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Quotes of the Day:
“In war the real enemy is always behind the lines. Never in front of you, never among you. Always at your back. That’s something every soldier knows. In every army, since the world began. And plenty of times they’ve been tempted to turn their backs on the enemy — the so-called enemy, that is — and give it to the real one, once and for all… No, my friend, in war the real enemy is seldom who you think.”
- Jean Raspail
"I shall earnestly and persistently continue to urge all women to the practical recognition of the old Revolutionary maxim. 'Resistance to tyranny is obedience to God.' "
- Susan B. Anthony
"Promise me you'll always remember: You're braver than you believe, and stronger than you seem, and smarter than you think."
- A.A. Milne
1. N. Korean leader inspects military spy satellite facility: state media
2. Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Reconnaissance Satellite Launch Preparatory Committee
3. 'Washington Declaration' a huge but not last step in deterring N. Korean provocation: experts
4. Tasks Ahead for the Nuclear Consultative Group
5. South Korea to expand nonlethal aid to Ukraine
6. South Korea imperatives to help ensure peace on the peninsula
7. Yoon slams Russia for 'illegal invasion' of Ukraine
8. Korea signs preliminary deal with Ukraine to offer low-interest rate loans
9. Ukraine seeks S. Korea's participation in reconstruction projects: senior official
10. South Korea’s Coming Era of Stagnation
11. S Korea must prepare for a Taiwan war: ex-official
12. Why South Korean women don’t date, marry or birth
1. N. Korean leader inspects military spy satellite facility: state media
So Kim now has us speculating about a possible satellite launch. Rather than get all worked up about this we need to continue to remind the Korean people in the north that they are suffering because Kim is prioritizing activities like this over the welfare of the people.
(2nd LD) N. Korean leader inspects military spy satellite facility: state media | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · May 17, 2023
(ATTN: ADDS more info in paras 7-8,11-12; CHANGES photos)
By Yi Wonju
SEOUL, May 17 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un inspected the country's first military reconnaissance satellite and gave the green light for its next action plan, Pyongyang's state media said Wednesday, adding that the satellite is "ready for loading" on a rocket.
Kim made the on-site inspection to the Non-permanent Satellite Launch Preparatory Committee a day earlier to check the overall status of the spy satellite and approved of its "future action plan," the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said, in a move that signals the launch could be imminent.
"After acquainting himself in detail with the work of the committee, he inspected the military reconnaissance satellite No. 1 which is ready for loading after undergoing the final general assembly check and space environment test," it said in an English-language dispatch.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (2nd from R, rear), along with his daughter Ju-ae (far R, rear), talks with members of the Non-permanent Satellite Launch Preparatory Committee in Pyongyang on May 16, 2023, to inspect the country's first military reconnaissance satellite, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. Kim gave the green light for its "future action plan," Pyongyang's state media said. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Kim stressed that the successful launch of the satellite is an "urgent requirement" under the prevailing security environment and a process of "bolstering up the defence capabilities on a top priority basis."
He also said "the more desperately the U.S. imperialists and South Korean puppet villains" escalate their confrontational moves against the North, "the more fairly, squarely and offensively" it will exercise its right to self-defence to deter them.
The KCNA did not provide further details on the "future action plan," including the exact date of the launch.
Experts said the North is likely to calibrate the ideal timing of the satellite launch, considering climate conditions and major political events.
"As the next step, North Korea will mount the satellite inside the pairings at the top end of the projectile," Kim Dong-yub, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies, said. "The launch seems likely as early as June depending on the readiness of the delivery vehicle."
Photos released by the KCNA showed Kim's daughter Ju-ae accompanying the inspection in lab gowns and head caps.
The latest inspection marks Kim's first public activity since his on-site visit to the North's space development agency on April 18, when he announced that the North has completed building its first military spy satellite.
In December last year, Pyongyang said it had conducted an "important final-stage" test at its rocket launching facility for the development of its first reconnaissance satellite.
The development of spy satellites was one of the key weapons projects announced by Kim during a ruling party meeting in January 2021.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R), along with his daughter Ju-ae, is pictured as he meets with members of the Non-permanent Satellite Launch Preparatory Committee in Pyongyang on May 16, 2023, to inspect the country's first military reconnaissance satellite, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. Kim gave the green light for its "future action plan," Pyongyang's state media said. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (2nd from R, rear), along with his daughter Ju-ae (far R, rear), talks with members of the Non-permanent Satellite Launch Preparatory Committee in Pyongyang on May 16, 2023, to inspect the country's first military reconnaissance satellite, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. Kim gave the green light for its "future action plan," Pyongyang's state media said. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · May 17, 2023
2. Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Reconnaissance Satellite Launch Preparatory Committee
Is a launch coming soon?
Excerpts:
Repeatedly stressing the strategic nature of possessing military reconnaissance satellites, he said that the more desperately the U.S. imperialists and south Korean puppet villains escalate their confrontational moves against the DPRK, the more fairly, squarely and offensively the DPRK will exercise its sovereignty and just right to self-defence to deter them and defend the country.
He approved the future action plan of the preparatory committee.
Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Reconnaissance Satellite Launch Preparatory Committee
Date: 17/05/2023 | Source: KCNA.kp (En) | Read original version at source
https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1684276877-205317905/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-inspects-reconnaissance-satellite-launch-preparatory-committee/
Pyongyang, May 17 (KCNA) -- The Non-permanent Satellite Launch Preparatory Committee for launching the military reconnaissance satellite No. 1, which is composed of scientists and technicians of the DPRK Aerospace Development Administration, national defence scientific research institutes and universities and scientific research institutes at all levels of the DPRK, is pushing ahead with its work at the final stage amid an intensive campaign for bolstering up the self-defence capabilities to attain the major five-point goals for developing national defence capabilities set at the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea.
Kim Jong Un , general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), guided the work of the Non-permanent Satellite Launch Preparatory Committee on the spot on May 16.
The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un was greeted by leading officials of the Department of Munitions Industry and the Department of Science and Education of the Party Central Committee, members of the Aerospace Development Administration and the Non-permanent Satellite Launch Preparatory Committee.
After acquainting himself in detail with the work of the committee, he inspected the military reconnaissance satellite No. 1 which is ready for loading after undergoing the final general assembly check and space environment test.
He highly appreciated that the preparatory committee has fulfilled its duty and role in a responsible manner in the course of carrying out the important work for dramatically developing the military technology of the country.
To successfully launch the military reconnaissance satellite is an urgent requirement of the prevailing security environment of the country, a process of correctly implementing our Party and government's policy of bolstering up the defence capabilities on a top priority basis, and at the same time, a clear stride forward in developing the space military, science and technology of the country, he said, specifying the strategic goals to be attained continuously in the field of space research.
Repeatedly stressing the strategic nature of possessing military reconnaissance satellites, he said that the more desperately the U.S. imperialists and south Korean puppet villains escalate their confrontational moves against the DPRK, the more fairly, squarely and offensively the DPRK will exercise its sovereignty and just right to self-defence to deter them and defend the country.
He approved the future action plan of the preparatory committee. -0-
www.kcna.kp (Juche112.5.17.)
3. 'Washington Declaration' a huge but not last step in deterring N. Korean provocation: experts
Is Kim reacting to the deterrence message of the Washington Declaration? While he may soon launch a reconnaissance satellite, he has not conducted any missile tests in weeks. Is he moderating his behavior or has he just run out of missiles to test?
