Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:


"We will never have true civilization until we have learned to recognize the rights of others."
– Will Rogers


"The world we see that seems so insane is the result of a belief system that is not working. To perceive the world differently, we must be willing to change our belief system, let the past slip away, expand our sense of now, and dissolve the fear in our minds."
~ William James

“By replacing fear of the unknown with curiosity we open ourselves up to an infinite stream of possibility. We can let fear rule our lives or we can become childlike with curiosity, pushing our boundaries, leaping out of our comfort zones, and accepting what life puts before us.“tyring to influence the Korean people in the north.
– Alan Watts




1. KDVA and KUSAF Joint Message for “U.S.-ROK Alliance Memorial Week 2025”

2. U.S. Considers Withdrawing Thousands of Troops From South Korea

3. To Combat China, U.S. Wants Its Friends to Do More

4. US troop movements in Korea are not a challenge — they're an opportunity

5. How South Korea’s next president wants to deal with Trump and his tariffs

6. Pentagon dismisses USFK troop cut report as 'not true,' reaffirms US' firm commitment to South Korea

7. Korea's new leader's big challenge: Keeping US and China happy

8. Satellite photo shows N. Korea's new warship capsized at shipyard

9. North Korean envoy calls escapees ‘human scum’ at UN meet

10. Political leaders pay tribute to late President Roh

11. Who's Ahead: Kim Moon-soo catching up to Lee Jae-myung at 36% to 45%

12. North Korea fires cruise missiles after warship launch failure

13. China exploits N. Korean media preferences in ambitious cultural influence campaign





1. KDVA and KUSAF Joint Message for “U.S.-ROK Alliance Memorial Week 2025”


Let us never forget the brothers and sisters we have lost and those who gave the last for measure for our freedom.



KDVA and KUSAF Joint Message for “U.S.-ROK Alliance Memorial Week 2025”

https://kdva.vet/2025/05/23/kdva-and-kusaf-joint-message-for-u-s-rok-alliance-memorial-week-2025/

 May 23, 2025  Announcement

KDVA and KUSAF Joint Message for “U.S.-ROK Alliance Memorial Week 2025”

May 26 – June 6, 2025

“2025 한미동맹 추모주간”을 위한 한미동맹재단·주한미군전우회 공동 메시지

2025. 5. 26. – 6. 6.

This week, between U.S. Memorial Day and ROK Memorial Day, we pause to remember the Americans and Koreans who gave their lives in defense of freedom. Their courage shaped the world we live in today, and their sacrifice binds our nations in shared purpose and deep respect.

이번 주, 미국의 현충일과 한국의 현충일 사이에서 우리는 자유를 수호하기 위해 생명을 바친 미국과 한국의 영웅들을 경건히 추모합니다. 그들의 용기는 오늘 우리가 살아가는 세상을 이루는 데 큰 역할을 했으며, 그들의 희생은 우리 두 나라를 공동의 목표와 깊은 상호 존중 속에 굳게 결속시켰습니다.

When a Service Member falls, the loss is personal — felt by families, friends, fellow Veterans, and communities. But it is also a loss for every citizen who benefits from their bravery. The freedom and peace we enjoy were built on their devotion to duty and willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice.

한 명의 장병이 전사할 때, 그 희생의 아픔은 가족과 친구, 전우, 지역 사회에 깊은 개인적 슬픔으로 다가옵니다. 그러나 그들의 용기로부터 자유와 평화를 누리는 모든 국민에게도 이는 결코 남의 일이 아닌, 함께 나누어야 할 슬픔입니다. 오늘 우리가 누리는 자유와 평화는 바로 그들의 임무에 대한 헌신과, 생명을 바치는 희생을 마다하지 않았던 용기 위에 세워졌습니다.

The ROK-U.S. Alliance was bonded in war, tested for seven and half decades, and stands today as a pillar of regional stability and shared values. For 75 years, American and Korean troops have stood side by side — from the Korean War to decades of combined defense. More than 130,000 ROK and 36,000 U.S. Service Members have been lost in this shared cause.

한미동맹은 전쟁 속에서 맺어졌고, 75 년에 걸쳐 시련을 겪으며 단련되었으며, 오늘날에는 지역 안보와 같은 가치관을 지탱하는 기둥으로 우뚝 서 있습니다. 지난 75 년 동안 한국과 미국의 장병들은 한국전쟁에서부터 수십 년간의 연합 방위에 이르기까지 나란히 서서 함께 싸워왔습니다. 이 공동의 대의를 위해 13만 명이 넘는 한국군과 3만6천 명의 미군이 목숨을 바쳤습니다.

To honor them, the Korea-US Alliance Foundation (KUSAF) and the Korea Defense Veterans Association (KDVA) have designated May 26 to June 6, 2025, as “U.S.-ROK Alliance Memorial Week.” We ask Koreans and Americans to take time during this week to participate in remembrance: attend a ceremony, visit a cemetery or memorial, share a story, or learn about those who gave all.

이들을 기리기 위해, 한미동맹재단과 주한미군전우회는 2025 년 5 월 26 일부터 6 월 6 일까지를 ‘한미동맹 추모주간’으로 지정하였습니다. 이 기간 동안 한국과 미국의 국민 여러분께서 추모의 시간에 동참해 주시기를 부탁드립니다. 추모행사에 참석하거나, 묘지 또는 기념비를 방문하거나, 영웅들의 이야기를 나누고 그들의 희생에 대해 배우는 등 다양한 방식으로 기억의 시간을 함께해 주시기 바랍니다.

We also invite everyone to join in two moments of shared reflection:

– On May 26, U.S. Memorial Day, please pause at 3:00 p.m. EDT to remember American Service Members who died serving in Korea.

– On June 6, ROK Memorial Day, all of Korea will fall silent at 10:00 a.m. to honor those who died defending their homeland.

아울러 모든 분들께 두 차례의 공동 추모 묵념에 함께해 주시기를 요청드립니다. 5월 26일 미국 현충일에는 동부표준시 오후 3 시에 잠시 하던 일을 멈추고, 한국에서 목숨을 바친 미군 영웅들을 기리는 묵념의 시간을 가져주시기 바랍니다. 6 월 6 일 대한민국 현충일에는 한국시간 오전 10 시에는 온 국민이 일제히 침묵을 지키며, 조국을 위해 희생한 영웅들을 추모해 주시기 바랍니다.

These moments unite us across time zones and borders, renewing our commitment to remember and to serve. Let us honor the fallen not only with words, but through lives lived in freedom, gratitude, and friendship.

이 두 순간은 시차와 국경을 넘어 우리를 하나로 연결하며, 기억하고 실천하겠다는 우리의 다짐을 새롭게 합니다. 우리 모두, 고인들을 기리는 마음을 자유와 감사, 그리고 우정 속에서 살아가는 삶으로 이어가길 바랍니다.

“Together for the ROK-U.S. Alliance”

함께해요 한미동맹!

Curtis M. Scaparrotti General, U.S. Army (Retired) President, KDVA

커티스 스카파로티

예비역 육군 대장

주한미군전우회 회장

Leem, Ho Young, General, ROK Army (Retired) President, KUSAF

임호영

대한민국 육군대장 (예비역)

한미동맹재단 회장

KUSAF and KDVA Joint Message for Alliance Memorial Week 25.0513_Dual Language





2. U.S. Considers Withdrawing Thousands of Troops From South Korea


So much to parse from this initial report (and we should remind ourselves that the first report is often wrong).


