Quotes of the Day:
“The responsibility of great states is to serve and not to dominate the world.”
-Harry S. Truman, Message to Congress, April 16, 1945
"If you find your opponent in a strong position costly to force, you should leave him a line of retreat as the quickest way of loosening his resistance. It should, equally, be a principle of policy, especially in war, to provide your opponent with a ladder by which he can climb down."
-Sir Basil H. Liddel-Hart (Strategy, 1954)
“A trained and disciplined guerrilla is much more than a patriotic peasant, workman, or student armed with an antiquated fowling-piece and home-made bomb. His endoctrination begins even before he is taught to shoot accurately, and it is unceasing. The end product is an intensely loyal and politically alert fighting man.”
-Brig Gen S.B. Griffith in the Introduction to Mao’s On Guerrilla Warfare, 1961.
Note: There are a number of Asia/Biden trip articles in the National Security News section that include north Korea among the broader Asia issues.
1. Biden arrives in South Korea on first Asia trip as president
2. Biden Lands in Asia With Semiconductors and Security in Mind
3. South Korean army training 'very, very bad': former senior ROK commander
4. Opinion: Why North Korea's Covid-19 outbreak could shock the world
5. North Korea’s Covid caseload passes 2 million amid global concern about regime’s pandemic plan
6. N. Korea's low death count questioned amid COVID-19 outbreak
7. North Korea: Fighting Covid with traditional medicine
8. US denial of Biden-Moon meeting triggers speculation
9. Kim Jong Un Creates an Opportunity Out of North Korea’s Covid Crisis
10. Korea, US to launch dialogue channel on economic security
11. Joining Biden’s IPEF is a no-brainer
12. Security, economic security, top Biden’s Asia trip
13. Are Japan-Korea relations on Biden’s trip agenda?
14. What Comes Next in North Korea’s Battle With Omicron?
15. Kim Jong Un's harsh criticism of COVID-19 medicine distribution failures not welcomed by everyone
16. Ministry looking into reported arrest of N.K. defectors in China
17. Seoul court again orders N.K. leader to pay compensation to abductees' families
18. Time to Elevate US-South Korea Partnership With Strategic Refinement
19. U.S. labels N. Korea as country not cooperating in anti-terrorism efforts in draft notice
20. Gov't postpones planned opening of Yongsan park site near presidential office
1. Biden arrives in South Korea on first Asia trip as president
Excerpts:
Biden’s visit will be the first head-of-state meeting for Yoon, a first-time politician with no foreign policy experience. It is the first time a U.S. president’s visit has taken place at such an early stage in the South Korean presidency, according to local media reports.
The core of Yoon’s policy is strengthening the U.S.-South Korean alliance and taking a more assertive role on the global stage as the world’s 10th-largest economy, rather than shaping foreign policy goals solely related to the country’s volatile neighbor to the north.
“This will be an opportunity to build that relationship from the ground up,” Jake Sullivan, U.S. national security adviser, said about the two leaders’ meeting.
Biden arrives in South Korea on first Asia trip as president
Updated May 20, 2022 at 5:04 a.m. EDT|Published May 20, 2022 at 4:30 a.m. EDT
PYEONGTAEK, South Korea — President Biden touched down in South Korea on Friday in the first visit to Asia of his presidency, kicking off a five-day tour designed to underscore his administration’s diplomatic and economic commitment to the region in the face of a rising China.
Biden’s first remarks here will nod to a top domestic priority for the administration, calling for final passage of a sweeping bill in Congress meant to boost U.S. competitiveness against China that House and Senate negotiators are scrambling to finalize.
His speech also comes as his administration is struggling with the economic and political impact of rising inflation in the United States, with Biden planning to make the case that the legislation will ultimately strengthen supply chains and lower costs for consumers.
Accompanied by newly inaugurated South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, Biden will also tour a Samsung facility that will serve as a model for a plant the company is building in Texas — a sample of the president’s “foreign policy for the middle class” ethos that has guided his administration.
But Biden will confront a slew of other challenges during his trip to Asia. His visit kicks off amid signs that North Korea is preparing to conduct a nuclear test or a long-range ballistic missile test as early as this week, according to intelligence from Washington, Seoul and Tokyo. However, it would be unusual for North Korea to conduct a missile test while a U.S. president is on the Korean Peninsula.
Still, the looming potential missile test underscores the lack of progress on efforts to denuclearize North Korea, which has pursued an aggressive expansion of its weapons program since the 2019 collapse of diplomatic talks with the United States. North Korea seeks sanctions relief before agreeing to talks, and the Biden administration has not indicated interest in lifting them.
Biden’s visit will serve as an important early test of leadership for Yoon, who took office 10 days ago.
Biden’s visit will be the first head-of-state meeting for Yoon, a first-time politician with no foreign policy experience. It is the first time a U.S. president’s visit has taken place at such an early stage in the South Korean presidency, according to local media reports.
The core of Yoon’s policy is strengthening the U.S.-South Korean alliance and taking a more assertive role on the global stage as the world’s 10th-largest economy, rather than shaping foreign policy goals solely related to the country’s volatile neighbor to the north.
“This will be an opportunity to build that relationship from the ground up,” Jake Sullivan, U.S. national security adviser, said about the two leaders’ meeting.
Their trip to the Samsung electronics plant highlights the growing role South Korea is playing in the management of the semiconductor supply chain, which the United States has sought to strengthen as it looks for alternatives to depending on China for semiconductors and other technologies.
Yoon has said that he wants South Korea to step up its economic and strategic commitments to expand its alliance with the United States beyond military coordination. Yoon is expected to announce that South Korea will join the U.S.-proposed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which seeks to strengthen American economic cooperation with countries in the region and is in part designed to counter China’s influence.
But South Korea is still economically dependent on China, its biggest trading partner, and the presidential office has already rushed to clarify that Seoul is not seeking to exclude Beijing from global supply chains.
While Yoon has signaled that he would take a tougher approach on China, particularly on the issue of human rights, it remains to be seen whether his actions will match his rhetoric.
Lee and Kim reported from Seoul.
2. Biden Lands in Asia With Semiconductors and Security in Mind
Excerpts:
Samsung is responsible for a third of global memory chip production and controls just less than 20% of outsourced chips for tech clients. South Korea’s largest company has been expanding its facilities at home and in the US to keep up with soaring demand.
The Biden administration has been pushing Congress to approve a broad China competition bill that includes $52 billion in funding for domestic semiconductor research and manufacturing. The president has recently gotten personally engaged in urging Congress to act.
“Pass the damn bill and send it to me,” Biden said earlier this month. “If we do, it’s going to help bring down prices, bring home jobs, and power America’s manufacturing comeback.”
Biden Lands in Asia With Semiconductors and Security in Mind
- US president to tour Samsung chip plant after arriving
- North Korea may be looking at provocations during visit
May 20, 2022, 12:26 AM EDTUpdated onMay 20, 2022, 4:41 AM EDT
President Joe Biden arrived in South Korea, where he’s set to visit a Samsung Electronics Co. semiconductor complex Friday as he seeks to bolster supply chains that reduce reliance on China.
Biden’s first trip to Asia as president, which runs through Tuesday, also includes Japan. He’ll meet with regional leaders in a bid to firm up support for his plans to help Ukraine fend off Russia’s invasion and counter security threats posed by China and North Korea, which may conduct its first nuclear test since 2017 with Biden nearby.
US President Joe Biden disembarks from Air Force One at Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek, South Korea.Photographer: SeongJoon Cho/Bloomberg
Biden’s trip to the Samsung facility underscores the emphasis he’s placed on strengthening semiconductor alliances among the world’s largest chip making countries to try to ease shortages that have dragged on the global economy. The complex in Pyeongtaek, south of Seoul, houses the some of biggest chip production lines in the world and makes a wide range of products from memory chips to logic chips for Qualcomm Inc. and other companies.
Samsung is responsible for a third of global memory chip production and controls just less than 20% of outsourced chips for tech clients. South Korea’s largest company has been expanding its facilities at home and in the US to keep up with soaring demand.
The Biden administration has been pushing Congress to approve a broad China competition bill that includes $52 billion in funding for domestic semiconductor research and manufacturing. The president has recently gotten personally engaged in urging Congress to act.
“Pass the damn bill and send it to me,” Biden said earlier this month. “If we do, it’s going to help bring down prices, bring home jobs, and power America’s manufacturing comeback.”
Lawmakers, meanwhile, still have to work out differences between the Senate- and House-passed versions of the legislation, a process that could take until the end of the summer.
The White House has often used the continuing global semiconductor shortage and its impact on inflation as arguments for approval of the massive subsidies program. But analysts say the shortage will last through 2023, and the domestic supply of chips coming online will not meaningfully alleviate the crunch.
Samsung announced new investment plans in the US late last year. The company chose Texas in a $17 billion plan as the site of an advanced chip plant set to break ground this year, with a target to kick off operations in the second half of 2024.
Face-to-Face meetings
Biden is set meet new South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol soon after arrival. The conservative Yoon, who took office on May 10, has backed support for Biden’s supply chain initiatives and intends to join a new regional economic grouping the US president is expected to unveil in Japan.
The US and its partners also will kick off the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, part of the Biden administration’s efforts to counter China’s clout in Asia, following the US’s withdrawal from talks on the Trans-Pacific Partnership regional trade agreement under former President Donald Trump.
But some Asian nations are reluctant to sign up to the economic framework because they’re unsure what it will mean, US Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel said.
Some details framework’s details remain hazy, and the Biden administration has stressed it won’t include lower tariffs or better access to US markets.
Nuclear threat?
North Korea, which has a habit of timing its provocations to political events, may be preparing to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile or conduct a nuclear test to coincide with Biden’s trip to the region, security officials in the US and South Korea said this week.
The U.S. push to isolate Russia over Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine, coupled with increasing animosity toward China, has allowed North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un to strengthen his nuclear deterrent without fear of facing more sanctions at the United Nations Security Council.
There’s little chance Russia or China would support any measures against North Korea, as they did in 2017 following a series of weapons tests that prompted Trump to warn of “fire and fury” from Pyongyang.
3. South Korean army training 'very, very bad': former senior ROK commander
Probably not a good conference to lead into the POTUS visit to Korea. There will be deterrence impacts here that strategic influence will not easily overcome - this is one where actions must lead the words on readiness.
Quite an exchange. See critical comments from LTG Burleson, LTG Chun, and Dr. Duyeon Kim.
