Quotes of the Day:

“No man is truly free; All are slaves of money or necessity.  Public opinion or fear of prosecution forces each one, against his conscience, to conform.” 

- Euripides

“The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”

- “X” (George Kennan), Foreign Affairs, July 1, 1947.

"Imagination is more important than knowledge. Knowledge is limited. Imagination encircles the world."

- Albert Einstein

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 24, 2023

2. The Kremlin's Pyrrhic Victory in Bakhmut: A Retrospective on the Battle for Bakhmut

3. Marine Corps No More? By Bing West

4. NATO’s Future Depends On Who Wins In Ukraine

5. U.S. distances itself from raid into Russia that involved American military vehicles

6. A Surplus of Strategists—But A Lack of Good Strategy

7. What Should a Strategist Know and Do, and Why

8. Glorious Amateurs: The Legendary OSS of World War II

9. America and the Philippines Update Defense Guidelines

10. Berger: 'Time to look' at changing combatant command structure

11. JOHN BOLTON: The G-7 Shows It Still Doesn't Understand the China Threat

12. If America Defaults 'No Corner of the Global Economy Will Be Spared'

13. 4 Ways U.S. Support for Ukraine Helps Defend Taiwan

14. ASEAN and the Quad Inch Closer Together

15. 160 Senior Military Signed DEI Letter To Congress

16. Milley's team readying analysis for establishing new ‘Joint Futures’ organization for DOD

17. US Remains Under 'Heightened Threat' Alert Over Domestic and Foreign Terror Concerns

18. The Plot Against Russia

19. Okinawans March for Peace as Japan Beefs Up US Military Alliance

20. Japan Ground Self-Defense Force to Provide Ukraine With 100 Transport Vehicles

21. US-China trade war as mutually assured destruction

22. Philippines-Vietnam teaming up on China in South China Sea

23. China Committee wants Congress to establish a Taiwan weapons stockpile

24. Why the military moves faster than government on AI

25. U.S. says Chinese hackers breached gear in Guam, key to Pacific defense

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 24, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2023

Key Takeaways

• Discussions regarding reported Russian losses in Bakhmut have saturated the pro-war information space and are drowning out any remaining positive informational effect resulting from the city’s capture.
• The overall Russian information space response to the capture of Bakhmut has fixated on attributing responsibility for its capture and speculating on the associated costs of the operation, thus depriving the Russian MoD of the oxygen necessary to positively frame the city’s capture.
• Prigozhin is likely using his heightened profile following the capture of Bakhmut to intensify his attacks against the Russian military establishment and elites. Prigozhin is also using the perception that Wagner is responsible for the capture of Bakhmut to advocate for a preposterous level of influence over the Russian war effort in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to portray Russia as having significant diplomatic partnerships.
• Russian sources continued to respond to the limited all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and the Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) raid into Belgorod Oblast.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the outskirts of Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian positions in southern Ukraine with FAB-500 aerial bombs.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed on May 24 that more than 120,000 Russian personnel have undergone training since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.
• The Russian Federation Council approved a law on holding elections in territories under martial law on.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 24, 2023

May 24, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan

May 24, 2023, 5:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 4 pm ET on May 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Discussions regarding reported Russian losses in Bakhmut have saturated the pro-war information space and are drowning out any remaining positive informational effect resulting from the city’s capture. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed during an interview with Russian political strategist Konstantin Dolgov on May 23 that Wagner lost 10,000 convict recruits and 10,000 full-time professional Wagner fighters killed in action over the course of the Battle for Bakhmut.[1] Prigozhin specifically noted that Wagner had recruited 50,000 prisoners, 20 percent of whom (10,000) died in fighting for Bakhmut.[2] Russian milbloggers immediately seized on the reported losses, thereby shifting the overall Russian conversation away from discussions of the significance of the capture of Bakhmut and towards amplifying speculation surrounding the reported losses. The nationalist pro-war faction, exemplified by the views of former Russian officer Igor Girkin, commented on the massive scale of the reported losses and speculated that real losses may be much higher. Russian politician Viktor Alksnis simply remarked that the Soviet Army lost far fewer soldiers (15,051) in nine years in Afghanistan.[3] Girkin stated that he believes that Wagner’s actual losses could be more than 1.5 times higher than Prigozhin’s claims and pointed out that of the 50,000 recruits Wagner received from prisons, 10,000 died in action and 26,000 reportedly received pardons and returned to Russia, leaving 14,000 prison recruits unaccounted for.[4] Girkin suggested that a large portion of these 14,000 unaccounted-for prison recruits may have also been killed in action and claimed that Wagner has likely suffered more than 40,000 killed in action.[5] Girkin suggested that Prigozhin “keep [his] mouth shut” and stop talking about “wild losses for a very insignificant result.”[6] Another Russian milblogger, by contrast, praised Prigozhin for being open about the scale of losses and stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) would have hidden such figures.[7]

The overall Russian information space response to the capture of Bakhmut has fixated on attributing responsibility for its capture and speculating on the associated costs of the operation, thus depriving the Russian MoD of the oxygen necessary to positively frame the city’s capture. As ISW reported on May 22 factions within the pro-war information space immediately began arguing over whether Wagner or regular Russian units and commanders should receive medals and commendations for operations in Bakhmut.[8] Prigozhin’s claims about Wagner’s losses in Bakhmut have similarly become a distinct point of tension in the information space and have come to define the predominant discourse about Russia’s entire campaign in Bakhmut. In shifting the conversation towards claimed Wagner losses, Prigozhin has largely succeeded in further depriving the Russian MoD of the opportunity to claim informational victory over Bakhmut and will likely continue to define and lead conversations on Bakhmut going forward but at the cost of highlighting the huge losses his own forces suffered for a negligible gain.

Prigozhin is likely using his heightened profile following the capture of Bakhmut to intensify his attacks against the Russian military establishment and elites. Prigozhin stated in his May 23 interview with Dolgov that the Russian military leadership has so far failed to achieve the main objectives of the war in Ukraine.[9] Prigozhin blamed his usual targets, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, for being the main problem within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and for blocking support and supplies to Wagner.[10] Prigozhin also criticized Shoigu’s son-in-law and daughter for being the stereotypical children of Russian elite whose life experience is in dramatic opposition to those fighting in Ukraine.[11] Prigozhin warned that the Russian elite is fostering a situation that could end up like the revolution of 1917, in which soldiers and their loved ones stood up against the Russian government.[12] Prigozhin threatened that the Russian public may become violent towards the Russian elite, referencing mobs with pitchforks and alluding to the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, a string of politically motivated mob assassinations in France in 1572.[13] Prigozhin’s somewhat subtle and purposefully obscure threats of violence represent an inflection in his longstanding feuds with the Russian military establishment and select elite figures.

Prigozhin is also using the perception that Wagner is responsible for the capture of Bakhmut to advocate for a preposterous level of influence over the Russian war effort in Ukraine. Prigozhin reiterated that the Wagner Group is the best army in the world and argued that the conventional Russian army is second to Wagner.[14] Prigozhin claimed that 6,000 Wagner personnel can each manage his own company worth of personnel and that Wagner could therefore command a force of 600,000 personnel, roughly twice the estimated number of Russian personnel fighting in Ukraine.[15] Prigozhin suggested that he has previously asked for 200,000 personnel to command in Ukraine and argued that if he had such a force then Wagner could advance from 50 to 150km in different directions.[16] Prigozhin claimed that he did not receive this force because of fears that such a force would allow him to dictate terms and theoretically “come to Moscow in tanks.”[17] Prigozhin also advocated for Russian Deputy-Minister-of-Defense-for-Logistics-turned-Wagner-Group-deputy-commander Colonel General Mikhail Mizinstev to replace Shoigu as Defense Minister and for former overall theater commander and alleged Wagner ally Army General Sergey Surovikin to replace Gerasimov as Chief of the General Staff.[18]

Prigozhin is also likely doubling down on his attempts to establish himself as a Russian totalitarian figure who could achieve military victory in Ukraine. Prigozhin called for complete martial law, several subsequent waves of mobilization, and wide-scale economic mobilization of Russian industry to save Russia.[19] Prigozhin also suggested that Russia should become a totalitarian regime akin to North Korea and close all borders for a certain number of years to achieve victory in Ukraine. Prigozhin has routinely crafted an image to resonate with a constituency interested in the ideology of Russia’s national superiority, Soviet brutalist strength, and Stalinist totalitarian control.[20] Prigozhin is likely advocating for incredibly radical policy approaches to the war in Ukraine to contrast himself with Putin’s relatively risk-averse decision-making approach to the war.[21] ISW has previously assessed that Prigozhin harbors serious political ambitions and intends to cement himself as the central figure of the Russian ultranationalist community.[22] The capture of Bakhmut has likely emboldened Prigozhin to pursue those ambitions in a more explicit manner regardless of the internal upheaval that it may cause or the danger it may place him in with the Kremlin.

The Kremlin continues efforts to portray Russia as having significant diplomatic partnerships. Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke to attendees of the 11th International Meeting of High Representatives for Security Issues in Moscow on May 24 to deliver boilerplate rhetoric accusing the West of generating global instability and calling on Asian, African, and Latin American states to form a multipolar world order.[23] Putin later attended the Eurasian Economic Forum in Moscow alongside Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, and Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan.[24] Putin also met with Milorad Dodik, the president of Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina), and Dodik demonstratively supported the Russian narrative about the war in Ukraine by stating that Russia was forced to launch the “special military operation” and that the war is a clash against the West.[25] The Kremlin has previously leveraged energy and military cooperation with Republika Srpska to attempt to spread Russian influence in the Balkans, although Russian influence with its other notable partner in the region, Serbia, appears to be waning.[26] The Kremlin has used previous international forums and meetings with heads of state to portray Russia as having robust international partnerships and to advocate for the formation of a potential anti-Western coalition.[27] Putin most notably tried and failed to secure a no-limits bilateral partnership with Chinese President Xi Jinping in late March and align China with Russia in Putin’s envisioned geopolitical conflict with the West.[28] The nominal support of several post-Soviet states and the explicit support of a small constituent entity is likely far less than what the Kremlin is hoping to achieve with this wider diplomatic effort.

Russian sources continued to respond to the limited all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and the Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) raid into Belgorod Oblast. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed at the Ministry of Defense (MoD) Collegium meeting that Western Military District Border Guards expelled all pro-Ukrainian forces from Belgorod Oblast, killing 70 personnel and destroying an unspecified number of vehicles and armored vehicles.[29] Some milbloggers criticized the ineffectiveness of the Russian border guards and questioned why they would allow the RDK and LSR to break through to Russian territory and mine the border areas over the course of two days.[30] Other milbloggers criticized Russian forces for not maintaining “normal communication and interactions” with border guards, which created difficulties in repelling RDK and LSR forces.[31] One milblogger praised Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov and claimed that he rose to the occasion during the raid by solving problems that civilian officials usually do not have to solve.[32] Gladkov, however, said that he has “more questions for the MoD” and that lessons needed to be learned from the mistakes in Belgorod Oblast.[33] Another milblogger criticized Belgorod Oblast civilian authorities for allowing civilians to live one kilometer away from the “front line” and questioned why authorities chose not to relocate civilians until after the situation improved.[34]

The New York Times reported on May 24 that unnamed US officials said that the US intelligence community assesses with low confidence that unknown Ukrainian elements with unknown connections to Ukraine’s leadership were responsible for the May 3 drone attacks on the Kremlin.[35] ISW had previously assessed that the attack was a Russian false flag operation on May 3.[36]  ISW has no additional information about this incident.

Key Takeaways

• Discussions regarding reported Russian losses in Bakhmut have saturated the pro-war information space and are drowning out any remaining positive informational effect resulting from the city’s capture.
• The overall Russian information space response to the capture of Bakhmut has fixated on attributing responsibility for its capture and speculating on the associated costs of the operation, thus depriving the Russian MoD of the oxygen necessary to positively frame the city’s capture.
• Prigozhin is likely using his heightened profile following the capture of Bakhmut to intensify his attacks against the Russian military establishment and elites. Prigozhin is also using the perception that Wagner is responsible for the capture of Bakhmut to advocate for a preposterous level of influence over the Russian war effort in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to portray Russia as having significant diplomatic partnerships.
• Russian sources continued to respond to the limited all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and the Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) raid into Belgorod Oblast.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the outskirts of Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian positions in southern Ukraine with FAB-500 aerial bombs.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed on May 24 that more than 120,000 Russian personnel have undergone training since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.
• The Russian Federation Council approved a law on holding elections in territories under martial law on.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line on May 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Masyutivka (16km northeast of Kupyansk) and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[37] Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson Sergei Zybinsky claimed that assault detachments of the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) conducted a ground attack near Masyutivka.[38] Geolocated footage published on May 24 indicates that Russian forces captured Yahidne (22km east of Kupyansk) prior to May 24 and that Russian forces additionally made marginal advances near Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[39] Video footage amplified on May 24 purportedly shows Chechen Akhmat-Vostok forces operating near Kreminna.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s new retrospective analysis of the Battle for Bakhmut.

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the outskirts of Bakhmut on May 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations towards Ivanivske (3km southwest of Bakhmut) and Khromove (3km west of Bakhmut).[41] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi noted that Ukrainian troops are continuing defensive operations on the outskirts of Bakhmut.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group forces completely control Bakhmut and that forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) are slowly entering the city to take over clearing operations.[43] Another Russian milblogger warned that Ukrainian troops may be intensifying the movement of military equipment and personnel through Kostyantynivka (17km southwest of Bakhmut).[44]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on May 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations north of Donetsk City near Avdiivka and Novokalynove; on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Pervomaiske; and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka.[45] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Vodyane and Nevelske.[46] Ukrainian Avdiivka City Military Administration Head Vitaly Barbarash reported that Russian forces conducted a massive artillery strike on Avdiivka and launched two airstrikes with unguided aerial bombs at the city on the morning of May 24.[47] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck two Ukrainian fuel depots and a command post around Avdiivka during the strikes.[48]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 24.[49]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian positions in southern Ukraine with FAB-500 aerial bombs. Geolocated footage published on May 24 shows a Russian FAB-500 strike on Kizomys (20km southwest of Kherson City) in Kherson Oblast.[50] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported on May 23 that Russian forces attacked Beryslav (60km northeast of Kherson City) in Kherson Oblast with four KAB bombs (a FAB-500 variant).[51] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces continued to use KAB bombs on Ukrainian positions near Polohy (88km southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) in Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian forces reportedly continue to endanger the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on May 24 that Russian forces continue to militarize the ZNPP by using power units No. 1, 2, and 4 as logistics and military bases.[52] The GUR also stated that Russian forces permanently maintain armored vehicles, trucks, and personnel at the ZNPP and rotate personnel and equipment after curfew. ISW has previously reported on the Russian militarization of the ZNPP.[53]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage purportedly showing a Ukrainian attack on the “Ivan Khurs” Yury Ivanov-class intelligence vessel in the Black Sea on May 24.[54] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces destroyed all three unmanned speedboats that attacked the “Ivan Khurs” 140km northeast of the Bosporus Strait while the vessel was protecting the Turk Stream and Blue Stream pipelines.[55] Ukrainian officials have not commented on the attack as of this publication.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed on May 24 that more than 120,000 Russian personnel have undergone training since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.[56] Shoigu added that 21,000 personnel have undergone training to form new unspecified formations.[57] Shoigu’s figure is far lower than the roughly 300,000 mobilized personnel who underwent expedited training following the start of partial mobilization in 2022, the conventional 134,000 conscripts generated during a bi-annual conscription cycle, or the number of Russian volunteers stemming from widespread recruitment efforts.[58] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev recently claimed that the Russian military has recruited 117,400 contract personnel in volunteer formations since January 1, 2023.[59] If Shoigu’s figure refers to contract Russian servicemembers, then Russian efforts to generate contract servicemembers since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine have failed to meet Russian force requirements. It is unclear if Shoigu was referring to contract servicemembers or any other specific subset of the Russian Armed Forces, however.