But I agree with general Scaparrotti that our deterrence is aimed (and must be aimed) at aggression - e.g., an attack on the ROK and the use of WMD. We cannot deter provocations especially when they are integral to the regime's political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies. It pains me to receive questions from journalists that start with the premise that deterrence has failed because the regime has conducted another provocation. In fact deterrence has been extremely successful for the past 7 decades because there has been no resumption of hostilities. And of course the headline of this article gets it wrong.
Excerpts:
"The declaration says the U.S. "commits to make every effort to consult with the ROK on any possible nuclear weapons employment on the Korean Peninsula"," said Elaine Bunn, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy.
ROK stands for the Republic of Korea, South Korea's official name.
"You know that the use of U.S. nuclear weapons is a decision that only the U.S. president is authorized to make. So the commitment at the presidential level to make every effort to consult is very significant," she added in a webinar hosted by the Stimson Center, a Washington-based think tank.
...
Scaparrotti argued the Washington Declaration may have little to do directly with deterring North Korean provocation.
"I would remind you that these processes and commitments that I'm talking about are a process and not an end state. Therefore, they won't be the perfect response. The ROK-U.S. alliance will have to adapt as it moves along," he said.
"Our deterrence is aimed at one thing; aggression. So the idea that we are going to stop their provocations, et cetera, through nuclear deterrence, that's not at all the case," he added. "And I think there needs to be a clear understanding of what that nuclear deterrent is for. It's for aggression."
'Washington Declaration' a huge but not last step in deterring N. Korean provocation: experts | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · May 17, 2023
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, May 16 (Yonhap) -- The recent agreement reached between South Korea and the United States on strengthening U.S. extended deterrence is a significant step in dealing with North Korea's evolving nuclear threat but possibly not the last step to be taken by the allies, U.S. experts said Tuesday.
They also insisted that while the agreement, dubbed the Washington Declaration, may enhance the allies' joint deterrence against North Korea, it may fall short of preventing future provocations by the reclusive North.
"The declaration says the U.S. "commits to make every effort to consult with the ROK on any possible nuclear weapons employment on the Korean Peninsula"," said Elaine Bunn, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy.
ROK stands for the Republic of Korea, South Korea's official name.
"You know that the use of U.S. nuclear weapons is a decision that only the U.S. president is authorized to make. So the commitment at the presidential level to make every effort to consult is very significant," she added in a webinar hosted by the Stimson Center, a Washington-based think tank.
Elaine Bunn, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy, is seen speaking during a webinar hosted by the Stimson Center, a think tank based in Washington, on May 16, 2023 in this captured image. (Yonhap)
The Washington Declaration, signed by U.S. President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol late last month, calls for the establishment of a Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) between the allies, which U.S. officials have said will allow more South Korean input into how the U.S. prepares against a possible nuclear weapons use by North Korea.
Some have even likened the NCG to NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, although U.S. officials have noted that the Washington Declaration is not a "nuclear-sharing" agreement.
"My observations are that consultations are not new, but the Washington Declaration raises the level and further institutionalizes those consultations with the Nuclear Consultative Group," Bunn told the virtual seminar.
"And planning together is not new, but the Washington Declaration is an evolution toward greater integration of planning and assets for deterrence, both those of the U.S. and those of South Korea," she added.
Curtis Scaparrotti, a retired U.S. Army general who served as commander of U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. European Command, said the Washington Declaration and the provisioned NCG are uniquely designed to deal with threats specific to the region.
"As I watch the North Korean development of its nuclear capabilities in numbers, range and diversity of systems, it's clear that the deterrence and defense of the ROK-U.S. alliance has to adapt as well," he said.
"I believe the Washington Declaration, despite the criticisms that we have heard and discussed and I've read about, it outlines an effective way ahead for strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance, reassuring the ROK populace in deterring evolving North Korean threat," he added.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (L) shakes hands with U.S. President Joe Biden during a joint news conference after their summit at the White House in Washington, D.C., on April 26, 2023. (Yonhap)
The experts, however, noted that the allies may be required to take additional steps to further strengthen U.S. extended deterrence as North Korea's nuclear threat continues to evolve.
"I just think that the whole nature of extended nuclear deterrence ... is a constant," said Bunn.
"It is a constantly evolving situation, and I think there will be further evolutions. We have seen evolution so far in how we discuss together, plan together ... We will continue to see that evolution. So we shouldn't think that this is the end," she added.
Scaparrotti argued the Washington Declaration may have little to do directly with deterring North Korean provocation.
"I would remind you that these processes and commitments that I'm talking about are a process and not an end state. Therefore, they won't be the perfect response. The ROK-U.S. alliance will have to adapt as it moves along," he said.
"Our deterrence is aimed at one thing; aggression. So the idea that we are going to stop their provocations, et cetera, through nuclear deterrence, that's not at all the case," he added. "And I think there needs to be a clear understanding of what that nuclear deterrent is for. It's for aggression."
Joel Wit, a senior researcher at the Stimson Center, noted the declaration may have partly been driven by South Korea's desire to arm itself with its own nuclear weapons.
"The political and public pressures in South Korea that I think are a big factor driving forward, and so for me, I feel like we are on a slippery slope that the Washington Declaration may be a good step, it may deal with the problem right now, but we may be having a different conversation a year (from now) that will require more steps," he said.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · May 17, 2023
4. Tasks Ahead for the Nuclear Consultative Group
The terms of reference still need to be established for the NCG. This is a useful contribution.
Tasks Ahead for the Nuclear Consultative Group - Korea Economic Institute of America
keia.org · by Troy Stangarone · May 16, 2023
The Peninsula
Tasks Ahead for the Nuclear Consultative Group
Published May 16, 2023
Author: Hanbyeol Sohn
Category: South Korea
The ROK-U.S. state visit significantly strengthened the alliance amid changes in the international order, such as the Ukrainian war and intensifying U.S.-China competition. The two countries adopted six joint statements, including the “Washington Declaration,” which is significant in expressing the U.S. commitment for extended deterrence and South Korea’s willingness to comply with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
While some evaluations have disparaged the value of the Washington Declaration for merely maintaining existing pledges, the creation of “the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG)”, the commitment to regular visibility and deployment of U.S. strategic assets such as SSBN visits to South Korean ports, and the strengthening of information sharing and joint training are all notable aspects of the declaration.
The Achievements of the Washington Declaration
North Korea’s nuclear threat is growing. Fierce competition among great powers is opening up strategic space for North Korea, which has carried out unprecedented missile provocations throughout 2022. North Korea is making its nuclear possession a fait accompli and maximizing its potential for nuclear coercion. As a result, many expected this ROK-U.S. summit to address security anxiety of the South Korean people. The Washington Declaration did so in three ways:
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Political Solidarity of the Alliance: Various discussions on South Korea’s independent nuclear armament continued not only in South Korea but also in the United States ahead of the summit. Some argued the U.S. needs to relocate its tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula or establish a nuclear sharing system such as NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). However, South Korea’s nuclear deterrent is not a silver bullet to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem, and more sophisticated calculations on national interests are needed. The Washington Declaration is meaningful in that it has potentially ended such exhausting debates and suggested a direction for the alliance to work together. It was a clear declaration that the ROK-U.S. alliance, which marks its 70th anniversary, is firmly united.
