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Quotes of the day:
“A critic is a man who creates nothing and thereby feels qualified to judge the work of creative men. There is a logic in this; he is unbiased – he hates all creative people equally.”
– Robert A. Heinlein, Time Enough for Love
"There are three things against which the human spirit struggles in vain: stupidity, bureaucracy, and catchwords."
– Hans von Seeckt
“You think your pain and your heartbreak are unprecedented in the history of the world, but then you read.”
– James Baldwin
1. Rubio says appointment process underway to find 'right person' for N.K. human rights envoy
2. Kim Jong Un’s fury after watching North Korea’s new navy destroyer crippled in botched launch
3. 'Serious' accident at North Korea warship launch ceremony
4. Kim Jong-un furious as North Korea warship partly ‘crushed’ in launch gone wrong
5. Reviving Sunshine: Lee Jae-Myung’s Path To Korean Peace
6. ‘Silence is complicity,’ warns activist who fled DPR Korea
7. North Korean defectors urge the UN to hold the country's leader accountable for rights abuses
8. Korean Church keeps up quest for reconciliation between peninsula’s two nations
9. South Korea’s Defining Vote: The 2025 Presidential Election
10. South Korea presidential hopefuls back US alliance, differ on adversary strategy
11. Art of the deal: Why Trump could struggle to bring North Korea back to talks
12. Workers scoff at 'worthless' propaganda materials as N. Korea demands impossible production goals
13. TIME TO MODERNIZE ROK MILITARY POLITICAL TRAINING
14. Washington DC’s 500 Most Influential People of 2025
1. Rubio says appointment process underway to find 'right person' for N.K. human rights envoy
My nomination is Greg Scarlatoiu, President and CEO of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. There is no one more qualified than Greg. So there is no one more tight than Greg. If we want to make an appointment based on merit in our bureaucratic meritocracy , there is no one more meritoriously deserving of this appointment than Greg. And most importantly he is a great American who is willing to serve our great nation in a very important cause.
Please see his bio here: https://www.hrnk.org/team/greg-scarlatoiu/
Rubio says appointment process underway to find 'right person' for N.K. human rights envoy | Yonhap News Agency
m-en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 22, 2025
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, May 21 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Wednesday that an appointment process is taking place to find the "right" person to fill the State Department post for special envoy for North Korean human rights issues.
The secretary made the remarks during a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, responding to a question by Rep. Young Kim (R-CA) about whether he has a plan to appoint someone to fill the post that has been vacant since former Special Envoy Julie Turner left in January.
"Yes and obviously, that's going through the process of the presidential personnel for the appointment process to find the right person ... make sure the vetting is cleared and so forth," Rubio said.
view larger image
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio testifies at a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on Capitol Hill in Washington on May 21, 2025 in this photo released by Reuters. (Yonhap)
He noted that initially, the administration prioritized appointments of assistant secretaries and other Senate confirmed positions.
"We are working through it, but obviously our intention is to have someone as the statute requires," he said.
Questions have lingered over whether the Trump administration would name a new special envoy amid a sense that it is paying less attention to foreign human rights issues.
The appointment of the special envoy for North Korean human rights is based on the North Korean Human Rights Act, which was first enacted in 2004 and is updated and reauthorized periodically.
Turner took the special envoy post in October 2023, filling a vacancy that had lasted more than six years.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
Keyword
m-en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 22, 2025
2. Kim Jong Un’s fury after watching North Korea’s new navy destroyer crippled in botched launch
Incompetence, an accident, or sabotage?
Regardless of course we might consider creating a narrative of internal sabotage to undermine regime legitimacy. While you can argue this would put some Korean people at risk to Kim's witch hunt by his security service, that witch hunt will occur regardless so we may as well exploit this (that is assuming we were willing to function a psychological operations campaign against Kim Jong Un in support of the Korean people in the north). And even if we are unwilling to create a sabotage narrative we need to report on the regime witch hunt and the brutal response by the regime. Of course RFA and VOA would be helpful in doing that but we have already given Kim Jog n Un a gift by dismantling them for the most part.
And we should not forget who Kim is most afraid of: it is not the Korean or US militaries. It is the Korean people in the north armed with information and in particular armed with information about South Korea, the example of which is an existential threat to the regime. So many opportunities for the ROK/US alliance and no one seems willing to exploit them.
Kim Jong Un’s fury after watching North Korea’s new navy destroyer crippled in botched launch | CNN
CNN · by Brad Lendon, Gawon Bae, Mike Valerio, Yoonjung Seo · May 22, 2025
This satellite image shows North Korea's second newest destroyer in Chongjin Shipyard, North Korea, on May 18, 2025, just days before it was damaged in a 'serious accident' during a launching ceremony.
Maxar Technologies
Seoul, South Korea CNN —
North Korea’s newest warship was severely damaged during a launch ceremony Wednesday, with leader Kim Jong Un, who witnessed the accident, saying it brought shame to the nation’s prestige and vowing to punish those found responsible, state media reported.
In a rare admission of failure, the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said a malfunction in the launch mechanism caused the stern of the as-yet unnamed 5,000-ton destroyer to slide prematurely into the water, crushing parts of the hull and leaving the bow stranded on the shipway.
Kim called the launch failure “a criminal act” and blamed it on “absolute carelessness” and “irresponsibility” by multiple state institutions - including the Munitions Industry Department, Kim Chaek University of Technology and the central ship design bureau.
According to a South Korean military analysis, the vessel is lying on its side in the water, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) spokesperson Lee Sung-joon said during a press briefing on Thursday.
Naval analysts said the damage incurred by a vessel in such a launch malfunction could be “catastrophic.” State media did not immediately release images of the accident.
“If the ship does not move together, the stresses will tear the hull apart,” Sal Mercogliano, a professor at Campbell University in North Carolina and a maritime expert, told CNN.
North Korea making what could be its largest, most advanced warship ever, new satellite photos show
Maxar Technologies
Related article North Korea is making what could be its largest, most advanced warship ever, new satellite photos show
Naval analyst Carl Schuster in Hawaii, after reviewing the KCNA account, said he thinks the stresses would “warp the hull, induce cracks and (possibly) snap the keel depending on where the greatest stress falls.”
The launch failure marks a setback for what analysts have viewed as North Korea’s most ambitious naval modernization effort in decades.
The ship was to be the second major navy surface vessel revealed in quick succession by North Korea. In April, Kim unveiled the Choe Hyon, the country’s first newly constructed destroyer in decades, and declared his ambition of building more destroyers and various cruisers and frigates.
The Choe Hyon, described as a “new generation” warship, was presented with significant fanfare with state media saying it would strengthen naval readiness amid what Pyongyang calls rising threats from the United States and South Korea.
Western defense analysts noted that the Choe Hyon marked a departure from the aging Soviet-era vessels that dominated the Korean People’s Navy. While details remain scarce, satellite imagery and footage suggested the Choe Hyon could share design elements with similar Russian navy ships.
Lee, the South Korean military spokesperson, said the vessel damaged on Wednesday was thought to be equipped like the Choe Hyon.
Wednesday’s incident could cast doubt on the country’s ability to scale its navy. Kim said the damage would be addressed not only through technical repairs, but political accountability.
He ordered the destroyer to be restored before the late June plenary session of the ruling Workers’ Party, calling the matter one of national honor.
However, considering the potential degree of damage, analysts said that it would be nearly impossible to meet Kim’s deadline.
Retired South Korean Adm. Kim Duk-ki told CNN that North Korea appeared to lack the necessary infrastructure – a dry dock – to launch a 5,000-ton destroyer, let alone recover and repair it.
A dry dock is a basin facility that can be filled with water to float a ship or drain out to build or repair one.
“Dry dock is an expensive facility, and North Korea probably doesn’t have one… It’s easy to repair a ship in a dry dock after draining water, but they don’t have the facility,” the retired admiral said, adding that restoration could take over four to five months.
South Korean lawmaker and defense analyst Yu Yong-weon said rushing the launch of the ship likely led to the problems encountered on Wednesday and warned hasty repairs could cause more problems down the line.
Schuster said repairs, if possible, are more likely to take months, rather than weeks.
An accident investigation group has been formed, and senior officials may face censure at the upcoming Party Central Committee meeting, an account from KCNA reported.
North Korea’s navy is often seen as the least developed branch of its military. The hastened pace of destroyer development has surprised some outside observers, raising questions about how much of the technology is functional versus symbolic.
Mercogliano, the US professor, said it’s unclear whether Pyongyang’s new warships even have engines as state media has provided no images of them underway.
CNN · by Brad Lendon, Gawon Bae, Mike Valerio, Yoonjung Seo · May 22, 2025
3. 'Serious' accident at North Korea warship launch ceremony
And of course another narrative is that the Russian advice, aid, and assistance is to blame. Russian technology and equipment is inferior and resulted in the accident.
Excerpts:
The South Korean military has said the Choe Hyon could have been developed with Russian help, possibly in exchange for Pyongyang deploying thousands of troops to help Moscow fight Ukraine.
Ahn Chan-il, a defector-turned-researcher who runs the World Institute for North Korea Studies, said the warship involved in Wednesday's accident may have also been constructed with Russian assistance.
Chongjin, the North Korean city where the launch ceremony was held, is close to Russia's Vladivostok port, he noted.
"It's also likely that the projected timeline for the vessel - including when assembly would be completed and the ship launched - was shared with the Russian side," he told AFP.
'Serious' accident at North Korea warship launch ceremony
22 May 2025 09:45AM
(Updated: 22 May 2025 01:03PM)
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SEOUL: A major accident occurred at a launch ceremony for a new North Korean naval destroyer, state media reported on Thursday (May 22), with leader Kim Jong Un saying the mishap was a "criminal act".
At a ceremony to launch a new 5,000-ton destroyer in the eastern port city of Chongjin on Wednesday, "a serious accident occurred", the official Korean Central News Agency said.
South Korea's military said North Korea also fired "multiple unidentified cruise missiles" on Thursday, which were detected near the North's South Hamgyong province after being "fired toward the East Sea", also known as the Sea of Japan.
