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Quotes of the Day:
“The world is full of frightened little children. Being frightened, they frighten each other. Try to understand.”
– William Saroyan
“The library book had been burning a hole in his rucksack; at Oklahoma City he noticed a postal box at the freight depot and, on impulse, dropped the book into it. After he had mailed it, he had a twinge of worry that he might have given a clue to his whereabouts which would get back to Montgomery, but he suppressed the worry – the book had to be returned. Vagrancy in the eyes of the law had not worried him, nor trespass, nor impersonating a licensed teamster – but filching a book was a sin.”
– Robert A. Heinlein – Starman Jones
"There are three ways of arriving at an opinion on any subject. The first is to believe what one is told; the second is to disbelieve it; in the third is to examine the matter for oneself. The overwhelming majority of mankind practise the first method; of the remainder, the overwhelming majority practise the second; only an infinitesimal remnant practise the third."
– Bertrand Russell
1. N. Korea's Kim could face war crime probe for supporting Russia's war against Ukraine
2. N. Korea's Kim pays tribute to prominent military figure
3. Military says N. Korea likely received Russian support for air-to-air missiles
4. The South Korea-US Alliance Is Due for an Overhaul
5. As U.S. tariffs loom, South Korea talks quietly, Japan talks tough
6. Why Lee Jae-myung praised Park Chung Hee on the campaign trail
7. Timeline of North Korea-Russia Cooperation Since 2022
8. Ministry of Unification: “North Korea Replaces ‘Tongilgak’ Signboard with ‘Panmun-gwan’”
9. North Korea supplies 'portable radio detectors' to the Ministry of State Security
10. Pyongyang-Moscow Ties Are a Force Multiplier to Pyongyang-Beijing Relations
11. Recalibrating US Strategy on North Korea
12. N. Korean parents spend rice money on uniforms as state-supplied clothing falls short
13. N. Korean official ousted for falsifying rice reserve reports
14. North-China Border 1,000km Journey by a North Korean Defector and Fourth-Generation Korean-Japanese (1): To the Closest Point to My Ancestral Land, North Korea
1. N. Korea's Kim could face war crime probe for supporting Russia's war against Ukraine
Perhaps he and Putin can have adjoining cells on Alcatraz.
N. Korea's Kim could face war crime probe for supporting Russia's war against Ukraine | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · May 19, 2025
By Park Boram
SEOUL, May 19 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un could face a war crime probe at the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) for supporting Russia's war against Ukraine, a former chief of the ICC said Monday, adding that it is the right time for Kim to be brought to justice.
Song Sang-hyun, former president of the ICC, made the remarks at an international conference in Seoul, as North Korea confirmed for the first time last month that it has deployed troops to Russia to support Moscow's war against Ukraine.
Kim has not yet been referred to the ICC despite his human rights violations in North Korea, but legal standards have been met now for Ukraine to pursue a case against him at the ICC over the North's assistance in the Russia-Ukraine war, the former ICC president noted.
"The time is right to bring Kim Jong-un before the ICC," Song said in his keynote speech at the event, adding that Pyongyang's military assistance to Russia provided Ukraine with the legal standards to file a complaint against North Korea as a victim.
"There is an opportunity for Ukrainian authorities, as the victim, to file a complaint against North Korea with the ICC," Song said. "While a complaint filed by Ukraine would be very ideal, the ICC also has the authority to initiate an independent investigation."
In March 2023, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin over suspected war crimes connected to Russia's war against Ukraine.
Since late last year, North Korea has deployed thousands of troops to fight alongside Russian forces in the war, with Pyongyang and Moscow officially confirming the troop deployment last month.
Without a statute of limitations, an ICC arrest warrant requires the accused to "carry the stigma for their entire life" and imposes "significant psychological punishment" by prohibiting them from setting foot in 124 ICC member countries, Song noted.
He also urged the ICC to respond more actively to war crimes committed by the North Korean leadership and their accomplices.
This undated photo from the Russian news agency Tass shows North Korean troops engaged in military training from Russian instructors. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · May 19, 2025
2. N. Korea's Kim pays tribute to prominent military figure
Groomed Kim for leadership? Of course Jang Song Taek also groomed him. But his remains were burned and scattered (after the 14.5 MM anti-aircraft gun execution) so Kim cannot visit him. So I guess Hyon Chol-hae did the better job in grooming.
N. Korea's Kim pays tribute to prominent military figure | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · May 19, 2025
SEOUL, May 19 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has paid respects at the tomb of Hyon Chol-hae, who is known to have played a key role in grooming him for leadership, to mark the third anniversary of his death, the North's state media reported Monday.
Kim visited the Patriotic Martyrs Cemetery in Sinmi-ri the previous day and laid a flower to mark the third anniversary of Hyon's death, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.
Hyon, marshal of the Korean People's Army, died at 87 on May 19, 2022. He is known to have played a key role in assisting Kim Jong-il, the father of the current leader, in consolidating control over the military and in preparing Kim Jong-un as his successor.
In 2022, North Korea held a state funeral for Hyon, chaired by Kim Jong-un. Kim also visited Hyon's tomb on the first and second anniversaries of his death.
"Still vivid in my memory is Comrade Hyon Chol-hae, who was always with General Kim Jong-il. He was a shadow of the great General," Kim was quoted as saying by the KCNA.
"He will live forever in our minds, always reminding us of the era of Kim Jong-il and encouraging us in our sacred struggle for a great victory."
This file photo, published by the Korean Central News Agency, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un laying a flower at the Patriotic Martyrs Cemetery in Sinmi-ri on May 19, 2024, to commemorate the second anniversary of Hyon Chol-hae's death. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · May 19, 2025
3. Military says N. Korea likely received Russian support for air-to-air missiles
Of course they did.
Military says N. Korea likely received Russian support for air-to-air missiles | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · May 19, 2025
By Lee Minji
SEOUL, May 19 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's military on Monday raised the possibility that North Korea received technological assistance from Russia in developing a new air-to-air missile following the North's test of the weapon last week.
On Saturday, the North's state media reported North Korean leader Kim Jong-un oversaw anti-air combat and air raid drills by an air force flight group earlier in the week, unveiling what appeared to be a live-fire drill involving a new air-to-air missile launched from a MiG-29 fighter jet.
"We believe there is an association," Col. Lee Sung-jun, spokesperson for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), told a regular press briefing, when asked whether the North received arms and advanced technology from Russia in exchange for its troop deployment.
Lee said, however, that further analysis is necessary to determine the extent and scope of Russia's possible technological assistance.
North Korea's air force conducts anti-air combat and air raid drills, attended by leader Kim Jong-un, on May 15, 2025, in this photo released by the Korean Central News Agency two days later. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
The JCS official added that it will likely take "considerable" time for the North to deploy such weapons systems for combat use.
"There have been many cases in which the North attempted to deceive or exaggerate... issues in securing parts and material have led to delays in deployment," he said. "We believe the weapons systems will also take considerable time (to be operational)."
South Korea is seeking to develop its own air-to-air missile system, with defense authorities aiming to complete a research project to build a short-range air-to-air missile system by 2032 and deploy it by 2035.
The North's latest drills came as Kim has been highlighting the importance of modernizing conventional weapons as he recently made a series of public visits to military units and munitions factories and emphasized stronger war preparations.
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · May 19, 2025
4. The South Korea-US Alliance Is Due for an Overhaul
Needless to say I strongly disagree with my friend Clint the ROK/US Combined Forces Command but I also agree that the alliance should always be evolving and adapting..
I think the ROK/US CFC is of critical importance to the Alliance. I do think the key way forward is to complete the simple final aspect of OPCON transition and putting a ROK General Officer in command of CFC. I think it is imperative that a ROK GO leads CFC for a number of reasons, the most important ones being that the military must ultimately support the political process of unification. And second is that the US cannot afford to allow the perception that it is occupying the northern part of Korea - we cannot afford the appearance of another Iraq and Afghanistan. But we still need to commit US forces to CFC and ensure that the combined command operates at the highest level of proficiency which requires contributions from both militaries and both nations.
Excerpts:
Seoul and Washington should examine whether a future combined command structure, with a South Korean commander and a U.S. deputy commander, is consonant with the political tenor of the times. Put simply, a U.S. deputy commander is not America First. U.S. and South Korean officials may need to return to a parallel command concept, as was the case in the mid-2000s, opting for ROK OPCON over its own military and avoiding placing U.S. forces under OPCON of a South Korean commander, an arrangement that would face a very skeptical audience in Washington.
If Washington desires greater flexibility for U.S. forces on the peninsula yet also aims to retain its presence to support South Korea while Seoul takes the lead role in deterring North Korea, a return to a parallel arrangement may be necessary. The process would also require Seoul to continue building up its strategic command, alongside ongoing efforts to deep conventional-nuclear integration within the alliance. In addition, South Korea would have to think hard about how taking a lead role on the peninsula requires more coordination with Japan’s defense authorities and U.S. Forces Japan’s emerging joint force headquarters.
