Quotes of the Day:
"Our wretched species is so made that those who walk on the well-trodden path always throw stones at those who are showing a new road."
- Voltaire
"Power gradually extirpates from the mind every human and gentle virtue."
- Edmund Burke
"To be irrational gives you certain answers. Anyone would rather go to somebody who says 2+2=5 and there is no mistake about it than to go to someone who says, well, modern scientific research says that 2+2 is usually 4 but we cant always be certain of course. Of course they'll go for the certain thing even if it's wrong."
- Isaac Asimov
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 16 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. The ingenious strategy that could win the war for Ukraine
3. Special Operators Must Learn to Exist Without ‘Tethers’
4. Gov't to relocate JCS to southern Seoul: defense ministry
5. Analysis: Neutral Switzerland leans closer to NATO
6. President Biden’s Missed Opportunities at U.S.-ASEAN Summit
7. US troops heading back into Somalia, reversing Trump order
8. Retired colonel tells Russian state TV 'the whole world is against us'
9. More than 250 Ukrainian troops surrender as Kyiv orders Mariupol to yield
10. Vladimir Putin takes personal control of Russia's faltering Donbas offensive
11. Putin involved in war ‘at level of colonel or brigadier’, say western sources
12. War within Russia's secret services over bogus intelligence that led to invasion
13. U.S. State Department Set to Delist Mujahideen Shura Council of Jerusalem
14. Biden administration can’t overlook the Balkans when sanctioning Russia
15. The staggering amount of US military aid to Ukraine, explained in one chart
16. Why China Is Paranoid About the Quad
17. America’s Wars Are Fought by Relatively Few People. That’s a Problem for Phil Klay. (Book Review)
18. What Is China Learning From Russia's War in Ukraine?
19. The Right Way to Sanction Russian Energy
20. The Collateral Damage in China’s Covid War
21. Digital Transformation Is a Cultural Problem, Not a Technological One
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 16. (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 16
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 16
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan
May 16, 6:00 pm ET
Russian forces conducted limited and largely unsuccessful ground offensives along the front line in Ukraine on May 16. The Russian grouping around Kharkiv City is notably trying to hold the border and prevent Ukrainian troops from advancing further north. This activity is different from previous Russian withdrawals from around Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy earlier in the war when the Russians pulled completely back to Russian territory. Russian troops may seek to retain positions in Ukraine and continue artillery strikes on Ukrainian positions in order to prevent Ukrainian forces from getting into tube or rocket-artillery range of the outskirts of Belgorod, a major city in Russia and a key hub of the Russian military effort. The Russians might alternatively hope to conduct a counter-counter-offensive to push back south toward Kharkiv, although such an effort is highly unlikely to succeed.
Russian military bloggers continued to post analysis that is skeptical of Russian efforts and increasingly in-line with Western assessments of Russian military failures in Ukraine. One such blogger, Igor Strelkov, claimed that the Russian offensive to take Donbas has ultimately failed and that “not a single large settlement “has been liberated.[1] Strelkov even noted that the capture of Rubizhne is relatively insignificant because it happened before the new offensive in Donbas had begun. Strelkov stated that Russian forces are unlikely to liberate Donbas by the summer and that Ukrainian troops will hold their positions around Donetsk City. Strelkov notably claimed that Russian failures thus far have not surprised him because the intent of Russian command has been so evident throughout the operation that Ukrainian troops are aware of exactly how to best respond and warns that Russian troops are fighting to the point of exhaustion under “rules proposed by the enemy.” The continued disenchantment of pro-Russian milbloggers with the Russian war effort may fuel dissatisfaction in Russia itself, especially if Moscow continues to press recruitment and conscription efforts that send poorly-trained cannon-fodder to the front lines.
Over 260 Mariupol defenders evacuated from the Azovstal Steel Plant to Russian occupied settlements in Donetsk Oblast on May 16.[2] Ukrainian and Russian authorities negotiated evacuation for wounded Ukrainian servicemen via humanitarian corridors. Ukrainian officials previously called for the evacuation of 60 medics and critically wounded servicemen on May 13.[3] The Kremlin may extend humanitarian corridors for remaining Ukrainian defenders in an effort to fully control Mariupol.
Frictions between Russian occupation administrations and pro-Russian collaborators is growing in occupied areas of Ukraine. The Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration reported that Russian forces are having serious conflicts with collaborators due to interpersonal power conflicts.[4] A well-known collaborator in Zaporizhia accused the Russian-installed governor of the area of stealing his 10,000 ruble compensation. Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryshchenko additionally claimed that relatives of those mobilized into the forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) are holding a mass protest against mobilization in Donetsk City. While ISW cannot independently verify these claims, such discontent amongst occupation elements suggests a general lack of planning by Russian authorities in occupied areas, now compounded by increasingly evident Russian losses.
Key Takeaways
- Russian and Ukrainian authorities negotiated the evacuation of 264 wounded Ukrainian servicemen from the Azovstal Steel Plant on May 16.
- Ukrainian forces reached the Russian border north of Kharkiv City.
- Russian forces continued unsuccessful ground operations in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and did not make any confirmed advances on May 16.
- Russian forces continued to fortify their positions in Zaporizhia Oblast.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time. We have stopped coverage of supporting effort 4, “Sumy and northeastern Ukraine,” because it is no longer an active effort.
- Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
- Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
- Supporting effort 1 — Mariupol;
- Supporting effort 2—Kharkiv City;
- Supporting effort 3—Southern axis.
Main effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort— Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces did not make any confirmed advances in any direction from Izyum and focused on regrouping in preparation of renewed offensives on May 16.[5] Pro-Russian Telegram channels previously claimed that Russian troops entered Dovhenke, about 25 kilometers south of Izyum, on May 14.[6] Another pro-Russian Telegram channel claimed that fighting is on-going in the settlement on May 16, but that the offensive was a “bloody meat grinder,” indicating that Ukrainian fortifications in Dovhenke were effective and caused significant Russian losses.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that elements of the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army are reconstituting after suffering losses around Izyum and likely preparing for renewed offensives towards Slovyansk.[8] Ukrainian forces are continuing to mount attacks against Russian positions in the Izyum area, and the Ukrainian General Staff claimed that Ukrainian troops destroyed a Russian ammunition depot in Izyum on May 16.[9] Such targeted Ukrainian attacks are likely putting continued pressure on Russian logistical capabilities around Izyum and contributing to the disruption of any planned Russian offensives in this area.
Russian forces continued offensive operations through Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and made limited gains on May 16. The Head of the Luhansk Regional State Administration Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces in the area are focusing on securing territory from the direction of Bilohorivka, continuing attempts to seize Severodonetsk, and taking control of the highway to Lysychansk.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces did not conduct active ground operations in Severodonetsk and instead heavily shelled Ukrainian positions in the Rubizhne-Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area.[11] This is consistent with our previous assessment that Russian troops are likely increasingly unable to commit to a full-scale encirclement of the area east of the Izyum-Slovyansk-Debaltseve highway and are opting for a shallower encirclement with artillery support. Ukrainian forces in the area are reportedly destroying Russian communications routes and railway bridges between Rubizhne and Severodonetsk to disrupt further Russian offensives on Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.[12] Russian forces additionally continued offensive operations south of Severodonetsk around Toshkiva, Pylpchatyne, and Hirske, which is a likely push towards Bakhmut in order either to secure northwestward highway access to the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk area or to cut the last highway connecting Severodonetsk with the rest of Ukraine at Bakhmut.[13]
Russian troops reportedly conducted ground assaults towards Lyman, Bakhmut, Kurakhove, Shandrygolove, and around Donetsk City on May 16.[14] These assaults, however, continued to be largely ineffective and pro-Russian military analysis Telegram channels reporting on such stymied advances are increasingly critical of heavy Russian losses. One such channel claimed that the Russian operation to defeat the Ukrainian grouping in Donetsk Oblast by late April has failed and that marginal tactical success has come at the cost of heavy losses and fierce fighting.[15] Discontent over unsuccessful Russian operations within Donetsk Oblast appears to be growing, and Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko claimed that family members of those mobilized in the troops of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) militia held a massive protest against mobilization in Donetsk City on May 15.[16] While ISW cannot independently confirm Andryushchenko’s claim, it is consistent with growing discontent amongst previously pro-Russian military factions as losses during the war become more widely known.
Supporting Effort #1—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)
Russian and Ukrainian officials negotiated the evacuation of 264 wounded Mariupol defenders from Azovstal Steel Plant to occupied Donetsk Oblast on May 16.[17] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces evacuated 53 seriously wounded servicemen to Novoazovsk approximately 60 kilometers and 211 to occupied Olenivka south of Donetsk City.[18] Russian Defense Ministry claimed to have opened a humanitarian corridor for wounded Ukrainian defenders to receive treatment in occupied Donetsk Oblast on May 16.[19] Ukraine’s Azov Regiment Commander Denys Prokopenko published an ambiguous video stating that Ukrainian defenders at the Azovstal completed their order to prevent Russian soldiers from redeploying to other axes for 82 days.[20] It is possible that Ukrainian and Russian officials will negotiate to evacuate the remaining Mariupol defenders in the coming days.
Russian forces are trying to reopen the Port of Mariupol to establish shipping routes from Russia. The Donetsk People’s Republic claimed that proxy militia will demine the port by May 25.[21] Russian forces have raised a sunken Ukrainian ship from the sea floor in the port on May 15.[22] Andryushenko said another sunken Ukrainian ship and mines are preventing Russian forces from reopening the port.[23]
Supporting Effort #2—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Ukrainian forces reached the Russian border in an unspecified location northeast of Kharkiv City on May 15.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to repel Ukrainian forces near the Russian border approximately 60 kilometers northeast from Kharkiv City on May 16.[25] Russian military bloggers also confirmed that Ukrainian forces are pushing Russian and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) units to the border northwest and northeast of Kharkiv City, while withdrawn troops accumulate in Belgorod Oblast for future redeployments.[26] Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleg Synegubov noted that Russian forces resumed limited shelling of northern and eastern residential areas in Kharkiv City and continued artillery fire against Ukrainian counteroffensives in the region.[27] Russian forces will likely seek to maintain condensed positions near Kharkiv-Belgorod highway to prevent Ukrainian artillery from striking the outskirts of Belgorod City and defend Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Vovchansk, approximately 90 kilometers northeast of Kharkiv City.
Supporting Effort #3—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces continued to fortify their positions in Zaporizhia Oblast and did not conduct active offensive operations on the Southern axis on May 16. The Ukrainian nuclear power company Energoatom reported that Russian forces dug trenches and established concrete barricades along the entire perimeter of the Zaporizhya Nuclear Power Plant in Enerhodar City.[28] ISW has previously reported that Russian forces have fortified settlements approximately 37 kilometers east of Enerhodar and in areas south of Melitopol.[29] Russian forces are likely fortifying positions to establish long-term control over the occupied settlements. The Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration also noted that Russian forces destroyed a highway between Russian-controlled settlements in Polohy district and areas of Ukrainian counteroffensives near Huliapole, approximately 47 and 60 kilometers west of the Donetsk Oblast border.[30] Road-bound Russian forces may abandon their efforts to seize Huliapole and instead establish defensive positions.[31]
Ukrainian forces reportedly struck Russian ammunition and field bases in central and northern Kherson Oblast. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot in Chornobaivka again, likely near the Kherson City Airport.[32] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also destroyed a Russian field depot on the southeastern border of Mykolaiv Oblast.[33] Ukrainian forces will likely continue to inflict artillery and air strikes on Russian ammunition depots ineffectively located in the immediate vicinity of the frontline.
Russian forces launched another missile strike on Odesa Oblast, likely in effort to completely destroy the damaged bridge over Dniester estuary.[34] Russian forces will likely continue to target Ukrainian transport infrastructure connecting Odesa Oblast with Romania to disrupt one route by which Western countries can provide aid to Ukraine. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces are continuing rescue operations on Snake Island following Ukrainian strikes against the Russian grouping on the island.[35] The situation in Transnistria did not change.[36]
Immediate items to watch
- Russian forces will likely complete their withdrawal from the vicinity of Kharkiv City but attempt to hold a line west of Vovchansk to defend their GLOCs from Belgorod to Izyum. It is unclear if they will succeed.
- The Russians will continue efforts to encircle Severodonetsk and Lysychansk at least from the south, possibly by focusing on cutting off the last highway connecting Severodonetsk-Lysychansk with the rest of Ukraine.
- A Ukrainian counter-offensive around Izyum will likely begin soon.
- The Battle of Mariupol may be coming to an end.
[2] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/ukrayina-rozpochala-operaciyu-z-poryatunku-zahisnikiv-mariupolya-minoboroni
[3] https://t dot me/mariupolnow/10289
[17] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/ukrayina-rozpochala-operaciyu-z-poryatunku-zahisnikiv-mariupolya-minoboroni
[20] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/ukrayina-rozpochala-operaciyu-z-poryatunku-zahisnikiv-mariupolya-minoboroni
2. The ingenious strategy that could win the war for Ukraine
Attrition, annihilation, and here we have corrosion (or the indirect approach according to Liddel Hart)
A great quote:
This is not unusual in warfare. While political objectives shape how war is conducted and what battles are fought, so too do battles reshape political objectives. As American strategist Eliot Cohen recently wrote, “retaining a sense of direction in war is a constant struggle for political and military leaders at the top, and so the staff officers (and the commentary journalists) are doomed to frustration.”
Excerpts:
The Ukrainians have achieved this through the adoption of a simple military strategy: corrosion. In Australia, we describe the capacity to fight as “fighting power”. It is made up of physical, moral, and intellectual components. The Ukrainian approach has hollowed out the Russian physical, moral, and intellectual capacity to fight and win in Ukraine, both on the battlefield, and in the global information environment.
This strategy of corrosion sees Ukraine attacking the Russians where they are weak, while also using some of their combat power to delay Russian combat forces. British military historian and theorist, Basil Liddell Hart described this as the indirect approach. In his classic book, Strategy, he writes how “effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponents’ unreadiness to meet it. This indirectness has usually been physical and always psychological.”
The ingenious strategy that could win the war for Ukraine
May 17, 2022 — 11.38am
Throughout their Ukrainian campaign, the Russian military has been continually forced to reassess its strategic objectives. Plan A was to seize Kyiv, Kharkiv and other key points, capture government leaders and force a political accommodation from Ukraine. The battlefield performance of the Ukrainians, and strategic leadership of President Zelensky, quickly revealed the folly of this plan.
Plan B for the Russians saw their multi-axis attacks in the south, east, northeast, north and in the skies above Ukraine placed on a slower timetable. This strategy also failed. They then shifted to a focus on the Donbas and the creation of a “land bridge” from Russia to Crimea. Since the invasion began in February, the Russians have constantly downgraded their political goals for Ukraine, and the strategy for achieving them.
Ukrainian villagers check the remains of a destroyed Russian helicopter in Malaya Rohan, near Kharkiv, on Monday.Credit:AP
This is not unusual in warfare. While political objectives shape how war is conducted and what battles are fought, so too do battles reshape political objectives. As American strategist Eliot Cohen recently wrote, “retaining a sense of direction in war is a constant struggle for political and military leaders at the top, and so the staff officers (and the commentary journalists) are doomed to frustration.”
The Ukrainians have not suffered from a similar level of shifting objectives. Perhaps, as the defender, their goals are simple – defend their sovereignty, their people, and their land. But more recently, the notion of victory over Russia has crept into the strategic discourse.
The Ukrainian military, reassured by the steadfastness on its political masters, has demonstrated consistency throughout the war.
The Ukrainians have achieved this through the adoption of a simple military strategy: corrosion. In Australia, we describe the capacity to fight as “fighting power”. It is made up of physical, moral, and intellectual components. The Ukrainian approach has hollowed out the Russian physical, moral, and intellectual capacity to fight and win in Ukraine, both on the battlefield, and in the global information environment.
Journalists visit the site of a destroyed Russian munitions depot on to the east of Kharkiv on Monday.Credit:John Moore
This strategy of corrosion sees Ukraine attacking the Russians where they are weak, while also using some of their combat power to delay Russian combat forces. British military historian and theorist, Basil Liddell Hart described this as the indirect approach. In his classic book, Strategy, he writes how “effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponents’ unreadiness to meet it. This indirectness has usually been physical and always psychological.”
The Ukrainians have taken this advice to heart. They have attacked the weakest physical support systems of an army in the field – communications networks, logistic supply routes, rear areas, artillery and senior commanders in their command posts. In the Battle for Kyiv, the Ukrainians were able to fight the Russians to a standstill because they were able to penetrate Russian rear areas and destroy parts of their logistic support. They corroded the northern Russian expedition from within, and eventually, forced its humiliating ejection from Ukraine.
In the east, the Ukrainians have again adopted this strategy of corrosion. They are attacking Russian logistics, even though the Russians have moved more cautiously. The Ukrainians have also attacked critical enabling capabilities such as engineers, surveillance drones, fuel depots and senior Russian commanders. Once again, the Ukrainians have corroded from within the physical capacity of the Russians to fight.
A photograph of one of victims of the battles for Irpin and Bucha adorns a cross as it stands among other crosses and floral tributes at Irpin cemetery.Credit:Christopher Furlong
Perhaps more importantly, these acts in the physical world are impacting on the moral and intellectual components of Russian fighting power. Russian morale is being corroded because of its battlefield defeats, supply challenges and withdrawals in the face of Ukrainian pressure at Kyiv and Kharkiv. Ukrainian use of social media, showing off Russian deficiencies, has magnified this moral corrosion. The collapse in morale has resulted in declining battlefield discipline, with Russian desertions, battlefield refusals and war crimes. Bad morale and discipline, if not addressed, can become endemic in an army. The Ukrainians have slowly diluted Russia’s will to fight. Another major battlefield setback could result in a total collapse in Russian resolve.
The Ukrainians have also forced a form of intellectual corrosion on the Russians. Under pressure to achieve some form of victory due to previous setbacks, the invaders are taking greater tactical and operational risks with their military operations. The disastrous assault river-crossing over the Severskyi Donets – where at least one Russian brigade had its combat capability destroyed – is indicative of an army that is becoming less capable of assessing the risks of significant operational or tactical decisions.
The Ukrainian consistency in implementing their strategy now sees the Russian army approaching its high watermark in Ukraine. And in corroding the Russians physically, morally, and intellectually from within, the Ukrainians have evolved the military art. Conventional ground and air operations have absorbed special operations forces and information operations into a new, unified whole. What we once understood as separate conventional, unconventional, or information operations are now components of an integrated and indivisible whole.
This is what 21st century warfare looks like. The Ukrainians have proved to be masters of it. There is much that every mid-sized country with limited resources (including Australia) can learn from them.