Of course this could be simply a leak by some disgruntled staffer (US or ally) trying to derail this. Which would be a shame because we do not need such leaks if we want to maintain our strong alliances which are critical to US and allied national security. Anyone who believes in the necessity for strong US alliances would not resort to leaks that in reality undermine our alliances.


But the fundamental questions are two:


How do we organize, train, equip, station, and optimize US forces to accomplish number one, the deterrence mission throughout Indo-Pacom. and number two meet our treaty obligations to contribute to the mutual defense of our allies as they contribute to ours? 


If this Wall Street Journal report is true; hopefully this is what is taking place: the military is conducting a review of how to optimize US forces in the region (and I hope this is bedding done after the theater experts in Hawaii and Korea have conducted reviews and presented a united Indo-Pacom recommendation. This must not be done in a vacuum in the Pentagon.


We are at inflection point and for the first time the indo-Pacom Commander and the Commander of the United Nations, ROK/US Combined Forces Command, and the subunified command of US Forces Korea are in synch with taking holistic view of the entire range of security problems in the Asia-Pacific (or Pacific region as it is described in the mutual defense treaties) or the Indo-Pacific as we are calling it today.


In addition to the US taking a holistic view of the security challenges in Indo-Pacom, our allies are coming to the realization that they cannot look only at their own security challenge but that all these challenges and potential contingencies are interconnected and they must be viewed holistically. 


Which leads to two additional fundamental questions that build on the two above:


How do the US AND its allies organize, train, equip, station, and optimize Allied forces to accomplish number one, the deterrence mission throughout Indo-Pacom. and number two, to contribute to mutual defense? 


We must consider the strategy of the CRInK. First, they know that the strength of the US and like minded democracracies is the silk web of alliances, and multilateral and unilateral and bilateral partnerships. Therefore a major line of effort for the CRInk is to weaken, undermine, and destroy the US silk web of alliances. One way to do that is to cause the US to appear to prioritize one strategic challenge over another. For example, prioritization of deterrence and defense of Taiwan over Taiwan could undermine Trust in the US commitment to South Korea and vice versa.  


Unfortunately there is only one metric the press, policymakers, and public uses to assess our commitments and that is purely the number of troops. This is the root of the "trust" problem because the removal or addition of a single soldier is believed to be a message on the level of commitment. This perceptive undermines our alliances because technology, capabilities, and doctrine, and campaign plans drive our decisions to station our forces (How do we optimize the stations of troops in CONUS, in the Indo-Pacific, in the region (first or second island chain), or at a specific location (e.g., Korea, Japan, Philippines, Australia, and Guam) to contribute to deterrence of all threats, defense of allies, and the preservation of strategic agility to provide options the leaders as conditions evolve from existing or emerging threats.


What our allies need to know is that we are committed to all our obligations but that we must do so with the help, coordination, and in conjunction with our allies. We need to demonstrate strategic resolve and strategic reassurance. But this cannot be based solely on the number of troops in a specific location.  We have become so focused on troop levels or numbers that we have tied ourselves and allies up on knots. As the military recommends how to optimize the locations and activities of US and allied forces we will need US and allied leaders to explain changes that are of strategic and military necessity. In actuality every move we make is designed to provide the balance and strategic agility to address the threats that affect all of us in the Indo-Pacom region.


"America First, Allies Always – Allies Are America's Asymmetric Advantage."


My additional thoughts:


America Must Stop Treating Taiwan and Korea as Separate Security Issues

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/04/america-must-stop-treating-taiwan-and-korea-as-separate-security-issues/


Silk Web of Alliances: Trump’s Legacy and the Indo-Pacific’s Future

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/01/silk-web-of-alliances-trumps-legacy-and-the-indo-pacifics-future/





U.S. Considers Withdrawing Thousands of Troops From South Korea

Trump administration contemplates moving roughly 4,500 U.S. forces to Guam or other locations in region

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/u-s-considers-withdrawing-thousands-of-troops-from-south-korea-725a6514?st=nJXrUg&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

By Nancy A. Youssef

FollowAlexander Ward

Follow and Timothy W. Martin

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May 22, 2025 3:40 pm ET


U.S. Army soldiers participated in an exercise with South Korean troops in Yeoncheon recently. Photo: Kim Jae-Hwan/Zuma Press

WASHINGTON—The Trump administration is weighing a withdrawal of thousands of American troops from South Korea, according to defense officials familiar with the discussions, a move that could stir new anxiety among allies worried about the White House commitment to Asia.

An option being developed by the Pentagon is to pull out roughly 4,500 troops and move them to other locations in the Indo-Pacific region, including to Guam, the officials and a person familiar with the matter said. The idea is being prepared for consideration by President Trump as part of an informal policy review on dealing with North Korea, two of the officials said. 

The proposal has yet to reach Trump’s desk and is one of several ideas under discussion by senior officials conducting the review, the two officials said.

Asked about the discussion of a troop drawdown, a Pentagon spokesman said there were no policy announcements to make. National Security Council spokesman Pete Nguyen didn’t address the troop-withdrawal issue but said Trump was committed to the “complete denuclearization” of North Korea. South Korea’s defense ministry declined to comment. 

Since his first term, Trump has considered changing the U.S. footprint in South Korea, where there are about 28,500 troops.

Last month top commanders overseeing U.S. forces in Asia warned against reducing their numbers, saying a drawdown would jeopardize their ability to prevail against North Korea, and in other possible conflicts against China and Russia that could arise in Northeast Asia.

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To counter China, the U.S. is racing to upgrade remote airstrips in the Pacific Ocean. WSJ’s Niharika Mandhana traveled to Tinian Island, where the U.S. is reviving a vast World War II era airfield. Photo: DVIDS

Army Gen. Xavier Brunson, the commander for U.S. forces in Korea, advised against a drawdown in congressional testimony, saying “to reduce the force becomes problematic.”

That assessment was echoed at the same April 10 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing by Adm. Samuel Paparo, the top commander in the region, who said of taking forces from South Korea: “Inherently, it would reduce our ability to prevail in conflict.”

U.S. officials say a decision on troop levels won’t come until there is more clarity about the direction of the war in Ukraine and whether the administration will keep supporting Kyiv militarily.

Serious consideration to a South Korea troop withdrawal would likely cause alarm across the Indo-Pacific. South Korea, along with Japan and the Philippines rely on close coordination with American armed forces to defend themselves and project power in an increasingly contentious region.

The U.S. military presence there has long been seen as a deterrent against a renewed war on the Korean Peninsula, as well as against an aggressive China, which asserts claims over a swath of the South China Sea and has threatened to take control of Taiwan.

Removing forces from the Korean Peninsula but keeping them in the region might lessen Pentagon concerns about a drawdown. Guam is emerging as a crucial Pentagon hub for forces because it is close enough to potential hot spots but harder for Chinese forces to reach.

On his first official trip to Asia earlier this year, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said he wants the U.S. and allies to re-establish deterrence and promised an “unprecedented” shift to the region.

Yet maintaining a large-enough U.S. force posture in South Korea remains a central concern for the Pentagon and for Seoul.


A news report in Seoul on Thursday after North Korea launched cruise missiles into the East Sea. Photo: JEON heon-kyun/epa-efe/shutterstock

Elbridge Colby, the undersecretary of defense for policy, has long advocated pushing South Korea to assume more of the burden of defending itself with conventional forces to enable the U.S. to better confront China, even as the U.S. maintains its commitment to defend Seoul from Pyongyang, if necessary with nuclear weapons.