The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on May 25 that Russian cadets from higher military academies are undergoing training near the Ukrainian border in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts.[60] The Resistance Center reported that the cadets are undergoing training at the deployment points of elements of the 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) and the 76th Air Assault Division in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts.[61] Russian graduates from higher military academies recently graduated several months ahead of schedule, and Russian forces are likely expediting the normal education path for cadets to generate new lower and medium-level commanders.[62] ISW has yet to observe visual confirmation of recent Russian graduates serving in Ukraine or current cadets training near the Ukrainian border.

The Russian State Duma adopted in the first reading a bill preventing Russian officials with access to state secrets from traveling abroad.[63] The bill also bans people with financial accounts and real estate abroad from accessing state secrets and prohibits lawyers working on cases involving state secrets from leaving the country. The bill does permit those with access to state secrets to travel abroad for humanitarian reasons, including the death of close relatives or the need of emergency treatments. ISW previously reported that Russian security services are allegedly confiscating the passports of senior officials and state company executives to limit flights from Russia.[64] These measures illustrate an increasing paranoia within the Russian government about informational security that may lead to further draconian security measures reminiscent of the Soviet Union.

The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that research by independent Russian journalists suggests that more Russian personnel have gone absent without leave (AWOL) since January 2023 than in all of 2022.[65] The UK MoD reported that 1,053 Russian personnel have gone AWOL between January and May of 2023. The UK MoD also reported that Russian court data suggests that Russian personnel found guilty of going AWOL have received suspended sentences, allowing them to redeploy to Ukraine.

Russian authorities continue to arrest Russian citizens over concerns about Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). Russian sources claimed on May 24 that Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers detained a design engineer of an unspecified military industrial enterprise in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast for transmitting information about the location of defense enterprises, air defense systems, and Russian personnel to Ukrainian representatives.[66] ISW previously assessed that Russian authorities appear to be using the pretext of threats to Russia’s DIB as one justification for potential crackdowns as well as for the FSB’s ongoing overhaul of domestic security organs.[67]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Russian Federation Council approved a law on holding elections in territories under martial law on May 24. A Russian source claimed on May 24 that the Russian Federation Council approved the law after consulting with the Russian Central Election Commission and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).[68] The Russian source also stated that the Federation Council approved a law that allows Russian occupation authorities to establish specifics for holding regional elections.[69] The Russian State Duma previously adopted amendments to the martial law legislation on May 18 that require that the FSB and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to authorize holding elections in territories under martial law.[70] ISW continues to assess that these measures indicate that Russian officials and occupation authorities may be setting informational conditions for September regional elections in case Russia loses more territory as a result of Ukrainian counteroffensives.

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Belarusian Minister of Defense Viktor Khrenin will chair a meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Council of Ministers on May 25 in Minsk.[71] The meeting will discuss threats to the CSTO member states, improving the crisis response system, military-technical cooperation, and other topics.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. The Kremlin's Pyrrhic Victory in Bakhmut: A Retrospective on the Battle for Bakhmut

Maps/graphics: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut

THE KREMLIN’S PYRRHIC VICTORY IN BAKHMUT: A RETROSPECTIVE ON THE BATTLE FOR BAKHMUT

May 24, 2023 - Press ISW

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The Kremlin's Pyrrhic Victory in Bakhmut: A Retrospective on the Battle for Bakhmut

Kateryna Stepanenko

May 24, 2023, 8am ET

Russia declared victory in Bakhmut on May 21, 2023, after fighting for the city for nearly a year.[1] The battle marks the first claimed Russian victory over a large city since the capture of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in the summer of 2022. The Battle for Bakhmut is still ongoing as Ukrainian forces regained the initiative and are counterattacking Bakhmut’s flanks north and south of the city. The Russian year-long drive began as part of a theoretically sensible but overly-ambitious operational effort but ended as a purely symbolic gesture that cost tens of thousands of Russian casualties.

The seizure of Bakhmut was originally intended to facilitate Russian offensives to encircle large Ukrainian forces in the east and specifically to take the large and fortified city of Slovyansk from multiple directions. Bakhmut was not a primary Russian objective during the early phases of the war, and the Russian military command aimed to secure Donetsk Oblast’s administrative borders by seizing major Ukrainian strongholds such as Slovyansk and Kramatorsk directly. The Ukrainian liberation of most of Kharkiv Oblast in September 2022 ended the immediate Russian threats to Slovyansk and, secondarily, Kramatorsk, whereupon Bakhmut became the main operational and political objective for the Kremlin. Bakhmut fit into the planned Russian winter offensive as one of several lines of advance that were supposed to end by securing the Luhansk and Donetsk oblast boundaries, but all the other attempted advances failed, once more depriving the battle for Bakhmut of hypothetical operational significance by March-April 2023. Moscow stubbornly clung to its efforts to seize Bakhmut regardless of the operational context and ultimately took the destroyed city at a hideous cost in manpower and materiel, then ceding the initiative in the Bakhmut area to Ukraine.[2]

The Russian military command initially sought to seize Bakhmut to support a wide encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Donbas in Spring 2022. Following the Russian withdrawal from Kyiv and the refocusing of Russian military efforts in the east in April 2022 the Russian military command aimed to encircle a large group of Ukrainian forces in western Luhansk and eastern Donetsk oblasts.[3] The Russian military command sought to conduct three simultaneous maneuvers that would collectively surround and seize the Slovyansk stronghold: a westward push through Severodonetsk-Lysychansk, a drive south from Izyum (southeastern Kharkiv Oblast), and an attack north from Bakhmut. The Russian military command sought to secure and advance along the E40 highway - which connects Izyum, Slovyansk, and the Bakhmut area - to quickly encircle Ukrainian forces in eastern Donetsk Oblast and advance towards the region’s western borders.[4] The Russian seizure of Bakhmut was a necessary but not sufficient condition for this massive encirclement to succeed. Russian forces captured Izyum in early April 2022 and the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area in late June and early July 2022, and began launching localized attacks southeast and east of Bakhmut in May 2022.[5] ISW assessed at the time that Russian forces were unlikely to complete this wide encirclement as Russian forces would be unable to advance far enough or quickly enough to accomplish it, an assessment that proved accurate.[6]

Russian offensive operations in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk proved extremely costly and slow, consuming a high proportion of Russian offensive capabilities in Donbas. This forced the Russian military command to deprioritize the wide encirclement in Donetsk Oblast in order to complete the seizure of those two cities. The grinding offensives on the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk line forced the Russian military command to deprioritize the objective of completing a wide encirclement of Ukrainian forces along the E40 highway.[7] Wagner forces alongside Chechen and regular Russian units operated in Popasna (about 26km from Bakhmut) and made occasional westward advances towards Bakhmut, but mainly prioritized the capture of Luhansk Oblast.[8] ISW assessed that the Russian attack on Slovyansk from Izyum culminated in mid-May 2022, and Russian forces likely started to prioritize attacks closer to the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk line.[9] Russian forces also abandoned some of their positions in Kharkiv City’s immediate vicinity to reinforce the attritional urban attacks in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.[10]

Russia reprioritized the Battle for Bakhmut in July-August 2022, following the culmination of Russian attacks on the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk line. Wagner forces began localized assaults around settlements east and southeast of Bakhmut, using Popasna and previously Russian occupied territories as springboards for further operations.[11] The Wagner Group also began to expand its forces by recruiting convicts, likely after Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin promised Putin to maintain offensive operations during the period when Russian regular forces were unable to pursue further offensive operations across the theater.[12] It is possible that the Russian military command hoped to eventually resume the drive to the E40 highway after recruiting volunteers to compensate for dwindling reserves. Russian forces still held positions in the Izyum-Lyman area, which made an advance from north and south along the E40 to secure Slovyansk theoretically possible if highly unlikely due to Russia’s force composition and degraded offensive capabilities.

The successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kharkiv Oblast in September 2022 that liberated Izyum ended the prospect of a wide encirclement of Ukrainian forces in the east, thus depriving the attacks on Bakhmut of operational significance. Ukrainian forces liberated Izyum on September 10-11.[13] The loss of Izyum meant that Russian forces no longer threatened Ukrainian defenders in Slovyansk and could no longer hope to conduct a multi-directional offensive from Bakhmut, Izyum, and the east.[14] ISW assessed on September 11 that the loss of Izyum doomed the initial Russian campaign plan to attack Slovyansk from multiple directions and that even the seizure of Bakhmut would “no longer support any larger effort to accomplish the original objectives of this phase of the campaign since it would not be supported by an advance from Izyum in the north.”[15] ISW also assessed that Russian offensive operations against Bakhmut and around Donetsk City have “lost any real operational significance for Moscow and merely waste some of [Russia’s] extremely limited effective combat power.”

Wagner mercenaries nevertheless intensified their offensives on Bakhmut and fully committed to the Battle for Bakhmut in Fall 2022 likely to achieve informational and political rather than operational objectives. The Kremlin desperately needed any battlefield victory as Russian forces suffered a great military defeat in Kharkiv Oblast in September and in Lyman (about 43km north of Bakhmut) on October 1.[16] Putin had also faced significant backlash after declaring partial mobilization on September 21 and likely allowed Prigozhin to initiate the Wagner offensive on Bakhmut at least partly in response.[17] Prigozhin himself likely sought to capture Bakhmut in a timely manner in order to convince Putin to promote Wagner-affiliated officials within the Russian military command. Wagner forces began to intensify their offensives northeast, south, and southeast of Bakhmut following the appointment of Wagner-affiliated Army General Sergei Surovikin as the theater commander on October 8.[18] Prigozhin later claimed that he and Surovikin began operation “Bakhmut meatgrinder” to pin Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut shortly after Surovikin’s appointment.[19] The purpose of the efforts to pin Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut in Fall 2022 were unclear—there were no other significant Russian offensives underway, and Ukrainian counteroffensives culminated with the liberation of western Kherson Oblast.

Wagner mercenaries shifted their approach to seizing Bakhmut to a focus on encircling and trapping Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut City by expending a high proportion of their estimated 40,000 prisoner recruits in deadly human wave attacks.[20] At least 22,000 prisoners disappeared from Russian prisons between October and November 2022 alone - likely as a result of Wagner’s prisoner recruitment efforts.[21] A Russian opposition outlet concluded that 55 percent of the total reported Wagner fatalities in October occurred just on October 24 and October 27 – when Ukrainian forces resisted Wagner assaults on the eastern outskirts of the city.[22] The outlet concluded that the number of social media reports commemorating Wagner servicemen increased by more than 2.5 times as they were committed to suicidal drives on Bakhmut’s immediate outskirts.[23]

The Russian MoD began to prepare for its own winter offensive operation in December 2022 and likely began to deprioritize support for Wagner forces at that time. The Russian MoD banned Wagner forces from recruiting prisoners in early January and began to conserve mobilized personnel and military equipment ahead of the planned offensive operation in Luhansk Oblast.[24] Ukrainian intelligence officials reported that Russian forces decreased their use of artillery shells from 60,000 per day to 19,000-20,000.[25] ISW assessed on December 31 that ammunition shortages would slow the pace of Russian offensives.[26] Wagner relies on the Russian MoD to provide ammunition and supplies. The decrease in such ammunition provisions indicates that the Russian MoD likely assessed that it needed more ammunition to launch another offensive operation in the theater and that the Wagner effort against Bakhmut was not a primary mission. The Russian regular forces were ultimately unsuccessful in achieving the goal of capturing Donbas over the winter, confirming that Russian forces did not have sufficient offensive capabilities to maintain a multi-pronged offensive in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.[27] The fight for Bakhmut could have regained operational significance as part of the general Russian winter offensive had any of the other drives been successful. As it was, the total failure of all the other offensive efforts during the winter offensive operation meant that Bakhmut remained primarily an informational and political rather than operationally significant objective for Russian forces.

Wagner’s highly attritional offensives began to show signs of culmination by late December 2022 and in January 2023. US military doctrine defines culmination as the “point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offensive or defensive,” and when “a force cannot continue the attack and must assume a defensive posture or execute an operational pause.”[28] A force can continue operations after culmination but normally in a badly degraded condition. The rate of Wagner forces’ advance slowed, and Ukrainian forces were able to push back Russian forces from some eastern outskirts of Bakhmut City.[29] ISW also observed that Wagner forces made slightly fewer overall advances in the Bakhmut area in November and December 2022 combined as compared to the month of October.[30] Wagner forces likely needed to initiate a tactical or operational pause in late December 2022 and early January 2023 as they started to face heavy losses in the Bakhmut area and ammunition shortages but continued to make advances in eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[31] A Russian opposition outlet estimated that Wagner fatalities increased by an additional 2.5 times in December, and US officials noted that at least 1,000 Wagner mercenaries were killed in action in December.[32] The Russian MoD - which has been feuding with Prigozhin and attempting to compete with him for Putin’s favor - had likely seen Wagner’s slowing pace as an opportunity to regain control over the Bakhmut direction and advance to Soledar (about 12km northeast of Bakhmut).[33] The introduction of Russian regular forces on Bakhmut’s flanks likely temporarily offset the culmination of the Wagner Group’s offensive by allowing Wagner forces to concentrate in the city and retain the initiative in the urban fighting.[34] ISW assessed as early as January 31 that Russian forces were unlikely to complete the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut, however.[35]

The Wagner Group began committing its remaining forces to Bakhmut between February and March to threaten Ukrainian forces into withdrawing from the city so as to avoid having to fight through it. Wagner casualties reportedly decreased by 35 percent in February when compared to January, likely because Wagner expended much of its convict recruits personnel when fighting for Bakhmut the previous month.[36] The limited introduction of regular artillery forces to Bakhmut’s flanks may also have contributed to the decrease of Wagner casualties. Prigozhin later admitted to receiving assistance from artillery and infantry units belonging to the Eastern Military District.[37] Wagner, however, lost its main source of rapid recruitment and began to commit its elite units to sustain the advance.[38] Geolocated footage showed 43 buses full of well-dressed and high-spirited Wagner personnel moving from Crimea to an unspecified location via Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast on February 18.[39] These personnel and other Wagner forces likely arrived in Bakhmut to reinforce Wagner forces as Ukrainian military officials reported that Wagner was using its combat-ready assault units in attacks on northern Bakhmut City in late February.[40] Wagner forces also likely prioritized maneuvers northeast and south of Bakhmut in an effort to sever Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) west of Bakhmut and threaten to encircle Ukrainian forces in the city.[41] Prigozhin, who was likely aware that he was running out of uncommitted personnel, likely hoped to scare Ukrainian forces into withdrawing from Bakhmut and used additional forces to threaten envelopment or encirclement. Prigozhin even offered Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky an opportunity to withdraw Ukrainian forces from Bakhmut on March 3 and claimed that Wagner mercenaries had practically encircled Ukrainian forces in the city after Wagner achieved some breakthroughs in eastern, northern, and southern Bakhmut.[42]

