Quotes of the Day:
"Do not go gentle into that good night.
Old age should burn and rave at close of day;
Rage, rage, against the dying of the light."
- Dylan Thomas
"We make a living by what we get, but we make a life by what we give."
-Winston Churchill
"Shallow men believe in luck. Strong men believe in cause and effect."
-Ralph Waldo Emerson
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 15 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. Russian war effort runs into diplomatic, military hurdles
3. Russian soldier says commander shot himself in leg to leave war in Ukraine, officials say
4. Ukraine War Update - May 16, 2022 | SOF News
5. Preparing Taiwan for a War With China
6. Ukraine claims battlefield successes in northeast as Russians fall back
7. Ukraine Is in Worse Shape than You Think
8. Japan’s reluctant realism on Taiwan
9. USMC Force Design 2030: Threat or Opportunity?
10. Chinese Navy Ship Operating Off of Australia, Canberra Says
11. Bill Gates’s Pandemic Prevention Plan Has a China-Sized Blind Spot
12. FDD | Ahead of Biden's expected visit to Israel
13. Russia has lost ‘a third of ground forces’ in Ukraine attack
14. Russia warns Finland and Sweden joining Nato would be ‘grave mistake’
15. FDD | The White House Is Bending the Law on Syria Sanctions
16. ‘A magnet for rip-off artists’: Fraud siphoned billions from pandemic unemployment benefits
17. New commando force leads Britain’s military in Arctic operations
18. Growing evidence of a military disaster on the Donets pierces a pro-Russian bubble.
19. Nations Aim to Secure Supply Chains by Turning Offshoring Into ‘Friend-Shoring’
20. 7 reasons why Zelenskyy’s crisis leadership is so effective
21. US special-operations leaders are figuring out what skills to bring with them into 'the 5th modern era' of special ops
22. EXPLAINER: Theory of white replacement fuels racist attacks
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 15 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 15
Kateryna Stepanenko, Frederick W. Kagan, and George Barros
May 15, 6:30 pm ET
Russian forces have likely abandoned the objective of completing a large-scale encirclement of Ukrainian units from Donetsk City to Izyum in favor of completing the seizure of Luhansk Oblast. Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai said that the Russian military command likely understands that it will not be able to seize Donetsk Oblast but believes that it has the capacity to reach the administrative borders of Luhansk Oblast.[1] His observations are generally consistent with our analysis. The Russian military command will likely prioritize the Battle of Severodonetsk going forward, with some efforts dedicated to disrupting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in eastern Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces are continuing a coordinated effort to seize Severodonetsk from the north and the south, which would result in a shallower encirclement of Ukrainian troops than originally expected. The failed Russian attempts to cross the Siverskyi Donets River near Kreminna may shift Russian encirclement operations further east, closer to Severodonetsk via Rubizhne, rather than conducting a wider encirclement along multiple axes. Russian forces have also likely been scaling down advances to Slovyansk from Izyum, possibly due to the slow pace of the offensive operation there.
Russian forces have likely run out of combat-ready reservists, forcing the Russian military command to amalgamate soldiers from many different elements, including private military companies and proxy militias, into ostensibly regular army units and naval infantry. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that approximately 2,500 Russian reservists are training in Belgorod, Voronezh, and Rostov oblasts to reinforce Russian offensive operations in Ukraine. That number of reservists is unlikely to generate enough force to replenish Russian units that have reportedly lost up to 20 percent of staffing in some areas—to say nothing of the battalion tactical group that was largely destroyed recently while attempting to cross the Siverskyi Donets River.[2] The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate stated that Russian forces are conducting covert mobilization and creating new units with newly mobilized personnel who likely have insufficient training to be effective and little motivation to fight.[3] Russian forces also deployed new conscripts from occupied settlements in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to maintain an offensive around Kharkiv City, likely due to the lack of Russian reserves.[4]
Russian private military companies are reportedly forming combined units with airborne elements due to significant losses in manpower.[5] Denaturing elite airborne units with mercenaries is shocking, and would be the clearest indication yet that Russia has exhausted its available combat-ready manpower reserves. The Russian 810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade is reportedly receiving personnel from other Black Sea Fleet units, including navy ship crewmembers.[6] Newly formed or regrouped units are unlikely to be effective in combat.
Russian forces are likely fortifying occupied settlements in southern Ukraine, indicating that the Russians are seeking to establish permanent control in the region. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces began digging trenches and building concrete revetments in unspecified areas of Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblast, near Melitopol, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[7]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces will likely prioritize winning the Battle of Severodonetsk over reaching the administrative borders of Donetsk Oblast.
- Russian forces did not advance in the Slovyansk direction due to unsuccessful offensive operations in the Izyum area. Ukrainian aviation continues to operate north and east of Izyum.
- Russian forces continued to launch artillery, air, and naval assaults on the Azovstal Steel Plant, but Mariupol defenders maintained their positions.
- Russian forces are fortifying occupied settlements along the southern axis, indicative of Russian objectives for permanent control of the area.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time. We have stopped coverage of supporting effort 4, ”Sumy and northeastern Ukraine,” because it is no longer an active effort.
- Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
- Subordinate main effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
- Supporting effort 1—Mariupol;
- Supporting effort 2—Kharkiv City;
- Supporting effort 3—Southern axis.
Main effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground assaults in the direction of Slovyansk on May 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched an offensive on Dovhenke and Bogorodychne, approximately 18 and 25 km south of Izyum, respectively.[8] Pro-Russian Telegram channels claimed that Russian forces entered Dovhenke on May 14, but we assess that they were likely unable to secure the settlement due to heavy fighting.[9]
Ukrainian aviation continues to operate over Russian-controlled settlements near Izyum. Ukrainian artillery struck Russian armor and positions approximately 65 km north of Izyum with support from Ukrainian drones.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces suffered losses and retreated from an occupied settlement east of Izyum, likely due to a Ukrainian airstrike.[11] Social media also observed Ukrainian fixed-wing aircraft striking the Russian salient in the Izyum area.[12]
Russian forces made minor territorial advances toward Severodonetsk and are likely committing to a shallower encirclement of Ukrainian troops in Luhansk Oblast in place of the more ambitious encirclements that might have given them control over all or most of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai reported that Russian forces engaged in battles in settlements approximately 4 km northeast and 5 km southwest of Severodonetsk on May 15.[13] Haidai said that the Russian command likely scaled back its objective of reaching the Donetsk Oblast administrative borders to focus on Luhansk Oblast. Haidai said that the Russians are committing additional forces to their northern and southern drives toward Severodonetsk in Luhansk Oblast.[14] He added that the Russian command also continued its efforts to seize the Lysychansk-Bahmut highway to surround Ukrainian units in Rubizhne, Severodonentsk, and Lysychansk, all in Luhansk Oblast.[15] Commentary on pro-Russian Telegram channels and observed ground offensives northeast of Popasna suggest that Russian forces will try to advance to Lysychansk via the T1303 highway.[16] Failed Russian attempts to cross Siverskyi Donets River from Kreminna likely further undermined Russian large-scale encirclement efforts.[17]
Russian forces continue their efforts to reach Zaporizhia City and Slovyansk from Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful assault southwest of Donetsk City, likely to secure the N15 highway to Zaporizhia City.[18] Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful attack on Avdiivka from the west.[19] Pro-Russian Telegram channels claimed that units of the Donetsk People’s Republic advanced in the eastern Avdiivka area.[20] Pro-Russian Telegram channels characterized Russian efforts in western Donetsk Oblast as “methodological and unhurried encirclement” of Ukrainian units in Donbas that will reunite with Russian forces in Izyum.[21] Russian forces are unlikely to succeed in such large-scale encirclement operations due to the evidently limited availability of effective Russian combat power, stiff Ukrainian resistance, and Russian prioritization of the Severodonetsk offensive operation. Ukrainian forces destroyed the dam at the Mironovskyi reservoir, 5 km north of Svitlodarsk, on May 14 to cause flooding that will likely slow down Russian advances to the north.[22]
Supporting Effort #1—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)
Russian forces conducted artillery, air, and naval strikes on the remaining Ukrainian defenders in the Azovstal Steel Plant on May 15.[23] Ukrainian officials said that Russian forces fired incendiary munitions with thermite layers at Azovstal on May 14.[24] Families of the Mariupol defenders said that Ukrainian servicemen barely leave shelter at Azovstal and then only to procure food and water.[25]
Mariupol Mayor Advisor Petro Andryushenko reported that a column of over 500 vehicles evacuated from Mariupol to Zaporizhia City on May 15.[26] Andryushenko added that Russian forces did not fix access to water or electricity for Mariupol residents and focused on strengthening occupation authority in the city.[27]
Supporting Effort #2—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
The Ukrainian counteroffensive continued to push Russian forces from northeastern Kharkiv City toward the Russian state border on May 15.[28] Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleg Synegubov reported that Russian forces fired on Ukrainian positions northeast of Kharkiv, likely in an attempt to defend Russian ground lines of communications in Vovchansk, approximately 60 km from Kharkiv City.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Russian command had committed newly mobilized units from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to the Kharkiv City axis—further evidence of the inadequacy of Russia’s available reserves.[30]
Supporting Effort #3—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces continued to fortify their positions in southern Ukraine and did not conduct active offensive operations on May 15. The Zaporizhia Military Administration reported that Russian forces dug trenches in southern Melitopol along the Molochna River and in villages 30 km south of the city.[31] ISW previously reported that Russian forces reportedly also created trenches 35 km east of the Kherson Oblast border.[32] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces are also creating reinforced concrete structures in Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblasts.[33] Russian trenches and concrete shelters are indicators that Russian forces seek to establish and defend permanent control over the occupied areas. Russian forces are also attempting to restart operations at an auto parts plant in Zaporizhia Oblast in an effort to start military production in the region.[34]
Immediate Items to Watch
- Russian forces will likely complete their withdrawal from the vicinity of Kharkiv City but will likely attempt to hold a line west of Vovchansk to defend their GLOCs from Belgorod to Izyum. It is unclear if they will succeed.
- The Russians will continue efforts to encircle Severodonetsk and Lysychansk at least from the south, possibly by focusing on cutting off the last highway connecting Severodonetsk and Lysychansk with the rest of Ukraine.
- A Ukrainian counteroffensive around Izyum will likely begin soon.
- The Battle of Mariupol will, apparently and surprisingly, continue.
2. Russian war effort runs into diplomatic, military hurdles
As noted at the end of the article the Kalush Orchestra from Ukraine won the best song at Eurovision. I think the entire population of Ukraine is full of experts at psychological operations and strategic influence. See the powerful music video here. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z8Z51no1TD0
Russian war effort runs into diplomatic, military hurdles
AP · by OLEKSANDR STASHEVSKYI and CIARAN McQUILLAN · May 16, 2022
KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Its military bogged down in a grinding conflict in eastern Ukraine, Russia lost diplomatic ground over the weekend as two more European nations moved closer to joining NATO.
Finland announced Sunday that it was seeking to join the alliance, saying Russia’s invasion of Ukraine nearly three months ago had changed Europe’s security landscape. Finland shares a 1,340-kilometer (830-mile) land border and the Gulf of Finland with Russia.
Several hours later, Sweden’s governing party endorsed a bid for membership, which could lead to an application in days.
Those moves would be a serious blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has called NATO’s post-Cold War expansion in Eastern Europe a threat and cited it as a reason for attacking Ukraine. NATO says it is a purely defensive alliance.
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, meeting with top diplomats from the alliance in Berlin, said the war “is not going as Moscow had planned.”
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“Ukraine can win this war,” he said, adding that NATO must continue to offer military support to Kyiv.
Britain’s Defense Ministry said Monday that Belarus was deploying special operations forces along its border with Ukraine and air defense, artillery and missile units to training ranges in the west of the country.
Belarusia’s forces have not been directly involved in the conflict, though its territory was used as a staging post for Russia’s initial advance on Kyiv and Chernihiv. Russia has also launched air sorties and missile strikes from Belarus.
The presence of Belarusian troops near the border may keep Ukrainian troops pinned down there, preventing them from moving to support the counteroffensive in the Donbas, Ukraine’s eastern industrial heartland.
Russian and Ukrainian fighters have been battling village-by-village for the Donbas, where Ukraine’s military has fought Moscow-backed separatists for eight years.
On Sunday, a Ukrainian battalion in the Kharkiv region, where Russian troops have been pushed back by a counteroffensive, reached the Russian border and made a victorious video there addressed to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The video posted on Facebook by Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense shows a dozen fighters around a post covered with blue and yellow, Ukraine’s colors.
One said the unit went “to the dividing line with the Russian Federation, the occupying country. Mr. President, we have reached it. We are here.” Other fighters made victory signs and raised their fists.
Ukraine’s military reported Monday that Russian forces were concentrating on “maintaining positions and preventing the advance of our troops toward the border.”
Determining a full picture of the fighting, especially the unfolding battle in the east, is difficult. Airstrikes and artillery barrages make it extremely dangerous for reporters to move around, and both Ukraine and the Moscow-backed separatists fighting in the east restrict reporting from combat zones.
The Ukrainian military said that Russian forces were focusing their latest attacks on the Donetsk region in the east, targeting civilian and military sites in multiple towns.
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Russia troops also continued air and artillery strikes around the Azovstal steel plant in Mariupol, the last holdout of several hundred Ukrainian forces in the strategically important city, the Ukrainian General Staff said.
In an online news conference, many wives of the besieged soldiers urged the international community to help gain the release of “the entire garrison,” which is suffering from a dire lack of food, water and medicine.
Turkey’s presidential spokesman, Ibrahim Kalin, said his country had offered to evacuate wounded Ukrainian soldiers and civilians by ship from Azovstal, the official state broadcaster TRT said.
Over the weekend, Russian forces hit a chemical plant and 11 high-rise buildings in Siverodonetsk, in the Donbas, regional Gov. Serhii Haidaii said. Russian missiles also destroyed “military infrastructure facilities” in the Yavoriv district of western Ukraine, near the Polish border, the Lviv region’s governor said. Lviv is a gateway for Western-supplied weapons to Ukraine.
And Ukrainian forces stopped an attempted Russian advance near the eastern city of Izyum, the governor of Ukraine’s Kharkiv region, Oleh Sinegubov, reported.
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The Ukrainian claims could not be independently verified, but Western officials also painted a somber picture for Russia.
Britain’s Defense Ministry estimated that the Russian army had lost up to one-third of the combat strength it committed to Ukraine in late February and was failing to gain any substantial territory. “Under the current conditions, Russia is unlikely to dramatically accelerate its rate of advance over the next 30 days,” the ministry said.
Despite the fighting in the wider Kharkiv region and the threat of Russian missile attacks, many people were returning home to Kharkiv and other cities around Ukraine, Anna Malyar, deputy head of the Ministry of Defense, said.
Refugees were returning not just because of optimism that the war might ebb.
“Living somewhere just like that, not working, paying for housing, eating ... they are forced to return for financial reasons,” Malyar said in remarks carried by the RBK-Ukraine news agency.
Countries neighboring Russia and Ukraine worry they could be next after Russia invaded Ukraine.
Sweden’s parliament on Monday was to discuss joining NATO after the ruling Social Democratic Party endorsed a plan to do so. An announcement by the Cabinet was expected to follow.
During a visit to Sweden, U.S. Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell said Sunday that Finland and Sweden would be “important additions” to NATO and that the U.S. should swiftly ratify their membership. A delegation of GOP senators led by McConnell made a surprise visit to Kyiv on Saturday.
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NATO operates by consensus, however, and Turkey has cast doubts over adding Finland and Sweden as members.
Ukraine celebrated a morale-boosting victory on Saturday night in the Eurovision Song Contest. The folk-rap ensemble Kalush Orchestra won the glitzy pan-European competition with its song “Stefania,” which has become a Ukrainian wartime anthem.
Zelenskyy vowed his nation would claim the customary winner’s honor of hosting the next annual competition.
“Step by step, we are forcing the occupiers to leave the Ukrainian land,” Zelenskyy said.
The band’s frontman, Oleh Psiuk, said at a news conference Sunday that the musicians were “ready to fight” when they return home. Ukraine’s government prohibits men between 18 and 60 from leaving the country, but the all-male band’s six members got special permission to go to Italy to represent Ukraine in the contest.
___
McQuillan reported from Lviv, Ukraine. Yuras Karmanau in Lviv, Mstyslav Chernov and Andrea Rosa in Kharkiv, Elena Becatoros in Odesa and other AP staffers around the world contributed to this report.
___
Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine
AP · by OLEKSANDR STASHEVSKYI and CIARAN McQUILLAN · May 16, 2022
3. Russian soldier says commander shot himself in leg to leave war in Ukraine, officials say
The moral is to the physical as three is to one (Bonaparte). The Russians do not seem to have much morale.
Russian soldier says commander shot himself in leg to leave war in Ukraine, officials say
- Audio published by Ukrainian officials captured a Russian soldier talking to his mother
- Soldier told her he and others in the military did not want to be fighting war in Ukraine
Published: 12:54pm, 16 May, 2022
A Russian soldier in Ukraine told his mother over the phone that his superior shot himself just to go home, according to audio released by Ukrainian officials.
A recording of the intercepted phone call was published Saturday on Facebook by the Ukrainian Defence Ministry’s Main Intelligence Directorate.
The soldier, who says he is 20, can be heard complaining to his mother that the war will not end soon and that he doesn’t want to be there.
“This Ukraine does not interest me at all. I need to come back and quit,” he said, explaining that many other Russian soldiers do not want to be there either.
His mother pressed him on whether there are “patriots” in the Russian military encouraging other soldiers not to give up.
“Mom, the commander of my battery of the second platoon shot himself in the leg to get out of here, in the very beginning! What are we even talking about here? And he served in Chechnya,” the soldier responded.
His mother then asked what would happen if the West decides to advance on Russia: “Who will defend Russia then? Who, tell me? They will just kill us all, there will be a fourth world war and Russia will lose in it!”
“Well then maybe Putin will think twice,” the soldier said, adding that “we don’t have munitions or people, there is no command from Moscow!”
The soldier also said the conflict was because Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded: “Nobody advanced on us!"
His mom defended Putin and said he did not invade but was advancing on the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, the Kremlin-backed separatist states in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region.
“I don’t know … we did not even come close to there,” the soldier said.
Multiple reports have described Russian soldiers who do not want to be fighting the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said early on in the war that Russian forces were “tired” and “demoralised”.
Ukrainian servicemen in Kyiv load a refrigerated railcar with bodies of Russian soldiers killed during the war. Photo: Reuters
Last week, a Russian soldier told The Guardian he wanted to quit the army because there was no point in fighting in Ukraine.
Since launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, Russian forces have seen major losses and been pushed back from areas around Kyiv and Kharkiv after unsuccessful attempts to advance.
Ukraine Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov on Saturday said the country was preparing for a new, long-term phase of the war.
Translations by Nikita Ilyich Angarski.
4. Ukraine War Update - May 16, 2022 | SOF News
Ukraine War Update - May 16, 2022 | SOF News
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, Ukrainian defense, and NATO. Additional topics include refugees, internally displaced personnel, humanitarian efforts, cyber, and information operations.
Photo: U.S. soldiers participate in a NATO live-fire exercise at the Bemowo Piskie Training Area, Poland, March 16. 2022. During the annual event, the soldiers practice their skills to test their readiness and cohesiveness while working with NATO allies and contributing to the NATO enhanced forward presence mission in Poland. Photo by Staff Sgt. Walter Carroll.
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Big Picture of the Conflict
Russia is now in Day 82 of its 3-day ‘special military operation’. Russia invaded Ukraine to weaken the NATO alliance, topple the Ukrainian government, install a puppet government friendly to Russia, and to seize a significant amount of Ukrainian territory that would make it a land-locked country economically dependent upon Russia. Thus far, the only significant gains are additional territory captured in the Donbas region and the establishment of a land bridge from the Russian border along the eastern side of the Sea of Azov, and on to Crimea.
Ground Situation. The Russians have failed to achieve significant territorial gains over the past month. The ground that has been seized resulted in huge losses in personnel, vehicles, and equipment. The Russians are lacking key enablers such as drones, night vision goggles, and bridging equipment – and is experiencing low morale and combat effectiveness. The Donbass offensive has stalled. The Russians had planned to use Izium (Google Maps) as a base from which to push further west into Ukraine; it has a significant amount of troops in the city and and surrounding area. Now the city is in danger of encirclement by the Ukrainian forces. The Pentagon estimates that there are about 105 Russian battalion tactical groups in Ukraine (as of May 13).
Fight for the Skies. The air space is still contested. Ukrainian fighters are still flying. Aircraft is hindered by the presence of multiple air defense systems of the Ukrainians and the Russians. Most Russian aircraft are operating within Russia’s borders and launching air to ground missiles at targets in Ukraine within range of the Russian territory.
Maritime Activities. Dr. Basil Germond, a professor at Lancaster University, UK, is an expert in naval and maritime affairs. He analyzes Russia’s use of naval forces in the Ukraine war, its aspiration to control the northern coast of the Black Sea from the Russian Federation borders to Moldova, and its desire to dominant the Black Sea. “Ukraine War: The Limits of Traditional Naval Power and the Rise of Collective and Civilian Seapower”, E-International Relations, May 10, 2022. Snake Island is still in the news. Read “Why the battle over Ukraine’s Snake Island matters for the world“, GZERO, May 12, 2022.
Moskva. The Ukrainian military published audio from the Russian flagship of the Black Sea, the Moskva, that was attacked by missiles and that the crew needed to be rescued. The ship sank on April 14th after being struck twice and began tilting on its side.
Russia and the Enemies Within. There are deepening rifts between the Russian military and the Federal Security Service (FSB) over the failures of intelligence and military incompetence on the battlefield. Some members of the Russian military suspect that the FSB may be working against the Kremlin’s efforts to win in Ukraine. (Radio Free Europe, May 8, 2022).