“I’m not in favor of withdrawing forces from South Korea, as I have repeatedly laid out,” Colby said in a post on X last year before he was nominated for his Pentagon post. “I’m in favor of reshaping U.S. forces in the ROK to focus on China while the ROK takes the great burden of conventional defense against the DPRK.”

ROK refers to the Republic of Korea, the formal name for South Korea, while DPRK stands for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as North Korea is called.

South Korea’s military said in a statement it had not held any discussions with the U.S. about a potential troop reduction. The two countries would maintain their combined defense posture to deter a North Korean invasion or provocation, it added.

In response to a military buildup by China, the Pentagon has moved more military equipment to the region in recent years, increased multilateral exercises with allies and deployed new mobile units designed to jump from island to island.

Pyongyang last year abandoned its decadeslong policy of peaceful reunification, declaring Seoul its primary enemy. North Korea regularly conducts weapons launches. On Thursday, it fired cruise missiles.

Write to Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com, Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com and Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the May 23, 2025, print edition as 'U.S. Weighs Korea Troop Cuts'.



3. To Combat China, U.S. Wants Its Friends to Do More


I think Washington will be pushing on a mostly open door for alliance support and coordination.


From a paper I am working on:


The CRInK Strategy and the "Silk Web" of Alliances

The CRInK powers recognize the United States’ asymmetric advantage: our global network of alliances and partnerships. Their collective strategy seeks to weaken that “silk web” by exploiting fissures in allied trust, spreading disinformation, and provoking fear that the U.S. will prioritize one ally or region over another. If we appear to prioritize Taiwan over Korea, or vice versa, adversaries win.
To counter this, we must reinforce two messages:
Strategic Resolve: The U.S. will fulfill all its treaty obligations across the Indo-Pacific. Period.
Strategic Reassurance: Deterrence is a shared mission, and it requires shared sacrifice, coordination, and integration of U.S. and allied forces.
It is not the sole responsibility of the U.S. to bear the burden of deterrence. Allied militaries must also optimize their own force structures, modernize capabilities, and deepen interoperability with U.S. forces. The question is not only how the U.S. stations troops, but how all allies contribute to the collective defense architecture. Every country for first and foremost owns its own defense burden. There must be "burden owning" to have burden sharing.

Organize, Train, Equip, Station, Optimize

We must answer these four strategic questions:
How do we organize U.S. and allied forces across the Indo-Pacific to provide an integrated deterrence architecture?
How do we train together, multilaterally and bilaterally, to ensure readiness for high-end conflict across domains and geographies?
How do we equip our forces with interoperable systems, resilient C4ISR, and the platforms needed to fight and win in a contested environment?
How do we station forces smartly, balancing forward presence, mobility, survivability, and strategic flexibility and agility?
Answers to these questions cannot come solely from Washington. They must emerge from sustained dialogue between theater commands, allied militaries, and civilian leaders. The objective is not just deterrence by denial, but deterrence by integration: integrating U.S. and allied forces into a credible, combined defense posture that signals unwavering resolve.


To Combat China, U.S. Wants Its Friends to Do More

Washington’s allies grow more amenable to collectively fighting Chinese aggression, though the new demands bring fresh challenges

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/us-china-aggression-allies-6eb726a5?st=xt3ePR&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink


U.S. and Philippine troops held a military exercise in the Philippines earlier this month. Photo: Ezra Acayan/Getty Images

By Timothy W. Martin

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May 20, 2025 8:51 am ET

HONOLULU—Top military officials from the U.S. and its main Asia-Pacific allies warned that the threat of Chinese aggression is rising, pressuring Washington to find ways to work with partners in a region where American resources are greatly stretched.

The path forward, articulated at a recent event in Hawaii attended by the U.S. and more than two dozen allies, was to sharpen their ability to jointly fight against Beijing by sharing intelligence, staging military exercises and ensuring their command systems can work together—in some areas for the first time.

The U.S. has struggled for years to beef up its military strategy in the Indo-Pacific, a region with a patchwork of alliances and partnerships with Washington. That’s a contrast with the unified structure in Europe with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

To illustrate the scale of Beijing’s ambitions and capabilities, Adm. Samuel J. Paparo, head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, recalled how China in a single day last year deployed 152 warships, three-quarters of its amphibious forces and dozens of brigades to conduct aggressive maneuvers around Taiwan. Last month, China carried out large-scale drills there again.

“Rehearsals, not exercises,” said Paparo, a four-star admiral who oversees U.S. forces in the region, in a keynote speech. “China is on a dangerous course.”


Samuel J. Paparo, a four-star admiral who oversees U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific region. Photo: Ted Aljibe/AFP/Getty Images

The military risk posed by China represents a key foreign-policy challenge for President Trump, who must get allies more aligned to combat Beijing while also negotiating trade deals over his “reciprocal” tariffs that have already caused friction with Asia-Pacific partners.

The Trump administration has identified China as the top national-security priority. On his first official visit to the region, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth touted an “unprecedented” shift by the U.S. to the region.

Gen. Yasunori Morishita, who heads Japan’s army, said he has never seen a tenser security moment since he joined the country’s self-defense forces nearly four decades ago. He said the great risk posed by China meant Japan needed to be able to respond to any scenario.  

Japan recently established a new joint operations command for its armed services, allowing for cross-branch coordination that previously would only have kicked in during a conflict or emergency. Tokyo also plans to deploy new homegrown counterstrike missiles by next March, Morishita said. Strengthening the alliance with the U.S. and other like-minded countries are two of Tokyo’s top priorities now. 

“Building this network is so important,” Morishita said.

The U.S. has recently added a second mobile “littoral regiment” team meant to hold key islands and deter China at the American military base in Okinawa, which sits just several hundred miles from Taiwan. That adds to the roughly 60,000 U.S. military personnel already stationed across Japan. During his Asia visit, Hegseth said the U.S. would also accelerate the establishment of a new joint U.S.-Japan military command in Tokyo, which he referred to as a “war-fighting headquarters.” 

China has unleashed an extraordinary military buildup in recent years, possessing a naval fleet now larger than the U.S., boosting incursions into neighboring airspace and ratcheting up maritime disputes across the region. 

Taiwan, whose own defense strategy hinges on buying itself enough time for U.S. support to arrive, has contemplated a potential Chinese invasion as soon as 2027, with the Pentagon expressing a similar possible timeline.

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Beijing’s new ships can land on beaches and link to form massive mobile piers. Analysts say they’re intended to rapidly offload military equipment, setting the stage for a D-Day-style invasion of Taiwan. Photo Illustration: WSJ

China has pledged to seize control of Taiwan, potentially by force. To the U.S. and allies, a key goal for the initial phase of a potential showdown with China over Taiwan would be to neutralize China’s radar sites, missile launchers and command centers that hold off the U.S. and its allies, said Paparo, the Indo-Pacific commander.

China possesses several types of antiship missiles, a sizable lead in advanced hypersonic weaponry and an edge in its proximity to Taiwan. Paparo touted the addition of U.S. precision-strike missiles that can sink ships as a “gamechanger that fundamentally alters China’s risk calculus.” New long-range hypersonic missiles add to the threat. So too do a pair of agile forces working closely with U.S. allies near Taiwan that can hit Chinese targets from land, collect valuable battlespace information and create openings for U.S. air and naval forces to maneuver. 

