Quotes of the Day:

"Our greatest weakness lies in giving up. The most certain way to succeed is always to try just one more time."

- Thomas A. Edison

"If you think in terms of a year, plant a seed; if in terms of ten years, plant trees; if in terms of 100 years, teach the people."

- Confucius

"A Just Man - He stands on the side of the right with such conviction, that neither the neither the passion of a mob, nor the violence of a despt can make him overstep the bounds of reason."

- Baltasar Gracian

1. G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué

2. The China Hawk in Washington Rattling Corporate Boardrooms

3. Zelenskiy joins Japan G7 as democracies take aim at Russia and China

4. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 19, 2023

5. With eye on Ukraine, top Chinese general calls for unconventional warfare capabilities

6. US to Counter Russian Disinformation on Ukraine With AI Tool

7. Cold Wars, Grey Zones, and Strategic Competition: Applying Theories of War to Strategy in the 21st Century

8. Many AI tools are a distraction, but you’d better pay attention

9. China Puts Spymaster in Charge of U.S. Corporate Crackdown

10. ‘Approaching. Move In.’ How Ukraine Reversed the Momentum in Bakhmut

11. 'War is not an option', Taiwan president says amid China tensions

12. China ‘Welcomes’ Taiwan Tourism in Symbolic Push for Closer Ties

13. 1 in 5 Young Chinese Is Jobless, and Millions More Are About to Graduate

14. G7 issues strongest condemnation of China as it intensifies response to Beijing

15.  Ex-ByteDance employee claims China had 'supreme access' to all data

16. Three Lessons from the Front: Economic Warfare in Russia / Ukraine

17. Ukraine Launches Sabotage Operations on Occupied Territories and Inside Russia

18. It’s Not Enough for Ukraine to Win. Russia Has to Lose.

19.  CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, MAY 19, 2023

20. Why Putin Is Right to Fear for His Life

21. PLA Drones Off Taiwan’s East Coast: The Strategic Implications

22. China is preparing for war – and the West is preparing to surrender

1. G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué

66 paragraphs

G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué | The White House

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · May 20, 2023

Preamble

1. We, the Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7), met in Hiroshima for our annual Summit on May 19-21, 2023, more united than ever in our determination to meet the global challenges of this moment and set the course for a better future. Our work is rooted in respect for the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and international partnership.

We are taking concrete steps to:

• support Ukraine for as long as it takes in the face of Russia’s illegal war of aggression;
• strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, towards the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all;
• coordinate our approach to economic resilience and economic security that is based on diversifying and deepening partnerships and de-risking, not de-coupling;
• drive the transition to clean energy economies of the future through cooperation within and beyond the G7;
• launch the Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security with partner countries to address needs today and into the future; and
• deliver our goal of mobilizing $600 billion in financing for quality infrastructure through the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment (PGII)

as outlined in the reference documents of this Communique.

We are determined to work together and with others to:

• support a free and open Indo-Pacific and oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion;
• foster a strong and resilient global economic recovery, maintain financial stability, and promote jobs and sustainable growth;
• accelerate achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), recognizing that reducing poverty and tackling the climate and nature crisis go hand in hand;
• promote the evolution of the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs);
• strengthen our partnerships with African countries and support greater African representation in multilateral fora;
• preserve the planet by accelerating the decarbonization of our energy sector and the deployment of renewables, end plastic pollution and protect the oceans;
• deepen cooperation through Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs), the Climate Club and new Country Packages for Forest, Nature and Climate;
• invest in global health through vaccine manufacturing capacity worldwide, the Pandemic Fund, the future international agreement for pandemic prevention, preparedness and response, and efforts to achieve universal health coverage (UHC);
• cooperate on international migration and strengthen our common effort to fight the trafficking and smuggling of human beings; and
• advance international discussions on inclusive artificial intelligence (AI) governance and interoperability to achieve our common vision and goal of trustworthy AI, in line with our shared democratic values.

2. We will champion international principles and shared values by:

• upholding and reinforcing the free and open international order based on the rule of law, respecting the UN Charter to the benefit of countries, large and small;
• strongly opposing any unilateral attempts to change the peacefully established status of territories by force or coercion anywhere in the world and reaffirming that the acquisition of territory by force is prohibited;
• promoting universal human rights, gender equality and human dignity;
• reiterating the importance of multilateralism including the role of UN and international cooperation in promoting peace, stability and prosperity; and
• strengthening the rules-based multilateral trading system and keeping pace with the evolution of digital technologies.

3. We will work with our international partners to achieve a world that is human-centered, inclusive and resilient, leaving no one behind. In that spirit, we welcomed the participation of the Leaders of Australia, Brazil, Comoros, Cook Islands, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, and Vietnam.

Ukraine

4. We once again condemn in the strongest possible terms the war of aggression by Russia against Ukraine, which constitutes a serious violation of international law, including the UN Charter. Russia’s brutal war of aggression represents a threat to the whole world in breach of fundamental norms, rules and principles of the international community. We reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine for as long as it takes to bring a comprehensive, just and lasting peace. We issued the G7 Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine, and with the clear intention and concrete actions set forth in it, we commit to intensifying our diplomatic, financial, humanitarian and military support for Ukraine, to increasing the costs to Russia and those supporting its war efforts, and to continuing to counter the negative impacts of the war on the rest of the world, particularly on the most vulnerable people.

Disarmament and Non-proliferation

5. Together with the G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, we express our commitment to achieving a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all, through taking a realistic, pragmatic, and responsible approach. We reaffirm the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation efforts to create a more stable and safer world. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We remain committed to the universalization, effective implementation, and strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as well as the Chemical Weapons Convention. We welcome the steps taken to strengthen effective and responsible export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognize the central role of multilateral export control regimes in this regard.

Indo-Pacific

6. We reiterate the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific, which is inclusive, prosperous, secure, based on the rule of law, and that protects shared principles including sovereignty, territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of disputes, and fundamental freedoms and human rights. Given the importance of the region, G7 members and our partners have taken respective Indo-Pacific initiatives to help strengthen our engagement. We underscore our commitment to strengthen coordination with regional partners, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states. We reaffirm our unwavering support for ASEAN centrality and unity and our commitment to promoting cooperation in line with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. We also reaffirm our partnership with Pacific Island countries and reiterate the importance of supporting their priorities and needs in accordance with the Pacific Islands Forum’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. We welcome and further encourage efforts made by the private sector, universities and think tanks, which contribute to realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Global Economy, Finance and Sustainable Development

7. The global economy has shown resilience against multiple shocks including the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and associated inflationary pressures. Nevertheless, we need to remain vigilant and stay agile and flexible in our macroeconomic policy amid heightened uncertainty about the global economic outlook. In striving for strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth, we are committed to a stability- and growth-oriented macroeconomic policy mix that supports medium-term fiscal sustainability and price stability. Inflation remains elevated and central banks remain strongly committed to achieving price stability, in line with their respective mandates. Meanwhile, fiscal policy should continue to provide, as appropriate, temporary and targeted support to vulnerable groups suffering from the increase in cost of living and catalyze investment needed for the green and digital transformations while the overall fiscal stance should ensure medium-term sustainability. We also reaffirm our existing G7 exchange rate commitments. We reemphasize the importance of supply-side reforms, especially those that increase labor supply and enhance productivity. We also stress the crucial role of women and under-represented groups for the long-term success of our economies through promoting inclusion, diversity and innovation. We look forward to a successful review of the G20/Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance to strengthen sustainability and resilience of the private sector. Recognizing that our economic and social structures have undergone dynamic and fundamental transformation, we underscore the multidimensional aspects of welfare and that these aspects should be brought into policymaking in a practical and effective manner. Such efforts will help preserve confidence in democracy and a market-based economy, which are the core values of the G7.

8. We will continue to closely monitor financial sector developments and stand ready to take appropriate actions to maintain financial stability and the resilience of the global financial system. We reaffirm that our financial system is resilient, supported by the financial regulatory reforms implemented after the 2008 global financial crisis. We strongly support the work of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and standard-setting bodies on enhancing the resilience of non-bank financial intermediation. We will continue policy deliberation on digital money to harness the benefits of innovation such as payment efficiency as well as financial inclusion while addressing potential risks to the stability, resilience and integrity of the monetary and financial system. Effective monitoring, regulation and oversight are critical to addressing financial stability and integrity risks posed by crypto-asset activities and markets and to avoid regulatory arbitrage, while supporting responsible innovation.

9. We re-emphasize our strong political commitment towards the swift global implementation of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework Two-Pillar Solution to address the tax challenges arising from globalization and the digitalization of the economy and to establish a more stable and fairer international tax system. We recognize significant progress in the negotiation of the Pillar 1 Multilateral Convention (MLC) and reaffirm our commitment to the swift completion of the negotiation so that the MLC can be ready for signature within the agreed timeline. We welcome the progresses in domestic legislation toward the implementation of Pillar 2. We will further provide developing countries with support for strengthening their tax capacity to build sustainable tax revenue sources, highlighting the importance of assistance for the implementation of the Two-Pillar Solution.

10. We recognize that achieving the sustainable development goals by 2030, reducing poverty, responding to global challenges including the climate crisis, and addressing debt vulnerabilities in low and middle-income countries are urgent, interrelated and mutually reinforcing. We are determined to do our part to mobilize the private and public resources needed to meet these challenges and support a just transition. Recognizing the importance of providing and protecting global public goods, we will support efforts to embed building resilience, sustainability and inclusiveness as integral elements in MDBs’ efforts to reduce poverty and promote shared prosperity. We will strive to enhance the development finance toolkit to mobilize additional financing from international financial institutions, bilateral partners, and the private sector to more effectively reduce poverty by better addressing vulnerabilities including climate change.　We will work together and with partners to deliver this ambition and make concrete progress on this agenda at key moments over the coming year starting with the Summit organized in Paris on June 22-23 to revitalize global development financing, and continuing the momentum through the G20 Summit in New Delhi, the SDG Summit in New York, the 2023 World Bank Group (WBG) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Annual Meetings in Marrakech, the G20 Compact with Africa Conference in Berlin, and the 28th meeting of the Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC-COP 28) in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

11, We are determined to take on a leading role in reversing the setback of progress towards the SDGs. Recognizing that 2023 is the halfway point to achieve the SDGs, we highlight the importance of the SDG Summit in September and will ambitiously contribute to a successful outcome. We reaffirm our commitment to revitalizing international cooperation and strengthen multilateralism. We will accelerate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA), and will do so in a comprehensive and gender-transformative manner including through locally-led development. We will also promote the concept of human security in the new era aiming to realize a society that leaves no one behind. We stress the critical role of development cooperation and international partnerships in addressing global challenges and the need to engage with international partners in solidarity. We also call for further domestic resource mobilization and efficient use of existing resources as well as mobilizing private financial assets to address financing gaps for sustainable development. We underscore the need for continued efforts to scale up official development assistance (ODA) and expand its catalytic use including through innovative financing mechanisms, recognizing the importance of respective commitments, such as the 0.7% ODA/GNI target that some countries adopted.

12. We remain concerned that serious challenges to debt sustainability are undermining the progress towards the SDGs and low-and middle-income countries are disproportionately affected by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and wider global challenges. We reiterate the urgency of addressing debt vulnerabilities in these countries and fully support the G20’s effort to improve the implementation of the Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) in a predictable, timely, orderly and coordinated manner, providing clarity to participants. We welcome the recent approval by the IMF board of a program for Ghana. Beyond the Common Framework, debt vulnerabilities in middle income countries (MICs) should be addressed by multilateral coordination. In this respect, we welcome the launch of the creditors’ meeting for Sri Lanka under the three co-chairs, France, India, and Japan, and look forward to a swift resolution as a successful model for future multilateral efforts to address MICs’ debt issues. We also stress the importance of private creditors providing debt treatments on terms at least as favorable to ensure fair burden sharing in line with the comparability of treatment principle. We welcome the development of Climate Resilient Debt Clauses (CRDC) to enhance the safety net for borrowers facing the impacts of climate change. We welcome work by our finance ministers on this topic and encourage more creditors to offer CRDC for loan agreements. In order to enhance debt data accuracy and transparency, we invite all official bilateral creditors to join the data sharing exercise for debt data reconciliation, including through further advancing the G20’s initiative in the area of debt data accuracy.

13. We encourage MDBs and Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) to accelerate their efforts to increase their capacity to leverage private finance, including through implementing MDB reforms. In this regard, we strongly support and encourage to expedite the ongoing work on the evolution of the MDBs to review and transform their business models to better address transboundary challenges such as climate change, pandemics, fragility and conflict, which are integral to achieving poverty reduction and shared prosperity. This evolution should come with the most efficient use of their existing capital. To this end, we will contribute to developing an ambitious G20 Roadmap on implementing the recommendations of the G20 MDB Capital Adequacy Framework Review and call on MDBs to make further progress in a comprehensive manner while safeguarding MDBs’ long-term financial sustainability, robust credit ratings and preferred creditor status. Building on key reforms to the WBG’s mission and operational model along with financial reforms that can add up to $50 billion of financing capacity over the coming decade, we look forward to further progress at the WBG toward the 2023 WBG and IMF Annual Meetings and beyond so that ambitious reforms can be made on a continual basis. We encourage other MDBs to join this initiative for a coordinated approach of MDBs as a system. We also call on MDBs to make the best use of policy and knowledge support, and explore strengthened approaches to promote mobilizing domestic resources and private capital as well as private sector engagement. We have further advanced our joint efforts to support countries most in need through the voluntary channeling of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) or equivalent contributions. We welcome that additional pledges by Japan and France, amongst others, together with our previous contributions and commitments, put the global ambition of $100 billion within reach and call for the delivery of existing pledges and for further pledges from all willing and able countries to fulfill the ambition. We support the IMF achieving its agreed 2021 fundraising targets by the 2023 WBG and IMF Annual Meetings and identifying all available options to put the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) which supports Low Income Countries (LICs), on a sustainable footing with a view to meeting the growing needs of LICs in the coming years. We will further explore viable options for enabling the voluntary channeling of SDRs through MDBs, while respecting national legal frameworks and the need to preserve the reserve assets character and status of SDRs.

14. We stress the importance of narrowing the infrastructure investment gap in low and middle income partner countries, including by delivering financing for quality infrastructure, supporting efforts to advance policy reforms needed to attract investment, operationalizing country-led partnerships, and promoting upstream support including project preparation support. We reaffirm our shared commitment to the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) and to working together and aiming to mobilize up to $600 billion by 2027.We will continue strengthening global partnerships for public and private investments in sustainable, inclusive, resilient and quality infrastructure with partner countries. We will mobilize the private sector for accelerated action to this end. Our offer is fair and transparent and aims at accelerating global sustainable development with the focus on delivering impact at local level. We welcome the Factsheet on PGII that demonstrates how the G7 and partners have made concrete progress in fostering investments that will create lasting positive impacts and promote sustainable development. We reiterate our support to the G20 Compact with Africa as a key framework to enhance the business environment in Africa and call on reform-oriented partners to join and strengthen this initiative.

15. We shared our determination to promote transparent and fair development finance and work together to address the gap in implementing existing principles such as debt transparency and sustainability, fair appraisal, selection, and lending practices for quality infrastructure investment. In this regard, we call on all actors to adhere to international rules, standards and principles, including the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment, the G20 Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. These rules, standards and principles also include measures to safeguard the integrity of infrastructure investments.

16. We note the importance of addressing development, humanitarian, peace and security issues together. We are determined to address the unprecedented number of humanitarian crises, focusing on women and girls and those in vulnerable situations. In this regard, we commit to providing over $21 billion in total to address the worsening humanitarian crises this year, including in response to urgent food crises. Bearing in mind that many countries are vulnerable to disasters, including Small Island Developing States, we will accelerate international disaster risk reduction cooperation in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and the output of its midterm review conducted by the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR). We emphasize the importance of a disaster preparedness approach and investment in human capital, goods and infrastructure that contribute not only to “risk transfer” but also to “risk reduction,” resulting in the strengthening of anticipatory actions. We remain committed to holding ourselves accountable, in an open and transparent way, for the promises we have made. In this regard, we endorse the 2023 Hiroshima Progress Report, following up on the G7’s development-related commitments on food security and nutrition as well as refugees and migration.

17. We emphasize the transformative power of cities worldwide as drivers for every aspect of sustainable development. We will continue our cooperation on sustainable urban development and task our relevant Ministers to consider the development of principles on carbon neutral, resilient and inclusive cities and on the digitalization in cities, and to accelerate the use of data and technologies for cities. This work will support exchanges with our global partners, whose cities face some of the most significant challenges relating to climate change.

Climate Change

18. Our planet is facing unprecedented challenges from the triple global crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution as well as from the ongoing global energy crisis. We are steadfast in our commitment to the Paris agreement, keeping a limit of 1.5°C global temperature rise within reach through scaled up action in this critical decade, halting and reversing biodiversity loss by 2030, and ensuring energy security, whilst leveraging synergies and recognizing the interdependent nature of these challenges. While Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine impacts energy markets and supply chains globally, our goal to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050 at the latest remains unchanged. We emphasize our strong concern, amplified by the latest finding of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and its Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), at the accelerating and intensifying impacts of climate change, and highlight the increased urgency to reduce global GHG emissions by around 43 percent by 2030 and 60 percent by 2035, relative to the 2019 level, in light of its latest findings. We reiterate our commitment made in Elmau last year to rapidly implement domestic mitigation measures aimed at achieving our Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) targets and to increase our ambition including, for example, by adopting or strengthening sectoral targets, by developing non-CO2 sub targets, and by adopting stringent implementation measures. Mindful of our leadership role, and noting that emissions have already peaked in all G7 countries, we recognize the critical role of all major economies in limiting increases in global temperature over this critical decade and in subsequent decades. In this context, we underscore that every major economy should have significantly enhanced the ambition of its NDC since the Paris Agreement; already peaked its GHG emissions or indicated that it will do so no later than 2025; and in particular, included economy-wide absolute reduction targets and that cover all GHGs in its NDC. Accordingly, we call on all Parties – especially major economies – whose 2030 NDC targets or long-term low GHG emission development Strategies (LTSs) are not yet aligned with a 1.5°C pathway and net zero by 2050 at the latest, to revisit and strengthen the 2030 NDC targets and publish or update their LTSs as soon as possible and well before UNFCCC-COP28, and to commit to net zero by 2050 at the latest. Furthermore, we call on all Parties to commit at UNFCCC-COP28 to peak global GHG emissions immediately and by no later than 2025. We reaffirm our commitment to the Global Methane Pledge and we will step up efforts to collectively reduce global anthropogenic methane emissions by at least 30 percent below 2020 levels by 2030. We commit to actively contributing to securing the most ambitious outcomes of the first global stocktake (GST) at UNFCCC-COP28, which should result in enhanced, immediate and ambitious actions across mitigation, adaptation, means of implementation and support. We call on all Parties to submit their next round of NDCs and LTSs well ahead of UNFCCC-COP30 that are informed by the outcomes of the GST, reflecting economy-wide absolute reduction targets including all GHGs, sectors and categories. These should reflect significantly enhanced ambition aligned with a 1.5°C pathway and should also include their revisited and strengthened 2030 targets.

19. Noting the importance of increasing the pace and scale of action on climate change, biodiversity loss and clean energy transitions, we will globally advance and promote a green transformation, working together to realize transformation of our economies to reach net-zero GHG emissions by 2050 at the latest. We will engage with developing and emerging countries to accelerate emission reduction, including by supporting their transitions to climate resilient, circular, and nature positive economies and net-zero GHG emissions through various and practical pathways taking into account national circumstances. To that end, we reaffirm our strong commitment to supporting developing countries’ just energy transitions, which will be supported by coordinated actions, including through the PGII. We welcome progress achieved on JETPs with South Africa, Indonesia and Vietnam, and also continue our discussions with India and Senegal. We take note of initiatives that are intended to support clean energy transition in countries around the world, such as Asia Zero Emission Community (AZEC) initiative, the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA), 2050 Pathways Platform, Net Zero World (NZW), and the Global Carbon Pricing Challenge and underscore the importance of actions taken through such initiatives being aligned with a 1.5°C pathway. We will take further action on supply-side measures and recognize the need for further decarbonization efforts on the demand-side such as promoting changes in infrastructure and material use and end-use technology adoption as well as promoting sustainable consumer choice. We also recognize the vital role of sub-national governments in collaboration with other stakeholders and partners to advance climate and energy actions based on local needs and environmental conditions. We reaffirm the important role of high integrity carbon markets and carbon pricing to foster cost-efficient reductions in emission levels, drive innovation and enable a transformation to net zero, through the optimal use of a range of policy levers to price carbon. We support appropriate policy mixes including carbon pricing, non-pricing mechanisms, and incentives that effectively reduce emissions, and note that these could vary reflecting country-specific circumstances. We strongly support the OECD Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches (IFCMA). We look forward to advancing the open, cooperative, and inclusive Climate Club, in collaboration with international partners, to advance industrial decarbonization. We encourage private entities to commit to GHG net-zero emissions throughout the value chain via credible net zero pledges and transparent implementation strategies. We also encourage and promote private entities’ work to foster innovation contributing to the emission reduction of other entities through decarbonization solutions. We welcome the progress of the Industrial Decarbonization Agenda (IDA) that decided to start working on implementation of the new Global Data Collection Framework for steel production and product emissions. We reaffirm our commitment to a highly decarbonized road sector by 2030, and recognize the importance of reducing GHG emissions from the global fleet and the range of pathways to approach this goal in line with trajectories required for keeping a limit of 1.5°C within reach. We are committed to the goal of achieving net-zero emissions in the road sector by 2050. In this context, we highlight the various actions that each of us is taking to decarbonize our vehicle fleet, including such domestic policies that are designed to achieve 100 percent or the overwhelming penetration of sales of light duty vehicles (LDVs) as zero emission vehicles (ZEV) by 2035 and beyond; to achieve 100 percent electrified vehicles in new passenger car sales by 2035; to promote associated infrastructure and sustainable carbon-neutral fuels including sustainable bio- and synthetic fuels. We note the opportunities that these policies offer to contribute to a highly decarbonized road sector, including progressing towards a share of over 50 percent of zero emission LDVs sold globally by 2030. Considering the findings of the International Energy Agency (IEA)‘s Energy Technology Perspective 2023, we also note the opportunity to collectively reduce by at least 50 percent CO2 emissions from G7 vehicle stock by 2035 or earlier relative to the level in 2000 as a halfway point to achieving net zero and to track the progress on a yearly basis. We reaffirm our commitment to strengthen global efforts to achieve GHG lifecycle zero emissions from international shipping by 2050 at the latest. We commit to support this target and introducing intermediate targets for 2030 and 2040 for the revised International Maritime Organization (IMO) GHG reduction strategy, in line with efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels through a credible basket of measures. We commit to accelerate global efforts to achieve the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)’s goal of net-zero emissions in international aviation by 2050, including making an effort for promoting and introducing sustainable aviation fuel (SAF), introducing new technologies and improving operations, also building on ICAO’s Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA).

20. In the face of the increasing threats posed by climate change, supporting climate-vulnerable groups is essential for ensuring human security and achieving resilient and sustainable development. We will continue to scale up and enhance support to strengthen the resilience of climate-vulnerable groups through enhancing climate change adaptation and climate disaster risk reduction, response and recovery and early-warning systems including through the Global Shield against Climate Risks and other initiatives related to early warning systems and the adoption of climate-resilient debt clauses. We reaffirm our commitments to the developed country Parties’ goal of jointly mobilizing $100 billion annually in climate finance by 2020 through to 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation. We will work together with other developed country Parties in order to fully meet the goal in 2023. We welcome discussions on an ambitious and fit-for-purpose new collective quantified goal (NCQG) which contributes as a global effort, from a wide variety of sources, public and private, to reaching the goals of the Paris Agreement, including making finance flows consistent with a pathway toward low GHG emissions and climate resilient development. Recognizing the critical role of the G7 and that developed country parties should take the lead in mobilizing climate finance, we underscore the need for all countries and stakeholders, who have the capabilities and are not yet among the current providers of international climate finance, to contribute to global efforts in this regard.

21. We are committed to accelerating our own efforts to making financial flows consistent with a pathway toward low GHG emissions and climate resilient development, in line with Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement. We stress the importance of mobilizing finance especially including private finance focusing on further implementation and development of clean technologies and activities. We underline our commitment to consistent, comparable and reliable disclosure of information on sustainability including climate. We support the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) finalizing the standards for general reporting on sustainability and for climate-related disclosures and working toward achieving globally interoperable sustainability disclosure frameworks. We also look forward to the ISSB’s future work on disclosure on biodiversity and human capital, in line with its work plan consultation. We remain committed to supporting the implementation and monitoring of the G20 Sustainable Finance Roadmap. We highlight the need for corporates to implement their net-zero transitions in line with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement based on credible corporate climate transition plans. We also highlight that transition finance, in line with keeping a limit of 1.5°C temperature rise within reach, avoiding carbon lock-ins and based on effective emissions reduction, has a significant role in advancing the decarbonization of the economy as a whole. We look forward to an ambitious and successful second replenishment for the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and reaffirm the need for robust G7 pledges. We urge other countries to do the same and underscore the need to broaden the GCF’s contributor base by encouraging all potential contributors. We continue to accelerate efforts to respond to the Glasgow Climate Pact that urges developed countries to at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing countries from the 2019 level by 2025, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources. We also urge MDBs to commit to ambitious adaptation finance targets, announcing revised and enhanced 2025 projections, and call on non-G7 countries to enhance provision and mobilization including private finance for adaptation. We stress the key role of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in mobilizing finance and call on them to mainstream climate and environment issues in their policies, investments, operations and governance. We also urge MDBs to increase finance for global public goods including climate finance and support ambitious regulatory reforms in developing countries via policy-based finance in order to foster the transition to net zero and enable private sector investment. Furthermore, in order to promote the development of carbon markets while ensuring their environmental integrity, we endorse the “Principles of High Integrity Carbon Markets” to facilitate their implementation in carbon credit markets. We emphasize our extreme concern at the scale of impacts that are already resulting in economic and non-economic loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change and being felt globally, particularly by the most vulnerable. Alarmed by the adverse effects of climate change globally, we will scale up action and support to avert, minimize and address loss and damage, especially for the most vulnerable countries. This will include implementing the UNFCCC-COP27/The 4th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA4) decision to establish new funding arrangements, including a fund, for developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, in the context of article 8 of the Paris Agreement, and providing support identified in the “G7 Inventory on Climate Disaster Risk Reduction, Response and Recovery”.

Environment

22. We commit to realizing the transformation of the economic and social system towards net-zero, circular, climate-resilient, pollution-free and nature-positive economies and to halting and reversing biodiversity loss by 2030, in an integrated manner, while ensuring sustainable and inclusive economic growth and development and enhancing the resilience of our economies. Highlighting that enhancing resource efficiency and circularity along value chains reduces primary resource use and contributes to achieving our climate and other environmental goals, we encourage stakeholders and in particular businesses to strengthen their action. Thus, we endorse the Circular Economy and Resource Efficiency Principles (CEREP). We will increase domestic and international environmentally-sound, sustainable and efficient recovery and recycling of critical minerals and raw materials and other applicable materials while increasing circularity along the supply chains. We reaffirm that management and governance of water-related ecosystems are essential for all life on earth. We are actively engaging in relevant international fora including following up on the UN Water Conference successfully held this year.

23. Building on the G7 Ocean Deal, we commit to act towards realizing clean, healthy and productive oceans. We reaffirm our commitment to end illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and will take further actions to address this phenomenon in all its dimensions, including supporting developing countries and strengthening policy coordination among our relevant agencies and task them to take stock of their progress on this issue by the end of this year. In particular, we encourage non-parties to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Agreement on Port State Measures (PSMA) to join for further global acceptance and effective implementation of the PSMA. We welcome the conclusion of the negotiations for an international legally binding instrument under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) and call for its rapid entry into force and implementation. We will continue to actively engage in the development of a regulatory framework on deep seabed mineral exploitation under the International Seabed Authority (ISA) that ensures effective protection for the marine environment from harmful effects which may arise from such activities, as required under the UNCLOS. We are committed to end plastic pollution, with the ambition to reduce additional plastic pollution to zero by 2040. With this in mind, we are determined to continue and step up our actions based on the comprehensive life cycle approach. We support the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) process, look forward to the next round of negotiation in Paris with a view to completing its work with an international legally binding instrument covering the whole life cycle of plastics by the end of 2024 and call for ambitious outcomes. We will make as much progress as possible on these issues and on the broader agenda of ocean protection by the UN Ocean Conference in 2025.