Ukrainian Defense
Russian Attacks Stopped. The news of the Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine is mixed. There are some reports that attacks by the Russians that have made some minimal gains. However, many attacks have not gained much territory at all. Some estimates put the Russian loses at one third of the ground forces since the invasion took place on February 24th.
Russian Unit Destroyed at River Crossing. A number of Russian armored vehicles were destroyed and personnel killed while attempting to cross Siversky Donets River on May 11th over a pontoon bridge. Apparently the Russian vehicles were gathering in a tight group at each end of the bridge and caught in an artillery barrage. There are reports that a significant part of a battalion’s worth of vehicles (as many as 80) were put out of action. Over 400 Russian soldiers were killed or wounded. About 550 troops of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade tried to cross the river at Bilohorivka in an attempt to encircle Ukrainian forces. “Russia takes losses in failed river crossing, officials say”, Military Times, May 13, 2022.
Ukrainian Tractor Brigade. The John Deere’s of Ukraine have been providing a significant service to the Ukrainian military. As Russian tanks, self-propelled artillery and rocket launchers, and other armored vehicles are disabled or abandoned the farmers of Ukraine have been coming to the rescue. The ‘Tractor Brigade‘ has been both cleaning up the battlefield and bringing valuable tank and armored vehicles to Ukrainian military repair shops where they are put back into action; but this time against the Russians. The Ukrainians now have more tanks than when the war started. The Russians – not so much. (Twitter, May 15, 2022).
Tactical Situation
Kharkiv Counteroffensive. The second largest city of Ukraine, Kharkiv, is an area where the Ukrainians have been successfully pushing the Russians back. For several days, the counterattacks have resulted in more territory liberated from the Russians. There are reports that the Ukrainian troops defending Kharkiv have pushed some Russian troops across the Russian border (Reuters, May 16). This is putting some of the logistic supply lines of the Russians in jeopardy further to the south. The battle for the city of Kharkiv may now be over. View a detailed map of the Kharkiv battle zone. (Twitter, @IAPonomarenko, May 15, 2022).
Mariupol – Defenders Still Holding Out. As of Sunday (May 15), the Ukrainian defenders continue to hold a small section of the city in the steel factory known as Azovstal. A large convoy of from 500 to 1,000 cars and vans carrying refugees from Mariupol arrived in the Ukrainian-controlled city of Zaporizhzhia on Saturday (May 15). There are approximately 1,000 Ukrainian defenders still fighting; many of them wounded. The fight for the city began over 80 days ago with 3,500 Ukrainian defenders from the National Guard’s Azov Regiment, 36th Marine Brigade, and other units. There is no medicine left and the wounded are operated on with no anesthesia. Turkey has offered a sea evacuation for wounded Ukrainian fighters; but Russia has refused the offer. (Reuters, May 14) Nearly 90% of the city has been destroyed with over 20,000 residents believed dead due to the house-to-house fighting and massive bombardments by the Russians. The city, once holding over 500,000 residents, is situated along the coastal road network that will provide Russia with a land bridge between Russia and the Crimea.
Missile Attacks on Lviv Oblast. On Sunday (May 15) several missiles struck military facilities in the Lviv region. Other than these periodic airstrikes, the city is operating under conditions of normalcy. Gas and fuel shortages persist.
General Information
Panzerfaust 3. An antitank rocket that has it roots in fighting the Soviets in World War II is now being used against the Russians again – in Ukraine. This shoulder-fired weapon has made an impressive showing against Russian armored columns. With its Simrad Optonics sight and targeting mechanism, the Panzerfaust can engage targets up to ranges of 600 meters. The weapon costs about $11,000 and rounds are around $300; an inexpensive option for destroying Russia’s best tanks. “Panzerfaust 3: The Cold War Weapon Wrecking Russian Tanks in Ukraine”, Historynet.com, May 5, 2022.
Refugees, IDPs, and Humanitarian Crisis. View the UNHCR Operational Data Portal – Ukraine Refugee Situation (Updated daily), https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine. Since May 11th over six million Ukrainians have fled their country since late February. The people leaving are predominantly women, children, and the elderly.
Negotiations. There is not much progress in the current state of negotiations. Turkey, France, and other nations are attempting to restart the dialogue; but not with much success. Turkey has indicated they would assist in the evacuation of the remaining Ukrainian fighters in Mariupol; but Russia isn’t agreeing.
Worldwide Food Supplies Affected by Ukraine War. The impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on global food supplies is being magnified by nations imposing bans on food and fertilizer exports to preserve stocks for their domestic needs. The financial crisis of 2008 around the world led to nations doing the same; which then contributed to food shortages in nations that traditionally import food. This led to food riots in parts of the world, to include the Middle East. Wheat importing nations include Turkey, Egypt and several African countries. Russian and Ukraine provide about a third of the world’s wheat and barley as well as other agricultural products. David Uren provides the details in “Food supplies squeezed by Ukraine war and trade bans”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 16, 2022.
Cyber and Information Operations
Ukraine Wins Eurovision 2022. The Ukrainian rap and folk band Kalush Orchestra won the competition at a European music event over the weekend. It has generated a lot of publicity for the Ukraine nation. The band has released an official video of its winning song “Stefania”. It was filmed in Bucha, Irpin, and other cities near Kyiv that were liberated from the Russian occupation in early April. The song was first dedicated to the singer’s mother, and when the war broke out, the song took on a lot of new meanings. It carries a powerful message. (YouTube, May 2022).
Russia and InfoWarfare . . . Just Not That Good at It. Jeff Schogol says that “Russian memes are working about as good as Russian tanks.” Prior to kicking off its “mega-sized Charlie Foxtrot in Ukraine”, the Russians were widely regarded as masters of deception and propaganda. Jeff points out the many flaws in the aggressor’s IO campaign in “Russia actually isn’t as good at information warfare as everyone thought”, Task & Purpose, May 11, 2022.
Cyber and InfoWar Failure. In 2008 the world was distracted with the Beijing Olympics. Russia took advantage of this distraction with an attack on Georgia. Russia conducted cyber-attacks, a media campaign to form the narrative, and military action to “come to the aid of the South Ossetians” in Georgia. In 2022, Russia calculated that the world, distracted with the 2022 Winter Olympics and COVID-19 pandemic, would ignore its invasion of Ukraine. This time, however, Russia’s cyber and information campaigns, did not perform effectively. Read more in “How to Terminate Russian Disinformation”, Europe’s Edge, CEPA.org, May 12, 2022.
Telegram. The popular messaging service has about 500 million active users and is used by many in Europe and around the world. It has become a source of information about the Ukraine war for many – on both sides of the conflict. It was founded by Pavel Durov and his brother – both of St Petersburg, Russia. Pavel now lives in Dubai, having fallen out of favor with the Russian regime. (Business Insider, March 28, 2022).
Cell Phones and War Zones. Jeff Schogol writes on how Russian troops are proving that cell phones in war zones are a very bad idea. (Task & Purpose, May 13, 2022).
World Response
Finland and NATO. After much talk the past several weeks, Finland has officially announced that it will apply for NATO membership. Finnish President Sauli Niinisto and Prime Minister Sanna Marin made the announcement at a joint news conference on Sunday (May 15). The Finnish parliament will consider the decision over the next several days. Finland shares an 800-mile border with Russia – so the nation is pragmatic about its defense. Despite a small population of about 5.5 million, the nation can actually field a large army of 280,000 once fully mobilized. The cornerstones of its national defense posture is conscription and a large, well-trained reserve. Its army is equipped with modern weapons systems bought from several countries. Read more about the Finnish defense forces in “What Would Finland Bring to the Table for NATO?”, War on the Rocks, May 9, 2022.
And Sweden? In the next several days we may see news reports of Sweden deciding to join NATO; some media outlets say that May 17th is the big day. Sweden also shares a border with Russia. Sweden’s ruling Social Democratic Party says it is in favor of joining NATO. This reverses its decades-long opposition. And Switzerland? Could neutral Switzerland lean closer to NATO?
Blinken Meets with Ukrainian Foreign Minister. Secretary of State Blinken met with Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba on Sunday (May 15) during the G7 and NATO ministerial. (DoS, May 15). The G7 Foreign Ministers’ issued a joint statement on Russia’s war against Ukraine. (DoS, May 14, 2022).
Austin Speaks with Russians. On Friday (May 13) Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin spoke with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu urging an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine.
NATO. The Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said on Sunday (May 15) that Russia’s war in Ukraine is not going as the Kremlin had planned. He says that Ukraine can win the war.
“Russia failed to take Kyiv. They’re pulling back from around Kharkiv, their major offensive in Donbas has stalled. Russia is not achieving its strategic objectives.”
U.S. Ukraine Supplemental Aid Bill. The flow of equipment to Ukraine by the United States may very well be interrupted if the $40 billion bill is not passed by Congress. Senator Rand Paul is currently one of the reasons it has not been passed. Attempts to insert language authorizing the Afghan Adjustment Act failed. The bill has been passed by the House of Representatives.
Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act. The Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting provides a detailed examination of the recent legislation signed by President Biden that allows a constant flow of military aid to Ukraine. (May 10, 2022).
More US Troops to Europe. The United States will begin an additional deployment of troops to Europe to replace those forces sent to Europe earlier this year. One of the units to be replaced will be an element of the 82nd Airborne Division; to be replaced by 101st Airborne Division elements. Around 10,500 personnel will be sent to various East European countries in a one-for-one replacement plan. “Pentagon Announces Deployments to Replace Forces in Europe”, DoD News, May 13, 2022.
Commentary
Modern Resistance. Russia’s aggressive actions over the past two decades have forced Baltic and Nordic states to examine their defense posture, assess critical gaps, and take action to fill the gaps. One strategy that has emerged is the resistance operating concept – where all segments of the population engages in total defense strategies based on peacetime social resilience and war time resistance. Sandor Fabian, a former Special Forces officer in the Hungarian military, provides us with a detailed account of this new concept of resistance – something the Ukrainian people have demonstrated in their remarkable performance against the Russian aggressors. Read “Modern Resistance – Learning from Non-Western Examples”, Journal on Baltic Security, May 12, 2022.
Podcast – The State of Play in Ukraine. Two national security analysts who are following events in Ukraine closely discuss the current situation in Ukraine. Rob Lee, FPRI Senior Fellow and Michael Kofman, of the Russia Studies Program at CNA, are interviewed by Aaron Stein. Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 13, 2022, 50 minutes.
Siberia – What’s the Future? Some international analysts are viewing the poor performance of the Russian military in Ukraine as a sign of the decline of the ‘Russian ’empire’. Just as the 10-year war in Afghanistan helped lead the way to the disestablishment of the Soviet Union; it is possible that one of the end results of the Ukraine War and other misadventures may cause the decline of Russia as a nation along with a redefining of its borders. Russia’s control over Siberia – the size of the U.S. and India put together – is only 157 years old. China plays the long game. It is a population-rich and resource-poor nation; while Siberia is population-poor and resource-rich. The China-Russia border is almost 3,000 miles long and is the legacy of the Convention of Peking of 1860. China’s population outnumbers Russia’s population by 10 to 1. Read an article first published in 2015 on this topic in “Why China Will Reclaim Siberia”, The New York Times, January 15, 2015. (Subscription).
Ukraine War, Weapons, and Australia. Defense experts in Australia are looking at the novel way that weapons are being used by the Ukrainians against aircraft, tanks, and armored vehicles. They believe valuable lessons can be learned from the war that would modernize the Australian military to be able to fight in the future. “Australia must learn defence lessons from Ukraine”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 16, 2022.
Maps and Other Resources
UNCN. The Ukraine NGO Coordination Network is an organization that ties together U.S.-based 501c3 organizations and non-profit humanitarian organizations that are working to evacuate and support those in need affected by the Ukraine crisis. https://uncn.one
Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.
Ukrainian Think Tanks – Brussels. Consolidated information on how to help Ukraine from abroad and stay up to date on events.
5. Preparing Taiwan for a War With China
Excerpts:
For the near future, Taiwan’s administration needs to double down on its investment in Taiwan’s defense industry to cultivate a military supply chain. Taiwan is capable of producing some weapons on its own, including the Hsiung Sheng surface-to-surface missiles, Wan Chien air-to-ground missiles, and its indigenous diesel submarine. Taiwan should also initiate a discussion with the United States to carve out divisions of labor to not overlap efforts in producing arms. More importantly, Taiwan needs to maintain deterrence with its navy and air force. Cumulatively, of course, the disparity between Taiwan and China reveals that Taiwan’s air force and naval powers could not effectively expel or stall its enemy. However, losing air and naval superiority quickly to China at the beginning of warfare will allow China to easily suppress resistance from Taiwan’s troops. In other words, Taiwan still very much needs traditional weapons such as fighter jets and missiles to deter a Chinese invasion.
In brief, pursuing both goals would result in fewer trade-offs than many would think. Recently, more and more citizens in Taiwan now support the government to increase its defense budget and even revert back to the conscription system. For instance, Taiwan will be able to procure more arms with a 3% GDP. Taiwan’s weapon procurements should be multi-dimensional, and public support now is the highest in recent years.
Preparing Taiwan for a War With China
May 16. 2022
As the Ukraine-Russia war passes the two months mark, the tide on the battlefield has fundamentally changed. Rather than staying on the defensive, Ukrainian forces have shifted their strategy, with NATO’s assistance, to expel Russia from its current occupation. While the final outcome of this war seems elusive, most observers believe that the successes of Ukrainian forces lie partially in employing an asymmetrical strategy. The employment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as Stinger missiles, Bayraktar TB2, switchblades, NLAWs, and new technology such as SpaceX’s Starlink has disproportionately damaged Russian forces, paving the foundation of Ukraine’s current military posture against Russian invasion.
Many believe that Taiwan could learn important lessons from what Ukraine has been doing. A recent New York Times report posits that the U.S. wants Taiwan to emulate this asymmetrical strategy for arms procurement, while another coverage on the Politico adds more details. In the past several decades, Taiwan has cast its eyes on high-priced military items such as F-16, F-15, F-18, and F-35 fighter jets. Taiwan has also tried tirelessly to purchase diesel submarines and even initiated a project to produce those. The change of mindset on the U.S. side could be an underlying reason for rejecting the sale of Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk helicopters in a recent arms sales negotiation. Some even think Taiwan’s recent purchase of 108 M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank is squandering resources. Consider the following scenario: How many tanks could survive in the first several waves of aerial bombing after a war breaks out across the Strait? In this new thinking, some U.S. officials would want Taiwan to prioritize the procurement of weapons such as Stinger missiles and Harpoon anti-ship missiles, in lieu of other exorbitant items, as part of the island’s asymmetrical defense strategy.
We argue that Taiwan should keep constructing its defense capability by balancing a variety of approaches and should not treat these strategies mutually exclusive. Putting most emphasis on purchasing light weapons and small arms could be helpful for Taiwan’s defense, but it might also incur other weaknesses. Cross-Strait war games have demonstrated that China has considered various ways to coerce Taiwan, such as a naval blockade, an amphibious attack, a surprise attack, a decapitation strike, or a combination of the above. Therefore, reorienting the island to rely on light arms or asymmetrical strategy could significantly weaken the traditional deterrence that Taiwan’s forces could provide against the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It might also create unintended consequences that give China an upper hand in identifying a previous nonexistent weakness. Recent delays for U.S. manufacturers to acquire chips to make stinger missiles also suggest that shifting arms purchases to just a few categories could be risky. Thus, striking a balance between traditional and asymmetrical military capabilities is critical for Taiwan to maintain its deterrence posture against China.
For the near future, Taiwan’s administration needs to double down on its investment in Taiwan’s defense industry to cultivate a military supply chain. Taiwan is capable of producing some weapons on its own, including the Hsiung Sheng surface-to-surface missiles, Wan Chien air-to-ground missiles, and its indigenous diesel submarine. Taiwan should also initiate a discussion with the United States to carve out divisions of labor to not overlap efforts in producing arms. More importantly, Taiwan needs to maintain deterrence with its navy and air force. Cumulatively, of course, the disparity between Taiwan and China reveals that Taiwan’s air force and naval powers could not effectively expel or stall its enemy. However, losing air and naval superiority quickly to China at the beginning of warfare will allow China to easily suppress resistance from Taiwan’s troops. In other words, Taiwan still very much needs traditional weapons such as fighter jets and missiles to deter a Chinese invasion.
In brief, pursuing both goals would result in fewer trade-offs than many would think. Recently, more and more citizens in Taiwan now support the government to increase its defense budget and even revert back to the conscription system. For instance, Taiwan will be able to procure more arms with a 3% GDP. Taiwan’s weapon procurements should be multi-dimensional, and public support now is the highest in recent years.
Yao-Yuan Yeh, Chair and Associate Professor in the Department of International Studies & Modern Languages at the University of St Thomas, Houston @yeh2sctw
Charles K. S. Wu, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of South Alabama Twitter: @kuanshengtwn
Fang-Yu Chen, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Soochow University, Taiwan @FangYu_80168
Austin Horng-En Wang, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. @wearytolove
6. Ukraine claims battlefield successes in northeast as Russians fall back
Ukraine claims battlefield successes in northeast as Russians fall back
- Summary
- Ukraine says its forces have pushed through to Russian border
- Russia warns of consequences over Finland, Sweden NATO move
- NATO chief says Russian offensive not going to plan
- Situation still tough in south
RUSKA LOZOVA, Ukraine/KYIV, May 16 (Reuters) - Ukrainian troops counter-attacking against Russian forces in the country's northeast have pushed them back from the city of Kharkiv and advanced as far as the border with Russia, Ukrainian officials said on Monday.
The developments, if confirmed, would signal a further shift in momentum in favour of Ukrainian forces nearly three months into a conflict that began when Russia sent tens of thousands of troops over the border into Ukraine on Feb. 24.
Moscow meanwhile warned of "far-reaching consequences" should Finland and Sweden go ahead with plans to join the NATO military alliance - a change in the Nordic countries' long-standing policy of neutrality brought on by concern about Russian President Vladimir Putin's wider ambitions.
Fighting was reported near Kharkiv, Ukraine's second-largest city, on Monday in what interior ministry adviser Vadym Denisenko said was "our counter-offensive".
"It can no longer be stopped...Thanks to this, we can go to the rear of the Russian group of forces," he said.
Kharkiv, lying about 30 miles (50 km) from the border with Russia, had endured weeks of heavy bombardments from Russian artillery. The Russians' routing from there follows their failure to capture the capital Kyiv in the early stages of the war.
However, thousands of people, including many civilians, have been killed across the country, towns and cities have been blasted into ruins, and more than six million people have fled their homes to seek refuge in neighbouring states in scenes not seen in Europe since the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Russia denies targeting civilians.
Ukraine's defence ministry said on Monday the 227th Battalion of the 127th Brigade of Ukraine's Territorial Defence Forces had reached the border with Russia.
"Together to victory!" it said.
Kharkiv region governor Oleh Sinegubov said the troops had restored a sign on the border.
"We thank everyone who, risking their lives, liberates Ukraine from Russian invaders," Sinegubov said.
Reuters could not immediately verify Ukraine's battlefield account and it was not clear how many troops had reached the Russian border or where.
If confirmed, it would suggest a Ukrainian counter-offensive is having increasing success in pushing back Russian forces in the northeast after Western military agencies said Moscow's offensive in two eastern provinces known as the Donbas had stalled.
Nonetheless, the governor of the Luhansk region in Donbas, Serhiy Gaidai, said the situation "remains difficult", with Russian forces trying to capture the town of Sieverodonetsk.
He said leaders of the Lugansk People's Republic, the territory in Luhansk controlled by Russian-backed separatists, declared a general mobilisation, adding it was "either fight or get shot, there is no other choice".
In the south, fighting was raging around the city of Kherson and Russian missiles struck residential areas of Mykolayiv, the presidential office in Kyiv said. Reuters was unable to verify the reports.
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said on Sunday Ukraine could win the war, an outcome few military analysts predicted when Russia invaded Ukraine.
EXPANDING NATO
In a blow for Russia, which has long opposed NATO expansion, Finland on Sunday confirmed it would apply to join the alliance.
Sweden's ruling Social Democrats also backed NATO membership, paving the way for an application and abandoning decades of military nonalignment. read more
But Russia's deputy foreign minister, Sergei Ryabkov, said on Monday that Finland and Sweden were making a mistake that would have far-reaching consequences.
"They should have no illusions that we will simply put up with it," Ryabkov said, quoted by the Interfax news agency.
"The general level of military tension will rise, predictability in this sphere will decrease," Ryabkov said.
NATO and the United States said they were confident both countries would be accepted into the alliance and that reservations from Turkey, which wants the Nordic countries to halt support for Kurdish militant groups present on their territory, could be overcome. read more
Moscow calls its invasion of Ukraine a "special military operation" to rid the country of fascists, an assertion Kyiv and its Western allies say is a baseless pretext for an unprovoked war.
Since mid-April, Russian forces have focused much of their firepower on trying to capture the Donbas. Moscow recognised the independence of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic and the Lugansk People's Republic in the Donbas days before it launched its invasion.
British military intelligence said Russia had lost about a third of the ground combat force deployed in February, and its Donbas offensive had fallen "significantly behind schedule".
FIGHTING AROUND IZIUM
The most intense fighting appeared to be around the eastern Russian-held city of Izium, where Russia said it had struck Ukrainian positions with missiles. read more
Russia continued to target civilian areas along the entire frontline in Luhansk and Donetsk, firing at 23 villages and towns, Ukraine's military task force said.
Ukraine's military also acknowledged setbacks, saying Russian forces "continue to advance" in several areas in the Donbas region.
There was also no letup on Sunday in Russia's bombardment of the steelworks in the southern port of Mariupol, where a few hundred Ukrainian fighters are holding out weeks after the city fell into Russian hands, the Ukrainian military said.
