Quotes of the Day:
"The only good is knowledge and the only evil is ignorance."
- Socrates
“If everyone fought for their own convictions there would be no war.”
- Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace
“The likelihood that your acts of resistance cannot stop the injustice does not exempt you from acting in what you sincerely and reflectively hold to be the best interests of your community.”
- Susan Sontag, At the Same Time: Essays and Speeches
1. Why North Korea Wants Nuclear Weapons: Korean Unification By John Bolton
2. S. Korea analyzing former N.K. nuke envoy's return to public view
3. How North Korean Paranoia Enwrapped an 85-Year-Old American
4. FM nominee cautious on additional THAAD deployment
5. S.Korea should stand firm on security issues against China: FM nominee
6. Kim Jong-un Keeps Threatening Preemptive Nuclear Strikes
7. Beijing concerned with rising North Korea tensions, envoy says in Seoul
8. North Korean leader praises youth for their role in recent military parade
9. Hoeryong’s security agency arrests party cadre for leaking secret documents
10. Explaining the Impasse in Japan’s Relations with North Korea
11. Kim Jong Un orders nuclear energy ministry to visit candidate sites for new nuclear power plant
12. N. Koreans working for Li-Ning contractor are suffering from low pay and back-breaking work
13. Colombia chooses South Korea’s TA-50, FA-50 as next jet trainers, officials say
14. Most Seoul citizens walk around with masks on despite eased rules
1. Why North Korea Wants Nuclear Weapons: Korean Unification By John Bolton
A provocative essay from Ambassador Bolton.
Excerpts:
The notion that Pyongyang’s nuclear-weapons program was purely defensive, to safeguard the Kim dynasty and fend off Washington’s “hostile policy,” has been extremely useful in lulling its targets into complacency. Now, however, the North’s increasingly evident capabilities show ever more clearly that Kim seeks reunification of the Peninsula on his terms. Over time, his nuclear capability is the lever to drive U.S. forces from South Korea and possibly even Japan, or at least severely weaken their alliances.
If the wrong kind of American President (Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth Warren, for example) received an ultimatum to withdraw U.S. forces or face a nuclear attack, what would happen?
Think about it. Kim Jung Un certainly is. So should Yoon Suk-yeol and Joe Biden.
Why North Korea Wants Nuclear Weapons: Korean Unification
Why North Korea Wants Nuclear Weapons: South Korea is busy preparing for the May 10 inauguration of President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol. During the closely-contested election campaign, he advocated harder-line diplomacy for Seoul, rejecting outgoing President Moon Jae-in’s failed “sunshine policy.” Yoon said, for example, “[W]e shall stand on the right side of history with the U.S. by making sure that those who undermine the liberal international order pay the price accordingly.” He also pledged to improve long-strained relations with Japan, which worsened under his predecessor.
All this suggests closer Indo-Pacific cooperation against the aspiring hegemon China, but the President-elect’s most urgent challenge is North Korea’s increasingly threatening military posture and its bellicose rhetoric. As he prepares for his swearing-in, Yoon must assess the increasing risks of Pyongyang’s provocations against Seoul and Washington, its principal ally. With limited intelligence about North Korea’s actual intentions, assessments of its leaders’ pronouncements, whether intended for foreign or domestic consumption, are often simply shoe-horned into pre-conceived notions. Nonetheless, despite years of theorizing that the North’s main purpose for seeking deliverable nuclear weapons was to defend the ruling regime, it is increasingly clear that the true central objective of those efforts is to reunify the Peninsula on the Kim dynasty’s terms.
This is a jarring, disconcerting conclusion for many, but concrete evidence from the North’s nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile programs is telling. Kim Jong Un has been no slacker in both advancing his menacing weapons programs and propaganda to conceal his actual intentions. For example, four of North Korea’s six nuclear tests occurred on his watch, including the last known shot in 2017 (all six at the Punggye-ri test site). As of 2020, former CIA analyst Jung H. Pak calculated that Kim had tested three times more missiles than his two predecessors combined. In the past two years, the pace has increased, with 22 tests so far this year. As to disinformation, in 2017, Kim orchestrated a media spectacular, “closing” the Punggye-ri tunnel entrances, but allowing no prior international inspection of the tunnel system and no verification of what was actually closed. This reverse-Potemkin village fantasia closely resembled the 2008 destruction of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor’s cooling tower, impressive for the credulous media but not affecting the aging reactor’s key operating systems.
Trump’s answer, centering on himself, of course, is that he intimidated Kim, yet they also enjoyed a close personal relationship. The more compelling explanation is that North Korea had learned what it needed through its six nuclear tests to proceed to systematic warhead production for its stockpile. Moreover, while long-range missile testing was suspended, frequent launch-testing of shorter-range missiles continued, notwithstanding that these tests violated applicable Security Council resolutions. The lessons thereby learned could readily be scaled up for ICBMs, albeit likely subject to further testing at the appropriate time. Like now.
Moreover, Kim undoubtedly believed he could entice Trump into a deal highly favorable to Pyongyang, following the North’s usual (and usually successful) playbook: Kim would commit to ending the nuclear program and even destroy or shutter portions of it, in exchange for America (and Japan) terminating economic sanctions and providing material assistance. Kim’s visible disappointment at the 2019 Hanoi Summit, having failed to close the deal he wanted, and the lack of further progress, likely put Kim into a holding pattern until after the 2020 U.S. presidential elections.
Joe Biden’s subsequent attempted resumption of lower-level negotiations efforts was lackluster, tracking Barack Obama’s “strategic patience” approach, thus affording North Korea free rein to proceed unhindered on both missile and nuclear weapons. Moreover, Biden’s first-year focus on domestic priorities placed Pyongyang well down on his priority list. When foreign affairs did come to the fore in America’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, the White House’s strategic incompetence could only have encouraged Kim to accelerate his programs. Today, the unfolding crisis following Russia’s February 24 invasion of Ukraine is consuming almost all of the Administration’s national-security bandwidth.
Notwithstanding America’s errors and inattentiveness, particularly failing to invest in a major expansion of its national missile-defense capabilities, Kim is undoubtedly worried by both the incoming Yoon administration and the Indo-Pacific’s growing focus on China. The chess pieces are moving, and Washington’s current distractions simply underline for Kim his need to traverse the limited remaining distance to achieve an undoubted ability to launch, target, and produce nuclear detonations at any site of his choosing worldwide. He has the nuclear warheads, he has intercontinental-range missiles, and the remaining issues are whether he can target those warheads accurately and whether they can survive atmospheric re-entry. These last two points are critical and remain unproven, but no one should doubt how close North Korea is to its long-standing objective of unequivocally threatening the continental U.S.
Kim is not wasting time. By reopening entrances to Punggye-ri’s tunnel network, he is either intending to resume nuclear testing (perhaps for more sophisticated weapons) or at least make testing possible on very short notice. New delivery-system technology, like maneuverable hypersonic missiles, increases Pyongyang’s options. Kim’s rhetoric is heating up in tune with changing physical and political realities; at a massive military parade last week, he said the North was able to “pre-emptively and thoroughly contain and frustrate all dangerous attempts and threatening moves … if necessary.”