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Strategic Credibility of Deterrence: Nuclear extended deterrence is bound to face questions about its inherent credibility. This summit was intended to increase the credibility of deterrence through the creation of the NCG for close consultation between allies. It not only holds regular meetings as a vice-ministerial/assistant secretary consultative body but also installs them as a permanent consultative group. This may help reduce crisis response time, which is considered a weak point, and reduces North Korea’s potential for miscalculation by sending immediate and cohesive deterrence messages. And, crisis stability may be improved by reducing misperceptions about others’ intentions. In the end, South Korea can participate in all different facets of deterrence, thereby increasing the credibility of deterrence against North Korea.
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Military Integration and Effectiveness: North Korea tried to secure advantages by decoupling the ROK-U.S. alliance. Instead, the Washington Declaration tightened military linkages and plugged gaps. The entire process of information sharing, and planning, coordinating, and operating nuclear-related actions helps integrate the combined deterrent power of South Korea and the United States. This contributes to the Conventional and Nuclear Integration (CNI), which effectively integrates the operation of nuclear and conventional weapons in terms of means, and allows strategic assets including SSBN to fill the gap between the U.S. mainland and the Korean Peninsula in terms of space. Therefore, by enhancing military integration and effectiveness, it can contribute to integrated deterrence aimed at building a credible force across all domains and across the full spectrum of conflict, and with all government agencies, as well as allies and partners.
Future challenges of NCG
South Korea’s concern about U.S. extended deterrence is not just a question of whether Washington would risk New York to save Seoul. South Korean leaders are also concerned about whether the U.S. would be reluctant to use nuclear retaliation when South Korea wants U.S. nuclear retaliation, or, on the contrary that the U.S. might take steps toward nuclear retaliation when South Korea does not want it. The devastatingly destructive power of nuclear weapons causes sensitivity in domestic politics due to the collateral damage to the Korean people. Therefore, Korea’s position should be fully reflected in the implementation of U.S. extended deterrence. The NCG is expected to be able to handle such a role.
The creation of the NCG is an important step in enhancing the execution of extended deterrence and securing the credibility of deterrence against North Korea. It will also serve as the U.S.’s test bed for whether it will be able to maintain its existing international order and NPT regime through tailored responses to North Korea. The NCG’s future challenges include the following:
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Collaboration with existing consultative bodies: The NCG intends to institutionalize consultation with South Korea on the operation of U.S. nuclear weapons that may affect the Korean Peninsula. It is meaningful as a starting point to ensure South Korea’s participation in the U.S. nuclear planning and operating process. However, the role of the NCG must align with the alliance’s existing consultative mechanisms, yet the structure must be different. Founded in 2015 to integrate the alliance’s deterrence efforts, the ROK-U.S. Deterrence Strategy Committee (DSC) is responsible for establishing and implementing the Tailored Deterrence Strategies (TDS), preparing alliance operational concepts and principles such as 4D, and integrating nuclear and conventional capabilities. In addition, the high-level Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), which resumed last year, integrated all elements of national power, including diplomatic, informational, military and economic (i.e. DIME) and has developed a deterrence message as a declaration policy. Effective collaboration with these consultative bodies is imperative for the NCG.
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Guidelines for military crisis management: The NCG will provide various kinds of information to consult with South Korea on U.S. nuclear operations. This affects all military operations throughout the Korean Peninsula both in peacetime and wartime. Since nuclear and the conventional crises do not exist separately, all crisis management should be in line with the principle of a Combined Crisis Management of Agreement (CCMOA). Therefore, in terms of military crisis management, the NCG has to cooperate with South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, and even the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and Strategic Command. To this end, it will be necessary to revitalize the KIDD ad-hoc Consultation Mechanism (KCM), a crisis management dialogue agreed to at the 2016 SCM and to consider creating another military planning consultative body to link the NCG and KCM.
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Establishment of a system for practical consultation: Regular meetings held four times a year function as peacetime consultative bodies, but more importantly, immediate consultations in times of crisis. Therefore, the size and location of a permanent NCG working-level office that will be operated at all times are important. This is because deliberated consultation cannot be made during a crisis at the level of liaison officers. Instead, it is necessary to establish a communication system that can safely exchange sensitive information and secrets between the two countries in a crisis situation. A more reliable and secure common network is required within the framework of the two countries’ strategic cybersecurity cooperation framework emphasized at this summit.
- Information sharing and exercise: The alliance’s consultation on U.S. nuclear operations does not simply entail receiving information on nuclear weapons. In order to establish and reflect Korea’s position clearly, the NCG should be developed through comprehensive information sharing and practical exercise assuming the urgency of the actual nuclear crisis To this end, the NCG should share the following information in conjunction with institutions and units at various levels in both countries discuss nuclear operation strategies with the Ministry of National Defense and Department of Defense, target information, assets allocation and strike measures with both Joint Chiefs of Staff, operational plans and concepts with U.S. STRATCOM and timing and crisis management measures with U.S. Forces Korea.
The decision to create the NCG is a significant achievement. However, the NCG cannot solve every problem. To avoid remaining only in formal consultations, implementation is more important than promises, and there are many challenges that need to be addressed in the future. It is necessary to move beyond consultation and develop “joint guidelines for the alliance’s nuclear operations” in the Korean Peninsula. Thus far, North Korea’s nuclear threat has increased much faster than anticipated. Nuclear deterrence and stability on the Korean Peninsula will be achieved when North Korea recognizes that the ROK-U.S. alliance cannot be decoupled and realizes that no strategic gap is available to them.
The Korean people remember how stubbornly President Syngman Rhee persuaded the U.S. 70 years ago to form the alliance. Stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula have been maintained for 70 years because of the Korea-U.S. mutual defense treaty, which was born out of his unwavering conviction. Moving forward, Korea’s expectations toward the United States will never diminish. The Washington Declaration of 2023, amid North Korean nuclear threats, embodies the expectation, promise, and blueprint of the two countries. It is crucial to plan this in more detail and implement it decisively.
Hanbyeol Sohn is an associate professor in the Department of Military Strategy at the Korea National Defense University (KNDU) and Director, Center for Military Strategy in the Research Institute for National Security Affairs (RINSA).
The views expressed here are the author’s alone.
Official White House Photo by Adam Schultz from White House flickr photostream.
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keia.org · by Troy Stangarone · May 16, 2023
5. South Korea to expand nonlethal aid to Ukraine
South Korea to expand nonlethal aid to Ukraine
militarytimes.com · by Kim Tong-Hyung, The Associated Press · May 16, 2023
SEOUL, South Korea — South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol vowed to expand the country’s nonlethal aid to Ukraine when he met the European country’s first lady Tuesday in Seoul.
Olena Zelenska visited South Korea as a special envoy of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. During her meeting with Yoon, Zelenska requested South Korea expand its support of nonlethal military supplies, including equipment for detecting and removing mines and ambulance vehicles, according to Yoon’s office.
Yoon replied that his government would closely coordinate with NATO and other international partners to “actively support the Ukrainian people,” his spokesperson Lee Do Woon said during a briefing.
Yoon also condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, saying the “horrific losses of innocent lives, especially women and children, are unacceptable under any circumstances,” according to remarks shared by his office.
Lee said Zelenska made no request for South Korean weapons supplies during her conversation with Yoon.