The Ukrainian military blocked the Russian efforts to envelop or encircle Bakhmut in March, forcing Wagner forces to fight through the city and suffer significant losses for the next two months. Ukrainian forces conducted a series of controlled withdrawals and gradually stabilized the battlefield geometry in Bakhmut, eliminating the threat of encirclement or envelopment.[43] The pace of Russian advances north and south of Bakhmut decreased, and Russian forces were unable to physically interdict Ukrainian GLOCs despite claiming “fire control” over the two highways into the city.[44] Ukrainian military officials even observed on March 15 that Wagner attacks had markedly decreased in and around Bakhmut – just two weeks after Prigozhin announced that Wagner forces would imminently encircle Ukrainian forces.[45] Wagner’s pace likely decreased as a result of high-intensity urban combat in Bakhmut City, and Wagner was unable to maintain the same momentum it had had in February and early March. Wagner forces also began releasing convicts who had signed six-month contracts with Wagner, which likely further depleted Wagner personnel and slowed the pace of advance.[46]

ISW assessed that the Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut was a strategically sound decision as Ukrainians would benefit from exhausting Wagner forces if they were able to retain control over the two GLOCs west of Bakhmut.[47] ISW also argued that while Bakhmut is not intrinsically significant operationally or strategically for Ukrainian forces to maintain, the defense of Bakhmut became more strategically significant as Russian forces decided to commit Wagner elements, Russian airborne troops (VDV), and other lower-quality troops to the fight.[48] US Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff General Mark Milley reported on March 29 that the Wagner Group had around 6,000 professional personnel and 20,000 to 30,000 remaining recruits and convicts in the Bakhmut area.[49] The Ukrainian defense of the city – despite high Ukrainian costs – exhausted and inflicted significant casualties on Russian personnel that otherwise could have reinforced other directions ahead planned Ukrainian counteroffensives. US President Joe Biden stated on May 21 that Russian forces have suffered 100,000 casualties while fighting for Bakhmut, and White House national security spokesperson John Kirby stated that an estimated 10,000 Wagner servicemen have been killed since December 2022.[50]

Prigozhin has likely signaled the culmination of Wagner forces in declaring victory in Bakhmut on May 20 and announcing Wagner’s withdrawal from the city and plans to reconstitute on May 25, despite subsequent denials.[51] Prigozhin claimed on May 22 that Wagner forces did not advance or attempt to seize any new territories on May 21 and reiterated that Wagner will hand over the responsibility for Bakhmut City to Russian MoD on May 25.[52] Prigozhin also announced that all Wagner servicemen will leave the frontlines in Ukraine by June 1 to reconstitute and train.[53] It is unclear if Prigozhin will fully withdraw his forces from Bakhmut at this time, but it is highly likely that Wagner forces must initiate a long-needed operational pause. Prigozhin denied on May 23 that his forces are exhausted and claimed that Wagner recruits 10,000 forces per month in a response to ISW’s assessment of the likely exhaustion of his forces in Bakhmut.[54] Prigozhin additionally refused to specify whether Wagner forces will soon restart offensive operations elsewhere. Prigozhin’s announced intention to withdraw his forces from the frontlines and give them two months to reconstitute likely indicates that Prigozhin assesses that his forces have been exhausted in combat, his denials notwithstanding.[55] Prigozhin had also been setting information conditions for months signaling that Wagner would not be able to continue to advance after capturing Bakhmut while observing that the Russian seizure of all of Donetsk Oblast will require years of combat.[56] ISW assessed on March 5 that “the Russian offensive in Bakhmut will likely culminate whether Russian forces capture the city or not, and the Russian military will struggle to maintain any subsequent offensive operations for some months.”[57] Prigozhin also acknowledged on May 18 that Wagner forces failed to encircle Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut – a goal that had been part of the supposed “Bakhmut meatgrinder” operation that his forces have been pursuing since Fall 2022 and Winter 2023.[58]

The Wagner Group’s announced two-month reconstitution period could have Wagner forces sitting out key parts of the Ukrainian counteroffensive depending on when and how it begins.[59] US defense officials previously expressed concerns that the Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut would undermine Ukrainian counteroffensive plans and urged Ukrainian forces to deprioritize the defense of Bakhmut.[60] ISW assessed on March 5 that “Ukrainian forces will likely have a window of opportunity to seize the battlefield initiative and launch a counteroffensive when the Russian effort around Bakhmut culminates either before or after taking the city.”[61] Wagner forces are unlikely to successfully conduct a controlled withdrawal from Bakhmut while in contact with Ukrainian forces within the next two days without disrupting the Russian MoD’s efforts to prepare for planned Ukrainian counteroffensives.[62] Conducting a relief-in-place while in contact is an extremely challenging maneuver that Russian forces would likely struggle to conduct even if the Russian MoD agrees to undertake it. Russian forces continue to transfer airborne, motorized rifle, and special forces elements to reinforce the Bakhmut flanks and these additional forces could in principle participate in Wagner’s relief-in-place operation.[63] They will not be available to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in other sectors of the front, however.

The Battle of Bakhmut exposed several key flaws in the Russian planning and conduct of operational maneuver. The Russian military command continued to pursue a relentless assault on Bakhmut after the city lost its original operational significance and failed to adjust its military objectives appropriately. The Kremlin, evidently, chased after any potential victory to generate informational effects and allowed Prigozhin to expend a large amount of Russian ammunition and thousands of prisoner recruits and then more professional forces to maintain a battle of no operational significance in Bakhmut. Prigozhin also continued this battle to gain desired political standing in Russia – likely without the intent to pursue the original goal of conducting a wider encirclement of Donbas. The Kremlin’s fixation with Bakhmut indicates that Russia has not learned lessons from the first phases of the war. The Russian military command continues to overestimate Russian military capabilities and has not mastered time and space relationships in this war at its current level of effectiveness. The Russian military command also continues to pursue ill-informed political objectives at the expense of Russian personnel and resources.

It is not even clear that the Battle of Bakhmut is yet over. Ukrainian forces have been conducting local counterattacks on Bakhmut’s flanks, having regained the initiative following Wagner’s culmination.[64] The decision to allow the battle to end or force it into a new phase now lies with Kyiv. Ukraine thus now has the initiative at every level of war across almost the entire front.

3. Marine Corps No More? By Bing West

HOOVER INSTITUTION  STANFORD UNIVERSITY

https://www.hoover.org/research/marine-corps-no-more

                                      MILITARY HISTORY IN THE NEWS            May 23, 2023

                                    MARINE CORPS NO MORE?

                                            By Bing West

Since 1775, the iconic image of the American Marine has been that of a disciplined, tough rifleman moving forward in battle, often with fixed bayonet. The Marine Corps is small, agile, and flexible, priding itself on being the first to fight, anywhere. Over the past four years, however, the current Commandant, General David H. Berger, has radically transformed the image and the mission of the Marine Corps. The primary focus now is upon developing missile units intended to sink Chinese warships. To fund those units, General Berger did away with 21% of the personnel in infantry battalions, 100% of the tanks, 67% of the cannon artillery batteries, 33% of the assault amphibious companies, nearly 30% of Marine aviation, and almost all assault breaching equipment. The desired number of large amphibious ships was reduced from 38 to 31. Due to these cuts, Marines are less capable to fight as a combined arms force. The Marine Corps cannot seize a city from an entrenched enemy, as it did Fallujah in 2004. It cannot fight on a battlefield such as Ukraine unless it queues up behind the National Guard to receive any left-over tanks and crews the U.S. Army is not employing.

What has been gained by shredding the Marine’s historic image and reducing its capability to fight in any place or clime? In theory, China is further deterred. On paper, the Marines will be prepared by 2030 to land small units on a dozen islands or atolls in the South China Sea. Each unit will include eight or ten anti-ship missiles mounted on heavy trucks, plus sophisticated naval intelligence devices to detect ship movements. When and if Chinese warships try to exit the South China Sea to attack Guam or wherever, the Marines will track and sink them.

However, the Philippines has refused to permit U.S. forces to use its bases as a staging area, let alone land on its islands in the South China Sea. Plus, the Marines don’t have the shallow-draft ships to get to those islands. The Navy is reluctant to build them and has secured the Marines’ pledge that such ships would pull out before a shooting war began. This means the Marines may never get to the islands; and if they do, they are on their own, without reinforcement or resupply. In addition, those islands are one thousand miles south of Taiwan. If Taiwan is the focus of Beijing’s future aggression, the Marines have placed themselves out of position. In short, the anti-ship mission lacks strategic coherence as well as resources.

General Berger concocted his concept in secret, not consulting the retired four-star community that, appalled by his extensive cuts, has united in opposition. Multiple articles have been written, laying out the irremediable defects in the anti-ship strategy. To sink some Chinese warships in a dubious war scenario, Marine resources and organizational cohesion have been severely damaged. General Berger’s injudicious change of direction will adversely affect Marine war-fighting capabilities, internal morale, and recruiting for years to come.

Military historian West served in Marine infantry and as assistant secretary of defense for international security. He has written a dozen books about America’s recent wars

https://www.hoover.org/research/marine-corps-no-more

4. NATO’s Future Depends On Who Wins In Ukraine

Conclusion:

This war will change the face of Europe as much as World War II did. And NATO will reflect this change. The Ukrainian people, seeking the right way to live, remind us that democracy sometimes requires accepting human risk to defend liberal principles. A Ukrainian victory would rejuvenate sleeping democracies. NATO must end the practice of trickling support into Ukraine to avoid defeat, but not enable Ukraine to crush the invaders. Time is in Putin’s corner. He still expects Western resolve to eventually crumble, or military stockpiles to become depleted, negating NATO’s capacity to provide material assistance. Russia can do what it has done in the past, use time and sheer numbers to win unless the West finds a way to defeat Russia soon. If Putin gets what he wants in Ukraine, NATO, democracy, and the rule of law will be diminished and recovering will be difficult and costly.

ARTICLES

NATO’s Future Depends On Who Wins In Ukraine

Thursday, May 18, 2023  5 min read

By: Hy Rothstein

Research Team: Military History in Contemporary Conflict Working Group

https://www.hoover.org/research/natos-future-depends-who-wins-ukraine?utm_source=pocket_reader

The future of NATO, in almost every dimension imaginable, depends on the outcome of the war in Ukraine. That outcome is unknown. While there is reason to be optimistic, events, and especially wars, can take unanticipated paths and generate unexpected results. Moreover, underestimating Putin’s willingness to kill as many Ukrainians as possible––and to throw hundreds of thousands of Russian men into the fray against Ukrainian bullets until there are no more Ukrainian bullets left––would be a big mistake. Furthermore, politicians and politics change constantly in NATO’s liberal democracies, but in his own mind, Putin is staying forever. Time and math may be on Russia’s side.

The First Year of the War—Coming Together

Many experts have suggested that the invasion will go down as one of history’s greatest geostrategic blunders. Putin clearly intended to show that Russia’s modernized military would present a formidable capability against a country that had no right to exist. And that the West, as it had done in 2014 after the annexation of Crimea and the seizing of territory in eastern Ukraine, would respond feebly. The outcome was very different. The war revealed Russian military incompetence as well as the defects of a corrupt, authoritarian political system. The Ukrainians fought and kept the Russian invaders from entering Kyiv. Putin’s plan for a quick and easy victory was shattered. Even Henry Kissinger, who for decades cautioned against Ukraine’s membership in NATO, concluded, “Ukraine is a major state in Central Europe for the first time in modern history,” and a peace process should link Ukraine to NATO. Putin generated the opposite of what he intended. More importantly, NATO, having struggled for more than two decades to reach a shared view with Moscow, finally acknowledged Putin’s expansionist agenda in Europe, and as a result came together with a common purpose to arm Ukraine and stop Russia.

NATO’s initial reluctance to assist Kyiv to fight Russia turned into a massive military assistance program. The courageous actions of President Zelensky and Ukrainian fighters, coupled with the barbaric, genocidal, and war crimes of Russian leaders and their troops, certainly helped to solidify NATO’s strong support. During his recent visit to Kyiv, President Biden expressed Western resolve and unveiled an additional $460 million U.S. weapons package to the total of $32 billion in aid since Russia's invasion began. The West’s determination to support Ukraine has been remarkable though gradual and measured. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was accurate when he recently said that the West is engaged in a proxy war with his country. Though NATO has not put boots on the ground, Western leaders’ words and deeds have made the war in Ukraine their war too, and their commitment brings its own risks.

After President Biden’s address, Putin delivered his own message of undying commitment to the fight. He addressed the Russian parliament, stressing the stakes of the war: “This is a time of radical, irreversible change in the entire world, of crucial historical events that will determine the future of our country and our people, a time when every one of us bears a colossal responsibility.” In what sounded like a wartime speech, Putin discarded the initial justification for his limited “special military operation” to “demilitarize and denazify” Ukraine, and recast the conflict as a war against Western civilization. Putin has now framed the conflict, blaming imperial America and its allies for starting the war despite Russian efforts for peace. Putin was trying to justify the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of Russians and placing Russia on a war-time footing. It also gave him political cover as he prepares for a long fight. The West, according to Putin, has become an existential threat to Russia. Now Russian soldiers will be fighting and dying to defend not just Russians in Ukraine, or even the Russian border, but their entire culture against aggression from the West. The war has become Russia against the West.

The Second Year of the War—Falling Apart?

The second year of the war will likely be more consequential than the first. Moscow seems to have gotten smarter. Strategic decisions are starting to make military sense. The partial mobilization of reservists that Putin ordered in September 2022 strengthened Russian forces at the front. The redeployment of forces to eastern Ukraine and the withdrawal of Russian forces from Kherson in November saved units from destruction and made them available for action elsewhere. Undeniably, to avert immediate disaster, Russia has been sending a mix of the trained and untrained soldiers to fight. But now, thousands of troops are receiving more substantial training in Russia and Belarus. During the first year of the war, Ukraine’s military achieved considerable success when Russia’s forces were at their weakest and its leadership was at its poorest. In 2023, the Ukrainian army should expect to fight a better led and trained opponent. A Darwinian process has produced some competent Russian planners and battlefield commanders.

Russia has also launched a brutal, methodical bombing campaign against Ukraine’s electrical system to turn the winter into a struggle for survival for Ukrainian civilians. This campaign has not proved decisive so far, but like most strategic bombing campaigns, it imposes direct and indirect military costs. For example, modern military air defense, command and control, and intelligence-gathering systems all run on electricity. While generators can fill the gap, making that transition degrades these systems’ performance. Moreover, the heat signatures produced by generators, are easily detected by Russian intelligence, facilitating further targeting. The bombing campaign also impacts the Ukrainian weapons and ammunition industry that depends on electricity, as does much of the rail system that moves war materiel around the country. NATO is helping Ukraine repair the grid, but from the Russian perspective, this is good news as the repairs consume resources that cannot be used to support fighting at the front.

Casualty figures are notoriously inaccurate. The U.S. intelligence estimates put the number of total casualties after one year of fighting at 100,000 for the Russians and 100,000 for the Ukrainians, roughly comparable for both sides. Russia has already mobilized 300,000 additional troops and routinely recruits and trains 250,000 annually. So far, Ukraine has managed to replenish its army relatively effectively. Tens of thousands of Ukrainians, eager to defend their country, have volunteered for combat. However, the manpower arithmetic works to Moscow’s advantage. Russia has 3.5 times Ukraine’s population. Russia can lose twice as many soldiers as Ukraine and still have a manpower advantage. Russia can likely do what Russia has always done––use sheer numbers to win in the end.

The math on ammunition and weapons is also complicated. Ukraine now uses Western 155mm artillery shells. They are firing these shells at twice the rate that they can be manufactured. The same problem exists with other munitions. Although there are indications of Russian ammunition shortages, ammunition plants seem to be producing munitions at a rate to keep pace with their operations. Plus, Russian munitions stockpiles seem to be plentiful, though old. NATO, in part worried about their own war stocks, is finally investing in ammunition production but it may take until next year to narrow the growing gap.