North Korean Missile Launch. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Image of North Korean Road-Mobile ICBM. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
The notion that Pyongyang’s nuclear-weapons program was purely defensive, to safeguard the Kim dynasty and fend off Washington’s “hostile policy,” has been extremely useful in lulling its targets into complacency. Now, however, the North’s increasingly evident capabilities show ever more clearly that Kim seeks reunification of the Peninsula on his terms. Over time, his nuclear capability is the lever to drive U.S. forces from South Korea and possibly even Japan, or at least severely weaken their alliances.
If the wrong kind of American President (Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth Warren, for example) received an ultimatum to withdraw U.S. forces or face a nuclear attack, what would happen?
Think about it. Kim Jung Un certainly is. So should Yoon Suk-yeol and Joe Biden.
2. S. Korea analyzing former N.K. nuke envoy's return to public view
The leadership watchers have their hands full. No one ever leaves the Pyongyang stage forever (evening Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il are sll in charge even in death). BUtit is interesting how north Korean leaders can be rehabilitated.
And of course the analysis for this one must stress "personnel is policy." This may be an indicator.
S. Korea analyzing former N.K. nuke envoy's return to public view | Yonhap News Agency
By Yi Wonju
SEOUL, May 2 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's unification ministry said Monday it is analyzing the background and other details on the first public appearance of Kim Kye-gwan, a well-known North Korean figure who had long led the country's denuclearization talks, in more than two years.
Kim, the North's former vice foreign minister and top delegate to the now-defunct six-way talks on its nuclear program, was spotted shaking hands with and whispering to the regime's leader Kim Jong-un at a follow-up celebratory event of a military parade marking the 90th anniversary of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army. The scene was made public in video footage aired Saturday by the state-run Korean Central Television.
It has spawned speculation here on Kim's current stature in the secretive regime and his potential role in Pyongyang's approach toward the nuclear issue.
"We are currently conducting a comprehensive analysis in cooperation with the relevant authorities," Cha Deok-cheol, the ministry's acting spokesperson, told a regular press briefing.
The ministry will keep a close eye on North Korea, he added, taking a cautious view on whether Kim's appearance could signal any change in the North's policy direction.
In the mid-2000s, Kim headed North Korea's delegation at the six-party nuclear talks also involving South Korea, the United States, China, Russia and Japan. He played a key role in producing a landmark agreement on Sept. 19, 2015, under which Pyongyang pledged to give up its nuclear weapons program. Kim is called by many a "living witness" of the North's nuclear negotiations. In January 2020, he issued a statement on Pyongyang's stern position on the nuclear issue and had not appeared in the North's media reports since then.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
3. How North Korean Paranoia Enwrapped an 85-Year-Old American
A fascinating story on many levels. But it is important that we understand north Korea's paranoia.
Excerpts:
During the Korean War, Newman was a member of the United Nations Partisan Infantry Korea (UNPIK), a top-secret precursor of today’s U.S. special operations forces that combined South Korean and American forces. They ran several partisan groups behind enemy lines, including one known as the “White Tigers”—a name that would eventually be reused for South Korea’s own counterterrorism unit. Newman’s assignment was to advise anti-communist Koreans operating behind North Korean lines around Mount Kuwol, which lies south of Pyongyang. The guerrillas were known as the Kuwol Comrades.
In South Korea, the Kuwol Comrades have long been revered as heroes, with their exploits even the subject of a popular film called Blood–Soaked Mount Kuwol. Newman, although he had visited South Korea many years after the war, apparently did not realize that, for precisely this reason, the guerrillas were viewed as the worst kind of traitors and counter-revolutionaries.
And while ordinary Korean War veterans had visited without incident, North Korea reserved a particular vendetta for U.S. infiltrators. Both UNPIK and the CIA ran numerous missions into the North, mostly unsuccessfully, and sometimes disastrously. The CIA’s efforts lasted beyond the war, with hundreds of CIA-trained South Korean agents parachuted into the North in the 1950s. Almost all of them were killed.
How North Korean Paranoia Enwrapped an 85-Year-Old American
Trauma and fears of espionage run deep in Pyongyang.
By Mike Chinoy, a nonresident senior fellow at the University of Southern California’s U.S.-China Institute.
In October 2013, Merrill Newman, an 85-year-old grandfather from California, was taken off a plane at the Pyongyang airport at the end of a weeklong tourist trip to North Korea. He was detained, and his plight soon involved the State Department, the international news media, and, by all accounts, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un himself. But for most of the 42 days that Newman, who died this January, was held in Pyongyang in the fall of 2013, nobody outside North Korea knew why.
The answers lay in Newman’s past—and in North Korea’s acute historical memory and still-present paranoia. That same fear helps drive its quest for security today, recently demonstrated by yet another series of missile tests.
Newman was a Korean War veteran and retired finance executive. He was an avid sailor and scuba diver with a taste for adventure. He had decided to visit North Korea while breakfasting with a friend at his retirement community in Palo Alto. Curious to see the country where he’d served, and aware that other veterans of the war had visited without incident, he contacted Juche Travel Services, a London-based agency specializing in North Korea tourism. That’s when Newman saw Mount Kuwol listed on the company’s website.
During the Korean War, Newman was a member of the United Nations Partisan Infantry Korea (UNPIK), a top-secret precursor of today’s U.S. special operations forces that combined South Korean and American forces. They ran several partisan groups behind enemy lines, including one known as the “White Tigers”—a name that would eventually be reused for South Korea’s own counterterrorism unit. Newman’s assignment was to advise anti-communist Koreans operating behind North Korean lines around Mount Kuwol, which lies south of Pyongyang. The guerrillas were known as the Kuwol Comrades.
In South Korea, the Kuwol Comrades have long been revered as heroes, with their exploits even the subject of a popular film called Blood–Soaked Mount Kuwol. Newman, although he had visited South Korea many years after the war, apparently did not realize that, for precisely this reason, the guerrillas were viewed as the worst kind of traitors and counter-revolutionaries.
And while ordinary Korean War veterans had visited without incident, North Korea reserved a particular vendetta for U.S. infiltrators. Both UNPIK and the CIA ran numerous missions into the North, mostly unsuccessfully, and sometimes disastrously. The CIA’s efforts lasted beyond the war, with hundreds of CIA-trained South Korean agents parachuted into the North in the 1950s. Almost all of them were killed.
The infiltrators achieved little, but they were easy targets for the widespread anger at the United States in North Korea, where 85 percent of the country’s buildings were destroyed by U.S. airpower between 1950 and 1953. Approximately 1.5 million North Koreans were killed in the war. They also coincided with a perennial fear in communist states of saboteurs and spies, which, as in the Soviet Union and China, led to persistent purges inside North Korea. While the rhetoric of fifth columnists was wielded for brutal political ends, it was also sincerely believed and feared by many in Pyongyang. The passage of time had not dimmed the North’s hate and suspicion of potential infiltrators.
