Quotes of the Day:

"Remember that not getting what you want is sometimes a wonderful stroke of luck." 

– Dalai Lama

"The evil that is in the world almost always comes of ignorance, and good intentions may do as much harm as malevolence if they lack understanding."

– Albert Camus

"Nothing in life is to be feared, it is only to be understood. Now is the time to understand more, so that we may fear less."

– Marie Curie

1. Ukraine, U.S. Say Russia Is Deploying Banned Toxic Gas in Battle

2. Inside the White House, a Debate Over Letting Ukraine Shoot U.S. Weapons Into Russia

3. With Ukraine losing ground, allies debate how to squeeze cash for Kyiv out of frozen Russian assets

4. Wary of China, American military plans return to Peleliu in Western Pacific

5. This summer’s RIMPAC exercise in Hawaii drawing 30 nations and 40 ships

6. More military veterans and active duty service members are dying by suicide than in battle – understanding why can help with prevention

7. Navy looks to Army for more data analytics capability

8. DOD: Russia’s use of Starlink will be a ‘continuous problem’ in Ukraine

9. Army brass opposes drone branch

10. Airmen, guardians could skip shaving under congressional plan

11. Poland spends $1 billion on US-made surveillance aerostats

12. First aid from US pier in Gaza has reached starving Palestinians, the UN says

13. How Soda, Chocolate and Chewing Gum Are Funding War in Sudan

14. China 'PUNISHES' Taiwan: Huge military drills are launched around the island three days after the island's new president - detested by Beijing - took charge

15. Army unveils colorful new patch for soldiers assigned to US Forces Japan

16. A Nuclear Iran Has Never Felt More Possible

17. A Taliban revenge killing prompts questions, removal of an acclaimed documentary

18. Asia starting to feel like 1997-98 all over again - Asia Times

19. Philippines picked as regional HQ for US civil nuclear work group

20. The U.S. Military Needs a Better China 'Messaging' Strategy

21. Iran’s Nuclear Threshold Challenge

22. The Failure of Israel’s “Strategy” in Gaza Continues

23. Coast Artillery Reimagined: The Mid-Range Capability’s First Deployment to the Indo-Pacific

24. Can America’s Special Relationship With Israel Survive?

25. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 22, 2024

26. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, May 22, 2024

1. Ukraine, U.S. Say Russia Is Deploying Banned Toxic Gas in Battle

When was the last time US forces routinely incorporated realistic chemical defense training in exercises? (And this does not mean carrying protective masks at CP Tango in Korea).

Excerpts:

“We assessed Russian forces used the chemical weapon chloropicrin and riot control agents as a method of warfare to dislodge Ukrainian forces from fortified positions,” Robert Wood, a U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said on Monday. “The use of such chemicals is not an isolated incident.”

After the U.S. sanctions announcement, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov called accusations that troops used gases “baseless,” saying, “Russia has been and remains committed to its obligations under international law in this area.” The Kremlin and the Russian Defense Ministry didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment.

Dan Kaszeta, an expert on chemical weapons and associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based think tank, said chloropicrin is toxic to humans and animals, but also acts as an irritant.

Depending on the level of exposure, the gas can burn skin, irritate tear ducts and make it difficult to breathe, let alone defend against incoming attacks. Kaszeta said the chemical has been surpassed by more modern agents sometimes used by riot police as tear gas, known as CN and CS, which are also banned by the convention. 

Ukraine, U.S. Say Russia Is Deploying Banned Toxic Gas in Battle

Ukrainian troops describe having trouble breathing, burning skin and teary eyes as they say Moscow’s forces use gas to force them from their positions

https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-u-s-say-russia-is-deploying-banned-toxic-gas-in-battle-48b1b841?mod=hp_lead_pos8

By Jane Lytvynenko

Updated May 23, 2024 12:04 am ET

KYIV, Ukraine—The Ukrainian soldiers were hunkered down last month in a front-line dugout and under siege from Russian drones dropping grenades. They were relieved at first when bomblets landed that didn’t explode. Then a strong smell of chlorine filled the air: The grenades were seeping poisonous gas.

The Ukrainians felt their skin sting, eyes water and lungs fill with smoke, provoking a hard cough. They rushed to wet rags with water and place them over their faces as the heavy gas filled the air around them. One of the fighters left the protection of the dugout to distract the enemy drones, allowing his compatriots to escape.

Oleksiy Bozhko, a volunteer medic whose team examined the men near the eastern city of Avdiivka, identified the gas as chloropicrin, a banned chemical irritant, based on the men’s symptoms and description of the smell. U.S. and Ukrainian officials, as well as medics, soldiers and international researchers say Russian use of toxic gases on the battlefield is increasing as Moscow ramps up an offensive designed to seize more of Ukraine’s territory than the roughly 20% it already occupies.

“This weapon cripples and kills, it’s indiscriminate,” said Bozhko.

After Ukraine repelled initial Russian attacks in 2022, the war has morphed into a grind where each side is looking for an advantage against hardened defensive lines. Seeing an opportunity in Ukraine’s shortage of weapons and reserve forces, Russia has been pressing forward on several fronts, using guided aerial bombs to smash up Ukrainian positions. Toxic gases can impair Ukrainian troops’ ability to defend entrenched positions, even forcing them to withdraw.

Oleksiy Bozhko, a Ukrainian volunteer medic, said he believed troops were exposed to the banned chemical irritant chloropicrin. PHOTO: JUSTYNA MIELNIKIEWICZ FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The U.S. announced sanctions earlier this month against Russian companies and government bodies involved in the creation and supply of chemical weapons used at the front, singling out chloropicrin. The chemical agent, sometimes used in pesticides, was weaponized during World War I and is banned for use in battle by the Chemical Weapons Convention, of which Russia is a signatory.

“We assessed Russian forces used the chemical weapon chloropicrin and riot control agents as a method of warfare to dislodge Ukrainian forces from fortified positions,” Robert Wood, a U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said on Monday. “The use of such chemicals is not an isolated incident.”

After the U.S. sanctions announcement, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov called accusations that troops used gases “baseless,” saying, “Russia has been and remains committed to its obligations under international law in this area.” The Kremlin and the Russian Defense Ministry didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment.

Dan Kaszeta, an expert on chemical weapons and associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based think tank, said chloropicrin is toxic to humans and animals, but also acts as an irritant.

Depending on the level of exposure, the gas can burn skin, irritate tear ducts and make it difficult to breathe, let alone defend against incoming attacks. Kaszeta said the chemical has been surpassed by more modern agents sometimes used by riot police as tear gas, known as CN and CS, which are also banned by the convention. 

Ukrainian army soldiers take part in drills. PHOTO: MANU BRABO FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

U.S. soldiers wore World War I gas-mask designs in Philadelphia around 1919. PHOTO: ARCHIVE OF MODERN CONFLICT

According to Capt. Dmytro Serhiyenko, assistant to the commander of the Analytical Center of the Ukrainian Army’s Support Forces, which analyzes chemical weapon use at the front, all three of those agents are used by Russians on the battlefield. Although his team has mostly logged uses of CN and CS in the area they track, they also found two grenades containing chloropicrin at abandoned Russian positions.

Ukrainians have been tracking the use of chemical weapons at the front since February 2023, and the number of confirmed incidents have steadily increased. As of May 3, the Support Forces have confirmed 1,891 such attacks since they began tracking data, 444 of them in April, an increase of 71 confirmed incidents from the month prior. These numbers are an incomplete picture, as it often isn’t possible to get to the location where a gas was used to collect a sample or interview soldiers because of the intensity of the fighting. 

“Currently, the use of poisonous chemical substances by Russians is our everyday reality,” Serhiyenko said. “You never know when you’ll encounter a cloud of poisonous chemicals.”

Lt. Vitaliy Katrych, a military medic working at a stabilization point near the front, said there have been times when every second patient he treated had been exposed to a poisonous gas. Once Russians receive a shipment, he says, they use it all the time until they have run out. 

Katrych recently had to treat soldiers who were exposed to the gas for a week. The Russians dropped the poisonous substance on a dugout, then attacked the entrance itself, sealing the fighters in. It took them seven days to dig themselves out. Katrych said they ran so low on oxygen that lighters wouldn’t work. 

A Ukrainian Army doctor stood at the door of a makeshift medical stabilization point near Chasiv Yar in Ukraine in April. PHOTO: MANU BRABO FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Sandbags protected a window at a military hospital in the Donetsk region of Ukraine in April. PHOTO: MANU BRABO FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Because CS, CN and chloropicrin are all chlorine based, they are heavier than air and settle close to the ground. If the gas enters a trench or a dugout, a simple gust of wind won’t disseminate it. Even when the gas settles, it can be kicked up from the ground, mixing with sand and creating a constant problem, especially if the soldier doesn’t bring a gas mask, forgoing it in favor of other necessary equipment. 

Russians began using chemical attacks systematically in early 2023, said Kateryna Stepanenko, Russia analyst at Institute for the Study of War who has been tracking the tactic. Medics said they saw the effects of gases used during battles for the eastern cities of Bakhmut and Vuhledar that winter. It was a time when Russians were trying different strategies in the battlefield to see what stuck, said Stepanenko, including using explosive drones and deploying irregular forces such as Wagner paramilitaries. 

Russia has been accused by the West of using chemical weapons several times in recent years, including to poison a Russian ex-spy on U.K. soil. In Ukraine, Russia’s 810th Brigade posted about using gas-carrying grenades on its Telegram channel last December. 

“The tactic of dropping K-51 grenades from drones onto enemy positions was successfully tested and applied in order to smoke them out from fortified positions, followed by exposure to combined weapons,” read part of the message, which referred to gas-carrying grenades, and was later deleted. Alongside it, Russians posted a video appearing to show a gas grenade dropped from a drone hovering above Ukrainian positions. 

Stanislav Horozheyev, a Ukrainian combat medic, said he and others were exposed to gas last year during a rotation in a front-line trench.

JUSTYNA MIELNIKIEWICZ FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Stanislav Horozheyev, a combat medic with the 12th Special Purpose Brigade Azov, said he and others were exposed to such a tactic in August last year during a rotation in a front-line trench. The rotation was meant to be done in secret, but Russians found out and bombed the positions. Then, they fired a mortar shell with the gas. Horozheyev said they got lucky because the mortar didn’t land directly in their dugout, but they still felt the effect: trouble breathing, burning skin, teary eyes.

“When you’re in that position, you feel like you’re a cornered bug, and you’re just being smoked out,” he said. 

Once the gas was deployed, well-equipped Russian infantry stormed their positions. Horozheyev had a gas mask on him, but some of his fellow soldiers didn’t, and began panicking when they had difficulty breathing. The gas mask, he said, makes it difficult to aim weapons, making defense that much more challenging. In the end, Horozheyev said the fighters hung on to their positions.

Nikita Nikolaienko contributed to this article.

Appeared in the May 23, 2024, print edition as 'Ukraine, U.S. Say Russia Is Deploying Banned Toxic Gas in Battle'.

2. Inside the White House, a Debate Over Letting Ukraine Shoot U.S. Weapons Into Russia

is SECSTATE proposing to change the foreign policy "prime directive" of "take no action out of fear of escalation?"

Buried lede: Training of Ukraine troops inside the country.

Excerpts:

Now, the pressure is mounting on the United States to help Ukraine target Russian military sites, even if Washington wants to maintain its ban on attacking oil refineries and other Russian infrastructure with American-provided arms. Britain, usually in lockstep with Washington on war strategy, has quietly lifted its own restrictions, so that its “Storm Shadow” cruise systems can be used to target Russia more broadly.

The British foreign secretary, David Cameron, a former prime minister, said during a visit to Kyiv ahead of Mr. Blinken’s that Ukraine “absolutely has the right to strike back at Russia.”

The United States is now considering training Ukrainian troops inside the country, rather than sending them to a training ground in Germany. That would require putting American military personnel in Ukraine, something else that Mr. Biden has prohibited until now. It raises the question of how the United States would respond if the trainers, who would likely be based near the western city of Lviv, came under attack. The Russians have periodically targeted Lviv, though it is distant from the main areas of combat.

Inside the White House, a Debate Over Letting Ukraine Shoot U.S. Weapons Into Russia

After a sobering trip to Kyiv, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken is urging the president to lift restrictions on how Ukraine can use American arms.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/22/us/politics/white-house-ukraine-weapons-russia.html?utm

The aftermath of a Ukrainian attack on Belgorod, Russia, earlier this month.Credit...Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

By David E. Sanger

Reporting from Washington

Published May 22, 2024

Updated May 23, 2024, 1:59 a.m. ET

Since the first American shipments of sophisticated weapons to Ukraine, President Biden has never wavered on one prohibition: President Volodymyr Zelensky had to agree to never fire them into Russian territory, insisting that would violate Mr. Biden’s mandate to “avoid World War III.”

But the consensus around that policy is fraying. Propelled by the State Department, there is now a vigorous debate inside the administration over relaxing the ban to allow the Ukrainians to hit missile and artillery launch sites just over the border in Russia — targets that Mr. Zelensky says have enabled Moscow’s recent territorial gains.

The proposal, pressed by Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken after a sobering visit to Kyiv last week, is still in the formative stages, and it is not clear how many of his colleagues among Mr. Biden’s inner circle have signed on. It has not yet been formally presented to the president, who has traditionally been the most cautious, officials said.

The State Department spokesman, Matthew A. Miller, declined to comment on the internal deliberations over Ukraine policy, including Mr. Blinken’s report after his return from Kyiv.

But officials involved in the deliberations said Mr. Blinken’s position had changed because the Russians had opened a new front in the war, with devastating results. Moscow’s forces have placed weapons right across the border from northeastern Ukraine, and aimed them at Kharkiv — knowing the Ukrainians would only be able to use non-American drones and other weaponry to target them in response.

For months, Mr. Zelensky has been mounting attacks on Russian ships, oil facilities and electricity plants, but he has been doing so largely with Ukrainian-made drones, which don’t pack the power and speed of the American weapons. And increasingly, the Russians are shooting down the Ukrainian drones and missiles or sending them astray, thanks to improved electronic warfare techniques.

Now, the pressure is mounting on the United States to help Ukraine target Russian military sites, even if Washington wants to maintain its ban on attacking oil refineries and other Russian infrastructure with American-provided arms. Britain, usually in lockstep with Washington on war strategy, has quietly lifted its own restrictions, so that its “Storm Shadow” cruise systems can be used to target Russia more broadly.

The British foreign secretary, David Cameron, a former prime minister, said during a visit to Kyiv ahead of Mr. Blinken’s that Ukraine “absolutely has the right to strike back at Russia.”

The United States is now considering training Ukrainian troops inside the country, rather than sending them to a training ground in Germany. That would require putting American military personnel in Ukraine, something else that Mr. Biden has prohibited until now. It raises the question of how the United States would respond if the trainers, who would likely be based near the western city of Lviv, came under attack. The Russians have periodically targeted Lviv, though it is distant from the main areas of combat.

Another hint of a shift came in recent days. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, in repeating the usual administration position — “our expectation is that they continue to use the weapons that we’ve provided on targets inside of Ukraine” — seemed to suggest that there may be exceptions made for Russian aircraft operating in the safety of Russian territory, just over the border, enabling pilots to release glide bombs into eastern Ukraine.

“The aerial dynamic’s a little bit different,” Mr. Austin allowed, but he struggled to articulate the new standard. “And so — but again, don’t — don’t want to speculate on any — any one or — or any type of engagement here at the podium, so.”

When a reporter followed up by asking whether such aerial operations by the Russians were “off-limits or not off-limits?” Mr. Austin did not respond.

The Russians are accustomed to such debates, and they have been unsubtle in playing to American concerns about an escalation of the war.

This week they began very public exercises with the units that would be involved in the use of tactical nuclear weapons, the kind that would be used on Ukrainian troops. Russian news reports said it was “a response to provocative statements and threats from Western officials against Russia.”

But the administration appears less sensitive to such threats than it was in the early days of the war, or in October 2022, when there were fears that Russia, its forces failing, might use those weapons against Ukrainian military targets. During that incident, some administration officials, picking up conversations among Russian officers, feared there was a 50 percent chance a nuclear weapon could be detonated.

The current exercises, in contrast, are being dismissed as bluster and muscle-flexing.

In a notable break from the administration’s public position, Victoria Nuland, who left her position as No. 3 official in the State Department this spring, is now making a public argument that the administration needs to drop its ban on the use of its weapons against targets inside Russia.

“I think if the attacks are coming directly from over the line in Russia, that those bases ought to be fair game,” she said Sunday on ABC’s “This Week.”

“I think it’s time for that because Russia has obviously escalated this war,” she added, noting that Russia’s attack on Kharkiv is an effort “to decimate it without ever having to put a boot on the ground. So I think it is time to give the Ukrainians more help hitting these bases inside Russia.”

Ms. Nuland was always among a far more hawkish camp inside the administration, and her view was in the minority. But over time she won more and more of the arguments over whether to send more sophisticated missiles and artillery systems to Ukraine, and each time Mr. Biden relented, the worst fears he had about escalation did not materialize.

In an interview with The New York Times this week, Mr. Zelensky dismissed fears of escalation, saying President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia had already escalated the war. And he thought it unlikely that Mr. Putin would ever make good on his threat to unleash a nuclear weapon.

Mr. Biden and some of his aides are clearly not convinced. Over the past year they have said they believe there is some red line out there that would unleash a more severe reaction from Mr. Putin. They just don’t know exactly where that is, or what the reaction might be.

In private with Mr. Blinken last week and in his interview with The Times, Mr. Zelensky argued that at this desperate stage of the war, it was critical to let him use American weapons against Russian military units.

“This is part of our defense,” Mr. Zelensky told The Times. “How can we protect ourselves from these attacks? This is the only way.”

David E. Sanger covers the Biden administration and national security. He has been a Times journalist for more than four decades and has written several books on challenges to American national security. More about David E. Sanger

3. With Ukraine losing ground, allies debate how to squeeze cash for Kyiv out of frozen Russian assets

Excerpts:

U.S. Treasury officials and outside economists are proposing ways to turn that annual trickle into a much larger chunk of upfront cash. That could done be through a bond that would be repaid by the future interest income, giving Ukraine the money immediately. The ministers meet with Ukrainian Finance Minister Sergii Marchenko on Saturday.

“Securing Ukraine’s position in the medium-to-long term requires unlocking the value of immobilized Russian sovereign assets,” U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said at a news conference Thursday in Stresa. “We support the EU’s decision to utilize the windfall profits from these assets, but we must also continue our collective work on more ambitious options.”

With Ukraine losing ground, allies debate how to squeeze cash for Kyiv out of frozen Russian assets

AP · by FATIMA HUSSEIN · May 23, 2024

FRANKFURT, Germany (AP) — Ukraine’s allies are wrestling with how to squeeze money out of frozen Russian assets to support Kyiv’s war effort, a debate that is ever more urgent as Russia gains territory on the battlefield and as the outlook for Ukraine’s state finances looks shakier.

What to do with the Russian central bank reserves frozen in response to the invasion of Ukraine is at the top of the agenda as finance officials from the Group of Seven rich democracies meet Thursday through Saturday in Stresa, Italy, on the shores of scenic Lago Maggiore.

The issue: Ukraine and many of its supporters have called for the confiscation of $260 billion in Russian assets frozen outside the country after the Feb. 24, 2022, invasion. But European officials have resisted, citing legal and financial stability concerns. And most of the frozen assets are located in Europe.

A European plan to merely use the interest on the Russian funds would provide only a trickle of money every year — some $2.5 billion-$3 billion at current interest rates. That would barely meet a month’s financing needs for the Ukrainian government.

U.S. Treasury officials and outside economists are proposing ways to turn that annual trickle into a much larger chunk of upfront cash. That could done be through a bond that would be repaid by the future interest income, giving Ukraine the money immediately. The ministers meet with Ukrainian Finance Minister Sergii Marchenko on Saturday.

“Securing Ukraine’s position in the medium-to-long term requires unlocking the value of immobilized Russian sovereign assets,” U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said at a news conference Thursday in Stresa. “We support the EU’s decision to utilize the windfall profits from these assets, but we must also continue our collective work on more ambitious options.”

The debate over the Russian assets is being revived after President Joe Biden in April signed into law the Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity for Ukrainians Act, which allows the administration to seize the roughly $5 billion in Russian state assets located in the U.S. The law was included in the U.S. aid package for Ukraine and other nations, which includes roughly $61 billion for Ukraine’s defense.

Exactly what the income from Russian assets would be spent on remains open, but one key focus is Kyiv’s state budget. Ukraine spends almost the entirety of its tax revenue on the military and needs another $40 billion a year to continue paying old-age pensions and the salaries of doctors, nurses and teachers — the glue that holds society together under dire wartime circumstances. Support from allies and a $15.4 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund was initially thought to have secured the budget for four years, but the prospects of an extended conflict have darkened the outlook.

Ukraine depends on its allies for that money because the war keeps the government from accessing international bond market borrowing. The alternative would be printing money at the central bank, which risks igniting hyperinflation.

Thanks to EU support and the U.S. aid package, passed after months of delay, this year’s budget “looks decent in terms of budget financing” but “next year is going to be much more challenging,” said Benjamin Hilgenstock, senior economist at the Kyiv School of Economics Institute.

The ministers will seek to build consensus ahead of the June 13-15 summit of G7 national leaders summit in Italy.

Yellen will also raise China’s outsized, state-backed production of green energy technology, which the U.S. considers a threat to the global economy. It has been a little more than a month since she traveled to China to speak with her counterparts in Guangzhou and Beijing about the nation’s massive subsidies to its electric vehicles, batteries, solar energy equipment and other products.

Since then, the U.S. has imposed major new tariffs on electric vehicles, semiconductors, solar equipment and medical supplies imported from China. Included is a 100% tariff on Chinese-made EVs, meant to protect the U.S. economy from cheap Chinese imports.

Yellen said Chinese overcapacity was an issue not just for the U.S. but also for other G7 and developing countries. That’s because China’s selling of low-priced goods threatens the existence of competing companies around the world, she said. “We are not willing to be completely reliant on China as a provider of these goods,” she said.

“We need to stand together and send a unified message to China so they understand that it is not just one country that feels this way but that they face a wall of opposition to this strategy that they are pursuing.”

Yellen said the finance ministers would also discuss humanitarian aid for Gaza, and that she would urge other member governments to join in strengthening sanctions against Iran over support of terrorist groups.

The G7 meets annually to coordinate economic policy and discuss other issues including security and energy. Its members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Representatives of the European Union also take part, but the EU does not serve as one of the rotating chairs.

___

Follow AP’s coverage at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

AP · by FATIMA HUSSEIN · May 23, 2024

4. Wary of China, American military plans return to Peleliu in Western Pacific

​I wonder if the USS Peleliu has ever made a port call in Peleliu.

Wary of China, American military plans return to Peleliu in Western Pacific

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · May 22, 2024

Maj. Asia Pastor, logistics plans officer for U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, takes a question about a new U.S. military site from a Peleliu resident in Koror, Republic of Palau, May 15, 2024. (Shaina O’Neal/U.S. Navy)

The Pentagon is proposing a new U.S. military site on a Micronesian island where a bloody battle raged during World War II.

Department of Defense representatives met Republic of Palau leaders and residents May 13-15 to discuss the proposed facility on the island of Peleliu, according to a May 17 statement from Joint Region Marianas.

Engineers from the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps shared details of the proposal with the Palauans, including plans to repair and expand the Peleliu Airstrip and South Dock, the statement said.

Efforts by Beijing to gain influence in the region, including a pact with the Solmon Islands that’s seen as a precursor to forward basing by the Chinese navy, has the attention of U.S. officials.

President Joe Biden signed legislation March 9 that provides $7.1 billion over two decades and renews compacts with Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau.

The compacts grant the U.S. military exclusive access to the nations’ land, airspace and waters, while their citizens are allowed to work and attend school in America, enlist in the U.S. armed services and access veterans’ health care.

A Peleliu resident asks a question about a new U.S. military site during a public meeting at the state office in Peleliu, Republic of Palau, May 13, 2024. (Shaina O’Neal/U.S. Navy)

Palau was the scene of fierce battles during World War II. About 1,800 Marines and soldiers were killed in the three-month Battle of Peleliu in fall 1944. Another 8,000 were wounded.

The U.S. Army began training again in Palau in 2019, after a 37-year hiatus. The following year, a Patriot missile battery deployed there and shot down a target drone during an exercise.

In October 2020, then-Palau President Tommy Remengesau Jr. offered to host new military facilities, including ports and air bases.

“Palau’s request to the U.S. military remains simple — build joint-use facilities, then come and use them regularly,” Remengesau wrote to then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, according to a Wall Street Journal report the following month.

The Pentagon in December 2022 awarded a $118 million contract to Gilbane Building Co., a Rhode Island firm, to build reinforced concrete pads and foundations for mobile, over-the-horizon radar in Palau by June 2026.

In December, the hospital ship USNS Mercy visited there on a humanitarian assistance mission. Palau also received aid parachuted to remote islands that month during Operation Christmas Drop, which involved airlift missions from Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.

“We have a strong partnership with the Palauan government and people,” Harry Elliott, counsel for the Indo-Pacific Command senior military official to Palau, said in the Joint Region Marianas statement. “When the Government of Palau sought to improve the infrastructure in Peleliu, we looked together to the designation of this new defense site to strengthen the U.S.’s ability to secure and defend Palau and meet this request.”

The site is meant to promote the quality of life for the people in Palau and to enhance the military’s capabilities throughout the region to include humanitarian assistance, disaster relief efforts, and power projection, he said.

The project is about partnership, Peleliu State Gov. Emais Roberts said in the statement.

“The Republic of Palau and State of Peleliu asked the U.S. government, asked the Department of Defense to help fix the airfield for our benefit, and also for the benefit of the military if they had the use for it,” he said.

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · May 22, 2024

5. This summer’s RIMPAC exercise in Hawaii drawing 30 nations and 40 ships

Excerpts:

This year’s exercise includes forces from Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The head of U.S. 3rd Fleet will serve as the Combined Task Force commander for the exercise.

Vice Adm. Michael Boyle is currently commander of the San Diego-based 3rd Fleet.

Vice Adm. John Wade, who previously oversaw the task force in charge of defueling the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility in Hawaii, has been nominated to replace Boyle.

Commodore Alberto Guerrero, of the Chilean navy, will serve as deputy commander of the Combined Task Force.

Rear Adm. Kazushi Yokota of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force will serve as vice commander.

This summer’s RIMPAC exercise in Hawaii drawing 30 nations and 40 ships

Stars and Stripes · by Wyatt Olson · May 22, 2024

U.S. and Indonesian marines arm wrestle during the Rim of Pacific exercise at Pohakuloa Training Area, Hawaii, July 15, 2018. (Stars and Stripes)

Forty ships from nearly 30 nations are slated to participate in this summer’s Rim of the Pacific exercise in and around the Hawaiian islands, the Navy said in a news release Tuesday.

The biennial RIMPAC, which the U.S. Navy touts as the largest international maritime exercise in the world, has been held 29 times since it began in 1971.

The training starts June 26 and runs through Aug. 2 and will include three submarines, 14 land-based forces, more than 150 aircraft and about 25,000 personnel, according to the Navy.

This year’s exercise includes forces from Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The head of U.S. 3rd Fleet will serve as the Combined Task Force commander for the exercise.

Vice Adm. Michael Boyle is currently commander of the San Diego-based 3rd Fleet.

Vice Adm. John Wade, who previously oversaw the task force in charge of defueling the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility in Hawaii, has been nominated to replace Boyle.

Commodore Alberto Guerrero, of the Chilean navy, will serve as deputy commander of the Combined Task Force.

Rear Adm. Kazushi Yokota of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force will serve as vice commander.

The expected participation in this year’s exercise is an increase over the 26 nations and 38 ships that joined the drills in 2022.