The U.S. has roughly 380,000 military personnel across the Indo-Pacific region. But just a fraction of them are closest to the potential conflict areas around Taiwan and the South China Sea—a proximity struggle that military officials often refer to as the “tyranny of distance.”

Many of the advances hinge on U.S. allies being willing to host American firepower on their own territory, expanding their own capabilities and knowing how to fight alongside one another. But big challenges remain to enable a cohesive response. For instance, certain allies and the U.S. are unable to share communications on a secured platform; they also have different military doctrines that dictate when and how a fight should be carried out. 

Col. Charles W. Kean, who commands the U.S.’s 1st Multi-Domain Task Force, which works closely with the Philippines and other regional allies, said doors are opening with allies that previously were closed, owing to China’s rising aggression. 

The U.S., which has kept an American missile system in the Philippines that has enraged China, has recently sent more military equipment to its treaty ally, including a lethal-strike missile. “So how do we complement each other with what uniqueness we’re able to bring to a situation or to solve a problem,” Kean said.

America’s military also faces a shortage of available amphibious vehicles for transport, which would be key for any fight over Taiwan. That may require trade-offs, such as slower deployments of troops and supplies, said Lt. Gen. James F. Glynn, who commands Marine forces throughout the Pacific. 

“It doesn’t mean we can’t respond,” Glynn said. “It just means you have one less option.” 


In the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. has expanded bilateral—and increasingly multilateral—military drills. It now conducts roughly 120 named exercises annually, involving more than 20 allies.

Earlier this year, some 30 nations participated in the Cobra Gold drills in Thailand as participants or observers, with more than 8,000 military personnel involved. The exercises went beyond just the paratrooper tasks of the past, simulating electronic warfare and an amphibious landing. 

“It’s really come a long way,” said Lt. Gen. Matthew W. McFarlane, who commands America’s First Corps, which has more than 40,000 soldiers across the Indo-Pacific region. “But we’ve got work to do.”

Write to Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com

Corrections & Amplifications

The U.S. conducts roughly 120 joint military exercises with allies in the Indo-Pacific annually. An earlier version of this article incorrectly said it was more than 40. (Corrected on May 22)




4. US troop movements in Korea are not a challenge — they're an opportunity


Important insights and recommendations form LTG Chun.


  1. Opinion

US troop movements in Korea are not a challenge — they're an opportunity

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/20250523/us-troop-movements-in-korea-are-not-a-challenge-theyre-an-opportunity

textScalePopoverWrapper open

By Chun In-bum

Published May 23, 2025 8:57 am KST

Updated May 23, 2025 5:50 pm KST

Seoul should embrace, not resist, a more flexible American military presence

Chun In-bum



On Thursday, The Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. Department of Defense is reviewing the possible redeployment of approximately 4,500 American troops currently stationed in South Korea. Predictably, the headline sparked immediate concern in Seoul. Some interpreted it as a sign of U.S. disengagement or a political maneuver to pressure South Korea on defense cost-sharing — echoes of past controversies during the Trump administration.


But this time, the context is different and the logic is strategic — not transactional. Instead of reacting with alarm, South Korea should see this development as a signal to evolve its approach to alliance management. A flexible, regionally integrated U.S. force posture centered on the Korean Peninsula is not a liability — it’s a critical asset. If anything, this is an opportunity to modernize the alliance and deepen Seoul’s role in preserving regional stability.


Not a bargaining chip


To be clear, troop redeployment is not a thinly veiled threat to extract more money from Seoul. If Washington wanted to increase South Korea’s contribution to defense costs, it would not reduce its footprint; it would add forces or reevaluate the cost structure. Shrinking the presence undermines any leverage in that kind of negotiation. The assumption that this is another round of “pay more or else” diplomacy is a projection of past anxieties, not a reflection of present U.S. policy.


The reality is that the United States is undergoing a significant global force posture review. From Europe to the Indo-Pacific, the Pentagon is restructuring its forward presence in response to new threats, budget pressures and the changing nature of warfare. South Korea is only one piece of this larger puzzle.


America needs strategic flexibility


U.S. military resources are finite. With a shrinking Army and increasing global demands — from Europe’s eastern flank to the Taiwan Strait — the Pentagon must optimize where and how it positions troops. Permanent, immobile deployments are becoming less practical. Instead, Washington is investing in mobility, rotational deployments and interoperability.


This is especially true for the Army, which is planning to downsize significantly in the coming years. The logic is simple: fewer troops must be usable in more places. If South Korea insists that U.S. troops remain fixed in place solely on Korean soil, it creates a strategic constraint for Washington — and risks diminishing Korea’s value as a flexible ally.


Reimagining the role of USFK


The role of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) must be redefined. For decades, USFK has been seen as a tripwire — an immovable deterrent stationed along the Demilitarized Zone. But in today’s Indo-Pacific, a static force is a vulnerable one. Instead, Korea must position itself as the anchor of a regionally mobile U.S. force capable of deterring adversaries, responding to crises and projecting stability far beyond the 38th parallel.


By adopting a broader view of USFK — as a regional force rather than a purely national one — South Korea enhances its strategic utility. If Seoul were to welcome regional training, rotational operations or forward deployments from Korean bases to Guam or the South China Sea, it would significantly increase the alliance’s flexibility and strength. Far from weakening deterrence, mobility enhances it. Troops that can come and go quickly, operate in multiple theaters, and deploy rapidly are harder for adversaries to track, plan against or neutralize. North Korea and China both understand this — and that’s why they fear it.


Strategic deterrence through agility


North Korea has long demanded the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces. Why? Because even a limited American presence significantly complicates Pyongyang’s calculations. But an agile, mobile force is even more dangerous from their perspective. It is unpredictable. It’s not tethered to any one location. And in a crisis, it can surge back onto the peninsula with overwhelming force. China, too, would find such a posture disconcerting. A U.S. presence in Korea that can project power regionally — including into the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea — undercuts Beijing’s ambitions for regional hegemony. It puts Korea squarely in the middle of the strategic chessboard. That is not a vulnerability; it is leverage.


From defense consumer to strategic contributor


This moment demands a shift in Seoul’s mindset — from that of a defense consumer to that of a strategic contributor. The U.S.-ROK alliance cannot be limited to defending South Korea from northern aggression. It must evolve into a proactive partnership that contributes to peace and stability across the Indo-Pacific.


If Seoul demonstrates a willingness to adapt — by accepting regional mobility, supporting joint operations and investing in shared strategic infrastructure — it not only strengthens the alliance, but also makes itself indispensable to Washington’s long-term planning. In return, the U.S. is more likely to sustain or even expand its investment in Korean facilities, logistics capabilities and high-end training assets. In short, the more useful Korea becomes, the harder it is to marginalize or bypass.


A message to all audiences


To the South Korean public: Not every troop movement is a crisis. It can be a sign of strategic maturity. We must resist knee-jerk fear and instead ask, “What kind of ally do we want to be?” Do we want to anchor a static force that slowly loses relevance, or host a dynamic force that shapes the future?


To our allies and adversaries alike: Korea is not just a protectorate — it is a strategic partner. We welcome a U.S. presence that is adaptive, agile and globally relevant. We support a force posture that extends beyond our borders and contributes to the common defense of the region.


