Quotes of the Day:
“The capacity for the human mind for swallowing nonsense and spewing it forth in violent and repressive action has never yet been plumbed.”
– Robert A. Heinlein Revolt în 2100, (Postscript (1953)
“Because fanaticism and ignorance is forever busy and needs feeding. And soon, your honor, with banners flying high and drums beating we’ll be marching backward… backward – to the glorious ages of that sixteenth century when bigots burned the man who dared bring enlightenment and intelligence to the human mind!’
– Henry Drummond, Inherit the Wind
“What must we do then? We must complain. Yes, plain, blunt complain, ceaseless agitation, unfailing exposure of dishonesty and wrong. This is the ancient, unerring way to liberty, and we must follow it.”
– W.E.B Dubois, “The Niagara Movement,” Voice of the Negro II (September 1905)
1. HRNK President and CEO Greg Scarlatoiu Testifying at First Ever UN High-Level Meeting on North Korean Human Rights
2. A Major Shift in South Korean Diplomacy: Trump’s America First Policies and the ROK–US AllianceDate
3. US Forces Korea serves roles beyond deterring North Korea, commander says
4. US ally revives aircraft carrier plan amid North Korea threat
5. Bridging The Divide: A Strategy For Peace On Korean Peninsula – OpEd
6. South Korea Goes Small in Bid for Nuclear Power Ascendance
7. Can South Korea, Japan forces train together? Joint drill denial reveals unresolved trauma
8. Red Lines and Reckonings (Global threat assessment)
9. China quietly bought land near top Seoul security sites
10. USFK chief stresses continued troop presence in S. Korea amid China-Russia threats
11. Workers' hell: Inside North Korea's brutal construction program
12. N. Korea finalizing selection of workers for China deployment
13. APEC trade ministers issue joint statement reaffirming WTO's role in addressing trade issues
14. S. Korea again requests exemption from all U.S. tariffs; 2nd round of technical talks to be held next week
15. S. Korea holds bilateral trade talks with 14 partners at APEC meeting
16. Silent infiltration: Hackers on the payroll
17. S. Korea-U.S. trade negotiation conclusion unlikely before launch of new Seoul gov't: Cheong
18. Leading candidate doesn't know his own birthday — and voters relate
19. Losing ground, PPP's Kim Moon-soo sinks deeper into Yoon dilemma
1. HRNK President and CEO Greg Scarlatoiu Testifying at First Ever UN High-Level Meeting on North Korean Human Rights
The United States is fortunate to have Greg Scarlatoiu carrying the human rights torch. President Trump should just make him the US Ambassador and Special Envoy for north Korean Human Rights. There is no American more qualified for the position than Greg. There is no American who can speak fluent Korean (and Romanian and French) as well as Greg and who knows as much about human rights in north Korea as Greg.
HRNK President and CEO Greg Scarlatoiu Testifying at First Ever UN High-Level Meeting on North Korean Human Rights
As the United Nations General Assembly prepares to host its first-ever high-level meeting on North Korean human rights next Tuesday, concerns are mounting over the absence of key human rights envoys in both South Korea and the United States.
The UN invitation letter to HRNK is at this link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_f5iqE8Z0BnAk71e7SdGUPen_EJeJj6Y/view?usp=sharing
2. A Major Shift in South Korean Diplomacy: Trump’s America First Policies and the ROK–US Alliance
We should think (and act), "America FIrst, Allies Always - Allies are America's Asymmetric Advantage"
But sadly there is this assessment and recommendation:
This effectively nullifies the World Trade Organization (WTO), the South Korea–US Free Trade Agreement, and even the defense cost-sharing agreement reached at the end of the Joe Biden administration. It entirely negates South Korea’s recent contributions—particularly its increased corporate investment in the US—and destroys not just the value and economic basis of the strategic alliance between the two countries but also its security foundations. It is a direct and existential threat to South Korean diplomacy. Now is the time to restore the constitutional order of the republic and move away from a blind faith in US power and virtue. South Korea must face the reality of a US captured by far-right populism, which is dismantling the international order and the South Korea–US alliance and pursue a transformative shift in its foreign policy.
...
South Korea must secure a balance of interests in the face of Trump’s one stop shopping pressure. This necessitates a major transformation in foreign policy. Specifically, there are three tasks. First, and most directly, is to soberly assess the value of the South Korea-US alliance—including the unavoidable costs of maintaining it—under conditions where the US is weaponizing economic and security interdependence in a predatory manner. Second, the cost-benefit analysis of the alliance must lead to a redefinition of South Korea’s national interests. Should the defense cost-sharing agreement that was already negotiated and ratified by the South Korean National Assembly be broken in pursuit of economic benefits from the one stop shopping package? If US troops in South Korea are repurposed for containing China, should South Korea still pay for their presence? Should Seoul accept demands to lift agricultural import restrictions or loosen tech regulations under pressure from US industry in return for exports of automobiles? Cooperation in shipbuilding could ultimately lead to production bases being moved to the US—are such corporate interests truly aligned with South Korea’s national interest? Given worsening trade conditions, is export-led growth still viable as a national strategy? Third is the formulation of a new grand strategy to realize these redefined national interests. Given the prospect of prolonged US–China strategic rivalry and mounting US-driven threats to South Korean interests, a strategy of hedging against both the US and China, self-strengthening and diversification is essential. If South Korea’s soft power lies in empathizing with the Global South as a postcolonial state while upholding democracy and economic stability, then its inertia-bound, alliance-centric foreign policy must be abandoned.
EAF Policy Debates
A Major Shift in South Korean Diplomacy: Trump’s America First Policies and the ROK–US Alliance
- Date2025-05-14
- PublisherEast Asia Foundation
- AuthorHea Jeong Lee(Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Chung-Ang University)
- https://www.keaf.org/en/book/EAF_Policy_Debates/A_Major_Shift_in_South_Korean_Diplomacy_Trumps_America_First_Policies_and_the_ROK%E2%80%93US_Alliance
- EAF Policy Debates_No.234.pdf
Summary
In President Donald Trump’s second term, his administration is further reinforcing its “America First” policies and demanding “one-stop shopping” from South Korea, including reciprocal tariffs and increased cost-sharing for defense. This poses a direct and existential threat to South Korean diplomacy, shaking the very foundations of the strategic South Korea–US alliance—its values and its economic and security framework. Trump’s America First policies stem from a failure of the existing hegemonic and democratic order, and the resulting chaos in the US and globally will persist for the foreseeable future. South Korea, having aligned itself with the US as a leading force of the liberal order, must completely overhaul its alliance-first strategy. To do so, it must carefully assess the benefits and costs of the alliance, redefine its national interests in light of the changed international environment and South Korea–US relations, as well as establish a grand strategy to realize those interests.
South Korean diplomacy is facing a comprehensive internal and external crisis. Trump’s re-election as US president coincided with the implosion of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, following his self-coup in December and his subsequent removal from office. The political division and regression in South Korea persist even after Yoon’s impeachment and the snap presidential election set for June 3. Meanwhile, 100 days into his second term, Trump has unleashed sweeping executive orders to neutralize opposition in a “flood the zone operation,” threatening, according to his critics, the foundations of American democracy, such as the separation of powers, rule of law and academic freedom, while dismantling the US-led post-Second World War international order of alliances and multilateral trade. South Korea has been hit with item-specific tariffs on steel, aluminum and automobiles, along with a 25 percent “reciprocal tariff.” Within the 90-day grace period (by July 8), the US is demanding “one-stop shopping” negotiations that include not only tariffs but also the removal of non-tariff barriers, increased cost-sharing for defense, imports of US LNG, investment in the Alaska pipeline and cooperation on shipbuilding.
This effectively nullifies the World Trade Organization (WTO), the South Korea–US Free Trade Agreement, and even the defense cost-sharing agreement reached at the end of the Joe Biden administration. It entirely negates South Korea’s recent contributions—particularly its increased corporate investment in the US—and destroys not just the value and economic basis of the strategic alliance between the two countries but also its security foundations. It is a direct and existential threat to South Korean diplomacy. Now is the time to restore the constitutional order of the republic and move away from a blind faith in US power and virtue. South Korea must face the reality of a US captured by far-right populism, which is dismantling the international order and the South Korea–US alliance and pursue a transformative shift in its foreign policy.
Trump’s America First: Failure of the Existing Order and Chaos
Trump’s America First agenda is the result of structural ills in the existing American system—a decline in manufacturing, a collapse of the middle class, increasing immigration paired with a shrinking white population, and political polarization. The failure of the Barack Obama administration to rebuild the middle class and end the “forever wars” formed the backdrop for Trump’s first term. His re-election signifies the failure of the Biden administration’s attempts to restore the status quo by of the democratic system by addressing systematic racism and plutocracy and reinstating leadership centered on the framework of “democracy vs. autocracy.” The core of Trump’s right-wing populism and the MAGA agenda—“Make America Great Again”—is the destruction and disruption of the established order. In his first term, this meant breaking conventions and norms; in his second term, it has extended to laws, institutions and infrastructure. While his first term dismantled the mechanisms of America’s post-Cold War unipolar hegemony, the second has brought global tariff wars, proposals to annex Panama and Greenland, and threats to integrate Canada as the 51st state of the US—shaking the very foundation of the post-Second World War international order and the modern sovereign state system.
The restraints on Trump during his first term—FBI investigations, Democratic impeachment efforts, mainstream media criticism and resistance from bureaucrats—and even the criminal indictments during Biden’s presidency disappeared with his victory in the 2024 election. Trump capitalized on Biden’s failures on inflation and immigration, transforming the Republican Party into a personal vehicle while broadening his base among minorities and the working class. Meanwhile, the Democrats lost both message and messenger as a viable governing alternative. Trump claims that surviving two assassination attempts proves a divine mission to fulfill right-wing populism. Guardrails have vanished, Project 2025—a conservative plan for governance crafted by the Heritage Foundation—has become more refined, and Trump has built his second-term administration around a team of loyalists.
The emergence of Trump’s second administration is likened to the “shock and awe” of the Bush invasion of Iraq. Some deportation operations targeting undocumented immigrants have been executed without proper legal procedures, and Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency began dismantling the “deep state,” including abolishing the US Agency for International Development. A sweeping culture war is also underway, targeting media, universities and law firms, portraying Biden’s Diversity, Equity, Inclusion (DEI) initiatives as un-American and unpatriotic radical-left agendas. The most prominent element of Trump’s second-term shock is the tariff war. While the Biden administration viewed industrial policy as a “Swiss knife” for achieving middle-class diplomacy, economic security and climate goals simultaneously, Trump’s administration treats tariffs as tools to negotiate against undocumented immigrants and drug trafficking, reduce trade deficits, restore manufacturing and the middle class, offset tax cuts, and most of all, replace industrial policy through onshoring.
Trump declared the day he announced global reciprocal tariffs, April 2, as “Liberation Day.” However, that day also exposed the contradictions and limitations of his entire foreign policy—unleashing the Pandora’s box of America First policies. The US stock and bond markets fell, as did the dollar, while China and the EU fought back with retaliatory tariffs. Anti-Trump protests began being organized across the US. With US federal debt surpassing 120 percent of GDP and interest payments exceeding defense spending from FY2024, rising bond yields threatened Trump’s tax cuts and the dollar’s safe-haven status. In response, Trump deferred the reciprocal tariffs for 90 days and called on affected countries to negotiate trade deals with the US.