On the Juche Travel Services website, though, Mount Kuwol was described as a tourist attraction. For Newman, the possibility of visiting a place so linked to his youthful wartime experience was an enticing one. The travel agency told him it would not be a problem. At the time, North Korea tourism for Westerners was a small but highly prosperous industry, charging large amounts to Americans and Europeans curious about one of the most closed-off societies on earth. Travel agencies usually pre-screened visitors, mostly concerned about journalists or government officials who might be targeted or put their North Korean guides at risk. But an 85-year-old retiree seemed unlikely to trigger any buttons.
Newman and his retirement home friend Bob Hamdrla spent a fascinating but largely uneventful week in Pyongyang, visiting the usual tourist attractions such as Mansu Hill, where two giant bronze statues, one of Kim Il Sung and one of Kim Jong Il, look out over the Pyongyang skyline.
As their visit to Mount Kuwol approached, Newman wondered aloud to his two female guides whether there might be any soldiers from the war still alive in the area, perhaps even people he had known. Suddenly, the Kuwol visit was canceled. The night before his scheduled departure, security agents brusquely questioned Newman about the Korean War. And then he was taken off his plane and confined in a Pyongyang hotel room.
North Korea’s fear of infiltrators was undimmed by the years—in part because of its own constant attacks on the South. Pyongyang has run numerous infiltration missions, most infamously the attack on Seoul’s Blue House in an attempt to kill then-President Park Chung-hee in 1968. Attempts still continue—though some supposed attackers are in fact defectors, or take the opportunity to defect.
But the North’s attacks also prompted South Korean retaliation, especially after 1968. According to South Korean veterans, over 13,000 South Korean soldiers were dispatched to the North by the South Korean dictatorships between the late 1960s and 1980s—of whom 7,729 never made it home. Even though the missions—at least as far as public information is available—dropped dramatically after South Korea’s transition to democracy, they remained a constant of Pyongyang’s propaganda.
Even in the context of North Korea’s long-term worries, though, believing an 85-year-old was a spy—and that he would openly chat about his plans with his guides—was quite a leap. “If you are that paranoid,” observed Evans Revere, a long-time State Department Korea expert, “it is perfectly understandable they reacted the way they did, because they really felt that somehow this sickly 85-year-old man was a threat to their security. Only in North Korea could a guy like that be considered a threat to anyone’s security.”
And yet Newman’s detention was, by North Korean standards, relatively cozy. Rather than being sent to a prison or labor camp, he was interrogated in his hotel. Nurses and doctors constantly checked his blood pressure, apparently concerned about the consequences if anything happened to him. The interrogations were conducted by a man who always sat with his back to the window, in silhouette, so Newman could not make out his features.
Over and over, the interrogator made the same threat.
“If you do not tell us everything, and apologize for your illegal acts, you will not be able to return to your home country.”
It was clear from the questions, which focused on Newman’s wartime experience with the Kuwol partisans, that the North Koreans had convinced themselves he had returned to activate a geriatric spy network. They demanded information about the structure, organization, and people involved. But despite his age and fragile health—he suffered from heart problems and high blood pressure—Newman was more than a match for his interrogator. Pressed for details, he simply made up names, places, and descriptions.
On another occasion, his captors discovered three books on North Korea on his Kindle and demanded he delete them. When Newman said that would require getting on the internet, his guard insisted again. “You go figure out how to delete them without going online,” Newman retorted. The guard grudgingly allowed him to keep the Kindle.
When first confined at Pyongyang’s Yanggakdo Hotel, Newman also had the presence of mind to pick up the phone and, to his surprise, get through to his home in California. He was able to tell his wife, Lee, that he had been detained before the line was cut. Newman’s family quickly asked the State Department for help. But as the weeks went by with no news, they became increasingly frustrated. At one point, out of desperation, they even contacted eccentric former basketball star Dennis Rodman, who had famously visited Pyongyang and befriended Kim Jong Un. But Rodman was planning another trip and did not want to get involved. Then the San Jose Mercury News made Newman’s plight public. Overnight, his case became a top news story in the United States, with reporters calling at all hours and satellite trucks parked outside his retirement home.
With no fresh information, the family passed a bleak Thanksgiving. But a few days later, the North Koreans released a video of Newman reading a “confession” that had been written for him.
“During the Korean War, I have been guilty of a long list of indelible crimes. … I committed indelible offensive acts against the DPRK government and Korean people. Although 60 years have gone by, I came to DPRK on the excuse of the tour. … Shamelessly I had a plan to meet any surviving soldiers. I realize that I cannot be forgiven for my offensives but I beg for pardon on my knees. … If I go back to USA, I will tell the true features of the DPRK.”
Korean War veteran Merrill Newman (left), accompanied by his wife Lee and son Jeff, speaks to the press after arriving at San Francisco International Airport on Dec. 7, 2013 following his release from detention in North Korea. SUSANA BATES/AFP via Getty Images
To signal he was being coerced, Newman went out of his way to emphasize the English grammar errors in the script he had been given—something that was not lost on his family, who finally had confirmation he was still alive.
But another week passed with no further sign of movement.. Getting someone senior to sign off on letting Newman go seemed a remote prospect. But on Saturday, Dec. 7, Newman was suddenly informed he was being released. He was told how close he had come to being sentenced to a long prison term and given specific talking points the North Koreans wanted him to stress in the U.S.
“I was supposed to say, I apologize for this, this, and this, and thank the government for releasing me,” Newman told me when I interviewed him in 2014. Arriving home, Newman said nothing.
There is no way to know for sure what combination of factors triggered Newman’s detention. The most likely explanation is that his offhand comment to his minders about Mount Kuwol—which were clearly reported to more senior officials—aroused the suspicion of the security apparatus. “I said, ‘If I get there, I’d like to meet any living soldiers, and if you can help me do it, I’d appreciate it,’” he recalled later. “It was probably a dumb thing to do. It was clearly my error to indicate I’d like to make contact with any North Korean survivors.” North Korean security officials may well have concluded that it was safer to detain him than face the consequences, from their own bosses, of allowing someone associated with the hated Kuwol Comrades to leave.
But what apparently began as a cover-your-ass decision by midlevel security officials became a much bigger issue, impacting the North’s already frosty relations with the United States. At some level, it seems likely that the North Koreans may have recognized that the sinister retiree network didn’t exist. But in communist dictatorships, admitting to a mistake is not only embarrassing for the system but can also damage everyone involved. Even in North Korea’s then far more open neighbor China, when a group of 20 South Africa, British, and Indian charity workers were arrested for “watching propaganda videos”—which turned out to be videos of Sufi dances—in 2015 by overzealous local police, it took a week to free them from jail, whereupon they were deported without apology. And the case of the detainees known as the “two Michaels”—Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, who faced spurious charges of spying and were held as hostages for three years in retaliation for the detention in Canada of a Chinese executive facing extradition to the United States on criminal charges—further highlights the growing risks that seemingly innocent travelers can face in such countries.