To be fair, these efforts could face confounding countercurrents depending on whether Washington and Seoul reestablish positive engagement with Pyongyang. Trump indicated he may be interested in doing so, and candidate Lee has made it a priority, even saying that Washington “will have to improve its relationship with North Korea” to contain China. That said, North Korea has agency. Diplomacy is not entirely dependent upon Seoul and Washington’s actions and entreaties, despite what some South Korean progressives argue.
However, in all these efforts, U.S. officials would be advised to seek buy-in from their South Korean counterparts. As history and current sensitivities show, that will be immensely difficult. U.S. officials must insist on alliance transformation, but they can best achieve U.S. objectives by bringing South Korea into the process early and often. If not, the changes would become politicized in a manner that threatens the underlying health of the alliance, which could significantly undermine U.S. interests in the region.
The South Korea-US Alliance Is Due for an Overhaul
At a time of growing U.S.-China competition, the purpose of the alliance is once again becoming a subject of debate.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/the-south-korea-us-alliance-is-due-for-an-overhaul/?utm_
By Clint Work
May 19, 2025
U.S. Army Command Sgt. Maj. Jack Love, U.S. Forces Korea Senior Enlisted Advisor (right), along with U.S and ROK senior leaders, pose inside an AAVP-7A1 Amphibious Assault Vehicle during the Ulchi Freedom Shield Battlefield Circulation, Aug. 22, 2024.
Credit: U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Xavier Legarreta
American and South Korean officials often describe the Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. alliance as ironclad, with both allies working in lockstep on their combined defense posture. While nice sounding, such truisms will soon be tested.
From the secretary of defense to military commanders in the region, U.S. authorities increasingly characterize Indo-Pacific alliances and U.S. forces stationed on allied territory – like United States Forces Korea (USFK) – as critical to deterring and, if need be, contesting China. However, policymakers across South Korea’s highly partisan political spectrum do not welcome the expansion of USFK’s role beyond deterring and defending against North Korea, nor the increased expectations such a change would invariably place upon Seoul and the alliance.
Given this existing tension, the Trump administration must engage the next South Korean administration, due to come into office on June 4, on several issues, including how to recalibrate USFK’s force posture to cover peninsula deterrence alongside addressing shared regional priorities, evolve the alliance’s combined command structure for Seoul to take a lead role, and align (or at least deconflict) Seoul and Washington’s respective understandings of their mutual defense obligations.
Recent Signals Raise Concerns in Seoul
The Pentagon and regional commanders have sent clear signals about U.S. intentions. In both the “Interim National Defense Guidance” and Statement on the Development of the 2025 National Defense Strategy, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth made it abundantly clear that U.S. force posture and alliances in the region must prioritize deterring China as the sole pacing threat, and denying China’s seizure of Taiwan as its sole pacing scenario.
Furthermore, in recent public testimony, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) Commander Adm. Samuel J. Paparo and Gen. Xavier T. Brunson, commander of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command (CFC), and USFK, revealed “an unprecedented level of synchronization and strategic integration” between INDOPACOM and USFK. More than previous commanders, Brunson highlighted the fact that U.S. forces on the peninsula posed dilemmas for and could impose costs on multiple adversaries, including China, Russia, and North Korea, with particular emphasis on the areas around the peninsula.
Additionally, Brunson emphasized that the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty “commits both nations to provide mutual aid if either faces an external armed attack, but it does not specifically name an adversary.”
Mutual defense obligations in Article III of the treaty apply in the event of “an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties.” An “armed attack” could come from anywhere, and the “Pacific area” extends well beyond the Korean Peninsula, presumably including U.S. bases and facilities throughout the region. While Brunson thus gave a seemingly innocuous literal reading of the treaty – mirroring mutual defense obligations in the original NATO charter – neither South Korean policymakers nor the general South Korean public embrace it.
Japan has reportedly leaned into the shift in U.S. signals. Last month, Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani laid out a “one theater” concept encompassing the East and South China Seas, the Korean Peninsula, and surrounding areas as a single “theater” for wartime operations. Seoul has responded differently. South Koreans have raised concerns about whether USFK will be reduced or repurposed for off-peninsula operations. The South Korean Defense Ministry denied that any such changes in USFK’s role are underway or that it has been asked by U.S. counterparts to clarify Seoul’s role and commitment in a potential military conflict in the Indo-Pacific region involving China.
Many in South Korea raised similar concerns in response to comments by Elbridge Colby, now the under secretary of defense for policy, who has been tasked by Hegseth to begin development of the 2025 National Defense Strategy. In the run-up to the 2024 U.S. presidential election, Colby – who was then out of government – argued that USFK needed an overhaul to make it more relevant to handling China-related contingencies rather than being held “hostage” to countering North Korean challenges.
South Korea’s progressive national security commentators – long inclined to preserve the nation’s autonomy in relation to U.S. regional strategy and avoid choosing between Washington and Beijing – have been critical of what they view as contradictory and unilateral U.S. signals, which demand more from Seoul while appearing to reduce the U.S. commitment and sidestep allied consultation. Others have called Japan’s one theater concept “unacceptable.”
To be sure, there are a range of nuanced perspectives within South Korea’s foreign policy and national security establishment, including in the progressive camp. Yet if progressive candidate Lee Jae-myung wins South Korea’s presidential election on June 3 – an outcome that appears likely – such views will more directly impact policy outcomes.
Past as Prelude?
Despite Brunson’s literal reading of the treaty, Seoul has long viewed its own and U.S. mutual defense obligations in the treaty – and USFK – as confined to the Korean Peninsula.
South Korean leaders – conservatives particularly – have often sought an upgrade of mutual defense obligations but in the opposite direction: namely, a more automatic and concrete U.S. commitment to the peninsula. Many conservatives want a U.S. imprimatur for robust retaliation against North Korean provocations. In his campaign platform, Kim Moon-soo, the presidential candidate for the conservative People Power Party, said he would pursue a “nuclear attack protection clause” in the mutual defense treaty, the latest iteration of this tendency.
South Korean progressives, while hardly abjuring the U.S. commitment, often push back against overt demonstrations of U.S. military power, lest it undermine engagement with Pyongyang, and bristle against expanding mutual obligations – or the USFK’s operation – beyond Korea, lest it offend China or entrap Seoul in a regional conflict (i.e., over Taiwan). Conservatives, while more willing to rhetorically lean into U.S. regional strategy and draw linkages between the peninsula and regional contingencies, are no less concerned about entrapment and tend to see the USFK’s expanded aperture as a step toward abandonment.
These discordant currents of South Korean thought played out in the early and mid-2000s. In the context of the U.S. Global Posture Review and Iraq war, the Bush administration – and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in particular – aimed to reduce and realign static, heavily concentrated Cold War-era force deployments, like those in South Korea. Rumsfeld sought greater mobility for U.S. forces on the peninsula and strategic flexibility off it to deploy those forces elsewhere, whether to Iraq or to address a regional contingency.
While passing key military missions to South Korea, the Pentagon aimed to evolve the alliance’s combined command structure so that the South Koreans would take the lead in their own defense, with the United States providing a supporting role. This included transitioning wartime operational control (OPCON) of the ROK military from the United States to South Korea. Both sides agreed to dissolve the bilateral combined command into separate, parallel (yet interlinked) national commands. The parallel construct would avoid placing U.S. forces under the OPCON of a ROK commander, which would not fly back in Washington given the politically controversial optics.
For its part, the progressive Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003-2008) eagerly sought a more equal alliance and greater self-reliance, and strenuously pushed OPCON transition to regain South Korean sovereignty. However, some Roh administration officials feared U.S. force realignments were a prelude to U.S. preemptive strikes against North Korea. The progressive camp felt that North Korean nuclear weapons were not really a threat to the South, and engagement would temper the threat anyway, further enabling Seoul to handle the bulk of the defense burden.
Meanwhile, while the Roh administration agreed in principle with strategic flexibility, it also insisted any off-peninsula U.S. deployment to a regional contingency would require consultation and South Korean agreement beforehand. In short, sending forces to the Middle East was acceptable, but involving USFK – and by extension South Korea – in a fight with China was not.
Officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Treaties Bureau pointed to Article IV of the treaty, which states the ROK “grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement,” as a legal obstacle to USFK’s flexibility elsewhere. Both sides eventually came to an “understanding” on strategic flexibility in 2006, yet it was actually an artful diplomatic agreement to disagree.
South Korean conservatives, viewing such changes as harbingers of a dissolution of the alliance, responded apoplectically and opposed Roh at every turn, erecting political obstacles to the changes described above. As it turned out, U.S. and South Koreans officials soon delayed or significantly altered each policy. With a shift to conservative political leadership in Seoul, the Bush administration stopped further troop reductions in 2008, stating that U.S. forces would remain at 28,500. In a context of growing North Korea aggression, concerns about China’s rise, and the U.S. pivot, mention of strategic flexibility in alliance statements first was revised – to signify U.S. forces flexibly deploying to the peninsula, not away from it – and then disappeared entirely.