Around the 100-day mark of his presidency, Trump faced three major obstacles: market discipline, judicial pushback against his executive orders, and falling public approval. His deferral of reciprocal tariffs restored faith in the “Trump Put”—the notion that Trump will react to market signals, especially from the bond market—and this dynamic is likely to continue. Though a surge in imports caused negative GDP growth in Q1, the US economy remains strong and indicators on inflation and employment are relatively stable. The conservative-leaning Supreme Court and the mixed outcomes of lawsuits suggest the judiciary won’t significantly restrain Trump. Support from moderates has declined since his inauguration, but Republican backing remains firm. While Trump’s economic leadership rating is historically low, the Democrats are in even worse shape, with lower economic approval and historically low internal trust. The Democratic leadership is fragmented and unlikely to politically organize the scattered anti-Trump protests, because it remains undecided on whether to wait for Trump to fail or to confront him directly—and if so, whether to focus on economic mismanagement or democratic backsliding.
Domestically, Trump’s leadership is based on an extreme fandom bordering on cult-like devotion, rooted in personal loyalty and patrimonialism—“Trump First.” Externally, his leadership relies on transactional deals with strongmen—“Trump First” based on the notion of Trump the dealmaker. Despite bearing the brunt of the US–China trade war, farmers in the Midwest continue to support him, aided by subsidies. Unless severe stagflation occurs, Trump’s hold over the MAGA base will persist. He remains steadfast in asserting that tariffs are essential for rebuilding America, particularly its manufacturing and middle class, and that the pain of transition will be minimal and necessary. His core supporters agree. While his foreign negotiations and patronage networks may weaken tariffs into a “Swiss cheese” model, it’s extremely unlikely Trump will abandon the tariff war altogether. The political chaos and paralysis in the US will likely continue throughout Trump’s term, at least until the midterm elections.
South Korea’s America First Challenge
Trump’s America First policies present a particularly serious challenge for South Korea. This is not merely because South Korea objectively depends on the US for security or relies heavily on its markets, technology and currency. The US holds a unique ideological and political position in South Korea, and as South Korea experiences “Peak Korea”—marked by low growth and political regression—Trump's America First stance is forcing changes in the South Korea–US alliance. During the Cold War, anti-communism and pro-Americanism were national imperatives for South Koreans. During that period, even though South Korea underwent an “IMF economic trusteeship” led by the US, it came to embrace globalization—effectively Americanization—under neoliberal globalization, with a broad national sentiment of South Korea’s own form of modernization and/or Westernization. The post-Cold War South Korea-US alliance evolved into a strategic alliance with shared values and global cooperation in military, economic and diplomatic spheres, such as the FTA and Iraq War participation, with South Korea leading peninsula defense and sharing US base costs. This framework persisted under the Roh, Lee, Park, and Moon administrations throughout the 2000s and 2010s.
Considering that US decline began with the 2007–08 financial crisis and Trump’s rise since 2016, the continued deepening of the alliance since Lee Myung-bak’s administration has been a strategic error born of South Korea’s outdated America First mindset. Under Yoon’s administration, economic stagnation, political backsliding, and US unilateralism have all reached extremes. Although he hosted the Summit for Democracy under the slogan of a values-based alliance encompassing security, economy, technology, culture and information, Yoon’s self-coup plunged South Korean democracy into crisis and the economy into continued negative growth. Most crucially, his administration failed to prepare for Trump’s re-election.
Complacency in responding to Trump’s America First policies is not unique to the Yoon administration. Trump has consistently accused allies of free-riding under America’s security umbrella and exploiting the US through unfair trade practices and industrial policy. Yet, South Korea’s ruling and opposition parties both passed a resolution reaffirming support for the alliance and pledging broad strategic cooperation upon his inauguration. In Trump’s second term, however, South Korea is being labeled as one of the notorious “dirty fifteen” nations exploiting the US and pressured into a “one stop shopping.” Ironically, the absence of functioning economic leadership—marked by Yoon’s impeachment, the impeached president’s prime minister running for office, the finance minister’s resignation, and the education minister, third in the line of succession, serving as acting president—may delay rash negotiations. Should the caretaker or next government hastily agree to Trump’s “July package,” it could amount to a surrender of sovereignty and a mortgage on South Korea’s future—a modern-day Eulsa Treaty, the 1905 forced agreement that stripped Korea of its sovereignty by placing it under Imperial Japan’s protectorate.
The Triple Task of a Grand Strategy Shift
South Korea must secure a balance of interests in the face of Trump’s one stop shopping pressure. This necessitates a major transformation in foreign policy. Specifically, there are three tasks. First, and most directly, is to soberly assess the value of the South Korea-US alliance—including the unavoidable costs of maintaining it—under conditions where the US is weaponizing economic and security interdependence in a predatory manner. Second, the cost-benefit analysis of the alliance must lead to a redefinition of South Korea’s national interests. Should the defense cost-sharing agreement that was already negotiated and ratified by the South Korean National Assembly be broken in pursuit of economic benefits from the one stop shopping package? If US troops in South Korea are repurposed for containing China, should South Korea still pay for their presence? Should Seoul accept demands to lift agricultural import restrictions or loosen tech regulations under pressure from US industry in return for exports of automobiles? Cooperation in shipbuilding could ultimately lead to production bases being moved to the US—are such corporate interests truly aligned with South Korea’s national interest? Given worsening trade conditions, is export-led growth still viable as a national strategy? Third is the formulation of a new grand strategy to realize these redefined national interests. Given the prospect of prolonged US–China strategic rivalry and mounting US-driven threats to South Korean interests, a strategy of hedging against both the US and China, self-strengthening and diversification is essential. If South Korea’s soft power lies in empathizing with the Global South as a postcolonial state while upholding democracy and economic stability, then its inertia-bound, alliance-centric foreign policy must be abandoned.
-- The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the East Asia Foundation.
About the Author
Hea Jeong Lee (Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Chung-Ang University)
Hea Jeong Lee graduated from Seoul National University’s Department of International Relations, where he earned his bachelor’s and master’s degrees, and later his Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University. During his doctoral studies, he was selected for an international research program on “Reviewing the Cold War” and served as a visiting researcher at the Norwegian Nobel Institute. He has been a visiting fellow at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies, a senior researcher at Yonsei University’s Institute for Unification Studies, and a visiting professor at the Mansfield Center, University of Montana. His main academic interest lies in the “origins of political phenomena,” beginning with the military’s political involvement and expanding to the origins of US hegemony and modern international relations. His current research includes US foreign policy, international relations theory and the history of Korea’s international relations. Recent publications include After Impeachment: Toward a New Republic (co-authored, in Korean, 2025), “Liberal International Order, China and American Hegemony: A Critique of Ikenberry’s Evolving Views on China” (co-authored, in Korean, 2025), and “The Return of Trump: The Compounding Crises of the Great Recession and the Covid Pandemic, and the Remaking of America” (in Korean, 2025).
3. US Forces Korea serves roles beyond deterring North Korea, commander says
We can no longer look at our security challenges in isolation. They are interrelated and interconnected and we need to take a holistic approach to them not only from a US forces perspective but also from the perspective of our silk web of alliances. As we can see from the respective mutual defense treaties they are rather broad and do not limit their support to defense of only their respective countries.
Silk Web of Alliances: Trump’s Legacy and the Indo-Pacific’s Future
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/01/silk-web-of-alliances-trumps-legacy-and-the-indo-pacifics-future/
America Must Stop Treating Taiwan and Korea as Separate Security Issues
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/04/america-must-stop-treating-taiwan-and-korea-as-separate-security-issues/
ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty:
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp
Japan-US Mutual Defense treaty:
ARTICLE IV
The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html
Philippines- US Mutual Defense Treaty
ARTICLE IV
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp
Security Treaty Between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand (ANZUS); September 1, 1951:
ARTICLE III
The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.
ARTICLE IV
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
ARTICLE V
For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/usmu002.asp
US Forces Korea serves roles beyond deterring North Korea, commander says
Gen. Xavier Brunson stresses need for US troops on peninsula to counter China and Russia under Indo-Pacific strategy
Jooheon Kim May 16, 2025
Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of U.S. Forces Korea and the combined U.S.-South Korea forces, speaks at the Land Forces Pacific (LANPAC) Symposium in Hawaii on May 15, 2025. | Image: U.S. Army
American troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula serve purposes beyond deterring North Korea, the commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) stated this week, stressing the need to maintain U.S. ground forces in the country to counter threats from China and Russia.
Speaking at the Land Forces Pacific (LANPAC) Symposium in Hawaii on Thursday, Gen. Xavier Brunson explained that U.S. troops stationed in South Korea play a vital role in overcoming the “tyranny of distance,” which he described as a major challenge to military operations across the vast Indo-Pacific region.
Brunson pointed out South Korea’s strategic location, calling it “the closest allied presence to Beijing,” and likened it to “an island or a fixed aircraft carrier floating in the water between Japan and mainland China.”
The commander also noted that the U.S. forces’ presence in ROK “imposes costs” and “changes the calculations of the leaders of North Korea, Russia and China.”
Brunson’s remarks highlight what appear to be a growing U.S. push to expand the mission of USFK beyond the peninsula, despite the military force’s central role in deterring North Korean aggression with nearly 30,000 troops.
Since returning to office, Trump has clearly focused U.S. policy in Asia on containing China, while signaling that America expects South Korea to do more to counter the DPRK nuclear threat.
The Pentagon’s temporary redeployment of multiple Patriot missile defense systems from South Korea to the Middle East underscored Washington’s shifting priorities, as did Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s statement that the U.S. could no longer be a “permanent guarantor” of security abroad.
These developments have not escaped notice in Seoul, where there has been speculation that Washington may seek to repurpose USFK for broader regional contingencies, including potential threats like a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
In his remarks on Thursday, Brunson also highlighted the risk that North Korea is receiving technological assistance in exchange for sending troops to Russia.
“What I’m concerned about is, are the North Koreans going to learn how to make those nuclear weapons that they have with the air vehicles they have currently,” and noted that without Russia’s help, this leap would have taken years to achieve.
He emphasized the importance of making trilateral military cooperation between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan a regular practice, urging the removal of any obstacles that may hinder this collaboration.
He also noted the value of involving as many partners as possible in training exercises on the Korean Peninsula. “The question I always ask myself is if my family is on the peninsula, I want every partner we can bring to come and train. And we have to remove the barriers.”
Edited by Alannah Hill
4. US ally revives aircraft carrier plan amid North Korea threat
This would not only be for defense against Korea. This could give South Korea some power projection capability.
US ally revives aircraft carrier plan amid North Korea threat
Newsweek · by Ryan Chan · May 14, 2025
South Korea, a United States ally, is set to revive its plan to construct an aircraft carrier amid threats from its nuclear neighbor, North Korea, local media reported.
Newsweek has contacted South Korea's military for comment by Facebook message. The North Korean Embassy in China did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Why It Matters
North Korea has been threatening to use force against South Korea, which is protected by U.S. forces stationed in the country. The Pentagon has frequently deployed aircraft carriers to the Korean Peninsula to demonstrate its commitment and extended deterrence to its ally.
