urban warfare. Cities collapse these elements into a single, compact battlespace. Unlike operations in open terrain, urban warfare places civilians, combatants, and political objectives in constant, physical contact. The Clausewitzian trinity becomes spatially literal: civilians live among the fight, military action is hyperlocalized and constrained, and every movement carries political weight.
Clausewitz also famously wrote, “No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.” He noted, therefore, that “the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking.”
This act of judgment is especially difficult in cities, where the kind of war one is fighting can shift from block to block. Is the objective to destroy an entrenched enemy force? To hold key, vital, or symbolic terrain? To safeguard a civilian population? In urban warfare the answer is often all of the above.
Clausewitz’s dictum that war is a continuation of politics by other means is vividly realized in urban combat. Tactical decisions in cities reverberate at strategic levels. Urban warfare does not allow separation between military action and political consequence—they are fused.
But Clausewitz reminds us that strategy is not made of battlefield maneuvers alone—it is also made of will. He defined war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”
Victory, then, is not always the annihilation of enemy forces—it is the collapse of the enemy’s will to resist. And in modern urban warfare, maintaining the will of one’s own people (or of your ally’s population)—to support the fight or to accept the moral and political costs—is just as critical. Clausewitz considered these moral forces among the most decisive in war, writing that they “constitute the spirit that permeates war as a whole.” In cities under siege or attack, public opinion, national resolve, and leadership cohesion become as important as any tactical maneuver.
Urban warfare places enormous pressure on the internal willpower of a combatant nation and that of its involved and invested allies. The proximity of civilians, the visibility of destruction, and the speed at which information spreads can erode public support even as military objectives are met. A video, a collapsed building, or a failed operation can shift the strategic balance—not through force, but by weakening the political object that gives war its purpose. Clausewitz warned, “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.”
This relationship between political objectives, military action, and national will is especially fragile in urban combat. When will breaks—on either side—the war may be lost regardless of battlefield gains.
Yet even the clearest strategy must contend with the inherent chaos of war. “War is the realm of uncertainty,” Clausewitz cautioned. “Three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.” This fog of war—its confusion, unpredictability, and lack of reliable information—is magnified in dense urban environments where lines between civilian and combatant blur and information spreads instantly and globally. Commanders must make high-stakes decisions in environments where clarity is fleeting.
Compounding this is what Clausewitz called friction—the accumulation of countless small obstacles that derail even the best-laid plans. As he wrote:
Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war. . . . Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.
Friction in cities is not theoretical—it’s tactical and visceral. Streets canalize movement. Buildings obscure lines of sight. Civilians become obstacles or allies. The environment itself resists clean execution. Urban warfare reveals Clausewitz’s insights not just as philosophical musings, but as hard realities in concrete and steel.
Urban Warfare in Iraq: Lessons from Baghdad and ISIS
The US campaigns in Iraq and the broader fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) offer a laboratory of Clausewitzian warfare in cities—where tactical success frequently collided with political complexity, and where the will of the population, not battlefield metrics, often defined the limits of victory.
The 2003 “Thunder Run” into Baghdad was more than a demonstration of military power—it was a calculated strike at the enemy’s political center of gravity. Recall Clausewitz’s observation that “public opinion is won through great victories and the occupation of the enemy’s capital.” Taking Baghdad had immediate strategic effects: It overthrew Saddam Hussein and dismantled the Ba’athist regime. But it did not yield strategic clarity. Once the political objective shifted from regime removal to establishing a new political order—that is, nation-building—the occupation of the capital no longer compelled the enemy to do our will. Instead, it ushered in a new phase of resistance—fought not by conventional armies, but by insurgents embedded in the population. The Clausewitzian trinity fractured, and the fog of war deepened.
The 2004 First and Second Battles of Fallujah posed a different Clausewitzian challenge: how to reestablish control over a city that had become both a symbol and a stronghold of insurgent defiance. The battles exposed the full weight of friction. Every block was contested. Civilian presence, urban density, and improvised defenses neutralized many of the coalition’s technological advantages. Clausewitz’s observation rang true: The simplest thing became difficult. But beyond the tactical grind, Fallujah also heightened the strategic burden of fighting in cities under global media scrutiny. Images of destruction and civilian displacement reverberated internationally, influencing Iraqi public opinion, straining allied cohesion, and testing the will of the Iraqi government itself. Tactical brilliance could not guarantee strategic clarity—and each gain came at political and moral cost.
Clausewitz’s theories are no less relevant in the fight against ISIS. The battles for Mosul, Raqqa, and Aleppo offer vivid examples of Clausewitzian dynamics playing out in dense urban terrain.