Mick Ryan is a retired major general who served in the ADF for more than 35 years and was commander of the Australia Defence College. He is the author of War Transformed: The Future of 21st Century Great Power Competition and Conflict.
3. Special Operators Must Learn to Exist Without ‘Tethers’
"Contested logistics." This is not talking about operating without proper command and control, only support and logistics.
Special Operators Must Learn to Exist Without ‘Tethers’
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
5/16/2022
By
Air Force photo
TAMPA, Florida — After two decades of moving relatively freely in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military’s elite commandos are going to have to learn to operate in contested environments without being “tethered” to lines of support.
Those lines of support can be anything from traditional logistical systems to radio waves that allow special operations forces and their equipment to link back to higher headquarters, officials in change of developing technology at Special Operations Command said May 16.
“The term ‘contested logistics’ is at the very top of a lot of our discussions right now,” Col. Joseph Blanton, SOCOM program executive officer for SOF support activity, told reporters at the Special Operations Forces Industry Conference in Tampa, Florida.
Needed supplies in Iraq and Afghanistan were either delivered to forces operating in the field or they were staged, Blanton said. “Now that we are looking at going into contested environments, how are we going to do that?” He asked.
SOCOM is looking for new ways to push supplies to the tactical edge called the “untethered logistics concept.” His office has created a new program manager position to help look for solutions, he said.
“We’re definitely interested in hearing from industry what is in the realm of the possible,” he said. Solutions could either be stealthy ways to push supplies to units operating in austere environments or technologies that help them make their own supplies in place, he added, mentioning 3D printing as something that was done in forward operating bases during the past 20 years and could be part of the solution in the future.
The war in Ukraine has highlighted the importance of logistics as Russia has struggled to maintain its own supply lines, Blanton said.
“If you go in and you are lacking the logistical support, that can end an operation or stymie an operation,” Blanton said.
Across the U.S. military, everybody is looking at the Russia-Ukraine war as a contested environment and looking for lessons learned, Blanton said. “What were those challenges and what can we anticipate in our future operating environment that we can learn from today to start to drive those material solutions?” he said.
SOCOM is just at the beginning stages of looking what logistics looks like in future operations, Blanton said.
David Breede, program executive officer for special reconnaissance, said the SOCOM logistics community gathered last month “to look at itself to identify what we’re going to expect in the future. How do you support it? And then what are the current capabilities.”
The next step will be to sort through what was learned at the gathering and then identify capability gaps, Breede added.
Breede’s office — which among other technologies has sensors in its portfolio — is looking at being “untethered to radio frequencies,” he said.
“In the last 20 years, that [radio frequency] environment was not terribly contested,” he said. The suites of sensors his office develops — whether they are unattended ground sensors, or mounted on air or ground vehicles — will be in a contested environment, he said.
“We know that environment will be more contested, more congested and being able to operate without that RF environment is a goal,” he said.
"It’s a tough problem," he said. “It’s hard. It’s not something we can do right now,” he added.
4. Gov't to relocate JCS to southern Seoul: defense ministry
Excerpts:
Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup said that the government plans to move the JCS building to the Capital Defense Command in Namtaeryeong, southern Seoul, in the "mid- and long-term."
Lee estimated that the relocation and the construction of the new JCS building may cost between 200 billion won (US$ 157 million) and 300 billion won, much more than initially expected.
"But we will be able to get the exact cost estimate through a study on that," Lee told lawmakers.
The Namtaeryeong command houses the country's key wartime underground command bunker, a reason why the government says the JCS relocation would unify the military's wartime and peacetime command systems.
(2nd LD) Gov't to relocate JCS to southern Seoul: defense ministry | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with defense minister's remarks in lead, paras 3-7; CHANGES headline)
SEOUL, May 17 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean government plans to relocate the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) headquarters to southern Seoul and seeks to construct its new building there by 2026, the defense ministry said Tuesday.
In a parliamentary policy briefing, the ministry made public the relocation plan, as the ministry's key offices have occupied parts of the current JCS building since the presidential office's relocation to what used to be the ministry's headquarters in Seoul's central district of Yongsan.
Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup said that the government plans to move the JCS building to the Capital Defense Command in Namtaeryeong, southern Seoul, in the "mid- and long-term."
Lee estimated that the relocation and the construction of the new JCS building may cost between 200 billion won (US$ 157 million) and 300 billion won, much more than initially expected.
"But we will be able to get the exact cost estimate through a study on that," Lee told lawmakers.
The Namtaeryeong command houses the country's key wartime underground command bunker, a reason why the government says the JCS relocation would unify the military's wartime and peacetime command systems.
In a written policy report to parliament, Lee's ministry said that it plans to start a feasibility study on the relocation plan this year under the scheme to complete the construction of the new JCS building in 2026.
Should the JCS relocate to a new place, defense ministry offices that have relocated to multiple separate locations due to the relocation of the presidential office are expected to move to the current JCS building, observers said.
Commenting on the question about whether to reposition Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile interception units for the defense of the new presidential office, the ministry said there is no plan for their relocation or installation of additional units as the current units cover the entire Seoul metropolitan area.
Defense Minister Lee was pelted by lawmakers with questions about the possibility of a North Korean nuclear test.
Lee said the North appears to have made lots of preparations for what would be its seventh nuclear test "in broad terms," though it is still difficult to confirm whether the country has completed all required preparations.
Asked if the COVID-19 outbreaks in the North could affect the timing of its nuclear test, Lee refused to make a prediction.
Touching on the suspected COVID-19 spread in the North's military, Lee said the situation in the tightly controlled armed forces seems to be "less serious" compared with the infections among ordinary people.
The Yoon Suk-yeol government's push to send humanitarian aid to the North was a point of criticism from opposition lawmakers.
On a question of whether the government would offer aid to the North even after it conducts a nuclear test, Lee gave a positive answer, citing the Geneva Convention stipulating the protection of the wounded and sick in a conflict.
He later said the government has not made a decision yet on whether to provide aid to the North in the event it carries out a nuclear test.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
5. Analysis: Neutral Switzerland leans closer to NATO
Wow. Is this the end of neutrality? Will there be any neutral countries left?
Analysis: Neutral Switzerland leans closer to NATO
BERN, May 16 (Reuters) - Switzerland's fabled neutral status is about to face its biggest test in decades, with the defence ministry tilting closer to Western military powers in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
The defence ministry is drawing up a report on security options that include joint military exercises with NATO countries and "backfilling" munitions, Paelvi Pulli, head of security policy at the Swiss defence ministry told Reuters.
The details of the policy options under discussion in the government have not been previously reported.
"Ultimately, there could be changes in the way neutrality is interpreted," Pulli said in an interview last week. On a trip to Washington this week, Defence Minister Viola Amherd said Switzerland should work more closely with the U.S.-led military alliance, but not join it, Swiss media reported.
Neutrality, which kept Switzerland out of both world wars during the 20th century, was not an objective in itself, but was intended to increase Swiss security, Pulli said.
Other options include high-level and regular meetings between Swiss and NATO commanders and politicians, she said.
Moving so much closer to the alliance would mark a departure from the carefully nurtured tradition of not taking sides that its supporters say helped Switzerland prosper peacefully and maintain a special role as intermediary, including during the West's standoff with the Soviet Union.
The idea of full membership of NATO has been discussed, but whereas Sweden and Finland - countries that also have a history of neutrality - are on the verge of joining, Pulli said the report was unlikely to recommend Switzerland take that step.
The report is due to be completed by the end of September when it will go to the Swiss cabinet for consideration.
It will be submitted to parliament for discussion and serve as a basis for possible decisions on the future direction of Swiss security policy. The report itself will not be submitted to a vote.
The defence ministry will also contribute to a broader study being prepared by the foreign ministry. That project will look at the adoption of sanctions, weapons, munitions exports and the relationship with NATO from a neutrality perspective, the foreign ministry said.
UKRAINE REVIVES SWISS NEUTRALITY DEBATE
Switzerland nation has not fought in an international war since 1815, when it adopted neutrality at the Congress of Vienna which ended the French Revolutionary Wars.
The 1907 Hague Convention establishes Switzerland will not take part in international armed conflicts, favour warring parties with troops or armaments, or make its territory available to the warring sides.
Neutrality, included in the constitution, does allow Switzerland the right to self defence and scope on how to interpret the political aspects of the concept not covered by the legal definition.
It was last updated in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union, to allow a foreign policy based on cooperation with other countries in areas like humanitarian aid and disaster relief.
The Ukraine conflict has revived the debate, now centered on the government's decisions to impose sanctions on Russia but to stop short of allowing the re-export of Swiss-made ammunition to Ukraine. read more
"There is a lot of uneasiness that Switzerland cannot contribute more to help Ukraine," Pulli said.
Backfilling - where Switzerland supplies munitions to other countries to replace those sent to Ukraine - is another potential measure, Pulli said, in a shift from the government's policy until now, although direct supply is likely a step too far.
President Ignazio Cassis has ruled out arms deliveries to third countries in support of Ukraine, but, possibly showing a more expansive view of the issue, he has also said that neutrality is not a "dogma" and that failure to respond with sanctions "would have played into the hands of the aggressor."
GROWING SUPPORT FOR NATO
Switzerland already has some ties to NATO, while last year it decided to buy Lockheed Martin (LMT.N) F-35A fighters which are being purchased or already used by some NATO members. read more
Switzerland "cannot join any alliance because of neutrality. But we can work together and the systems we are buying are a good basis for that," defence minister Amherd told broadcaster SRF.
The measures under consideration would be a significant move closer for a country that did not join the United Nations until 2002 and produces many of its own weapons.
Vladimir Khokhlov, spokesman for the Russian embassy in Bern, said such measures would amount to a radical change of policy for Switzerland. Moscow would "not be able to ignore" an eventual renunciation of neutrality, which would have consequences, Khokhlov said. He did not provide further details.
The Swiss military favours greater cooperation with NATO as a way to strengthen national defence, while public opinion has undergone a sea-change since the Ukraine invasion.
More than half of respondents – 56% - supported increased ties with NATO, a recent poll found – well above the 37% average in recent years.
Support for actually joining the treaty remains a minority view, but has grown significantly. The April poll by Sotomo showed 33% of Swiss people supported joining the alliance, higher than the 21% long term view in a separate study by ETH university in Zurich.
"Clearly the Russian invasion of Ukraine has changed a lot of minds. This is seen an attack on our western democratic values," said Michael Hermann of Sotomo.
Thierry Burkart, leader of the right-of-centre Liberal Democratic Party, part of the governing coalition, described a "seismic shift" in how people feel about neutrality.
Neutrality "has to be flexible," he told Reuters.
"Before Ukraine, some people thought there would never be another conventional war in Europe," he said, adding that some had advocated for disbanding the army. "The Ukraine conflict shows we cannot be complacent."
Burkart said he supported higher military spending and a closer relationship with NATO, but not full membership.
However, Peter Keller, general secretary of the far right Swiss People's Party (SVP) told Reuters a closer relationship with NATO was incompatible with neutrality.
The SVP is also part of the governing coalition and is the biggest party in the Swiss lower house of parliament.
"There is no reason to change this successful foreign policy maxim. It has brought peace and prosperity to the people," Keller said.
The defence ministry disagrees. During her visit to Washington, Amherd said the framework of the neutrality law "allows us to work more closely together with NATO and also with our European partners," Tagesanzeiger newspaper reported.
Reporting by John Revill; Editing by Frank Jack Daniel
6. President Biden’s Missed Opportunities at U.S.-ASEAN Summit
Excerpts:
At the summit’s conclusion, the White House announced plans to provide ASEAN countries with $150 million in infrastructure, security, and pandemic-related assistance. Of that, Washington committed $40 million to reducing the carbon footprint associated with the region’s power supply. ASEAN countries will also receive funds to develop digital economies and legal frameworks for artificial intelligence. Regrettably, Washington’s meager contributions pale in comparison to the $1.5 billion in development assistance that China pledged to ASEAN countries last fall.
Moving forward, Biden’s disinterest in conducting regular leader-to-leader exchanges with his ASEAN counterparts, as well as the White House’s refusal to consider a more robust regional trade agenda, will severely hamper the administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. Regarding the IPEF, the White House has thus far not outlined what incentives it intends to offer ASEAN countries to secure their participation. The administration’s reliance on executive orders rather than legislation or formal trade treaties to enact IPEF-related deals also raises questions about what deals, if any, will outlast Biden’s time in office. The adjudication process for resolving IPEF-related disputes also appears unclear.
While Biden neglected ASEAN diplomacy even before the invasion of Ukraine, the war is likely to hinder any nascent efforts to shift American policymaker attention and resources to the Indo-Pacific. That concern, one felt widely in the region, was recently voiced by Ong Keng Yong, former secretary-general of ASEAN and Singapore’s current ambassador-at-large, who noted that “[s]ince the end of the Second World War, it is obvious that Europe comes first to the U.S. before any other region of the world.” Beijing will be keen to take advantage of Washington’s policy void to expand its economic, political, and security-related commitments throughout the region, with an eye towards further eroding Washington’s influence.
President Biden’s Missed Opportunities at U.S.-ASEAN Summit
By Craig Singleton
May 17, 2022
President Joe Biden hosted an in-person summit last week with leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a bloc of 10 countries with a total annual GDP of approximately $3 trillion. While the Biden administration billed the summit as an opportunity to signal its renewed commitment to the region, the White House gathering resulted in few tangible outcomes and received scant media coverage, likely compounding regional concerns that Washington has no clear agenda for the Indo-Pacific.
Overall, Biden has held few substantive engagements with ASEAN leaders, although he did attend last October’s virtual heads-of-state summit, an event that former President Donald Trump skipped during all four years of his administration. Apart from that one engagement, Biden has not held a single bilateral telephone call with any ASEAN leader since assuming office. Moreover, Biden decided against conducting any one-on-one exchanges with ASEAN leaders on the margins of last week’s White House gathering.
The ASEAN summit’s agenda focused primarily on COVID-19 recovery efforts and global health security, climate change, promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment, and deepening people-to-people ties. There was little emphasis on security matters, such as China’s unlawful claims to sovereignty over most of the South China Sea. Moreover, summit attendees largely avoided discussing the deteriorating situation in Myanmar, including whether to boost support for Myanmar’s National Unity Government, a group formed in exile by elected officials ousted during the 2021 military coup.
On the economic front, White House officials largely rebuffed appeals by ASEAN leaders for enhanced U.S. market access. This snub is consistent with Biden’s moratorium on any new trade deals, even those that could potentially help ASEAN countries reduce their dependence on China. During the lead-up to the summit, the White House also declined to unveil any substantive details regarding its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which will reportedly focus on a series of unenforceable agreements involving “fair and resilient trade,” supply chain resilience, decarbonization, and anti-corruption policies. IPEF is unlikely, however, to meaningfully improve U.S. market access for ASEAN countries or their companies.
At the summit’s conclusion, the White House announced plans to provide ASEAN countries with $150 million in infrastructure, security, and pandemic-related assistance. Of that, Washington committed $40 million to reducing the carbon footprint associated with the region’s power supply. ASEAN countries will also receive funds to develop digital economies and legal frameworks for artificial intelligence. Regrettably, Washington’s meager contributions pale in comparison to the $1.5 billion in development assistance that China pledged to ASEAN countries last fall.
Moving forward, Biden’s disinterest in conducting regular leader-to-leader exchanges with his ASEAN counterparts, as well as the White House’s refusal to consider a more robust regional trade agenda, will severely hamper the administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. Regarding the IPEF, the White House has thus far not outlined what incentives it intends to offer ASEAN countries to secure their participation. The administration’s reliance on executive orders rather than legislation or formal trade treaties to enact IPEF-related deals also raises questions about what deals, if any, will outlast Biden’s time in office. The adjudication process for resolving IPEF-related disputes also appears unclear.
While Biden neglected ASEAN diplomacy even before the invasion of Ukraine, the war is likely to hinder any nascent efforts to shift American policymaker attention and resources to the Indo-Pacific. That concern, one felt widely in the region, was recently voiced by Ong Keng Yong, former secretary-general of ASEAN and Singapore’s current ambassador-at-large, who noted that “[s]ince the end of the Second World War, it is obvious that Europe comes first to the U.S. before any other region of the world.” Beijing will be keen to take advantage of Washington’s policy void to expand its economic, political, and security-related commitments throughout the region, with an eye towards further eroding Washington’s influence.
Craig Singleton, a national security expert and former U.S. diplomat, is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he contributes to FDD’s China Program. For more analysis from Craig and the China Program, please subscribe HERE. Follow Craig on Twitter @CraigMSingleton. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
7. US troops heading back into Somalia, reversing Trump order
Excerpts:
Al-Shabab fighters have killed at least 12 Americans in East Africa in recent years, including three defense contractors during an attack on a military site in Kenya in 2020.
White House officials said the group has also focused efforts in recent years to plan attacks outside of Africa against western targets, underscoring the need to counter the group’s ambitions as soon as possible.
The move comes a day after Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who served as Somalia’s president between 2012 and 2017, was announced on Sunday as the winner of the country’s most recent presidential election. U.S. officials described him as “consistent” in his opposition to the terrorist groups in the region.
US troops heading back into Somalia, reversing Trump order
Several hundred U.S. servicemembers will be again stationed inside Somalia to help combat growing al-Shabab terrorist forces there, administration officials confirmed Monday.
The move reverses an order by President Donald Trump 18 months ago to remove all U.S. military forces from the country over the objections of Pentagon officials. Before then, about 700 American troops had been stationed in the country, helping to train local forces in their fight against terrorist groups.
White House officials said that President Joe Biden made the move to “re-establish a persistent U.S. military presence in Somalia” in response to concerns about the growing strength of al-Shabab in the region, along with other threats affiliated with al Qaeda and the Islamic State.
RELATED
The defense secretary is weighing whether to send troops back to Somalia.
The mission will include both training friendly Somali forces to combat the terrorist groups and assist on operations “to try and dislodge Shabab from what is a significant amount of territory that it purports to govern and hold.”
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin requested the move as a way to build on U.S. military airstrikes in the region “to increase the safety and effectiveness of our special operators,” a senior administration official said.
Even after the Trump order, U.S. forces continued deploying to Somalia for short rotations to train and facilitate counter-terrorism operations.
But military leaders have categorized those restrictions as problematic.
In testimony before the Senate in March, Army Gen. Stephen Townsend, head of U.S. Africa Command, called the current arrangement “not effective.”
“It’s not efficient, and it puts our troops at greater risk,” Townsend said.
Administration officials would not say how many troops will be deployed, but said it will be fewer than 500. They also did not specify which units will be sent, but said the personnel would come “from U.S. forces that are already generally stationed in that region of Africa.”