The United States aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt arrives in Busan, South Korea, on June 22, 2024. The United States aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt arrives in Busan, South Korea, on June 22, 2024. SONG KYUNG-SEOK/AFP via Getty Images
While North Korea's naval power remains inferior to that of the U.S. and South Korea, it is bolstering its navy by building missile-armed destroyers and a nuclear-powered submarine.
Recently, U.S. and South Korean navies conducted a joint drill to strengthen their ability to counter simultaneous attacks. This came after the North Korean launch of multiple short-range ballistic missiles over the Sea of Japan—referred to as the East Sea in South Korea.
What To Know
The South Korean military will move forward with its aircraft carrier project after making modifications, newspaper The Chosun Daily reported on Monday. The original plan called for the construction of a 30,000-ton vessel equipped with F-35B stealth fighter jets.
Under the revised project, the proposed aircraft carrier will be transformed into a "multifunctional unmanned combat force command ship," capable of carrying dozens of drones for a range of missions, including combat, self-detonation, surveillance and reconnaissance.
A self-detonation drone, also known as a kamikaze attack drone, is designed to crash into its target. North Korea tested this type of drone last November and put it into mass production.
A South Korean drone is seen during a ceremony at Seoul Air Base in Seongnam, South Korea, on October 1, 2024. A South Korean drone is seen during a ceremony at Seoul Air Base in Seongnam, South Korea, on October 1, 2024. JUNG YEON-JE/AFP via Getty Images
Citing the South Korean military, the report said the navy recently presented the new plan to a defense committee of the National Assembly. The so-called "drone carrier" will be capable of responding to North Korean threats by conducting strikes, as well as raid and landing operations.
The project was first launched under the Moon Jae-in administration, which held office from 2017 to 2022. However, it was suspended by the succeeding administration, led by President Yoon Suk Yeol, who was removed from office last month for his declaration of martial law.
The South Korean navy tested the "drone carrier" concept last November, when a Gray Eagle unmanned aircraft—capable of short takeoffs and landings—launched from the amphibious landing ship ROKS Dokdo and landed at a ground base.
Yesterday, Gray Eagle STOL launched from the ROK helicopter ship Dokdo (deck length, 653ft/199m).
GE STOL gets up so quick, we might launch it off surfboards next. pic.twitter.com/H8GUuzQPLT
— C. Mark Brinkley (@cmarkbrinkley) November 13, 2024
This demonstrated the versatility of short takeoff and landing capability aboard a warship not designed for fixed-wing aircraft, the South Korean navy said at the time, which also proved that new capabilities can be added without costly, major modifications to existing warships.
What People Are Saying
The South Korean navy said: "We have taken into account the situation of future maritime warfare and the development of artificial intelligence, unmanned technology, etc. It is necessary to…build an unmanned composite combat system as soon as possible."
Specialist outlet The War Zone said: "The Republic of Korea Armed Forces already operates a wide range of drones, ranging in size from Israeli-made Harpy loitering munitions to U.S.-supplied RQ-4B Block 30 Global Hawk high-altitude, long-endurance, remotely piloted aircraft."
Republic of Korea is the official name of South Korea.
What Happens Next
According to The Chosun Daily, the modified, drone-equipped aircraft carrier could be constructed as early as the late 2030s, if a final decision is made within the year.
ByRyan Chan is a Newsweek reporter based in Hong Kong, where he previously had over a decade of experience at a local newspaper, covering China and current events around the world. His focus is on security and defense issues in the Western Pacific region. He is a graduate of Hong Kong Baptist University. You can get in touch with Ryan by emailing r.chan@newsweek.com.
Newsweek · by Ryan Chan · May 14, 2025
5. Bridging The Divide: A Strategy For Peace On Korean Peninsula – OpEd
The largest misconception about unification is that it is based on the assumption that somehow north and South will agree to peacefully unify. That may happen but it will never happen as long as the Kim family regime remains in power because its sole objective is to dominate the peninsula under its rule. Therefore, for peaceful unification to take place it will require a transformation of leadership from inside north Korea by the Korean people in the north.
Second, the economic costs of unification will of course be huge. But so will the benefits. We should consider the insight of billionaire investor Jim Rogers and expert north Korean economist and demographer Nick Eberstadt. They are bullish on the economic opportunities for a free and unified Korea.
Jim Rogers still bullish on united Korea
https://m.koreaherald.com/article/2799697
The Economics of Korean Re-Unification: Thinking the Unthinkable?
https://www.aei.org/research-products/working-paper/the-economics-of-korean-re-unification-thinking-the-unthinkable/
Excerpts:
Reunification is a legitimate aspiration, but it must remain a voluntary and gradual process determined by the democratic will of the Korean people. Surveys in South Korea show that over sixty percent of respondents support the principle of peaceful reunification, although many express concerns about potential social costs. Analysts estimate that these costs could reach 2.5 trillion US dollars over the first fifteen years of integration, factoring in infrastructure upgrades, social welfare, and expanded fiscal transfers. In North Korea, testimonies from defectors reveal a range of views shaped by controlled media and personal hardships, highlighting the necessity for transparent public deliberation and inclusive referendums conducted under international observation.
In conclusion, the path to peace on the Korean Peninsula by 2025 depends not on unilateral actions or external pressure, but rather on a carefully sequenced strategy. This strategy should incorporate military de-escalation, institutionalized humanitarian and economic collaboration, dialogue, and impartial mediation from actors such as ASEAN, Indonesia, Switzerland, Mongolia, and Sweden. Diplomatic normalization will formalize inter-Korean cooperation, while any potential reunification must authentically arise from both societies. Only through sustained trust-building and inclusive regional engagement can shared ownership of the process transform a legacy of division into a stable and prosperous future.
Bridging The Divide: A Strategy For Peace On Korean Peninsula – OpEd
https://www.eurasiareview.com/14052025-bridging-the-divide-a-strategy-for-peace-on-korean-peninsula-oped/?utm
May 14, 2025 0 Comments
By Simon Hutagalung
Achieving peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is one of the most significant security challenges in 2025. This challenge is heightened by the strategic competition between the United States, Japan, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China, the evolving leadership in both Seoul and Pyongyang, and the lasting impact of the 1953 Armistice.
The thesis of this article is that lasting peace can only emerge from a comprehensive strategy that includes concrete confidence-building measures, robust institutional communication, formal diplomatic normalization, and mediation facilitated by respected neutral bridge builders from both regional and global actors, such as ASEAN, Indonesia, Switzerland, Sweden, or Mongolia. Additionally, it is essential to preserve reunification as a voluntary outcome determined solely by the Korean people.
Military posturing on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone continues to fuel mistrust. In 2024, global military expenditure surged by 9 percent, marking the steepest annual increase since at least 1988. The global military burden reached 2.5 percent of the world’s GDP, and average military spending per person climbed to 334 US dollars. South Korea’s defense budget for 2025 is projected to exceed 61.6 trillion won (approximately 46.3 billion US dollars), reflecting a 3.6 percent year-on-year increase. This budget demonstrates South Korea’s commitment to modernizing its “Three-Axis” deterrence system and sustaining joint exercises with approximately 28,500 troops under the Mutual Defense Treaty, focusing on advanced missile defense capabilities. Meanwhile, North Korea persists in allocating an estimated 20 to 25 percent of its GDP to military expenditure—one of the world’s highest burdens—diverting scarce resources from civilian needs and signaling its reliance on weapons advances to offset conventional inferiority.
Cooperation in humanitarian efforts provides a powerful opportunity to build trust through our shared humanity. Seventy thousand families remain separated due to the Korean War, yet since 2000, intermittent reunification programs have allowed fewer than two thousand participants to meet. By expanding these family reunions to an annual schedule, even with a limited number of participants, we could foster grassroots reconciliation. Additionally, complementary initiatives—such as joint medical research on tuberculosis and coordinated vaccine distribution during pandemics, along with collaborative disaster-relief drills—could further humanize relations and showcase the tangible benefits of cooperation, thereby strengthening public support for broader engagement in both societies.
Economic collaboration serves as a key pillar for de-escalation, using shared prosperity to encourage reduced confrontation. Before United Nations sanctions were imposed, inter-Korean trade surpassed one billion US dollars annually. However, these sanctions drastically diminished cross-border commerce to nearly zero after nuclear and missile tests in 2016. Reassessing special economic zones, such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex, could facilitate the reintroduction of bilateral trade in specific sectors like agriculture, light industry, and manufacturing, through revenue-sharing agreements, third-party oversight, and phased sanctions relief. Planned transport corridors connecting rail and road networks through the DMZ would not only enhance logistics efficiency but also create economic interdependence within regional connectivity, thereby raising the political cost of renewed hostilities.
Institutionalized communication channels are crucial for preventing misunderstandings and managing crises. Although Seoul and Pyongyang reopened their liaison office in Panmunjom in late 2024, ongoing disputes led to repeated closures, undermining its effectiveness as an early warning mechanism. Upgrading this office to be fully staffed and mission-oriented in both capitals, along with establishing parallel military hotlines that ensure year-round operation, would create continuous channels for dialogue. Additionally, civil society exchanges—such as joint historical commissions, academic symposiums on shared heritage, and inter-Korean sports events—would strengthen official channels and cultivate a culture of sustained engagement that transcends political cycles.
Selecting and empowering neutral bridge builders is crucial for maintaining momentum when bilateral trust wanes. ASEAN’s ten member states represent over 660 million people and have a combined GDP exceeding 3.6 trillion US dollars. They have long practiced non-aligned diplomacy through ASEAN and the Regional Forum. Indonesia, ASEAN’s largest economy, achieved a growth rate of 4.87 percent in the first quarter of 2025, despite facing global headwinds. The country has set a target growth rate of 5.2 percent for the year, highlighting its resilience and policy credibility. Jakarta’s historical leadership, dating back to the Bandung Conference of 1955, has allowed it to maintain balanced relations with both Koreas. This experience in hosting high-level meetings positions Indonesia as an ideal candidate to facilitate inter-Korean negotiations, conduct backchannel discussions, and monitor the implementation of confidence-building measures through a multilateral support mechanism. Beyond Southeast Asia, countries like Switzerland, Sweden, and Mongolia offer additional advantages. Switzerland is known for its longstanding neutrality and expertise in mediating conflicts in Europe. Sweden has a strong track record in peace processes, ranging from the Middle East to Africa. Meanwhile, Mongolia occupies a unique position as a neighbor to two nuclear-armed states and engages in “third neighbor” diplomatic outreach. By incorporating one or more of these countries into the mediation architecture, we can draw on diverse expertise, distribute responsibilities, and reinforce the impartiality necessary to sustain delicate inter-trust in Korea.
Diplomatic normalization should occur after the successful implementation of previous agreements. This process should begin with a mutual recognition treaty, followed by the establishment of embassies or consulates in Seoul and Pyongyang, and cooperative participation in regional organizations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the reconstituted United Nations Six-Party Talks. These steps would solidify inter-Korean relations within established international norms. Establishing diplomatic relations would create legal frameworks for energy grid interconnection, environmental protection agreements, and cultural exchange programs, facilitating the transition from adversarial states to collaborative partners within the regional framework.