The Battle of Mosul (2016–2017), the largest urban combat operation since World War II, marked both the height and unraveling of ISIS’s territorial control. The city—where ISIS declared its caliphate—was a living example of Clausewitz’s trinity: ideological violence among the people, unpredictable chance in military operations, and the overarching influence of policy and statecraft. ISIS weaponized the city’s geography to negate coalition advantages. Each alley and rooftop became a node of Clausewitzian friction, where the fog of war was compounded by hidden explosives, civilian shields, and the media theater of terror.
The struggle to recapture Raqqa (2017) similarly underscored Clausewitz’s emphasis on the strategic value of cities—but also on the cost of capturing them. Coalition forces had to balance the immediate tactical need for firepower with the long-term strategic imperative of minimizing civilian casualties and preserving infrastructure. Raqqa’s fall signaled not just military defeat for ISIS, but the collapse of its political narrative of governance and legitimacy.
Aleppo (2012–2016) offered a final case study in how urban warfare reshapes Clausewitzian dynamics. The regime of Bashar al-Assad, with Russian support, waged a prolonged campaign of attrition to reclaim the city. Aleppo’s recapture was not just a battlefield event—it was a strategic and psychological victory that reshaped the regional balance. Clausewitz’s insight that war is always shaped by the interaction of violence, politics, and chance was on full display. In Aleppo, military power served political ends—but at enormous humanitarian and reputational cost.
The Battle of Kyiv: A Clausewitzian Struggle
The 2022 Battle of Kyiv illustrates many of Clausewitz’s core principles. Russian forces launched a lightning assault on the capital, aiming to swiftly decapitate Ukraine’s political leadership and seize its strategic center of gravity. But what they encountered was not just a military defense, but a national resistance. The people, military, and government acted as one cohesive trinity. And President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s decision to remain in Kyiv was not just political theater—it was a deliberate act of strategic will.
The defenders of Kyiv skillfully leveraged the urban environment to neutralize Russia’s advantages and impose costs at every level of engagement. What followed was a textbook display of Clausewitzian friction: stalled armored columns, logistical failures, intelligence breakdowns, and a general underestimation of local resistance. Citizen volunteers, guided by their knowledge of terrain and empowered by social networks, became a force multiplier against a numerically and technologically superior invader. Even simple tactical objectives—securing key intersections or resupplying units—became unexpectedly complex under the weight of terrain, resistance, and human error. This was the very essence of what Clausewitz warned distinguishes real war from war on paper.
Russia’s inability to capture the capital—the symbolic heart of the Ukrainian state—had cascading effects. It allowed Ukraine to garner international support, secure military resupply, and build momentum on the strategic level. In urban warfare, just holding out can be a victory. The defense of a city like Kyiv can serve not only to blunt an assault but to buy time for political conditions to shift, for alliances to strengthen, and for strategic clarity to emerge. In such contexts, endurance becomes its own form of offense.
This was not just a tactical defeat for Russia—it was a strategic failure born of a fundamental mismatch between political ambition and military means. The objective—seizing Kyiv—was politically clear, but Russia failed to align its resources, capabilities, and assumptions with that goal. Clausewitz’s admonition echoed loudly as Russian columns stalled short of the capital: “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.” The Battle of Kyiv proved that even with overwhelming force, war conducted without coherence between ends and means is destined to fail.
Gaza and the Israel Defense Forces: Tactical Success, Strategic Strain
If Kyiv is a case study of Clausewitzian alignment of war and policy, Israel’s ongoing operations in Gaza provide another example of the dangers when the alignment falters.
The Israel Defense Forces are one of the most experienced militaries in urban warfare in the world. Israeli military operations are precise, intelligence-driven, and supported by technological superiority. Yet even these capabilities cannot eliminate the strategic dilemma of fighting in cities densely packed with civilians, under intense global scrutiny, and against nonstate actors that use the urban fabric—cities’ terrain and their people—as both shield and weapon.
Clausewitz emphasized that war is not an isolated act but part of a “continuous interaction”—including, notably, interaction with political objectives. In Gaza, the Israel Defense Forces face a situation where the tactical destruction of enemy infrastructure—tunnels, command nodes, rocket sites—does not necessarily translate to strategic success of all the war’s political goals. Every collapsed apartment building and every civilian casualty reverberates globally. The moral forces Clausewitz emphasized—public opinion and will—are not abstract; they are measurable in diplomatic isolation or support, domestic cohesion, and battlefield morale.
This is not to say the Israeli military lacks clarity in its objectives, but rather that the urban environment imposes costs and constraints that can undermine strategic coherence. As I argued in Understanding Urban Warfare, a city can be the greatest ally or the worst foe, depending on how it is approached. Clausewitz would remind any military leader that the means employed must remain proportionate and consistent with the political purpose.