Alexander Khodakovsky, a commander of separatist forces in Donetsk, said on his Telegram channel on Monday that 10 Ukrainian fighters emerged from a tunnel at the Azovstal steel plant holding white flags. Reuters could not verify the report.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said "very difficult and delicate negotiations" were going on to save Ukrainians in Mariupol and Azovstal.
Ukrainian troops received a morale boost from the country's win in the Eurovision song contest at the weekend, with some saying it was a sign of battlefield victories to come.
"We have shown that we can not only fight, but we can also sing very nice," said Vitaliy, a soldier bunkered down north of Kyiv. read more
Reporting by Reuters bureaux; Writing by Stephen Coates and Angus MacSwan; Editing by Lincoln Feast and Nick Macfie
7. Ukraine Is in Worse Shape than You Think
The photos of the level of damage inflicted on Ukraine are tragic. So much of the nation will have to be rebuilt from the ground up.
Excerpts:
Unfortunately, Zelensky’s leadership and the outpouring of international military and humanitarian assistance it has elicited have not prevented a shocking level of destruction to Ukraine’s cities, economy, and society. The fact that Kyiv has not fallen and Russian troops have retreated to the east masks that Ukraine is in worse shape than portrayed in the media.
It is worth remembering that Ukraine has been fighting a Russian invasion since 2014. Between 2014 and February 2022, almost 10,000 were killed in the simmering war in the Donbas, but little or no military progress was made. Now, Ukraine is fighting with that same army in an expanded theater against a bigger opposing force. It is a testament to the pure valiance of its troops that Ukraine has managed since February 24 not only to hold its line but force the Russians into a retreat from Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernigiv, and surrounding areas.
...
The U.S. government decided in May to symbolically move some of its diplomatic staff back into Kyiv, partially reversing its rapid, defeatist withdrawal when it assumed Kyiv would fall within days. President Biden has even, finally, nominated a U.S. ambassador to Ukraine after more than a three-year leadership gap. The message this and E.U. gestures send is important. But despite our desire to see in outmatched Ukraine’s survival a tale of David beating Goliath, and to cheer ourselves for donating the slingshot, the country is seriously, dangerously weakened.
Ukraine needs more than symbols, and more than weapons. Not losing is not winning, and it will take a long and deep commitment by the western world to help Ukraine both win and then heal.
Ukraine Is in Worse Shape than You Think
It has been said that, given how massively Ukrainian troops were believed be outmatched early in Russia’s invasion, not losing the war is itself a form of victory for Ukraine. The difference between expectations and the surprising resilience of Ukraine’s military makes it easy to misinterpret the current situation in Ukraine’s favor. But not winning is still not winning. Ukraine is in far worse shape than commonly believed and needs, and will continue to need, a staggering amount of aid and support to actually win.
We love an underdog. We love a plucky little guy who beats the odds. It fuels hope for our ordinary selves and allows us to feel we are on the morally superior side. This is why Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has appealed so successfully to the world. His defiance against the odds gave us someone to root for against a bully. While cheering on the scrappy, outmatched Ukrainians, we could also assuage some of our shame at leaving them—to whom we had made promises of protection, “security guarantees”—to die alone in the snow and the mud.
Unfortunately, Zelensky’s leadership and the outpouring of international military and humanitarian assistance it has elicited have not prevented a shocking level of destruction to Ukraine’s cities, economy, and society. The fact that Kyiv has not fallen and Russian troops have retreated to the east masks that Ukraine is in worse shape than portrayed in the media.
It is worth remembering that Ukraine has been fighting a Russian invasion since 2014. Between 2014 and February 2022, almost 10,000 were killed in the simmering war in the Donbas, but little or no military progress was made. Now, Ukraine is fighting with that same army in an expanded theater against a bigger opposing force. It is a testament to the pure valiance of its troops that Ukraine has managed since February 24 not only to hold its line but force the Russians into a retreat from Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernigiv, and surrounding areas.
Nonetheless, Russia now controls significantly more Ukrainian territory than before February 24. Putin’s army holds Kherson, whatever is left of Mariupol, all the intervening territory, and now not only Luhansk and Donetsk but the entire Donbas Oblast. For example, whereas Ukrainian authorities controlled approximately 60% of Luhansk before the recent Russian invasion, now Russian forces control over 80% of the region. They also have about 70% of Zaporizhye region. Cumulatively, this accounts for an increase of Russian occupied territory from approximately 7%, including Crimea, before February more than double that now. Viewed this way, not losing looks a lot more like losing than winning.
Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense is not releasing combat casualty numbers to maintain morale, but experts believe it has lost at least 25,000 troops — up to 11,000 deaths and 18,000 wounded —since the February 24 invasion. Over two and a half months into the war, Ukraine’s losses are at least 10% of their now undoubtedly exhausted army of under 250,000. This is, however, many, many fewer than Russia’s casualties, believed to be over 35,000, and buttressed by an astonishing loss of weapons and equipment, such as tanks and warships.
Ukraine’s relative success is due in part to the weapons at least 31 western governments have been donating. The U.K. has sent anti-tank, anti-air, and anti-ship missiles, air defense systems, and other weapons; Slovakia the S-300 air defense system; the U.S. drones, howitzers, missiles, and anti-armor systems; and this is just a sampling. These weapons have allowed Ukraine to maximize its home field advantage, leverage its troops’ greater resolve, and exploit Russia’s military weaknesses and apparent lack of adequate planning and preparation. Without these donations, Kyiv may well have fallen by now.
While Ukraine is flush with weapons and other military supplies and equipment, however, Ministry of Defense officials and volunteer fighters are both quietly admitting that they lack the capacity to absorb so much aid. Much of the equipment and weaponry requires new training to be used. Even when that is available it takes time. Similarly, the influx of 16,000 or more foreign volunteer fighters would seem like a decisive boon, but in fact almost none of them had any military experience or training. They proved little more than extra mouths to feed in most cases, according to Ministry of Defense staff and some of the volunteer foreign special forces soldiers on the ground.
Economically, Ukraine is surviving, but only that. The sanctions on Russia that are expected to cause a less than 7% contraction in GDP compare rather unfavorably to the 45-50% GDP collapse Ukraine is facing. At least 25% of businesses are closed, although the number that have completely stopped has fallen from 32% in March to 17% in May. But a Black Sea blockade of Ukraine’s ports—Mariupol, Odesa, Kherson, and others—by Russia’s navy is preventing both the import of fuels to power the agricultural sector, and also the export of grain and other Ukrainian products. The inability to export is costing Ukraine’s economy $170 million per day. Meanwhile, Russia is targeting Ukrainian fuel storages, grain silos, and agricultural equipment warehouses, damaging already tattered supply chains. The power sector is facing default because so few Ukrainian citizens and companies are able to pay their electricity bills.
Not only is May a critical agricultural month, but it is when Naftogaz usually starts buying natural gas to store it for the cold Ukrainian winter. The state-owned energy giant was already in bad shape before the invasion, with the CEO asking the Ukrainian government for a $4.6 billion bailout in September 2021. Now, with very tight gas markets and no funds, it is unclear how the country can prepare for winter, when temperatures can fall to below 20 Fahrenheit. Adding to the prospect of a tragic 2022-2023 winter, most of Ukraine’s coal mines are in the Donbas, where Russia’s offensive continues.
The White House is reportedly considering forgiving Ukrainian sovereign debt, which would undoubtedly help Bankova (the Ukrainian White House equivalent). So too will, among other efforts, the €15 billion in debt securities the European Commission plans to issue to cover Ukraine’s next few months. However, this will not coax back the over six million mostly women and children who have fled Ukraine. If men were allowed to leave, the numbers would almost certainly be double.
Recent reports that 25,000-30,000 are returning daily to Ukraine from abroad are encouraging, but Ukraine faced a brain drain problem before the invasion. The poorest country in Europe, many citizens were already trying to leave. Before the war, Ukrainians were the third largest immigrant population in the E.U., behind only Morocco and Turkey. Now, the International Labor Agency estimates that 4.8 million jobs have been lost in Ukraine, which will rise to seven million if the war continues. And after many months of war, children will have settled in new schools abroad, mothers will be integrating in their new worlds, and both will be waiting for their husbands and fathers to join them. Some will return to Ukraine, of course, but many will prioritize their family’s comfort and children’s opportunities over the calls of patriotism.
Most troublingly, many Ukrainians still in their country have begun to wonder how it will rebuild itself. The war has torn the fabric of society. One mother in Poltava said she no longer trusts the neighbors she has lived next to for 40 years, people she considered to be family before the invasion. A young volunteer, formerly a civil society activist, described hunting for saboteurs, and how he has begun to see Russian sympathizers everywhere. Native Ukrainian speakers of Russian, who constitute at least a third of the population, are uncomfortable or even scared to use their mother tongue. Trust has been shattered, even while nationalism has been motivated. No matter how quickly Russia is beaten back, rebuilding communities will be a challenge.
The U.S. government decided in May to symbolically move some of its diplomatic staff back into Kyiv, partially reversing its rapid, defeatist withdrawal when it assumed Kyiv would fall within days. President Biden has even, finally, nominated a U.S. ambassador to Ukraine after more than a three-year leadership gap. The message this and E.U. gestures send is important. But despite our desire to see in outmatched Ukraine’s survival a tale of David beating Goliath, and to cheer ourselves for donating the slingshot, the country is seriously, dangerously weakened.
Ukraine needs more than symbols, and more than weapons. Not losing is not winning, and it will take a long and deep commitment by the western world to help Ukraine both win and then heal.
8. Japan’s reluctant realism on Taiwan
Excerpts:
As a key US ally in East Asia, Japan is debating the introduction of legislation to ready itself to deal with a contingency scenario in Taiwan. This seems to be more of a defensive response rather than a proactive military strategy. At the same time, Japan has repeatedly called for a ‘peaceful resolution’ of the Taiwan issue through dialogue, and is well positioned to achieve regional balance by handling China–Japan relations within the framework of the US–Japan alliance.
China often views Japanese intervention in Taiwan affairs through the historical lens of Japan’s colonial rule of the island from 1895 to 1945, casting distrust on Japan’s attempt to balance Chinese interests in Taiwan. This highlights the need for China and Japan to find ways to effectively communicate with each other and avoid misinterpretations over Taiwan.
Japan’s reluctant realism on Taiwan | The Strategist
While the US–Japan alliance, US military bases in Japan, and its geographical proximity to Taiwan make Japan an important country across the Taiwan Strait, it is yet to formulate any specific plans or legislation to guide its response to a potential crisis. If the United States were to request military assistance from Japan, Tokyo might be well in chaos.
Several key factors have shaped Japan’s policy on Taiwan over the past two decades. Former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe sought to thaw Japan’s frosty attitude to China during his first stint in the top job in 2006–07. Despite historically being tough on China, Abe avoided visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine and resumed the long-interrupted summit meetings between Japanese and Chinese leaders. According to former deputy chief cabinet secretary Hakubun Shimomura, easing Japan–China tensions was part of Abe’s strategy for the upper house election in 2007.
Former Japanese ambassador to China Yuji Miyamoto revealed that before Abe was inaugurated as prime minister in September 2006, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was already considering improving relations with Beijing. According to Miyamoto, the Abe administration intentionally avoided diplomatic exchanges with Taiwan. Official visits from Taiwan were refused to avoid offending China. This approach mainly served Abe’s domestic agenda and was not indicative of a new foreign-policy strategy or any concern about Japan’s economic interest in China.
Since 2017, the China–US–Japan strategic triangle has largely constrained Japan’s Taiwan diplomacy. The nature of the strategic triangle is that whenever the Japan–US alliance is united by the shared goal of containing China, the relationship between Japan and Taiwan tends to be closer. But when the Japan–US alliance is destabilised or if China and the US bypass Japan, Tokyo will get closer to Beijing in order to counteract US uncertainty.
From 2017 to 2020, under former US president Donald Trump’s ‘America first’ approach, the Japan–US alliance experienced a high level of uncertainty. In response, Abe resorted to a tactical hedging strategy of trying to get close to Beijing to achieve a balance between China and the US. With these strategic moves, in March 2019, Japan ultimately announced that its policy towards Taiwan would adhere to the agreements set out in the 1972 China–Japan joint declaration.
In 2020, the world was rattled by the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic and the continuing intensification of competition between China and the US. These factors combined to create a more stable alliance between the US and Japan. This signified that Japan’s Taiwan diplomacy would follow the US lead. In December 2021, Abe said that any Taiwan contingency would also be a ‘Japan contingency’. By publicly commenting on the Taiwan issue, Abe hoped to pressure Japan’s new Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to reveal his administration’s position on Taiwan, and to maintain the influence of his own faction over the Kishida administration.
Against this domestic background and under pressure from the Biden administration, Japan’s position on Taiwan at an international level is also shifting. In April last year, when Yoshihide Suga was prime minister, Japan and the US, for the first time in 52 years, formally discussed their concern about the security situation in the Taiwan Strait during the US–Japan summit. Japan also stressed ‘the vital importance of a stable security scenario across the Taiwan Strait’ in its 2021 white paper on national defence.
This sent a signal about Japan’s policy adjustment towards Taiwan. In the past 10 years, Japan has been cautious about the Taiwan issue, seldom challenging China’s bottom line. It is puzzling to observe Tokyo’s switch, particularly if one takes into account Suga’s inexperience with foreign policy.
Before the Japan–US summit in April 2021, the US sent Kurt Campbell, coordinator of Indo-Pacific affairs for the US National Security Council, to Tokyo to request Japan’s support for efforts to contain China by passing a bill similar to the US’s Taiwan Relations Act. Not wanting to upset China, Japan had difficulty meeting the request. To prevent Biden from making such requests during the summit, Japan chose to compromise and express its concern about the security situation across the Taiwan Strait in a joint statement. By doing so, Japan hoped to alleviate Washington’s suspicion over its relatively close relationship with Beijing.
Japan’s Taiwan stance is closely tied to Japan’s domestic politics, the US–China–Japan strategic triangle and alliance politics with the US. Importantly, Japan’s policy adjustments do not necessarily indicate support for Taiwan’s independence.
As a key US ally in East Asia, Japan is debating the introduction of legislation to ready itself to deal with a contingency scenario in Taiwan. This seems to be more of a defensive response rather than a proactive military strategy. At the same time, Japan has repeatedly called for a ‘peaceful resolution’ of the Taiwan issue through dialogue, and is well positioned to achieve regional balance by handling China–Japan relations within the framework of the US–Japan alliance.
China often views Japanese intervention in Taiwan affairs through the historical lens of Japan’s colonial rule of the island from 1895 to 1945, casting distrust on Japan’s attempt to balance Chinese interests in Taiwan. This highlights the need for China and Japan to find ways to effectively communicate with each other and avoid misinterpretations over Taiwan.
9. USMC Force Design 2030: Threat or Opportunity?
Excerpts:
Beyond its organic capabilities, a force-in-readiness must be ready to perform any other duties that the President may direct with little notice. As conceived by the Marine Corps, the force-in-readiness must therefore be like an organizational Swiss army knife, able to quickly change its form and capabilities to perform any task assigned. The Swiss Army knife versatility of the Marine Corps comes in the form of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force construct that allows rapid, efficient task organization for any assigned mission. Just as today, Force Design 2030 retains the MAGTF construct, with the MEF as its primary warfighting organization and the MEU as its primary forward operating crisis response force.
Finally, a force in readiness needs to be, well, ready. General Berger emphasizes the need for the Corps of today and tomorrow to be ready for any challenge, like every Commandant before him. Not just ready to deploy or get out of garrison, but ready to respond to aggression in a world in which we face peer threats, not the past threats of the Unipolar era over which we enjoyed a decided combat overmatch. It seems unlikely that the 2030 Commandant will be any different. And in any event, arguing over what the state of readiness of the Marine Corps in 2030 is a fruitless endeavor.
To further buttress their case that Force Design 2030 will result in a debilitated force-in-readiness, the grandparents make two supporting arguments:
USMC Force Design 2030: Threat or Opportunity?
It is important to understand which aspects of war are likely to change and which are not. We must stay abreast of the process of change for the belligerent who first exploits a development in the art and science of war gains a significant advantage. If we are ignorant of the changing face of war. We will find ourselves unequal to its challenges.
These words are drawn from Warfighting, the capstone doctrinal document of the U.S. Marine Corps. They help explain an important cultural attribute of the Corps’s ethos, that of anticipatory adaptation to the changing character of war. And they also help explain what animates the actions of General David Berger, the current Commandant (senior military officer) of the Marine Corps. He is convinced the organization, training, equipment and posture of the service–its overall force design–is not keeping up with the evolving character of war and needs to be changed as a matter of some urgency.
Accordingly, soon after General Berger became Commandant on 11 July 2019, he made plain that big changes were afoot for the Marine Corps. He wrote:
Our current force design, optimized for large-scale amphibious forcible entry and sustained operations ashore, has persisted unchanged in its essential inspiration since the 1950s… I am convinced that the defining attributes of our current force design are no longer what the nation requires of the Marine Corps.
He made it his top priority to bring the Marine Corps more into alignment with both the changing character of war and international security environment, and he announced a plan called Force Design 2030 to accomplish this aim.
But today, a group composed primarily of disaffected retired generals vehemently disagree with the General Berger’s overall vision of a future Marine Corps–so much so, that they are mounting a sweeping public relations campaign to stop him from getting it off the drawing board. While the Commandant is in no way obligated to listen to their complaints, the thoughts and inputs of retired Marines, particularly general officers, have long been valued by serving Commandants (the same can be said of all service chiefs). But this campaign takes “input” to an unsettling degree. The retired generals have made their objections known to General Berger and are expecting him to heed their preferences to preserve the status quo. Up to this point, Berger has not done so–or at least not enough for their liking. They therefore decided to “seek legislation that would halt the [Commandant’s] ongoing efforts until a more thorough requirements-based future is reviewed.”
There is a term for this approach: a shake down. There is nothing remotely like this behavior in Marine Corps history. Those who wage the campaign feel their attempts to engage Commandant Berger have either been ignored or rebuffed. Having failed to force a reversal of the Commandant’s direction that has been carefully designed and tested over the past two years, they feel the only way forward is to relentlessly and publicly denigrate his plans. Toward this aim, they have published a spate of attacks in numerous fora. They have gone so far as to engage a lobbying firm to help persuade Congress Berger is on the wrong path. As a Marine veteran myself, I am stunned, saddened, and embarrassed these respected gentlemen would pursue such drastic, unseemly tactics.
For those who are not Marines, the best way to think about this messy public debate is to view it as a custody fight between the grandparents and parents of a beloved child. The child, of course, is the Marine Corps. The retired general officers are the child’s grandparents. General Berger is the parent. The grandparents object to the way Gen. Berger is raising their grandchild. They have tried to get him to change his ways, to no avail. They have therefore decided to take the Commandant to court (Congress) to seek an injunction against his plans.
Grandparents have a high bar to climb in child custody fights against parents. One tactic is to try to make the case the parent is an unfit guardian. That tactic clearly won’t work. No one would accept that General David Berger, a career Marine with a sterling command and combat record, is unfit to be Commandant of the Marine Corps. A second tactic is to claim, “extraordinary circumstances that would drastically affect the welfare of the child.” This is the approach being pursued by the retired generals.
The purpose of this paper is to try to sort through the arguments that Berger’s Force Design 2030 poses an unwarranted threat to the Marines’ role as a “homogenous, all-encompassing “force in readiness,” and to judge them on their merits. To do this, a review of Force Design 2030 and its antecedents is in order.
General Berger States his Case for Change
Soon after General Berger became Commandant, as is customary, he published his Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG). This serves as the authoritative document for Service-level planning and provides a common direction to the Marine Corps Total Force… describing where the Marine Corps is going and why.”
Berger’s guidance endorsed the conclusion of his immediate predecessor, General Robert Neller, that “The Marine Corps is not organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving future operating environment.” General Berger made it his top priority to remedy this situation.
Toward this end, the Commandant announced he would personally lead a new force design effort. His participation would build on his time as head of Marine Corps Combat Development and Integration, an organization that, among other things, develops future operational concepts and helps the serving Commandant plan, design, and implement a Marine Corps aligned with the National Defense Strategy, relevant Defense Planning Guidance and his own planning guidance. Additionally, General Berger could draw upon his time as Commanding General, First Marine Expeditionary Force; Commanding General, U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific; direct participation in five years of naval and global war games that explored the future national security environment, the changing character of war, and the rising threat from China in the Pacific. As a result, he arrived as Commandant with some broad preliminary judgments about both the future and Marine Corps force design, which he offered in his planning guidance. Among them, four stand out to me.
Judgment 1: The future Marine Corps must be organized, trained, equipped and postured to conduct distributed operations.
Berger argued that the “character of war in the future will be much different than that of the recent past,” dominated by what he would later refer to as the “mature precision strike regime.” At its core, then, his force design effort was a deliberate reaction to the widespread development and fielding of deadly accurate guided munitions fire–directed and controlled by increasingly capable command, control, communications, computer and cyber intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance networks. This trend was upending the traditional American way of war, and Berger’s conclusions about what to do about it were backed up by combat operations during Operation Desert Storm and since, the steady development of and extensive Chinese anti-access/area-denial network in the Western Pacific, and the results of over 30 years of war games and campaign analyses.
In this new highly lethal warfighting regime, the function of mass on the battlefield and legacy conceptions of naval expeditionary and combined arms operations were changing. In the face of persistent guided munitions attack, future Marine forces would first need to master distributed operations, which would “drive the continued evolution of the future operating environment.” Indeed, given its imperative for future force design, codifying distributed operations would be critical to the overall effort. One characteristic of a distributed operations-capable Marine Corps would be its ability to disaggregate into smaller, mobile units with lower signatures to make their targeting and attack by an enemy more difficult. General Berger wasn’t expecting to make these smaller units invisible; that was a bridge too far. He was instead shooting for an acceptable degree of survivability on battlefields swept by guided munitions.