But all American officers need to look in the mirror and reflect on these words:
It’s worth noting that Chun praised Burleson “as a godsend because he truly tries to understand the Koreans.” The bad news is that Chun said he finds only “one in 10” American officers do that.
South Korean army training 'very, very bad': former senior ROK commander - Breaking Defense
At the end of the panel, the US commander of the Eighth Army in Korea, Lt. Gen. Bill Burleson, made a point of stating categorically that the forces facing North Korea are ready to fight.
U.S. Soldiers assigned to Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment and Republic Of Korea Soldiers (ROK) with 8th Division, 137th Battalion conducts an urban breaching with South Korean troops at Rodriguez Live Fire Range, South Korea, March 9, 2016. The training is the second leg of Pacific Pathways. (U.S Army photo by Staff. Sgt Kwadwo Frimpong/released)
LANPAC: In a stark critique of the 420,000-strong South Korean army, the former deputy commander of South Korea’s First Army described the “conditions for training are very, very bad,” driven by high turnover of troops every year and the lack of live fire training.
In-Bum Chun, former deputy commander of South Korea’s First Army, said after his panel on “Deterring Aggression through Joint and Coalition Readiness” that he believes it will take five years to make a significant improvement in the readiness of Republic of Korea troops. A key, he believes, will be creation of a senior NCO corps — experienced solders who can help because of their deep experience — that can speak truth to power to officers. The current Confucian culture makes this difficult with its emphasis on respect for hierarchy, but that, he said hopefully, is beginning to wear thin.
Chun, who retired in July 2016, offered a few metrics to illustrate the problem, citing 60% turnover of troops every year because of Korea’s conscript force system. He also said he knew of many troops who had not experienced live fire training for a decade.
“So, we just can’t manage the kind of level of training that we used to be amazed that others require,” he said during the panel. Many commanders consider live fire training crucial to prepare troops for the reality of combat.
He appealed for help from the United States to help build the NCO corps and to rectify the training situation.
Another panelist, a Korean expert with the Center for New American Security, pointed to the Trump administration’s decision to eliminate many military exercises, saying that “US-South Korea joint military readiness has severely deteriorated over the past five years.” Duyeon Kim, the CNAS expert based in Seoul, also pointed to the recently defeated “South Korean progressive administration” as a cause of lower readiness.
At the end of the panel the US commander of the Eighth Army in Korea, Lt. Gen. Bill Burleson, made a point of stating categorically that the forces facing North Korea are ready to fight.
“They’re flying reconnaissance aircraft as we speak. They are Patriot crew members. They are artillery batteries and missile batteries that are standing ready to respond within minutes. There’s a network that’s in place. They are an armored Brigade Combat Team. There are all the frontline ROK corps with young men and women standing looking into North Korea. And despite the challenges that you’ve heard described,” Burleson said, “they’re ready”.
It’s worth noting that Chun praised Burleson “as a godsend because he truly tries to understand the Koreans.” The bad news is that Chun said he finds only “one in 10” American officers do that.
4. Opinion: Why North Korea's Covid-19 outbreak could shock the world
Dr. Kee Park provides useful information about the north Korean medical system. He acknowledges that Kim Jong-un must be more flexible about recovering outside aid.
But we cannot provide aid if Kim does not ask for it and accept it. Does he envision a humanitarian invasion? And I believe we (the ROK, US, UN, and international community) have offered aid. We cannot force Kim to accept it.
Excerpt:
The monitoring and evaluation requirements should not be a sticking point right now -- people's lives are at stake. We should also take a solidarity approach and not demand North Korea ask for help first. Our hands should go out first; their need is clear.
But I disagree that we should forgo transparency and proper monitoring. First, the regime does not have the infrastructure for vaccination operations (transportation and cold storage as Kim demands the MNRA vaccines). It does not have the medical capabilities to test and treat large numbers. If we provide aid without any oversight it is likely to lead to continued suffering and deaths because they cannot properly administer it. We will just be throwing away the aid or it will only be used to are for the regime elite and possibly some of the military. Transparency and oversight is necessary to ensure the aid gets to all those who need it. We need to ensure that it happens if our aid is accepted.
Opinion: Why North Korea's Covid-19 outbreak could shock the world
CNN · by Opinion by Dr. Kee B. Park
Dr. Kee B. Park (@keepark) is director of the Korea Health Policy Project at Harvard Medical School. He has worked alongside North Korean doctors during more than 20 visits to North Korea and is a member of the National Committee on North Korea, which facilitates principled engagement between the US and North Korea. The views expressed in this commentary are his own. Read more opinion on CNN.
(CNN)If I learned one thing after performing countless operations alongside surgeons in Pyongyang over the past 15 years, it's North Koreans do not throw anything away.
I have used scalpels dulled from reuse to make incisions. One time I watched an anesthesiologist use his hands to squeeze a bag every three to four seconds to ventilate a patient for several hours during an operation.
It was business as usual in a place where medical equipment like mechanical ventilators are scarce. And I have always admired their ability to work with limited resources.
But now I fear for the safety of the doctors and nurses, as well as their ability to care for the surge of Covid-19 patients in the hospitals.
Last week, North Korea announced the first confirmed case of Covid-19 inside the country. Since then, we have learned of at least 1.72 million "fever cases," with about half in quarantine and dozens of deaths so far. The Omicron BA.2 variant was found in at least one of the deaths.
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With symptomatic cases accounting for roughly 7% of the population of 25 million, the outbreak is a disaster for North Korea.
We need to help North Korea immediately. Given the entire population has yet to be vaccinated, the death toll could be unprecedented.
North Korea, like China, has adopted a zero-Covid strategy for managing the virus. To its credit, this strategy of prioritizing the prevention of the virus from entering its borders seemed highly effective, with apparently no confirmed cases for over two years.
But the highly transmissible Omicron variants changed everything. China had successfully thwarted the virus until recently, succumbing to drastic lockdowns in several cities, including Shanghai.
Now, the virus has breached North Korea's defenses. And the relatively weak ability of North Korea to respond to the massive outbreak is alarming.
First, they lack medical countermeasures. The capacity to treat large numbers of patients with severe respiratory illness is limited. They need oxygen, IV fluids, ventilators, personal protective equipment (especially for the health care workers) and antibiotics.
But the most valuable items right now are the newly developed antivirals against Covid-19. Paxlovid appears to be effective against the Omicron BA.2 variant, can be taken by mouth and does not require any special storage and transportation methods. We should send these medical countermeasures as soon as possible. People are dying now, and we can and should help.
Secondly, their testing capacity is woefully inadequate. According to the WHO South-East Asia Region office situation reports, North Korea has been testing about 1,500 people each week for Covid-19.
If this is their maximum capacity, it would be impossible to test the current number of symptomatic patients -- 1.72 million and counting -- let alone their contacts. They also need Covid-19 tests to confirm diagnosis before initiating Paxlovid. We should send diagnostics in sufficient quantities now; they are flying blind.
Third, the country is food insecure. Lockdowns are hard on the people, especially the poorest. Even stricter isolation measures are expected now that the virus has entered the country.
Immediate food aid is needed to mitigate hunger for those who lack the supplies to weather the lockdowns.
North Korea has not vaccinated its population. They have rejected offers of vaccines, presumably believing they could ride out the pandemic in isolation until it goes away.
The risk of the virus entering via cargo and possibly foreigners was not worth the benefit the vaccines provided. They were overreliant on their ability to keep the virus out and therefore unprepared for the outbreak.
The breach and the ensuing outbreak require a new strategy that can increase the protection of the population from further outbreaks. mRNA vaccines are effective against Omicron BA.2. Sufficient quantities of vaccines and deployment supplies should be offered to North Korea quickly. Our research has shown North Korea can deploy mRNA vaccines using the existing network of refrigerators.
The first group of people to be vaccinated should be the frontline health workers as they are facing an onslaught of Covid-19 patients each day.
When delivering assistance to North Korea, the "who" and "how" are as important as the "what." A nationwide crisis requires all actors to work together.
The United Nations is in the best position to coordinate the different agencies, such as the World Health Organization, UNICEF, World Food Programme and nongovernmental organizations; to manage the complex regulations and logistics; and to help implement them alongside the North Korean government.
The monitoring and evaluation requirements should not be a sticking point right now -- people's lives are at stake. We should also take a solidarity approach and not demand North Korea ask for help first. Our hands should go out first; their need is clear.
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North Korea needs to become more flexible as well. They should not try to manage the crisis by patching together isolated aid packages from individual organizations. We need a clear focal point of communication to coordinate with the international community. The obvious counterpart to the United Nations is the DPRK Mission in New York.
To be sure, aid to North Korea is controversial. On the same day the outbreak was announced, North Korea fired three short-range ballistic missiles. Perhaps we can have a moratorium on any military activity on the Korean Peninsula until the outbreak is contained. Such activity diverts precious resources and attention away from the urgent needs of the people.
All sides need to have their eyes on containing the pandemic. It's in everyone's interest to help North Korea contain this outbreak -- and prevent future ones.
CNN · by Opinion by Dr. Kee B. Park
5. North Korea’s Covid caseload passes 2 million amid global concern about regime’s pandemic plan
Sadly and tragically, north Korea may become a laboratory for the study of how the COVID variants attack an unvaccinated and sequestered or isolated population.
North Korea’s Covid caseload passes 2 million amid global concern about regime’s pandemic plan
Experts believe North Korean authorities are underreporting deaths to prove that their response has been effective
Experts have questioned North Korea’s claim that it is achieving “good results” in its battle against a Covid-19 outbreak, as the number of people with symptoms of the virus surpassed 2 million.
The regime reported 263,370 new fever cases on Friday and two deaths, taking the total caseload to 2.24 million, including 65 deaths, according to state news agency KCNA.
It did not report how many of those cases had tested positive for Covid but said the country was seeing “good results” in its battle against the virus.
The rising caseload and a lack of medical resources and vaccines has led the UN human rights agency to warn of “devastating” consequences for North Korea’s 25 million people, and World Health Organization officials worry an unchecked spread could give rise to deadlier new variants.
Cases of fever reported by the government had declined in the capital Pyongyang but risen in rural provinces. The figures were unlikely to be fully accurate, either due to error or deliberate manipulation, said Martyn Williams, a researcher at the US-based observer 38 North. “I doubt they represent the exact picture,” he said on Twitter.
Some North Korea watchers believe the regime was forced to acknowledge the Covid-19 outbreak last week because attempting to conceal the virus’s spread would have been futile and could have fuelled public discontent with the country’s leader, Kim Jong-un.