Reunification is a legitimate aspiration, but it must remain a voluntary and gradual process determined by the democratic will of the Korean people. Surveys in South Korea show that over sixty percent of respondents support the principle of peaceful reunification, although many express concerns about potential social costs. Analysts estimate that these costs could reach 2.5 trillion US dollars over the first fifteen years of integration, factoring in infrastructure upgrades, social welfare, and expanded fiscal transfers. In North Korea, testimonies from defectors reveal a range of views shaped by controlled media and personal hardships, highlighting the necessity for transparent public deliberation and inclusive referendums conducted under international observation.
In conclusion, the path to peace on the Korean Peninsula by 2025 depends not on unilateral actions or external pressure, but rather on a carefully sequenced strategy. This strategy should incorporate military de-escalation, institutionalized humanitarian and economic collaboration, dialogue, and impartial mediation from actors such as ASEAN, Indonesia, Switzerland, Mongolia, and Sweden. Diplomatic normalization will formalize inter-Korean cooperation, while any potential reunification must authentically arise from both societies. Only through sustained trust-building and inclusive regional engagement can shared ownership of the process transform a legacy of division into a stable and prosperous future.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.
References
- Lim, S. (Ed.). (2024). Politics, International Relations, and Diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula. Routledge.
- Fields, D. P., Lerner, M. B., & Ayhan, K. J. (Eds.). (2024). Divided America, Divided Korea: The US and Korea During and After the Trump Years. Cambridge University Press.
- Lee, S., & Panda, J. (Eds.). (2024). The United Nations, Indo-Pacific and Korean Peninsula: An Emerging Security Architecture. Routledge.
Simon Hutagalung
Simon Hutagalung is a retired diplomat from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and received his master's degree in political science and comparative politics from the City University of New York. The opinions expressed in his articles are his own.
6. South Korea Goes Small in Bid for Nuclear Power Ascendance
South Korea is a global pivotal state that chooses to be a peaceful nuclear power, is a partner in the arsenal of democracies, and seeks to uphold the rules based international order.
South Korea Goes Small in Bid for Nuclear Power Ascendance
Seoul is trying to replicate its success exporting large-scale atomic technology by focusing on the nascent SMR space.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2025-05-15/south-korea-turning-to-small-reactors-to-bolster-nuclear-energy-ascendance?utm
A nuclear power plant in the Czech Republic, where South Korea wants to build an $18.8 billion project.Photographer: Milan Jaros/Bloomberg
By Will Wade and Heesu Lee
May 15, 2025 at 7:42 AM EDT
Welcome to our guide to the commodities markets powering the global economy. Today, energy reporters Will Wade and Heesu Lee look at South Korea’s nuclear potential in the small modular reactor space.
South Korea is fast becoming the world’s go-to supplier for big nuclear reactors. But as the atomic energy renaissance gathers pace, it could be the smaller, modular units that help the country make an even bigger mark.
The nation expects to complete the design for its first such plant this year. It is on track to get regulatory approval by 2028, meaning the facility could be in service by the mid-2030s.
The longstanding vision for small, modular reactors, or SMRs, is to use a standardized design that’s made in factories and assembled on-site. Supporters say this approach will make them quicker and cheaper to build than the massive, bespoke structures widely used today.
Nuclear engineer Han Gon Kim, who oversaw the design of South Korea’s 1,400-megawatt APR1400 reactor, now works on a 170-megawatt model.
He’s adopting a unique strategy for deployment. In the US, technology companies are eager to use SMRs to power energy-hungry data centers.
Nuclear reactors in Ulsan province, South Korea.Photographer: Jean Chung/Bloomberg
But in South Korea, Kim plans to build a four-reactor site, totaling 680 megawatts of capacity, to help replace an extensive fleet of fossil fuel plants. The nation still gets about 30% of its electricity from coal generators ranging from 500 to 800 megawatts in size.
Still, the SMR concept is largely untested. Dozens of companies worldwide are working on them, but there’s only a handful in service, and they’re in China and Russia.
While there’s strong demand for nuclear power, the industry is notorious for expensive delays, and there are legitimate questions about how long it will take to see an SMR move from the drawing board to the power grid.
That’s not deterring Seoul, however, which plans to export the technology. While there are many potential markets, Kim is targeting one region in particular: North America.
That might seem counterintuitive given President Donald Trump’s advocacy for fossil fuels, but nuclear is actually the one cleaner energy source he seems to like.
--Will Wade and Heesu Lee, Bloomberg News
Chart of the day
Growth Spurt in China's Coal Output
Source: China's statistics bureau
Chinese coal prices are locked in a downward spiral due to a persistent glut, the country’s top industry group said. The optimism that’s taken hold in the wake of a trade truce with the US doesn’t extend to the market for power fuels, with utilities reluctant to buy while inventories are full and prices are falling, the China Coal Transportation and Distribution Association said.
Top stories
Oil fell for a second day after Trump said the US and Iran are getting closer to a deal on Tehran’s nuclear program. Brent dropped below $64 a barrel, losing as much as 4% in London.
Global oil demand growth will slow for the rest of the year after a robust first quarter due to “economic headwinds,” the International Energy Agency’s Toril Bosoni tells Bloomberg Television’s Francine Lacqua.
National Grid Plc’s chief executive officer said his network doesn’t have reliability issues, and recent power failures at Heathrow airport and in the London Underground system were rare, isolated incidents.
US sanctions on oil-services company CCIC Singapore Pte are sending ripples through the local trading community while renewing a focus on the clandestine supply chain moving Iranian oil to China.
Thyssenkrupp AG shares tumbled as much as 14% after the steel and engineering group reported a slump in earnings due to weak demand from automotive and industrial customers.
BNEF today
Drop in European Clean Energy Buying Activity Offset By Record Volumes in Asia Pacific
Global annual corporate power purchase agreement volumes, by region
Source: BloombergNEF
Note: Chart shows only offsite power purchase agreements (PPAs). Asia Pacific capacity is estimated. Figures are subject to change as more information is made available. Data through April 2025.
Companies announced power purchase agreements for more than 6 gigawatts of solar, wind, geothermal and hydro energy in March and April, putting the 2025 tally just behind the record 12.3 gigawatts from a year earlier, according to BloombergNEF. The EMEA region is seeing a decline in deals, while corporate clean-energy buying across Asia Pacific is moving fast, with about 1 gigawatt of co-located PPAs tracked this year.
Best of the rest
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Trump’s push for deep-sea mining is encouraging for prospectors, but it won’t be easy for them to realize his vision, the Financial Times reports.
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Dozens of data centers can be added to the US grid if operators embrace “load flexibility,” Duke University researcher Tyler Norris explains on Wood Mackenzie’s Energy Gang podcast.
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Australia’s coal miners should consider methane abatement an opportunity to transform waste into profit and strengthen green credentials, according to the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis.
Coming up
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— With assistance from Lara Hayim and Amanda Jordan
7. Can South Korea, Japan forces train together? Joint drill denial reveals unresolved trauma
Can South Korea, Japan forces train together? Joint drill denial reveals unresolved trauma
Many South Koreans may find it difficult to accept the idea of their soldiers training beside Japanese troops, analysts say
Park Chan-kyong
Published: 12:28pm, 15 May 2025
South Korea’s categorical denial of Japanese media reports that it will conduct its first-ever joint military exercise with Japan highlights the ongoing challenges facing the two countries in strengthening military cooperation, despite growing threats from North Korea and an increasingly assertive China, analysts say.
On Tuesday, major Japanese news outlets reported that the South Korean Marine Corps would participate in a joint exercise with the Japan Ground Self-Defence Force (JGSDF) as part of Kamandag, an annual multinational military exercise in the Philippines scheduled for next month.
Kamandag – short for Kaagapay ng mga Mandirigma ng Dagat, or “Cooperation of the Warriors of the Sea” – is led by the Philippine Marine Corps and the US Marine Corps.
However, South Korea’s Marine Corps swiftly denied the reports.
“We will conduct combined drills with the United States and the Philippines, but there is no plan to do so with the JGSDF,” a defence ministry spokesman told This Week in Asia on Wednesday. “As in previous years, the South Korean Marine Corps and the JGSDF will conduct separate exercises.”
South Korean marines take aim with their rifles after dashing out of an assault amphibious vehicle during a landing drill in Pohang, North Gyeongsang province, on April 28. Photo: EPA-EFE/Yonhap
A Marine Corp officer told Yonhap news agency: “There won’t be any scenario in which Korean marines and JGSDF troops share the same vessel.”
Chang Yong-seok, a senior researcher at Seoul National University’s Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, said any move towards joint drills with Japan would be politically sensitive in South Korea due to lingering resentment over Japan’s 1910-1945 colonial rule.
“For many Koreans, it’s still difficult to accept the idea of their soldiers training shoulder to shoulder with Japanese troops,” Chang said.
‘Historical grievances’
Japan is pushing to integrate regional military exercises like Kamandag into a broader Indo-Pacific strategy that treats Northeast Asia and the South China Sea as a unified operational theatre.
“But South Korea finds it hard to join such frameworks due to public opposition rooted in historical grievances, as well as strategic concerns about provoking China”, Chang said.
Cho Jin-goo, a professor of political science at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies, cautioned that Tokyo should tread carefully when discussing potential joint drills.
“Japanese authorities should avoid sparking public backlash in South Korea by prematurely suggesting military cooperation,” Cho said.
Japan, Philippines push security and economic ties as Ishiba holds talks in Manila
Since 2022, Japan’s Self-Defence Forces have been moving away from their traditionally passive posture and are now embracing capabilities for pre-emptive strikes.
“Japan needs to work to ease regional concerns about its expanding military capabilities, especially in countries like South Korea that were impacted by past military aggression,” Cho said.
He noted that Tokyo’s caution was even more critical as South Korea’s presidential front-runner, Lee Jae-myung, might take a more pragmatic stance on Japan if elected.
“Lee is unlikely to reverse the momentum for improved ties initiated under the Yoon administration,” Cho said, referring to President Yoon Suk-yeol, whose impeachment led to the June 3 snap presidential election.
“Lee would likely adopt a two-track approach – enhancing economic and security cooperation with Japan while carefully managing long-standing issues that continue to strain relations.”
These unresolved matters include compensation for victims of wartime forced labour and sexual slavery, Japan’s release of treated water from the damaged Fukushima nuclear reactor, and the territorial dispute over the Dokdo islets, known in Japan as Takeshima.
The Lee factor
In 2023, Lee staged a hunger strike in protest of Japan’s discharge of what he called “contaminated” water from the Fukushima plant, denouncing the move as “barbaric”.
When he was leading the liberal Democratic Party of Korea, Lee had criticised Yoon’s approach to Japan – including the creation of a Seoul-funded foundation to compensate victims of wartime forced labour – as “too submissive”.
Last year, however, he said South Korea could simply say “xie xie” or thank China, accusing Yoon of jeopardising trade ties with China through unnecessary provocations.
Lee has brought back controversy over these remarks when he said on Tuesday that South Korea should maintain good relations not only with the United States and Japan but also with China and Russia to increase exports.