24.We welcome the adoption of the historic Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030, which is fundamental to human well-being, a healthy planet and economic prosperity, and commit to its swift and full implementation and to achievement of each of its goals and targets. In this regard, G7 members that are parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) commit to revise, update and submit our National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) aligned with the GBF and its goals and targets, or to communicate national targets reflecting as applicable all the goals and targets of the GBF in 2023 or sufficiently in advance of CBD-COP16. We will identify incentives, including subsidies, harmful to biodiversity by 2025, and redirect or eliminate them while scaling up positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity by 2030 at the latest, taking initial steps without delay. We call on all signatories to swiftly implement their commitments under the GBF and stand ready to provide support to developing countries. We reiterate our commitment to substantially increase our national and international funding for nature by 2025. We will ensure that our international development assistance aligns with the GBF. We call on the MDBs to increase support for biodiversity including through leveraging financial resources from all sources and deploying a full suite of instruments. To implement the GBF, we commit to substantially and progressively increasing the level of financial resources from all sources, and to align all relevant fiscal and financial flows with the GBF and call on others to do the same. We commit to supporting the establishment of the GBF Fund within the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and its successful launch at the GEF Assembly in Vancouver in August 2023, noting the importance of financial contributions from all sources to capitalize the new fund. We reaffirm our commitment to enhance synergies between finance for climate and biodiversity, including increased funding for Nature-based Solutions. We also commit to supporting and advancing a transition to nature positive economies, including through sharing knowledge and creating information networks among the G7 such as the G7 Alliance on Nature Positive Economy. We call on businesses to progressively reduce negative and increase positive impacts on biodiversity. We look forward to the publication of the Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures’ (TNFD’s) market framework and urge market participants, governments and regulators to support its development. We stress our commitment to achieving the target of effectively conserving and managing at least 30 percent of terrestrial and inland water areas, and at least 30 percent of marine and coastal areas by 2030 (30 by 30), nationally and globally, according to national circumstances and approaches through promoting the designation and management of protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures (OECMs). We commit to conserving and protecting global marine biological diversity and sustainably using its resources based on the best available scientific evidence. In this context, we reconfirm our commitment under the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) to adopt, as a matter of urgency, proposals to designate Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in Eastern Antarctica, the Weddell Sea and the Western Antarctic Peninsula, based on the best available scientific evidence. In this regard, we will support other countries by sharing best practices for protected areas and OECMs to achieve the GBF target of 30 by 30. We will enhance international cooperation on measures against invasive alien species. We reiterate our commitment to halting and reversing forest loss and land degradation by 2030, and are committed to conserving forests and other terrestrial ecosystems and accelerating their restoration, supporting sustainable value and supply chains as well as promoting sustainable forest management and use of wood. We will work together, with high ambition to deliver integrated solutions to support the protection, conservation and restoration of high-carbon, high-biodiversity ecosystems, including by coordinating our offers through Country Packages on Forests, Nature and Climate, especially in countries which host vital reserves of carbon and biodiversity, with an initial focus on forests. We commit to continuing our efforts to reduce risk of deforestation and forest and land degradation linked to the production of relevant commodities and enhance cooperation with various stakeholders on this issue. We will, if appropriate, develop further regulatory frameworks or policies to support this.

Energy

25. We commit to holistically addressing energy security, the climate crisis, and geopolitical risks. In order to address the current energy crisis caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and achieve our common goal of net-zero emissions by 2050 at the latest, we highlight the real and urgent need and opportunity to accelerate clean energy transitions also as a means of increasing energy security at the same time. While acknowledging various pathways according to each country’s energy situation, industrial and social structures and geographical conditions, we highlight that these should lead to our common goal of net zero by 2050 at the latest in order to keep a limit of 1.5 °C within reach. In this regard, we invite the IEA to make recommendations by the end of this year on options how to diversify the supplies of energy and critical minerals as well as clean energy manufacturing. Through this, together with our partners, we seek to holistically address energy security, climate crisis, and geopolitical risk including the expansion of global use of renewable energy in order to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 at the latest and keep a limit of 1.5 °C temperature rise within reach. Through our experience in coping with past and current energy crises, we highlight the importance of enhanced energy efficiency and savings as the “first fuel,” and of developing demand side energy policies. We also need to significantly accelerate the deployment of renewable energies and the development and deployment of next-generation technologies. The G7 contributes to expanding renewable energy globally and bringing down costs by strengthening capacity including through a collective increase in offshore wind capacity of 150GW by 2030 based on each country’s existing targets and a collective increase of solar PV to more than 1TW by 2030 estimated by the IEA and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) through means such as each country’s existing targets or policy measures. We recognize that low-carbon and renewable hydrogen and its derivatives such as ammonia should be developed and used, if this can be aligned with a 1.5 °C pathway, where they are impactful as effective emission reduction tools to advance decarbonization across sectors and industries, notably in hard-to-abate sectors in industry and transportation, while avoiding N2O as a GHG and NOx as air pollutant. We also note that some countries are exploring the use of low-carbon and renewable hydrogen and its derivatives in the power sector to work towards zero-emission thermal power generation if this can be aligned with a 1.5°C pathway and our collective goal for a fully or predominantly decarbonized power sector by 2035. We will enhance our efforts to develop the rule-based, transparent global market and supply chains for low carbon and renewable hydrogen based on reliable international standards and certification schemes adhering to environmental and social standards. We affirm the importance of developing international standards and certification including for a GHG calculation methodology for hydrogen production and mutual recognition mechanism for carbon intensity-based tradability, transparency, trustworthiness and sustainability. We reaffirm our commitment to achieving a fully or predominantly decarbonized power sector by 2035, and prioritizing concrete and timely steps towards the goal of accelerating the phase-out of domestic unabated coal power generation in a manner consistent with keeping a limit of 1.5°C temperature rise within reach and urge others to join us. We will work towards ending the construction of new unabated coal fired power generation as identified in the IEA’s Coal in Net Zero Transitions report in 2022 as one of the primary actions to be taken in line with the IEA net zero by 2050 scenario. We call on and will work with other countries to end new unabated coal-fired power generation projects globally as soon as possible to accelerate the clean energy transition in a just manner. We highlight that we ended new direct government support for unabated international thermal coal power generation in 2021. We call on other countries, especially major economies to join us in fulfilling their commitments to do the same. We acknowledge that Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage (CCUS)/carbon recycling technologies can be an important part of a broad portfolio of decarbonization solutions to reduce emissions from industrial sources that cannot be avoided otherwise and that the deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) processes with robust social and environmental safeguard, have an essential role to play in counterbalancing residual emissions from sectors that are unlikely to achieve full decarbonization.

26. We underline our commitment, in the context of a global effort, to accelerate the phase-out of unabated fossil fuels so as to achieve net zero in energy systems by 2050 at the latest in line with the trajectories required to limit global average temperatures to 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels, and call on others to join us in taking the same action. We reaffirm our commitment to the elimination of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 or sooner, and reaffirm our previous calls for all countries to do so. In view of the emerging need for net-zero and circular industrial supply chains in the transformation towards a 1.5°C pathway, we recognize the opportunities associated with decarbonized, sustainably and responsibly produced non-combustion feedstocks, and are committed to supporting our workers and communities in this transformation. We also highlight that we ended new direct public support for the international unabated fossil-fuel energy sector in 2022, except in limited circumstances clearly defined by each country consistent with a 1.5 °C warming limit and the goals of the Paris Agreement, recognizing the importance of national security and geostrategic interests. It is necessary to accelerate the phase out of our dependency on Russian energy, including through energy savings and gas demand reduction, in a manner consistent with our Paris commitments, and address the global impact of Russia’s war on energy supplies, gas prices and inflation, and people’s lives, recognizing the primary need to accelerate the clean energy transition. In this context, we stress the important role that increased deliveries of LNG can play, and acknowledge that investment in the sector can be appropriate in response to the current crisis and to address potential gas market shortfalls provoked by the crisis. In the exceptional circumstance of accelerating the phase out of our dependency on Russian energy, publicly supported investment in the gas sector can be appropriate as a temporary response, subject to clearly defined national circumstances, if implemented in a manner consistent with our climate objectives without creating lock-in effects, for example by ensuring that projects are integrated into national strategies for the development of low-carbon and renewable hydrogen. We will further utilize neutral and impartial statistical data made available by international organizations such as the IEA and strengthen their data-collection and analysis functions, with a view to stabilizing energy markets. We emphasize the importance of strengthening forums for communication and cooperation between producing and consuming countries with a view to stabilizing energy markets and mobilizing necessary investment consistent with climate goals. Those G7 countries that opt to use nuclear energy recognize its potential to provide affordable low-carbon energy that can reduce dependence on fossil fuels, to address the climate crisis and to ensure global energy security as a source of baseload energy and grid flexibility. They commit to maximizing the use of existing reactors safely, securely, and efficiently, including by advancing their safe long-term operation, in addressing the current energy crisis. They also commit, domestically as well as in partner countries, to supporting the development and construction of nuclear reactors, such as small modular and other advanced reactors with advanced safety systems, building robust and resilient nuclear supply chains including nuclear fuel, and maintaining and strengthening nuclear technology and human resources. They will work with like-minded partners to reduce dependence on Russia. The G7 underlines that the highest standards of nuclear safety and security are important to all countries and their respective publics. We welcome the steady progress of decommissioning work at Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings (TEPCO)’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, and Japan’s transparent efforts with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) based on scientific evidence. We support the IAEA’s independent review to ensure that the discharge of Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) treated water will be conducted consistent with IAEA safety standards and international law and that it will not cause any harm to humans and the environment, which is essential for the decommissioning of the site and the reconstruction of Fukushima.

Clean Energy Economy

27. Emphasizing that the global climate and energy crisis highlights the urgent need to accelerate the clean energy transition towards achieving net-zero emissions no later than 2050 and to transform our energy systems, we underline the necessity of economic diversification and transformation, including in supply chains. In order to further promote clean energy transitions on a global scale, we are determined to increase our efforts and, in particular, will pursue secure, resilient, affordable, and sustainable clean energy supply chains, including those for critical minerals and clean energy technologies. In implementing energy transitions, we also reaffirm the importance of working collectively to avoid market distortions and ensuring a global level playing field. We will continue to work with international partners to realize a clean energy economy through concrete actions as laid out in the Clean Energy Economy Action Plan.

Economic Resilience and Economic Security

28. Ensuring economic resilience and economic security globally remains our best protection against the weaponization of economic vulnerabilities. Recalling our commitment from the 2022 G7 Elmau Summit, we will advance economic policies that enhance global economic resilience and economic security to protect against systemic vulnerabilities. To this end, we will engage in dialogue and follow a cooperative approach within the G7 as well as with partners beyond the G7 and globally, including in collaboration with developing countries. In so doing, we will promote international rules and norms in order to facilitate trade and promote economic resilience, based on the rules-based multilateral trading system with the World Trade Organization (WTO) at its core. Our efforts will include taking action to make our supply chains and those of our partners around the world more resilient, sustainable and reliable, as well as appropriate measures to promote prosperity for all. We will also promote trust and security in critical infrastructure. We will enhance ongoing collaboration to address non-market policies and practices that exacerbate strategic dependencies and systemic vulnerabilities, harm our workers and businesses, and can undermine international rules and norms. Building on our resolve in Elmau to increase vigilanceand enhance our cooperation to address risks that undermine global security and stability, we will enhance collaboration by launching the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion to increase our collective assessment, preparedness, deterrence and response to economic coercion, and further promote cooperation with partners beyond the G7. We will deepen our strategic dialogue against malicious practices to protect global supply chains from illegitimate influence, espionage, illicit knowledge leakage, and sabotage in the digital sphere. We affirm our shared responsibility and determination to coordinate on preventing the cutting-edge technologies we develop from being used to further military capabilities that threaten international peace and security. In this context, we hereby adopt the G7 Leaders’ Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security.

29. We reaffirm the growing importance of critical minerals in various fields, especially for the global clean energy transition, and the need to manage economic and security risks caused by vulnerable supply chains. We support open, fair, transparent, secure, diverse, sustainable, traceable, rules- and market-based trade in critical minerals, oppose market-distorting practices and monopolistic policies on critical minerals, and reaffirm the need to build resilient, robust, responsible, and transparent critical mineral supply chains. We are committed to strengthening our preparedness and resilience against emergencies such as market disruptions, and considering ways to jointly address any such disruptions, including through the support of the IEA’s “Voluntary Critical Mineral Security Program.” We welcome joint progress in efforts to diversify supply chains, including the refining and processing of critical minerals, such as the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP). We will support local value creation in critical minerals supply chains in line with the WTO rules. We will promote domestic and international recycling of critical minerals in collaboration with developing countries. We affirm that strong environmental, social and governance (ESG) standards will ensure benefits to local communities, including people living in the vicinity of areas with mineral reserves and refining and processing plants, protect workers’ rights, and promote transparency, while giving due consideration to upstream and midstream environments. In order to further promote the clean energy transition we reiterate the need to establish sustainable an resilient supply chains for critical mineral resources and products manufactured using such resources. We welcome the “Five-Point Plan for Critical Mineral Security” adopted by G7 Climate, Energy and Environment Ministers and instruct them to implement the plan.

Trade

30. We stand united in our commitment to free and fair trade as foundational principles and objectives of the rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core, which proves more important than ever in the current geopolitical environment. We confirm that honoring these foundational principles is essential to creating resilient global supply chains that are transparent, diversified, secure, sustainable, trustworthy, and reliable, and that are fair for all and responsive to the needs of global citizens. We affirm our attachment to transparency, coordination and to the respect of WTO rules in our respective policies. This global trading system must be inclusive and ensure that the prosperity it can bring is felt by all, including those that have been traditionally underrepresented. To this end, we will continue to work with non-G7 partners, in particular developing country partners, which are integral partners in supply chains and in the global trading system. Based on the outcome of the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12) and looking ahead to achieving a successful MC13, we underscore the importance of working towards WTO reform, including by conducting discussions with the view to having a fully and well-functioning dispute settlement system accessible to all Members by 2024 and by reinforcing deliberation to respond to global trade policy challenges. In addition, we call on all WTO members to work together to secure the prompt entry into force of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, to engage constructively on recommendations for additional provisions that would achieve a comprehensive agreement on fisheries subsidies, and the plurilateral initiatives including the joint statement initiatives (JSIs), and to make permanent the Moratorium on Customs Duties on Electronic Transmissions. We are committed to accelerating the WTO JSI E-Commerce negotiations and working to conclude an ambitious outcome by the end of 2023. The outcome should be high standard and commercially meaningful. Free and fair trade flows, consistent with our commitment to our multilateral trading system, play an important role in the green and just transition. We will continue our collaboration at the WTO including to facilitate and promote trade in environmental goods and services, and technologies. We reaffirm our shared concerns with non-market policies and practices, including their problematic evolution, that distort global competition, trade and investment. We will further step up our efforts to secure a level playing field through the more effective use of existing tools, as well as development of appropriate new tools and stronger international rules and norms. We will seek to ensure that our responses to unfair trading practices will not create unnecessary barriers to our partners’ industries and are consistent with our WTO commitments. We reaffirm that export controls are a fundamental policy tool to address the challenges posed by the diversion of technology critical to military applications as well as for other activities that threaten global, regional, and national security. We affirm the importance of cooperation on export controls on critical and emerging technologies such as microelectronics and cyber surveillance systems to address the misuse of such technologies by malicious actors and inappropriate transfers of such technologies through research activities. We task our Trade Ministers to deepen these discussions towards the G7 Trade Ministers’ Meeting in October, and to explore, both within and beyond the G7, coordinated or joint actions where appropriate against trade-related challenges, including economic coercion.

Food Security

31. We remain deeply concerned with the ongoing and worsening global food security and nutrition situation, with the world facing highest risk of famine in a generation. Multiple factors including the COVID-19 pandemic, soaring energy prices, the climate crisis and shocks, biodiversity loss, land degradation, water security and armed conflicts have contributed to the global disruption and disorder in food systems and supply chains and the deterioration in global food security in recent years. In particular, Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine has drastically aggravated the global food security crisis. We are committed to continuing our efforts to address pressing issues to improve global food security including through initiatives already launched by the G7 and relevant international organizations, building on the positive outcomes achieved. Stressing that we have exceeded our joint commitment of $14 billion to the global food security announced at the 2022 G7 Elmau Summit, we will continue to provide assistance in the food and nutrition related sectors to vulnerable countries and regions affected by the current food security crisis, in particular in Africa and the Middle East. Given the scale of the needs across the Horn of Africa, we have collectively met our commitment from Elmau and have effectively delivered assistance to tackle one of the worst droughts in the region’s history.　We also call on other international donors to step up their contributions in this regard. We further call on Russia to lift its measures that hinder the exports of Russian grain and fertilizers.　Given Ukraine’s essential role as a major exporter of food to the world, we are seriously concerned about the current and future impact of Russia’s deliberate disruption of Ukraine’s agricultural sector on food security in the most vulnerable countries. Building on our commitment made at Elmau, we continue to provide support for the restoration of Ukraine’s agriculture sector, including support to its efforts in identifying and evidencing illegal seizure of Ukrainian grains by Russia, through the creation of a grain database which can be used to verify the origin of grain shipments. We reaffirm the importance of the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes and President Zelenskyy’s Grain from Ukraine Initiative. We reiterate the critical importance of continued and scaled-up implementation of the UN and Türkiye-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) in order to further facilitate grain exports from Ukraine and enable stable supply to those in need. We call on Russia to stop threatening global food supplies and to allow the BSGI to operate at its maximum potential and for as long as necessary. We reiterate the importance of ensuring rules-based, open, fair, transparent, predictable, and non-discriminatory trade and avoiding unjustified restrictive trade measures to keep the food and agricultural markets open and call on our G20 partners to do the same. We welcome the Ministerial Decision on World Food Programme (WFP) Food Purchases Exemption from Export Prohibitions or Restrictions adopted at the MC12 and call for its full implementation. We call for more concrete actions to address export restrictions imposed by agricultural producer countries on global food security, recognizing that such measures have a disproportionate effect on countries at greater risk of famine and acute food insecurity. We emphasize the necessity of market transparency and accurate information backed by neutral and impartial data and analysis to prevent arbitrary measures and reduce market volatility in addressing ongoing and future food crises, and commit to strengthening the G20 Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) as well as various efforts by international organizations in this regard. We underscore the importance of strengthening the capacity of low and lower-middle income countries to collect, analyze and use high quality agricultural, market and food security data and maintain the quality of data. We also recognize the value of dialogue between food exporting countries and importing countries to develop a shared understanding on crisis responses.

32. We share the view that it is essential to focus on each human and enable stable access to affordable, safe, sufficient and nutritious food for each and every individual. In our pursuit to ensure that all people can progressively realize their right to adequate food, we affirm the need to protect and assist members of the most vulnerable populations, including women and children, in all aspects of food security from short-term food crisis responses through medium to long-term efforts to make food systems sustainable. Nutrition is also fundamental from the viewpoint of a human centered approach, and we highlight the importance of improving access to healthy diets, including through school meal programs. We recognize the urgent need of establishing inclusive, resilient and sustainable agriculture and food systems including through enhancing, diversifying and ensuring sustainability of local, regional and global food supply chains as well as through solving structural bottlenecks. This includes increasing local production capacities by making use of existing domestic agricultural resources and by facilitating trade, sustainable productivity growth with climate adaptation and mitigation and biodiversity conservation, and sustainable food consumption. We promote a wide range of innovations and technology which is suitable for local, environmental and farming conditions and benefits all stakeholders including smallholder farmers. We also underscore the role of the private sector, including small and medium enterprises and startups, in research and development (R&D) as well as responsible investment. We recognize the need to maintain the availability, affordability and accessibility of fertilizers, to diversify the production to reduce the impact of supply chain disruptions, and to promote more efficient and responsible use of fertilizers and soil health, including through the use of appropriate and safe fertilizers, for stable and sustainable agricultural production. We acknowledge the importance of supporting fertilizer value chains including local fertilizer production in line with WTO rules and through supporting the use of local sources of energy in consistency with a 1.5°C warming limit and the goals of the Paris Agreement. We strengthen broader partnerships on those efforts including through the UN Food Systems Stocktaking Moments. We commit to taking concrete steps with partner countries as outlined in the annexed “Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security”, and call for broader cooperation in the international community.

Health

33. We renew our strong commitment to developing and strengthening the global health architecture (GHA) with the World Health Organization (WHO) at its core for future public health emergencies to break the cycle of panic and neglect, recognizing that the COVID-19 pandemic has made an unprecedented impact on the international community. To this end, we commit to further enhancing political momentum toward more coordinated and sustained leader-level governance for health emergency prevention, preparedness and response (PPR) that ensures legitimacy, representation, equity, and effectiveness, noting the ongoing discussions including on a new instrument on pandemic PPR (WHO CA+), targeted amendments to the International Health Regulations (IHR), and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) High-Level Meeting (HLM) on pandemic PPR in September 2023 and the need to avoid duplication and ensure coherence between these processes, stressing the leading role of WHO. We also applaud the landmark decision at the 75th WHA to work towards increasing the share of assessed contributions to 50 percent of WHO’s 2022-2023 base budget, and which takes into account the importance of monitoring of budgetary proposals as well as progress on reforms, with a view to sustainably finance the organisation to fulfil its leading and coordinating role in global health. We also reaffirm our commitment to strengthening collaboration between Finance and Health Ministries for pandemic PPR including through the ongoing and essential work of the G20 Joint Finance and Health Task Force (JFHTF). We welcome the launch of the Pandemic Fund (PF), look forward to the successful execution of its first call for proposals, and encourage active participation and increasing contributions to the PF from a broader donor base. We also commit to working together, including by sharing work plans and tracking, encouraging efforts and progress in priority countries to achieve the G7’s target of supporting at least 100 Low and Middle Income Countries (LMICs) in implementing the core capacities required in the IHR, for another 5 years until 2027 as committed in 2022. We also highlight the need for strengthening financing for pandemic response. To this end, we commit to thoroughly assess how existing financing sources can be used in pandemic response and to explore a surge financing framework that allows us to complement existing mechanisms through better coordination and deploy necessary funds quickly and efficiently in response to outbreaks without accumulating idle cash. In this respect, we welcome the G7 Shared Understanding on Finance-Health Coordination and PPR Financing endorsed by the G7 Finance and Health Ministers at their joint session. Reaffirming that strengthening international norms and regulations is essential to enhance pandemic PPR, guided by equity, we reiterate our commitment to contributing to and sustaining momentum on the negotiations of WHO CA+ with a view to adopting it by May 2024 and on the negotiations of targeted amendments to strengthen the IHR, together with all stakeholders. Furthermore, we reiterate the importance of timely, transparent and systematic sharing of pathogens, data and information in a safe and secure manner, ensuring the respect of relevant data protection rules, for multisectoral and integrated surveillance of emerging and ongoing health threats both in ordinary times and in emergencies, in line with the G7 Pact for Pandemic Readiness. We also recognize the importance of strengthening and maintaining sufficient and high-quality human resources for health worldwide at all times, such as the public health and emergency workforce including consideration of Global Health Emergency Corps. We will support the further enhancement of a global network of experts and trainings, including through initiatives such as the WHO Academy, promote decent work with equal payment for work of equal value and protect health workers during emergencies and conflicts among others. We recognize the integral role civil society plays, including by reaching those in vulnerable situations, and recommit to working together for a healthier future for all.

34. We commit to reverse the first global decline in life expectancy in more than seven decades emphasizing the importance of achieving UHC by 2030 and accelerating progress toward SDG 3. We recommit to working alongside global partners to assist countries to achieve UHC by supporting primary health care (PHC) and developing and restoring essential health services, to achieve better than pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2025, as part of our effort to strengthen health systems in ordinary times. We commit to supporting countries to strengthen PHC delivery, including through health workforce strengthening We also commit to support bringing survival rates back to better than pre-pandemic levels, including by reducing maternal, newborn and child mortality, and consistent with the full range of SDG targets and indicators related to UHC on which we will also support progress. We recognize the importance of financial risk protection to prevent people from slipping into poverty due to health care costs. To this end, we endorse the “G7 Global Plan for UHC Action Agenda” and note the importance of a global hub function, in support of relevant international organizations, including for financing, knowledge management, and human resources on UHC. We reaffirm the essential role of UHC in addressing various health challenges significantly set back by the pandemic, including in humanitarian contexts, such as tackling communicable diseases including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, hepatitis, malaria, polio, measles, cholera, and neglected tropical diseases (NTDs), antimicrobial resistance (AMR), non-communicable diseases (NCDs) including mental health conditions, realizing comprehensive sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) for all, and promoting routine immunization, healthy ageing, and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH). We are committed to spearheading research in this regard, including with a focus on understanding post COVID-19 conditions. We noted the historic outcome of the Global Fund’s 7th replenishment and welcome the financial support from the G7 and further countries towards ending the epidemics of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. We call for continued support to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) to stay on track for polio eradication by 2026. We will build on the success of the Tokyo Nutrition for Growth (N4G) Summit in 2021 for the Paris N4G in 2024 to improve nutrition. We also commit to further promoting comprehensive sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) for all individuals, including maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health, especially in vulnerable circumstances. Recognizing the increasing need for overarching, system-level coordination and alignment of global health partnerships including the Global Health Initiatives and their interface, we will take collective actions to avoid fragmentation and duplication, ensure accountability, maximize impacts, and reinforce country leadership with a view to enhancing governance in global health and to supporting the achievement of UHC. In this regard, we look forward to the outcome of the Future of Global Health Initiatives. We reiterate our determination to further contribute to achieving UHC, including through making the most of and ensuring synergies among the upcoming UNGA HLMs on UHC, tuberculosis, and pandemic PPR. In order to contribute to global health towards the post COVID-19 era, with a view to supporting the achievement of UHC as well as strengthening PPR, we highlight our financial contributions totaling more than $48 billion from the public and private sectors. We also call for further domestic resource mobilization as well as efficient use of existing resources. We emphasize the important role of the private sector towards sustainable financing in global health, including through impact investments and endorse the Triple I (Impact Investments Initiative) for Global Health.

35. We reaffirm that innovative initiatives including those related to digital health are keys to strengthening GHA and achieving UHC. We will reiterate the urgent need to foster innovation and to strengthen research and development of safe, effective, quality-assured and affordable medical countermeasures (MCMs) as underlined by the 100 Days Mission. We commit to enhancing equitable access to MCM, including by addressing issues relating to manufacturing and delivery. In this regards, we will continue to contribute to ongoing processes, including in the G20, on an end-to-end MCM ecosystem, aligned with the ongoing discussions on the WHO CA+ and which should actively contribute to the diversification of MCM production and address the priority of the most vulnerable partner’s needs and expectations, including in terms of global governance, in cooperation with relevant partners including the WHO, the WB, UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Global Fund, Gavi the Vaccine Alliance, Global Health Innovative Technology (GHIT) Fund, Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), the Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics (FIND) and Unitaid and Medicines Patent Pool, regional organizations and the private sector. To this end, we announce the G7 Hiroshima Vision for Equitable Access to MCMs and launch the MCM Delivery Partnership for equitable access (MCDP) to contribute to more equitable access to and delivery of MCMs based on the principles of equity, inclusivity, efficiency, affordability, quality, accountability, agility and speed. We commit to work across providers of development finance, for the purpose of identifying concrete options this summer for providing for the liquidity for global health organizations to procure and deliver MCMs earlier in a crisis. This supports the mapping exercise for surge financing to be conducted by the WHO and World Bank and presented at the G20 Finance and Health Task Force and the UNGA HLM, contributing to ongoing negotiations on the WHO CA+. We also reiterate our commitment to addressing global health threats including those exacerbated by climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution through integrated measures and by applying a holistic One Health approach. Recognizing the rapid escalation of AMR globally, we continue to commit to exploring and implementing push and pull incentives to accelerate R&D of antimicrobials as well as promoting antimicrobial access and stewardship for their prudent and appropriate use toward the UNGA HLM on AMR in 2024. We remain committed to promoting policies and resources to care for people living with dementia and welcome the development of potentially disease modifying therapies for the various types of dementia, including Alzheimer’s disease.

Labor

36. We emphasize the importance of investment in human capital to ensure a just transition, in response to structural changes such as digital and green transformations as well as demographic changes including societies that are ageing, in part due to declining birth rates. In order to facilitate these transformations, we commit to supporting individuals through reskilling and upskilling measures, along with a combination of appropriate social protection and active labor market policies. As reskilling and upskilling to support workers to adapt to these changes are investments in human capital and should not be seen as a cost, we must continue to provide adequate investment necessary to address workforce transition needs including vocational training and life-long learning. We commit to efforts towards achieving a virtuous cycle of workers’ well-being and social and economic vitality, which will lead to sustainable growth and real wage growth in line with productivity, contributing in turn to further investment in human capital. We emphasize that freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining play an important role in promoting decent work and wage growth. We are resolved to build an inclusive labor market that ensures decent and good quality jobs for all and leaves no one behind, especially, women and under-represented groups, including persons with disabilities, older persons and youth, while engaging constructively with social partners and other stakeholders. We also work towards quality job creation, universal access to social protection, and further improving gender equality in the labor market. The COVID-19 pandemic has disproportionately affected women and girls, and has highlighted the unequal distribution of care work as a key cause of gender inequalities, while showing the essential role paid and unpaid care work plays in the functioning of our societies and economies. We commit to addressing underlying discriminatory social and gender norms, such as unequal sharing of paid and unpaid care-work and housework, promoting and protecting social security including parental leave, providing support for childcare and other field of care work and care economy, including by facilitating access to infrastructures and long-term care. In particular, we reaffirm the need to support and promote parenthood protection to ensure parents can combine work and family and personal life and actively contribute to all spheres of our society. We also highlight the need to recognize, reduce and redistribute unpaid care, reward care workers fairly, while generating sufficient care jobs to meet the demand for care, and give care workers representation in social dialogue and collective bargaining. We recognize the importance of enhancing work engagement and worker retention through various measures such as promoting health and well-being at work, ensuring occupational safety and health, and supporting the inclusive and equitable career development of workers. We commit to promoting decent work in line with SDG 8, including through technical cooperation, as well as ensuring respect for international labor standards and human rights in global value chains, in particular the fundamental conventions adopted by the International Labor Organisation (ILO). We reiterate our commitment to the effective abolition of all forms of forced and compulsory labor and child labor. We reaffirm our commitment to taking measures to strengthen our cooperation and collective efforts towards eradicating all forms of forced labor from global supply chains. We commit to continuing to promote decent work and protect rights-holders in global supply chains through a smart mix of mandatory and voluntary measures, including through legislation, regulations, incentives and guidance for enterprises and to engage constructively in discussions at the UN and the ILO in close consultation with all relevant stakeholders to explore ideas and options for a consensus-based legally binding instrument at the international level that adds value to the existing legal and policy approaches and is implementable. We endorse the Action Plan for Promoting Career Development and Greater Resilience to Structural Changes developed by Labor and Employment Ministers.