The senior administration official also emphasized that the move “will not change the scope of the mission that our special operators have conducted in Somalia … and also will not significantly change the Defense Department’s overall posture and resource dedication in East Africa.”
RELATED
All troops deploying to U.S Africa Command will receive the new training.
Al-Shabab fighters have killed at least 12 Americans in East Africa in recent years, including three defense contractors during an attack on a military site in Kenya in 2020.
White House officials said the group has also focused efforts in recent years to plan attacks outside of Africa against western targets, underscoring the need to counter the group’s ambitions as soon as possible.
The move comes a day after Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who served as Somalia’s president between 2012 and 2017, was announced on Sunday as the winner of the country’s most recent presidential election. U.S. officials described him as “consistent” in his opposition to the terrorist groups in the region.
Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.
8. Retired colonel tells Russian state TV 'the whole world is against us'
Damn retired colonels. But Russia has arrived in the modern era now that it has colonels turned talking heads/pundits. But how long will he last with this criticism?
Retired colonel tells Russian state TV 'the whole world is against us'
'The whole world is against us': Retired colonel gives damning assessment of Russia's war in Ukraine on state TV as he urges Putin to 'get out of' the conflict
- Mikhail Khodaryonok, a retired Soviet colonel, gave a dire assessment of Russia's war in Ukraine on state TV
- He warned that myths of the Ukrainian army being demoralised and in disarray are 'to put it mildly, false'
- Said Ukraine may soon have 1m troops armed with western weapons who are ready to 'fight to the last man'
- Russia is in 'full geopolitical isolation' with 'virtually the entire world against us', Khodaryonok added, saying it is a situation that the country 'needs to get out of'
PUBLISHED: 08:45 BST, 17 May 2022 | UPDATED: 10:00 BST, 17 May 2022
Daily Mail · by Chris Pleasance for MailOnline · May 17, 2022
Russian state media's trumped-up narrative of Putin's glorious war in Ukraine was last night shattered by a retired colonel who gave an unusually frank and damning assessment of the situation on the frontlines and world stage.
Mikhail Khodarenok, a former air defence commander and graduate of some of the Soviet Union's top military schools, used his platform on one of Russia's most-watched talk shows to warn that the war is going badly and is likely to get worse, and that nuclear sabre-rattling - far from being threatening - actually 'looks quite amusing'.
Ukraine, he said, will soon have mobilised more than a million soldiers who will be trained by the West and equipped with modern weapons, ready to fight and die to protect their homeland against Russia.
Batting aside repeated interruption from propagandist Olga Skabeyeva that the army will be mostly made of conscripts, Khodarenok insisted that how an army is recruited is irrelevant - what really matters is willingness to fight, and Ukraine 'intends to fight to the last man.'
Russia's position on the world stage is no better, he added, pointing out that 'we are in full geopolitical isolation, and that, however much we would hate to admit this, virtually the entire world is against us. And it's that situation that we need to get out of.'
Khodarenok's remarks, broadcast to millions of Russians who until now have been spoon-fed a narrative of their military's prowess and Ukraine's weakness, mark a stunning break with the state-sanctioned narrative and puts him at extreme odds with the Kremlin stooges stood to either side of him.
Mikhail Khodarenok, a former Soviet air defence commander, has given a full and frank assessment of Russia's military failings on state TV - warning that 'the whole world is against us'
Ukrainian solders examine the wreck of a Russian tank in an image taken on an unknown date at an unknown location, but released by the country's defence ministry on Monday
A local resident looks at a destroyed Russian tank next to a residential house in the village of Mala Rogan, east of Kharkiv
Russia's offensive across Ukraine has all-but ground to a halt, except for an attempted pincer movement around Ukrainian troops at Severodonetsk in the east, and an ongoing assault on the Azovstal steel works in Mariupol
Speaking on Skabeyeva's evening talk show - which toes the Kremlin line so tightly that she has become known as the 'iron doll of Putin TV' - Khodarenok urged his fellow panellist to wean themselves off of 'information tranquilisers' and look objectively at the situation.
First of all, he said, rumours of a 'moral and psychological breakdown in the Ukrainian armed forces which are allegedly on the verge of some kind of crisis in morale' are 'to put it mildly, is false'.
'The situation... is that the Ukrainian armed forces are able to arm a million people,' he added, who will be equipped with western weapons and trained how to use them by armies that are part of NATO. 'So a million armed Ukrainian soldiers needs to be viewed as a reality of the very near future,' he said.
Batting aside objections from Skabayeva that most of those men will be conscripts, he insisted that what really matters isn't how an army is recruited but its willingness to fight.
'A desire to protect one's homeland, in the sense that it exists in Ukraine, it really does exist there, they intend to fight to the last man,' he said. 'Ultimately victory on the battlefield is determined by a high level of morale among personnel, which sheds blood for the ideas which it's prepared to fight for.'
On the world stage, Khodarenok added, things hardly look better. 'We are in full geopolitical isolation,' he said, adding that: 'However much we would hate to admit this, virtually the entire world is against us.'
Nuclear sabre-rattling, he insisted, will do little to deter Russia's enemies and in fact 'actually looks quite amusing' when the whole world is arrayed against the Kremlin.
Urging those around him to 'maintain a sense of realism', he warned that 'sooner or later the reality of history will hit you so hard that you'll regret it.'
It is hardly the first time that Khodarenok has voiced concerns. Even before the war started, he wrote that Ukrainians would fight like hell to defend their country and that Russia was walking into a longer, bloodier, and far more costly conflict than it was preparing for.
It is not even the first time he has spoken out on state TV. Ahead of Putin's Victory Day speech on May 9, he warned that a rumoured mass mobilisation of troops would not solve the problems Russia's military is facing.
But his latest remarks are the lengthiest, most in-depth analysis of the corner that Moscow has backed itself into and seems intended to spark a conversation about how exactly the country gets itself out again.
What remains unclear - however - is whether anyone, and in particularly those in the Kremlin, are listening to him.
He spoke out after repeated briefings from western intelligence agencies said that Russia's offensive in the Donbass has stalled and that a path to Ukrainian victory is now emerging.
In a sign of growing desperation in the Kremlin, military sources said last night that Putin is now micro-managing the war effort - taking decisions that are typically left to colonels as his battleplan falters.
General Valery Gerasimov is also said to be making similar tactical decisions, micro-managing the war in minute detail which would normally be overseen by a colonel.
'We think Putin and Gerasimov are involved in tactical decision-making at a level we would normally expect to be taken by a colonel or a brigadier', said a Western military source, according to The Guardian.
The same source said that Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) had been 'battered', adding: 'If Putin is doing the job of a brigade commander' then 'he could be delving into a force that could be as small as 700 to 1,000 soldiers'.
Putin's soldiers have so far failed to achieve their military objectives in eastern Ukraine, where Russian forces have been attempting to mount a breakthrough in order to encircle Ukrainian troops in the Donbas region.
Ukrainian troops have posed with a border marker on the frontier with Russia having counter-attacked to the north of Kharkiv and pushed Putin's army out of the country, the regional governor said today
It is thought the footage was filmed Sunday to the north of the town of Ternova, around two miles from the Russian border, which Ukrainian troops had captured the day before
Officials believe Putin's decision to take personal control of on-the-ground troop movements could be contributing to the military failures.
Radio jamming has forced Moscow to send more battalion leaders to the front line in order to communicate with their troops, only for Ukrainians to take advantage by killing Russia's generals - with 12 confirmed dead.
The news comes after Ukrainian soldiers became the country's first to reach the Russian border after retaking Kharkiv from occupation.
Ukraine’s ministry of defence said on social media that the 227th Battalion of the 127th Brigade of its military had reached the border with Russia, marking the closest Ukrainian soldier's have come to their neighbour since it was invaded on February 24.
On Monday, one of Putin's top propagandists has declared Russia's offensive in the Donbas region has failed as incredible pictures show the inside of the steel plant at Azovstal which has been under siege for much of the war.
Russian intelligence officer and commander Igor Girkin took to his Telegram channel to summarise the situation for Russian forces in Ukraine and said their intention was 'so obvious' that Ukraine Armed Forces have been able to resist.
Meanwhile, incredible photos have been shared of the inside of Azovstal steel works - which has been under siege in Mariupol for months - after wounded Ukrainian soldiers were evacuated.
Girkin, who has spoken frankly about the difficulties facing Putin's forces in recent weeks as their invasion of Ukraine drags on, shared a detailed summary of their progress, or lack thereof, on his Telegram channel, adding that the failure to make headway was not a surprise.
He wrote: 'With regret I must say that the widely advertised [...] operation to defeat the Donetsk group of the enemy has FAILED.
'In more than two weeks of fierce hostilities (which have cost both sides huge losses) only tactical successes have been reached. Not a single large locality has been liberated.'
Girkin said that perhaps some 'local tactical successes' could be achieved before a counter-offensive by Ukraine forces but said it was unlikely the Donbas region would be 'fully liberated', adding: 'It's likely the UAF will not even be pushed away from the outskirts of Donetsk. And I cannot say that this result is unexpected for me. Quite the opposite.'
It comes as Russia said on Monday that it had agreed to an evacuation effort from the bunkers below the besieged plant in Mariupol to a medical facility in the Russian-controlled town of Novoazovsk.
A man examines the ruins of his house in the village of Mala Rogan, to the east of Kharkiv, after Ukrainian troops recaptured the area from Russian forces in the past few days
Ukrainian troops move past the ruins of a destroyed Russian vehicle along with discarded artillery shells in a village to the north of Kharkiv which has now been recaptured by Kyiv's men
As the soldier were evacuated, incredible images were shared online showing inside the plant earlier today.
One photo shows a Ukrainian soldier standing under a beam of light in the now-wrecked steel plant as wounded forces were evacuated.
The fighting at Azovstal in ruined Mariupol has symbolised Ukrainian resistance throughout Russia's nearly three-month-old invasion. Most civilians who had sought shelter at the vast Soviet-era plant were evacuated earlier this month.
'In order to save lives, the entire Mariupol garrison is implementing the approved decision of the Supreme Military Command and hopes for the support of the Ukrainian people,' the Azov Regiment said in a social media post.
In an accompanying video, one of the unit's senior commanders, Denys Prokopenko, said: 'The main thing is to realise all the risks, is there a plan B, are you fully committed to that plan which must allow for fulfilling the assigned tasks and preserve the lives and health of personnel?'
'This is the highest level of overseeing troops. All the more so when your decision is endorsed by the highest military command.'
Prokopenko did not spell out what action the defenders were taking. The video was released hours after Russia said it had agreed to evacuate wounded Ukrainian soldiers to a medical facility in the Russian-controlled town of Novoazovsk.
Ukraine estimates tens of thousands of civilians died in Mariupol during months of siege by Russian forces who destroyed the Sea of Azov port, a city of around 400,000 people.
The last defenders, including many who were wounded, had been holding out for weeks in bunkers beneath Azovstal, one of the largest metallurgical plants in Europe.
'An agreement has been reached on the removal of the wounded,' Russia's defence ministry said in a statement.
'A humanitarian corridor has been opened through which wounded Ukrainian servicemen are being taken to a medical facility in Novoazovsk.'
Ukraine's Deputy Defence Minister Hanna Malyar earlier told Ukrainian television: 'Any information can harm the processes that are taking place ... Inasmuch as the process is under way, we can't say what's happening right now.'
Daily Mail · by Chris Pleasance for MailOnline · May 17, 2022
9. More than 250 Ukrainian troops surrender as Kyiv orders Mariupol to yield
An honorable army would treat these fighters with dignity and respect for their heroic defense. But we must fear for their safety and the likely terrible treatment they will receive.
More than 250 Ukrainian troops surrender as Kyiv orders Mariupol to yield
- Summary
- Companies
- Ukrainian soldiers, many wounded, bussed to Russian-held towns
- 'Defenders of Mariupol are heroes of our time'- Ukraine military
- Putin says he sees no threat from Finland, Sweden joining NATO
- Explosions hit Lviv, fighting reported in numerous areas
KYIV/NOVOAZOVSK, Ukraine, May 17 (Reuters) - Ukraine's military said on Tuesday it aimed to evacuate its remaining soldiers from their last stronghold in Mariupol, as fighters that have held out for 82 days began to surrender, heralding the end of Europe's bloodiest battle in decades.
Reuters saw buses leave the huge Azovstal steelworks overnight and five of them arrive in the Russian-held town of Novoazovsk. In one, marked with the Latin letter 'Z' that has become the symbol of Russia's assault, wounded men were lying on stretchers three bunks high. One man was wheeled out, his head tightly wrapped in thick bandages.
Video released by the Russian ministry of defence showed fighters leaving the plant, some being carried on stretchers, others with their hands up to be searched by Russian troops.
Russia said 256 Ukrainian fighters had "laid down their arms and surrendered", including 51 severely wounded. Ukraine said 264 soldiers, including 53 wounded, had left the metal plant, and efforts were under way to evacuate others still inside.
"The 'Mariupol' garrison has fulfilled its combat mission," the General Staff of Ukraine's Armed Forces said in a statement.
"The supreme military command ordered the commanders of the units stationed at Azovstal to save the lives of the personnel ... Defenders of Mariupol are the heroes of our time."
The surrender appears to mark the end of the battle of Mariupol, where Ukraine believes tens of thousands of people were killed under months of Russian bombardment and siege.
The city now lies in ruins. Its complete capture is Russia's biggest victory of the war, giving Moscow total control of the coast of the Sea of Azov and an unbroken stretch of eastern and southern Ukraine about the size of Greece.
But it comes as Russia's campaign has faltered elsewhere, with its troops around the city of Kharkiv in the northeast lately retreating at the fastest pace since they were driven out of the north and the area around Kyiv at the end of March.
Authorities on both sides gave few clues about the ultimate fate of Mariupol's last defenders, with Ukrainian officials discussing the prospect of some form of exchange for Russian prisoners but giving no details.
"We hope that we will be able to save the lives of our guys," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said in an early morning address. "There are severely wounded ones among them. They're receiving care. Ukraine needs Ukrainian heroes alive."
Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister Hanna Malyar said 53 injured troops from the steelworks had been taken to a hospital in Russian-controlled Novoazovsk, some 32 km (20 miles) to the east, and another 211 people were taken to the town of Olenivka, also in an area controlled by Russian-backed separatists.
All of the evacuees would be subject to a potential prisoner exchange with Russia, she added.
HEAVY SHELLING REPORTED
Mariupol is the biggest city Russia has captured since its Feb. 24 invasion, giving Moscow a clear-cut victory for the first time in months, during which its campaign in Ukraine has mostly faced military disaster against an underestimated foe.
In a statement released late on Monday, the Azov Regiment, the Ukrainian unit that had held out in the steelworks, said it had achieved its objective over 82 days of resistance by making it possible for Ukraine to defend the rest of the country. read more
"In order to save lives, the entire Mariupol garrison is implementing the approved decision of the Supreme Military Command and hopes for the support of the Ukrainian people," the Azov Regiment said in a social media post.
In an accompanying video, one of the unit's senior commanders, Denys Prokopenko, called the decision to save the lives of his men "the highest level of overseeing troops".
The United Nations and Red Cross say thousands of civilians died under Russia's siege of the once prosperous port of 400,000, with the true toll uncounted but certain to be Europe's worst since wars in Chechnya and the Balkans in the 1990s.
For months, Mariupol's residents were forced to cower in cellars under perpetual bombardment, with no access to food, fresh water or heat and dead bodies littering the streets above. Two incidents in particular - the bombings in March of a maternity clinic and of a theatre where hundreds of people were sheltering - became worldwide emblems of Russia's tactic of raining down devastation on population centres.
Thousands of civilians are believed to have been buried in mass graves or makeshift pits dug in gardens by their neighbours. Ukraine says Moscow sent mobile cremation trucks to erase evidence of civilian deaths, and forcibly deported thousands of residents to Russia.
Moscow denies targeting civilians or deporting them, and says it has taken in refugees. It says it is now restoring normal life to the city, part of the Donbas region it claims on behalf of separatists it has backed since 2014.
UKRAINE ADVANCES
Elsewhere, Ukrainian forces have been advancing in recent days at their fastest pace for more than a month, driving Russian forces out of the area around Kharkiv, Ukraine's second largest city.
Ukraine says its forces have reached the Russian border, 40 km north of Kharkiv. They have also pushed at least as far as the Siverskiy Donets river 40 km to the east, where they could threaten supply lines to Russia's main advance in the Donbas.
Russia is still pressing that advance, despite taking heavy losses in a failed river crossing last week. Zelenskiy's office said on Tuesday the entire front line around Donetsk was under constant massive shelling. Ukraine's general staff said Russian forces were reinforcing and preparing to renew their offensive near Slovyansk and Drobysheve, southeast of the town of Izium.
Areas around Kyiv and the western city of Lviv, near the Polish border, have continued to come under Russian attack. A series of explosions struck Lviv early on Tuesday, a Reuters witness said. One missile hit a military facility but there were no casualties, according to Zelenskiy's office.
A village in Russia's western province of Kursk bordering Ukraine came under Ukrainian fire on Tuesday, regional Governor Roman Starovoit said. Three houses and a school were hit but there were no injuries, he said.
PUTIN CLIMBDOWN OVER NATO
In response the invasion, historically non-aligned Finland and Sweden have announced plans to join NATO, bringing about the very expansion of the Western alliance that President Vladimir Putin had long invoked as one of the main justifications for ordering his "special military operation" in February.
After weeks in which Russia threatened unspecified retaliation, Putin appeared to abruptly climb down, saying in a speech on Monday that Russia had "no problems" with either Finland or Sweden, and that their NATO membership would not be an issue unless the alliance sent more troops or weapons there.
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Tuesday there would be "probably not much difference" if Finland and Sweden joined NATO, since they had already been cooperating in the alliance's military exercises. read more
Reporting by Natalia Zinets in Kyiv and a Reuters journalist in Novoazovsk; Additional reporting by Reuters bureaux; Writing by Lincoln Feast and Peter Graff; Editing by Stephen Coates and Nick Macfie
10. Vladimir Putin takes personal control of Russia's faltering Donbas offensive
Vladimir "LBJ" Putin. Is he choosing individual targets and objectives for tactical units?
Vladimir Putin takes personal control of Russia's faltering Donbas offensive
The Russian president is reportedly interfering in low-level tactical decisions usually made by much junior figures
DEFENCE AND SECURITY EDITOR
17 May 2022 • 8:28am
The Russian President and the head of his armed forces, General Valery Gerasimov, were said to be interfering in low-level tactical decisions usually made by much junior figures.