Don’t fear change — lead it


The redeployment of U.S. troops should not be viewed as the beginning of a withdrawal. It is a realignment, one that reflects how much the world — and this alliance — has changed. South Korea now has a chance to influence that change by embracing a more modern, more flexible alliance model. Rather than resist these changes, we should shape them. Rather than fear troop movement, we should lead the conversation about how best to use the American presence for regional peace. That is how we preserve deterrence, defend our interests and honor the alliance that has secured our freedom for more than seventy years.


Let us respond not with fear, but with vision.


Chun In-bum is the former commander of the Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command.



5. How South Korea’s next president wants to deal with Trump and his tariffs


Has anyone ever explained to the President what South Korea does in terms of its defense and spending? There is no ally that owns its defense burden more than South Korea and contributes as much to the US defense burden in the region as well. 



How South Korea’s next president wants to deal with Trump and his tariffs

Los Angeles Times · by Max Kim · May 22, 2025

SEOUL — The winner of South Korea’s upcoming presidential election will be faced with the task of uniting a country riven by political acrimony since the impeachment of former President Yoon Suk Yeol, who sparked national outrage after declaring martial law in December.

But first, they will have to contend with President Trump’s tariffs.

On Wednesday, U.S. and South Korean trade officials kicked off a new round of negotiations aimed at reaching a deal by July 8, when Trump’s 90-day reprieve for his “liberation day” tariffs expires. South Korea faces a 25% reciprocal tariff rate as well as product-specific duties of 25% for steel, aluminum and automobiles — all of which are major exports.

With the election scheduled for June 3, carrying these talks to the finish line will be the first and most pressing agenda item for South Korea’s next president.

For now, officials from the two countries have agreed to expand the talks beyond tariffs rates to include broader topics such as currency exchange rates and economic security — a reflection of Trump’s desire for a sweeping realignment of the U.S.–South Korea relationship that he has described as “one-stop shopping.”

But there are likely to be further complications.

Trump, who has long griped that South Korea does not pay enough for the upkeep of the 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in the country, has expressed a desire to fold defense cost-sharing into the current talks. Writing on his social media site last month, he said that he had discussed “payment for the big time Military Protection we provide to South Korea” with then-acting President Han Duck-soo.

But with Trump having once claimed he would get Seoul to pay $10 billion a year, the topic has been highly sensitive in South Korea, fueling calls for the country’s nuclear self-armament on grounds that the U.S. can no longer be relied upon for military support. There are also concerns in the country that a “package deal” favored by Trump may not work out to Seoul’s advantage.

Here’s what to know about what South Korea’s three leading presidential candidates have said about tariffs and the U.S.-South Korea relationship under Trump.

Lee Jae-myung, a candidate of the ruling Democratic Party, holds a news conference in January.

(Chung Sung-Jun / Associated Press)

Lee Jae-myung

The former leader of South Korea’s liberal Democratic Party, Lee, 61, is the front-runner in the race, having led by as many as 20 percentage points.

During Trump’s first term, Lee, then the mayor of Seongnam, cautioned against what he called “overly submissive attitudes” in the face of demands that South Korea should pay more for the presence of the U.S. military.

“Giving up whatever is demanded of us will only lead to us losing everything,” he said. “We need to boldly assert our position.”

Lee echoed those sentiments in a presidential debate Sunday, criticizing Han, the former acting president, for reportedly signaling his willingness to renegotiate the latest defense cost-sharing deal between Seoul and Washington.

Under what is known as the Special Measures Agreement, the U.S. has covered 40% to 50% of the total costs of keeping troops in South Korea, according to the U.S. Congressional Research Service.

Under the latest version, which was signed under the outgoing Biden administration and will last from 2026 to 2030, Seoul’s annual contribution in the first year will be $1.19 billion, an 8.3% increase from 2025.

A U.S. soldier walks at the Panmunjom border village in Paju, South Korea. President Trump has long complained that South Korea does not pay enough for the upkeep of the 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in the country.

(Ahn Young-joon / Associated Press)

Lee, who is running on a platform of pragmatic diplomacy, has also stressed the need to balance South Korea’s relationship with the U.S. against those with regional neighbors such as Russia or China.

“The U.S.-South Korea alliance is important, and we need to expand and develop that in the future — from a security alliance into an economic alliance and a comprehensive alliance,” he said Sunday. “But that does not mean we can rely exclusively on the U.S.-South Korea alliance.”

While describing Trump’s tariffs as the “campaign of a madman,” Lee has also indicated a willingness to discuss a package deal that spans Trump’s Alaska natural gas pipeline project, the defense cost issue and cooperation in shipbuilding.

Lee’s camp has said that if elected, he will begin his term by seeking an extension of Trump’s 90-day grace period for the tariffs.

“If we win the election we will need time to closely examine the issues at the center of the trade relationship with the U.S. as well as any progress made on the tariff negotiations and come up with alternatives,” an official from Lee’s camp told the South Korean newspaper Donga Ilbo last week.

South Korea’s People Power Party’s presidential candidate Kim Moon-soo campaigns Tuesday in Seoul.

(Ahn Young-joon / Associated Press)

Kim Moon-soo

A distant second in the polls, Kim, 73, served as labor minister under the impeached Yoon and is the conservative People Power Party’s nominee.

Staying true to the South Korean right’s self-identification as the staunchly pro-U.S. political camp, Kim has accused Lee of seeking to curry favor with China at the expense of the U.S.-South Korea relationship.

“Your comments in the past would be considered appalling from the perspective of the U.S.,” he told Lee at the debate Sunday.

Participants march to the headquarters of the People Power Party in Seoul during a December 2024 rally to demand South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment.

(Ahn Young-joon / Associated Press)

Unlike Lee, who has warned against rushing into a trade deal in favor of a slower and more strategic approach, Kim has said that he would immediately set up a U.S.-South Korea summit to ink a deal before July 8, if he is elected president.

“I will make sure that tariffs against South Korea are either removed or the lowest out of any country in the world,” he said at a recent rally.

To this end, Kim has cast himself as the candidate with the greatest chance of winning over Trump.

During his party’s primary debates in April, when asked by the moderator whether he would wear a MAGA hat if Trump requested it during any tariff negotiations, Kim responded: “I would do even more, I would even wear a jumper if he asked.”

“The most important thing in negotiating with President Trump is trust,” he said Sunday. “Only when both sides can trust each other can the U.S.-South Korea alliance be strengthened, and I am the one who has the most favorable and trusting relationship with President Trump.”

A currency trader works at the foreign exchange dealing room of KEB Hana Bank headquarters in Seoul last month.

(Ahn Young-joon / Associated Press)

On defense cost-sharing, Kim has struck a noticeably more acquiescent tone than Lee: At a meeting Monday of the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea, he said that he would be willing to accept a hike in Seoul’s contribution.

“The global order and trade environment is rapidly changing. In order to overcome these crises, it is critical that we strengthen positive cooperation and the U.S.-South Korea alliance,” he said. “I will establish common ground between the two countries through comprehensive negotiations and find a win-win solution for both.”

Lee Jun-seok, the presidential candidate of the New Reform Party, center, runs to attend a campaign event Saturday in Seoul.

(Ahn Young-joon / Associated Press)

Lee Jun-seok

Polling around 10%, the 40-year old candidate from the conservative Reform Party faces long odds for the presidency.