Education

37. We commit to making progress for ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education, including vocational education, and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all to build resilient, just and prospering societies. Recent crises have led to decreased access to education and increased learning loss amongst children and youth, especially girls, and those in the most marginalized and vulnerable situations. As education is a catalyst to achieving all of the SDGs, we reaffirm the importance of upholding education and building more resilient education systems, especially following the COVID-19 pandemic. We reiterate our firm determination to uphold the G7’s previous commitments to protecting educational opportunities for all learners, and to promoting gender equality as well as the empowerment of all women and girls in all their diversity, in and through education including by prioritizing global ODA in this regard. We welcome the UNSG’s Transforming Education Summit (TES) in September 2022, and call for continued support to the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), Education Cannot Wait (ECW) and UN agencies including the UNESCO and UNICEF as key partners in helping countries to build stronger education systems for the most marginalized children. We also reiterate the importance of foundational learning and the need for the G7 to increase investment in people in a more equitable and efficient way to provide quality learning opportunities that prepare all learners, especially children with the knowledge and skills they need to thrive and improve their own well-being, noting that education is a human right. We continue to break down gender-related barriers and underlying discriminatory social norms from pre-primary through higher education for more resilient, inclusive and gender-transformative education. We continue to encourage international exchanges between youth and international talent mobility and circulation among academics, students, and researchers, as well as cooperation between higher education and research institutions. We acknowledge the importance of investment in support of human resources that can contribute to resolving social issues while simultaneously achieving economic growth through education. We will strive for an educational environment and lifelong learning opportunities where every child can fulfil their own potential, including through the improvement of instruction. This could include promoting small class size, an improved Information and Communication Technology (ICT) environment and the effective use of digital technology to support teaching and learning, while not exacerbating the digital equality gaps.

Digital

38. We recognize that, while rapid technological change has been strengthening societies and economies, the international governance of new digital technologies has not necessarily kept pace. As the pace of technological evolution accelerates, we affirm the importance to address common governance challenges and to identify potential gaps and fragmentation in global technology governance. In areas such as AI, immersive technologies such as the metaverses and quantum information science and technology and other emerging technologies, the governance of the digital economy should continue to be updated in line with our shared democratic values. These include fairness, accountability, transparency, safety, protection from online harassment, hate and abuse and respect for privacy and human rights, fundamental freedoms and the protection of personal data. We will work with technology companies and other relevant stakeholders to drive the responsible innovation and implementation of technologies, ensuring that safety and security is prioritized, and that platforms are tackling the threats of child sexual exploitation and abuse on their platforms, and upholding the children’s rights to safety and privacy online. We continue to discuss ways to advance technology for democracy and to cooperate on new and emerging technologies and their social implementation, and look forward to an inclusive, multi-stakeholder dialogue on digital issues, including on Internet Governance, through relevant fora, including the OECD Global Forum on Technology. We commit to further advancing multi-stakeholder approaches to the development of standards for AI, respectful of legally binding frameworks, and recognize the importance of procedures that advance transparency, openness, fair processes, impartiality, privacy and inclusiveness to promote responsible AI. We stress the importance of international discussions on AI governance and interoperability between AI governance frameworks, while we recognize that approaches and policy instruments to achieve the common vision and goal of trustworthy AI may vary across G7 members. We support the development of tools for trustworthy AI through multi-stakeholder international organizations, and encourage the development and adoption of international technical standards in standards development organizations through multi-stakeholder processes. We recognize the need to immediately take stock of the opportunities and challenges of generative AI, which is increasingly prominent across countries and sectors, and encourage international organizations such as the OECD to consider analysis on the impact of policy developments and Global Partnership on AI (GPAI) to conduct practical projects. In this respect, we task relevant ministers to establish the Hiroshima AI process, through a G7 working group, in an inclusive manner and in cooperation with the OECD and GPAI, for discussions on generative AI by the end of this year. These discussions could include topics such as governance, safeguard of intellectual property rights including copy rights, promotion of transparency, response to foreign information manipulation, including disinformation, and responsible utilization of these technologies. We welcome the Action Plan for promoting global interoperability between tools for trustworthy AI from the Digital and Tech Ministers’ Meeting. We recognize the potential of immersive technologies, and virtual worlds, such as metaverses to provide innovative opportunities, in all industrial and societal sectors, as well as to promote sustainability. For this purpose, governance, public safety, and human rights challenges should be addressed at the global level. We task our relevant Ministers to consider collective approaches in this area, including in terms of interoperability, portability and standards, with the support of the OECD. We express our interest in possible joint cooperation in research and development on computing technologies. We also task our relevant Ministers to consider ways to further promote digital trade.

39. We reaffirm that cross-border data flows, information, ideas and knowledge generate higher productivity, greater innovation, and improved sustainable development, while raising challenges related to privacy, data protection, intellectual property protection, and security including that of data and cloud infrastructure. We reiterate the importance of facilitating Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT) to enable trustworthy cross-border data flows and invigorate the digital economy as a whole, while preserving governments’ ability to address legitimate public interest. We stress our intention to operationalize this concept and our support for cooperation within the G7 and beyond to work towards identifying commonalities, complementarities and elements of convergence between existing regulatory approaches and instruments enabling data to flow with trust, in order to foster future interoperability such as through supporting multi-stakeholder engagement, leveraging the role of technologies, and clarifying domestic and municipal policies and due processes. In this regard, we endorse the Annex on G7 Vision for Operationalising DFFT and its Priorities from the Digital and Tech Ministers’ Meeting, and the establishment of the Institutional Arrangement for Partnership. We task our relevant Ministers to continue working to deliver substantive outcomes and subsequently report back to us. We welcome the OECD Declaration on Government Access to Personal Data Held by Private Sector Entities as an instrument to increase trust in cross-border data flows among countries committed to democratic values and the rule of law. We emphasize our opposition to internet fragmentation and the use of digital technologies to infringe on human rights. In this context, we should counter unjustified obstacles to the free flow of data, lacking transparency, and arbitrarily operated, which should be distinguished from our measures implemented to achieve the legitimate public policy interests of each country. We seek to increase trust across our digital ecosystem and to counter the influence of authoritarian approaches. We recognize the importance of secure and resilient digital infrastructure as the foundation of society and the economy. We are committed to deepen our cooperation within the G7 and with like-minded partners to support and enhance network resilience by measures such as extending secure routes of submarine cables. We welcome supplier diversification efforts in ICTS supply chains and continue to discuss market trends towards open, interoperable approaches, alongside secure, resilient and established architecture in a technology neutral way. Under the Japanese G7 Presidency and against the background of early deployments of Open Radio Access Network (RAN), we have exchanged views on open architectures and security-related aspects and opportunities. We recognize the need to bridge the digital divides, including the gender digital divide, and the importance of initiatives to use data and technology for cities, such as smart city initiatives, to promote digital inclusion and address challenges in urban development. We will facilitate inclusive development and enable greater employability and movement of digital experts, and restate our commitment to supporting other countries to increase digital access under principles of equity, universality and affordability while ensuring that security, interoperability, the protection of personal data and respect for human rights including gender equality are built into global connectivity.

Science and Technology

40. We support the development of advanced technologies, research infrastructures and highly-skilled human resource networks that will drive innovation to solve global challenges and enable the next stage of economic growth. To this end, we promote international talent mobility and circulation. The G7 will promote open science by equitably disseminating scientific knowledge, publicly funded research outputs including research data and scholarly publications following the Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, and Reusable (FAIR) principles. This will enable researchers and people to benefit from and contribute to creating knowledge, innovation and solutions to global challenges. We further commit to working together to promote responsible global science and technology cooperation and use of emerging technologies such as advanced computing and biotechnology with partners sharing common values and principles in research and innovation. This includes a better understanding of the seas and the ocean in the context of climate change and utilizing very large research infrastructures. We are committed to fostering and promoting a common understanding of values and principles in research and innovation through dedicated multilateral dialogues, including in the area of research security and research integrity, and international joint research based on the philosophy of open science. We welcome the forthcoming launch of the G7 Virtual Academy and release of the Best Practices Paper on Research Security and Integrity. These efforts will contribute to addressing the various challenges that arise at the intersection of security, economy, and scientific research.

41. We reiterate our commitment to promoting the safe and sustainable use of outer space, given our ever-greater reliance on space systems. Restating the importance of addressing the issues of space debris, we strongly support the implementation of international guidelines adopted at the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as urgent and necessary. We welcome national efforts to develop further solutions for space debris mitigation and remediation as well as further research and development of orbital debris mitigation and remediation technologies. Furthermore, we commit not to conducting destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing and encourage others to follow suit in order to ensure the security, stability and sustainability of outer space.

Gender

42. Achieving gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls is fundamental for a resilient, fair, and prosperous society. We endeavor to work with all segments of society to ensure full, equal and meaningful participation of women and girls in all their diversity as well as LGBTQIA+ persons in politics, economics, education and all other spheres of society, and to consistently mainstream gender equality in all policy areas. In this respect, we commit to redoubling our efforts to overcome longstanding structural barriers and to addressing harmful gender norms, stereotypes, roles, and practices through such means as education and achieve a society where diversity, human rights and dignity are respected, promoted and protected and all people can enjoy vibrant lives free from violence and discrimination independent of gender identity or expression or sexual orientation. We welcome the work of the Gender Equality Advisory Council (GEAC) and look forward to strengthening it further. We look forward to the first revision of the G7 Dashboard on Gender Gaps and the publication of the first implementation report this year, which aims to monitor past G7 commitments to make progress on gender equality.

43. We express our strong concern about the rollback of women’s and girls’ rights in particular in time of crisis and we strongly condemn all violations and abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms for women and girls and LGBTQIA+ people around the world. We further recognize the essential and transformative role of comprehensive SRHR in gender equality and women’s and girls’ empowerment, and in supporting diversity, including of sexual orientations and gender identities. We reaffirm our full commitment to achieving comprehensive SRHR for all , including by addressing access to safe and legal abortion and post abortion care. We are committed to championing, advancing and defending gender equality and the rights of women and girls in all their diversity, at home and abroad, and will work together to thwart attempts to undermine and reverse hard-won progress in this area. In this regard, we commit to advancing, implementing and strengthening the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda including its application to disaster risk reduction (DRR), through partnership with the WPS-Focal Points Network and support for National Action Plan development, and to promote intersectional approaches. We highlight the leading role of women in preventing violent conflict, delivering relief and recovery efforts, and forging lasting peace, and pledge to champion the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in peace and political processes. We commit to strengthening our efforts to eliminate conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, and the importance of providing comprehensive support and meaningful participation for victims and survivors, using a survivor-centered approach. We further commit to eliminating all forms of sexual and gender-based harassment and abuse both offline and online as well as aid-related sexual exploitation and abuse. We are committed to ensuring the right to education for all, and emphasize the importance of promoting equitable access to safe, gender-transformative quality education as well as to taking measures to close the gender gap in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) sectors and education, and close the gender digital gap. We see this as key to promote women’s entrepreneurship, which is an essential building block to address the climate, nature and development challenges. We also commit to promoting reskilling and upskilling, fostering decent work conditions, strengthening financial inclusion of women in all their diversity, and eliminating the gender pay gap. We further reiterate our commitments to promoting women’s full empowerment as well as their full and equal participation in decision-making processes at all levels, including in leadership positions. We recognize that quality care plays an essential role in the functioning of our societies and economies, but is a key cause of gender inequalities due to its gender unequal distribution.

44. To advance our commitments, we emphasize the need to overcome the fragmentation and marginalization of gender equality issues by enhancing our efforts to integrate and deepening gender mainstreaming for a substantial transformation of our societies. In this regard, we call for a continuous, holistic and comprehensive approach to promote gender equality by creating a “nexus” that bridges the political and security, economic and social spheres and advocate for maximizing the efficiency and the impact of multi-sectorial policies and of our actions across diverse dimensions of policy implementation. We stress the importance of such a nexus approach in our foreign and sustainable development policy and in our ODA and endeavor to support the nexus. We reaffirm our commitment to make every effort to collectively increase the share of our bilateral allocable ODA advancing gender equality and women’s and girls’ empowerment over the coming years. In this regard, we welcome “the Fact Sheet: Promoting Gender Mainstreaming through the nexus approach” made by our experts and look forward to further progress in this area.

Human Rights, Refugees, Migration, Democracy

45. We reaffirm our commitment to upholding human rights and dignity of all, as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, so that everyone can participate fully and equally in society. We commit to firmly speaking out against human rights violations and abuses, and at the same time, listening to and assisting the countries and civil society organizations that seek to defend and promote human rights through dialogue and cooperation. Recognizing the need to deepen discussions within and beyond the G7 on business and human rights, we intend to strengthen cooperation and collective efforts, including by accelerating exchange of information, towards ensuring respect for human rights and international labor standards in business activities and global supply chains, and further enhancing resilience, predictability and certainty for businesses, and call upon others to join us in these efforts. We reaffirm our commitment to protecting refugees, supporting forcibly displaced persons and supporting host countries and communities, ensuring the full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of refugees and displaced persons, and defending and promoting the rights of marginalized people or persons facing vulnerable conditions exacerbated by conflict, crisis, and displacement, including freedom from sexual and gender-based violence. We call upon the international community to follow suit. We commit to fighting against impunity and holding perpetrators to account for the most serious crimes of international concern, including conflict-related sexual violence, together with improving documentation. In this regard, we recall the need to strengthen international architecture to prevent conflict-related sexual violence in the future. We acknowledge the importance of the discussions of the International Law Commission’s draft articles on the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity. We continue to work with the international community towards the second Global Refugee Forum in December 2023. We reaffirm our commitment to support the full inclusion of refugees, in the spirit of international cooperation and in line with the Global Compact on Refugees, national policies, legislation, and circumstances, ensuring full respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms.

46. We reaffirm our commitment to ensuring the safe, orderly, and regular migration around the world. We recognize the important economic and social benefits that migrants can bring to our countries. We commit to ensure full respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms regardless of their migration status. We remain committed to preventing irregular and often highly dangerous migration whether by land or sea. We commit to joint efforts to tackle the organized criminal networks which facilitate illegal migration and the dangerous journey of migrants and asylum seekers, profiting off some of the most vulnerable. We call for firmness in dealing with this ruthless criminality that puts lives in danger and poses risks to the internal security of G7 partners. In this regard, we will intensify efforts to break the business model of organized criminal networks, including through cooperation to disrupt the supply chains that enable the criminal and exploitative operations of those engaged in the trafficking and smuggling of human beings. To this end, we will task relevant Ministers to deepen partnerships to enhance our understanding of the root causes and work together with partners around the world to address this complex challenge.

47. We reaffirm our shared belief that democracy is the most enduring means to advance peace, prosperity, equality and sustainable development. We reaffirm our commitment to protecting the information environment by supporting media freedom and online freedom, including protection from online harassment and abuse, internet shutdowns and disruptions, as well as addressing foreign information manipulation and interference, including disinformation, which is designed to undermine trust in democratic institutions, and sow discord in the international community. We strongly condemn the widespread use of information manipulation and interference by Russia in order to gain support for its war of aggression against Ukraine and to obscure the facts of its aggression. Through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), we will work to strengthen our collective efforts to counter threats to democracy, including such manipulation, with full respect for international human rights law, in particular freedom of expression. We will work towards ensuring that fact-based, quality and trustworthy information is promoted, and call on digital platforms to support this approach. We will increase cooperation on these issues with government and non-governmental partners from all regions who share the determination to promote access to such information, including through supporting relevant international initiatives, such as the Partnership for Information and Democracy, and efforts by the UN and OECD.

Countering Terrorism, Violent Extremism and Transnational Organized Crime / Upholding the Rule of Law / Anti-Corruption

48. We reiterate our strong commitment to working together with all relevant actors to counter all forms of terrorism and violent extremism, both online and offline, as well as transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking, human trafficking, child sexual abuse and exploitation, corruption, fraud, intellectual property theft, ransomware threats, cybercrime and environmental crimes, as well as money laundering and terrorist financing in a unified, coordinated, inclusive, transparent and human-rights-based, gender-responsive manner. In countering the exploitation of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes and countering the misuses of technologies for criminal purposes, we will continue our utmost efforts to enhance global cooperation and digital response capacity. In this regard, building on our collaboration and on efforts through existing frameworks such as the Christchurch Call, and recalling previous commitments, including maintaining tightly controlled lawful access, we call on the private sector to step up their efforts to address the problem of dissemination of terrorist and violent extremist content online and to prioritize safety by design, and stop, in particular, child sexual exploitation and abuse on their platforms. We support the efforts of our partner countries to sign and ratify the relevant international agreements such as the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), and those of the Council of Europe such as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, in the wide spectrum of cooperation by criminal justice and other relevant authorities that form the basis for efficient cross-border cooperation. We also recognize the significant public health and security threat of illicit synthetic drugs and will strengthen our cooperation to address it, engaging with other willing countries and the private sector.

49. We will also strengthen bilateral, regional and multilateral coordination and cooperation in the field of law and justice, such as providing technical assistance to countries to develop and implement laws, and capacity building related to the justice sector. We will continue to step up our fight against corruption, promoting good governance and strengthening accountable, transparent, equitable and community-oriented law enforcement to make progress on many of our shared priorities, which will lead to safer and more secure societies and thus contribute to the promotion of the rule of law and respect for human rights. We further recognize that corruption and related illicit finance and proceeds of crime drain public resources, can often fuel organized crime, enable kleptocratic systems to accumulate wealth and power at the expense of citizens, and undermine democratic governance. We will pursue a stronger and more unified approach in rigorously enforcing international anti-corruption obligations and standards, and enhancing law enforcement cooperation, including through relevant regional and international organizations, and holding corrupt actors accountable. Recalling the importance of beneficial ownership transparency for the integrity and transparency of democratic systems, we reaffirm the importance of supporting African partners in establishing and strengthening registers of beneficial ownership.

Regional Affairs

50. We stand together on core foreign policy and security challenges to build a more secure and prosperous future. We also reaffirm our determination to work with a wide range of partners to address pressing global challenges and to ensure that the international system is able to respond effectively to these issues.

51. We stand together as G7 partners on the following elements, which underpin our respective relations with China:

• We stand prepared to build constructive and stable relations with China, recognizing the importance of engaging candidly with and expressing our concerns directly to China. We act in our national interest. It is necessary to cooperate with China, given its role in the international community and the size of its economy, on global challenges as well as areas of common interest.
• We call on China to engage with us, including in international fora, on areas such as the climate and biodiversity crisis and the conservation of natural resources in the framework of the Paris and Kunming-Montreal Agreements, addressing vulnerable countries’ debt sustainability and financing needs, global health and macroeconomic stability.
• Our policy approaches are not designed to harm China nor do we seek to thwart China’s economic progress and development. A growing China that plays by international rules would be of global interest. We are not decoupling or turning inwards. At the same time, we recognize that economic resilience requires de-risking and diversifying. We will take steps, individually and collectively, to invest in our own economic vibrancy. We will reduce excessive dependencies in our critical supply chains.
• With a view to enabling sustainable economic relations with China, and strengthening the international trading system, we will push for a level playing field for our workers and companies. We will seek to address the challenges posed by China’s non-market policies and practices, which distort the global economy. We will counter malign practices, such as illegitimate technology transfer or data disclosure. We will foster resilience to economic coercion. We also recognize the necessity of protecting certain advanced technologies that could be used to threaten our national security without unduly limiting trade and investment.
• We remain seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas. We strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion.
• We reaffirm the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to security and prosperity in the international community. There is no change in the basic positions of the G7 members on Taiwan, including stated one China policies. We call for a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.
• We will keep voicing our concerns about the human rights situation in China, including in Tibet and Xinjiang where forced labor is of major concern to us. We call on China to honor its commitments under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, which enshrine rights, freedoms and a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong.
• We call on China to act in accordance with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular relations, and not to conduct interference activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities, the integrity of our democratic institutions and our economic prosperity.
• We call on China to press Russia to stop its military aggression, and immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw its troops from Ukraine. We encourage China to support a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on territorial integrity and the principles and purposes of the UN Charter, including through its direct dialogue with Ukraine.

52. There is no legal basis for China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, and we oppose China’s militarization activities in the region. We emphasize the universal and unified character of the UNCLOS and reaffirm UNCLOS’s important role in setting out the legal framework that governs all activities in the oceans and the seas. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on July 12, 2016, is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings, and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties.

53. We strongly condemn North Korea’s unprecedented number of unlawful ballistic missile launches, each of which violated multiple UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). We demand that North Korea refrain from any other destabilizing or escalatory actions, including any further nuclear tests or launches that use ballistic missile technology, which undermine regional stability and pose a grave threat to international peace and security. Such reckless actions must be met with a swift, united, and robust international response. This must include further significant measures to be taken by the UN Security Council. We reiterate our unwavering commitment to the goal of North Korea’s complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and any other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs in accordance with relevant UNSCRs. We are concerned about North Korea’s choice to prioritize its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs over the welfare of the people in North Korea. We call on North Korea to accept repeated offers of dialogue, including from Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea. We urge North Korea to respect human rights, facilitate access for international humanitarian organizations, and resolve the abductions issue immediately.

54. We remain deeply concerned about the deteriorating security, humanitarian, human rights, and political situation in Myanmar, and we express our solidarity with its people. We continue to support ASEAN’s efforts including its continued engagements with all stakeholders in Myanmar to implement the Five-Point Consensus, including through Indonesia as the ASEAN Chair and ASEAN special envoy to Myanmar. We continue to call on the Myanmar military to immediately cease all violence, release all political prisoners and those arbitrarily detained, create an environment for an inclusive and peaceful dialogue, and return the country to a genuinely democratic path. We reiterate our call on all states to prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar. We also call for full, safe, and unimpeded humanitarian access to all people, especially the most vulnerable.

55. We note with grave concern increased threats to stability and the dire humanitarian and economic situation in Afghanistan. We call on the Taliban to uphold its counterterrorism commitments and to ensure the territory of Afghanistan cannot be used to threaten or attack any country, to plan or finance terrorist acts, or to shelter and train terrorists. We express our strongest opposition to the Taliban’s systematic violations on human rights and fundamental freedoms, and call for the immediate reversal of unacceptable decisions, especially those against women and girls. All Afghans must enjoy full, equal, and meaningful participation in all spheres of public life, and have access to humanitarian assistance and basic services. We call upon the Taliban to respect UNSCR 2681/2023 and the UN Charter, including Article 8, and to ensure unrestricted operations of the UN in Afghanistan. To remedy the persistent lack of political inclusivity and representation, we urge the Taliban to take significant steps to engage in credible, inclusive and Afghan-led national dialogue, in which all Afghans can be involved. We recognize the need for conveying unified messages to the Taliban in coordination with other international partners.

56. We reiterate our clear determination that Iran must never develop a nuclear weapon. We remain deeply concerned about Iran’s unabated escalation of its nuclear program, which has no credible civilian justification and brings it dangerously close to actual weapon-related activities. A diplomatic solution remains the best way to resolve this issue. In that context, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action continues to provide a useful reference. We call on Iran to take prompt and concrete actions to fulfill its legal obligations and political commitments, including nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards obligations. We reiterate our profound concern over Iran’s systemic human rights violations and abuses, including its repression of popular feminist protest as well as the targeting of individuals, including women, girls, minority groups, and journalists, in and outside of Iran. We call on Iran’s leadership to end all unjust and arbitrary detentions.

57. We express our grave concern regarding Iran’s continued destabilizing activities, including the transfer of missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related technologies to state and non-state actors and proxy groups, in breach of UNSCRs including 2231 and 2216. Iran must stop supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. In particular, we call upon Iran to cease transferring armed UAVs, which have been used to attack Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and kill Ukrainian civilians. We welcome initiatives to improve bilateral relations and de-escalate tensions in the region, including Iran and Saudi Arabia’s recent agreement to restore ties. We emphasize the importance of ensuring maritime security in the Middle East’s waterways and call on Iran not to interfere with the lawful exercise of navigational rights and freedoms by all vessels.

58. We call on Israelis and Palestinians to take steps to build trust toward the realization of a two-state solution. To this end, all parties must refrain from unilateral actions, including settlement activities and incitement to violence. We reiterate our support for the historic status quo in Jerusalem. We welcome the recent meetings between Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and the United States and hope their commitments will be fulfilled in good faith. We will continue our support for Palestinian economic self-reliance and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

59. We remain firmly committed to an inclusive, UN-facilitated political process consistent with UNSCR 2254 in Syria. We reaffirm that the international community should only consider normalization and reconstruction assistance once there is authentic and enduring progress towards a political solution. We express our continued support for the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and are committed to accountability for those responsible for the use of chemical weapons and violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as applicable. We call for full and unhindered humanitarian access to all Syrians in need, particularly through UN cross-border aid for which there is no alternative in scope or scale. We remain committed to the enduring defeat of ISIS, including durable solutions for ISIS detainees and displaced persons remaining in Northeast Syria.

60. We further express our support to preserve stability and prosperity in other parts of the Middle East and North Africa. Regarding Yemen, we call on all parties to secure a durable ceasefire and work towards a comprehensive, durable, and inclusive Yemeni-led political process under UN auspices. We encourage the Tunisian government to meet the democratic aspiration of its people, to address its economic situation and to reach an agreement with the IMF. We also support efforts to achieve stability and unity in Libya under the auspice of the UN in coordination with the African Union and the Arab League. We urge all Libyan stakeholders to work constructively on the political process in order to hold free, fair, and inclusive presidential and parliamentary elections by the end of 2023.

61. We reaffirm our engagement with Central Asian countries to address various regional challenges, including the consequences of Russia’s war of aggression, the destabilizing effect of the situation in Afghanistan, food and energy security, terrorism, and climate change. We are determined to foster trade and energy links, sustainable connectivity and transportation, including the “Middle Corridor” and associated projects to enhance regional prosperity and resilience.

62. We are deepening our partnerships with African countries and regional organizations, including the African Union. We have each expressed support to African calls for stronger representation in international fora, notably the G20. We reiterate our strong commitment to supporting governments in the region to address, in a manner consistent with international law, the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, violent extremism, and instability across Africa. We are seriously concerned about the growing presence of the Russia-affiliated Wagner Group forces on the continent and their destabilizing impact and human rights abuses. Keeping in mind the situations in West Africa and the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes regions, we will work together to support African-led efforts on peace, stability and prosperity on the continent. In this regard, we welcome the positive developments stemming from the cessation of hostilities agreement between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, and call on both parties to remain committed to full implementation. We also call for international support for the Somali President’s reform priorities and the fight against al-Shabaab. We reaffirm our commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Congo. We welcome the cessation of hostilities agreed in March and call for its full implementation. We condemn the advance of the UN-sanctioned March 23 Movement armed group (M23) and join African leaders in calling for M23 to withdraw unconditionally from all territories it controls. We are also seriously concerned about the spread of terrorist threats and activities towards coastal countries in West Africa, and are available to lend our support in addressing those threats.

63. We strongly condemn the ongoing fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. This threatens the security and safety of civilians, undermines efforts to restore Sudan’s democratic transition, and could affect the stability of the region. We urge the parties to end hostilities immediately without pre-conditions and return civilian-led democratic government. We call on all actors to renounce violence and take active steps to reduce tensions, and ensure the safety of all civilians, including humanitarian personnel. The parties to the conflict must uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law, ensure the safety of all civilians, including humanitarian personnel, and not impede or restrict the delivery of life-saving aid. We commend the bravery and fortitude of humanitarian agencies working in Sudan. We acknowledge the generosity of Sudan’s neighbors who, despite facing significant humanitarian challenges of their own, host a growing number of Sudanese refugees. We commit to supporting response operations in Sudan and across East and North Africa and the Sahel region for refugees and returnees.

64. We highlight the importance of enhancing cooperation with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to uphold shared interests as well as values. We are committed to working with regional partners to address economic challenges, climate change, biodiversity loss, natural disasters, and other global issues. We reiterate our commitment to strengthen coordination with Latin American and Caribbean partners and other actors to promote the rule of law, respect for human rights, and meet the elevated humanitarian and security needs in the region, especially in Venezuela, Haiti, and Nicaragua. With respect to the ongoing crisis in Haiti, we underscore the importance of working towards Haitian-led solution for a return to stability and need to hold accountable those who cultivate violence, corruption and instability.

65. We welcome the Agreement on the path to normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia and its Implementation Annex, reached under the EU facilitated dialogue in Brussels on February 27 and in Ohrid on March 18 respectively. In order to unlock its full potential for the citizens of Kosovo and Serbia and for advancing good-neighbourly relations in the Western Balkans, we call on both parties to implement expediently and in good faith their respective obligations.

Conclusion

66. We appreciate the exchanges with and the inputs from the G7 Engagement Groups. We are furthermore grateful for the valuable contributions from the Heads of the IEA, the IMF, the OECD, the UN, the WB, the WHO and the WTO who joined us in Hiroshima.