Instead, they believe North Korean authorities are underreporting deaths to prove that their response has been effective.
“It’s true that there has been a hole in its two and a half years of pandemic fighting,” said Kwak Gil Sup, head of One Korea Center, a website specialising in North Korea affairs. “But there is a saying that North Korea is ‘a theatre state,’ and I think they are massaging Covid-19 statistics.”
While North Korea is partly using the outbreak as a propaganda tool to cast Kim’s leadership in a favourable light, it has “a Plan B” and “a Plan C” to seek Chinese and other foreign aid if the pandemic gets out of hand, Kwak said.
Kee Park, a global health specialist at Harvard medical school who has worked on health care projects in North Korea, said earlier the number of new cases should start to slow as a result of strengthened preventive measures such as travel restrictions and keeping workers separated in groups according to their jobs.
But, Park said, North Korea will struggle to provide treatment for the already large number of people with Covid-19, adding that deaths could reach the tens of thousands.
Despite the caseload, the isolated country claimed that farming continued, factories were working and it was planning a state funeral for a former general.
“Even under the maximum emergency epidemic prevention situation, normal production is kept at key industrial sectors and large-scale construction projects are propelled without let-up,” KCNA said on Friday. “Good results are reported steadily in the ongoing anti-epidemic war.”
North Korea said on Wednesday the country’s virus outbreak was taking a “favourable turn”, although officials in South Korea say it is hard to draw a conclusion as it is unclear how North Korea is calculating the number of fever and Covid patients.
South Korea and the US have both offered to help North Korea fight the virus, including sending aid, but have not received a response, Seoul’s deputy national security adviser said this week.
6. N. Korea's low death count questioned amid COVID-19 outbreak
Like everything else in the north there are probably party directed "quotas" that can only be reported.
N. Korea's low death count questioned amid COVID-19 outbreak
AP · by HYUNG-JIN KIM · May 20, 2022
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korea said Friday that nearly 10% of its 26 million people have fallen ill and 65 people have died amid its first COVID-19 outbreak, as outside experts question the validity of its reported fatalities and worry about a possible humanitarian crisis.
After admitting the omicron outbreak last week following more than two years of claiming to be coronavirus-free, North Korea has said an unidentified fever has been explosively spreading across the country since late April. Its anti-epidemic center has since released fever tallies each morning via state media, but they don’t include any COVID-19 figures.
Some observers say North Korea was likely forced to acknowledge the COVID-19 outbreak because it couldn’t hide the highly contagious viral spread among its people and suffer possible public discontent with leader Kim Jong Un. They believe North Korean authorities are underreporting mortalities to try to show that its pandemic response is effective, while the country lacks test kits to confirm a large number of virus cases.
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“It’s true that there has been a hole in its 2 1/2 years of pandemic fighting,” said Kwak Gil Sup, head of One Korea Center, a website specializing in North Korea affairs. “But there is a saying that North Korea is ’a theater state,′ and I think they are massaging COVID-19 statistics.”
Kwak said North Korea is likely partly using the outbreak as a propaganda tool to show that it is overcoming the pandemic with Kim’s leadership. But the country has “a Plan B” and “a Plan C” to seek Chinese and other foreign aid if the pandemic gets out of hand, he said.
On Friday, the North’s state emergency epidemic prevention headquarters said 263,370 more people had feverish symptoms and two more people died, bringing the total fever cases to 2.24 million and fatalities to 65. They said 754,810 people remain quarantined, according to the official Korean Central News Agency.
The outbreak likely originated from an April 25 military parade in Pyongyang that Kim organized to show off his new missiles and loyal troops. The parade and other related festivals, which marked North Korea’s army foundation anniversary, drew tens of thousands of people and soldiers from Pyongyang and other parts of the country, who returned home after the events.
South Korea’s spy agency told lawmakers Thursday that “a considerable number” of the fever cases reported by North Korea include people sick with waterborne diseases like measles, typhoid and pertussis.
The National Intelligence Service assessed that those diseases had already been spreading across North Korea even before COVID-19 broke out, according to Ha Tae-keung, a lawmaker who attended a private NIS briefing. Ha cited the NIS as saying the waterborne diseases were spreading due to shortages of medicines and medical supplies in the wake of the North’s previous long-running anti-pandemic steps.
“(The NIS) said it doesn’t know exactly what percentage of the fever cases are coronavirus patients. It said North Korea lacks coronavirus diagnostic kits but appears to have sufficient thermometers,” Ha said.
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The NIS has a spotty record in confirming developments in North Korea. Some civilian medical experts earlier said they believed most of the fever cases announced by North Korea were COVID-19.
On Monday, when the North’s fever cases had already surpassed 1.2 million, Ryu Yong Chol, an official at Pyongyang’s anti-virus headquarters, said on state TV that the government had detected 168 COVID-19 cases as of last Saturday. There have been no updates on the North’s virus cases since then.
Ahn Kyung-su, head of DPRKHEALTH.ORG, a website focusing on health issues in North Korea, said Pyongyang had likely determined its omicron outbreak won’t cause catastrophic fatalities but disclosed it to prevent potential public unrest. He said North Korea’s increased anti-virus measures are partly meant to solidify its control of a public tired of previous restrictions and other difficulties.
“North Korea’s pandemic response isn’t completely staged as people are dying. But it’s obvious that its leadership’s political intentions have been added there,” Ahn said. “One day, they’ll proclaim their victory over COVID-19 in a colorful manner.”
North Korea’s public medical system remains in shambles, and experts say the country could suffer mass pandemic fatalities if it doesn’t receive outside aid shipments. They say the country’s elevated restrictions on movement and quarantine rules may also worsen its food insecurity.
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The NIS said North Korea intends to overcome the pandemic with assistance from its main ally, China, according to Ha and Kim Byung-kee, another lawmaker who was briefed by the spy service. During an anti-virus meeting Saturday, Kim said his country faces “a great upheaval” and that officials must study how China and other nations have handled the pandemic.
Some media reports said North Korea already sent planes to China to bring back emergency supplies earlier this week, but the South Korean government said it couldn’t confirm the reports. South Korea said it and the United States have offered to ship vaccines, medicines and other medical supplies to North Korea, but the North hasn’t responded.
AP · by HYUNG-JIN KIM · May 20, 2022
7. North Korea: Fighting Covid with traditional medicine
I am a great believer in traditional medicine (such as acupuncture). But I don't think the traditional treatments outlined in this article are useful except perhaps to provide false hope.
North Korea: Fighting Covid with traditional medicine
By Rachel Schraer and Wanyuan Song
BBC Reality Check
A worker disinfects a vehicle carrying medical oxygen, in Pyongyang
North Korea is grappling with the spread of Covid in an unvaccinated population, without access to effective anti-viral drugs.
In early 2020, the country sealed its borders to try to insulate itself from the pandemic.
Its leadership has so far rejected outside medical support.
We've been monitoring state media, which is recommending various traditional treatments to deal with what is referred to as "fever".
Hot drinks
For those not seriously ill, ruling-party newspaper Rodong Simnun recommended remedies including ginger or honeysuckle tea and a willow-leaf drink.
Hot drinks might soothe some Covid symptoms, such as a sore throat or cough, and help hydration when patients are losing more fluid than normal.
Ginger and willow leaf also relieve inflammation and reduce pain.
But they are not a treatment for the virus itself.
Salt water
State media recently interviewed a couple who recommended gargling with salt water morning and night.
A "thousand of tonnes of salt" had been sent to Pyongyang to make an "antiseptic solution", the state news agency reported.
Some studies suggest gargling and nasal rinses with salt water combat viruses that cause the common cold.
But there is little evidence they slow the spread of Covid.
The army has been brought in to distribute medical supplies
Mouthwash could kill the virus in the lab, a study found.
But it has not convincingly been shown to help in humans.
Covid is mainly caught by inhaling tiny droplets in the air via the nose as well as the mouth, so gargling attacks only one point of entry.
And once the virus has entered, it replicates and spreads deep into the organs, where no amount of gargling can reach.
Painkillers and antibiotics
State television has advised patients to use painkillers such as ibuprofen as well as amoxicillin and other antibiotics.
Ibuprofen (and paracetamol) can bring down a temperature and ease symptoms such as headache or sore throat.
But they will not clear the virus or prevent it developing.
Antibiotics, meant for bacterial infections not viruses, are not recommended.
And using antibiotics unnecessarily risks developing resistant bugs.
Laboratory research suggests some may slow the spread of some viruses, including Covid.
But these have not been replicated in the real world.
And a study of the antibiotic azithromycin found it made little or no difference to Covid symptoms, the likelihood of hospital admission or death.
There are some approved drugs to prevent people with Covid ending up in hospital:
- antivirals paxlovid, molnupiravir and remdesivir
- antibody therapies that mimic the immune system
But their effectiveness is variable.
Health system
North Korea's health system has been set up to offer free medical care from basic services at village level up to specialised treatment in government hospitals (usually in urban centres).
But the economy has contracted in recent years because of sanctions and extreme weather such as droughts.
Closing the country's borders and strict lockdown measures will also have had a damaging impact.
Particularly weak outside Pyongyang, the health system is thought to suffer shortages of personnel, medicines and equipment.
A report for the UN, last year, said: "Some of the pharmaceutical, vaccination and medical-appliance plants do not reach the level of good practice of the WHO [World Health Organization] and do not meet local demand as well."
But state media says it is now increasing production.
International aid
South Korea says it has had no reply to its offer of vaccines, medical supplies and personnel.
North Korea has reportedly recently sent three planes to collect medical supplies from Shenyang.
These had not included "anti-pandemic supplies", the Chinese foreign ministry said, but it was "ready to work with North Korea… in the fight against the coronavirus".
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8. US denial of Biden-Moon meeting triggers speculation
For the life of me I cannot figure out why we would request a meeting with former President Moon so soon after inauguration.
Excerpt:
In a media interview, an unnamed aide of Moon said the former president was contacted by a person working for President Biden on Thursday, a day before Biden's scheduled arrival in South Korea, and heard that the U.S. president ultimately wouldn't be able to meet Moon during his Seoul visit. "They didn't explain to us why, and we didn't ask them why, either, because we didn't think they should have to do that," the aide said, adding that the Moon side had until recently been arranging a meeting between the two after the U.S. side proposed one based on President Biden's hope to meet President Moon personally and informally.
Rep. Youn Kun-young of the main opposition Democratic Party of Korea said on Thursday that it was true that Washington had indeed requested to hold a Biden-Moon meeting.