Still, he has emphatically rejected repeated calls to form a unity ticket, presenting himself as the younger, shrewder and less doctrine-driven alternative to what he has criticized as the old-hat conservatism of those such as Kim.

At the debate Sunday, Lee Jun-seok called for “careful calculation” in navigating the U.S.-South Korea relationship under Trump, while emphasizing the need to demonstrate that South Korea is not just a trading partner but also an important strategic ally to Washington.

Yet when it comes to tariffs, he has also openly called Trump’s bluff.

“I think we have to bet on the fact that Trump will eventually find that it’s difficult to maintain this situation,” he said on a YouTube political talk show last month, citing the economic pressures that tariffs against China will create for Trump’s heartland supporters.

“What Trump is advancing isn’t sustainable…. My view is that, it’s likely that Trump will admit defeat as soon as within the next six months.”

More to Read

Los Angeles Times · by Max Kim · May 22, 2025




6. Pentagon dismisses USFK troop cut report as 'not true,' reaffirms US' firm commitment to South Korea


Pentagon dismisses USFK troop cut report as 'not true,' reaffirms US' firm commitment to South Korea

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/defense/20250523/pentagon-dismisses-usfk-troop-cut-report-as-not-true-reaffirms-us-firm-commitment-to-south-korea


By Yonhap

Published May 23, 2025 7:58 pm KST

A Pentagon spokesperson on Friday dismissed reports on the United States' consideration of a U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) troop drawdown as "not true," reaffirming that America remains "fully" committed to the defense of South Korea.


Chief Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell issued a statement after The Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. is weighing the idea of pulling out roughly 4,500 troops — part of the 28,500-strong USFK — and moving them to other locations in the Indo-Pacific, including Guam.


"The U.S. remains firmly committed to the defense of the ROK and we look forward to working with the incoming government officials to maintain and strengthen our iron clad alliance," Parnell said in a statement sent to Yonhap News Agency. ROK is short for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.


"Reports that the Department of Defense will reduce U.S. troops in the Republic of Korea are not true," he added.


The report on the idea of the USFK troop cut raised eyebrows in South Korea as the reduction, if realized, could affect deterrence against a muscle-flexing North Korea and be construed as a sign of a diminished security commitment to South Korea.


It came as the Pentagon is looking to rebalance and reapportion its military assets in the region to optimize deterrence against its geopolitical rival, China, amid U.S. President Donald Trump's belief that South Korea, a "wealthy" ally, is not "reimbursing" the U.S. sufficiently for America's "big-time" military protection of it.


U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Commander Adm. Samuel Paparo Jr. and USFK Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson have presented their negative views about the drawdown idea.


During a Senate hearing last month, Paparo warned the withdrawal or reduction of American troops from Korea would raise a "higher" likelihood of a North Korean invasion, while Brunson stressed that a troop reduction would be "problematic."


The USFK has maintained the current troop level since the late 2000s. (Yonhap)



6. Korea's new leader's big challenge: Keeping US and China happy


Of course this could lead to upsetting both. 


Can balance be maintained by the "shrimp among whales?" Or will it be "when whales wrestle shrimp die?"


Of course with the Mutual Defense Treaty some in Korea argue that it has already chosen the US and there is no question that Korea aligns with the US and like minded democracies.


But based on reports and what I have heard from members of Candidate Lee Jae Myung's camp, he is described as a pragmatist. And for him pragmatism will likely be to balance the relationships to protect the ROK both militarily and economically.



Korea's new leader's big challenge: Keeping US and China happy

https://www.nst.com.my/opinion/columnists/2025/05/1220098/koreas-new-leaders-big-challenge-keeping-us-and-china-happy?utm

By Hieun Shin - May 22, 2025 @ 11:05am


South Korea’s presidential candidates Lee Jae-myung (left) of the Democratic Party and Kim Moon Soo of the People Power Party are leading the June 3 presidential race. AFP PIC

Since United States President Donald Trump began his second term, key Asian ally South Korea has not had an elected leader — meaning crucially, no one to bargain with Washington on tariffs.

With the country now set to vote in a presidential election on June 3, the new leader will need to juggle finding ways to stay out of Trump's trade wars with keeping both Washington — Seoul's main security partner against the nuclear-armed North — and neighbouring Beijing happy.

There are two main contenders for the top job: front-runner ex-opposition leader Lee Jae-myung and conservative Kim Moon-soo.

Lee, a charismatic former child factory worker turned human rights lawyer, has been dubbed "South Korea's Bernie Sanders" for his strong support of a basic income, advocating measures like direct cash payments to spur economic growth.

But he's been dogged by a string of scandals, although a court recently delayed a retrial that could have derailed his bid for office.

Kim was once a labour and pro-democracy activist fighting military authoritarian regimes, but he shifted his views after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Kim is solidly in second, trailing Lee by 22 per cent, according to the most recent Gallup poll.

Both candidates have made the economy their top priority, but their approaches are sharply different.

Lee's first pledge is to make South Korea "a global economic powerhouse" — and it seems, analysts say, he's taking his left-wing party more to the centre.

Lee's Democratic Party previously "emphasised labour rights and distribution, but now it is leaning towards economic growth", said Kim Yong-jin, a professor at Sogang University.

Kim's conservative People Power Party, on the other hand, tends to focus more on "corporate policies rather than the national policies," he added, with their candidate emphasising his pro-business approach.

Branding himself as the "job president and economy president", Kim has repeatedly emphasised that "the key to an economic overhaul is regulatory reform" — ironically for a former labour activist.

South Korea's next leader will need to carefully balance its relationships with main security ally Washington and key trading partner and neighbour Beijing.

Lee claims he's not in a rush to strike a new tariff deal with the US, saying he would be "prioritising national interests" above quickly sorting things out with the White House.

In contrast, Kim says the most important thing for export-focused South Korea is to maintain a good relationship with Trump.

"I have a very friendly and trusting relationship" with the US leader, he said, vowing to "immediately" hold a summit if elected.

Lee has often been accused of being too China-friendly, saying in 2024 Taiwan was "none of our business" — a message his opponent says is "alarming".

But neither candidate was really bringing fresh ideas on balancing these key foreign policy ties, said Park Seung-chan, a professor of Chinese studies at Yongin University.

"Our past approach of simply siding with the stronger power is no longer viable," he said.

Already hit by 25 per cent tariff on automobiles — a key export — South Korea is "highly sensitive" to tariffs, said Park Sang-byung, a political commentator.

South Korean officials are in Washington trying to negotiate a "trade package" aimed at preventing new levies, but progress has been slowed by the lack of an elected leader.

With export performance and economic growth rate "already facing significant concerns, if we do not actively respond to Trump's tariff war, South Korea could find itself in a very difficult situation", said Park.

At this point, anyone is better than no one, experts say.

Following ex-president Yoon Suk Yeol's disastrous declaration of martial law and the impeachment, South Korea has cycled through two acting presidents, one of whom was the finance minister, and is now on its third.

"A country needs its chief executive officer, the president, and right now South Korea is desperate," said Kim Dae-jong, a professor at Sejong University.

"Typically, the president determines about 90 per cent of a country's fate," he said.

Until there is a new leader in place, all negotiations are at a halt, with Vice-Trade Minister Park Seung-taek saying it was "theoretically impossible" to sort things out until after the election.

* The writer is from AFP




8. Satellite photo shows N. Korea's new warship capsized at shipyard


I defer to the squints to interpret the satellite imagery. Satellite imagery is a rorschach test for me.