Reference documents:

• G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament
• G7 Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine
• G7 Clean Energy Economy Action Plan
• G7 Leaders’ Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security
• Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security
• Factsheet on the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment

###

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · May 20, 2023

2.The China Hawk in Washington Rattling Corporate Boardrooms

Excerpts:

For years, Gallagher viewed the Middle East as the pre-eminent U.S. security challenge, based on his deployments to Iraq a decade and a half ago and on his work later as a staff member at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He speaks Arabic, which he studied at Princeton University. 

A dark view of Beijing crystallized for Gallagher after the U.S. Office of Personnel Management in 2015 told more than 21 million Americans, including him, that suspected Chinese hackers had stolen personal information contained in government background records.

“That was just the most prominent incident in an accumulation of things that convinced me I need to be paying more attention to China,” he says. At the time, it struck him as incongruous that the Obama White House was planning to honor China’s Xi with a state visit.

Gallagher turned to friends he considers authorities, especially a Chinese-speaking fellow Marine he had served alongside in Iraq, Matt Pottinger. The pair kept up a dialogue over breakfasts as Pottinger later charted a hard-line approach to China as deputy national security adviser in the Trump White House and Gallagher in 2016 got elected to Congress. 

“We’ve just had a long, open-ended conversation that’s lasted a decade and a half about the Middle East, Asia and the world,” says Pottinger, who also previously reported for The Wall Street Journal in China. He called Gallagher a “serious student of history” who will “have an outsized impact on national security policy.”

The China Hawk in Washington Rattling Corporate Boardrooms

Republican Rep. Mike Gallagher aims to counter Beijing by telling ‘American companies to act like American companies’

https://www.wsj.com/articles/thechinahawkin-washington-rattling-corporate-boardrooms-a9c10117

By James T. AreddyFollow

May 20, 2023 5:30 am ET

GREEN BAY, Wis.—To counter Beijing, one of Washington’s most vocal China hawks is taking aim at American business, looking to halt the investment and trade he says is enabling Beijing’s superpower ambitions. 

Wisconsin Republican Mike Gallagher chairs a new bipartisan House committee empowered to devise strategies for the U.S. to compete against China. The congressman sees the titans of Wall Street, Hollywood, Silicon Valley, higher education and other Americans with Chinese commercial interests as behind the curve in appreciating the risks China presents. 

To redress that, Gallagher is pointing his committee to examine where extensive U.S. commercial links are making China stronger and then mapping how to disentangle them.

In recent months, he has charged that Apple’s supply chain is dangerously exposed to China, that Walt Disney has undermined U.S. values by editing films to appease Beijing’s censors and, as some activists allege, that Nike may have used cotton produced with forced labor.

A former Marine Corps intelligence officer with a Ph.D. in Cold War policy-making, Gallagher hammers on a view that China’s ruling Communist Party manages an “Orwellian techno-totalitarian surveillance state” determined to render the U.S. a subordinate power. He warns that Chinese leader Xi Jinping is on a war footing, and the U.S. must position itself for what he calls “an existential struggle over what life will look like in the 21st century.”

“We want American companies to act like American companies,” Gallagher says.

Disney has said it won’t compromise storytelling to abide by rules in different nations, while Apple has taken steps to diversify production into places such as India. A policy statement on Nike’s website says the company supports efforts to end forced labor and works to “identify and address risks in our supply chain.”

Not long ago, Washington and Beijing agreed that deeper business ties reinforced stability. Gallagher calls such thinking naive. While not advocating a full severing of ties, he proposes a pullback that would fundamentally redefine the globally critical U.S.-China relationship, say his fellow members of Congress, their aides and China specialists.

Rep. Mike Gallagher, standing to the side of the microphone stand, appeared a rally of anti-Chinese Communist Party activists in February in New York. PHOTO: JAMES T. AREDDY/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

American holdings of stocks and bonds in China were valued at $1.2 trillion in 2020, the research firm Rhodium Group estimates, on top of hundreds of billions of dollars worth of factories, real estate and other assets. Two-way trade last year touched nearly $700 billion, including dairy and mink exported to China from Gallagher’s district which includes Green Bay. China also holds more than $850 billion in U.S. Treasury securities.

Undoing that, in Gallagher’s vision, means getting Silicon Valley to curb funding for China’s tech sector, Wall Street fund managers to sell Chinese stocks and manufacturers to enforce American standards in their supply lines. 

Gallagher’s approach has rattled business executives who charge that it lacks nuance and worry the committee’s spotlight risks damaging profitable businesses and the global economy.

“Nobody wants to be in the crosshairs,” says the head of a U.S. organization that favors China engagement.

Gallagher’s growing influence on China policy stems from uncharacteristic unity in Washington between Republicans and Democrats to confront Beijing. Formally called the “Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party,” his panel lacks lawmaking authority. But it has subpoena power and, as an important sounding board in Congress for all things China, it gives Gallagher sway with committees that craft legislation.

A priority he has set for the committee is trying to speed up weapons deliveries to Taiwan to deter military threats to the island democracy from China. Committee hearings, held in prime time, have focused on the Communist Party, its repression of human rights and, last Wednesday, its use of economic and regulatory pressure to disadvantage foreign companies and obtain proprietary technology.

Rep. Mike Gallagher chairs a new bipartisan House committee charged with developing strategies for the U.S. to compete against China. PHOTO: KEVIN DIETSCH/GETTY IMAGES

“What I want these businesses to be aware of, and that ranges from a Wisconsin company to Apple to Disney, is you have to take seriously the prospect of Xi Jinping invading Taiwan, and in that scenario the bottom falls out of the economic relationship, unless we totally surrender,” says Gallagher. Recently, the committee participated in a Taiwan wargame that estimated economic losses in the trillions of dollars, even if Beijing limits its actions to a blockade. 

Having never set foot in China or even much focused on it until recent years, Gallagher says he isn’t an expert. He says a sober assessment of the evidence demonstrates that decades of U.S. investment and diplomacy with Beijing failed to create a viable working relationship and instead enabled what he regards as America’s greatest adversary. 

“Yes, a lot of people have been able to make a lot of money but things have gotten much worse geopolitically for America,” Gallagher says.

After calling on Disney Chief Executive Robert Iger in California on a committee trip to California last month, Gallagher cast doubt on a Hollywood view that moviemaking generates goodwill toward the U.S. “What is the evidence that it is improving our geopolitical position relative to the CCP?” he asked. 

As for Apple, Gallagher said after meeting CEO Tim Cook, the iPhone maker epitomizes the challenge of “how we disentangle ourselves from this complex economic relationship with China so we are not dependent on the largess of an increasingly hostile regime without shooting ourselves in the foot economically.”

At a U.S. Chamber of Commerce conference in Washington this month, a discussion moderator asked Gallagher and the committee’s top Democrat, Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi of Illinois, if they planned to call businesses before their panel. 

At a meeting last month of the House select committee on U.S.-China strategic competition, Rep. Mike Gallagher and fellow lawmakers engaged in a Taiwan wargame. PHOTO: ELLEN KNICKMEYER/ASSOCIATED PRESS

“We can have intense debates about our policy vis-à-vis China going forward,” Gallagher said, acknowledging the alarm in the business community. He then said, “Companies should be prepared to defend their investment strategy in China, their manufacturing presence in China.” 

A New York corporate strategist who deals with multinational companies says he has felt like a bartender listening to executives express anxiety they might fall under Gallagher’s gaze.

Adam Kovacevich, chief executive of McLean, Va.-based trade group Chamber of Progress, which represents major Silicon Valley companies, says Gallagher has an opportunity to help or hurt American firms. “Is he trying to shame companies, or is he actually trying to reduce economic dependency on China?” asks Kovacevich.

So far, Gallagher hasn’t forced public showdowns with American executives and instead has met many behind closed doors.

“My goal is not to have some sort of bomb-throwing viral moment,” he says. “I want to engage in a serious discussion about the complexities of selective, economic decoupling or de-risking.”

Detractors of Gallagher’s committee say the panel’s determined approach risks fueling bias against Asian-Americans or preordaining a military clash between superpowers—outcomes Gallagher says are both high priorities to avoid.

The criticisms remind Gallagher of Wisconsin Republican Sen. Joseph McCarthy, who unsettled 1950s America in his pursuit of communist “enemies from within,” and is buried in Gallagher’s district. A “dubious legacy,” Gallagher says.  

Now in his third term in Congress, Gallagher is regarded as thoughtful by supporters and critics in the House.

“He’s a very serious legislator,” says House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R., Calif.). He chose the now 39-year-old Gallagher to become the youngest committee chairman in Congress for his Marines intelligence background and experience on the House Armed Services Committee. 

Rep. Mike Gallagher met constituents this month in Green Bay, Wis., his hometown. PHOTO: ALEX WROBLEWSKI FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

For years, Gallagher viewed the Middle East as the pre-eminent U.S. security challenge, based on his deployments to Iraq a decade and a half ago and on his work later as a staff member at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He speaks Arabic, which he studied at Princeton University. 

A dark view of Beijing crystallized for Gallagher after the U.S. Office of Personnel Management in 2015 told more than 21 million Americans, including him, that suspected Chinese hackers had stolen personal information contained in government background records.

“That was just the most prominent incident in an accumulation of things that convinced me I need to be paying more attention to China,” he says. At the time, it struck him as incongruous that the Obama White House was planning to honor China’s Xi with a state visit.

Gallagher turned to friends he considers authorities, especially a Chinese-speaking fellow Marine he had served alongside in Iraq, Matt Pottinger. The pair kept up a dialogue over breakfasts as Pottinger later charted a hard-line approach to China as deputy national security adviser in the Trump White House and Gallagher in 2016 got elected to Congress. 

“We’ve just had a long, open-ended conversation that’s lasted a decade and a half about the Middle East, Asia and the world,” says Pottinger, who also previously reported for The Wall Street Journal in China. He called Gallagher a “serious student of history” who will “have an outsized impact on national security policy.”

Gallagher’s congressional district is centered on his hometown, Green Bay, where the family name is associated with a pizza chain once owned by his father, an obstetrician. 

The area boasts little investment from China, though it is still a presence. Local shipyard Fincantieri Marinette Marine, which has made donations to Gallagher’s campaigns, is adding hundreds of jobs since securing Navy contracts to build a new class of guided missile frigate designed for deployment near China.

On a visit to his district earlier this month, Gallagher donned a white plastic coverall at a mink farm and heard how the fur industry relies on China as a market and vaccine producer.

Being effective against Beijing, he says, hinges on places like northeast Wisconsin. “If you haven’t explained the stakes, then how are you going to generate support for the actions necessary, actions that may actually be costly?” Gallagher says.

Siobhan Hughes contributed to this article.

Write to James T. Areddy at James.Areddy@wsj.com

3. Zelenskiy joins Japan G7 as democracies take aim at Russia and China

Excerpts:

Leaders of the G7 - the U.S., Japan, Germany, Britain, France, Italy and Canada - are grappling with the challenges posed by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and tensions with China, notably over economic security and Taiwan, the self-ruled island Beijing claims as its own.

Worried by the outsized role China now plays in supply chains for everything from semiconductors to critical minerals, the G7 issued a communique that set out a common strategy towards future dealings with the world's second-largest economy.

"We call on China to press Russia to stop its military aggression, and immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw its troops from Ukraine," the leaders said in a statement.

They warned that countries attempting to use trade as a weapon would face "consequences", sending a strong signal to Beijing over practices Washington says amount to economic bullying.

"We are not decoupling or turning inwards. At the same time, we recognise that economic resilience requires de-risking and diversifying," they said. "A growing China that plays by international rules would be of global interest."

Zelenskiy joins Japan G7 as democracies take aim at Russia and China

Reuters · by John Irish

HIROSHIMA, Japan, May 20 (Reuters) - Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelenskiy brought his call for support against Russia's invasion to a Group of Seven (G7) summit on Saturday to Japan, where leaders agreed to tighten sanctions against Moscow and pare back exposure to China.

The Ukrainian president's attendance at the G7 summit in Hiroshima, the first city to suffer a nuclear attack, put in sharp relief western concerns over the nuclear threat posed by Russia.

Leaders of the G7 - the U.S., Japan, Germany, Britain, France, Italy and Canada - are grappling with the challenges posed by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and tensions with China, notably over economic security and Taiwan, the self-ruled island Beijing claims as its own.

Worried by the outsized role China now plays in supply chains for everything from semiconductors to critical minerals, the G7 issued a communique that set out a common strategy towards future dealings with the world's second-largest economy.

"We call on China to press Russia to stop its military aggression, and immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw its troops from Ukraine," the leaders said in a statement.

They warned that countries attempting to use trade as a weapon would face "consequences", sending a strong signal to Beijing over practices Washington says amount to economic bullying.

"We are not decoupling or turning inwards. At the same time, we recognise that economic resilience requires de-risking and diversifying," they said. "A growing China that plays by international rules would be of global interest."

'MEETINGS WITH FRIENDS'

[1/7] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy arrives at Hiroshima airport for attending the G7 leaders' summit in Mihara, Hiroshima prefecture, western Japan May 20, 2023., in this photo released by Kyodo. Mandatory credit Kyodo via REUTERS

The communique was issued shortly after Zelenskiy touched down in a French government aircraft.

Footage from Japanese public broadcaster NHK showed the Ukrainian president, wearing his customary olive green fatigues, stepping down to the tarmac and moving quickly to a waiting car.

Moments later he tweeted: "Japan. G7. Important meetings with partners and friends of Ukraine."

Zelenskiy was set to meet the leaders of the G7 individually throughout Saturday evening. He began with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, followed by Britain's Rishi Sunak, whom he hugged upon greeting.

French and other European officials said it was crucial that Zelenskiy came in person first to the Arab League, which he addressed on Friday, and now to the G7, also being attended by members of the Global South, a term for some mostly low- and middle-income nations, including India.

Zelenskiy could outline Ukraine's view as the victim of an attack by Russia and how he saw a peace settlement in the future to the disparate groups, the officials said.

"We have to use all the means to bind non-aligned states to the cause of the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine," a French presidential official told reporters.

As well as bilateral meetings with G7 leaders, Zelenskiy will also meet the leaders of India and Brazil, two countries that have not distanced themselves from Moscow. With Russia and China they form the BRIC grouping.

Zelenskiy is due to hold a session on Sunday with the G7 before a broader session with the Global South attendees.

Reporting by Reuters G7 team in Hiroshima; Writing by David Dolan; Editing by Nick Macfie

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by John Irish

4. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 19, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2023-0

Key Takeaways

• A Ukrainian official stated that Russian forces have concentrated most of their available reserves to the Bakhmut area and slowed Ukrainian counterattacks in the past 24 hours.
• Ukrainian counterattacks near Bakhmut have notably likely eliminated the threat of a Russian encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut and forced Russian troops to allocate scarce military resources to defend against a limited and localized offensive effort, as Ukrainian command likely intended.
• Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes across Ukraine on the night of May 18 to 19.
• President Joe Biden reportedly informed G7 leaders on May 19 that Washington will support a joint effort to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16s and other fourth generation aircraft.
• The Kremlin reportedly spent 3.1 trillion rubles (approximately $38.7 billion) in an undisclosed section of the Russian budget in 2023, likely to on fund the war and maintain occupied territories in Ukraine.
• Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin announced that he will run for reelection as a member of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia Party for the first time, prompting criticism from select Russian ultranationalists.
• A Ukrainian source reported that elements of two brigades of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) have deployed to border areas of Kursk Oblast in order to conduct counter-sabotage activities and provocations.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian troops continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line.
• Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks in the Bakhmut area and slightly increased their tempo of ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces are preparing defenses by flooding fields in Russian occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev claimed that the Russian military has recruited 117,400 contract personnel in volunteer formations since January 1, 2023.
• The Russian State Duma adopted the final reading of a draft law authorizing regional elections under martial law.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 19, 2023

May 19, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 19, 2023

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Layne Philipson, and Mason Clark

May 19, 2023, 7:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 3pm ET on May 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

A Ukrainian official stated that Russian forces have concentrated most of their available reserves to the Bakhmut area and slowed Ukrainian counterattacks in the past 24 hours. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on May 19 that Russian forces concentrated most of their reserves in the Bakhmut direction, which has slowed the rate of Ukrainian advances.[1] Malyar also stated that Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack on the northern and southern outskirts of Bakhmut and advanced 500 meters on one flank and 1,000 meters on the other.[2] Some Russian milbloggers celebrated the slowed Ukrainian rate of advance and claimed that the Ukrainian forces are unable to sustain prolonged localized counterattacks around Bakhmut.[3] Russian forces on Bakhmut’s flanks likely remain weak, however; Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to criticize the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) on May 19 for retreating from defensive lines southwest of Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut).[4] Ukrainian counterattacks near Bakhmut have notably likely eliminated the threat of a Russian encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut and forced Russian troops to allocate scarce military resources to defend against a limited and localized offensive effort, as Ukrainian command likely intended.

Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes across Ukraine on the night of May 18 to 19. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russia launched six Kalibr cruise missiles and 22 Shahed-131/136 drones at Ukraine from the direction of the Black Sea.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 16 drones and three Kalibr missiles, despite the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)’s claim that Russian forces struck all intended targets.[6] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Head Serhii Lysak reported explosions near Kryvyi Rih following Russian strikes in the area.[7] Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Vadym Skibitsky noted that the recent uptick in Russian drone and missile strikes, as well as artillery strikes along the entire frontline, are meant to disrupt Ukrainian counteroffensive plans and preparations.[8] ISW previously assessed on May 14 that the recent increase in Russian strikes on Ukrainian rear areas is likely part of a new air campaign premised on degrading Ukrainian counteroffensive capabilities in the near term.[9] Skibitsky additionally noted that Russia can only produce 25 Kalibr cruise missiles, 35 Kh-101s, two Kinzhals, and 5 ballistic 9M723 Iskander-Ms per month.[10] Considering that Russian forces have launched missile strikes at rear areas of Ukraine on a near daily-basis thus far in May, it is likely that they are rapidly expending their stocks of precision munitions, potentially at a rate that exceeds production capabilities.

President Joe Biden reportedly informed G7 leaders on May 19 that Washington will support a joint effort to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16s and other fourth generation aircraft. This decision marks a sharp turn in US policy vis a vis fourth generation aircraft in Ukraine and follows Biden’s meetings with various G7 leaders in Hiroshima, Japan on May 19. Yahoo News relatedly reported on May 18 that Ukrainian pilots outperformed standard Pentagon expectations for F-16 training time in a flight simulator and would be able to operate F-16s in only four months as opposed to the anticipated 18 months, citing an internal US Air Force assessment.[11]

The Kremlin reportedly spent 3.1 trillion rubles (approximately $38.7 billion) in an undisclosed section of the Russian budget in 2023, likely to fund the war and maintain occupied territories in Ukraine. Independent Russian news outlet The Bell reported that the Russian Ministry of Finance released data on May 16 on budget expenditures since the start of 2023 amounting to a total of 11.9 trillion rubles ($148.5 billion) with only 8.8 trillion rubles ($109.8 billion) accounted for in Russia’s public budget, leaving 3.1 trillion rubles – over a quarter of Russia’s expenditures – unaccounted for.[12] The Bell reported that most undisclosed budget items account for defense, national security, and law enforcement, and that some may fall onto social and other expenditures in occupied Ukraine. The Bell also reported that the unspecified spending is higher than in the same time period in previous years. ISW continues to assess that the Russian economy will struggle to meet the needs of the large-scale war that the Russian military is fighting in Ukraine and to sustain its occupation of Ukrainian territories.[13]

Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin announced that he will run for reelection as a member of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia Party for the first time, prompting criticism from select Russian ultranationalists. Russian “Civil Solidarity” movement head Georgy Fedorov argued on May 19 that Sobyanin’s United Russia candidacy suggests that “all political processes in Russia are now only possible in the pre-existing political party system,” that Russia is set to experience “great turbulence,” and that Russia’s “non-systemic opposition has been crushed.”[14] Former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin amplified Georgy’s statements and sarcastically called United Russia the “party of crooks and thieves,” a well-known slogan used by Russian opposition figure Alexey Navalny.[15] Sobyanin has held the post of Moscow Mayor nominally as an independent since 2010, although his United Russia candidacy is likely simply a public formalization of his longstanding relationship with United Russia, as Sobyanin has been a member of the party since 2001. United Russia likely seeks to buttress its own popularity (which stands around 45% in Moscow) with that of Sobyanin, who has polled at 74%.[16] These select ultranationalists likely responded to Sobyanin’s announcement to critique what they view as United Russia’s attempt to monopolize support amongst the Russian ultranationalist constituency and were likely not genuinely reacting to the loss of an independent figure. The Kremlin may additionally have publicly linked Sobyanin to United Russia to remove a nominally independent figure, regardless of his actual independence. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin will likely attempt to solidify United Russia as the definitive pro-war party during elections in 2023 and 2024, and Russian ultranationalist communities with their own political ambitions may increasingly seek to undercut these efforts.[17]

A Ukrainian source reported that elements of two spetsnaz brigades of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) have deployed to border areas of Kursk Oblast in order to conduct counter-sabotage activities and provocations. The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on May 19 that the 3rd and 22nd Guards Special Purpose brigades have deployed to Tyotkino, Kursk Oblast to prevent cross-border Ukrainian partisan activities, carry out cross-border provocations, and raise the morale of Russian forces.[18] ISW has previously assessed that such Russian deployments to border areas are likely an attempt to fix a portion of Ukrainian forces to border regions and disperse them from critical frontline areas.[19] Elements of the 3rd Guards Special Purpose Brigade have been previously reported near the Kreminna area of Luhansk Oblast, while elements of the 22nd Guards Special Purpose Brigade were reportedly active in the Orikhiv area in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[20] It is unclear why Russian leadership may have made the decision to remove such elements from active sectors of the frontline to Russian rear areas, and it may be possible that these units suffered previous losses in recent operations and have been withdrawn and redeployed in order to rest and refit. The deployment of these units to border areas is unlikely to have the desired informational or operational effects.

Key Takeaways

• A Ukrainian official stated that Russian forces have concentrated most of their available reserves to the Bakhmut area and slowed Ukrainian counterattacks in the past 24 hours.
• Ukrainian counterattacks near Bakhmut have notably likely eliminated the threat of a Russian encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut and forced Russian troops to allocate scarce military resources to defend against a limited and localized offensive effort, as Ukrainian command likely intended.
• Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes across Ukraine on the night of May 18 to 19.
• President Joe Biden reportedly informed G7 leaders on May 19 that Washington will support a joint effort to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16s and other fourth generation aircraft.
• The Kremlin reportedly spent 3.1 trillion rubles (approximately $38.7 billion) in an undisclosed section of the Russian budget in 2023, likely to on fund the war and maintain occupied territories in Ukraine.
• Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin announced that he will run for reelection as a member of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia Party for the first time, prompting criticism from select Russian ultranationalists.
• A Ukrainian source reported that elements of two brigades of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) have deployed to border areas of Kursk Oblast in order to conduct counter-sabotage activities and provocations.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian troops continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line.
• Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks in the Bakhmut area and slightly increased their tempo of ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces are preparing defenses by flooding fields in Russian occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev claimed that the Russian military has recruited 117,400 contract personnel in volunteer formations since January 1, 2023.
• The Russian State Duma adopted the final reading of a draft law authorizing regional elections under martial law.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian sources claimed that Russian troops continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on May 19. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Western Group of Forces units (primarily from the Western Military District) disrupted Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Tymkivka (18km east of Kupyansk) and Synkivka (10km northeast of Kupyansk).[21] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces lost control over a tactically significant area of high ground west of Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk) and that battles are ongoing along the line of contact between Masyutivka and Lyman Pershyi (11km northeast of Kupyansk).[22] Geolocated combat footage posted on May 19 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions near Masyutivka.[23] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked Novoselivske, 14km northeast of Svatove.[24]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks near Kreminna on May 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a counterattack near Bilohorivka and recaptured several unspecified lost positions in the area.[26] The milblogger additionally claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Serebrianske forest area near Shyplivka (10km south of Kreminna) and attacked west and northwest of Kreminna near Nevske (18km northwest) and Makiivka (22km northwest).[27]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks in the Bakhmut area on May 19. Russian milbloggers made varied claims that Wagner Group forces made either some advances within or completely cleared a Ukrainian fortified area in western Bakhmut on May 18 and 19.[28] Geolocated footage suggests that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the fortified area as of May 18, however.[29] A milblogger claimed on May 19 that Wagner forces also advanced towards the entrance to Bakhmut on the T0504 Bakhmut-Chasiv Yar highway in the southwestern part of the city.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported continued fighting in Bakhmut and that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations towards Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) and Bila Hora (14km southwest of Bakhmut).[31] Various voices in the Russian information space are prematurely declaring that Wagner forces have completed the capture of Bakhmut on May 19, drawing ire from other dominant voices.[32] ISW has observed no indication that Ukrainian forces are conducting a controlled withdrawal from their remaining positions inside the city or that Wagner assaults imminently threaten to capture all remaining Ukrainian positions.

Russian forces slightly increased their tempo of ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on May 19 following a week-long slowdown. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 19 that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Novokalynove (8km north of Avdiivka), Stepove (2km north of Avdiivka), Avdiivka, Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka), and Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka), a notably greater number of settlements than the Ukrainian General Staff has listed over the past week.[33] A Russian source claimed that there were no significant changes in the Avdiivka direction and that Russian forces made marginal advances in western Marinka as of May 18.[34] The source also claimed on May 19 that Ukrainian forces increased their rate of artillery fire in the Avdiivka area.[35] Russian independent investigative outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories) reported that a Ukrainian HIMARS strike destroyed up to 10 Russian T-90 tanks east of Marinka on an unspecified date.[36]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a counterattack near Solodke (32km southwest of Donetsk City) in western Donetsk Oblast on May 19.[37] The source claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to advance southeast of the settlement towards the H20 highway to Volnovakha but did not specify an outcome of the attack. Ukrainian forces have recently conducted limited and localized counterattacks in western Donetsk Oblast.[38]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration and Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported on May 18 and 19 that Russian forces are preparing for an anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive by flooding the fields of Vasylivkskyi raion (about 35km south of Zaporizhzhia City) and Yakymivskyi raion (in the Melitopol area).[39] ISW previously reported on Russian efforts to flood the area near the Kakhovka Reservoir in a misguided attempted to bolster defensive preparations.[40]  

Russian forces continue to endanger the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Reuters reported on May 19 that Russian forces have been enhancing defensive positions in and around the ZNPP by reportedly laying mines, digging trenches, and establishing firing positions on top of some ZNPP buildings.[41] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi stated on May 19 that unspecified actors fired on the ZNPP and called on the combatants not to use the ZNPP as a military base.[42]

Russian sources claimed on May 19 that Ukrainian drones targeted Russian occupied Crimea. Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov claimed that Russian forces shot down four Ukrainian drones north of Dzhankoy and one near Solone Ozero.[43] ISW has not observed visual evidence of downed drones in Crimea.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on May 19 purportedly showing Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu visiting a forward command post of an unspecified formation of the Eastern Group of Forces (Eastern Military District) in the Zaporizhia direction.[44] Shoigu met with the Eastern Group of Forces commander – whom the MoD did not name – and headquarter officers and instructed them to continue to conduct reconnaissance and presented awards to servicemen. Putin reportedly dismissed Russian Eastern Military District (EMD) Commander Colonel General Rustam Muradov in March or April 2023, but the Russian MoD has not confirmed either Muradov’s dismissal or the appointment of his replacement.[45] The MoD likely posted this footage in order to posture coherency in the command and control of the EMD, who are responsible for a large sector of the front in southern Ukraine.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on May 18 that the Russian military has recruited 117,400 contract personnel into volunteer formations since January 1, 2023.[46] ISW has not observed confirmation of this figure, but it is possible that the Kremlin’s focus on the expansion of regionally based volunteer battalions in recent months has produced 117,400 recruited personnel.

The Kremlin continues to rely on regional officials to recruit contract servicemembers. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on May 19 that Russian regional officials in the Siberian Federal District began receiving personal orders to participate in the recruitment of contract servicemembers and that there are discussions that regional industry ministers and deputy prime ministers will receive quotas for recruitment.[47] One of Verstka’s sources reportedly stated that the Kremlin’s first and main task for regional officials is to recruit contract servicemembers.[48]

The United States, Australia, and G7 member states have imposed a new round of sanctions against Russia as of May 19.[49] The United Kingdom (UK) government sanctioned 86 individuals and entities connected to Russian theft of Ukrainian grain, advanced military technology, and remaining revenue sources.[50] The new UK sanctions also target individuals and entities connected to Russian nuclear energy company Rosenergoatom’s support for Russian military efforts.[51] The US sanctions, in coordination with G7 member states and other partners, target 22 individuals and 104 entities involved in Russian sanctions evasion, critical technology supply chains, future energy extraction capabilities, and financial services.[52]

The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is reportedly relying on intermediaries in Kazakhstan to acquire microelectronics and drones. German outlet Der Spiegel reported that Russian drone seller Celestial Mechanics receives drones from Kazakh enterprise Aspan Arba and that Russian company “Stack” imports microelectronics from Kazakh supplier “Da Group 22,” which sources its microchips from German company Elix-st.[53]  

The Russian Federal State Statistic Service (Rosstat) released new demographic data that continues to highlight demographic anxieties in Russia. Rosstat’s statistics purportedly show that up to 1 million 20–40-year-old men left Russia to fight in Ukraine or to flee the country.[54] Rosstat reportedly highlighted that this figure accounts for five percent of the male population who are of reproductive age.[55] ISW has previously assessed that Russian nationalist figures will continue to weaponize intensely nationalist rhetoric in response to substantial demographic impacts within Russia associated with the war in Ukraine.[56]

Russian volunteers and security contractors continue their efforts to increase the production of electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Russian Business Espionage Counteraction Laboratory, an information security contractor, stated on May 19 that it is organizing a meeting on May 26 for Russian developers of small EW systems to show off promising prototypes. The laboratory claimed that it will evaluate product performance in conjunction with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), Russian special services, and Wagner Group representatives.[57] Russian outlet RIA Katyusha claimed on May 18 that it is in the final stages of producing its own electronic warfare station which it previously crowdsourced on its Telegram channel.[58] RIA Katyusha claimed that it will be sending the electronic warfare systems to an unspecified regiment from Tver Oblast operating in the Svatove direction.[59]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Russian State Duma adopted the final reading of a draft law on May 18 authorizing regional elections under martial law.[60] The law states that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Russian MoD must approve elections in territories under martial law, as well as allows Russian occupation authorities to reduce the duration of voting and establish other unspecified features of voting.[61]

Russian occupation authorities continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Crimea under the guise of summer vacations. A Russian source stated on May 18 that children receiving treatment at a psychological and social rehabilitation center in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, are participating in restful activities in Yevpatoriya, Crimea.[62]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on May 19 that Belarusian military leadership will hold the annual meeting “Military Security and State Defense” with Belarusian oblast, military recruitment oblast, and Minsk city administration heads in Gomel on May 16 to discuss joint operations and improve weapons handling skills.[63] Belarusian Special Operations Commander Major General Vadim Denisenko stated that Belarusian forces have revised the training program for reservists which would allow them to reach service requirements in a short amount of time.[64]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

5. With eye on Ukraine, top Chinese general calls for unconventional warfare capabilities

Anything that is not conventional is unconventional or so goes the conventional wisdom.