Clausewitz also cautioned against rigid formulas. “Every age,” he wrote, “[has] had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions”. Urban warfare in the twenty-first century demands adaptation, and nowhere is this more evident than in the lessons derived from Gaza.
For the Israel Defense Forces operating in Gaza, every strike, pause, or maneuver is interpreted through political, humanitarian, and informational lenses. This is enhanced by the magnified friction of fighting in dense urban terrain. Streets can canalize movement, buildings and tunnels can conceal threats, and civilians can either support or sabotage operations.
Clausewitz, with his emphasis on uncertainty, chance, and moral forces, would have found urban warfare like that seen in Gaza to be the ultimate test of the statesman’s clarity and the commander’s judgment. In today’s information environment, that friction is amplified—a single video or narrative about the use (or misuse) of force, whether true or fabricated, can influence entire populations and political bodies. This aligns with Clausewitz’s trinity of wills—the people, the military, and the government, all three of which must be in balance for coherent strategy. In cities, that balance is constantly tested in real time and often in front of a global audience.
The Strategic Center of Gravity is Urban
Clausewitz’s concept of the “center of gravity”—the source of power that holds everything in war together—was one of his most important strategic insights. He described it as the “hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.” In his time, contending military with the center of gravity often meant the destruction of the enemy’s main army or the occupation of its capital. But in modern warfare—especially in urban environments—the center of gravity is rarely a fixed physical point. It is dynamic, psychological, and deeply political.
Today, the center of gravity often resides in urban areas, not just as terrain to be seized but as spaces where power is concentrated: political authority, public opinion, information control, and the will of the people. Cities like Kyiv, Gaza City, Mosul, or Aleppo are not merely battlefields—they are arenas where military action collides with political meaning. Clausewitz would recognize these dynamics, because for him, the essence of war was not tactical victory but the pursuit of a political object shaped by what he called moral forces.
Again, Clausewitz wrote, “The moral elements are among the most important in war. They constitute the spirit that permeates war as a whole.” He was referring to intangible but decisive factors—public support, national will, leadership cohesion, and belief in the cause. These forces are especially visible in cities, where every strike and every image can either strengthen or fracture the political foundations of the war effort. What we might now call legitimacy in modern strategy—credibility in the eyes of a population or the international community—can be understood as the sum of these moral forces. Clausewitz didn’t use the term, but he clearly grasped its meaning and importance.
In Kyiv, the city itself became the center of gravity—not only for its political and logistical importance, but for what it symbolized. Its defense became an act of national will. In Gaza, the battle shifts between tactical objectives and a struggle over public opinion, both local and global.
In today’s urban conflicts, the political object—the goal, in Clausewitz’s terms, which must not be separated from war as the means of reaching it—is constantly under pressure. This pressure comes not just from the enemy, but also from how one’s own population, allies, and adversaries perceive the use of force. A commander may win the battle for terrain and still lose the war if public opinion collapses or the political object becomes unsustainable.
This is why the center of gravity in modern warfare often runs through the city—not because of what is physically located there, but because of what is at stake symbolically, psychologically, and politically. In cities, Clausewitz’s theory finds its sharpest edge: Moral forces meet material realities, and the balance of war can shift not through firepower alone, but through the will of those watching, enduring, or resisting.
Clausewitz in the Urban Century
Cities have become the default terrain of modern war. From Kyiv to Gaza, the battles fought today are not anomalies—they are signals. Urban warfare is not an exception to Clausewitz’s theory; it is its most vivid and volatile expression.
Cities compress all the elements Clausewitz identified as fundamental to war: violence, chance, political purpose, friction, and uncertainty. They bring the political object, the will of the people, and military action into immediate proximity—requiring a level of harmony among these forces that is difficult to achieve but critical to sustaining strategic coherence. In this space, tactical actions instantly reverberate across strategic and political spheres. Every strike is a message, every misstep a liability.
Clausewitz would demand that today’s commanders and policymakers understand that war in cities is not just about maneuver and firepower—it is about narrative, perception, endurance, and will. Modern urban warfare is fought in full view of the world, under moral scrutiny, and amid civilian populations whose support or suffering can shape the outcome as much as any weapon system.
Victory in this environment requires more than technological superiority. It demands clarity of purpose, coherence between means and ends, disciplined execution, and moral restraint—the very fundamentals Clausewitz insisted upon. These are not optional in the urban century. They are decisive.
Clausewitz offers no checklist for success in cities, but rather something more valuable. What he offers is a way to think clearly, to adapt amid chaos, and to confront the true nature of war—a contest of wills, shaped by politics, distorted by chance, and fought in the dense, contested, and morally fraught terrain of the modern city.
John Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute, codirector of MWI’s Urban Warfare Project, and host of the Urban Warfare Project Podcast. He served twenty-five years as an infantry soldier, which included two combat tours in Iraq. He is the author of the book Connected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connections in Modern War and coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Staff Sgt. Jason Hull, US Army
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mwi.westpoint.edu · by John Spencer · May 13, 2025
24. It’s Not Enough for France to Be Right About Strategic Autonomy
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Macron is therefore facing a political dilemma at the nexus of foreign and domestic policy. Precluded from running for another term in the next presidential elections in 2027, Macron could go all in on European security and strengthening strategic autonomy, deciding to take decisions that would likely benefit Europe but go against French short-term interests and be massively unpopular among voters. The question for him is one of political legacy: If he puts all his odds on Europe, he might be remembered as a key enabler and trailblazer for European strategic autonomy. Yet, this also requires European partners to step up and not hit the snooze button again after yet another wake-up call, a scenario that sparks major concern in Paris. Furthermore, prioritizing his European agenda with potentially costly implications for French citizens could spark considerable discontent and demonstrations among the French public, which is nothing less than an anticipated gift for the election campaign of the far-right Rassemblement National. In a case of victory of Marine Le Pen or her successor in the next presidential elections, Macron would also be remembered as the president who paved the way for the far-right’s ascent to power. The danger of this for the European project, and for his pet project of strategic autonomy, is hard to overestimate.
While France might have won the intellectual battle on European strategic autonomy, the tough political and strategic choices still lie ahead.
It’s Not Enough for France to Be Right About Strategic Autonomy - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Gesine Weber · May 14, 2025
“I have come to talk to you about Europe. ‘Again,’ some might exclaim.” These were the words with which French President Emmanuel Macron, just a few months after taking office, opened his famous Sorbonne speech in September 2017. He called for a stronger role for Europeans in European defense and strategic autonomy. And that has been his message ever since, often sparking irritation and even open outrage among France’s European partners. The almost theological debate culminated in September 2020 in a confrontation via interviews and op-eds with Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, then defense minister of Germany, who clearly rebuked Macron’s ideas and underlined that there was only one backbone for the European security: the United States.
European defense should be solidly constructed on a trans-Atlantic (meaning American) backbone, voices like Kramp-Karrenbauer argued from across Germany, Poland, and the Baltic states. Simply the idea of strengthening the European contribution, let alone European leadership on the continent’s security, was perceived as potentially offensive to Washington. Furthermore, perhaps the key problem of Macron’s vision was that it barely took into consideration the warnings of Eastern European states regarding the threat from Russia. Instead, it projected France’s view of the map to the European level, rather than approaching European security and defense holistically.
Since 2017, things have changed. Russia’s war against Ukraine profoundly altered threat perceptions among Europeans, including in France, testing the continent’s ability to defend itself. And the Trump administration is downgrading Europe’s place in American security interests, with Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth explaining that it is time for Europe to “take ownership of conventional security on the continent” and that the United States “will no longer tolerate an imbalanced relationship which encourages dependency.”
When even staunch trans-Atlanticists call for “independence from the United States,” such as likely next German chancellor Friedrich Merz and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, what was once a parochial French position has become mainstream across Europe.
This has significant implications for France’s role in Europe: What might look like a massive political victory after a long uphill battle now also presents a new challenge for French foreign policy and France’s role in Europe. If France wants to seize this momentum and truly strengthen Europe’s ability to defend its interests by itself, this will not only require intellectual leadership from Paris, but also revisiting some of its own approaches to European defense — including the E.U. preference for acquiring capabilities and linking E.U.-U.K. defense cooperation to a deal on fisheries. And ironically, France itself and the country’s domestic situation are likely to stand in the way of realizing this ambition, as the possibility of a far-right president in 2027 jeopardizes the necessary trust among partners.
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France Had to Come a Long Way
Three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, France has hence re-emerged as a leader against the odds. Europe’s new endorsement of the originally French proposal of strategic autonomy did not emerge overnight — and neither did France’s credibility as a partner. When Russia launched its full-scale attack against Ukraine, Macron’s ongoing dialogue with President Vladimir Putin and the government’s initial reluctance to publish the full list of French equipment sent to Ukraine sparked outrage, especially among partners along the eastern front of Europe.