Finally, U.S. and South Korean officials agreed to delay OPCON transition a couple of times, to ditch the parallel command concept for a return to the existing combined command structure under CFC, and to adopt more strenuous conditions before completing the transition. In short, this period raised various questions about alliance transformation, which neither side has been able to fully address. These questions are now becoming salient again.
Past Echoes in a Transformed Present
Present trends indicate elements of those earlier debates may soon reemerge. To be clear, unlike in that earlier period, current U.S. policy does not entail a reduction of U.S. forces. Indeed, the 28,500 U.S. service members on the peninsula are not a ceiling but a “manpower floor,” according to Brunson. Furthermore, Hegseth has directed the secretary of the army to increase the U.S. Army’s forward presence in the Indo-Pacific by expanding pre-positioned stocks, rotational deployments, and exercises with allies and partners to enhance strategic access, basing, and overflight. If anything, this implies the potential for increasing force deployments or at least enhancing capabilities, such as long-range fires or enhanced aerial assets, on the peninsula.
Such capabilities may assuage abandonment concerns, yet they also raise difficult cost-sharing questions and fears of entanglement since they range well beyond Pyongyang. U.S. forces and assets on the peninsula are increasingly folded into broader INDOPACOM planning, with deterring China foremost in mind, reawakening the strategic flexibility debate.
In the early 2000s, the debate about USFK’s strategic flexibility was ultimately more hypothetical and involved meeting demands well beyond Northeast Asia. Today’s discourse on the issue centers in the Indo-Pacific in the context of a potential Taiwan conflict. Also, compared to the early 2000s, adversaries and threats are more interconnected. Strategic demands on the United States to integrate its force posture and defense infrastructure in the region are more urgent. And the need to call on allied support is greater than ever before, as are U.S. allies’ capabilities to meet the call.
However, U.S. and South Korean officials have not discussed in much detail or depth how to navigate a Taiwan conflict and the added risk of a simultaneous conflict in Korea, despite former (and now disgraced) President Yoon Suk-yeol having been outspoken in linking peace and stability around Taiwan with the Korean Peninsula. Yoon’s most likely successor, Lee Jae-myung, has openly questioned the linkage, and members of Lee’s Democratic Party proposed legislation to bar ROK forces from being used in a Taiwan contingency and pushed back against USFK’s strategic flexibility. Ironically, while certain U.S. officials increasingly link the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan to argue that U.S. forces on the former should not be restricted from supporting operations around the latter, this ends up reiterating an either-or distinction between them. It is a false dichotomy.
Fortunately, both U.S. and South Korean analysis has begun to dig into the complex linkages between Korea and a Taiwan conflict. For one, simplistic conceptions about USFK’s strategic flexibility – which is to say, the deployment of some units from the peninsula to a Taiwan conflict and then back again – miss the point. USFK’s current posture and mission make it ill-suited to support off-peninsular contingencies. More problematic, U.S. forces normally apportioned in operational plans for a Korean conflict would be diverted in the event of a Taiwan contingency, thus creating a deterrence vacuum on and around the peninsula the U.S. and ROK military would have to fill.
Moreover, strategic flexibility is overly crisis-oriented, centered as it is around a plausible if still hypothetical Taiwan conflict. Rather than transforming USFK into a flexible expeditionary force that flows on and off the peninsula toward a Taiwan conflict – which is often how it is reported – more thought should be put into how U.S. forces and the alliance can be bolstered now, in peacetime, to help to fill the gap between Northeast Asia and Taiwan. This should translate into more serious discussions about third-party intervention scenarios on and around the peninsula and maintaining trilateral U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation. If Washington and Seoul disagree on how to navigate these issues, they must talk about it.
To be sure, a not insignificant number of progressive foreign policy and national security experts are well aware of the challenge China poses. The next South Korean president must grapple with Beijing’s increased maritime assertiveness in the West/Yellow Sea, which tracks with its previous behavior in the East and South China seas. And the idea that North Korea’s nuclear weapons do not target Seoul – considering Kim Jong Un’s suite of short-range capabilities and tactical nukes, 2022 nuclear policy law, and the historic shift on inter-Korean relations – is far less compelling a notion than it once (if ever) was. Meanwhile, Kim’s firm embrace of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the upgraded North Korea-Russia ties only amplify the complexities Seoul faces.
Candidate Lee has adopted a pragmatic foreign policy stance. On the one hand, he has echoed past progressive leaders’ arguments about engaging Pyongyang, resetting relations with Beijing and Moscow, and striking a more balanced – even hedging – foreign policy. On the other hand, he has noted that the South Korea-U.S. alliance is “the foundation” of his country’s foreign policy and that Seoul “must engage in security cooperation with the U.S. and Japan.” Only time, and the advisers Lee appoints to key positions if elected, will tell how campaign statements translate into policy.
When it comes to OPCON transition – another way to shift a greater burden to Seoul – the Trump administration may have a ready partner in Lee. He pushed to complete the process when running against Yoon in the 2022 presidential election and has made it part of his current campaign platform. Experts in Seoul expect the OPCON issue to quickly reemerge.
The current bilaterally agreed upon Condition-based Wartime Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP) requires South Korea to acquire certain capabilities and demonstrate it can lead a combined fight, and for the environment around the peninsula to be conducive to OPCON transition. While the final condition is broad and political – and served to delay the process in the past – the political winds in Washington and Seoul may soon align to shift momentum forward.
Before his appointment, Colby said the current environment, considering competition with China and South Korea’s robust capabilities, was conducive to OPCON transfer. In his confirmation hearing, he more circumspectly noted that he “would need to review this delicate issue carefully” but added that Trump’s vision of foreign policy “involves empowering capable and willing allies like South Korea, and thus I support efforts to bolster South Korea’s role in the alliance.”
Seoul and Washington should examine whether a future combined command structure, with a South Korean commander and a U.S. deputy commander, is consonant with the political tenor of the times. Put simply, a U.S. deputy commander is not America First. U.S. and South Korean officials may need to return to a parallel command concept, as was the case in the mid-2000s, opting for ROK OPCON over its own military and avoiding placing U.S. forces under OPCON of a South Korean commander, an arrangement that would face a very skeptical audience in Washington.
If Washington desires greater flexibility for U.S. forces on the peninsula yet also aims to retain its presence to support South Korea while Seoul takes the lead role in deterring North Korea, a return to a parallel arrangement may be necessary. The process would also require Seoul to continue building up its strategic command, alongside ongoing efforts to deep conventional-nuclear integration within the alliance. In addition, South Korea would have to think hard about how taking a lead role on the peninsula requires more coordination with Japan’s defense authorities and U.S. Forces Japan’s emerging joint force headquarters.
To be fair, these efforts could face confounding countercurrents depending on whether Washington and Seoul reestablish positive engagement with Pyongyang. Trump indicated he may be interested in doing so, and candidate Lee has made it a priority, even saying that Washington “will have to improve its relationship with North Korea” to contain China. That said, North Korea has agency. Diplomacy is not entirely dependent upon Seoul and Washington’s actions and entreaties, despite what some South Korean progressives argue.
However, in all these efforts, U.S. officials would be advised to seek buy-in from their South Korean counterparts. As history and current sensitivities show, that will be immensely difficult. U.S. officials must insist on alliance transformation, but they can best achieve U.S. objectives by bringing South Korea into the process early and often. If not, the changes would become politicized in a manner that threatens the underlying health of the alliance, which could significantly undermine U.S. interests in the region.
Authors
Guest Author
Clint Work
Dr. Clint Work is a fellow for Northeast Asia at the Center for Strategy and Military Power (CSMP), Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University (NDU). The views expressed here are his own.
5. As U.S. tariffs loom, South Korea talks quietly, Japan talks tough
As U.S. tariffs loom, South Korea talks quietly, Japan talks tough
Seoul, Tokyo send different messages at APEC trade forum
washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon
By - The Washington Times - Friday, May 16, 2025
SEOUL, South Korea — As trade chiefs of the 21-member Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum met in Jeju, South Korea, on Friday, Seoul requested the negation of tariffs pending from the Trump administration.
Seoul’s Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun said Friday, after meeting with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, that he had asked the U.S. to exempt South Korea. The country faces 25 percent tariffs on key products, to take effect from July 9.
The two agreed to table discussions next week in Washington and to further talks in June.
Japan and Korea, together with Australia, Britain and India, are the five “preferred nations” prioritized by Washington for tariff agreements.
Japan, which also faces 25 percent tariffs, is more confrontational.
Tokyo officials did not attend Jeju and warn that Japan’s massive holding of U.S. debt is a “card” it can play against Washington.