"We think Putin and Gerasimov are involved in tactical decision-making at a level we would normally expect to be taken by a colonel or a brigadier," the source said.
The source added that Mr Putin’s most senior general was still “up and running” despite claims he had been suspended after a series of military failures in Ukraine.
Gen. Valery Gerasimov is said to be micromanaging the war effort in the Donbas Credit: Anadolu Agency /Anadolu
It was suggested that the pair could be meddling in the movements of Russian units containing as little as 700 to 1,000 soldiers.
Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the head of Britain’s armed forces, told Parliament on Monday said Ukraine’s survival was “guaranteed” and that he had been given clear direction from Boris Johnson that “Putin must fail”.
“The Foreign Secretary speaks of a network of liberty,” he said.
“If we, the responsible, democratic nations of the world, don’t step up to strengthen and defend the rules and freedoms that underpin global security, then we leave that space to others that subscribe to a very different set of values.”
Mr Putin, according to a US-based think-tank, has downgraded his military ambitions for the second time since he ordered the invasion of Ukraine on February 24.
Russia had already abandoned efforts to capture the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, in favour of taking full control over the eastern Donbas region.
But now the Kremlin has appeared to scrap plans to capture Donetsk, a pro-Russian separatist-held city, in favour of seizing full control over Luhansk to the northeast, the latest assessment by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said.
The ISW said Russia was believed to have run out of combat-ready reserves, forcing them to gather soldiers from different units, including private military fighters and proxy militias.
11. Putin involved in war ‘at level of colonel or brigadier’, say western sources
Perhaps they do not need general officers (or any above brigadier). Most colonels think they are good enough to be generals anyway. (note my sarcasm)
Excerpts:
“We think Putin and Gerasimov are involved in tactical decision making at a level we would normally expect to be taken by a colonel or a brigadier,” the military source said, referring to the ongoing battle in the east of Ukraine.
Moscow’s armies have so far failed to achieve a breakthrough in the Donbas, where they have been mounting an offensive for a month that has failed several times to encircle the smaller Ukrainian forces.
No further detail to back up the statement was provided, although it was implied the assessment about Putin’s close personal involvement was based on intelligence that had been received.
Colonels in the US army and brigadiers in the British army typically command a brigade, units made up of a handful of battalions – the latter of which is equivalent to the smallest operating unit in the Russian army.
Russia’s military operates in a more top down fashion compared to western counterparts, with instructions typically sent to generals in the field. But Moscow’s faltering invasion has meant that it has been forced to send generals closer to the frontline, where up to 12 have been killed, according to the Ukrainian armed forces.
Ben Barry, a former brigadier in the British army, and a land warfare expert at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, said: “A head of government should have better things to do than make military decisions. They should be setting the political strategy rather than getting bogged down in day to day activity”.
Putin involved in war ‘at level of colonel or brigadier’, say western sources
President helping determine movement of Russian soldiers, say sources, as head of UK armed forces says Ukraine is winning
Vladimir Putin has become so personally involved in the Ukraine war that he is making operational and tactical decisions “at the level of a colonel or brigadier”, according to western military sources.
The Russian president is helping determine the movement of forces in the Donbas, they added, where last week the invaders suffered a bloody defeat as they tried on multiple occasions to cross a strategic river in the east of Ukraine.
The sources added that Putin is still working closely with Gen Valery Gerasimov, the commander of the Russian armed forces, in contrast to claims made by Ukraine last week that the military chief had been sidelined.
“We think Putin and Gerasimov are involved in tactical decision making at a level we would normally expect to be taken by a colonel or a brigadier,” the military source said, referring to the ongoing battle in the east of Ukraine.
Moscow’s armies have so far failed to achieve a breakthrough in the Donbas, where they have been mounting an offensive for a month that has failed several times to encircle the smaller Ukrainian forces.
No further detail to back up the statement was provided, although it was implied the assessment about Putin’s close personal involvement was based on intelligence that had been received.
Colonels in the US army and brigadiers in the British army typically command a brigade, units made up of a handful of battalions – the latter of which is equivalent to the smallest operating unit in the Russian army.
Russia’s military operates in a more top down fashion compared to western counterparts, with instructions typically sent to generals in the field. But Moscow’s faltering invasion has meant that it has been forced to send generals closer to the frontline, where up to 12 have been killed, according to the Ukrainian armed forces.
Ben Barry, a former brigadier in the British army, and a land warfare expert at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, said: “A head of government should have better things to do than make military decisions. They should be setting the political strategy rather than getting bogged down in day to day activity”.
Last week’s failed attempt to cross the Siverskyi Donets river at Bilohorivka led to the destruction of more than 70 Russian vehicles, and the loss of at least one batallion’s worth of equipment, according to estimates based on aerial photography of the battle site.
Ukraine: drone footage shows destroyed bridge and vehicles at Donbas river crossing – video
The defeat was so serious it led some Russian military bloggers to comment “on the incompetence of the Russian military to their hundreds of thousands of followers”, according to the Institute for the Study of War, a rare sign of internal dissent.
In the past 24 hours, Russian forces shelled frontline positions in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas area as fighting becomes increasingly focused on Severodonetsk, the easternmost city still held by Ukrainian forces after more than 11 weeks of war.
Serhiy Haidai, the governor of Luhansk region, said on Monday that Russian strikes had hit a hospital in the city over the weekend, killing two and injuring nine, including a child – and several other locations had been targeted. Ukrainian forces repelled 17 attacks on Sunday, he added, and destroyed 11 Russian armoured vehicles.
The Russians are gradually mounting an assault on Severodonetsk, an industrial city that had a population of 100,000 before the war, as the effort to complete a wider encirclement of Ukraine’s defending forces in the Donbas appears to have failed.
Ukrainian forces also continued to push Russian forces back from Kharkiv, the country’s second biggest city, with Volodomyr Zelenskiy congratulating soldiers who erected a new border post on Russia’s border north of the city.
“I’m very grateful to you, on behalf of all Ukrainians, on my behalf and on behalf of my family,” he said in a video message. “I’m very grateful to all the fighters like you.”
Ukraine says footage shows soldiers in Kharkiv region at Russian border – video
Russia’s withdrawal is a fighting retreat, however, with the outlying northern villages around Kharkiv being peppered with shelling on Monday, with one person confirmed killed in Tsyrkuny, 17 miles from the city centre and four injured in the districts of Shevchenkivskyi and Saltivka.
Ukrainian officials said that Russian forces were concentrating on “maintaining positions and preventing the advance of our troops toward the border”.
Britain’s chief of defence staff, Adm Sir Tony Radakin, said he believed that Ukraine was now winning the war because Putin had wanted to “subjugate the whole of Ukraine” and “impose his own rule on that country” and had failed.
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Giving a speech in to a parliamentary audience in Westminster, the head of the UK armed forces said Ukraine was winning because it had fought off “an existential threat” and that “its nation is going to survive,” he added.
The Institute for the Study of War said it believed “Russian forces have likely abandoned the objective of completing a large-scale encirclement of Ukrainian units from Donetsk City to Izium” in favour of capturing the remainder of the Luhansk region, of which Severodonetsk is part.
A second smaller-scale encirclement of Severodonetsk also failed last week after Russian forces were defeated with heavy losses in a series of unsuccessful attempts to cross the Siverskyi Donets River at Bilohorivka.
The river is increasingly becoming a dividing line between the two sides in the Donbas – the name given collectively to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions – and around Kharkiv to the north.
Haidai said battles were taking place on Sunday to the north and south of Severodonetsk, which is one of the few locations held by Ukraine on the east side of the river. Analysts believe there may be a long struggle for the city.
Konrad Muzyka, the founder of Rochan Consulting, which specialises in open source intelligence, said he believed the capture of Severodonetsk was weeks away. “Moscow … does not have the appropriate manpower and equipment levels to take the city swiftly,” he said in a weekly review of the fighting.
12. War within Russia's secret services over bogus intelligence that led to invasion
When faced with problems, always return to the tired trope: it was an intelligence failure.
War within Russia's secret services over bogus intelligence that led to invasion: Blame game erupts over 'worthless' info that meant 'Putin was the most uninformed person to decide about the war'
- FSB's 5th Service accused of gathering 'worthless' information that misled Putin
- It's charged with intelligence and political subversion in former Soviet republics
- Sources accuse 'unprofessional' service of 'selling air' and 'making things up'
- Head of the 5th Service allegedly arrested in April over embezzling funds
PUBLISHED: 09:30 BST, 17 May 2022 | UPDATED: 09:49 BST, 17 May 2022
A bitter new blame game has erupted in Russia's secret services over the bogus intelligence that led Putin to believing his troops would be welcomed in Ukraine with open arms.
Much of the blame is being pointed at the door of the FSB's 5th Service for gathering 'worthless' information that misled Russian President Vladimir Putin and left him 'the most uninformed person to decide about the war'.
Disputed reports in April stated that Col-General Sergei Beseda, 68, head of the 5th Service, and his deputy, Anatoly Bolyukh, had been detained in April either under house arrest or under pre-trial detention for leaking plans and embezzling funds.
The 5th Service is known as the foreign spying arm of the FSB, charged primarily with intelligence and political subversion in former Soviet republics such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
It is also reportedly in charge of the Kremlin's 'kill list' of Ukrainian senior officials and other dissidents who live in Ukraine.
Sources have told IStories, a media outlet linked to Russia's top investigative journalists, that 'the level of professionalism there is worthless.'
Pictured: Colonel General Sergei Beseda, 68, head of the 5th Service of Russian Federal Security Service. Disputed reports in April stated that he had been detained either under house arrest or under pre-trial detention over furnishing Putin with dud information that led him to setting a target of taking Kyiv in five days, and Mariupol in three
Much of the blame within Russian secret services is being pointed at the door of the FSB's 5th Service for gathering 'worthless' information that misled Russian President Vladimir Putin (pictured) and left him 'the most uninformed person to decide about the war'
A woman walks in front of the headquarters of Russia's Federal Security Services (FSB) in central Moscow
Pictured: Destroyed Russian tanks outside Kyiv. Putin was forced to abort his plan to grab Kyiv, and has only gained control of a devastated and unrecognisable Mariupol after almost three months of fighting, contrary to intelligence he had received prior to the invasion
Pictured: A Ukrainian man walks past a destroyed Russian tank in a damaged field as Russian attacks continue in Chernihiv Oblast, Ukraine on May 12
In fact, Putin was forced to abort his plan to grab the capital, and has only gained control of a devastated and unrecognisable Mariupol after almost three months of fighting.
Beseda's agents were 'selling air' instead of providing hard and reliable data, according to IStories.
'They would over or misinterpret information, sometimes they would make up things completely,' said a former FSB officer.
'The senior executives used to believe all of this nonsense.
'For instance, they would report that the regions of Ukraine did not have any real connection with the Kyiv government and would run towards Russia should they have a chance to do so.'
This led Putin to setting a target to take Kyiv in five days, and Mariupol in three, according to IStories.
Another FSB staffer still serving said of the 5th service: 'It was full of people who had no clue how the job is done.
'Many people would refuse to join the department, it is something of a swamp really.'
A key problem was that the spies Putin relied on were gathering intelligence from discredited and fugitive members of the Ukrainian government overthrown in 2014.
These people had an axe to grind and fed false or misleading information to the 5th Service that painted a far rosier picture of a prospective invasion.
Anatoly Bolyukh, deputy head of the 5th Service of the Federal Security Service, head of the operational information department, was reportedly dismissed from his post in April
A charred Russian tank and captured tanks are seen, amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine, in the Sumy region, Ukraine, March 7
Sources were speaking to respected investigative journalist Andrei Soldatov and Russian media outlet IStories
Another ex-FSB agent told journalists: 'They would feed Beseda with their made-up fantasies to seem worthwhile and receive financial aid.
'They were also dreaming about returning to Ukraine.
'They would even plan out what positions they would take in the future. This way they adapted their stories to create a favourable picture.'
Both Beseda and Bolyukh were reported to have been arrested over reports that they had simply embezzled much of the billions earmarked for subversion and 'fifth column' operations in Ukraine that would undermine the country's ability to resist Russia's invasion from within.
These accounts are now disputed by at least four sources despite stark new evidence of the incompetent intelligence reaching Putin, according to IStories.
'Beseda is untouchable,' one source told IStories, a media outlet linked to Russia's top investigative journalists.
'People like him don't get jailed.'
Russian President Vladimir Putin chairs a meeting with members of Russia's Security Council in the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, 21 February, the day before the invasion of Ukraine
It is unclear if he is still in post or currently advising Putin but the report stated: 'At the start of the war many media even reported Beseda and colleagues were arrested for the fact their information about Ukraine was false.
A member of a Russian special-purpose unit - referring to Putin - told IStories: 'However funny it may sound, the decision about the war was taken by the most uninformed person that could possibly have taken it. The president.'
The report said that while Beseda may not have been arrested, there is a mood for recriminations.
'No-one hides that inside FSB that there are big questions over the work of the 5th service,' said the report.
'Moreover, many fellow FSB are thirsty for the blood of their colleagues from that service, and wait for criminal cases to start against them.'
Novaya Gazeta - an independent Russian investigative news outlet now in exile - wrote: 'Putin relied upon the information provided by incompetent FSB officers when he planned his invasion into Ukraine.'
Other accounts, especially from leading security expert and journalist Andrei Soldatov, have insisted that Beseda was detained as part of a sweep up of dozens of FSB operatives seen as having given Putin dud data over Ukraine.
He was being held in Lefortovo under a pseudonym, it was claimed.
'Right now the military is blaming the FSB for many things,' Soldatov told Radio Free Europe.
'[It’s] not only about the decision to go to war [and how they did it], but also about how the war is being conducted and all the mistakes that are being made.
'Of course, we are not talking about the [Russian] military thinking that it was better to not get into the war.
'Unfortunately, I don't see that as a big sentiment in the military. They're quite pro-war, actually -- aggressively pro-war, I’d say.
'They're just not happy with the way it has been conducted.'
13. U.S. State Department Set to Delist Mujahideen Shura Council of Jerusalem
U.S. State Department Set to Delist Mujahideen Shura Council of Jerusalem | FDD's Long War Journal
The U.S. State Department is expected to remove the Gaza-based Mujahideen Shura Council of Jerusalem (MSC) and several other groups from its Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) list, according to an Associated Press report.
The groups are believed to be inactive and unlikely to pose further threats to warrant their continued listing as FTOs.
“Based on a review of the Administrative Record assembled in this matter and in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, I determine that the circumstances that were the basis for the designation… have changed in such a manner to warrant revocation of the designation,” the AP reported, citing a statement by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
The groups named in the AP report are the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo, the Spanish separatist organization Basque Homeland and Liberty, a Jewish ultra nationalist group called Kahane Chai, the Egyptian Sunni Islamist movement Gama’a al-Islamiyya, and the MSC.
In the context of the MSC, the Salafi-jihadist organization was established in 2012 in an effort to resurrect the Islamic caliphate and wage violent jihad against Israel.
The State Department designated the organization in 2014 due to numerous rocket attacks against Israel, a cross-border attack targeting an Israeli construction site that killed one civilian and the group’s declaration of support to the Islamic State.
As noted in the State Department’s FTO listing, MSC is responsible for several attacks against Israel, notably in 2012 when two of its members detonated an IED and attacked vehicles carrying construction workers at the security fence Israel was constructing at the Egyptian border.
In a video released by the MSC after the attack, the organization proclaimed its establishment and responsibility for the cross-border raid.
“We announce the formation of the Shura Council of the Mujahideen of Jerusalem as the foundation of a blessed Jihadi operation, with a clear path and features to be a brick in the global project of bringing back the [Islamic] caliphate,” according to a translation made by al-Arabiya News.
The second half of the video is dedicated to the two militants who perpetrated the attack named Khalid Salah Abdul Hadi Jadullah (a.k.a. Abu Salah al Masri) and a Saudi named Adi Saleh Abdullah al Fudhayli al Hadhli (a.k.a Abu Hudhayfa al Hudhali). [See: FDD’s Long War Journal: Al Qaeda-linked group claims responsibility for attack in Israel.]
The MSC have been operationally inactive for years and the U.S. State Department’s decision to remove them from the list of FTOs is unlikely to change the landscape of jihadist activity against Israel emanating from Gaza.
Joe Truzman is a contributor to FDD's Long War Journal.
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14. Biden administration can’t overlook the Balkans when sanctioning Russia
Biden administration can’t overlook the Balkans when sanctioning Russia
BY IVANA STRADNER AND MATTHEW ZWEIG, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 05/14/22 10:30 AM ET
THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOT THE VIEW OF THE HILL
As Western economic sanctions tank Russia’s economy, the Kremlin and its supporters are scouring the globe for jurisdictions to use to evade sanctions. Moscow appears to have set its sights on the Western Balkans, long plagued by corruption and malign Russian influence. Washington and its Western allies must work to combat Russia’s illicit financial networks and broader malign influence in the Western Balkans while expanding our own economic ties to the region.
Exploiting corruption in the Western Balkans is central to the Kremlin’s efforts to cultivate influence in the region. This problem began decades ago. As the former Yugoslav states liberalized their economies after the 1990s, festering corruption exposed openings for Russian manipulation. Under Vladimir Putin, Moscow has used the corrupt actors who benefited from this kleptocracy to exploit economic, ethnic, and religious fissures in Balkan societies, in order to use that instability to challenge the United States and our allies. Western disengagement has compounded the problem, allowing Russia and China to fill the void through corruption and “debt-trap” investments in critical areas such as energy and security.
This inattention may ultimately weaken the impact of Western sanctions against Russia. Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Russian influence is particularly strong, have refused to sanction Russia. Serbian media reported in early April that nearly 300 Russian persons, including many in the IT sector, had opened companies in Serbia since Moscow invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, likely reflecting an attempt to dodge Western sanctions by re-registering Russian firms in Serbia. And although Albania, Montenegro, and others have developed Russia sanctions regimes in line with EU sanctions, they may be unable or unwilling to enforce them if Moscow can prevail upon their leadership through either political pressure or corruption.
For a Biden administration that’s declared fighting corruption and Russian sanctions evasion to be top priorities, this should be a call to action. While the Kremlin has a head start, the West can wield a combination of economic incentives and pressure to undercut Russia’s efforts in the Western Balkans. Washington and its European allies should leverage existing regional institutions to strengthen their political and economic influence. In concert, the Western allies should use sanctions to expose and disrupt Russian illicit financial schemes and discourage regional actors from working with Russia.
The newly minted Open Balkan initiative represents the West’s best opportunity to build and effectively utilize economic leverage in the region. Established by Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia in 2021, the project aims to promote ties between the three countries by ultimately creating a single market for goods, services and capital.