The second required characteristic of a distributed force is for its smaller more mobile units to disperse across a contested battlespace and apply decisive battlefield effects from such a distributed posture, synchronized and guided by commander’s intent and mission-type orders in accordance with Marine Corps’ maneuver warfare doctrine. As he said:
Achieving this end state requires a force that can create the virtues of mass without the vulnerabilities of concentration, thanks to mobile and low-signature sensors and weapons.
The Commandant went out of his way to explain why distributed operations would be required in the mature precision strike regime and the advantages he believed would accrue from them. He wrote, “Success will be defined in terms of finding the smallest, lowest signature options that yield the maximum operational utility.” As a start, Force Design 2030 would push combined arms down to the squad level–giving this smallest unit of action its own organic scouting (i.e., sensing) assets as well as the guided munitions to exploit them. This thinking built on the Hunter Warrior experiments promoted and tested by the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory during the tenure of Commandant Charles C. Krulak in the late 1990s.
The logic of distributed operations is theater agnostic and applicable across the full range of military operations–from high-end campaigns against peer competitors, to combat operations against regional state powers, to “brush fire wars” and counter-terrorism operations. Distributed operations would also be useful for the day-to-day competition the “gray zone,” below the level of armed conflict. As Berger saw it,
A force composed of highly capable tactical units that can perform combined arms operations at all echelons, enabled by organic air and logistics, is a force that can execute the complex missions defined by our emerging concepts in any potential theater.
Judgment 2: The Chinese anti-access/area denial threat in the Western Pacific is the “pacing threat” for a future naval expeditionary force in the precision strike regime and calls for a different set of amphibious capabilities.
Although Berger considered a distributed operations-capable Marine Corps good against any adversary, the 2018 National Defense Strategy and its associated Defense Planning Guidance designated the People’s Republic of China as the pacing threat, and the Indian Ocean and Western as the priority theater(s). Force Design 2030 would reflect this authoritative guidance, one in which the Marine Corps is well suited, given its relationship with the Navy and its strong posture in Japan and Hawaii. In this case, “pacing threat” meant a fight against China in the Western Pacific was to be Force Design 2030’s most serious stress test. If Force Design 2030 could fight and win against China’s land-based anti-access/area-denial network, it would likely overmatch any other conventional adversary armed with guided munitions and battle networks.
Under any circumstances. the appearance of land based anti-access/area-denial networks in the Western Pacific and beyond made “closer naval integration an imperative.” Large-scale amphibious assaults in the Western Pacific would be far too vulnerable and risky to mount. As a result, perhaps the biggest bombshell in Berger’s planning guidance was that the Marine Corps would no longer use the longstanding “requirement” (quotation marks in the original) to conduct a 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) amphibious assault to help size and shape the force. In truth, since 9-11, the Marine Corps had been sized and shaped primarily to service the wartime demands in the Central Command area of responsibility. But the 2.0 MEB requirement provided the foundation for the size of the amphibious fleet (38 ships), the “requisite capacity” for vehicles and ship-to-shore connectors and the Maritime Prepositioning Force. Rejecting this guiding metric was a tectonic shift for a service that had identified itself with the amphibious assault mission for a century. That announcement, in and of itself, was enough to guarantee substantial pushback from some active and retired Marines.
The Commandant made clear that he did not think amphibious assaults were “irrelevant or an operational anachronism.” However, the appearance of powerful anti-access-area-denial networks called for different types of amphibious capabilities in support of an integrated naval campaign in the Western Pacific. Accordingly, Force Design 2030 called for III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), forward based in the Pacific, to be transformed into a new “fight tonight, stand in force capability to persist inside an adversary’s weapon system threat range, create a mutually contested space, and facilitate the larger naval campaign.”
Translated, III MEF would become a force capable of operating inside the Chinese anti-access/area-denial network from the first day of any future conflict and enabling prompt and persistent forward sea control and denial operations in support of a broader integrated naval campaign. A key aim would be for a redesigned III MEF able to win the reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance battle against the People’s Liberation Army and Navy along the first island chain that stretches from Japan to Taiwan and the Philippines, requiring “an agile, stealthy tactical system employing forces that are able to locate, target, and fire precisely first (emphasis added).
It is important to note these ideas were not cut out of whole cloth. Berger’s call for closer naval integration echoed those of every Commandant since 2012 (Commandants Conway, Amos, Dunford and Neller), all of whom anticipated the ultimate withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq and Afghanistan and an end to sustained Marine Corps combat operations ashore in the Middle East. All espoused a desire for the Marines to return to their naval roots, and to extend its relevance to the nation’s priority strategic challenges. Furthermore, the idea of a stand-in force capability sprang from two concepts developed in close partnership with the U.S. Navy before General Berger became Commandant–Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). Both were consistent with the Navy’s capstone Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept. Indeed, Gen Neller, Berger’s immediate successor, began wargames and analysis on a Marine Corps force design consistent with these concepts well before General Berger’s arrival. These efforts informed his own planning guidance.
While the 2.0 MEB “requirement,” would be eliminated, Force Design 2030 would retain the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) construct, which is the secret sauce for the Marine Corps’ demonstrated ability to task organize for any mission. Marine air-ground task forces come in all shapes and sizes, but each has a headquarters element, ground combat element, air combat element, and logistics element. Each element can be tailored for any mission assigned. The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) would remain the Corps’ principal warfighting organization, and the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) would continue to be its primary “forward operating crisis response force.”
Judgment 3: Given expected budgets, pursuing any new force design would require the Marine Corps to divest some legacy programs and force structure to invest in needed future capabilities.
It is relevant to understand that General Berger formulated Force Design 2030 just as the sequestration years were ending. Demand for resources among the four services and within the Marine Corps itself was still intense. His philosophy was therefore to “seek the affordable and plentiful at the expense of the exquisite and few.” In his planning guidance, Berger also announced he was willing to trade legacy capability to pursue the advanced capabilities needed to make Force Design 2030 a reality and achieve operational success. This was hardly a novel approach. It was adopted by every single service chief at the time, all of whom faced the same challenge.
Beyond announcing the elimination of the 2.0 MEB amphibious “requirement,” the Commandant did not explicitly list capability divestments in his planning guidance, instead opting to provide general guidance for how future divestment decisions would be made. In contrast, he was quite specific about the general investments he was confident 2030 Marine Corps would need. These included ground-based long-range precision fires; unmanned systems; command and control capabilities suitable for a degraded environment; air and missile defense; and emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence.
There were no surprises here. The capabilities mirrored those called for in the 2018 National Defense Strategy. And all were consistent with his thoughts on the precision strike regime and the need for a future force able to disaggregate and conduct distributed operations.
Judgment 4: The urgent requirement to adopt Marine Corps force design for the future operating environment meant change must start immediately; “essential to charting our course in an era of strategic fluidity and rapid change will be the effective integration of professional wargaming in force design…”
In this, General Berger was heeding the 2018 National Defense Strategy’s call for “urgent change at significant scale.” Accordingly, General Berger did not think the voyage toward Force Design 2030 could wait for a precise understanding of the desired destination. As such, he wrote, “While others may wait for a clearer picture of the future operating environment, we will focus our efforts on driving change and influencing future operation environment outcomes” (emphasis mine).
In one of his most cited essays, the late Michael Howard wrote that leaders responsible for preparing for future security challenges must look forward into the unknown and compared their role to that of a “sailor navigating by dead reckoning.” Defense policy makers and chiefs of the Services have to let go of the terra firma of past wars and extrapolate forward without a clear idea of when and where the next war will be.
General Berger was confident that a force organized, trained, equipped and postured to conduct distributed operations provided an accurate base course for change, and he was ready to push off from terra firma toward a not yet fully defined destination. Nevertheless, General Berger was fully aware he was navigating primarily by dead reckoning through a fog of uncertainty. To mitigate strategic risk, he therefore announced a major focus during his tenure as Commandant would be a “campaign of learning” involving his “direct, personal [and] regular engagement…to drive an integrated process of wargaming and experimentation” that will rapidly produce solutions for further development.”. This approach is a time-tested way for military organizations to prepare for an uncertain future. As Williamson “Wick” Murray and Barry Watts, noted experts in military transformation, said, “Institutional processes for exploring, testing and refining conceptions of future war are literally a sine qua non of successful military innovation.”
General Berger Announces His Initial Decisions
While the Marine Corps is among the most conservative of the armed forces, it has a rich history of operational innovation: amphibious assault, close air support, the creation of the Marine-Air Ground Task Force, and the adoption of vertical and short take-off and landing aircraft are just a few examples. And whatever else one thinks about Berger’s planning guidance, one must acknowledge it represents a bold (critics would say reckless) departure from Marine Corps orthodoxy, particularly the turn away from an emphasis on large scale amphibious assaults and sustained ground combat operations ashore toward a force design built around the imperative for distributed operations and naval expeditionary campaigns in the face of anti-access/area-denial networks.
Still, Berger’s planning guidance was more about making the rationale for “sweeping changes” than it was providing a specific blueprint for action. The initial blueprint came in the Commandant’s first report on Force Design 2030, which was then sketched out in more detail in the Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and A Concept for Stand-In Forces. Taken together, these three documents explained the Commandant’s preliminary decisions on divestment of legacy capabilities and investment in new capabilities, suggested tentative changes to existing organizations, and discussed how future Fleet Marine Forces would operate as part of an integrated naval campaign.
Force Design 2030, the first of these documents, codified the three trends behind the necessity for change: the mature precision strike regime; gray zone activities, and the need for maritime campaigning.” It then laid out the initial force design of the 2030 Marine Corps and compared it against the existing, legacy design.
Among the document’s more consequential decisions, Berger announced the divestment of one of eight infantry regimental headquarters; the divestment of three of 24 active component infantry battalions, two of six reserve battalions, as well as the redesign of all remaining battalions; a dramatic restructuring of Marine Corps cannon and rocket artillery capabilities; the divestment of all organic tank units; and modifications to Marine Corps aviation plans.
- The divestment of one of eight infantry regimental headquarters.
Infantry regiments are the primary ground combat units in Marine divisions, which are themselves the ground combat element of a Marine Expeditionary Force. While the MEF would remain the Corps’ primary warfighting organization, Force Design 2030’s three MEFs would not be identical. As initially envisioned, two infantry regiments and one artillery regiment assigned to the 3d Marine Division based in the Pacific would all be reconfigured as new Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs)–an experimental construct for naval campaigning in the precision strike regime. However, General Berger cautioned there was not enough experimental evidence to support an immediate top to bottom reorganization of III MEF. Accordingly, the 3d Marine regiment in Hawaii would become a singular experimental organization to test, validate and refine the MLR structure. The infantry regiments in the other two MEFs would remain largely unchanged, except for their redesigned infantry battalions (see next under).
- The divestment of three of 24 active component infantry battalions and two of six reserve component battalions, and the redesign of all remaining battalions.
Based on the elimination of the 2.0 MEB amphibious assault requirement and the evolution of joint war plans, FD 2030’s remaining seven regiments and 25 battalions were deemed adequate to satisfy naval and joint requirements. However, General Berger decided the battalions themselves needed to be redesigned with distributed operations in mind. As such, combined arms capability would be pushed down to the squad level, with the addition of the Multipurpose Anti-Armor Anti-personnel Weapon System (MAAWS),— a lightweight, 84 mm reloadable recoilless rifle– organic unmanned aerial vehicles, and loitering attack drones. Like the MLR, the final design of the reorganized infantry battalion would be determined after live-force experimentation involving three infantry battalions, one in each Marine division.
- A dramatic restructuring of Marine Corps cannon and rocket artillery capabilities.
General Berger believed the Marine Corps’ focus on indirect fire capabilities had heretofore “fixated on those capabilities with sufficient range and lethality to support infantry and ground maneuver.” He deemed this singular focus as being “no longer appropriate or acceptable.” He wanted future Marine Corps indirect fire capabilities to boast more range, more precision, and more lethality, all while being more suited to distributed operations.
Much has been made of Force Design 2030’s divestment of no less than 16 of 21 155mm cannon batteries. But that cut has been offset by an increase from seven to 21 rocket artillery batteries armed with the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS. The best way to think about these changes is that while the future Marine Corps will have two fewer total firing batteries than the legacy force design (falling from 28 to 26) the resulting force would be more mobile, easier to conceal, and far more capable and deadly. The M777, the standard 155mm howitzer now in service, is towed by a seven-ton truck. In travel configuration, the combination of the truck and howitzer is over 53 feet long. The cannon normally fires unguided shells to a range of 24-30 kilometers (km). It can also fire a guided shell to 40 km with an accuracy of 10 meters. In contrast, the HIMARS system is an integrated transport launcher on a 6×6, all-wheel drive, 5-ton truck. The entire system in travel configuration is 23 feet long. It fires guided rockets to ranges of 40-150 km, and guided ballistic missiles out to 300 km, with an accuracy of 5 meters. Moreover, its 200-pound unitary warhead is equivalent to the explosive charge of a 250-pound small diameter bomb–and 13 times larger than a 155 mm artillery round. The rocket batteries will also provide the basis, over time, for cross-domain expeditionary ballistic and cruise missiles capable of anti-ship attack and longer-range ballistic missiles out to 499 km and beyond.
- Divestment of all organic tank units.
Berger believed he had sufficient evidence to conclude that despite their usefulness in past wars, tanks were “operationally unsuitable for our highest-priority challenges in the future.” Accordingly, all seven companies of active and reserve tanks would be divested. In addition, two of six companies of tracked assault amphibian vehicles and all three bridging companies needed to support sustained armor operations ashore would go. All old and increasingly unsafe tracked assault amphibian vehicles would be replaced on a one-for-one basis by the new wheeled Amphibious Combat Vehicle, optimized for operations on land. Finally, the number of wheeled Light Armored Reconnaissance companies would be increased from nine to 12, although the Commandant wanted to see more evidence before making this move. Should the future force ever need tank support, it would be requested from the U.S. Army.
Force Design 2030 also announced several modifications to Marine Corps aviation plans.
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The total number of active component strike fighter squadrons remained unchanged at 18, albeit with a reduction in aircraft per squadron to ten from 16. The reduction reflected, in part, the difficulty in training and maintaining enough pilots for the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, the Marines’ primary tactical aircraft.
- Three MV-22 tiltrotor squadrons, three heavy lift helicopter squadrons, and “at least” two light attack helicopter squadrons would be divested, leaving 14, five and five squadrons of each type aircraft, respectively. These moves were made possible by the reduction of three infantry battalions, which made these squadrons excess to need.
- The only increases in aviation capability would come in the form of one additional aerial refueler squadron (from three to four) and three additional unmanned aerial vehicle squadrons (from three to six).
In total, these and other changes would see the 2019/2020 total Fleet Marine Force Structure decrease by some 12,000 Marines by 2030, and result in overall potential savings of $12 billion to help pay for equipment modernization, training modernization, and other force development priorities outlined in FD 2030.
Once again, however, to further refine and develop an understanding of initial changes and changes to come, General Berger emphasized the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab would lead a “continuous cycle of learning and adjustment” involving “concept refinement, wargaming, analysis and simulation and experimentation.”
The Commandant did not reiterate his decisions in these articles. Instead, he once again laid out and expanded his thinking upon the three principal developments driving the need for sweeping changes: the rise and maturation of the precision strike regime; gray zone strategies involving multi-domain competition within the mature precision strike regime; and the imperative of maritime campaigning. He also cautioned that while it was important to remember that “’answers’ are elusive when the task is preparation for an unknowable future,” the three developments he outlined demanded that he not wait for perfect answers before pursuing change in response. Berger therefore said “the next great challenge” would be analyzing his initial force design decisions “through integrated Naval wargaming and analysis but most importantly in real-world, live experimentation,” and adjusting plans based on their findings.
General Berger Makes Subsequent Course Adjustments
The Commandant’s first adjustments to his initial decisions came in annual updates to Force Design 2030, published in April 2021 and April 2022. These reports provided updates on activities in support of the force design campaign of learning. For example, the 2021 report announced that the 12 light armored reconnaissance battalions in the Force Design 2030 objective force would be transformed into “multi-domain reconnaissance units” with the “capabilities necessary to succeed in a contested information environment.” The 2022 report announced the successful demonstration of the new Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), consisting of two modified Navy vertical launch systems on a remotely operated Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, able to fire Navy anti-ship missiles. Both reports continued to emphasize how the ongoing campaign of learning would continue to inform the final force design.
The Grandparents Intervene
As it turned out, Berger was wrong. His next great challenge would not be continuing to analyze changes, it would be contending with a concerted effort by over two dozen retired Marine generals and defense executives to stop Force Design 2030 in its tracks.
In the view of the grandparents, Berger’s ideas and plans were “insufficiently tested or intrinsically flawed.” Worse, from their perspective, General Berger did not appear inclined to listen to their criticisms and change course. After “several unsuccessful attempts…to engage in quiet dialogue” with the Commandant, the opponents decided to make their objections public. They formed a daily working group of 17 retired generals to communicate concerns to national leaders and published a “letter of concern,” signed by 22 retired four-star generals. They also engaged a lobbying firm to convey their concerns to Congress and to seek its intervention to block General Berger’s plans.
The underlying premise of these opponents was laid out in an article by a highly decorated retired Marine who served as Secretary of the Navy and Virginia state Senator, Jim Webb. He argued that Berger lacked carte blanche to make significant changes to Marine Corps force structure, and even if he did, his plans were not approved by the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of Defense, or Congress. Therefore, Congress should enact legislation to halt further pursuit of FD 2030 “until a more thorough, requirements-based future…is reviewed and approved.”
Let’s apply some facts to the first part of this premise. Each year, the Commandant of the Marines Corps, like all service chiefs, creates what is called a Program Objective Memorandum (POM). This describes how a service chief wants to allot current and future year funding for a force design that meets both service and defense planning guidance. If a Commandant wants to make significant changes to Marine Corps force structure, they need to prepare a POM that reflects the desired changes. Once developed, the Commandant then briefs and seeks approval of their plans from both the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense. If approved, the memorandum becomes a part of an overall defense program assembled by the Secretary of Defense. The program is then sent to the Office of Management and Budget, to be incorporated in the President’s budget estimate submission to Congress. In essence, OMB’s delivery of the administration’s submission to Congress signals the President’s endorsement of anything included therein. Once delivered, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees unpack Department of Defense plans, study them, and decide whether to authorize and fund them. The former Commandants among the opponents know this process well. They followed it when they held the office.
Force Design 2030 was included in the Marine Corps’ Fiscal Year 2021 (FY 2021) Program Objective Memorandum. It was approved by then-Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer and briefed directly to then-Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist at the Deputy’s Management Action Group (the organ that reviews service POMs for the Secretary of Defense). Per standard practice, it was then considered by the Director of Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation and endorsed. Based on supportive recommendations from both that director and the Deputy Secretary, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper approved Force Design 2030 and transferred approximately $500 million to the Marine Corps budget to help pay for aspects of it. It was incorporated into the overall defense program and president’s budget request, which was considered and approved by Congress. What Senator Webb described–a wily Commandant sneaking a force structure plan through the Department of Defense and by Congress–literally could never happen.
The real story is that the grandparents simply believe they know what’s best for the child, and they hope to enlist Congress on their side to prevent the Commandant from veering from their thinking. But who would Congress ask to make a more thorough, requirements-based future review? Some sort of Commission? A think tank? The retired generals themselves? Since this exercise is fundamentally about imagining the future, what evidence is there that anyone of them has a better answer? And in any case, since Congress has already authorized the changes made so far and appropriated funds to pay for them, enlisting them as part of this scheme seems like an unlikely outcome. Especially since they have accused the Congress of being asleep at the switch when FD 2030 was presented in the FY 2021 POM.
This has not moderated the grandparents’ efforts. Their attacks on the Commandant’s vision cover a wide front, stemming from one overriding concern: Force Design 2030 threatens the Marine Corps’ longstanding role as “a homogenous, all-encompassing ‘force-in-readiness’ that can go anywhere and fight anyone on any level short of nuclear war.”
In 1952, after the surprise outbreak of the Korean War, the early reversals suffered by the U.S. Army in that conflict, and the subsequent stunning combat performance of the Marine Corps, the 82nd Congress wrote:
[The Marine Corps] has fully demonstrated the vital need for the existence of a strong force in readiness … The nation’s shock troops must be the most ready when the nation is generally least ready…
Since then, the Marine Corps has fiercely embraced the role as the nation’s “9-1-1 force” to the point it now lies at the very heart of its institutional identity. The grandparents believe the changes found in Force Design 2030 risk this “obligation to our national security.”
The problem with this argument is what makes a “force-in-readiness” is very much in the eye of the beholder. Title 10 of the U.S. Code provides the legal basis for the roles, missions, and organization of the U.S. Department of Defense and each of the armed services. As codified in the Code, Congress directs that the Marine Corps shall include no less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet…” Force Design 2030 retains a Fleet Marine Force of three divisions and wings, so it continues to meet that basic legal requirement. However, it underscores readiness for a larger and more challenging operating environment, and a more potent opposition, instead of irregular challenges or stability operations in failed states. The current Fleet Marine Forces can still handle those, but Force Design 2030 does not compromise risk for the more demanding missions, per the guidance of current and past administrations.
Beyond that, Congress expects the force in readiness to be a “balanced force…for a naval campaign and, at the same time, a ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain international disturbances short of large-scale war.” As discussed, Force Design 2030 is specifically designed for the imperative of integrated naval campaigns, particularly for the pacing threat in the Western Pacific. It is also designed to excel in day-to-day competition in the gray zone below the threshold of armed conflict, where Marine agility, naval maneuver options, and political utility still matter. So, in this regard, Force Design 2030 appears entirely consistent with law. However, the grandparents argue Force Design 2030 ground and air striking forces are dangerously unbalanced.