APEC praises WTO
The Jeju meeting precedes the 2025 APEC leaders summit during which VIPs, including Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Trump, are expected to gather in South Korea in September.
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On Friday, the APEC Ministers Responsible for Trade agreed on a joint statement promoting the role of the World Trade Organization in resolving trade problems. Given the furor caused by U.S. tariffs, that may be a safe play.
The world’s supranational body for trade has faltered in recent years. The WTO’s “Uruguay Round” of talks, from 1986-1994, were the largest global trade talks ever, but its “Doha Round” of 2001 never concluded.
Since then, countries and groups of countries have concluded multiple free trade agreements — implicit criticisms of the shortcomings of the global trade regime.
Some in Washington consider the WTO to have hurled open the global economy’s doors to China. In March, it was reported that the Trump administration had frozen U.S. funding for the body.
Bypassing WTO dispute resolution mechanisms for unfair trade, Washington is deploying tariffs on imports to America on a colossal scale. The aims: To win optimal trade terms for the U.S. and to impel inward investment.
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The shock tactic has shattered confidence and driven nations and agencies to revise economic outlooks downward.
While attention focuses on the fraught U.S. trade relationship with China, tariffs also impact allies.
Officials in 75 countries who have, per the White House, sought to “address the lack of trade reciprocity in our economic relationships and our resulting national and economic security concerns” are working overtime to gain deals before a 90-day grace period, announced by the White House on April 9, expires on July 9.
Among the countries, industrial powerhouses Japan and South Korea have long histories of multibillion-dollar trade surpluses with the United States.
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Negotiations are colored by the fact that both nations are key U.S. security allies; are core nodes in global supply chain; and are major investors and investees with the U.S.
Experts wonder if Trump will actually apply the tariffs, or if they are a huge bluff designed to compel other countries to shift policies.
“Whether he is trying to show some bravado, I think is 50-50,” Kim Yong-jin, a professor of management systems at Seoul’s Sogang University, told foreign reporters. “In all honesty, I think he truly believes that other countries are exploiting the U.S.”
Korea quietly seeks deal
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Seoul and Washington’s talks are expected to flesh out a previously discussed “package deal.” Four areas are in focus: tariff and non-tariff measures; economic security; investment cooperation; and currency policies.
There had been hopes in Seoul that Korean shipbuilders’ potential work on U.S. commercial and military shipping, and it corporation’s roles in the mooted Alaska pipeline, could be included. Indications are they will be discussed separately.
South Korea wants tariffs levied on key exports, including chips autos and steel, to be nixed.
South Korea and the U.S. have a bilateral free trade agreement, the KORUS FTA, signed in 2007 and tweaked under the first Trump administration. However, trade imbalances in South Korea’s favor persist.
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KORUS means tariffs on U.S. exports to Korea are largely voided. Instead, USTR, which issued its “2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers” report in April, found 21 non-tariff barriers impede U.S. exporters in Korea.
These include regulations preventing beef from being sourced from cows older than 30 months, regulatory threats to U.S. digital firms and restrictions on Google Maps.
A standout issue is “offset” demands in defense. Under offset, U.S. arms exporters are required to transfer a certain amount of technology to the buyer.
Seoul, in recent years, has benefited massively from its alliance with the U.S.
Thanks to offset; to the adoption of U.S./NATO-standard weaponry; and to its domestic industrial excellence; the country has emerged as a major exporter of tanks, self-propelled artillery and rocketry, and jet trainer aircraft.
Seoul is taking tariffs seriously.
In Jeju Friday, James Kim, chairman and CEO of U.S. business lobby group AMCHAM Korea, said he sensed “good vibes.” He noted that in recent weeks, Korean bodies have been reaching out in a “Buy America” campaign.
On May 8, the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry agreed with AMCHAM and GM Korea to promote sales of GM cars, made in Korea, to Korean corporate fleets. On May 15, AMCHAM signed an agreement with the Korean Trade-Investment Promotion Agency to push regulatory reform related to 70 non-tariff barriers identified by AMCHAM.
American negotiators said Korea was “proactive” in talks, Mr. Kim said, implying that “they like what the Koreans are doing, despite the political situation.”
Seoul’s low-key stance on tariffs is necessitated by de facto policy paralysis.
Due to the removal from office of President Yoon Suk Yeol after his martial law declaration last December, the nation is in the midst of a presidential election campaign. A new leader, mandated to make major policy decisions, will be voted in on June 3.
Tokyo talks tough
Tokyo has held three rounds of tariff talks with U.S. negotiators. Unlike Seoul, its response is hardening.
Threatened tariffs on cars — Japan is the world’s top automaker — and on rice — a long-protected agricultural staple — appall Tokyo. Rice is especially sensitive, given Upper House elections in July.
Its response — highly unusual for a nation that customarily conducts negotiations with the U.S. at minimal volume — has been vocal.
“I won’t hesitate at all to ask President Trump in person,” about tariffs, “at the most appropriate time and in the most appropriate format, if necessary,” Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba said last month.
“We are seriously concerned about whether the tariff measure is consistent with WTO rules and the Japan-U.S. trade agreement,” Economy, Trade and Industry Minister Yoji Muto said, calling the U.S. initiative “extremely unfortunate” and “against our wishes.”
On May 3, Tokyo turned tough.
Finance Minister Katsunobu Kato called Japanese holdings of $1.3 trillion worth of U.S. Treasuries — Tokyo is the world’s largest overseas buyer of the bonds — a “card on the table” in talks.
If Tokyo liquidated a significant portion of those assets, the value of the dollar would weaken, and the U.S. Federal Reserve would likely have to buy bonds, increasing the national debt, which would become more expensive to service.
Tokyo has also been talking up investments made by Japan Inc. in the U.S.: In cumulative terms, it is the largest national investor.
In what may have been a signal, Japan — and fellow APEC members Australia, Canada, Russia and Singapore - did not send a minister to the Jeju trade talks.
• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.
Copyright © 2025 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.
washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon
6. Why Lee Jae-myung praised Park Chung Hee on the campaign trail
Simple answer. Lee is a pragmatist. I attended an event with a Lee advisor recently (Chatham House Rule) and he said that Lee's pragmatism can be defined as Lee doing and saying what is necessary to get votes. I told him that was the most honest thing I have ever heard anyone say about a politician.
Monday
May 19, 2025
dictionary + A - A
Why Lee Jae-myung praised Park Chung Hee on the campaign trail
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-05-19/national/2025presidential/Why-Lee-Jaemyung-praised-Park-Chung-Hee-on-the-campaign-trail-/2310796
Published: 19 May. 2025, 19:33
Updated: 19 May. 2025, 19:56
- PARK EUN-JEE
- park.eunjee@joongang.co.kr
Korea JoongAng Daily
Why Lee Jae-myung praised Park Chung Hee on the campaign trail
5 min
Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI
Left: Former President Park Chung Hee, who secured a third term, delivers his inaugural address in Seoul on July 1, 1971. Right: Lee Jae-myung, the presidential candidate of the Democratic Party, pays his respects at the grave of former President Park Chung Hee at Seoul National Cemetery on April 28 during his presidential campaign. [PRESIDENTIAL ARCHIVES, LIM HYUN-DONG]
[NEWS ANALYSIS]
Judging by his economic rhetoric and campaign pledges alone, it might be hard to tell the political affiliation of Lee Jae-myung, the Democratic Party (DP) front-runner.
Lee openly credited former President Park Chung Hee for his role in advancing Korea’s industrialization during his campaign last week, stating, “What do ideology or political camps matter? Whether it’s a Park Chung Hee policy or a Kim Dae-jung policy, it doesn’t matter.”
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His remarks mark a clear departure from the platforms of progressive presidents and candidates who distanced themselves from the former president, widely considered a conservative.
On the other hand, Lee has not explicitly mentioned the redistribution of wealth via higher tax on the rich and big corporations — often at the center of liberal campaigns — on the campaign trail. It was notably absent from the latest presidential debate.
Things were different when he ran for president three years ago, when he pledged to distribute a universal basic income: 1 million won ($714) to all citizens 30 and older each year and 2 million won to those 19 to 29.
The rightward shift, experts say, aims to better absorb the center-right base while acknowledging that in the current political climate, universal basic income no longer has the appeal it once did.
Disillusionment of income-led growth
As a left-leaning candidate, Lee has departed from the playbook of past progressive contenders and remained tight-lipped about potential tax increases.
In fact, phrases like inequality or polarization were nowhere to be seen among his top 10 pledges submitted to the National Election Commission.
In the latest debate on May 18, Lee devoted a significant amount of time to addressing low economic growth and a slump in domestic spending.
“Only with growth can there be distribution, and growth without distribution is simply not sustainable,” Lee said while outlining his economic policy.
After the country's GDP contracted 0.2 percent in the January-March period, the unorthodox stance exposes the shortcomings of the income-focused growth strategy that DP-affiliated candidates have advocated in the past.