Lee Jae-myung, presidential candidate of the Democratic Party, arrives at a campaign event in Seoul, South Korea on Monday. Photo: AP
In response, rival People Power Party (PPP) spokesman Shin Dong-wook accused Lee of being submissive to China.
“The upcoming presidential election is a confrontation between forces aiming to restore South Korea’s pride and defend its sovereignty, and anti-state forces characterised by pro-China submissive diplomacy”, Shin said on Wednesday.
Lee’s tone towards Japan has softened recently. In a congratulatory message to a forum on Korea-Japan ties last week, he called the two countries “important partners” with “a long history of close cooperation”.
“Continued cooperation between South Korea and Japan is vital for both economic growth and regional security,” he said. “We are at a geopolitical turning point. National interests must be secured through careful diplomacy and strengthened bilateral relations.”
Still, he acknowledged that “serious and complex issues remain, including historical disputes and the Fukushima water release”.
“To build a future-oriented relationship, historical grievances must be addressed,” Lee said. “Korea-Japan relations can further mature when dialogue, mutual respect and a responsible attitude are prioritised.”
Lee’s top foreign policy adviser, Kim Hyun-chong, confirmed this position in Washington last week, saying the candidate supported strong ties with both the US and Japan.
“I conveyed to US officials that candidate Lee and the Democratic Party of Korea view the South Korea-US alliance as crucial and believe it should be upgraded if possible,” Kim said. “There’s also a clear need to enhance trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the United States and Japan.”
“Given the current global environment, close collaboration between South Korea and Japan is essential,” he added.
Still, conservative critics argue that a Lee administration would reverse course on Yoon’s Japan-friendly policies and instead prioritise improved relations with China and Russia.
According to a Gallup Korea poll published on Wednesday, Lee polled at 51 per cent, followed by the conservative PPP’s Kim Moon-soo with 31 per cent and a splinter opposition party candidate Lee Jun-seok with 8 per cent.
Park Chan-kyong
FOLLOW
Park Chan-kyong is a journalist covering South Korean affairs for the South China Morning Post. He previously worked at the Agence France-Presse's Seoul bureau for 35 years. He studied
8. Red Lines and Reckonings (Global threat assessment)
Just one point on all these assessments. Regarding Korea, very few ever examine what is happening inside north Korea, they never assess the instability indicators or assess the amount of stress the regime is under from internal dynamics. We overlook all of this at our peril. This is especially important because the path to war could be through and result from internal instability.
Red Lines and Reckonings
https://warontherocks.com/2025/05/the-adversarial-red-lines-and-reckonings/
WOTR Staff
May 15, 2025
Members
Welcome to The Adversarial. Every other week, we’ll provide you with expert analysis on America’s greatest challengers: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and jihadists. Read more below.
***
China
On May 12, the United States and China agreed to simultaneously suspend or remove tariffs imposed since April 2 for an initial period of 90 days. The agreement was negotiated between Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng and U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. It represents a major de-escalation of trade tension between the world’s two largest economies, at least for now — although the future path to rebalancing bilateral trade relations remains challenging.
From May 7 to 10, Chinese leader Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Russia and attended the Victory Day military parade in Moscow. He issued joint statements with Russian President Vladimir Putin on global strategic stability and on deepening bilateral strategic coordination between China and Russia. A key purpose of the visit was to counter concerns about a “reverse Nixon” — a strategy in which Washington might try to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing by improving U.S.-Russian relations.
The recent crisis between India and Pakistan had benefits for China and Chinese weapon systems. The Pakistani military reportedly used Chinese J-10 fighter jets, PL-15 missiles, and drones to shoot down a number of Indian fighter jets and drones. The apparent success of Chinese weapons systems boosted expressions of nationalism in China.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping in his most recent state visit to Russia. Image: The Kremlin via Wikimedia Commons
Russia
On the ground, the front between Russian and Ukrainian forces remains largely static. Efforts to broker a peace deal have continued, with the United States and Europe finalizing a 30-day ceasefire proposal. On May 10, the leaders of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Poland visited Kyiv and issued a joint statement backing Ukraine’s readiness for a ceasefire. Putin responded by proposing direct talks in Istanbul on May 15 but signaled that fighting would continue for now. However, Putin chose not to travel to Istanbul and sent a relatively low-level diplomatic team. In response, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said it was clear that Russia is not serious about the talks but said that Ukraine would still send a higher-level delegation. Late on May 15, it was not clear if the two delegations would meet.
If the Kremlin decidedly rejects the Western ceasefire proposal, there are new Western sanctions on Russia in the making. Both the European Union and the United States are reportedly boosting aid to Ukraine.
On May 9, Russia celebrated Victory Day with a military parade that featured the attendance of Xi, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, and the leaders of most former Soviet republics. From Moscow’s perspective, this was a diplomatic win — enabling Putin to project an image of overcoming Western diplomatic isolation. Following his meeting with Xi on May 8, Putin announced that Russian-Chinese cooperation had reached its “highest level.”
The 2025 Victory Day parade in Moscow. Image: The Kremlin via Wikimedia Commons
Iran
On May 11, U.S. and Iranian teams met in Oman for a fourth round of talks. Two days later, President Donald Trump arrived in Saudi Arabia to start a trip aimed at securing investment and weapons deals with Gulf Arab partner states. The president’s visit included a speech in which he repudiated the legacy of U.S. neoconservative and liberal interventionist approaches toward the region. He framed Iran’s regime as a leading force of regional instability and vowed that Iran should never have a nuclear weapon but said, “I want to make a deal with Iran.” Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called Trump’s comments deceptive and blamed the United States for Iran’s struggles, but he also made it clear that Trump’s remarks would not affect current nuclear negotiations.
On May 15, while visiting Qatar, Trump said that he thinks the two sides are close to a deal. Iranian officials remain cautiously optimistic that compromise on the nuclear issue could still be found. A key sticking point has been Iran’s insistence that any deal must allow it to continue uranium enrichment in some capacity. Yet, the spokesman for Iran’s Foreign Ministry, Esmail Baghaei, recently suggested to the Iranian press that a pause in enrichment could be possible in exchange for sanctions relief, even if a total ban on enrichment was off the table, stating: “The termination of Iran’s nuclear program is not on the agenda.”
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in 2024. Image: Mehr News Agency via Wikimedia Commons
North Korea
On May 13, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency published an assessment projecting that North Korea could field as many as 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles by 2035 — a force that would put “the U.S. Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system under greater pressure.” The report estimates that North Korea currently possesses 10 or fewer ground-based intercontinental ballistic that are capable of reaching the American homeland.
On May 9, North Korean state media reported that Kim Jong Un had supervised the test of a short-range ballistic missile and long-range artillery, while inspecting the operational reliability of its “nuclear trigger” system, designed to ensure rapid response. On May 14, Kim was reported to have overseen tactical assault drills, emphasizing the need for war readiness. This included special operations units, simulated tank battles, and live fire coordination exercises. This comes just weeks after North Korea formally confirmed its troop provision to Russia’s war. The cybersecurity firm Proofpoint released a report revealing North Korean state-based hackers had engaged in a new spear-phishing campaign targeting Ukrainian government entities.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un oversees tactical drills. Image KCNA Watch
Jihadists
Five months since the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, the Islamic State group has failed to use the political transition to significantly re-assert itself. However, questions remain about whether this trend will continue as the United States begins to withdraw troops from eastern Syria. The Department of Defense announced in mid-April that it will consolidate its forces in Syria from 2,000 to 1,400 soldiers — and eventually to below 1,000. In the month since this process began, there have been signs that the Islamic State is increasing its activity. While Islamic State attacks in Syria are still historically low, such groups frequently take advantage of any small power vacuum. In the prior three months, the group had been averaging around five claimed attacks per month, but since the withdrawal process began a month ago, that number has jumped to 12. It is still too early to know if it is a coincidence or not, but as the United States debates its future relations with Syria — now that Trump has called for the end of sanctions and met with Syrian President Ahmed al Sharaa — withdrawing U.S. forces too early could create space for the Islamic State to re-emerge as a major threat in Syria, with potential for spillover into Iraq.
President Donald Trump meets with Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman and Syrian President Ahmed al Sharaa in Saudi Arabia Image: The White House via Wikimedia Commons
Image: The 2025 Victory Day military parade in Moscow’s Red Square. The Kremlin via Wikimedia Commons
9. China quietly bought land near top Seoul security sites
Beware Chinese intentions in South Korea. It wants to subvert South Korea and create dilemmas for the US and the ROK/US alliance. (with the ultimate objective to drive US forces off of the Asian landmass).
It may not be visible to us (probably because we do not want to see it) but China is waging a sophisticated unrestricted warfare campaign in South korea and is expertly employing its three warfare, psychological warfare, legal warfare (lawfare), and public opinion or media warfare.
China quietly bought land near top Seoul security sites
The 2018 purchase shows legal blind spots in South Korea's foreign land rules
https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/05/16/M6HRWLGY7VESHJ3J3JQOMHSKEU/
By Roh Suk-jo,
Koo Amo,
Park Su-hyeon
Published 2025.05.16. 14:14
China’s government quietly purchased more than 4,100 square meters of land in a strategically sensitive area of central Seoul in 2018—without seeking approval from South Korean authorities or paying acquisition taxes—under diplomatic immunity provisions granted by international law.
The transaction marks the first known instance of the Chinese government acquiring land in South Korea. Despite the proximity of the plots to key government and military facilities, South Korean law imposes no restrictions on land purchases by foreign governments or individuals.
The Chinese Embassy in Seoul, located in the city's central Jung District./News1
According to property records reviewed by The Chosun Ilbo, the 11 parcels—located in the Itaewon neighborhood of Seoul’s Yongsan District—were bought in December 2018 for 29.92 billion won (about $22 million). The land is now officially registered under the name “People’s Republic of China.”
One of the lots sits just over a kilometer from the planned new site of the U.S. Embassy, which is slated to relocate from Gwanghwamun to a section of the former U.S. military base known as Camp Coiner. Although the move was approved in 2005, the embassy has yet to vacate its current location, and U.S. officials have not publicly explained the delay.
Two of the parcels had previously been owned by the South Korean government. In June 2017, Seoul sold the land to a Korean national, who in turn sold it to the Chinese government 18 months later.
The area is within 1.5 kilometers of several high-profile sites, including the presidential office in Yongsan and the presidential residence in Hannam-dong.
The Chinese embassy was exempted from paying acquisition taxes under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which allows foreign missions to avoid local taxes on properties used for official functions. South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that it had supported the Chinese Embassy’s application for full tax exemption at the time of purchase.
“There is no law requiring foreign embassies to obtain separate approval or report land purchases to the government,” a Foreign Ministry official told reporters on May 15. The official added that while buying land does not trigger oversight, any new construction would require consultation with the South Korean government regarding the building’s intended use.
Lee Jae-woong, spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speaks during a regular briefing at the ministry building in Seoul’s Jongno District on March 20, 2025./News1
A spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Seoul told The Chosun Ilbo the land was purchased for “official purposes,” including housing for embassy staff. The spokesperson said development plans were delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but stressed the embassy had notified South Korean authorities of the acquisition and intended to use the land as declared. “If the intended use changes,” the official added, “we will inform the Korean government again.”