Blaming "inexperienced command and operational carelessness" during the launch, which was being observed by Kim, KCNA said there was a mishap which left "some sections of the warship's bottom crushed".
It said the accident managed to "destroy the balance of the warship".
The report did not mention whether there were any casualties.
Kim watched the entire incident and declared it a "criminal act caused by absolute carelessness", warning it "could not be tolerated".
He said the "irresponsible errors" of officials responsible would be "dealt with at the plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee to be convened next month".
South Korea's military said US and Seoul intelligence authorities assess that North Korea's "side-launch attempt" of the ship failed.
"The side-launch method used in this case is no longer employed by South Korea's military," Lee Sung-jun, spokesperson for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters.
The vessel is currently listing in the water, Lee said, and based on its size and scale, it is believed to be similarly equipped to the 5,000-ton destroyer-class warship Choe Hyon, which North Korea unveiled last month.
Last month, Pyongyang's state media ran images of Kim attending a launching ceremony of Choe Hyon with his daughter Ju Ae, considered by many experts to be his likely successor.
North Korea claimed the vessel was equipped with the "most powerful weapons", and that it would "enter into operation early next year".
Some analysts said the ship could be equipped with short-range tactical missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads -- although North Korea has not proven it has the ability to miniaturise its atomic arsenal.
RUSSIAN CONNECTION?
The South Korean military has said the Choe Hyon could have been developed with Russian help, possibly in exchange for Pyongyang deploying thousands of troops to help Moscow fight Ukraine.
Ahn Chan-il, a defector-turned-researcher who runs the World Institute for North Korea Studies, said the warship involved in Wednesday's accident may have also been constructed with Russian assistance.
Chongjin, the North Korean city where the launch ceremony was held, is close to Russia's Vladivostok port, he noted.
"It's also likely that the projected timeline for the vessel - including when assembly would be completed and the ship launched - was shared with the Russian side," he told AFP.
"It appears the dock was hastily constructed, and multiple issues may have arisen during the shipbuilding process.
"With today's announcement, Pyongyang seems to be signalling not only to its own people, but also to the Russian side."
A satellite image shows the new North Korean warship at harbour before launch, in Chongjin, North Korea on May 18, 2025. (Photo: Reuters/Maxar Technologies)
STRENGTHENING THE NAVY
North Korea confirmed in April for the first time that it had deployed troops to Russia to support Moscow in the Ukraine war.
Moscow and Pyongyang recently announced that they had started building the first road bridge linking the two countries.
North Korea also launched a flurry of ballistic missiles last year in violation of UN sanctions.
In March, Kim inspected a project to build a nuclear-powered submarine, asserting that "radically" boosting the navy was a key part of Pyongyang's defensive strategy.
Kim called at the time for the modernisation of the country's surface and underwater naval forces, including the development of warships.
Pyongyang has previously claimed to be developing underwater nuclear attack drones, which could unleash a "radioactive tsunami", but analysts have questioned whether it actually has such a weapon.
Washington - Seoul's key security ally - has in recent years ramped up joint military exercises and increased the presence of strategic US assets in the region to deter the North, such as an aircraft carrier and a nuclear-powered submarine.
Pyongyang has repeatedly declared itself an "irreversible" nuclear weapons state and routinely denounces joint US-South Korea drills as rehearsals for invasion.
Source: AFP/nh
Newsletter
4. Kim Jong-un furious as North Korea warship partly ‘crushed’ in launch gone wrong
Laying on its side? Hopefully CSIS' Beyond Parallel or Stimson's 38 North will find some satellite images of the accident soon. They would of course be useful in a psychological operations campaign.
Kim Jong-un furious as North Korea warship partly ‘crushed’ in launch gone wrong
South Korea said the destroyer was lying sideways in the water after ceremony to launch the new 5,000-tonne ship
Justin McCurry in Tokyo and agencies
Thu 22 May 2025 00.50 EDT
The Guardian · by Justin McCurry · May 22, 2025
A ceremony to welcome a new addition to North Korea’s naval fleet has ended in embarrassment following a major accident during the ship’s launch that the country’s dictator, Kim Jong-un, described as a “criminal act”.
Kim was present when the 5,000-tonne destroyer appeared to go off balance during its launch in the eastern port city of Chongjin on Wednesday. The tipping caused damage to sections of the hull, the state-run KCNA news agency said on Thursday.
“Kim Jong-un made [a] stern assessment, saying that it was a serious accident and criminal act caused by absolute carelessness, irresponsibility … and could not be tolerated,” KCNA reported.
Kim ordered the ship restored before a key meeting of the ruling Workers’ party next month, KCNA added. The accident had “brought the dignity and self-respect of our state to a collapse”.
Blaming “inexperienced command and operational carelessness” during the launch, the news agency said the incident left “some sections of the warship’s bottom crushed”. Officials found responsible for the debacle would be “dealt with at the plenary meeting of the party central committee” in June, Kim said.
Delays, edits, and no Son Heung-min: how North Korea watches the Premier League
Read more
South Korea’s military said the vessel was lying on its side in the water.
In a report issued last week on preparations for the launch, US-based 38 North said it appeared the ship would be side-launched from the quay, a method not previously observed in North Korea. “The use of this launch method could be one of necessity, as the quay where the ship is being built does not have an incline,” the 38 North report said. Commercial satellite imagery of the shipyard the day before the launch showed the destroyer positioned on the quay with support vessels by its side.
The ship was the second 5,000-tonne destroyer-class vessel – the biggest in the North Korean fleet – to have been launched in recent weeks. State media ran images of Kim attending a ceremony at the earlier launch with his daughter Ju Ae, considered by many experts to be his likely successor.
This picture taken on 25 April 2025 and released from North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency shows the launch ceremony of a newly built destroyer. Photograph: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP/Getty Images
North Korea claimed that vessel, named the Choe Hyon, was equipped with the “most powerful weapons” and that it would “enter into operation early next year”.
Some analysts said the ship could be equipped with short-range tactical nuclear missiles – although North Korea has not proven it has the ability to miniaturise its atomic bombs.
The South Korean military has said the Choe Hyon could have been developed with Russian help, possibly in exchange for Pyongyang deploying thousands of troops to help Moscow in its war against Ukraine. Ahn Chan-il, a North Korean defector who runs the World Institute for North Korea Studies, pointed out that Chongjin is conveniently close to the Russian port of Vladivostok.
“It’s also likely that the projected timeline for the vessel – including when assembly would be completed and the ship launched – was shared with the Russian side,” Ahn said. “It appears the dock was hastily constructed, and multiple issues may have arisen during the shipbuilding process.”
While the usually secretive North has previously disclosed failed satellite launches and the destruction caused by natural disasters, some analysts said the regime had been surprisingly quick to report Wednesday’s incident.
“It shows again Kim Jong-un’s ruling style of cutting off negative rumours from spreading and controlling officials more forcefully by being open about it rather than hiding it,” said Cheong Seong-chang at the Sejong Institute in Seoul.
While much of Kim’s focus has been on missile development and forging closer ties with Russia, he inspected a project to build a nuclear-powered submarine in March and said “radically” boosting the navy was a key part of the North’s defences.
He called for the modernisation of the country’s surface and underwater naval forces, including the development of warships.
The Guardian · by Justin McCurry · May 22, 2025
5. Reviving Sunshine: Lee Jae-Myung’s Path To Korean Peace
A few thoughts when we were preparing for the possibility of the catastrophic collapse of north Korea in the 1990s.
CATASTROPHIC COLLAPSE OF NORTH KOREA: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES MILITARY
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA314274.pdf
We believed (and most of us still believe - or at least Bob Collins and me) that regime collapse will occur when the Korean Workers Party (the regime) can no longer govern all the territory in the north from Pyongyang and the breakdown of the three military chains of control resulting in the the loss of coherence and support of the military for the regime. In short this is the combination of the loss of central governing effectiveness combined with the loss of coherency and support of the military.
We thought this was imminent in 1996 after three years of famine resulting in possibly some 3 million deaths as a result of the conditions of the Arduous March and especially the collapse of the party's public distribution system and the ability to feed the people.
Why did north Korea not collapse? One reason is the Sunshine Policy that saved the Kim family regime by transferring perhaps billions of dollars to the regime. The other is the resilience of the Korean people in the north who developed their own markets, i.e., nascent capitalism, that helped them survive to this day. (though the advent of COVID Kim Jong Un took the opportunity to crack down on markets, foreign currency, information, etc) to re-establish control of the people thus trying to take away their relief valve or safety mechanism of the markets.
But the fundamental premise of the Sunshine policy should be challenged. Does extending the carrots of the Sunshine policy lead to a change in regime behavior. Did it (or will it) cause the regime to seek peaceful coexistence or does it create further opportunities for Kim Jong Un to execute his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies. Recall that at the end of the Sunshine Policy (its successor under Roh - the Peace and Prosperity Policy) Kim Il Sung tested the first of 6 nuclear weapons tests (in 2006).
A re-initiation of the Sunshine Policy in whatever form or name sends a clear message to Kim that his political warfare and blackmail strategies are working and thus he should double down to extract more political and economic concessions, continue to subvert the South korean political system and drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance.
So is a new SUnshine Policy the right path forward for South Korea and the ROK/US Alliance?
Reviving Sunshine: Lee Jae-Myung’s Path To Korean Peace – OpEd
eurasiareview.com · by Simon Hutagalung · May 21, 2025
If Lee Jae-myung secures the South Korean presidency in June 2025, he will inherit a peninsula characterized by increasing strategic risks, significant economic disparities, and a North Korea that has been emboldened by a renewed partnership with Moscow.
In this context, a revitalized Sunshine Policy focused on engagement rather than isolation presents a way to reduce tensions. However, it must be accompanied by rigorous verification, ongoing diplomatic efforts, and a credible third-party intermediary to bridge the competing interests of Pyongyang, Seoul, Washington, and other regional stakeholders.