US denial of Biden-Moon meeting triggers speculation
Then President Moon Jae-in, left, and U.S. President Joe Biden smile in this photo taken in Washington D.C. on May 21 during Moon's visit to the United States. Yonhap
By Kang Hyun-kyung
Washington has denied local media reports that U.S. President Joe Biden will meet former President Moon Jae-in during the U.S. leader's visit to Seoul for a summit with President Yoon Suk-yeol. Biden will arrive in South Korea on Friday for a three-day visit.
U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said in a press briefing on Wednesday (local time), "We don't have a meeting scheduled with President Moon at this time."
The U.S.' denial of the Biden-Moon meeting came weeks after a then Cheong Wa Dae official confirmed on April 28 the U.S. request for the rare meeting. At that time, Moon was still in office. May 9th was his last day in the presidency.
The Cheong Wa Dae official said Seoul and Washington were preparing for the Biden-Moon meeting to be held on May 22, upon the request of the U.S. "He (Biden) maybe wants to meet his friend during his visit to Korea," the official said, noting that consultations between the two sides had been underway to set the exact time and venue.
On Thursday, the former president confirmed that the Biden-Moon meeting won't be held.
In a media interview, an unnamed aide of Moon said the former president was contacted by a person working for President Biden on Thursday, a day before Biden's scheduled arrival in South Korea, and heard that the U.S. president ultimately wouldn't be able to meet Moon during his Seoul visit. "They didn't explain to us why, and we didn't ask them why, either, because we didn't think they should have to do that," the aide said, adding that the Moon side had until recently been arranging a meeting between the two after the U.S. side proposed one based on President Biden's hope to meet President Moon personally and informally.
Rep. Youn Kun-young of the main opposition Democratic Party of Korea said on Thursday that it was true that Washington had indeed requested to hold a Biden-Moon meeting.
"It's clear that the U.S. contacted Cheong Wa Dae to request the meeting," he said. "I think the ball is now in the U.S.' court and they need to provide an accurate response," he said during a radio interview.
Prior to become a lawmaker, Youn worked for Moon as a presidential secretary.
"There appear to be several different reasons behind the U.S. side denying its plans for the meeting," he said.
News reports about the Biden-Moon meeting had sparked speculation about the U.S. president's motives behind the rare proposal for an official meeting with the South Korean leader, who would be a former president when they were to meet.
Some said that Biden might ask Moon to play a role to help North Korea denuclearize.
Jeong Se-hyun, the former unification minister during the Roh Moo-hyun government, said in a radio interview on Tuesday that the former president could play a role to narrow the differences between the United States and North Korea regarding the denuclearization of its nuclear weapons program. Citing then-Unification Minister nominee Kweon Young-se's remarks about a special envoy to the North during his confirmation hearing, Jeong said that Seoul and Washington seemed to have agreed on the need to send an envoy to the North.
Rep. Youn said if the subject is about South Korea sending a special envoy to North Korea, it is not a matter involving the U.S. but rather a question that the current Yoon administration has to answer.
9. Kim Jong Un Creates an Opportunity Out of North Korea’s Covid Crisis
Perhaps not the opportunity some think. What if this is in fact an attempt to bring great credit to Kim Jong-un. Surely there is a COVID outbreak, But look at the reporting on it so far. Note the skepticism on the number of deaths, on numbers of cases and the rapid recovery of large numbers. What if they regime continues to shape the reporting to make it look like the regime is able to cope with it and solve the problem. What if this is another elaborate ruse or deception operation (using half truths about COVID simply to enhance Kim Jong-un's legitimacy and reputation?
Another opportunity is if the regime is lying about the cases and numbers of deaths, a strategic influence campaign could use the truth to undermine the regime. The Korean people in the north and the entire world need to know the truth about the regime.
Excerpts:
If the impact of the pandemic on North Korea, and Pyongyang in particular, isn’t as bad as feared, the leadership could use it as an opportunity to reopen its border with China and resume trade once it joins other nations in achieving herd immunity, North Korea watchers say.
The risks for Mr. Kim are still high, but he may emerge in a stronger position if the current crisis leads to an easing of food shortages and dire economic conditions caused by North Korea’s isolation since the start of the global pandemic.
“This is an opportunity to prove the country can overcome a crisis under his leadership,” said Hong Min, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, a government-funded think tank in Seoul.
Kim Jong Un Creates an Opportunity Out of North Korea’s Covid Crisis
State media highlights Mr. Kim’s role in fighting the rapid spread of infection
May 19, 2022 7:21 am ET
SEOUL—For more than two years, North Korea said dictator Kim Jong Un’s decision to close the country’s borders had ensured it remained Covid free.
A recent surge of infections centered on the capital Pyongyang has triggered a pivot to portray Mr. Kim as a more active protector. State media has shown him making late night visits to pharmacies to check on medical supplies, berating officials for laziness in guarding against the spread of the virus, and describing the outbreak as the country’s worst ever crisis.
Health experts suspect Covid was already circulating in some parts of North Korea, but the clear arrival of the disease in Pyongyang is a more serious proposition for Mr. Kim because it’s home to regime loyalists who support his grip on power. The risks to the three million people in the capital have been increased by North Korea’s refusal of vaccines.
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“The regime realizes that it’s going to be difficult to hide this, so instead it’s using it as an opportunity to try and make Kim Jong Un look good,” said Go Myung-hyun, a senior fellow at the Asan Institute, a Seoul-based think tank.
More than 400,000 fever cases have officially been reported in Pyongyang. After confirming a single person in Pyongyang tested positive for Covid-19 on May 8, North Korea hasn’t indicated whether others have been tested and instead refers to the spread of fever cases, likely because it doesn’t have mass testing capacity.
Nationwide, almost two million people have been reported with fever, including over 260,000 new cases on Wednesday. Only 63 deaths have been confirmed by state media.
Streets were closed in Pyongyang amid a growing outbreak of Covid in North Korea.
PHOTO: KYODO/VIA REUTERS
Health experts say the true toll is almost certainly higher, but North Korea has refused to share information with the World Health Organization or accept offers of medical aid, antiviral treatments and vaccines, including from South Korea.
Instead, it has secretly flown in shipments of medical supplies from China and pooled its medical resources in Pyongyang. One person who left North Korea in 2019 but has maintained contacts inside the country said medical goods have been transferred to the capital from the provinces, leaving very little for those in rural areas, where hospitals and clinics are already chronically short of supplies.
Another person who defected from North Korea in recent years and spoke to people in the country this week said cases of infection in the northwest border area are widespread. Malnutrition among poorer North Koreans and the failing medical system has raised concerns about a high toll from the Covid outbreak, but this person said most people who get sick have a fever for a few days and don’t consider the disease too serious.
From Earlier
North Korea Reports First Covid Case, Locks Down All Major Cities
North Korea Reports First Covid Case, Locks Down All Major Cities
Play video: North Korea Reports First Covid Case, Locks Down All Major Cities
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un appeared wearing a mask on state TV as Pyongyang reported its first local case of Covid-19. The country, which had so far claimed to be Covid-free, has poor health infrastructure to fight outbreaks. Photo: Associated Press
It’s all but impossible to get a reliable picture of the overall state of illness, but human rights advocates say the spread of Covid in unvaccinated North Korea has the potential to create a health crisis not seen since a famine in the 1990s killed more than a million people.
North Korea’s relatively young population may be one factor that could keep the impact of the outbreak relatively mild. Serious illness and death from Covid around the world is much lower among younger people. The median age in North Korea is 34.6, according to the CIA World Fact Book, compared with 43.2 in South Korea, where nearly 24,000 people have died of Covid.
Speculation about how the chain of infections began in Pyongyang has focused on a military parade on April 25, at which thousands of unmasked people gathered at a central square in the city to cheer on displays of weapons and soldiers, and at which Mr. Kim appeared from a balcony to wave to the crowd.
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In a sign that cases have spread widely, members of the small diplomatic community have also come down with fever, according to a person familiar with the situation.
North Korea’s military medical workers helped distribute medicine to citizens at a pharmacy in Pyongyang on Wednesday.
PHOTO: KYODONEWS/ZUMA PRESS
North Korea hasn’t asked for vaccines because doing so would be equivalent to admitting that its Covid-prevention policy—closely linked to Mr. Kim—has failed, said Mr. Go of the Asan Institute. Creating a dependency on an outside country, particularly rival South Korea, or the U.S., to supply vaccinations and booster shots could also weaken North Korea’s control of its population, he said.
Instead, the strategy is to show the elite class in Pyongyang that the battle against Covid can be fought and won by Mr. Kim with North Korea’s own resources. State media has called Mr. Kim the “front-line commander in the prevention war” and the “incarnate of devotion for the people.”
During a recent Politburo meeting, Mr. Kim told officials the party should prove its competency by successfully dealing with the outbreak and urged people to strengthen their trust in the leadership, according to state media.
If the impact of the pandemic on North Korea, and Pyongyang in particular, isn’t as bad as feared, the leadership could use it as an opportunity to reopen its border with China and resume trade once it joins other nations in achieving herd immunity, North Korea watchers say.
The risks for Mr. Kim are still high, but he may emerge in a stronger position if the current crisis leads to an easing of food shortages and dire economic conditions caused by North Korea’s isolation since the start of the global pandemic.
“This is an opportunity to prove the country can overcome a crisis under his leadership,” said Hong Min, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, a government-funded think tank in Seoul.
10. Korea, US to launch dialogue channel on economic security
Hopefully this will include cooperation on defense against Chinese economic warfare against the ROK. We do not want to make the same mistake we did during THAAD when the ROK was left on its own to fend off CHina.
Korea, US to launch dialogue channel on economic security
Wang Yun-jong, presidential secretary in charge of economic security affairs / Joint Press Corps
By Lee Hyo-jin
Korea and the United States have agreed to launch a dialogue channel on economic security between the two presidential offices, with an aim to strengthen technology cooperation, according to Seoul's presidential office, Friday.
The agreement was made during a phone talk held earlier in the day between Wang Yun-jong, presidential secretary in charge of economic security affairs, and Tarun Chhabra, U.S. National Security Council (NSC) senior director for technology and national security.
"Through the dialogue channel, the two sides will cooperate frequently and on a regular basis on economic security issues," the presidential office said in a statement released to the media.
"The launch of the channel is meaningful in that the two countries will be able to coordinate closely and respond jointly to key issues regarding cooperation in technologies such as semiconductors, secondary batteries and artificial intelligence (AI), as well as the establishment of supply chains."