The coronavirus pandemic dramatically curtailed the exercise in 2020, with only Australia, Brunei, Canada, France, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore and the U.S. joining. The exercise lasted only two weeks and all events were held at sea.

China participated for the first time in 2014 and joined again in 2016.

It was disinvited in 2018 over Beijing’s construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea by dredging sand onto small coral atolls, which it then set about militarizing with aircraft hangars and runways.

Vietnam joined RIMPAC in 2018 for the first time but has not returned since.

Chinese officers attending the Rim of the Pacific exercise line up to pose in front of the guided-missile destroyer Xian at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, July 8, 2016. They are joined by two U.S. Navy officers who served as translators for visiting reporters. (Wyatt Olson/Stars and Stripes)

The Navy did not provide specifics about what drills will take place this summer.

The training will “strengthen our collective forces and promote a free and open Indo-Pacific,” the news release states.

The exercise will enhance the capability of the joint force “to deter and defeat aggression by major powers across all domains and levels of conflict,” according to the release.

Previous RIMPAC events have included sinking ships at sea with missiles, amphibious landings and Marine Corps Osprey aircraft landing on an Australian ship for the first time.

Stars and Stripes · by Wyatt Olson · May 22, 2024

6. More military veterans and active duty service members are dying by suicide than in battle – understanding why can help with prevention

This is an incredibly tragic statistic:

A 2021 study estimated that four times as many active duty service members and veterans died by suicide as died in battle since 9/11.

More military veterans and active duty service members are dying by suicide than in battle – understanding why can help with prevention

theconversation.com · by April Smith

Although service members know they may lose their lives in combat in service of their country, they may not expect to lose their lives – or those they love – to suicide. A 2021 study estimated that four times as many active duty service members and veterans died by suicide as died in battle since 9/11.

Despite recent calls to action to improve suicide prevention within the military, suicide rates remain elevated among service members. In particular, active duty Army suicide rates were nearly two times higher than other active duty military services and more than two and a half times higher than the general population. Suicide rates are even more elevated in veterans, with an estimated 17 or more dying by suicide each day in 2021.

My research is aimed at identifying what drives high rates of suicide among certain groups. Better understanding what causes active duty service members and veterans to think about and plan suicide is imperative for efforts to prevent it.

Many soldiers are lost to suicide after the battle is over. AP Photo/Richard Vogel

Risk factors for suicide within the military

There are many reasons why service members and veterans may have elevated rates of thoughts of suicide and death. Notably, risk factors for active duty service members can be different from those of veterans.

Some factors linked to suicide in active duty service members include loneliness, relationship issues, workplace difficulties, trauma, disrupted schedules, increased stress, poor sleep, injury and chronic pain. On top of these same factors, veterans may also experience difficulties transitioning to civilian life.

Additionally, service members may have an elevated capability for suicide, meaning a decreased fear of death, high pain tolerance and familiarity with using highly lethal means like firearms.

Rethinking suicide research in the military

Increasing rates of suicide suggest that researchers need to study suicide differently in order to save more lives. Fortunately, several research advances are helping scientists rethink the way people study suicide within and outside the military.

Different approaches to studying suicide can help improve interventions. Prostock-Studio/iStock via Getty Images Plus

In my lab’s recent study, we harnessed some of these innovations to study what drives thoughts of suicide among service members. We asked 92 participants to download an app on their phones and take short surveys assessing suicide risk factors four times per day for one month. Using a newer type of statistical method called network analysis, we were able to pinpoint which symptoms related to suicide risk had the greatest influence on other symptoms at one moment in time as well as over time.

Overall, we found that feeling ineffective or like a burden to others, a sense of low belonging or feeling disconnected from others, and agitation are important drivers of moment-to-moment and longer-term risk for thoughts of suicide among service members and veterans.

Increasing effectiveness and belonging

Based on our study results, considering how the military both fosters and hinders a sense of belonging and effectiveness could help address suicide risk factors. This may become even more important as demands created by technology, such as drone pilots operating in siloed facilities, may lead active duty service members to be less connected to one another.

Additionally, some active duty service members report task saturation – feeling like they have too much to do without enough time, resources or tools to get tasks done. They also report working an unbalanced amount of hours that precludes rest and reflection. Allowing soldiers more time to do their work and reflect on it could renew their sense of effectiveness and improve their understanding of how they contribute to overall goals.

Fostering a culture of support in the military could help build connection among service members. AP Photo/Ted S. Warren

Additionally, military leadership could find ways to prioritize and reward group-level achievements over individual accomplishments. This could lead to both increased belonging and reduced feelings of ineffectiveness, in turn reducing thoughts of suicide.

Finally, relaxation techniques, including progressive muscle relaxation, massage and gentle movement, could be beneficial in reducing agitation.

There is still much work to do to turn the tides in the fight against suicide and help those who serve and protect us. If you or someone you love is thinking about suicide, know that you are not alone and there is help. For military-specific resources, you can call 988 and then press 1, or text 838255. You can also visit www.veteranscrisisline.net.

theconversation.com · by April Smith

7. Navy looks to Army for more data analytics capability

​"Joint" analytics.

Navy looks to Army for more data analytics capability

The sea service is also planning to release a new information strategy in July.

defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams

Navy CIO Jane Rathbun U.S. Navy / Petty Officer 2nd Class Wade Costin

By Lauren C. Williams

Senior Editor

May 22, 2024 05:22 PM ET

The Navy wants to piggyback on the Army’s data analytics efforts through a new policy that encourages secure information sharing, the Navy’s chief information officer said.

The Pentagon “just issued a reciprocity memo that basically is like data sharing because now we're going to agree to take the [authority to operate] of a system or an application from another service and adopt it,” Jane Rathbun said during a keynote at AFCEA NoVa’s defense IT event Tuesday. “We're going to actually pilot this idea with the Army's Palantir ATO and try to get it so that we can leverage it on our side and not go through that process over again as part of our data analytics ecosystem.”

Last week, the Defense Department’s chief information office released a cybersecurity reciprocity handbook to help military departments and defense agencies protect data and speed up the authority to operate, or ATO, process where one already exists.

“Executed appropriately, reciprocity reduces redundant testing, assessment and documentation, and the associated costs in time and resources,” states the memo, which is dated May 15.

The ATO process has long been a pain point across the Defense Department, particularly when it comes to upgrading software. And for the Navy, the Army’s data efforts with the AI-company Palantir is a good place to start.

“It is something that we want to do because they already have Palantir on a contract. And they have a platform and we can leverage their ATO. That's what we want to do. And…we will be in conversations with them about that. I've tasked my staff to do that,” Rathbun told reporters. “We want to have variety in our data analytics ecosystem, and this will just be another capability in our data analytics toolbox.”

The Navy is also planning to update its Information Superiority Vision strategy this summer. The document, originally released in 2020, focuses on the network and security plans and will be refreshed with an emphasis on data management.

“A core focus of the Information Security Vision 2.0 is data management, and data management is about creating standards and guardrails that allow us to maneuver data in smart ways,” Rathbun said during her keynote.

For example, the new strategy would include policy on software containerization, where an application’s code, files, and tools are bundled together so software is ready to deploy.

“So if you're developing software, you don't have to containerize today. Is that really going to be useful if our goal is to be able to securely move data from anywhere to anywhere? Especially to the tactical edge and leverage an ecosystem that includes commercial [satellite communications], maybe cloud on a ship?” Rathbun said. “We need to have some standards and guardrails that are about information sharing, in general, application systems—and data management has to be core to that.”

Additionally, Rathbun said, the ISV 2.0 strategy, which has been written and is expected to be published in July, would also tackle how the Navy tags data.

“We don't tag data the way we should be tagging data. People are doing it if they need to do it for their systems, but there's not a movement, I will say, across the Department of Navy that is focused on prepping, tagging, understanding the prominence, all of those things are important in order to be able to fully consume and utilize data,” she said. “And so I will tell you, the ISV 2.0 is going to have a list of things or does have a list of things in it that we want to go after holistically as the Department of Navy on that topic.”

8. DOD: Russia’s use of Starlink will be a ‘continuous problem’ in Ukraine

DOD: Russia’s use of Starlink will be a ‘continuous problem’ in Ukraine

The Pentagon and SpaceX have been working together to shut off Russia’s use of Starlink.

defenseone.com · by Audrey Decker

The antenna of the Starlink satellite-based broadband system is seen in the snow in Bakhmut, Ukraine, on February 16, 2023. YASUYOSHI CHIBA / AFP via Getty Images

By Audrey Decker

Staff Writer

May 21, 2024

• The Pentagon and SpaceX could be playing an unending game of whac-a-mole to identify and shut off Starlink satellite terminals obtained by Russia to use in Ukraine.

“I think this will be a continuous problem. We can continue to identify them and turn them off, but I think Russia will not stop" at trying to get more terminals, John Hill, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for space and missile defense, told the Senate Armed Services subcommittee on strategic forces Tuesday.

Russian forces have been buying Starlink through the black market, compromising Ukraine’s advantage. Since it's a commercial product, Russia can continue buying terminals as the Pentagon and SpaceX turns them off, and the U.S. is unlikely to geofence an area to block them because there might be Ukrainains trying to operate in that region.

SpaceX also markets a military version of Starlink, called Starshield, to the U.S. military, but that’s not currently available to Ukraine.

Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., pressed Hill about whether SpaceX has been cooperating with the Pentagon to help cut off Russia’s use of Starlink.

“Not only has SpaceX been very cooperative with the entire U.S. government and the government of Ukraine, they’ve been forward leaning in identifying and bringing information to us,” Hill said.

The Pentagon is working with SpaceX to address Russia’s use of Starlink through its commercial integration cell at U.S. Space Command, which allows commercial companies and the government to work together and share company proprietary information and classified information, Hill said.

The Pentagon has “developed strategies” with SpaceX to identify all the terminals that should be left on and which should be turned off, Hill said.

Warren and Sen. Mark Kelly, D-Ariz., have previously expressed concerns over Russia’s use of Starlink and Warren has pressed the Pentagon to ensure military contractors are held accountable for any exploitation of their technology by adversaries.

9. Army brass opposes drone branch

Is it congressional overreach if Congress forces the Army to establish a drone branch?

Army brass opposes drone branch

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

Army leaders reject a Congressional proposal to establish a drone branch, they said in statements Tuesday and Friday.

“We see [drones] as integrated into our formation, not some separate piece. And I think we need that kind of flexibility,” Army Chief of Staff Randy George, told the Senate Appropriations Committee. “I don't think it would be helpful to have a separate drone branch.”

Service Under Secretary Gabe Camarillo was similarly forthright, speaking Friday at an event hosted by think tank CNAS.

“Making a decision on specializing a branch I think would be premature,” Camarillo said. Instead, the Army must first experiment with drones to establish how it wants to best use them across Army formations, he said.

The House’s tactical and land forces subcommittee made the proposal for the drone branch in the 2025 defense authorization bill. It would put drones on par with the 22 branches the service has now, such as artillery and armor.

A senior Army officer would lead the drone branch, taking responsibility for training and force modernization. And the drone branch would also include counter-drone activities, a congressional staffer told Defense One last week.

The staffer did note Army opposition to the plan, but expressed confidence that it would be adopted anyway.

A drone branch is a good sign that Congress is taking unmanned vehicles seriously, said Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. In general, the Army should seek to professionalize its use of drones, Clark added.

“Drones have been treated mostly as elements of troop formations for surveillance, but the idea of drones as an important element of [indirect fire] should drive ground forces to rethink their role as being more like artillery,” Clark said.

Ukrainian drone operators have described the use of drones to coordinate artillery fire as key to offensive operations. The country in February announced the formation of its own drone branch. German parliamentarians have similarly advocated for a drone branch.

Still, U.S. Army leaders say that while they’re leery of a drone branch, they do back more investments in drones and counter-drone tools.

“Gen. George and I both believe that we need to invest more in counter [drone] capabilities,” Army Secretary Christine Wormuth told the Senate Appropriations Committee on Tuesday.

“As we're putting together the [fiscal year] 26 budget, counter-UAS investment is definitely an area of focus for all of the Army leadership,” said Camarillo, speaking to reporters after the CNAS event last Friday.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

10. Airmen, guardians could skip shaving under congressional plan

Doesn't Congress have more important issues to address than growing beard in the military?

Airmen, guardians could skip shaving under congressional plan

militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · May 22, 2024

Congress wants to know if airmen and guardians will still be able to defend the skies with facial hair.

An amendment included in the House Armed Services Committee’s draft of the annual defense authorization bill would mandate the creation of a new pilot program allowing some Air Force and Space Force members to grow beards.

The idea has been discussed by service officials in the past, but not acted upon in recent years. Navy officials recently completed a study on whether beards would interfere with service members’ gas mask seals, but has yet to publicly release those results.

Language unanimously adopted for the authorization bill on Wednesday would require the Air Force to conduct the pilot to test similar job-related complications of facial hair, and also to gauge “the effect of beard growth on discipline, morale and unity within the ranks.”

The pilot program — proposed by Rep. Marc Veasey, D-Texas — would also look at “whether allowing members to grow beards improves inclusivity, including for members with conditions like pseudofolliculitis barbae or those who wish to grow beards for religious purposes.”

RELATED

Sailors, Marines could see changes to how beards are accommodated

The Department of the Navy is now examining whether changes to its beard accommodation policies would be “operationally supportable and prudent."

Air Force policy currently bans beards for all airmen except those who have five-year medical waivers for pseudofolliculitis barbae — chronic razor bumps — or religious waivers.

Military.com reported last month that shaving waivers for medical conditions in the Air Force and Space Force have nearly doubled since 2021. Service officials would have six months after the passage of the authorization bill to launch the pilot program. Some have suggested the Air Force study those who already have shaving waivers rather than finding an entirely new pool of participants.

Committee members also included a provision in the authorization bill draft to force a congressional briefing on the Navy study, so lawmakers can better understand the impact of such a policy change.

Before either provision becomes law, however, members of Congress will have to pass the authorization bill. That process is expected to take several more months as both House and Senate negotiators work through differences in their respective proposals.

About Leo Shane III

Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.

11. Poland spends $1 billion on US-made surveillance aerostats

What is old is new again?

Poland spends $1 billion on US-made surveillance aerostats

Defense News · by Jaroslaw Adamowski · May 22, 2024

WARSAW, Poland — Poland’s Ministry of National Defence announced it has signed a deal to buy four aerostat-based early warning radar systems from the United States under a deal worth almost $1 billion.

“Poland will be the second country in the world to use such a system,” Kosiniak-Kamysz said at a press conference today, as quoted in a statement released by his ministry. “These aerostats will be financed by a loan provided by the United States.”

The U.S. Army uses aerostats under its Persistent Surveillance System – Tethered program, according the service’s website.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Poland has ramped up its efforts to acquire new weapons and military gear for the nation’s armed forces. Under the plan, the four aerostats will be deployed to Polish military bases in the country’s eastern and north-eastern parts where Poland borders Belarus and Russia’s exclave of Kaliningrad, according to the national defense ministry.

How does the Army want to update its blimp-like aerostats? C4ISRNET’s Colin Demarest asks an expert.

The ordered systems “have the capacity to detect a wide range of objects, such as missiles, aircraft, drones, and seaborne units,” the ministry said.

In February 2024, the U.S. Department of State approved the foreign military sale, and it was subsequently authorized by Congress.

In a statement, the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency said that the principal contractors for this procurement will include Raytheon Intelligence and Space, TCOM, ELTA North America, and QinetiQ’s subsidiary Avantus Federal. Deliveries under the contract will cover airspace and surface radar reconnaissance aerostat systems, airborne early warning radars, as well as related equipment and logistics, according to the agency.

Manufacturer TCOM received a $450 million contract in 2021 to provide Saudi Arabia with 10 sensor-laden aerostats for communications and intelligence, according to the company’s website.

About Jaroslaw Adamowski

Jaroslaw Adamowski is the Poland correspondent for Defense News.

12. First aid from US pier in Gaza has reached starving Palestinians, the UN says

Reports are varied. They include food aid being stolen.

Now, Biden’s Gaza pier aid is being stolen

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/beltway-confidential/3011753/now-bidens-gaza-pier-aid-being-stolen/

UN food agency warns that the new US sea route for Gaza aid may fail unless conditions improve

https://apnews.com/article/us-pier-gaza-famine-israel-1feae14dac670bb4de0467988799c5c6

Looted Gaza aid trucks ‘a type of self-distribution:’ UN official

https://www.newsnationnow.com/vargasreports/looted-trucks-self-distribution-un-official/

Gaza aid piles up in Egypt, US pier delivery falters

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/no-us-pier-aid-un-gaza-two-days-after-truck-incident-2024-05-20/

First aid from US pier in Gaza has reached starving Palestinians, the UN says

AP · by ELLEN KNICKMEYER · May 22, 2024

By

Share

WASHINGTON (AP) — The U.N. World Food Program said Wednesday that it has handed out in Gaza in recent days a “limited number” of high-energy biscuits that arrived from a U.S.-built pier, the first aid from the new humanitarian sea route to get into the hands of Palestinians in grave need.

The small number of biscuits came in the first shipments unloaded from the pier Friday, WFP spokesman Steve Taravella said. The U.S. Agency for International Development told The Associated Press that a total of 41 trucks loaded with aid from the more than $320 million pier have reached humanitarian organizations in Gaza.

“Aid is flowing” from the pier, U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan told reporters Wednesday in response to questions about the troubled launch of aid deliveries from the maritime project. “It is not flowing at a rate that any of us are happy with.”

Pentagon spokesman Maj. Gen. Patrick Ryder told reporters Tuesday that he did not believe any of the aid from the pier had yet reached people in Gaza. Sullivan said a day later that some aid had been delivered “specifically to the Palestinians who need it.”

American officials hope the pier at maximum capacity can bring the equivalent of 150 truckloads of aid to Gaza each day. That’s a fraction of the 600 truckloads of food, emergency nutritional treatments and other supplies that USAID says are needed each day to bring people in Gaza back from the start of famine and address the humanitarian crisis brought on by the seven-month-old Israel-Hamas war.

Israeli restrictions on land crossings and a surge in fighting have cut deliveries of food and fuel in Gaza to the lowest levels since the first months of the war, international officials say. Israel’s takeover this month of the Rafah border crossing, a key transit point for fuel and supplies for Gaza, has contributed to bringing aid operations near collapse, the U.N. and relief groups say.

All 2.3 million people of Gaza are struggling to get food, according to aid groups, with the heads of the WFP and USAID having said famine has begun in north Gaza.

The U.S. pier project to bring aid to Gaza via the Mediterranean Sea has had a troubled launch, with groups of people overrunning a convoy Saturday and taking most of the supplies and a man in the crowd who was shot dead in still-unexplained circumstances.

Saturday’s chaos forced suspension of aid convoys from the pier for two days. Shada Moghraby, the WFP’s spokesperson at the U.N., said trucks carrying aid from the pier arrived at a U.N. warehouse Tuesday and Wednesday, but it wasn’t clear how many.

The WFP had warned this week that the U.S. project could fail unless Israeli authorities gave clearances and cooperation for alternate land routes and better security.

Humanitarian officials and the U.S. say the sea route is not a replacement for bringing aid through land crossings, and they have repeatedly called on Israel to allow a steady large flow of trucks through entry points and to ensure aid workers are safe from the Israeli military.

Israel insists it puts no restriction on the number of trucks entering Gaza and has blamed “lack of logistical capabilities and manpower gaps” among aid groups. But Israel’s military operations make it very difficult for groups to retrieve the aid.

___

AP writer Edith M. Lederer contributed from the United Nations.

AP · by ELLEN KNICKMEYER · May 22, 2024

13. How Soda, Chocolate and Chewing Gum Are Funding War in Sudan

Excerpts:

“Moving in convoys is the only way to stay safe, but it’s very costly,” says Jaber. “Everyone has to pay.”

In addition to the payments at the main RSF checkpoints, Jaber says gum arabic traders also hand over between $60 and $100 to AK-47-toting RSF fighters, who accompany the convoys of traders in pickup trucks. Traders who refuse to pay risk losing their cargo and vehicles to militia, he says. 

Around 80% of the world’s gum arabic is harvested from Sudan’s acacia trees, which grow in the desert belt that stretches from Sudan’s western border with Chad to its eastern border with Ethiopia, covering an area of roughly 200,000 square miles. Gum arabic is a tasteless and odorless dried sap used as a stabilizer, thickening agent or emulsifier for many foods, drinks, cosmetics and medicines. 

How Soda, Chocolate and Chewing Gum Are Funding War in Sudan

A powerful militia and the country’s military both profit from trade in gum arabic, a common ingredient

https://www.wsj.com/world/how-soda-chocolate-and-chewinggumare-funding-war-insudan-535a7686?mod=hp_lead_pos7&utm

By Alexandra WexlerFollow

 in Johannesburg and Nicholas BariyoFollow

 in Kampala, Uganda

Updated May 23, 2024 12:05 am ET

Once a week, Muhamed Jaber drives down a bumpy road to the Sudanese city of El Obeid, the back of his truck heaving with bags full of amber-colored chunks of gum arabic, a little-known ingredient in chocolate, soda, chewing gum and other consumer goods.

Near the end of his 50-mile trip, Jaber says he pays around $330 to fighters from the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary group that the U.S. government has accused of ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in Sudan’s one-year-old civil war. The RSF has laid siege to El Obeid since June and controls three out of four major access roads to the city, which is one of Sudan’s main agricultural hubs and held by the country’s military.

“Moving in convoys is the only way to stay safe, but it’s very costly,” says Jaber. “Everyone has to pay.”

In addition to the payments at the main RSF checkpoints, Jaber says gum arabic traders also hand over between $60 and $100 to AK-47-toting RSF fighters, who accompany the convoys of traders in pickup trucks. Traders who refuse to pay risk losing their cargo and vehicles to militia, he says. 

Around 80% of the world’s gum arabic is harvested from Sudan’s acacia trees, which grow in the desert belt that stretches from Sudan’s western border with Chad to its eastern border with Ethiopia, covering an area of roughly 200,000 square miles. Gum arabic is a tasteless and odorless dried sap used as a stabilizer, thickening agent or emulsifier for many foods, drinks, cosmetics and medicines. 

EGYPT

SUDAN

AFRICA

Port Sudan

Nile River

Red Sea

Merowe

CHAD

SUDAN

ERITREA

Khartoum

Kassala

GUM BELT

El Geneina

El Fasher

El Obeid

Nyala

ad-Damazin

El Daein

ETHIOPIA

Abyei

200 miles

SOUTH SUDAN

200 km

Source: Rami Sirelkhatem and Eisa E. l. Gaali, 2009, “Phylogenic analysis in Acacia senegal using AFLP molecular markers across the Gum Arabic Belt in Sudan” (Sudan Commission for Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering, National Center for Research, Ministry of Science and Technology)

The sap has become a key source of funding for both sides in the war, according to Sudanese traders. In addition to the RSF collecting money through its control of most major agricultural routes, the Sudanese military—which runs the country’s de facto government—levies taxes and other tariffs on the gum arabic trade.

The U.S. has accused both sides in the conflict of committing war crimes. In September, the State Department slapped sanctions on two senior RSF commanders for their alleged involvement in ethnic killings, sexual violence and the looting and burning of communities, among other abuses. Another two RSF commanders were sanctioned this month.

Around 8.5 million Sudanese have been forced from their homes since the start of the war in April 2023. Tom Perriello, the Biden administration’s special envoy for Sudan, this month warned that the war’s real death toll could be 10 to 15 times higher than the about 15,000 who are confirmed to have been killed.

“Proceeds from the gum arabic exports are directly financing this fighting,” says Rabie Abdelaty, a Sudanese academic who has researched the gum arabic industry.

Millions of Sudanese have been forced from their homes since the war began in spring 2023. PHOTO: MOHAMED NURELDIN ABDALLAH/REUTERS

People who fled the war arriving in Renk, in neighboring South Sudan. PHOTO: LUIS TATO/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Despite these concerns, few companies have taken steps to make sure they are avoiding Sudanese gum arabic, based on interviews with manufacturers, suppliers and end-users. 

“You don’t want the customers to be out of gum,” said Osama Idris, general manager at Morouj Commodities UK, a raw-gum importer and processor based in Weston-super-Mare, in England. Idris said that none of his customers, which include confectionary, beverage and flavor companies, have expressed concerns about sourcing gum arabic from Sudan.

Nestlé, which adds gum arabic to chocolates and gummy candies, said that according to its suppliers, the small quantities it uses come primarily from Chad, Niger and Mali. 

A spokesman for Kisses-maker Hershey said the company expects all of its suppliers to adhere to all laws in the countries in which they operate. A Ferrero spokeswoman said the chocolate maker has strict due diligence measures that all of its suppliers must comply with, including assessments and on-field audits.

Some companies have said that stopping purchases of Sudanese gum arabic would hurt hundreds of thousands of Sudanese who depend on the sap for their livelihoods, many of them subsistence farmers or members of nomadic communities, at a time when United Nations agencies warn of an impending famine.

Refugees from the Sudan conflict in Adré, Chad. PHOTO: DAN KITWOOD/GETTY IMAGES

A Sudanese man who was shot getting medical treatment last month in Adré, Chad. PHOTO: DAN KITWOOD/GETTY IMAGES

French company Nexira, which says it has a 40% share of the global gum arabic market, paused its operations in Sudan for three months last year, but has since resumed and is receiving shipments of gum from the country. 

“Despite uncertainties in transportation and potential incidents affecting the crop, we have decided to continue buying from harvesters,” a company spokeswoman said. “This is part of our commitment to the local communities with whom we have worked for several decades.”

She said some of Nexira’s contacts recently had reported “potential racketeering activity on Sudanese roads,” and said the company has asked its partners in the country to avoid routes where free movement can’t be guaranteed. 

The U.S. Treasury Department, which is in charge of economic sanctions, declined to comment on whether it has considered gum arabic’s role in funding the war in Sudan. When the U.S. imposed sanctions against Sudan in the 1990s for its then-leader Omar al-Bashir’s alleged support for international terror groups, including al Qaeda, President Bill Clinton created a loophole for gum arabic, largely exempting shipments from the embargo imposed on bilateral trade. 

Gum arabic is one of Sudan’s main agricultural exports. In 2022, Sudan exported gum arabic valued at around $183 million, making it one of the country’s top 10 exports overall, according to the latest available data. 

Traders say they expect Sudan’s production to decline by around half during this season, which runs from October through about May, as many young men who normally harvest the sap have signed up to fight and others were too afraid to go out and tap the trees. Prices, meanwhile, have increased by around two-thirds to as much as $5,000 a metric ton, traders say. 

A man harvesting gum arabic sap last year from an acacia tree east of El Obeid, Sudan. PHOTO: ASHRAF SHAZLY/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Netherlands-based FOGA Gum, which used to import and process Sudanese gum arabic mainly to supply flavor companies in the U.S. and Europe, ceased all trading activities in Sudan in April 2023, shortly after the start of the war.  

“Our business came to a complete halt,” said Martijn Bergkamp, a partner at FOGA Gum. “We work on a completely transparent food chain. Due to the war, it is not clear where gum comes from in Sudan. We don’t want to cooperate with either party.” 

Now the company only supports tree planting by some nurseries in the western Darfur region, he said.

Traders say the bulk of Sudan’s gum arabic currently passes through El Obeid for onward export, mainly through Chad, Egypt and the Sudanese Red Sea city of Port Sudan.

“If there’s any big shortage of gum arabic on the world market, the repercussions could be quite serious,” said Rachid Amui, who monitors commodity trade at the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, an agency that promotes the interests of developing countries in world trade.