South Korea, a growing arms exporter with a well-equipped military backed by the United States, has provided humanitarian aid and other support to Ukraine while joining U.S.-led economic sanctions against Moscow. But it has not directly provided arms to Ukraine, citing a long-standing policy of not supplying weapons to countries actively engaged in conflict.
During a visit to South Korea in January, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg called for South Korea to provide direct military support to Ukraine, saying Kyiv is in urgent need of weapons to fight off the prolonged Russian invasion.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, South Korea has reached billions of dollars worth of deals to provide tanks, howitzers, fighter jets and other weapons systems to Poland, a NATO member. An American official said in November that the United States has agreed to buy 100,000 artillery rounds from South Korean manufacturers to provide to Ukraine, although South Korean officials have maintained that the munitions were meant to refill depleted U.S. stocks.
6. South Korea imperatives to help ensure peace on the peninsula
Excerpts:
North Korea’s missile systems are faster, bigger and more dangerous than the missiles being fired at Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. It will require a joint American-South Korean-Japanese development program to create an anti-missile umbrella over South Korea and Japan (North Korea threatens both). This should be a high priority for the Pentagon. The joint system’s development will yield defensive dividends all around the world as countries such as Iran and others also develop missile capabilities.
Eliminating cybercrime and developing an effective missile defense system will ensure peace on the Korean Peninsula and contain the North Korean threat.
A city as beautiful as Seoul and an ally as steadfast as South Korea (with whom we are celebrating the 70th anniversary of our alliance this year) deserve the best possible defense.
South Korea imperatives to help ensure peace on the peninsula
Stopping cybercrime and creating anti-missile umbrella over it and Japan
washingtontimes.com · by Newt Gingrich
Illustration on protecting South Korea with missile defense system by Greg Groesch/The Washington Times more >
OPINION:
Callista, my wife, and I recently visited South Korea to participate in Peace Summit 2023, an event hosted by the Universal Peace Federation. The federation is a remarkable organization with activities in nearly 140 countries, and the summit was an amazing experience.
Visiting Seoul is always fascinating, and this year it was especially educational.
We joined a Washington Times Foundation delegation in a special briefing by key South Korean intelligence experts. As you might expect, South Korea pays extremely careful attention to Kim Jong Un and the North Korean dictatorship. Their common understanding of the Korean language and culture makes them the preeminent analysts of Pyongyang.
Based on their briefings, two large but vital projects became obvious.
First, there is an enormous cyber theft hole in the sanctions levied against North Korea. This is providing an astonishing amount of money to the Kim dictatorship to finance its missile and nuclear weapons programs.
Second, the recent North Korean missile firings have put renewed emphasis on analyzing the country’s non-nuclear ballistic threat to the Republic of Korea.
Let’s consider each challenge.
We were told North Korea is earning an estimated $1.2 billion a year through cybercrime. This is an enormous funding source for Mr. Kim’s military research and development program.
There should be an all-out effort by the combined U.S., South Korean and Japanese intelligence services to lock down North Korea’s ability to steal on the internet. If Mr. Kim can count on more than $1 billion a year in theft, the effect of other sanctions is dramatically weakened. Closing this loophole is vital to slowing down the North Korean military program.
Second, the scale of the North Korean missile program is growing and involves conventional as well as nuclear weapons.
As Time magazine reported on April 12, North Korea completed a record 68 missile tests in 2022, “and there are no signs that the country plans to let up.”
The magazine reported that in early April, North Korea shot an intercontinental ballistic missile toward the East Sea, which separates the Korean Peninsula from Japan. It was the 12th missile test this year.
“North Korea has reportedly fired 26 projectiles, including short-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles, over 11 test launches in just the first three months of this year,” Time reported.
North Korea could do enormous damage to Seoul with conventional missiles. Seoul is an extraordinarily modern city of nearly 10 million people and is only 31 miles south of the Demilitarized Zone. The human casualties would be devastating.
The North Korean missile buildup requires an extraordinary program of developing missile defenses.
The country that has the best record of defeating missile attacks is Israel. According to Claire Berlinski at the Cosmopolitan Globalist, 469 missiles were recently fired from Gaza, targeting Israeli towns and cities. The combination of the Arrow short-range defense system, the new David’s Sling medium-range defensive system (co-developed by Rafael Defense Systems and Raytheon), and the Iron Dome computerized control system — which sorts incoming missiles based on the danger they represent — has enabled Israel to defeat an amazing number of missile attacks and saved an enormous number of lives.
North Korea’s missile systems are faster, bigger and more dangerous than the missiles being fired at Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. It will require a joint American-South Korean-Japanese development program to create an anti-missile umbrella over South Korea and Japan (North Korea threatens both). This should be a high priority for the Pentagon. The joint system’s development will yield defensive dividends all around the world as countries such as Iran and others also develop missile capabilities.
Eliminating cybercrime and developing an effective missile defense system will ensure peace on the Korean Peninsula and contain the North Korean threat.
A city as beautiful as Seoul and an ally as steadfast as South Korea (with whom we are celebrating the 70th anniversary of our alliance this year) deserve the best possible defense.
• For more commentary from Newt Gingrich, visit Gingrich360.com.
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7. Yoon slams Russia for 'illegal invasion' of Ukraine
It is Putin's War.
Yoon slams Russia for 'illegal invasion' of Ukraine
The Korea Times · May 17, 2023
President Yoon Suk Yeol speaks during the 2023 Asian Leadership Conference at the Shilla Hotel in Jung District, Seoul, Wednesday. Joint Press Corps
Ukraine first lady urges Seoul to provide air defense systems
By Nam Hyun-woo
President Yoon Suk Yeol slammed Russia for its "attempts to change the status quo by force and coercive diplomacy," du
ring a conference attended by Ukraine's first lady Olena Zelenska, Wednesday.
"Instead of joining forces to resolve global challenges, there are groups resorting to attempts to change the status quo by force, coercive diplomacy and nuclear threats," Yoon said during his speech at the 2023 Asian Leadership Conference in central Seoul.
"Such attempts blatantly violate international law and norms, and the international community must join hands, respond firmly and collectively to uphold international law and norms in the face of these violations."
Yoon mentioned North Korea's escalating nuclear and missile threats and Russia's aggression against Ukraine as examples of such attempts.
Citing his meeting with Zelenska a day earlier, Yoon said he was informed of the sufferings and human rights violations that Ukrainians are facing due to "an illegal invasion." He said that countries sharing common values of freedom, human rights and rule of law should "never allow the illegal invasion of Ukraine and the attempt to change the status quo by force to become a successful precedent."
"The international support and assistance for Ukraine are not only for the benefit of Ukraine and its people but also for the global community," the president said. "By strengthening the cooperative systems of the international community in responding to global crises and challenges, I am confident that the benefits and advantages will be reciprocated to all global citizens."
President Yoon Suk Yeol and Ukraine first lady Olena Zelenska, applaud during the 2023 Asian Leadership Conference at the Shilla Hotel in Seoul, Wednesday. Joint Press Corps
During the conference, Zelenska also delivered a speech urging the world to provide military assistance for her country ― especially calling for South Korea's support for air defense systems.
"When there is a criminal in your house, who has come to kill your family, humanitarian aid alone will not save the residents," Zelenska said. "The first thing to do is to stop the murderer. In the case of Kherson, it could be air defense systems ― technologically advanced and effective like everything your country creates and produces."