Even more troubling, while the U.S. and Germany are trying to figure out how to get the very limited numbers of tanks committed into Ukrainian hands, Russia is pulling World War II-era T-60 tanks out of storage and sending them to the battlefield because any tank is better than no tank. What is frustrating is that the U.S. and NATO are sitting on large numbers of tanks that are ready to go. Why these assets aren’t already in Ukrainian hands where they would significantly alter the balance of power against Russia is maddening. Issues such as training and logistics can be taken care of by using contractors, which is a standard military practice. Putting contractors in Ukraine would not cross any meaningful threshold of escalation. It is worth remembering that the Soviets had thousands of advisors in Vietnam assisting the North Vietnamese. Many of those advisors routinely flew combat aircraft attacking American forces on the ground. The seemingly standard pattern of denying Ukraine’s requests for certain weapons systems, only to approve the transfer later needs to stop, especially if Russia begins to receive arms from China.

In the second year of the war, there’s an increased focus on how it will end. The NATO position seems to be that Western governments will support Ukraine “as long as it takes” to drive Russian forces out of its territory. For all the bold rhetoric, it’s still uncertain how far NATO can go. There are limits to the amount of material and money Western countries can send to Ukraine. And while President Biden may want to support Ukraine for the long haul, that could quickly change, given that a segment of Republicans is increasingly opposed to doing much more to help Ukraine. Leadership changes in European countries can also upset the current trajectory of support. Fortunately for now, opinion polls show broad, if not overwhelming, U.S. and European support for backing Ukraine.

NATO’s Future is Ukraine’s Future

The first year of the war found NATO coming together to assist Ukraine beat back a poorly trained and led Russian army. The second year of the war may not be cascading in NATO’s and Ukraine’s favor, especially if Russia’s learning curve is faster than NATO’s ability to get vital weapons and munitions into Ukrainian hands. Ukraine can only sustain its fight with help from the West, and that help has generally been too little, late, and may faulter with changes in Western leadership, or significant Russian success on the battlefield. What brought NATO together in 2022 may come undone in 2023. NATO will reflect Ukraine’s fate.

The nature of reality is also on the line. Putin tells lies for power. His control is based on the production of fiction, murdering political opponents, and outlawing language contrary to official state views. Denazification, NATO’s intention to deny Russia its rightful place in the international arena, Ukraine being on the cusp of joining NATO, Ukrainians killing their Russian-speaking citizens, Ukraine not being a legitimate, independent state, the West starting the war, claiming to prevent genocide while committing it, and Putin’s warped interpretation of history are but a few examples of distorted reality. If Russia wins, the truth dies along with the hundreds of thousands of people who perished defending Ukraine.

Finally, the outcome of the war transcends what happens to Ukraine. A Russian victory would strengthen tyrants whose visions of geopolitics render any concept of a liberal democratic order obsolete. Russian actions in Ukraine make the case for what is at stake. In areas under Russian control, male Ukrainians have been murdered or forced to become cannon fodder and die at the front. Women have been raped. Millions of Ukrainians have been forcibly deported to Russia, many of them women with young children, to eliminate their Ukrainian heritage and force them to accept being Russian or face prison and torture. Russia has destroyed Ukrainian archives, libraries, universities, and publishing houses to erase Ukraine. The war is about the future of a democracy, the principle of self-rule, and the rule of law. A Ukrainian victory would confirm this. A Russian victory would destroy hope for countries working towards a democratic future and the rule of law.

This war will change the face of Europe as much as World War II did. And NATO will reflect this change. The Ukrainian people, seeking the right way to live, remind us that democracy sometimes requires accepting human risk to defend liberal principles. A Ukrainian victory would rejuvenate sleeping democracies. NATO must end the practice of trickling support into Ukraine to avoid defeat, but not enable Ukraine to crush the invaders. Time is in Putin’s corner. He still expects Western resolve to eventually crumble, or military stockpiles to become depleted, negating NATO’s capacity to provide material assistance. Russia can do what it has done in the past, use time and sheer numbers to win unless the West finds a way to defeat Russia soon. If Putin gets what he wants in Ukraine, NATO, democracy, and the rule of law will be diminished and recovering will be difficult and costly.

5. U.S. distances itself from raid into Russia that involved American military vehicles

My recommendation would be not to try to distance ourselves but would be to focus on exploiting the influence opportunity to highlight why these Russian -pro-Ukrainian forces will attack their homeland. In addition, distancing ourselves from this serves no purpose except to delude ourselves that somehow Putin will believe we had no role in it and therefore will not escaleta actions against us. We should never confirm or deny our involvement (even though in this case it was very likely we were not involved nor even knew such an attack would take place) but instead focus on exploiting every action to support influence operations.

The bottom line is that denials serve no positive purpose. They do not effectively influence Putin (in the way we intend), they most likely are no effective with the international target audience, and they likely undermine Ukraine's confidence in our support. Lastly they make us look timid and weak while large scale combat operations are taking place with the partner we are supporting.

U.S. distances itself from raid into Russia that involved American military vehicles

Moscow said Tuesday it had fought off an assault in its Belgorod region after two days of battles with attackers who had staged a cross-border raid.

NBC News · by Alexander Smith, Caroline Radnofsky and Matthew Mulligan

The United States has sought to distance itself from a dramatic raid into Russian territory by pro-Ukraine forces who appeared to use American equipment in their attack.

Moscow said Tuesday it had fought off an assault into its Belgorod region after two days of battles with attackers who had staged a cross-border raid.

Much is unclear about the fighting. Russia says the raid was conducted by saboteurs from the Ukrainian military; Ukraine says it was carried out by Russian citizens who rose up independently.

Washington has provided billions of dollars of military assistance to Kyiv, but has sought to restrict its use to the defense of Ukrainian territory rather than attacks on Russian soil that could potentially be used as a reason for the Kremlin to escalate the conflict.

Video posted by the Russian Defense Ministry and verified by NBC News show U.S.-made Humvee and "MRAP" armored vehicles at a Russian border checkpoint following the alleged incursion by pro-Ukraine and anti-Putin fighters.

The Russian Volunteer Corps, who claim to be Russians fighting on behalf of Ukraine and who have claimed to be behind a previous cross-border raid, also posted video on Wednesday morning showing them in possession of MRAP American military vehicles, although it wasn’t clear where it was filmed.

Denis Nikitin, the far-right nationalist leader of the Russian Volunteer Corps, told the Financial Times newspaper that his group was in possession of the American-made vehicles but declined to say how they got them.

Video released by the Russian Defence Ministry shows armored fighting vehicles in the Belgorod region on Tuesday. Russian Defense Ministry / EPA via Shutterstock

The vehicles were destroyed by Russian forces, according to the Kremlin.Russian Defense Ministry / EPA via Shutterstock

Some analysts questioned the appearance of the vehicles in the video shared by the Russian defense ministry, drawing attention to a lack of visible damage and their placement.

“It’s possible the vehicles were used in some form of assault, but it’s also possible the image is staged — a longstanding practice of disinformation employed by the Kremlin to cast a narrative. This narrative conveniently matched the domestic Russian audience narrative that the U.S. and NATO threaten the security of Russia,” said Clint Watts, a national security analyst for NBC News and MSNBC.

Asked about the images, U.S. officials said they were monitoring the reports.

"It’s something we’re keeping a close eye on," Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder, a Defense Department spokesman, said when asked about the reports of American vehicles being used. "I don't know if it's true or not, in terms of the veracity of that imagery."

He added that the U.S. has not authorized Ukraine to give this equipment to anyone else, and that Ukraine has not asked.

State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said "we’re skeptical at this time of the veracity of these reports."

Both spokespeople stressed that the U.S. does not "encourage or enable strikes inside of Russia," as Miller put it. “But as we’ve also said,” he added, “it is up to Ukraine to decide how to conduct this war.”

This caveat is part of a wider debate in the West about how much military backing to give Ukraine without provoking a direct war with President Vladimir Putin.

"It is no secret to us that more and more equipment is being supplied" to Ukraine, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said in a daily news briefing Wednesday. And "it's no secret that this equipment is used against our military," he said.

Turning his attention to the U.S. and its allies, he added, "It's no secret that the direct and indirect involvement of these Western countries in this conflict is growing every day. We draw the appropriate conclusions," he added without elaborating.

Half of Americans support the Pentagon's ongoing supply of weapons to Ukraine, according to a survey by the University of Chicago's Harris School of Public Policy and the The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research this week.

If the images of American vehicles are genuine, it's not clear how they came to be used in a battle on Russian soil.

Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov said 70 attackers, who he said were saboteurs from the Ukraine military, were killed but did not mention Russian casualties.

Kyiv denies this. Andriy Yusov, a spokesman for Ukraine's military intelligence directorate, said in a voice note to NBC News that the attackers were Russian citizens from the Russian Volunteer Corps, a far-right nationalist group, and the Freedom of Russia Legion.

The militias "acted completely autonomously," he said, while the Ukrainian army is "engaged solely in the liberation of occupied Ukrainian territories within the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine."

The Freedom of Russia Legion describes itself as a group of Russians fighting on behalf of Ukraine against the Kremlin. Some members of the group have expressed Neo-Nazi ideologies.

The group said in its Telegram channel that the goal of the operation was to “liberate” the border region, which lies some 45 miles north of the city of Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine and far from the war's front lines.

NBC News · by Alexander Smith, Caroline Radnofsky and Matthew Mulligan

6. A Surplus of Strategists—But A Lack of Good Strategy

An interesting critique. Is the answer to every problem simply to militarize it? Do we really do that? And is there a better way to educate strategists? I have taught at two major institutions that educate "strategists" (National War College and Georgetown's Security Studies Program) and I thought both institutions did a fine job academically. But I know I am too close to the problem and I need to step back and re-evaluate.

It is one thing to use your education to craft a strategy and propose it to elected leaders for execution. It is quite another to iteratively execute that strategy in a competitive environment. Yes good strategists can update assumptions and recommend updates to the strategy based on adversary reactions and changing conditions but too often they are cut out from the decision making process. Too often once a strategy is executed there is little appetite among decision makers to hear about necessary changes. Most of the "educated" strategists are not in a position to execute the strategy and make the hard strategic decisions. And most of the decision makers who have to make the hard decisions are not educated as strategists.

Excerpts:

This gets at the fundamental problem: for the United States, the typical answer is to militarize problems that may elude purely military solutions. Our national security leadership appears incapable—even after immense amounts of so-called “strategic education”—to be able to look at an emerging strategic challenge and ask themselves: 1) what are its unique characteristics and requirements; and 2) do we actually have the tools/capabilities to achieve the desired political outcomes? Lacking this ability, they too often default—ineffectively at best and catastrophically at worst—to the toxic belief that if we just apply enough force, we can achieve whatever goal we desire.

...

So, is there a better way to educate our national security leaders? Ultimately, today’s complex strategic environment requires a fundamentally different set of skills. To be sure, we need a strong understanding of strategic foresight, future literacy, and complex systems. We must also acknowledge that today’s hyper-connected strategic challenges are not so much solvable as they are merely manageable. Strategic foresight—which involves the practice of envisioning alternative futures in order to better sense, shape, and adapt to change—can help. It cultivates a tolerance for uncertainty, which cognitive psychology tells us can reduce judgmental bias and promote non-linear thinking.

A Surplus of Strategists—But A Lack of Good Strategy

What does the U.S. government have to show for millions spent on strategic education?

The National Interest · by Josh Kerbel · May 23, 2023

If you happened to be waiting for your morning coffee at the Starbucks in the Pentagon, you might not be aware that you are surrounded by what is probably the world’s highest density of strategists. Every year, without fail, thousands of mid-level and senior military officers as well as their civilian counterparts will complete some form of professional education that prepares them to be strategists or emphasizes strategic thinking. But what is the true payoff of all the money the U.S. government spends on “strategic education” aside from all those fancy certificates on office walls in Washington DC? A quick look at the last two decades of American global strategy suggests strategic education may simply have become a rite of passage instead of something to be put into practice.

To be sure, every student who attends a strategic education program is undoubtedly familiar with Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz, who famously wrote that “war is a continuation of politics by other means.” But it seems that two decades of American strategists have forgotten (or worse, never truly absorbed) Clausewitz’s prescient admonition that politicians and military commanders must “recognize the kind of war they are undertaking, neither mistaking it for, nor attempting to turn it into something it cannot be because of the nature of the circumstances.” Our track record certainly leaves much to be desired. Over the past twenty years, the $6 trillion Afghanistan and Iraq debacles were followed by more regime change in Libya, plunging that country into a civil war (and subsequent proxy war) that rages to this day. Western attempts to overthrow Syria’s Bashar al-Assad were blunted by Russian support, ensuring Assad remains firmly in control. American strategy failed to deter Russia from invading Georgia in 2008 or Ukraine in 2014 and again in 2022. Finally, the hawkish consensus emerging in Washington (i.e. a “New Cold War”?) that conflict with China is increasingly likely—if not inevitable—risks excessively securitizing every aspect of the U.S.-China relationship.

How did we get here? The United States, at least since industrialization, has won its wars (when it’s won them) through the overwhelming application of force and firepower. We have essentially churned out awe-inspiring amounts of war material that we brought directly to bear on clearly identified and traditional (nation-state) opponents who could not match or withstand it. While not necessarily pretty, it was effective. This highly linear approach (action “x” will lead to predictable/intended effect “y”) to warfare became our default strategic playbook.

Unfortunately, such a linear approach is often insufficient in highly complex, interconnected, and interdependent environments. In today’s world, the challenges are much more multi-dimensional and don’t often present a clearly identifiable military center of gravity—never mind one whose damage or destruction can be easily translated into political objectives.

This gets at the fundamental problem: for the United States, the typical answer is to militarize problems that may elude purely military solutions. Our national security leadership appears incapable—even after immense amounts of so-called “strategic education”—to be able to look at an emerging strategic challenge and ask themselves: 1) what are its unique characteristics and requirements; and 2) do we actually have the tools/capabilities to achieve the desired political outcomes? Lacking this ability, they too often default—ineffectively at best and catastrophically at worst—to the toxic belief that if we just apply enough force, we can achieve whatever goal we desire.

Instead of learning from our past mistakes, we are doubling down on failed strategic approaches. The same voices that led us into the strategic fiascos of the past two decades still loom large in contemporary security debates. Turn on any cable news show and you’ll see one of the architects or enablers of these failed policies lecturing us on the “right way ahead.” Apparently, even relying on one’s “gut instincts” alone (as one recent Air Force memo suggests) is an acceptable means of making strategy. Part of this problem, however, lies in a dangerous culture of toxic positivity within the national security establishment. There is a big difference between a proactive, “can-do” approach and a failure to simply look facts in the face. The unintended consequences and outcomes of excessively linear thinking over the last twenty years underscore this reality.

So, is there a better way to educate our national security leaders? Ultimately, today’s complex strategic environment requires a fundamentally different set of skills. To be sure, we need a strong understanding of strategic foresight, future literacy, and complex systems. We must also acknowledge that today’s hyper-connected strategic challenges are not so much solvable as they are merely manageable. Strategic foresight—which involves the practice of envisioning alternative futures in order to better sense, shape, and adapt to change—can help. It cultivates a tolerance for uncertainty, which cognitive psychology tells us can reduce judgmental bias and promote non-linear thinking.

As we shift to building artificial intelligence-based platforms and data solutions, we must also deliberately develop intellectual capital. Seizing and occupying the high ground in national security requires more than just “buying things,” developing weapons systems, or pursuing disruptive technologies. It requires security professionals to have the cognitive capacity to leverage them. Perhaps most importantly, we need a new approach to strategic education that produces leaders that are humble and not paralyzed—or worse, driven to obsolete default behaviors—by the unavoidable uncertainty of today’s complex world. We need more leaders who can bring themselves, when appropriate, to say “no, we probably can’t achieve that through military means, but we might be able to do this with the range of tools we have available.” After twenty years of failures, American taxpayers ought to know that their government has a plan to effectively leverage this cadre of strategists in whom they have invested so much.