Title 10 offers little help in judging this assertion. Beyond setting a minimum size of three division-wing teams, the only expectation it sets for Marine Corps capabilities is “such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein.” Congress thus leaves it to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of Defense to determine the most appropriate organic capabilities in their POM, and these capabilities change over time based on threats, technology, and war plans. It is certainly true the capabilities and combat power envisioned in Force Design 2030 will be different from today’s force. That is the aim of Berger’s entire exercise. But the grandparents buttress their claim that the force redesign results in an unbalanced ground and air striking force primarily by focusing solely on its associated divestments., especially the divestment of tanks and the reduction in cannon artillery. They assert such cuts will result in a “hollow force.”
However, the grandparents make little effort to provide context for the divestments. When highlighting the divestments, they overlook the tradeoffs such as the gained additive manning or resources for investments, and the cost/benefit choices. For example, they often fail to mention the reductions to some aviation squadrons are tied to the elimination of three infantry battalions which make these units excess to need. They occasionally acknowledge the reduction in 16 howitzer batteries is offset by 14 new rocket artillery battalions, but imply the rockets are only useful in naval campaigns and not combat operations ashore.
Beyond its organic capabilities, a force-in-readiness must be ready to perform any other duties that the President may direct with little notice. As conceived by the Marine Corps, the force-in-readiness must therefore be like an organizational Swiss army knife, able to quickly change its form and capabilities to perform any task assigned. The Swiss Army knife versatility of the Marine Corps comes in the form of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force construct that allows rapid, efficient task organization for any assigned mission. Just as today, Force Design 2030 retains the MAGTF construct, with the MEF as its primary warfighting organization and the MEU as its primary forward operating crisis response force.
Finally, a force in readiness needs to be, well, ready. General Berger emphasizes the need for the Corps of today and tomorrow to be ready for any challenge, like every Commandant before him. Not just ready to deploy or get out of garrison, but ready to respond to aggression in a world in which we face peer threats, not the past threats of the Unipolar era over which we enjoyed a decided combat overmatch. It seems unlikely that the 2030 Commandant will be any different. And in any event, arguing over what the state of readiness of the Marine Corps in 2030 is a fruitless endeavor.
To further buttress their case that Force Design 2030 will result in a debilitated force-in-readiness, the grandparents make two supporting arguments:
Force Design 2030 is betting all on a conflict with China in the Western Pacific, which “risks turning the Marine Corps into a niche force optimized for one conflict that is unlikely to occur, while hobbling its ability to meet security challenges that are certain.”
The law tasks the Marine Corps to be organized, trained and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms “for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.” That’s exactly what Force Design 2030 aims for. So this complaint rests on the observation that the military’s poor record of predicting the next war argues for maintaining flexibility and not over-focusing on a singular threat or contingency. If this poor record were not enough, the grandparents point to the Commandant’s apparent utter disregard for other potential future threats when he writes:
We will build one force — optimized for naval expeditionary warfare in contested spaces, purpose-built to facilitate sea denial and assured access in support of the fleets. That single purpose-built future force will be applied against other challenges across the globe; however, we will not seek to hedge or balance our investments to account for those contingencies (emphasis added).
It’s highly unlikely that General Berger would dispute the military’s poor record of predicting the next war. But he would certainly, and does, argue the Marines must provide what the Department of Defense asks of them. The National Defense Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance are the authoritative documents in this regard, and they tell the Marine Corps (and all the services) that China is the pacing threat, and that they need to be ready to win a war with China if one comes. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has defined those priorities, assessed the risk to other tasks, and allocated resources in line with this direction. Accordingly, Navy and Marine Corps concepts aim to help develop war-winning capabilities if conflict with China breaks. Force Design 2030 is consistent with both the highest guidance and these concepts. This explains why successive Secretaries of the Navy and Secretaries of Defense have approved Force Design 2030, as has Congress in both the FY 2021 and FY 2022 defense authorizations and appropriations.
Moreover, the claim that General Berger will not seek to hedge or balance investments to account for contingencies beyond naval expeditionary warfare in contested spaces is an overly restrictive description of the Commandant’s thinking. He argues that while FD 2030 will be applied to problems and conflicts globally, it cannot afford to build multiple forces optimized for specific contingencies like arctic warfare, urban warfare and desert warfare. The future Marine Corps would be able to “execute the complex mission defined by our emerging concepts…in any potential theater.”
And in any event, the grandparents’ argument is a straw man. It reflects either a misapprehension of Force Design 2030 or a willful mischaracterization of it. Berger is designing a force able to fight, survive and win in mature precision strike regime. This criterion is both theater and threat agnostic, and hardly seems a recipe for a less flexible force in readiness. Indeed, in a recent Congressional hearing, when Representative Mike Gallagher (R, WI) asked General Todd Wolters, current Commander of U.S. European Command, how the changes being contemplated by the Marine Corps might affect his future options, General Wolters said they would “dramatically enhance” them.
A second concern closely related to the degradation of the force-in-readiness role is “By eliminating tanks and gutting infantry, artillery and aviation, [FD 2030] severely degrades the Marine Corps’ ability to conduct combined arms warfare.”
Warfighting, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication One (MCDP-1), is the capstone Marine Corps doctrinal publication. It defines combined arms “as the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another.” The intent is to “pose the enemy not just with a problem, but with a dilemma–a no win situation.”
The grandparents’ assertion that the three main components of combined arms are infantry, tanks and artillery is thus not only doctrinally incorrect, it fails to consider that the precision strike regime and new types of arms have rendered that type of combined arms warfare subordinate to multi-domain warfare, where rocket and cannon artillery, organic precision weapons, loitering munitions and drone attacks, cyber strikes, and electronic attack will provide commanders at every echelon with more, and more varied, arms to pose dilemmas for future foes. Far from degrading the Marine Corps’ ability to conduct combined arms warfare, Force Design 2030 will dramatically enhance its ability to employ combined arms against peer competitors and not just Third World actors and failed states.
The opponents’ response is that this type of wishful thinking demonstrates that Berger and his future Marine Corps adopt “the techno-centric view of push button warfare at long range,” rejecting the Corps’ longstanding “more visceral” view that war will be “brutal, dirty, chaotic, bloody, often at close range–and deeply human.” This smear is ironically all at odds with the grandparents’ own 1990s vision of the Corps’ major warfighting priorities: the extremely expensive standoff capabilities of F-35, the MV-22 and the debacle of the $3B water-skiing Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. The implication now being, of course, that Force Design 2030’s emphasis on long-range lethality will debilitate all Marines and make them less capable warriors.
This negative view of technology is counter to Marine Corps doctrine. As said in MCDP-1, Warfighting:
One major catalyst of change is the advancement of technology. As the hardware of war improves through technological development, so must the tactical, operational, and strategic usage to its improved capabilities both to maximize our own capabilities and to counteract our enemy’s.
Indeed, a strong case can be made the “visceral school” prevented the Corps from making just the type of changes championed in Force Design 2030 that the Marine Corps first experimented with in the late 1990s in a series of experiments called Hunter Warrior. Then, as now, the argument that killing enemies from a distance somehow diminished Marines was used to prevent the experiments from leading to any substantive change.Said another way, this type of backward thinking lost the Marine Corps 20 years of time to make the changes that advances in technology called for.
In any event, before making such a smear, the grandparents would do well to remember what their own parents had to say on the subject. In “Club and Knife Fighting,” the Marine Corps’ basic World War II hand-to-hand fighting film, the very first thing that young Marines getting ready to storm fortified beaches are told is, “to kill your enemy from as great a distance as possible is good sense–and basic to Marine Corps tactics (emphasis mine).” Perhaps the grandparents should heed this timeless advice and not worry so much over the grit and warfighting prowess of future Marines.
Force Design 2030: Threat or Opportunity?
Force Design 2030 will result in a Marine Corps unlike any in the past. The question is, have the grandparents made a compelling case that it will harm the Marine Corps? Will Force Design 2030 be hobbled by an unwise fixation on maritime campaigning against the People’s Republic of China? Will it be incapable of conducting combined arms operations, or fulfilling its longstanding force-in-readiness role?
Stated differently: Do the changes being pursued by General Berger constitute a threat to the Marine Corp, or the means for it to be ready for a far more hostile international security environment and more lethal battlefields?
The true answer to these questions is we cannot know for sure. We are talking about the future, which is obscured by a fog of uncertainty, and judgments about future risk are always difficult to adjudge. While the grandparents assert that allowing the Commandant to proceed is just too risky for the child and must be stopped before it is irrevocably harmed, there is arguably more risk associated with complacency and relying on legacy capabilities than there is with adopting new concepts and capabilities. Indeed, it seems to me the arguments put forth by the grandparents reflect more than mere complacency; they suggest a willful blindness about the discontinuities that are driving the Commandant to pursue urgent change. The grandparents fault almost every decision made by Gen Berger while failing to acknowledge the changing security environment, including technology diffusion and the rise of peer competition. Most importantly, they offer no real alternative other than standing pat. Their lack of foresight or recognition of evidence from contemporary conflict is startling, and at odds with the distinguished history of the Marine Corps, derived from its ethos of anticipatory adaptation to the changing character of war.
So, the last and most pressing question is: is there enough evidence for Congress to intervene and prevent the Commandant of the Marine Corps from pursuing the future he foresees? The answer to that is a resounding no. Congress should continue to endorse Force Design 2030 and support the Commandant’s plans, as they have already done.
Robert O. Work spent 27 years on active duty as a Marine artillery and MAGTF officer. He is a former Undersecretary of the Navy and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security. He served as the Deputy Secretary of Defense alongside three Secretaries of Defense spanning both the Obama and Trump administrations.
[i] U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication One (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 20 June 1997), p. 17.
[iv] General Tony Zinni, USMC, retired, “Retired General Officer Outreach,” an open letter to Congress, undated.
[xx] Force Design 2030, Annual Update, April 2022, p. 2.
[xxxii] Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2018), p. 11.
[xxxiv] Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute Vol. 119, No. 1 (March 1974), p. 4.
[xxxvi] Williamson Murray and Allan Millett, eds, Innovation in the Interwar Period (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 410.
[lvi] Gen David H. Berger, “The Case for Change,” Marine Corps Gazette, June 2020, p. 12.
[lvii] Gen David H. Berger, Force Design 2030: Annual Update, April 2021, p. 3.
[lix] Jim Webb, “Momentous Changes in the US Marine Corps’ Force Organization Deserve Debate,” Wall Street Journal Opinion. March 25, 2022.
[lxii] General Tony Zinni, USMC, retired, “Retired General Officer Outreach.”
[lxiii] Conversation between the author and former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist. April 8, 2022.
[lxiv] Webb, “Momentous Changes in the US Marine Corps’ Force Organization Deserve Debate.”
[lxvi] Zinni, USMC, retired, “Retired General Officer Outreach.”
[lxx] Zinni, USMC, retired, “Retired General Officer Outreach.”
[lxxi] Webb, “Momentous Changes in the US Marine Corps’ Force Organization Deserve Debate.”
[lxxiii] “Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 5063. United States Marine Corps: composition; functions.”
[lxxiv] Sheehan, Punaro and Muravchik,” Wasteful Spending, a Shrinking Force and the Marine Corp’s Big Bet.”
[lxxvi] Gen David H. Berger, Force Design 2030: Annual Update, April 2022, p. 2.
[lxxviii] U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting, p. 94.
[lxxix] Schmitt, “The Marines are Marching toward Irrelevance.”
[lxxx] U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting, p. 17.
In this article:
WRITTEN BY
Robert O. Work spent 27 years on active duty as a Marine artillery and MAGTF officer. He is a former Undersecretary of the Navy and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security. He served as the Deputy Secretary of Defense alongside three Secretaries of Defense spanning both the Obama and Trump administrations.19fortyfive.com · by ByRobert Work · May 15, 2022
10. Chinese Navy Ship Operating Off of Australia, Canberra Says
Chinese Navy Ship Operating Off of Australia, Canberra Says - USNI News
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Intelligence Collection Vessel Haiwangxing operating off the north-west shelf of Australia. Australian Department of Defence Photo
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia – A People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) intelligence ship is currently operating off the north-west shelf of Australia, the Australian Department of Defence said Friday.
Australia’s DoD identified the vessel as China’s Dongdiao-class auxiliary intelligence ship Haiwangxing (792) and released imagery and video of the ship.
A graphic of Haiwangxing’s voyage showed the ship crossed Australia’s exclusive economic zone on the morning of May 6. On Sunday, it was approximately 70 nautical miles off the Harold E. Holt Communications Station, in Exmouth, Western Australia, while a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft monitored the ship.
Harold E. Holt Communications Station provides Very Low Frequency (VLF) communication transmission services for Australian, the United States and Australian-allied submarines.
The Chinese ship continued sailing southwards, and on Monday, it was 150 nautical miles off Exmouth while an RAAF P-8 tracked the intelligence ship. At the same time, HMAS Perth (FFH157) sailed out from port to monitor Haiwangxing but subsequently turned back because the Chinese ship changed its sailing direction on Tuesday morning. Haiwangxing turned north, sailing at a speed of six knots, 125 nautical miles from Exmouth. An RAAF P-8 and an Australian Border Force (ABF) Dash-8 maritime surveillance aircraft monitored the ship.
On Wednesday, Haiwangxing sailed northeast at 12 knots, with the ship approaching as close as 50 nautical miles of the of Harold E. Holt Communication Station, while an RAAF P-8, ABF Dash-8 and ABF patrol vessel ABFC Cape Sorell monitored. Haiwangxing was last spotted on Friday at 6 a.m. local time, approximately 250 nautical miles northwest of Broome Western Australia. An RAAF P-8 and a Maritime Border Command Dash-8 maritime surveillance aircraft monitored the ship on Thursday.
“Australia respects the right of all states to exercise freedom of navigation and overflight in international waters and airspace, just as we expect others to respect our right to do the same. Defence will continue to monitor the ship’s operation in our maritime approaches,” the Australian DoD said in the news release.
Movements of PLAN Dongdiao AGI-792 near Australia May 8-13 2022. Australian Department of Defence Photo
Meanwhile, over in the Philippine Sea, the PLAN’s CNS Liaoning (16) carrier strike group continues flight operations, according to the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s daily news releases this week. Liaoning; Type 055 destroyer CNS Nanchang (101); Type 052D destroyers CNS Xining (117), CNS Urumqi (118) and CNS Chengdu (120); Type 052C destroyer CNS Zhengzhou (151); Type 054A frigate CNS Xiangtan (531); and Type 901 fast combat support ship CNS Hulunhu (901) sailed into the Pacific Ocean via the Miyako Strait earlier this month.
The carrier and ships in its CSG performed a series of flight operations four days in a row this week. On 9 a.m. Sunday local time, Liaoning, the two Type 052D destroyers and Hulunhu were sighted 160 kilometers south of Ishigaki Island conducting flight operations with its embarked J-15 fighter aircraft and Z-18 helicopters from 9 a.m. to 8 p.m., according to news releases from Japan’s Joint Staff Office.
On Monday, the same ships were seen at 10 a.m. sailing 200 kilometers south of Ishigaki Island, performing flight operations from 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. On Tuesday at 9 a.m., the group was sailing 310 kilometers south of Ishigaki Island, performing flight operations from 9 a.m. to 8 p.m. On Wednesday at 9 a.m., Liaoning and two Type 052D destroyers were seen 160 kilometers south of Ishigaki Island, again performing flight operations from 9 a.m. to 8 p.m.
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) destroyer helicopter carrier JS Izumo (DDH-183) has tracked the Liaoning carrier strike group since May 2. Japanese destroyer JS Suzutsuki (DD-117) took over the task of tracking the Liaoning carrier group on Tuesday.
A People’s Liberation Army Navy J-15 carrier fighter takes off from Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning (16) on May 7, 2022. Japanese MoD Photo
Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) fighter aircraft scrambled each day in response to the J-15 launches, according to the news release. In a Tuesday press conference, Japan Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi said the Chinese carried out a total of 100 sorties with its J-15s and Z-18s from Liaoning between May 3 and May 8.
While the activities of the PLAN carrier group were likely aimed at improving its aircraft carriers’ operational capabilities and its ability to carry out operations away from home, Kishi said Japan is concerned about the operations given that they were happening close to the Ryuku Islands and Taiwan. The Japanese Ministry of Defense will continue to monitor such activities, he said.
The Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group is also operating in the Philippine Sea. Earlier this week, the CSG conducted deterrence missions in the Philippine Sea by performing long-range maritime strike with refueling help from Pacific Air Forces KC-135 Stratotankers, according to a U.S. 7th Fleet news release issued Friday.
An F/A-18E Super Hornet, assigned to the “Tophatters” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 14, prepares to make an arrested landing on the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) in the Philippine Sea on May 12, 2022. U.S. Navy Photo
USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), destroyers USS Spruance (DDG-111) and USS Dewey (DDG-105), and cruiser USS Mobile Bay (CG-53) also performed multi-domain training to defend the carrier, according to the news release.
“Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group is a powerful presence in the Philippine Sea that serves as a deterrent to aggressive or malign actors and supports a free and open Indo-Pacific,” Rear Adm. J.T. Anderson, the commander of carrier strike group Three, said in the release. “There is no better way to strengthen our combat-credible capabilities than to work alongside other joint forces to demonstrate our commitment to sovereignty, the region, and a rules-based international order.”
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11. Bill Gates’s Pandemic Prevention Plan Has a China-Sized Blind Spot
Excerpts:
Disease surveillance is a consistent theme in Gates’s book, which includes an entire chapter titled “Get Better at Detecting Outbreaks Early.” Gates explains that “the world’s disparate disease surveillance systems need to be integrated so that public health officials can rapidly detect emerging and circulating respiratory viruses no matter where they emerge.” His approach to disease surveillance draws from his experiences in low-income countries that report outbreaks quickly and ask for assistance, and the GERM team is indeed a useful concept for addressing outbreaks in these countries. However, it does not hold up to scrutiny when compared with China’s actions to hide the COVID-19 outbreak. Beijing did not acknowledge the seriousness of the outbreak until late January 2020, despite evidence in late December 2019 that the new virus was similar to the one that caused the 2003 SARS outbreak.
Neither in the book nor during subsequent media appearances does Gates address this fairly obvious problem. He remains blind to the intensely political nature of public health decisions, fixating instead on technical solutions. Many of his prescriptions are valid and useful, but none are sufficient to prevent the next pandemic.
Without a full reckoning of what happened in the early days of this pandemic, the world will be doomed to repeat the devastation next time around.
Bill Gates’s Pandemic Prevention Plan Has a China-Sized Blind Spot
In his new book, the billionaire philanthropist focuses on technical solutions but ignores politics.
By Anthony Ruggiero, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Bill Gates
Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates speaks at a New York Times event in New York on Nov. 6, 2019. Mike Cohen/Getty Images for The New York Times
In his now famous March 2015 TED talk, which has more than 40 million views online, Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates pleaded with the world to start preparing for the next infectious disease outbreak “because time is not on our side.” In many ways, Gates’s remarks were prescient, such as noting the next outbreak could be “a virus where people feel well enough while they’re infectious that they get on a plane or they go to a market.” In his just-published book, How to Prevent the Next Pandemic, Gates taps into his public health expertise to identify lessons learned from the world’s dysfunctional response to the spread of COVID-19. Gates urges Washington to act decisively while the impact of COVID-19 is still fresh in our minds, lest complacency take over. However, the book’s recollections of the pandemic’s early days are quite selective, which prevents Gates from recognizing that political failures are at least as dangerous as scientific ones when governments are scrambling to stop an outbreak. Specifically, Gates fails to reckon with the Chinese government’s deliberate obstruction, obfuscation, and outright deception regarding COVID-19 during the first pivotal weeks of the crisis.
Gates’s dedication to and credibility in the public health sector are unquestionable. Since 2000, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has spent over $53 billion on public health initiatives. The organization initially focused on reducing mortality rates among children under 5 years old who were dying from diarrhea and pneumonia. Twenty years later, the mortality rate has been cut in half. The foundation is also the third-largest donor to the World Health Organization (WHO), spending $584 million in 2020 and 2021 to support a global program to eliminate polio.
Gates’s name is also synonymous with technological innovation, with him having co-founded Microsoft in 1975 with Paul Allen. Advancing innovation and technology in public health is an important element of Gates’s new book. He applauds scientists for developing multiple vaccines for a novel virus in about a year—an astonishing achievement considering the previous record was four years. Gates contends that scientists, after the next outbreak, should try to develop a vaccine in six months and develop infection-blocking drugs. He rightly focuses on the challenges of delivering vaccines to low-income countries and writes that we should develop vaccines that can be inhaled or taken as a pill, which would drastically simplify distribution by reducing the need for cold storage. While much of this may sound fanciful, we should recall that at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, leading public health experts said it was “ridiculously optimistic” for the U.S. government to promise a vaccine within 12 to 18 months.
In his now famous March 2015 TED talk, which has more than 40 million views online, Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates pleaded with the world to start preparing for the next infectious disease outbreak “because time is not on our side.” In many ways, Gates’s remarks were prescient, such as noting the next outbreak could be “a virus where people feel well enough while they’re infectious that they get on a plane or they go to a market.” In his just-published book, How to Prevent the Next Pandemic, Gates taps into his public health expertise to identify lessons learned from the world’s dysfunctional response to the spread of COVID-19. Gates urges Washington to act decisively while the impact of COVID-19 is still fresh in our minds, lest complacency take over. However, the book’s recollections of the pandemic’s early days are quite selective, which prevents Gates from recognizing that political failures are at least as dangerous as scientific ones when governments are scrambling to stop an outbreak. Specifically, Gates fails to reckon with the Chinese government’s deliberate obstruction, obfuscation, and outright deception regarding COVID-19 during the first pivotal weeks of the crisis.