However, Macron has managed to slowly repair France’s image, particularly through his Bratislava speech in 2023. Since his mea culpa, Paris has been permanently pushing European lines on potential actions Europeans could take for Ukraine’s support and their own defense, at least intellectually and rhetorically. The most visible manifestation of this is the debate on a Franco-British proposal for a European “reassurance force” in Ukraine. When Macron first suggested in early 2024 not to rule out European “boots on the ground” in Ukraine, his words triggered massive headwinds in most other European partner nations. Since then, other high-ranking European politicians have endorsed the proposal — and today, it is a critical element of the debate on Europe’s engagement for Ukraine’s future security, even though neither France nor the United Kingdom have presented credible proposals how such a force could be resourced.
While Macron has certainly reminded the world that he has been calling for European strategic autonomy for years, his “I told you so” moment has been mostly implicit. But today, the idea of European strategic autonomy à la française seems more in vogue than ever before.
One of the central reasons why France’s vision of strategic autonomy never became consensual among Europeans was the lack of consideration for the concerns of other European states, be it in terms of their relationship with the United States or the threat from Russia. If France wants to play a leading role in shaping the European security order, it needs to bring those most affected by the fundamental shifts into this process. The E5 format, consisting of France, Germany, Poland, Italy, and the United Kingdom, is a promising step toward coordinating a European position.
Nuclear Options and the Limits of Trust
A critical issue for the French role in the new European security order is the European dimension of France’s nuclear weapons. Macron had already suggested a “strategic dialogue” on European nuclear defense with partner nations in 2020, but this was never implemented on the highest political level — on the military level, only Italy took up the offer and participated in French nuclear exercises in 2022.
With the risk of abandonment by the United States, European states are looking for alternatives for nuclear deterrence. Nobody in Europe or France has any illusion that a European nuclear deterrent could replace the U.S. umbrella — the ambition would be supplementing it. From a purely practical and operational point of view, liaising with Paris on this issue is easier than doing so with London, given that British nuclear weapons are highly dependent on operational and technical cooperation with the United States. Just in early March, Macron reaffirmed his willingness to discuss French nuclear protection for European partners. Beyond the operational and capability challenges, a key problem here is trust, which suffers due to the trajectory of French domestic politics and the strong electoral position of the far-right Rassemblement National. Why should other European states bet everything on cooperation with Paris instead of Washington, even though they could shortly face a similar scenario of a partner that is not willing to defend them?
The answer is that France’s European partners do simply not have any alternatives. Nuclear deterrence in Europe by the United States is already weakened by the lack of credible assurances that Washington would protect Europe against an attack. Muddling through for three more years and hoping for a scenario where the next U.S. president might revise the retrenchment from Europe and fully re-engage in the continent’s security is a risky bet on an unrealistic outcome. Whether Europeans like it or not, the best alternative might be Paris. However, while the deliberate ambiguity in France’s nuclear strategy might be salient for France as an individual state with a limited nuclear arsenal, it is challenging for trust-building with European partners.
Autonomy Could Well Fall in France
A similar conundrum for French foreign policy emerges beyond the nuclear domain and operational aspects. In many regards, France’s traditional claims and long-held positions, as well as its domestic policy, limit its own credibility — and raise the question of to what extent France’s partners will give Paris credit for its strategic change.
Other Europeans will scrutinize whether France walks the walk instead of just talking the talk of European strategic autonomy, both within and beyond the European Union. A longstanding point of criticism is that France’s quest for European strategic autonomy is a way to Europeanize French security interests, and use the European Union as a power multiplier for French national interests. If Paris is serious about the idea of truly building a “Europe of defense” and about other Europeans buying into this objective, it will need to avoid a “France first” approach. Against this backdrop, the French push to exclude non-E.U. states from procurement and capability acquisition financed from the ReArm plan, often referred to as “European preference,” opens the door for old (and justified) criticism. Similarly, tying a potential post-Brexit E.U.-U.K. security pact to a deal on fisheries and access to British waters, a key ask of French fishermen among others, appears like the pursuit of a particular national interest at the cost of advancing European defense cooperation — and again prompts the question of whether France is only serious about European strategic autonomy when it serves French interests. Only revisiting its positions can help Paris fight these claims.
Another challenge for France’s credibility on European strategic autonomy is the lack of clarity on how Macron intends to fund these ambitions. In his speech on March 5, he reassured French citizens that increased defense spending would not imply new taxes — but the margin of maneuver for budget cuts is limited, meaning that the only viable option seems to be new debt. In light of the budgetary pressure France is currently facing, it is hard to see how this approach could be sustainable.