Excerpt:

A new genre of hybrid warfare has emerged from the Ukraine conflict, with the intertwining of "political warfare, financial warfare, technological warfare, cyber warfare, and cognitive warfare," General Wang Haijiang, commander of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) Western Theatre Command, wrote in a front-page article in an official newspaper on Monday.

​

With eye on Ukraine, top Chinese general calls for unconventional warfare capabilities

Reuters · by Reuters

BEIJING, May 16 (Reuters) - Drawing lessons from the Ukraine crisis, a top Chinese general urged greater integration of novel capabilities, including artificial intelligence, with conventional warfare tactics ahead of any confrontation with the West.

A new genre of hybrid warfare has emerged from the Ukraine conflict, with the intertwining of "political warfare, financial warfare, technological warfare, cyber warfare, and cognitive warfare," General Wang Haijiang, commander of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) Western Theatre Command, wrote in a front-page article in an official newspaper on Monday.

In the name of national security and to fend off perceived threats from the West, Chinese efforts to prepare the country for security challenges have not relaxed despite a slowing economy and COVID-19. Defence spending is set to rise for the eighth straight year in 2023.

The scale and sweep of Chinese military preparations are closely watched not just by the West, but also by China's neighbours and democratically governed Taiwan, which China claims as its own.

"At present and in the future, local conflicts and turmoil are frequent, global problems are intensifying, and the world has entered a new period of turmoil and change," Wang wrote in Study Times.

"Various 'black swan' and 'grey rhinoceros' events may occur at any time, especially with the containing, encircling, decoupling, suppressing, and military threats of some Western nations," he continued.

Despite the hundreds of billions of dollars poured into defence spending, China's armed forces do not have much recent experience in a hot war, with its last - and brief - military conflict in 1979 with Vietnam.

The ability to win is needed to maintain national security, Wang wrote.

The PLA's combat-readiness in a hypothetical war has become a focus in recent months as China flexes its military muscle over Taiwan, putting itself in potential conflict with the United States.

Washington has a policy of "strategic ambiguity" over whether it would intervene militarily to defend Taiwan, but is bound by law to provide the island with the means to defend itself.

China will seek new military advantages by building up capabilities in areas such as artificial intelligence, information networks, and aviation and space, Wang said.

In a separate rare critique in January reflecting on lessons learned from the Ukraine war, the PLA Daily noted Russia's military flaws, including the need to improve its "situation awareness" in the battlefield.

Reporting by Ryan Woo. Editing by Gerry Doyle

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

6. US to Counter Russian Disinformation on Ukraine With AI Tool

US to Counter Russian Disinformation on Ukraine With AI Tool

thedefensepost.com · by Inder Singh Bisht · May 16, 2023

The US State Department has developed an AI-based online tool to counter Russian disinformation on the Ukraine war.

The Ukraine Content Aggregator will collect “verifiable Russian disinformation” and share it with partner nations, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced last week.

“Russia continues to push a steady, relentless stream of disinformation about its war of aggression against Ukraine, to lie about and cover up horrific abuses it’s committed, to try to justify committing others,” he said at the Freedom House 2023 Annual Awards Ceremony.

“We’re promoting independent media and digital literacy. We’re working with partners in academia to reliably detect fake text generated by Russian chatbots.”

Longstanding Disinformation Narratives

The war saw an escalation in Russia’s longstanding disinformation narratives against Ukraine, including Russia’s claim that Crimea always belonged to Moscow, and that Kyiv has been infiltrated by neo-Nazis or conspiracy theories about Ukraine/US bioweapons laboratories.

According to NewsGuard, Russia’s state-controlled broadcaster RT’s documentary site published 50 films on the war in one year — nearly one a week — that pushed the propaganda.

The films use footage of civilian casualties caused by Russian strikes spun to make it seem Ukraine is behind it.

Many of the documentaries reached YouTube, garnering over half a million views combined, wrote the journalism and technology tool that tracks online misinformation.

Exploiting Anti-Colonial Sentiments

Russia’s influence information has particularly targeted Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, trying to tap into their anti-colonial sentiments to stir up distrust of Western governments, NPR wrote.

“There’s been a major focus on non-English-language information,” the head of research at Logically, a company that tracks online misinformation and disinformation, Kyle Walter, told the outlet.

“They’re broadly going across the spectrum, both to try to change their opinions of the invasion, but also to position themselves as a better strategic partner moving forward.”

thedefensepost.com · by Inder Singh Bisht · May 16, 2023

7. Cold Wars, Grey Zones, and Strategic Competition: Applying Theories of War to Strategy in the 21st Century

Conclusion:

Though the term Strategic Competition may suggest that the war/peace dyad is now insufficient for understanding the full range of strategic interaction, it is important to remember that clarity and abstraction are features rather than defects of theories of war. All theories must make tradeoffs in exchange for specific explanatory power. While some employ elegant concepts of dyadic war and peace, others explore the entanglement of such concepts. Though the latter enables a better understanding of phenomena like strategic competition in peacetime, it is important to remember that such theoretical choices may be drawbacks if competition becomes conflict.

Cold Wars, Grey Zones, and Strategic Competition: Applying Theories of War to Strategy in the 21st Century. - Military Strategy Magazine

Peter L. Hickman - Strategist for the Director of the Air National Guard, USA

militarystrategymagazine.com

In 1947 Bernard Baruch warned the United States “not to be deceived” by the post-WWII “peace.” He described the emerging rivalry between the U.S. and the USSR as a “Cold War” that was not quite war but was also not quite peace.[i] Echoes of this concept of a Cold War are evident today in the somewhat ambiguous phrase “Strategic Competition” that the Biden Administration uses to describe relations between the United States and China.[ii] Though strategic competition is not a state of war, the rivalry between the U.S. and China is a precarious kind of peace in which both sides are also preparing for the possibility of future significant military escalation, major war, or even nuclear exchange.

U.S. foreign policy in the grey zone between war and peace has become the norm rather than the exception since Baruch’s warning in 1947. Though the U.S. Congress declared war eleven times between 1812 and 1942,[iii] Congress has not declared war in the last eighty years despite nearly 100,000 U.S. battle deaths in that same period.[iv] The conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan are all frequently referred to as “wars,” yet none drew a declaration of war from Congress. All are individually understood as instances of broader “wars”; the Cold War and the War on Terrorism. “Wars” on social ills further subsume the conceptually elegant definition of war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will”[v] into an ill-defined aspiration to change a social or political status quo. Today’s interest in “grey zone” conflict illustrates that even in foreign policy, the concepts of war and peace have lost saliency for describing political reality and are more likely to be seriously encountered in academic environments than in the practice of grand strategy.[vi] The normalcy of “military operations other than war” since the 1950s has even led some military leaders to try to remind American service members that war at the scale of World War II remains a possibility in the future and is not simply a thing of the past.[vii]

However, the apparent inapplicability of theoretical concepts of war and peace to current political reality is a feature rather than a defect of theory. In the words of Clausewitz, the point of theory is “to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were confused and entangled.”[viii] Likewise, Harold Winton writes that “theory’s first task is to define the field of study under investigation.”[ix] These acts of clarification and definition involve an irreconcilable conflict between synthesizing reality into useful models, which are finite, and the endless complexity of events as experienced in reality. Even in the early nineteenth century, when Clausewitz wrote On War, he acknowledged that war in practice “branches out in almost all directions and has no definite limits.”[x] However, this paper will explore how theorists make trade-offs between thinking clearly about war and peace with accurate descriptions of endless complexity. When it comes to issues of war and peace, this choice often involves abstracting war as a distinct phenomenon with enduring, essential characteristics that can be identified and modeled across time. While sacrificing some descriptive accuracy, such abstraction and clarification of concepts provide powerful tools for understanding the entanglement of war and peace. These theoretical tools are as helpful today for understanding “strategic competition” as they were two centuries ago for understanding grand strategy in the Napoleonic wars.

Theory Provides Conceptual Clarity at the Expense of Descriptive Accuracy

Clausewitz grounds his theoretical approach with the concept of “absolute war,” an abstracted form of war that provides an extreme point of theoretical reference for students of war theory.[xi] He does not suggest that this concept corresponds to wars as they are experienced in reality. Instead, “he who wants to learn from theory becomes accustomed to keeping that point in view constantly, to measuring all his hopes and fears by it, and to approximating it when he can or when he must.”[xii] In the early nineteenth century, when Clausewitz wrote, war in practice was, at most, an “approximation” of the theoretical concept of absolute war.[xiii] Nevertheless, this theoretical form has value because it provides “a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him avoid the pitfalls of battle.”[xiv]

Several other important theorists, familiar with war in practice, nonetheless develop abstract, theoretically elegant concepts of war. Jomini’s “art of war” consists of enduring principles and rules that become a “means of almost certain success” among the “poetry and metaphysics of war.”[xv] Nonetheless, he concedes that he cannot fully consider all the factors that influence the conduct of war without “deviating from my intention” and “enlarging too much the limits of this work.”[xvi] Alfred Mahan draws principles from the “constant” and “permanent” lessons of history by limiting his theoretical scope to the “immense determining influence” of sea power upon world history, albeit in both peace and war.[xvii] Likewise, Julian Corbett seeks “clear conceptions and the exposition of the inherent relations of things” to enable effective collective action. However, his “clear conceptions” function at a level of abstraction that cannot accompany one on the battlefield.[xviii] In the aftermath of World War I, Giulio Douhet defined war as an industrial pitting of “populations directly against populations, nations directly against nations… which come to blows and seize each other’s throats.”[xix] Douhet’s vision of industrial warfare was theoretically distinct from any other level of political interaction because, in his treatment, nations at war discard all concerns except the single-minded struggle for survival or death.

The development of elegant, precise, and unentangled theories of war provides explanatory power for theorists interested in war in the abstract. In most cases, theorists acknowledge that theoretical pruning always leaves some descriptive power on the cutting room floor. For example, Corbett writes that his focus on sea power renders exploration of “primordial” political questions and conditions “unprofitable.”[xx] Likewise, Jomini writes that military operations are often subject to important “political objective points” that appear “very irrational” in the context of a theoretical perspective focused on military considerations.[xxi] Finally, J.F.C. Fuller seeks to develop “a workable piece of mental machinery that will enable the war student to sort out military values” but acknowledges that “the fewer the parts of any machine, the simpler becomes its working.”[xxii] He, therefore, develops a simple, if limited, theoretical tool that can be employed by policymakers deciding whether or not to launch the first strike while leaving aside the additional machinery that might shed light on how war and peace are less conceptually independent in reality.[xxiii]

Exploring the Entanglement of War and Peace in Strategy

The theorists cited above acknowledge that they must make trade-offs between explanatory power over time and descriptive accuracy in any instance. The theories of war discussed above sacrifice descriptive accuracy by developing elegant, abstract, and theoretically useful concepts that enable thinking clearly about war. Elegant theoretical concepts of war also enable theorists to explore the “entanglement” of war and peace in practice and better understand concepts like strategic competition, which take place between rigid theoretical boundaries of war and peace.

Clausewitz employed his theoretical ideal of “absolute war” to demonstrate the practical entanglement of the concepts of war and peace in reality.[xxiv] Clausewitz points out that “final victory” in war is meaningful only within the theoretically isolated concept of “absolute war.”[xxv] Looking narrowly, Napoleon’s conquering of Moscow and half of Russia in 1812 was a great victory. His failure to subsequently destroy the Russian army and secure his desired peace rendered the broader campaign a disaster. This expansion of scope illustrates how individual engagements, and any war in its totality, “are only of value in their relation to the whole.”[xxvi] If particular engagements are only of value in relation to the whole war, then wars are only of value in relation to ongoing “political intercourse,” which is “crowned” not by victory in a war but through securing a desired peace.[xxvii] However, for Clausewitz, a crowning peace is always aspirational because “even the outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.”[xxviii]

Though Fuller developed a “simple machine” to understand war, he simultaneously emphasizes the fundamental entanglement of war and peace by crafting a theory of war that effectively has no peace portion of the dyad. Quoting William James, he writes, “every up to date dictionary should say that ‘peace’ and ‘war’ mean the same thing, now in posse, now in actu… preparation for war by the nation is the real war, permanent, unceasing; and that battles are only a sort of public verification of mastery gained during the ‘peace’ intervals.”[xxix] Writing in the aftermath of WWI, Fuller’s focus on economy of force was not limited to any particular war but was always partially oriented to the next war.[xxx] Fuller argues that war should be conducted based on forward-looking calculations of post-war power rather than the victory at hand. Therefore, the means of seeking today’s victory should always consider tomorrow’s preparations, and states should minimize destruction because “to kill, wound, and plunder is to destroy or debilitate a future buyer.”[xxxi]

More recently, Colin S. Gray has explored the entanglement of theoretical war and peace by writing that “war and peace overlap in a fuzzy zone that is a world of both/and, rather than of sharp differences.”[xxxii] For Gray, any “theory of war must also be a theory of peace, all the while it needs to develop analytical tools suitable to cope with conditions that are neither plainly of war nor peace, but rather are both.”[xxxiii] In this sense, “warfare is not self-referential” but is always about the larger war and peace political context over time.[xxxiv] War and peace are other-referential and endlessly entangled, like the states who struggle through them in an endless pursuit of advantage.

The Art of Strategy in posse

As argued above, theories emphasizing the entanglement of war and peace offer insight into strategic competition. However, to better understand the nature of strategic competition, it is essential to understand strategy formation across repeated periods of war and peace, particularly the overriding fear of future entrapment.

Everett Dolman argues that when considered from an expansive theoretical scope, the international strategic environment is similar to an iterated prisoner’s dilemma.[xxxv] In an open-ended, strategic game, Dolman describes strategy as “a plan for attaining continuing advantage” because “the strategist can never finish the business of strategy, and understands that there is no permanence in victory – or defeat.”[xxxvi] Though final victory does lose conceptual salience across time, defeat in the form of imposition of another’s political will, regime change, or even nuclear annihilation retains its salience as an alarming danger. Moreover, this apprehension of future insecurity and strategic pursuit of future advantage is the fundamental driver of arms races, the Cold War, and 21st-century strategic competition.

Concern about such dangers is evident as far back as the Ancient Greeks. According to Thucydides, the Peloponnesian war began because Sparta feared the rise of Athenian power and decided that war would be preferable to the continued rise of that power.[xxxvii] Athens, for their part, refused to concede Sparta’s relatively modest near-term demands because, according to Pericles, they would lead over time to “slavery.”[xxxviii] Athens also launched the expedition to Sicily not because of an immediate threat but due to the potential future growth of Syracuse and the danger that they could one day join with the Spartans against Athens.[xxxix]

These three examples from Thucydides demonstrate great concern with an adversary reaching some future point of control beyond which no viable options exist for contesting the imposition of their will. This concern is similar to Sun Tzu’s concept of being surrounded, and Clausewitz’s description of a situation in which every possible change is “a change for the worse.”[xl] Perhaps most succinctly, B. H. Liddell Hart describes it as a “psychological dislocation” that arises from a sense of being “trapped.”[xli] Fundamentally, once an individual, army, or state has become trapped, they no longer have any means by which they can escape the imposition of an adversary’s will. Therefore, Pericles’s use of “slavery” seems not exaggerated but apt.

The implications for strategy are relatively straightforward if the overriding concern of states over time is to avoid becoming strategically trapped and, therefore, helpless in the face of an adversary’s will. A military strategy must maximize options available to statesmen to achieve political ends.[xlii] “Their purpose is not to project violence, but to be prepared to do so, or in perfect terms, to be able to do so.”[xliii] For Clausewitz, this means creating conditions in which the “opponent either will not appeal to that supreme tribunal – force – or that he will lose the verdict if he does.”[xliv] For Dolman, “every action of the master strategist should be intended to increase options, not eliminate them. For there is always another alternative waiting to be found.”[xlv] In short, the role of (grand) strategy is to avoid any future entrapment and win the peace, “even if only from your point of view.”[xlvi]

Strategic competition between the U.S. and China is precisely this kind of peacetime maneuvering to avoid future insecurity and risk of entrapment. The U.S. and China must consider the full range of future iterations of current strategic relationships. Some possible iterations may result in a trap for at least one state or even a “Thucydides Trap” for both.[xlvii] The threat of great power war and even the use of nuclear weapons looms over possible future iterations. The most impactful strategic decisions are available now. Both states seek to avoid the “supreme tribunal of force,” maximize options, and seek advantage should the day come for a decision through force. Though the U.S. and China are not at war, the current “peace” is also war in posse, and both states strive to keep it that way while preparing for the worst.

As argued above, theories of war and peace that emphasize the entanglement of the concepts provide powerful tools for exploring the grand strategic context of strategic competition. However, it is worth noting that this increased explanatory power is purchased at the expense of the clarity of thought that Clausewitz found so valuable for the education of strategists. From the lofty heights of grand strategy, gazing across future iterations of war and peace, the strategist focuses on the economy of force and continuing advantage over time rather than the adversary fleet or winning air command.[xlviii] Such a grand theoretical sweep comes at the expense of clarity needed if war in posse becomes a war in actu, and Clausewitz’s reassurance that defeat is never final gives way to Douhet’s waves of bombers with their payloads of poison gas. After all, a focus on the economy of force and continuing advantage was likely on the minds of 18th-century princes of Europe just before Napoleon “ruthlessly cut through all his enemies’ strategic plans in search of battle.”[xlix] In hindsight, those princes might have wished for the simple clarity of theorists like Jomini, Mahan, or Douhet rather than the entangled complexity of Dolman or Gray.

Conclusion

Though the term Strategic Competition may suggest that the war/peace dyad is now insufficient for understanding the full range of strategic interaction, it is important to remember that clarity and abstraction are features rather than defects of theories of war. All theories must make tradeoffs in exchange for specific explanatory power. While some employ elegant concepts of dyadic war and peace, others explore the entanglement of such concepts. Though the latter enables a better understanding of phenomena like strategic competition in peacetime, it is important to remember that such theoretical choices may be drawbacks if competition becomes conflict.

References

[i] Andrew Glass, “Bernard Baruch Coins Term ‘Cold War,’ April 16, 1947,” POLITICO, accessed August 13, 2021, https://www.politico.com/story/2010/04/bernard-baruch-coins-term-cold-war-april-16-1947-035862.

[ii] Joseph Biden, “National Security Strategy” (The White House, October 2022), 11. The term “strategic competition” is introduced though not clearly defined in the 2022 National Security Strategy. For more on the lack of clarity of the phrase, see Overfield, Cornell. “Biden’s ‘Strategic Competition’ Is a Step Back.” Foreign Policy (blog), October 13, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/13/biden-strategic-competition-national-defense-strategy/.

[iii] https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/declarations-of-war.htm

[iv] https://dcas.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/app/summaryData/deaths/byYearManner

[v] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Indexed Edition, trans. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret, Reprint edition (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1989), 75.

[vi] John Raine, “War or Peace? Understanding the Grey Zone,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (blog), April 3, 2019, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/04/understanding-the-grey-zone; Steven Aftergood, “Pentagon Moves to Support War in the ‘Grey Zone,’” Federation Of American Scientists (blog), accessed October 26, 2019, https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2018/08/dod-grey-zone/.

[vii] Notable is Air Force General Mike Minihan’s January 2023 memo https://www.airandspaceforces.com/read-full-memo-from-amc-gen-mike-minihan/ as well as Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles Q. Brown’s statements on related to potential casualties in a future war; https://taskandpurpose.com/news/air-force-future-war-planning-cq-brown/

[viii] Clausewitz, On War, Indexed Edition, 132.

[ix] Harold R. Winton, “An Imperfect Jewel: Military Theory and the Military Profession,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 6 (December 1, 2011): 854, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2011.583389.

[x] Clausewitz, On War, Indexed Edition, 134.

[xi] Clausewitz, 581.

[xii] Clausewitz, 581.

[xiii] Clausewitz, 580.

[xiv] Clausewitz, 141.

[xv] Baron Antoine-Henri De Jomini, The Art of War (Radford, VA: Wilder Publications, 2008), 245–47.

[xvi] Jomini, 27.

[xvii] Rear Adm Alfred Thayer Mahan, Mahan on Naval Strategy: Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, ed. John B. Hattendorf, Reprint edition (Naval Institute Press, 2015), 8, 22, 102.

[xviii] Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Classics of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1988), 6, 4.

[xix] Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari, Air University Press edition (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 2019), 174.

[xx] Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 27, 30.

[xxi] Jomini, The Art of War, 68.

[xxii] J. F. C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (Military Bookshop, 2012), 326.

[xxiii] Fuller, 335.

[xxiv] Clausewitz, On War, Indexed Edition, 579–81.

[xxv] Clausewitz, 582.

[xxvi] Clausewitz, 582.

[xxvii] Clausewitz, 582.

[xxviii] Clausewitz, 80.

[xxix] Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War, 66.

[xxx] Fuller, 204.

[xxxi] Fuller, 69.

[xxxii] Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice, Reprint edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 107.

[xxxiii] Gray, 115.

[xxxiv] Gray, 31.

[xxxv] Everett Dolman, Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age, 1st edition (London; New York: Routledge, 2005), 56.

[xxxvi] Dolman, 6, 11.

[xxxvii] Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War: Revised Edition, Revised (Penguin Classics, 1972), 16.

[xxxviii] Thucydides, 81.

[xxxix] Thucydides, 365.

[xl] Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 109–10.; As quoted in B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: Second Revised Edition, 2nd Revised ed. edition (New York, N.Y., U.S.A: Plume, 1991), 341.

[xli] Liddell Hart, Strategy, 327.

[xlii] Dolman, Pure Strategy, 33.

[xliii] Dolman, 34.

[xliv] Clausewitz, On War, Indexed Edition, 99.

[xlv] Dolman, Pure Strategy, 9.

[xlvi] Liddell Hart, Strategy, 349–53.

[xlvii] Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?,” The Atlantic, September 24, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/.

[xlviii] Douhet, The Command of the Air.

[xlix] Clausewitz, On War, Indexed Edition, 386.

militarystrategymagazine.com

8. Many AI tools are a distraction, but you’d better pay attention

Many AI tools are a distraction, but you’d better pay attention

Google, Microsoft and a slew of other companies are touting AI features in their apps for work. Here’s what workers need to know.

By 

May 19, 2023 at 12:30 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Danielle Abril · May 19, 2023

This article is a preview of The Tech Friend newsletter. Sign up here to get it in your inbox every Tuesday and Friday.

The onslaught of new artificial-intelligence-integrated tools claiming to help you at work doesn’t appear to be slowing down. Generative AI is all the rage, and everyone wants to be at the party.

On Thursday, OpenAI, the company behind ChatGPT, launched a mobile app on iOS that integrates Whisper, an open-source speech-recognition system, enabling voice input. Workers can use ChatGPT for tasks such as idea generation, note summarization and technical topic assistance. In the last couple of months, Microsoft also announced new AI features for its apps in Microsoft Office, including its email provider Outlook, word processor Word and presentation maker PowerPoint. Similarly, Google released its vision and very first features for its workplace suite of tools called Google Workspace. And they’re not alone. Other workplace software providers that have recently announced AI integrations include Salesforce and Salesforce-owned Slack, Zoom, Box, Adobe and HubSpot, to name a few.

Generative AI is supposed to help workers do things like draft emails with a simple prompt, summarize meetings (even ones you don’t attend) and include action items, create entire presentations complete with speaker notes and AI-generated images, sift through long email threads or texts and pull out key points, and highlight important patterns in sets of data.

Google also recently demoed its video communication tool called Project Starline. The tool uses AI to create a 3D image of a person during a video call using a few cameras and a screen. The idea is to create a feeling of someone else’s lifelike presence and allow for things like nonverbal cues and eye contact. When someone reaches out to you, the image appears as though the person’s arm is coming through the screen.

“It feels like you’re at the table … like you were together,” said Andrew Nartker, general manager of the project.

The prototype of Starline is being tested by Salesforce, T-Mobile and WeWork, which are helping provide feedback for further development of features like whiteboarding. A firsthand test of the tech did provide a sense of presence different from an average video call. Still, it’s not perfect. At times, the pixels of the image flickered similar to the way you might see a virtual background accidentally malfunction on a traditional video call. It’s also too early to know whether the experience could make people sick the way virtual reality does for some users. Google believes it would be much more similar to watching a 3D TV than using virtual reality because no headsets are involved.

All of these features and products seem to make the same promise: Your job will be made easier and better with the help of AI. But what does this really mean for everyday workers?

Leaders at Microsoft say it boils down to this: You’re going to need to learn new skills for the AI era.

“In order to stay relevant, you have to make sure your skills are valuable,” said Jared Spataro, Microsoft’s corporate vice president of modern work and business applications. “Everyone is going to need to learn how to use AI and to apply it to their role.”

And Spataro says this extends to roles beyond just the office. AI is eventually going to change how everyone works, he says. In terms of time spent learning the new tech, Spataro compares it to the process of learning how to ride a bike: You may fall a lot, but once you get the hang of it, you’ll go farther faster.

Kate Bezrukova, chair and associate professor of organization and human resources at the University at Buffalo School of Management, says it’s important that companies think fully about employees’ comfort level with AI tools before implementing them.

For workers, she believes it’s important to approach new tools with a sense of curiosity and intention to learn. Consider the time spent learning new tools as an investment in your future, she says.

“You don’t want to be left behind,” she said about learning new AI tools. “This is a skill that’s probably going to be valuable in the future.”

That said, some tools may be worth your time only for specific uses. In other cases, the shiny thing may be nothing more than a distraction. Bezrukova says either be willing to test which tools make the most sense for you or give the market some time to play itself out.

“Those that are helpful will survive, and those that aren’t won’t,” she said. “It’ll become clear soon.”

In the meantime, those of us at the Help Desk will take some face-first falls to spare you some struggles. Feel free to drop us a line to commiserate or share your experiences using AI tools by emailing us at yourhelpdesk@washpost.com.

Help Desk Essentials

I would be remiss if I didn’t highlight some important pieces you might have missed (but definitely should read) from my Help Desk colleagues. Please enjoy!

• Tatum Hunter informed us about a settlement that fertility app Premom made with the Federal Trade Commission for allegedly sharing sensitive user information with third parties without consent.
• Chris Velazco explored a new feature Apple is releasing later this year that will allow iPhone users to teach their phones to speak in their voice.
• Heather Kelly told us about a new feature in the Uber app that will allow teens in some cities to hail a car while providing parents with tracking.
• Heather also helps us navigate the latest settings we should change to keep our Facebook accounts from getting hacked.

The Washington Post · by Danielle Abril · May 19, 2023

9. China Puts Spymaster in Charge of U.S. Corporate Crackdown

"Securocrats."

Why are the Chinese so concerned about data security? Is it because they know how vulnerable it is because they are stealing it all over the world? And that they know what can be done with the data?

Excerpts:

In addition to the securocrats, other government officials have been pitching in to assist Xi’s efforts to pressure overseas firms.

The regulator overseeing state assets has told major state-owned companies to shun the Big Four accounting firms for audit work because Beijing is worried about data leaks, said the people with knowledge of Beijing’s decision making.

The cybersecurity regulator has moved to restrict overseas access to various databases involving economic, financial and corporate-registration information, as well as patents, procurement documents, academic journals and official statistical yearbooks.

Before the latest clampdown, Beijing had at times tried to reassure Western executives that it still wanted foreign investment. In late March, Xi’s handpicked new premier, Li Qiang, told an international audience of business people and politicians that foreign investment is welcome. An official statement from an April Politburo meeting pledged to step up efforts to attract foreign capital, without announcing any specific measures.

But there is no longer enthusiasm for all types of foreign investment. The emphasis these days is on getting “high-quality foreign investments,” according to Western business executives who have consulted with Chinese authorities.

That means foreign investments that can help China build and secure its own industries and supply chains, such as Elon Musk’s Tesla, whose electric-vehicle plant in Shanghai has helped propel China’s EV industry. Tesla, which didn’t respond to questions, is expanding its operations there with a large battery plant.