Write to Alexandra Wexler at alexandra.wexler@wsj.com and Nicholas Bariyo at nicholas.bariyo@wsj.com

​

14. China 'PUNISHES' Taiwan: Huge military drills are launched around the island three days after the island's new president - detested by Beijing - took charge

China 'PUNISHES' Taiwan: Huge military drills are launched around the island three days after the island's new president - detested by Beijing - took charge

• China claims Taiwan is part of its territory and refused to renounce use of force

By DAVID AVERRE

PUBLISHED: 03:45 EDT, 23 May 2024 | UPDATED: 03:46 EDT, 23 May 2024

Daily Mail · by David Averre · May 23, 2024

Taiwan was forced to scramble fighter jets and put missile, naval and land units on alert this morning after China launched huge military exercises around the self-governing island.

Beijing said the menacing war games, dubbed 'Joint Sword-2024A', were a 'strong punishment' for Taiwan following the inauguration of its new president, Lai Ching-te, who is detested in Beijing as a 'separatist'.

China claims Taiwan is part of its national territory and the People's Liberation Army routinely sends navy ships and warplanes into the Taiwan Strait and other areas around the island to wear down Taiwan's defences and seek to intimidate its people.

But this week's wargames are massive in scale.

The PLA released a map of the intended exercise area which completely surrounds Taiwan's main island concentrating major firepower at five key points, as well as places like Matsu and Kinmen, outlying islands that are closer to the Chinese mainland than Taiwan.

China's coast guard also said it organised a fleet to carry out law enforcement drills near two islands close to the Taiwanese-controlled island groups of Kinmen and Matsu just off the Chinese coast.

They come after the island swore in President Lai who said in his inaugural speech on Monday that Taiwan 'must demonstrate our resolution to defend our nation'.

China denounced Lai's speech as a 'confession of independence'.

A Taiwan Air Force Mirage 2000-5 aircraft prepares to land at Hsinchu Air Base in Hsinchu, Taiwan May 23, 2024

A Taiwanese air force Mirage 2000 fighter jet prepares for take off at a base in Hsinchu in northern Taiwan on May 23, 2024

This handout photo taken and released by the Taiwan Coast Guard on May 23, 2024 shows a Chinese military ship northwest of Pengjia Island, off the coast of northern Taiwan. China on May 23 encircled Taiwan with naval vessels and military aircraft in war games aimed at punishing the self-ruled island after its new president vowed to defend democracy

Taiwanese air force Mirage 2000 fighter jets wait for take off at a base in Hsinchu in northern Taiwan on May 23, 2024

China on May 23 encircled Taiwan with naval vessels and military aircraft in war games aimed at punishing the self-ruled island after its new president vowed to defend democracy. Taiwan's Mirage 2000 fighter jets prepare for takeoff in this image

A Taiwan Air Force C-130 aircraft takes off at Hsinchu Air Base in Hsinchu, Taiwan May 23, 2024

China publishes a map of the intended scale of the war games, showing how warships and planes will conduct drills in five areas surrounding Taiwan

Taiwan's former President Tsai Ing-wen (L) and new President Lai Ching-te (R) wave to people during the inauguration ceremony outside the Presidential office building in Taipei, Taiwan May 20, 2024

Members of an honor guard hold flags during an inauguration ceremony of Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te in Taipei, Taiwan, Monday, May 20, 2024

Chinese soldiers stand in formation during the Cambodian-Chinese Dragon Gold-2024 drill at a military police base in Kampong Chhnang province on May 16, 2024

Chinese soldiers stand in formation during the Cambodian-Chinese Dragon Gold-2024 drill at a military police base in Kampong Chhnang province on May 16, 2024

A flight of Mirage 2000 jet fighters were seen taking off from an airbase in northern Taiwan in anticipation of the oncoming wargames this morning as the defence minister issued a scathing statement in response to China's aggression.

China's 'irrational provocation has jeopardised regional peace and stability,' the ministry said.

It added that Taipei will seek no conflicts but 'will not shy away from one'.

'This pretext for conducting military exercises not only does not contribute to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, but also shows its hegemonic nature at heart,' the ministry's statement said.

The PLA's Eastern Theatre Command said the land, navy and air exercises around Taiwan are meant to test the navy and air capabilities of the PLA units, as well as their joint strike abilities to hit targets and win control of the battlefield, the command said on its official Weibo account.

'This is also a powerful punishment for the separatist forces seeking ''independence'' and a serious warning to external forces for interference and provocation,' the statement said.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sees Taiwan as a renegade province to be brought back under Beijing's control - something the authoritarian president Xi Jinping has said he's willing to do by force.

But Taiwan's elected Democratic Progressive Party steadfastly argues it presides over a self-governing, democratic, capitalist society with overwhelming support from its people.

Self-ruled Taiwan is separated by a narrow 110-mile strait from China, and Taipei's coast guard said it had encountered Chinese ships around the Taiwan-administered outlying islands of Dongyin and Wuqiu early Thursday morning.

Two Chinese coast guard ships had sailed into the 'restricted waters of Dongyin' at 7:48am, while another was outside the restricted zone to 'provide support', Taipei's coast guard said.

Another two Chinese ships were detected around Wuqiu, about 70 miles from Taiwan's western coast, 'entering restricted waters', with a third outside the restricted area, the coast guard said.

Footage released by the coast guard showed Taiwanese officers ordering Chinese ships to leave over a loudspeaker.

'Your movements affect our country's order and safety, please turn away and leave our restricted waters as soon as possible,' an officer said, according to the coast guard video.

'Leave right away, leave right away!'

The incidents near Dongyin and Wuqiu marked the seventh time this month that Chinese vessels breached Taiwan's restricted waters.

China's President Xi Jinping

Two people ride a motorcycle as a Taiwanese Air Force Mirage 2000 fighter jet approaches for landing at an air force base in Hsinchu in northern Taiwan on May 23, 2024

A Taiwan Air Force Mirage 2000-5 aircraft prepares to take off at Hsinchu Air Base in Hsinchu, Taiwan May 23, 2024

Chinese soldiers prepare machine guns on armoured vehicles ahead of war games

Taiwan's new President Lai Ching-te gives a speech at his inauguration ceremony on May 20, 2024 in Taipei, Taiwan. Lai urged China to stop its military threats against Taiwan in his inaugural address

FILE PHOTO: A fishing boat sails past a Chinese warship during a military drill off the Chinese coast near Fuzhou, Fujian Province, across from the Taiwan-controlled Matsu Islands, China, April 11, 2023

FILE - In this photo released by Xinhua News Agency, Chinese naval frigate Binzhou takes part in a joint naval drills with Russian warships in the East China Sea

In his inauguration address on Monday, new president Lai called for Beijing to stop its military intimidation and pledged to 'neither yield nor provoke' the mainland Communist Party leadership.

Lai has said he seeks dialogue with Beijing while maintaining Taiwan's current status and avoiding conflicts that could draw in the island's chief ally the U.S. and other regional partners such as Japan and Australia.

Read More

David vs. Goliath: How China and Taiwan's militaries shape up as Xi Jinping tells Beijing's troops to prepare for 'real combat' while Joe Biden claims US will defend the island from invasion

While China has termed the exercises as punishment for Taiwan's election result, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has now run the island's government for more than a decade.

Speaking in Australia, Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Stephen Sklenka, the deputy commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, called on Asia-Pacific nations to condemn the Chinese military exercises.

'There's no surprise whenever there's an action that highlights Taiwan in the international sphere the Chinese feel compelled to make some kind of form of statement,' Sklenka told the National Press Club of Australia in the capital Canberra, in a reference to Monday's presidential inauguration.

'Just because we expect that behaviour doesn't mean that we shouldn't condemn it, and we need to condemn it publicly. And it needs to come from us, but it also needs to come, I believe, from nations in the region.

'It's one thing when the United States condemns the Chinese, but it has a far more powerful effect, I believe, when it comes from nations within this region,' Sklenka added.

Japan's top envoy weighed in while visiting the U.S., saying Japan and Taiwan share values and principles, including freedom, democracy, basic rights and rule of law.

'(Taiwan) is our extremely important partner that we have close economic relations and exchanges of people, and is our precious friend,' Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa told reporters in Washington, where she held talks with Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

She said the two ministers discussed Taiwan and the importance of the Taiwan Strait, one of the world's most important waterways for shipping, remaining peaceful.

FILE PHOTO: missile from the rocket force of the Eastern Theater Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) takes part in operations during the combat readiness patrol and military exercises around Taiwan

Air Defence and Missile Command of Taiwan Air Force takes part in a military exercise, at an undisclosed location in Taiwan in this handout picture provided by Taiwan Defence Ministry and released in April 2023

Taiwanese soldiers pose for group photos with a Taiwan flag after a preparedness enhancement drill in Kaohsiung City, Taiwan on Wednesday, Jan 11, 2023

U.S. President Joe Biden meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the G20 leaders' summit in Bali, Indonesia, November 14, 2022

Beijing's incessant war games in the Taiwan Strait and Xi's declaration that 'China will never renounce the right to use force' to bring the island under the control of the mainland suggest the CCP may be laying the groundwork for an invasion.

Speaking last year, China's leader said the People's Liberation Army, which is now the second largest force in the world, must conduct 'military struggles firmly and with flexibility'.

'You must strengthen real combat military training,' he said in a statement carried by state news agency Xinhua, adding that the military must 'resolutely defend China's territorial sovereignty and maritime interests, and strive to protect overall peripheral stability'.

Taiwanese and US defence officials have since warned they expect the PLA to be ready to launch an attack on the island well before the end of the decade.

CIA Director William Burns in February 2023 claimed US intelligence suggests Xi has instructed his country's military to 'be ready by 2027' to invade Taiwan.

'We do know, as has been made public, that President Xi has instructed the PLA, the Chinese military leadership, to be ready by 2027 to invade Taiwan, but that doesn't mean that he's decided to invade in 2027 or any other year as well,' Burns told CBS' 'Face the Nation.'

But for all of Xi's posturing and declarations that Beijing will not renounce the right to use force to 'reunite' the island with the mainland, China has shown in recent decades it is very reluctant to fight a war.

Beijing last engaged in a large-scale military operation in Vietnam in 1979 which failed just as the US effort had four years prior - and the CCP has plenty to lose in a war with Taiwan.

The conflict would be widely condemned by its Western trading partners, and Xi has the hindsight of watching the damaging economic response levied by Western powers on Russia following Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine.

And launching an invasion would run the risk of triggering a military response from the only world power whose armed forces have the might to overcome the sheer size of the People's Liberation Army - the United States.

Daily Mail · by David Averre · May 23, 2024

15. Army unveils colorful new patch for soldiers assigned to US Forces Japan

Adopting the Torii.

Army unveils colorful new patch for soldiers assigned to US Forces Japan

Stars and Stripes · by Jeremy Stillwagner · May 22, 2024

Soldiers assigned to U.S. Forces Japan wait to receive new patches during a ceremony in the Officers' Club at Yokota Air Base, Japan, May 20, 2024. (U.S. Forces Japan)

YOKOTA AIR BASE, Japan — Soldiers who serve with U.S. Forces Japan are sporting a new, colorful patch on their sleeves to indicate their unique association with the command.

USFJ revealed the patch during a Monday ceremony at this airlift hub in western Tokyo, where USFJ is headquartered.

The new design is a blue-bordered white disc featuring seven rays reminiscent of Japan’s rising-sun flag. It includes six stars and the silhouette of a torii, a traditional gate whose design is a familiar sight in Japan.

The red, white and blue represents the United States; the red and white also represents Japan, a USFJ spokesman, Air Force Maj. Thomas Barger, told Stars and Stripes by email Wednesday. The blue border represents the Pacific Ocean, the torii symbolizes unity and diplomacy, and the six stars signify each of the armed forces that are part of USFJ.

“The new patch signifying the Army Element of USFJ represents their mission in support of the U.S. Japan Alliance, with the Army members being part of the joint command composed of six U.S. uniformed services,” USFJ said in a Facebook post Tuesday.

USFJ is subordinate to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and helps plan and coordinate military exercises and resolve issues in common with their Japanese counterparts, among other responsibilities.

The commander of U.S. Army Japan, Maj. Gen. David Womack, presents soldiers with their new organization patches during a ceremony in the Officers' Club at Yokota Air Base, Japan, May, 20, 2024. (U.S. Forces Japan)

The commander of U.S. Army Japan, Maj. Gen. David Womack, presents soldiers with their new organization patches during a ceremony in the Officers' Club at Yokota Air Base, Japan, May, 20, 2024. (U.S. Forces Japan)

The commander of U.S. Army Japan, Maj. Gen. David Womack, led Monday’s ceremony at the Yokota Officers’ Club and applied the new patch to the sleeve of each soldier in attendance.

Soldiers assigned to USFJ previously wore the Joint Activities patch, which was shield-shaped and featured the U.S. coat of arms.

A former USFJ chief of staff, Army Col. Jeff Gottlieb, encouraged the command to apply for an exception to policy so it could issue a shoulder-sleeve insignia and distinctive unit insignia, ,which is worn on berets and dress uniforms, rather than continuing to wear the Joint Activities patch, Barger said.

The Army approved the request in April 2023.

USFJ then assigned a team led by Lt. Col. Matt Wright to work with the Army’s Institute of Heraldry at Fort Belvoir, Va., to design the new patch. They worked for about five months before finalizing the design.

After approving the design in fall 2023, USFJ ordered the patches and spent the following months waiting for them to be manufactured and shipped before setting a date for the patching ceremony, Barger said.

Jeremy Stillwagner

Jeremy Stillwagner

Jeremy Stillwagner is a reporter and photographer at Yokota Air Base, Japan, who enlisted in the U.S. Army in 2018. He is a Defense Information School alumnus and a former radio personality for AFN Tokyo.

Stars and Stripes · by Jeremy Stillwagner · May 22, 2024

16. A Nuclear Iran Has Never Felt More Possible

​Excerpts:

Historically, Iran’s leaders have repeatedly concluded that they have more to gain from “playing by the rules” of the international nonproliferation order than they do from racing for the bomb. To do so, they would have to first withdraw from the nonproliferation treaty, which would immediately signal their intentions to the world and could invite American military intervention. At the same time, the revolutionary government has been reluctant to cave into Western demands and dismantle their program altogether, as that would demonstrate a different kind of weakness. Iran’s leaders are no doubt keenly aware of the example of Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi, who agreed in 2003 to abandon his country’s nuclear program, only to find himself overthrown eight years later following military intervention by a NATO-led coalition.

That strategic happy medium has worked well for the Islamic Republic — until now. Two decades of dysfunctional U.S. nuclear policy toward Iran have created a dangerous dynamic, in which Iran enriches more uranium than it otherwise might, either as a defensive posture or a negotiating tactic, and gradually inches its way toward being able to make a weapon that it might not even really want.

A Nuclear Iran Has Never Felt More Possible

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/23/opinion/iran-nuclear-president.html

May 23, 2024, 5:04 a.m. ET

Credit...AFP/Getty Images

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By John Ghazvinian

Dr. Ghazvinian is executive director of the Middle East Center at the University of Pennsylvania.

The uncertainty ushered in by the death of Iran’s president, Ebrahim Raisi, in a helicopter crash, just weeks after an unprecedented exchange of military attacks with Israel, has brought a chilling question to mind: Is 2024 the year that Iran finally decides it can no longer take chances with its security and races to build a nuclear bomb?

Up to now, for reasons experts often debate, Iran has never made the decision to build a nuclear weapon, despite having at least most of the resources and capabilities it needs to do so, as far as we know. But Mr. Raisi’s death has created an opportunity for the hard-liners in the country who are far less allergic to the idea of going nuclear than the regime has been for decades.

Even before Mr. Raisi’s death, there were indications that Iran’s position might be starting to shift. The recent exchange of hostilities with Israel, a country with an undeclared but widely acknowledged nuclear arsenal, has provoked a change of tone in Tehran. “We have no decision to build a nuclear bomb but should Iran’s existence be threatened, there will be no choice but to change our military doctrine,” Kamal Kharrazi, a leading adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, said on May 9.

In April, a senior Iranian lawmaker and former military commander had warned that Iran could enrich uranium to the 90 percent purity threshold required for a bomb in “half a day, or let’s say, one week.” He quoted the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, saying that the regime will “respond to threats at the same level,” implying that Israeli attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities would cause a rethinking of Iran’s nuclear posture.

Iran’s relationship with nuclear technology has always been ambiguous, even ambivalent. Both during the regime of the pro-western Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in the 1960s and 1970s and the anti-American Islamic Republic that has held power since 1979, Iran has kept outside powers guessing and worrying about its nuclear intentions. But it has never made the decision to fully cross the threshold of weaponization. There are several important reasons for this, ranging from religious reservations about the morality of nuclear weapons to Iran’s membership in the global Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). But the biggest reason has been strategic.

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Historically, Iran’s leaders have repeatedly concluded that they have more to gain from “playing by the rules” of the international nonproliferation order than they do from racing for the bomb. To do so, they would have to first withdraw from the nonproliferation treaty, which would immediately signal their intentions to the world and could invite American military intervention. At the same time, the revolutionary government has been reluctant to cave into Western demands and dismantle their program altogether, as that would demonstrate a different kind of weakness. Iran’s leaders are no doubt keenly aware of the example of Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi, who agreed in 2003 to abandon his country’s nuclear program, only to find himself overthrown eight years later following military intervention by a NATO-led coalition.

That strategic happy medium has worked well for the Islamic Republic — until now. Two decades of dysfunctional U.S. nuclear policy toward Iran have created a dangerous dynamic, in which Iran enriches more uranium than it otherwise might, either as a defensive posture or a negotiating tactic, and gradually inches its way toward being able to make a weapon that it might not even really want.

When the U.S.-Iran nuclear dispute first emerged in the early 2000s, Iran had only 164 antiquated centrifuges and little real appetite for a weapons program. But the Bush administration’s unrealistic insistence that Iran agree to “zero enrichment” turned it into a matter of national pride. During the years that the Obama administration spent negotiating with Iran, the regime kept enriching uranium and adding to its stockpile, in part as a hedge against future concessions. And of course, President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018 and subsequent campaign of maximum pressure only added to Iran’s defiance.

Today, Iran has thousands of advanced centrifuges and a large stockpile of enriched uranium. This, in turn, has provoked some camps inside Iran to adopt a “might as well” argument for nuclear weaponization. If we’ve already come this far, the argument goes, then why not just go for a bomb?

Under Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran has remained adamant that it is better off demonstrating to the world its willingness to stay within the nonproliferation treaty. But in recent years, as Western sanctions have piled up and Iran’s economy has been strangled, hard-liners have occasionally suggested that the country has gained nothing from this posture and might be better off following the “North Korea model”— that is, pulling out of the nonproliferation treaty and racing for a bomb as North Korea did in 2003. Until now, these voices have been quickly marginalized, as it’s clear the supreme leader does not share the sentiment. An early 2000s fatwa, or religious ruling, by Ayatollah Khamenei declared nuclear weapons to be “forbidden under Islam” and decreed that “the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons.”

Mr. Raisi’s death has quickly and dramatically shifted the landscape. A regime that had already begun to drift into militarism and domination by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (I.R.G.C.) now risks moving more firmly into this camp. Some in the I.R.G.C. see the fatwa as outdated: One senior former regime official recently told me that the top brass of the corps is “itching” to engineer the fatwa’s reversal — and will most likely do so at the first opportunity.

Regardless of who wins the snap presidential election that now must be held by early July, the ultimate succession battle will be for the role of supreme leader, and the I.R.G.C. is likely to play a decisive role in the transition. The late president was seen as a front-runner to succeed the 85-year-old ayatollah. Now, other than Ayatollah Khamenei’s son, there are few strong contenders. Whoever prevails is likely to rely heavily on the I.R.G.C. for his legitimacy.

Historically, Iran has felt a nuclear hedging strategy is its best defense against external aggression and invasion. And Tehran may continue to calculate that racing for a bomb would only invite more hostility, including from the United States. Then again, an increasingly distracted and unpredictable Washington might not be in a position to react forcefully against a sudden and rapid Iranian rush for a bomb, especially if Iran chooses its moment wisely.

Between the war in Gaza, a possible change in American leadership, and a domestic power vacuum that the I.R.G.C. could step into, it is not difficult to imagine a brief window in which Iran could pull out the stops and surprise the world by testing a nuclear device.

Would I bet the house on this scenario? Perhaps not. But from the perspective of a historian, the possibility of an Iranian rush for a bomb has never felt more real than it does today.

John Ghazvinian is executive director of the Middle East Center at the University of Pennsylvania and author of “America and Iran: A History, 1720 to the Present.” He is working on a book on the history of Iran’s nuclear program.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

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17. A Taliban revenge killing prompts questions, removal of an acclaimed documentary

​A long read. A tragic story.

A Taliban revenge killing prompts questions, removal of an acclaimed documentary

National Geographic has pulled the Emmy-winning film “Retrograde” from its streaming platforms after criticism from veterans and inquiries from The Washington Post.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/2024/05/22/retrograde-documentary-film-taliban-heineman/

By Manuel Roig-Franzia and Hope Hodge Seck

May 22, 2024 at 10:00 p.m. EDT

Thomas Kasza, a former Green Beret, runs the 1208 Foundation, a charitable organization that specializes in evacuating Afghans who cleared mines for U.S. forces in Afghanistan before the 2021 withdrawal. He and others believe that a 2022 documentary, "Retrograde," may have endangered some of those workers by featuring them in close-up. Kasza is pictured here in Long Beach, Calif., in February. (Philip Cheung for The Washington Post)

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n a winter day not long ago, an Afghan man — a 21-year-old who’d once dazzled U.S. Special Forces with his ability to find roadside bombs — was stopped at a checkpoint by Taliban guards on his way to a bazaar.

They let him go, but within days, the Taliban seized him at his house, according to an interpreter who spoke to The Washington Post on the condition of anonymity to describe this sequence of events without imperiling his own family in Afghanistan.

In many ways the man was like the thousands of Afghans who’d worked for U.S. troops as interpreters and bomb-clearers but were left in peril after the 2021 U.S. withdrawal and the Afghan government’s fall to the Taliban. But this man — whom the Green Berets had nicknamed “Justin Bieber” because of his good looks and lustrous hair — was different in one crucial way.

His role aiding the Green Berets had been featured in an acclaimed National Geographic documentary, “Retrograde,” by director Matthew Heineman, which shows the man in a lingering close-up. Even more attention was drawn to him because he appears prominently in a clip from the documentary that rapidly spread through Afghanistan on TikTok in the weeks before he was captured.

Heineman and “Retrograde” producer Caitlin McNally made the decision to show close-ups of the man and other mine-clearers despite warnings from at least five people prior to “Retrograde’s” December 2022 debut on the National Geographic Channel and Hulu, according to Post interviews. Those people — three active-duty U.S. military personnel and two former Green Berets — said the scene in “Retrograde” would put the man and other Afghan contractors in the film in danger, warnings they issued at a time when hundreds of Taliban retribution killings of contractors and their families had already been documented.

After his release from Taliban custody, the interpreter said the man told him: “They showed me Retrogade Movie and said you have worked with foreign forces and also worked in the movie. ... They found me through Retrograde Movie.”

His captors plunged his head below water, nearly drowning him. They punched and kicked him. They beat him with wooden sticks. More than two weeks later his family found him lying in the street outside their home, he told the interpreter. (A family friend who had direct contact with the man, as well as a second interpreter, confirmed the account of his capture, according to text messages with extraction advocates related to humanitarian efforts that were reviewed by The Post.) A doctor told him “my lung is not working.”

Within weeks he was dead.

A scene from the 2022 documentary "Retrograde," which aired on National Geographic and streamed on digital platforms, including Hulu, until National Geographic removed it in April, in “an abundance of caution,” according to a statement, because of “new attention to this film.” (National Geographic/Everett Collection)

For some of those who say they issued warnings, the loss of the man the soldiers called Justin Bieber was a death foretold — and a tragedy that may be repeated. (The Post is not using his name to protect his family from potential further harm.) As many as eight other Afghans whose faces are shown in “Retrograde” remain in hiding in the region, according to the 1208 Foundation, a charitable organization that specializes in evacuating Afghans who cleared mines for U.S. forces.

“Retrograde” — which won three Emmy awards in 2023 as well as an Edward R. Murrow Award for feature documentary — has now disappeared. National Geographic quietly removed the documentary from all its platforms in April after The Post sought comment about whether its content may have put some of its subjects in danger. National Geographic, which produces documentaries as part of a joint agreement with Disney, said in a statement to The Post that it was pulling the film in “an abundance of caution,” because of “new attention to this film.”

“The film also showcased the vital work of Afghan soldiers and allies who operated alongside U.S. troops,” the statement says. “We were devastated to learn of the death of one of those brave Afghans and our heart goes out not only to his family but to all those still in danger as they fight against a brutal terrorist organization.”

Heineman and McNally declined to be interviewed. In response to written questions, they said they “have no recollection” of receiving specific warnings about the Afghan bomb-clearers after two prerelease reviews by the U.S. military or following a D.C. screening event held before the film’s debut that was attended by two former Green Berets who say they warned about the danger of showing the faces of bomb-clearers.

In a statement emailed to The Post after “Retrograde” was removed from streaming, Heineman and McNally called the man’s death “a heartbreaking tragedy.”

“The U.S. government’s precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan and the vengeful actions of the Taliban upon taking power — armed with detailed information identifying Afghans who worked with the U.S. government — led to the deaths of countless partners left behind. That is the tragic story that warrants attention,” the statement said. “But any attempt to blame ‘Retrograde’ because the film showed faces of individuals in war zones — as has long been standard in ethical conflict reporting — would be deeply wrong.”

Heineman and McNally also criticized National Geographic’s decision to remove “Retrograde” from its platforms.

“From the beginning, Nat Geo/Disney have been true partners to us. Despite a complex and ever-changing story, they greenlit, oversaw, thoroughly reviewed, and released ‘Retrograde,’” the statement said. “But their decision to remove the film from their platforms protects no one and accomplishes nothing other than undermining the vitality of long-established norms of journalism.”

Alex Gibney, an Oscar-winning documentarian who was executive producer of a 2017 film directed by Heineman, is also critical of National Geographic’s decision.

“This comes at a time when risk-averse entertainment companies are increasingly inclined to avert their eyes from current events that affect us all in favor of celebrity commercials and mindless true crime,” Gibney said.

Director Matthew Heineman speaks about his film "Retrograde" during a Q&A at a film festival in Savannah, Ga., in October 2022. (Dia Dipasupil/Getty Images for SCAD)

As The Post was reporting this story, the interpreter’s account of Justin Bieber’s final days was referenced in a previously unreported March 27 letter that wasn’t released publicly to Secretary of State Antony Blinken from two House members — Jared Moskowitz (D-Fla.), and retired Green Beret and Afghanistan war veteran Michael Waltz (R-Fla.).

“The lack of obscured faces,” the congressmen wrote, “has transformed [‘Retrograde’] into a de facto target list, one which the Taliban has exploited, resulting in the confirmed torture and murder” of the man who was killed after appearing in the documentary. They urged the State Department to expedite visas for the men depicted in “Retrograde” who remain in Afghanistan, “given the immediate and severe threat to their lives.”

The death of the man featured in “Retrograde” raises thorny questions about the responsibilities of journalists and documentarians, particularly in conflict zones, who are faced with the difficult task of balancing the desire to tell complete and compelling stories with the potential dangers their work might create for subjects. In recent years, there has been some discussion in the industry and academia about the creation of a code of ethics or formal guidelines for documentary filmmakers, who often work without the oversight that is common at major news organizations.

“Retrograde,” which was filmed with military permission, is not the first National Geographic documentary involving filmmakers embedding with U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In 2007’s “Inside the Green Berets,” the narrator — Emmy-nominated filmmaker Steven Hoggard — tells the viewer: “The Taliban will kill anyone who speaks with or interprets for the Americans, and we’ve blurred the faces of anyone deemed at risk.”