The original Policy Sunshine, enacted under President Kim Dae-jung from 1998 to 2008, achieved significant milestones: three inter-Korean summits, the creation of the Kaesong Industrial Complex that employed 54,000 North Korean workers, and regular family reunions. However, by 2016, Pyongyang’s intensified nuclear and missile programs led Seoul to suspend many cooperative projects. Critics contended that the economic incentives had not succeeded in restraining the North’s weapons development and ambitions. By 2024, inter-Korean trade had fallen to zero for the first time since formal relations began in 1989. This stark decline highlights how engagement that lacks enforceable verification can exacerbate deep-seated strategic mistrust.
Lee Jae-myung’s policy platform aims to learn from past shortcomings by incorporating stringent oversight mechanisms into any revival of engagement. His proposals include the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement, which halted propaganda blasts along the Demilitarized Zone—an arrangement that previously reduced civilian risks in border communities. He also links humanitarian aid to specific benchmarks for denuclearization. Additionally, he advocates for targeted assistance for malnourished North Korean children, citing data from the World Food Programme, which classifies hunger in the DPRK as “serious,” with a Hunger Global score index of 31. Furthermore, chronic stunting rates among children in North Korea are among the highest in East Asia. By linking food security programs with joint climate initiatives, Seoul could enhance resilience in flood-prone regions and build trust through apolitical channels.
The environmental strategy for 2025 remains problematic. On January 6, a new intermediate-hypersonic missile was successfully test-fired, featuring a glide vehicle that traveled approximately 1,100 kilometers before landing in the East Sea. In May, North Korea conducted multiple short-range ballistic missile launches—its first such tests since March—indicating the country’s ongoing efforts to enhance its strike capabilities and challenge conventional deterrence. South Korean military assessments report nearly a 20 percent increase in missile test frequency compared to 2024 levels, a trend that raises the risk of miscalculation and potential regional escalation.
One of the compounding threats is the strengthening alliance between Russia and North Korea. In June 2024, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un signed the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in Pyongyang, which reintroduced a mutual defense clause obligating both nations to provide military and other assistance if either faces aggression. Since then, Pyongyang has sent 15,000 troops in two waves to support Russia’s operations in Ukraine, resulting in approximately 4,700 casualties, including about 600 deaths, according to the South Korean National Intelligence Service. These deployments not only show Pyongyang’s readiness to utilize manpower overseas but also suggest that Moscow may be providing North Korea with advanced air defense and reconnaissance technology in return for artillery and shells.
Given the complex interplay of security, economic, and diplomatic factors, a successful strategy requires an impartial mediator. Suitable candidates include neutral middle powers like Switzerland and Indonesia, which maintain formal ties with both Koreas, as well as United Nations agencies such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which has previously managed cross-border deliveries under sanction exemptions. Acting as mediators, these entities could facilitate confidence-building measures, such as reactivating military hotlines to minimize misunderstandings, jointly supervising health programs to combat tuberculosis outbreaks among border populations, and managing a reopened liaison office staffed by accredited personnel to alleviate espionage concerns.
Domestic yet international challenges persist. South Korea faces opposition from bereaved families of abductees and conservative parties against sanctions or any relief unless there are verifiable steps toward denuclearization. Public opinion is divided: while around 51 percent support President Lee, only about one-third favor immediate concessions to Pyongyang without any corresponding actions. Meanwhile, the United States continues its maximum-pressure policy, linking any rollback of sanctions to concrete benchmarks for weapons dismantlement, while upholding its Extended Deterrence guarantee, which includes THAAD battery carriers and strike groups. Meanwhile, China’s position is ambivalent; it rhetorically opposes broad multilateral sanctions, yet it fears destabilization along its border and a loss of regional influence if the Peninsula descends into conflict.
Ultimately, the test of Lee Jae-myung’s presidency will be whether a data-driven and responsibly calibrated Sunshine framework can thrive in a multipolar environment where Pyongyang exploits great power rivalries to its advantage. Robust embedding verification, sustained diplomatic engagement, and effective third-party mediation offer the most plausible route to de-escalation. However, without an impartial mediator to maintain momentum, ensure compliance, and manage the differing interests of Seoul, Washington, Beijing, and Moscow, old patterns of mistrust may quickly resurface. To ensure lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula beyond June 2025, building that bridge will be just as essential as developing the policy itself.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.
References
- Lee Jae-Myung’s Inter-Korean Gamble: Reviving Sunshine in a Nuclear Age. Eurasia Review, May 1, 2025.
- Dealing with North Korea as It Deepens Military Cooperation with Russia. RAND Corporation, March 2025.
- North Korean Leader Calls Support for Russia in Ukraine a ‘Sacred Mission. Stars and Stripes, May 12, 2025.
eurasiareview.com · by Simon Hutagalung · May 21, 2025
6. ‘Silence is complicity,’ warns activist who fled DPR Korea
This is why we need a human rights upfront approach. Human rights must be on every agenda when we engage with north Korea. Do not accept the erroneous (and dangerous) argument that we must avoid human rights to get a denuclearization agreement. We must understand the fundamental nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. We must understand the fundamental strategic assumption: Kim Jong Un is not going to negotiate away his nuclear weapons. Therefore when we engage north Korea on any issue we must include human rights. We should recall that even as President Reagan negotiated nuclear agreements with the USSR he never neglected human rights (to Gorbachev - "tear down this wall.") President Trump needs to say - "Open up the DMZ." (and seek a free and unified Korea) - There is no Nobel Peace Prize for simply engaging north Korea like Kim Dae Jung received (and because of the circumstances of his prize the only way that there will be a Nobel Prize for Korea is through achieving a free and unified Korea, nothing less).
‘Silence is complicity,’ warns activist who fled DPR Korea
news.un.org · May 20, 2025
20 May 2025 Human Rights
When human rights activist Eunju Kim was 11, her mother and older sister left, telling her they were going in search of food. For six days and six nights, Ms. Kim counted from one to 100 over and over again, desperate for their return.
When they eventually did, her mother said to her, “If you are going to die anyway, better to be shot crossing the two-mile border than starve here.”
Shortly thereafter they fled from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, more commonly known as North Korea.
Ms. Kim gave testimony to the UN General Assembly on Tuesday during a meeting convened to discuss human rights abuses and violations in DPRK: “The human rights situation in the country has been of grave concern for years, and, in many respects, is deteriorating,” Ilze Brands Kehris, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, told delegates.
The representative from DPRK denounced the meeting, insisting that the information presented was a “fabrication.”
Wide-ranging abuses
North Koreans have been forced to exist in “absolute isolation” for many years, according to UN Special Rapporteur on human rights for the country, Elizabeth Salmón.
The independent UN Human Rights Council-appointed expert said this isolation has exacerbated the impact of multiple rights violations which include forced labour systems, infringement on freedom of expression and movement, torture and the forced disappearance of hundreds of thousands of civilians.
The DPRK has also denied entry to humanitarian aid despite UN data which suggests that it is desperately needed – 11.8 million people, or 45 per cent of the population, are estimated to be undernourished and more than half the population lacks adequate sanitation.
Instead of social services, Pyongyang has prioritized militarisation, exacerbating human rights violations, said the Special Rapporteur.
“As the DPRK expands its extreme militarization policies, it exacerbates the extensive reliance on forced labour and quota systems, showing how peace, security and human rights are strongly interrelated,” Ms. Salmón said.
‘Please do not turn away’
Ms. Kim pleaded with delegates and UN officials to take action.
“Please do not turn away from the innocent lives being lost in North Korea and elsewhere. Silence is complicity,” she said.
Ms. Kehris noted that the international community has taken many steps in past decades to address ongoing human rights abuses in the DPRK but that these actions have failed the change the status quo.
“Given the gravity and scale of the violations, and inability or unwillingness of the [DPRK] to pursue accountability, international accountability options must be considered, including referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court,” she said.
Despite such challenges, the senior official did note that Pyongyang has shown “increased willingness” to engage with her office, OHCHR.
In September, OHCHR is due to present a report to the Human Rights Council which will make new proposals on improving the situation.
In her remarks, Ms. Salmón insisted that long-term accountability for the DPRK must go hand in hand with peace.
“Peace is a foundation for human rights. Human rights cannot thrive without peace. In this rapidly developing political climate, we must act together to prevent geopolitical tensions from destabilizing the Korean Peninsula,” she said.
Hope for the future
It has been more than 25 years since Ms. Kim fled: “One day, I hope to return to North Korea, hand in hand with my daughters, to show them a North Korea not defined by control and fear but filled with freedom and hope,” she said.
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news.un.org · May 20, 2025
7. North Korean defectors urge the UN to hold the country's leader accountable for rights abuses
Again, human rights are a moral imperative and a national security issue. Kim Jong Un denies the human rights of the Korean people to make money for the regime, develops advanced military weapons, a regime in power.
North Korean defectors urge the UN to hold the country's leader accountable for rights abuses
newsday.com · by The Associated PressMay 20, 2025 8:05 pm
UNITED NATIONS — Eunju Kim, who escaped starvation in North Korea in 1999, was sent back from China and fled a second time, told the United Nations on Tuesday that the country’s leader must be held accountable for gross human rights violations.
Gyuri Kang, whose family faced persecution for her grandmother’s religious beliefs, fled the North during the COVID-19 pandemic. She told the General Assembly that three of her friends were executed — two for watching South Korean TV dramas.
At the high-level meeting of the 193-member world body, the two women, both now living in South Korea, described the plight of North Koreans who U.N. special investigator Elizabeth Salmón said have been living in “absolute isolation” since the pandemic began in early 2020.
Thousands of North Koreans have fled the country since the late 1990s, but the numbers have dwindled drastically in recent years.
Salmón said North Korea’s closure of its borders worsened an already dire human rights situation, with new laws enacted since 2020 and stricter punishments, including the death penalty and public executions.