The Open Balkan initiative could enable the West to exploit its greatest advantage over Russia in the Western Balkans: economic clout. Europe’s economic ties to the region dwarf Russia’s, which are concentrated mostly in the energy sector. While Russia dominates Serbia’s energy industry, Russia is only Serbia’s fifth-largest trading partner, lagging behind Germany, Italy, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Romania. Russian trade with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Croatia, and Montenegro is similarly limited. By spurring Western investment in the region, using the Open Balkan initiative as an instrument for incentivizing regional players to embrace anti-corruption, anti-money laundering and other rule of law measures, Washington and its allies could work to limit Russia’s influence.
While the Open Balkan initiative’s underlying concept is sound, the West must ensure this prospective asset does not turn into a long-term liability by perversely facilitating Russian and other illicit finance.
Unless properly policed, a single market in the Western Balkans could create opportunities for Russian sanctions-evasion networks and transnational criminal organizations to move Russian capital into and through regional economies. For these reasons, trade liberalization initiatives such as Open Balkan require strong institutions that can track and thwart illicit financial schemes involving Russia or other malign actors.
Western governments should pair the promise of economic opportunity with sustained pressure to strengthen the rule of law and defenses against illicit finance. Washington and its allies should also encourage Western companies to invest in the Western Balkans — but on the conditions that regional governments and their private-sector counterparties comply both with international anti-corruption and anti-money laundering standards and with Western sanctions against Russia.
Along with these economic carrots, Washington and its allies should wield the stick. The West should threaten and, if necessary, impose sanctions against regional actors who continue to facilitate Russian illicit finance or other malign Russian activity in violation of U.S. sanctions against Moscow. Executive Order 14033, signed by President Biden in June 2021, offers an additional tool for the administration to do so, authorizing sanctions against persons who are involved in corruption or undermine security or democracy in the Western Balkans.
As Russia’s invasion in Ukraine continues, more Western sanctions are likely to follow. Russia’s cultural and political influence and economic presence in the Western Balkans offers the Kremlin a chance to establish one or more jurisdictions for sanctions evasion in the middle of Europe. Through a combination of carrots and sticks, the United States and its allies can foil Russia’s plans.
15. The staggering amount of US military aid to Ukraine, explained in one chart
The staggering amount of US military aid to Ukraine, explained in one chart
$9.8 billion — and that tranche for Ukraine is only part of the picture.
Vox · by Jonathan Guyer · May 17, 2022
Servicemembers in the Ukrainian military move US-made Stinger missiles, a portable air-defense system, and other military assistance shipped from Lithuania to Kyiv on February 13, 2022.
Sergei Supinsky/AFP via Getty Images
American weapons are pouring into Ukraine.
President Joe Biden requested that Congress send $33 billion of emergency aid to the country at war with Russia, and the US House increased the pot to $40 billion, with about 60 percent going toward security assistance in some form or another. A bipartisan majority in the Senate is expected to approve it this week. It’s an unprecedented ramp-up that builds on the rapid transfer of billions’ worth of weapons already sent.
As Russia’s brutal invasion enters its third month, it’s clear why the US, a close partner of Ukraine and ally of 29 other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, has made support for the country a national security priority. But it’s worth stepping back to consider the sheer scale of the military aid headed to Ukraine, what it means for the country’s future, and whether those weapons will end up where they’re supposed to.
An apples-to-apples comparison of US security assistance to Ukraine versus to other countries is not so simple, because the aid comes from so many different funds and because security assistance comes in many forms. (This isn’t unique to Ukraine; tracking the various streams of security assistance the US sends around the globe is complicated enough that think tanks have whole programs devoted to it.)
The most conservative analysis of US security assistance directly for Ukraine, allocated since Russia’s February 24 invasion, will come to about $9.8 billion once Congress passes the new appropriation.
That includes the $6 billion for a new fund called the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative in the forthcoming bill, according to a fact sheet published by the House Appropriations Committee. That will go toward weapons, the salaries of military officials, and other forms of intelligence, logistics, and training support. It’s in addition to the $3.8 billion worth of weapons from the US’s own stockpiles that the Biden administration has dispatched since February.
“You know they’re ramping it up when they create a whole separate budget category for it,” says Lauren Woods, who closely tracks arms budgets as director of the Center for International Policy’s security assistance monitor. “This is a really enormous request, and I’m really not sure most Americans get how big this is.”
That tranche for Ukraine is only part of the picture.
The number could be even bigger, as there’s $4 billion of foreign military financing (US taxpayer dollars to underwrite other countries’ purchase of US weapons) allocated to Ukraine and NATO allies in the congressional appropriation.
Then there’s the $8.7 billion of funds in the congressional package to replenish US stockpiles of weapons, probably backfilling much of what has been sent to Ukraine since the Russian invasion was launched in February, especially missiles. The Biden administration sent those under what’s called the drawdown authority, so that emergency weapons could reach the country as quickly as possible.
Experts say they have never seen those stockpiles retrieved from at this volume. There’s also $3.9 billion for European partners supporting the mission (including hardship pay for troops), $600 million for the US to increase its weapons production, and $500 million for the Pentagon to buy more munitions, which all together comes to about $24 billion, a staggering number according to each of the experts I interviewed.
The US is far and away the world’s largest arms seller and provider of military assistance. It’s a central part of American foreign policy, so this method of support is, in one sense, unsurprising. But still, taken all together, the aid to Ukraine is gigantic compared to what the US sends abroad in a given year. Typically, according to the Security Assistance Monitor, US military aid globally hovered around $20 billion in most years since 2013, with 2007 reaching a high of $30.6 billion.
In short, it’s a massive investment in Ukrainian and European security. If the war in Ukraine drags on for years, this level of funding will arguably not be sustainable. Already it’s shaping Ukraine’s pushback to Russia’s invasion, but it may also catalyze other long-term effects.
What so many weapons could mean for Ukraine
Earlier this month, Biden visited the Lockheed Martin factory that builds anti-tank missiles known as Javelins, which have become a much-desired commodity in Ukraine’s fight against Russian forces. That visit captured just how integrated military support is in US foreign policy, particularly in a conflict where the US isn’t going to directly involve itself.
“So these weapons, touched by the hands — your hands — are in the hands of Ukrainian heroes, making a significant difference,” Biden told workers at Lockheed’s Troy, Alabama, facility.
President Joe Biden watches employees as he tours Lockheed Martin’s Pike County Operations facility in Troy, Alabama, on May 3, 2022.
Nicholas Kamm/AFP via Getty Images
It would have been “unthinkable” for Biden to visit a weapons factory before the Ukraine war, according to Elias Yousif, an analyst at the Stimson Center. “The president came into office promoting an expanded view of human rights considerations in US foreign policy,” he told me. “The optics of touring the arms factory maybe just doesn’t align very well with that messaging.”
Biden’s presence at Lockheed, his visit to an Ohio metals factory along with executives from other arms makers days later, and a Pentagon roundtable with further executives from the weapons industry to see how to boost supply chains epitomized the emergence of the wartime president. William Hartung, a military budget expert at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, says “certainly more than half” of foreign military financing ends up in the pockets of military contractors like Lockheed.
The most significant forward-looking question is what will happen with all these weapons. Ukraine ranks in the bottom third of the watchdog group Transparency International’s corruption ranking, and there are serious concerns about Ukraine in recent years being a nexus of illicit arms trafficking. “Ukraine certainly has problems with corruption, and if that’s the case in a country, you can be sure that some of these weapons will be lost or transferred or sold,” Woods, a former State Department official, told me.
Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) held up the Senate bill on Thursday as he called for a government watchdog to oversee taxpayer funds going to Ukraine. “I would say that we agree oversight is critical. That’s why the package already includes millions of dollars to support additional oversight measures, including additional funding for existing inspectors general,” White House spokesperson Jen Psaki said in a briefing.
Congress is building an accounting process into the massive funding bill to oversee what weapons are actually bought, and an “end-use monitoring” program to ensure that the arms sent to Ukraine end up where they’re supposed to be. (The 1976 Arms Export Control Act requires US weapons transfers to have end-use monitoring.) That’s not an end-all solution. “In fact, the term ‘end-use monitoring’ is a bit of a misnomer, since it doesn’t actually monitor end-use,” Yousif told me. “What it does is essentially catalog the location and stewardship of US-origin defense articles. It doesn’t really, let’s say, track how a government or country is using the equipment, just that equipment is accounted for in some way.”
Daria Kaleniuk, executive director of the Anti-Corruption Action Center in Ukraine, said that it’s difficult to monitor end-use during wartime, but the country is trying. “What I’m hearing from our armed forces and Ministry of Defense, is we are ready to implement whatever mechanisms are needed — digital tools, procedures to upgrade our system to the highest possible level in mind with NATO standards,” Kaleniuk said while visiting Washington to advocate for the aid package to Ukraine, in particular F-16s from American stockpiles, tanks, and other advanced weapons. “We desperately need weapons to win the war and are willing to do whatever is needed to make our NATO allies, especially the US, happy and trust us.”
The worst-case scenario would be more arms contributing to new spillover effects, even perhaps bringing the US more directly into conflict with Russia, a nuclear power. “Does it lead to escalation of the war, or even some engagement between US and NATO troops and Russian forces, like if Putin decides he’s going to bomb the supply lines for the weapons?” Hartung said. “Going so quickly, with so little discussion, also raises that risk.”
The Biden administration has portrayed Ukraine’s resolve against Russia as a battle of freedom versus tyranny, one worth investing in. The security assistance is helping “support Ukraine’s ability to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity and to stand against Russia’s brutal and unprovoked assault,” Jessica Lewis, the State Department’s assistant secretary for political-military affairs, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this week.
One thing is clear: this level of immediate support to Ukraine and European allies goes beyond even the heights of yearly US security aid to Afghanistan or Iraq.
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More From Vox
Vox · by Jonathan Guyer · May 17, 2022
16. Why China Is Paranoid About the Quad
Excerpts:
Is India’s tilt toward the United States irreversible, or could it be reversed by India’s refusal to criticize Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and join its Quad partners in sanctioning Moscow? These questions animate both Chinese and American analysts.
The Biden administration probably recognizes that Russia is about India’s past—a long and deep relationship it can’t unwind overnight—and not its future. The rivalry between India and China is structural and unlikely to be resolved anytime soon. China could break the logjam on the border but doesn’t appear to be willing to let go of its only strategic leverage against India.
For India, the trick is to move slowly to strengthen its regional position. India’s tactics are wrapped in incrementalism, but its strategic imperative lies in deeper cooperation with the United States. The Quad summit in Tokyo next week will give us a better sense of how the geopolitics of Asian realignment will play out.
Why China Is Paranoid About the Quad
Beijing has long lived with U.S. alliances in the region, but a realigned India would change the game.
C. Raja Mohan
By C. Raja Mohan, a columnist at Foreign Policy and a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute.
U.S. President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken participate in a virtual summit with the leaders of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue countries at the White House in Washington on March 12.
U.S. President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken participate in a virtual summit with the leaders of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue countries at the White House in Washington on March 12. Alex Wong/Getty Images
India may be nowhere near turning its partnership with the United States into any sort of formal or informal military alliance, but their growing strategic engagement dominates China’s discourse on India. Next week’s Tokyo summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad—a loose grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—is therefore bound to be of special concern in Beijing.
On the face of it, China’s persistent campaign against India’s ties with the United States, its characterization of the Quad as an “Asian NATO,” and its blistering attacks against the Indo-Pacific geopolitical construct embraced by New Delhi and its partners in the Quad seem unnecessarily alarmist. Its top diplomats have castigated the Quad members for “ganging up in the Asia-Pacific region, creating trilateral and quadrilateral small cliques, and [being] bent on provoking confrontation.” China focusing its outrage on the Quad looks odd considering Beijing has long lived with real U.S. alliances and hard security commitments on its periphery, including U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, Japan, and elsewhere.
Two factors, however, help explain China’s aggressive campaign against the Quad and, especially, nascent U.S.-Indian ties.
India may be nowhere near turning its partnership with the United States into any sort of formal or informal military alliance, but their growing strategic engagement dominates China’s discourse on India. Next week’s Tokyo summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad—a loose grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—is therefore bound to be of special concern in Beijing.
On the face of it, China’s persistent campaign against India’s ties with the United States, its characterization of the Quad as an “Asian NATO,” and its blistering attacks against the Indo-Pacific geopolitical construct embraced by New Delhi and its partners in the Quad seem unnecessarily alarmist. Its top diplomats have castigated the Quad members for “ganging up in the Asia-Pacific region, creating trilateral and quadrilateral small cliques, and [being] bent on provoking confrontation.” China focusing its outrage on the Quad looks odd considering Beijing has long lived with real U.S. alliances and hard security commitments on its periphery, including U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, Japan, and elsewhere.
Two factors, however, help explain China’s aggressive campaign against the Quad and, especially, nascent U.S.-Indian ties.
The most obvious factor is India’s sheer size and potential power to shape China’s strategic periphery. Although China has rarely seen India as a peer competitor, Beijing is acutely conscious that India could create significant problems for China if aligned against it with other powers. Keeping India—a potential superpower—from aligning with the United States is thus a first-order strategic goal for Beijing.
That China’s concerns about a potential U.S.-Indian alignment have recently taken a paranoid turn reminds us of Beijing’s endless rants about New Delhi’s strategic collaboration with Moscow during the 1960s and 1970s. Beijing worried about Russian imperialism aligning with India’s own hegemonic ambitions in South Asia. Chinese leader Mao Zedong was at his vulgar and pithy best in a poem describing the Soviet Union’s relationship with India: “The bear flaunts its claws / Riding the back of the cow.” Then, as now, China did not like to see India’s relations with other powers looking better than its own mostly failed attempts to win allies.
Chinese rhetoric intensified after the Trump administration revived the Quad in 2017.
Second, Beijing is playing to the gallery of entrenched anti-American sentiment in New Delhi that insists on Asian solidarity and avoidance of Western coalitions. Although the weight of this sentiment—a product of India’s history of anti-colonialism, quasi-socialism, and Cold War alignment with the Soviet Union—has begun to decline, there are many in the Indian establishment who worry that getting too close to the United States might provoke China. Beijing is betting that its warnings might stoke further unease in New Delhi.
China, of course, has a much longer history of partnership with the United States, beginning under former U.S. President Richard Nixon in the 1970s. In New Delhi, on the other hand, keeping a reasonable distance from Washington has been a long-standing policy. Even as India warmed up to the United States in recent years, New Delhi has insisted that its policy of “strategic autonomy” remains unchanged—currently demonstrated by India’s refusal to join its Quad partners in denouncing Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine.
Beijing’s obsession with Indian-U.S. relations also stands in contrast to the fact that China has rarely objected to Pakistan’s intensive, formalized military partnership with the United States over the decades. China seems to have no issues reaching out to Pakistan despite the latter’s bilateral military cooperation agreement with the United States and former membership in the Central Treaty Organization and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization—two alliances sponsored by Britain and the United States, respectively, in the 1950s.
Despite occasional hiccups, the U.S. military partnership with Pakistan endured through the decades but drew little criticism from Beijing. When the United States declared Pakistan a major non-NATO ally in 2004, it evoked little protest from China—on the contrary, Beijing continues to celebrate its “all weather” partnership with Islamabad. This stands in sharp contrast to China’s ballistic rhetoric in 2007, when India invited Australia, Japan, and Singapore to join its annual Malabar naval exercises. Beijing called the event the precursor to the formation of an Asian NATO. Chinese propaganda along these lines has had some measure of success in India in the past; the narrative of Washington trying to engineer an Asian NATO resonated with Indian nationalists and leftists who shared the Chinese idea that Asian security must be shaped by Asian powers. In September 2007, Beijing’s campaign against a U.S.-led Asian NATO triggered large-scale protests by the Indian communist parties and played a role in the eventual collapse of the coalition, backed by the left, supporting the Manmohan Singh government.
Since 2007, the “Asian NATO” moniker has stuck in the Chinese discourse on India’s partnerships, especially its military relations with the United States. Chinese rhetoric intensified after the Trump administration revived the Quad in 2017—and gained additional salience when the Biden administration gave the Quad fresh momentum by organizing a flurry of summits and policy initiatives. The upcoming Tokyo summit is the Quad’s third since Joe Biden became president.
Barely a year ago, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was still dismissing the Quad as mere “sea foam”—here this moment and gone the next. Now, China can’t stop denouncing the Quad as a dangerous manifestation of “small cliques” seeking to undermine Asian security.
India’s arm’s-length relationship with its Quad partners, however, creates a problem for Chinese analysts. They are torn between denouncing Indian military engagement with the United States as a dangerous threat and ridiculing U.S. strategic illusions about India. On a good day, Beijing welcomes New Delhi’s foreign policy of nonalignment and its continuing refusal to become a junior partner to Washington. On a bad day, China attacks India’s growing alignment with the United States.
For some Chinese analysts, India’s strategy is a mirror image of China’s own strategic maxim in the 1970s and 1980s: “align with the far”—the United States—“against the near”—the Soviet Union. Today, it is India’s turn to draw closer to the United States to fend off the much nearer threat from China. In their informal interactions with the Indian strategic community, some Chinese scholars have expressed their concern that New Delhi is leveraging Sino-Indian military tensions over the disputed border in Ladakh since 2020 to ramp up military cooperation with Washington.
Few Chinese scholars are ready to concede the flip side of their proposition: that China’s aggressive actions on the border are driving India closer to the United States. The official Chinese position, which Wang repeated during his visit to India in March, is that the countries’ border tensions should be kept separate from the larger challenges of building a multipolar world that limits U.S. power. That remains unacceptable to India.
But Wang also offered some assurances that China’s vision of Asia is not unipolar, as India fears, and acknowledged India as a major regional power. To his interlocutors in New Delhi, Wang dangled the bait of working together on a response to the Russia-Ukraine war and its threat to the global order.
India is not ready to bite, insisting that resolving border tensions must precede any cooperation with China on larger issues. Similarly, Beijing’s new Global Security Initiative—a sweeping statement designed to counter U.S. global influence—has drawn little interest in New Delhi.
Almost a century ago, at an anti-imperialist congress in Brussels in 1927, Indian and Chinese nationalists had their first formal encounter. Together, they swore their shared commitment to overthrowing Western colonialism and building a new Asian order. Since then, both countries have struggled to deal with the West’s enduring power, but their policies have almost never been in sync. When China seemed to be drawing closer to the West, India was raging against it. When it was India’s turn to warm up to the West, China was taking up cudgels against it.