In an email to The Post, Hoggard said he considered it “paramount” while working on his film to ensure that no one featured in the documentary was “hurt or killed after production.” Hoggard said he believes some people “might not fully comprehend the risk they are assuming just by being seen and heard. … Safeguarding folks who entrust us with their stories is, to me, a sacred kind of responsibility.”

The mine-clearer who was killed (a.k.a. Justin Bieber) survived the 16 months after the U.S. pullout in August 2021, but was seized within weeks of “Retrograde’s” TV release, according to a translation of the man’s account that was texted to 1208 by an interpreter and was confirmed in a Post interview with the interpreter. Since the man’s death, the filmmakers have made payments to his family, including at least one $150 payment in 2023, according to text messages at the time with Kasza. More recently, Heineman and McNally arranged through a different charity, Team Themis, for a grant to pay the family $800 per month in living expenses for six months starting in February this year, according to the charitable group.

Heineman and McNally contend that the Taliban would have had the means to identify the man even if he hadn’t appeared in the film, because the Taliban had numerous ways of identifying Afghans who worked with American forces, including using seized biometrics devices left behind by the U.S. military containing information about them. Some analysts have concluded those devices were only of limited use.

But in at least one instance, McNally told others that “Retrograde” would endanger an Afghan who wasn’t in the bomb-clearing group but also appeared in the documentary. About six weeks before the film premiered on the National Geographic Channel in December 2022, McNally sent a message to Thomas Kasza, a former Green Beret who runs the 1208 Foundation, saying that an Afghan military officer “who is featured quite a bit in the film is still stuck inside the country. We are very concerned for him especially once the film comes out.”

In the same message, McNally wrote that the man had worked with Green Berets “for years and is definitely in danger now.”

Actress Rosamund Pike, left, with director Matthew Heineman on the set of Heineman's 2018 feature film "A Private War." (Paul Conroy/Aviron Pictures/Everett Collection)

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t 40, Heineman is one of only two people — along with Martin Scorsese — to be nominated for the Directors Guild of America awards as both a documentary (2015’s “Cartel Land”) and feature film director (for 2018’s “A Private War,” which starred Rosamund Pike as Marie Colvin, a journalist slain while covering civil war in Syria).

Documentarian Tom Yellin, who worked on Heineman’s “Cartel Land,” called the director a “thoughtful, focused, caring and careful journalist.”

“On our film,” Yellin said by text message, “we had many sensitive scenes that we reviewed in detail to ensure that we were handling them in ways that best told the story without putting people in harm’s way.”

“Retrograde” takes its name from the military term for a withdrawal from the front lines. In a late 2022 interview with a movie industry journalist’s streaming program titled “DP 30: The Oral History of Hollywood,” Heineman held forth on the importance of “the motif of faces” in the film. “Holding on faces, holding on reaction shots,” he said. “It was very much something that was contemplated, obviously, in the editing room.”

“Retrograde” was well-received by critics. The Guardian’s reviewer raved about its “hyper high-definition cinematography [that] is both beautiful in a savage way and adds immediacy to the viewing experience.” A Washington Post critic called it “an impressive and yet enormously depressing achievement.” The New York Times said it was “shrewdly observant.”

Heineman’s film crew first embedded in January 2021 with a group of Green Berets in Helmand province — the dangerous hub of the Taliban’s opium trade and the site of some of the most brutal and protracted battles of the 20-year war. The Green Berets trained Afghan National Army troops but also conducted their own operations with the paid help of two groups of Afghan bomb-clearers, a collection of contractors working independently from the Afghan army and known as the National Mine Removal Group, or NMRG.

The view in March 2021 from an Afghan National Army outpost overlooking a Taliban-controlled area northeast of the Helmand Province, where parts of "Retrograde" were filmed. (Wakil Koshar/AFP/Getty Images) (Wakil Kohsar/Afp/Getty Images)

Some of the Afghan mine-clearers were initially uneasy about being filmed but overcame their reluctance.

Charlie Crail, the 10th Special Forces Group media officer assigned to the project, said the mine-clearers were “fearless” and, when asked about being filmed, “all of them were like, ‘Yeah, we don’t care, that’s fine.’”

One of the commanders of the two NMRG groups shown in the film said in an April 22 statement that was forwarded to The Post by Heineman that he “authorized” the men being filmed and having their faces shown because “we saw the value for this story to be told.” Later, in response to questions from The Post, the commander — who spoke on the condition of anonymity, so as not to endanger relatives in Afghanistan — acknowledged that he was not in charge of the dead man’s group, but he said he had served as an adviser to it.

The conversations about whether the men could be filmed took place at a time when the mine-clearers and their U.S. allies still hoped that the Taliban would be defeated. More than 300 Afghans and their family members who had worked with the Americans had already been killed by the Taliban, according to a report published the year before “Retrograde” filming began by No One Left Behind, a charitable organization that assists in evacuating Afghan allies and helping them acquire U.S. visas.

The danger for those Afghans and their families “dramatically increased” after the U.S. withdrawal, No One Left Behind’s Andrew J. Sullivan testified during a congressional hearing in January.

Some of the Green Berets felt protective of their Afghan partners and were concerned about exposing them to danger and unsure whether they understood what was being asked of them, said a U.S. service member who was in Afghanistan at the time, and spoke on the condition of anonymity because he is not authorized to speak publicly.

“There were concerns from day one,” he said.

During filming in March 2021, the Green Berets in the documentary insisted that they be able to preview “Retrograde” and the Department of the Army granted them, in writing, an “assurance that the film would be screened heavily by the military and NatGeo in accordance with our requests,” the service member said. “It’s kind of a fallback that even though [filmmakers are] deviating from personnel security at the moment, that it would be caught and cleaned up later.”

The role of the Green Berets would be greatly diminished in “Retrograde” as U.S. forces withdrew and the film changed its narrative focus. The scene with the close-up that circulated on TikTok shows the Green Berets telling the bomb-clearers that they’re leaving, and includes comments from one of the Afghans saying they will be in danger if they return to their “normal lives.” The man who was killed nods in response.

The scene lasts just a few minutes of a 96-minute film, but it is a pivotal and quietly despairing prelude.

A scene from "Retrograde." (National Geographic/Everett Collection)

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efore “Retrograde’s” release, the U.S. military got the preview it had been promised. They immediately saw issues.

“Concern about Afghan partners and faces being blurred was raised,” said Crail.

After screening the film, Crail, who has since retired, said he and another U.S. service member told McNally: “You guys need to do your due diligence before you release this movie to make sure as many of these guys are out [of Afghanistan] as possible.”

Military officials not only feared for the Afghans they’d hired but had also begun to worry that returning Green Beret team members who’d agreed to be in the film were at risk, even in the United States.

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“The team members also have concerns over security because of the Taliban now being in charge in Kabul,” Maj. Peter Bogart, a U.S. Army communications officer assigned to the project, wrote in an email to a group of military public affairs officers. “They have concerns over their identity being shown in the film since it was not a routine rotation followed by continued ops, but now many of the targets are now part of the government. At this stage in the review process, can team members or family members withdraw their consent to be in the film?” (Eventually they decided not to make that request.)

The Taliban takeover had also heightened concerns among some of the Green Berets about their NMRG partners being shown in the film.

“It was a different risk perspective,” the filmmakers were told, according to a U.S. military officer’s account of the review process that was shared with Kasza after the man’s death, while they were seeking assistance from Disney in acquiring visas for men depicted in “Retrograde.”​

Some of the military personnel who reviewed the film considered it their mandate to scan for anything that would compromise U.S. military interests. The contract between the military and Heineman’s company requires the filmmakers to remove “sensitive security-related or classified information.”

Military officers ultimately signed off on the film — a key point that Heineman and McNally say guided their decisions.

“The bottom line is that both the military public affairs officers and the Green Berets approved the final version of the film for release, which included faces of NMRG,” Heineman and McNally said in a written response to further questions from The Post.

The military screeners saw their sign-off differently. Their reading of the contract with Heineman’s production company was that it did not give them the right to demand changes related to Afghan contractors, according to a U.S. service member who provided an account of the sequence of events to Kasza. An internal U.S. military public affairs email about “Retrograde” states that “the US Army does not have editorial control of the documentary, but we can ask that scenes be deleted if we can justify how the scenes will be harmful to the unit or US Army.”

(Heineman and McNally did not address The Post’s written questions about the military’s interpretation of the contract.)

Still, the officials asked the filmmakers to take steps to protect the mine-clearers, who were now considered to be in much greater danger than when the project had begun, according to The Post’s interviews.

“The feedback given was that, you can blur it, you can cut ’em, you can crop the scenes,” the U.S. service member who was in Afghanistan at the time of the filming said on the condition of anonymity beacuse he was not authorized to speak publicly. “Whatever is done the absolute minimum should just be blurring. Just fix it. We discussed this ad nauseam.”

McNally, the “Retrograde” producer, showed the film to Crail and a U.S. military commander, as well as Green Berets in the film. Crail recalled that she was noncommittal about making changes, such as blurring faces, though she was “definitely taking notes.”

At that point, a military screener concluded that “the decision had already been made,” according to another U.S. service member’s account of interactions with the filmmakers that was shared with Kasza and was reviewed by The Post on the condition that the service member not be named because of concerns that the service member could face retribution from the filmmakers or Disney. “Nothing was going to change.”

Thomas Kasza, 35, seen here in Long Beach, Calif., in February. Kasza says he was initially enthusiastic about the documentary "Retrograde," and its potential to help raise money to evacuate Afghan workers who assisted U.S. military personnel before the Taliban's 2021 takeover. But he says he and others also urged the filmmakers to blur faces of the workers so they would not be put at risk of Taliban retribution. (Philip Cheung for The Washington Post)

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n October 2022, Thomas Kasza and a colleague from the 1208 Foundation attended an invitation-only screening of “Retrograde” at National Geographic’s Washington headquarters. They met McNally for pre-show drinks at a bar in the elegant Jefferson hotel nearby.

Kasza recalled that he and his friend were “starry eyed” that night, getting to hang out with Hollywood types. Kasza, now 35, had been a Green Beret and saw combat in Afghanistan. When he came home, the restlessness of the battlefield came with him, an intensity he channeled into the foundation’s effort to evacuate Afghans who worked with the United States. In “Retrograde,” Kasza and his colleague saw an opportunity to raise money.

The film did not disappoint in its depiction of the fall of Afghanistan, but the scene showing close-ups of the Afghan bomb-clearers gnawed at Kasza and his colleague, Dave, who agreed to be interviewed by The Post on the condition that only his first name be used so as not to compromise ongoing logistical work evacuating Afghans who worked with the U.S. military.

Kasza couldn’t help but worry that the film could essentially be handing “a hit list” to the Taliban.

That feeling of unease persisted as the evening spilled into an after-party at Old Ebbitt Grill, said Kasza.

Both Kasza and Dave vividly recalled pulling Heineman and McNally aside and expressing concerns that showing the faces of the Afghan bomb-clearers put them at risk. They remember urging the documentarians to take steps to help the men and their families leave Afghanistan. Heineman and McNally were opposed to obscuring faces and gave vague assurances about assistance evacuating the men, Kasza and Dave said, but the veterans were still hopeful at that point that the filmmakers would take their advice to heart. (In their written response to The Post regarding their lack of recollection about the conversation, Heineman and McNally also note that Kasza and Dave were “repeatedly thanking us and praising our work” after the screening.)

Producer Caitlin McNally speaks at a premiere screening of "Retrograde" in London in November 2022. (Dave Benett/Getty Images for National Geographic)

Director Matthew Heineman speaks at a Los Angeles screening of "Retrograde" in January 2023. (Vivien Killilea/Getty Images for Disney Plus.)

Despite the misgivings Kasza and Dave say they felt about showing the faces of Afghan bomb-clearers, they continued to publicly support the film, hoping it would help them raise funds for their charity, they said. In one text message that Kasza confirmed to The Post that he sent Heineman and McNally, he even said to the filmmakers that “Retrograde” was “about to be the hottest show in town and every Afghan centric org will be lining up to tie themselves to you guys.” Kasza attended more than a dozen screenings and occasionally praised the film on social media.

Dave also attended other screenings, including one in New York, where, he said, he attended a boisterous cocktail reception and expressed his concerns to Carolyn Bernstein, National Geographic’s executive vice president of global scripted content and documentary films. “I really think that showing their faces is a huge mistake, and I think it’s going to lead to people being injured or killed,” Dave recalled telling her. (Bernstein, who attended numerous screenings, does not recall the conversation, a National Geographic spokesman said.)

Warnings were also communicated by a high-ranking U.S. military officer to Disney’s global intelligence and threat analysis manager, according to text messages sent to Kasza during strategy discussions about seeking assistance from Disney in evacuating at-risk Afghans shown in “Retrograde.” (Disney owns Hulu; the National Geographic Channel is a joint venture between Disney and the National Geographic Society.) Crail, the Special Forces media escort, also said that a U.S. military screener warned Disney about blurring faces.

In a written statement, a National Geographic spokesman vigorously rebutted the officer’s account of the warnings, saying that “at no time … was anything related to blurring faces of NMRG discussed. Any reporting to the contrary is simply not true, and we suspect is a mis-relaying of a conversation.”

U.S soldiers stand guard at the airport tower near an evacuation control checkpoint during ongoing evacuations at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul on Aug. 25, 2021. (AP Photo)

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ays after “Retrograde’s” TV premiere, McNally began sending text messages to Kasza raising some alarms about repercussions, including passing along insights from a “mil intel dude” who ominously warned: “Afghanistan culture is huge on revenge.”

In her messages, McNally didn’t say whether she believed the warning, but she relayed fresh concerns from men who had appeared in the film and were now contacting Afghans in the United States and other places to say they were in danger.

McNally next alerted Kasza by text message that a pirated clip of the scene featuring the Afghan NMRG was circulating on TikTok in Afghanistan. She sent him an audio recording of a message left for her in broken English by one of the NMRG featured in the film who’d managed to get out of Afghanistan and was hearing from others in the film who were still there.

“My soldiers say to me, ‘You guys make my life more danger so I need your guy’s help,’” the man said. “So this is big problem. Everyone is watching that video.”

At a secret location in Afghanistan, the TikTok video landed on the phone of one of the mine-clearers in the film, sent by a former colleague who was worried about him. (The man, who later managed to escape Afghanistan after a long ordeal, agreed to be interviewed on the condition of anonymity to protect the safety of family members in the region.)

In a tearful interview with The Post, the man recalled being told: “Watch out. Be careful. Everyone can find you.”

A realization dawned on him: “Now you can find me on Google. I thought it was the last day of my life.”

A general view of Lashkar Gah, the capital city of Helmand province, in March 2021. (Wakil Kohsar/AFP/Getty Images)

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n Jan. 17, 2023, not quite a month after “Retrograde’s” premiere, an email made its way to Heineman’s production company: “I had a side role in the film Retrograde and appeared in very serious scenes. I need Mr. Matthew Heineman’s Email for some serious reason … I need to talk directly with Mr. Heineman. it will be your kindness.”

The email was from the man called Justin Bieber, translated by a person who said he was a family friend. After the email was received, McNally again reached out to Kasza for help. Eventually, the man managed to get across the border into Pakistan, where he underwent four surgeries.

Photos texted to the 1208 Foundation by a person who spent time with the man in his final days show the crude nature of the medical treatment that failed to save his life. In one, he sits on a bench with tubes jutting out from under a blanket on his lap to two plastic containers on a tiled patio filled with blood-red fluid. In others, stitches close wounds that dotted along his torso; the longest traces a path that starts at his spine and travels across his rib cage.

When word about the man’s death made it to one of the U.S. service members who was in Afghanistan at the time of the filming, he “was heartbroken … heartbroken because they had trusted us and we had reluctantly trusted National Geographic. But there wasn’t the morality, the common sense, demonstrated to tone back the focus to obscure identities or to negate their exposure.”

Several journalists who have worked in conflict zones came to Heineman’s defense after he told them that this story was being prepared, among them Jane Ferguson, an award-winning “PBS NewsHour” journalist with extensive experience in Afghanistan.

“The reality is that, you know, if we’re now saying that anybody who has ever filmed anybody from any of the security forces in Afghanistan, who was ever filmed, we are suddenly liable for and responsible for the Taliban’s response, I don’t really understand how that is a practical or even rational evaluation, given that every news organization in America has hours and hours and hours of footage on the internet as readily available anywhere,” Ferguson said.

Crail — the military media escort — sees existential matters at play that go beyond journalism ethics, or the decisions made by one filmmaking duo: “The bottom line is that every Afghan who ever worked to support Western efforts in that country in any capacity was written off and abandoned by the US Government and, by and large, by the American people the moment the president announced withdrawal,” he said in an email to The Post. “I fully believe that no amount of blurred faces or obscured [IDs on uniforms] would have saved a single individual we as a people left behind.”

Thomas Kasza, 35, executive director/founder of the 1208 Foundation, in Long Beach, Calif. in February. Convinced that appearing in "Retrograde" has exposed several Afghan mine-clearers to punishment from the Taliban, he continues to raise funds and press for their evacuation from Afghanistan. (Philip Cheung for The Washington Post)

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ational Geographic was not informed by the documentarians about the man’s death until months after it happened and was unaware of money paid by the filmmakers to the family of the dead man until receiving questions about it from The Post. A National Geographic spokesman said he knew of no other example of payments being made to someone who died after appearing in one of its documentaries.

A series of texts among Heineman, McNally and Kasza show how they clashed over the best way to help the man’s family. The relationship between Kasza and Heineman grew contentious and the director and producer have come to believe that Kasza’s criticism of “Retrograde” is driven by “personal animosity” — a charge Kasza denies.

Among the things Kasza had wanted, for months, was help securing approvals for Afghan mine-clearers portrayed in the film, who are eligible for resettlement in the United States through a heavily backlogged Special Immigrant Visa program created to acknowledge the risks they’d undertaken. But the visa process — which was designed as an incentive for Afghans to work with U.S. forces — takes an average of 403 days to complete.

Now that National Geographic has pulled “Retrograde” from its platforms, Kasza sees another opening to get what he’s been pushing for: not only help with visas, but also assistance evacuating the mine-clearers in the documentary — though it’s unclear how that would be accomplished.

“We still want Disney and Matt Heineman to do the right thing and get our guys out,” Kasza said. “The risk is still there.”

Kasza also is starting to get some traction on Capitol Hill. On Jan. 31 of this year, he appeared at a barely noticed hearing before a subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. One of the congressmen who heard his testimony that day was Waltz, the House member who is now asking the State Department to expedite visas for Afghan contractors featured in “Retrograde” and has pointed an accusatory finger at the documentary.

Before he testified, Kasza shared with the subcommittee a written statement from a family member of the man who’d died after appearing in “Retrograde.” It said the man’s colleagues “now live in constant fear, knowing they could face the same brutal fate.”

Kasza also cast blame on “Retrograde” on behalf of his 1208 Foundation, saying in his own written statement to the subcommittee that the film contributed to “a chain of events” that led to the man’s death.

In his mind as he wrote those words were at least eight Afghan mine-clearers who appeared in the film. They still are out there in the Afghanistan region, Kasza believes, still hiding, still in peril.

Alice Crites contributed to this report.

18. Asia starting to feel like 1997-98 all over again - Asia Times

Asia starting to feel like 1997-98 all over again - Asia Times

‘Higher for longer’ US rates keep capital zooming out of the region, depriving markets of funds and putting pressure on currencies

asiatimes.com · by William Pesek · May 23, 2024

TOKYO – Last month, former US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers drew chuckles when he said the Federal Reserve’s next action might be to tighten, not ease, interest rates. Few bond traders are laughing now.

The odds are still low that Fed Chairman Jerome Powell’s team will raise borrowing costs anytime soon. But near-universal earlier expectations in Asia were that the US central bank would be easing between five and seven times this year.

Such bets are going awry as US inflation remains stubbornly high. It rose at a 3.4% rate in April year on year. Though far below the 9.1% peak in mid-2022, inflation is still too far away from the Fed’s 2% target for comfort.

This week, Goldman Sachs CEO David Solomon said he doubts the Fed will cut rates in 2024. “I still don’t see the data that’s compelling to see we’re going to cut rates here,” he said at a Boston College event.

At the same time, Solomon noted, persistently high inflation is squeezing American households. He cited recent earnings shortfalls at companies from McDonald’s Corp to AutoZone Inc to make the case that high prices are hitting consumption.

“If you’re talking to CEOs that are running businesses that really deal with what I’ll call the middle of the American economy, those businesses have been starting to see change in consumer behaviors,” Solomon said. “Inflation is not just nominal. It’s cumulative, and so everything is more expensive. You’re starting to see the consumer, the average American, feel this.”

The Fed, though, won’t see these dynamics as a reason to slash borrowing costs significantly, at least not this year. Stagflation is a live risk as oil prices surge amid rising turmoil in the Middle East. The risk rises if the US Congress doesn’t act boldly to increase productivity and competitiveness.

As JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon tells the Wall Street Journal, America “looks more like the 1970s than we’ve seen before. Things looked pretty rosy in 1972. They were not rosy in 1973.”

All this is rapidly changing the calculus for Asian policymakers.

“We believe that the bar to cut rates and the risk of a delayed easing cycle have gone up in Asia,” Nomura Holdings economists write in a note. “With repricing of Fed rate cuts and a stronger US dollar backdrop, Asian central banks will want to maintain some relative interest-rate differentials, else they risk weaker currencies and higher imported inflation.”

Nobel laureate Paul Krugman is as perplexed as anyone when it comes to predicting the outlook for US yields. “On interest rates, I am fanatically confused,” Krugman tells Bloomberg. “Anyone who claims to know for sure what the answer is to that is deluding themselves.”

The same goes for the trajectory of the dollar, another asset Asia thought would weaken in 2024. As Powell extends the “higher for longer” era for yields, capital continues to zoom toward the US. This dynamic is depriving Asian economies of capital needed to support bond and stock markets.

US Federal Reserve chairman Jerome Powell. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Al Drago

“Lower-yielding Asian currencies are bearing the brunt of the repricing of [US monetary policy]” as investors “focus on the relative level of interest rates,” HSBC analysts write.

Last month, Indonesia’s central bank announced a surprise 25 basis-point rate hike to support a sliding rupiah, raising the benchmark rate to 6.25%.

“This interest rate increase is [meant] to strengthen the stability of the rupiah exchange rate from the impact of worsening global risks,” says Bank Indonesia Governor Perry Warjiyo.

Meanwhile, the Malaysian ringgit recently hit 26-years lows, returning to levels not seen since Asia’s 1997-98 financial crisis. In Manila and Bangkok, policymakers are rethinking plans to cut rates, lest the Philippine peso and Thai baht plunge, increasing capital flight risks.

In Seoul, another nation hit hard by the previous Asian financial crisis, Bank of Korea Governor Rhee Chang-yong cautions against excessive won moves and stands ready to “deploy stabilizing measures.”

The US dollar may continue grinding higher as more and more traders come to terms with the idea the Fed is keeping interest rates steady.

“If the Fed holds steady but more jurisdictions decide to proceed with domestic easing rather than waiting on the US central bank, then policy divergence would likely keep the dollar stronger for longer,” says Kamakshya Trivedi, strategist at Goldman Sachs.

Trivedi notes that central banks in the UK, the Euro area and Canada are likely to cut rates next month. European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde signaled that a cut is likely as consumer-price pressures ease.

That’s likely to extend gains in the dollar, which has risen markedly in all of the 10 biggest industrialized nations. It’s already up 11% versus the Japanese yen and 2% against the euro so far this year.

Krugman has lots of company as he struggles to discern where Fed rates are headed. So are Fed officials, who seem all over the map on whether rate cuts might happen this year.

For example, Fed Governor Christopher Waller says a softening in US data over the next three to five months could create space for a rate cut toward the end of 2024.

“The economy now seems to be evolving closer to what the Committee expected,” Waller says. “Nevertheless, in the absence of a significant weakening in the labor market, I need to see several more months of good inflation data before I would be comfortable supporting an easing in the stance of monetary policy.”

Recent consumer price trends leave Waller “hopeful that progress toward 2% inflation is back on track.” The Fed, he adds, can “probably” rule out hiking rates. Yet, Waller admits, some senior Fed officials are more open to tapping the monetary brakes if need be.

The process is sure to keep Asia on edge. “Where macro and potential policy divergence has been more apparent, policymakers have kept a keen eye on Fed shifts to limit the extent of currency volatility,” Trivedi notes.

Yet the Fed holding rates higher than Asia believed back on January 1 is a major blow to a region uniquely on the front lines of Fed policy decisions a world away.

Case in point: People’s Bank of China Governor Pan Gongsheng, who’s been hinting at rate cuts in recent months. Though China’s gross domestic product expanded by 5.3% in the first three months of 2024, retail sales and household confidence remain weak amid a deepening property crisis.

Yet the PBOC’s latitude to cut rates may depend more on what Fed officials do in Washington than economic conditions in Beijing. As Pan’s team seemingly understands better than some peers, an extension of the “higher for longer” yield era will make it harder to cut rates without the currency weakening significantly against the dollar.

There are myriad reasons why the PBOC is reluctant to let the yuan weaken in a big way.

China doesn’t want the yuan to depreciate in a big way. Image: Twitter

One, it could make it harder for property development giants to keep up with offshore bond payments, heightening default risks. Two, it could squander progress made on Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s watch to increase global trust in the yuan. Three, it could make China an even bigger US election flashpoint in the lead-up to November 5 elections, if that’s possible.

In the interim, Xi is stepping up state-led efforts to buy up the inventory of unsold homes to stabilize the property sector.

“The new property measures are unlikely to deal with the full overhang of unsold homes given the PBOC’s new facility’s initial size,” says economist Mansoor Mohi-uddin at Bank of Singapore. “But the aid is likely to be scaled up if it proves successful.”

Analysts at UBS Global Wealth Management write that “securing adequate funding remains a key question and it is unclear if this will be sufficient to restore consumer confidence and draw buyers back into the market.”

As Xi’s government fine-tunes its property rescue plan, the PBOC may be under pressure to add giant waves of fresh liquidity. Yet the onus is also on governments like China’s to accelerate efforts to recalibrate growth engines.

The Asia region remains too export and dollar-centric for comfort. Though formal currency pegs are gone, export-dependent Asia still turns on the dollar’s exchange rate. Here, foreign exchange trends from Seoul to Jakarta smack of déjà vu for many global investors.

A top cause of Asia’s 1997-98 crisis was a runaway dollar pulling in huge waves of capital from all directions. In 2024, this dynamic is wreaking fresh havoc as the world’s biggest economy defies recession predictions year after year.

The Fed’s reluctance to ease, meanwhile, is increasing the gap in interest rate differentials, causing new strains on Asian central banks. It’s making it harder and harder for emerging market monetary authorities to tame local debt markets.

Among the biggest wildcards: how a US national debt approaching $35 trillion collides with toxic electoral politics in Washington.

Some of this risk stems from the extreme political polarization imperiling Washington’s credit rating. Last August, when Fitch Ratings yanked away America’s AAA credit score, it cited the polarization behind the January 6, 2021 insurrection among the reasons.

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Ditto for President Joe Biden’s Democrats and Republicans loyal to Donald Trump playing games over the US debt ceiling. Such bickering might worry Asia less if not for the fact Washington’s debt is twice the size of China’s annual GDP and more than eight times Japan’s.

Another concern is Washington’s sharp mercantilist pivot since 2017. Then-president Trump slapped huge tariffs on Chinese goods and global steel and aluminum. When Biden arrived, he left Trump’s trade war in place — and added new layers of China-targeted curbs.

Now, as Trump threatens 60% tariffs on all Chinese goods, Biden is trying to out-Trump “The Donald” with a 100% tax on China-made electric vehicles. This trade-tax arms race is drawing retaliation threats from Xi’s government, including tariffs as high as 25% on imported cars.