Kherson has seen some of the heaviest combat in the Ukraine War, with its residents experiencing both Russian occupation and Ukrainian recapture. In a referendum held in September of last year, Russia annexed the Kherson Oblast and the Ukrainian military recaptured the city of Kherson in November, but some areas of the oblast are still occupied by Russia.
Her comments are in line with her remarks during the meeting with Yoon a day earlier. During the meeting, she asked South Korea to provide "non-lethal military aid" to Ukraine, according to Seoul's presidential office.
Zelenska wrote on her Telegram channel late Tuesday that she discussed "the necessity of air defense systems" with Yoon. An official at the presidential office confirmed that Zelenska asked for air defense radar systems.
Currently, South Korea provides only humanitarian and economic assistance to Ukraine, following the principle of not including lethal weapons in aid packages to foreign countries.
However, Yoon signaled a major shift from this principle during a media interview last month, stating that it may be difficult for Seoul to stick solely to humanitarian or financial aid if there is "a situation the international community cannot condone, such as a large-scale attack on civilians, massacres or serious violations of the laws of war."
Zelenska said she is grateful to the Korean people for sharing Ukraine's pain and to President Yoon "for his recent words that humanitarian aid alone may not be enough when civilians are being killed."
"We also need to stop the murderer, Russia. That's why we say we need victory, not an abstract ceasefire. Moreover, this is not only our grief and the threat not only to us. This is a violation of rules of coexistence."
The Korea Times · May 17, 2023
8. Korea signs preliminary deal with Ukraine to offer low-interest rate loans
Wednesday
May 17, 2023
dictionary + A - A
Korea signs preliminary deal with Ukraine to offer low-interest rate loans
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/05/17/business/economy/Korea-Ukraine-EDCF/20230517183347888.html
Finance Minister Choo Kyung-ho, right, and his Ukrainian counterpart Yulia Svyrydenko sign the Economic Development Cooperation Fund on Wednesday at The Shilla hotel in central Seoul. [YONHAP]
The Korean government signed a preliminary agreement with Ukraine to offer low-interest rate loans through its aid fund to help the war-torn country rebuild urban infrastructure.
Finance Minister Choo Kyung-ho signed the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) project, the finance ministry said Wednesday.
The minister hailed the move as paving the way for Asia's No. 4 economy to support Ukraine via the EDCF during his meeting with his Ukrainian counterpart Yulia Svyrydenko in Seoul, according to the Ministry of Economy and Finance.
The preliminary agreement signed on Wednesday will be implemented in the future after going through domestic procedures in both countries.
During the meeting, Choo also expressed hope for the end of the war and the restoration of peace in Ukraine.
Korea wishes to cooperate with Ukraine in various areas, especially on post-war reconstruction efforts, he added.
The two countries vowed to work closely on follow-up measures to find projects under the EDCF program.
After conducting feasibility studies for the development projects filed by Ukraine, the amount of funding will be decided.
Korea launched the EDCF program in 1987 with the purpose of supporting economic and social infrastructure projects in developing countries.
Korea offered humanitarian aid worth $100 million to Ukraine in 2022.
In February, the government announced its plan to provide additional assistance worth $130 million.
On Tuesday, President Yoon Suk Yeol met with Ukraine's first lady Olena Zelenska at the presidential office, saying Korea will provide active assistance to her country in close coordination with the international community.
Yoon recently signaled a shift in the policy of providing only non-lethal aid to Kyiv, saying in an interview with Reuters last month that it might be difficult to insist only on humanitarian or financial assistance if Ukraine comes under a large-scale attack on civilians.
BY PARK EUN-JEE, YONHAP [park.eunjee@joongang.co.kr]
9. Ukraine seeks S. Korea's participation in reconstruction projects: senior official
This is something that South Korea has excelled in since the Vietnam War.
Ukraine seeks S. Korea's participation in reconstruction projects: senior official
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230517000776&np=1&mp=1
By Yonhap
Published : May 17, 2023 - 21:24 Updated : May 17, 2023 - 21:24
This photo, provided by the Korea International Trade Association, shows Ukraine's First Vice Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko delivering a speech during a forum in Seoul on May 17, 2023. (Yonhap)
Ukraine expects South Korean companies to participate in various reconstruction projects, particularly regarding nuclear power and other energy fields, a ranking Ukrainian government official said Wednesday.
Rostyslav Shurma, deputy head of Ukraine's presidential office, made the remarks during a forum held in Seoul, where Ukraine's eight-member delegation explained a mid- to longer-term reconstruction plan after the war with Russia to major firms here, including POSCO International Corp., Daewoo Engineering & Construction Co. and the utility firm Korea Electric Power Corp., according to the organizer, the Korea International Trade Association.
The official said that the envisioned reconstruction projects are forecast to cost around $900 billion, and South Korean companies can play a major role in various projects, such as building two new nuclear reactors, and infrastructure for hydrogen and electric power generation.
He also voiced hope for Seoul's helping in the recovery of his country's traffic system, producing green steel items, manufacturing electric and hydrogen-powered vehicles and developing battery technologies.
In a keynote speech during a forum, Ukraine's First Vice Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko said South Korea is a credible partner having a professional capacity in infrastructure projects, and called for further strengthening bilateral ties in the economy and trade down the road. (Yonhap)
10. South Korea’s Coming Era of Stagnation
Excerpts:
In a sense, Park had the right idea when it came to economic reforms but embodied some of her country’s other systemic issues, above all its weak institutions and persistent corruption. Her impeachment in 2017 and later conviction on charges of abuse of power and corruption was a historic watershed. Many hoped that the liberal government of her successor, Moon Jae-in, would catalyze much-needed changes beyond the realm of economic reform. Moon was given a strong mandate to restore public trust in the government, and his pitch for a more just society resonated broadly. But to implement that vision, his administration often took a blunt interventionist approach that only exacerbated labor market rigidities, regulatory burdens, and social polarization. Even before the pandemic, job creation in the private sector had at one point ground to a near-total halt. Housing prices soared, wealth and income inequality rose, and growth expectations worsened.
The most recent election, held last year, pitted Lee Jae-myung, a popular candidate of Moon’s party who vowed to fight social inequities with progressive policies, against the right-wing opposition candidate Yoon Suk-yeol. That Yoon managed to eke out a narrow victory over Lee is a testament to the depth of voters’ economic dissatisfaction and anger at the then ruling party. Yoon, for his part, has pledged to revitalize the economy by rolling back outdated regulations and reforming the labor market, public pensions, and higher education. But he lacks a majority in parliament and his first year in office has been marred by missteps, scandal, and controversy, frustrating initial hopes that he might unify an increasingly polarized electorate.
The travails of Yoon and of his predecessors underscore a sobering new political reality. South Korea’s supercharged exports once offset or at the very least masked policy mistakes and social fault lines at home. That balm and binding glue is gone in an era of slow growth. Instead, the stakes are higher than ever for the government to get economic policy right—and even if it does, the painful adjustments this will entail will bring social and political discontent of its own. The country needs reform-minded and bold leadership that can transcend the political divide. Perhaps, then, South Korea’s best hope is that a future generation of politicians lives up to that task.
South Korea’s Coming Era of Stagnation
Can Seoul Save Its Economy From Japanese-Style Paralysis?