The presidential office noted that Chhabra has invited Wang to visit Washington, D.C., to hold face-to-face talks in the near future.
The first phone call between the two officials came hours ahead of U.S. President Joe Biden's visit to Korea. Biden begins a three-day visit to Korea on Friday afternoon, and a summit with President Yoon Suk-yeol is scheduled for Saturday.
11. Joining Biden’s IPEF is a no-brainer
Excerpt:
As Korea joined the China-led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, it can also join U.S.-led economic partnerships. Seoul also must be ready for retaliatory actions from Beijing.
Thursday
May 19, 2022
Joining Biden’s IPEF is a no-brainer
South Korea will announce it’s joining the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) U.S. President Joe Biden will be launching during his Asian tour. The IPEF will be a key agenda item at the upcoming Korea-U.S. summit along with strengthening of deterrence against North Korean nuclear and missile threats.
In a National Assembly address earlier this week, President Yoon Suk-yeol said he would discuss with Biden ways to strengthen the alliance in global supply chains through the IPEF.
The IPEF is designed to build a new cooperative framework for fair trade and stable supply chains. It groups liberal democracy states for economic and trade cooperation while isolating China. The United States touts it as a new model for economic involvement and commerce.
Economics and security have become one. The traditional perspective of turning to the U.S. for security and China for economic benefit no longer holds. Korea is not being dragged into the framework as an ally to the United States. South Korea has benefited greatly from free trade.
It cannot stay passive in a new order among liberal democracy states to uphold universal values and international trade rules. It is natural for the Yoon government to join the IPEF as it had set the goal of becoming a global core state contributing to world freedom, peace, and prosperity as one of six key state tasks.
Economic interests must be considered. South Korea is a major exporter of semiconductors and high-tech products and plays a crucial role in global supply chains. Joining the IPEF is a must, not a choice, given the downside risks if South Korea stalls or refuses membership.
China’s protest is foreseeable. During a video conference with his Korean counterpart Park Jin, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi reminded him that the colossal Chinese market would provide long-term growth and advised Seoul to reject options that could “decouple” the two economies. He was more or less warning of restricted access to the Chinese market if Korea joins the IPEF.
Vice President Wang Qishan, who attended Yoon’s inauguration, made a similar comment. South Korea must resist such pressure, while persuading Chinese officials that our economic relationship will stay important.
As Korea joined the China-led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, it can also join U.S.-led economic partnerships. Seoul also must be ready for retaliatory actions from Beijing.
12. Security, economic security, top Biden’s Asia trip
Interesting that the meeting will be in the National Museum versus the National War Museum where I would have recommended they meet. But from a strategic messaging perspective perhaps meeting there is intended to send a less military message.
Excerpts:
The location for the Biden-Yoon meet – a chip fab – was unusual. The site of their summit is unusual, too: South Korea’s National Museum.
Set in a park in Seoul’s Yongsan district, it was the site of a massive US Army base, prior to the relocation of troops out of the capital to Camp Humphreys.
Yoon, who took office last month, has relocated the presidential offices to the Ministry of National Defense compound in Yongsan, having vowed not to enter the Blue House – the purpose-designed presidential compound that has been in use since South Korea emerged as a state in 1948.
Opponents have slammed the speed and expense of the move, as well as its rationale. While Yoon has criticized the Blue House for physically distancing the national leader from his citizenry, Yoon’s critics scoff that his decision to shift locations was influenced by shamans.
Security, economic security, top Biden’s Asia trip
Prior emphases on domestic, European issues crowd Biden’s agenda in Seoul and Tokyo – while Pyongyang simmers
SEOUL – New South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol on Friday greeted visiting US President Joe Biden, who is embarking on the first leg of the first Asian tour of his term.
With the two expected to focus on both security and economic security, the location for Biden’s arrival, and his first agenda item, was appropriate.
Biden arrived at the US airbase in Osan on Friday afternoon, where he was greeted by South Korea’s foreign minister and senior US officers. From there, he traveled to the nearby city of Pyongtaek, a port south of Seoul on the Yellow Sea coast.
Pyeongtaek is home both to Camp Humphreys, the largest US Army base outside the continental USA, and also to a D-RAM memory fab, and an under-construction non-memory foundry, both run by electronics colossus Samsung.
TV footage showed Biden and Yoon meeting in a Samsung facility, which they toured along with Samsung heir Lee Jae-yong. Samsung is the world’s largest maker of memory semiconductors, and chips have emerged, in recent years, as perhaps the most strategic industrial component in a fast-digitizing world, central to modern technologies, industries and weaponry.
In Seoul, Biden will be staying at the hilltop Hyatt Hotel, a favorite site of visiting US presidents thanks to its remoteness from downtown and its defensibility – before Saturday’s summit.
With South Korea being a trade and manufacturing powerhouse as well as a US ally, discussions are expected to cover supply-chain resilience, regional relations regarding both an expansive China and a menacing North Korea, and the bilateral alliance.
Biden’s trip “will advance the administration’s “rock-solid commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific and to US treaty alliances with the Republic of Korea and Japan,’ said White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki. “It will build on more than a year of intensive diplomacy with the Indo-Pacific.”
These aims are likely to fall on fertile ground in South Korea.
Conservative Yoon, who took office on May 10, has repeatedly stated that he wants to firm up his country’s US alliance. Joint exercises since 2018 have been downplayed, first to assist then-President Donald Trump’s North Korea diplomacy, subsequently due to Covid-19.
While computer simulation drills have been conducted, US officers privately grumble that the downgrading of ground and air exercises has eroded readiness.
The Ukraine war – a conflict in which both Seoul and Tokyo have sided with the US-led West – will be on the agenda. South Korea, a leading supplier of technological components and arms, holds potential leverage in terms of both sanctions and production.
Take semiconductors. Chips are a key element of advanced weapon and aviation systems, and with Russia suffering ongoing material losses in Ukraine, Moscow needs to ramp up arms production.
A South Korean-made K9 155mm self-propelled howitzer at a parade in Finland. Photo: WikiCommons
South Korea also manufactures the K9 155mm self-propelled howitzer, a weapon that has been successfully exported to countries including Finland, Poland and Turkey. At a time when an artillery battle is underway in Donbas, allies are arming Kiev with NATO-standard weapons to wean Kiev off its reliance on Russian-standard munitions.
Taking an unusual stance for a South Korean president, Yoon, in his inaugural speech, stated that his country should stand up and actively promote the principles of democratic rights and freedoms in global fora. Seoul has customarily kept a low profile in that area, preferring to focus on diplomatic pragmatism.
Yoon’s speech was likely music to the ears of Biden, who prioritizes these principles.
The regional dimension
Though Yoon wins the kudos of being the first regional leader to host the US president, Biden will fire off his most spectacular geopolitical fireworks in Tokyo.
There he will have a summit with Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. But he is also expected to unveil the long-awaited details of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework – an ambitious, multilateral, regional economic strategy.
Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. Photo: Agencies
South Korean media expect Yoon to join that meeting via video conference to announce Seoul’s participation.
The IPEF is designed to secure resilient supply chains, set rules for the digital economy and provide top-quality investments in infrastructure.
It takes the place of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP. That regional free trade agreement was ready for launch in 2016, until Donald Trump withdrew the US in 2017. De facto leadership of the body has since been taken over by Tokyo.
Biden will also have a summit in Tokyo with the leaders of the unofficial “Quad” security alliance – Australia, India and Japan – a loose regional grouping that aims to counter China across the Indo-Pacific. Yoon has expressed his intention of joining Quad working groups – a precursor to joining the body.
The Northeast Asia trip follows a summit Biden held in Washington on May 12-13 with the leaders of ASEAN – a region where China has, in recent years, been expanding its reach and influence.
Biden may hope for better from Northeast Asia, where both Japan and South Korea are firm security allies, as well as being world-leading economic powerhouses.
Here, experts expect Seoul-Tokyo relations to be on the schedule in both capitals. The lack of a “NATO of East Asia” has been a long-term stumbling block for US diplomats seeking to forge a united regional front against China and North Korea. Biden has some experience in this space.
As US vice-president, Biden was a key player behind a 2015 Seoul-Tokyo deal on “comfort women.” That was nullified by Seoul’s previous Moon Jae-in administration, infuriating Tokyo and sending relations into a steep downward spiral from which they have far from recovered.
The US president has an unusually crowded schedule of business to transact, partly because this is his first presidential visit to the region.
Biden’s first summits as president, both held in Washington, were with Japan and South Korea. However, this is his first visit to the region as chief executive since taking office in January 2021, and 16 months later, there is still no US ambassador in Seoul.
Circumstances have dictated Biden’s agenda. He has been grappling with the domestic issues facing a deeply polarized American society, the economic issues of the post-Covid era and the security issues of a full-scale war in Europe.
This focus has led some – including a group of regional academics who will debate the issue in an online conference next week – to assert that the US has prioritized the west and de-prioritized the east.
A test-fire of a ‘newly developed’ anti-aircraft missile carried out by the Academy of Defense Science of North Korea. Photo: AFP / KCNA / KNS
The perennial security challenge
While the hot war in Ukraine dominates global headlines, 35 miles north of the Seoul summit location lies a long-simmering, decades-long challenge that has confounded generations of US policymakers.
And Pyongyang is not sitting still. It has been on an accelerated weapons testing program this year and there are concerns among some that it might seize the moment to make a point by testing a missile or even detonating a nuclear device while the US president is on the peninsula.
However, the isolated and impoverished nation has, since last week, been caught in the grip of a shock Covid outbreak. The virus has breached the tried-and-trusted playbook Pyongyang has customarily deployed – notably, ultra-tight border closures – to shield its population from pandemics including SARS, MERS, Ebola, and, until last week, Covid-19.
That crisis may well be monopolizing the attention of the regime’s leadership. Though South Korea has publically offered assistance to the North, those offers have so far been ignored.
Some analysts hope the Biden visit could provide an opportunity for assistance.
“Yoon and Biden will likely express a desire to help the North Korean people while pointing out that Pyongyang is misallocating resources to its illegal nuclear and missile programs,” Leif-Eric Easley, an associate professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul, wrote in an email to reporters.
“Seoul and Washington know how to strengthen military deterrence; the less straightforward policy challenge is how to give Kim options to make better choices.”
Easley suggested that South Korea could unconditionally offer contactless delivery of medical aid over the border before a larger humanitarian package including food and vaccines can be facilitated through international organizations.