Might this tariff one-upmanship further dent faith in US Treasury securities, of which Beijing holds $768 billion? Or do more damage to the US economy than China’s?

Both presidential candidates want to penalize China through greater tariffs on its products. Image: X Screengrab

“These policies are more likely to hurt than help the lower- and middle-income Americans they purport to benefit,” says economist Kimberly Clausing at the Peterson Institute.

Adds Ryan Sweet, an economist at Oxford Economics: “Most economists view tariffs as a bad idea because they prevent a country from reaping the benefits of specialization, disrupt the movement of goods and services, and lead to a misallocation of resources. Consumers and producers often pay higher prices when tariffs are implemented.”

That could mean less US demand for Asian goods. Asia also worries about a mistake by the Fed. Though the Fed didn’t cause the conditions that led to the 2008 Lehman Brothers crisis, its misreading of deep tensions in credit markets in 2007 exacerbated the carnage. By the time debt markets were seizing up, it was too late for Fed rate cuts to contain the financial chaos.

In recent months, as the Fed slow-walked rate cuts, many economists questioned whether more medium-size lenders might be facing Silicon Valley Bank-like reckonings.

Similar concerns are rising about an intensifying crisis in commercial property, which faces a post-pandemic crisis. Joel Pruis, senior director at Cornerstone Advisors, calls it a “perfect storm” of high interest rates amid an “over-concentration” of lending in commercial office space.

Any resulting market chaos will put Asia’s open, trade-reliant economies in harm’s way. And in ways few in the region ever saw coming, never mind the Summers’ and Krugman’s of the world.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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asiatimes.com · by William Pesek · May 23, 2024

19. Philippines picked as regional HQ for US civil nuclear work group

Philippines picked as regional HQ for US civil nuclear work group | NHK WORLD-JAPAN News

www3.nhk.or.jp

The Philippines has been chosen as the regional headquarters for a US work group aiming to promote the civil nuclear industry. A US official says this initiative will strengthen cooperation between the two nations in advancing nuclear power.

The move was announced Tuesday on the sidelines of an international business forum held in Manila. Officials from both countries say the group will provide opportunities for Southeast Asian markets.

US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink said, "This industry-led group will connect Philippine partners with US companies, providing world-class technology solutions and best practices to accelerate Philippines' transition to clean and safe nuclear energy."

Philippine Energy Secretary Raphael Lotilla said, "The renewed interest in civilian uses of nuclear power is now viewed by many of the Southeast Asian countries as a viable option."

The two allied countries also signed agreements to promote civil nuclear cooperation and academic exchanges.

Manila and Washington had signed an agreement in November that provides legal framework for potential nuclear power projects with US providers in the Philippines.

The move was seen as an attempt to address energy costs in the Philippines, where electricity rates are among the highest in Asia.

www3.nhk.or.jp

20. The U.S. Military Needs a Better China 'Messaging' Strategy

Conclusion:

The U.S. military should exercise specificity in language when labeling a pacing threat, to ensure they are supporting the correct narrative, thereby separating malign actions of specific parties and groups from the overall ethnic diaspora.

The U.S. Military Needs a Better China 'Messaging' Strategy

19fortyfive.com · by Justin Woodward · May 21, 2024

Summary: To enhance U.S. military messaging and avoid fostering anti-Asian discrimination, it is crucial to distinguish between the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the global Chinese diaspora.

Key Points:

-Broadly using “China” as a threat can strengthen CCP narratives and alienate non-CCP Chinese communities.

-Specificity in language, highlighting positive actions of non-CCP Chinese groups, and recognizing Taiwan as an example of a successful, free Chinese society are key strategies.

-This approach prevents misunderstandings and counters the PRC’s narrative while promoting U.S. foreign policy effectively.

Getting the Messaging Right Around the China Challenge: The U.S. Military’s Dilemma

China is not our enemy. The Chinese people are not our enemy, and we need to start using this narrative in our daily messaging.

The term China is often used by the U.S. Military to represent a pacing threat or challenge to the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. Military should be specific to increase accuracy in their language to avoid confusion and misperception.

China is used as a catch-all, mingling the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), PRC nationals, and the ethnic diaspora across the globe into the term “China” as one entity.

Mixing the terms or using just one term to refer to all groups weakens U.S. Foreign Policy and strengthens the CCP narrative that they represent all Chinese parties. This usage will also contribute to anti-Asian American discrimination.

The U.S. Military can draw ties from lessons learned during the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in discriminating between radical Islamic terrorists and the Muslim global population. Conversely, the U.S. Military can highlight positive aspects of specific behaviors and actions related to non-CCP Chinese communities and ethnic diaspora.

Department of Defense messaging should take steps to promote the actions or behaviors of non-CCP Chinese groups in messaging to demonstrate the willingness of the U.S. to avoid alienation and misrepresentation.

The Problem

Incorrectly identifying and highlighting “China” as a threat further causes rifts and gaps for the PRC to exploit. Instead of grouping all actions under the term “China,” U.S. government entities should highlight specific entities’ or organizations’ actions as threats.

Specificity in messaging avoids collateral alienation of friendly/pro-U.S. Chinese populations and takes steps to separates malign and positive actions.

For example, according to the Pew Research Center, over 50% of Americans view China as the greatest threat to the U.S. up from 24% in 2019. Obviously, a growing military threat is a concern to the American public.

Using the umbrella term China to capture the growing military threat posed by the PRC creates a narrative that China as a whole, and all Chinese people and entities, should be viewed as the threat. In reality, the aggressive military actions of the PRC do not represent all Chinese. Another example is found in a recent Time article which highlighted that for U.S. Hawks China poses “the greatest threat to Americans’ security, freedom, and prosperity.”

These statements center on the drive to increase our military preparedness against the PRC/CCP. At the same time, they infer that the Chinese as a whole are the threat. This example is found in both media publications and in Department of Defense statements. DOD Policy Chief John C. Rood, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, stated that “China Poses the Largest Long-Term Threat to U.S.” and “[I]t is not an exaggeration to say China is the greatest long-term threat to the U.S.”

The China Threat Messaging Challenge

These statements continue to proliferate across media, building a strong narrative that China is a threat and our enemy. While this makes for a great soundbite, the lack of specificity creates a problem because it signals to all Chinese that they are considered a threat. This signals to the largest ethnic diaspora in the world that America views them as a threat and provides a rallying cry to the CCP that their actions are justified. Specificity in statements and speeches can ensure clarity and focus.

One should delineate a difference between the PRC and the CCP. The CCP is the governing part of the PRC, but the terms are not identical. The CCP often reinforces a narrative that they are the sole representation of China, Chinese citizens, and the Chinese diaspora. This is not the case. Specificity in language and rhetoric avoids overgeneralizing and assists in recognizing and promoting Chinese actions that are positive. Specificity also illuminates malign acts and behaviors of the CCP. Using the term China broadly damages our narrative and emboldens the CCP as the protectorate of all things Chinese.

According to a PEW Center Research study (Negative Views of China Tied to Critical Views of Its Policies on Human Rights | Pew Research Center) of over 19 countries- 11 from Europe, 2 from North America, 1 from the Middle East, and 5 from Asia- over 68% of adults surveyed had a negative view of the PRC and most associated Chinese actions with the PRC as trending towards unfavorable. Most people predominantly were concerned about the PRC’s rising military power, aggressive actions, and human rights violations. Interestingly, adults in countries describing themselves as ethnically Chinese felt a stronger confidence in the leadership of Xi Jinping. The narrative that the PRC represents all Chinese actions globally remains strongly entrenched.

What GWOT Teaches

There are an estimated 1.4 billion Han Chinese worldwide. This makes up almost 18% of the global population and is the largest ethnic group in the world. Additionally, there are over 55 recognized Chinese ethnic groups globally. Using umbrella terms in rhetoric is, therefore, misleading. Further, illuminating malign actions perpetrated by specific entities demonstrates coercive actions and holds the correct party responsible. The U.S. military should be clear and precise in language when stressing actions or developing capabilities against pacing threats and potential adversaries. Lessons of the GWOT where islamophobia spread like wildfire, causing significant issues and distorting narratives, hurting U.S. efforts, and creating false narratives. These false narratives were used by radicalized terrorists to justify their horrendous acts of terror in the name of their ideological struggle. These lessons from the GWOT should be put into practice as the U.S. now faces threats from revisionist actors and states who seek to undermine current international norms.

The Taiwan Case

While specificity towards negative actions is needed, highlighting positive Chinese actions is also critical to enhancing information. The Republic of China (ROC) on the island of Taiwan, often referred to as just Taiwan, offers an excellent example of a Chinese society whose actions can be highlighted to counter the PRC. The ROC is an example of an alternate Chinese society and government from the PRC and CCP. The government on Taiwan counters the CCP’s one voice – one option narrative and provides an alternate Chinese government and society.

In 1979, the United States moved to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and de-recognize the Republic of China (ROC). Under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the United States maintained unofficial relations with Taiwan. While the U.S. refers to Taiwan as a defacto state, on the island of Taiwan the official name remains the Republic of China (ROC). Taiwan is one of the freest democracies in Asia, ranking number one in education, freedom of the press, and human rights, which is a stark contrast from the PRC-controlled mainland. While there is a Taiwanese identity that has grown over the years, the island today represents one of the largest free Chinese societies in existence. A reminder to the world that Chinese people can live, operate, and thrive in the current system. Taiwan demonstrates how a Chinese society can flourish in an interconnected, open global common system and highlights a disparity to the PRC, which offers an authoritarian closed system. Taiwan is a fully functioning democracy, respecting human rights and the rule of law is supportive of the open international system. Taiwan remains a vital partner for the United States and many other countries regionally and globally. Taiwan represents a robust, prosperous, free, and orderly society with strong institutions that stand as a model for the region.

The reminder of this functioning, open, free Chinese society is a thorn in the side of the PRC, who domestically enable strict controls over their population. The PRC maintains that Taiwan is a rogue state belonging to the PRC. However, the ROC government on the self-ruled island of Taiwan does not accept the PRC claims and operates agnostically from the PRC.

Getting the Language Right

Precise language is needed to ensure we are not mistakenly promoting a false narrative and leading to misunderstanding. Delineating specificity with how we represent and articulate Chinese societies, governments, entities, and national groups is critical. Further, highlighting Chinese societies like Taiwan combats the PRC’s messaging and provides an alternative option instead of a threat.

Signaling the United States’ views China, and equally the Chinese, as a threat only bolsters and emboldens the PRC and CCP to pit nations against each other. We should welcome the Chinese people across the globe, whether they be our citizens, green card holders, visitors, or tourists into our open system and signal the threat is not China or the Chinese People. We should learn from our past mistakes of alienating and dividing ethnic groups like we did during the GWOT where misplaced hatred and ignorance of terrorist groups spilled over against Muslim and Arab populations in ways that fueled divisiveness and created misunderstanding. The Taiwan authorities (ROC) provide a competing narrative that can be highlighted to differentiate Chinese actions from the PRC/CCP and offer alternative messaging opportunities.

The U.S. military should exercise specificity in language when labeling a pacing threat, to ensure they are supporting the correct narrative, thereby separating malign actions of specific parties and groups from the overall ethnic diaspora.

About the Author: Justin Woodward

The above work reflects the author’s opinion and does not represent the official policy or position of the Special Forces Regiment, the Department of Defense, or the United States Army.

Major Justin Woodward is a Special Forces officer, a veteran of small wars, and a student of Unconventional Warfare. He has served in the Army and in the Joint Force in various roles for 17 years.

19fortyfive.com · by Justin Woodward · May 21, 2024

21. Iran’s Nuclear Threshold Challenge

Excerpts:

Sharpening the distinction between nuclear energy and weapons and shifting away from the sole focus on production of fissile materials is also important in the context of facilitating an expansion of nuclear energy for climate, energy security, and sustainable development objectives. In particular, it will be indispensable to winning over support for the new norm from countries legitimately interested in producing fuel for their nuclear energy programs. Policymakers could bolster this distinction by enumerating a framework for responsible nuclear power behavior based on adoption of safety, security, nonproliferation, environment, and liability best practices commensurate with peaceful nuclear ambitions. This would endow with credibility commercial nuclear energy pursuits on the basis of application of safeguards and transparency measures, rather than access to the technology itself.

Articulating and incentivizing a stronger normative framework for nuclear energy could thus make seeking a nuclear threshold both less appealing and easier to observe. In turn, it would avail a more moderate Iranian leadership an avenue to credibly reassure about its non-weapons nuclear intentions without in the process singling it out.

Iran’s Nuclear Threshold Challenge - War on the Rocks

TOBY DALTON AND ARIEL LEVITE

warontherocks.com · by Toby Dalton · May 23, 2024

Iran is overtly inching closer to the possession of nuclear weapons, but thus far has refrained from crossing the line. Crucially, Iranian officials are already acting and speaking as if Iran has a threshold nuclear capability, claiming that they possess all the needed technical elements for nuclear weapons. Moreover, they are threatening to acquire nuclear weapons if attacked and expressing satisfaction at the deterrent effect they have already achieved.

Tehran’s behavior raises acute (but not unprecedented) problems for the United States and the world: how to deal with a state that has succeeded in acquiring the capability to quickly produce nuclear weapons and how to prevent it from going all the way. An effective strategy for dealing with Iran should also address the specific problem of its leveraging a threshold nuclear capability to enable other provocative behavior. This includes its direct missile and drone attacks (most recently on Israel) and capture of commercial shipping vessels, as well as its use of proxies to carry out other violent or destabilizing acts in the region. Yet this challenge extends beyond Iran, to other states that might be inspired to emulate its behavior or respond to the threat it poses. To navigate these twin problems — dealing with Iran and preventing the nuclear threshold from becoming a desirable status for others — policymakers ultimately will need to reconfigure nuclear energy and nonproliferation policy.

Become a Member

The Nuclear Threshold

Nuclear weapons are the sum of a disparate set of policy, technical, and organizational activities: producing fissile material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium); designing a weapons system and engineering a warhead; building delivery systems (ballistic and cruise missiles or gravity bombs for aircraft); creating a military infrastructure to command and control them; and deciding on strategies and plans for how to utilize nuclear weapons for political and military effect. Bringing these elements together indigenously takes time and serious effort. Iran has been working towards this moment for the better part of three decades.

The nuclear weapons development process is lengthy not simply because of the cost and complexity of these activities, but also because of a global system of treaties aimed at incentivizing restraint and dissuading and stymieing states that seek the bomb. This system is backed by unilateral and collective enforcement efforts from major powers. Since the 1950s, many states have contemplated or even pursued nuclear weapons. Most gave up, failed, or stopped somewhere short of the threshold, which is what makes Iran’s status today unique for now but perhaps not for long.

Japan, among other potential threshold states, for example, has ample weapons usable fissile material and is developing missiles that could be capable of nuclear delivery. Although it has long adhered to the three non-nuclear principles it adopted in 1967 and does not appear to be currently considering nuclear weapons acquisition, let alone actively working on its necessary constituent elements, Tokyo’s latent capabilities allow it to quickly put all the missing pieces together if it decided to do so.

Japan constitutes a clear example of nuclear latency, in which a state unintentionally acquires many of the capabilities needed to develop nuclear weapons (especially fissile material). Other states may intentionally obtain such capabilities to create the potential for a nuclear weapons option down the road, a phenomenon referred to as nuclear hedging. Iran has clearly gone a step further, necessitating specific analytic focus on the threshold between hedging and nuclear weapon possession.

Three distinct elements distinguish a state that has achieved a threshold status. First, the conscious pursuit of this combined technical, military, and organizational capability to rapidly (probably within three to six months) obtain a rudimentary nuclear explosive capability after a decision to proceed. Second, implementation of a strategy for achieving and utilizing this status. And third, the application of this status for gain vis-à-vis adversaries, allies, and/or domestic audiences. Nevertheless, a threshold state remains sufficiently short of weapons possession and even from the capacity to assemble disparate components into a nuclear weapon within days (a “screwdriver’s turn away”). This allows it to try to claim that it is staying within the rules, allay some of its security concerns, and leverage the potential of possession while attempting to evade efforts to roll back the capability.

Iran as a Threshold State

Iran began a full-fledged clandestine nuclear weapons program in the 1990s. The program was exposed and truncated in 2003, but not before it had made considerable strides. In this early phase the program lacked the necessary fissile material to power the bomb, a critical deficiency Iran has successfully labored to make up for since. There are various estimates today for how long it might take Iran now to acquire its first nuclear weapon, the gist of which is months, not years.

Consecutive reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency detail the numerous achievements made by Iranian scientists in developing a substantial uranium enrichment enterprise and accumulating a stockpile of many bombs’ worth of highly enriched uranium. Rafael Grossi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has criticized Iran for “accumulating a vast amount of highly enriched uranium. And this is something that, of course, draws our attention because no other country without nuclear weapons is enriching at these high levels.” Indeed, in one respect, Iran has been using inspectors to validate and advertise its nuclear gains. There is also a body of evidence of research, development, and testing of dual-use delivery vehicles and various weapons design components and materials, including extensive studies documented in the Iranian archive covertly taken by Israel.

Although Iran has been relatively close to the capability to assemble nuclear weapons for several years, it only consolidated its threshold states after 2018. President Donald Trump’s decision that year to unilaterally pull the United States out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action freed Iran from the negotiated restraints on its nuclear program. Since then, with increasing assertiveness and consistency, Iranian officials have begun to overtly acknowledge and attempt to leverage its threshold status. Here, the statements of various regime figures are telling:

Ali Akbar Salehi, the former head of Iran’s nuclear agency, stated in February 2024:

We possess all the nuclear science components and technology. We’ve crossed all the lines, overcome all obstacles. It’s like having all the parts to build a car: we have the chassis, the engine, the transmission, everything. Each component serves its purpose, and everything is in our hands.

In January 2024, the current head of the same agency, Mohammad Eslami, asserted:

This is not about having the capability [to produce nuclear weapons]. Rather, it is about us not wanting to do this. In terms of our national security, we do not want to do it. It is not about the lack of capability. This is a very important point. Our national security in this field requires us to continue to seek our objectives and to gain influence. I think we have achieved such deterrence.

In April 2024, Mahmoud Reza Aghamiri, the president of Shahid Beheshti University, argued:

The issue is not about producing an atomic bomb. When you have high capabilities, it means power. As you said, going in this direction is problematic and forbidden in the Leader’s view at the moment, but since he is a religious jurist, this could change tomorrow or later.

Also in April 2024, Iranian Majles member Javad Karimi Ghodousi posted on X (formerly Twitter) about a nuclear weapons capability, “If permission is issued, it would take one week to conduct the first test.”

And Kamal Kharrazi, a senior advisor to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, stated in May 2024, “We have no decision to build a nuclear bomb but should Iran’s existence be threatened, there will be no choice but to change our military doctrine.” Similarly, Brig. Gen. Ahmad Haghtalab, commander of the Revolutionary Guard Corps Nuclear Protection and Security Corps, declared that “a revision in the nuclear doctrine and policies of the Islamic Republic and departure from previously stated considerations is possible and conceivable.”

These statements serve a clear communication purpose for both foreign and domestic audiences: to validate the achievement of the nuclear weapons threshold and to justify the economic sacrifices involved; to warn that the threshold to nuclear weapons possession could be quickly crossed at any time based on reversal of the leader’s oft-discussed original 2004 fatwa; and, yet, to convey restraint, for now. Interestingly, Eslami’s statement suggests a motivation for maintaining the status quo, namely that Iran is accruing the benefits of nuclear deterrence without having to take on the risks of actually possessing nuclear weapons. He also asserted, “This deterrence has been achieved with the help of God, without having to violate any rules and regulations.” Worryingly, this statement underscores Iran’s belief, largely endorsed by Russia, that — notwithstanding repeated protestations from Grossi — reaching the nuclear weapons threshold has been done legitimately and without violating any international norm.

Detection, Deterrence, and Reassurance

Iran’s achievement of a threshold status reveals clear gaps in the global nonproliferation system that policymakers should close if they are to prevent others from following in Tehran’s footsteps. The international nuclear nonproliferation system is built mainly on deterrence through detection. The International Atomic Energy Agency is charged with the latter mission. A state that fails to completely and correctly declare to the agency all its fissile materials and related activities risks being found out by inspectors (as was the case with North Korea in the early 1990s). Exposure of such cheating can trigger members of the international community to respond unilaterally and collectively with varying degrees of punishment. Iran’s economy and people have no doubt suffered the toll of the sanctions levied over the years due to revelations of its nuclear cheating.

This system can work well at detecting and dissuading proliferation at an early stage, but its efficacy declines the closer a state openly comes to acquiring weapons-grade fissile materials. The reason is simple: There is no formal prohibition on amassing highly enriched uranium (or weapons-grade plutonium), even though this practice defies reasonable commercial rationale, and the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency does not extend to the other activities necessary to acquire a bomb, namely nuclear weapons design activity, delivery capability, or even nuclear militarization. For a state like Iran that already possesses abundant fissile material, the timeliest indicators of actions to acquire nuclear weapons are likely to occur in areas not currently monitored by the agency.

Therefore, the nuclear threshold challenge means that other states need to be able to impress on the leaders of a proliferating state their national capacity to quickly detect (through intelligence) the other attributes of a decision to proceed toward nuclear weapons and convince them that proceeding will subject them to swift punitive (perhaps military) responses as a result. The successful application of this strategy has no doubt helped dissuade Iran from crossing the threshold for the past two decades and lured Tehran occasionally into diplomatic arrangements that slowed down its nuclear advances.

Threats alone, however, are unlikely to succeed in continuously deterring threshold states — to remain effective over time they should be coupled with reassurance. If the leaders of a threshold state believe that without nuclear deterrence they would suffer the stipulated consequences regardless of whether or not they exercise restraint, there is little incentive for them to refrain. Deterrence without reassurance could even inadvertently drive a state to cross the threshold. Thus, opposing states need to find credible means of communicating that lack of movement to cross the threshold means that core security interests will be respected and further punishments will be held in abeyance.

The acute challenge presented by Iran’s current nuclear status is clear. Neither diplomacy nor current punitive measures (sanctions) can make it roll it back its nuclear gains. Covert measures have proven strategically ineffective, while the threat of a U.S. and/or Israeli preventive military action against its nuclear infrastructure appears less credible under the current circumstances, especially when Iran enjoys intimate cooperation and backing from Russia. Given what Iran’s leadership values, the more impactful area for the United States and others to apply leverage now might be the Islamic Republic’s stability and security. Threatening the regime’s survival might still dissuade Iran from taking the next step to cross the line. But such a threat should be invoked subtly and be accompanied by reassurances and an extended hand for resumption of diplomacy. This combined approach would avoid feeding the regime’s self-serving view that a certain amount of friction with the United States over its nuclear ambitions helps guarantee regime survival while also providing a useful cover for subversive activities throughout the Middle East. Furthermore, the United States and its European partners would want to avoid legitimizing or rewarding the threshold status or to tolerate a threshold state’s pernicious behavior in other domains.

Managing the Broader Threshold Challenge

Iran foreshadows a potentially bigger problem — not only as a role model but also as a catalyst for other states to seek a threshold capability, in the Middle East (Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia immediately come to mind) and well beyond (South Korea and Japan). Furthermore, increasing interest in nuclear power for climate and energy security could drive a significant increase in the spread of the equipment, materials, and knowledge required to develop nuclear weapons. This trend is exacerbated by interest in “non-proscribed” military applications such as nuclear-powered submarines, mobile reactors to power military bases, or space propulsion systems. Worse, the rivalry between the major powers in general, and especially the growing rift with Russia (and its nascent but rapidly growing military cooperation with both Iran and North Korea), undermines traditional collaboration to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Drawing from past efforts to deal with nuclear threshold states, some hope still resides in efforts combining deterrence and reassurance. In particular, sustaining and even strengthening credible bilateral or multilateral security guaranteesas a form of assurance will be crucial in incentivizing nuclear restraint among U.S. allies and partners. The Biden administration has pursued this approach with South Korea, Japan, and Australia, and via expanded NATO membership for Sweden and Finland. At the same time, Washington would probably have to make more explicit the contingent relationship between its security commitments and nuclear weapons forbearance among its other allies and partners.

To manage the broader nuclear threshold challenge, however, policymakers also need to adapt existing nonproliferation approaches. Japan and Iran are instructive cases for how to go about this. Both have ample fissile material. Only Iran, so far as is publicly known, has pursued work to design nuclear weapons and construct the missiles and command structure to deliver them. It is these weaponization and militarization activities that are most problematic, not simply (or solely) the ability to make fissile material. Policymakers thus need to establish clearer norms around activities that are oriented toward nuclear weapons and to focus more detection and analytic effort on their pursuit. The International Atomic Energy Agency should be given broader remit to assess these activities, accordingly.

Sharpening the distinction between nuclear energy and weapons and shifting away from the sole focus on production of fissile materials is also important in the context of facilitating an expansion of nuclear energy for climate, energy security, and sustainable development objectives. In particular, it will be indispensable to winning over support for the new norm from countries legitimately interested in producing fuel for their nuclear energy programs. Policymakers could bolster this distinction by enumerating a framework for responsible nuclear power behavior based on adoption of safety, security, nonproliferation, environment, and liability best practices commensurate with peaceful nuclear ambitions. This would endow with credibility commercial nuclear energy pursuits on the basis of application of safeguards and transparency measures, rather than access to the technology itself.

Articulating and incentivizing a stronger normative framework for nuclear energy could thus make seeking a nuclear threshold both less appealing and easier to observe. In turn, it would avail a more moderate Iranian leadership an avenue to credibly reassure about its non-weapons nuclear intentions without in the process singling it out.

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Toby Dalton is senior fellow and co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Ariel (Eli) Levite is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment and author of numerous articles and papers on nuclear hedging.

Image: Wikimedia

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Toby Dalton · May 23, 2024

22. The Failure of Israel’s “Strategy” in Gaza Continues

Excerpts:

While Israel may be capable of destroying Hamas leaders, weapons caches, infrastructure, and ability to fight in the present conflict, something very much like Hamas will likely re-emerge, as the casus belli of this conflict remains unchanged, and the thousands of Palestinians who have lost a child, parent, sibling, or in some cases entire families will be highly motivated to continue the fight against any Israelis they can reach. If Israel truly desires to end this conflict, not just the battle that began on October 7, it must address the Palestinian issue politically, as military means alone have clearly failed.

If reduction or elimination of violence is their objective, Israeli leaders must explore a totally different relationship with the Palestinians and the territories where they live. Israel’s settlement program, which contributes to Palestinian insecurity and underscores the PNA’s inability to protect ordinary Palestinians and their property, would need to stop. A variant on the failed Oslo plan, separating Israelis and Palestinians from each other, with enhanced security cooperation would need to evolve out of the current crisis; if Palestinians achieve their own state, with genuine political and economic self-determination, rejectionists like Hamas would potentially represent a danger to Palestinian self-governance as well as to Israelis. In this eventuality, Israel would have to treat the new Palestine in much the same way as it treats Jordan or Egypt; it could not violate its sovereignty at will. Something very similar to this peace through separation is also current US policy, and the United States should stand ready to assist in ending this conflict once and for all.

Observers are left wondering if Israel, given its record of futility, truly seeks peace with the Palestinians or prefers instead to retain the territories, despite the human and military costs of managing nearly five million increasingly hostile Palestinians. Ignoring Palestinian demands, has clearly failed to secure Israelis. Some Israeli leaders have openly indicated a desire to maintain control of the Palestinian territories at all costs. Whether this represents the dominant thinking among most Israelis remains to be seen.

The Failure of Israel’s “Strategy” in Gaza Continues - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Amir Asmar · May 23, 2024

Despite decades of demonstrated failure of military operations to achieve Israeli security, Israel continues to prioritize use of its military in its conflict with the Palestinians rather than pursue political processes—such as negotiations, mediation, conciliation, or concessions—that have a chance to achieve peace.