May 17, 2023
Foreign Affairs · by Jaejoon Woo · May 17, 2023
Much of South Korea’s modern history is a record of a spectacular economic and social success. The country rose from the ashes of the Korean War to become an industrial powerhouse. It successfully transitioned to liberal democracy. Names like Hyundai, LG, and Samsung are shorthand for its technological dominance, and K-pop has become a global cultural phenomenon.
But the impressive façade is showing cracks. Long before the pandemic and the current inflation spike, the country’s economy was sputtering and socioeconomic fractures were deepening. It is no accident that another of its recent breakout cultural hits was Parasite, Bong Joon-ho’s dark-humored thriller on the inequities of modern South Korean society: The gap between the country’s rich and poor is now among the widest in industrial countries. The less fortunate are mired in debt, young Koreans are struggling to find employment, and poverty is pervasive among the elderly. The fertility rate is the lowest in the world, and the population is aging at an alarming pace. That is to say nothing of the external uncertainties facing the country, such as the escalating tensions between its two largest trading partners, China and the United States.
The South Korean economy is at an inflection point. If the country pushes forward with bold structural reforms, it could regain its erstwhile momentum. The alternative, more likely by the day, is something more akin to “Eurosclerosis,” or worse, Japanification: high debt, an aging population, and long-term stagnation. The political challenge runs even deeper. Reversing South Korea’s current path requires bipartisan support for comprehensive reforms, but years of confrontational party politics have crippled consensus building and the ability to compromise. The result often is policy paralysis and a political class struggling to respond to the challenges that lie ahead.
A DECLINE LONG IN THE MAKING
South Korea’s long era of Asian-tiger GDP expansion ended two decades ago. Growth downshifted to below five percent in the early years of this century and continued to decelerate following the 2008 financial crisis. This year, the economy will likely grow by just 1.4 percent, its second-worst performance since 2009. The years following the Great Recession revealed another worrying trend: the contribution of exports and investment to overall output became increasingly weaker, which was a dramatic departure from previous decades, when exports and investment were powerful drivers that allowed the country to quickly bounce back from recessions.
One reason is that the forces that once propelled South Korean exports to record heights are in retreat. Some of that pullback has been felt the world over, with the global financial crisis, the pandemic, and deglobalization slowing growth most everywhere in recent years. In part, however, it is specific to South Korea’s unique industrial structure, with its heavy reliance on manufacturing exports in just a handful of industries, which leaves it vulnerable to sector-specific shocks such as the current tech downturn. Some of these industries are showing signs of decline, having entered a stage of maturity with less room for growth. Meanwhile, a slowing economy in China—still a key destination for South Korean exports—is depressing demand even as China’s rise as a tech superpower in its own right is creating additional competitive pressures. Once the darlings of Chinese consumers, South Korean cosmetics, smartphones, cars, and information technology products have all lost large chunks of market share in China. Their losses have been exacerbated by Beijing's response to Seoul's decision in 2017 to deploy a U.S. antimissile system, which included nontariff measures against South Korean products and a ban on group tours to Korea.
Underpinning the country’s economic slowdown is a steep, decades-long decline in labor productivity growth. That decline, in turn, is largely explained by the slowing pace of capital accumulation and plummeting growth in total factor productivity—a measure of how efficiently an economy allocates resources and harnesses technological progress, among other things. As a result, labor productivity and total factor productivity levels remain strikingly low compared with nations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and fellow Asian-tiger economies. In 2019, South Korean workers were only about half as productive as their American counterparts, measured by output per labor hour. Much of this labor productivity gap is explained by South Korea’s poor total factor productivity, which stood at just 37 percent of the U.S. figure. Little has changed in the years since. Simply accumulating more physical and human capital alone will likely have limited effects on productivity, partly because the country already has relatively high levels of them. Moreover, the exceptional export growth and investment levels seen during the heyday of globalization are likely a thing of the past.
The real problem behind South Korea’s low productivity lies elsewhere: in its structural rigidities in the product and labor markets and in its poor-quality institutions. Outdated or excessive business regulations, entry barriers for startups, and the dominance of conglomerates all shield its companies from healthy competition while often frustrating innovation and entrepreneurship. Likewise, administrative red tape, pay based on seniority rather than performance, and inflexible hiring and firing rules—including strong employment protection for regular, often unionized, workers—prevent firms from quickly adjusting their workforces to new technologies and business opportunities. This is one of the factors driving up the country’s youth unemployment, and it has also caused an ever-greater reliance on so-called nonregular workers, such as temporary contract workers, whom employers hire to avoid burdensome requirements and constraints. Last year, these nonregular workers made up 37.5 percent of the total workforce.
South Korea’s institutional problems extend even into the halls of public power. A dynamic and innovative economy needs a state that fosters public trust and puts up guardrails against rent-seeking and corruption. On this front, too, the country is falling short. There is, to name just one example, widespread suspicion that its judiciary is corrupt and fails to sanction abuses of power by the rich and powerful. Claims of judicial capture are not without merit, considering that judges who miss out on a coveted promotion often resign to join the legal teams of the chaebol, South Korea’s large business conglomerates.
South Korea’s income disparities are an outgrowth of its structural problems.
Even the education system has not kept pace with the times. Instead of learning to think critically and master basic science and technology, students are condemned to rote memorization. That traditionalism is not suited for a knowledge economy that runs on creativity and multidisciplinary thinking. No wonder that South Korea has seemingly failed to produce much high-tech innovation despite having the world’s highest percentage of college-educated 25- to 34-year-olds.
The upside is that taking on these structural bottlenecks could still unleash major gains in productivity and, by extension, growth. The country’s stagnant service sector holds particular potential in this regard. The sector is beset by a lack of access to finance, low investment in research and development, anticompetitive behavior by large enterprises, and excessive regulations. As a result, its productivity is only about half as high as that of the manufacturing sector. Regulations, in particular, often make it harder for new technology and businesses to succeed. Consider the case of Tada, a South Korean van-hailing service that in recent years gained explosive popularity with more than 1.7 million users—that is, until lawmakers, responding to criticism from established taxi operators, passed new rules in 2020 requiring drivers to hold a taxi license. Tada went out of business shortly thereafter. Strict financial regulation, albeit intended to safeguard financial stability, has hobbled and slowed the country’s financial technology industry. Internet banks, for example, were long prevented from scaling up by banking rules that prohibited them from raising more than four percent of their capital from tech companies and other nonfinancial firms. It took lawmakers more than two years, until 2018, to raise that limit to 34 percent.
An overhaul of the regulatory framework would help correct these distortions. It would also nurture a more vibrant and competitive business ecosystem. Loosening the labor market, for instance, could facilitate job creation, make it easier for workers to move into the firms and sectors that best match their skills, and allow entrepreneurs and innovators to pursue ideas and ventures without the constraint of rigid employment structures. To manage the resulting disruption, labor market reforms should go hand in hand with measures to strengthen the social safety net. No less essential, considering South Korea’s looming demographic challenges, are efforts to retrain and reskill older workers, in conjunction with revisiting questions around the retirement age and pay and pension systems. Doing so will reduce the drop in labor supply and the fiscal burden that an aging workforce will entail.
Tackling structural issues would help lessen inequality, too. To be sure, some of that inequality is driven by the same complex processes of technological change and globalization with which other economies are grappling. But South Korea’s income disparities are also an outgrowth of its structural problems, including its rigid labor market, the gulf between a relatively productive manufacturing sector and a far less productive service industry, and a decreasing but nonetheless persistent gender pay gap.