However, other experts have told Asia Times that Pyongyang is more likely to turn to China or Russia for support.
Unconventional moves
The location for the Biden-Yoon meet – a chip fab – was unusual. The site of their summit is unusual, too: South Korea’s National Museum.
Set in a park in Seoul’s Yongsan district, it was the site of a massive US Army base, prior to the relocation of troops out of the capital to Camp Humphreys.
Yoon, who took office last month, has relocated the presidential offices to the Ministry of National Defense compound in Yongsan, having vowed not to enter the Blue House – the purpose-designed presidential compound that has been in use since South Korea emerged as a state in 1948.
Opponents have slammed the speed and expense of the move, as well as its rationale. While Yoon has criticized the Blue House for physically distancing the national leader from his citizenry, Yoon’s critics scoff that his decision to shift locations was influenced by shamans.
13. Are Japan-Korea relations on Biden’s trip agenda?
An interesting excerpt here. I did not know that Kishida had a reputation as "pro-Korean." But the rightwing view is troubling.
Kishida faces criticism from within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party where he has been seen as being “pro-Korean,” mainly due to his role as Foreign Minister in negotiating the 2015 agreement. That may explain his unusual decision to raise the issue of a statue dedicated to “comfort women” victims in Berlin during a late April visit to Tokyo by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.
“The Japanese right-wing has decided that Japan doesn’t need South Korea,” says Harris. “If Kishida thinks that cooperation with South Korea is important, he is going to have to make the case for it.”
In the past, however, Japanese leaders have often needed clear pressure from the United States to take the risk of opening the door to improving relations with South Korea, particularly when it comes to dealing with wartime history problems.
Are Japan-Korea relations on Biden’s trip agenda?
The shift in power in Seoul to conservative President Yoon Suk-yeol has created an opportunity to improve relations
United States President Joe Biden has a full plate for his first presidential trip to Asia, a five-day swing through South Korea and Japan.
There will be lots of talk about strengthening alliances and bolstering deterrence in the face of Russian aggression, Chinese great power ambitions and North Korean missile and nuclear testing.
The trip will launch a new Indo Pacific Economic Framework, a loosely drawn idea designed to counter the impression that the US is abandoning economic engagement. And the trip will conclude with a summit meeting in Japan of the leaders of the Quad, the pseudo alliance of Japan, the US, Australia and India.
“The president is well-positioned to have a successful visit,” said Georgetown University’s Michael Green, a former national security advisor to President George W Bush.
“He will be able to demonstrate, just by his visit alone, that the administration can focus on the Indo-Pacific while dealing with Ukraine. But he can also argue that only the United States could have pulled together the global coalition that imposed really unprecedented economic and geopolitical and diplomatic consequences on Putin for his invasion of Ukraine.”
There is, however, one item that is not clearly on the president’s ambitious agenda – repairing the still yawning gap between the two American allies he is visiting, Japan and South Korea. The shift in power in Seoul to the conservative government of President Yoon Suk-yeol has created an opportunity to reverse the downward spiral in relations.
Yoon has vowed to make relations with Japan a priority, and there have been some positive initial exchanges. More importantly, Yoon is moving to reposition South Korea in line with the global and regional framework shaped by the Biden administration.
Senior American officials believe there is a window open, but the question remains whether all the parties, including the US, will do enough to capitalize on it.
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol speaks to foreign reporters in Seoul after winning a bitterly fought election. Photo: Asia Times / Andrew Salmon
Who blinks first?
The issues of wartime history and the bitter heritage of Japanese colonial rule in Korea remain a formidable obstacle, despite plentiful shared interests in other realms, from supply chain resilience to the North Korean threat. Both Seoul and Tokyo are at a moment of stand-off – both think the next move to break the ice should be taken by the other.
The inability of Japan and South Korea to restore normal relations serves to undermine US efforts to assert a values-driven purpose to its presence in the Indo-Pacific.
The failure of two American-allied democracies to cooperate undermines this strategy, whether it is the elevation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to a broader alliance or Japan’s idea of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” It creates an opportunity for China or Russia to drive wedges between the US and its allies.
All of this has acquired even greater urgency with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as the US and Europe seek to rally allies across the globe, and particularly in Asia, to a common cause. If this is a struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, as they assert, the visible gap between Japan and South Korea is a glaring problem.
During the years of the Trump administration, when the current downturn in Japan-South Korea relations began, there was little if no attention to this challenge. Under the advent of the Biden administration, with its commitment to a policy of revival and strengthening of alliances, this has changed.
There has been a drumbeat of statements and meetings of officials, stressing the importance of trilateral cooperation. But there also remains manifest frustration, till now, with the inability of South Korea and Japan to transcend the legacy of wartime history – a familiar lament of American officialdom.
The Biden administration includes many veterans of the Obama administration, some of whom dealt with the earlier downturn in South Korea-Japan relations at the beginning of the Abe and Park administrations. The same debates that took place at that time are being replayed.
Some American officials want to place the focus on reminding Japan and South Korea of the strategic imperatives that should unite them.
Others recognize that geopolitics, even when married with a values-based approach, cannot succeed without confronting the issues of wartime historical justice that lie at the root of the breakdown in relations.
The advent of a conservative administration in Seoul, and to a lesser extent the transition to the Fumio Kishida administration in Tokyo with a Foreign Minister (Hayashi Yoshimasa) who has close ties to Washington, has created some limited optimism.
The upsurge in North Korean missile testing, and its preparations for renewed nuclear testing, combined with the global imperative of the war in Ukraine, would seem to create momentum to improve relations and draw the three countries into closer security cooperation.
There is some optimism that Japan’s Fumio Kishida will move to improve relations. Photo: AFP / Du Xiaoyi
US engagement
But some senior Biden officials, including ones with deep previous experience, warn against the idea that normalization of relations, much less reconciliation, can occur without active American involvement, though not necessarily mediation, in the disputed historical issues.
“I disagree that we should not be engaged,” a senior Biden official told a recent closed-door meeting on US-Japan relations, attended by this writer. “There is some urgency here.”
This official, speaking off the record, went so far as to argue that South Korea-Japan relations had a higher significance than efforts to promote the Quad or a regional ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ association. Moreover, he indicated that this would require grappling with the wartime history issues.
“The single most important thing the US can do is to help effect rapprochement that is sincere,” the senior official said. “This is a noble and important endeavor and one we should not shy away from taking.”
So far, however, there is no overt effort to put this on the Biden agenda for this trip. Instead, the emphasis is on other parts of the US plans where Japan and South Korea might cooperate, for example strengthening supply chain resilience and creating a digital services framework agreement in the Indo-Pacific.
The lack of a visible American push may reflect the problems of domestic politics in both South Korea and Japan that limit the ability of both governments to move ahead. The Japanese official position is that the responsibility for the first step lies with South Korea.
Tokyo demands that Seoul slow down, if not halt, the implementation of court decisions to seize the property of Japanese companies to pay compensation to Korean forced laborers used during the colonial and wartime periods.
Japanese officials also want the South Korean government to restore the 2015 agreement which created a Japanese-funded foundation to pay compensation to the surviving Korean women forced into sexual servitude by the Japanese Imperial Army during the war.
The previous progressive government of Moon Jae-in effectively dismantled that agreement. That set in motion a chain of back and forth retaliatory measures, including Japan’s imposition of export control measures on precursors for semiconductors in South Korea.
The new Yoon administration has already stated its position that the 2015 agreement remains in force. And there is clearly an effort to hold off the seizure of Japanese company assets. But Yoon is not in a position to go much further without some clear public signals from Japan given Korean public opinion on these issues.
He already faces significant challenges from the opposition-controlled National Assembly, his opinion poll support rating is below 50%, unusually low for a new president, and he faces a crucial test in June 1 local elections.
“Yoon has much less room to maneuver,” compared to Prime Minister Kishida, believes Asian expert Tobias Harris, author of an authoritative biography of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. “A gesture from Kishida would go a lot further and would be politically more doable if Kishida had the political courage to do it.”
The Japanese government still bears the scars of its experience with the Moon government. “The Japanese feel like they were burned,” says a former senior American official active on these issues and who is close to the Biden administration. “The Japanese are sitting on the sidelines now,” he says, but “the ball is in the Japanese court.”
Protesters in Seoul hold up placards saying ‘No Japan’ during a rally against Japan’s decision to remove South Korea from a ‘white list’ of preferred export partners on August 3, 2019. Photo: AFP / Jung Yeon-je
Kishida seen as ‘pro-Korean’
Kishida faces criticism from within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party where he has been seen as being “pro-Korean,” mainly due to his role as Foreign Minister in negotiating the 2015 agreement. That may explain his unusual decision to raise the issue of a statue dedicated to “comfort women” victims in Berlin during a late April visit to Tokyo by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.
“The Japanese right-wing has decided that Japan doesn’t need South Korea,” says Harris. “If Kishida thinks that cooperation with South Korea is important, he is going to have to make the case for it.”
In the past, however, Japanese leaders have often needed clear pressure from the United States to take the risk of opening the door to improving relations with South Korea, particularly when it comes to dealing with wartime history problems.
President Biden has personal experience with this, playing a key role in mediating between then Premier Abe Shinzo and South Korean President Park Geun-hye when he was Vice-President.
“There is nothing to suggest that it is going to be a top priority” on this visit, says Harris. But, the real action may take place behind closed doors, he adds. “I wouldn’t be surprised if it would be more of an issue when Biden is sitting in the room.”
Daniel Sneider is a lecturer on international policy at Stanford University and a former Christian Science Monitor foreign correspondent. This article originally appeared in The Oriental Economist and is republished with kind permission. Follow Daniel Sneider on Twitter at @DCSneider
14. What Comes Next in North Korea’s Battle With Omicron?
Excepts:
Put simply, Pyongyang is destined for a grueling test of stewardship over the next year. The upcoming summer months will likely help keep infections low for a while, but the looming fall and winter seasons are sure to be great sources of anxiety. Even South Korea, with its sophisticated mitigation methods and high vaccination rate, was unable to control Omicron dissemination this past winter. One can only imagine how much harder it will be for North Korea.
In my February piece, I opined that North Korea’s January missile tests seemed like a strategy to signal the international community for pandemic-related assistance. In my mind, these tests indicated Pyongyang, well-aware of the threat posed by Omicron, was using the aggression to try to leverage for food and vaccines. Now that North Korea’s epidemic has started, however, it is unclear how much harder Pyongyang will continue pressing in that direction. Will they continue to launch more missiles as they did the day after announcing their first COVID case, or will they try something even more provocative out of desperation? Only time will tell.