How to Prevent the Next Pandemic, Bill Gates, Knopf, 304 pp., $28, May 2022
Gates’s dedication to and credibility in the public health sector are unquestionable. Since 2000, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has spent over $53 billion on public health initiatives. The organization initially focused on reducing mortality rates among children under 5 years old who were dying from diarrhea and pneumonia. Twenty years later, the mortality rate has been cut in half. The foundation is also the third-largest donor to the World Health Organization (WHO), spending $584 million in 2020 and 2021 to support a global program to eliminate polio.
Gates’s name is also synonymous with technological innovation, with him having co-founded Microsoft in 1975 with Paul Allen. Advancing innovation and technology in public health is an important element of Gates’s new book. He applauds scientists for developing multiple vaccines for a novel virus in about a year—an astonishing achievement considering the previous record was four years. Gates contends that scientists, after the next outbreak, should try to develop a vaccine in six months and develop infection-blocking drugs. He rightly focuses on the challenges of delivering vaccines to low-income countries and writes that we should develop vaccines that can be inhaled or taken as a pill, which would drastically simplify distribution by reducing the need for cold storage. While much of this may sound fanciful, we should recall that at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, leading public health experts said it was “ridiculously optimistic” for the U.S. government to promise a vaccine within 12 to 18 months.
The central thesis of Gates’s book is that we can prevent the next pandemic by creating a global rapid-response organization that can stop the spread of the next lethal pathogen during the first pivotal weeks following its emergence.
Specifically, Gates recommends that the international community create a global epidemic response and mobilization (GERM) team—a permanent 3,000-person organization made up of experts in epidemiology, data science, logistics, communications, and other disciplines.
Gates estimates that GERM would cost $1 billion a year and says it should be funded by the governments of wealthy and some middle-income nations, which have the most to lose economically from a pandemic. In a new TED talk in April, Gates said, “We need to spend billions in order to save trillions.” He’s right about the magnitude of potential losses. The International Monetary Fund estimates that the COVID-19 pandemic will cost the global economy more than $12.5 trillion through 2024. Gates hopes his GERM concept will be adopted over the next year. The WHO would manage the team, and it could be created by a resolution at the World Health Assembly, the WHO member states’ annual meeting, which is convening this month in Geneva.
The GERM team, Gates writes, would develop “a checklist for pandemic preparedness, similar to the ones that airplane pilots follow before every takeoff and many surgeons now go through during an operation.” The GERM team’s most important role would be to run outbreak response exercises. “Just as militaries do complex exercises where they simulate different conditions and see how well they respond, the GERM team would organize outbreak response exercises,” Gates writes. “Not war games, but germ games.” He explains that “in most countries, these exercises can be run by national public health institutions, emergency operations centers, and military leaders,” with the GERM team “acting as an advisor and reviewer. For low-income countries, the world will have to bring in resources to help out.”
GERM’s mission would be to detect and stop outbreaks before they became pandemics. Once it spots a new outbreak, “GERM should have the ability to declare an outbreak and work with national governments and the World Bank to raise money for the response very quickly.” The organization “would take the lead on creating and coordinating common responses, such as how and when to implement border closures and recommend mask use.” Correctly, Gates observes that the measures necessary to prepare for naturally occurring threats also apply to preventing bioterrorism.
Where Gates begins to run into trouble is his unexamined assumption that national governments will give up control at pivotal moments to an international organization. The genesis of the COVID-19 pandemic teaches us that those governments may even insist there is no threat to address. In his book, Gates never mentions that Chinese leaders spent one month denying there was an outbreak at all.
On Jan. 30, 2020, WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus declared COVID-19 a public health emergency of international concern. Gates heralds this announcement in the book but does not address what we now know about how China obstructed an effective response. For example, on Jan. 1, 2020, local officials in Wuhan, the center of the COVID-19 outbreak, censored eight whistleblowers for “rumor-mongering.” Their only crime was warning fellow medical professionals in late December 2019 of a novel virus outbreak.
China also delayed for a week the release of the virus’s genome, which is necessary to develop diagnostics and vaccines. An Associated Press investigation highlighted that “Chinese government labs only released the genome after another lab published it ahead of authorities on a virologist website on Jan. 11.” Beijing also withheld other crucial information from WHO officials throughout much of January 2020. The AP found that “China stalled for at least two weeks more on providing WHO with detailed data on patients and cases.”
The Chinese Communist Party has a history of obstructing reports of viral outbreaks. In 2003, then-WHO Director-General Gro Harlem Brundtland criticized Beijing’s response to the SARS outbreak, noting experts would have been able to help had they been called earlier. “Next time something strange and new comes anywhere in the world, let us come in as quickly as possible,” she said. Yet letting in foreign observers is rarely what governments want to do when their reputations are on the line.
He remains blind to the intensely political nature of public health decisions, fixating instead on technical solutions.
In making the case for GERM, Gates compares the organization to a global fire department, noting that “a pandemic is the equivalent of a fire that starts in one building and within weeks is burning in every country in the world.” In keeping with the analogy, China’s leaders stood outside a burning building in January 2020 and denied it was on fire. The fire eventually became too obvious, but by then the neighborhood was ablaze.
Disease surveillance is a consistent theme in Gates’s book, which includes an entire chapter titled “Get Better at Detecting Outbreaks Early.” Gates explains that “the world’s disparate disease surveillance systems need to be integrated so that public health officials can rapidly detect emerging and circulating respiratory viruses no matter where they emerge.” His approach to disease surveillance draws from his experiences in low-income countries that report outbreaks quickly and ask for assistance, and the GERM team is indeed a useful concept for addressing outbreaks in these countries. However, it does not hold up to scrutiny when compared with China’s actions to hide the COVID-19 outbreak. Beijing did not acknowledge the seriousness of the outbreak until late January 2020, despite evidence in late December 2019 that the new virus was similar to the one that caused the 2003 SARS outbreak.
Neither in the book nor during subsequent media appearances does Gates address this fairly obvious problem. He remains blind to the intensely political nature of public health decisions, fixating instead on technical solutions. Many of his prescriptions are valid and useful, but none are sufficient to prevent the next pandemic.
Without a full reckoning of what happened in the early days of this pandemic, the world will be doomed to repeat the devastation next time around.
Anthony Ruggiero is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense on the U.S. National Security Council during the Trump administration. Twitter: @NatSecAnthony
12. FDD | Ahead of Biden's expected visit to Israel
FDD | Ahead of Biden's expected visit to Israel
Israel must receive a clear promise that it will preserve its full freedom of action, in all dimensions.
fdd.org · by Jacob Nagel Senior Fellow · May 13, 2022
Negotiations with Iran on a return to the nuclear deal are currently in a kind of limbo (cessation/freeze), without a set timetable to continue, but the team leaders, especially the American team led by Rob Malley, and the European Union team, Led by Minister Borel, are looking for some crazy “creative ways to square the circle.”
The Russian representative, Mikhail Ulyanov, was interviewed a few days before the expected signing and bragged a few weeks ago that the Iranians were about to get a much better agreement than they wished for in their most optimistic dreams, led by him, with Chinese help. Ironically, he had to follow orders from Moscow and put forward a Russian demand for the exclusion of economic sanctions imposed on them because of the invasion of Ukraine, from trade with the Iranian market. While that demand has since been resolved, it has led to the cessation of talks, at the time.
But Russia was not alone. Causing, and still doomed, the inability to sign the agreement, is the Iranians’ demand to remove the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) from the list of foreign terrorist organizations, after all of their other extortionate demands were met in the affirmative.
While contacts are officially halted, all parties still want a deal and there are big concerns in Israel and the Gulf that a “creative way to square the circle” will eventually be found. Minister Borel just flew to Teheran to try finding such a solution, after declaring his talks with state secretary Blinken came to a dead-end.
Whether an agreement is signed by the time Biden visits Israel or not, there is no doubt the Iranian nuclear issue will take a central place in the talks, alongside Iran’s aggressive behavior and their terror support in the region and around the world. Russia, China, the peach process and other issues will probably come up, but this time Israel should insist to concentrate on the Iranian problem.
It is important to present the shortcomings and dangers of the agreement that has been formulated and was very close to being signed and to propose some measures that Israel will be required to take if the agreement is signed, or if it is not signed (hopefully, together with the US and other partners).
The agreement that was formulated, is based on the bad 2015 agreement but includes additional concessions. It is not considering the time elapsed from 2015 and the short time remaining to finalize the expiry of all restrictions on Iran. The agreement does not include a way to verify the new findings, both from the nuclear archive the Mossad brought in 2018 and from IAEA’s findings on Iranian NPT violations, which were discovered at several sites.
There are no doubts that signing an agreement will lead Iran to a status of a nuclear thresh-hold country, and then to the bomb in the coming years, causing a change in the world global power balance and a broad nuclear race in the Middle East.
The agreement does not include any tools and leverage that will force the Iranians to negotiate a “longer and stronger” agreement, as promised by Biden, and mistakenly spread out, as the next step, by supporters of a the return to the agreement.
The restrictions on the program will expire according to the original timetable, so by 2025 the powers will lose the Snap-Back mechanism that allows all sanctions to be reinforced, and very short after all other restrictions will expire, while the Iranians, will get immediately hundreds of billions of dollars.
The agreement does not address the supervision activities related to the development of the weapons system, beyond the very narrow section T in the original agreement. Apparently, the 2015 secret agreement between the Russians, Iranians, and Americans, not to enforce this chapter, which was added to the agreement only because the pressure from the Israeli expert’s team, remains in effect. It can be assumed that the new agreement includes more side documents and confidential agreements.
The future of the IAEA’s open investigations is uncertain. Iran still needs to answer the open questions by June, prior to the BOG meeting in Vienna, so it is clear the Iranians have every interest in dragging the current situation at least until June, if they do not intend to sign an agreement, to withhold their threatening cards.
It looks like Biden and his team would be more comfortable continuing with the current situation until November to get through the mid-term elections. Signing an agreement now, certainly if t will include a delisting, in any way, of the Revolutionary Guards from the foreign terrorist organizations list, would provoke strong objections in US on both sides of the political map.
An in-depth examination of the alternatives presents two main paths, and the right choice looks very clear.
Under a bad agreement, with or without removing the Revolutionary Guards from the FTO list, the Iranians will soon reach industrial enrichment capacity, in parallel with the capability to sneak for a bomb, based on advanced centrifuges and transfer a small portion of the huge amount of legitimate enriched uranium, and to accumulate enough bomb-grade enriched Uranium, and then the bomb, under the intel radar.
Albeit it will be in a relatively slow pace, they will be in a much stronger position, carried on a wave of a country that upheld the agreements it signed.
On the other hand, without an agreement, Iran will try to reach the nuclear threshold status and the bomb, probably much faster, but they will do it from a position of weakness and without legitimacy.
Israel will have then have the legitimacy, relevancy, urgency and the appropriate targets to cause painful and critical harm to the Iranian program and infrastructure, for many years.
Comparing the alternatives of not signing an agreement because of urgency + legitimacy + relevancy, against the alternative of signing and “buying time” to build more capabilities, which might come too late, if the Iranian will progress beyond the point of no return, it is clear what is the right way.
During Biden’s visit, Israel must receive a clear promise that Israel will preserve its full freedom of action, in all dimensions, alongside increasing the cooperation between the countries (if no agreement is signed).
Israel should build a full-scale legitimacy campaign to weaken Iran in all possible dimensions – economically, politically, militarily, cyber, kinetic tools, soft and legal tools, perception-changing tools, and more. For this purpose, it is necessary to invest appropriate budgets and manpower.
Iran’s leaders must understand that the era in which the “head of the octopus” remains immune while he invokes his proxies to attack and destabilize the region, is gone.
It is essential to build, alongside the detailed operational plans, a strategic communication plan that will convey Iranian behavior and the dangers of a nuclear Iran, emphasizing the threats to every city in Europe and US when Iran completes the development of its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) equipping them with nuclear warheads.
The US was about to sign a shameful and dangerous “surrender agreement”, and apparently is still willing to do so, under certain conditions. Iran, entrenched in its unreasonable demands and probably putting one extra demand over the edge, gave US a ladder and opportunity to backoff and build a joint plan with Israel that would force Iran to stop progressing in its program and move to a “longer and stronger” agreement that would block its path to nuclear weapons for many years.
To achieve this, the US cannot surrender to crazy Iranian demands, and return to the maximum pressure scheme, alongside credible military threat to the regime and to its survival, to the lives of the leaders and to the Iranian economy. If the serious threat does not affect the Iranian behavior, we all must be seriously prepared to activate the threats, hopefully using a broad international coalition.
Brig. Gen. (Res.) Professor Jacob Nagel is a former national security adviser to the prime minister and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Jacob Nagel Senior Fellow · May 13, 2022
13. Russia has lost ‘a third of ground forces’ in Ukraine attack
One third? That is hard to believe. But if true I think the adage that has been repeated over and over again is apt: "The only thing worse than a Russian win may be a Russian loss."
Russia has lost ‘a third of ground forces’ in Ukraine attack
By Tom Balmforth and Jonathan Landay
Updated May 15, 2022 — 7.08pmfirst published at 3.42am
London/Kyiv: Russia has probably lost around a third of the ground forces it deployed to Ukraine and its offensive in the Donbas region “has lost momentum and fallen significantly behind schedule”, British military intelligence said.
“Despite small-scale initial advances, Russia has failed to achieve substantial territorial gains over the past month whilst sustaining consistently high levels of attrition,” the British defence ministry said on Twitter.
“Russia has now likely suffered losses of one third of the ground combat force it committed in February.”
It said Russia was unlikely to dramatically accelerate its rate of advance over the next 30 days.
Since Russia’s invasion on February 24, Ukraine’s military has forced Russia’s commanders to abandon an advance on the capital Kyiv, before making rapid gains in the north-east and driving them away from the second biggest city of Kharkiv.
A Ukrainian counteroffensive has been under way near the Russian-held town of Izium, though Ukraine’s military reported on Sunday that Russian forces were advancing elsewhere in the Donbas region, the main theatre of war over the past month.
Ukrainian National Guard soldiers inspect a basement during a reconnaissance mission in a recently retaken village on the outskirts of Kharkiv, east Ukraine.Credit:
Russian forces have focused much of their firepower on the Donbas in a “second phase” of their invasion that was announced on April 19, after they failed to reach the capital Kyiv from the north in the early weeks of the war.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also said complex talks were under way to find a way to evacuate a large number of wounded soldiers from a besieged steel works in the port of Mariupol in return for the release of Russian prisoners of war.
Mariupol, which has suffered the heaviest fighting in nearly three months of war, is now in Russian hands but hundreds of Ukrainian fighters are still holding out at the Azovstal steel works despite weeks of heavy Russian bombardment.
Fresh off his country’s Eurovision win, Zelensky vowed on Sunday to one day host the song contest in the embattled city.
Ukraine’s Kalush Orchestra won the popular contest with its song Stefania, which has become a popular anthem among Ukrainians during the war, and its victory was a morale booster.
“Our courage impresses the world, our music conquers Europe,” Zelensky said on Facebook. “Next year, Ukraine will host Eurovision!”
Western military analysts say Russian President Vladimir Putin and his generals failed to anticipate such fierce Ukrainian resistance when they launched the invasion on February 24.
As well as losing large numbers of men and much military equipment, Russia has been hit by economic sanctions. The Group of Seven leading Western economies pledged in a statement on Saturday to “further increase economic and political pressure on Russia” and to supply more weapons to Ukraine.
Ukrainian National Guard soldiers gather in a house used as temporary base in a recently retaken village on the outskirts of Kharkiv, east Ukraine.Credit:
Moscow’s invasion, which it calls a “special operation” to disarm Ukraine and protect it from fascists, has jolted European security. Kyiv and its Western allies say the fascism assertion is a baseless pretext for an unprovoked war of aggression.
Top NATO diplomats, including US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, gathered on Sunday in Berlin to discuss the war and moves by Finland, Sweden and other countries to join the Western military alliance over mounting worry about Russia’s intensions.
“The brutal invasion (by) Russia is losing momentum,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoana said. “We know that with the bravery of the Ukrainian people and army, and with our help, Ukraine can win this war.”
Putin has justified the war in Ukraine by claiming it was a response to NATO’s expansion in Eastern Europe.
The war has prompted Finland to abandon its military neutrality and seek membership of NATO. Sweden is widely expected to follow suit.
Finnish President Sauli Niinisto told Putin by phone that his country, which shares a 1300 kilometre border with Russia, wanted to join NATO to bolster its own security.
Putin told Niinisto it would be a mistake for Helsinki to abandon its neutrality, the Kremlin said, adding that the move could harm bilateral relations.
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan said on Friday it was not possible for his country, a NATO member, to support enlarging the alliance because Finland and Sweden were “home to many terrorist organisations”.
The foreign ministers of Finland and Turkey were due to meet in Berlin later on Saturday to try to resolve their differences over NATO accession.
Erdogan’s spokesman, Ibrahim Kalin, said on Saturday that Turkey had not shut the door to Sweden and Finland joining but wants negotiations with both countries and a clampdown on what it sees as terrorist activities in Europe.
Kalin said the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) - designated a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the United States and the European Union - was fundraising and recruiting in Europe and its presence was “strong and open” in Sweden in particular.
“What needs to be done is clear: they have to stop allowing PKK outlets, activities, organisations, individuals and other types of presence to ... exist in those countries,” Kalin said.
Reuters, AP
14. Russia warns Finland and Sweden joining Nato would be ‘grave mistake’
Well I doubt Russia will employ its fictional tactics against Finland and Norway as it did in Netflix' series "Occupied?" But maybe it will actually try them out in Norway to create a dilemma for Sweden, Finland, and NATO (but I doubt it). (note semi-sarcasm)
Russia warns Finland and Sweden joining Nato would be ‘grave mistake’
Moscow tells Nordic pair there will be ‘far-reaching consequences’ as both parliaments begin debating issue
Russia has told Finland and Sweden that their decision to join the Nato military alliance is a serious mistake with far-reaching consequences and that they should not assume that Moscow will not respond.
The decisions by the two governments, both of which have remained neutral or non-aligned since the end of the second world war, herald a historic redrawing of Europe’s security map prompted by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February.
“The situation is, of course, changing radically in light of what is happening,” Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Sergei Ryabkov, said on Monday. “The fact that Finland and Sweden’s security will not be strengthened as a result of this is very clear to us.”
Ryabkov added that the two Nordic nations “should have no illusions that we will simply put up with it”, warning that the move was “another grave mistake with far-reaching consequences” and the “general level of military tension will increase”.
Nato Europe map
Russia has repeatedly warned both countries against joining Nato, saying such a move would oblige it to “restore military balance” by strengthening its defences in the Baltic Sea region, including by deploying nuclear weapons.
Finland shares an 810-mile (1,300km) land border with Russia and Sweden a maritime border. Both countries have for decades considered that joining the 30-member, US-led Nato alliance would represent an unnecessary provocation of Moscow.
However, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February has led to a profound change in Nordic thinking, with public support for Nato accession in Finland more than trebling to about 75% and rising to between 50% and 60% in Sweden.
The Swedish and Finnish parliaments on Monday began debating the issue, with the session in Helsinki likely to last several days. While 85% of Finland’s 200 MPs back membership, 150 have requested to speak and a vote was not expected on Monday.
“Our security environment has fundamentally changed,” the prime minister, Sanna Marin, told parliament as she opened the debate on Monday. “The only country that threatens European security, and is now openly waging a war of aggression, is Russia.”
In Stockholm, where the parliamentary vote is also expected to be a formality, the prime minister, Magdalena Andersson, said on Sunday after her Social Democratic party came out in favour of joining Nato that she would consult MPs before announcing her government’s official intention to apply later in the day.
The Swedish prime minister, Magdalena Andersson (centre), talks to the media on Monday before a parliamentary debate on Sweden’s application for Natio membership. Photograph: Henrik Montgomery/EPA
The Finnish president, Sauli Niinistö, is due in Stockholm on an official visit on Tuesday and Wednesday, suggesting a joint application by the two Nordic neighbours to join the alliance could be formally submitted within the next three days.
The Nato secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, has said both countries would be “welcomed with open arms” and their accession would be quick, although Turkish objections could delay the process, which requires unanimity among members.
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Sweden’s defence minister, Peter Hultqvist, said on Monday Stockholm was working to overcome Ankara’s reservations, which centre on Swedish support for the Kurdish PKK group, designated a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the EU and the US.
“We will send a group of diplomats to hold discussions and have a dialogue with Turkey so we can see how this can be resolved and what this is really about,” Hultqvist said.
Speaking before a meeting with EU foreign ministers in Brussels, the Canadian foreign minister, Mélanie Joly, called for Finland and Sweden’s speedy accession.
“Our goal is to be amongst the first countries to be able to ratify the accession of Sweden and Finland, because we know that the interim period between the accession demand and the ratification must be shortened,” she said.
Joly added that she had held discussions with Turkey, saying: “We need to meet this moment, this is historic and it is way more important than any bilateral issues.”
Nato and the US have both said they were confident Turkey would not hold up the Nordic nation’s accession. “I’m confident we will be able to address the concerns Turkey has expressed in a way that doesn’t delay the membership,” Stoltenberg said on Sunday.
15. FDD | The White House Is Bending the Law on Syria Sanctions
Conclusion:
The executive branch should have discretion in applying the Caesar Act, yet in this instance it is defying both the plain meaning of the text as well as the intent of Congress. The White House is likely counting on congressional passivity and partisan divisions to prevent a coordinated response. If lawmakers confound that expectation by acting in a unified and proactive manner, they can steer the White House back into compliance. If lawmakers remain passive, they will affirm the administration’s blueprint for evading its statutory obligations. The United States should help Lebanon to mitigate its power shortages but should do so without violating the law or enriching Assad.