Security personnel stand guard in Gumi, North Gyeongsang, as Democratic Party presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung holds a campaign rally in the region on May 13. [YONHAP]
“During the 2022 election, basic income was a hallmark of Lee’s campaign,” said Joseph Yi, a political science professor at Hanyang University.
“However, its relative absence today likely reflects both political pragmatism and changing economic circumstances. The policy faced skepticism from fiscal conservatives, and even some within the progressive camp, due to concerns of feasibility and effectiveness. In the contexts of inflation, budget constraints and broader economic uncertainty, Lee appears to be prioritizing more targeted, fiscally cautious proposals,” Yi said in an email interview with the Korea JoongAng Daily.
Former President Moon Jae-in’s vision of income-led growth, which envisioned that hiking the minimum wage would grow the economy, is a case in point.
But the average quarterly GDP growth during Moon’s term stood at 2.3 percent, the lowest among those of past presidents. That of former President Park Geun-hye, Moon’s conservative predecessor, was 3.1 percent.
Critics maintain that the steep hikes in minimum wage ended up burdening smaller merchants and damaging the employment rate after many resorted to layoffs or reducing working hours to cut costs. Advocates claim that the high minimum wage still reduced the gap between higher and lower income brackets.
Instead, Lee put support for AI at the forefront of his economic policy while DP-backed bills aimed at strengthening workplace safety and the rights of unionized workers took a back seat.
Winning conservative voters
Lee’s moves are designed to appeal to conservative voters with left-leaning voters already standing firm to support him.
“Even if Lee presents the policies that appear to favor conservative values, the left-leaning voters — whether staunch or mild — will vote for Lee anyway,” said Jhee Byong-kuen, a political science professor at Chosun University. “What matters is how he will bring those in the right, and his remarks and campaign pledges are intended to win over their hearts.”
Since the DP tends to favor big government principles with higher budgets, tax hikes often fund increased spending.
Lee, however, avoids directly addressing about the possibility of increasing levies and even went a step further to reduce the proportion of income earners exempt from income tax, driving a decline in tax revenue.
“They’re actually talking about tax cuts instead,” said Lee Jun-han, political science professor at Incheon National University. “Likewise, when the economy is struggling, it’s even harder to win an election.”
But Lee's approach has left many scratching their heads, because the candidate has yet to address how he will fund the pledges that require hefty spending.
“I am really curious how we will make his pledges, like creating a 100 trillion won fund for AI, happen,” Jhee said, “A candidate is supposed to address financing measures in campaign pledges submitted to National Election Commission. But I couldn’t figure out his strategy from the statement.”
BY PARK EUN-JEE, YOON SEUNG-JIN [park.eunjee@joongang.co.kr]
7. Timeline of North Korea-Russia Cooperation Since 2022
Please go to the link to view the entire timeline.
Timeline of North Korea-Russia Cooperation Since 2022
May 19, 2025, by Victor Cha and Andy Lim
https://beyondparallel.csis.org/timeline-of-north-korea-russia-cooperation-since-2022/
The war in Ukraine has precipitated a renewed relationship between Russia and North Korea. Driven by Russia’s need for ammunition for the war, and North Korea’s need for food, energy, and military technology, these burgeoning ties pose challenges for the U.S., and its allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region. In Europe, North Korea’s assistance may allow Vladimir Putin to prevail in Ukraine when U.S. support is in question. In Asia, Russian military technology could advance North Korea’s military satellite, nuclear submarine, and ICBM programs.
CSIS Beyond Parallel created a timeline documenting major developments in the growing North Korea-Russia relationship since September 2022.
8. Ministry of Unification: “North Korea Replaces ‘Tongilgak’ Signboard with ‘Panmun-gwan’”
Do not be misled. While the regime says it no longer seeks peaceful unification, it still seeks domination of the entire Korean peninsula. That is why it remains an existential threat to ROK and a global threat because what happens on the Korean peninsula will have global effects.
This is a Google translation of an RFA article.
Ministry of Unification: “North Korea Replaces ‘Tongilgak’ Signboard with ‘Panmun-gwan’”
Seoul-Mokyongjae moky@rfa.org
2025.05.19
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in-focus/2025/05/19/north-korea-unification-signboard-jsa/
The Tongilgak on the North Korean side of Panmunjom where President Moon Jae-in and North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un held a summit in May 2018. (Yonhap)
Anchor: It has been belatedly revealed that the signboard of the North Korean meeting facility, 'Tongilgak' in Panmunjom, has been changed to 'Panmunkwan'. Reporter Mok Yong-jae reports from Seoul.
It has been belatedly confirmed that the name of the North Korean facility in the Joint Security Area (JSA), “Tongilgak,” where major talks and contacts between the South and the North took place, has been changed.
This appears to be in line with General Secretary Kim Jong-un's declaration in late 2023 that inter-Korean relations would be considered hostile to each other.
According to South Korea's Ministry of Unification on the 19th, North Korea removed the signboard for Tongilgak on the northern side of Panmunjom in January of last year. Then, in August of last year, a new signboard with the name "Panmun-gwan" was installed in the place where the "Tongilgak" signboard had been.
These are the words of South Korea's Unification Ministry Spokesperson Koo Byung-sam.
[Koo Byung-sam, Spokesperson for the Ministry of Unification] Regarding that intention, we believe it is part of the North’s push to erase unification based on the theory of two hostile states since last year.
The Tongilgak is a North Korean meeting facility within the JSA, and has been a symbolic location for major exchanges such as working-level talks and summits between the US and North Korea and between the South and the North. In May 2018, former South Korean President Moon Jae-in and General Secretary of the Workers' Party Kim Jong-un held a summit here.
According to South Korea's Ministry of Unification, there have been 376 rounds of talks between the authorities of the two Koreas at Panmunjom to date, of which 96 rounds have been held at Tongilgak.
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“North Korea bans ‘Nice to Meet You’ song of inter-Korean reconciliation”
North Korean Media, People's Artist's Representative Song 'Erasing Unification'
Since General Secretary Kim declared the two hostile nations, North Korea has been reorganizing organizations and institutions related to “unification,” “inter-Korean relations,” and “the nation,” and erasing all traces, including expressions and records.
Recently, it has been reported that North Korean authorities have banned the performance of the song "Bangapseumnida", which includes lyrics such as "Dongpo" and "Unification Day." "Bangapseumnida" is a North Korean song that has been sung without fail whenever inter-Korean exchange events are held.
Additionally, North Korea no longer calls South Korea “South Korea” but rather “Republic of Korea” and treats it as its number one enemy.
From left, People Power Party candidate Kim Moon-soo, Democratic Labor Party candidate Kwon Young-guk, New Reform Party candidate Lee Jun-seok, and Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung, attending the first debate for the 21st presidential election on the 18th.
From left, People Power Party candidate Kim Moon-soo, Democratic Labor Party candidate Kwon Young-guk, New Reform Party candidate Lee Jun-seok, and Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung attending the first debate for the 21st presidential election on the 18th. (Yonhap)
South Korea presidential candidates hold first public debate
Meanwhile, the 21 presidential candidates for South Korea held their first public debate on the 18th ahead of the presidential election to be held on the 3rd of next month.
In the debate held that day, where the candidates announced their pledges in the economic field, they revealed some of their views on the South Korea-U.S. alliance and the North Korean nuclear issue.
Kim Moon-soo, the candidate for South Korea's ruling People Power Party, emphasized that South Korea's foreign policy and response to North Korea's nuclear program must be centered around the South Korea-U.S. alliance.
[People Power Party presidential candidate Kim Moon-soo] Security can only be maintained when we secure the ability to station US troops in Korea, form a double or triple defense barrier to respond to North Korea’s nuclear weapons by joining forces with US nuclear submarines, strategic bombers, US troops stationed in Guam, and US troops in Japan, and launch retaliatory strikes to destroy North Korea’s core command when necessary.
Candidate Kim then added about North Korea's nuclear program, "I think denuclearization is very difficult and we need to achieve a nuclear balance (policy)."
Lee Jae-myung, the presidential candidate of the main opposition Democratic Party of Korea, also emphasized that while pursuing foreign policy with the South Korea-U.S. alliance as the core axis, a practical foreign policy toward China and Russia should also be pursued.
[Lee Jae-myung, Democratic Party of Korea presidential candidate] The ROK-US alliance is important. We should continue to expand and develop it. It is the basic axis of our diplomacy that must develop from a security alliance to an economic alliance and a comprehensive alliance. However, we should not rely on it completely. There is no need to exclude or hostile relations with China and Russia. Diplomacy should always be pragmatic and centered on national interests.
The candidate then drew a line, saying that he was concerned about economic sanctions from the international community due to South Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regarding its possession of nuclear weapons, and the so-called "nuclear domino" phenomenon in East Asia.