Josh Kerbel is a member of the research faculty at the National Intelligence University, the academic arm of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Lt. Col. Jake Sotiriadis, USAF, Ph.D., is a career Air Force intelligence officer. He currently serves on the research faculty at the National Intelligence University and is Director of the Center for Futures Intelligence.

The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the official positions of the U.S. intelligence community or the Department of Defense.

Image: Felix Mittermeier/Unsplash.

The National Interest · by Josh Kerbel · May 23, 2023​

7. What Should a Strategist Know and Do, and Why

Graphics at the link: https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/what-should-a-strategist-know-and-do-and-why/

Excerpts:

In developing the matrix and the process, we did not simply state the obvious. The competencies we propose are rigorously developed from a specific realist strategic theory. They are parsimonious, covering only the essential requirements of sound strategic planning and action. The competitive nature of great power competition drives the strategic process. The strategic matrix is adapted to specific use, planning, and doing in adversarial conditions, avoiding generic coverage of all possible nuances of strategic engagement.

We should also distinguish between the strategic competencies defined above and strategic analysis. We know that strategic analysis writ large is a meta-theoretical approach derived from game theory[xxi] and public choice theory.[xxii] Its application to international relations is, ultimately, a particular case of a broader domain of inquiry. Thus, our theory, applications, and competencies may be seen as domain-specific applications of strategic analysis. Connecting them with higher-level theory might lead to more rigorous analytic methods for future strategists. After all, the human choice dilemmas identified by strategic analysis are revealed in crisper detail by the struggle for power in international relations.

The methods developed for defining and utilizing competencies in context should not be used dogmatically. The refrain of this paper is that strategy is not a recipe. Strategies require creative thinking and practical use of competencies to map variable means onto fixed ends.[xxiii] Using indirect thinking at the resourcing phase, by which false capabilities are touted and real ones hidden, can be a very appropriate means to gain strategic advantage. The only limit that can be imposed on strategic thinking and doing is staying true to its goals while following the original policy. Like a jazz musician, a good strategist can shift the tune and vary the register but should obtain the same predictable artistic effect.

What Should a Strategist Know and Do, and Why - Military Strategy Magazine

Sorin Adam Matei, Kira Graves, David Benson - Purdue University, Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy, Critical Thinking Enterprise, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, Wargames and Simulations at Valens Global, USA

militarystrategymagazine.com

Defining Strategy: Theory and Dimensions

Big, broad words that cover many specific situations ultimately pay the price for their notoriety. They collect meanings the way a windshield picks up grime, degrading visibility. Big common interest words become placeholders for people’s many private understandings. Strategy is such a shapeshifting concept. For some, strategy is a definite course of action [i]; for others, a bag of tricks.[ii] Strategy can be tied to ideal goals, lacking bite, or can become a vague roadmap. Strategic education suffers enormously from these two semantic pitfalls. The premises, the expectations, and the skills associated with strategic thinking and doing are ambiguous, confusing, or lacking.

A good concept demands a sound definition. Definitions must be rigorously formulated, containing the necessary conditions that make the concept unique and unchanging in time and space.[iii] Furthermore, the conditions are not simple verbal crutches; they are the concept’s core dimensions. These features should be turned into specific differentiating factors that give the concept individuality. Factors are not only theoretical; they should be employed in practice. Differentiating factors should be turned into competencies that can train anyone in any context. However, the differentiating factors need to be necessary and sufficient. Because of this, they should be derived from a theoretical model of international actor behavior.[iv] This model should flow from a core premise, grounding the factors. Only after proposing a model and deriving core dimensions can we advance specific learning objectives, competencies, and methods for training strategists.

Smith and Stone preceded us in the pages of this magazine by offering a dimensional definition of strategy.[v] The components of any good strategy proposed by them and relevant to our article include matching ends with means, interdependence in decision-making, and assumption of rationality. As shown below, the dimensions are validated by our process-based perspective and general theory. Other dimensions, however, such as Smith and Stone’s call for moral neutrality,[vi] should be considered in a more nuanced way.

We propose that strategic practice and a set of necessary competencies should be anchored by a theory of international order that rests on three overarching assumptions. [vii] One, international actors aim to preserve or enhance their autonomy. Two, international norms or laws are the product of this desire. Norms prevent the stronger actors from imposing their will on the weaker while providing the former enough leeway to counter. Third, the balance of power periodically adjusted by conflict is intrinsic to the dynamic of international order [viii]. The theory predicts that strategy always creates net effects in the world, a perspective shared by Gray, as well, including in this magazine.[ix] Strategy is not a vague plan or description of ideal end states[x] but the aggregated means to change a specific state of the world to one’s advantage.[xi] Strategy is a series of concatenated decisions that lead to effects that require more decisions.[xii] It is a means to change the world by working off effects-of-effects. These requirements demand that strategies should include a forward-looking, anticipatory perspective.

Strategy is also conducted against opposition, which often demands alliances. Thus, strategy is a network problem. To achieve the goals of containing or defeating adversaries while maintaining robust allies, strategies must be built on a solid foundation of strategic empathy with multiple partners or their second-degree partners.[xiii] This, however, is not a call to feel-good generosity. It is necessary to understand all actors from the perspective of their core values. Alliances are required to effectively counter the enemy’s strengths and exploit its vulnerabilities while bolstering the strengths of allies. Identifying strengths and weaknesses of friend and foe requires an in-depth understanding and the ability to analyze the situation accurately. A critical outcome of this process is the alignment of means to the desired end-state, identifying the necessary trade-offs required to achieve the goals.

The World War II allied leaders, especially Churchill, displayed, for the most part, excellent strategic empathy. While Churchill had no illusions about Stalin’s grand strategy and his status as a “enemy friend,” he understood where and when interests converged. Continuing the British Lend and Lease program in 1942 when the British were hurting in North Africa was such a moment of strategic empathy.[xiv]

Strategy has a communicative aspect, as well. It should include both actions that can be disclosed and actions that need to remain confidential. Furthermore, a certain amount of pre-emptive misdirection of the adversary’s perception should be included in any strategy, introducing an element of surprise to augment the results of one’s actions. Finally, strategy should include an ethical dimension. However, ethics has two facets, one reflecting the values of each actor and the other global, human ethics. The challenge in formulating an ethical boundary around strategies is balancing the two. Ethics is an essential facet of any strategy if the results should be justifiable in the long run.

Strategic competencies

Returning to the core assumption of our theory, it is worth re-emphasizing that these necessary aspects of strategy are anchored by the fact that actors want to protect their autonomy and self-interest. Actors always aim to create favorable net effects that enhance their position.[xv] However, working against opposition, strategic analysis, and empathy typically advise adopting a balance of power behavior that requires alliances and trade-off thinking.

Building on these factors that give strategy identity, we propose that the necessary preconditions for any strategy can also be seen as competencies practiced by strategists, which all educators should employ as learning objectives and metrics for their strategy courses. Competencies, in this context, are “knowledge sets in action”.[xvi] They combine theoretical with procedural knowledge demonstrated both in analytic and actional terms. From the theoretical perspective and the assumptions named above, we can propose a set of necessary and, within the context, sufficient competencies. These are:

1. Analytic thinking (discriminant definitory skills)
2. Systems thinking
3. Tradeoff optimization
4. Effects-of-effects iterative planning
5. Indirect thinking
6. Strategic Foresight
7. Strategic Empathy
8. Ethical balancing of interests

The eight competencies are derived from the realist theory of international relations already described.

1. Analytic thinking is deduced from the need to rigorously understand friend and foe before asserting autonomy, a core requirement of realist theory.
2. Systems thinking is demanded by the holistic nature of any strategic problem and the natural entanglements that surround any attempt to induce a net effect in the state of the world.
3. Tradeoff optimization is demanded by the need to balance our approach to influencing our friends’ strengths and limiting their weaknesses while denying the strengths and amplifying the weaknesses of our enemies. According to our realist theory, the goal is, again, to maximize one’s freedom of action and mastery of the environment.
4. Effects of effects planning result from the intrinsically dynamic nature of strategic action.
5. Indirect thinking is the product of selective communication and the misdirection of the enemy’s attention.
6. Strategic foresight involves long-range anticipatory thinking and the ability to create a range of plausible futures derived from continuously updating assumptions and understanding the changing landscape.
7. Strategic empathy is derived from the need to understand both enemies and friends regarding their views and principles without giving in to identification with those views. The goal is to avoid wishful thinking.
8. Ethical balancing of interests refers to infusing the strategy and shaping its outcomes to satisfy the actor’s values while keeping them balanced with fundamental, universal human values.

These strategic competencies are necessary and sufficient not only theoretically but practically. This is a cyclical process that follows a straightforward logic:

The first step of the strategic process involves resourcing, identifying the material and human factors that can be used to affect the needed change. Resourcing is not just a matter of identification but also of accounting and trading off one type of resource against another. In effect, resourcing is a type of budgeting requiring a solid understanding of economic and human resource principles. Naval powers, such as Venice, the British Empire, and later the United States, learned this lesson well, even when the war took them unawares, as was the case for the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although caught on the wrong resourcing foot, fielding an insufficient carrier force in the Pacific, despite vast commitments, the US made up for this shortcoming with a vengeance. Starting the war with a dozen aircraft carriers, the US Navy finished it with over 100 and a completely different force structure.[xvii]

More than the nation’s resources are needed for creating large-scale, grand strategy net effect changes in the world. Alliances and preventing counter alliances should be continuously negotiated. Domestic support should also be obtained via political negotiations. Thus, the must-have negotiation stage. Negotiations and alliance formation are distinct features of modern war, starting with the first global conflict, the Seven Years War (1757 – 1763), and its sequel, the American Revolutionary War, to the Great Coalitions that defeated Napoleon,[xviii] Hitler,[xix] or Saddam Hussein.[xx]

The strategic process continues with the deployment phase, within which the resources and assets are positioned for maximum effect. Deployment is not a mere logistics exercise. It is a strategic decision of its own, by which threats and inducements are used to funnel the adversaries’ actions and facilitate future actions.

Competencies and the strategic process

Once set in place, strategic assets are put in motion to affect the net change necessary to achieve the strategic goals imposed by the policy in the operational stage. Momentary choices and thinking in terms of longer-term consequences are continuously balanced. Operations may take short or long periods; however, they are bound by the requirement to reach an expected result. Once this is achieved (or not), the strategist needs to reconsider the options that have opened and or that have been lost. The conclusions will help realign future policy and strategy goals. A new cycle of resourcing, negotiation, deployment, and operations will start, keeping the strategic process fresh and relevant.

An effective strategist stands out by using the right competencies at the right time in the strategic process. While strategic competencies are generic enough to be relevant in most contexts, their usefulness is maximized and employed in a particular order of priority. The strategic competency matrix below indicates which competency is most needed at a given stage of the strategic process.

The dark blocks indicate where each competency is primarily developed and utilized. Grey blocks indicate where a competency may be used, but it is not as essential. White boxes indicate stages where the competencies can be used “as needed.” Across the board, we first notice that the competency most necessary and constantly present in the strategic thinking and doing process is systems thinking. Every phase of the strategic process should be imbued with the understanding that there are no local decisions or outcomes. All decisions have system-wide implications, and all outcomes will be impacted by how strategists employ systems thinking. Second, negotiation is the phase of the strategic process that necessitates the highest number of competencies. All grand strategies die or live by the strengths of the alliances and promises made (or deftly broken) to the adversaries. A good strategy needs to negotiate its terms by limiting the adversary’s degrees of freedom.

Conclusions

This article proposes that strategy is a method, not a definite plan, to achieve a political goal: to create net effects in the international order that promote the interests of a given actor. The method uses tradeoff analysis to limit uncertainty. Policy defines strategic objectives, which are always relative to the aims of the opposing side. National self-interest drives all policies, which hinge on maximizing autonomy. When executing a strategy, nations aim to achieve their national goals while preventing any given country from becoming an overwhelming global ruler. Finally, while systematic and rigorous, strategies are not predictable in a deterministic way. Any given strategy does have a starting point and goal, but it can take multiple courses. These are imposed by the competitors’ responses and the need to surprise the enemy. Feints, surprise, and deceit are necessary elements of a successful strategy. Because of this, it is worth repeating that a good strategy is not a recipe. It is a plan working against necessity with practicality while not forgetting to secure national survival primacy.

At the same time, this article points out that strategic thinking and doing can be rigorously defined as a set of competencies used in a prioritized manner within the five stages of the strategic process: resourcing, negotiation, deployment, operations, and re-alignment. These competencies refer to analytic and situation management abilities originating in theoretical knowledge: analysis, system thinking, tradeoff optimization, effects-of-effects planning and timing, indirect thinking, strategic empathy, and ethical balancing of interests. A matrix-based method suggests that the competencies should be used selectively within the five stages of the strategic process. Contextual needs determine the selection of the competencies.

In developing the matrix and the process, we did not simply state the obvious. The competencies we propose are rigorously developed from a specific realist strategic theory. They are parsimonious, covering only the essential requirements of sound strategic planning and action. The competitive nature of great power competition drives the strategic process. The strategic matrix is adapted to specific use, planning, and doing in adversarial conditions, avoiding generic coverage of all possible nuances of strategic engagement.

We should also distinguish between the strategic competencies defined above and strategic analysis. We know that strategic analysis writ large is a meta-theoretical approach derived from game theory[xxi] and public choice theory.[xxii] Its application to international relations is, ultimately, a particular case of a broader domain of inquiry. Thus, our theory, applications, and competencies may be seen as domain-specific applications of strategic analysis. Connecting them with higher-level theory might lead to more rigorous analytic methods for future strategists. After all, the human choice dilemmas identified by strategic analysis are revealed in crisper detail by the struggle for power in international relations.

The methods developed for defining and utilizing competencies in context should not be used dogmatically. The refrain of this paper is that strategy is not a recipe. Strategies require creative thinking and practical use of competencies to map variable means onto fixed ends.[xxiii] Using indirect thinking at the resourcing phase, by which false capabilities are touted and real ones hidden, can be a very appropriate means to gain strategic advantage. The only limit that can be imposed on strategic thinking and doing is staying true to its goals while following the original policy. Like a jazz musician, a good strategist can shift the tune and vary the register but should obtain the same predictable artistic effect.

References

Britannica, Encyclopedia. “Balance of Power | Definition & Examples.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed August 11, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/topic/balance-of-power.

Cassidy, John Robert. “Aristotle on Definitions.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 5, no. 2 (1967): 110–18. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1967.tb02000.x.

Churchill, Winston S. The Grand Alliance. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986.

Craig, Campbell. Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.

Elkus,. “Beyond Strategy as a Means to an End.” Military Strategy Magazine, Winter 2014.

Gervais, J. “The Operational Definition of Competency-Based Education.” The Journal of Competency-Based Education 1, no. 2 (2016): 98–106. https://doi.org/10.1002/cbe2.1011.

Gray, Colin S. “Can Strategy Be Taught?” Military Strategy Magazine, Winter 2019, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice. Reprint edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Hanania, Richard. Public Choice Theory and the Illusion of Grand Strategy: How Generals, Weapons Manufacturers, and Foreign Governments Shape American Foreign Policy. 1st edition. Routledge, 2021.

Hill, Alexander. “British Lend Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941 June 1942.” The Journal of Military History 71, no. 3 (2007): 773–808.

Hone, Thomas C. “Replacing Battleships with Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific in World War Ii.” Naval War College Review 66, no. 1 (2013): 56–76.

Luttwak, Edward N. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Revised and Enlarged Edition. 2nd edition. Harvard University Press, 2002.