What Comes Next in North Korea’s Battle With Omicron?
How bad might North Korea’s first COVID-19 outbreak get, and what options does the international community have in responding?
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Now that Pyongyang has officially confirmed arrival of the Omicron variant of the coronavirus, it is time to consider the implications. Where might things go from here? How bad might the fallout be? What opportunities and challenges might the international community face as a result?
Predicting the Epidemiological Damage
Despite negativity from some critics, all initial signs indicate Pyongyang does understand the gravity of the situation they are in. Kim Jong Un’s public presence in a COVID-19 response meeting and his description of the situation as “[the greatest] turmoil to fall on our country since [its] founding” convey the understanding that this outbreak is not something that can be ignored or spun out of existence through censorship or propaganda. When considering the added facts that the North Korean population is entirely unvaccinated, often malnourished, and served by an obsolete healthcare system that harkens back to the 1990s, the looming peril should be obvious, even for those who might have political motivations to hide bad news.
Accepting the reality that North Korea is in the early stages of a major outbreak, what kind of fallout can we expect? In January, my company and I assembled a statistical model to predict the number of hospitalizations and deaths North Korea might suffer in a nation-wide epidemic. This model pooled together a variety of numbers from different sources, taking into account things like North Korea’s age demographics and the rate at which unvaccinated people are hospitalized after Omicron infection. Depending on how quickly the virus spreads, our model predicts around 10 million adults will be infected over the next year or two (roughly half of the nation’s adult population). Our model also predicts 280,000 will need hospitalization. For COVID-19, hospitalization is generally characterized by severe breathing difficulty accompanied by the need to use a ventilator.
Predicting death is not as easy since there are many factors (like underlying disease rates) that we don’t have information for. Focusing on the numbers we do have, our model predicts 10 million adult infections will precipitate between 44,000 and 220,000 deaths. Given that North Korean healthcare will likely be ineffective in combatting the virus, with many already suffering from weak immune systems due to malnutrition, I would hazard a guess that North Korea is on course to be much closer to the higher end of this range, rather than the lower.
Pyongyang’s Limited Options
So what can North Korea do? In a piece I wrote in February, I expressed the opinion that Pyongyang’s initial pandemic strategy was likely to wait things out by isolating from the international community. Now that Omicron is in the country, however, Pyongyang has unceremoniously been thrust into the new phase of epidemic management, something they are woefully unequipped for.
Given that effective healthcare will be severely limited, most of Pyongyang’s focus will have to be on mitigation. Simply put, it matters immensely whether tens of thousands of patients needing hospitalization appear over the course of a few weeks or are spread out over the course of a full year. The latter would be a daunting crisis; the former would collapse the healthcare system.
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To slow virus dissemination, Pyongyang will need to follow China’s playbook, instituting lockdowns in as organized a manner as possible. Unlike China, however, North Korea lacks anything resembling systematic testing, meaning they will have to make decisions based on limited information. These decisions will be guided, at best, by fever incidence, something we already know is an ineffective marker of infection, with some COVID-19 patients never developing symptoms at all and those who do develop symptoms being infectious for at least two days prior. This lag in information and responsiveness means North Korean authorities will always be a step behind when instituting lockdowns based on symptom reports, likely forcing them to adopt the more aggressive approach of resorting to preemptive or preventative lockdowns when things get bad.
Predicting Economic and Social Damage
As anyone who has been in a lockdown will tell you, such events are incredibly disruptive. Productivity comes to a halt, people have trouble accessing necessities, and unattended burials often take place for virus victims, putting harsh strains on family, sustenance, and the cultural fabric. Similar events are destined to occur in North Korea, although it remains unclear yet to what degree.
It also remains unclear how much disruption the fragile North Korean economy can take, especially given that its export income in 2020 and 2021 was already 1 and 12 percent of pre-pandemic levels, respectively. Unlike other countries, the North Korean government has significant difficulty borrowing money, meaning civilians and businesses will have little support from state-funded relief programs to deal with losses due to lockdown. An even greater concern is whether civilians who depend on day-to-day work to make a living will starve if they abide by lockdown mandates. However you cut it, any reasonable scenario predicts serious societal strain and at least some sort of recession, yet another challenge to be added on top of North Korea’s running five-year decline in GDP.
Panic buying and social unrest due to the pandemic have been observed in virtually every country, especially in the early stages of large outbreaks. There seems no reason to believe similar events will not happen in North Korea, especially given its delicate food situation. Yes, given its prior history, Pyongyang will likely be much more willing to deploy military personnel to maintain order, but fear of disease, hunger, and discontent do have a way of mixing in volatile ways, making an unprecedented clash between civilians and the military a real possibility in upcoming months.
On the political side, the Kim family seems destined to come under a lot of pressure, especially when difficulties mount. One of the long-held tenets of North Korea’s internal propaganda machine is a glorification of the Kim family, a messaging campaign that frequently portrays them as a superior bloodline with something akin to a divine right to rule. If North Korean civilians find themselves in a situation where their government is unable to save their loved ones and feed their children, there may be significant damage done to this myth, threatening, at the very least, Kim Jong Un’s perceived right to lead. What consequences may result is anyone’s guess.
What About International Aid?
Put simply, Pyongyang is destined for a grueling test of stewardship over the next year. The upcoming summer months will likely help keep infections low for a while, but the looming fall and winter seasons are sure to be great sources of anxiety. Even South Korea, with its sophisticated mitigation methods and high vaccination rate, was unable to control Omicron dissemination this past winter. One can only imagine how much harder it will be for North Korea.
In my February piece, I opined that North Korea’s January missile tests seemed like a strategy to signal the international community for pandemic-related assistance. In my mind, these tests indicated Pyongyang, well-aware of the threat posed by Omicron, was using the aggression to try to leverage for food and vaccines. Now that North Korea’s epidemic has started, however, it is unclear how much harder Pyongyang will continue pressing in that direction. Will they continue to launch more missiles as they did the day after announcing their first COVID case, or will they try something even more provocative out of desperation? Only time will tell.
For its part, South Korea, over the weekend, did signal its willingness to provide medical supplies and vaccines. The volume of this assistance was not specified, but, curiously, Pyongyang, at the time of writing, has not yet offered a response, suggesting they are still evaluating the situation. If this silence is due to indecision, that might suggest Pyongyang has already failed to implement a predetermined comprehensive action plan for epidemic management, indicating any systematic response may be marred by unnecessary delays.
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With the outbreak still in early stages, there is ample room for useful humanitarian intervention. Donations of medical supplies, vaccines, ventilators, and food would all be helpful, both now and in the coming months. Aid also offers some potential to encourage North Korea back to a discussion of denuclearization at a later date. Despite the (admittedly muted) potential for this progress, I must imagine many world leaders outside of the Korean Peninsula are quietly wondering whether a “let them suffer” approach might be easier, potentially destabilizing the authoritarian regime. In my mind, destabilization risks putting North Korea’s nuclear arsenal in unwieldy hands, but that has always been an argument difficult to make to those who don’t live in the neighborhood.
Even if some change of heart does take place, there are real limitations on the aid that the international community can provide. Even with the best of intentions, countries will not be lining up to donate ventilators in the thousands, nor will anyone be willing, in the next few months at least, to offer enough vaccines to cover the entirety of North Korea’s 25.8 million population. Perhaps the most realistic assistance in the long run is food. But then again, if the unspoken goal is to use the epidemic to destabilize the Kim regime, why would you provide the one ingredient that can most effectively inhibit that outcome?
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Justin Fendos
Justin Fendos is a professor at Dongseo University in South Korea.
15. Kim Jong Un's harsh criticism of COVID-19 medicine distribution failures not welcomed by everyone
Kim Jong-un's deliberate policy decisions are the root cause of all suffering in north Korea. Kim gives us so much to work with if we wanted to conduct a strategic influence campaign.
Kim Jong Un's harsh criticism of COVID-19 medicine distribution failures not welcomed by everyone - Daily NK
Many North Koreans blame the drug supply problems not on government cadres, but on the leadership's closure of the border for over two years
Kim Jong Un at an emergency consultative meeting of the politburo on Sunday. (Rodong Sinmun - News1)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s recent harsh criticism of cadres and officials for problems in the distribution of COVID-19 medicines has not been welcomed by everyone in the country.
A source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Thursday that North Korean TV and newspapers have been continuously carrying Kim’s sharp criticism of cadres over the condition of the medical system and medication supplies.
“Among themselves, however, people say that the problems aren’t the fault of the cadres,” he said.
According to North Korean media, the politburo held an emergency consultative meeting on Sunday, during which leaders intensively discussed measures to correct “deviations” in the supply of medications.
Pointing out that the “medicines provided by the state have not been supplied to people through pharmacies correctly in time,” Kim said it is “because officials of the Cabinet and public health sector in charge of the supply have not rolled up their sleeves, not properly recognizing the present crisis but [are] only talking about the spirit of devotedly serving the people.”
The North Korean leader strongly criticized the Cabinet and public health officials for their “irresponsible work attitude, and their ability to organize and execute [policy].”
In particular, he censured the director of the Central Public Prosecutors Office for “idleness and negligence of his duties.”
Kim also slammed judicial and prosecutorial officials, saying they “failed to exercise legal supervision and control properly and correct several negative phenomena in the nationwide handling and sale of medicines so as to make the administrative order concerning the supply of medicines be immediately and exactly carried out.”
The source said, however, that problems in the distribution of medications are nothing new.
North Korea’s healthcare system practically collapsed with the start of the “Arduous March” of the 1990s, and North Koreans have been providing for their own needs by procuring medicines from markets or private drug merchants.
After taking power in 2012, Kim began taking measures to resolve problems in the drug supply, setting up pharmacies in major cities. The impact of those measures has been negligible, however, and people are still buying drugs from markets or private merchants.
North Korea’s closure of the border to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in January 2020 created a drug scarcity, and markets and private merchants began selling drugs at much higher prices.
Given these circumstances, many North Koreans blame the drug supply problems not on government cadres, but on the leadership’s closure of the border for over two years. Medications have long been scarce due to the border closure, which has meant that problems with the supply and sale of drugs have been inevitable.
Nonetheless, North Korea’s leadership is trying to quiet public discontent by blaming innocent cadres.
“The leadership just issues empty orders to ease the lives of the people, but take none of the necessary practical measures,” said the source. “The conditions cadres must have to do their jobs don’t exist, and with the government issuing such orders and scolding them, how are the problems supposed to get solved?”