COMPOUND RISKS
In the best-case scenario, South Korea manages to enact sweeping structural reforms while global growth recovers from its current slump. Long-term economic forecasts are imprecise and fraught with uncertainty, but under the right conditions, the country might be able to sustain growth near, or perhaps even above, three percent over the next ten years. Absent improved global economic conditions and an ambitious domestic overhaul, however, annual growth could drop to as low as one percent by the late 2020s.
In the worst-case scenario, multiple risks compound to perpetuate stagnation over the next decade and beyond. Beside rapid population aging, such risks include an outright financial crisis or, more likely, a negative feedback loop between subpar growth and growing financial distress among highly indebted households and small businesses. The ingredients for this toxic mix are already present: growth is lackluster, private sector debt is high, and the housing market is shaky. Many countries experienced rapid debt buildups during the pandemic, but debt levels in South Korea were already troubling going into the crisis. Household debt is now at a record high, standing at 106 percent of GDP and about 166 percent of household disposable income. Overloaded with obligations, many Koreans are vulnerable to adverse shocks—and such a shock is now materializing in the form of inflation and high interest rates. Meanwhile, the housing market is facing the prospect of a prolonged downturn. After nearly doubling within just a few years, house prices in Seoul have fallen more than 20 percent from their 2021 peak and are expected to fall further.
Although worrisome, household debt is a drag on growth more than it is an immediate threat to South Korea’s financial stability. Thanks to stringent regulations on lending and substantial down payment requirements, most borrowers can still service their debts for the time being. Still, the medium-term risk of a negative feedback loop remains. The rise in the number of firms struggling to service their debts is particularly troubling. The percentage of South Korean companies whose operating income cannot cover the cost of debt servicing has been rising for years. In 2021, the most recent year for which comprehensive data is available, it reached 40.5 percent of all companies in the country.
ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL
Even if it averts economic calamity, South Korea will contend with the political fallout of slowing growth and rising inequality for the foreseeable future. If enacted, structural reforms will bring economic disruption and the potential for social conflict—between the vested interests of the old guard and the newcomers, between the winners and losers of economic change. To mitigate such conflict and ward off the rise of populist leaders with myopic solutions requires a government that can engage diverse stakeholders in a constructive national dialogue, something the South Korean political class has proven incapable of so far.
Take the conservative administration of Park Geun-hye, who served as president from 2013 to 2017. Park put forth an ambitious reform agenda that encompassed education, labor, the public sector, and the service industry. Yet aside from some progress on public sector reform, her plans ran aground in the face of concerted resistance from the main opposition party and labor unions.
In a sense, Park had the right idea when it came to economic reforms but embodied some of her country’s other systemic issues, above all its weak institutions and persistent corruption. Her impeachment in 2017 and later conviction on charges of abuse of power and corruption was a historic watershed. Many hoped that the liberal government of her successor, Moon Jae-in, would catalyze much-needed changes beyond the realm of economic reform. Moon was given a strong mandate to restore public trust in the government, and his pitch for a more just society resonated broadly. But to implement that vision, his administration often took a blunt interventionist approach that only exacerbated labor market rigidities, regulatory burdens, and social polarization. Even before the pandemic, job creation in the private sector had at one point ground to a near-total halt. Housing prices soared, wealth and income inequality rose, and growth expectations worsened.
The most recent election, held last year, pitted Lee Jae-myung, a popular candidate of Moon’s party who vowed to fight social inequities with progressive policies, against the right-wing opposition candidate Yoon Suk-yeol. That Yoon managed to eke out a narrow victory over Lee is a testament to the depth of voters’ economic dissatisfaction and anger at the then ruling party. Yoon, for his part, has pledged to revitalize the economy by rolling back outdated regulations and reforming the labor market, public pensions, and higher education. But he lacks a majority in parliament and his first year in office has been marred by missteps, scandal, and controversy, frustrating initial hopes that he might unify an increasingly polarized electorate.
The travails of Yoon and of his predecessors underscore a sobering new political reality. South Korea’s supercharged exports once offset or at the very least masked policy mistakes and social fault lines at home. That balm and binding glue is gone in an era of slow growth. Instead, the stakes are higher than ever for the government to get economic policy right—and even if it does, the painful adjustments this will entail will bring social and political discontent of its own. The country needs reform-minded and bold leadership that can transcend the political divide. Perhaps, then, South Korea’s best hope is that a future generation of politicians lives up to that task.
- JAEJOON WOO is Associate Professor of Economics at DePaul University and former Chief Korea Economist at Bank of America Merrill Lynch.
Foreign Affairs · by Jaejoon Woo · May 17, 2023
11. S Korea must prepare for a Taiwan war: ex-official
Tue, May 16, 2023 page2
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/05/16/2003799876
S Korea must prepare for a Taiwan war: ex-official
‘INEVITABLE’: In the event of a war with China, North Korea could launch partial attacks, so South Korea needs to strengthen its missile defenses, the ex-official said
- By Chen Cheng-liang and William Hetherington / Staff reporter, with staff reporter
-
-
- South Korea would inevitably be drawn into a potential war in the Taiwan Strait, so it must take steps to prepare and prevent war from breaking out, a former South Korean official said on Friday last week.
- The US plans to send a submarine equipped with nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula as a deterrent against a nuclear attack by North Korea, US President Joe Biden said during a visit to the White House by South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol on March 26.
- Former South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs official Lee Yong-jun said the submarine would also have important implications for the US’ ability to respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan, South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo reported on Friday last week.
South Korean and US soldiers watch a joint drill between South Korea and the US in Pocheon, northeast of Seoul, on April 26, 2017.
- Photo: AFP
- The Ohio-class nuclear submarine could be equipped with 192 nuclear warheads — nearly half of the total number of nuclear warheads that China has — including the Trident-2 nuclear missile, which has an accuracy of within 100m, he said.
- “Each of those warheads is 32 times stronger than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in World War II, meaning a fully equipped Ohio-class submarine is a threat equivalent to 6,000 times that bomb,” he said.
- “Within three to five minutes it could turn every major Chinese city into scorched earth,” he said.
- Having such a powerful US arsenal so close to China’s shores would leave the Chinese leadership feeling helpless, he said.
- “But this is largely China’s own fault. This is the price China should pay for allowing and supporting North Korea’s nuclear weapons development over the past 30 years, obstructing international sanctions, and helping North Korea complete its nuclear armament,” he said.
- Many people believe that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) would attempt an invasion of Taiwan within the next few years, and if that happens, the US would inevitably be drawn into the conflict, and Japan would most likely assist the US, he said.
- Those assumptions were evidenced by a number of factors including the US’ acquisition of bases in the Philippines, US aid packages to Taiwan for defensive weapons and Japan’s arming of uninhabited islands in Okinawa Prefecture, he said.
- In the event of a war, the US and its allies would provide large-scale military assistance to Taiwan, and the US would completely block trade and financial transactions with China, he said.
- “In that scenario, it would be very difficult for South Korea to only provide humanitarian aid to Taiwan, as it did during the Ukrainian war, or to remain on the sidelines,” he said.
- “US troops stationed in South Korea may be transferred to the Taiwan front at that time, and North Korea may be incited to take military action,” he said, adding that South Korea would be unable to escape the possible diplomatic, military and economic repercussions of the war.
- A Russian defeat in the Ukraine war would greatly weaken China’s will to invade Taiwan, Lee said, adding that the South Korean government should provide greater support to Ukraine’s defense.