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In another rights issue, she said, the deployment of North Korean troops to support Russia in its war against Ukraine has raised concerns about “the poor human rights conditions of its soldiers while in service, and the government’s widespread exploitation of its own people.”
The North's “extreme militarization” enables it to keep the population under surveillance and it exploits the work force through a state-controlled system that finances its expanding nuclear program and military ventures, Salmón said.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, speaks with North Korean officers after the Victory Day military parade in Moscow, Russia, Friday, May 9, 2025, during celebrations of the 80th anniversary of the Soviet Union's victory over Nazi Germany during the World War II. Credit: AP/Gavriil Grigorov
North Korea’s U.N. Ambassador Kim Song called the allegations that his country violates human rights “a burlesque of intrigue and fabrication" and insisted that tens of millions of North Koreans enjoy human rights under the country's socialist system. He accused the West of being the bigger violator, through racial discrimination, human trafficking and sexual slavery.
But the two defectors and human rights defenders detailed numerous abuses.
Kim, who said her father died of starvation, told U.N. diplomats that after making it to China across the Tumen River the first time, she, her mother and sister were sold for the equivalent of less than $300 to a Chinese man. Three years later, they were arrested and sent back to the North. In 2002, they escaped again across the river.
Kang, who was banished to the countryside as a 5-year-old because of her grandmother’s religious beliefs, said she became the owner of a 10-meter (33-foot) wooden fishing boat and escaped on it in October 2023 with her mother and aunt.
The United Nations flag flies on a stormy day at the U.N. during the United Nations General Assembly, Sept. 22, 2022. Credit: AP/Ted Shaffrey
She said she was lucky to have access to information about the outside world and to have been given a USB with South Korean TV dramas, which she said she found “so refreshing and more credible than North Korea state propaganda,” though she knew being caught could mean death.
“Three of my friends were executed, two of them in public for distributing South Korean dramas,” Kang said. “One of them was only 19 years old. … It was as if they were guilty of heinous crimes.”
She expressed hope that her speech would “awaken the North Korean people” and help them “to point in the direction of freedom.”
Kim accused North Korea of sending soldiers to fight in Ukraine without them knowing where they were going and using them as cannon fodder to make money.
“This is a new and unacceptable form of human trafficking,” she said.
Kim called for the country's leader, Kim Jong Un, to be investigated and held accountable by the International Criminal Court.
Addressing the world’s nations, she said: “Silence is complicity. Stand firm against the regime’s systematic atrocities.”
Sean Chung, head of Han Voice, who spoke on behalf of a global coalition of 28 civil society organizations, called on China and all other countries to end forced repatriations to North Korea.
He called on U.N. member nations to urge the Security Council to refer North Korea to the International Criminal Court, and to impose and enforce sanctions on “every official and entity credibly found to be responsible for North Korea’s atrocity crimes.”
newsday.com · by The Associated PressMay 20, 2025 8:05 pm
8. Korean Church keeps up quest for reconciliation between peninsula’s two nations
Unfortunately peace and reconciliation can only come after there is a regime transformation in the north and new leadership emerges that does not embrace the Kim family regime ideology and methods. And advocating for two nations is contrary to Korean history (5000 years), culture, and the Korean constitution. And worse, advocating for two countries continues the sentence to life in prison for 25 million Koreans in the north living under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.
Korean Church keeps up quest for reconciliation between peninsula’s two nations
catholicnewsagency.com · by CNA
ACI Prensa Staff, May 21, 2025 / 06:00 am
Eight decades after the partition of the Korean peninsula, the Catholic Church in South Korea remains one of the few actors that, with perseverance and faith, keeps alive the hope for reconciliation between the two Koreas.
“Hatred and suspicion can never be a solution,” Bishop Simon Kim Jong-Gang, president of the Korean Reconciliation Commission, told ACI Prensa, CNA’s Spanish-language news partner.
Last month, the Korean bishop led a pilgrimage to Kyodong Island on the border with North Korea in a gesture that highlighted the Church’s commitment to reconciliation between the two countries. The bishops walked along the three-mile barbed-wire fence on the island that has divided the two countries since the Korean War (1950–1953) and prayed that the two countries would put their differences behind them.
South Korean bishops walking alongside the barbed wire fence that has divided the two countries since the Korean War in 1953. Credit: Courtesy of South Korean Bishops' Conference
For 80 years, soldiers on both sides of the demarcation line at the Panmunjom Peace Village in the Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas have stood guard face to face, armed and under the pressure that any minor incident could trigger a new war. In 2018, as part of agreements between the two countries to build mutual trust, the Joint Security Area was cleared of firearms and military posts.
But this openness was short-lived. In early 2020, North Korea closed its borders due to the COVID-19 pandemic and again ordered its soldiers to shoot at any movement across the border.
Kim noted that there are no exchanges between South and North Korea. “It’s impossible to meet people, exchange letters or phone calls, or even send emails between the two sides of Korea.”
Indeed, since the failure of the diplomatic process that attempted to reestablish communications between North Korea and the United States in 2019 and the closure of borders due to the pandemic, isolation has become total.
Five years without any exchanges
“In the past five years, South Korea and North Korea have not had any official exchanges, either at the governmental or civil level,” the bishop lamented. Before that, “there were some meetings and some correspondence, but lately there has been no news.”
In any case, he said that at this historic moment North Korea “is preparing to reopen to the international community.”
“There are rumors that embassies and international organizations are preparing to return to Pyongyang and that some areas are attracting foreign tourists,” he noted.
During the pilgrimage, the bishop said he could “easily see the other side.”
“I always experience the same feeling when walking along the barbed-wire fence. The South and the North are really close,” he explained.
This walk for peace gave him a certain sense of closeness. “If someone on the other side had shouted, I would have been able to hear it. I hope that trust between the South and the North will be restored as soon as possible,” he remarked.
Thousands of families torn apart and divided
(Story continues below)
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One of the most moving moments of the day was the meeting with an elderly man who fled North Korea during the Korean War and now lives in Seoul. Today, he is 90 years old, but his age doesn’t prevent him from returning to Kyodong Island nearly every week.
“He came to the island fleeing the Korean War and lived there for many years. He didn’t want to leave his homeland,” Kim recounted. “He visits Kyodong Do almost once a week, although the round trip by public transport takes him between four and five hours.”
The bishops met with a 90-year-old man who fled North Korea during the Korean War and now lives in Seoul. Credit: Courtesy of Episcopal Conference of South Korea
His story exemplifies the rift left by the division, with thousands of families unable to see one another for years. “For 80 years, North and South have lived with mutual distrust and hatred. This hatred and distrust still have a great impact on our society,” the bishop lamented.
A persecuted Church
During the Korean War, communist troops persecuted missionaries, foreign religious, and Korean Christians, pursuing them to the south. In North Korea, all monasteries and churches were destroyed. Monks and priests who could not flee were sentenced to death.
Today, the Church in North Korea has neither clergy nor religious services. However, according to official data, there are approximately 4,000 North Korean Catholics belonging to the Korean Catholic Association, controlled by the communist regime. This association, which does not recognize the pope’s role in appointing bishops, has only one church in the country, in Changchun, which is considered window dressing by the regime.
The Korean bishop hopes to one day be able to communicate with “the Catholic community in North Korea and also receive news from them.”
In this regard, he noted that the Catholic Church in South Korea is one of the few voices trying to build bridges despite the hostility.
“I know it’s difficult to easily change this mistrust toward North Korea, as it’s a feeling that has persisted for 80 years. But the Church teaches us that we cannot build new relationships with hatred and mistrust,” Kim said.
Small steps toward reconciliation
In recent years, the Catholic Church has organized international forums and meetings. For example, in 2022, the Commission for National Reconciliation of the Korean Bishops’ Conference, together with American institutions, organized a conference in Washington, D.C., titled “The Role of Religion for Peace on the Korean Peninsula.”
“This event was attended by bishops from Korea and the United States, government and legislative officials from both countries, and academics from think tanks. The Vatican’s apostolic nuncio to the United States also attended, expressing his solidarity for peace on the Korean Peninsula,” the bishop explained.
Added to this are the peace forums held in 2023 with dioceses from Japan and the United States, and the entry, in 2024, of several Korean, Japanese, and American dioceses into the Partnership for a World Without Nuclear Weapons (PWNW) network.
For Kim, these initiatives are also a call to peace: “It is the duty of Christians throughout the world who know and practice the peace of Christ to constantly criticize and warn political leaders who promote military security based on nuclear weapons, so that they may awaken from their illusion.”
Kim acknowledged that reunification lacks enthusiasm among young South Koreans, who are experiencing other pressing needs.
“It’s a global phenomenon, but in Korea, too, we’re seeing a decline in quality jobs. Even if you study for many years, it’s not easy to find a good job. Housing prices have risen considerably, making it difficult to buy a home,” he explained.
Younger generations in South Korea fear that “if exchanges between North and South Korea increase, South Korea will have to help the North financially. That’s why some young people oppose that. I completely understand.”
In any case, the bishop insists that if the internal conflicts caused by division are not resolved, “social stability, political integration, and economic development will always be limited.”
“Christ’s teaching is to live as brothers and sisters. When we work together courageously to create a path toward peace, the lives of our descendants can improve,” he concluded.
World Youth Day 2027 is to be held in Seoul, the capital of South Korea.
This story was first published by ACI Prensa, CNA’s Spanish-language news partner. It has been translated and adapted by CNA.
As a journalist, Victoria Cardiel has specialized in social and religious news. Since 2013, she has covered the Vatican for various media outlets, including Europa Press and Alfa and Omega, the weekly newspaper of the Archdiocese of Madrid.
catholicnewsagency.com · by CNA
9. South Korea’s Defining Vote: The 2025 Presidential Election
What will June 4th bring? (the day after the Presidential election).