But by North Korean standards, Newman’s detention was resolved relatively quickly. Other American detainees have experienced far longer trials, usually lasting years before they were released. In 2017, Otto Warmbier, an American student arrested for tearing down a propaganda banner, was sent back to the United States in a coma from unknown causes, a year and a half after his arrest—and he died a few days later. In a case of such sensitivity, though, the final OK for Newman to leave probably came directly from Kim. Remarkably, the release came without—at least publicly—any of the small U.S. concessions or highly publicized visits that usually help free detainees. The confession and self-criticism, a standard demand in communist states, was all that was needed.
As for Newman himself, he readily acknowledged how naive he was in not realizing that the war, for the North Koreans, had not ended.
“After 60 years,” he observed following his release, “my assumption was that, like Germany or Japan or Vietnam, people forget. That was my mistake. It’s not true. The North Koreans still think the war is on.”
That was the case in 2013. Nearly a decade later, as Pyongyang engages in a new round of provocative missile tests, it’s clear that remains the case today. If North Korea, which has cut itself off from the world due to COVID-19, eventually decides to allow tourists to return, Newman’s experience will remain a cautionary tale.
4. FM nominee cautious on additional THAAD deployment
I am told the President-elect's intention is for South Korea to procure THAAD and have ROK soldiers trained to operate the system. If that is the case we will not see additional THADD before about 2026. I was under the impression the president-elect was going to request additional deployment of US systems but apparently that is not the case (and I do not think the US has the depth to deploy additional THAD to Korea without accepting greater risk somewhere else.
Do the Chinese get a vote in South Korean national security and their intent to procure advanced defensive weapons?
(2nd LD) FM nominee cautious on additional THAAD deployment | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with Park's remarks in paras 9-10, 16)
By Kim Eun-jung and Song Sang-ho
SEOUL, May 2 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's foreign minister nominee stressed the need Monday for "in-depth" deliberations on whether to deploy additional U.S.-made THAAD missile defense systems here, in an apparent sign of cautiousness on the geopolitically charged issue.
During his confirmation hearing, Park Jin responded to a lawmaker's question about President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol's campaign pledge to bring in more THAAD systems, which opponents say would undermine ties with China, South Korea's top trade partner.
China has opposed Korea's hosting of the THAAD system, arguing the anti-missile asset undermines its security interests. The installation of a THAAD battery here in 2017 triggered apparent Chinese economic retaliation.
"We need to have in-depth discussions on what kind of result we will arrive at following a deep review by the incoming government," he said, noting the importance of insulating the economy from any negative fallout from security matters.
"(Additional THAAD deployment) was proposed to reinforce the air defense of the Seoul metropolitan area, as North Korea threatens us with various missiles," he added.
Despite his cautious stance, Park highlighted the "first task" of ensuring U.S. Forces Korea can normally operate its THAAD unit in the southeastern county of Seongju.
Since the THAAD battery was installed here, it has been in the status of "temporary installation" pending South Korea's environmental impact assessment.
"I think that there needs to be an environment for the normal operation of the THAAD battery, as access to the unit has been restricted, while living conditions for troops there are also poor," he said.
The four-term lawmaker also stressed the importance of "strategic communication" between South Korea and China to minimize potential risks of friction that could flare up in the process of Seoul bolstering its alliance with the U.S. and expanding its role in promoting "rules-based" international order.
"When we pursue a value-based diplomacy promoting liberal democracy, the rule of law and human rights, the fault line between South Korea and China at the end would be whether to preserve the rules-based order," he noted.
The nominee was negative about the idea of redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea. Instead, he vowed to reinforce the credibility of America's extended deterrence to South Korea by reactivating the allies' dialogue channel between the allies' foreign affairs and defense officials.
The Yoon administration will also remain committed to international cooperation for the implementation of sanctions on North Korea to make it realize "nothing can be achieved with its nuclear weapons," he said, while reaffirming the door for dialogue will remain open as well.
If Pyongyang moves toward "substantive progress" in denuclearization, the new government will consider providing humanitarian aid and economic cooperation, and discussing a possible peace treaty in coordination with the U.S., he said.
Park vowed to expand partnerships with the U.S. in "new-frontier" fields, including economic security and technologies, to further upgrade the security alliance into a "comprehensive strategic alliance."
He said the new government will seek to play a greater role in the region with a "positive" view on the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and the issue of whether to join working groups of the Quad, a U.S.-led security partnership also involving Australia, Japan and India.
"I understand the Quad is not a framework designed to pressure a certain nation," he said. "I think we have to take advantage of the Quad to expand our role and contribution in the Indo-Pacific region."
His first main task will be successfully preparing the summit between Yoon and U.S. President Joe Biden, slated for May 21.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
5. S.Korea should stand firm on security issues against China: FM nominee
Replace strategic ambiguity with strategic clarity.
S.Korea should stand firm on security issues against China: FM nominee
S.Korea should stand firm on security issues against China: FM nominee
South Korea should actively participate in global efforts to maintain peace and stability in South China Sea
Published : May 1, 2022 - 15:46
Updated : May 1, 2022 - 17:10
South Korean Foreign Minister nominee Park Jin speaks with reporters after arriving at his temporary office in Seoul on April 20 ahead of preparations for his parliamentary confirmation hearing. (Yonhap)
Foreign Minister nominee Park Jin has said South Korea should not discuss issues of undermining national security and sovereignty with China, expressing opposition to the Moon Jae-in government’s China policy including its commitment to the “Three Noes.”
Park clarified the dissimilarities between the incoming Yoon Suk-yeol government’s approach to China and its predecessor in a written statement presented to South Korea’s National Assembly on Saturday.
The nominee underscored the necessity for South Korea to firmly state its position on the issues of sovereignty, identity and major national interests and defend them against China in his answers submitted in the run-up to his confirmation hearing scheduled for Monday.
Park went on to say that the Moon government’s China policy “has not been up to scratch” in that context, pointing to its “Three Noes” policy as a bad example.
The “Three Noes” stems from a diplomatic clash in 2017 over the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery.
The Moon government promised China that the country would not deploy additional THAAD batteries, integrate into the US-led regional missile defense system, nor participate in trilateral military cooperation between South Korea, the US and Japan.
The nominee underlined that the “issues that constrain the country’s security and sovereignty cannot be the agenda for discussion” with China, suggesting that the Yoon government will take the issues off the table.
But Park took note of the significance of China as South Korea’s biggest trading partner and a major stakeholder in resolving North Korea’s nuclear issues.
The nominee elucidated that the Yoon government seeks to push forward China policy “based on mutual respect and cooperation, national interest and principles.” The incoming government pursues strengthening strategic communication to that end, he said.
President-elect Yoon has stood against his predecessor’s policy of “strategic ambiguity” vis-a-vis the growing US-China rivalry. Yoon has opted to reinforce the South Korea-US alliance. But at the same time, he has recognized the need to maintain and develop cooperation with China in light of trade volume and China’s leverage over North Korea.
S.Korea’s greater contribution to Indo-Pacific strategy
Park notably suggested that South Korea will make a greater contribution to the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy and its efforts to deter China’s challenges to the rules-based international order in the disputed South China Sea.