The Palestinians’ lack of self-determination has been the casus belli of this conflict. While some on the Palestinian side such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) would likely never accept a negotiated peace, they would be isolated and lacking the broader Palestinian community’s acquiescence in the event of a demonstrable and durable peace that recognized Palestinian rights and security, along with those of Israelis.

In the past twenty years, Israeli leaders have consistently avoided meaningful negotiations, arguing falsely that there is no Palestinian partner for peace, restricting the Palestinian National Authority’s (PNA) activities in the West Bank, conflating Hamas and PIJ violence with rejection by all Palestinians, and persistently punishing Palestinian civilians, in highly disproportionate attacks, for acts of terrorism committed by Islamist or nationalist extremists. This has been an ineffectual formula that promoted rather than prevented future violence.

If Israel is to secure its southern population—particularly given its demonstrated intelligence and military failures on October 7—it needs to destroy more than Hamas’ governance, military infrastructure, and leadership. These will likely begin to re-emerge in a matter of months. It would need to destroy the need for Hamas, and this is a political, not a military, challenge. A variant on the formula of the failed Oslo process that results in the separation of Israelis from Palestinians and self-determination and economic freedom for Palestinians—freedoms Israelis already enjoy—would be needed if there is any chance of a lasting diminution of the violence and potential end to the conflict.

Gaza since 2005

The political and security configuration of the Gaza Strip on October 6, 2023—the day before Hamas’ brutal terrorist attack in southern Israel and Jerusalem’s subsequent retaliatory war—dates back to two events nearly twenty years old. First, in 2005, the government of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon conducted Operation Shevet Ahim, withdrawing settlers and ground forces from the Gaza Strip. Israel maintained full control over Palestinians’ lives, restricting the transit of products and people in and out of Gaza, violating Gaza’s airspace and its territorial waters, and conducting periodic ground operations. Consequently, Israel’s claim that it no longer held responsibility for the Gaza Strip was widely disputed by international bodies, such as the International Criminal Court and the UN General Assembly, and non-governmental organizations, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

Second, Palestinian elections were held in 2006 to elect a new Legislative Council, the PNA’s legislature. The result was a victory for Hamas’ Change and Reform list, which received 74 of 132 seats, while the Fatah party of President Mahmoud Abbas received 45 seats in a mixed voting system that included both national party lists and representative districts. Despite longstanding Israeli and American complaints about the corruption of Fatah’s leaders and the US public commitment to promoting democracy in the region, both encouraged Fatah to overthrow the newly-elected Hamas government and hold on to power. Then-US President George W. Bush signed off on a plan calling for Washington’s allies in the region, including Egypt and Jordan, to funnel arms and salaries to Fatah fighters who would lead a coup against the elected Hamas government.

By 2007, Hamas had consolidated its power in Gaza after a brief civil conflict, defeating Fatah fighters and relegating most of the Fatah-dominated PNA structure to the West Bank. With Egyptian collaboration, Israel then instituted a blockade, exacerbating previous restrictions and further limiting the numbers of people and specified categories of goods allowed in and out of the Gaza Strip. Israeli forces also restricted the Gaza coast, allowing fishermen to access only 50% of the fishing waters allocated for this purpose under the Oslo Accords.

Since then, there have been multiple Israeli conflicts in Gaza against Hamas and other militants. However, Israeli military attacks and responses to Hamas and PIJ provocations, intended to dissuade the groups from future attacks, persistently failed, and the Israeli military kept re-engaging in Gaza with growing regularity and increasing ferocity.

As the United States and its partners consider a postwar plan for governance and security in the Gaza Strip, it is important to avoid repetition of the circumstances that contributed to the present conflict, both proximate (retaliation for yet another attack) and strategic (the absence of peace and security, and unfettered economic activity, for Palestinians).

The Israel-Gaza Wars

Looking at the major Israeli incursions into Gaza since the 2007 Hamas takeover demonstrates the futility of Israeli efforts. In November 2008, Israeli soldiers launched a raid into Deir al-Balah in central Gaza to destroy a tunnel, killing several Hamas militants. Israel said the raid was a preemptive strike while Hamas characterized it as a ceasefire violation and responded with rocket fire into Israel. Israel then began Operation Cast Lead with the stated aim of stopping the rocket fire. It was a weeks-long full-blown assault on Gaza involving aerial bombing and a ground invasion.

Thirteen Israelis were reportedly killed, along with1,200-1,400 Palestinians, mostly civilians, alongside damage to housing, businesses, and other infrastructure in Gaza. Amnesty International described the destruction as “wanton,” reporting that many Palestinian civilians were killed in indiscriminate and reckless attacks using imprecise weapons. UN officials determined that both sides committed war crimes. Among other things, the Israeli military used white phosphorus, an incendiary weapon, in populated areas and, according to the UN, intentionally targeted civilians; Palestinian militants had also committed war crimes by shooting rockets at Israeli civilians.

In 2012, after an increase in Hamas rockets launched from Gaza into Israel, Jerusalem retaliated with Operation Pillar of Defense—eight days of airstrikes, killing the head of Hamas’ military wing in Gaza, Ahmed Jabari. An estimated 180 Palestinians, mostly civilians including women and children, died in the fighting. Again, the UN found both sides had committed war crimes.

In 2014, Hamas kidnapped and killed three Israeli teens from the West Bank. In response, Israel launched seven weeks of airstrikes, ground operations, and naval blockades in Gaza, dubbed Operation Protective Edge. Though Israel’s stated target was Hamas militants and their infrastructure in Gaza, at least 2,200 Palestinians were killed, the majority of whom were civilians. Hamas launched rockets into Israel, most of which were intercepted by the Iron Dome air defense system. Half a million Palestinians were displaced, and the operation left Gaza with significant infrastructure damage and shortages of basic goods.

In 2021, violence again broke out following a threat from Israel to evict Palestinian families from their homes in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of East Jerusalem, which includes sites of religious significance for Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Concurrent Israeli restrictions around the al-Aqsa Mosque during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan resulted in violent clashes between Palestinian protesters and Israeli police in East Jerusalem. After demanding that Israel withdraw its security forces from the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, Hamas and the PIJ unleashed a barrage of rockets from Gaza into Israel. Dubbing it Operation Guardian of the Walls, Israel hit back with air strikes on Gaza. The fighting went on for 11 days, killing at least 250 Palestinians and 13 Israelis.

In May 2023, Khader Adnan, a senior PIJ leader in the West Bank, died as a result of an 87-day hunger strike while in an Israeli prison. In response, a hundred rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel. On May 9, Israeli troops initiated Operation Shield and Arrow, a pre-dawn raid on Gaza, killing some PIJ military leaders and ten civilians.

This is not intended to be a comprehensive list, and other skirmishes have similarly led to disproportionate Palestinian casualties. Despite Israel’s vast military superiority and its willingness to engage Hamas and the PIJ, even at the cost of civilian casualties, these efforts have not materially deterred Hamas or other militant groups, as evidenced by Israel’s repeated need to attack Gaza. Israeli politician Ksenia Svetlova describes a Hebrew-language meme that circulated on social media, listing 15 Israeli military operations in Gaza over the past two decades and sarcastically asserting, “For sure, this one will be different.”

Hamas and other militants’ willingness to attack Israel cannot be deterred in the current setting; these groups likely can count on popular acquiescence or support of their attacks, as Palestinians continue to lack individual and communal security, self-determination, and economic freedom. It is also probable that civilian deaths and the destruction of property and livelihood facilitate recruitment into Palestinian militant groups, as victimized individuals look for revenge.

In other words, since 2007, Israeli military operations in Gaza have been more likely to generate more committed Palestinian adversaries in the future, provoking more attacks against Israel, triggering more intense Israeli responses, and laying the foundation for more brutal future conflicts—the very definition of vicious circle.

The Present Conflict

Two new features of the 2023-24 Gaza conflict—its extended duration and Israel’s restriction of assistance to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of its retaliatory war—further demonstrate the futility of the military approach to resolving this conflict. The duration of the conflict has resulted in much greater destruction, loss of civilian life, and displacement than previous conflicts, while the restriction of humanitarian assistance to less than pre-war levels has pushed hundreds of thousands of civilians to the edge of starvation and started shifting the global narrative from Israeli and Palestinian security to Israel’s collective punishment policies and its consequent loss of the worldwide sympathy it enjoyed after October 7.

The Palestinian casualty figures—over 35,000 killed and 77,000 wounded, as of this writing—are the result of concerted Israeli campaigns in urban areas, including attacks against Israeli-designated “safe zones.” Neither Israeli nor Palestinian figures regarding the percentage of the dead who are Hamas or other militants can be considered reliable, although Israeli-provided figures suggest that less than half of Palestinian casualties were militants. The Israeli military uses the indisputable fact that Hamas has facilities in, and conducts attacks from, dense urban areas as cover to attack any civilian target it deems appropriate, irrespective of the consequences for non-combatants.

Moreover, Israeli military forces have attacked health care facilities in Gaza, along with Palestinians and foreign nationals affiliated with aid organizations working to mitigate the widespread and severe consequences of the war. Israel has also attacked first responders, who arrive at the scene after its attacks, and there have been reports of arrests and humiliation of medical personnel. In defense of their actions, Israeli military and political leaders refer to intelligence about Hamas’ use of medical and other civilian facilities and the typically high civilian casualty rates in any urban combat; rarely, Israeli leaders will acknowledge a mistake, as they did after destroying a World Central Kitchen convoy, killing seven.

Even US President Joe Biden, an ardent supporter of Israel, characterized Israel’s attacks in Gaza as “indiscriminate” and “over-the-top,” all while continuing to re-arm the Israeli military and resisting calls to condition US aid to unambiguous Israeli steps to minimize civilian casualties. The United States, of course, understands better than most that military power alone has historically proven incapable of dislodging entrenched insurgencies, having learned that lesson in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

The Future

A strategic reappraisal is necessary if Israel is to forestall Palestinian attacks and the next war more permanently. A review of Israel’s activities vis-à-vis Gaza in the past twenty years suggests an operational, rather than strategic, approach to the Palestinians overall and terrorist attacks in particular. Israel seems to attempt, futilely, to address the latter while ignoring the former. When terrorists are readily willing to die, forsaking what quality of life Israel (and Hamas) have permitted them, they cannot be dissuaded from attacking.

While Israel may be capable of destroying Hamas leaders, weapons caches, infrastructure, and ability to fight in the present conflict, something very much like Hamas will likely re-emerge, as the casus belli of this conflict remains unchanged, and the thousands of Palestinians who have lost a child, parent, sibling, or in some cases entire families will be highly motivated to continue the fight against any Israelis they can reach. If Israel truly desires to end this conflict, not just the battle that began on October 7, it must address the Palestinian issue politically, as military means alone have clearly failed.

If reduction or elimination of violence is their objective, Israeli leaders must explore a totally different relationship with the Palestinians and the territories where they live. Israel’s settlement program, which contributes to Palestinian insecurity and underscores the PNA’s inability to protect ordinary Palestinians and their property, would need to stop. A variant on the failed Oslo plan, separating Israelis and Palestinians from each other, with enhanced security cooperation would need to evolve out of the current crisis; if Palestinians achieve their own state, with genuine political and economic self-determination, rejectionists like Hamas would potentially represent a danger to Palestinian self-governance as well as to Israelis. In this eventuality, Israel would have to treat the new Palestine in much the same way as it treats Jordan or Egypt; it could not violate its sovereignty at will. Something very similar to this peace through separation is also current US policy, and the United States should stand ready to assist in ending this conflict once and for all.

Observers are left wondering if Israel, given its record of futility, truly seeks peace with the Palestinians or prefers instead to retain the territories, despite the human and military costs of managing nearly five million increasingly hostile Palestinians. Ignoring Palestinian demands, has clearly failed to secure Israelis. Some Israeli leaders have openly indicated a desire to maintain control of the Palestinian territories at all costs. Whether this represents the dominant thinking among most Israelis remains to be seen.

Amir Asmar was a senior executive and long-time Middle East analyst in the U.S. Department of Defense, where he authored analyses and provided intelligence briefings to decision-makers throughout the executive and legislative branches. He is an adjunct professor at the National Intelligence University, and his writings can be found at the Council on Foreign Relations, the World Politics Review, and other publications.

Main image: IDF forces and the Israeli Police close the Kisufim checkpoint to citizens by the order of the Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, and the Ministry of Defense. (IDF via Wikimedia)

Views expressed in this article solely reflect those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

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23. Coast Artillery Reimagined: The Mid-Range Capability’s First Deployment to the Indo-Pacific

Next we will have some in Congress calling for a Coast Artillery branch. (note my sarcasm about congressional overreach).

Excerpt:

The ability of the MRC to strike a maritime target today and HIMARS maritime-strike technology of the future, paired with the organic deep sensing of the ERSE company, are complementary capabilities that enable the Army to answer Admiral Harris’s call to action: to be relevant in the future fight in the Indo-Pacific region, the Army needed to be able to sink ships. The collective deployment of these systems and formations during Operation Pathways is a testament to the sense of urgency behind the Army’s transformation as well as the all-domain interdependencies of the joint force that come together on the land through the creation of joint interior lines. These new systems and formations will later participate in Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center (JPMRC) training, another signature effort for US Army Pacific, which enhances the training with a free-thinking adversary and overarching scenario within an already challenging operational environment. Forward deployment of combat-credible forces through Operation Pathways, creation of enduring interior lines for the joint force, and the addition of complexity to training through JPMRC: this is transformation in contact for the Army in the Indo-Pacific.

Coast Artillery Reimagined: The Mid-Range Capability’s First Deployment to the Indo-Pacific - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Ben Blane, Ryan DeBooy · May 23, 2024

In 2016, as the Army was transitioning away from counterinsurgency and focusing its efforts toward strategic competition, the commander of US military forces in the Pacific issued a clear challenge that would drastically change the way the Army would prepare for a fight in a maritime environment. In that year’s annual Association of the United States Army LANPAC conference, Admiral Harry Harris stated that he needed the Army to be able to do four things to be relevant in a future fight in the Pacific. The Army must be able to “sink ships, neutralize satellites, shoot down missiles, and deny the enemy the ability to command and control its forces.” At the time, the Army possessed the capability to perform three of those tasks. But it had been nearly seven decades, since the days of coast artillery, that the Army had given serious thought to the concept of sinking ships.

At the time of Admiral Harris’s remarks, the Army had just completed a large-scale combat operations gap study to determine the modernization priorities for the operational force. In parallel, the Army was refining its concept for multidomain battle and developing a new prototype formation designed to accelerate transformation by putting multidomain concepts into action. General Charles Flynn, today the commander of US Army Pacific, was the Army’s deputy commander for the region at the time and was sitting in the audience during Admiral Harris’s speech. He described it as a combatant commander “putting the gauntlet down” for the Army’s transformation efforts in the region.

With the help of the Philippine government and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Army’s 1st Multi-Domain Task Force’s (1MDTF) recently deployed the Mid-Range Capability (MRC) system into the northern Luzon area of the Philippines, demonstrating that Admiral Harris’s challenge served as an effective accelerant for these concepts, organizations, and capabilities. With this capability forward in the first island chain, the Army can now support the joint force and treaty allies in a way that it could not in 2016: it can kill ships. This photo essay chronicles key milestones in the development of this capability and its employment into the Indo-Pacific.

(US Army photo by Joshua Fernandez)

In December 2022, the Army’s Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office, another new organization in the Army, successfully delivered the first battery of MRC launchers to 1MDTF at Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM), Washington. Ahead of the delivery of the system, soldiers of the Long Range Fires Battalion’s Charlie Battery organized and conducted the necessary individual training and certification to begin section-level training as soon as the systems arrived. The rapid development and fielding of the capability was the result of a collaborative effort between soldiers and sailors throughout the MRC program with critical soldier participation in each phase of the development, training, and testing of the MRC to provide continuous feedback.

(Photo provided courtesy of the Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office)

(Photo provided courtesy of the Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office)

Between May and June of 2023, barely weeks out of new equipment fielding and training, Charlie Battery soldiers conducted the first Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) shot for the Army at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico (top), followed by the first Tomahawk Land Attack Missile shot at Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, California (bottom). SM-6 brings the Army the capability to engage moving maritime targets today with future Tomahawk variants enhancing this maritime strike capability.

In her opening address at the 2023 Association of the United States Army annual meeting on October 9, the secretary of the Army, the Honorable Christine Wormuth, highlighted the MRC battery’s ability to strike ships from land as a prime example of the incredible progress on prototyping, production, and fielding the Army had made over the previous year. Secretary Wormuth previously predicted that fiscal year 2023 would be “the year of long-range precision fires.” Not only was the fielding of the MRC to an operational unit a remarkable achievement for the Army acquisition community, she explained, but the MRC, along with dozens of other systems introduced that year, provided the Army the “capability to respond to various threats and serve as a credible deterrent to our adversaries.” The Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office subsequently completed full delivery of “residual combat capability” with the delivery of live SM-6 and Tomahawk munitions at JBLM. The Army would then go on to field a second MRC battery at JBLM in early 2024.

Mid-Range Capability (MRC) launcher from Charlie Battery (MRC), 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery (Long Range Fires Battalion), 1st Multi-Domain Task Force arrives as part of the capability’s first deployment into theater on northern Luzon, Philippines, April 7, 2024. The MRC deployment aims to enhance Philippine maritime defense capabilities, while bolstering interoperability and readiness within the US-Philippine Alliance. (US Army photo by Captain Ryan DeBooy)

On April 11, 2024, the collective efforts of Charlie Battery and supporting agencies across the Philippine government, Armed Forces of the Philippines, joint force, and Army modernization enterprise culminated in the historic delivery of the MRC missile system to northern Luzon. The system was transported over fifteen thousand miles aboard a C-17 Globemaster III airframe as part of US Army Pacific’s Operation Pathways and combined exercise Salaknib 24. The deployment, undertaken in part with the pilots and flight crew of the US Air Force’s 62nd Airlift Wing from JBLM, showcased the extensive reach and logistical precision of the joint and combined force in the first island chain. Moreover, the deployment demonstrated the Army’s ability to answer the initial call to action as another arrow in the Indo-Pacific commander’s quiver of capabilities to counter threats in the maritime domain.

Philippine Army Lt. Gen. Roy M. Galido, commander of the Philippine Army, speaks with US Army Gen. Charles Flynn, commanding general of United States Army Pacific Command, and the commander of Charlie Battery (MRC) 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery (Long Range Fires Battalion),1st Multi-Domain Task Force (1MDTF) on the Mid-Range Capability (MRC) during a 1MDTF site visit in northern Luzon, Philippines, April 28, 2024 in support of Exercise Balikatan 24. “MRC enhances our defensive posture in the region, providing the Philippine and US forces with increased interoperability and readiness. This capability is strictly defensive, aimed at ensuring the security of maritime domains and critical infrastructure without provoking or escalating conflict,” said Lt. Col. Ben Blane, commander of 5-3 FA (LRFB), 1MDTF. (US Army photo by Captain Ryan DeBooy)

On April 28, 2024, Philippine Army Lieutenant General Roy M. Galido, commanding general of the Philippine Army, and General Flynn visited the MRC site, where the commander of Charlie Battery (MRC), 5-3 Field Artillery (Long Range Fires Battalion), 1MDTF provided an overview of training in preparation for joint and combined exercise Balikatan 24. Balikatan is an annual exercise between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the US military designed to strengthen bilateral interoperability, capabilities, trust, and cooperation built over decades of shared experiences.

US Army Lt. Col. Ben Blane, commander of the 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery (Long Range Fires Battalion), 1st Multi-Domain Task Force (1MDTF), briefs US Army Gen. Charles Flynn, commanding general of United States Army Pacific Command, and Philippine Army Lt. Gen. Roy M. Galido, commander of the Philippine Army, on the Mid-Range Capability (MRC), as they walk between two MRC launchers during a 1MDTF site visit in northern Luzon, Philippines, April 28, 2024 in support of Exercise Balikatan 24. “The introduction of the MRC in the Philippines underscores a nonaggressive, defensive stance aimed at preserving peace and preventing conflict. It reflects our dedication to a rules-based international order and the safety and security of a free and open Indo-Pacific,” said Blane. (US Army photo by Captain Ryan DeBooy)

During their visit to the MRC site, General Flynn and Lieutenant General Galido were shown the MRC launchers and provided with an overview of the ongoing training, which includes section certification and digital rehearsals with Pacific Fleet assets in the region. Although this training began on JBLM, this was the first time the battery has conducted training in the hot, humid, and corrosive environment of the Philippines with its higher headquarters and partnered forces distributed hundreds of miles away. The lessons from this training were shared in near-real time to improve future iterations of the system as the Army fields equipment for subsequent MRC batteries.

US Army Brig. Gen. Bernard Harrington, commander of the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force (1MDTF), briefs Philippine Army Lt. Gen. Roy M. Galido, commander of the Philippine Army, and Philippine Air Force Maj. Gen. Fernyl Buca, commander of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Northern Luzon Command (NOLCOM), on the Mid-Range Capability (MRC) inside the battery operations center during a 1MDTF site visit in northern Luzon, Philippines, April 28, 2024 in support of Exercise Balikatan 24. “MRC deployment is fully aligned with the sovereignty of the Philippines, undertaken in close coordination with and the consent of the Philippine government. This collaboration is essential for addressing shared challenges in a manner that promotes security and stability in the region,” said Brig. Gen. Bernard Harrington. (US Army photo by Captain Ryan DeBooy)

Philippines senior military leaders—Lieutenant General Galido and Philippine Air Force Lieutenant General Fernyl Buca, commander of the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Northern Luzon Command—also visited the battery operations center, where they were briefed on MRC training and operations by Brigadier General Bernard Harrington, commander of 1MDTF, who also explained the unique capability the MRC, as a rotational asset, provides to a joint and combined force. Amid increasingly violent engagements against Philippine vessels in the country’s own territorial waters, the US Army has introduced a system that can hold at risk potential adversaries that threaten territorial sovereignty.

(US Army photo by Captain Ryan DeBooy)

While visiting the MRC site, an officer assigned to the Extended Range Sensing and Effects (ERSE) company, 1st Multi-Domain Effects Battalion, 1MDTF briefed Lieutenant General Buca, General Flynn, and Lieutenant General Galido on a solar uncrewed aerial vehicle. As the Army increases the ranges of its shooters, it must also increase its ability to sense more persistently and at greater ranges. Since 2022, the ERSE company has been experimenting with a variety of high-altitude and long-endurance capabilities within the annual Balikatan exercise. These systems, launched from the land, complement and integrate with other space, aerial, and terrestrial collection efforts, a foundational component to the formation of interior lines for the joint force.

The ERSE company continued this experimentation in Balikatan 24 with flights in the Luzon Strait and West Philippine Sea further enhancing combined capacity for maritime domain awareness as well as contributing to the joint force’s ability to sense and make sense of the operating environment. Throughout Balikatan 24, US forces increased combined capacity by training alongside Philippine allies and other participating forces to integrate communications, sensing, and targeting systems throughout the scenario.

US Army Soldiers assigned to Charlie Battery (MRC), 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery (Long Range Fire Battalion), 1st Multi-Domain Task Force, lift a reload training canister for movement during Mid-Range Capability (MRC) certification tables as part of Exercise Balikatan 24 in northern Luzon, Philippines, April 30, 2024. This was the first time certification was completed on the MRC in a deployed environment, a milestone for the unit. (US Army photo by Captain Ryan DeBooy)

US Army Soldiers assigned to Charlie Battery (MRC), 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery (Long Range Fire Battalion), 1st Multi-Domain Task Force position training canisters during Mid-Range Capability (MRC) certification training as part of Exercise Balikatan 24 in northern Luzon, Philippines, April 30, 2024. (US Army photo by Captain Ryan DeBooy)

Charlie Battery training in northern Luzon also included ammunition handling and reloading as part of its certification. Movement of these critical munitions over the land in this environment is a task the joint force had not previously undertaken and helps inform and improve logistical capabilities, another foundational component of joint interior lines.

(US Marine Corps photo by Corporal Kyle Chan)

Elsewhere on Luzon, US soldiers under Alpha Battery, 5-3 Field Artillery, 1MDTF and airmen with 1st Special Operations Squadron conducted a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) Rapid Air Insertion, better known as HIRAIN, from Subic Bay International Airport into San Vicente Airport on the island of Palawan.

(US Marine Corps photo by Corporal Kyle Chan)

Alpha Battery soldiers with sailors and Marines assigned to Amphibious Craft Unit 5 continued movement to southern Palawan aboard US Navy Landing Craft, Air Cushion 8 to participate in a joint and combined littoral live-fire event. The beaches were secured by US and Armed Forces of the Philippines special operations forces ahead of each landing. The movement of the HIMARS launchers represents a dynamic deployment of assets to complement other postured and rotational systems on the islands.

(US Marine Corps photo by Corporal Kyle Chan)

Philippine Marine M101 105-millimeter howitzers and US Army M142 HIMARS launchers occupied firing positions on the beach in Rizal, Palawan during dry-fire rehearsals ahead of live-fire execution. The shoulder-to-shoulder positioning of these weapon systems, alongside other direct-fire systems, with varying range of munitions challenges previous concepts of how forces will be arrayed for the close and deep fight in a multidomain environment.

(US Marine Corps photo by Corporal Kyle Chan)

(US Army photo by Sergeant Major Lebaron Gordon)

During the joint and combined live-fire event, multiple Alpha Battery HIMARS launchers, receiving data from a US Marine Corps sensor through 1MDTF’s all-domain operations center in downtown Manila, emerged from hide sites within the jungle to deliver the first rounds from firing points along the beach against a maritime target thousands of kilometers away. This was followed by a barrage of cannon and direct-fire weapon systems from other Philippine and US partners engaging multiple maritime targets. The entire live-fire event was conducted within Philippine territorial waters and represents a complex territorial defense against an adversary advancing with multiple maritime destroyers and landing crafts. Ahead of the introduction of the future Precision Strike Missile with maritime targeting capability for the HIMARS, these rehearsals help develop the human, technical, and procedural interoperability critical to the successful execution of these live-fire events.

Coast Artillery Reimagined

The ability of the MRC to strike a maritime target today and HIMARS maritime-strike technology of the future, paired with the organic deep sensing of the ERSE company, are complementary capabilities that enable the Army to answer Admiral Harris’s call to action: to be relevant in the future fight in the Indo-Pacific region, the Army needed to be able to sink ships. The collective deployment of these systems and formations during Operation Pathways is a testament to the sense of urgency behind the Army’s transformation as well as the all-domain interdependencies of the joint force that come together on the land through the creation of joint interior lines. These new systems and formations will later participate in Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center (JPMRC) training, another signature effort for US Army Pacific, which enhances the training with a free-thinking adversary and overarching scenario within an already challenging operational environment. Forward deployment of combat-credible forces through Operation Pathways, creation of enduring interior lines for the joint force, and the addition of complexity to training through JPMRC: this is transformation in contact for the Army in the Indo-Pacific.

Lieutenant Colonel Ben Blane is a field artillery officer and commands the Army’s first long-range fires battalion as part of the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. He holds an undergraduate degree from the United States Military Academy and graduate degrees from Columbia University and John Jay College.

Captain Ryan DeBooy is the public affairs officer for the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. He holds undergraduate and graduate degrees from Middle Tennessee State University and is a recipient of an Emmy Award from the Michigan chapter of the National Academy of Television Arts & Sciences.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Ben Blane, Ryan DeBooy · May 23, 2024

24. Can America’s Special Relationship With Israel Survive?

Excerpts:

It should be noted that continued divergence of American and Israeli public opinion is not the only possible near-term outcome of the current situation. If Trump succeeds in defeating Biden, and continues policies that favor the Israeli right, the current rift between the two countries, at least at the government level, may shift to a populist right-wing alignment. But it seems likely that in the years to come, the shifts that have taken place among younger voters in both countries will continue, presenting a significant challenge for the two allies as they seek to agree on a common policy agenda.