However, he said, “We must expand conventional military power as much as possible and share the US extended nuclear deterrence as much as possible.”
This is Mok Yong-jae from RFA's Free Asia Broadcasting in Seoul.
Editor Yang Seong-won
9. North Korea supplies 'portable radio detectors' to the Ministry of State Security
"Stingray?"
Information is an existential threat to Kim Jong Un. It must be controlled.
This is a Google translation of an RFA report.
North Korea supplies 'portable radio detectors' to the Ministry of State Security
Seoul-Son Hye-min xallsl@rfa.org
2025.05.
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in-focus/2025/05/19/north-korea-supplies-high-performance-detectors-to-border-security/
A North Korean security guard walks with a metal detector in front of a large statue of President Kim Il Sung in central Pyongyang in October 2005. (Reuters)
Anchor: North Korean authorities are distributing high-performance portable radio detectors to border guards and strengthening crackdowns on residents making calls to South Korea. Reporter Son Hye-min reports from inside North Korea.
A source in North Pyongan Province (who requested anonymity for personal safety reasons) told Radio Free Asia on the 18th, “Last week, hand-held radio detectors were distributed to counterintelligence officers in the Uiju County Security Department.”
“The radio detectors were smuggled in by authorities with the aim of cracking down on defectors and their relatives who use Chinese mobile phones to communicate with South Korea, thereby catching leakers of information,” the source added.
He continued, “It is unknown which country the radio detector was manufactured in because it was smuggled in with the labels removed, but it is a high-performance device with a wide detection radius and can quickly detect abnormal radio waves.”
Since the Kim Jong-un regime came to power, North Korean authorities have been focusing on blocking the inflow of foreign information or the leak of North Korean information by installing large German-made radio detectors imported from China under the pretext of strengthening border security, sources point out.
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“However, the large-scale radar detectors have a limited detection radius that can detect radio waves from South Korea even when they are on the mountain,” the source said. “Portable radar detectors can detect radio waves while moving, which is making residents nervous.”
In relation to this, another source in North Pyongan Province (requesting anonymity for personal safety reasons) reported on the 19th, “After the coronavirus outbreak, surveillance cameras have been installed everywhere in the border area, and surveillance of residents has been strengthened more than ever.”
A man uses his mobile phone through the window of a car in downtown Pyongyang, October 2018.
A man uses his cell phone through the window of a car in downtown Pyongyang in October 2018. (AP)
“If you talk to South Korea, you’re a ‘spy’… Catch me”
In particular, the authorities explained that “they installed radio detectors to eavesdrop on phone conversations and catch people who talk about rice prices while talking to their (North Korean) family members who have settled in South Korea, but the detection range was limited.”
“Earlier this month, authorities distributed portable, high-performance radio detectors to security officials in border areas across the country, including Sinuiju, in an attempt to go beyond these limitations and catch people using Chinese mobile phones to make calls to South Korea,” the source said.
He continued, “Plainclothes officers carry portable radio detectors in their pockets and patrol mainly residential areas or forested areas at dawn to detect radio signals.”
The source added, “Existing radio detectors would detect a Chinese mobile phone if a call with South Korea lasted more than five minutes, but portable, high-performance radio detectors can detect a call that lasts more than a minute.”
This is Son Hye-min from RFA's Free Asia Broadcasting in Seoul.
Editor Yang Seong-won
10. Pyongyang-Moscow Ties Are a Force Multiplier to Pyongyang-Beijing Relations
Excerpts:
Analysis of North Korea–Russia interactions within the US–China dynamic must also consider other triangular configurations, such as US–North Korea–China, North Korea–China–Russia, and US–China–Russia relations. North Korea and Russia must remain conscious of their alliances with China and the US–China ties to secure their positions amid increasing strategic rivalries. Russia must also evaluate its strategic partnership with China, its most significant ally, and the US–China power balance.
This indicates that analyzing the sources and impacts of burgeoning North Korea–Russia relations can shed light on China–North Korea relations. In this analytical framework, the US–China ties are a global constant (independent variable), while North Korea–Russia and China–North Korea interactions are dependent variables shaped by US-Sino relations.
The trilateral relationship between China, North Korea, and Russia is increasing Pyongyang’s and Moscow’s dependence on Beijing. This shows that China, not the United States, is the constant in this triangle equation. China–North Korea and China–Russia ties are thus dependent variables. North Korea–Russia relations, therefore, fluctuate depending on their relations with China. This theory holds that Beijing’s strategic position determines Pyongyang-Moscow ties.
Pyongyang-Moscow Ties Are a Force Multiplier to Pyongyang-Beijing Relations
https://www.38north.org/2025/05/pyongyang-moscow-ties-are-a-force-multiplier-to-pyongyang-beijing-relations/?utm
Many experts believe that North Korea’s improving ties with Russia have weakened the North Korea–China relationship. Circumstantial evidence and one-dimensional analysis of political developments between Pyongyang and Beijing and ongoing Pyongyang-Moscow cooperation often result in this view. However, examining these three countries’ dynamics merely through the lens of current events without considering their historical backgrounds or the driving forces behind the changes in the strategic landscape poses clear analytical limitations. In particular, the North Korea-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed in June 2024, while solidifying their alliance, does not explain everything. To do so would be a fundamental misunderstanding of this triangular relationship.
North Korea’s strengthening ties with Russia should be viewed within the China-North Korea-Russia triangle, where China plays the central actor. It is important to note that both North Korea and Russia are heavily dependent on China and their bilateral relationship is shaped by their respective ties to China, not the other way around. Furthermore, it would be logical to assume that China and Russia coordinated their policy toward North Korea in advance. Their joint actions, such as dissolving the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea, reflect a shift toward supporting North Korea’s “legitimate security concerns” and away from denuclearization. In short, China remains the strategic constant in Northeast Asia’s security architecture, with North Korea-Russia relations fluctuating in response to China’s position.
Three Analytic Traps
The notion that a strengthened North Korea–Russia relationship comes at the expense of the North Korea–China relationship is often seen as a natural outcome of the relative nature of a triangular relationship: As one side draws closer, the other grows distant. However, this thinking is flawed for three reasons.
First, it risks falling into a zero-sum fallacy. Giving too much weight to fragmentary or transient incidents is another risk. North Korea and Russia had numerous high-level summits and interactions in 2023 and 2024. China sent lower-ranking officials to North Korea’s national ceremonies, unlike Russia. An assessment of North Korea-China political and diplomatic exchanges over the years, however, shows that this imbalance is not unusual.
Second, it ignores the primary actor in the trilateral relationship: China. China remains the center of North Korea–China–Russia ties due to the other two countries’ dependence on Beijing. North Korea’s and Russia’s alignment with China, therefore, shapes their bilateral relationship with each other. China would be isolated and North Korea and Russia would naturally grow closer if China and Russia had antagonistic relations. The logic is “the enemy of my friend is my enemy.” This logic gives North Korea, which depends on both China and Russia, two strategic options. One is to leverage China-Russia rivalry—in short, a “divide and rule” strategy. This is illustrated by North Korea’s forging of alliance treaties with both countries in 1961. The other option is for North Korea to maximize its strategic interests when China and Russia cooperate. This is a reason all three countries can now sign alliance-like treaties.
Finally, many have neglected the reality that China and Russia—North Korea’s patron states—have coordinated their policies in advance. This shift became obvious in 2023, when both countries changed their position on North Korea’s denuclearization. The China-Russia joint statements in 2024 and 2025 only reinforced this trend (this is discussed in greater detail in the “Pre-Coordination Between China and Russia” section below).
Why We Were Misled
Many experts believe that burgeoning Pyongyang–Moscow relations—as exemplified by a series of high-level meetings that included Putin’s visit to Pyongyang and Kim’s trip to the Russian Far East in September 2023 and Putin’s reciprocal visit to Pyongyang in June 2024—have led to a cooling of Pyongyang-China relations. In the lead-up to and following Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea in 2024, his first in 24 years, a parade of senior Russian officials visited Pyongyang, to include the defense minister (July 2023 and September 2024) and the foreign minister (October 2023).
This stood in stark contrast to the lack of high-level exchanges between North Korea and China during the same period. For example, China sent Li Hongzhong, the vice chairman of the National People’s Congress and member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo, as the head of its delegation to Pyongyang’s Victory Day celebrations in July 2023. Li was significantly lower in rank than the head of Russia’s delegation, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. Li, presumably ranked 24th or 25th among China’s 25 Politburo members, was notably lower-level than Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao (ranked eighth in the leadership hierarchy), who attended North Korea’s Victory Day in 2013. Furthermore, China sent Vice Premier and Politburo member Liu Guozhong to North Korea’s National Day celebrations in September 2023. He was much lower in ranking than Zhou Yongkang (ranked ninth in the Chinese leadership hierarchy) and Li Zhanshu (ranked third), who attended the same event in 2010 and 2018, respectively.