The nominee said South Korea “needs to actively participate in international efforts to maintain peace and stability as well as freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea.”
“It is necessary for us to play a more active role in line with the new government’s vision of becoming a ‘global pivotal state that contributes to (advancing) freedom, peace and prosperity’ in a situation where the acts of undermining the rules-based multilateral order in the region and escalating tensions in the South China Sea have recently continued,” he said.
Park cited China’s Coast Guard law, which passed in January 2021 and allows the authorities to use weapons to “stop the violation and eliminate the danger” at sea by foreign individuals and entities, as an example.
China also revised its Maritime Traffic Safety Law, which took effect in September 2021. The law requires advance notice from foreign submarines, nuclear-powered vessels, and “other vessels that may endanger the maritime traffic safety of China” before entering and exiting the Chinese “territorial sea.”
In addition, Park pointed out that the “security cooperation among South Korea, the US and Japan is more important than ever given that North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat has recently heightened.”
The move is in line with the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific engagement strategy, which aims to align and coordinate the three countries’ regional strategies and handle North Korea issues through trilateral channels.
Participation in Quad working groups
The foreign minister nominee also dispelled the concern that the Yoon government’s endorsement of joining the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) will lead to friction with China. The Quad is a strategic security dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the US.
“Cooperation with the Quad does not intend to exclude or target a specific country, but to expand mutually beneficial cooperation with the countries in the region in the fields where we can reap substantial benefits,” Park said.
Yoon has pledged to participate in working groups on COVID-19 vaccines, climate change and emerging technology under the auspices of the Quad to expand cooperation with members and other countries concerned. Then, he plans to carefully examine whether to join the Quad as a member while evaluating the outcomes of the multilateral coordination.
Park also said the South Korea-US Policy Consultation Delegation led by him had an in-depth discussion with the US on ways to enhance cooperation with countries in the Indo-Pacific region through various channels including the Quad in a separate statement submitted to the National Assembly on Friday.
The nominee also reiterated that the Yoon government will “revitalize high-level strategic communication between South Korea and China to better handle pending issues.” Park pledged to arrange and facilitate reciprocal state visits by Yoon and Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
Park underscored that Yoon and Xi “agreed to advance relations between South Korea and China in the spirit of mutual respect and cooperation” during their phone conversation on March 25.
Yoon has not sent a special delegation to China although his policy consultation delegations traveled to the US and Japan in April.
But Liu Xiaoming, special representative of the Chinese government on Korean Peninsula affairs, is set to travel to South Korea this week for the first time since his appointment in April 2021. The Chinese top nuclear envoy will have a first face-to-face meeting with his South Korean counterpart Noh Kyu-duk on Tuesday.
(dagyumji@heraldcorp.com)
6. Kim Jong-un Keeps Threatening Preemptive Nuclear Strikes
Of course that may be what Kim Jong-un intends - that his statements can have a wide range of interpretation.
Excerpts:
In a speech during the parade earlier last week, Kim also threatened to use nuclear weapons "if any forces try to violate the fundamental interests of our state."
"Fundamental interests" admits of a wide interpretation.
Kim Jong-un Keeps Threatening Preemptive Nuclear Strikes
May 02, 2022 13:10
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has once again threatened unspecified "hostile forces" with preemptive nuclear strikes, the second time in less than a week.
The official [North] Korean Central News Agency on Saturday quoted Kim as saying the North will continue developing nuclear weapons so it can "preemptively and thoroughly contain and frustrate all dangerous attempts and threatening moves, including ever-escalating nuclear threats from hostile forces, if necessary."
He made the remarks while praising top brass for a huge military parade in Pyongyang to mark the 90th anniversary of the army.
"Formidable striking power and overwhelming military power are lifelines that guarantee the security of our state and people and the future of the generations to come," he added.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (center) poses for a group photo with top military brass in Pyongyang, in this photo from the official [North] Korean Central News Agency on April 30. /Yonhap
In a speech during the parade earlier last week, Kim also threatened to use nuclear weapons "if any forces try to violate the fundamental interests of our state."
"Fundamental interests" admits of a wide interpretation.
7. Beijing concerned with rising North Korea tensions, envoy says in Seoul
But the envoy subtly puts the blame on the US, not KimJong-un. E.g., the "legitimate and reasonable concerns" of all parties really means north Korea has legitimate and reasonable concerns and the US is the threat).
Beijing concerned with rising North Korea tensions, envoy says in Seoul
SEOUL, May 2 (Reuters) - Beijing is concerned about the tense situation on the Korean peninsula, China's Korean affairs envoy said as he arrived for talks in Seoul this week, adding that both the symptoms and root cause of tensions needed to be addressed.
Amid stalled denuclearisation talks, North Korea has conducted a flurry of weapons tests this year, from hypersonic missiles to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
North Korea had not conducted an ICBM or nuclear weapons test since 2017. Officials in Seoul and Washington say there are signs of preparations for a new nuclear test.
The "legitimate and reasonable concerns of all parties" need to be acknowledged for there to be a political settlement, Liu Xiaoming, Special Representative of the Chinese Government on Korean Peninsula Affairs, told reporters at Seoul's airport late on Sunday.
"We call on all parties to stay cool-headed and exercise restraint, and we disapprove (of) actions by any party that could escalate tension," he said in a summary of his remarks on Twitter.
In his first visit to South Korea since taking office in April 2021, Liu is due to meet his South Korean counterpart, nuclear envoy Noh Kyu-duk, on Tuesday. He may also meet representatives of South Korean President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, who takes office on May 10, Yonhap news agency reported.
The United States has pushed for more United Nations sanctions on the North. But China and Russia have signalled opposition, arguing that sanctions should be eased to jumpstart talks and provide humanitarian relief to the impoverished North.
The issues on the peninsula can be resolved politically and China will continue to play a "positive role," Liu said.
However, the key to resolving the issues is in the hands of North Korea and the United States, he added.
Reporting by Josh Smith; Editing by Edwina Gibbs
8. North Korean leader praises youth for their role in recent military parade
And interrupting their studies for a month or so. And of course this kind of praise does not fill bellies.
North Korean leader praises youth for their role in recent military parade
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un praises students and young workers who participated in a massive military parade for demonstrating ardent patriotism, May 1. YonhapNorth Korean leader Kim Jong-un praised students and young workers who participated in a massive military parade for demonstrating ardent patriotism like no other country, state media reported Monday.
At the photo session held Sunday, Kim noted the "rosy future" of "our-style socialism" belongs to the youth and urged them to hasten their efforts toward this "sacred patriotic cause," according to the official Korean Central News Agency.
"Our youths have regarded the loyalty to the Party and revolution as their high honor and pride and spent their youthful days with ardent patriotism and high enthusiasm for the revolution and struggle," Kim was quoted as saying.
He stressed such proud traits are "peculiar to the Korean youths that can neither be seen nor be imitated in any society of the world."
Kim also expressed appreciation for their contribution in glorifying the anniversary of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army (KPRA) as an "unprecedented, grand festival of single-minded unity" and a "showcase theatre" of its national power.