The disclosure comes amid growing concern in countries like the United States and Japan over foreign ownership of land near sensitive facilities. In July 2024, the U.S. Treasury proposed new rules to strengthen national security reviews of real estate transactions near military installations. Japan has also stepped up its “real estate security” policies, restricting foreign investment near military sites and nuclear power plants.
10. USFK chief stresses continued troop presence in S. Korea amid China-Russia threats
The headline should be The Commander of the ROK/US Combined Force Command.
The public affairs people should help the media and minimize any mention of USFK and focus on the ROK/US Combined Forces Command when it addresses the Korea press. They need to help the Korean press understand that Korea is a full partner in the command, oversight, and strategic guidance for the ROK/US CFC. It is their command and it is not a US only command (which USFK is).
Now of course at LANDPAC in Hawaii I am sure the only title they recognized is USFK which is of course a subunifed command of Indo-Pacom. But it is the ROK/US CFC that is charged with deterrence and the defense of the ROK. USFK is simply a force provider to the ROK/US CFC.
On the other hand it is appropriate for the Commander of USFK to state his view that we must have a sustained US presence in Korea to support the ROK/US CFC and the defense of Korea. At the same time the Commander of the ROK/US CFC and the Senior US Military Officer in KOrea (Also General Brunson), should be working with the ROK to develop a holistic approach to security threats throughout the region and not just from north Korea. This is of course what the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) should require especially since the MDT makes no mention of the north Korea threat. It is included as a threat in the Pacific which is what the treaty calls for in terms of mutual defense.
USFK chief stresses continued troop presence in S. Korea amid China-Russia threats
https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/05/16/DZVZINLLJRDK7HLJUI7LSXKC4U/
By Roh Suk-jo,
Kim Seo-young
Published 2025.05.16. 17:59
U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson speaks at a U.S. House Armed Services Committee hearing in Washington, D.C. on April 9. /Courtesy of U.S. House Armed Services Committee
Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of United States Forces Korea (USFK), emphasized on May 15 that maintaining American ground forces in South Korea is essential to confronting growing threats from China and Russia.
Speaking at the Land Forces Pacific (LANPAC) Symposium, hosted by the Association of the United States Army in Hawaii, Brunson highlighted the strategic significance of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea in overcoming the “tyranny of distance” that complicates military operations across the vast Indo-Pacific region.
He described South Korea as a strategically vital location, noting that it is the U.S.’s “closest allied presence to Beijing,” and likened it to “an island or a fixed aircraft carrier floating between Japan and mainland China.”
Brunson added that the presence of American troops in South Korea “imposes costs, changes the calculations of leaders of [North] Korea, Russia, and China, and provides options for our nation’s most senior leaders.”
He also noted that U.S. Forces Korea are not only focused on defeating the North, but are “also focused on operations, activities, and investments in the region as a small part of the greater Indo-Pacific strategy.”
Brunson’s remarks marked a rare public statement by the USFK commander on the need for strategic flexibility, including adjustments to the role of U.S. troops in South Korea.
Since the beginning of U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term, speculation has grown that the U.S. will seek greater strategic flexibility by expanding the role of its troops in South Korea beyond the peninsula to respond to regional crises, such as a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
U.S. Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro visits HD Hyundai Heavy Industries in Ulsan (left), accompanied by HD Hyundai Executive Vice Chairman Chung Ki-sun (right in left photo), and Hanwha Ocean shipyard in Geoje, with Hanwha Group Vice Chairman Kim Dong-kwan (right in right photo) on April 30. /Courtesy of HD Hyundai, Hanwha Ocean
Brunson also cited Hanwha Ocean’s recent overhaul of a U.S. Navy ship that looked “better than new,” saying South Korea’s manufacturing, maintenance, repair, and overhaul activities can strongly support U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific.
He said North Korea receiving technical support in exchange for sending troops to Russia is concerning, adding, “They are advancing some of their [weapons] programs in ways we would not have expected.”
He also raised concerns about whether North Korea will learn to equip its nuclear weapons on existing air vehicles, noting they are making leaps that would have taken years without Russia’s cooperation.
Regarding trilateral military cooperation between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, Brunson said it must become “habitual,” and obstacles to it should be removed. He added that he “[wants] every partner we can bring to come and train.”
Xavier Brunson
USFK
South Korea
North Korea
U.S. Forces Korea
11. Workers' hell: Inside North Korea's brutal construction program
It is amazing how much suffering the Korean people can withstand.
Will Kim ever run out of his most important resource: The Korean people?
Workers' hell: Inside North Korea's brutal construction program - Daily NK English
At construction sites in Sinuiju and Uiju, supervisors push laborers through exhausting hours in competitive "construction races"
By Seon Hwa - May 16, 2025
dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · May 16, 2025
North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported on Feb. 11 that the “largest-ever modern greenhouse farm and vegetable science research base will be built in Hadan-ri of Sinuiju, border gateway of the country, and in Soho village of Uiju county as creations symbolic of the lively and bold progress in regional rejuvenation.” (Rodong Sinmun, News1)
North Korea is mobilizing vast numbers of military construction workers, work brigades, and factory laborers for a nationwide building program aimed at constructing regional industrial facilities purportedly to improve living standards. These workers face grueling conditions with no set schedule, forced to endure extreme hours of hard labor.
A Daily NK source in North Pyongan province said recently that workers at large-scale greenhouse farms in Sinuiju and Uiju county routinely work 10-14 hour days, with schedules changing at managers’ whim but averaging about 12 hours daily.
While North Korean propaganda boasts of having established an eight-hour workday before South Korea, calling itself a “workers’ paradise,” the reality is starkly different. Most citizens aren’t even aware that labor laws stipulating eight-hour workdays exist, leaving them with no understanding of their legal rights or protections.
“People typically start at 8 a.m. and don’t return home before 8 p.m. Factory workers and those at external sites frequently work around the clock under what managers call ‘mobilizations’ and ‘struggles,'” the source explained.
At the Sinuiju and Uiju construction sites, supervisors push laborers through exhausting hours in competitive “construction races” designed to demonstrate results and prove loyalty to the regime. “Workers must meet their managers’ demands without complaint to achieve party goals,” the source said. “They have only obligations, not rights.”
Military personnel and work brigades face even harsher conditions. “Soldiers and work brigades must follow an absurd mandate—to leap into deep water or fire without hesitation when ordered by the party,” the source revealed. “They endure far worse physical hardship than ordinary construction workers.”
“Soldiers and work brigades have absolutely no rights, only duties,” the source concluded. “In truth, North Koreans don’t live in a ‘workers’ paradise’ but in a ‘hell’ where they’re stripped of all rights.”
The same punishing regimen applies to those building 10,000 homes in Pyongyang and developing modern regional factories under the party’s “20 x 10 regional development policy.”
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · May 16, 2025
12. N. Korea finalizing selection of workers for China deployment
The irony. The Korean people compete to become slave laborers because they believe they will be better off and can make more money for their families as overseas laborers than they can make inside north Korea. They will voluntarily suffer inhumane conditions to take care of their families. But to do so they must be "ideologically sound."
Excerpts:
The selected candidates are primarily in their 20s and 30s and have already passed ideological screenings and background checks conducted by provincial party committees. These evaluations thoroughly examined candidates’ ideological soundness, loyalty to the party, political background and any history of legal penalties.
According to the source, about 100 young people from Chongjin in North Hamgyong province who passed the provincial party committee’s review are currently awaiting their trip to Pyongyang. They remain in a state of tension, having been instructed to avoid causing problems and to faithfully participate in organizational activities until their departure.
N. Korea finalizing selection of workers for China deployment - Daily NK English
In Hyesan, about 80 candidates have been selected and are prepared to travel to Pyongyang, a source told Daily NK
By Lee Chae Eun - May 16, 2025
dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Eun · May 16, 2025
FILE PHOTO: North Korean women on a bus heading over the Sino-North Korean Friendship Bridge into China. The women appear to be heading to work in Dandong from their homes in Sinuiju. (Daily NK)
North Korea is completing the selection process for workers to be dispatched to China, according to sources inside the country. Those chosen will undergo final reviews in Pyongyang this month before expected deployment to China around mid-June.
“Selection of workers for dispatch to China has been underway at institutions and enterprises across various provinces since February,” a source in North Hamgyong province told Daily NK recently. “Those selected at the provincial level will travel to Pyongyang this month for final review.”
North Korean authorities plan to gather the provincially selected workers in Pyongyang for health examinations and training sessions before their deployment, the source said.
The selected candidates are primarily in their 20s and 30s and have already passed ideological screenings and background checks conducted by provincial party committees. These evaluations thoroughly examined candidates’ ideological soundness, loyalty to the party, political background and any history of legal penalties.
According to the source, about 100 young people from Chongjin in North Hamgyong province who passed the provincial party committee’s review are currently awaiting their trip to Pyongyang. They remain in a state of tension, having been instructed to avoid causing problems and to faithfully participate in organizational activities until their departure.
“These workers will undergo health examinations and ideological education in Pyongyang for about a month, and those who pass the document screening will be immediately dispatched to China,” the source said. “However, some fail the document screening, which is why tension remains high.”
In Hyesan, Ryanggang province, about 80 candidates have been selected and are also prepared to travel to Pyongyang, according to another source.
“If they receive final approval in Pyongyang, they will complete training and head to China next month,” the Ryanggang province source said. “But if they fail the central review, they must return home, so they’re waiting in considerable tension.”
Bribery seems to have played a significant role in the selection process. Some unemployed young people allegedly rushed to secure workplace registrations through bribes to labor department officials after hearing about the recruitment opportunity.
“To go to China, one must be affiliated with a workplace. When the opportunity to go abroad arose, some unemployed youth hurriedly paid bribes to city labor department officials to register with workplaces,” the source explained. “This naturally pushed out young people who were actually employed but couldn’t afford bribes.”
Even those with acceptable family backgrounds often failed to be selected without paying bribes, forcing some to borrow money to provide payments, the source said.
The actual departure date remains subject to change. “Although mid-June is the current scheduled departure, we’ll have to see if they actually leave then,” the source noted. “In the past, dispatches have been delayed by several months, so this year’s schedule could also change.”
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Eun · May 16, 2025
13. APEC trade ministers issue joint statement reaffirming WTO's role in addressing trade issues
The rules based international order.
(2nd LD) APEC trade ministers issue joint statement reaffirming WTO's role in addressing trade issues | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · May 16, 2025
(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; UPDATES throughout; ADDS photo)
By Kim Na-young
JEJU, South Korea, May 16 (Yonhap) -- Trade ministers of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) on Friday reaffirmed the importance of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in addressing global trade issues amid escalating uncertainties sparked by growing protectionism.
The trade chiefs of the Asia-Pacific region reached such a consensus in a joint statement unanimously adopted after their annual two-day multilateral meeting held on South Korea's southern island of Jeju from Thursday.
"We recognize the importance of the WTO to advance trade issues and acknowledge the agreed upon rules in the WTO as an integral part of the global trading system," the joint statement adopted by the APEC trade ministers read.
"We are concerned with the fundamental challenges faced by the global trading system," it added, amid growing concerns over global trade uncertainties sparked by U.S. tariffs.