However, China’s US policy, rather than its policy toward North Korea, appears to have been the greater factor for these lower-level visits. China has been under growing pressure from Washington regarding North Korea’s military support for Russia since 2023, when the two countries started to hold regular minister-level talks. Improvement of relations with the United States has been Beijing’s top foreign policy priority since then, and it has had to balance demands from both Washington and Pyongyang. China’s abstention from, rather than veto of, the vote on renewing the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea in March 2024 should be understood in the same context.
Moreover, recent developments between China and North Korea should be viewed within a broader historical context. Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in 2000 made him the first and only Soviet/Russian leader to have visited the country in 77 years. Putin’s second visit to North Korea occurred in 2024. Between 2018 and 2019 alone, North Korea and China held five summits. Zhao Leji, the third-ranking CCP member and Standing Committee Chairman of the National People’s Congress, met with Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang in April 2024. The month before, Kim Song Nam, director of the Workers Party of Korea’s International Department, visited China and was warmly welcomed by Wang Huning (ranked fourth in the Chinese leadership hierarchy), Cai Qi (ranked fifth), Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and International Liaison Department Head Liu Jianchao.
Despite many foreign observers’ assessment that North Korea-China relations have deteriorated, North Korea allegedly dispatched 500 workers to China in September 2024 in violation of UN sanctions. This shows Beijing’s persistent strategic accommodation of Pyongyang and calls into question whether North Korea-China relations have truly deteriorated.
Pre-Coordination Between China and Russia
China’s and Russia’s positions on North Korea, including denuclearization, changed before the North Korea–Russia alliance pact of 2024. Xi’s visit to Russia in March 2023 marked the beginning of coordinating their strategies toward the Korean Peninsula. In that year’s China–Russia summit, the joint statement deleted “dual suspension,” a formula that Beijing first proposed in March 2017 where the United States and South Korea would suspend major military exercises in exchange for North Korea’s suspension of its nuclear and missile programs. In 2024, Beijing and Moscow went further and dropped from their summit joint statement “dual processes,” a reference to denuclearization and peace-building. Notably, the 2024 summit’s joint statement acknowledged North Korea’s “legitimate security concerns,” echoing Pyongyang’s long-held logic that its continued nuclear advancements are due to US threats. It criticized sanctions and joint military exercises and called on the United States to establish favorable conditions for dialogue. Like this, China and Russia reinstated the “concerned parties” principle, or deferring the responsibility of denuclearization to the United States while China and Russia take a step back. This, similar to the stance China took toward the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993, marked a retreat from their past positive engagement with denuclearization. These trends were upheld by the latest China-Russia joint statement, adopted during Xi’s state visit to Russia in May 2025.
China’s evolving denuclearization stance derives from intricate geopolitical calculations. US–South Korea joint military exercises resumed when the Biden and Yoon Suk-yeol administrations took office. Putting aside North Korea’s record number of missile launches in 2022, China and Russia appear to have made the assessment that the “dual suspension” principle was obsolete because of the resumption of the US-South Korea joint military drills under Biden and Yoon.
Given the new security predicament, China and Russia in 2023 began to encourage the United States, South Korea, and other relevant parties to acknowledge North Korea’s “legitimate security concerns.” They even appeared to view the “dual processes” formula as impossible. The stalled US-North Korea engagement since the breakdown of the working-level nuclear talks in Sweden in October 2019 was crucial to this assessment. China and Russia, however, declined to mediate for various reasons. Both countries seemed to view denuclearization or a peace process as politically unachievable and unrealistic, especially without Washington’s engagement with Pyongyang. China and Russia revived the “principle of concerned parties” in their 2024 joint statement instead. This trend extended to their stance on sanctions, as shown by Russia’s veto of, and China abstention from a vote in March 2024 that dissolved the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea.
Conclusion: A Paradigm for Understanding the China–North Korea–Russia Triangle
The overarching premise of the China-North Korea-Russia trilateral relationship is that all three currently have strained or adversarial relations with the United States. In Northeast Asia, international relations are fundamentally based on alliances, and therefore the China-North Korea-Russia and US-South Korea-Japan triangles form the foundation of regional dynamics. This region, therefore, lacks true bilateral interactions. In a system built on alliances, a nation cannot engage with another without factoring in both its own allies and those of its counterparts. This structural reality is particularly salient in diplomacy, security, and military affairs, forming a basic paradigm and the basic prerequisite for understanding international relations in Northeast Asia.
For China, its relationship with South Korea must consider the ROK–US alliance. That means China’s connection with third nations affects China–South Korea relations as well as US–China, inter-Korean, and China–North Korea relations. A third party always determines a bilateral relationship’s trajectory. Thus, any serious discussion of China–South Korea must be placed within triangular frameworks like the South Korea–US–China or North Korea–South Korea–China ties.
Analysis of North Korea–Russia interactions within the US–China dynamic must also consider other triangular configurations, such as US–North Korea–China, North Korea–China–Russia, and US–China–Russia relations. North Korea and Russia must remain conscious of their alliances with China and the US–China ties to secure their positions amid increasing strategic rivalries. Russia must also evaluate its strategic partnership with China, its most significant ally, and the US–China power balance.
This indicates that analyzing the sources and impacts of burgeoning North Korea–Russia relations can shed light on China–North Korea relations. In this analytical framework, the US–China ties are a global constant (independent variable), while North Korea–Russia and China–North Korea interactions are dependent variables shaped by US-Sino relations.
The trilateral relationship between China, North Korea, and Russia is increasing Pyongyang’s and Moscow’s dependence on Beijing. This shows that China, not the United States, is the constant in this triangle equation. China–North Korea and China–Russia ties are thus dependent variables. North Korea–Russia relations, therefore, fluctuate depending on their relations with China. This theory holds that Beijing’s strategic position determines Pyongyang-Moscow ties.
11. Recalibrating US Strategy on North Korea
But does this effort align with our assumptions about the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime? However, it does address these erroneous assumptions:
For the past 35 years, US policy towards North Korea has assumed that:
• Post-Cold War North Korea was isolated internationally, particularly on the issue of its nuclear weapons program; in addition, the DPRK nuclear and missile problem was detachable from broader superpower rivalries;
• The DPRK nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program could be halted before it matured through technology and economic embargos;
• A normalized relationship with the United States carried significant geopolitical advantages; and
• There was an inflection point in DPRK decision making that would either coerce or induce it to give up nuclear weapons.
None of these assumptions remain valid today.
Conclusion:
A new, pragmatic US policy should focus on continuing to bolster deterrence, reducing the risk of war—particularly nuclear war—and building an architecture of peace on the Korean
Peninsula. Pursuing these objectives will require: 1) summit-driven diplomacy, including negotiated agreements and unilateral steps; 2) the support of Russia and China; 2) convincing Pyongyang to return to talks despite its shift away from seeking better relations with the United States and the expansion of its WMD arsenal; 3) identifying North Korea’s priorities for talks; 4) and new realistic US objectives, including a near-term focus on reducing the risk of war instead of denuclearization.
The 13 page report can be downloaded here: https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/25-0516_Wit_North-Korea-Policy-Review.pdf
It does not address the "Korea question" (the unnatural division of the peninsula per the1953 Armistice) and unification.
Recalibrating US Strategy on North Korea
https://www.38north.org/reports/2025/05/recalibrating-us-strategy-on-north-korea/
Introduction
The election of Donald Trump to a second presidential term provides an opportunity to reevaluate American policy towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), especially given the President’s summitry with Kim Jong Un during his first term in office. Although the Biden administration’s approach focused on reinforcing deterrence, the risks of conflict have grown. Tensions between Washington, Beijing and Moscow; Pyongyang’s shift to closer relations with America’s rivals and the growth of its WMD arsenal; as well as a burgeoning regional arms race, have only heightened the dangers.
These developments have increased the risk of:
- Greater polarization of East Asia and an accelerating regional arms race;
- Nuclear proliferation in the region which will weaken or destroy the non-proliferation regime;
- Proliferation outside of the region if Pyongyang decides to peddle its WMD wares elsewhere;
- Conflict due to misperception and miscalculation;
- Nuclear use on the Korean Peninsula that could spill over into East Asia and even the continental United States.
A new, pragmatic US policy should focus on continuing to bolster deterrence, reducing the risk of war—particularly nuclear war—and building an architecture of peace on the Korean
Peninsula. Pursuing these objectives will require: 1) summit-driven diplomacy, including negotiated agreements and unilateral steps; 2) the support of Russia and China; 2) convincing Pyongyang to return to talks despite its shift away from seeking better relations with the United States and the expansion of its WMD arsenal; 3) identifying North Korea’s priorities for talks; 4) and new realistic US objectives, including a near-term focus on reducing the risk of war instead of denuclearization.