McMaster, H. R. Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World. Illustrated edition. New York, NY: Harper, 2020.

Parker, Geoffrey. The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800. 2nd edition. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Rapp-Hooper, Mira. Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2020.

Schelling, Thomas C. Choice and Consequence. 1st Paperback Edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985.———. The Strategy of Conflict: With a New Preface by the Author. 2nd edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981.

Smith, MLR, and Stone, John. “Explaining Strategic Theory.” Military Strategy Magazine, Fall 2011.

Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. Translated by Ralph D. Sawyer. Boulder: LITTL, 1994.

Watkins, Michael D. “Demystifying Strategy: The What, Who, How, and Why.” Harvard Business Review, September 10, 2007. https://hbr.org/2007/09/demystifying-strategy-the-what.

[i] Watkins, “Demystifying Strategy.”

[ii] Tzu, The Art of War.

[iii] Cassidy, “Aristotle on Definitions.”

[iv] Smith and Stone, John, “Explaining Strategic Theory.”

[v] Smith and Stone, John.

[vi] Smith and Stone, John.

[vii] Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz.

[viii] Britannica, “Balance of Power | Definition & Examples.”

[ix] Gray, The Strategy Bridge; Gray, “Can Strategy Be Taught?”

[x] Elkus, “Beyond Strategy as a Means to an End.”

[xi] Gray, The Strategy Bridge.

[xii] Luttwak, Strategy.

[xiii] McMaster, Battlegrounds.

[xiv] Hill, “British Lend Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941 June 1942.”

[xv] Gray, The Strategy Bridge.

[xvi] Gervais, “The Operational Definition of Competency-Based Education.”

[xvii] Hone, “Replacing Battleships with Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific in World War Ii.”

[xviii] Parker, The Military Revolution.

[xix] Churchill, The Grand Alliance.

[xx] Rapp-Hooper, Shields of the Republic.

[xxi] Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict; Schelling, Choice and Consequence.

[xxii] Hanania, Public Choice Theory and the Illusion of Grand Strategy.

[xxiii] Elkus, “Beyond Strategy as a Means to an End.”

​Authors:

​Sorin Adam Matei, Associate Dean of Research, is a Professor, Senior Fellow at the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy, and FORCES Initiative director at Purdue University. He holds a BA in History and Philosophy from Bucharest University, an MA in IR from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and a PhD in Communication Technology Research from Annenberg School, University of Southern California.

Dr. Kira Graves is the Assistant TRADOC G-2, Director for the Critical Thinking Enterprise at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, and author of the “Future Hunters” course at Army University.

Dr. David Benson is Director of Wargames and Simulations at Valens Global. He was previously a Professor of Security and Strategic Studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) at Air University, Montgomery, AL. While at Air University, David was a primary investigator with the DAWG and DAGGER projects.

militarystrategymagazine.com

8. Glorious Amateurs: The Legendary OSS of World War II

Excellent photos at the link: https://coffeeordie.com/oss

Glorious Amateurs: The Legendary OSS of World War II

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May 19, 2023Matt Fratus

Marlene Dietrich served in the Morale Branch of the OSS. Photo courtesy of the International Spy Museum.

On March 5, 1944, Flight Officer Chuck Yeager bailed out of his P-51 Mustang and pulled the ripcord of his parachute at 8,000 feet. His aircraft plummeted to the ground and exploded on impact. Yeager landed safely in a forest clearing somewhere in Nazi-occupied France. 

Almost immediately, half a dozen French resistance fighters were at Yeager’s location. They stashed his parachute, then whisked him to a nearby safe house. Yeager’s bomber jacket was exchanged for civilian clothes, and he was given enough food to fill his stomach. 

Over the next two weeks, the pilot and his rescuers moved clandestinely through the French countryside, evading the Gestapo as they jumped from safe house to safe house en route to the Pyrenees mountains. The Pyrenees provided one of the most reliable escape routes out of France during World War II. Accompanied by local guides, Yeager and three other American aviators trekked through the snowy mountains for four days before finally arriving in neutral Spain. 

The men and women who assisted Yeager in his escape were not just random strangers. They belonged to a highly organized network of resistance groups who worked in close cooperation with Allied intelligence to rescue GIs stranded in enemy territory. Over the course of World War II, the network helped approximately 1,000 downed airmen and escaped prisoners of war sneak across France’s treacherous southern border and reach friendly lines through Spain. 

Related: Inside The OSS’s League of Lonely War Women

The Limping Lady

Virginia Hall was a legendary intelligence officer having worked with the British SOE and American OSS during World War II. She later served with the CIA after it was established in 1947. Photo courtesy of the CIA.

Among the most famous individuals involved in the rescue efforts was Virginia Hall, a one-legged foreign service officer from Baltimore, Maryland. Prior to becoming a secret agent, Hall had worked as an ambulance driver for the army of France and was in the country when it fell to the Germans. In 1941, while living in neighboring Spain, she was recruited by the Special Operations Executive — the British counterpart to the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS — to help the agency forge a working partnership with the nascent French resistance movement.

Hall returned to France disguised as a reporter for the New York Post. Basing herself in the city of Lyon, she and her team got to work organizing the various partisan groups in the country into a unified rebel force. The job also entailed establishing safe houses to shelter other secret agents, as well as Allied airmen and fugitive POWs trying to evade the Gestapo. Hall’s work did so much to bolster the resistance that the Gestapo added her to their most-wanted list, labeling her “The Limping Lady,” as they didn’t know her actual name.

In 1942, the Germans seized control of the city of Vichy, one of Hall’s main areas of operations. At risk of capture, she used the same escape route established by her team to flee the country over the Pyrenees, all while lugging her prosthetic leg, which she called “Cuthbert,” through ice and snow. Hall eventually returned once more to occupied France, except this time as a member of the OSS, the forerunner to the CIA. 

Related:The Daring Exploits of Virginia Hall, World War II’s Most Notorious Spy

The OSS Director Was a Medal of Honor Recipient

“Wild Bill” Donovan was one of the most decorated soldiers of World War I. He was awarded the Silver Star, Distinguished Service Cross, and the Medal of Honor. Photo courtesy of the CIA.

The security failures that allowed Japan to carry out its devastating attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 led President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to establish America’s first spy agency devoted to the work of collecting intelligence abroad. 

Roosevelt tasked an aging yet battle-hardened US Army officer named  William J. Donovan with drafting the blueprint for the new agency. Known as “Wild Bill,” Donovan had served in World War I as the commanding officer of the US Army’s 165th Infantry Regiment. Donovan’s commendations included the Medal of Honor, which he earned in October 1918 while fighting near the French town of Landres-et-St. Georges. According to his award citation, then-Lt. Col. Donovan led his men in a successful assault on a heavily defended German position. He was shot in the leg but refused evacuation.

Donovan returned to the States a bona fide war hero. He became a successful lawyer in New York and even ran for governor. Though his campaign failed, it gained him the political connections that would ultimately put him on Roosevelt’s radar.

“Wild Bill” Donovan, second from left, in Burma, where he risked his life by going behind enemy lines. Photo courtesy of the OSS Society.

The president’s first task for Donovan was to embark on a world tour to meet with foreign leaders and intelligence officials in order to forge strategic partnerships for conducting covert operations in the Mediterranean. His journey took him to several European and North African countries. In England, he met with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill as well as the heads of Britain’s Ministry of Economic Warfare, Political Warfare Executive, and the heads of the SOE.

After Donovan returned to Washington, Roosevelt named him Coordinator of Information, the head of the nation’s first peacetime intelligence agency. A year later, in June 1942, the agency was reorganized into the OSS, with Donovan still at the helm.

Donovan was promoted to the rank of major general when he assumed command of the OSS. He organized the agency into two main divisions: Intelligence Services and Strategic Services Operations. 

Intelligence Services units included Secret Intelligence, X-2 (counterintelligence), Research & Analysis, Foreign Nationalities (domestic-based intelligence collected from foreign national groups for psychological operations abroad), and Censorship & Documents. Strategic Services Operations was composed of Special Operations, Morale Operations, Maritime Unit, Special Projects, Field Experimental Unit, and Operational Groups. 

Related: How Irish American Spymaster ‘Wild Bill’ Donovan Earned His Nickname

Oh So Social vs. The Glorious Amateurs

Chinese paratrooper trainees and their OG instructors prior to their first mass tactical jump, China 1945. US Army photo.

Early on, the OSS earned a not-so-flattering nickname because of its reputation as an agency made up of aristocrats and Ivy Leaguers. As Washington’s old guard saw it, OSS officers were more interested in attending “Oh So Social” cocktail parties than performing tradecraft in the field.  

In time, the OSS overcame that reputation as Donovon filled its ranks with highly educated men and women who were also willing to get their hands dirty. The ideal OSS officer, according to Donovan, was a “Ph.D. who could win a bar fight.” He liked to refer to the members of his unit as “glorious amateurs” because many of them lacked prior military experience but ultimately proved to be highly capable spies.

The so-called glorious amateurs came from all walks of life, such as singer Marlene Dietrich, who was already internationally famous when she volunteered for service with the OSS. Dietrich was assigned to the OSS’s Morale Branch, which was responsible for disseminating anti-Axis propaganda across Europe and the Far East. Her primary job was writing and recording music intended to cause friction among enemy troops.

Sterling Hayden, right, served in the Maritime Unit with the OSS. Photo courtesy of the OSS Society.

Since her involvement with the OSS was a secret, her music was broadcasted uncensored around the world. Her most famous piece of propaganda, the hit song “Lili Marlene,” became so popular in Germany that the Nazi government eventually caught on and banned it from being played on the radio. 

Another notable member of the OSS was actor Sterling Hayden, who went on to achieve Hollywood stardom after the war. Hayden served in the OSS Maritime Unit — a predecessor to today’s Navy SEALs — and earned the Silver Star crossing the Adriatic Sea from southern Italy to supply Yugoslavian communist rebels with weapons.

There was also future celebrity chef Julia Child, who served as a research assistant in the OSS Secret Intelligence division. During the war, she worked stateside helping develop a shark repellent that her superiors hoped would deter the amphibious predators from tampering with underwater explosives and attacking sailors and airmen stranded at sea.

Related: Julia Child: The OSS Officer Who Introduced French Cuisine to American Households

Operational Groups and the Jedburghs

Members of the OSS Italian Operational Group. Photo courtesy of the OSS Society.

In 1943, the 400-acre Congressional Country Club in Bethesda, Maryland, was leased to the US government and transformed into a training ground for commandos. The driving range became a firing range, the sand traps were used for grenade practice, and the fairways on the 17th and 18th holes became simulated minefields. Over the next two years, more than 2,500 OSS recruits underwent training at the CCC, acquiring skills in espionage, demolitions, sabotage, and weapons handling.

Most of the officers trained at CCC were subsequently assigned to OSS Operational Groups, which conducted paramilitary operations in France, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Burma, Malaya, and China. The OGs worked behind enemy lines alongside local partisan forces to sabotage key Axis infrastructure, such as railroads and bridges. 

The most specialized OSS commandos were a small faction of airborne paramilitaries called the Jedburghs, whose primary AO was Europe. The Jedburgh teams typically contained one American, one British, and one French commando. Belgians, Dutchmen, and Canadians occasionally worked with the teams too.

William Colby, a future director of the CIA, participated in a daring ski-parachute mission in Norway during World War II. He is pictured here on skis. Photo courtesy of the CIA.

The first Jedburgh team ever deployed parachuted into France the night before D-Day. Their objective was to assist the invasion force by leading pockets of resistance forces against German units based inland. As the march to Berlin got underway, approximately 90 more Jedburgh teams were dispatched to Europe. They primarily operated in German-occupied France and worked closely with various French resistance guerrilla groups, including the Maquis, who smuggled Yeager out of France after he was shot down. 

At least two Jedburgh officers leveraged their training and wartime experiences to further improve America’s military and intelligence capabilities after the war. Aaron Bank, who commanded Jedburgh Team Packard for six weeks in France’s Rhone Valley, went on to help establish the Green Berets. (He has been called the “Father of Special Forces.”) 

The other was William Colby, who during the war led a daring ski-parachute mission in Norway that succeeded in severing a key Nazi railroad. After the OSS was disbanded in 1945, Colby joined the CIA and later became its director.

Related:The Legend of Jack Hemingway: OSS Commando, Fly Fisherman, POW, Writer

OSS to CIA

On the south wall of the original headquarters building lobby is the OSS Memorial. The memorial is dedicated to the men and women who lost their lives while serving in the OSS during World War II. The memorial consists of a single star on the wall and a book that lists the names of the 116 OSS fallen. Photo courtesy of the CIA.

By the war’s end, more than half of the OSS’s 13,000 officers had served tours overseas. Donovan tried to persuade President Harry S. Truman to let him reorganize the unit into a peacetime intelligence agency, but to no avail. 

Instead, Truman decided to disband the OSS and mandated the establishment of the Central Intelligence Group to take its place. But even though the OSS was gone, its legacy would survive in many ways. Secretary of War John J. McCloy, a personal friend of Donovan’s, absorbed OSS Secret Intelligence and X-2 into the War Department’s Strategic Services Unit. And when the National Security Act of 1947 turned CIG into the CIA, many OSS veterans, including Hall and Colby, joined the service and helped lay the groundwork for the agency as it stands today.

Nor have the extraordinary accomplishments of Donovan and his glorious amateurs been forgotten. In 2016, the OSS received the Congressional Gold Medal for “implementing a system of strategic intelligence during World War II and providing the basis for the modern-day American intelligence and special operations communities.”

Read Next:OSS Guide Maria Gulovich Escaped the Nazis and Earned the Bronze Star

Matt Fratus

Matt Fratus is a history staff writer for Coffee or Die. He prides himself on uncovering the most fascinating tales of history by sharing them through any means of engaging storytelling. He writes for his micro-blog @LateNightHistory on Instagram, where he shares the story behind the image. He is also the host of the Late Night History podcast. When not writing about history, Matt enjoys volunteering for One More Wave and rooting for Boston sports teams.

9. America and the Philippines Update Defense Guidelines

Conclusion:

The recent clarification of defense obligations under the MDT marked another shift in American policy in the South China Sea to one that seems focused on the deterrence of further provocative Chinese actions. Of course, clarity is crucial for the success of any deterrent strategy. But what is also important is consistency. Beijing may yet test the new bilateral defense guidelines or find new “gray zones” in their language to further challenge Manila in the South China Sea. If deterrence is to succeed, American policy must also be consistent, holding its course in the possible storms to come.

America and the Philippines Update Defense Guidelines - Foreign Policy Research Institute

fpri.org · by Felix K. Chang

Bottom Line

• In May 2023, the United States and the Philippines issued new bilateral defense guidelines that clarified the conditions under which American forces would come to the aid of their Philippine counterparts under the terms of their mutual defense treaty. The guidelines marked a change in American policy in the South China Sea from “scrupulous noninvolvement” to one that seems focused on deterring provocative Chinese actions in “gray zone” scenarios.
• The Philippines long sought such a clarification of America’s obligations. But Washington was reluctant to do so. It had been concerned that Manila could use its mutual defense treaty as leverage to advance its maritime and territorial claims against its neighbors in the South China Sea, potentially drawing the United States into confrontations with them, most notably China.
• The recent American policy shift in the South China Sea follows others that have occurred over the last decade. The major factors that paved the way for the new bilateral defense guidelines have been Manila’s continued commitment to rebuilding its external defense capabilities and Washington’s growing perception of China as a strategic adversary.