WTO reform was a key agenda item of the meeting in light of concerns over the organization's role in facilitating free trade, amid the rise of protectionism across the world, as seen prominent in U.S. trade policies under President Donald Trump.
WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who attended the APEC meeting, projected a reverse growth of the global trade market this year and reaffirmed the organization's commitment to reestablishing itself as a relevant institution for fostering a stable and predictable trading environment, according to South Korean Trade Minister Cheong In-kyo.
This photo provided by South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy shows Trade Minister Cheong In-kyo during the APEC trade ministers' meeting held on the southern Jeju Island on May 16, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
According to Cheong, the joint statement also acknowledged South Korea's proposal for an artificial intelligence (AI) for trade initiative, aimed at promoting the use of the cutting-edge technology and voluntary information exchange of trade-related AI standards and technologies.
AI technology can enhance customs procedures to increase efficiency of trading firms and help businesses identify opportunities and risks, Cheong explained.
South Korea plans to host a joint dialogue on the AI for trade initiative between the public and private sectors in Incheon, just west of Seoul, in August to lead follow-up discussions on the initiative, according to Seoul's trade ministry.
The APEC trade ministers also agreed to continue discussions on global supply chain issues facing "cross-sectoral challenges" and strengthen cooperation on the matter.
Participants in a trade ministers' meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation member economies pose for a photo during an opening ceremony on the southern resort island of Jeju on May 15, 2025, in this photo provided by South Korea's trade ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
nyway@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · May 16, 2025
14. S. Korea again requests exemption from all U.S. tariffs; 2nd round of technical talks to be held next week
(4th LD) S. Korea again requests exemption from all U.S. tariffs; 2nd round of technical talks to be held next week | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · May 16, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS details in 2nd para)
By Kim Na-young
JEJU, South Korea, May 16 (Yonhap) -- South Korea has again asked the United States to exempt the country from all tariffs, Seoul's Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun said Friday, after meeting with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer on the sidelines of a trade ministers' meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) member economies.
In the meeting, the two sides agreed to hold their second round of technical discussions in Washington next week on six areas related to trade -- trade imbalances, non-tariff measures, economic security, country of origin of products and commercial considerations -- Ahn said.
Next week's meeting is expected to be followed by additional high-level talks in mid-June, he added.
The high-level meeting held on South Korea's southern island of Jeju comes about three weeks after their last gathering in Washington for high-level trade consultations, where the two sides agreed to pursue a "package" deal on U.S. tariffs and economic cooperation issues by July 8.
Greer was participating in the APEC Ministers Responsible for Trade meeting on Jeju, which wrapped up its two-day run on Friday.
Last month, Seoul and Washington agreed to focus their talks on four categories -- tariff and non-tariff measures, economic security, investment cooperation and currency policies.
South Korea has been seeking to get a reduction or exemption from U.S. tariffs, including 25 percent reciprocal duties, which have been suspended for 90 days.
This photo provided by South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy shows Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun (R) shaking hands with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer in their meeting held on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation trade ministers' meeting on the southern Jeju Island on May 16, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
"In Friday's meeting, we tried to raise awareness that South Korea has a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) with the U.S., unlike some other countries, and have expanded trade and investment with the U.S. under the FTA," Ahn told reporters in a press briefing.
"We also explained that U.S. tariffs on automobile and steel imports have a huge impact on trade relations between the two countries," he added.
Ahn noted that South Korea's capabilities in becoming a major cooperation partner to the U.S. in industrial sectors, such as semiconductors, energy and advanced technologies, stand out compared to other countries.
"Rather than approaching the negotiations in a narrow-minded manner of reducing South Korea's trade surplus with the U.S. to get tariff cuts, we are working to build a more constructive and future-oriented relationship with Washington, where the two countries can create a stable trade environment and strengthen industrial cooperation," he said.
On concerns over the current leadership vacuum in South Korea, the minister said Seoul is "doing its best" to meet the July 8 deadline, but also noted the possibility of a delay due to the domestic political situation.
South Korea is scheduled to hold a presidential election on June 3 following the impeachment of former President Yoon Suk Yeol due to his failed martial law bid.
"The U.S. understands we are not trying to unnecessarily delay our negotiations by using the domestic political situation as an excuse."
This photo provided by South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy shows Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun (2nd from R) holding tariff discussions with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer at the International Convention Center on the southern Jeju Island on May 16, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Regarding next week's technical discussions, Ahn said the U.S. has shown a big interest in digital trade, including Google Maps and cloud computing issues, Ahn said.
The shipbuilding cooperation and Seoul's potential participation in the Alaska liquefied natural gas project, however, will not be covered in the talks, the minister said, noting the issues will be discussed separately.
Earlier in the day, Greer also met with executives of HD Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. in Jeju to discuss bilateral cooperation in shipbuilding.
Shipbuilding cooperation is one of the key agenda items of the Seoul-Washington trade negotiations amid the Trump administration's push to rebuild America's shipbuilding sector. South Korea is a global leader in the shipbuilding industry.
Last month, U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Phelan visited South Korea to tour HD Hyundai Heavy Industries' Ulsan headquarters and Hanwha Ocean's Geoje shipyard.
In an exclusive written interview with Yonhap News Agency following his trip, Phelan said the U.S. Navy welcomes further collaboration with South Korean shipyards as part of a broader effort to revitalize America's maritime industrial base.
Meanwhile, on media reports the Alaskan government has invited South Korean trade officials to its sustainable energy conference kicking off on June 2 (local time), Ahn confirmed his ministry received such an invitation.
"We are still reviewing if we can attend the conference due to the timing," he said, apparently conscious of the South Korean presidential election the following day.
U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Phelan (2nd from R, front row) visits the shipyard of Hanwha Ocean Co. in the southeastern industrial city of Geoje on April 30, 2025, in this file photo released by the company. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
nyway@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · May 16, 2025
15.S. Korea holds bilateral trade talks with 14 partners at APEC meeting
Again, despite the preisdnial poltiical turmoil the ROK government has deonstrated strong resilience and has continued to function effectively.
S. Korea holds bilateral trade talks with 14 partners at APEC meeting | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · May 16, 2025
SEOUL, May 16 (Yonhap) -- South Korea has discussed ways of enhancing bilateral economic and trade cooperation with the United States, China, Japan and several other partner nations on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting amid heightened uncertainties in the global economic and trade landscape, the industry ministry said Friday.
The two-day APEC Ministers Responsible for Trade Meeting took place on South Korea's southern resort island of Jeju from Thursday, providing an opportunity for trade ministers of regional economies to engage in one-on-one discussions, according the Seoul's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy.
On the sidelines of the meeting, South Korean trade and industry officials held high-level bilateral talks with representatives from 14 of the 20 other APEC member economies, as well as with the director-general of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to explore avenues for trade cooperation and coordination.
"During my meeting with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer yesterday, I explained the current political situation and other domestic issues ahead of the upcoming presidential election. We also reviewed the procedures necessary to conclude the negotiations," Trade Minister Cheong In-kyo said during a press briefing on Friday.
Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun is scheduled to meet with Greer later in the day, which "is expected to be a chance for the two sides to understand each other's positions during these two rounds of tariff talks," he added.
Last month, the Donald Trump administration began imposing reciprocal tariffs on partner nations, including 25 percent duties on South Korea, only to pause them shortly afterward to allow for one-on-one negotiations.
Seoul and Washington subsequently agreed to work toward a "July package" deal on trade and other related issues before July 8, when Trump's 90-day pause on reciprocal tariffs is to expire.
South Korean Trade Minister Cheong In-kyo (R) and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer shake hands during their meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation trade ministers' meeting on the southern Jeju Island on May 15, 2025, in this photo provided by the ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Cheong met with senior officials from Japan's economic and foreign ministries on Jeju, where the two countries agreed to enhance cooperation in advanced industries, hydrogen and other new energy sectors, and supply chains, according to the ministry.
In a separate meeting with his Indonesian counterpart, Cheong requested active support for South Korean companies operating in the Southeast Asian nation.
"The government will make every effort to mitigate uncertainties in the trade environment and external risks by further strengthening the foundation for cooperation with the Asia-Pacific region," the ministry said in a statement.
South Korean Trade Minister Cheong In-kyo (3rd from L) speaks with senior Japanese officials during their meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation trade ministers' meeting on the southern Jeju Island on May 16, 2025, in this photo provided by the ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
graceoh@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · May 16, 2025
16. Silent infiltration: Hackers on the payroll
We must defend against and defeat KJU's all purpose sword of cyber.
Silent infiltration: Hackers on the payroll - Daily NK English
When companies discover they've unwittingly hired North Korean operatives, many remain silent due to compliance concerns and potential reputational damage
By English Language Editor - May 16, 2025
dailynk.com · by English Language Editor · May 16, 2025
The revelation that North Korean IT operatives have successfully infiltrated numerous Fortune 500 companies highlights a dangerous evolution in state-sponsored cyber threats. These schemes—where North Korean agents pose as remote tech workers using stolen identities and deepfake technology—have reportedly generated tens of millions of dollars funneled directly to Pyongyang’s weapons programs.
The sophistication of these operations, with laptop farms managed by American accomplices and the ability to work multiple jobs simultaneously, demonstrates how sanctions-evading tactics have adapted to exploit the digital economy.
What makes this threat particularly insidious is its exploitation of legitimate business needs. American companies face a genuine shortage of cybersecurity talent, while remote work policies implemented during the pandemic have created new vulnerabilities.
When companies discover they’ve unwittingly hired North Korean operatives, many remain silent due to compliance concerns and potential reputational damage. This culture of silence only benefits the perpetrators, allowing the scheme to spread unchecked across corporate America.
Law enforcement has made important strides, with recent indictments against American accomplices who facilitated these operations. However, the expanding scale of this threat—now extending beyond U.S. borders to the U.K., Poland, Romania, and South Asian nations—demands a more comprehensive approach.
Companies must recognize that this isn’t just a cybersecurity issue but a national security threat with significant compliance implications for organizations doing business with sanctioned entities, even unknowingly. Corporate leaders should follow SentinelOne’s example by speaking openly about these incidents.
Only through transparent information sharing, improved verification protocols, and close cooperation with law enforcement can we effectively counter North Korea’s cyber deception campaign. The stakes extend far beyond corporate security to the funding of a nuclear-armed regime actively working to undermine international stability. This is a challenge that requires both corporate responsibility and coordinated government action.
dailynk.com · by English Language Editor · May 16, 2025
17. S. Korea-U.S. trade negotiation conclusion unlikely before launch of new Seoul gov't: Cheong
S. Korea-U.S. trade negotiation conclusion unlikely before launch of new Seoul gov't: Cheong | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · May 16, 2025
By Kim Na-young
JEJU, South Korea, May 16 (Yonhap) -- South Korea is unlikely to strike a deal with the United States over their ongoing tariff-related trade negotiations until a new president is elected, a senior Seoul official said Friday, noting that the current government's role is to "thoroughly" lay the foundation for future tariff negotiations with Washington.
"What's clear is that no agreement will be possible until a new government is in place," Minister of Trade Cheong In-kyo told reporters on his way to meet with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) trade ministers' meeting on the southern Jeju Island.
"What we can do now is faithfully laying the foundation for the future agreement," he said.