Last Monday, the North staged the nighttime parade to celebrate the 90th founding anniversary of the KPRA and showcased key weapons, including its Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile.
The latest session comes after Kim earlier held photo sessions with the soldiers, broadcasting workers and commanding officers who took part in the parade, in a move seen as aimed at bolstering internal unity and loyalty.
Other officials attended the photo session, including Ri Il-hwan, a member of the ruling party's powerful politburo. (Yonhap)
9. Hoeryong’s security agency arrests party cadre for leaking secret documents
How much of this kind of activity goes on that is not detected? Had he been recruited? Was he under the control of an intelligence agency or are these simply trumped up charges?
Excerpts;
The authorities accused him of leaking secret internal documents to the outside world over several years, including orders and directives sent from the ruling party’s Central Committee to the provincial party committee.
The authorities began suspecting that Choe was a spy last year.
Hoeryong’s security agency arrests party cadre for leaking secret documents
The Ministry of State Security formed a special surveillance team that kept the man and his family under tight 24-hour watch for over a year
A photo of Hoeryong taken in 2013 (Raymond Cunningham, Flickr, Creative Commons)
The Ministry of State Security recently arrested a party cadre in Hoeryong, North Hamgyong Province, on charges of leaking secret internal documents, Daily NK has learned.
North Korean security authorities are in the midst of a “mop-up operation” against users of foreign-made mobile phones along the China-North Korea border. The arrest of the official shows that the authorities are not refraining from cracking down on party cadres, who play a leading role in supporting the regime.
According to a Daily NK source in North Hamgyong Province on Friday, a managing guidance officer with the organizational department of the Hoeryong party committee — a man identified by his family name of Choe — was suddenly arrested by the municipal branch of the Ministry of State Security on Apr. 7.
The authorities accused him of leaking secret internal documents to the outside world over several years, including orders and directives sent from the ruling party’s Central Committee to the provincial party committee.
The authorities began suspecting that Choe was a spy last year.
While ordinary people and even relatively better-off cadres were suffering from economic difficulties due to the prolonged closure of the China-North Korea border, Choe and his family lived an extravagant lifestyle, frequently going to high-priced restaurants and buying a lot of foreign goods.
Having received tips from locals about Choe’s lifestyle, the Ministry of State Security formed a special surveillance team that kept him and his family under tight 24-hour watch for over a year. They even mobilized a mobile radio detection unit to monitor his cell phone usage at night.
The charges against Choe grew especially clear after a ministry raid of his home turned up three foreign-made mobile phones and stacks of dollars and yuan.
An investigation of messages Choe sent and received through the Chinese messaging app WeChat revealed that he had forwarded 247 secret materials, written orders, and other documents to people outside the country.
The Ministry of State Security is now conducting an intensive investigation to learn if Choe passed on similar materials through international calls or text messages.
Officials at major agencies in North Hamgyong Province — including the provincial party and provincial branches of the Ministry of State Security and Ministry of Social Security — are on edge because Choe leaked secret documents from the Hoeryong municipal party committee’s organizational department. This department passes on party policy to partymembers and local residents and organizes various political events.
Daily NK’s source said that Choe’s arrest has been reported to the Central Committee since the official was allegedly using his position as a cadre in a key party organization to engage in espionage. Choe’s case may lead to investigations of other people involved and sweeping ideological probes of party cadres.
The source further said that while it would not be an exaggeration to say that people’s use of foreign-made mobile phones in the border region has been “annihilated,” the cadre’s arrest has frightened local residents even more. He added that locals believe that it is best not to contact the outside world because “it’s only a matter of time before one gets caught.”
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Kim Chae Hwan is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. He can be contacted at dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
10. Explaining the Impasse in Japan’s Relations with North Korea
Excerpts:
In fact, bilateral relations have only worsened over the two decades since that ground-breaking summit. North Korea now sees no need to beg for money from the “millennium enemy,” since it can get support from an economically developed China and South Korea provided it can relax economic sanctions by negotiating with the United States. After all, the North Korean economy has recovered compared to how it was immediately after the “March of Suffering,” while Japanese economic power has diminished in relative terms.
The memoirs of former National Security Advisor John Bolton describes in detail how Japan tried to obstruct the U.S.-North Korea summit. Knowing this, North Korea sees Japan as simply a nuisance. This explains the “an idiot by birth and a scoundrel with no human worth,” “a vulgar, ignorant, and inhuman reprobate,” and other abuse it hurled at the hardliner former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo.
Still, North Korea can’t afford to completely ignore Japan, which still has one card it can play. Tokyo might lack the ability to independently drive negotiations with North Korea, but it can influence the American president. In particular, former President Donald Trump trusted Abe more than he did Moon.
It remains unclear how effective the advice really was, but Abe repeatedly warned Trump not to make major concessions to North Korea. Of course, the final say will always be Washington’s, but Tokyo’s input can play a role. After all, Trump suddenly brought up the Japanese abduction issue during lunch with Kim, even though it was not on the agenda. If North Korea does want to reopen negotiations with the United States, it is quite likely that it will first try to maneuver Japan into silence.
Explaining the Impasse in Japan’s Relations with North Korea
Pyongyang is dismissive of Tokyo, but the latter still has an important card to play.
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Japan’s relations with North Korea seen frozen in time, showing none of the movement that has been seen in Pyongyang’s negotiations with the United States or South Korea. One need only visit the website of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has not updated its page on “Japan-North Korea relations” for more than four years. Given the lack of progress on the abduction issue, Japan has maintained a consistently hardline stance on North Korea, but how does North Korea view Japan?
The first point to make is that North Korea has lost interest in Japan. For a long time, North Korean media liked to refer to Japan as the “millennium enemy.” This phrase was repeated by the Rodong Sinmun 29 times in 2018 and 34 times in 2019, but only twice in 2020 and twice in 2021. This is a striking drop, even taking into account the large number of COVID articles on the page-six international section of the newspaper.
Another important aspect is that Japan is seen as a “lapdog for the United States.” Late last September, President of the State Affairs Commission Kim Jong-un gave a policy speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly, in which he said that, “The severe crises and challenges that the world faces today are numerous, but a more fundamental danger is the heavy hand and despotism of the United States and its lapdogs that are destroying the root of international peace and stability.” The idea is that the United States is at the center, and Japan does Washington’s bidding. This worldview holds that if there is progress in U.S.-North Korea relations, then Japan will naturally follow.
The same applies to North-South relations. President Moon Jae-in’s attempts to appease North Korea and despite repeated summit meetings and agreements with President Kim Jong-un, Pyongyang has not been able to extract any economic support from Seoul. The hurdle is UN economic sanctions on North Korea, which have not been relaxed, in turn a reflection of the U.S.-North Korea impasse. The lesson that Pyongyang has learned from the Moon Jae-in administration over the last five years is that little tangible can be achieved in North-South relations until there is a breakthrough with Washington.