Macron is therefore facing a political dilemma at the nexus of foreign and domestic policy. Precluded from running for another term in the next presidential elections in 2027, Macron could go all in on European security and strengthening strategic autonomy, deciding to take decisions that would likely benefit Europe but go against French short-term interests and be massively unpopular among voters. The question for him is one of political legacy: If he puts all his odds on Europe, he might be remembered as a key enabler and trailblazer for European strategic autonomy. Yet, this also requires European partners to step up and not hit the snooze button again after yet another wake-up call, a scenario that sparks major concern in Paris. Furthermore, prioritizing his European agenda with potentially costly implications for French citizens could spark considerable discontent and demonstrations among the French public, which is nothing less than an anticipated gift for the election campaign of the far-right Rassemblement National. In a case of victory of Marine Le Pen or her successor in the next presidential elections, Macron would also be remembered as the president who paved the way for the far-right’s ascent to power. The danger of this for the European project, and for his pet project of strategic autonomy, is hard to overestimate.
While France might have won the intellectual battle on European strategic autonomy, the tough political and strategic choices still lie ahead.
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Gesine Weber is a research fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, based in Paris, an associate fellow at the Centre for Grand Strategy at King’s College London, and a non-resident Hans J. Morgenthau fellow at the Notre Dame International Security Center.
Image: Staff Sgt. Kyle Larsen via DVIDS
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Gesine Weber · May 14, 2025
25. When Trade Wars Become Shooting Wars
Excerpts:
The United States is unlikely to attack any of these countries outright, although Trump has threatened Danish-controlled Greenland. But by reducing mutual dependency, his tariffs do lower the costs of military confrontation. If the United States reduces its economic reliance on Taiwanese semiconductors, for instance, Beijing might decide that Washington won’t respond if China blockades or invades the island. Conversely, in a more transactional world, countries could use whatever dependencies still exist to gain a political advantage—as Berlin did with agriculture in the 1930s. Russia, in particular, has long used such tactics by manipulating the price of oil and gas to extract political concessions from countries in its periphery, contributing to regional conflict.
Moscow’s tactics have naturally led many nearby states to diversify away from Russia. Now, similar tactics are also costing the United States. But should Washington lose its economic credibility, the result could be far more destabilizing than is the case for countries that do not trust the Kremlin. Washington’s ability to stand by its agreements has been the backbone of many essential global institutions, including NATO. It is a key reason the dollar is the world’s reserve currency. Without reliable frameworks, international politics will become more uncertain and volatile, making miscalculation and conflict more likely. The situation could start to resemble the lead-up to World War II, which partially resulted from the collapse of the League of Nations and the failure of European powers to nip German expansionism in the bud.
Trump may ultimately reduce some of his levies, particularly as he negotiates with more and more countries. He has already made a trade deal with the United Kingdom. But the president has abandoned the institutions and norms that once stabilized global trade. In doing so, he is risking an era not of renewed American strength but of stagnation, fragmentation, and danger. History, after all, shows that this is what trade wars create.
When Trade Wars Become Shooting Wars
Foreign Affairs · by More by Allison Carnegie · May 14, 2025
How Tariffs Destabilize an Already Dangerous World
May 14, 2025
Shipping containers in Oakland, California, May 2025 Carlos Barria / Reuters
ALLISON CARNEGIE is Professor of Political Science at Columbia University.
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American President Donald Trump may have backed off, for now, from the sweeping tariffs he proposed placing on almost every country in the world. But he is still upending global trade. Trump has established baseline ten percent tariffs on most imports. He has made those levies higher for a variety of specific goods, including steel. And he slapped 145 percent tariffs on imports from China, the world’s largest manufacturer, although he has now agreed to cut this rate to 30 percent. The result has been a raft of trade wars between Washington and other governments, Beijing foremost among them.
Trump’s disruptions to the global economy are serious, and they may feel novel. But today’s situation is hardly without precedent. One does not have to look especially far back to see what the president’s tariffs might do to the world. The problems the global economy now faces echo some that existed before the 1995 creation of the World Trade Organization and others that existed even before the WTO’s predecessor, the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Until those bodies helped standardize commerce, countries frequently used trade to extract concessions from one another. They created and exploited what economists call “hold-up problems”: when one state or firm makes an investment in another in which profits depend on the continuation of the relationship. For example, one country could build oil infrastructure in another country that the supplier alone can service or operate. Once such deals are concluded, powerful countries can coerce their partners simply by threatening to change the terms of the agreement.
In the near term, countries can benefit from wielding trade as a cudgel. But in the long term, trade wars leave almost everyone worse off. When countries frequently use economic leverage to secure concessions from vulnerable partners, investment and economic growth go down. Political instability, meanwhile, goes up. States that chafe at economic coercion sometimes turn to their militaries in order to fight back. Countries that once cooperated because of commercial ties turn into competitors. Even close allies drift apart. Trump may think his tariff regime will make the United States richer, safer, and stronger. But history suggests it will do just the opposite.