Satellite photo shows N. Korea's new warship capsized at shipyard | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · May 23, 2025

SEOUL, May 23 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's new warship that failed to properly launch into the sea this week lies partially submerged on its side while being draped over with tarpaulins, a British research organization has said, citing commercial satellite imagery.

The Open Source Centre posted the image taken Thursday of the warship at a shipyard in North Korea's northeastern city of Chongjin on X, a day after the 5,000-ton naval destroyer's failed launch ceremony.

"High resolution satellite imagery from @AirbusSpace shows the ship lies partially submerged on its side, tarpaulins draped over the wreckage in a visible attempt to contain the disaster," it said.


A North Korean warship lies partially submerged on its side and draped over with blue tarpaulins in this commercial satellite image taken on May 22, 2025, and released by the London-based Open Source Centre. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

North Korea said Thursday the warship experienced a "serious accident" during its launch and some sections of its bottom were "crushed." North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who attended the ceremony, called the accident a "criminal act" that could not be tolerated.

South Korea's military said the North appears to have failed in using a side launching technique and the destroyer remains partially capsized in the sea.

On Friday, the North said it has launched an investigation into the accident, while noting that the extent of the damage to the warship is "not serious."

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · May 23, 2025


9. North Korean envoy calls escapees ‘human scum’ at UN meet



Admit nothing, deny everything, make counter accusations. And attack the messengers.


The irony is that these Koreans from the north who provided testimony are free to travel anywhere at will. Korean diplomats have no such freedom to travel alone anywhere they want.



North Korean envoy calls escapees ‘human scum’ at UN meet

Derogatory remarks were a response to testimonies shared at UNGA by two women escapees who now live in South Korea

https://www.ucanews.com/news/north-korean-envoy-calls-escapees-human-scum-at-un-meet/109085?utm


North Korea's Permanent Representative to the United Nations Kim Song (left), and escapees Gyuri Kang (center) and Eun-joo Kim, at the United Nations General Assembly, on May 20. (Photo: UN WebTV)


By UCA News reporter

Published: May 22, 2025 11:00 AM GMT

Updated: May 22, 2025 11:52 AM GMT

North Korea's permanent representative to the United Nations has slammed two women escapees to South Korea as “human scum,” while condemning a meeting on human rights abuses in his country as a “political scheme.”

Song Kim, who led the North Korea delegation, made his remarks during the first-ever high-level plenary meeting in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on May 20, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported on May 21.

“The [North Korean] delegation categorically rejects and strongly condemns this meeting, which was convened with the political aim of undermining the dignity and sovereignty of our state,” Kim said in his address.

“What is more deplorable is the invitation of human scum who have even betrayed their own parents and families,” Kim added.

Kim’s derogatory remarks were a response to personal testimonies shared at the UNGA by two women escapees — Gyuri Kang, 24, and Eun-joo Kim, 38 — who now live in South Korea.

Diplomats, international human rights experts, and North Korean escapees attended the meeting held at the UN headquarters in New York, convened under a North Korea human rights resolution adopted by consensus in December 2024.

The UNGA is the main deliberative and policy-making body at the UN, where all member states are represented. Its resolutions have political weight but are not binding on member states.

China and Russia criticized the meeting, saying it was held without the consent of North Korea and questioned its legitimacy.


Eyewitness accounts of rights abuses

Eun-joo Kim, who fled North Korea in 2023 aboard a 10-meter wooden boat with her mother and aunt, described how the authorities publicly executed people, including teenagers, for watching or distributing South Korean dramas.

“Three of my friends were publicly executed. Two were killed for distributing South Korean dramas. One was just 19 years old,” Kang told the assembly.

North Korean authorities are determined to keep their people in the dark and prevent them from dreaming of freedom, Kang alleged.

In 2020, North Korea passed the Anti-Reactionary Ideology and Culture Act, which encompasses punishments including the death penalty or watching or distributing foreign media.

In 2021, the Supreme Leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Un, issued a directive to prevent young people from adopting South Korean speech, fashion, and hairstyles.

Deteriorating rights situation since Covid-19

Gyuri Kang stated that the Covid-19 lockdowns gave the regime the perfect excuse to intensify its crackdown amid widespread hyperinflation, economic hardship, and hunger caused by the collapse of trade with China.

Elizabeth Salmón, the UN special rapporteur on North Korean human rights, told the assembly that conditions in North Korea have sharply worsened since the Covid-19 pandemic.

“North Koreans have lived in near-total isolation for over five years,” she alleged.

Border closures, severe restrictions on humanitarian aid, and limited access to outside information were key factors worsening the humanitarian crisis, Salmón added.

Newly adopted laws have further restricted freedom of movement, labor rights, and freedom of expression, she further added.

Greg Scarlatoiu, president of the US-based nongovernment Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, said the Pyongyang regime has become a global threat, citing arms exports to Russia and militant groups in the Middle East via Iran.

Scarlatoiu alleged that “North Korea’s threat now reaches far beyond Northeast Asia,” while adding that “its roots lie in the regime’s systematic human rights abuses.”


10. Political leaders pay tribute to late President Roh



(LEAD) Political leaders pay tribute to late President Roh | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · May 23, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout; RECASTS headline; ADDS photos; TRIMS)

By Yi Wonju

SEOUL, May 23 (Yonhap) -- Heavyweight politicians from both liberal and conservative parties, including Democratic Party (DP) presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung, on Friday paid their respects to late former President Roh Moo-hyun.

The memorial service was held to mark the 16th anniversary of the death of Roh in the southeastern rural village of Bongha, where Roh lived after his retirement, with the presidential election just 11 days away.

Among the participants were Lee Jun-seok, presidential candidate of the conservative minor New Reform Party, and party officials, including Rep. Kim Yong-tae, interim leader of the conservative People Power Party (PPP), and DP floor leader Park Chan-dae.

"I will build a true Korea -- a world where people can truly live, a country where the people are the owners and a nation where the people are happy," the DP's Lee wrote in a guestbook after paying his respects.

On the sidelines, the DP's Lee also met with former President Moon Jae-in, who served as a key presidential secretary under Roh's administration.

The move by the DP's Lee appears to be part of his efforts to rally support from the liberal bloc by strengthening ties with the pro-Moon and pro-Roh factions and highlighting his legitimacy as a successor to previous liberal administrations.

Roh, a liberal politician who ran the country from 2003 to 2008, leaped to his death from a cliff behind his retirement home 15 years ago amid a corruption investigation involving his family and aides.


Democratic Party presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung pays respects at the grave of former President Roh Moo-hyun in Gimhae, southeastern South Korea, on May 23, 2025. (Yonhap)


A citizen looks at a mural of late President Roh Moo-hyun in Bongha Village in Gimhae, South Gyeongsang Province, on May 22, 2025, a day before the memorial marking the 16th anniversary of his passing. (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · May 23, 2025


11. Who's Ahead: Kim Moon-soo catching up to Lee Jae-myung at 36% to 45%


Still a large gap.


Who's Ahead: Kim Moon-soo catching up to Lee Jae-myung at 36% to 45%

koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · May 23, 2025

Posters of presidential candidates hang on the side of the road in Seoul on Friday. Yonhap

People Power Party presidential candidate Kim Moon-soo is catching up to his Democratic Party of Korea rival, Lee Jae-myung, according to Friday's poll from Gallup Korea.