China Puts Spymaster in Charge of U.S. Corporate Crackdown

Investigations into due-diligence firms show how state-security clique is gaining more control over economic policy

https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-crackdown-foreign-companies-chen-yixin-9b403893

By Lingling WeiFollow

May 18, 2023 11:06 am ET

China’s crackdown on overseas firms has made clear that leader Xi Jinping values security over economic growth. To eradicate any doubt, according to people familiar with the matter, he has put state-security czar Chen Yixin in charge.

The campaign, which has included raids on Chinese offices of U.S. due-diligence firms and questioning of staff at the Bain consulting firm, is sending shock waves across global businesses.  

As news about investigations emerged in recent weeks, some international business executives were surprised that no one in Xi’s leadership came out to try to calm foreign investors, as was the case in the recent past. 

Such a role was traditionally played by technocrats such as Liu He, Xi’s longtime economic adviser, who negotiated a trade deal with the Trump administration and retired in March. This time, economic officials stayed silent as the crackdown intensified.

Priority shift

Putting Chen in charge is part of a broader push by Xi to displace technocrats whose backgrounds in economics and finance once made them key to establishing China’s credibility with global investors and businesses. While Xi has been gradually shifting the priority of the Communist Party’s political agenda from economic development, what’s emerging is an entire government apparatus geared toward domestic security. 

Until recent years, China’s leaders had embraced capitalist forces—both domestic and foreign—as they focused on integrating China’s economy with those of the U.S. and other Western countries.

Xi believes that China must do more to defend the party’s ideological and economic security against the West—a belief made more urgent by Beijing’s worsening relations with Washington, according to the people with knowledge of Beijing’s decision making as well as an examination of Xi’s writings and speeches.

The shift risks alienating U.S. companies, which often backed Beijing in Washington as they eyed opportunities in China. That support has splintered in recent years, as Xi’s turn toward greater state control over China’s economy has prompted many American companies to slow their expansion in the country.

In a blunt speech on May 10 in Washington, Suzanne Clark, president and chief executive officer of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, called out mounting risks for American companies operating in China. Chinese policies and practices “in pursuit of China’s absolute security,” Clark said, “have made the world less secure.”

Some Western firms have paused research work in China, especially when related to technology and other sensitive areas, according to business executives. Analysts at Wall Street firms, including those specializing in recommendations of Chinese stocks, said they are worried about getting their contacts in China in trouble because of the heightened government scrutiny over foreign connections.

Many economists expect foreign direct investment in China, which plummeted in the past year amid falling profits and the country’s economic slowdown, to keep dropping.

The MSCI China Index, a measure of global investors’ interest in Chinese equities, has dropped 20% from a high at the beginning of this year. 

Chen Wenqing, Beijing’s former minister of State Security, attended a 2019 meeting of top security officials in Iran. PHOTO: MOHSEN ATAEI/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

A weakened appetite for investment in China could deal a further blow to the Chinese economy already struggling with weak domestic demand and rising unemployment. 

Neither the State Council’s information office, which handles press inquiries for senior Chinese leaders, nor the Chinese Embassy in Washington responded to requests for comment.

The security officials—dubbed “securocrats” by some China experts—share Xi’s belief in the use of state power to increase China’s technological capabilities, and tend to look at anything Western with skepticism. 

“The securocrats do not place as much weight on foreign investments,” said Lester Ross, a Beijing-based lawyer at WilmerHale, who advises American companies in China. “They see threats posed by foreign firms outweighing the value the firms bring.”

Chen Yixin, then-Communist Party boss of Wuhan, accompanied British Prime Minister Theresa May on a 2018 visit. PHOTO: FEATURE CHINA/FUTURE PUBLISHING/GETTY IMAGES

Xi has awarded important leadership positions to several people with security and defense backgrounds. Chen Wenqing, Beijing’s top intelligence officer for years, late last year became the first spy chief in recent decades to join the Politburo, currently a 24-member leadership body of the party.

Other new members of the Politburo have educational backgrounds or experience in defense-related sectors, according to an analysis by Wu Guoguang, a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute, a New York-based think tank. One of them, Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing, who oversees key parts of the Chinese economy including information technology, state-owned enterprises and market supervision, worked for more than two decades at a major Chinese military contractor.

Chen Yixin, known within the Communist Party as a heavy-handed law-and-order enforcer for Xi, was elevated to minister of state security in October. His powerful portfolio encompasses the Chinese equivalent of both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency.

When Xi ran the coastal Zhejiang province in the 2000s, Chen served as a senior aide. In early 2020, soon after Covid-19 engulfed the Chinese city of Wuhan, Xi dispatched Chen to oversee the city’s implementation of strict lockdowns. Chen, 63, also spearheaded a campaign to clean up China’s security apparatus of officials deemed as disloyal to the top leader. 

Before Chen took it over, the investigation into Western consulting firms was a low-key affair. Launched in 2020, the initiative was led by the State Administration for Market Regulation, together with the National Bureau of Statics and the Ministry of Commerce, according to a notice put out by the market regulator on July 27 of that year.

The purpose at the time was to warn firms such as Boston-based Bain against conducting social surveys and other research in areas that were considered off-limits to foreign companies in China, said Western business executives who have consulted with Chinese authorities.

The firms in general heeded such warnings, the executives said, and no major punishments were announced. 

Xi ultimately decided the investigations didn’t go far enough, according to the people with knowledge of Beijing’s decision making. Tougher U.S. sanctions on Chinese businesses and tighter restrictions on the sale of advanced technologies to China, rolled out over the past several years, added to his resolve, they said.

With a top-level party conclave late last year clearing the way for him to assume an unprecedented third term, Xi wanted to make sure that his expanding national security agenda covers every area of Chinese society—including foreign investment, until recently something the leader saw as a blind spot, the people said.

Fear of on-the-ground research

To facilitate the expanded foreign-focused investigation led by the securocrats, China’s top legislative body in late April broadened the country’s anti-espionage law to give security authorities greater power in inspecting baggage and electronic devices of those suspected of spying.

Due-diligence work by consulting and investigation firms has become evermore crucial to multinationals that need to demonstrate to their shareholders and home-country governments that they’re deploying capital in responsible and law-abiding ways.

But for Xi and the security state, such on-the-ground research work by these consultancies, often involving interactions with Chinese nationals, has exposed state secrets, threatened the party’s control over how the rest of the world views China and helped the U.S. and its allies develop a hard-line policy toward Beijing.

The Shanghai offices of international consulting firm Capvision were raided by Chinese authorities recently. PHOTO: HECTOR RETAMAL/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

In an April 14 article, the official Xinhua News Agency singled out overseas consulting and investigation firms as those endangering China’s national security by trying to “make a fuss” about the country’s human-rights practices and technological development.

Among the firms known to have been targeted so far are Bain, the management consulting firm, which said staff at its Shanghai office were recently questioned by Chinese police, and New York-based due-diligence firm Mintz Group, which said five staff members at its Beijing office, all Chinese nationals, were detained after a raid.

Japan’s government has said some of its nationals in business in China have been detained during investigations into alleged espionage.

Last week, state broadcaster China Central Television made the point of showing in prime time the police raid on Capvision, a consulting firm jointly based in Shanghai and New York.

In the 15-minute program aired on May 8, the primary news broadcaster quoted a now-jailed former researcher at an unidentified state-owned company as saying he was encouraged with money by Capvision staff to provide information such as his former employer’s costs and profit margins. 

Some of Capvision’s experts “leaked internal sensitive content, even state secrets and intelligence” to its foreign clients, an unnamed state-security official said in an interview with the broadcaster. The official indicated that security authorities will continue their nationwide sweep of foreign-related consulting services.

A Bain spokesman said the firm is “cooperating as appropriate with the Chinese authorities.” Mintz said it is licensed to do business in China and operates transparently and within the law, and gives priority to the safety and well-being of its staff there.

Shortly after the May 8 broadcast, Capvision posted a statement online in China saying it would resolutely abide by China’s national security regulations.

Chinese Premier Li Qiang said foreign investment is still welcome in China. PHOTO: FLORENCE LO/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

In addition to the securocrats, other government officials have been pitching in to assist Xi’s efforts to pressure overseas firms.

The regulator overseeing state assets has told major state-owned companies to shun the Big Four accounting firms for audit work because Beijing is worried about data leaks, said the people with knowledge of Beijing’s decision making.

The cybersecurity regulator has moved to restrict overseas access to various databases involving economic, financial and corporate-registration information, as well as patents, procurement documents, academic journals and official statistical yearbooks.

Before the latest clampdown, Beijing had at times tried to reassure Western executives that it still wanted foreign investment. In late March, Xi’s handpicked new premier, Li Qiang, told an international audience of business people and politicians that foreign investment is welcome. An official statement from an April Politburo meeting pledged to step up efforts to attract foreign capital, without announcing any specific measures.

But there is no longer enthusiasm for all types of foreign investment. The emphasis these days is on getting “high-quality foreign investments,” according to Western business executives who have consulted with Chinese authorities.

That means foreign investments that can help China build and secure its own industries and supply chains, such as Elon Musk’s Tesla, whose electric-vehicle plant in Shanghai has helped propel China’s EV industry. Tesla, which didn’t respond to questions, is expanding its operations there with a large battery plant.

Write to Lingling Wei at Lingling.Wei@wsj.com

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the May 19, 2023, print edition as 'Xi’s Top Spy Leads Crackdown'.

10. ‘Approaching. Move In.’ How Ukraine Reversed the Momentum in Bakhmut

​Excerpts:

On and on it went like that for hours, they said. Videos taken by Ukrainian soldiers appear to show trenches littered with dead Russian soldiers.

By the end of the third day, they had the surviving Russians surrounded.

“Our guys were yelling at them to surrender,” said the soldier called Face. Some laid down their weapons. Others fled. Still others fought on and were killed.

Face was towing a damaged Ukrainian armored vehicle from the battlefield, smiling as he stopped for coffee a day after the clash ended.

He was most happy that the Ukrainians came away with far fewer soldiers killed.

“According to military doctrine, the army who counterattacks has more casualties,” he said. “But that’s not true. We have the opposite. We have losses, but they have many times more losses.”

​

‘Approaching. Move In.’ How Ukraine Reversed the Momentum in Bakhmut

Seizing an opening as Russia rotated troops, Ukraine pressed ahead with three days of maneuvers that gained ground on the flanks of Bakhmut.

By Marc SantoraPhotographs by Tyler Hicks

Marc Santora reported from the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine.

• May 20, 2023
• Updated 6:53 a.m. ET

The New York Times · by Marc Santora · May 20, 2023

The 80th Air Assault Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces firing a barrage of rockets in the direction of Bakhmut during a night operation.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Seizing an opening as Russia rotated troops, Ukraine pressed ahead with three days of maneuvers that gained ground on the flanks of Bakhmut.

The 80th Air Assault Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces firing a barrage of rockets in the direction of Bakhmut during a night operation.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

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• May 20, 2023Updated 6:53 a.m. ET

Ukrainian soldiers were waiting for just the right moment to attack. Then they received critical intelligence: Russian mercenaries on the other side of the front line outside Bakhmut were about to rotate out and be replaced by other soldiers.

It was time to go. “We all felt the adrenaline,” said an infantry soldier who identified himself by his call sign, Face, in accordance with military protocols.

Ukrainian soldiers were told to get their kits ready, making sure they had plenty of grenades and full clips of ammunition. “We considered the change of shifts to be the enemy’s biggest weakness,” said Col. Andriy Biletsky, the commander of the brigade.

It was the morning of May 6, the beginning of three days of fighting on the outskirts of Bakhmut that has shifted momentum in the fiercest battle of the war. Soldiers from Ukraine’s 3rd Separate Assault Brigade battled with the Russians across forest belts where the trees rose like scorched matchsticks. They stormed trenches littered with the dead. They followed armored personnel carriers across open fields as the two sides exchanged heavy gunfire.

In the maelstrom of explosions, every yard gained felt like a mile, soldiers said.

But when this three-day clash was over, Ukraine had reclaimed a patch of land about 1.8 miles wide and a mile and a half deep just south of the Ivanivske village, outside Bakhmut.

Though the territory captured was small, the Ukrainians have since built on their success, reclaiming more than 12 square miles to the north and south of the city, according to the military. Those gains represent a striking reversal of fortune in a place where the Ukrainians had been on the back foot for months, and a blow to a Russian war effort that had made Bakhmut the primary strategic prize within its grasp.

Ukrainian and British officials said on Saturday that Moscow was racing to bring in more soldiers to reinforce its lines around the city. Such a redeployment could help Russia reverse recent Ukrainian gains, but it could also benefit Ukraine as it prepares its counteroffensive by weakening Russian forces elsewhere along the front.

Ukrainian soldiers atop a tank moving toward the front line near Bakhmut.

Soldiers preparing to fire grad rockets. The fighting near Bakhmut is fierce, and costly.

This account of the three-day clash on the outskirts of Bakhmut is based on an extended interview with Colonel Biletsky near the front, soldiers who took part in the assault, videos those soldiers recorded in real time with body cameras and more extensive videos the brigade released later.

Russian military bloggers have reported on the retreat in this sector, and military analysts have confirmed the location of the battlefield footage.

Colonel Biletsky said dozens of Russians were killed on the last day of the battle alone and more were taken prisoner. His brigade also lost soldiers over the course of three days, he said. Neither Ukraine nor Russia publicly releases precise casualty counts.

The 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, which was formally established in the fall, was dispatched to Bakhmut this winter to help secure the one remaining road into the city, after Russian forces came close to cutting it off.

It is led by Colonel Biletsky, a former ultranationalist politician and co-founder of the Azov regiment, a group that was part of Ukraine’s national guard before the war and is now integrated into the country’s military forces, with little or no political bent.

The number of Ukrainian units engaged in fighting around Bakhmut is kept secret for operational security reasons, but the Ukrainian military said that dozens of clashes were now playing out every day with units from a constellation of brigades. The 3rd Separate Assault Brigade said on Thursday that its soldiers had advanced about a half mile further and would continue to try to advance on Friday.

Ukrainian Marines removed branches that concealed a Howitzer before firing at a Russian target from a wooded position.

The 59th Motorized Brigade of the Ukrainian Ground Forces firing a 152mm Howitzer at Russian positions.

No two battles in war are identical. They are shaped by the contours of the land, the strength of the opposing forces, the weapons available, the weather and a host of other factors. The fighting outside Ivanivske offers only a small window into the furious fighting in and around Bakhmut, where Russian forces continue to wage a scorched-earth campaign inside the city limits.

But the three-day battle provides a telling example of how Ukraine hopes to exploit the very public divisions among the three principal Russian forces fighting in Bakhmut: the Wagner private military company, loyal to Yevgeny V. Prigozhin, Chechen militias loyal to Ramzan Kadyrov and the regular army.

It is also a reminder that retaking land from a well-entrenched enemy is a brutal affair fought at close quarters. “You need to understand the cost of this advance,” Hanna Maliar, a deputy defense minister, said on Friday. “It is extremely difficult to carry out combat tasks there, because the enemy has concentrated a huge amount of his efforts.”

Colonel Biletsky dismissed notions that the Russians were poorly equipped as “more TikTok propaganda than reality.”

“The enemy is ready,” he said. “They are well personally equipped, armed, they have means of communication, good armored vehicles and a very good system of unmanned aerial vehicles.”

A member of the 59th Motorized Brigade carrying ammunition for a Howitzer.

A soldier in the 28th Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Army in an armored vehicle.

Ukrainian fighters control only a small corner inside the city limits of Bakhmut roughly the size of Central Park, according to Russian and Ukrainian soldiers and officials. They are being attacked in frontal assaults and bombarded with artillery from Russian positions on the high hills flanking the ruins.

The only way to relieve the pressure, Ukrainian officials said, was to drive the Russians from the positions around the city.

“The No. 1 task was to push back the enemy on the flanks of Bakhmut,” Colonel Biletsky said. “We used three types of maneuvers: infiltration, frontal attack and turning movement.”

When Ukrainian commanders noticed the Russians rotating in new units, replacing Wagner mercenary fighters with soldiers from Russia’s 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, they decided to try to take the other side by surprise.

“We attack as quickly as possible, immediately trying to advance behind the enemy’s front line,” said Colonel Biletsky.

Before dawn on May 6, unit commanders assembled and were given their orders: Cross a distance of about 500 meters from the Russian front line southwest of the village of Ivanivske to the Russians’ second line of defense. And do it quietly.

This would allow them to avoid the enemy’s principle defensive positions and force the Russians to move their own positions to meet the threat.

To maintain the element of surprise, the Ukrainians decided not to use artillery. Infantry soldiers following armored vehicles moved swiftly to cover the scorched ground, the threat of detection by Russian drones an ever-present risk.

Once Ukrainian soldiers got to the second trench line, the Russians realized what was happening and the fighting was intense and chaotic. Soldiers described having to move quickly to storm trenches, turning corners even as they were unsure what they would find — and often coming face-to-face with the opposing side. They also had to clear out the Russian positions now at their back.

But by the end of the first day, they held the flank.

Then they waited.

An apartment building that was damaged by Russian bombing, and left uninhabitable.

Ukrainian soldiers, west of Bakhmut, after rotating out following a month of fighting inside the city.

Colonel Biletsky said they wanted to make the Russians believe that the small advance on the flank was the goal of the operation, so they did not try to advance on the second day. Instead, the soldiers carried out reconnaissance and artillery attacks aimed at enemy reserves trying to approach.

In the quiet hours, they talked, ate and made sinister jokes.

“Who were you before the war?” one soldier asks another in a video shared by the brigade. “A fireman,” the other soldier replies. “I used to save people, but now I kill them.”

The fighting resumed on the third morning at 5 a.m.

The New York Times viewed video footage that the Ukrainian military said was taken by soldiers in battle that day and confirmed its location. It shows armored vehicles bursting through the first line of defense under a hail of gunfire. Infantry soldiers jump out, firing as they exit the vehicle.

“Go around the left side, you’re the first,” a soldier orders in one video. “Go!”

At this point, soldiers said, the only way to clear out the Russians was to go trench by bloody trench, unsure whether the Russians had fled, were hiding or were still fighting.

“Approaching! Move in!” one soldier shouts as they storm a Russian dugout. Something explodes near the Ukrainians. “Go! Go back!” another soldier yells.

The Ukrainians then approach the Russian dugout again and toss in a grenade, and it goes quiet, according to video footage.

After clearing the first line — a defensive network spread out over an area about two miles across — they had to take out the second line, where even more Russians were positioned, according to soldiers and the commander.

On and on it went like that for hours, they said. Videos taken by Ukrainian soldiers appear to show trenches littered with dead Russian soldiers.

By the end of the third day, they had the surviving Russians surrounded.

“Our guys were yelling at them to surrender,” said the soldier called Face. Some laid down their weapons. Others fled. Still others fought on and were killed.

Face was towing a damaged Ukrainian armored vehicle from the battlefield, smiling as he stopped for coffee a day after the clash ended.

He was most happy that the Ukrainians came away with far fewer soldiers killed.

“According to military doctrine, the army who counterattacks has more casualties,” he said. “But that’s not true. We have the opposite. We have losses, but they have many times more losses.”

The 80th Air Assault Brigade performing a night operation.

Nataliia Novosolova and Anastasia Kuznietsova contributed research.

The New York Times · by Marc Santora · May 20, 2023

11. 'War is not an option', Taiwan president says amid China tensions

Excerpts:

"War is not an option. Neither side can unilaterally change the status quo with non-peaceful means," Tsai said. "Maintaining the status quo of peace and stability is the consensus for both the world and Taiwan."

"Although Taiwan is surrounded by risks, it is by no means a risk maker. We are a responsible risk manager and Taiwan will stand together with democratic countries and communities around the world to jointly defuse the risks," she said.

'War is not an option', Taiwan president says amid China tensions

Reuters · by Reuters

TAIPEI, May 20 (Reuters) - Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen vowed on Saturday to maintain the status quo of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait amid high tensions with China, which has stepped up military pressure on the democratically governed island.

Taiwan will not provoke and will not bow to Chinese pressure, Tsai said in a speech in the presidential office in Taipei marking the seventh anniversary of her governance.

China, which considers Taiwan as its own and threatens to bring the island under its control if necessary, has stepped up military and diplomatic pressure to force the island to accept Chinese sovereignty since Tsai took office in 2016.

Beijing has rebuffed calls for talks from Tsai, regarding her to be a separatist. Tsai has repeatedly vowed to defend Taiwan's freedom and democracy.

"War is not an option. Neither side can unilaterally change the status quo with non-peaceful means," Tsai said. "Maintaining the status quo of peace and stability is the consensus for both the world and Taiwan."

"Although Taiwan is surrounded by risks, it is by no means a risk maker. We are a responsible risk manager and Taiwan will stand together with democratic countries and communities around the world to jointly defuse the risks," she said.

Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) rich nations agreed they were seeking a peaceful resolution to issues on Taiwan, the host of the G7 summit in Hiroshima, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, said on Friday.

Tsai said Taiwan officials are in discussions with U.S. President Joe Biden's administration on sending $500 million worth of weapons aid to Taiwan, adding that the aid was meant to address deliveries of weapons delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

She stressed the global importance of Taiwan's supply chain, which produces most of the world's advanced semiconductor chips, and vowed to keep the most advanced chip technologies and research and development centres in Taiwan.

Taiwan is gearing up for a key presidential election in mid-January, with China tensions set to top the campaign agenda.

Representing Taiwan's main opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party for the key vote in mid-January, New Taipei City mayor Hou Yu-ih said on Saturday that Taiwan faces a choice between "peace and war" under Tsai's rule and he vowed to keep regional stability through unspecified "dialogue and exchanges".

"The fears for war will never drive away the hope for peace," Hou said at an event in Taipei to kick off his election campaign, vowing to defend the Republic of China, Taiwan's official name.

Hou is running against Taiwan Vice President William Lai from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party.

The KMT, which favours close ties with China, has framed the 2024 vote as a choice between war and peace.

In the presidential office when asked about the opposition's stance on the elections, Tsai said maintaining peace should be the consensus for all political parties in Taiwan, and that one should not "sell the fears of war for elections gains."

Reporting by Yimou Lee; Editing by Jacqueline Wong

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

12. China ‘Welcomes’ Taiwan Tourism in Symbolic Push for Closer Ties

As an aside, in 2011 I accompanied 15 students from the National War College on a trip to China. After visiting the Kunming Military Academy (which was fascinating) we visited the tourist spot of the Stone Forest in Kunming (https://www.chinahighlights.com/kunming/attraction/the-stone-forest.htm) . I was surprised at how many people came up to us and introduced themselves as tourists visiting from Taiwan.

China ‘Welcomes’ Taiwan Tourism in Symbolic Push for Closer Ties

• Taiwan maintains group tour ban, signaling no immediate change
• Beijing is looking to court favor with Taiwan opposition party

ByBloomberg News

May 19, 2023 at 3:03 AM EDT

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-19/china-welcomes-taiwan-tourism-in-symbolic-push-for-closer-ties?sref=hhjZtX76

China said it will reopen its doors to visits from Taiwan tour groups, a mostly symbolic move as Beijing aims to increase exchanges with the island ahead of a key election next year. 

“We warmly welcome Taiwan compatriots” to “see the beautiful scenery and recent developments,” Ma Xiaoguang, a spokesperson for the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, said in a statement Friday. 

Beijing’s announcement doesn’t carry a lot of practical significance just yet, as Taiwan still bars its own population from traveling to China in group tours. The island isn’t lifting that ban until tourism associations across the strait can talk, the Taipei-based Central News Agency reported Friday after the China announcement.

China’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism allowed the resumption of foreign inbound group tours in March, three years after it clamped down on inbound travel because of Covid-19. But that change didn’t apply to Taiwan, a self-ruling democracy that China claims as part of its territory. 

READ MORE ON CHINA-TAIWAN TIES:US Agrees on Taiwan Trade Terms, Clouding Plans for China TalksTaiwan’s KMT to Pick Hou for President Over Foxconn’s GouTop Taiwan Lawmaker Visits US Capitol to Meet China Panel 

CNA reported — citing Chang Shi-chung, director-general of Taiwan’s tourism bureau — that talks between Chinese and Taiwanese tourism associations could happen as soon as this month. While Taiwan is happy that Beijing lifted its ban, the government had hoped the two sides could jointly announce decisions to open up, CNA cited Chang as saying.

A ban on individual China tourists traveling to Taiwan — implemented in 2019 — remains in effect. The Chinese government halted its tourism scheme that year ahead of the re-election of President Tsai Ing-wen, whose independence-leaning government has angered China in recent years.

Beijing cited the state of relations between the two sides when it decided to suspend the program. 

Tsai isn’t eligible for re-election when Taiwan holds its next vote for president early next year. The island’s main opposition party, the Kuomintang, chose its presidential candidate this week and is eying the leadership after making inroads in local elections last year. 

That’s given Beijing reason to try and woo the KMT ahead of the election, since the party is more China friendly and thus its preferred negotiating partner. Allowing tour groups from Taiwan represents an effort by Beijing to increase communications and recalibrate a hardline approach that has involved piling military, diplomatic and economic pressure on the island in recent years. 

Earlier this month, the Communist Party’s No. 4 official Wang Huning called for improved ties saying that “cross-Strait exchanges should be restored and expanded step by step.”

“Friendship with people from all social strata in Taiwan should be cultivated,” he said during China’s annual Taiwan work conference.

— With assistance by John Liu, Jing Li and Cindy Wang

13. 1 in 5 Young Chinese Is Jobless, and Millions More Are About to Graduate

Is there potential for internal instability? How will the CCP address this issue? What can they do? What will happen if they cannot address it?

1 in 5 Young Chinese Is Jobless, and Millions More Are About to Graduate

The New York Times · by Claire Fu · May 19, 2023

The youth unemployment rate, which spiked during the pandemic, reached a record high this week, showing the perils of China’s uneven economic recovery.

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A job fair in Fuyang, China, in March. High youth unemployment has been a dark stain on China’s economy for several years.

By

May 19, 2023Updated 10:12 a.m. ET

Shu Xiang, 21, started looking for a job in February and still has had no luck. A financial management major at a college in Chengdu, China, Ms. Shu said she has received five responses to about 100 applications. Graduation is in a few weeks.

“I’m not so confident about finding a job,” she said. The only thing that makes her feel less anxious, she said, is knowing she’s not alone — most of her classmates were facing similar problems.

Ms. Shu is one of nearly 12 million Chinese expected to enter the job pool next month at a difficult time. The government reported this week that 20.4 percent of people ages 16 to 24 looking for a job were out of work in April. That is the highest level since China started announcing the statistic in 2018.

High youth unemployment has been a dark stain on China’s economy for several years, exacerbated by strict pandemic health restrictions limited travel, decimated small businesses and damaged consumer confidence. The government, facing rare public discontent as young professionals in major cities across China protested the “zero Covid” rules, abruptly announced in December that it would start easing the policies. But the youth jobless rate has remained high, even as the overall rate has ticked down two months in a row.

The Chinese government has introduced a set of policies meant to stimulate youth employment, including subsidies for small and midsize businesses that hire college graduates. State-owned enterprises have been directed to make more jobs available for those just starting out.

Overall, the Chinese economy is steadying itself more slowly and unevenly than many believed it would. Other reports released by Beijing this week showed an increase in retail sales and factory activity in April, but those numbers caused unease among economists and investors, who expected better results because the data was being compared to April 2022, when millions of people were effectively shut inside during a lockdown in Shanghai. China’s big tech companies, coming off a difficult year, are starting to show signs of a rebound, but for the most part their financial performances have not returned to prepandemic levels.

One problem, analysts said, is a mismatch between the jobs college graduates want and the jobs that are available.

In March, listings for jobs in tourism and in passenger and cargo transportation grew the fastest, according to Zhilian, a Chinese job searching site. Another sector with many available jobs is retail.

Industries like construction, transportation and warehousing, which typically draw heavy interest from China’s vast population of migrant workers, have also picked up, Fu Linghui, a spokesman for the National Bureau of Statistics, said at a news conference this week.

Nearly 12 million college graduates are expected to enter the job market in China next month.

Nie Riming, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute of Finance and Law, a research organization, said that young people with degrees in higher education were seeking jobs in technology, education and medicine.

“But these industries are exactly the ones that have been growing slow in China in the past several years,” Mr. Nie said. “Many industries not only did not grow, but also suffered from devastating blows.”

China has cracked down on its once-vibrant education and technology industries in the past several years. Hundreds of thousands of people have lost their jobs. and companies and investors have been left reeling. The tightened supervision has prompted concerns about further government intervention in the private sector, which in turn has led companies to reduce hiring.

While the industries that attract educated young people are shrinking, the number of college graduates has been increasing.

According to the Chinese Ministry of Education, 11.6 million college students are expected to graduate in June, an increase of 820,000 over last year.

Another way the Covid pandemic is still haunting young job seekers is that many students spent part of college in lockdown, living on campuses where their movement was highly restricted. They had fewer opportunities at internships or to gain the social experience that recruiters are looking for.

.

While China’s economy is expected to strengthen in the coming months, the recovery will remain tenuous until consumers are feeling confident enough again to make big-ticket purchases — which will, in turn, will prompt more companies to do more hiring.

Dong Yan, who works for a Beijing organization that holds regular job fairs, said that the number of companies inquiring about booths is still lower than before the pandemic.

“The economy is said to be recovering,” said Ms. Dong. “But I feel it’s going downward, because many people are now out of work or have been laid off by their companies.”