There were two brief exceptions. In the 1950s, then-Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had romantic ideas about building an Asian “area of peace” in partnership with China, but relations quickly deteriorated over China’s militarization of Tibet and border claims, ultimately culminating in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. After the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991, Indian and Chinese interests briefly realigned when each worried about the so-called unipolar moment. But the Indian leadership soon decided that a unipolar Asia dominated by a rising China would be far worse than a unipolar world led by the United States.
India’s tactics are wrapped in incrementalism, but its strategic imperative lies in deeper cooperation with the United States.
Barely a decade after 1927, Indian and Chinese nationalists were confronted with World War II, but the two sides could not agree on a joint approach. Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek visited India in early 1942 to persuade Mahatma Gandhi to align the Indian nationalist movement with China and Britain to fight Japanese imperialism. Gandhi was not impressed. He was more interested in getting the British out of India right away—though he stopped short of aligning with the Nazis and Japanese to that end, as other Indian nationalist leaders did.
With Sino-Indian relations defined by violent border disputes after 1962, New Delhi looked to Moscow to balance Beijing. As the United States and China drew closer in the 1970s, India doubled down on its partnership with Russia. Similarly, as China and Russia align with each other today, India has steadily tilted toward the United States.
Is India’s tilt toward the United States irreversible, or could it be reversed by India’s refusal to criticize Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and join its Quad partners in sanctioning Moscow? These questions animate both Chinese and American analysts.
The Biden administration probably recognizes that Russia is about India’s past—a long and deep relationship it can’t unwind overnight—and not its future. The rivalry between India and China is structural and unlikely to be resolved anytime soon. China could break the logjam on the border but doesn’t appear to be willing to let go of its only strategic leverage against India.
For India, the trick is to move slowly to strengthen its regional position. India’s tactics are wrapped in incrementalism, but its strategic imperative lies in deeper cooperation with the United States. The Quad summit in Tokyo next week will give us a better sense of how the geopolitics of Asian realignment will play out.
C. Raja Mohan is a columnist at Foreign Policy, a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute, and a former member of India’s National Security Advisory Board. Twitter: @MohanCRaja
17. America’s Wars Are Fought by Relatively Few People. That’s a Problem for Phil Klay. (Book Review)
Excerpts:
What does Klay ask of the other 99 percent of Americans? It starts with seriousness about the consequences of going to war. He dares dream of an America in which a president would “regularly go before Congress to explain where and why he was putting troops in harm’s way” — and of a Congress that would have to vote up or down on the plans. But he connects those stakes to the daily obligations of citizenship under the Constitution, which all service members must take an oath to defend.
“No civilian can assume the moral burdens felt at a gut level by participants in war, but all can show an equal commitment to their country,” he writes. “Ideals are one thing; the messy business of putting them into practice is another. That means giving up on any claim to moral purity. That means getting your hands dirty.”
It turns out that I was the one making a mistake about this book. It is engrossing and important, and I hope readers will start with the longest parts first.
America’s Wars Are Fought by Relatively Few People. That’s a Problem for Phil Klay.
Nonfiction
A color guard in Savannah, Ga., 2022
UNCERTAIN GROUND
Citizenship in an Age of Endless, Invisible War
By Phil Klay
At first I thought Phil Klay had made a mistake in collecting his nonfiction magazine, newspaper and online work from the past dozen years into a new book, “Uncertain Ground.”
Klay’s first book, “Redeployment,” in 2014, was an achievement hard to match. It was a group of 12 short stories set in wartime Iraq, where Klay had been a Marine Corps public affairs officer during the “surge” of 2007-8. Among other recognitions it won the National Book Award for fiction, plus enthusiastic reviews both from those with extensive military experience and from those with none. Six years later, he published “Missionaries,” a novel of ideas based on the drug-and-guerrilla wars of Colombia. Its admirers included Barack Obama, who chose it as one of his books of the year.
News-pegged opinion essays don’t always age well. My reading of “Uncertain Ground” started with some of the shorter items in it, the op-eds and blog posts — for instance, a newspaper piece on how the killing of the Iranian Quds Force commander Qassim Suleimani in 2020 might affect fighting in Iraq. Most of these, I thought, now looked like journalistic “takes” from their particular moments, written while emotions and reactions were still fresh, and meant to be read under those same conditions, rather than months or years later.
But the rule of most writing — the shorter, the better — appears not to apply to Klay’s nonfiction. The half-dozen longest, meatiest and most probing essays and articles presented here share the lasting power of Klay’s acclaimed fiction. They were published separately, in different places over a decade-plus span. But read together they amount to an interwoven, evolving and revealing examination of Klay’s central topic: What it means for a country always at war, that so few of its people do the fighting.
“War remains a large part of who we are as Americans,” he writes in his introduction, “with almost a sixth of our federal budget going to defense, keeping troops deployed in 800 military bases around the world and engaging in counterterror missions in 85 countries. And yet, thanks to a series of political and strategic choices, to the average American that’s mostly invisible.”
Firsthand exposure to the country’s “long wars” has been almost unbelievably concentrated. All the Americans who have served in Iraq, Afghanistan or any other U.S. combat theater at any time since the 9/11 attacks of 2001 together amount to around 1 percent of the nation’s public. The best of these essays combine reporting, with Klay’s observations from his own military service, with historical evidence and spiritual reflections, all to help illuminate the “invisible” world of this 1 percent.
For instance, “A History of Violence,” written after the Las Vegas gun massacre of 2017, explains how what is now America’s most widely owned rifle, the AR-15, arose from the military’s quest for a lightweight weapon that could do maximum damage through high-volume “area fire,” rather than relying on carefully aimed sniper shots. He also recounts the grisly sequence of experiments in “wound ballistics” that guided the choice of ammunition for the AR-15 and its military descendant, the M16. (According to his family, the AR-15’s designer, Eugene Stoner, never imagined this weapon in civilian hands.) With a slightly modified AR-15, the Las Vegas gunman was able to kill 58 people and wound at least 400 more. “There was nothing particularly remarkable about the shooter’s skills,” Klay writes. “His lethality was primarily a function of the sheer number of rounds he could put downrange.”
“Citizen Soldier: Moral Risk and the Modern Military,” originally a Brookings essay, is about the invisibility of the 1 percent who have worn the uniform — and the resentment many veterans feel not for mistreatment but for cheap “thank you for your service!” rituals that mask a deeper indifference to the physical, emotional and moral costs of war. Klay writes, “It’s that sense of a personal stake in war that the veteran experiences viscerally, and which is so hard for the civilian to feel.”
And in “Man of War,” for the Jesuit magazine America, Klay explains at length how serving in the Marine Corps gave him an almost religious sense of community and mission, whose absence he felt on return to civilian life. As a Marine, he writes, “I was given the stories of military saints — men and women who risked their lives under enemy fire, who jumped on hand grenades to save their buddies, who held faith with their fellow prisoners of war during years of torture. … Out of the Corps, I was deprived of that community and not yet fully absorbed into the civilian world. … I was alienated, as so many veterans have been before.”
What does Klay ask of the other 99 percent of Americans? It starts with seriousness about the consequences of going to war. He dares dream of an America in which a president would “regularly go before Congress to explain where and why he was putting troops in harm’s way” — and of a Congress that would have to vote up or down on the plans. But he connects those stakes to the daily obligations of citizenship under the Constitution, which all service members must take an oath to defend.
“No civilian can assume the moral burdens felt at a gut level by participants in war, but all can show an equal commitment to their country,” he writes. “Ideals are one thing; the messy business of putting them into practice is another. That means giving up on any claim to moral purity. That means getting your hands dirty.”
It turns out that I was the one making a mistake about this book. It is engrossing and important, and I hope readers will start with the longest parts first.
18. What Is China Learning From Russia's War in Ukraine?
Excerpts:
Given the increasing alignment between Russia and China, the United States cannot rule out that Russia would offer significant assistance to China during a conflict over Taiwan, including arms, energy, food, and intelligence. The United States should also assume Russia would seek to distract it from any fight against China by conducting cyberattacks or seeking to destabilize Europe. In their remarkable February 4 joint statement that established a “no limits” friendship, China and Russia reaffirmed “their strong mutual support for the protection of their core interests,” and Russia agreed that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.” China, which has backed Russia throughout the war in Ukraine, will expect to be repaid during a Taiwan conflict.
The steps that Washington and Taipei should take to bolster deterrence must be carried out carefully, so as to avoid inadvertently sparking the conflict they are seeking to prevent. For starters, any stepped up coordination with Taiwan should be done quietly and kept out of the public eye. The United States and Taiwan should focus on how to increase Taiwan’s warfighting capabilities and eschew symbolism. Privately, the United States should emphasize to China that these moves are consistent with the U.S. one-China policy and are a response to the eroding balance of power in the Taiwan Strait that is caused by China’s military build-up. Publicly, the United States should underscore that it does not support Taiwan independence and its overriding interest is in maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
The unfolding war in Ukraine offers important lessons for China, Taiwan, and the United States. Whichever side adapts more deftly will do much to determine whether deterrence holds or a conflict that would fundamentally alter the world arrives.
What Is China Learning From Russia's War in Ukraine?
America and Taiwan Need to Grasp—and Influence—Chinese Views of the Conflict
May 16, 2022
Beyond Europe, the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is being felt most keenly 5,000 miles away, on the island of Taiwan. Many Taiwanese worry that they might be the next to suffer an invasion by a more powerful neighbor. Those fears are not unreasonable. While Ukraine and Taiwan differ in many ways, as relatively young democracies living alongside larger authoritarian neighbors with long-standing designs on their territory, the two face strikingly similar strategic predicaments.
Much as Russian President Vladimir Putin has described restoring the “historical unity” between Russia and Ukraine as a kind of spiritual mission, Chinese President Xi Jinping believes that reuniting mainland China with what he views as its lost province of Taiwan will help cement his place in history. Xi speaks of Taiwan in much the same way Putin talks about Ukraine, highlighting blood ties and arguing that China and Taiwan are one family. Whereas Putin has recently challenged the traditional understanding of state sovereignty, in order to suggest that Ukraine does not deserve it, Xi (like his predecessors) denies Taiwan’s sovereignty altogether.
These similarities notwithstanding, it would be a mistake to assume that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will in any way hasten China’s desire to achieve unification with Taiwan. Fundamentally, Chinese leaders’ calculations about whether to use force against Taiwan are political decisions that Moscow’s actions will not influence. Moreover, Chinese officials are well aware that attacking Taiwan now would likely fuel Western fears that Beijing and Moscow are forming an authoritarian axis and beginning to act in concert, thereby increasing the likelihood of direct intervention by the United States and its allies.
Nevertheless, Xi and the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are closely monitoring events in Ukraine, looking for lessons that might be usefully applied in the event of a conflict with Taiwan. Russia’s struggles will in no way shake China’s determination to bring Taiwan under its control. From Beijing’s perspective, Russia’s war in Ukraine is merely a realistic preview of the costs China would likely bear if it resorted to war. Chinese leaders will examine Russia’s failures and adapt their operational plans to avoid making similar mistakes.
Taiwan and the United States, therefore, would be well advised to do the same, and to scrutinize each stage of the war in Ukraine from the perspective of a Chinese official. By doing so, they may be able to identify facts or patterns that may already be giving Chinese officials pause as well as capabilities that Taiwan should adopt to buttress deterrence. Although it would be a mistake to assume that Moscow’s actions have any direct influence on Beijing’s decisions, identifying the kind of evidence that could convince China that Putin’s decision to attack Ukraine was a colossal strategic blunder could also help Taiwanese and U.S. strategists deter China from a catastrophic attack on Taiwan.
A WORLD LESS TRANQUIL
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine confirms Chinese leaders’ belief that they are entering a more dangerous era and that they must prepare for a greater likelihood of war. In his call with U.S. President Joe Biden after the war began, Xi noted that “the prevailing trend of peace and development is facing serious challenges” and that “the world is neither tranquil nor stable.” Xi’s words strongly suggest that China will continue to increase its defense spending, which remains focused on developing the capabilities the PLA would need to conquer Taiwan.
As the United States has built a coalition of countries, including many of the world’s top economies, to impose severe sanctions on Russia, China has been examining these efforts for evidence of declining U.S. influence. From Beijing’s perspective, any cracks in the coalition are heartening news, and it has certainly noted that some close U.S. partners, such as India, have not sanctioned Russia or forcefully condemned its invasion of Ukraine, even after reports emerged of alleged Russian war crimes. China likely assumes that global support for Taiwan will be more muted than support for Ukraine has been, as few countries maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and many lack even robust unofficial relations with the island. Moreover, Russia has successfully leveraged its economic ties with some countries to keep them on the sidelines, which has likely reassured China that its far greater economic might will prevent many countries from supporting Taiwan.
The most important thing China has learned from war in Ukraine may be that the U.S. will not directly intervene against a nuclear-armed opponent.
China will also study the sanctions applied to Russia and take steps to decrease its own vulnerability to similar actions. As a first measure, Beijing will accelerate its “dual circulation” strategy—seeking to promote exports while simultaneously encouraging stronger domestic demand—in a bid to increase other countries’ economic dependence on China and reduce its dependence on others. This strategy would serve two purposes: insulating China’s economy from sanctions and making any sanctions that Western countries apply to Beijing to deter or punish an invasion of Taiwan hurt the West more than China. China will also attempt to produce critical technologies such as semiconductors domestically, reduce its reliance on the U.S. financial system and the dollar, and support an alternative to SWIFT, the dollar-based international payments system. Regardless of how much progress China makes on this front, its leaders are likely confident that U.S. allies would be far more reticent to impose wide-ranging sanctions against China, given its centrality to global supply chains.
Potentially the most important lesson China has learned from war in Ukraine is that the United States will not contemplate direct military intervention against a nuclear-armed opponent. Before Russia invaded Ukraine, the United States took direct military intervention off the table, with Biden warning that “direct confrontation between NATO and Russia is World War III.” Chinese analysts and policymakers have likely concluded that Russia’s nuclear arsenal deterred the United States from intervening and that nuclear weapons create more room for conventional operations. Chinese strategists likely believe that this validates the country’s decision to invest heavily in increasing its nuclear arsenal, which the U.S. Department of Defense recently estimated will reach at least 1,000 warheads within the decade. Moreover, having witnessed Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling, China may conclude that it could deter U.S. intervention on Taiwan’s behalf by raising its nuclear alert level or conducting nuclear tests at the outset of a conflict.
Russia’s military blunders will help the PLA hone its plans and improve its chances of conquering Taiwan. Russia has failed to achieve air superiority over Ukraine; keep its forces supplied with fuel, food, and munitions; and effectively conduct combined arms operations. The PLA’s leadership was likely shocked that Russia’s military, with extensive recent operational experience, failed to secure a decisive victory. For the PLA, this vindicates the difficult military reforms it began in 2015, which focused on joint operations and logistics and incorporate lessons learned from watching the United States conduct complex joint operations. At the same time, the PLA fields a significant amount of Russian military equipment and has sought to integrate elements of Russia’s military reforms and therefore Russia’s struggles could prompt the PLA to question its own readiness to conduct the operations necessary for a fight with Taiwan. This worry is likely compounded by the fact that the PLA assumes the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense and the United States has sold Taiwan many of the same weapons Ukraine is using to great effect. In the longer term, the PLA will likely redouble its focus on integrating its land, sea, and air power and improving its joint warfighting capabilities.
President Volodymyr Zelensky’s ability to rally the Ukrainian people and international public opinion has shown Chinese leaders the importance of eliminating Taiwan’s political and military leadership early in a conflict and breaking the Taiwanese people’s determination to resist. In practice, this would, at a minimum, entail attempting to assassinate Taiwanese leaders to demoralize the population, inhibit command and control, and prevent the emergence of a rallying figure. But China would likely pursue even more expansive operations ahead of any assault, including sowing divisions within Taiwanese society, spreading disinformation, and severing Taiwan’s communications with the outside world. China has already established essential platforms within Taiwan for spreading pro-China messages through investments in media outlets and recruitment of intelligence assets. It will surely continue to refine this non-kinetic element of warfare.
HOW TAIWAN CAN PREPARE
Since China will be using Russia’s war in Ukraine as an opportunity to improve its planning for a Taiwan conflict, it is critical for Taiwan to do the same. There are already encouraging signs. After Ukraine’s early successes against Russia, many Taiwanese took to the streets to celebrate, and activists and commentators argued that Ukraine’s ability to repel a militarily superior foe had inspired Taiwanese to believe they could do the same. Taiwan’s defense minister has established a working group to study Ukraine’s tactics and raised the prospect of extending compulsory military service, which now has the support of over three-quarters of those polled. Interest in learning first-aid and disaster response has surged.
But this alone is not enough. Taiwan must urgently accelerate its adoption of an asymmetric defense strategy. It should focus on fielding many of the same capabilities Ukraine is using to significant effect, including portable air defense systems, drones (which Taiwan has already indicated it is prioritizing in the wake of Russia’s invasion), and anti-tank missiles. In addition, Taiwan should ramp up anti-ship missile and sea mine production. Its military must decentralize command and control and develop systems to empower smaller military units to analyze and adapt to rapidly evolving circumstances on the ground.
Taiwan must also create a more trained and ready reserve force, establish new territorial defense forces, and more broadly plan for mobilizing its entire society. Ordinary Ukrainians’ ability to withstand bombardment and, in many cases, take up arms has showed Taiwanese something of the resilience they would need to demonstrate to withstand a Chinese assault. Should China attack Taiwan, its objective would be to rule 24 million people indefinitely, and it would be up to the Taiwanese people to make that impossible.
A critical weakness that Taiwan must address is the difficulty of resupplying its population and military during a conflict. Ukraine borders NATO member states, allowing arms and humanitarian supplies into the country even after Russia’s invasion, but supplying Taiwan in the event of an invasion, let alone a potential blockade, will be extremely difficult. Supplying even basic goods such as food and medicine will be challenging, as commercial ships and aircraft cannot be expected to risk the lives of their crews to continue delivering goods. Supplying Taiwan’s military, especially if the United States were to intervene on Taiwan’s behalf, would be infinitely more so.
Since China has noted Ukraine’s reliance on resupply by Western countries, even as the war rages, China would likely prioritize cutting off Taiwan as quickly as possible during a conflict. Taiwan should anticipate this and prepare now by stocking reserves of munitions, oil, food, and other critical materials and dispersing these supplies throughout the island. In essence, everything Taiwan will need to fight the PLA for a sustained period while keeping its population fed and healthy enough to put up a resistance must already be on the island when a conflict erupts.
A DETERRENT ROLE FOR THE U.S.