Excerpt:
In conclusion, the election on June 3, 2025, will decide whether South Korea embarks on a new path of adaptive multilateralism—utilizing diversified partnerships and state-guided technological investments—or returns to a transactional approach focused on market liberalization, alliances, and consolidation. The four candidates—Lee Jae-myung, Kim Moon-soo, Lee Jun-seok, and Kwon Young-guk—highlight the strategic crossroads facing the nation: a choice between state resilience and unfettered markets, the primacy of alliances versus multipolarity, and a balance between militarized deterrence and conditional dialogue with Pyongyang.
South Korea’s Defining Vote: The 2025 Presidential Election – OpEd
eurasiareview.com · by Simon Hutagalung · May 20, 2025
The 2025 South Korean presidential election marks a crucial turning point, occurring on June 3, 2025, as a snap vote following the impeachment of President Yoon Suk. This election serves as a referendum on the nation’s economic and strategic direction.
Four prominent candidates are in the race. Jae Lee-myung of the Democratic Party advocates for pragmatic diplomacy, alongside significant government investment in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and renewable energy. Meanwhile, Moon Kim-soo, representing the conservative People Power Party, pushes for extensive deregulation and a reduction in corporate tax rates from 22 percent to 18 percent. He also proposes a transactional approach to the U.S.–Korea alliance, emphasizing increased burden-sharing for the 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in Korea. Jun Lee-seok of the New Reform Party promotes a libertarian approach to conservatism, advocating for meritocratic competition over government aid, with an unwavering stance against unconditional support for North Korea. He also supports private-sector initiatives focused on defense-led digital advancements and interoperability. In contrast, Young Kwon-guk of the Justice Party champions social-liberal policies, including enhanced labor rights, anti-discrimination legislation, and humanitarian efforts aimed at achieving reunification based on equality and human rights.
South Korea’s export-oriented economy is heavily reliant on semiconductors, which accounted for 21 percent of exports in 2024, totaling $141.9 billion. U.S. “reciprocal” tariffs of up to 25 percent on chips and steel have put pressure on manufacturers and contributed to a sluggish GDP growth of just 1.2 percent in early 2025. In response, Acting President Han Duck-soo announced a support package worth 33 trillion won (approximately $25 billion) in April 2025. This package increases low-interest loans for chipmakers from 17 trillion to 20 trillion won and introduces production tax credits of up to 10 percent to help offset U.S. duties and maintain global competitiveness. Additionally, Lee Jae-myung has proposed a $12 billion stabilization fund along with incentives for AI startups, while Lee Jun-seok criticizes protectionism as detrimental to fair competition and advocates for merit-based market reforms instead. Kwon Young-guk suggests providing targeted assistance for small and medium-sized enterprises, along with enhanced social safety nets, while dismissing broad corporate subsidies as financially imprudent.
The United States–South Korea military alliance, supported by approximately 500 American troops under the 1966 Status of Forces Agreement, is crucial for deterring North Korean aggression. Seoul’s current annual contribution of USD 1.09 billion, renegotiated in October, became contentious for 2024 when former President Trump demanded an increase to USD 2.2 billion. Kim Moon-ha has indicated a willingness to consider higher payments in exchange for permanent basing guarantees and joint development programs in missile defense and cybersecurity. Meanwhile, Jae Lee-myung cautions that financial contributions should be balanced against reciprocal U.S. commitments, including conditional technology transfers and joint military exercises. In contrast, Lee Jun-seok advocates for private-sector-led defense collaborations and frameworks for digital interoperability. Kwon Young-guk, on the other hand, advocates for a shift in U.S. bases towards international peacekeeping training centers. He emphasizes prioritizing diplomatic conflict resolution measures instead of engaging in escalatory burden-sharing standoffs.
Engagement with Russia and the legacy of Soviet-era ties to North Korea add further strategic complexities. In 2024, bilateral trade with Moscow totaled only USD 16 billion, less than 3 percent of South Korea’s total trade. Nevertheless, Russia remains a crucial energy conduit, and Pyongyang historically retains leverage from its cooperation with the USSR. Lee Jae advocates for cautious cooperation in civil nuclear research and the opening of Arctic shipping routes, which could reduce freight times by up to ten days. This approach aims to diversify energy imports and mitigate the impact of U.S. spillover tariffs, according to Reuters. However, Moon Kim-soo warns that a close alignment with Moscow could fracture consensus within the Atlantic alliance and compromise Seoul’s commitments to Ukraine and liberal democratic norms. Lee Jun echoes pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong and advocates for targeted sanctions on Russian entities, rejecting any broad energy deals that could enable the Kremlin’s overreach. Young Kwon urges restraint and proposes that South Korea lead a coalition prioritizing human rights in Russian engagement, while also avoiding sanctions spillover on domestic firms.
Reunification of the Korean Peninsula remains a complex issue, with the IMF projecting integration costs exceeding USD 1.5 trillion over twenty years. An HRC Opinion survey indicates that 82 percent of South Koreans support eventual reunification; however, only 37 percent are willing to accept concessions as immediate preconditions. Jae Lee suggests a phased engagement strategy through special economic zones, which could boost inter-Korean trade by eight percent annually. He also advocates for the resumption of family reunions and joint infrastructure projects, such as reconnecting rail links, all under strict compliance metrics. While Kim Moon insists that credible verification of denuclearization and the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear assets must occur before any substantive economic integration, to protect taxpayers. Lee Jun champions the idea that reunification should facilitate the peaceful absorption of North Korea into a democratic system, firmly opposing the current regime and emphasizing the need for a regime transition. Finally, Kwon Young-guk emphasizes humanitarian priorities, including the urgent delivery of food and medicine, protections for North Korean defectors, and the establishment of a National Reconciliation Commission to promote equitable social integration.
The intersection of policy, economic resilience, alliance management, multipolar diversification, and reunification creates a complex landscape for the incoming administration. Innovative fiscal tools, such as sovereign wealth funds and digital levies, can help balance social welfare priorities with the demands of defense modernization. Diplomatic coherence will be essential for guiding multilateral engagements and preventing diplomatic drift or punitive backlashes. Additionally, leveraging public-private partnerships in technology and innovation can enhance efficiency, but it is crucial to ensure ethical oversight to safeguard transparency and accountability. Any approach to reunification must balance moral imperatives with fiscal realities and human rights protections.
In conclusion, the election on June 3, 2025, will decide whether South Korea embarks on a new path of adaptive multilateralism—utilizing diversified partnerships and state-guided technological investments—or returns to a transactional approach focused on market liberalization, alliances, and consolidation. The four candidates—Lee Jae-myung, Kim Moon-soo, Lee Jun-seok, and Kwon Young-guk—highlight the strategic crossroads facing the nation: a choice between state resilience and unfettered markets, the primacy of alliances versus multipolarity, and a balance between militarized deterrence and conditional dialogue with Pyongyang.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.
REFERENCES
- Kim, H.-J. & Song, S. A. (2025, May 18). South Korea’s presidential candidates face off in a fiery debate. Reuters.
- Jeong, H. (2025, May 19). South Korea presidential candidate Kim says open to discussing US troop cost. Reuters.
- Lee, J. (2025, May 13). South Korean presidential frontrunner Lee Jae-myung’s policy pledges. Reuters
eurasiareview.com · by Simon Hutagalung · May 20, 2025
10. South Korea presidential hopefuls back US alliance, differ on adversary strategy
With the divisiveness of Korean politics, it is surprising to see such a photo and it should give people hope. I doubt we will ever see American presidential candidates grip and grin this way.
South Korea presidential hopefuls back US alliance, differ on adversary strategy
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi and Yoojin Lee · May 20, 2025
South Korean presidential candidates, from left, Kim Moon-soo of the People Power Party, Kwon Young-kook of the Democratic Labor Party, Lee Jun-seok of the New Reform Party and Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party pose after a televised debate in Seoul on May 18, 2025. (Lee Jae-myung)
The presidential candidates representing South Korea’s two largest political parties agreed on the importance of the country’s relationship with the United States during a recent televised debate but differed on how to handle its adversaries.
Lee Jae-myung of the liberal Democratic Party and Kim Moon-soo of the conservative People Power Party reaffirmed the 72-year U.S.-South Korea alliance as foundational to the country’s security.
Kim and Lee “totally understand the importance of the South Korea-U.S. alliance,” Hahm Sung Deuk, dean of Kyonggi University’s Graduate School of Political Studies, said by phone Tuesday. “The only difference is their approaches toward North Korea, China, Taiwan and Russia.”
Kim, formerly the minister of Employment and Labor, has taken a hardline stance against North Korea, China and Russia, Hahm said. Lee advocated a more engagement-focused approach to foreign policy, he added.
Kim pledged to meet with President Donald Trump following South Korea’s June 3 presidential election to discuss North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, China relations and trade.
“Trust is the most important thing in the discussion with Trump,” he said in response to a moderator’s question during Sunday’s debate. “We can only bolster the South Korea-U.S. alliance when we can trust each other.”
Lee agreed the alliance is “a core value in our security” but cautioned against full reliance on the United States.
“We should not fully depend on the alliance,” he said. “There is no need for us to intentionally exclude or stand hostile against China or Russia. Diplomacy should always focus on national interest and practicality.”
A Realmeter poll of 1,509 South Korean adults showed Lee leading with more than 50% of voter support, followed by Kim with nearly 36%. The poll, conducted over three days beginning May 14, had a margin of error of 2.5 percentage points.
Both candidates are aware that most South Korean voters view the alliance with Washington as essential, Hahm said.
Approximately 28,500 U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea to defend it from North Korean aggression. The U.S. also has a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, system deployed to the South and frequently dispatches aircraft carriers and bombers for joint training exercises.
Kwon Young-kook of the progressive Democratic Labor Party and Lee Jun-seok of the neo-conservative New Reform Party — candidates who together command less than 10% support in recent polls — also participated in the debate in Seoul.
David Choi
David Choi
David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.
Yoojin Lee
Yoojin Lee
Yoojin Lee is a correspondent and translator based at Camp Humphreys, South Korea. She graduated from Korea University, where she majored in Global Sports Studies.
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi and Yoojin Lee · May 20, 2025
11. Art of the deal: Why Trump could struggle to bring North Korea back to talks
This is why I recommend a radical new strategy (summary below).