FDD | The White House Is Bending the Law on Syria Sanctions
fdd.org · by David Adesnik Senior Fellow and Director of Research · May 12, 2022
“Let us resolve to put the strength of democracies into action to thwart … the designs of autocracy. Let us remember that the test of this moment is the test of all time.” – President Joe Biden, Warsaw, March 26, 2022
Russian blasts are reducing Ukrainian cities to rubble, the same way they once devastated Aleppo and other Syrian cities. “Swift and punishing costs are the only things that are going to get Russia to change its course,” President Joe Biden asserted in Warsaw as he laid out U.S. policy toward the Kremlin. The same logic should apply to the Syrian regime led by Bashar al-Assad, which has survived thanks only to the patronage of Moscow and Tehran. Yet the Biden administration has quietly signaled to its Arab allies that it supports their engagement with Damascus. The White House has facilitated this process by supporting the Assad regime’s inclusion in a pair of nearly completed regional energy deals. The deals’ total value is $550 million to $600 million, of which Damascus would pocket $40 million to $50 million.
The regime’s inclusion in these energy agreements would require Washington to declare the deals do not violate U.S. sanctions, especially those authorized by the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019. Even though the Assad regime would receive payments worth tens of millions of dollars, senior Biden administration officials have repeatedly insisted the agreements would not violate the Caesar Act. This memo examines the four rationales the administration uses to justify its assertion that sanctions are not applicable. None hold water.
If Biden wanted, he could sweep away legal objections to the two energy deals by issuing a sanctions waiver on national security grounds. Yet doing so would contradict Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s vow not to “lift a single sanction on Syria” until there is “irreversible progress” toward resolution of the country’s civil war. Despite its tacit approval of Arab engagement with Damascus, the administration does not want to acknowledge it has downgraded human rights in its policy toward Syria. Since a waiver would constitute such an admission, the administration is trying instead to bend the law, an approach that is politically expedient but paves the way for both Biden and future presidents to ignore congressional intent regarding sanctions.
In Syria, fighting has diminished since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, yet Damascus continues to perpetrate atrocities against the Syrian people. The regime maintains a vast prison system, where political opponents endure torture and sexual violence. Regime forces deliberately bombard civilian targets while withholding humanitarian aid from populations Damascus considers disloyal.
The Caesar Act is designed to hold the Assad regime accountable for a decade of grave offenses. The administration should enforce the law as Congress intended. If the president believes doing so would not serve the national interest, he should issue a waiver and explain why. If the administration evades its responsibilities under the Caesar Act, Congress should conduct oversight hearings and adopt remedial legislation compelling the administration to implement the law.
Key Features of the Proposed Energy Deals
Lebanon’s electrical generation capacity has fallen sharply amid a severe economic crisis, increasing the frequency and duration of blackouts that were already occurring daily before the crisis began in the fall of 2019. The Biden administration has justifiably looked for ways to help. However, it appears to be intent on violating U.S. law to do so.
In August 2021, the U.S. ambassador in Beirut, Dorothy Shea, informed President Michel Aoun that the United States would support a plan to bring Jordanian electricity to Lebanon via Syria. Shea also conveyed U.S. support for a plan to bring Egyptian gas to Lebanon via Jordan and Syria; the gas would enable Lebanon to increase production at its Deir Ammar power plant. When a journalist asked Shea about the compatibility of the two deals with U.S. sanctions on Syria, the ambassador responded that she had conferred with the White House and the Treasury Department, both of which supported the agreements. According to Shea, “the United States has been helping to facilitate — and encourage” — the deals. Yet the administration has not publicly shared its assessment of what features might violate the Caesar Act or other sanctions.
Five months passed between Shea’s announcement of U.S. support and the January 2022 signing of the Jordan-Syria-Lebanon electricity deal. The agreement would bring 250 megawatts (MW) of Jordanian power to Lebanon per day, enough to provide two additional hours of daily electricity to customers through Beirut’s national utility, Electricite du Liban (EDL). Currently, the EDL grid provides as little as two hours of daily power. Last October, the grid shut down entirely for several days.
Corruption and mismanagement are to blame both for Lebanon’s blackouts and for EDL’s average losses of more than $1 billion per year — an immense amount for a country of Lebanon’s size. The World Bank has called for “comprehensive electricity sector reform,” but the Lebanese government would prefer to sidestep such reform.
The World Bank’s regional director, Saroj Kumar Jha, said Lebanon had applied for $250 million to finance the aforementioned deal. Syrian Energy Minister Ghassan al-Zamel said his government would receive 8 percent of the power Lebanon purchases from Jordan. This compensation in kind would amount to $20 million if the deal itself is worth $250 million. The terms of the natural gas agreement are not yet final.
In January, a Lebanese media outlet published a letter from the U.S. Treasury Department to the director general of EDL indicating that Egypt would provide an additional 60 million cubic feet of natural gas per day to Lebanon “passing through Jordan and Syria via the Arab Gas Pipeline.” Egypt will further “provide ‘in-kind’ gas payments to the Syrian General Petroleum Corporation in exchange for transit through Syria.” Lebanese Energy Minister Walid Fayad estimated the value of the gas deal to be $300 million, with Syria receiving $0.75 per British thermal unit of gas, or somewhere between 7 and 10 percent of the sale price. If those figures are correct, total Syrian compensation would be $20 million to $30 million.
In January 2022, Treasury said its Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) “will not consider Lebanon’s negotiations and engagements regarding the electricity supply and gas proposal to be subject to sanctions under the Syrian Sanctions Regulations or the 2019 Caesar Civilian Protection Act.” The letter did not specify the statutory basis for this conclusion but did offer to advise Beirut on how to avoid potential conflicts between U.S. sanctions and yet-to-be-finalized aspects of the agreements.
Four Rationales for Exemption
The text of the Caesar Act demonstrates its applicability to the gas and energy deals under consideration. Section 7412(a)(2)(A)(i) directs the president to impose sanctions on any foreign person who “knowingly provides significant financial, material, or technological support to, or knowingly engages in a significant transaction with … the Government of Syria (including any entity owned or controlled by the Government of Syria) or a senior political figure of the Government of Syria.”
The term “financial, material, or technological support” has a clear definition in U.S. sanctions law. It includes any property, “tangible or intangible,” as well as a range of services and the broad category of “goods.” Thus, the Caesar Act applies regardless of the form of compensation Damascus would receive for transmitting gas and electric power to Lebanon. The law also applies to the full range of partners with whom Damascus might do business. For statutory purposes, the term “person” includes both natural persons as well as entities, which federal regulations broadly define as a “partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization.”
Congress deliberately chose to make Caesar sanctions mandatory. The law says the president “shall” impose the sanctions authorized by the Caesar Act, meaning he has a legal obligation to designate all violators. Only a presidential waiver can grant an exception. Even so, State Department officials have consistently asserted the gas and power agreements are exempt from sanctions, meaning the administration can bypass the Caesar Act without a waiver.
In defense of this claim, these officials have provided only cursory and evolving rationales. The first rationale is that the agreements are humanitarian in nature. The second and third rationales are intertwined. The former disputes whether the energy deals constitute a “significant transaction” for statutory purposes. The latter asserts that the Caesar Act does not apply to payments in kind, as opposed to cash, even though the text of the law prohibits all forms of material support. Finally, the fourth rationale extends UN agencies’ exemption from sanctions on Syria to cover the gas and power agreements.
Utilizing any of these four rationales to evade Caesar sanctions would establish a troubling precedent not only for Syria sanctions enforcement but also for sanctions on Russia and other hostile governments.
The Humanitarian Exemption
U.S. law requires all sanctions to include exemptions for humanitarian trade to limit unintended impacts on civilians. During a mid-October visit to Beirut, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland, the department’s third-ranking official, argued that “because [energy] falls under the humanitarian category, no sanctions waiver would be required in this instance.” A week later, Amos Hochstein, the department’s senior advisor for global energy security, also in Beirut, hesitated to confirm definitively that the gas and electricity agreements were exempt from sanctions. He stated, “[T]his kind of a transaction could be, likely is not … covered by the sanctions.” Hochstein did not elaborate why it was only “likely” that sanctions do not apply.
The Treasury Department does not have an all-purpose definition of what qualifies as humanitarian trade. To determine its meaning in the context of a particular sanctions regime, one should consult portions of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) that govern implementation. Specifically, one should examine material related to OFAC licenses, which authorize particular exemptions. Regarding Syria, OFAC issued a general license allowing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to engage in not-for-profit activities such as “humanitarian projects to meet basic human needs in Syria, including, but not limited to, drought relief, assistance to refugees, internally displaced persons, and conflict victims, food and medicine distribution, and the provision of health services.” This definition emphasizes “basic human needs” such as the distribution of food, water, medical care, and temporary shelter. None of the examples given remotely resemble a multi-country commercial arrangement worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
In November 2021, the Biden administration revised the general license for NGOs to include permission for “new investment” related to not-for-profit activities. Guidance from OFAC explains that this revision authorizes NGOs to engage in “early recovery activities,” such as the rehabilitation of schools, health clinics, water systems, and bakeries. This update significantly broadens the general license but still comes nowhere close to allowing for an international energy agreement. Furthermore, the general license for NGOs permits them to engage in activities that support humanitarian efforts “in Syria,” not in Lebanon or any other country.
Finally, if the president wants to approve humanitarian or other select activities that go beyond the scope of the general license for NGO operations, Section 7432(c) of the Caesar Act authorizes him to grant long-term waivers for individual NGOs or groups of NGOs. Since none of the participants in the two energy deals are NGOs, the president cannot employ Section 7432(c) to insulate them from sanctions.
Significant Transactions and In-Kind Payments
The Caesar Act prohibits “significant transactions” with the government of Syria but does not define what is significant. However, OFAC has defined the term very specifically and very consistently regarding sanctions on Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia. The OFAC definitions reserve considerable discretion for the executive branch, yet it has limits.
Several factors typically determine whether a transaction is “significant,” with the most relevant being “the size, number, and frequency of the transaction(s),” the “nexus between the transaction(s) and a blocked person,” “the impact of the transaction(s) on statutory objectives,” and “other factors that the secretary of the Treasury deems relevant.”
With a multi-year agreement worth hundreds of millions of dollars, the proposed transactions clearly meet the first criterion. Sanctioned entities would be parties to the transaction, so the nexus is clear, too. By generating ample benefits for the Assad regime, the transactions would directly contravene the Caesar Act’s objectives of holding the regime accountable and depriving it of the means to commit further atrocities. While the secretary has latitude to consider additional factors, it is difficult to see what aspect of these transactions would make them any less “significant.”
The purpose of the secretary’s discretion is to ensure reasonable application of the significance standard rather than requiring the application of sanctions for every transaction. It is also not meant to serve as a blank check for authorizing transactions an administration considers beneficial from a policy perspective. While the administration may assert that the energy agreements would mitigate the current crisis in Lebanon, that is a national security consideration properly addressed by a presidential waiver.
Regarding significance, a review of Syria-related law enforcement actions may be illustrative. Admittedly, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has its own criteria for bringing charges. Still, in 2018, the DOJ indicted eight individuals for violating U.S. sanctions on Syria along with other offenses. The indictment lists numerous illicit transactions, some less than $100,000. Others had a value of less than $1,000,000. While sanctions and indictments are distinct actions, common sense indicates that if a $100,000 transaction that benefits the Assad regime is a crime, deals worth hundreds of millions of dollars are clearly significant.
Nothing To See Here
A bolder alternative to claiming the absence of a significant transaction is to claim the absence of any transaction at all. Amos Hochstein, the State Department’s energy envoy, told Lebanon’s LBCI that Caesar sanctions do not apply to the gas component of the deal because “there is no transaction with Syria. The transaction is between Egypt and Lebanon.” Yet Hochstein acknowledged the Syrian government would receive compensation for allowing the gas to cross through its territory. He explained that the agreement “will allow Syria to keep some of the gas — a small percentage of the gas in Syria, for electricity for Syrian people, in exchange — as a payment for the tariff, for the gas to go through Syria.”
If the receipt of gas constitutes a form of “payment,” as Hochstein said, then a transaction is taking place. What remains unclear is the identity of the Syrian government’s counterparty. Will the agreement between the governments of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt include a provision stipulating that the Syrian government will receive compensation in-kind? If so, the other three governments would be counterparties despite Hochstein’s insistence that there is no transaction. If the deal’s main text does not address this issue, will there be a separate agreement that sets the terms for Syria’s compensation? If there is a separate agreement, who will sign it?
Another interpretation of Hochstein’s comments is that no transaction is taking place because Syria will receive payment in-kind rather than cash. This interpretation is consistent with comments by a Democratic congressional staffer familiar with the deal, who told Lebanon’s L’Orient Today that “[n]o Caesar Act sanctions are triggered,” because neither the gas nor the electricity agreement entails “any direct payments to the Assad regime.”
Yet the Caesar Act, like other legislation, anticipates and precludes such narrow interpretations. Specifically, Caesar authorizes mandatory sanctions on persons who either engage in a “significant transaction” or provide “significant financial, material, or technological support.” Even if one granted the premise that in-kind payments are not transactions, this would hardly matter. The text of the statute applies both to “support” and to “transactions,” and both gas and electricity meet the legal definition of support, since they are goods.
Finally, if OFAC were to rule that in-kind payment or bartering does not constitute a transaction, the office would be setting a precedent for similar exemptions from sanctions on Russia, Iran, and others. New channels for illicit finance would open across the globe.
The UN Agency Exemption
In addition to a general license for NGO activities, the Syrian Sanctions Regulations include an exemption for the various organizations under the UN umbrella, including the World Bank. Specifically, this general license applies to “the conduct of official business” with the Syrian government, leading observers to suggest the Biden administration would rely on the bank’s financing of the gas and power agreements as grounds for exemption from the Caesar Act. Yet doing so would require an implausibly broad interpretation of what counts as the bank’s official business.
The World Bank is not a party to the electricity deal that the energy ministers of Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan signed in late January. World Bank officials have also stated unequivocally that their board of directors has not yet considered, let alone approved, the Lebanese request to finance its energy imports. Furthermore, Saroj Kumar Jha, the organization’s regional director, said the proposal would not go to the board for approval until the Lebanese Cabinet adopts comprehensive reforms for the electricity sector.
It is possible that the United States and other countries that sit on the World Bank’s board have privately agreed to support the Lebanese request. This would explain the claim by Fayad, the Lebanese energy minister, that Lebanon has already secured $300 million of World Bank financing. Regardless, a private agreement does not change the fact that the bank, as an institution, is not a party to the electricity deal. The matter therefore does not constitute official bank business.
Policy Recommendations
For the executive branch to grant an exemption from sanctions in the absence of a sound rationale amounts to open defiance of the law. In this instance, it is a statute that both the Senate and the House of Representatives passed with overwhelming bipartisan support less than three years ago. The two proper courses of action available to the Biden administration are to reverse its position or to issue a sanctions waiver on national security grounds, as the Caesar Act allows. Should the administration do neither, Congress should proceed as follows:
- Hold public hearings on the two energy agreements, during which senior administration officials must fully explain their rationale for exempting the agreements from sanctions. The hearings should also address whether the administration has made commitments to support World Bank financing and what reforms to the Lebanese electricity sector the administration would consider sufficient.
- Absent a more compelling rationale, senior lawmakers from both parties should inform the White House that they consider its exemption invalid. This may not change the administration’s policy, but it would likely compel the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Lebanese governments to re-evaluate the risk that a future U.S. administration may treat the deals as sanctionable. Currently, Cairo and Amman continue to press the Biden administration for stronger assurances it will protect them from sanctions.
- Pass amendments to the Caesar Act further clarifying the criteria for exemption. The original text is clear, yet amendments could deter further efforts to bend the law for political purposes. The proposal and passage of amendments would also constitute a clear signal of congressional resolve to the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Lebanese governments.
Conclusion
The executive branch should have discretion in applying the Caesar Act, yet in this instance it is defying both the plain meaning of the text as well as the intent of Congress. The White House is likely counting on congressional passivity and partisan divisions to prevent a coordinated response. If lawmakers confound that expectation by acting in a unified and proactive manner, they can steer the White House back into compliance. If lawmakers remain passive, they will affirm the administration’s blueprint for evading its statutory obligations. The United States should help Lebanon to mitigate its power shortages but should do so without violating the law or enriching Assad.
fdd.org · by David Adesnik Senior Fellow and Director of Research · May 12, 2022
16. ‘A magnet for rip-off artists’: Fraud siphoned billions from pandemic unemployment benefits
Our amazingly inept bureaucracy. Imagine what we could do with $163 billion properly used.
Please go to the link to view the graphics and the properly formatted text.
‘A magnet for rip-off artists’: Fraud siphoned billions from pandemic unemployment benefits
Identity theft and other sophisticated criminal schemes contributed to potentially $163 billion in waste, while inflicting harm on unwitting victims.
Sareena Brown-Thomas had just arrived home from her shift as a custodian when she noticed an envelope in the mail from the D.C. government. Bearing her name, address and the last four digits of her Social Security number, the letter inside said she had been awarded unemployment benefits — a problem, she later recalled, since she had never applied for them.
The 32-year-old soon notified her bosses, believing last summer that she had put the matter to rest. But the real trouble wouldn’t start until September: When Brown-Thomas did actually find herself out of a job, she couldn’t get the financial support she needed. Mired in bureaucratic battles, she said she faced a months-long struggle just to prove her identity to the city.
“I’m still trying to figure out how to get a lot of stuff paid,” Brown-Thomas, who warred at one point with D.C. over her eligibility, said in an interview this spring. “It was so easy for them to use my Social Security number to get unemployment.”
Brown-Thomas is part of a sprawling community of victims caught up in a massive series of attacks targeting the nation’s generous coronavirus aid programs. The more than $5 trillion approved since the start of the pandemic has become a wellspring for criminal activity, allowing fraudsters to siphon money away from hard-hit American workers and businesses who needed the help most.
The exact scope of the fraud targeting federal aid initiatives is unknown, even two years later. With unemployment benefits, however, the theft could be significant. Testifying at a little-noticed congressional hearing this spring, a top watchdog for the Labor Department estimated there could have been “at least” $163 billion in unemployment-related “overpayments,” a projection that includes wrongly paid sums as well as “significant” benefits obtained by malicious actors.
So far, the United States has recaptured just over $4 billion of that, according to state workforce data furnished by the Labor Department this March. That amounts to roughly 2.4 percent of the wrongful payments, if the government’s best estimate is accurate, raising the specter that Washington may never get most of the money back.
17. New commando force leads Britain’s military in Arctic operations
New commando force leads Britain’s military in Arctic operations
WASHINGTON ― The new Future Commando Force program, made up of about 4,000 personnel with the British Royal Marines, is leading the way in Arctic operations for the entire service, according to the head of the effort.
“We are the U.K.’s Arctic experts [in] regard for specialists and electronic warfare elements,” Brig. Mark Totten said at the Modern Day Marine expo on Wednesday. “And we can use ship-to-shore maneuver and maneuver at sea to support routine operations in that theater.”
For the most part, the service previously focused on the Arctic theater for “training and environmental development,” Totten said, but that’s going to shift. He added that the Future Commando Force wants to bolster its resources in the region and is ready to position other readiness forces near the Suez Canal.
The program is composed of two littoral response groups, and it aims for forces to be able to immediately deploy to complete a range of tasks, from combat operations to humanitarian missions.
These forces form a littoral strike group that works alongside a carrier strike group, designed to boost the carrier strike group’s capabilities, Totten said. “What we’re really looking at doing in this context is supporting carrier operations much more than marines previously have.”
British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace also cautioned the region is encountering new threats — specifically increased militarization in the area from Russia and infrastructure capabilities from China.
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British Defense Minister Ben Wallace has previously warned the Artic was becoming an area of increasing military competition whose security would directly affect Britain.
“The UK Armed Forces will be doing more with our close Arctic allies and partners, as part of NATO, bilaterally, and through other multilateral groupings such as the Joint Expeditionary Force,” Wallace said in a March statement. “The Royal Navy, including our dedicated Littoral Response Group (North), will periodically operate in the High North alongside Allies and partners, the Army will expand its cold-weather training, and the RAF will deploy P8A maritime patrol aircraft to the region and continue participating in Icelandic air policing.”
The strategy document coincided with more than 3,000 sailors and Marines participating in the exercise Cold Response in Norway to focus on cold-water training with NATO allies and partners in March and April. During the exercise, the Royal Marines participated in a small boat raid from an Astute-class hunter-killer submarine using inflatable raiding craft to conduct reconnaissance missions while evading the enemy, according to a Royal Navy news release.
The British aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales operated as one of 25 ships in the exercise, functioning as the head of NATO’s maritime high-readiness force.
“As we continue to operate in and around the Arctic with our allies and partners, the sailors on HMS Prince of Wales are continuing to learn the skills, and build the experience that allow the Royal Navy to push the boundaries of UK carrier operations in the cold, harsh environment,” the ship’s commanding officer, Capt. Steve Higham, said in a Royal Navy news release.
U.S. Marines from the II Marine Expeditionary Force also participated in the exercise, conducting Arctic vehicle operations, avalanche prevention and response, flight operations, and casualty evacuations drills in austere weather conditions, according to the service.
Altogether, Cold Response 2022 included roughly 30,000 troops from 27 countries. Norway hosts the exercise biannually.
18. Growing evidence of a military disaster on the Donets pierces a pro-Russian bubble.
River crossings are damn hard.
Growing evidence of a military disaster on the Donets pierces a pro-Russian bubble.
May 15, 2022, 11:01 a.m. ET
A ruined pontoon crossing with dozens of destroyed or damaged Russian armored vehicles on both banks of the Donets River.Credit...Ukraine Armed Forces
The destruction wreaked on a Russian battalion as it tried to cross a river in northeastern Ukraine last week is emerging as among the deadliest engagements of the war, with estimates based on publicly available evidence now suggesting that well over 400 Russian soldiers were killed or wounded.