The United States must also hone its playbook to deter a Chinese assault against Taiwan and respond to Chinese aggression. It cannot rely on the threat of sanctions alone to change Xi’s calculus. When the United States publicly warned Putin of the enormous economic consequences he would bear if he invaded Ukraine, he did so anyway. And given China’s centrality to the global economy, imposing broad sanctions on the country will be far more difficult.
The United States should coordinate a sanctions package with its allies and partners during peacetime and investigate ways to reduce their economic dependence on China. The biggest weakness of the sanctions imposed on Russia is the carveout for Russian energy, deemed necessary (at least for the first two months of the conflict) given Europe’s reliance on Russian oil and gas. The United States should make a concerted effort to develop alternative sources of materials such as rare earth minerals, which the world depends mostly on China to supply.
There is a danger that one of China’s takeaways from the conflict in Ukraine is that the United States will be unwilling to intervene militarily on Taiwan’s behalf. Thus, the United States needs to introduce a policy of strategic clarity that makes explicit it would directly come to Taiwan’s defense. Having a credible military option is essential, which will mean continuing to view Taiwan as the Department of Defense’s pacing scenario and resourcing it accordingly. The United States must also work more closely with Taiwan, establishing a robust bilateral training program to bolster Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities. It should also help Taiwan develop an asymmetric defense strategy and prioritize weapons deliveries to the island.
The U.S. intelligence community distinguished itself during the Ukraine crisis by revealing Putin’s moves before he made them and sharing this intelligence with U.S. allies, which deprived Putin of strategic surprise and helped a coalition coalesce around strong sanctions and military support. The United States should be prepared to gather and preemptively share intelligence about Chinese plans, as well. It must act now to ensure that it has an understanding of early indicators of PLA preparations for an attack on Taiwan and be ready to share these indicators with its partners to plan a unified response before the war begins.
Given the increasing alignment between Russia and China, the United States cannot rule out that Russia would offer significant assistance to China during a conflict over Taiwan, including arms, energy, food, and intelligence. The United States should also assume Russia would seek to distract it from any fight against China by conducting cyberattacks or seeking to destabilize Europe. In their remarkable February 4 joint statement that established a “no limits” friendship, China and Russia reaffirmed “their strong mutual support for the protection of their core interests,” and Russia agreed that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.” China, which has backed Russia throughout the war in Ukraine, will expect to be repaid during a Taiwan conflict.
The steps that Washington and Taipei should take to bolster deterrence must be carried out carefully, so as to avoid inadvertently sparking the conflict they are seeking to prevent. For starters, any stepped up coordination with Taiwan should be done quietly and kept out of the public eye. The United States and Taiwan should focus on how to increase Taiwan’s warfighting capabilities and eschew symbolism. Privately, the United States should emphasize to China that these moves are consistent with the U.S. one-China policy and are a response to the eroding balance of power in the Taiwan Strait that is caused by China’s military build-up. Publicly, the United States should underscore that it does not support Taiwan independence and its overriding interest is in maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
The unfolding war in Ukraine offers important lessons for China, Taiwan, and the United States. Whichever side adapts more deftly will do much to determine whether deterrence holds or a conflict that would fundamentally alter the world arrives.
19. The Right Way to Sanction Russian Energy
Excerpts:
If Washington and its allies are to make good on their intent to sanction Russian energy effectively, they will have to deal with a difficult dilemma. Russian tax revenue from oil is a function not only of the number of barrels sold, but also their price. The United States and Europe have plenty of tools to reduce Russia’s ability to sell oil, but the price is set on global markets. Because of the risk that sanctions pose to potential buyers, Russian firms must now sell their oil at a more than $30 per barrel discount on current world prices. But since the price of oil has increased substantially over the last 12 months, Russia is making roughly the same amount per barrel as it was a year ago.
In other words, sanctions have a complex and contradictory effect on the world’s second-largest oil exporter. The more they succeed at taking Russian supply offline, the higher the world price of oil goes. This is particularly true when there are few immediate alternative sources on the global market to replace the lost Russian supply—precisely the current situation.
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Currently, only three major importers of Russian oil stand outside the sanctions coalition: China, India, and Turkey. China can continue to import Russian oil via a pipeline that is practically immune to sanctions. This pipeline, however, represents only a small share of Russian oil exports. Because the pipeline operates at capacity, if China wanted to significantly increase its imports of Russian oil, it would need to do so via ship, which already accounts for more than half of Chinese imports of Russian oil. Moreover, as the average price of Russian oil falls, China will likely negotiate a harder bargain for piped oil, further cutting into Moscow’s bottom line. India and Turkey, on the other hand, import much of their oil from Russia via shipping routes that are exposed to Western sanctions. Both are also economically vulnerable to high oil prices and would benefit greatly from lower prices. Although it is unlikely that either would publicly welcome a price cap, both would probably abide by it.
A price cap would be a major innovation in the use of financial sanctions. Given the challenges of sanctioning Russian energy exports, a traditional embargo applied globally would be difficult to implement and, even if it were possible, would send energy prices soaring. The United States and its allies would be better served by focusing on the goal of slashing Russian revenues while keeping enough Russian oil flowing to avoid a massive price spike. Imposing a reverse OPEC price cap on Russia, backed by Western sanctions, would benefit consumers the world over while focusing pressure on the petrodollars flowing into Putin’s coffers.
The Right Way to Sanction Russian Energy
How to Slash Moscow’s Revenues Without Crippling the Global Economy
Western sanctions are beginning to hit Russia where it hurts most: its energy exports. Over the last few weeks, the European Union, the biggest buyer of Russian oil, has been working on a plan to ban imports by the end of this year, although objections by Viktor Orban of Hungary have slowed progress.
For energy sanctions to work, however, they must be carefully designed to hurt Russia more than they hurt Western states. Their primary goal should not be to cut the volume of oil and gas leaving Russia, which would further drive up world energy prices and endanger domestic support, but to reduce the dollars and euros flowing into Russia. Moving forward, the EU should therefore focus collective efforts on a more ambitious approach: partnering with the United States and other allies to impose a global regime, backed by the threat of secondary sanctions, to cap the price of Russian oil and slash the Kremlin’s revenue.
Prior rounds of sanctions against Moscow restricted investment and technologies destined for Russia’s energy sector, targeting the country’s refineries and its construction of liquefied natural gas infrastructure. Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States also banned Russian energy imports, but this had limited impact because all three were small consumers of Russian oil and gas. Until recently, the biggest buyer of Russian energy—the EU—not only declined to sanction energy exports but also designed its financial sanctions to explicitly allow Russian fuel to keep flowing.
But now, the Russian-European energy relationship is unraveling. On top of its discussions about phasing out Russian oil imports, the EU also announced plans to completely end Russian natural gas imports over the coming years. Europe buys slightly over half of all Russian exports of crude oil and refined products such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. Taxing these exports, meanwhile, currently provides around a quarter of Moscow’s budget. The EU effort to halt Russian oil purchases therefore represents a dramatic and welcome shift in the global response to Russia’s invasion.
But Europe’s plans also pose a challenge for Washington. Thus far, the United States has declined to impose the toughest sanctions on Russian energy, including the kinds of secondary sanctions that have been used against Iran to limit oil sales to third countries. This reluctance is explained by the Biden administration’s deference to the EU on matters affecting Europe’s energy security and concerns that reducing global oil supplies would send gasoline prices—and thus inflation—spiraling higher. But now that many Europeans are signaling that they are serious about cutting off Russian energy imports, the United States and its allies need a coordinated strategy. Together, they must figure out how to slash Russian energy revenue without unduly damaging the global economy.
CUTTING RUSSIAN REVENUE
If Washington and its allies are to make good on their intent to sanction Russian energy effectively, they will have to deal with a difficult dilemma. Russian tax revenue from oil is a function not only of the number of barrels sold, but also their price. The United States and Europe have plenty of tools to reduce Russia’s ability to sell oil, but the price is set on global markets. Because of the risk that sanctions pose to potential buyers, Russian firms must now sell their oil at a more than $30 per barrel discount on current world prices. But since the price of oil has increased substantially over the last 12 months, Russia is making roughly the same amount per barrel as it was a year ago.
In other words, sanctions have a complex and contradictory effect on the world’s second-largest oil exporter. The more they succeed at taking Russian supply offline, the higher the world price of oil goes. This is particularly true when there are few immediate alternative sources on the global market to replace the lost Russian supply—precisely the current situation.
The EU’s embargo will exacerbate this dynamic by substantially reducing the amount of Russian oil reaching world markets. Most of Russia’s oil exports are sent abroad via ship, so they can, in theory, be sold anywhere. In practice, however, because around half of Russia’s exports of crude oil and refined products go to Europe, most shipborne exports touch European commodity traders, shippers, and insurers. EU sanctions threaten to prohibit Moscow’s use of some of this infrastructure, limiting Russia’s ability to ship oil to other potential customers.
Allied states must figure out how to slash Russian energy revenue without damaging the global economy.
Although there is some uncertainty about the impact, forecasts suggest that Russian exports would decrease by around 2 million barrels of oil and refined products per day if the EU halts all purchases. Russian government officials have given similar forecasts, foreseeing a 17 percent decline in Russian oil production this year. Given that Russia exported slightly less than eight million barrels of crude and refined products per day before the war, this is a substantial hit, and a meaningful reduction in world oil supply. For the Kremlin, however, such a decline is significant but far from catastrophic, as reduced production will inevitably drive oil prices higher.
For energy sanctions to put real pressure on Russia’s government budget, they need to cut deeper. In April, according to the Russian Ministry of Finance, the government made around half a billion dollars per day taxing oil, roughly a quarter of Russian government revenue. A 17 percent decline in this figure would be painful but manageable. Moreover, because oil is priced in dollars, if the Russian government lets the ruble decrease slightly in value, it can reduce the impact of lower oil taxes on the government budget because each dollar of oil revenue will buy more rubles. In other words, although an EU embargo would be painful for Russia, it would be survivable. This is why Western countries need a new global framework—one that systematically reduces the price of Russian oil while keeping it flowing.
A REVERSE OPEC
Reducing the price of Russian oil while still allowing Moscow to sell significant volumes abroad would curtail the Russian government’s revenues without increasing global oil prices. A price reduction would hit Moscow directly, swiftly reducing the hard currency flowing into the Kremlin’s coffers. And if it were structured in the right way, the price cap would also provide incentives for everyone, including China, India, and even Russia itself, to comply.
To understand how, it is important to consider the tremendous leverage the United States, Europe, and other allies have over Russia’s oil sector. Currently, Europe accounts for roughly half of Russia’s sales of oil and refined petroleum products. Outside of Europe, other large buyers include Japan and South Korea, both of which have signed onto sanctions against Russia and should be amenable to measures that curb the Kremlin’s revenues.
The key to limiting the price of Russian oil is for these allied countries to band together and dictate terms. Think of it like a reverse OPEC: instead of wielding control over supply to set prices, the allies could leverage their control over demand to do the same. OPEC’s power is rooted in the fact that its members produce about 40 percent of the world’s oil. Europe, Japan, South Korea, and other members of the sanctions coalition account for an even greater share of Russia’s oil sales, roughly 60 or 70 percent. Members of the group, moreover, play critical supporting roles in Russia’s shipborne oil exports, from ports to shipping to maritime insurance. These links provide them with additional leverage beyond their purchasing power.
These states could form a buyers’ club that publicly announces a price cap for Russian oil. There’s room for debate about the right price, which would need to be high enough to keep Russia selling. Oil trader Pierre Andurand has proposed $50 per barrel, whereas financier and energy expert Craig Kennedy has suggested as low as $20. So long as the price is slightly above the marginal cost of production, Russia has every reason to keep shipping. In prior periods of low prices, such as 2014 and 2020, Russia continued to export roughly constant volumes of oil. Although Russia could theoretically halt exports, its storage facilities are already mostly full. The Kremlin’s only alternative to selling on the cheap is to shut down production and watch its most critical industry go into a deep freeze while its tax revenue collapses.
Would other buyers agree to a price cap? Beyond the sanctions coalition, the biggest buyer of Russian oil is China, which generally consumes around 15 percent of Russia’s exports, largely via pipeline. Historically, India has not been a major buyer of Russian oil, but it has more than doubled its purchases in recent months to take advantage of discounted prices. Russia also sells oil to many other countries, such as Lebanon and Tunisia, but they are small buyers and can acquire the oil they need from alternative sources.
A price cap would be a major innovation in the use of financial sanctions.
To bring these other states on board, the United States, Europe, and East Asian allies could enforce compliance by using sanctions to throw sand in the gears of Russian oil shipments that violate the price cap. They could start by imposing full-blocking sanctions on vital nodes in Russia’s oil sales, including Rosneft, the state-owned oil giant; Gazprombank, the main bank serving Russia’s energy sector; and Sovcomflot, Russia’s largest shipping company. At the same time, the United States and others could provide exemptions for oil shipments that comply with the price cap. Such a regime would make it prohibitively risky for global banks and companies to deal with those entities, unless the underlying transaction abides by the price cap. The dire risk of sanctions violations would compel firms involved in such transactions to insist on clear documentation demonstrating that oil cargoes are compliant.
Additionally, allied states could wield the threat of secondary sanctions against non-Russian companies involved in prohibited oil sales. For instance, if a Chinese or an Indian firm were to buy a shipload of Russian oil for a price above the cap, Western states could threaten sanctions against the shipping company that transports the oil, the insurance company that underwrites the cargo, any port operator that provides services to the tanker, and the banks that process associated payments. The same governments could also make it illegal for U.S. and EU firms to provide any of these services, making it very difficult for such a sale to proceed. The risk involved would force Russia to sell at even greater discounts than at present, in effect enforcing the price cap.
The United States used a similar regime to curb Iran’s oil exports, slashing Tehran’s oil sales by more than 60 percent and locking tens of billions of dollars of revenue in escrow accounts. A price cap on Russian oil would be more complex because Russia is a bigger supplier of oil, with more sophisticated international trade and financial linkages. Yet, compliance would not solely rely on the threat of sanctions. Critically, there would also be a positive incentive to comply: buyers of Russian oil would benefit substantially because abiding by the price cap would lower the cost of their own imports. Challenging the cap would be rife with financial risk and carry no economic benefit—it would be charity to the Kremlin. Amid the tightest world energy markets in years, there is little reason to believe Russia’s oil customers would be in a charitable mood.
Currently, only three major importers of Russian oil stand outside the sanctions coalition: China, India, and Turkey. China can continue to import Russian oil via a pipeline that is practically immune to sanctions. This pipeline, however, represents only a small share of Russian oil exports. Because the pipeline operates at capacity, if China wanted to significantly increase its imports of Russian oil, it would need to do so via ship, which already accounts for more than half of Chinese imports of Russian oil. Moreover, as the average price of Russian oil falls, China will likely negotiate a harder bargain for piped oil, further cutting into Moscow’s bottom line. India and Turkey, on the other hand, import much of their oil from Russia via shipping routes that are exposed to Western sanctions. Both are also economically vulnerable to high oil prices and would benefit greatly from lower prices. Although it is unlikely that either would publicly welcome a price cap, both would probably abide by it.
A price cap would be a major innovation in the use of financial sanctions. Given the challenges of sanctioning Russian energy exports, a traditional embargo applied globally would be difficult to implement and, even if it were possible, would send energy prices soaring. The United States and its allies would be better served by focusing on the goal of slashing Russian revenues while keeping enough Russian oil flowing to avoid a massive price spike. Imposing a reverse OPEC price cap on Russia, backed by Western sanctions, would benefit consumers the world over while focusing pressure on the petrodollars flowing into Putin’s coffers.
20. The Collateral Damage in China’s Covid War
Excerpts:
Fears of growing social controls have already caused many well-off people to consider leaving. Amid the Shanghai lockdown this spring, WeChat Index, which measures search popularity on the social media platform, recorded a sevenfold jump in searches with the word “immigration.” Many foreigners who have been in China during the pandemic have left or have plans to do so. A recent survey of 950 foreigners in Shanghai found that nearly half plan to leave China in the next 12 months. Taking notice of signs that multinationals are seriously considering pulling out of China, a Canadian researcher wrote that “Beijing’s zero-COVID policy does what Trump’s trade war could not.”
Of course, it is still possible that the social and economic shock of the Shanghai lockdown will cause the Chinese leadership to think twice before repeating the same mistakes, perhaps in Beijing itself. With some effort, China could choose a better course based on more effective vaccines and therapeutics, workable protocols for screening and triage of COVID patients, and targeted non-pharmaceutical interventions. But the government’s behavior so far indicates that it is unlikely to change course, which would involve acknowledging, at least implicitly, that its policies are doing more damage than good. Its recent decision to cancel hosting the summer 2023 Asia Cup indicates that the government has no plan to end zero COVID next year. Instead, it seems likely to stake everything on its current approach, even at the risk of cutting itself off from the world and eroding its support at home.
The Collateral Damage in China’s Covid War
Are Beijing’s Harsh Measures Undermining Its Hold On Power?
May 17, 2022
Two and a half years into the pandemic, China is rapidly losing its battle to maintain its “zero COVID” goal. The government’s total lockdown of Shanghai, its largest city and financial hub, has created economic chaos and engendered social backlash from tens of millions of residents who have been prevented from going outside, even to obtain food or to seek health care. Despite such protocols, the government was unable to prevent hundreds of thousands of new cases from emerging in the city during the lockdown, while causing much unnecessary hardship and suffering. Now a similar problem threatens the capital itself. Unwilling to acknowledge the changing nature of the virus, the Chinese government continues to claim that it can outrace the virus through extreme containment measures, even amid growing popular discontent.
For all countries, COVID-19 of course remains a public health problem. But for China, the chief risks of the virus have become less epidemiological than political and economic. As the experience of other countries has shown, with appropriate strategies in place the Omicron variant can be managed and contained. But the Chinese government insists on maintaining policies that are unsustainable and have little grounding in science. In doing so, it has shown an increasing willingness to put China’s economy, and even its social stability, at risk.
For Chinese President Xi Jinping, the stakes could not be higher. The all-important 20th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress is scheduled for later this year, and the purported success of Beijing’s COVID-fighting strategy has been a central part of state propaganda almost since the pandemic began. If Beijing loses the trust and support of the public on this core issue—at a time when the Chinese economy itself is suffering from continual lockdown shocks—a regime once known for its technocratic efficiency could soon face a growing legitimacy crisis.
Farmers in Hazmat Suits
From the outset, Beijing’s approach to this spring’s outbreak in Shanghai has been governed by fidelity to party policies rather than best public health practice. Blaming Shanghai’s targeted approach for causing the surge of new cases, the central government not only imposed a harsh new version of its zero-COVID strategy but also parachuted in officials from Beijing to supervise the city’s response. As a result, Shanghai’s 26 million residents suddenly found themselves under the world’s most stringent lockdown, which has now been repeatedly extended, for more than six weeks.