The basis of the U.S.-Israeli relationship was once grounded in shared interests, but with a much-prized sense of values. In terms of interests, the geopolitics of the Cold War are long gone. But the two countries still have overlapping regional concerns. The question of shared values, however, is more complicated: do both countries continue to share a commitment to democracy, especially liberal democracy? Israel has been moving away from that identity, and the United States will decide its own path in November.

Much is unknown about where both countries will go, especially given the continuing war and upheaval in Israel. But if the core values of the United States and Israel diverge further, the next generation of leaders in both places may no longer see each other as kindred spirits. In that case, shared strategic interests might ensure that the countries remain allies, but they might cease to have the “special relationship” they have counted on in the past.

Can America’s Special Relationship With Israel Survive?

How Gaza Has Accelerated the Social and Political Forces Driving the Countries Apart

By Dahlia Scheindlin

May 23, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by The Crooked Timber of Democracy in Israel: Promise Unfulfilled · May 23, 2024

On May 8, the Biden administration confirmed that it was withholding a major weapons shipment to the Israel Defense Forces. It was the biggest step that the United States has taken in decades to restrain Israel’s actions. The decision concerned a consignment of 2,000-pound bombs—weapons that the United States generally avoids in urban warfare, and which White House officials believed that Israel would use in its Rafah operation in the Gaza Strip—and did not affect other weapons transfers. Nonetheless, the administration’s willingness to employ measures that could materially constrain Israel’s behavior reflected its growing frustration with Israel’s nearly eight-month-old war in Gaza.

But the announcement also underscored something else: the growing partisan divide within the United States over Israel. For months, some Democratic leaders in Congress and many Democratic voters felt that the administration was far too indulgent of Israel’s conduct in the war, which they believe it enabled with overwhelming military, financial, and political support. On the other side, Biden’s decision on the bombs was excoriated by dozens of Republican members of Congress, who have called him a “pawn for Hamas” and a “terrible friend to Israel.” On May 19, Republican Representative Elise Stefanik, of New York, went further, traveling to Jerusalem and publicly denouncing Biden’s policy in a meeting with a caucus of the Israeli Knesset.

Washington prides itself on its tradition of bipartisan support for Israel, but in reality a partisan gap has been growing for years. Democratic voters, and younger Americans generally, have become critical of Israel’s long-standing denial of Palestinian human rights and national self-determination. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s populist, illiberal policies and his theocratic governing-coalition allies have alienated them further. On the other hand, Republicans and many religious conservatives have seized on support for Israel—including unrestrained backing for right-wing Israeli governments—as an article of faith, and, increasingly, a political litmus test.

The increasingly partisan reading of the bilateral relationship isn’t only on the American side. Despite the Biden administration’s strong support for Israel after October 7 and through much of the war—and despite the fact that a large majority of American Jews have traditionally voted Democratic—Israelis show that they prefer Donald Trump to Joe Biden by a wide margin. Unlike in past decades, a majority of Israelis also approve of their leaders’ defying U.S. policy preferences. And it’s not clear that these majorities are much concerned about a rupture in the U.S.-Israeli relationship or that Israeli defiance might one day jeopardize the extensive military aid on which Israel relies.

The growing friction between Israelis and Americans didn’t emerge with the current war in Gaza. Longer-term social and political trajectories in both countries suggest that the famous “shared values” that have for decades underpinned the relationship were already under pressure. But the war has brought this tension, and the partisan politics driving it, into full view. This does not mean that the countries are on a collision course, but it raises important questions about the nature of alliance for the years to come.

FRIENDSHIP FIRST

To understand the significance of the current rift, it is important to recall that the U.S.-Israeli alliance has weathered many disagreements over the decades. In the past, each side presumed that the underlying relationship was sufficiently solid to absorb tensions or even crises. A U.S. administration that pushed back on Israeli behavior or demanded significant concessions might generate controversy, but opinion surveys, where available, indicated that the Israelis generally deferred to the Americans, regardless of who was in the White House. (Unless otherwise specified, historic data cited here comes from the Data Israel resource, hosted by the Israel Democracy Institute.)

Take the Carter administration. Breaking with decades of U.S. policy, in 1977, President Jimmy Carter became the first U.S. president to speak publicly about the need for a Palestinian homeland, in an unscripted remark at a Massachusetts town hall meeting. The idea was anathema to Israeli Jews at the time. In a survey taken two years earlier, 70 percent of them supported a boycott of the Palestinian Liberation Organization at the United Nations. Even Stuart Eizenstat, who was Carter’s chief domestic policy adviser and heavily involved in the administration’s Middle East policy, was caught by surprise. “I nearly fell off my bench,” he recalled in an interview.

Nonetheless, in 1978, Carter hosted the Camp David negotiations between Egypt and Israel, cajoling Israel to make an unpopular land withdrawal from the Sinai, which it had occupied after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and putting the Palestinian issue squarely on the negotiating agenda. And when Israeli Jews were asked that September how much they trusted Carter, almost two-thirds said that they trusted him somewhat or a great deal. During President Ronald Reagan’s first few months in office, a similarly large majority, between 63 and 70 percent of Israeli Jews, said that they trusted him regarding Israel. (Unfortunately for researchers, the limited surveys of Israel’s Arab citizens at the time were separate from surveys of Jewish Israelis, and usually asked different questions.)

Secretary of State Antony Blinken and President Joe Biden meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other Israeli officials, Tel Aviv, October 2023

Miriam Alster / Reuters

President Bill Clinton also maintained wide support in Israel, even when he was advocating for unpopular policies. In 1994, a year after the controversial Oslo accords were signed, 65 percent of Israelis said they were somewhat or very satisfied with Clinton. In the coming year, Israel lived through a wave of suicide bombings and the assassination of its prime minister, and there was sufficient concern about the accords that Israelis elected Netanyahu; nonetheless, support for Clinton remained.

In the summer of 2000, days before Clinton hosted the Camp David summit between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority chairman Yasir Arafat, surveys I conducted as an analyst for Stan Greenberg, who was advising Barak, found that nearly the same portion, two-thirds of Israeli Jews, gave Clinton a favorable rating. This was despite the fact that Israelis knew the United States would press for significant and highly controversial Israeli concessions to the Palestinians. Even after the talks collapsed and the second intifada broke out, Clinton remained popular.

Moreover, an Israeli leader who defied a U.S. president too brazenly could face serious political consequences at home. In early 1992, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker threatened to withhold U.S. loan guarantees to deter right-wing Israeli leader Yitzhak Shamir from using the funds to build settlements. Shamir’s government rejected the U.S. terms, and the rift was widely reported to have contributed to Shamir’s loss in the 1992 Israeli election. His successor, Yitzhak Rabin, ushered in a left-leaning government that quickly agreed to cease settlement expansion in certain areas and broke the impasse with the United States (although settlement growth ultimately continued).

Israelis prefer Donald Trump to Joe Biden by a wide margin.

But it’s not at all clear that these patterns hold true today. Despite Biden’s sweeping support for Israel after the October 7 attack and throughout the war, Israelis have shown only lukewarm approval. In November 2023 and January 2024, studies from the Israel Democracy Institute reminded Israeli respondents that Biden had offered unyielding support, and then asked them if Israel should meet some U.S. demands in return; in both surveys, a larger number (a plurality) of Israelis said that Israel should make its own decisions rather than coordinate with Washington.

And in mid-March, an opinion survey for Israel’s News 12 network found that Israelis preferred Trump to Biden in the 2024 U.S. presidential election by 14 points: 44 percent for Trump, versus just 30 percent for Biden. This was well before the administration had announced the decision to withhold the weapons shipment and just before the administration said that it would sanction a small number of violent West Bank settlers.

As in the case of U.S. attitudes about Israel’s leadership, Israeli attitudes about U.S. administrations also align to a significant degree with political affiliation: in the News 12 poll, nearly three-quarters of those who support Netanyahu’s coalition said that they preferred Trump, whereas 55 percent of those who support parties opposed to Netanyahu preferred Biden. In fact, this partisan divide reflects the culmination of social and political forces that have been underway in both Israel and the United States for years.

DEMOCRATIC DISCONTENT

In the months preceding Biden’s announcement about delaying the weapons shipment, Democratic discontent with Israel’s war in Gaza was running high. Progressive members of Congress were pressing the Biden administration to take a tougher stand against Netanyahu’s policies. And this past March, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer—a centrist Democrat and well-known Israel supporter—broke precedent to publicly criticize Netanyahu and call for early Israeli elections. Parts of the Democratic electorate, especially younger Americans and those on the left, have been at least as vocal as politicians in criticizing the war. Notably, weeks before Biden made his announcement about withholding the 2,000-pound bombs, a poll found that a large majority of Democrats, and a bare majority of all Americans, supported halting weapons shipments to Israel.

But these developments also reflect longer-term trends in U.S. opinion about Israel. It’s important to note that, as in previous decades, a firm majority of Americans support Israel. Netanyahu himself has cited a Harvard CAPS / Harris Poll from March that found that 82 percent of American adults support Israel over Hamas in the current war. The following month, a Harvard CAPS / Harris Poll found that 52 percent of Americans gave Israel a “favorable” or “very favorable” rating, compared to just 16 percent for the Palestinian Authority—and 14 percent for Hamas (a figure that is perhaps surprisingly high, though the group ranked dead last in favorability on a list of 18 countries or groups). Even among college and university students, whose pro-Palestinian protests have been widely covered, opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are far more measured than has often been portrayed in the media. For example, a survey conducted in early May for Axios found that 83 percent—an overwhelming majority—of U.S. college and university students believe that Israel has a right to exist.

Counter-protesters in front of a Pro-Palestinian student encampment, Seattle, May 2024

David Ryder / Reuters

Yet Americans have become increasingly critical of Israeli policies toward the Palestinians. According to Gallup polling, the overall portion of Americans who side with Israel over the Palestinians has declined from 64 percent in 2018 to just 51 percent in early 2024. Pew surveys have also revealed a growing partisan gap on this question. In 2001, just 50 percent of Republicans sided with Israel; by 2018, the number had increased to 79 percent; conversely, among Democrats, those who chose Israel shrunk from 38 percent in 2001 to just 27 percent in 2018. This divergence seems only to have solidified in the years since.

At the same time, a large generational divide has also emerged in American views about Israel. A February 2024 survey by Pew found that 78 percent of older Americans (over 65) see Israel’s reasons for fighting the war as valid, whereas just 38 percent of 18- to 29-year-olds do—a 40-point gap. And although students in the Axios survey overwhelmingly agreed with Israel’s right to exist, nearly half of them—45 percent—supported the campus protests “which seek to boycott and protest against Israel,” whereas only 24 percent were opposed. (The remainder were neutral.) The Harvard CAPS / Harris Poll from April also found that respondents between 18 and 24 years old were almost evenly divided between those who believed that Israel was mostly responsible for “the crisis in Gaza”— 49 percent—and those who held Hamas mostly responsible—51 percent. By contrast, among people over 65, just 14 percent blamed Israel.

Regardless of how one interprets the behavior of young Americans during the current war, these trends should not be surprising: in most of the Western world, young people tend to skew liberal and progressive. And in Western countries, liberal or left-leaning politics tends to involve supporting oppressed people, a pattern that has helped fuel pro-Palestinian protests by young Americans. The political preferences of young people are sure to evolve over time, but the trends are sufficiently established to suggest the future direction of Democratic positions on Israel. Notably, the progressive tilt of young people in the West appears to be the opposite of where young Israelis are moving.

BIBI’S YOUNG GUNS

For at least 15 years, in-depth studies have shown firm right-wing trends among young Israeli Jews. There are two immediate explanations for this phenomenon. One is demographics: more young Israeli Jews are religious than was the case in earlier decades because religious families tend to have many children, and religious Jews are reliably more right-wing than less religious Jews in Israel. The second is the prevailing political environment in Israel during the past two decades: young Israelis today have grown up in the heavily nationalist right-wing era of Netanyahu. They carry no memories of the Oslo years or a peace process and have plenty of experience of war, having grown up amid numerous rounds of fighting with Hamas, frequent rocket attacks, and waves of conflict-related violence.

In fact, the rightward tilt of younger Israeli voters has closely coincided with Netanyahu’s own efforts to make the U.S.-Israeli relationship more partisan. Shortly after Netanyahu returned to power in 2009, a plurality of Israelis held positive views of President Barack Obama, more than those who held negative views. But Netanyahu and his proxies began systematically attacking Obama—tellingly, for taking positions that were close to a policy consensus at the time, such as the president’s 2011 support for a two-state solution using the 1967 borders, the 1949 armistice lines, with adjustments. Netanyahu’s accusations ricocheted back to the United States, where Mitt Romney, the Republican nominee for president in 2012, accused Obama of “throwing Israel under the bus.”

In 2015, Netanyahu took an even bigger gamble: breaking a long-standing taboo, he delivered a speech in Congress at the unilateral invitation of Republican lawmakers, in which he made a broadside attack on the Obama administration’s efforts to secure a deal with Iran to rein in its nuclear program. Why did Netanyahu play roulette with Israel’s most essential ally? He was facing a cutthroat reelection bid at the time, and he wagered that his global statesmanship, even if it meant directly challenging a U.S. president (perhaps especially so) would actually help his campaign.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu preparing to address Congress, Washington, D.C., March 2015

Joshua Roberts / Reuters

Netanyahu was mostly right. With Israeli society firmly trending right-ward by the mid-2010s, he won the Israeli election handily (though there can be numerous explanations), and the insult to Obama did not dissuade the president from signing what was at the time one of the biggest U.S. aid packages in history—$38 billion for Israel, over ten years.

When Trump was elected president, in 2016, Netanyahu portrayed him as Israel’s best friend. “Pro-Israel” soon came to mean embracing Trump’s policies: humiliating the Palestinians, proposing plans for Israel to annex parts of the West Bank, recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem. In retrospect, given the record of the Trump administration toward Israel, it is not surprising that Israelis viewed him favorably.

By contrast, even before he entered the Oval Office, Biden’s lifelong record as a devoted pro-Israel Democrat left many Israelis cold. In October 2020, ahead of the U.S. election that year, a survey conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) found that 63 percent of Israelis preferred to see Trump reelected; just 17 percent preferred Biden. Following Biden’s victory, an even larger percentage of Israelis—73 percent—said that Biden was likely to be somewhat or much worse than Trump for Israel, according to another IDI poll.

These figures make clear that it’s not just the current tensions over the war in Gaza that are contributing to Biden’s low levels of support in Israel, but also deeper changes within the Israeli electorate. Moreover, after the war, Israel’s right-wing majority in Israel could grow further, even as U.S. voters become more dissatisfied with Israeli behavior.

LOST EQUILIBRIUM

Public opinion fluctuates, and polls should never drive policy. In an interview, former Israeli Ambassador to the United States Michael Oren observed that Israeli opinion about the United States isn’t very consequential to U.S. policymakers. (Although it may have an indirect impact because it affects American Jewish opinion.) But in the past, generally positive Israeli attitudes toward the U.S. president have sometimes helped give the president the authority to advance policies in Israel that reflect U.S. interests. Eizenstat noted that Carter’s team read Israeli polls closely to discern whether Israelis supported the president’s efforts to reach an Israeli-Egyptian peace. Israelis generally did, Eizenstat recalls, and his team learned about the Israeli public’s specific security concerns that would need to be met as they worked out the details.

By contrast, in April 2024, after the United States gathered an international coalition that included even Arab states to provide extraordinary military support to Israel, using their combined air defenses to thwart a massive Iranian missile attack, Israelis seemed no more favorable toward the Biden administration than before. Following the attack, the IDI reminded Israelis of this highly effective coalition and asked if they would now “agree in principle to the future establishment of a Palestinian state, in return for a permanent regional defense agreement.” Israeli numbers didn’t budge: a majority of 55 percent rejected the idea, while just 34 percent agreed. The rate was even lower among Israeli Jews: only 26 percent agreed.

Young voters in both countries are drifting apart.

Yet Israelis are also tracking the growing partisan division of U.S. opinion toward Israel with alarm. They know well that Biden is watching polls showing how his positions on Israel and the war are viewed among critical constituencies in the American public during his difficult reelection campaign against Trump. Informally, many Israelis think that Biden has succumbed to pressure from the left, that American university students protesting the war in Gaza have been brainwashed, and that anti-Semitism has surged to dangerous levels.

It should be noted that continued divergence of American and Israeli public opinion is not the only possible near-term outcome of the current situation. If Trump succeeds in defeating Biden, and continues policies that favor the Israeli right, the current rift between the two countries, at least at the government level, may shift to a populist right-wing alignment. But it seems likely that in the years to come, the shifts that have taken place among younger voters in both countries will continue, presenting a significant challenge for the two allies as they seek to agree on a common policy agenda.

The basis of the U.S.-Israeli relationship was once grounded in shared interests, but with a much-prized sense of values. In terms of interests, the geopolitics of the Cold War are long gone. But the two countries still have overlapping regional concerns. The question of shared values, however, is more complicated: do both countries continue to share a commitment to democracy, especially liberal democracy? Israel has been moving away from that identity, and the United States will decide its own path in November.

Much is unknown about where both countries will go, especially given the continuing war and upheaval in Israel. But if the core values of the United States and Israel diverge further, the next generation of leaders in both places may no longer see each other as kindred spirits. In that case, shared strategic interests might ensure that the countries remain allies, but they might cease to have the “special relationship” they have counted on in the past.

• DAHLIA SCHEINDLIN is a pollster, a Policy Fellow at Century International, and a columnist at Haaretz. She is the author of The Crooked Timber of Democracy in Israel: Promise Unfulfilled.

Foreign Affairs · by The Crooked Timber of Democracy in Israel: Promise Unfulfilled · May 23, 2024

25. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 22, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed on May 21 that the Russian government reassess Russia’s maritime borders in the Baltic Sea so that these borders “correspond to the modern geographical situation.”
• Kremlin and Russian MoD officials denied on May 22 that Russia is planning to change the Russian maritime border, but invertedly implied that the Russian government is considering undertaking some “security” measures in the Baltic Sea.
• Western officials noted that Russia may be reassessing the basis for maritime borders in order to revise maritime zones in the Baltic Sea.
• The Kremlin appears to be developing a system to legalize the status of Russia's so-called “compatriots abroad,” likely as part of its efforts to set information conditions to justify further aggression and hybrid operations abroad as “protecting” Russia's compatriots.
• United Kingdom (UK) Defense Minister Grant Shapps stated on May 22 that US and UK intelligence have evidence that the People's Republic of China (PRC) “is now or will be” providing lethal military assistance to Russia, a statement that US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan questioned.
• Western officials warned that Russian intelligence services intend to increase sabotage activities and other hybrid operations against NATO member countries.
• US Space Command reported on May 21 that Russia recently launched an anti-satellite weapon, the most recent report that Russia intends to field disruptive anti-satellite capabilities.
• Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan indirectly accused Russia and directly accused Belarus of helping Azerbaijan to prepare for the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, against the backdrop of deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured territory near Vovchansk and Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Vovchansk, Avdiivka, Donetsk City, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian courts reportedly began forcibly hospitalizing Russians charged with political crimes such as spreading “fake” information about the Russian military, in psychiatric hospitals.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 22, 2024

May 22, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 22, 2024

Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

May 22, 2024, 8:40pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:00pm ET on May 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed on May 21 that the Russian government reassess Russia’s maritime borders in the Baltic Sea so that these borders “correspond to the modern geographical situation.”[1] The Russian MoD produced a since-deleted document, which appeared on the Russian government’s legal portal on May 21, proposing that the Russian government should reassess the 1985 maritime borders in the Gulf of Finland because these borders were based on outdated “small-scale nautical navigation maps” developed in the mid-20th century.[2] The document proposed to partially recognize the 1985 resolution as “defunct.” The document suggested that the Russian government should adjust the maritime border coordinates in the Gulf of Finland in the zone of Jähi, Sommers, Gogland, Rodsher, Malyy Tyuters, and Vigrund islands and near the northern delta of the Narva River. The document also proposed that the Russian government revise the area of the Curonian Spit, Cape Taran, a cape south of Cape Taran, and the Vistula Spit in the Baltic Sea. Sommers, Gogland, Rodsher, Malyy Tyuters, and Vigrund island are under Russian control, while Russia and Finland split control over the Jähi island. The northern delta of the Narva River is located between Russia and Estonia, while the Curonian Spit leads to the international border between Russia and Lithuania. The Vistula Spit (also known as the Baltic Spit in Russia) is split between Kaliningrad Oblast, Russia and Poland, and Cape Taran is just northwest of Kaliningrad City. The document stated that these proposed changes would establish a system of baselines for maritime borders on the southern part of the Russian islands in the eastern part of Gulf of Finland as well as in the areas of Baltiysk and Zelenogradsk, both in Kaliningrad Oblast. The document also noted that these changes will allow Russia to use corresponding water areas as Russian internal sea waters, and that the line of the Russian state border will shift due to the changes in the position of the external border of the territorial sea.

Kremlin and Russian MoD officials denied on May 22 that Russia is planning to change the Russian maritime border, but invertedly implied that the Russian government is considering undertaking some “security” measures in the Baltic Sea. Russian state news agencies Ria Novosti and TASS published statements from unnamed military-diplomatic sources, who claimed that “Russia did not have and does not have any intentions of revising the state border line, economic zone, and continental shelf in the Baltic [region].”[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that the Russian MoD’s proposal is not politically motivated, despite the fact that the “political situation has changed significantly” since 1985.[4] Peskov added that the escalation of tensions and the increased level of confrontation in the Baltic region “requires appropriate steps” from relevant Russian agencies to “ensure [Russian] security.” Russian officials did not explain why the MoD proposal was removed from the government’s legal portal.

Western officials noted that Russia may be reassessing the basis for maritime borders in order to revise maritime zones in the Baltic Sea.[5] Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen stated on May 22 that the Finnish Foreign Ministry (MFA) is reviewing the reports about Russia's reassessment and that Finland expects Russia to act according to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea.[6] Finnish Prime Minister stated that Russia's review of maritime borders will likely be routine and that Finland is not worried about the reassessment.[7] Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis announced that Lithuania summoned the Russian charge d'affaires in connection with the reassessment.[8] The Lithuanian MFA told Politico that Lithuania sees Russia’s actions as “deliberate, targeted, escalatory provocations to intimidate neighboring countries and their societies.”[9] The Lithuanian MFA added that the Russian MoD’s proposal is “further proof that Russia’s aggressive and revisionist policy is a threat to the security of neighboring countries and Europe as a whole.” Swedish Commander-in-Chief Mikael Byden expressed concern about Russian ambitions in the Baltic Sea and warned that Russian President Vladimir Putin aims to control the Baltic Sea and that Putin “has his eyes” on the island of Gotland.[10] Byden did not rule out the possibility that Russia is already using oil tankers to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage in the Baltic Sea and near Gotland.[11]

The Kremlin appears to be developing a system to legalize the status of Russia's so-called “compatriots abroad,” likely as part of its efforts to set information conditions to justify further aggression and hybrid operations abroad as “protecting” Russia's compatriots. Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo) General Director Yevgeny Primakov stated during an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on May 22 that Rossotrudnichestvo is developing an “Electronic Card of Compatriots” program that will allow Russia's compatriots abroad to access unspecified government services, visit and work in Russia, and even apply for Russian citizenship in the future.[12] Primakov stated that Russia is preparing to launch a pilot version of the program in several unspecified neighboring countries and may begin issuing the first cards by the end of 2024. Primakov stated that Russia's compatriots can provide their personal identifiable information through an online application in exchange for a card and access to these various services, which will presumably be available through an unspecified online platform. Primakov noted that while some of Russia's compatriots abroad do not have Russian citizenship and are “skeptical” of Russia's policies, they are still compatriots in “one way or another” and that this program will help compatriots and their children maintain ties with Russia. Primakov estimated that Russia has between 20 and 40 million compatriots abroad, although it is unclear what definition of “compatriot abroad” Primakov is using. Primakov also emphasized the importance of Russia's educational and cultural exchange programs with students from Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and other countries and noted that the Russian government has been increasing the number of foreign students allowed to study in Russia over the past several years. Primakov stated that Russia has set a goal of having 500,000 foreign students studying in Russia every year by 2030. Primakov noted that Rossotrudnichestvo is having issues operating in the US, United Kingdom (UK), Canada, and other Western countries due to “unfriendly” Western policies and absurdly claimed that Russian Houses (Russkyi Dom) in Europe “do not engage in political propaganda or anything else” and only conduct “cultural activities.” Moldovan and Ukrainian officials have previously warned that Russian officials use Russkyi Dom to promote Russian propaganda and conduct “subversive work” abroad.[13]

Rossotrudnichestvo has been working on the “Electronic Card of Compatriots” project since at least 2021 but has yet to publicly launch the program, and Primakov stated in June 2023 that Rossotrudnichestvo plans to open “certification centers” in Russkyi Dom centers throughout the world where compatriots can verify their identity as part of the application process.[14] The Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP), a Kremlin-controlled organization and a known tool within the Russian hybrid warfare toolkit, issued a series of recommendations during the World Russian People's Council on March 27 and 28, which included a call for Russia to prioritize the mass repatriation of “compatriots” to Russia, and the “Electronic Card of Compatriots” program could be a viable pathway for Russia to pursue this recommendation.[15] Russia's compatriots abroad — whom Russian President Vladimir Putin has previously defined as anyone with historical, cultural, or linguistic ties to Russia — are a key aspect of the Kremlin's Russkyi Mir (Russian World) narrative, which the Kremlin intends to use to justify future Russian aggression under the guise of “protecting” Russian compatriots.[16] The Russian government previously eased language and ancestry requirements for compatriots interested in moving to Russia and may be attempting to further broaden its vague definition of a compatriot to encompass as many people as possible.[17]

United Kingdom (UK) Defense Minister Grant Shapps stated on May 22 that US and UK intelligence have evidence that the People's Republic of China (PRC) “is now or will be” providing lethal military assistance to Russia, a statement that US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan questioned.[18] Shapps stated that this evidence is a “significant development” as the PRC has previously presented itself as a “moderating influence” but did not provide further information about the supposed intelligence. Sullivan stated during a press conference that he has previously warned that the PRC may supply Russia with lethal military assistance but that the US has “not seen that to date.”[19] Sullivan stated that he will speak with his British counterparts to ensure that the US and UK have a “common operating picture” and to clarify Shapps' comment.

Western officials warned that Russian intelligence services intend to increase sabotage activities and other hybrid operations against NATO member countries. Norway's Police Security Service (PST) and the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) warned on May 22 that there is an increased threat of Russian sabotage against Norwegian arms supplies and other Norwegian organizations involved in the delivery of military materiel to Ukraine.[20] PST Counterintelligence Head Inger Haugland stated that the PST has warned Norwegian arms suppliers to be on high alert and previously warned that Russian actors were planning acts of sabotage in western Norway, where Norwegian naval bases and oil and gas infrastructure are located.[21] Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned on May 20 that Polish authorities have recently arrested and charged nine suspects for engaging in acts of sabotage in Poland on behalf of Russian security services.[22] Haugland stated that Russian security services have used non-Russian nationals to conduct sabotage in Poland, Germany, and the United Kingdom in order to have deniability.[23] Tusk also warned on May 21 that Russian actors plan to illegally smuggle thousands of migrants from Africa to Europe and that more than 90 percent of those recently apprehended illegally entering Poland have had Russian visas in their passports.[24] Russian officials recently attempted to create an artificial migrant crisis on the Finnish border in late 2023 in an effort to destabilize NATO and the European Union (EU).[25] Russian security services are likely intensifying sabotage operations in European countries to disrupt the arrival of resumed US security assistance to Ukraine and will likely continue hybrid operations aimed at fomenting discord in Europe ahead of European Parliament elections scheduled for early June 2024.