If a Chinese ship was to open fire on a Philippine coast guard vessel in the disputed South China Sea, what would the United States do? Clearly, given that the Philippines and the United States share a long-standing mutual defense treaty, American forces would be obligated to come to the aid of the vessel if the attack occurred in recognized Philippine territorial waters. But until Manila and Washington issued new bilateral defense guidelines in May 2023, it was unclear what America’s obligations would be if the attack occurred in disputed waters or against non-military Philippine government vessels, like those of its coast guard. Such circumstances were considered “gray-zone” scenarios.

The newly issued bilateral defense guidelines cleared up the ambiguity. They also marked a change in American policy in the South China Sea from “scrupulous noninvolvement” to one that seems focused on deterrence. For the Philippines, the change could not have come soon enough. China’s increasingly aggressive efforts to assert its sovereignty over the waters within its “nine-dash line” in the region have strained the Philippine government’s ability to respond. But the reason why that ambiguity lasted as long as it did was, in part, purposeful. For decades, Washington had been concerned that Manila might be tempted to use the 1951 United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) as leverage to advance its maritime and territorial claims against its neighbors, potentially drawing the United States into confrontations with them, most notably China.

In fact, America’s strategic calculus had already begun to shift in the early 2010s. Barack Obama’s administration was the first to take a slightly firmer stance in the South China Sea. Then, American policy took on a more defiant tone under President Donald Trump, who formally rejected China’s “nine-dash line” claim. And with relations between China and the United States deteriorating further during the early years of the Biden White House (not to mention continued Chinese assertiveness in Southeast Asia), Washington had become open to clarifying the terms of its MDT with Manila. Thus, when Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. visited Washington in May 2023, he was able to secure what his predecessors had not: a clarification of America’s obligations in “gray-zone” scenarios.

Bilateral Defense Guidelines

As “ironclad” and useful as the MDT has been since its inception in 1951, it was crafted with the circumstances of the Cold War in mind. Its authors could not have imagined the sorts of gray-zone scenarios that would emerge in the South China Sea decades later. Unsurprisingly, some of the treaty’s original terms had become ambiguous in modern situations. Thus, clarification of those terms in the newly issued bilateral defense guidelines constituted a practical change in American policy in the region. In that regard, their most noteworthy provisions include:

Agreement on the conditions for mutual defense. “An armed attack in the Pacific, to include anywhere in the South China Sea, on either Philippine or U.S. armed forces—which includes both nations’ Coast Guards—aircraft, or public vessels, would invoke mutual defense commitments under Article IV and Article V of the MDT.” This guideline means that not only would American forces come to the aid of their Philippine counterparts, but also they would do so in many of the gray-zone scenarios that are more likely to transpire today.

Recognition of the Permanent Court of Arbitration decision. “The United States and the Philippines reaffirm the importance of the 2016 Arbitral Award on the South China Sea.” This guideline refers to the legal case that the Philippines brought against China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The court ruled that China had “no legal basis” to claim historic rights within its “nine-dash line” claim and that China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone. Though the guideline stopped short of stating whether Washington believes the court ruling is binding, it does go a bit further than its earlier refutation of China’s claims.

Agreement to adapt to Chinese tactics. The Philippines and the United States would also cooperate to address “asymmetric, hybrid, and irregular warfare and gray-zone tactics.” This guideline means that even if China tries to fashion new “gray zones,” the two countries would act to counter them.

The guidelines also included a significant, if self-referential, provision that “the bilateral Defense Guidelines are not intended to create rights or obligations … and are meant to serve as a living document” that the Philippines and the United States can mutually agree to modify later. In other words, the guidelines are not meant to exceed what is already detailed in the MDT, but could be jointly altered to adapt to new situations as they arise.

Philippines’ External Defense Revival

The earlier ambiguity around America’s MDT obligations gave China room to pressure the Philippines’ South China Sea claims in gray-zone scenarios with reduced risk of American intervention. The main reason for Washington’s opaque posture had been Manila’s longtime neglect of its external defense capabilities. The Philippines, which at one time fielded one of Asia’s largest and most modern armed forces, had allowed its navy to dwindle to four offshore patrol boats and its air force to mothball its last jet aircraft in 2005, even as China conducted a massive military buildup in the region. If Manila was not committed to its own self-defense, Washington was disinclined to shoulder the entire burden for the Philippines.

Hence, the Philippines had become completely dependent on its mutual defense treaty with the United States for its external defense. The situation not only constrained the strategies that Philippine leaders could devise to counter Chinese actions in the South China Sea, but also raised the possibility that Manila, lacking any other means, might use the MDT as leverage to advance its maritime and territorial claims against its neighbors in the region. Naturally, that had the potential of drawing the United States into confrontations with those neighbors, particularly China. Worse still, it could happen at a place and time not of Washington’s choosing.

Officials in Manila well understood how lengthy and expensive (both in terms of financial and political capital) it would be to modernize the Philippine armed forces. Most shrank from the challenge. Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo sought to ease Chinese pressure another way—by striking a deal with it. Unfortunately for her, she inadvertently weakened Philippine sovereignty in the process. It was not until Benigno Aquino III became president in 2010 that Manila took its first real steps to revive its navy and air force. It would eventually take him years to pass the legislation required to reform the military and its procurement process so that it could conduct long-term planning and more efficiently acquire new hardware.

Aquino’s multi-phased military modernization program had just gained traction when Rodrigo Duterte entered office. And though Duterte intimated that he would push military procurement towards Russia, he ultimately did not tinker much with it. Thus, in the late 2010s, the Philippine Navy received its first purpose-built frigates and the Philippine air force its first new jet fighters. In 2022, the Philippines even acquired Brahmos ground-launched anti-ship missile systems from India as a cost-effective means to project power into the South China Sea. Ultimately, Manila’s renewed commitment to its external defense capabilities were a key factor in convincing Washington that the Philippines could be a meaningful security partner and worthy of shared defense commitments.

Change in American Strategic Sentiment

To be sure, other actions Duterte took while in office did little to encourage the United States to clarify its policy of ambiguity in the South China Sea, despite the region’s growing importance to Philippine energy security. His very public announcement, during a 2016 visit to Beijing, of the Philippines’ “separation” from the United States was hardly helpful. However, other forces were at work. Many American policymakers had become increasingly disillusioned with the notion that engagement with China would make it less adversarial. Together with China’s growing threat to both America and its Asian allies, relations between China and the United States deteriorated, a trend that accelerated during the Trump administration.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 further dented American relations with China, which chose to provide Russia with dual-use military assistance and reportedly agreed to supply it with even more lethal aid. In late 2022, China’s intimidation of Taiwan soured relations further. That intimidation continued into 2023 when China launched ballistic missiles into the waters around Taiwan and conducted large-scale military exercises around it. China’s display of firepower appeared to persuade American policymakers of the need to seriously prepare for the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Certainly, the Philippines’ proximity to Taiwan makes Philippine military bases highly valuable to the United States in the event of an armed conflict between it and China over Taiwan. That, ultimately, may have been the final push needed to make Washington amenable to Manila’s desire for clarification of American policy in the South China Sea, perhaps in exchange for expanded access to Philippine bases. In fact, in February 2023, the Philippines agreed to grant the United States access to four additional bases under their Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. And it turns out that three of the four bases are situated in northern Luzon, near Taiwan.

New American Policy Shift

For much of the early 2000s, the United States (and the rest of Asia) had hoped that China would take a less confrontational approach to its maritime and territorial disputes in the South China Sea, perhaps even channeling its claims through multilateral organizations like ASEAN. When it became apparent that would not happen, Washington began to incrementally shift away from long-held policy of “scrupulous noninvolvement” and take steps toward a firmer stance. In 2014, it published maps that cast doubt on China’s “nine-dash line” claim, and a year later resumed the U.S. Navy’s freedom of navigation patrols near Chinese outposts in the region. Against a backdrop of deteriorating relations between China and the United States over trade, cyber espionage, the COVID-19 pandemic, and China’s tightened grip over Hong Kong, the United States then defiantly rejected China’s “nine-dash line” claim in 2020.

The recent clarification of defense obligations under the MDT marked another shift in American policy in the South China Sea to one that seems focused on the deterrence of further provocative Chinese actions. Of course, clarity is crucial for the success of any deterrent strategy. But what is also important is consistency. Beijing may yet test the new bilateral defense guidelines or find new “gray zones” in their language to further challenge Manila in the South China Sea. If deterrence is to succeed, American policy must also be consistent, holding its course in the possible storms to come.

Felix K. Chang

Felix K. Chang is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is also the Chief Operating Officer of DecisionQ, a predictive analytics company, and an assistant professor at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.

fpri.org · by Felix K. Chang

10. Berger: 'Time to look' at changing combatant command structure

A good point in the subtitle. Do too many cooks spoil the soup?

Berger: 'Time to look' at changing combatant command structure - Breaking Defense

"There comes a point where there’s so many combatant commanders and so many service chiefs that I wonder at what point does the secretary of defense have a span of control where… getting to a decision and getting the right perspectives on the table becomes really difficult," the Marine Corps leader said.

breakingdefense.com · by Justin Katz · May 24, 2023

Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger observes a simulated casualty response demonstration by U.S. Navy Hospital Corpsmen with the 15th Marine Expeditionary unit during a tour aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island (LHD 8). (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Sarah Stegall)

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon’s structuring of regional combatant commanders may be overdue for reform, given the changing nature of how and where wars are being fought, Marine Corps commandant Gen. David Berger said Tuesday.

“My own opinion is it’s time for a look at that,” Berger said in response to questions at a Brookings Institute event. “For all the right reasons, we’ve added where we needed, but there comes a point where there’s so many combatant commanders and so many service chiefs that I wonder at what point does the secretary of defense have a span of control where… getting to a decision and getting the right perspectives on the table becomes really difficult.”

The current COCOM structure, which assigns one four-star officer to oversee activities in different regions of the world — North America, South America, the Middle East, Africa, among others — is the result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

That legislation streamlined the military’s chain of command by having the combatant commanders report directly to the defense secretary and, by extension, the president. The Joint Chiefs under Goldwater-Nichols took up an advisory role as well as being responsible for training and equipping their respective services.

It also created certain tensions between the Joint Chiefs and the COCOM heads over where and how to invest the Pentagon’s budget, as well as strategic priorities — and yet, a service leader calling for the COCOM structure to be reorganized is a rarity.

In his comments, the commandant argued that the current structure of the combatant commands is based solely on geography, which “made absolute sense when most of the conflicts were regional,” he added.

But “not anymore,” he said. “We have a framework that has lines on maps that don’t really correspond to where the — they create seams.”

Berger specifically referenced conflicts occurring in space and cyberspace, both of which cross the boundaries of the current COCOM structure. While there have been efforts to address those seams through the creation of US Cyber Command and US Space Command, ultimately those organizations may end up just as siloed as their geographic compatriots.

“These are now becoming — I think, a challenge when you’re viewing global threats, global problems. How do you integrate that from a global perspective?” he said.

11. JOHN BOLTON: The G-7 Shows It Still Doesn't Understand the China Threat

A depressing conclusion:

G-7 meetings come and go, and their leaders’ statements fade quickly. The impression that will not fade after the Hiroshima summit, certainly not from the minds of policymakers in Beijing, is that the great industrial democracies are still divided and unsure about how to oppose China’s economic warfare against them. The global West’s disarray only encourages Xi Jinping’s belligerent tendencies.

JOHN BOLTON: The G-7 Shows It Still Doesn't Understand the China Threat

The global West’s disarray only encourages Xi Jinping’s belligerent tendencies.

19fortyfive.com · by John Bolton · May 24, 2023

Last Saturday, leaders of the G-7 nations meeting in Hiroshima issued a 40-page communique addressing, most importantly, their relations with China.

The communique was touted as demonstrating G-7 unity and strength against Beijing’s economic warfare, but the China language instead reflects disarray and incoherence.

Embarrassingly weak, for example, is the Taiwan passage.

It is essentially unchanged from recent G-7 statements, ignoring China’s rapidly rising menace during the same period. Similarly, the G-7 urged China to speak directly to Ukraine, but referred only to a peace “based on territorial integrity,” not on the full restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty as well as its territorial integrity — a restoration all NATO members profess to support.

By resorting to bromides regarding both Taiwan and Ukraine, the leaders of the global West do precisely the opposite of what they intend: They reveal weakness rather than unity and strength.

An Empty Slogan

The communique is weakest and least coherent on the G-7’s economic relationship with China, the very front where current Chinese efforts at regional and global hegemony are playing out. Instead of forthrightly confronting Beijing’s economic aggression, the Hiroshima document relies on a slogan, a sure signal of inadequate strategic substance. The communique adopts the mantra first unfurled by the European Union and quickly adopted by the Biden White House.

The slogan holds that the G-7 nations favor “derisking, not decoupling” their economies from China. This is a bumper sticker in search of a meaning, masking both the European Union’s flat unwillingness to acknowledge the Chinese threat, and significant policy disagreements and inadequacies within the G-7. It reflects not so much a failure of leadership in bringing along the lagging Europeans, but a collapse of U.S. resolve at the very outset.

The G-7 communique is quick to say, “we are not decoupling or turning inwards.” In fact, the concept of “decoupling” was always a straw man, an exaggeration implying near-cessation of business between China and the West. Deployed in America by those who overprize economic relations with Beijing — placing their importance above American national security — the term aimed to panic businesses and policymakers who were beginning to awaken to the re-emergence of significant international political risk. This “project fear” meaning of decoupling was never accurate.

Nor was “decoupling” ever seriously suggested in the sense of a government-mandated, latter-day industrial policy. Such an approach was no more likely to succeed than other industrial policies, which all rest on the assumption that politicians and government bureaucrats are better at making economic choices than markets. Existing levels of trade and investment between the global West and China are, for well or ill, too complex to believe that top-down government decision-making would lead to anything other than confusion and disorder.

Where government-directed decoupling is necessary, and should be expedited, is where it can eliminate dependency on goods and services that significantly impact U.S. national security. Both the Trump and Biden administrations have imposed significant sanctions on China in the high-tech field.

Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Europe trails far behind. France and Germany still see China almost exclusively through an economic prism, as repeatedly confirmed by statements from German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron.

Even the United Kingdom is torn, with significant debate between the hawkish Conservative parliamentary party and a China-friendly Ten Downing Street.

China Decouples

The hollowness of the “derisking, not decoupling” mantra is most evident at the level of individual firms, which have no practical way to derisk without decoupling. They must either reduce capital investment, or at least not increase it; withhold intellectual property (at risk from decades of Chinese piracy); reduce supply-chain reliance; find other markets; or take other defensive measures, depending on the circumstances of the particular firm. Many companies are already deeply engaged in reducing or hedging their risks, but others are not. These latter may ultimately pay the greatest economic price for their lack of diligence.

In due time, the sum of national-security prudence and businesses’ political-risk decisions will determine the extent of decoupling, not the G-7’s false dichotomy.

Tellingly, China is already far along in decoupling from the West, preparing for future military conflict by reducing its dependence. In what should have been required reading for G-7 leaders at Hiroshima, Ross Babbage’s The Next Major War demonstrates what Beijing was doing while we slept. Babbage explains four decades of China’s policy of so-called dual circulation, or “two markets, two resources.” Beijing’s “domestic market [was] a resource to protect and insulate, while foreign markets were to be penetrated and exploited.” He quotes McKinsey’s conclusion that “‘China has been reducing its exposure to the world, while the world’s exposure to China has risen.’”

Chinese President Xi Jinping with the first lady during the Moscow Victory Day Parade on 9 May 2015.

Poor Signals From the G-7

However, China was far from successful in insulating itself. Its dependence on massive energy imports and other raw materials remains a critical weakness — one very difficult for China to correct in the foreseeable future, given its lack of domestic mineral and hydrocarbon resources.