PAIN WITHOUT GAIN
In the early nineteenth century, American traders began doing business with U.S. settlers in the kingdom of Hawaii. At the time, the islands’ economy revolved around sugar plantations, many of which were owned or controlled by American businessmen who exported sugar to the U.S. market. Eventually, to help the sugar farmers, the two countries struck the Reciprocity Treaty of 1875, which eliminated tariffs on Hawaiian sugar entering the United States. In response, Hawaii’s sugar economy boomed.
Initially, this deal worked reasonably well for Hawaii, which grew much richer from the exports. But it made the kingdom ever more dependent on the United States, which was able to exploit this reliance to its advantage. Washington refused, for example, to renew the Reciprocity Treaty unless Hawaii gave it exclusive rights to Pearl Harbor. American officials then eliminated tariffs on all foreign sugar in the 1890s and gave domestic producers a subsidy to shield the U.S. industry from foreign competition and keep prices low. This deprived Hawaii of its cost advantage. Hawaiian planters were crushed, increasing support among the islands’ U.S. elite for annexation. The elite’s push was successful, despite overwhelming opposition by the native Hawaiian population.
Hawaii was hardly the only country victimized by trade dependence. The United States and European countries had their investments in railroads mines, and oil infrastructure in Mexico, after Mexico expropriated them both outright and through regulator changes. Their banks and railways in China were attacked by the Qing dynasty. Western investments in Cuba were sabotaged under Spanish colonial rule. Perhaps most famously, Germany used its status as one of the largest importers of eastern European agriculture to gain political influence in that region before World War II.
These risks, in turn, suppressed overall economic exchange. No countries wanted to be conquered or coerced, so many of them steered clear of international commerce. The founders of the United States feared that economic dependence on the United Kingdom would give London undue influence even after they won the Revolutionary War, so they curtailed transatlantic trade. Qing China feared that trade dependence was a security vulnerability and likewise held back from global markets. Imperial Russia embraced autarky in the late nineteenth century to avoid vulnerability. In the 1930s, Japan went so far as to seize Manchuria in order to create an autarkic bloc that would supply Tokyo with raw materials without having to negotiate with the West.
Hawaii was not the only country victimized by trade dependence.
In this rough-and-tumble era, trade wars were frequent and destabilizing. Sometimes, they helped produce outright conflict. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which raised U.S. tariffs on over 20,000 goods, prompted a global trade war that intensified geopolitical rivalries and helped push Germany, Italy, and Japan toward autarky and expansionism. Most famously, after the United States placed tariffs, embargoes, and export controls on Japanese oil, scrap metal, and aviation fuel, Tokyo struck Pearl Harbor in 1941. Trade tensions have featured in many other military conflicts, as well. Trade pressure and maritime coercion, for example, also helped lead to the War of 1812.
There still were bright moments for trade in the pre-WTO era, especially after World War II ended. In 1979, for instance, China and the United States normalized ties, and in 1980, the latter country granted the former permanent normal trade relations—preferential tariff treatment under U.S. law. But for two decades, the U.S. Congress had to vote yearly to renew China’s normal trade status, which legislators conditioned on Beijing making human rights and nonproliferation concessions. Although Congress always granted this status, the recurring uncertainty depressed trade and investment, as firms hesitated to engage deeply with a partner whose access to the American market could be revoked at any time. Economic actors, after all, require stable, predictable frameworks to make long-term investments.
In response, Beijing pushed to join the WTO from the moment it was created, hoping the body could guarantee Chinese manufacturers predictable global access. This effort sparked fierce debate within the United States about whether to permit accession. Advocates of integration argued that tying China’s economy to the world’s would deter China from launching military conflicts, lest it risk a cutoff, and encourage political liberalization. Opponents feared that economic integration before political liberalization would only strengthen an authoritarian competitor. Ultimately, the optimists prevailed: Washington allowed Beijing to join the WTO in 2001. The organization then alleviated China’s hold-up problems by prohibiting the United States from threatening tariff hikes each year. The Chinese economy, already expanding at a healthy rate, began to grow even faster.
For the WTO, Chinese accession was a triumph. The organization was created to increase trade everywhere and stop countries from using commerce as a weapon, and integrating the world’s most populous country (and a former U.S. adversary) suggested the body was having its intended effect. And at the time, it was—countries typically obeyed the WTO’s common rules, listened to its adjudicators, and played along with its enforcement tribunals. The resulting system was hardly perfect; it failed, for example, to stop China from using industrial policy as a means to promote specific sectors or companies, often at the expense of foreign firms, or from restricting exports to countries that criticized Beijing. But for the most part, the WTO was quite successful. Trade flourished, and the global economy grew more quickly than it otherwise would have.