US Space Command reported on May 21 that Russia recently launched an anti-satellite weapon, the most recent report that Russia intends to field disruptive anti-satellite capabilities.[26] US Space Command reported that Russia launched the COSMOS 2576 satellite on May 16 and that US intelligence assesses that it is a counterspace weapon presumably capable of attacking other satellites in low Earth orbit.[27] Pentagon Spokesperson Brigadier General Patrick Ryder added that Russia deployed the COSMOS 2576 satellite into the same orbit as a US government satellite.[28] Russia reportedly launched a separate satellite as part of its program to develop a nuclear anti-satellite weapon in early February 2022.[29] Russia reportedly has yet to field nuclear components of the nuclear anti-satellite weapon and that weapon is likely not yet operational, although the most recent anti-satellite weapon likely is.[30] Russian efforts to field anti-satellite capabilities aimed at disrupting US and partner satellites likely aim to support preparations for a future confrontation with NATO.[31]

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan indirectly accused Russia and directly accused Belarus of helping Azerbaijan to prepare for the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, against the backdrop of deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated that he and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev conversed before the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and concluded that Azerbaijan could be victorious during Lukashenko's May 16-17 state visit to Azerbaijan.[32] Lukashenko also visited Fizuli and Shusha, two settlements that Azerbaijani forces took control of in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. Pashinyan responded to Lukashenko's statement at a question-and-answer session between the Armenian National Assembly and the Armenian government by stating that Lukashenko said aloud “what he has been trying to metaphorically say to Armenia for four years.”[33] Pashinyan added that he knows of at least two Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member countries that “participated in preparations for the war [in 2020]” and claimed that Azerbaijan's objective in the war was to destroy the “independent state of Armenia.”[34] Pashinyan's implication that Russia helped Azerbaijan prepare for the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, and by extension, supported Azerbaijan's objective of destroying Armenia, is part of Pashinyan's continued criticisms of Russian-Armenian relations and efforts to distance Armenia from political and security relations with Russia.

Pashinyan met with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Interim President Mohammad Mokhber on May 22.[35] Pashinyan's meeting with Khamenei and Mokhber indicates that Iran may intend to pursue positive relations with Armenia amid Armenia's souring relations with Russia.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed on May 21 that the Russian government reassess Russia’s maritime borders in the Baltic Sea so that these borders “correspond to the modern geographical situation.”
• Kremlin and Russian MoD officials denied on May 22 that Russia is planning to change the Russian maritime border, but invertedly implied that the Russian government is considering undertaking some “security” measures in the Baltic Sea.
• Western officials noted that Russia may be reassessing the basis for maritime borders in order to revise maritime zones in the Baltic Sea.
• The Kremlin appears to be developing a system to legalize the status of Russia's so-called “compatriots abroad,” likely as part of its efforts to set information conditions to justify further aggression and hybrid operations abroad as “protecting” Russia's compatriots.
• United Kingdom (UK) Defense Minister Grant Shapps stated on May 22 that US and UK intelligence have evidence that the People's Republic of China (PRC) “is now or will be” providing lethal military assistance to Russia, a statement that US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan questioned.
• Western officials warned that Russian intelligence services intend to increase sabotage activities and other hybrid operations against NATO member countries.
• US Space Command reported on May 21 that Russia recently launched an anti-satellite weapon, the most recent report that Russia intends to field disruptive anti-satellite capabilities.
• Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan indirectly accused Russia and directly accused Belarus of helping Azerbaijan to prepare for the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, against the backdrop of deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured territory near Vovchansk and Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Vovchansk, Avdiivka, Donetsk City, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian courts reportedly began forcibly hospitalizing Russians charged with political crimes such as spreading “fake” information about the Russian military, in psychiatric hospitals.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi on May 22, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near Lyptsi and into Zelene (both north of Kharkiv City), although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[36] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military command is withdrawing elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps (AC), Leningrad Military District [LMD]) from offensive operations near Lyptsi for rest and reconstitution.[37] Mashovets noted that Russian forces have increased the size of the Northern Grouping of Forces to roughly 40,000 personnel and that a significant portion of the grouping remains in reserve in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts.

Russian forces recently marginally advanced within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) as fighting continued in and near the settlement on May 22. Geolocated footage published on May 22 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced within Vovchansk, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing further within the settlement.[38] Additional geolocated footage published on May 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces from several houses and marginally advanced within northeastern Vovchansk, highlighting the dynamic nature of the combat situation in the settlement.[39] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian unit operating in the Kharkiv direction stated that Ukrainian forces control most of Vovchansk and that Russian forces are conducting assaults in squad-sized infantry groups.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing in the direction of Tykhe (east of Vovchansk) and conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations further east of Vovchansk near Volokhivka, Chaikhivka, Okhrimivka, and Mala Vovcha.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced up to 280 meters along Sadova Street within Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk).[42] Russian forces also conducted assaults near Buhruvatka (southwest of Vovchansk).[43] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 11th Tank Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD), 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), and the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA, MMD) are operating near Vovchansk.[44] Elements of Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz are reportedly operating near Vovchansk.[45]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on May 22, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; northwest of Svatove near Berestove, Stelmakhivka, and Ivanivka; southwest of Svatove near Serhiivka, Druzhelyubivka, Hrekivka, Novoyehorivka, and Makiivka; west of Kreminna near Nevske and Torske; and south of Kreminna near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka.[46] A Ukrainian source claimed that Russian forces have been using tanks with heavy metal plating protection during assaults near Bilohorivka over the past week, likely to protect Russian armor against Ukrainian drone strikes.[47] Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) reportedly continue operating near Bilohorivka.[48]

Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor reported on May 22 that the May 20 Ukrainian strike against the Luhansk Academy of Internal Affairs in occupied Katerynivka (formerly known as Yuvileyne) likely caused “significant” losses among Russian officers.[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 22, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. Russian forces conducted assaults southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka.[50]

Ukrainian forces recently regained marginal territory within eastern Chasiv Yar amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on May 22. Geolocated footage published on May 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured several buildings in the eastern part of the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar).[51] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces seized Klishchiivka, although a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are still operating within the settlement.[52] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further in the Klishchiivka area and that Ukrainian forces are withdrawing from positions west of the settlement.[53] ISW has not observed confirmation of Russian forces seizing Klishchiivka or advancing further west of the settlement. The Telegram channel of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division claimed that elements of the division advanced 500 meters within the Kanal Microraion and are fighting on the eastern outskirts of the Novyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar).[54] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated that Russian forces plan to withdraw elements of the 98th VDV Division committed to offensive operations east of Chasiv Yar for replenishment.[55] Russian forces also continued offensive operations east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske and southwest of Chasiv Yar near Andriivka.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) seized Klishchiivka, that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 11th VDV Brigade are operating in Ivanivske, and that elements of the 98th VDV Division and 11th VDV Brigade control a section of the Stupky-Holubovski 2 nature reserve (southeast of Chasiv Yar) up to the eastern side of the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal.[57] The milblogger also claimed that elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are attacking near Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar).[58]

Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Avdiivka amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on May 22. Geolocated footage published on May 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced up to the eastern outskirts of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka).[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 400 meters in depth along a railway line in the direction of Sokil (northwest of Avdiivka) and along a front 1.23 kilometers wide and 700 meters deep south of Netaylove (west of Avdiivka).[60] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are consolidating positions west of Netaylove and that Ukrainian forces are withdrawing from positions in the area to Karlivka (west of Avdiivka).[61] ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims. Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka near Novooleksandrivka, Prohres, Solovyove, Sokil, Kalynove, Yevhenivka, Arkhanhelske, Novopokrovske, and Ocheretyne and west of Avdiivka near Umanske, Yasnobrodivka, Novoselivka Persha, Sieverne, and Netaylove.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces redeployed elements of several Ukrainian brigades from the Avdiivka area to the frontline in northern Kharkiv Oblast, although ISW has not observed evidence of this claim.[63] Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps) are reportedly operating near Netaylove and Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka).[64]

Russian forces recently made marginal gains southwest of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage published on May 21 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[65] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 22 that Russian forces advanced further into Paraskoviivka (southwest of Donetsk City), although ISW has not observed evidence of this claim.[66] Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka, Pobieda, Paraskoviivka, Kostyantynivka, and Volodymyrivka on May 22.[67]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. Geolocated footage published on May 21 and 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within southern Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka).[68] Russian forces continued offensive operations south of Velyka Novsilka near Urozhaine and Staromayorske on May 22.[69]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 22, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) advanced a kilometer toward Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[70] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced near Robotyne and that fighting is ongoing near Verbove.[71] Elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Robotyne, and elements of the Russian BARS-10 Battalion of the “Tsarskiye Volki” Brigade (affiliated with Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin) are reportedly operating near Vasylivka (west of Robotyne).[72]

Positional engagements continued in left (east) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on May 22.[73]

Russian and Ukrainian sources claimed on May 22 that Ukrainian forces launched multiple rocket launch (MLRS) strikes from a maritime drone against Russian positions near the occupied Kinburn Spit, Mykolaiv Oblast.[74]

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) Russian occupation authority claimed on May 22 that Ukrainian forces conducted a loitering munition strike against a transport workshop at the ZNPP, but that the strike did not cause damage.[75] The ZNPP occupation authority also claimed that Ukrainian forces have launched several drone strikes against residential and social facilities at the ZNPP in the past two days. Russian sources repeatedly claimed in April that Ukrainian forces had conducted drone strikes against the ZNPP.[76] Russia has routinely raised the specter of a radiological incident at the ZNPP to prompt negotiations with international organizations, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that aim to force these organizations to meet with Russian occupation officials and legitimize Russia’s occupation of the ZNPP and by extension Russia’s occupation of sovereign Ukrainian land.[77]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 21 to 22 and missile and glide bomb strikes against Kharkiv Oblast during the day on May 22. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces launched 24 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, Kursk Oblast, and occupied Crimea and that Ukrainian forces shot down all 24 Shaheds over Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, Sumy and Odesa oblasts on the night of May 21 to 22.[78] The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported that Russian forces struck Chuhuiv with two S-400 missiles on the morning of May 22, injuring eight civilians.[79] Ukrainian authorities also reported that Russian forces struck Kharkiv City with two D-30SN guided glide bombs with universal joint glide munitions (UMPB), injuring 12 civilians.[80]

The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office reported on May 22 that it is investigating a May 21 Russian missile strike against Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast, and noted that Russian forces have used Iskander ballistic missiles in previous strikes against the settlement.[81]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in Donetsk Oblast stated on May 18 that it has shot down four Russian Su-25 attack aircraft in the past two weeks.[82] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash stated on May 22 that the brigade used man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to shoot down the aircraft and noted that Russian aircraft have been operating closer to the frontline under the assumption that Ukrainian forces continue to lack munitions.[83] ISW has not observed independent confirmation of the downing of these Russian aircraft.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian courts reportedly began forcibly hospitalizing Russians charged with political crimes such as spreading “fake” information about the Russian military, in psychiatric hospitals. Russian opposition outlet Agenstvo Novosti reported the Russian courts sentenced Russians involved in political cases to psychiatric care five times more often since 2023 than in 2021 and 2022.[84] Russian courts reportedly elected compulsory treatment as a punishment in at least 33 political cases over the past year and a half, despite on average sending up to three people to psychiatric hospitals every year before 2020, seven people in 2021, and three in 2022. Press secretary of the Russian human rights organization OVD-Info Dmitry Anisimov explained to Agenstvo Novosti that the Russian government began to prosecute Russians who were charged with discrediting the Russian military and protesting the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine in 2023, which increased the number of compulsory treatment sentences. Russian human rights activists told Agenstvo Novosti that the real number of Russians sentenced to compulsory treatment may be higher since more than half of such sentences issued between 2018 and 2023 occurred after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian human rights activists also told Agenstvo Novosti that the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs previously sent political prisoners to specialized psychiatric hospitals in the late 1980s, although at a significantly larger scale than that reported in 2023 and 2024.[85]

Ukrainian investigative portal Evocation.info reported that an unnamed commander of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) personally prevented the removal of the BARS-8 irregular volunteer battalion from the Melitopol direction in late summer 2023, despite the battalion’s extensive crimes against locals. Evocation.info published a profile report on the commander of the BARS-8 battalion, Denis Sidorenko (also known under the alias Maestro), who previously commanded the Russian 63rd Spetsnaz Regiment in Chechnya in the 1990s before facing corruption charges. Evocation.info reported that Russian officials offered Sidorenko command of the BARS-8 battalion in 2023 and that this battalion committed numerous kidnappings, extortion, and murders of several farmers and entrepreneurs in occupied Polohy Raion, Zaporizhia Oblast. Evocation.info reported that other Russian irregular volunteer units demanded the removal of the BARS-8 battalion from the frontline, but the commander of 58th CAA intervened in the scandal, causing BARS-8 personnel to stop committing crimes against locals. Evocation.info reported that BARS-8 began suffering significant casualties over winter 2024 partly due to poor training and materiel support, and because Sidorenko left the battalion without a commander to take an extended vacation.

The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading on May 21 about issuing payments to Russian troops fighting in Ukraine without requiring veterans and servicemembers to file an application.[86] Member of the Russian State Duma Committee on State Construction and Legislation Dmitry Vyatkin stated that the Russian government had already introduced a temporary non-declaration procedure in 2023 and that the Russian Social Fund established a mechanism to receive information about servicemen automatically receiving combat veteran statuses, which allow them to receive state compensations. The Russian government, however, has employed many irregular forces in combat that are likely not accounted for as veterans.

The Russian government is increasingly involving mercenaries from African countries, Cuba, and Serbia in combat engagements in Ukraine. A Russian state media broadcast revealed that a mercenary from Guinea fought in Ukraine.[87] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that 46 Cubans have been fighting in Ukraine since summer 2023 but have not received compensation from the Russian government.[88] A Russian milblogger also amplified a video reportedly showing African and Serbian mercenaries fighting in Ukraine.[89]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on May 22 claiming to show Russian Su-30SM naval aviation fighters reportedly using long-range R-37M air-to-air missiles and a pair of R-77-1 short-range missiles over the Black Sea.[90] A Russian milblogger claimed that this is the first video showing Russian Su-30SM using R-77-1 missiles.[91]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian propagandists and milbloggers amplified a false narrative that Ukrainian officials are unresponsive to Russian offers to carry out prisoner of war (POW) exchanges, likely as part of efforts to erode Ukrainians’ confidence in the Ukrainian government.[92]  Russian propagandists and milbloggers amplified a document purportedly showing names of 500 Ukrainian POWs, whom Russian propagandist Margarita Simonyan claimed Ukrainian officials refused to exchange over the past four months.[93] Simonyan claimed that Ukrainian officials only wanted to return 38 servicemen from the Ukrainian Azov unit, and that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky does not care about returning the rest of the POWs. Ukrainian and Russian forces last conducted a one-to-one POW exchange on February 8.[94] Ukrainian officials, however, routinely report that the Russian government has been refusing to conduct POW exchanges since February 2024.[95] Ukrainian officials also warned that the Russian officials call relatives of Ukrainian POWs to convince them that the Ukrainian government does not want to return its POWs in an effort to undermine the social and political situation in Ukraine.[96]

The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) attempted to compare the assassination attempt on Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico to the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme.[97] The SVR claimed that the assassination attempt against Fico shows that “adherents of the globalist sect” in the West are “moving towards open political terror against opponents” and are calling for the elimination of other “nationally oriented leaders” such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. The SVR claimed that the crime against Fico is analogous to the murder of King and Palme, because they also tried to go against the “mainstream.”

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin met with Equatorial Guinean National Defense Minister Divisional General Victoriano Bibang Nsue Okomo in Belarus on MAY 22 and discussed bilateral military cooperation.[98]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

26. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, May 22, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-22-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei presided over the funeral for Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, and others in Tehran.
• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stressed the continuity of Iranian foreign policy in meetings with several foreign dignitaries who attended Raisi’s funeral.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Jabalia.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces are advancing along the Philadelphi Corridor in Rafah.
• West Bank: The IDF continued an operation targeting Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure in Jenin.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi discussed Israel’s military readiness on its northern border with several senior IDF commanders.
• Yemen: Houthi media claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted airstrikes targeting the Hudaydah International Airport in Yemen.

IRAN UPDATE, MAY 22, 2024

May 22, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, May 22, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Alexandra Braverman, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Kathryn Tyson, Johanna Moore, and Thomas Bergeron

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei presided over the funeral for Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, and others in Tehran on May 22.[1] Ebrahim Raisi, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, and six other passengers and crew members died in a helicopter crash in northwestern Iran on May 19.[2] Heads of state and senior leaders from dozens of countries attended the funeral.[3] Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, Chairman of the Russian Duma Vyacheslav Volodin, and Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing, among others, attended the funeral in Tehran.[4] Senior Axis of Resistance leaders—including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, Lebanese Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem, member of Hamas Political Bureau Osama Hamdan, and two Popular Mobilization Forces officials—also attended the funeral.[5] Many senior Iranian officials attended the ceremony. Chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council Sadegh Larijani, hardline cleric and Raisi’s father-in-law Ahmad Alam ol Hoda, Assembly of Experts First Deputy Chairman Hashem Hosseini Bushehri, and Assembly of Experts member Mohsen Qomi sat in the front row next to Khamenei during the ceremony.[6] Notable individuals who CTP-ISW did not observe attending the funeral include former Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and member of the Iranian Assembly of Experts Ahmad Khatami. IRGC-affiliated media published images of thousands of citizens in the streets of Tehran in mourning.[7]

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the prayers over the bodies of President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian at Tehran University.[8] Khamenei recited a Quranic mourning prayer over the bodies of the deceased.[9] Ismail Haniyeh gave a speech as part of the funeral ceremony. Haniyeh praised Raisi’s support for the Palestinian resistance and claimed that Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attack on Israel created a “global transformation.”[10] Iran will hold two additional funeral ceremonies in other cities on May 23.[11] Raisi will be buried in Mashad on May 23.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stressed the continuity of Iranian foreign policy in meetings with several foreign dignitaries who attended Raisi’s funeral. Khamenei held separate meetings with senior officials from Armenia, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Qatar as well as Hamas officials to emphasize Iran’s commitment to preserving ties with these actors.[12] Iranian media claimed that officials from over 90 countries attended Raisi’s funeral procession, making Khamenei’s meeting with these seven actors particularly noteworthy.[13] Interim President Mohammad Mokhber and Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani attended the meetings that Khamenei held with Iraqi, Hamas, and Pakistani officials, suggesting that Khamenei is particularly concerned about projecting continuity to these actors.[14] It is possible that Mokhber and Bagheri Kani attended other meetings as well. Khamenei emphasized Mokhber’s presidential powers and Iran‘s uninterrupted commitment to its partnerships in several of these meetings.[15] Iran may delay some diplomatic processes, such as negotiations, however, until it elects its next president.

The regime may seek to leverage perceived international sympathy for Raisi’s death to forge ties with new strategic partners. Iranian media and regime-affiliated social media users boasted that some Egyptian and Tunisian officials traveled to Iran for the first time to attend Raisi’s funeral and celebrated international turnout.[16]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei presided over the funeral for Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, and others in Tehran.
• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stressed the continuity of Iranian foreign policy in meetings with several foreign dignitaries who attended Raisi’s funeral.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Jabalia.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces are advancing along the Philadelphi Corridor in Rafah.
• West Bank: The IDF continued an operation targeting Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure in Jenin.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi discussed Israel’s military readiness on its northern border with several senior IDF commanders.
• Yemen: Houthi media claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted airstrikes targeting the Hudaydah International Airport in Yemen.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Jabalia on May 22. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 7th Brigade raided dozens of Hamas military sites and located weapons, including explosive belts and grenades.[17] Israeli forces directed an airstrike that killed eight Hamas fighters in a weapons storage facility.[18]

The IDF 679th Reservist Armored Brigade (attached to the 99th Division) engaged several Palestinian fighters on May 22 in the central Gaza Strip.[19] The brigade began an operation on May 20 to destroy militia infrastructure, such as tunnels, in Gaza City's Sabra neighborhood.[20]

Israeli forces are advancing along the Philadelphi Corridor in Rafah. The Philadelphi Corridor is a 14-kilometer-long strip of land between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. The IDF said that the IDF 401st Brigade, which initially captured the Rafah crossing on May 7, has been operating along the corridor in recent days. Israeli forces located and destroyed rocket launchers in the corridor.[21] Israeli forces began operating in certain neighborhoods west of the Salah al Din Road in eastern Rafah following intelligence guidance about Palestinian militia targets there.[22] The IDF Air Force struck several targets in the area to shape the terrain for follow-on ground operations. The IDF currently has five brigades operating in Rafah, and ten across the Gaza Strip.[23]

The Wall Street Journal reported on May 22 that the IDF controls at least half of the Gaza Strip’s nine-mile border with Egypt.[24] This figure is largely consistent with ISW-CTP's current control of terrain assessment of reported Israeli clearing operations. Analysts can employ several methods to calculate control of terrain with varying results depending on the cartographical projection used and other factors. An estimate using ISW-CTP’s reported Israeli clearing operations data and the Israeli Transverse Mercator projection indicates that Israeli forces have advanced to an extent of 5.6 kilometers ( ~3.5 miles) as of May 22. Israeli forces have advanced at a rate of 0.16 square kilometers (~0.1 miles) a day over a 14-day period along the Gaza-Egypt Border in Rafah. As of May 8, Israeli forces previously advanced to an extent of 3.43 kilometers in clearing operations in late 2023–early 2024. Egyptian officials said that the IDF controls 70 percent of the Philadelphi corridor and intends to “dominate” the corridor by the end of May 2024.[25]

The IDF Air Force struck several military targets across the Gaza Strip on May 22, including Hamas infrastructure and fighters. The IDF Gaza Division directed airstrikes targeting Hamas fighters, including Hamas’ elite Nukhba fighters, inside a military compound located in a UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) school in Nuseirat.[26] The IDF said it detected secondary explosions at the compound, indicating the presence of weapons. The IDF Gaza Division additionally directed an airstrike targeting a Hamas fighter, Ahmed Yasser al Qura, who took part in Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack and directed attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip.[27] The IDF attack also killed a Nukhba and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighter. The IDF Southern Command directed an airstrike targeting five Hamas fighters inside a school compound near Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods in Gaza City.[28]

This map displays engagements between Israeli and Palestinian ground forces across the Gaza Strip. To compile this map data, you must clean the data and ensure that the coordinates are standardized.

Politico reported on May 21 that US intelligence indicates that Israel has killed 30-35% of Hamas fighters who were part of the group before October 7, 2023.[29] Politico cited a report that quotes an unspecified person familiar with US intelligence. The report stated that Hamas has been able to withstand Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip by recruiting “thousands over the last several months.” Senior US officials have recently indicated concerns that Hamas will survive in the Gaza Strip. The reporting is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Hamas retains combat-effective units in several areas of the Gaza Strip, despite continued Israeli clearing efforts. Politico also reported citing US intelligence that 65% of Hamas’ tunnels are “intact.”

A US official told Bloomberg that the United States softened its position on a broader Israeli ground operation in Rafah.[30] The official cited Israeli efforts to reduce the number of civilians in the area as an explanation. US President Joe Biden has said in recent weeks that a full-scale Israeli military operation would prompt the United States to suspend the transfer of certain weapons to Israel. The official said that Israel presented a plan to US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan that incorporated US humanitarian concerns. The UN estimated on May 18 that about 800,000 people have left Rafah since Israel launched a military operation in the area on May 7.[31]

The United Nations reported on May 21 that it suspended food distribution in Rafah due to a lack of supplies and security issues.[32] UNRWA said that its distribution center and the World Food Programme are inaccessible as a result of the ongoing military operation in eastern Rafah.[33] The IDF issued evacuation orders for eastern Rafah ahead of Israeli forces advancing into the area on May 6.[34] There is a UNRWA warehouse located in the evacuated areas, where CTP-ISW have observed Israeli forces operating.[35]

Norway, Spain, and Ireland announced on May 22 that they will recognize a Palestinian state.[36] Norway said that the territorial demarcation between Palestine and Israel should be based on the pre-1967 borders, with Jerusalem as the capital of both states.[37] All three countries said that their formal recognition of Palestine will enter into force on May 28, 2024.[38]

Hamas and the Palestinian Authority welcomed the three countries’ announcements.[39] US President Joe Biden said that Palestinian statehood should come through negotiations rather than “unilateral recognition.”[40] Israel recalled its ambassadors from Norway and Ireland.[41]

An Egyptian intelligence official modified the latest Israeli-approved ceasefire proposal without informing others involved in negotiations, according to three people familiar with the information who spoke to CNN on May 22.[42] The sources said the ceasefire agreement that Hamas announced it approved on May 6 was not what the Qataris or the United States believed had been submitted to Hamas for a potential final review. “We were all duped,” one of those sources told CNN. The Egyptian intelligence official modified the proposal by inserting more of Hamas’ demands to secure Hamas’ approval. Egypt said that CNN’s report is baseless and lacks factual information.[43]

The sources named Ahmed Abdel Khaleq as the Egyptian intelligence official. Khalek is a senior deputy to the Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamel and has been CIA Director Bill Burns’ counterpart in leading Egypt’s mediation in the ceasefire talks.[44] Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamel appointed Khalek as the head of the Palestinian file in Egyptian General Intelligence in 2018 and has since met with Hamas, Fatah, and several other Palestinian militias.[45] Khaleq was the first in his position to participate in a Hamas-organized event in 2018.[46] Khaleq previously participated in a 2011 deal that resulted in the release of over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners, including the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar.[47]

It is unclear from the CNN report if Khalek consulted Hamas on the changes he reportedly made to the proposal before the group claimed it “agreed” to the proposal. CTP-ISW previously reported that Hamas altered and then approved the Egyptian-proposed ceasefire agreement on May 6.[48] The CNN report supports the observation that the proposal that Hamas approved was not the original agreement, but rather one that favored Hamas’ maximalist demands in negotiations.

Palestinian militias conducted two indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on May 22.[49] PIJ and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine conducted a combined rocket attack targeting Ashkelon and the IDF Zikim military site.

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The IDF continued an operation targeting Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure in Jenin on May 22.[50] The IDF launched the operation on May 21 and has since killed several Palestinian fighters.[51] Palestinian militias, including Hamas, PIJ, and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, engaged Israeli forces in small arms clashes and detonated IEDs in at least nine locations across Jenin City.[52] Palestinian media reported on May 22 that Palestinian militias have used over 34 explosive devices since the operation in Jenin began.[53]  An Israeli military correspondent reported recently that Palestinian militias have started using larger and higher quality explosives to target Israeli forces ”in recent months.”[54]

Israel Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on May 22 expanded the scope of a law allowing Israeli settlers to return to settlements that Israel previously dismantled in the West Bank.[55] Gallant said that Israeli settlers will be able to return the settlements of Sha Nur, Ganin, and Kadim in the Jenin Governorate of the northern West Bank.[56] The law, which was enacted in 2005, stipulated that Israel evacuate the settlements in the West Bank and unilaterally pull out of the Gaza Strip.[57] Gallant cited March 2023 Israeli legislation that repealed the 2005 act and said that an Israeli presence in the additional settlements would “bring security to the area.”[58] The IDF declared the area a closed military zone and will establish outposts and bases, according to an unspecified security official.[59] The official added that it will take months to secure the area before settlers return.

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on May 22.[60]

IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi discussed Israel’s military readiness on its northern border with several senior IDF commanders on May 22.[61] Halevi met with IDF Northern Commander Major General Ori Gordin among others during a training exercise. Halevi said that the IDF is prepared for ”challenges” in the north and south of Israel.[62]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Houthi media claimed on May 22 that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted airstrikes targeting the Hudaydah International Airport in Yemen.[63] Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom have confirmed the strikes at the time of writing.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com