And as the scale of what happened comes into sharper focus, the disaster appears to be breaking through the Kremlin’s tightly controlled information bubble.
Perhaps most striking, the Russian battlefield failure is resonating with a stable of pro-Russian war bloggers — some of whom are embedded with troops on the front line — who have reliably posted to the social network Telegram with claims of Russian success and Ukrainian cowardice.
“The commentary by these widely read milbloggers may fuel burgeoning doubts in Russia about Russia’s prospects in this war and the competence of Russia’s military leaders,” the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based research body, wrote over the weekend.
On May 11, the Russian command reportedly sent about 550 troops of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 41st Combined Arms Army to cross the Donets River at Bilohorivka, in the eastern Luhansk region, in a bid to encircle Ukrainian forces near Rubizhne.
Satellite images reveal that Ukrainian artillery destroyed several Russian pontoon bridges and laid waste to a tight concentration of Russian troops and equipment around the river.
As the news of the losses at the river crossing in Bilohorivka started to spread, some Russian bloggers did not appear to hold back in their criticism of what they said was incompetent leadership.
“I’ve been keeping quiet for a long time,” Yuri Podolyaka, a war blogger with 2.1 million followers on Telegram, said in a video posted on Friday, saying that he had avoided criticizing the Russian military until now.
“The last straw that overwhelmed my patience was the events around Bilohorivka, where due to stupidity — I emphasize, because of the stupidity of the Russian command — at least one battalion tactical group was burned, possibly two.”
Mr. Podolyaka ridiculed the Kremlin line that the war is going “according to plan.” He told his viewers in a five-minute video that, in fact, the Russian Army was short of functional unmanned drones, night-vision equipment and other kit “that is catastrophically lacking on the front.”
“Yes, I understand that it’s impossible for there to be no problems in war,” he said. “But when the same problems go on for three months, and nothing seems to be changing, then I personally and in fact millions of citizens of the Russian Federation start to have questions for these leaders of the military operation.”
Another popular blogger, who goes by Starshe Eddy on Telegram, wrote that the fact that commanders left so much of their force exposed amounted to “not idiocy, but direct sabotage.”
Russia-Ukraine War: Key Developments
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Inching closer to NATO. Finland’s government announced that the nation would apply for NATO membership, hours before Sweden’s governing party said that it also supported joining the alliance. If accepted into NATO, both nations would set aside a long history of military nonalignment.
And a third, Vladlen Tatarski, posted that Russia’s eastern offensive was moving slowly not just because of a lack of surveillance drones but also “these generals” and their tactics.
“Until we get the last name of the military genius who laid down a B.T.G. by the river and he answers for it publicly, we won’t have had any military reforms,” Mr. Tatarski wrote.
Western military analysts have also pored over the imagery and say the attempted crossing demonstrated a stunning lack of tactical sense.
They have speculated that Russian commanders, desperate to make progress, rushed the operation. Some also suggested that it was a reflection of disorder in the Russian ranks.
If the estimates that hundreds of soldiers were killed or injured prove accurate, it would be one of the deadliest known engagements of the war.
There were more than 500 sailors aboard the Russian Black Sea flagship Moskva when it was struck by a Ukrainian missile in April. The Kremlin at first insisted that all the sailors were rescued, later saying one was killed. But even as the families of missing sailors have publicly demanded answers, the Kremlin has largely kept up an official silence on the fate of the crew, part of a larger campaign to suppress bad news.
19. Nations Aim to Secure Supply Chains by Turning Offshoring Into ‘Friend-Shoring’
Seems like a good way forward.
Nations Aim to Secure Supply Chains by Turning Offshoring Into ‘Friend-Shoring’
U.S. officials and allies around the world are looking to establish friendly supply routes for key goods amid a war and global pandemic
WASHINGTON—As war and the pandemic expose the fragility of supply chains, the U.S. and its allies are pursuing a new kind of global trade, one that confines commerce to a circle of trusted nations. Fans call the shift “friend-shoring.”
The new strategy is a departure from economic globalization of recent decades, when businesses bought and made products where costs were low and free-trade policies made moving goods around the world cheaper and faster.
Promoters of friend-shoring see it as a chance to revamp global supply chains to reduce their reliance on countries with autocratic governments and nonmarket economies, namely China and Russia. They say it is a compromise between full-fledged globalization and isolationism, and between offshoring and domestic production.
U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai says it is essential to diversify supply sources for key goods.
PHOTO: JIM WATSON/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
“Favoring the ‘friend-shoring’ of supply chains to a large number of trusted countries—so we can continue to securely extend market access—will lower the risks to our economy, as well as to our trusted trade partners,” Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said in an April speech. Such arrangements, she said, would allow the U.S. to deepen ties with a group of countries sharing “a set of norms and values about how to operate in the global economy.”
Efforts are already under way in industries including semiconductors and rare-earth metals, a crucial input for electric vehicles and missiles. Private companies are joining the fray as well, moving to increase production in countries they see as carrying relatively low political and logistical risk.
The emerging trend alarms some economists who worry it could hurt both rich and poor nations whose economies enjoyed the benefits of a more open, global trading system in recent decades. “One scenario is where we have divided blocs that are not trading much with each other, that are on different standards,” says Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, chief economist for the International Monetary Fund. “That would be a disaster for the global economy.”
Some skeptics of free trade say “friend-shoring” is just a term to disguise more offshoring, rather than accelerating domestic production that would better secure supply chains and create American jobs. “Friend-shoring is kind of like globalization lite. If you don’t have domestic popular support for that approach, that’s not going to be successful,” says Jamieson Greer, a King & Spalding lawyer and former chief of staff for the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative during the Trump administration.
Why Global Supply Chains May Never Be the Same - A WSJ Documentary
Why Global Supply Chains May Never Be the Same - A WSJ Documentary
Play video: Why Global Supply Chains May Never Be the Same - A WSJ Documentary
Every day, millions of sailors, truck drivers, longshoremen, warehouse workers and delivery drivers keep mountains of goods moving into stores and homes to meet consumers’ increasing expectations of convenience. But this complex movement of goods underpinning the global economy is far more vulnerable than many imagined. Photo illustration: Adele Morgan
Tensions with China in recent years have encouraged governments and companies to pursue diversification away from the country. The Covid-19 pandemic exposed the fragility of supply lines, accelerating the trend. Officials’ urgency has only increased with the war in Ukraine, which has brought export crunches of energy and food products, and waves of sanctions against Moscow disrupting global flows of money and goods.
“You may have heard people say countries that trade with each other don’t go to war with each other. In the last two months, we’ve seen that’s not necessarily true,” U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai said in an April speech.
She said it is essential to diversify supply sources for key goods “to make sure that the next time there is a crisis, we don’t have the panic and the sense of desperation.”
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What impact will ‘friend-shoring’ have on supply chains as well as political alliances? Join the conversation below.
To reduce their hefty reliance on China for critical minerals needed to power items such as electric vehicles and weapons, the U.S. and Australia are working together to build rare-earth mining and processing facilities located in both countries. China currently refines 60% of the world’s lithium and 80% of cobalts, two core critical mineral inputs to high-capacity batteries, according to an April 2022 White House supply-chain report.
After meeting with Australian officials and company executives in Washington recently, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo said the U.S. was committed to providing necessary financing and regulatory support.
“Geostrategic circumstances have changed and that’s why we’re thinking about things that maybe a few years ago we did not contemplate,” said Arthur Sinodinos, Australian ambassador to the U.
In trans-Atlantic trade discussions, the U.S. and the European Union are looking at coordinating their plans to spend tens of billions of dollars to help companies such as Intel Corp. build factories for advanced semiconductors. In 2021, 92% of the world supply of advanced semiconductors came from one company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., according to the White House report.
Some businesses are ahead of policy makers in their friend-shoring practices. Apparel companies in recent years had to grapple with U.S. policies clamping down on cotton products from China’s Xinjiang region linked to forced labor. Then came the pandemic-induced congestion that resulted in skyrocketing of the time and cost of shipping from Asia.
Apparel businesses’ favorite destinations are Central American countries such as Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador. Gap is doubling the region’s share of its global production to 10% within the next year and eventually wants to raise it to 25%, according to industry executives.
While the quality of fabrics and labor availability in the region still lag behind those of China, companies benefit from the proximity to American consumers, as well as lower tariff rates under a U.S. free-trade agreement. The Biden administration is also spending billions of dollars to develop the local economy and attract private-sector investment in the region, a step officials hope will help reduce migration to the U.S.
Among the beneficiaries are companies like Intradeco Holdings, a Miami-based company that manufactures clothing in El Salvador for retailers like Walmart Inc. and Amazon.com Inc. Intradeco Chief Executive Felix Siman says that since the spring of 2021, his company has signed up four to five new customers, including PVH Corp., the parent company of Calvin Klein brands. Intradeco’s revenue this year will be 20% higher than its prepandemic level, he says.
“The companies don’t want to do everything in China anymore,” Mr. Siman says. “There is tremendous interest in the region. Demand is much bigger than we can match now.”
20. 7 reasons why Zelenskyy’s crisis leadership is so effective
The classics remain relevant in the 21st Century.
Excerpt:
We found all seven of the key character virtues – humanity, temperance, justice, courage, transcendence, wisdom and prudence – evident in Zelenskyy’s responses to the interviewers’ questions.
7 reasons why Zelenskyy’s crisis leadership is so effective
Aristotle's ancient virtues play a vital role in today's war.
Yet Volodomyr Zelenskyy, a relative novice head of state, has not just risen to the challenge, he has been widely praised and admired for his exemplary crisis leadership. So, what explains this prowess?
Zelenskyy’s acting experience has been credited with his ability to connect powerfully with different audiences, using facts and emotions to build support for the Ukrainian cause.
His commitment to serve his people has been called pivotal. He has been described as charismatic – although this alone is no guarantee of success, given charismatic leaders can still lead their nations to destruction.
And it’s Zelenskyy’s repeated displays of courage that seem to really strike a chord with many. This leads us into the territory of character virtues, which we argue hold the key to Zelenskyy’s abilities as a crisis leader.
Ancient wisdom for today’s world
Aristotle is credited with first proposing that virtues play a central role in forging a strength of character that can navigate and weather life’s challenges with moral fortitude and integrity.
Recently, we drew on this knowledge to examine crisis leadership and how character virtues guided 12 heads of state through that first, tumultuous wave of COVID-19. We’ve used the same approach to analyse Zelenskyy’s leadership.
We closely examined an extended filmed interview with Zelenksyy by The Economist. Being unscripted and more spontaneous than his pre-prepared speeches, it offered a clearer insight into his character.
We found all seven of the key character virtues – humanity, temperance, justice, courage, transcendence, wisdom and prudence – evident in Zelenskyy’s responses to the interviewers’ questions.
Character virtues in action
The virtue of humanity relates to care, compassion, empathy and respect for others. Zelenskyy demonstrates this primarily through his focus on protecting Ukrainians from Russian aggression, but it even extends to his enemy’s suffering.
Zelenskyy expresses concern that Putin is “throwing Russian soldiers like logs into a train’s furnace”, and laments that the Russian dead are neither mourned nor buried by their own side.
This refusal to simply give way to hate and anger when speaking of his enemies also reflects a second virtue, temperance – the ability to exercise emotional control.
Zelenskyy’s modesty also reflects this virtue – in the interview he shrugs off praise for being an inspirational hero, preferring to keep to the main issues. Temperance serves to maintain emotional equilibrium, thus enabling Zelenskyy to make difficult decisions in a level-headed manner.
The virtue of justice means acting responsibly and ensuring people are treated fairly. It involves citizenship, teamwork, loyalty and accountability. Zelenskyy speaks of his “duty to protect” Ukrainians and to “signal” with his own conduct how others should act. By remaining in Ukraine, he becomes a role model of this virtue while simultaneously demonstrating the virtue of courage.
Zelenskyy’s own courage has been widely noted, but we observed that he also repeatedly acknowledges that of his fellow citizens, thereby encouraging them to act with virtue.
A formidable opponent
By expressing the seemingly unshakeable hope that Ukrainians will secure victory because of their courage, Zelenskyy demonstrates the virtue of transcendence – the optimism and faith that a cause is meaningful, noble and will prevail.
Zelenskyy’s views about what motivates other countries display his wisdom. In the interview he demonstrates a broad strategic perspective and insight into the varying interests that shape other nations’ responses to the war. This helps him craft his appeals to allies, and to Russia, which then have a greater chance of resonating.
The final virtue, prudence, complements that wisdom. It involves an ability to gauge what is the right thing to do and is something of a meta-virtue, guiding the choice of which other virtues are needed from moment to moment. We found repeated instances of Zelenskyy demonstrating just that, weaving together multiple virtues in his responses to questions.
Our analysis of his leadership indicates Zelenskyy possesses strength of character and emotional, intellectual and moral clarity about what is at stake. This explains his effective crisis leadership to date. Despite the clear military mismatch between Russia and Ukraine, Putin has taken on a formidable opponent.
21. US special-operations leaders are figuring out what skills to bring with them into 'the 5th modern era' of special ops
US special-operations leaders are figuring out what skills to bring with them into 'the 5th modern era' of special ops
A US soldier assigned to Special Operations Command Africa observes wind conditions during a parachute jump near Stuttgart, Germany, September 21, 2016.
US Army/VIS Jason Johnston
- US special operators are shifting focus to great-power competition after 20 years of counterterrorism.
- Special-ops leaders told lawmakers in April that in a new era they will focus on an old skill: supporting conventional forces.
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During a Senate hearing at the end of April, US special-operations leaders provided insight into how the US special-operations community is gearing up for future challenges.
Near-peer adversaries — mainly China, but also Russia — are the primary threats to US national security, and the US military, including US Special Operations Command, is adjusting accordingly.
When asked how the shift from counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations to great-power competition is affecting their planning and investment decisions, the commanders emphasized a shift to supporting operations.
The leaders of US Air Force Special Operations Command and Naval Special Warfare Command in particular described a desire for the special-operations component commands to more closely support their parent branch — the Air Force and the Navy, respectively.
"I believe that the service components of SOF are most effective when we're closest to our parent services," said Lt. Gen. James Slife, the head of US Air Force Special Operations Command.
US Air Force tactical air control party airmen during an exercise at Point Barrow in Alaska, January 13, 2022.
US Air Force/Staff Sgt. Zade Vadnais
The AFSOC boss went on to say that there is value in "enabling our broader service" and helping it "to be effective."
"So I think for AFSOC there's a lot of work to be done in the integrated-air-defense area as well as the counter-space mission area," Slife added.
Howard acknowledged that over the past 20 years NSW has lost some ground "in the distinctive things that only we can do, and we are moving with urgency to make the main thing the things that only we can do in the maritime domain."
The special-ops leaders' comments indicate a shift back to the role those special operators have played throughout their history: supporting their conventional brethren.
Cyber, space, and SOF
Airmen with the 919th Special Operations Communications Squadron configure a communications network at Duke Field in Florida, November 1, 2021.
US Air Force/Michelle Gigante
The special-operations leaders are also looking into the future, and especially in the cyber and space domains, which are increasingly important for facilitating operations in other domains and as domains of warfare on their own.
US Marine Corps Maj. Gen. James Glynn, commander of Marine Forces Special Operations Command, emphasized his command's "examination" of its cyber and space capabilities and "the integration with special operations going forward to narrow that gray zone," referring to the space in which threatening activities short of war often take place.
"I cannot envision a future where that does not increase in importance, affecting target audiences, general populations, governments, armies, morale, and eroding their overall effectiveness," US Army Lt. Gen. Jonathan Braga, commander of US Army Special Operations Command, said of information operations.
More direct action, less foreign training
A Marine with Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command fast-ropes out of an MV-22B Osprey at Camp Pendleton, February 4, 2016.
US Marine Corps/Cpl. Tyler S. Dietrich
The renewed focus on near-peer adversaries means that special-operations forces will need to reappraise their mission sets and priorities.
In shifting from counterterrorism to great-power competition, the focus "must shift from sensing, identifying, and targeting small underground terrorist networks to being able to initially provide a deterrence through a wide and formidable array of partnerships with our military alliances, not only in the Pacific but from across the globe," retired Marine Raider Maj. Fred Galvin told Insider.
Galvin is the author of "A Few Bad Men," a non-fiction account of the first Marine Special Operations combat deployment to Afghanistan and how they overcame attacks from all sides.
US Army Green Berets breach a building during direct-action operations training at Camp Hansen in Okinawa, May 2021.
US Army/Staff Sgt. Anthony Bryant
"SOCOM has a large task in shaping each phase of the future fight through imposing costs to our competitors during the crisis and conflict phases," Galvin said.
A "primary" difference in how US special-operations forces will conduct crisis and conflict operations during great-power competition will be those forces' "reliance on and coordination with conventional and allied forces vs. conducting separate, small-scale unilateral operations" as they did during the war on terror, Galvin added.
Although US special operators will still train partner forces and help foreign militaries increase their capacities, near-peer competition likely means those operators will be conducting "more direct engagements vs. the preponderance of advise and assist missions that have occurred over the previous 20 years," Galvin said.
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate.
22. EXPLAINER: Theory of white replacement fuels racist attacks
For those who might be unfamiliar with this and since it appears to be a motivator for racist attacks. Hard to believe any critical thinking person could believe this theory.
EXPLAINER: Theory of white replacement fuels racist attacks
AP · by DAVID BAUDER · May 16, 2022
Ideas from “The Great Replacement Theory” filled a racist screed supposedly posted online by the white 18-year-old man accused of targeting Black people in Saturday’s rampage. Authorities were still working to confirm its authenticity.
Certainly, there was no mistaking the racist intent of the shooter.
WHAT IS THE GREAT REPLACEMENT THEORY?
Simply put, it says there’s a conspiracy afoot to diminish the influence of white people.
Believers say this goal is being achieved both through immigration of nonwhite people into societies that have largely been dominated by white people, as well as through simple demographics, with white people having lower birth rates than others.
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The theory’s more racist adherents believe Jews are behind the so-called replacement conspiracy. When white supremacists marched in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017, their chants included “you will not replace us” and “Jews will not replace us.”
A more mainstream view in the U.S. suggests Democrats are encouraging immigration from Latin America so more like-minded potential voters replace “traditional” Americans, said Mark Pitcavage, senior research fellow at the Anti-Defamation League Center on Extremism.
WHAT ARE ITS ROOTS?
How long has racism existed? Broadly speaking, its roots are that deep. In the U.S., you can point to efforts to intimidate and discourage Black people from voting — from replacing white voters at the polls — that date to the post-Civil War era.
In the modern era, most experts point to two influential books. “The Turner Diaries,” a 1978 novel written by William Luther Pierce under the pseudonym Andrew Macdonald, is about a violent revolution in the United States with a race war that leads to the extermination of nonwhites.
The FBI called it a “bible of the racist right,” said Kurt Braddock, an American University professor and a researcher at the Polarization and Extremism Research & Innovation Lab.
A 2012 book by Frenchman Renaud Camus, about Europe being invaded by Black and brown immigrants from Africa, was called “Le Grand Remplacement” and a name was born.
WHO ARE ITS ADHERENTS?
To some of the more extreme believers, certain white supremacist mass killers — in Norway in 2011, two New Zealand mosques in 2019, a Pittsburgh synagogue in 2018, a Black church in South Carolina — are considered saints, Pitcavage said.
Those “accelerationist white supremacists” believe small societal changes won’t achieve much, so the only option is tearing down society, he said.
The Buffalo shooter’s alleged diatribe and some of his apparent methods indicate he closely studied the New Zealand shooter, particularly the effort to livestream his rampage. He reportedly inscribed the number 14 on his gun, which Pitcavage said is shorthand for a 14-word white supremacist slogan.
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A “manifesto” by the New Zealand shooter was widely spread online. If the message from the Buffalo shooter proves authentic, it seems designed to also spread his philosophy and methods to a large audience.
IS THE THEORY MAKING WIDER INROADS?
While more extreme forms of racism are clearly frowned upon, many experts are concerned about a mainstreaming of some views.
In a poll released last week, The Associated Press and the NORC Center for Public Affairs Research found that about 1 in 3 Americans believe an effort is underway to replace U.S.-born Americans with immigrants for electoral gain.
On a regular basis, many adherents to the more extreme versions of The Great Replacement Theory converse through encrypted apps online and tend to be careful. They know they’re being watched.
“They are very clever,” Braddock said. “They don’t make overt calls to arms.”
WHO’S TALKING ABOUT REPLACEMENT?
In particular, Tucker Carlson, Fox News’ most popular personality, has pushed false but more politically palatable views that are seen as sympathetic by some white people who are concerned about a loss of power.
“I know that the left and all the gatekeepers on Twitter become literally hysterical if you use the term ‘replacement,’ if you suggest the Democratic Party is trying to replace the current electorate, the voters now casting ballots, with new people, more obedient voters from the Third World,” he said on his show last year. “But they become hysterical because that’s what’s happening, actually, let’s just say it. That’s true.”
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A study of five years’ worth of Carlson’s show by The New York Times found 400 instances where he talked about Democratic politicians and others seeking to force demographic change through immigration.
Fox News pointed to repeated statements that Carlson has made denouncing political violence of all kinds.
The attention paid by many Republican politicians to what they see as a leaky southern border along the United States has been interpreted, at least by some, as a nod to the concern of white people who worry about being “replaced.”
House Republican Conference Chair Elise Stefanik’s campaign committee was criticized last year for an advertisement that said “radical Democrats” were planning a “permanent election insurrection” by granting amnesty to undocumented immigrants who would create a permanent liberal majority in Washington.
Pitcavage said he’s concerned about the message Carlson and some who agree with him are sending. “It actually introduces the Great Replacement Theory to a conservative audience in an easier-to-swallow pill,” he said.
AP · by DAVID BAUDER · May 16, 2022
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.