BACK TO THE FUTURE
Then came the 2016 election of Trump. The president, always a critic of free trade, quickly went about abandoning and dismantling the WTO framework—taking opposition to the body to a whole new level. The United States, once the organization’s biggest champion, largely stopped listening to WTO guidance. It adopted trade practices that outright violated the body’s rules. And it paralyzed the organization’s appellate body in order to further weaken the system. Instead, Washington’s leaders reembraced a transactional view of trade, deploying tariffs as blunt instruments of punishment and coercion. Hold-up problems, once thought tamed, returned with a vengeance. Long-term investment and cross-border economic planning became riskier as geopolitical considerations reasserted themselves.
During Trump’s first term, these policies helped spur a more defensive posture by the United States’ trade partners. The EU, for example, devised new geoeconomic policies such as its anti-coercion instrument, which allows the bloc to respond to economic coercion by imposing tariffs, restricting access to EU markets, or suspending international obligations. China and the United States began to separate out investments. Such actions may well have suppressed both trade and foreign direct investment, although the declines in both are difficult to disentangle from the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. But even if Trump’s policies mattered little the first time around, that does not mean they will have trivial effects now. The first Trump administration featured many advisers who prevented the president from unleashing the kind of broad-based tariffs that he has implemented in 2025. Today, firms face even greater uncertainty. As a result, Chinese companies are already intensifying efforts to eliminate foreign components from their supply chains. So is the EU.
Trump’s tariffs are unlikely to help the U.S. economy. They will probably fail at their main stated goal—bringing manufacturing jobs back to the United States—because businesses will be reluctant to invest more at home when Washington keeps making and breaking trade agreements. The White House, after all, could instantly render whatever domestic factories companies build unprofitable by slashing tariffs. Trump also wants to use the leverage from the tariffs to compel countries to sign bilateral agreements with the United States, as was common before the advent of the multilateral trading system, but these deals will not do much to encourage investment, either. Unlike in a multilateral system, bilateral agreements are difficult to enforce and thus difficult for countries and firms to trust. In a bilateral system, trading partners also constantly worry that whatever agreement they sign with the United States will be undercut by a new deal between Washington and a different government. The result is even more uncertainty and thus less investment.
Tariffs lower the costs of military confrontation.
Trump’s trade war, in other words, will likely have similar economic effects as trade wars past. It could also have similar political consequences. Alliances may fray as countries look to hedge their bets, diversifying economic ties rather than simply trusting their partners. Governments will use tariffs to try to weaken competitors. Trump has already apparently used tariffs in an effort to annex Canada (in a strange redux of U.S. policy toward Hawaii), saying that Canada could avoid tariffs by becoming an American state and threatening “economic force” if it doesn’t. In response, Canadians have pivoted away from the United States, including by boycotting U.S. products. So have people in other countries; for example, overall favorability of the United States shave fallen across Western Europe since Trump won.
The United States is unlikely to attack any of these countries outright, although Trump has threatened Danish-controlled Greenland. But by reducing mutual dependency, his tariffs do lower the costs of military confrontation. If the United States reduces its economic reliance on Taiwanese semiconductors, for instance, Beijing might decide that Washington won’t respond if China blockades or invades the island. Conversely, in a more transactional world, countries could use whatever dependencies still exist to gain a political advantage—as Berlin did with agriculture in the 1930s. Russia, in particular, has long used such tactics by manipulating the price of oil and gas to extract political concessions from countries in its periphery, contributing to regional conflict.
Moscow’s tactics have naturally led many nearby states to diversify away from Russia. Now, similar tactics are also costing the United States. But should Washington lose its economic credibility, the result could be far more destabilizing than is the case for countries that do not trust the Kremlin. Washington’s ability to stand by its agreements has been the backbone of many essential global institutions, including NATO. It is a key reason the dollar is the world’s reserve currency. Without reliable frameworks, international politics will become more uncertain and volatile, making miscalculation and conflict more likely. The situation could start to resemble the lead-up to World War II, which partially resulted from the collapse of the League of Nations and the failure of European powers to nip German expansionism in the bud.
Trump may ultimately reduce some of his levies, particularly as he negotiates with more and more countries. He has already made a trade deal with the United Kingdom. But the president has abandoned the institutions and norms that once stabilized global trade. In doing so, he is risking an era not of renewed American strength but of stagnation, fragmentation, and danger. History, after all, shows that this is what trade wars create.
ALLISON CARNEGIE is Professor of Political Science at Columbia University.
Foreign Affairs · by More by Allison Carnegie · May 14, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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