President Trump did something during his first term that no president had done: “He gave it a shot.” He met Kim and he offered him a future. But it was Kim Jong Un who failed to appreciate the opportunity he had. Now in his second term President Trump has the opportunity to implement new elements of policy and strategy that have never before been attempted. These include a human rights upfront approach that keeps human rights on all agendas, a sophisticated and holistic information campaign, and the support for the Korean people's pursuit of a free and unified Korea. There are few pundits who see the opportunities that both South Korea with its 8.15 Unification Doctrine and Kim Jong Un with his new hostile policy toward the South are providing to the U.S. and ROK/U.S. alliance. It is time to recognize that the only path to denuclearization is through unification. Most importantly, the prevention of war and nuclear use, and the long term outcome on the Korean peninsula are important to the national security and national prosperity of the U.S.
(Continued below)
Art of the deal: Why Trump could struggle to bring North Korea back to talks
In interview, ex-US intel officer Sydney Seiler assesses prospects and limits of the president’s unconventional style
https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/art-of-the-deal-why-trump-could-struggle-to-bring-north-korea-back-to-talks/?utm
Chad O'Carroll May 21, 2025
President Donald Trump holds a Cabinet meeting in April. | Image: Official White House Photo by Molly Roberts
As Donald Trump settles back into the Oval Office, his return has reignited questions about whether the president’s unconventional style can pave the way for a diplomatic breakthrough with Pyongyang.
Trump recently raised eyebrows by twice referring to North Korea as a “nuclear power” — a notable rhetorical olive branch from a president who once derided leader Kim Jong Un as “Little Rocket Man.”
For Sydney Seiler, who served as the U.S. national intelligence officer for North Korea from 2020 to 2023, it’s a shift that could gain some attention from the DPRK leadership, even if it doesn’t technically represent a formal American abandonment of denuclearization as the priority policy goal.
“It may be conscious and deliberately designed to appeal to Kim Jong Un’s ego, knowing that Kim wants recognition and respect,” the expert told NK News in an exclusive interview on Tuesday. “Maybe just go ahead and acknowledge the reality, North Korea has nuclear weapons. They are, therefore, a nuclear power.”
But Seiler, one of the U.S. government’s former experts on the secretive state, cautioned that coaxing North Korea back to the negotiating table remains a complex puzzle with no easy answers.
Kim Jong Un and top military officials overseeing a launch of the nuclear-capable Hwasong-17 ICBM | Image: Rodong Sinmun (March 25, 2022)
DEALMAKER’S DILEMMA
At the heart of the challenge, Seiler argued, is North Korea’s singular focus on locking in its status as a nuclear state and compelling the world to accept this new reality.
“Their goal is to have countries, one by one, and eventually the international community, just abandon enforcement of sanctions and learn to interact with a non-denuclearizing North Korea,” he said.
Balancing those demands against the U.S. goal of complete, verifiable denuclearization has confounded years of on-again, off-again negotiations. Even for an unorthodox president like Trump, whose summits and meetings with Kim made global headlines, the art of this deal has proved maddeningly elusive.
So what might entice North Korea to return to the table? Seiler said preemptive concessions like sanctions relief, shifts in U.S. military posture and addressing Pyongyang’s security grievances could open the door — but at a cost.
“Initially, we had a halt to intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches and a promise not to go forward with nuclear tests. And in exchange, we rolled back the military exercises,” he explained, commenting that this had the appearance of a quid pro quo.
Seiler also pointed to the potential for Trump to respond to Moscow and Beijing’s recurring calls for sanctions relief in exchange for North Korea’s previous dismantlement steps at the Sohae satellite launch facility and Punggye-ri nuclear test site. While he said those steps were easily reversible, dampening their value, the mere gesture could hold weight.
“If you just say, ‘Okay, we’re lifting sanctions,’ that could be the way to incentivize and say, ‘Hey, we’ll come back to the table and show that we are looking at shifting our hostile policy.'”
Still, Seiler cautioned that any engagement would need to demonstrate at least some degree of flexibility on denuclearization. He described the U.S. taking these kinds of pre-emptive actions to restart negotiations as a “long shot,” but added that Washington is “looking for moves that would have a degree of credibility.”
But the expert questioned what tangible impact preemptive offers could realistically have. “You can imagine an engagement that would probe, sincerely probe, even though I think we know what the answer will be,” he said.
Still, he suggested that even low-probability outreach could serve a purpose: signaling to critics that Washington is not simply reverting to another iteration of “strategic patience.”
The ultimate hurdle, he argued, is that North Korea now sees more to gain from its nuclear advancements and partnership with China and Russia than from any potential Trump outreach.
“As we can see with the recent rollouts of various new conventional capabilities, continued missile launches, Kim Jong Un is in a capabilities expansion mode, not a let’s talk to see how we can freeze this mode.”
That calculus leaves the U.S. with a stark dilemma: Just how much is it willing to put on the table upfront, with little guarantee of reciprocation, to lure North Korea back to talks?
For Seiler, who recalled his frustration at being “criticized for strategic patience,” it’s a question with no obvious answers.
“If North Korea doesn’t want to talk, there’s not much you can do. That’s where we sit right now.”
Kim Jong Un oversees military training drills in May 2025. | Image: Rodong Sinmun
WAITING GAME
In the meantime, North Korea has adopted a muted tone toward Trump and the U.S. under the current administration.
While some suggest this implies the DPRK could be amenable to talks, Seiler argued that the relative calm in DPRK state media toward the U.S. could just be down to Pyongyang’s growing internal confidence around its nuclear weapons status and the irreversibility of its programs.
Seiler said he believes the North’s logic is “We’re not here to try to intimidate the world or rhetorically coerce and threaten … We launch missiles, you launch missiles. What’s the big deal?”
As such, he continued, “the absence of ad hominem and attacks on Donald Trump may be just simply, they’re not going to answer the world’s expectation.”
Looking ahead, Trump’s unorthodox approach to diplomacy means it’s “not beyond imagination” for “a sudden middle of the night announced summit somewhere” with Kim Jong Un, according to Seiler.
But he still believes little will change by the end of Trump’s second term.
“The reality is [the North Korean nuclear] program is growing in an unfortunate but not astronomical, either qualitatively or quantitative, pace,” he said. “And so four years from now, if we do everything right, we’ll figure out how to approach the deterrence issue, maybe with a progressive government in Seoul who won’t be wanting nuclear submarines and B-52s and big exercises.”
That said, he warned that problems could still arise.
“North Korea may, between now and then, probe or test South Korea’s response to the redesignation of maritime boundaries on the West Sea, maybe with the intent of generating some type of military conflict that could cause people to try to rush to the table at Pyongyang’s beck and call.”
He sketched out a “least bad” scenario in which North Korea remains isolated but does little to cause tension with its neighbors.
“That would certainly not be an unacceptable outcome. I don’t know that I ever say that as an active policymaker, but, pragmatically speaking, again, life goes on in South Korea,” he explained.
“The peninsula is relatively stable: It’s free of major coercive or revisionist military actions. Given that, of course, that North Korea is not selling these weapons to third country actors, it’s just simply sitting there and just leaving us alone … But that’s not entirely a bad place to be.”
Seiler suggested that protracted DPRK isolation that limits “how much they thrive and prosper” could eventually lead them back to the negotiating table.
“That’s certainly a viable policy,” he said.
Edited by Alannah Hill
(Continued from above)
Kim can change. Or Kim can be changed by the Korean people in the north.
The Korean people must solve the “Korea question” (which is the unnatural division of the peninsula described in paragraph 60 of the1953 Armistice).
Key Points:
––Key strategic assumption is that Kim will never negotiate away his nuclear weapons.
––The United States has failed to achieve denuclearization in North Korea for four decades, and a new approach is needed that includes a new focus on human rights and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea.
–– South Korea unveiled the 8.15 Unification Doctrine in August 2024, emphasizing freedom, peace, and prosperity as core values for unification.
––Kim Jong Un's recent policy changes, including declaring South Korea as the "main enemy" and abandoning peaceful unification, present an opportunity for a new strategy.
––A human rights up front approach focusing on educating Koreans in the north about their universal human rights will empower them to create change.
––The right of self-determination for the Korean people is a fundamental justification for pursuing a free and unified Korea that requires transformation of the regime.
––Four paths to unification are: war, regime collapse, peaceful unification, and regime transformation. The U.S. (along with South Korea) should support regime transformation by the Korea people in the north as the optimal path to peaceful unification.
–– The long term “Two Plus Three strategy” of the U.S. must rest on these two traditional efforts:
(1) the foundation of military deterrence To Prevent War as the vital US national interest and;
(2) “strategic strangulation” – the well-executed use of sanctions and all instruments of national power to prevent weapons proliferation, cyber-attacks, and global illicit activities to support the regime.
––The radical new strategy must consist of three pillars to support the Korean people in the north to create the conditions for change inside north Korea:
(1) a human rights upfront approach (emphasizing the fundamental human right of self-determination of government per the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights);
(2) an information and influence campaign to inform and educate the Korean people in the north about their human rights and provide them practical knowledge for how to take collective action and create the conditions for change;
3) support to the Korean people on both sides of the DMZ as they seek to solve the Korean question and establish a free and unified Korea, a new nation, a United Republic of Korea (ROK).
––There is a through line from the 1776 Declaration to Independence to a Free and Unified Korea. The American Declaration influenced the 1919 Korean Declaration of Independence. Both influenced Mahatma Ghandi as he pursued Indian Independence and he in turn influenced Dr. Martin Luther King’s strategies. The virtuous circle will be complete when all the Korean people have the right to self-determination of government and achieve a free and unified Korea.
–– The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program, military threats, and the crimes against humanity is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a free and unified Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, free market principles, and human rights as determined by the Korean people: A free and unified Korea or in short, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK). Again, Kim can change or be changed.