None of this will be easy. Aside from needing to address more pressing foreign policy priorities in the Middle East and Europe, a new initiative will be time consuming and require a high degree of policy coordination at home and abroad. However, the dangers cited above make launching a new initiative is imperative.
12.
So much to say about this - from parents wanting the best for their children to the regime as a complete failure and cannot even make quality school clothing.
N. Korean parents spend rice money on uniforms as state-supplied clothing falls short - Daily NK English
"The quality is so bad that people eventually have to spend money on custom-made uniforms anyway, so now nobody welcomes what the state provides," a source told Daily NK
By Eun Seol - May 19, 2025
dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · May 19, 2025
A group of North Korean students in Pyongyang. (fresh888, Flickr, Creative Commons)
North Korean middle and high school students are increasingly buying fabric at markets to make custom uniforms because the quality of state-supplied uniforms is so poor.
“Wearing uniforms made with market-bought fabric has become a kind of ‘style standard’ among students,” a source in South Hamgyong province told Daily NK recently. “Especially among appearance-conscious female students, there’s a growing sense of embarrassment about wearing state-provided uniforms.”
The source said state-supplied uniforms are made from low-quality blended fabric that “puffs out,” creating wrinkles from the buttocks to knees when students stand up after sitting. The uniforms lack style and release blue dye when washed.
“While some male students just wear them anyway, female students often refuse to wear such uniforms altogether,” the source said. “More families are buying fabric at markets and having custom uniforms made.”
These custom uniforms are typically produced by taking market-bought fabric to private home-based tailors. One uniform costs about 150,000 North Korean won, enough to buy more than 15 kilograms (33 pounds) of rice at market prices, creating a significant financial burden for families.
Despite the cost, some parents justify the expense. “When electricity is so unreliable that it’s difficult to iron pleated skirts, it’s better to spend money on properly made uniforms,” one parent reportedly said.
Authorities turn a blind eye
While students have previously worn custom uniforms instead of state-supplied ones, enforcement against the practice was relatively strict. Recently, however, there has been virtually no regulation or control, and wearing custom uniforms has become a trend, according to the source.
“Homeroom teachers and youth group leaders don’t make a big issue of students wearing custom uniforms,” the source said. “There’s rarely any criticism or crackdown for not wearing state-supplied uniforms.”
North Korean authorities promote uniform distribution as part of leader Kim Jong Un’s “love for future generations,” but socially, there’s a prevailing perception that “wearing state uniforms damages one’s dignity” because the quality is so poor and unattractive.
“Current spring uniforms for middle school students consist of purple jackets and wide pleated skirts. The central government authorities only specify color and style without any quality standards for fabric,” the source explained. “Since provincial and city authorities procure fabric separately, wealthy merchants repeatedly supply cheap materials.”
Moreover, as the market economy has spread since the early 2000s and the custom uniform market has flourished, resistance has grown against the state’s enforcement of wearing low-quality uniforms.
“The quality is so bad that people eventually have to spend money on custom-made uniforms anyway, so now nobody welcomes what the state provides,” the source said. “At first, they strictly enforced wearing state uniforms, but now enforcement has fizzled out. Some people are saying, ‘Honestly, it’s better if they just leave us alone to live our lives.'”
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · May 19, 2025
13. N. Korean official ousted for falsifying rice reserve reports
So many forms of corruption. So rampant. But all because the regime is a failure that continues to try to rule with an iron fist.
N. Korean official ousted for falsifying rice reserve reports - Daily NK English
The official attempted to explain the shortage by citing "procurement shortfalls from lower units" and "transportation issues"
By Jeong Seo-yeong - May 19, 2025
dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · May 19, 2025
Rodong Sinmun published photos of rice planting in farms across the country on May 26, 2024, saying, "Rice planting is being promoted more vigorously in rural areas amid the rising momentum of the all-people's struggle to achieve excellent results in agriculture this year." The photo shows Jangwon Farm in Jongpyong County, South Hamgyong Province. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)
A senior official responsible for managing emergency rice reserves at North Korea’s State Affairs Commission has been disciplined for submitting false reports about reserve levels, according to a source in Pyongyang.
The source told Daily NK recently that “in early April, an internal investigation revealed an official in charge of emergency rice reserves had been expelled from the party and dismissed from his position for falsifying reports instead of replenishing depleted reserves.”
According to the source, North Korea released 20% of the State Affairs Commission’s emergency rice reserves last summer when flooding struck border regions in North Pyongan, Jagang and Ryanggang provinces. Kim Jong Un issued an order requiring the reserves be fully replenished after the fall harvest.
However, a mid-March internal audit discovered the reserves hadn’t been restored despite reports claiming complete replenishment. While records showed 100% stockpiling, physical inspection revealed actual reserves were about 35% below normal levels. Investigators also found evidence of old inventory being repackaged to conceal the shortage.
The source said the investigation was secretly ordered by Kim Yo Jong, a member of the State Affairs Commission and Kim Jong Un’s sister. After receiving the audit results, Kim Yo Jong submitted a report to her brother before April 15 (Kim Il Sung’s birthday), securing approval for the official’s punishment.
Following the holiday, the official’s party expulsion and dismissal were decided during a closed meeting on “reestablishing leadership responsibility ethics.”
The official attempted to explain the shortage by citing “procurement shortfalls from lower units” and “transportation issues,” but Kim Yo Jong concluded it was deliberate deception and ordered immediate disciplinary action.
“Recently, Kim Yo Jong has been aggressively pushing for authority adjustments among some State Affairs Commission working-level officials through internal investigations, creating a tense atmosphere,” the source said. “The power elite are being extremely cautious as these incidents stem from Kim Yo Jong taking on the role of her brother’s secret inspector and digging into officials’ backgrounds.”
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · May 19, 2025
14. North-China Border 1,000km Journey by a North Korean Defector and Fourth-Generation Korean-Japanese (1): To the Closest Point to My Ancestral Land, North Korea
North-China Border 1,000km Journey by a North Korean Defector and Fourth-Generation Korean-Japanese (1): To the Closest Point to My Ancestral Land, North Korea
asiapress.org
A man and woman on a bicycle waving with smiling faces toward our boat. A portrait badge is visible on the man's chest. Sakju County, North Pyongan Province.
◆ Laughter, Smells... Truly Experiencing "A Country Where People Live"
What kind of lives do North Koreans lead today, and what are they thinking? To find out, two ASIAPRESS journalists headed to the North Korean-Chinese border region in mid-October 2024. Starting from Dandong at the lowest reaches of the Yalu River and traveling upstream to Fangchuan at the mouth of the Tumen River, they covered approximately 1,000 kilometers of accessible border areas out of the total 1,400-kilometer journey over ten days. One journalist, JEON Sung-jun, is a North Korean defector, while HONG Mari is a fourth-generation Korean-Japanese whose grandfather's hometown is in North Korea. Through what these two people with Korean Peninsula roots saw and felt at the border, they reflected on North Korea as a neighboring country and the people living there.
Construction site for flood victim apartments. The work is done almost entirely by human labor, so workers are densely packed. Everyone looks exhausted. Wihwa Island, Sinuiju City, North Pyongan Province.
◆ Two Korean Roots
I quit my job in 2022. It might sound impressive to say I did it to confront my roots, but honestly, there was no particular reason. I simply wanted to know where my grandparents were born and raised, and why they left their homeland. Despite being Korean-Japanese, I knew nothing about my family history. This curiosity, born from that void, led me to language studies in South Korea, where my grandmother was born.
However, visiting my other ancestral homeland proved much more difficult—North Hamgyong Province, where my grandfather was born and raised. I never heard stories about his hometown during his lifetime.
All I know is that during the Japanese colonial period, he worked at a nitrogen chemical factory known for Minamata disease, and that he met my grandmother in Seoul after fleeing south to escape the Soviet army that invaded in August 1945. That's the extent of my knowledge. Because of this, I always wanted to visit the border region—the closest I could get to that land.
Soldiers mobilized for flood recovery work. Part of the embankment has collapsed. Sakju County, North Pyongan Province.
◆ Being Called "Enemy Nation" in First Conversation
My first conversation with North Koreans was at a North Korean restaurant in Shenyang, Liaoning Province. A female employee approached me speaking Chinese. When I instinctively replied, "I can understand Korean," she glared at me and snapped, "It's not Korean, it's Chosun language!" Her attitude was so intimidating I nearly backed away.
"I'm from Japan."
"Go away."
"Why?"
"Because Japan is our eternal enemy."
I was eventually allowed in but was seated in a far corner and not even offered tea—clearly unwelcome. However, her attitude softened as the meal progressed, and she even mixed my cold noodles with a smile.
When I asked, "Why aren't South Koreans allowed in?" she immediately replied, "Because those puppet (South Korean) bastards are part of an enemy nation." The mechanical way she spat out these words left a strong impression. In late 2023, Kim Jong-un declared, "South Korea is the enemy," and this directive was being strictly applied even to workers dispatched to China.
asiapress.org
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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