The government again appears to be shifting responsibility in regards to a problem with obvious origins, making it seem as if a “grave incident” occurred due to official negligence, the source continued.
“However, this isn’t the first time something like this has happened, so nobody will be fooled,” he added.
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
16. Ministry looking into reported arrest of N.K. defectors in China
China is complicit in north Korean human rights abuses.
Ministry looking into reported arrest of N.K. defectors in China | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, May 20 (Yonhap) -- South Korea is trying to confirm media reports that a series of North Koreans were recently arrested in China after having fled their impoverished country, the unification ministry said Friday.
Cha Duck-chul, the ministry's deputy spokesperson made the remarks, citing a local law calling for diplomatic efforts to protect and support North Korean refugees based overseas.
Two North Korean defectors were arrested in the Chinese city of Dandong after they crossed the border from the North on Wednesday, according to sources. Three others were also captured earlier this week after they and two other fellows sought to cross the border into China, the sources said.
"We are working with the related agencies to find out the details (of the reports)," Cha told a regular press briefing. "We will make diplomatic efforts based on our position that North Korean defectors living abroad can go to any place they desire of their own free will."
The reported border crossings have spawned speculation that North Koreans are struggling with shortages of everyday necessities amid COVID-19 outbreaks and persistent economic difficulties caused by sanctions and other factors.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
17. Seoul court again orders N.K. leader to pay compensation to abductees' families
Why don't they confiscate all the "royalties" collected by Im Jong-seok for the broadcasts of news from Korea. He apparently has been collecting "royalties" on behalf of the north for the broadcast of news clips from north Korean television news.
Seoul court again orders N.K. leader to pay compensation to abductees' families | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, May 20 (Yonhap) -- A Seoul court on Friday ordered North Korea and its leader Kim Jong-un to compensate the families of South Koreans abducted by the North during the 1950-53 Korean War.
The Lawyers for Human Rights and Unification of Korea, a civic association made up of attorneys specializing in legal issues regarding North Korea, filed the lawsuit in Seoul on June 25, 2020, on behalf of 12 people whose family members were kidnapped by the North during the war.
The Seoul Central District Court ordered Kim and his regime to pay up to 30 million won (US$23,700) per person to the 12 plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs include the bereaved families of Jeong In-bo, the first chief auditor of the South Korean government; Lee Gil-yong, a former Dong-A Ilbo reporter; Hong Jae-ki, the nation's first lawyer; and former court judge Kim Yoon-chan.
The civic association, launching the lawsuit on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, said North Korea kidnapped around 100,000 civilians from the South and the plaintiffs' human rights have been violated by the North's crimes against humanity.
North Korea has refused to respond to the lawsuit but the Seoul court made the ruling through the "conveyance by public announcement" system, in which court hearings proceed without the presence of defendants.
Despite the ruling, however, it will be difficult for the plaintiffs to receive actual compensation, because there is no way to force the North to comply.
It marked the third time that South Koreans have won a damages suit against North Korea.
In July 2020, the same Seoul court ordered Kim and Pyongyang to pay 21 million won each to two former prisoners of war over forced labor in the North.
In March 2021, the same court ruled that North Korea and Kim have to pay compensation of 50 million won to a family member of a South Korean who was abducted to the North during the Korean War.
ycm@yna.co.kr
(END)
18. Time to Elevate US-South Korea Partnership With Strategic Refinement
Excerpts:
In light of such a critical foreign policy environment, it is in the clear interest of Seoul and Washington to elevate their decadeslong partnership to a next practical level enhanced by greater strategic clarity and realignment.
Washington’s latest Indo-Pacific Strategy document defines the “strategic ends” of America’s engagement in the region to be the advancement of “a free and open Indo Pacific that is more connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.”
Toward that, South Korea’s Yoon said he would discuss the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework initiative during his scheduled summit with Biden. Yoon further noted, “We will focus on ways to strengthen global supply channels through the IPEF.”
In fact, South Korea’s economic relationship with the U.S., which has been further institutionalized by a bilateral free trade agreement over the past decade, is underpinned by a strong foundation of shared ideals, enduring people-to-people ties, and close business cooperation led by global companies in both countries.
Time to Elevate US-South Korea Partnership With Strategic Refinement
Forging greater pragmatic cooperation between willing allies necessitates timely, forward-looking strategic clarity in terms of paving an elevated trajectory of the alliance. That’s why the upcoming May 21 summit between President Joe Biden and South Korea’s recently inaugurated President Yoon Suk Yeol matters.
Biden, on his first presidential trip to Indo-Pacific, will make his first stop in the Republic of Korea, America’s long-standing ally. Biden and Yoon are expected to leverage their first summit in Seoul to firm up and broaden the U.S.-South Korea alliance in the face of a number of challenges confronting the two long-time allies.
Their first meeting comes in light of the pressing geopolitical context of North Korea’s series of missile launches, China’s growing assertiveness, and Russia’s war in Ukraine, among others.
In light of such a critical foreign policy environment, it is in the clear interest of Seoul and Washington to elevate their decadeslong partnership to a next practical level enhanced by greater strategic clarity and realignment.
Washington’s latest Indo-Pacific Strategy document defines the “strategic ends” of America’s engagement in the region to be the advancement of “a free and open Indo Pacific that is more connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.”
Toward that, South Korea’s Yoon said he would discuss the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework initiative during his scheduled summit with Biden. Yoon further noted, “We will focus on ways to strengthen global supply channels through the IPEF.”
In fact, South Korea’s economic relationship with the U.S., which has been further institutionalized by a bilateral free trade agreement over the past decade, is underpinned by a strong foundation of shared ideals, enduring people-to-people ties, and close business cooperation led by global companies in both countries.
From a broader perspective, the U.S.-South Korea bilateral relationship, anchored in the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, is one of the strongest and most successful built by America since the end of World War II. Once a recipient of U.S. development assistance, South Korea has become one of the most competitive economies in the world, and notably transformed itself from a security consumer to America’s capable and reliable partner of providing security to other nations.
For these reasons and more, working with South Korea to implement the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework is the logical next step for further elevating the already robust partnership between Seoul and Washington, perhaps to a new chapter of strategic forward-adaptive high-tech alliance.
Not ambiguously, the United States and South Korea share a relationship that is truly unique among our closest friends and allies. Many of America’s main alliances today are with countries the U.S. was once forced to fight against. Japan and Germany are obvious examples, but in the early days of the American history, it was with England that we were most often at war. Clearly, adversaries can become friends.
However, Americans and South Koreans have never been enemies. The two countries’ bilateral relationship was forged in the struggles of World War II and, in its aftermath, the struggle against communist aggression from China and Russia. Fighting together against common enemies has indeed forged a lasting, vibrant relationship between the two long-time allies based on mutual respect and common values of democracy, human rights, and economic freedom. Today, the two long-time allies support each other, defend each other, and depend on each other.
Clearly, the U.S.-South Korean alliance has been fulfilling its promises. Yet, more can and should be done, given the fact that there are untapped, innovative ways in which to broaden the work going forward together.
To that end, the May 21 Seoul summit between Biden and Yoon deserves to be an elevated transition in U.S.-South Korea relations from that of a purely military and economic alliance to a more far-ranging partnership, particularly elevated by greater strategic clarity and realignment.
Seizing that opportunity would be a fulfilling way to gain from an ever-evolving partnership on key strategic fronts to move the U.S.-South Korea alliance forward and onward together.
Have an opinion about this article? To sound off, please email letters@DailySignal.com and we’ll consider publishing your edited remarks in our regular “We Hear You” feature. Remember to include the URL or headline of the article plus your name and town and/or state.
19. U.S. labels N. Korea as country not cooperating in anti-terrorism efforts in draft notice
U.S. labels N. Korea as country not cooperating in anti-terrorism efforts in draft notice | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, May 20 (Yonhap) -- The United States has named North Korea as a country not cooperating in its anti-terrorism efforts, a U.S. draft document showed Friday.
North Korea, along with Iran, Syria, Venezuela and Cuba, was listed as a country "not cooperating fully" with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts, according to the draft notice signed by Secretary of State Antony Blinken on May 11 and posted on the U.S. Federal Register website.
The public inspection document is scheduled to be published Friday (U.S. time), the website showed.
The U.S. first labeled North Korea as such a country in 1997.
The move comes just before U.S. President Joe Biden arrives in South Korea for a summit meeting with President Yoon Suk-yeol on Saturday, which is likely to focus on the approach to the recalcitrant regime.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
20. Gov't postpones planned opening of Yongsan park site near presidential office
Some of the footage the video shows that is supposed to be of Yongsan is actually Osan Air Base.
(LEAD) Gov't postpones planned opening of Yongsan park site near presidential office | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS USFK base's decontamination issue in last 3 paras)
SEOUL, May 20 (Yonhap) -- The land ministry on Friday announced its decision to postpone the plan to temporarily open to the public part of the site for an envisioned national park near the presidential office in central Seoul, citing a lack of preparations.
On Thursday, the ministry said it will open part of the site in the Yongsan Garrison in Seoul, including the southern side of the recently relocated presidential office and sports fields north of the National Museum of Korea, for 13 days starting on May 25, and hold various events.
"We've decided to defer the plan as inconvenience to visitors is expected due to the lack of preparations, such as convenient facilities," the ministry said in a release. "We will hold the opening event after wrapping up preparations to help people enjoy the park more comfortably."
The U.S. military is in the process of returning the site to the South Korean government after relocating the headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, 70 kilometers south of Seoul, and the government is working to turn it into a large national park, named Yongsan Park.
The ministry earlier said that the planned opening was meant to have people participate in the process of turning the Yongsan base, which has long been off-limits, into an open space, and to better reflect the people's opinions in the project.
The new Yoon Suk-yeol government relocated the presidential office from Cheong Wa Dae from near the Gwanghwamun area to the defense ministry compound in the Yongsan district in an effort to move out of a "symbol of imperial power" and get closer to the people.
The opposition Democratic Party and environmental groups have criticized the government for the opening decision, claiming that the site used by the USFK is contaminated and the "hasty opening" would pose risks to public health.
But the ministry said the postponement decision has nothing to do with any environmental issues, and the envisioned visits will not do any harm to the public, as visitors are supposed to stay at the site for only about two hours according to its plan.
Seoul and Washington have had consultations on procedures for joint contamination surveys, contamination management criteria and other related issues.
graceoh@yna.co.kr
(END)
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