Returning to Japan-North Korea relations, with virtually no movement of people or goods between the two countries, the Japan team at the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also fading into insignificance. At the Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies, which trains foreign-language specialists, only around 20 students are majoring in Japanese. The Japanese faculty used to be on a par with those for English, Chinese and Russian; today, it exists as a department within the “Ethnic Languages College,” alongside languages like Urdu and Romanian.
Twenty years ago, at the first ever Japan-North Korea summit, President Kim Jong-il acknowledged that the abductions of Japanese citizens had taken place and apologized to Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro. This was prompted by the promise of a large sum (said to be 10 billion dollars) if relations could be normalized. These “normalization funds” still have a latent appeal to Pyongyang, yet there are no signs of Japan-North Korean relations improving.
In fact, bilateral relations have only worsened over the two decades since that ground-breaking summit. North Korea now sees no need to beg for money from the “millennium enemy,” since it can get support from an economically developed China and South Korea provided it can relax economic sanctions by negotiating with the United States. After all, the North Korean economy has recovered compared to how it was immediately after the “March of Suffering,” while Japanese economic power has diminished in relative terms.
The memoirs of former National Security Advisor John Bolton describes in detail how Japan tried to obstruct the U.S.-North Korea summit. Knowing this, North Korea sees Japan as simply a nuisance. This explains the “an idiot by birth and a scoundrel with no human worth,” “a vulgar, ignorant, and inhuman reprobate,” and other abuse it hurled at the hardliner former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo.
Still, North Korea can’t afford to completely ignore Japan, which still has one card it can play. Tokyo might lack the ability to independently drive negotiations with North Korea, but it can influence the American president. In particular, former President Donald Trump trusted Abe more than he did Moon.
It remains unclear how effective the advice really was, but Abe repeatedly warned Trump not to make major concessions to North Korea. Of course, the final say will always be Washington’s, but Tokyo’s input can play a role. After all, Trump suddenly brought up the Japanese abduction issue during lunch with Kim, even though it was not on the agenda. If North Korea does want to reopen negotiations with the United States, it is quite likely that it will first try to maneuver Japan into silence.
ISOZAKI Atsuhito
ISOZAKI Atsuhito is a professor at Keio University.
11. Kim Jong Un orders nuclear energy ministry to visit candidate sites for new nuclear power plant
They could have had two light water nuclear power plants operational by now had they lived up to their agreements.
Kim Jong Un orders nuclear energy ministry to visit candidate sites for new nuclear power plant
North Korea’s interest in nuclear energy is aimed at expanding the production of electricity needed to carry out the country’s five-year plan
2022.05.02 1:52pm
The nuclear facility in Yongbyon County, South Pyongan Province, North Korea. (Yonhap)
The nuclear facility in Yongbyon County, South Pyongan Province, North Korea. (Yonhap)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un recently ordered the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry to visit two or three candidate sites for the construction of a nuclear power plant and submit action plans.
This development comes as Kim calls for the building of nuclear power plants to solve North Korea’s chronic energy shortages.
According to a Daily NK source in Pyongyang on Friday, Kim approved a working-level plan on Apr. 24 to focus state resources on the nuclear energy industry. North Korea’s interest in nuclear energy is aimed at expanding the production of electricity needed to carry out the country’s five-year plan, which started in 2021 and is expected to end in 2025.
The source said the party called for the creation of a “launchpad” to resolve the energy issue in “a groundbreaking way” by beginning the construction of a nuclear power station for power generation using the “scientific basis indigenously developed over the last 10 years based on [North Korea’s] autonomy and inalienable right to make peaceful use of the atom.”
According to the source, the plan approved by Kim calls for discussion of working-level plans to improve energy production based on making the atomic energy sector more Juche-based, modern, scientific, and self-reliant. It simultaneously called on experts to visit two or three candidate sites for the nuclear power plant and submit follow-up plans by early October.
Kim’s call to conduct feasibility reviews of candidate sites is the first step in picking an optimal site to build a nuclear power station, but also reveals North Korea’s intention to gradually build even more nuclear power stations.
Within the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry, officials are promoting the order as a reflection of the party’s decision to greatly develop the nuclear power industry, while also claiming that North Korea’s belt tightening to develop the nuclear sector since the “Arduous March” was not just to build nuclear weapons, but also to expand production of electricity “desperately needed for people’s lives.”
North Korea’s leadership presented plans to bolster energy production to overcome chronic electricity shortages during the Eighth Party Congress in January of last year. However, with repairs underway at existing thermal and hydroelectric power stations due to antiquated equipment, the country’s electricity generation has slowed.
The source said North Korea has responded to the drop in electricity production by ordering the indigenous construction of reactors to raise the percentage of power generated by nuclear energy, formally entrusting the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry with the task.
North Korea has issued a directive calling for nuclear experts, scientists, and technicians to take part in the electricity expansion plan overseen by the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry. The directive has instructed experts to participate in visits to candidate sites, and calls for technical research into the light-water reactors the new plant would require.
The source said the party plans to build about seven or eight nuclear power plants to defeat “enemy” sanctions and schemes to isolate and “crush” North Korea. He said the party is emphasizing that the electricity expansion plan is significant for future generations because it would allow people to live “civilized” lives with electrical lights 24 hours a day and open the way for North Korea to become a major economic power.
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
12. N. Koreans working for Li-Ning contractor are suffering from low pay and back-breaking work
Can you say working as slave labor?
N. Koreans working for Li-Ning contractor are suffering from low pay and back-breaking work
“North Korean laborers in Dandong work every day from 7:30 AM to 5:30 PM. After eating dinner, they go back to work from 8 PM to 10 PM," a source told Daily NK
North Korean workers at a clothing factory in China’s Jilin Province. (Daily NK)
North Korean laborers employed by a contractor of the Chinese sporting goods firm Li-Ning are suffering from low pay and high-intensity work, Daily NK has learned.
A source in China told Daily NK on Apr. 12 that several clothing manufacturers in Dandong, Liaoning Province, in collaboration with the Li-Ning head office, are making sports clothing and one of the companies employs around 600-700 North Korean laborers.
The source said that North Korean laborers dispatched overseas have been working for the last seven or eight years at this company, which is around 15 kilometers away from Dandong. Daily NK was unable to confirm whether North Korean laborers are working at other Li-Ning contractors.
The source reported that he was taken aback by the fact that such a large number of North Korean laborers have been working there for such a long time and that this fact is not well known to the outside world.
Chinese companies recruit considerable numbers of North Korean laborers because they can pay lower wages for high-intensity work than they would to local Chinese workers.
The source said that North Korean laborers at the company near Dandong receive monthly wages of about RMB 2,300 (around USD 348). “There was talk of a pay raise, but that fell by the wayside due to COVID-19,” he added.
The average monthly wage of Chinese workers in the logging industry is RMB 8,000 – 12,000 (about USD 1,210 – 1,815). In comparison, the pay North Korean laborers receive for their work is remarkably low.
North Korean laborers at Li-Ning contractors in Dandong also receive less than the average monthly wage of North Korean workers in China of RMB 2,800 – 3,200 (USD 423 – 484).