In the new poll, Kim trails Lee by 9 percentage points at 36 percent and 45 percent, respectively.

An earlier Gallup poll, released May 16, saw Kim lagging behind Lee by 22 percentage points at 29 percent and 51 percent, respectively.

While Lee still has a strong lead, this is a boost for Kim who has been behind in polling since he was made the People Power Party's nominee on May 11. Kim has five days until early voting begins, May 28-29, to close the gap.

Third-party candidate Lee Jun-seok of the New Reform Party went from 8 percent a week ago to 10 percent Friday in the same polls.

More about the poll can be found on the National Election Commission website.


arin@heraldcorp.com


koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · May 23, 2025


12. North Korea fires cruise missiles after warship launch failure


But this seems to be overlooked because it did not make much of a splash.




North Korea fires cruise missiles after warship launch failure

Kim Jong-un condemns mishap as 'criminal act' in rare public rebuke

https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2025/05/22/4BGZLJNXJ5HPRLFAGA3LSUILGQ/

By Yang Ji-ho,

Lee Jung-soo

Published 2025.05.22. 17:34




Rodong Sinmun reported on April 30 that North Korea’s Missile General Bureau, Academy of National Defense Science, and Electronic Warfare Bureau conducted performance and combat applicability tests on weapon systems installed on the destroyer Choe Hyun on April 28 and 29. /Rodong Sinmun via News1

North Korea fired multiple cruise missiles into the East Sea on the morning of May 22, just hours after state-run media publicly acknowledged the failed launch of a new 5,000-ton-class destroyer at Chongjin Port a day earlier.

The timing of the missile test has raised speculation that the regime may be attempting to tighten internal unity in the wake of the setback.

A South Korean military source said the missiles were launched from the area around Sondok in Hamgyongnam-do (Province). It was the North’s first known cruise missile launch in 14 days, following its firing of several short-range ballistic missiles on May 8.

The S. Korean military typically refrains from disclosing cruise missile launches by the North, making Thursday’s test notable.

Earlier in the day, the Rodong Sinmun and other North Korean state outlets reported in rare detail that the launch of the new warship had failed.

The vessel was meant to be introduced in a high-profile ceremony at Chongjin Port, with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in attendance. According to the reports, Kim condemned the failure as “an extremely grave and unacceptable accident” and went as far as to call it “a criminal act.”

South Korean defense officials believe the failure occurred during what is known as a lateral launch—a method in which the vessel is released into the water from the side. The Joint Chiefs of Staff assessed that the destroyer capsized during the process and is currently lying on its side.

Unlike North Korea, the South Korean military does not use the lateral launch method. Instead, it typically employs a floating dock system, which involves filling the dock with water to gently float the ship.

“Lateral launching is considered an outdated technique,” a military official said. “When the hull strikes the water broadside, it can experience unnecessary impact, which increases the risk of structural damage.”


A satellite image taken on May 15 shows a destroyer being prepared for launch at North Korea’s Chongjin Port. North Korean state media reported on May 22 that the launch of the new 5,000-ton-class destroyer, seen in the photo, had failed on May 21. /Ministry of Unification

Rep. Yoo Yong-won of the ruling People Power Party noted that North Korea appeared to preemptively disclose the failed launch before it could be identified through commercial satellite imagery.

“Satellite images from May 12 show that the second 5,000-ton destroyer was still incomplete, with no cover on the vertical launch system,” Yoo said. “It seems the regime pushed ahead with the ceremony prematurely, and that likely led to the accident.”



13. China exploits N. Korean media preferences in ambitious cultural influence campaign



China conducts its Unrestricted Warfare and Three Warfares (psychological warfare, legal warfare, and media or public opinion warfare) even against its only ally, north Korea.


Note the US' "pullback from democracy" welcomed by China. We must acknowledge (and reverse) the strategic error we have made with VOA and RFA. So China is capitalizing on it.


But we should use this forced VOA/RFA "pause" to study the CHinese campaign and see if there is anything we can learn from how they are trying to influence the Korean people in the north.


Excerpts:


As China implements this overseas cultural strategy, it’s closely watching the possibility of the U.S. scaling back efforts to influence North Korea.
“China is pleased by signs that the U.S. is voluntarily abandoning its democracy promotion campaign. If U.S.-backed content dissemination efforts lose momentum, China will become the only significant content provider. It sees this as an ideal opportunity to spread its own culture,” the source said.
“China is also preparing to use this program as a diplomatic tool. If North Korean officials and young people develop positive attitudes toward China, that could strengthen pro-China policies,” the source added.



China exploits N. Korean media preferences in ambitious cultural influence campaign

The Chinese have adopted a "culture bomb" strategy, believing that overwhelming North Korea with volume matters more than measuring responses or content quality

https://www.dailynk.com/english/china-exploits-north-korean-media-preferences-ambitious-cultural-influence-campaign/?tztc=1

By Lee Ho Jin - May 23, 2025

FILE PHOTO: The national flag of the People's Republic of China. (Daily NK)

China’s cultural development and cooperation program with North Korea across the three northeastern provinces of Jilin, Liaoning and Heilongjiang goes far beyond simply sharing cultural content. Instead, it represents part of a sophisticated overseas cultural campaign tailored to current North Korean attitudes.

“China recognizes that North Koreans feel less threatened by Chinese media than by content from South Korea or the U.S. The fact that North Koreans are more receptive to Chinese media was a major factor behind this program,” a source in China told Daily NK recently.

According to the source, North Korea’s tendency to view Chinese cultural content as relatively safe presents an opportunity that China is seizing. This has led Chinese producers to focus on programs that North Koreans consider “less dangerous foreign information,” such as dramas, documentaries and lifestyle content.

Specifically, China’s strategy involves making cultural inroads into North Korea by providing useful, apolitical content such as Chinese language educational videos and informational programs about daily life in China.

Another Chinese approach is helping North Koreans grow comfortable with Chinese culture through repeated exposure to Chinese media. The goal isn’t just for North Koreans to consume Chinese content, but to become familiar with Chinese culture and view it as part of their daily lives.

“The Chinese believe it’s better to invest manpower and resources in sending more content to more areas in North Korea rather than trying to measure North Korean responses. Since any Chinese media will seem fresh to North Koreans, the Chinese think what matters isn’t what they watch, but how frequently they watch it. They’ve therefore adopted a ‘culture bomb’ strategy—overwhelming through sheer volume,” the source said.

China is exploring various methods to deliver media content into North Korea, including sending USB drives, SD cards, and MP5 video players through traders or other North Koreans traveling to China.

“While North Koreans will continue seeking South Korean media, China believes that over time, Chinese media will begin feeling more familiar and comfortable to them. China’s long-term plan is to cultivate a shared cultural identity between the two countries,” the source explained.

US pullback in democracy promotion welcomed by Chinese

As China implements this overseas cultural strategy, it’s closely watching the possibility of the U.S. scaling back efforts to influence North Korea.

“China is pleased by signs that the U.S. is voluntarily abandoning its democracy promotion campaign. If U.S.-backed content dissemination efforts lose momentum, China will become the only significant content provider. It sees this as an ideal opportunity to spread its own culture,” the source said.

“China is also preparing to use this program as a diplomatic tool. If North Korean officials and young people develop positive attitudes toward China, that could strengthen pro-China policies,” the source added.

Read in Korean




























































































De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161


If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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