- South Korea and its allies must continue to articulate their opposition to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, he said.
- “Since a Chinese attack on Taiwan may instigate North Korea to launch a partial missile attack, South Korea’s missile defense network should be greatly strengthened,” he said.
- South Korean companies should also readjust their trade with and investment in China in advance of such a conflict, as sanctions on China would make such trade impossible, he said.
12. Why South Korean women don’t date, marry or birth
This is a national security issue for the ROK and the alliance. It is one of the causes driving a reduction in the size of the ROK military.
Why South Korean women don’t date, marry or birth
Gender war driven by sex crimes, unemployment and soaring cost of living as ‘N-Po’ generation gives up on trying to match their forebears
asiatimes.com · by Min Joo Lee · May 16, 2023
South Korea finds itself embroiled in an all-out gender war – and it keeps getting worse. The animosity between Korean men and women has reached a point where some women are outright refusing to date, marry and have kids with men – a phenomenon known as the 4B movement.
As a Korean feminist scholar living in the US, I’ve followed this gender war from afar as I conducted research on contemporary Korean gender politics. However, I also became embroiled in it myself after my research on Korean masculinity was published by CNN.
The article described foreign women who traveled to Korea after becoming enamored of the idea of dating Korean men from watching Korean television dramas. I pointed out that since the tourists’ fantasies were based on fictional characters, some of them ended up disappointed with the Korean men they dated in real life.
The article was about racial politics and the masculine ideals. But some Korean readers thought that I was simply criticizing Korean men for not being romantic and handsome enough. One enraged Korean man commented that I was an “ugly feminist.”
But this was tame in comparison to what women living in South Korea have endured in recent years.
Misogyny and backlash
Over the past couple of decades, there have been flash points in this gender war.
In 2010, Ilbe, a right-wing website that traffics in misogyny, started attracting users who peppered the forums with vulgar posts about women.
Then in 2015, an online extremist feminist group named Megalia arose. Its goal was to fight back by demeaning Korean men in ways that mirrored the rhetoric on sites like Ilbe.
A year later, a man who had professed his hatred of women murdered a random woman in a public bathroom near a Seoul subway station. He was eventually sentenced to decades in prison, but the lines were quickly drawn.
On one side were feminists, who saw misogyny as the underlying motive. On the other side were men who claimed that it was merely the isolated actions of a mentally ill man. The two groups violently clashed during competing protests at the site of the murder.
However, none of these events have elicited as much public controversy as the steep rise in digital sex crimes. These are newer forms of sexual violence facilitated by technology: revenge porn; upskirting, which refers to surreptitiously snapping photos under women’s skirts in public; and the use of hidden cameras to film women having sex or undressing.
In 2018, there were 2,289 reported cases of digital sex crimes; in 2021, the number snowballed to 10,353.
In 2019, there were two major incidents that involved digital sex crimes. In one, a number of male K-pop stars were indicted for filming and circulating videos of women in group chatrooms without their consent.
A few months later, Koreans were shocked to learn about what became known as the “Nth Room Incident,” during which hundreds of perpetrators – mostly men – committed digital sex crimes on dozens of women and minors.
They tended to target poorer women – sex workers, or women who wanted to make a few bucks by sharing anonymous nude photos of themselves.
The perpetrators either hacked into their social media accounts or approached these women and offered them money, but asked for their personal information so they could transmit the funds. Once they obtained this information, they blackmailed the women by threatening to reveal their sex work and their nudes to their friends and family.
Since sex work and posting nude images of yourself online are illegal in Korea, the women, fearing arrest or being ostracized by friends and family, complied with the perpetrators’ demands to send even more compromising images of themselves. The men would then swap these images in chatrooms.
Protests erupted in Seoul in July 2019 after women were drugged and sexually abused at a popular nightclub partly owned by the K-Pop star Seungri. Photo: Jean Chung / Getty Images / The Conversation
And yet a 2019 survey conducted by the Korean government found that large swaths of the population blamed women for these sex crimes: 52% said that they believed sexual violence occurs because women wear revealing clothes, while 37% thought if women experienced sexual assault while drunk, they are partly to blame for their victimization.
In other words, a significant percentage of the Korean population believes that female sexuality is the problem – not the sexual violence.
Government policy lays the groundwork
Digital sex crimes are too widespread to lay the blame at the feet of a handful of bad actors. To me, part of the problem stems from the long history of “gendered citizenship.”
Korean feminist scholar Seungsook Moon has written about the ways in which the government created one track for men and another for women as the country sought to modernize in the second half of the 20th century:
“Men were mobilized for mandatory military service and then, as conscripts, utilized as workers and researchers in the industrializing economy. Women were consigned to lesser factory jobs, and their roles as members of the modern nation were defined largely in terms of biological reproduction and household management.”
Although these policies are no longer officially carried out, the underlying attitudes about gender roles remain embedded in Korean life and culture. Women who veer from being mothers and housewives expose themselves to public and private backlash.
The government has created gender quotas in certain industries to try to unravel this system of gendered citizenship.
For instance, some government jobs have minimum gender quotas for new hires, and the government encourages the private sector to implement similar policies. In historically male-dominant industries, such as construction, there are quotas for female hires, while in historically female-dominant industries, such as education, there are male quotas.
In some ways, this has only made things worse. Each gender feels as if the other is receiving special treatment due to these affirmative action policies. Resentment festers.
‘The generation that has given up’
Today, the sense of competition between young men and women is exacerbated by the soaring cost of living and rampant unemployment.
Called the “N-Po Generation,” which roughly translates as “the generation that has given up,” many young South Koreans don’t think they can achieve certain milestones that previous generations took for granted: marriage, having kids, finding a job, owning a home and even friendships.
Members of South Korea’s Women’s Party campaign ahead of the 2020 election. Though the party didn’t win any races, it marked the first time a feminist party sought seats in the National Assembly. Photo: Jung Yeon-Je / AFP via Getty Images / The Conversation
Although all genders find themselves discouraged, the act of “giving up” has caused more problems for women. Men see women who forgo marriage and having kids as selfish. And when they then try to compete against men for jobs, some men become incensed.
Many of the men who have become radicalized commit digital sex crimes to take revenge on women who, in their view, have abandoned their duties.
Ultimately, the competitive dynamic created by the Korean government’s embrace of gendered citizenship has stoked the virulent gender war between Korean men and women, with digital sex crimes used as ammunition.
The 4B movement, whereby Korean women forego heterosexual dating, marriage, and childbirth, represents a radical escalation of the gender war by seeking to create an online and offline world devoid of men. Rather than engaging in altercations, these women are refusing to interact with men, period.
Digital sex crimes are a global problem
To be sure, digital sex crimes are not unique to Korea.
When I teach my college class on digital sex crimes in the US, I’m surprised by how many of my students admit that they’ve been victims of digital sex crimes, or knew of it happening at their high schools.
And at the National Women’s Studies Association’s annual conference in 2022, I watched feminist activists and scholars from all over the world present their findings about digital sex crimes back home.
Since each country has its own cultural context for the rise in digital sex crimes, there isn’t a single solution to solve the problems. But in South Korea, continuing to unravel the system of gendered citizenship could be part of the solution.
Min Joo Lee, Postdoctoral Fellow, Indiana University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
asiatimes.com · by Min Joo Lee · May 16, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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