The New York Times · by Claire Fu · May 19, 2023

14. G7 issues strongest condemnation of China as it intensifies response to Beijing

G7 issues strongest condemnation of China as it intensifies response to Beijing

Concerns raised over ‘economic coercion’ and militarisation of South China Sea

Financial Times · by Henry Foy · May 20, 2023

The G7 has issued its strongest condemnation of China as the world’s most advanced economies step up their response to what they say are rising military and economic security threats posed by Beijing.

Criticising China over everything from its militarisation of the South China Sea to its use of “economic coercion”, the G7 in a joint communiqué urged Beijing to push Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukraine.

The G7 members said they were “seriously concerned” about the situation in the East and South China Seas, and “strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion”. They also called for a “peaceful solution” to the increasing tension across the Taiwan Strait.

The countries stressed they “were prepared to build constructive and stable relations” with Beijing but recognised the importance of “engaging candidly . . . and expressing our concerns directly to China”.

The statement marks the strongest criticism of Beijing by the G7. At the three-day summit in Hiroshima, the US and its democratic allies have sought to project a unified front in the face of global division caused by the war in Ukraine, the US-China dispute, climate change and the expansion of artificial intelligence.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s president, landed in Hiroshima on Saturday afternoon, ahead of his participation in Sunday’s sessions devoted to the war in Ukraine.

Zelenskyy, whose attendance was kept secret until yesterday, wrote on arrival on Twitter: “Japan. G7. Important meetings with partners and friends of Ukraine. Security and enhanced co-operation for our victory. Peace will become closer today.”

A Ukrainian official travelling with Zelenskyy told the Financial Times that the main Ukrainian goals at the summit were to gain support for Kyiv’s peace plan; secure greater military aid and co-operation, particularly air defences and fighter jets, with an emphasis on long-term guarantees; convince allies to ratchet up sanctions on Russia; and discuss further measures to hold Moscow accountable for its invasion.

Downing Street said it would start training Ukrainian pilots “this summer” after the US gave the green light for the transfer of jets from countries including the Netherlands to the administration in Kyiv.

Britain has pledged to deliver a “basic programme” jet pilot training for Ukrainians although they will then need to take further advanced lessons.

“Obviously there will need to be further training with regards to F16s, specifically, which the UK doesn’t have as a capability,” said a Number 10 spokesperson on Saturday.

The increasingly tough stance on Beijing comes after two years of the US and Japan working with the other G7 countries to strike a harsher tone against China’s military activity around Taiwan and its use of economic pressure.

The leaders of Japan, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, US and UK also warned of “heightened uncertainty about the global economic outlook”, pledging to remain vigilant and flexible in their macroeconomic policy as global inflationary pressure continues.

On economic policy towards Beijing, the G7 said its approach was “not designed to harm China” nor “to thwart China’s economic progress and development”. Member nations said the group was not interested in decoupling from China and was simply engaging in “de-risking”.

But they said they would tackle “challenges posed by China’s non-market policies and practices, which distort the global economy” and “foster resilience to economic coercion”.

In a separate statement, the G7 said the world had witnessed “a disturbing rise in incidents of economic coercion”. It said they would create a mechanism to “increase our collective assessment, preparedness, deterrence and response to economic coercion” and would step up co-ordination on detecting and responding to economic coercion.

China’s foreign ministry on Friday said a “de-risking” strategy by G7 was unnecessary: “China brings to the world opportunities, stability and assurance, not challenges, turmoil and risks.”

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On climate policy the leaders agreed that, given the exceptional impacts of Russia’s war against Ukraine, “publicly supported investment in the gas sector can be appropriate as a temporary response”, in a victory for Germany.

Berlin had pushed for such an endorsement despite opposition from countries including the UK and France, which said it undermined the G7’s aim to shift away from fossil fuels.

Regarding the rapidly developing artificial intelligence industry, the leaders agreed to “commit to further advancing multi-stakeholder approaches to the development of standards for AI” and to develop international standards for the sector.

The G7 also agreed to set up a “Hiroshima AI process” in co-operation with the OECD and the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, a group of 29 countries focused on the topic, by the end of this year, to discuss governance, intellectual property rights and “responsible” use.

Follow Henry Foy, Kana Inagaki and Demetri Sevastopulo on Twitter.

Financial Times · by Henry Foy · May 20, 2023

15. Ex-ByteDance employee claims China had 'supreme access' to all data

Ex-ByteDance employee claims China had 'supreme access' to all data | CNN Business

CNN · by Laura He,Ramishah Maruf · May 15, 2023

Hong Kong CNN —

China’s Communist Party had “supreme access” to all data held by TikTok’s parent company Bytedance, including on servers in the United States, a former employer who is bringing a wrongful termination lawsuit has alleged.

The allegations in the lawsuit – which Bytedance denies and has vowed to contest – comes at a time of intense scrutiny within the US and other Western nations over what level of control, if any, Beijing is able to exert over TikTok and the social media app’s wildly popular content.

Yintao “Roger” Yu filed a lawsuit of wrongful termination against Bytedance in Superior Court in San Francisco earlier this month. He says he worked at the company from August 2017 to November 2018, as a head of engineering for US operations.

In a new complaint filed on Friday, Yu claimed that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had a special office in the company, sometimes referred to as the “Committee,” which monitored Bytedance and “guided how it advanced core Communist values.”

“The Committee maintained supreme access to all the company data, even data stored in the United States,” the complaint obtained by CNN read.

Yu’s lawsuit alleges that the company made user data accessible to China’s Communist Party via a backdoor channel, no matter where the data was located.

Yu also claimed that he had observed Bytedance being “responsive to the CCP’s requests” to share, elevate or even remove content, describing Bytedance as “useful propaganda tool” for Beijing’s leaders.

A Bytedance spokesperson has denied Yu’s allegations, saying he worked on an app called Flipagram while at the company, which was discontinued due to business reasons.

“We plan to vigorously oppose what we believe are baseless claims and allegations in this complaint,” the spokesperson said to CNN.

“Mr. Yu worked for ByteDance Inc. for less than a year and his employment ended in July 2018,” which Yu disputed in his complaint.

Issues of user content

Earlier reporting from Yu’s lawsuit detailed how shortly after he began his job, he realized that Bytedance had for years engaged in what he called a “worldwide scheme” to steal and profit from the content of others.

The scheme involved using software purposely unleashed to “systematically” strip user content from competitors’ websites, chiefly Instagram and Snapchat, and populate its own video services without asking for permission.

The former employee alleged he was “troubled by ByteDance’s efforts to skirt legal and ethical lines.”

Yu is seeking compensatory damages such as lost earnings, injunctive relief and liquidated and punitive damages.

Romain Talon/Adobe Stock

China may prefer TikTok to be banned than fall into US hands

In a statement to CNN, a ByteDance spokesperson said the company is “committed to respecting the intellectual property of other companies, and we acquire data in accordance with industry practices and our global policy.”

The latest allegations come as the hugely popular TikTok app is at risk of being banned by US lawmakers for national security concerns.

The Biden administration has threatened TikTok with a nationwide ban unless its Chinese owners sell their stakes in the company, spelling out an increasingly tense relationship between the two countries. Last month, Montana became the first US state to pass legislation banning TikTok on all personal devices.

At issue is who owns the keys to TikTok’s algorithms and the vast troves of data collected from the 150 million people in the United States who use the app each month.

US officials have widely expressed fears the Chinese government could potentially gain access to TikTok user data through its links to its parent company and that such information could be used to benefit Chinese intelligence or propaganda campaigns.

However, security experts say there is still no public evidence the Chinese government has actually spied on people through TikTok, which doesn’t operate in China.

In March, TikTok’s chief executive Shou Chew testified before Congress, saying that he had “seen no evidence that the Chinese government has access to that [US user] data; they have never asked us, we have not provided it.”

“Our commitment is to move their data into the United States, to be stored on American soil by an American company, overseen by American personnel. So the risk would be similar to any government going to an American company, asking for data,” Chew said at the hearing.

China has responded to the Biden administration’s demand, saying that it would “firmly” oppose a forced sale of TikTok.

Shou Chew, chief executive of TikTok Inc., speaks during a House Energy and Commerce Committee hearing in Washington, DC, US, on Thursday, March 23, 2023. The TikTok chief executive officer plans to tell Congress his app does more to protect young users than rival social media and that Beijing has no authority over its data, invoking familiar arguments to head off a US ban orforced sale. Photographer: Al Drago/Bloomberg via Getty Images

Al Drago/Bloomberg/Getty Images

TikTok CEO in the hot seat: 5 takeaways from his first appearance before Congress

The Chinese government considers some advanced technology, including content recommendation algorithms, to be critical to its national interest. In December, Chinese officials proposed tightening the rules that govern the sale of that technology to foreign buyers.

A sale or divestiture of TikTok would involve the export of technology, so it would need obtain a license and approval from the Chinese government, according to a commerce ministry spokeswoman in March.

CNN’s Brian Fung contributed to this report.

CNN · by Laura He,Ramishah Maruf · May 15, 2023

16. Three Lessons from the Front: Economic Warfare in Russia / Ukraine

Download the PDF here: https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023-05-15-No6_Three-Lessons-from-the-Front.pdf

The three lessons:

Lesson #1: The need to balance efficacy and coalition size

Lesson #2: Conflicts require both offense and defense

Lesson #3: Private sector coordination is key

Three Lessons from the Front: Economic Warfare in Russia / Ukraine – Irregular Warfare Center

irregularwarfarecenter.org

May 15, 2023

Three Lessons from the Front: Economic Warfare in Russia / Ukraine

James R. Sullivan, CFA

Download a PDF of this publication by clicking the icon to the left.

It’s the Economy…

A country’s economy is core to its ability to provide a better life for its people, develop and fund social services, and ultimately create the means for war. Presidents Xi Jinping and Donald Trump both used speeches in 2017 to directly link economic might to the pursuit of national interests. It should therefore come as no surprise that economic warfare tactics are getting a much-needed refresh as we re-enter a multi-polar world with specific challenges to both the United States’ economic hegemony, as well as the international rules-based system.

Sanctions remain the most widely implemented economic warfare tactics. Modern day best practices for sanctions construction and implementation have been outlined by organizations such as the Atlantic Council and the Wilson Center. Summarized, these argue that goals for sanctions must be well identified and explained in advance, that implementing coalitions must be as large and as complete as possible, and that private sector coordination is a critical component to sanctions efficacy. While the guidance is solid, there remain several gaps between these best practices and real-world implementation, as the Russian-Ukrainian conflict illustrates, especially in the finance, energy, and cyber realms.

The gap between theory and practice

Academics and current and former government officials from Nicholas Mulder to Agathe Demarais represent a rising chorus of voices arguing that while sanctions “fill the void between empty diplomatic declarations and deadly military interventions,” their overuse means that “the golden days of U.S. sanctions may soon be over.” Others including Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass have suggested that despite the rising sophistication of economic tools inclusive of a shift from “smart” trade restrictions to targeted financial sanctions, “all too often sanctions turn out to be little more than expressions of US preference that hurt American interests without changing the target’s behavior for the better.” The lack of an immediate collapse of the Russian economy in 2022 after western powers levied sanctions on Russia’s banking, technology, metals, mining, and energy sectors in response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is taken by many as a sign that the sanctions regime deployed most recently is having little impact.

But these conclusions are based on flawed (or at least incomplete) analysis. The case studies below will illustrate gaps between best practice and implementation in the current conflict that led to these flawed conclusions.

Lesson #1: The need to balance efficacy and coalition size

Economic sanctions led by the United States, the European Union, and Canada were announced the day after the Crimean referendum and prior to Russia’s declaration of Crimea as an independent state in 2014. These initial coalition partners were soon joined by Australia, Albania, Iceland and Montenegro in April 2014. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 expanded this list to countries representing 70 percent of global GDP including Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, although many emerging market nations inclusive of China, India, Mexico, and Brazil are not directly participating.

Sanctions against a range of Russian industries were specifically designed to restrain Russia’s capacity to make war after the invasion of Ukraine. Economic warfare tactics ranged from restricting imports and exports, severing Russian banks’ access to SWIFT, and seizing assets of the Russian central bank and the Russian government, and the personal assets of Russian oligarchs.

The best historical parallel to these sanctions are those applied to Italy (then the eighth largest economy in the world vs. Russia as the eleventh largest today) in 1935, after its invasion of Ethiopia. Italy post-sanctions saw a 47 percent dip in exports and a 21 percent reduction in industrial production between 1935 and 1936 (albeit even this did not dislodge Italy from Ethiopia). Russia has in some ways seen similar impacts, with 60 to 80 percent reductions in specialized manufacturing dependent on western imports, particularly technology, such as locomotives, refrigerators, internal combustion engines, and freight cars. That said, while the Russian ruble initially lost 90 percent of its value post-sanctions implementation, it soon recovered to a level 20 percent higher than before. Initial forecasts for Russian GDP targeted a 10 percent year-on-year fall, which by the end of 2022 had mitigated to only a 3 percent decline.

The supposed failure of the Russian economy to fall off a cliff in short order illustrates the criticality of defining goals clearly in advance, as well as the inherent conflict between the efficacy of short-term sanctions and coalition size.

The United States lauded the initial collapse of the ruble as evidence of sanctions efficacy. This obfuscated the goal of these sanctions—which was restraining Russia’s capacity to make war, rather than an immediate collapse of its economy—and implied an immediacy of impact that could not be met.

Efforts to increase the short-term efficacy of economic warfare tactics must be balanced against the risk that too much economic disruption causes coalition partners to fall out due to domestic pressures. The Russian-Ukrainian crisis is the first in modern times in which a major energy producer is pitted against its consumers. Previous energy-related conflicts were largely between producers, such as price wars between Russia and Saudi Arabia in 1986 and 2020 which were largely price depressive. Analysts estimate that a total removal of Russian oil exports from the market by the current round of sanctions would drive global oil prices as high as $380 per barrel. This would trigger severe economic stress, if not outright collapse, for many oil-importing countries around the world. Oil prices that high would also allow Russia to achieve supernormal profits on any oil that successfully evaded sanctions. The sanctions regime was forced to balance curtailing overall Russian economic activity while also avoiding undue volatility in global energy markets. The sanctions regime therefore included mechanisms to allow some Russian oil sales in order to maintain coalition cohesion.

Criticism of mechanisms to allow these sales has misunderstood the design and goal of oil sanctions. The primary mechanism deployed, beyond the complete ban of exports to EU and G7 nations, was a price cap of $60 on oil sold to other nations (primarily China and India, the latter seeing a 30-fold increase in Russian oil imports). On the one hand this measure allowed more Russian oil to flow (thereby stabilizing global oil markets). These oil sales drove a 3.4-fold increase in Russia’s current account in 2022, mitigating short-term negative impact on economic growth and currency depreciation. If the goal was strictly short-term efficacy, then one can term this a failure. On the other, sales at the lower price are estimated to have reduced Russia’s 2022 potential GDP by four to eight percent. This balanced approach both negatively impacted the Russian economy, while also preventing large increases in energy prices to the consumer which could have then reduced the size of the coalition of nations implementing sanctions. If the goal was balancing short-term efficacy with long-term coalition cohesion, the short-term four to eight percent reduction in GDP referenced above paired with forecasts of zero Russian economic growth into the future and a potential ten to 15 percent decline in Russian oil production as a result of sanctions seem like laudable achievements.

Lesson #2: Conflicts require both offense and defense

Many economic policies, particularly in the sanctions space, focus primarily on offense. As noted above, offensive economic sanctions targeting Russian banking, metals, mining, technology and energy sectors resulted in the US$1.8 trillion Russian economy shrinking by two to three percent in 2022. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s US$200 billion economy also lost at least 30 percent of its productive capacity. Shorter term “defensive” investments to shore up the Ukrainian economy inclusive of investments in critical infrastructure resilience, cyber resilience (as referenced below), and basic food security and services provision are of as critical importance as offensive measures deployed against Russia. Longer term “defensive” measures could include a “Marshall Plan” for Ukraine. This will require significant planning from many parties. There is little sign this has begun.

Lesson #3: Private sector coordination is key

Economic warfare tactics will, in practice, almost always involve private sector players in their implementation. This requires extensive coordination between governments and a wide range of industries. The Russian case study illustrates areas with clear historical precedent, areas where new strategies such as energy and technology sanctions are achieving strong results, and areas where incremental improvement is required.

Economic warfare tactics involving the financial services industry have perhaps the most precedent, particularly with the significant expansion of their use led by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in the post-9/11 era to eliminate the use of western banking infrastructure to finance terror. These efforts are assisted by the ongoing primacy of the U.S. dollar and the central role this creates for the U.S. banking system. These same tactics have been deployed against the Russian financial system to strong effect, as examples included here show.

Financial and technology sanctions on the energy industry in Russia have led to a significant exodus of international oil companies. These oil majors are not only removing capital from the country, but also the production technology that Russia needs to viably extract its mineral resources, given the complexity of Russian geology.

Private sector coordination in the cyber realm is one example where incremental improvement is required. Cyber defense assistance in Ukraine has been conducted almost completely by the private sector with little facilitation or funding from governments outside of Ukraine. Two examples are the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative which has established an ongoing effort to assist the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council, and the Global Cyber Cooperation Center, a public-private partnership with a collective of over 15 Western cyber security and technology companies. Western governments have yet to engage fully and effectively in the digital conflict in Ukraine. The U.S. government has been hampered in providing assistance based on a lack of clear policy guidance and appropriate funding mechanisms. This is one reason why U.S. Agency for International Development funds that are available have largely not been deployed.

Ensuring the Ukrainians establish their own capacity for cyber defense and digital resiliency is crucial in an environment where Russian irregular warfare tactics likely continue after the current military conflict stops. The U.S. government and its allies lack a coherent process for engagement with the Ukrainians in this crucial element of conflict resolution and post-conflict stability. No evidence exists that ensuring a strong Ukrainian cyber defense or broader digital resiliency has become part of a considered, broader U.S., NATO or Western strategy of increasing costs for the Russians during this war or in the future.

Next Steps

Current implementation of economic warfare tactics in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict illustrates several areas of potential focus for policymakers. First, officials from countries pursuing economic strategies against Russia need to outline clear, definitive goals for the tactics deployed which consider the inherent balancing act between impact on the target country and secondary impacts on coalition partners. Second, tactical options must be expanded from the almost knee-jerk focus solely on offensive options to include critical defensive measures. Third, the centrality of private sector participation must be recognized upfront, driving its inclusion in both planning and implantation of tactics deployed.

There is one final, overarching issue for consideration. Care must be taken to understand how farto pursue economic warfare tactics. There is evidence that weakened economies can drive conflict through multiple channels. One such example comes from research showing that the odds of a conflict being escalated during a presidential election year concurrent with a weak economy is 60 percent, double that during a non-presidential election year and/or a strong economy.

Risks are also illustrated through another current target of United States economic sanctions—China. An economically impaired China may begin to reinforce identity security by emphasizing a nationalism that looks to reverse perceived attempts by western powers to subjugate the country. A cornered adversary is a dangerous adversary, and the application of economic tools can perhaps be taken too far.

James Sullivan is a Non-resident WSD-Handa Fellow at the Pacific Forum and an External Associate for the Economic Conflict and Competition Research Group at the Defense Studies Department at King’s College London. He has previously served as a Non-Resident Visiting Scholar at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies.

irregularwarfarecenter.org

17. Ukraine Launches Sabotage Operations on Occupied Territories and Inside Russia

​Excerpts:

While Ukrainian officials do not draw any direct links to these sabotage operations, former advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine, Oleksiy Arestovich, recently claimed that the acts of resistance in Crimea, Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod and other regions have helped Ukrainian forces as they gear up for their impending counteroffensive and will be invaluable during its active phase (T.me/O_Arestovich, accessed May 16).

According to Budanov, in a recent interview with Forbes.ua, most of the explosions and fires that have been regularly breaking out in Russia are no coincidence. He asserted that “signaling equipment on the railways burns several times every day [and] on different highways constantly for two or three hours, sometimes for five or six hours [and] traffic is suspended on the entire section. It is clear that [this infrastructure] does not burn on its own.” Budanov also hinted that some Russians closely cooperate with Ukrainian side for the purpose of gaining financial benefits (Forbes.ua, February 22).

Thus, despite assurances from Moscow that these sabotage operations will not have a significant impact on the Russian military machine and cannot cause serious economic damage, these activities bring serious political consequences for the Kremlin, as Russian officials struggle to explain why they cannot guarantee the security of the regions along the border with Ukraine. Indeed, not only Russian troops but also civilians in these areas are growing increasingly worried about their safety ahead of the looming Ukrainian counteroffensive.

​

Ukraine Launches Sabotage Operations on Occupied Territories and Inside Russia

jamestown.org · by Mykola Vorobiov · May 16, 2023

While the Ukrainian Armed Forces actively prepare for their much-anticipated counteroffensive, which is expected to occur as soon as this summer according to Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal (Hromadske.ua, April 12), Kyiv has launched unprecedented sabotage operations in close cooperation with the Ukrainian resistance within those territories occupied by Russia, including Crimea.

On May 6, an explosive device was detonated under the car of war-mongering Russian blogger Zakhar Prilepin, who is widely known as a strong supporter of the Kremlin’s narratives regarding the necessity of the invasion to “denazify” Ukraine (Interfax, May 6). Yet, while Moscow has accused the Ukrainian State Security Service (SBU) of carrying out the assassination attempt, a spokesman for the SBU stated that he “can neither confirm nor deny” its involvement. He also added, “Death is the only prospect that we can offer the occupiers” (Korrespondent.net, May 6). For his part, the chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, Kyrylo Budanov, declared that the Ukrainian special services “have killed Russians and will continue to kill them anywhere in the world until Ukraine achieves complete victory” (Liga.net, May 6).

In Melitopol and the surrounding area, a key region as part of the “land bridge” connecting Crimea to Ukraine’s occupied eastern territories, a series of attacks have been launched by the Ukrainian resistance against officials that collaborated with the Russian administration once the region was occupied. Among the victims of these attacks were Andrei Boyko, “head of the sport department” (Obozrevatel.com, November 11, 2022); Roman Dzyuba, a well-known collaborator and principal of a local school that donated its premises for the illegal “referendums” conducted in September 2022 (Apostrophe.ua, September 30, 2022); Maksim Zubarev, head of the so-called “Akimov administration” in occupied Zaporizhzhia oblast (Focus.ua, April, 3); Oleksandr Mischenko, a deputy head of the local police department in Melitopol; and Ivan Tkach, head of the “military-civil administration” in Zaporizhzhia. According to Ukrainian media, Tkach had been instrumental in establishing transport links for Russian forces in occupied Crimea, as well as in individual cities of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republic” (Focus.ua, March 14).

The Ukrainian resistance has taken responsibility for most of these sabotage operations and has published videos warning other officials who cooperate with the Russians that for “all traitors to Ukraine … there is only one destination—the morgue” (Ukrainska Pravda, April 27). According to Ivan Fedorov, the Ukrainian mayor of Melitopol, the local partisan movement includes tens of thousands of people, with hundreds of them taking part in active resistance operations. Fedorov further claimed, “The resistance force and the guerrillas are being trained. They gain experience, so their work becomes more efficient and of high quality” (Unian, September 23, 2022).

In response to the myriad of assassination attempts, Moscow introduced additional security measures, including tighter curfews, for the occupied territories. In the meantime, many senior officials, including Zaporizhizhia collaborator Yevgeny Balitsky, were relocated to Crimea out of fear for their safety (New Voice of Ukraine, August 31, 2022). Simultaneously, Russia has tightened the conditions for the “passportization” of citizens in the occupied territories, with the threat that those who do not take a Russian passport before July 1 will be deported and recognized as foreigners. As of April 2023, less than 10 percent of the population remaining in these territories had accepted a Russian passport, according to Fedorov (061.ua, April 28).

Overall, the pro-Ukrainian resistance extends far beyond Zaporizhizhia region. In September 2022, local Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar activists created a military partisan movement called “Atesh” (“Fire”), with the primary goal to liberate all Ukrainian territories, Crimea included (Mil.in.ua, February 23). According to the movement’s Telegram channel, since November 2022, members of the organization have launched a series of sabotage operations against Russia military units—for example, assassinating 30 Russian servicemen in hospitals around the Crimean capital of Simferopol (New Voice of Ukraine, November 13, 2022; T.me/atesh_ua, accessed May 16). On February 10, Atesh claimed responsibility for a car bomb that resulted in the deaths of two Russian soldiers and the hospitalization of two others in occupied Nova Kakhovka in Kherson region (Euromaidan Press, February 15). In March 2023, the organization claimed to have killed the deputy head of the military administration of Nova Kakhovka in a bomb attack (Slobedenpecat.mk, March 16). And on April 23, Atesh operators took responsibility for blowing up a Russian National Guard (Rosgvardiya) checkpoint near Oleshky, resulting in multiple deaths (Ukrinform, April 24).

According to Atesh, as of November 2022, the movement had about 800 active members, with some being mobilized to the front within the regular Russian army as well as others who are active in Crimea (Euromaidan Press, February 15). Gradually, Atesh agents have been drafted into the Russian army, training some Russian troops to “wreck their own equipment” to survive the war. Additionally, these agents gather intelligence and pass on that information to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (Krymr.com, May 2).

Moreover, such attacks have not taken place solely on Ukrainian territory. On May 1, unknown persons blew up a power line in Gatchinsky district near St. Petersburg. According to the governor of Leningrad oblast, Aleksandr Drozdenko, a criminal case regarding the alleged sabotage has been initiated, as Russian law enforcement found another charge with a fuse nearby (Sanktpeterburg.bezformata.com, May 1). Meanwhile, 20 rail cars carrying petroleum products and lumber were derailed due to explosions on a section of railway tracks in Bryansk region. The governor of the region, Aleksandr Bogomaz, claimed that an unidentified explosive device had “detonated” near the Snezhetskaya railway station causing the derailment (Liga.net, May 2). Similar “accidents” have occurred in other Russian regions that share a border with Ukraine, including the Belgorod and Kursk regions, with one blast derailing almost 80 wagons allegedly carrying fuel and other provisions for military purposes.

While Ukrainian officials do not draw any direct links to these sabotage operations, former advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine, Oleksiy Arestovich, recently claimed that the acts of resistance in Crimea, Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod and other regions have helped Ukrainian forces as they gear up for their impending counteroffensive and will be invaluable during its active phase (T.me/O_Arestovich, accessed May 16).

According to Budanov, in a recent interview with Forbes.ua, most of the explosions and fires that have been regularly breaking out in Russia are no coincidence. He asserted that “signaling equipment on the railways burns several times every day [and] on different highways constantly for two or three hours, sometimes for five or six hours [and] traffic is suspended on the entire section. It is clear that [this infrastructure] does not burn on its own.” Budanov also hinted that some Russians closely cooperate with Ukrainian side for the purpose of gaining financial benefits (Forbes.ua, February 22).

Thus, despite assurances from Moscow that these sabotage operations will not have a significant impact on the Russian military machine and cannot cause serious economic damage, these activities bring serious political consequences for the Kremlin, as Russian officials struggle to explain why they cannot guarantee the security of the regions along the border with Ukraine. Indeed, not only Russian troops but also civilians in these areas are growing increasingly worried about their safety ahead of the looming Ukrainian counteroffensive.

jamestown.org · by Mykola Vorobiov · May 16, 2023

18. It’s Not Enough for Ukraine to Win. Russia Has to Lose.

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/05/ukraine-victory-russia-defeat/674112/

The Ukrainian soldiers and people are not lacking in courage.

Conclusion:

The key to this strategy is courage. We must conquer our fears of Russian threats and escalation, of its nuclear bravado, and even of Russian collapse. We must be strategic and shrewd, but nothing can be accomplished without courage. In the words of John Paul II—the unarmed, lone old man who did so much to bring Soviet communism to its knees—“Never doubt, never tire, and never become discouraged. Be not afraid.”

It’s Not Enough for Ukraine to Win. Russia Has to Lose.

Anything less will encourage Russian imperialism and embolden autocrats around the world.

By Eliot A. Cohen

The Atlantic · by Eliot A. Cohen · May 19, 2023

The United States has suffered from a deliberate fuzziness in formulating its objectives in the Russian war in Ukraine. Flaccid phrases like “helping Ukraine defend itself” or, even worse, “putting Ukraine in the best possible position for negotiations” are either meaningless or insipid. Bureaucratic mental fog is masquerading as artful policy, and it is dangerous. Strategy is the matching of means to ends. In war it is easy to become obsessed with action rather than purpose, and thereby to fall into Nietzsche’s famous description of the most common human stupidity: forgetting what one intended to do in the first place.

Ukraine knows how it defines victory: the pre-2014 borders cleansed of the invader, its exiles and refugees returned, its society and economy rebuilt, membership in the European Union and NATO attained, and some measure of justice for Russian rapists, torturers, and murderers secured. Similarly, we know how the Russians define victory: a Ukraine broken and severed from the West, much of its territory annexed; a Europe in disarray that resumes its addiction to cheap natural resources and business opportunities in Moscow; and the reconstruction of much of the old Russian imperial state.

We should want victory as Ukraine defines it. But to achieve it, the West must not only aid in the defeat of Russia—it must convince Russia that it has been defeated.

From the June 2023 issue: The counteroffensive

A Russia that prevails would be a Russia even further empowered to meddle in Europe and to expand its influence with unlimited violence; a Russia that will have learned that it can commit slaughter and atrocities with impunity; a Russia whose ambitions will grow with success. A Russian victory would, as well, teach the world that the West—including the United States—lacks the resolve, despite its wealth, to follow through on its commitments, offering Beijing an encouraging lesson.