Furthermore, these workers suffer from long hours and high-intensity labor, a situation criticized even in China as “slave labor.”
“North Korean laborers in Dandong work every day from 7:30 AM to 5:30 PM. After eating dinner, they go back to work from 8 PM to 10 PM,” the source said. “The intensity of labor there is terribly high and they work like machines without even one day of rest.”
Chinese laborers working like this would earn RMB 200 (around USD 30) per day, which comes to RMB 5,000 – 6,000 (around USD 756 – 907) per month; however, North Korean laborers do not even earn RMB 100 (around USD 15) per day for the same work, he said.
“Chinese companies say they can’t make any clothes without North Korean laborers. Nearly all Chinese clothing companies in China hire North Koreans,” the source added.
US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), part of the US Department of Homeland Security, revealed on Mar. 15 through its homepage that it will seize goods manufactured by Li-Ning at all US ports of entry in compliance with the “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.” According to the agency, the decision to do this came after confirmation that Li-Ning used North Korean labor in the process of manufacturing its goods.
According to the source, the sanctions have not led to an immediate change in the work environment at the factory in Dandong.
“Because the US is not Li-Ning’s primary customer, and due to the fact that the measures have only recently been implemented, it has not yet made a difference and the factories are still operating without issue,” the source said. “We’ll have to wait a month or two to see if these sanctions will have any effect on North Korean workers.”
Translated by Jason Mallet. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Mun Dong Hui is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about his articles to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
13. Colombia chooses South Korea’s TA-50, FA-50 as next jet trainers, officials say
South Korea's defense industry is being pretty formidable.
Colombia chooses South Korea’s TA-50, FA-50 as next jet trainers, officials say
SANTIAGO, Chile — Colombia’s Air Force has chosen a mix of TA-50 and FA-50 Golden Eagles as its next jet trainers, military sources told Defense News.
The Air Force plans to acquire at least 20 advanced jet trainers with air-to-air and air-to-ground combat capabilities under a project estimated to be worth $600 million.
The Air Force has denied negotiations are underway to procure the Golden Eagle variants, made by Korea Aerospace Industries. But local sources, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to the press, said the Colombian government has acknowledged the Air Force’s preference for the South Korean aircraft and has insisted negotiations with KAI also involve Leonardo.
The Italian firm was shortlisted during the competition process and had offered its M-346 advanced jet/lead-in fighter trainer. The inclusion of competitors is meant to help Colombia negotiate the best deal.
Colombia is buying new aircraft to replace its Cessna A-37B Dragonfly twin-engine, light-attack jets, which were retired in June 2021. They were used in both counterinsurgency missions and as tactical trainers. The new aircraft are also expected to temporarily fill a capability gap left by the aging fleet of Israeli-made Kfir jets, Colombia’s main combat aircraft. The Air Force is to begin retiring its Kfirs in 2023, most likely without a replacement on hand.
Fitted with ELM-052 active electronically scanned array radars from Israeli firm Elta Systems and armed with beyond-visual-range Derby missiles from Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, Colombia’s Kfirs are among the top operational fighters in South America. But maintenance and operation costs have grown too expensive, leading to limits on flight hours and forcing the Air Force to decline invitations to international exercises, such as Red Flag in the U.S.
This would not be the first time Colombia and South Korea work together. Colombia was one of the countries that contributed troops to United Nations efforts in the Korean War.
In 2012, the Colombian Navy ordered an undisclosed number of South Korean-made SSM-700K anti-ship missiles to upgrade its four German-built Padilla-class ships. And in 2014 and in 2020, the South Korean Navy donated secondhand corvettes to its Colombian counterpart.
The Golden Eagle was developed in collaboration with Lockheed Martin in the late 1990s and first introduced into service in 2005. It is powered by a General Electric F404 turbofan, can reach speeds of Mach 1.5 and has a flight range of 1,850 kilometers (1,150 miles). It can be armed with short-range, infrared-guided air-to-air missiles and air-to-ground weapons. There are plans to integrate the beyond-visual-range missiles AIM-120 and Derby as well as light AESA radar technology.
14. Most Seoul citizens walk around with masks on despite eased rules
Most Seoul citizens walk around with masks on despite eased rules | Yonhap News Agency
By Kim Han-joo
SEOUL, May 2 (Yonhap) -- Most citizens on the streets of Seoul walked around with their face masks on despite the lifting of the outdoor mask mandate Monday, as many were still wary of the virus or felt awkward about going maskless or found it cumbersome to put the mask back on when going indoors.
After nearly 1 1/2 years of mandating a mask anywhere outside homes, South Korea ended the outdoor mask rule starting earlier in the day in one of the most dramatic rollbacks of the country's COVID-19 restrictions.
Mask wearing has become no longer mandatory in outdoor places, except when people attend gatherings of 50 or more or sports and cultural events with potentially larger crowds. The mask mandate for indoors and public transport, however, remains in place.
Kang Hyun-doo, a 77-year-old jogger, was still wearing a mask while working out at a park in Seoul's financial district of Yeouido, voicing concerns that easing the rule may be "premature."
"I think it is wrong to lift the outdoor mask mandate when the ratio of infected people per population is still very high," Kang said.
The omicron wave has been on the decline after the country's daily infections reached the peak of 621,178 cases on March 17. On Monday, the country's new COVID-19 cases fell to around 20,000, marking the lowest level in nearly three months.
Noting that most people he saw walking along the street still had their masks on, Kang vowed to continue to wear a mask for "some time" for the sake of himself as well as others.
Lunchtime at Seoul's central district of Gwanghwamun painted a similar picture as citizens headed out to eat together with most of them wearing face masks.
Majority of workers kept their masks on even after leaving their office buildings, with an exception of one or two who had their masks off while drinking takeaway coffee.
Kim Joon-hwan, a 37-year-old banker working in Seoul's central Euljiro area, said he would continue to wear a mask even if restrictions are eased further.
Yet, Kim -- who fully recovered after being infected with the omicron variant -- said he changed to a lighter and disposable mask.
"I am used to wearing a mask ... it has become like a habit," he said. "I am doing this for the sake of public interest."
A 38-year-old office worker surnamed Kim, meanwhile, hailed the eased rule, saying that the latest move is in line with many countries that eased mandatory measures earlier.
Not having to wear a mask was also "very liberating and freeing" for 31-year-old Park Hyun-ah who had her mask off while leaving for work in Seoul's eastern Songpa Ward.
Park said she believed most people were still wearing masks outdoors out of habit and that people will eventually take off their masks sooner or later.
South Korea had already removed most of its pandemic restrictions last month, including a 10-person limit on private gatherings, a midnight curfew at restaurants, coffee shops and bars and a ban on food consumption at movie theaters, concert halls and indoor sports venues.
Yet, the government recommends mask wearing when it is difficult for people to keep a 1-meter distance from each other at gatherings and in circumstances where lots of droplets of saliva could be expelled, such as shouting and singing.
The mask mandate is also highly recommended for those who tested positive for COVID-19 or who are at high risk of infections.
khj@yna.co.kr
(END)
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