This photo provided by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy shows Trade Minister Cheong In-kyo (R) holding talks with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer (2nd from L) on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation trade ministers' meeting on the southern resort island of Jeju on May 15, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Cheong was set to meet with Greer along with South Korea's top trade envoy, Ahn Duk-geun, later Friday to continue discussions on pending trade issues between Seoul and Washington, including U.S. tariffs and economic cooperation.
Cheong held a one-on-one meeting with Greer the previous day, where he said the two sides discussed the progress of Washington's trade talks with other countries and how South Korea and the U.S. will proceed with their negotiations.
"We also addressed difficulties South Korea is facing with the planned launch of the new administration," he explained. South Korea is scheduled to hold a presidential election on June 3, following former President Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment over a failed martial law bid.
South Korea's goal is getting full exemption from U.S. tariffs on different sectors, including steel and automobile imports, and 25 percent reciprocal duties, but the U.S. appears to be wanting to keep the baseline 10 percent tariffs, he noted.
Cheong said the series of meetings with Greer on Jeju will serve as a good opportunity for the two countries to clear out "blurry" agenda items in the ongoing negotiations.
"It will definitely take some more time (to strike a deal)."
On Greer's meeting with chief executive officers of leading Korean shipbuilders, HD Hyundai Co. and Hanwha Ocean Co., earlier Friday, Cheong said the U.S. holds South Korea's shipbuilding capabilities in "high regard."
The Korean companies said they discussed various measures to strengthen bilateral cooperation in the shipbuilding sector.
Shipbuilding cooperation is one of the key agenda items of the Seoul-Washington trade negotiations amid the President Donald Trump administration's push to rebuild America's shipbuilding sector. South Korea is a global leader in the shipbuilding industry.
Last month, U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Phelan visited South Korea to tour HD Hyundai Heavy Industries' Ulsan headquarters and Hanwha Ocean's Geoje shipyard.
In this photo taken May 16, 2025, and provided by HD Hyundai Co., Chung Ki-sun (R), executive vice chairman and CEO of the group, shakes hands with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer ahead of a meeting to discuss shipbuilding cooperation on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation trade ministers' meeting on the southern Jeju Island from May 15–16. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
nyway@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · May 16, 2025
18. Leading candidate doesn't know his own birthday — and voters relate
Leading candidate doesn't know his own birthday — and voters relate
koreaherald.com · by Son Ji-hyoung · May 16, 2025
Lee Jae-myung (right) and his younger brother (Courtesy of Lee Jae-myung's Instagram)
Lee Jae-myung grew up not knowing his birthday. And this became symbol of struggle — and connection to ordinary voters
Liberal presidential frontrunner Rep. Lee Jae-myung's candidacy registration with the election authorities on Saturday showed that he was born on Dec. 12, 1964, and therefore he is officially now aged 60.
But his official date of birth is almost certainly wrong. Lee's recollection of his childhood memories suggests that he cannot have been born then. And Lee himself believes he is likely 61 years old, while his mother guessed he was born on either Dec. 7 or 8 of 1963.
Lee, the fifth son of a large family, was not registered at the time of his birth — not an uncommon practice at a time when infant mortality in South Korea was as high as around 70 per 1,000 births.
It wasn't until 1968, two years before his elementary school enrollment, that Lee and his mother learned that his birth certificate did not exist. As Lee tells it, his official birthday in 1964 was an auspicious day proposed by a fortuneteller when he was in Andong, North Gyeongsang Province, one that also followed a tradition of registering the date roughly a year after a baby's actual birth.
The fact that Lee has not been able to clearly confirm his birthday could be a testament to his childhood adversities, which his supporters say could resonate with "ordinary voters" ahead of the June 3 presidential election.
Lee's autobiographies also suggest that he moved to Seongnam, Gyeonggi Province after finishing elementary school in February 1976, but could not advance to middle school. His father told him to find work in a factory. As a teenage employee using a fake name, he often suffered late payment of wages, he recalled.
In his latest memoir, published in April, Lee wrote that he "had never worn a school uniform," and that he "attempted suicide" in 1978 after learning his left arm would not grow anymore due to a wrist fracture he sustained while working at a factory a year before.
But he recovered, eventually taking exams to enter college. After graduating from Chung-Ang University, he became a lawyer, and was elected as the mayor of Seongnam in 2010, before a stint as Gyeonggi Province governor and leader of the largest party in the National Assembly.
A Lee supporter present at the Democratic Party election campaign in Seoul on Wednesday told The Korea Herald that South Korea should elect a leader who has experience rising from poverty.
"We need a leader who knows the lives of ordinary people, a person who understands the minds of ordinary people, a person who knows what a true hardship is," said the woman, who identified herself as a 43-year-old surnamed Han.
“Not a person like a prosecutor,” added Han, who joined the Democratic Party a month after Yoon Suk Yeol — formerly prosecutor-general before elected as the president in 2022 — briefly imposed martial law on Dec. 3. Yoon was impeached two weeks later, and was ousted by the Constitutional Court in April. Lee was a lawyer.
This photo shows Lee Jae-myung's identification slip for his college entrance exam for the academic year of 1982. (Lee Jae-myung's Instagram)
During Lee's campaign rally in the southeastern region — a conservative stronghold — on Tuesday, Oh Jung-soo, a worker at a textile company in Gumi, North Gyeongsang Province, told the crowd, "You might have seen candidates visiting traditional markets and trying some tteokbokggi during campaigning season, pretending to understand the lives of an ordinary citizen."
"But Lee is different. His life as a teenage factory worker in the past is proof that Lee ... understands the reality, joy and sorrow of the workers and ordinary people, better than any other (candidates)," Oh added.
Lee's election opponent, Kim Moon-soo, also worked in a factory, but only after being expelled from Seoul National University for participating in a pro-democracy student movement.
Another man named Yoon Jong-myung, a Democratic Party member who said he recently defected after holding conservative party membership for decades, said onstage in Daegu that Lee was someone he could believe in, pointing to Lee's past history of passing high-school equivalency exams in 1980 while working at factories.
"As you all know, (Lee) was a factory worker. He had no time to study, but he endured (the reality)," he said.
Experts, however, downplayed the possibility that Lee's biography could have a big impact on the South Korean voters between now and the June 3 election, because the story of Lee — who is now in his third presidential bid — is already known to many South Korean voters.
"Those who appreciate that part of his biography are likely to already support him anyway," said Mason Richey, professor of international politics at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.
Another expert echoed Richey, saying it is difficult for the average Korean to connect a candidate to a "working-class background," given that any candidate would have left that background far behind.
"Background stories are less influential than performance, capability and the transactional calculation of what the voter stands to gain," said Jeffrey Robertson, associate professor of diplomatic studies at Yonsei University.
consnow@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · by Son Ji-hyoung · May 16, 2025
19. Losing ground, PPP's Kim Moon-soo sinks deeper into Yoon dilemma
When you find yourself in a hole, the fit thing to do is stop digging. But can Kim dig himself out of this hole?
Losing ground, PPP's Kim Moon-soo sinks deeper into Yoon dilemma
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · May 16, 2025
Kim Moon-soo, the presidential candidate of the conservative People Power Party, speaks during a meeting of the National Election Commission at the National Assembly in Seoul on Thursady. (Yonhap)
People Power Party presidential candidate Kim Moon-soo finds himself in the political hot seat as South Korea barrels toward an early presidential election on June 3.
Kim's campaign has already lost ground in the polls, and disgraced former President Yoon Seok Yeol's membership of his party has emerged as a major liability.
According to a Korea Gallup poll released Friday, Kim trails the liberal Democratic Party of Korea’s candidate Lee Jae-myung by a wide margin nationwide — 51 percent to 29 percent.
Even in Daegu and North Gyeongsang Province, traditionally strongholds for conservatives, Kim holds only a narrow lead at 48 percent to Lee’s 34 percent, falling short of the 50 percent threshold.
Internal party strife over how to redefine ties with Yoon has erupted ahead of the first televised presidential debate on Sunday, and Kim is being pulled between competing demands from two opposing camps.
One side urges a clean break from Yoon to win over moderates, while Yoon loyalists insist that Kim avoid public debate over Yoon’s whereabouts and instead focus on rallying the conservative base.
In response to the growing rift, Kim Moon-soo on Thursday effectively left the decision to Yoon, saying, “The issue of former President Yoon leaving the party is a matter for him to decide.”
The People Power Party’s new interim leader, Rep. Kim Yong-tae, appointed by Kim, has taken the initiative to address Yoon's status within the party.
Kim said Friday morning that he would speak with Yoon that afternoon to ask him to leave the party. “This issue needs to be settled no later than this weekend, in my view,” he added during a radio interview with the state-run Korean Broadcasting System.
Kim said Thursday he would respectfully make the request to Yoon "for the sake of the party and victory in the presidential election" at his first press conference as the interim leader.
The faction calling for Kim Moon-soo to expel Yoon from the party has underscored that without such action, the party has slimmer chances of winning against Lee.
A KBS-commissioned poll conducted by Hankook Research released Friday found that 70 percent of respondents supported the People Power Party severing ties with Yoon through expulsion or his voluntary withdrawal. However, 21 percent opposed the idea, and 9 percent were undecided or did not respond.
Former President Yoon Suk Yeol appears at the Seoul Central District Court in the capital on Monday to attend the third hearing of a trial over insurrection charges in connection with his declaration of martial law. (Pool photo via Yonhap)
Rep. Cho Kyoung-tae emphasized that the People Power Party “needs to broaden its appeal to moderate voters in order to win” the presidential election.
“I don’t think a polite suggestion for him to voluntarily leave is enough — he should be formally expelled or removed from the party in accordance with party rules,” Cho said Friday during his interview with local radio station CBS. “Only then will the public see that this party has finally come to its senses.”
Rep. Han Zee-a said Yoon should be expelled from the party, pointing out that the party has been trapped in a debate over Yoon’s exit or expulsion since the official presidential campaign commenced Monday.
“It shouldn't be Kim Yong-tae, the appointed interim leader, speaking out. It’s Kim Moon-soo, the candidate we elected, who needs to make a resolution, speak up and take action,” Han said during her interview with SBS radio.
Echoing that view, former People Power Party leader Han Dong-hoon urged candidate Kim to sever ties with Yoon and first lady Kim Keon Hee before the first televised debate.
"A determination from candidate Kim Moon-soo is needed before the presidential debate on May 18 in order to turn the situation around," Han Dong-hoon wrote in a Facebook post. “It’s not too late yet. But after that, it will be. I offer this candid advice to prevent the collapse of the conservative bloc."
However, the other side has claimed that Yoon's whereabouts should not be subject to public debate during presidential campaigning.
People Power Party chief spokesperson Rep. Shin Dong-uk said Friday, “It’s regrettable that the matter is being treated as a greater controversy than necessary," during a press briefing at the National Assembly. Shin added, “The former president is simply staying at his private residence and is not engaging in any particular political activity.”
Rep. Yoon Sang-hyun also said Friday, “This is not an issue that should be discussed publicly."
"The debate over whether former President Yoon Suk Yeol should leave the party continues to overshadow urgent strategy planning, with the presidential election just around the corner."
dagyumji@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · May 16, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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