Conversely, Russian defeat would put Beijing—already somewhat nervous about its partner’s incompetence and wild statements—on the defensive, consolidate the Western alliance, and help preserve some of the essential norms of decent behavior in those parts of the world most important to us. Above all, it would block the Russian imperial project for good, because without Ukraine, as the historian Dominic Lieven has noted, Russia cannot be an empire.

Russian defeat does not require a march on Moscow (rarely a good idea in the past), and it does not require a Russia that is defenseless and devastated (impossible without World War III). Rather, it will be achieved inside the heads of Russia’s leaders and population. Russia must be convinced that the military instrument, and its deployment in large-scale war, will inevitably fail, and it must realize that Ukraine is permanently and completely lost.

Such things have happened before. Israel did not occupy Arab capitals in 1967, but that war caused the Arab states to abandon the notion that they could annihilate the Jewish state through conventional means. The 1973 war forced the conclusion that even limited conventional conflict was too hazardous to attempt.

In Vietnam and Afghanistan, the United States was defeated without losing a single battle. We became convinced that fighting was both futile and painful, that our enemies were implacable and unbeatable, and that the price paid in blood, treasure, and attention was in no way worth the cost and never would be.

Carl von Clausewitz, the German philosopher of war, said that war is a trial of moral and physical forces through the medium of the latter. Ukraine must not only achieve battlefield success in its upcoming counteroffensives; it must secure more than orderly Russian withdrawals following cease-fire negotiations. To be brutal about it, we need to see masses of Russians fleeing, deserting, shooting their officers, taken captive, or dead. The Russian defeat must be an unmistakably big, bloody shambles.

Hein Goemans and Branislav Slantchev: Why Ukraine shouldn’t talk to Russia—yet

Russia’s theories of victory in Ukraine have collapsed one by one. Putin began by believing that the country would fall in a week; then that it would succumb to a month or two of hard fighting; then that Europe would abandon it during a cold winter without Russian gas; then that Ukraine could be bludgeoned into submission by attacking its cities. The final theory of victory—that the West does not have the heart to pour vast resources into Ukraine indefinitely—needs to be disproved as well, because there is nothing beyond that.

To that end, with the utmost urgency, the West should give everything that Ukraine could possibly use, including long-range missiles to break for good the 11-mile Kerch bridge between the mainland and Crimea, and cluster munitions to devastate Russian fighting vehicles and infantry. Breaking the Russian army, as we have, by spending only a small fraction of our defense budget and none of our blood is an astounding strategic bargain.

Russians must, moreover, conclude that Ukraine—formerly, in their view, a pseudo-state containing “cousins” or “little brothers”—is gone forever. That means speedy accession to the EU and NATO, but also a deep Western commitment to rebuilding Ukraine economically and, most important, arming it to the teeth for years to come.

The paltering of the administration about giving our superabundant F-16s to Ukraine is foolish and shortsighted. These jets might not make a difference on the battlefield two months from now, but the knowledge that several hundred of them are in the pipeline for the next five years would have profound symbolic importance. We should be talking about how we will rebuild Ukraine’s armed forces, the West’s largest, most combat-tested, and in some ways most determined army.

The West needs an aggressive information campaign to drive home the reality of Russian defeat. Russians need to be reminded that their faltering economy is only a tenth the size of the EU’s; that they cannot build and deploy a modern tank; that their latest high-performance jet, the Su-57, will be outnumbered by the F-35s of the four small Nordic states; that their generals are superannuated and incompetent; that their high command is indifferent to their men’s lives; that their equipment is inferior to that of Ukraine; and that their logistics are rotted by graft and corruption.

Information warfare should be reinforced by continued sanctions, whose aim is not so much to win the war as to cripple Russian war-making potential for the long run by depressing the economy and forcing Russia to make do with inferior components and spare parts.

Russia must be isolated politically and psychologically as well, thereby playing on the country’s historical ambivalence about the West, represented in its two capitals: St. Petersburg, facing Europe, and Moscow, facing Asia. But Russian literature, art, culture, and political practice are rooted in its relationship with Europe. The time may come—years or, more likely, decades from now—when a postimperial Russia will turn westward again.

This is all doable. In fact, it has happened on a smaller scale before. Russian leaders became convinced in the late 1970s and early ’80s that they could not keep up with advances in Western military technology, even as they fought and lost the war in Afghanistan. The Gorbachev upheaval was in part the result of this realization.

David J. Kramer, John Herbst, and William Taylor: The only realistic answer to Putin

But our expectations today should be measured. Unfortunately, a defeated Russia will still be malevolent, angry, and vengeful; it will probably still be ruled by the “vertical of power,” the hard men from the security ministries; it will be suffused with lawlessness and murder; and it will engage in subversion, political warfare, and malicious behavior of all kinds. But who would not prefer to deal with a thousand troll farms and front organizations than one Mariupol? And this Russia would be far less dangerous to us, far less useful to China, far less likely to raise monstrous new threats in the years to come.

The key to this strategy is courage. We must conquer our fears of Russian threats and escalation, of its nuclear bravado, and even of Russian collapse. We must be strategic and shrewd, but nothing can be accomplished without courage. In the words of John Paul II—the unarmed, lone old man who did so much to bring Soviet communism to its knees—“Never doubt, never tire, and never become discouraged. Be not afraid.”

This article was adapted from a speech given to the Polish Institute of International Affairs’s Strategic Ark conference on May 17, 2023.

The Atlantic · by Eliot A. Cohen · May 19, 2023

19. CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, MAY 19, 2023

Map/graphic: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-19-2023

CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, MAY 19, 2023

May 19, 2023 - Press ISW

Authors: Nils Peterson and Roy Eakin of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: May 17 at Noon ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on Chinese Communist Party paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways  

• Complementary CCP industrial and anti-espionage policies may facilitate the long-term expansion of China’s domestic industrial base and supply chain security.
• Kuomintang (KMT) presidential nominee Hou Yu-ih emphasizes the preservation of peace over clear cross-strait policy positions, possibly to create a pragmatic image in the eyes of Taiwanese voters.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Complementary CCP industrial and anti-espionage policies may facilitate the long-term expansion of China’s domestic industrial base and supply chain security. CCP industrial policy entails using foreign investment to facilitate knowledge and technology transfers that in turn strengthen domestic workforce and infrastructure. This development supports the creation of an increasingly autarkic domestic economic cycle still augmented by the international market.[1] The CCP then selects domestic companies to continue receiving state subsidies. These subsidies in combination with the enforcement of the anti-espionage law allow the CCP to push out foreign firms like Ford and GM by eating away at their market share.[2] The anti-espionage law includes a broad definition of foreign agent that the CCP uses to control what information businesses’ allow foreign entities to access.[3] High-ranking CCP officials previously called for foreign investment at the Boao Forum for Asia in March 2023 before the party subsequently raided business intelligence firms with foreign links in line with the new anti-espionage law.[4] The call for foreign investment buttresses the development of Chinese domestic industries while the implementation of the anti-espionage law undercuts the competitiveness of foreign firms.

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Kuomintang (KMT) presidential nominee Hou Yu-ih emphasizes the preservation of peace over clear cross-strait policy positions, possibly to create a pragmatic image in the eyes of Taiwanese voters. Hou became the KMT presidential nominee on May and continued emphasizing domestic issues as well as the necessity of cross-strait peace.[5] Hou is framing himself as a moderate while the Chinese media and "deep blue" KMT political figures frame the upcoming election as a choice between war and peace.[6] Hou's broad focus on peace and domestic issues likely aims to frame his election as one that will create domestic stability in Taiwan. This approach may be preferable for the KMT since the party’s deep support for the 1992 Consensus and cross-strait engagement contributed to their recent presidential election defeats in 2016 and 2020.[7] The 1992 Consensus refers to a cross-strait policy formulation supported in different formulations by the CCP and KMT that acts as a precondition to cross-strait dialogue.[8] Hou's further attempted to frame himself as a pragmatist via statements calling for both cross-strait engagement with China and strong US-Taiwan relations.[9]

Chinese cognitive warfare operations target Taiwanese consumers, which may aim to demoralize Taiwanese citizens during the Taiwanese presidential election cycle. Cognitive warfare refers to efforts aimed at influencing the target’s thoughts and perceptions of the world. Taiwanese citizens who purchased a book called "If China Attacks" from Taiwan's Eslite bookstore chain reportedly received calls after a data leakage from unknown individuals claiming they wanted the readers to participate in an Eslite customer survey.[10] The callers went on to promote messages about the “inevitability” of cross-strait unification, the inability of Taiwanese soldiers to fight in a cross-strait war, the United States’ unwillingness to support Taiwan, and the Kuomintang's (KMT) superiority in Taiwanese politics.[11] This messaging reiterates Chinese propaganda to degrade the Taiwanese populace’s confidence in their own government’s capacity to govern.

20. Why Putin Is Right to Fear for His Life

Be afraid? Be very afraid? Are we wishing for this? What if it happens? Are we prepared for what may come next?

I wonder.

Why Putin Is Right to Fear for His Life​

BY SIMON SEBAG-MONTEFIORE MAY 18, 2023 12:41 PM EDTSebag-Montefiore is the bestselling author of many books, including Jerusalem and The Romanovs. His new book is The World: A Family History of Humanity​

TIME · by Simon Sebag-Montefiore · May 18, 2023

Roman Emperor Domitian is remembered for only one joke. “It’s a terrible thing to be an emperor,” Domitian said, “because everything thinks your paranoia about being assassinated is groundless—until you’re actually murdered!” Soon after Domitian was assassinated. Extreme vigilance is the essential mood of tyranny, which must inhabit that condition not just first because it is indeed in danger of overthrow and surrounded by enemies but also because it requires its people to be fearful and isolated, therefore conditioned for extreme solutions. President Vladimir Putin is living proof of this conundrum.

The recent drone attack on the Kremlin may have been the work of Ukrainian or internal Russian factions, possibly within his own wider security organs, or a ‘false flag’ operation by the regime itself, but it was inevitable that the dictatorship would claim it was an assassination attempt on Putin. This is absurd since everyone knows that the president does not live in the Kremlin but outside Moscow in his gilded mansion, Novo-Ogaryovo. Yet Domitian would sympathize because Putin has every reason to fear assassination.

It is a cliché of the cliché-ridden Western press on Putin—and his predecessors Stalin, Peter the Great, Ivan the Terrible—that they are paranoid to the extent of madness. It is a cliché that ignores and misunderstands the nature of dictatorship particularly in Russia. All absolute systems in world history depend on coercion to crush opposition and maintain power, thereby creating internal enemies who can only use violence to overthrow the ruler. All such systems deploy war and xenophobia to inspire and control their own people which creates another legion of enemies. The Western press always emphasizes the omnipotence of the autocrat in a system without limits without seeing that a system without limits means the leader exists in a permanent state of carnivorous chaos without any real or lasting security. Systems without clear rules of succession grant enormous power to the ruler but also mean they have no means of retirement. In Russia—whether under Tsars Ivan IV and Peter I , Stalin or Putin—rulers could appoint their successors but could never do so without creating a potential present menace.

In October 2011, during the Arab Spring revolutions, Putin spent hours watching the gruesome smartphone footage of longterm Russian ally, Colonel Gadaffi, who was sodomized with a bayonet before being shot. Putin resolved to save his ally, Bashar al-Assad in Syria. And himself. He no doubt reflected on the nature of Russian tsardom. He was aware of it from the start: when Yeltsin offered him the presidency in 1999, Putin hesitated, asking “how will I protect my family?” The answer? To establish a dictatorship and keep it for life.

Read More: Putin’s Path to War in Ukraine

Every wise tsar knows that his constant poise must be ferocious vigilance. Peter the Great set the standard of the all-talented emperor and supreme commander to which Putin—along with every other Russian ruler—aspires but he faced constant plots against his life which he handled himself by personally torturing and executing thousands of mutinous musketeers; he even tortured his own rebellions son Alexei to death. Peter invented modern Russia—even its name Roosiya was coined by him—as a new empire; he took the title imperator. The state has never developed from that vision. But this imperial self-image also sets a perilous standard for Peter’s admiring successors: the tsar – whether president or general-secretary—is also a military commander.

If a Russian ruler cannot dominate the “Russian world,” he will disappoint history. Peter was overwhelmingly successful in his wars—but even he was nearly captured and defeated by the Ottomans. Yet the dream of every Russian ruler is conquest. In 1904, Nicholas II’s Interior Minister V.K. Plehve, supposedly advised, “What this country needs is a short victorious war.” Every ruler (even in our democracies) aspires to one of those. Nicholas II instead faced a disastrous defeat vs Japan; but Putin built his imperial presidency and garnished his swaggersome overconfidence with a run of three ‘short victorious wars’ in Chechnya, Georgia and Syria. But they were minor skirmishes; Ukraine is proving very different…

Out of the last twelve Romanov emperors, six died violently. Ivan the Terrible and Stalin died in their beds by wreaking such havoc around them that no one dared destroy them. Putin is a killer but not yet a mass killer on their scale.

Circa 1700, Peter the Great (1672 - 1725), Tsar of Russia, beheading one of the rebel Streltsy (semi-professional musketeers) in front of his nobles.

Hulton Archive-Getty Images

In June 1762, the new young Emperor Peter III—puny grandson of Great Peter—threw away costly Russian gains against Prussia. His own Guards and his wife Catherine the Great overthrew him; the Guards strangled him. The press release announced he had died of haemorrhoids. When Catherine later invited the French philosopher d’Alembert to Russia, he joked “I must decline because I suffer from haemorrhoids which are a fatal disease in Russia.” After midnight, on 11th March 1801, Russian Emperor, Paul, son of Catherine and Peter III, was awakened by footsteps on the stairs of his Mikhailovsky Castle; he hid behind a tapestry as the conspirators—slightly drunk after a pre-homicidal champagne—burst into his bedroom.

The conspirators were let in by trusted servant; they were led by his chief minister & top generals; and backed by his own son, who waited downstairs. What happened next was history’s most savage liquidation of a Russian autocrat.

Paul, inconsistent and menacing, was destroyed by war , capricious foreign policy—including sending an army to attack British India. The conspirators saw his feet peeping out of the wallhanging and dragged him out; conspirators hit him with a golden snuffbox, knocking out an eye, then threw themselves onto him, shattering his head on the floor, strangling him with his sash, then drunkenly stomping his head to pulp.

Just over a century later Nicholas II was not killed by his generals but he was overthrown by them. Yes the crisis was accelerated by hungry crowds in the capital Petrograd but contrary to popular history, he was forced to abdicate by his generals when he was isolated in his railway carriage on his way to put down the revolution.

Putin knows all this history. “How will history remember me?” he kept asking historians in recent years. His isolation during Covid made him one of history’s most dangerous creatures: the omnipotent history-buff. Stalin read history obsessively and collected a huge library—half of which is in Putin’s Kremlin office. Before the war, Putin liked to ask visitors to chose a book then together they would examine Stalin’s pungent marginalia. He is not an intellectual like Stalin but he reads historical biographies—including a famous Russian biography of Paul and my own biography of Catherine the Great and Potemkin. History matters to him; he has always been obsessed by eighteenth century Russian leaders, Peter, Catherine and Prince Potemkin. They were the trio who dominated Ukraine; all subsequent Russian-Soviet leaders including Lenin and Stalin regarded the possession of Ukraine as essential to their vision of Russian statehood.

It was Peter who founded St Petersburg and won the Baltic. It was Catherine in partnership with her brilliant lover, co-ruler and secret husband, Prince Potemkin, who conquered Crimea in 1783 and south Ukraine 1787-91, founding the cities Sebastopol, Odessa, Kherson that form today’s battlefield. When I wrote that first book in 2ooo, Putin, waiting for it to be translated, asked for a one-pager on Potemkin’s conquests and cities. In his speeches and essays before invading Ukraine, he cited Catherine and Potemkin. When his troops took Kherson, they captured Potemkin’s tomb and when they retreated late last year, they stole the Prince’s body. I predict that Putin will create a splendid tomb for Potemkin in Moscow to prove the Russian claim to Ukraine.

But the history also shows what happens when tsars fail. In 1964, Khrushchev was fortunate that he was only overthrown and retired after he risked nuclear war and delivered an unprecedented national humiliation in the Cuba Missile Crisis—though his successor Brezhnev did propose his assassination.

Victory makes a Russian ruler invulnerable, almost sacred. Defeat places a Russian ruler in danger from his closest courtiers, ministers and generals. While one thinks of tsars overthrown by crowds, most are actually destroyed by their closest colleagues deep within their own palaces. The modern prototype would be another secret-policeman-aspiring- to-rule, Lavrenti Beria, overthrown in June 1953 by his trusted, somewhat inferior comrades, Khrushchev and Malenkov (whose house at Novo-Ogorovo is now Putin’s home—what a small world) at a surprise meeting. He was shot.

When Russian leaders fall, nemesis usually comes from those closest. “When you walk down the corridors,” mused Stalin, “you never go when it’s going to come.” Putin is not paranoid; he has ever reason to be vigilant.

Domitian would sympathize.

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TIME Ideas hosts the world's leading voices, providing commentary on events in news, society, and culture. We welcome outside contributions. Opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of TIME editors.

TIME · by Simon Sebag-Montefiore · May 18, 2023

21. PLA Drones Off Taiwan’s East Coast: The Strategic Implications

Excerpts:

Therefore, it is reasonable to suspect that China might use its drones flying around Taiwan to record videos of certain specific objects on the island, similar to the images released of military posts on Taiwan’s frontline Kinmen Islands in 2022. China’s drones might also harass Taiwan’s naval ships monitoring PLA Navy ships in the waters east of Taiwan. Video footage of this kind could be turned into materials for digital public opinion warfare that serve China’s interests. These tactical maneuvers by PLA drones may be seen more frequently in the coming years.

The manned-unmanned team-up being pursued by the PLA is a growing threat that Taiwan must take seriously. The threat could be neutralized by means of hard-skill solutions, such as physical destruction, or soft-kill ones in the form of electronic warfare. Whatever the choice, the most suitable course of action must be selected after careful military planning and consideration of diplomatic factors and cross-strait relations.

Taiwan’s chosen action plan should also be rehearsed in advance by relevant government agencies in political-military war games so that in the event of an emergency situation, no time would be lost and no government authorities would be caught unprepared. If not, Taiwan might not have enough time to make decisions. We might also fall into a trap set by the enemy and disclose unwittingly vital information about our countermeasures.

PLA Drones Off Taiwan’s East Coast: The Strategic Implications

Unmanned aerial vehicles operating to the east of Taiwan serve multiple purposes for China: gathering intel, testing joint operations, and sending a political signal.

thediplomat.com · by Ying Yu Lin · May 20, 2023

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After launching a series of military exercises around Taiwan in April, China has increased rather than decreases its military activities in the vicinity of Taiwan. For one thing, it has sent unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on patrols off Taiwan’s east coast multiple times. These drones represent China’s progressive advancement in unmanned systems technology. They are not only available in sufficient quantities but also offer a wide variety of flight modes to choose from.

On April 27, one TB-001 (Twin-Tailed Scorpion) drone was spotted off Taiwan for the first time as it flew around the island counterclockwise within the air defense identification zone (ADIZ) claimed by Taipei. Five days later, one BZK-005 drone of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy flew along Taiwan’s east coastline clockwise. And on May 11, one CH-4 (Rainbow) drone of the PLA Army was present off Taiwan’s east coast, flying clockwise from north to south.

To begin with, what matters militarily is that these drones are not just flying vehicles; they count on flight guidance and data links to fulfill specific functions. For that reason, quite a few analysts view such vehicles more as unmanned aircraft systems than mere UAVs. Therefore, the PLA’s drone activities off Taiwan’s east coast were partly aimed at mapping routes; they were meant to test these drones’ navigation systems and gauge Taiwan’s reconnaissance capabilities at the same time.

The PLA would be particularly keen to find out whether, in the event of an escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait, its manned aircraft could fly relatively easily to the airspace east of Taiwan and launch strikes on the island from there, or whether these aircraft could verify or assess battle results from there. In light of Taiwan’s air defense capabilities, the answer that the PLA got was very likely negative. As a result, UAVs, rather than manned aircraft, became the PLA’s priority choice for the missions mentioned above.

In addition, also noteworthy is the possibility that the TB-001s of the PLA Air Force or Rocket Force, BZK-005s of the PLA Navy, and Rainbow 4s of the PLA Army of the Eastern Theater Command might be rehearsing joint operations procedures while taking turns patrolling the airspace east of Taiwan over the past few weeks. Integration of command and control systems across the services is a task for China’s theater commands. The effectiveness of such integration could be observed from the exercises around Taiwan, an aspect that observers will continue focusing their attention on.

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That PLA drones of all sorts have been able to function effectively is supposed to have been made possible by the BeiDou-3 navigation satellite system, which became operational in 2018. The BeiDou-3 system contributed to the effective integration of data links across different platforms and the application of the integrated links in realistic military exercises.

China’s use of drones also have implications for “grey zone” competition in the Taiwan Strait. Verbal confrontations sometimes occur between fighter pilots of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait in mid-air close encounters between them. During the Cold War, similar verbal exchanges also happened between Soviet Union and U.S. fighter pilots in standoffs between them in the sky. There are other ways to “get the message across” to the other side, such as using gestures or light signals in a forcible way.

Whatever the choice, the possibility of unintended consequences always exists. For instance, the 2001 collision between a Chinese warplane and a U.S. EP-3 spy plane over the South China Sea left in its wake long-running diplomatic tensions between Beijing and Washington.

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With the use of drones, unintended escalations could be avoided to a great extent. A drone is free of subjective human factors on the part of the pilot. It is theoretically subject to control from its ground control station. Drones are thus more suited for use in the grey zone between war and peace. And should an accident happen, the opposing two sides would find it easier to de-escalate the tensions as long as there are no casualties involved.

For example, in March 2023, a Russian Su-27 fighter jet forced down a U.S. MQ-9 Reaper over the Black Sea, but no armed conflict between the two countries happened as a result. In 2019, Iran shot down a U.S. RQ-4 Global Hawk. Before that, Iran even captured a U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel using electronic warfare techniques. Although Washington and Tehran have been using tough rhetoric against each other for years, they still refrained from taking further military action. Examples of this kind help other countries understand more about how to employ UAVs in a flexible manner.

The constant presence of PLA drones off Taiwan’s east coast suggests other objectives than preparing to attack military facilities in the eastern parts of the island. A more probable motivation is to collect information on eastern Taiwan, test the links between drones and the BeiDou-3 system, and conduct joint exercises alongside PLA Navy warships in the waters east of Taiwan.

There may also be an element of psychological warfare. The PLA started deploying UAVs to the airspace around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2013 in an attempt to disrupt Japan’s air defense for the islands step by step. At an UAV show in Beijing in 2014, aerial photos taken by civilian UAVs of the East China Sea and the disputed islands were put on display, serving as propaganda materials to the advantage of China.

Therefore, it is reasonable to suspect that China might use its drones flying around Taiwan to record videos of certain specific objects on the island, similar to the images released of military posts on Taiwan’s frontline Kinmen Islands in 2022. China’s drones might also harass Taiwan’s naval ships monitoring PLA Navy ships in the waters east of Taiwan. Video footage of this kind could be turned into materials for digital public opinion warfare that serve China’s interests. These tactical maneuvers by PLA drones may be seen more frequently in the coming years.

The manned-unmanned team-up being pursued by the PLA is a growing threat that Taiwan must take seriously. The threat could be neutralized by means of hard-skill solutions, such as physical destruction, or soft-kill ones in the form of electronic warfare. Whatever the choice, the most suitable course of action must be selected after careful military planning and consideration of diplomatic factors and cross-strait relations.

Taiwan’s chosen action plan should also be rehearsed in advance by relevant government agencies in political-military war games so that in the event of an emergency situation, no time would be lost and no government authorities would be caught unprepared. If not, Taiwan might not have enough time to make decisions. We might also fall into a trap set by the enemy and disclose unwittingly vital information about our countermeasures.

Ying Yu Lin

Dr. Ying Yu Lin is an assistant professor at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies Tamkang University in New Taipei City, Taiwan and a research fellow at the Association of Strategic Foresight. He received his Ph.D in the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tamkang University. His research interests include PLA studies and cybersecurity.

thediplomat.com · by Ying Yu Lin · May 20, 2023

22. China is preparing for war – and the West is preparing to surrender

UK perspective.

Excerpts:

Whitehall’s ambivalence about countering the Chinese threat head-on is also evident in the cautious approach adopted by ministers towards Beijing. After Sunak indicated he preferred to describe China as a “systematic challenge”, rather than a “threat”, James Cleverly, Truss’s successor at King Charles Street, warned against “pulling the shutters” down on China, instead preferring to “engage closely and regularly” with its communist leaders.

The problem with this approach, as was seen with Hong Kong, is that Beijing interprets this kind of equivocation as indicating the West has no real intention of confronting China over its intimidatory conduct, whether it is crushing democracy in Hong Kong or ending Taiwan’s independence.

One good way for Britain to show it is serious about holding Beijing to account would be to use its forthcoming membership of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to block China from obtaining membership, and propose that Taiwan joins the trade pact instead. That would send a clear signal to Beijing that the West is not going to tolerate any attempt by China to meddle with Taiwan’s sovereignty.

China is preparing for war – and the West is preparing to surrender

msn.com · by Con Coughlin 2 days ago

© Annabelle Chih/Getty Former British Prime Minister Liz Truss gives a speech at a forum held by Prospect Foundation on May 17, 2023 in Taipei - Annabelle Chih/Getty

Given the turmoil that surrounded Liz Truss’s short spell as prime minister, it is easy to overlook that, during the time she previously served as foreign secretary in Boris Johnson’s government, she acquitted herself well when tackling major global issues. While her predilection for photo-ops, such as posing in a tank, Margaret Thatcher-style, during a trip to Estonia in 2021, could cause toe-curling embarrassment, more often than not she had the right instincts on the big foreign policy calls she made on her watch.

She was robust in defending Ukrainian sovereignty in the wake of Russia’s invasion, and won plaudits for rallying support among European allies for imposing sanctions on Moscow. She also took a tough line on Britain’s feud with the EU over post-Brexit trading arrangements, so much so that at one point she topped the poll of Conservative voters’ favourite politician.

China, and the long-term challenge Beijing poses to Britain’s wellbeing, was another issue that was a central feature of Truss’s global outlook. Utterly refuting the Cameron/Osborne vision of establishing a new “golden era” in relations with Beijing, she wanted to make a declaration to the effect that China constituted a “threat” to Britain’s national security. She maintained this stance after becoming prime minister, even going so far as to call for the formation of an “economic Nato” to counter Beijing’s financial might.

Truss’s arrival in Taiwan this week, where she declared that the West must avoid appeasing China and should show unwavering support for Taipei’s democratically elected government, is therefore consistent with her hardline stance against China’s communist rulers.

Warning that China aims to use its global economic clout to “gain dominance” while undertaking “the biggest military build-up in peacetime history”, she called on the Western alliance “to do all we can to support free democracies like Taiwan in the face of aggression from a Chinese regime whose record we already know” – a reference to Beijing’s brutal suppression of democracy in Hong Kong. And she laid down a challenge to Rishi Sunak, who is visiting Japan for a G7 summit, to follow her lead in denouncing China as a threat to British security.

Beijing does not take kindly to prominent Western politicians making high-profile visits to Taiwan: it responded to then US House speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan last year by blockading the island and firing ballistic missiles into the surrounding sea. Its response to Truss’s visit has been more muted, not least because she is no longer a minister. A Chinese foreign ministry official simply denounced her trip as a “dangerous political stunt”.

But while critics will argue that her visit has been deliberately timed to upstage Sunak’s presence in the region, her assessment of the threat Beijing poses to both Taiwan’s future independence, as well as the wider world, deserves serious consideration.

In fairness to Sunak, Downing Street has grasped the importance of building new capabilities and alliances to counter the Chinese threat. Sunak has embraced the new Aukus pact between Australia, Britain and the US to build a new fleet of nuclear submarines, so much so that the lion’s share of the extra £11 billion he has pledged in defence spending will go towards boosting our nuclear submarine programme.

Even so, there are concerns that the pace of submarine construction, with the UK on average building only one nuclear submarine every five years, means it will be decades before the new fleet is ready to tackle Beijing’s military might. China, by contrast, builds between five and seven submarines each year. With US intelligence claiming the Chinese military will be ready to annex Taiwan by 2027, the new Aukus alliance has a lot of catching up to do if it is to pose a credible counter-balance to China’s military expansion. Certainly, there can be little question that Beijing is preparing itself for a major conflict – perhaps even against the West.

Whitehall’s ambivalence about countering the Chinese threat head-on is also evident in the cautious approach adopted by ministers towards Beijing. After Sunak indicated he preferred to describe China as a “systematic challenge”, rather than a “threat”, James Cleverly, Truss’s successor at King Charles Street, warned against “pulling the shutters” down on China, instead preferring to “engage closely and regularly” with its communist leaders.

The problem with this approach, as was seen with Hong Kong, is that Beijing interprets this kind of equivocation as indicating the West has no real intention of confronting China over its intimidatory conduct, whether it is crushing democracy in Hong Kong or ending Taiwan’s independence.

One good way for Britain to show it is serious about holding Beijing to account would be to use its forthcoming membership of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to block China from obtaining membership, and propose that Taiwan joins the trade pact instead. That would send a clear signal to Beijing that the West is not going to tolerate any attempt by China to meddle with Taiwan’s sovereignty.

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msn.com · by Con Coughlin 2 days ago

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com