Enforcement of zero COVID in the city has been accompanied by heavy-handed measures that have little basis in science or even common sense. In order to ferret out new COVID cases, for example, the government favored the invasive and costly PCR tests over rapid antigen tests. (Although rapid tests can provide good indicators of when an infection is contagious, the government prefers the PCR method, because it facilitates government control and better serves zero-COVID goals.) Whenever a single new positive case has been detected, the patient’s entire residential community—perhaps as many as 200,000 residents—has been sealed off for an additional 14 days; in some neighborhoods, residents of entire apartment buildings have been relocated to quarantine centers. Infected residents with mild or no symptoms have been required to go to makeshift hospitals for isolation; then, public health workers have come to their homes and sprayed large amounts of disinfectant on walls, floors, and personal possessions, even though numerous studies have shown that it is very rare for the infection to spread through contaminated surfaces, and that the virus is unlikely to survive outside the human body for longer than a very brief period.
During much of the Shanghai lockdown, residents in areas under full measures were prohibited from going outdoors except when they were corralled to receive PCR tests; the mass testing events only spread the virus further. Meanwhile, since most health-care workers had been mobilized to provide PCR tests and treat asymptotic or mild cases, very few were available to provide routine or emergency health care. And with wholesale markets and grocery stores closed, the city government scrambled to distribute food to residents in lockdown, many of whom faced shortages not just of food but also of medicine and other key supplies.
China’s leaders have refused to make any fundamental changes to their original COVID strategy.
Worse, the vast lockdown has done nothing to remedy one of China’s greatest vulnerabilities: its failure to adequately vaccinate its elderly and at-risk population. For almost two years, the government did not prioritize vaccination of the elderly because of a dearth of clinical data about any possible side effects in that age group. And for a long time, the zero-COVID policy, by shielding the vulnerable from exposure to the virus, also created a false sense of safety among the elderly, reducing the incentives to get vaccinated. With the rise of Omicron and far larger numbers of cases in China, that calculus has changed. But the use of health-care workers to enforce lockdown testing measures has left very few people to administer COVID vaccines to the at-risk population, which should have been the main priority. As of mid-April, some 38 percent of Shanghai’s over-60 population had not received more than one dose of the vaccine.
By adopting a zero-tolerance policy in China’s largest city, the central government has sent a powerful message around the country. Watching the Chinese leadership ratchet up the pressure on Shanghai, local officials elsewhere have doubled down on their own similar strategies, fearful that they will be blamed if their measures are not severe enough. In my hometown in the eastern Jiangsu Province, the local government required mass PCR testing of the entire population in the absence of a single known COVID case. Other cities have imposed lockdowns after only two or three cases were detected. By April 18, about 45 cities across the country, representing nearly 30 percent of China’s population and 40 percent of its annual GDP, were under full or partial lockdown. In some rural areas, outsiders have been banned from entering villages; farmers have had to receive permission to go to their fields, and even then have been required to wear hazmat suits. To enforce a lockdown in Qian’an, in Hebei Province, local officials have asked residents to hand in their keys so that volunteers could lock the door from outside.
The effects of these measures on local populations are becoming clearer by the day. In Shanghai, horror stories about the lockdown—often tinged with black humor—have filled social media feeds. There have been accounts of residents who died by suicide for not being able to cope with the pressures of the lockdown; patients who died not because of COVID-19 but because they were denied access to emergency health care; citizens in their 90s who were dragged by faceless people in hazmat suits to quarantine centers at midnight; a nursing home who sent a 75-year-old COVID patient to a morgue even though she was still alive.
Accelerating in Reverse
Fueled by stories like these, Shanghai residents have become increasingly vocal in criticizing the government. In some areas, they have scuffled with police who allegedly ordered them to surrender their homes to COVID patients; staged protests from their balconies, banging on pots and pans to demand basic necessities; and even confronted Shanghai’s party chief, Li Qiang, when he was paying an inspection visit. Until now, few of these acts of defiance have been violent, and much of the outcry has focused on material needs. Moreover, not all dissenting voices have explicitly blamed central government leaders or the zero-COVID policy itself. But it is hard to deny that the public response in Shanghai has reached a turning point. Where the Chinese leadership’s COVID policies were generally supported during the first years of the pandemic, there is now growing distrust of the government among the middle class. Commenting on the lockdown measures in a conversation recorded on China Digital Times, an online news site, one Shanghai resident said, “We are not coming to a halt. We are driving in reverse while stepping on the gas.”
One of my friends in Shanghai, who has long held a pro-government stance, described her attitude during the lockdown as having gone “from helplessness to disappointment to desperation.” Zhang Qiang, a Shanghai doctor turned entrepreneur, said that until the lockdown he did not believe the stories about the 1959–61 famine caused by the Great Leap Forward, in which tens of millions of Chinese starved to death; now he understood that “there can be food shortages even in Shanghai.” Such sentiment is shared by some leading pro-government commentators, including Larry Hsien Ping Lang and Liu Liu. In the Financial Times, Shan Weijian, the chair and CEO of a leading Asia-focused private equity firm, observed that popular discontent in China is at its highest point since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown.
Shanghai residents have become increasingly vocal in criticizing the government.
Popular discontent, of course, can be fleeting. But the excessive lockdown in Shanghai—experienced by 26 million citizens, including many members of the urban middle class—could contain the seeds of future political transformation. For one thing, the growing distrust and discontent with the party’s COVID policies contributes to a government credibility crisis, and, as Xi has acknowledged, the inability to please or placate Chinese society is a prelude to losing “the ruling foundation” and “the ruling status” of the CCP. For another, the measures that have caused such frustration in Shanghai and in many other cities have also damaged one of the other pillars of the regime’s legitimacy: its reputation for sound economic management.
For years, Chinese leaders have managed to hold on to popular support by maintaining high economic growth rates. Indeed, Beijing’s initial success in controlling the spread of COVID-19 enabled China to become the only major economy that registered positive economic growth in 2020. But that growth engine is rapidly losing steam, as the total lockdowns in Shanghai and other major cities have upended supply chains, stifled domestic consumption, and weakened the country’s growth outlook. By analyzing trucking data, scholars from the Chinese University of Hong Kong found that even before Shanghai launched partial lockdown at the end of March, economic activity in the city was down 40 percent below normal levels. Now, because of the shutdowns of Shanghai and other industrial centers, businesses are holding back, fearful of the uncertain economic outlook, and there is a plummeting demand for business loans. Net new yuan loans in April dropped by 79 percent from the previous month, and were less than half what they had been a year earlier. The International Monetary Fund has reduced China’s growth forecast for the second time this year, to 4.4 percent, well below the CCP’s 5.5 percent target.
Citing the Shanghai lockdown, some China watchers portray an even bleaker picture. According to Shan, the Chinese economy is currently “in the worst shape in the past 30 years.” Daniel Rosen noted in an April Foreign Affairs article that “zero growth or even economic contraction” in China should not be ruled out this year. And in late April, Stephen S. Roach, the Yale economist and former chair of Morgan Stanley Asia, declared that “the China cushion has deflated” and that “the world can no longer rely on China as a source of resilience.” Yet rather than change course, the Chinese government has seemed all the more determined to stick to its existing policies, no matter the consequences.
Too Autocratic to Fail
Despite the high social and economic costs, China's leaders have refused to make any fundamental changes to their original COVID strategy. For months, it has been clear to epidemiologists that the current situation has changed dramatically since COVID first spread in Wuhan in early 2020: the dominant Omicron variant is much more contagious than the original COVID strains, but its infection tends to be less severe, and the existence of effective vaccines and treatments have limited the risk of severe illness and offered new ways to manage it. Indeed, 0.09 percent of positive cases in Shanghai have led to death, which is below the approximate case fatality rate of seasonal influenza. A recent study jointly conducted by Chinese and American scientists found that administering effective vaccines on all eligible elderly people alone would lead to a 54.1 percent decrease in hospital admissions and a 60.8 percent decrease in mortality. Yet the Chinese government has been intransigent. Instead of recognizing the new reality, top government epidemiologists continue to highlight the danger of the Omicron variant, and the head of the National Health Commission has asked public health officials to take a clear-cut stand against the “wrong thinking” of coexistence with the virus—treating it like a flu-like disease that people should learn to live with.
Although many people in rural areas and smaller towns continue to support zero-COVID policies, the hardening approach has begun to shift popular perceptions of the government in China’s large cities. At the start of the pandemic, Beijing’s success in fighting COVID seemed to demonstrate the resilience and resourcefulness of the Chinese state. But the government’s obstinacy in the Shanghai lockdown has shown that its political system has become more rigid and resistant to change than ever. In part, this is a result of self-reinforcing mechanisms within the government administration itself. Two years into the zero-COVID strategy, many government agencies, as well as PCR testing companies, public health officials, and others involved in the zero-COVID effort have a deep stake in maintaining the current approach and have helped make the political system resistant to any significant shift in policy. But opposition from vested interests alone cannot explain the current approach, given both the social discontent and the serious damage to the Chinese economy.
Like Putin’s Russia, Xi’s China appears to be caught in what one journalist recently called an “authoritarian feedback loop,” in which a long-ruling, insulated leader is surrounded by advisers who have no interest in challenging his views. Indeed, even as the lockdowns are sapping China’s economy, Xi has told officials to ensure that China outperforms the United States in GDP growth this year. As an unnamed government policy adviser suggested in the Financial Times at the end of April, making China’s top decision-maker understand that the Shanghai lockdown is both counterproductive and unsustainable has become a “key challenge for the system.”
For Chinese President Xi Jinping, the stakes could not be higher.
In turn, rigidity at the top has hampered decision-making further down the chain. In the absence of lively and informed policy debate within the central government, there is ever more pressure on local officials to fanatically pursue a zero-COVID policy, no matter the social and economic costs. A growing number of liberal-minded scholars in China are concerned that zero COVID has also provided a fresh blueprint for a state that, once when the pandemic is over, will seek to control every facet of people’s lives. “To tell the truth, I am scared,” a well-known financial commentator said on WeChat. “I venture to assert that even after the end of the pandemic, the management-and-control methods that treat people like pigs, dogs, and criminals will be retained.” A political science professor in Fudan University predicted that, rather than be relaxed, the extreme social measures “will be tightened” in a post-COVID future. For many Chinese, such a merciless and omnipresent state has not been seen since the days of the Cultural Revolution.
Fears of growing social controls have already caused many well-off people to consider leaving. Amid the Shanghai lockdown this spring, WeChat Index, which measures search popularity on the social media platform, recorded a sevenfold jump in searches with the word “immigration.” Many foreigners who have been in China during the pandemic have left or have plans to do so. A recent survey of 950 foreigners in Shanghai found that nearly half plan to leave China in the next 12 months. Taking notice of signs that multinationals are seriously considering pulling out of China, a Canadian researcher wrote that “Beijing’s zero-COVID policy does what Trump’s trade war could not.”
Of course, it is still possible that the social and economic shock of the Shanghai lockdown will cause the Chinese leadership to think twice before repeating the same mistakes, perhaps in Beijing itself. With some effort, China could choose a better course based on more effective vaccines and therapeutics, workable protocols for screening and triage of COVID patients, and targeted non-pharmaceutical interventions. But the government’s behavior so far indicates that it is unlikely to change course, which would involve acknowledging, at least implicitly, that its policies are doing more damage than good. Its recent decision to cancel hosting the summer 2023 Asia Cup indicates that the government has no plan to end zero COVID next year. Instead, it seems likely to stake everything on its current approach, even at the risk of cutting itself off from the world and eroding its support at home.
21. Digital Transformation Is a Cultural Problem, Not a Technological One
To modify a famous quote - Culture eats strategy (and technology) for lunch.
Digital Transformation Is a Cultural Problem, Not a Technological One - War on the Rocks
BRANDON LESHCHINSKIY AND ANDREW BOWNE
“I don’t know what we mean when we say we’re ‘pursuing AI.’ Do you?”
“We don’t change to accommodate new technologies, anyway … We just shove them into our current paradigm.”
“I don’t even understand what we’re supposed to be doing right now!”
Twenty officers are seated around a table, mired in the discomfort of an “adaptive leadership” workshop. This framework, developed by Ronald Heifetz and colleagues at the Harvard Kennedy School, is designed to help organizations make progress on complex, collective challenges, known as “adaptive” challenges. Unlike “technical” problems, which can be solved with existing know-how, adaptive challenges demand learning and change — adaptation — from the stakeholders themselves.
Digital transformation presents an adaptive challenge for the Department of Defense. As long as the Department of Defense relies on painless, “technical” fixes — what Steve Blank calls “innovation theater” — America will become increasingly vulnerable to exploitation by foreign adversaries, costing both dollars and lives. To make progress on the challenge of digital transformation — and to maintain technological superiority — the Department of Defense should reexamine and reshape its deeply held values, habits, beliefs, and norms.
The officers in the workshop are an excellent example of a group wrestling with adaptation. As in many groups, they begin by looking outwards. One says, “It’s the ‘frozen middle’ that prevents us from doing anything digital,” while another adds, “Our higher-ups can’t agree on what they want, anyway. … What are we supposed to do?” The instructor nudges them: “It seems the group is shifting responsibility to anywhere but here. What makes it difficult to look inward?”
Next, the officers drift away from the challenge. They share stories of previous successes, appraise the instructor’s credentials, and joke about the workshop itself. Again, the instructor intervenes: “I notice we’re avoiding uncertainty. Can we stay longer in the nebulous space of ‘digital transformation’? Or will we escape the moment it’s not clear how to proceed?”
Begrudgingly, they return to digital transformation, but after a few minutes, they ask the instructor for help: “Are you going to chime in here, or …?” The instructor responds, “You’re depending on an authority — someone in charge — to solve a problem that can only be addressed collectively — by all of you.”
At this point, the room burns with frustration. But the officers can’t be blamed. Their moves to avoid adaptive work — diverting attention away from the issue and shifting responsibility for it elsewhere — are typical for groups confronting a difficult reality.
More specifically, in what Heifetz terms the “classic failure,” groups attempt to resolve adaptive challenges via “technical fixes”: painless attempts that apply existing know-how, rather than working with stakeholders to change how they operate.
Hiring someone, firing someone, increasing the budget, expanding the timeline, creating a committee, restructuring the org, building a new tool, pushing a new policy: These are all technical fixes, which, while not inherently harmful, are easier than — and can distract from — the internal work of reevaluating values, habits, beliefs, and norms.
The real obstacles to digital transformation are deep-seated norms and conflicting perspectives that exist across the entire organization. “How valuable are technologists, really? Should they be treated differently from others?”; “What about computers: Can we trust them to do our jobs as well as we do? If so, what will be the role of humans afterward?”; and perhaps most importantly, “How do we move beyond simply articulating new standards to actually living them?” These are hard questions that affect the Department of Defense’s objectives, strategies, and tasks at every level — but answers will be earned only through discussion and experimentation across the defense ecosystem itself.
Back in the workshop, at least, the officers have made a breakthrough. Toward the end of the session, the instructor says, “I feel a sense of sadness in the room. Does anyone else feel that?” Predictably, everyone shakes their head — admitting sadness feels like admitting failure — but then a major speaks up: “I’ll bite. Yeah, I do feel sad. This just feels overwhelming. If we can’t depend on our commanders to get this done …” He pauses. “I have no idea how we’re going to do it. Especially when we’re told to just keep our heads down all the time. It feels hopeless.”
The major’s comment is the most honest moment the group has seen, and the shift in the room is palpable: An hour prior, the officers were hardly aware of their own duty to generate adaptive work, and if they were, they did not appreciate its weight. Now, they are coming to terms with this responsibility, and they are doing it publicly — vulnerably — where the whole group can learn from individual experience. This shift is the stuff of real change.
The truth is, no one knows how a digitally transformed Department of Defense will operate. But no one will find out without the collective process of trying, failing, and learning. The Department of Defense should therefore become comfortable learning through experience — gathering data through discussion and experimentation — and publicizing that learning across the organization. And while the Department of Defense has good reasons for maintaining a risk-averse culture, avoiding learning creates its own set of risks. The world is changing, and America’s adversaries are improving their capabilities. We cannot afford to wait for our enemies to make clear that they’ve surpassed us.
Officers can take three actions to make progress on digital transformation now.
First, officers should generate and run low-risk experiments: actions that will produce learning for the future, not actions that will produce success based on today’s metrics — who knows whether those metrics will be relevant post-transformation? For example, at the Department of the Air Force– Massachusetts Institute of Technology Artificial Intelligence Accelerator, we have experimented with multiple forms of educating servicemembers, from live lectures and online courses to interactive exercises and project-based workshops. When an experiment produces failure, so be it: Failure is the primary ingredient of learning.
Second, officers should surface as many perspectives on digital transformation as possible. Who balks at digitization? Who supports it? Why? And what’s the wisdom in each perspective? If everyone is part of the problem, everyone should also be part of the solution — even if it means engaging people across boundaries in a way the Department of Defense has never done before.
Finally, officers should prepare those around them for a prolonged period of ambiguity, where operational reality dictates that those in charge will be unable to answer critical questions. This serves two purposes. First, it helps to manage expectations, so those in positions of authority can resist the pressure of providing answers where none exist. Second, it empowers those without authority to run their own experiments — to try something new and to fail — and report back on what they learned.
Ultimately, transforming a system requires transforming the people within it. If the Department of Defense is seriously committed to digital transformation, everyone should be engaged in the uncomfortable and personal process of change. As the work continues, both the organization and the people within it will find themselves better equipped to handle new and challenging realities.
The workshop, meanwhile, closes on a note that applies across the Department of Defense: “This moment demands courage. Try better. Fail better. Learn better. One day, you’ll look back and see that you’ve transformed.”
Brandon Leshchinskiy is an AI innovation fellow at the Department of the Air Force-Massachusetts Institute of Technology Artificial Intelligence Accelerator, where he has taught over 600 servicemembers, including over sixty generals, admirals, and senior executive service members, about AI. He also works with Ronald Heifetz and others at the Harvard Kennedy School, where he has coached over 50 students, ranging from young professionals to senior executives, on complex, collective challenges.
Andrew Bowne is an Air Force judge advocate and the chief legal counsel of the Department of the Air Force-Massachusetts Institute of Technology Artificial Intelligence Accelerator. He is also a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Adelaide examining the nexus of national security and AI, focused on the role of industry. He has published numerous articles and book chapters, including national security, security cooperation, contract law, rule of law, machine learning, and intellectual property.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Air Force. Further, the appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the Department of Defense of the linked websites, or the information, products, or services contained therein. The Department of Defense does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations.
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David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