12. Workers scoff at 'worthless' propaganda materials as N. Korea demands impossible production goals
What is the resistance potential? What is the potential for collective action to see transformation in the north? The Korean people in the north understand their position better than they have throughout the last seven decades.
The propaganda and ideological indoctrination is not have the effects of the past.
Change is coming.
Workers scoff at 'worthless' propaganda materials as N. Korea demands impossible production goals - Daily NK English
Referencing the Chollima Movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s, recently distributed political materials urged workers to "learn from the spirit of struggle of smelters at Kangson Steel Works"
By Seon Hwa -
May 22, 2025
dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · May 22, 2025
North Korean authorities have begun urging workers to “increase production” and “economize,” distributing political propaganda materials to General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea (GFTUK) organizations immediately following International Workers’ Day on May 5. This push appears aimed at meeting year-end targets related to the Eighth Party Congress’s plans.
Daily NK obtained a two-page document on political activities issued to GFTUK organizations in early May. The material was filled with propaganda slogans, including calls for a “struggle to boost production and economize” and demonstrations of “patriotism.”
North Korean authorities conducted political indoctrination sessions for GFTUK members beginning May 3, after granting workers a two-day holiday for International Workers’ Day. In essence, workers received the brief reward of time off, followed immediately by renewed pressure to meet production goals.
The political propaganda materials emphasized “learning from model examples” to increase output. Referencing the Chollima Movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s during Kim Il Sung’s era, the materials urged workers to “learn from the spirit of struggle of smelters at Kangson Steel Works, who rushed around furnaces that were hundreds of degrees hot.”
“The party’s demand is our standard amount,” the document stated. “Let’s embrace tasks we ordinarily consider impossible and create miracles.” This paradoxical message essentially calls for unconditional achievement of party targets, regardless of their feasibility.
However, GFTUK members attending these political sessions complained that the repeated use of historical examples itself reveals the party’s disconnect from current realities.
“They highlighted an example of placing a mat on a cement warehouse floor to prevent waste of supplies, but this happened decades ago,” a source inside the country told Daily NK recently. “Since neither the content nor the examples have changed for decades, workers consider these political classes to be ‘worthless, with no nutrients whatsoever.'”
The Rodong Sinmun newspaper published a series of campaign-style special reports earlier this year on the “movement for increased production and economy,” encouraging people to share success stories and pledge their commitment to production increases and resource conservation.
The newspaper solicited reader submissions of success stories, but this prompted skepticism, with people wondering if the paper “was taking reader submissions because it couldn’t find examples worth trumpeting.”
“Workers scoff, saying the party makes a big deal about preventing items from getting lost on warehouse floors, presenting it as a major transformation, but it’s just a drop in the ocean,” the source said. “The more important issue is cracking down on people who steal supplies.”
Given that the political materials included a quote from North Korean leader Kim Jong Un urging people to “ceaselessly create miracles, moving mountains and filling the seas,” such political classes aimed at encouraging workers to “fulfill Kim’s words” will likely continue until year’s end, just before the Ninth Party Congress.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · May 22, 2025
13. TIME TO MODERNIZE ROK MILITARY POLITICAL TRAINING
An interesting piece that we should reflect on for a number of reasons.
I am reminded of my engagement with the political officer at the Kunming MIlitary Academy in China. He thought that I was the political officer since I was the second ranking officer in our delegation of students from the National War College. I was suprised that PLA 1 star general thought we had political officers in the US military. He was incredulous and wanted to know how we ensure the ideological integrity of our soldiers and who cared for the welfare of our troops. I explained that our entire "ideological training: was summed up in our oath to support and defend the constitution of the United States and that our professional NCO Corps provides every commander with the stars and advice for ensuring the wellbeing of the troops.
TIME TO MODERNIZE ROK MILITARY POLITICAL TRAINING
[T]he ROK military has provided regular political instruction to compete with the DPRK in the ideological space, combat DPRK psychological warfare, and teach servicemembers Korean history and democratic values.
warroom.armywarcollege.edu · by Jinwoo Joshua Jeong · May 22, 2025
South Korea's military provides unique political training called Jeong-Hoon to its conscripted armed forces; a practice unusual for a democracy but rooted in the ongoing ideological struggle with North Korea. Jinwoo Joshua Jeong explains how this training aims to counter the Democratic People's Republic of Korea’s psychological warfare and instill democratic values, but it has faced criticism as improper ideological indoctrination due to its historical use by past military dictatorships. Jeong along with experts recommend that to modernize Jeong-Hoon, the Republic of Korea must stop the use of partisan materials, update content for younger service members, and establish a non-partisan commission to review the curriculum. Only then can the program effectively prepare the nation’s conscripts for the ideological conflict they must face.
[T]he ROK military has provided regular political instruction to compete with the DPRK in the ideological space, combat DPRK psychological warfare, and teach servicemembers Korean history and democratic values.
Unusual for a democracy, the Republic of Korea (ROK) offers regular political training to its largely conscript armed forces. In part, this is because the Korean War never officially ended, and with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) strong conventional and nuclear forces—as well as growing irregular warfare capabilities, including psychological and information operations—South Koreans live in the fear of a Second Korean War. In addition, the military largely comprises young conscripts, not volunteers, which suggests that not every new servicemember’s mindset is ready for the fight. As a result, the ROK military has provided regular political instruction to compete with the DPRK in the ideological space, combat DPRK psychological warfare, and teach servicemembers Korean history and democratic values.
Jeong-Hoon is the Korean name for this ROK military political instruction and training. It somewhat resembles political training conducted in the old Soviet bloc, yet the ROK has developed its own style of politically training servicemembers. Due to the training’s political nature, however, and because the ROK requires military service from all males, Jeong-Hoon has also been criticized as improper ideological indoctrination and domestic propaganda. This article will explore the development and current state of Jeong-Hoon, and the criticisms leveled against the training and suggest ways to modernize it for new generations of servicemembers.
The Meaning of Jeong-Hoon
First, some semantics. Jeong-Hoon combines Jeong (정/政), a Sino-Korean word which means ‘political,’ and Hoon (훈/訓), which means “instruction” or “training.” In 2018, the left-leaning Moon Jae-In administration (2017-2022)—attempting to distance itself from the negative connotations of the term “political” training—changed the Sino-Korean meaning behind the word Jeong to 正, which means “straight, proper, right, correct” but has the same pronunciation in Korean (정) as the word “political.” The administration’s official English translation for Jeong-Hoon therefore became ‘proper training.’
However, the current right-leaning Yoon administration—which came into office in May 2022—changed the meaning behind the word Jeong to another heteronym Jeong (정/精), meaning “mental,” to underline the importance of training the mental strength of the servicemembers to counter ongoing DPRK psychological and information warfare. Yoon also re-separated the “Gong-Bo” Public Affairs Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and the “Jeong-Hoon” Political Training MOS, which the Moon administration had combined in an attempt to erase the negative connotation associated with political training due to the country’s military rule in the 1970s and 80s.
The Roots and Evolution of Jeong-Hoon
The Soviet Union implemented propaganda and political education in the Red Army in the 1920s, and in the next decade the armed forces of both the Leninist, Mao Zedong-led Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chiang Kai-Shek-led Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT) adopted some form of political indoctrination. Jeong-Hoon’s roots stretch to political indoctrination and training conducted by groups fighting against Imperial Japan’s colonization of Korea, when Korean independence fighters operating in China and Japan-backed Manchuria—trying to promote morale and a sense of duty among fighters as well as counter Japan’s policy to erode Korean culture and national identity—adopted a KMT-style political instruction.
After Korea’s independence in 1945, the nation experienced a period of political and ideological turmoil. Independence fighters returned home with different backgrounds, experiences, and ideologies and tried to steer the new country toward their favored ideologies. Therefore, before the armed forces of the South could establish a clear identity, various conflicts arose and—fed by the sharp, burgeoning ROK-DPRK ideological rivalry—incidents such as the 1948 pro-Communist Yeosu 14th Regiment Rebellion occurred. Amidst this turmoil, in 1948 the ROK government launched the Bureau of Political Training within the Ministry of National Defense (MND) to fight the ideological battle against Communism.
With the onset of the Korean War—launched on June 25, 1950, by the Kim Il-Sung-led DPRK against the ROK—the ROK expanded political training. The first ROK president, Rhee Seung-Man (1948-1960), added more content emphasizing anti-Communism, the illegitimacy and roguery of the DPRK, and—despite Rhee’s dictatorial rule over the only nominally democratic ROK—the virtues of democracy, themes that dominated Jeong-Hoon until the ROK democratization in the 1980s. The regime also used political training to idolize Rhee as a great and mighty founding father.
Under Park Chung-hee, who came to power after the May 16, 1961 coup and ruled until his assassination in 1979, the political content of Jeong-Hoon intensified; Park included propaganda to justify the coup, highlight his charisma and leadership, and praise his vision to strengthen the economy and national security. Although anti-Communism was still the underlying theme, Park introduced new subjects such as national economic development, Self-Reliant Defense, the propriety of fighting Communism in the Vietnam War, and the regime’s effort to normalize diplomatic ties with Japan, a process that set off controversies that live on to this day. After a 1972 Constitutional amendment opened the door for Park to rule with no term limits, the ROK military started to use Jeong-Hoon to highlight the legitimacy of this change (and Park’s leadership) through special sessions targeting not only ordinary soldiers but also senior officers and military families.
In addition to expanding content, the Park regime also systematized the training. Park concluded that the strong mental strength and firm will to fight of the materially inferior North Vietnamese soldiers led them to victory in the Vietnam War. He was also discontented with the ROK military’s political training, which was de-centralized and conducted by each service branch. In response, in 1975 ROK military officials visited Taiwan to study its system of political training and plan how to apply aspects of it in the ROK. In 1976, the ROK military established a Jeong-Hoon institute—the Defense Mental Force Enhancement School (국방정신전력학교)—and began publishing Jeong-Hoon textbooks. Starting the same year, soldiers had to participate in regular Wednesday political training sessions, which is still the standard day for Jeong-Hoon classes.
Taking advantage of the power vacuum created by Park’s assassination in October 1979, ROK Army Major General Chun Doo-Hwan—assisted by members of Hanahoe, a secret society of military officers—took power in a coup on December 12 of the same year. Chun, following the precedent of Park, had himself promoted to four-star general and then discharged from the military. Forcing incumbent President Choi Kyu-Hah to resign, Chun ran in the 1980 election as a nominal civilian and won an electoral college vote. Like his undemocratic predecessors, Chun also used Jeong-Hoon to bolster his regime, justify the 1979 coup, and defend the legitimacy of the new (fifth) republic. In addition, and despite Chun’s initial efforts to improve inter-Korean relations, the 1983 Soviet downing of Korean Air Flight 007 and two major DPRK terrorist attacks in 1983 and 1987 aggravated Seoul’s relations with the Communist world, and Jeong-hoon under Chun therefore continued using strong anti-Communist themes.
In part to address the spread of left-wing and labor movements caused by rapid industrialization, Chun also ordered an intense special political training regimen for ROK military officers to prepare them to match the high ideological level of their DPRK peers. The military under Chun also used Jeong-Hoon, at least in classes aimed at officers, to correct what it thought of as errors in Communist, Neo-Marxist, and Eurocommunist theories, introducing the special “Ideological Armament Education” for officers in 1985 that emphasized officers’ role in combating leftist ideologies among the military. As North Korea resumed loudspeaker operations along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in September 1980, the military held special education for soldiers to prevent them from being swayed by North Korean propaganda. In taking up these themes, Chun-era political training was divided into three main sections: Our Nation, Our Enemy, and Our Military, systematically addressing issues like “How to view our nation,” “How to view Communism and North Korea,” “What is military culture and morale?”, and “What are values and expectations in the military?”
Under its current format, the military offers twelve basic political training courses during new recruits’ six weeks of basic military training.
Jeong-Hoon Today
As South Korea transitioned to democracy, solidified by a peaceful transition of power in 1993, Jeong-Hoon training became less of a direct propaganda tool for each administration. Under its current format, the military offers twelve basic political training courses during new recruits’ six weeks of basic military training. After being assigned to a unit, regulations require one day of Jeong-Hoon training per week, which typically includes reading articles from the military newspaper, watching political training content, or listening to lectures by, inter alia, senior officers, security experts, and North Korean defectors. Soldiers also take field trips to historically significant sites such as the National Cemetery or the National War Museum.
At the unit level, company commanders or public affairs/political training officers lead Jeong-Hoon training. In addition, servicemembers have an intensive Jeong-Hoon training week every six months to learn about ideologies, North Korea, and Korean history in greater depth. At military academies for officers and non-commissioned officers, political training comprises more than 5% of total training hours, largely using a centralized, Ministry of National Defense-mandated Jeong-Hoon syllabus. The training also has practical benefits for service members, who must get certain scores on Jeong-Hoon exams to be promoted. In addition, political training exam scores of a company or battalion will affect the promotion of its commander.
Continuing Controversies
ROK democratic oversight and laws, including the Framework Act on Military Status and Service (군인의 지위 및 복무에 관한 기본법), have tried to systematize Jeong-Hoon to prevent the training from being used as a domestic propaganda channel. Servicemembers, for example, no longer study subjects such as an administration’s policy objectives or learn idolized descriptions of the president. However, the tone and content of the political training can change from administration by administration, leading to frequent controversies.
In particular, progressive and conservative administrations each have differing views toward North Korea and Japan that color how Jeong-Hoon describes these relationships, leading to accusations of Jeong-Hoon being used to advance political objectives. For example, critics accused the Moon administration of promoting its achievement of signing the September 19 Comprehensive Military Agreement with North Korea—a symbol of the administration’s key policy objective of improving relations with Pyongyang—and downplaying security threats posed by North Korea during Jeong-Hoon training.
Liberal opposition parties, in turn, criticized the conservative Yoon administration’s 2023 Jeong-Hoon textbook for calling former dictator Rhee “the leader of the free world,” leading the Ministry of National Defense to delete words such as “insight” or “wisdom” to describe Rhee’s leadership. In April 2024, Yoon’s Defense Ministry also confronted criticism for instructing units to teach from President Yoon’s speech about freedom and the market economy during a special Jeong-Hoon training session just before the scheduled parliamentary election in April 2024. Opposition parties perceived it as Yoon’s attempt to use political training to interfere with the election.
Time to Move On?
Outsiders may be surprised that political training with Leninist roots is still in place in one of today’s most vibrant Asian democracies, but the idea of controlling servicemembers’ ways of thinking has long been accepted practice in the ROK, and Jeong-Hoon training has become a central part of the South Korean military’s culture and history. Jeong-Hoon can still play an important role politically and ideologically preparing servicemembers for DPRK psychological and information operations, but the military needs to address the basic criticism that political training—formerly used as domestic propaganda for dictators—may not be proper in its current form for a democracy.
In addition, critics question the effectiveness of current training. Young soldiers’ emphasis on individualism, creativity, free-thinking, and communication also makes one-way political training harder to implement. Compared to ROK soldiers before the mid-2010s, who had limited access to the internet, soldiers today also have more freedom to access information on duty, hampering effort to guide thoughts and minds. Their higher education attainment compared to older generations also makes ideological training more challenging. Furthermore, Jeong-Hoon needs to account for the traditional sense of national identity that has been watered down as the ROK has become a more multiethnic society. Millennial and Gen Z soldiers—a growing number of whom are not fully ethnic Koreans—did not come of age in the more starkly anti-Communist and anti-DPRK education system of their predecessors, making it harder for the military to start the training from the simple bottom line that “the DPRK is bad.” The new, shortened conscript service period also seems to have reduced efficacy. The training is also ill-suited to helping service members navigate the new, AI-powered information warfare environment. To address the above issues, MND should take several concrete steps. First, to prevent training from being used as domestic propaganda, the military should stop using the Defense Daily, which typically hews to an administration’s perspectives, to teach current affairs. In addition, the MND should update the style and content of Jeong-Hoon for Millennial and Gen Z servicemembers, including training on the evolving information warfare space. Finally, the ROK government should study establishing a non-partisan commission, along the lines of its National Election Commission, to review and establish non-partisan content. Such a commission would help improve civil-military relations by making the government’s intermediary training role more transparent and acceptable across the political spectrum. Information warfare is only going to get more intense, and an improved Jeong-Hoon curriculum could give South Korean service a leg up in this fight.
Jinwoo Joshua Jeong, a Seoul native and Dickinson College graduate in International Studies, served in the South Korean military and worked in the Political-Military section of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. With experience in defense policy, diplomacy, and international development, he is passionate about strengthening the U.S.-ROK alliance and is now pursuing a Master of Arts in International Relations (MAIR) at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
Photo Description: Korea DMZ – North Korean soldier looking south
Photo Credit: U.S. Army photos by Edward N. Johnson via Morning Calm Weekly Newspaper Installation Management Command, U.S. Army
warroom.armywarcollege.edu · by Jinwoo Joshua Jeong · May 22, 2025
14. Washington DC’s 500 Most Influential People of 2025
A lot of names we know. Congratulations Markus.
Markus Garlauskas
Atlantic Council
Director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative
With 20 years of government-intelligence experience, Garlauskas is a foremost expert on nuclear-deterrence-and-defense issues, particularly in East Asia and North Korea.
Hometown: Euclid, Ohio. What he’d tell his 18-year-old self: “Hang in there. You will meet the love of your life next year.” Worst career advice he ever received: “To take a position I was not interested in and for which I would have had a miserable schedule, just because it was an immediate promotion in pay grade that would enable daily ‘face time’ with the big boss.”
Washington DC’s 500 Most Influential People of 2025
Here’s our list of the experts and advocates, outside the government, who are playing big roles in Washington’s policy debates.
Written by Washingtonian Staff | Published on May 7, 2025
https://www.washingtonian.com/2025/05/07/washington-dcs-500-most-influential-people-of-2025/#antitrust
Contents
- Antitrust
- Banking & Finance
- Business & Labor
- Civil Rights & Criminal Justice
- Climate & Environment
- Economic Policy
- Education
- Energy
- Foreign Affairs
- Good Government
- Healthcare
- Immigration
- Infrastructure & Transportation
- National Security & Defense
- Tech & Telecom
- Trade
- Voting Rights & Election Law
- Alphabetical List of Influencers
- Photo Credits
Each year, we publish a special issue featuring the 500 most influential people in Washington. With a new administration now in place, these power players’ expertise and strategic insight are especially crucial as they navigate shifting priorities and relationships across the capital.
The selection process remains rigorous, and we acknowledge that there are far more than 500 influential voices in DC. We focus on several key factors: individuals with deep subject-matter expertise who understand how to effectively drive action in Washington; those who grasp the nuances and complexities of specific policy areas; and experts in fields we believe will be particularly significant to the current slate of elected officials.
We’ve maintained our practice of excluding those currently in elected office as well as Capitol Hill and administration staffers—the influencees, as we call them. However, many on our roster have government experience, affording them valuable insight into how to elevate issues effectively. Others, we suspect, may enter government service in the future or have the ear of those in office.
Our selections span the ideological spectrum, and we’ve deliberately avoided including big-name “hired guns” whose influence stems more from communication skills and networks than from genuine policy expertise. Some people or organizations may be viewed as having a controversial impact—we aren’t passing judgment on whether each person’s influence benefits the greater good. Our goal is simply to highlight those who wield it.
This year’s list features many newcomers we believe will be particularly influential during the current administration, such as Robert Doer of the conservative think tank AEI; Bruce Harris of Walmart, who understands global supply-chain policy; Mike Zamore at the American Civil Liberties Union; Christopher Smith, head of government affairs at Ford Motor Company; and many more.
What unites all of them is their passion for understanding policy issues and their ability to move them forward.
—Catherine Merrill
Washingtonian President and CEO
To purchase a physical copy of our Influencers list, please click here.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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