The global West is only belatedly grasping the extent of China’s theft of intellectual property, massive protectionism, and governmental subsidies. As the gauzy era of globalization dissipates, political risk has re-emerged as a central factor in international business, especially with China. Political risk is not and never was confined to the world’s economic fringes. Under Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “hide your capabilities and bide your time,” Beijing convinced too many Western politicians and businesses of the fantasy that China was little more than a pure economic play. This holiday from history is over, and China’s misdeeds and threats, politically, economically, and militarily, are increasingly evident.

G-7 meetings come and go, and their leaders’ statements fade quickly. The impression that will not fade after the Hiroshima summit, certainly not from the minds of policymakers in Beijing, is that the great industrial democracies are still divided and unsure about how to oppose China’s economic warfare against them. The global West’s disarray only encourages Xi Jinping’s belligerent tendencies.

Ambassador John R. Bolton served as national security adviser under President Donald J. Trump. He is the author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.” You can follow him on Twitter: @AmbJohnBolton.

19fortyfive.com · by John Bolton · May 24, 2023

12. If America Defaults 'No Corner of the Global Economy Will Be Spared'

Conclusion:

The Republicans and Democrats need to stop the madness and make a deal now. This isn’t the last debt ceiling vote of our lives. There’ll be another one at least a year after this one. So, the GOP has plenty of time to hold the line at the more opportune moment—which is not in the run-up to an already contentious presidential election.

If America Defaults 'No Corner of the Global Economy Will Be Spared'

“No corner of the global economy will be spared,” was what Mark Zandi, the chief economist at Moody’s Analytics told AP News in a recent interview. He was talking about what would happen if the United States defaulted on its massive debt because of a failure by President Joe Biden and his Democratic Party to come to a reasonable deal that would allow for the House Republicans to vote to raise the debt ceiling. 

19fortyfive.com · by Brandon Weichert · May 24, 2023

“No corner of the global economy will be spared,” was what Mark Zandi, the chief economist at Moody’s Analytics told AP News in a recent interview.

He was talking about what would happen if the United States defaulted on its massive debt because of a failure by President Joe Biden and his Democratic Party to come to a reasonable deal that would allow for the House Republicans to vote to raise the debt ceiling.

The Republicans have made clear their aims: to reduce the debt over the long term by lowering government spending. Republicans also want to stimulate economic growth by cutting taxes. They’re not going to get the latter part of their desires.

Yet, it is entirely reasonable for the GOP to call for lowered spending. The Democrats, after all, do not have a supermajority. Their arrogance, therefore, is uncalled for.

While the GOP is playing Russian Roulette by insisting that the debt ceiling not be raised without spending cuts, the fact remains that it is well within its rights to make such a demand.

The Democrats initially assumed they could run roughshod over the Republicans because, under Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy (R-CA), it was assumed that the GOP would be weak.

Plus, the Republicans are divided and their majority in the House is tiny.

Republicans Fighting Back

Nevertheless, McCarthy has led his raucous caucus well, all things considered. His polling numbers (for now) are competitive when compared to President Biden’s toileting numbers. Thus, McCarthy and the GOP have some—very small—wiggle room.

On top of assuming Republican weakness, the Democrats assumed that they didn’t have to negotiate in good faith with the House Republicans because, if the country defaulted due to the GOP’s calls for reduced government spending, the voters would blame the GOP, and the Democrats would gain even greater majorities in the federal government.

That is certainly still a possibility.

Republicans, after all, historically tend to be blamed. And if former President Trump is the GOP nominee in 2024, he will have difficulty appealing to independent and women voters—the very same voters who traditionally blame Republicans for financial crises. The last thing the GOP should want is to complicate its already tenuous appeal to independents more than it already is complicated.

Something, though, has changed. Democrats, for the first time in this process, appear unnerved.

With less than two weeks remaining before the debt ceiling vote is set to be had, Biden reversed his original course and sat down with Speaker McCarthy. Nothing has been determined and Biden seems to have hardened his position that there should be a “clean” vote on the debt ceiling – meaning Biden and the Democrats get everything they wanted, and the Republicans get nothing.

But if they were so convinced that they could walk away the victors in the debt ceiling fight, why is Biden now threatening to use an unconstitutional interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution, in which he as the chief executive could supposedly unilaterally raise the debt ceiling?

They’re worried on the Left. And they should be. So, too, should the Republicans. Because any failure to raise the debt ceiling by June will eventuate in a catastrophic economic collapse in which everyone—save for the wealthiest few among us—will suffer.

It is no guarantee that the Republicans will be blamed, especially because it is a Democrat, Joe Biden, who sits in the Oval Office. Then again, the Republicans aren’t exactly safe from the righteous wrath of the voters should the default occur next month.

What might happen if we default on the debt and fail to come to a consensus on how to raise the debt ceiling in a timely manner?

Expect What No One is Expecting

First, most economists believe that even if the debt ceiling is not raised after one week of having failed to do so, the U.S. economy would contract at such a clip that the country would lose 1.5 million jobs. If it lasted months, a U.S. debt default would lead to a significantly shrinking economy, in an already turgid economic environment.

Nearly 8 million jobs would be lost, with most of those losses being felt in the most disadvantaged communities. We’re talking from around 3.5 percent unemployment to almost 10 percent.

Again, forget about the possible political advantages that may arise for whichever party can effectively cast blame on the other side for the collapse. Think about the human costs that this will have across the board – and the globe.

It’s sick that we’re even here. The entire U.S. political elite—both parties—should be put up on charges if it comes to that. And it looks like it very well might come to that in just less than two weeks. Enjoy America, it’s been nice knowing you. Because once the default happens and everything collapses, we will not only be in a poorer and weaker country but the entire world order will have been reorganized.

Do you like interest rates where they are?

Well, they’ll go higher and stay high for a while until the debt ceiling vote is resolved. Inflation, already at astronomical levels, will go higher. That means those of us just barely hanging on are going to be sent off that fiscal cliff first. Nearly $10 trillion of household wealth will be lost as the stock market crashes, too.

Oh, and all that talk about the de-dollarization of the global economy gets put into hyperdrive. Even the naysayers recognize that the threat becomes suddenly real if the U.S. defaults on its debt. Why would anyone or any other country want to be dependent on a national currency—such as the U.S. dollar—that is beholden to such an ineffective and, frankly, insane government? It’s more of a threat than anything else to those foreign holders of the U.S. debt.

Where does this lead?

America’s Chickens Come Home to Roost

The diminishment of American power globally. Forever. All those hawks standing firm against Russia should be very concerned because our ability to sanction and apply economic pressure on America’s foes will be greatly reduced, if not erased entirely.

Other currencies will suddenly become competitive—including the Chinese yuan, especially as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia starts trading more in the petroyuan rather than the petrodollar.

Many nations with unstable domestic currencies globally trade exclusively on the U.S. dollar. These dollars will not be available after a default, causing these “basket case” nations to go crazy and become key conduits for global instability as their societies will undoubtedly collapse.

I’d hate to evoke Reverend Jeremiah Wright, but if we choose to default on the national debt, America’s chickens really will come home to roost. And you and I—not Joe Biden or Kevin McCarthy—will end up paying for it forever.

What’s more, potential presidents, such as Donald J. Trump, are cheering for the default to take place this summer rather than when he’s president – and possibly so that he will become president.

How’s that for perverse?

The Republicans and Democrats need to stop the madness and make a deal now. This isn’t the last debt ceiling vote of our lives. There’ll be another one at least a year after this one. So, the GOP has plenty of time to hold the line at the more opportune moment—which is not in the run-up to an already contentious presidential election.

A 19FortyFive Senior Editor, Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life (May 16), and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy (July 23). Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

19fortyfive.com · by Brandon Weichert · May 24, 2023

13. 4 Ways U.S. Support for Ukraine Helps Defend Taiwan

Excerpts:

Although much more needs to be done, here are four ways that arming Ukraine has materially improved the ability to deter or defeat a Chinese attack on Taiwan.

First, the war has prompted the United States and its Asian allies to significantly increase military spending.

...

Second, the war has pushed the United States to grow and modernize its own forces.

...

Third, Ukraine aid has jolted the U.S. defense industrial base after three decades of atrophy due to military restraint. 

...

Fourth, the Biden administration’s unprecedented use of Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) to send weapons to Ukraine has been extended to Taiwan.

Biden’s policies could still lead to the worst of both worlds. Slow, insufficient, and inadequate aid to Ukraine will neither defeat Russia nor generate enough of a slipstream to aid Taiwan. As long as Biden and the U.S. Congress are unwilling to rapidly scale up arms deliveries to Taiwan and increase the U.S. defense budget to Cold War levels, supporting larger and faster aid to Ukraine is currently the best thing the United States can do to preserve peace and stability in Asia.

4 Ways U.S. Support for Ukraine Helps Defend Taiwan

From deterrence to military readiness, Ukraine aid is a major boost to Pacific security.

By Gabriel Scheinmann, the executive director of the Alexander Hamilton Society.

Foreign Policy · by Gabriel Scheinmann · May 24, 2023

In the U.S. political debate, an often-heard criticism of military assistance to Ukraine is that it takes up resources needed against a far more dangerous threat: China. These critics argue that funding, arms, and other efforts to support Ukraine and deter Russian aggression in Europe should instead be oriented toward the Pacific and the far more potent threat of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Ukraine’s victory, they say, will be pyrrhic, since the support required to achieve it will undercut similar efforts to support Taiwan. Especially at a time when U.S. defense industrial capacity is at a century-long low, U.S. support for Ukraine may feel morally right, but will ultimately prove deadly to stopping China in its tracks.

In the U.S. political debate, an often-heard criticism of military assistance to Ukraine is that it takes up resources needed against a far more dangerous threat: China. These critics argue that funding, arms, and other efforts to support Ukraine and deter Russian aggression in Europe should instead be oriented toward the Pacific and the far more potent threat of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Ukraine’s victory, they say, will be pyrrhic, since the support required to achieve it will undercut similar efforts to support Taiwan. Especially at a time when U.S. defense industrial capacity is at a century-long low, U.S. support for Ukraine may feel morally right, but will ultimately prove deadly to stopping China in its tracks.

The critics are wrong. Rather than distracting from Pacific security and the defense of Taiwan, aid to Ukraine is enabling it. The disastrous military performance of Beijing’s most important ally in Ukraine is a major geopolitical setback for China. Ukraine’s successful, Western-supported defense of its territory could have a significant deterrent effect on China’s own plans to forcibly unite with Taiwan. As the downing of Russian hypersonic missiles by a U.S.-made Patriot missile defense system demonstrates, the United States is also learning valuable lessons from Russia’s and Ukraine’s performance in a large-scale, nation-on-nation war, following two decades in which the U.S. military was focused almost entirely on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions.

Already, measures taken to support Ukraine are helping modernize U.S. forces, revive dormant defense production, develop and accelerate processes for building and fielding weapons, and spur the largest defense buildup by the United States and its allies in 40 years. All these benefits to the United States come without the use of U.S. troops.

Although much more needs to be done, here are four ways that arming Ukraine has materially improved the ability to deter or defeat a Chinese attack on Taiwan.

First, the war has prompted the United States and its Asian allies to significantly increase military spending. Although U.S. President Joe Biden sought a de-facto cut (measured after inflation) to defense spending in fiscal years 2022 and 2023, the U.S. Congress instead increased it by more than $25 billion in 2022 and $45 billion in 2023. That’s in addition to the $44 billion in defense aid to Ukraine—money that is being spent on the U.S. military, as Ukraine aid mainly comes from existing stocks of mostly older weapons. Congress also finally ended the practice of linking defense with nondefense spending levels, enacting an after-inflation increase to the military budget and an after-inflation cut to everything else. Congress has already made clear that Biden’s 2024 defense budget request of $886 billion will also be supersized.

Western support for Ukraine has also catalyzed front-line Asian allies to significantly boost their own defense budgets, even as some of them, too, support Ukraine. In June, explicitly citing Russia’s war against Ukraine, Japan announced a plan to double military spending within five years. To that end, Tokyo subsequently enacted a 20 percent increase in 2023, including for the purchase of U.S.-made long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles. Taiwan’s defense budget has increased by 80 percent since 2019—of which two-thirds has come since the start of Russia’s invasion. According to people directly involved, U.S. planners and trainers are collaborating with Taiwan on the lessons it can learn from the fighting in Ukraine, which has already changed Taiwan’s thinking about how to defend itself. South Korea is following a similar path: In January, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense announced that its budget will grow by almost 7 percent annually over the next five years. Similarly, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos’s first defense budget proposal calls for an 8 percent increase in defense spending in 2023, with spending expected to maintain an average annual growth rate of more than 6 percent through 2028. In Australia, the new government of Prime Minster Anthony Albanese has already boosted defense spending by more than 7 percent.

Second, the war has pushed the United States to grow and modernize its own forces. The U.S. Army has used Ukraine supplemental funds, equal to one-third of its annual procurement budget, to buy seven more High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (known as HIMARS) in fiscal 2025 than previously budgeted. These long-range artillery systems have proven critical to Ukraine and may also be useful in a Taiwan scenario. Similarly, the Army is now planning to purchase 197 Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicles instead of the 91 units originally planned for 2024, backfilling the 1960s-era M113 armored personnel carriers sent to Ukraine. Production lines for the key munitions used in Ukraine—HIMARS, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS), and Stinger and Javelin missiles—are slated to nearly double or more than double their production capacity in the next two years. Production of 155 mm artillery shells is slated to increase sixfold over the next four years. The American taxpayer is also getting a better deal: These multiyear procurements allow the per-unit cost of HIMARS and GMLRS to drop 6 percent and 11 percent, respectively, even at a time when inflation is at 5 percent. Ukraine aid is driving down costs and accelerating purchases, leading to a larger, more modern, and better suited force.

Third, Ukraine aid has jolted the U.S. defense industrial base after three decades of atrophy due to military restraint. The dire state of the U.S. defense sector has been documented by report after report. Aid to Ukraine did not create this long-existing problem, but is instead catalyzing serious movement. Production lines have reopened for Stinger missiles, 155 mm artillery shells, and GMLRS. U.S. and European defense companies are working to set up additional production lines on both continents. While the discussion about expanding the capacity of the defense industrial base by issuing multiyear contracts originally centered on backfilling munitions transferred to Ukraine, these approaches have now been applied to other programs unrelated to Ukraine, such as the SM-6 WHAT, Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM). U.S. defense contractor Lockheed Martin has opened a second production line for the LRASM and JASSM air-to-surface variant, which will allow it to double annual production in 2024. The U.S. Defense Department recently set up the Joint Production Accelerator Cell, a process to identify supply chain restrictions across the United States and restore defense manufacturing competency. It also inaugurated the Undefinitized Contract Action, an accelerated contracting process that allows the Pentagon to contract and receive delivery before all terms and prices are made final, which it has already used to purchase GMLRs and Stingers. None of these ideas are new, but Ukraine aid is removing bureaucratic impediments and stimulating production in a way that has not been seen in decades. As the Pentagon’s head of acquisition and sustainment said in October: “Production is deterrence.” If Beijing believes that the United States can sustain a long military engagement, it is more likely to be deterred from an attack.

Fourth, the Biden administration’s unprecedented use of Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) to send weapons to Ukraine has been extended to Taiwan. This tool, originally passed by Congress in 1961, gives the president the power to provide military equipment, services, and training to foreign countries from existing U.S. stocks. After Russia attacked Ukraine, Congress gave the administration the ability to transfer $11 billion worth of weapons through September 2022, and then increased the authority to another $14.5 billion over the next year. Biden has used PDA 37 times since the war began. This strategy means the Pentagon can move weapons to Ukraine with great speed—without using purchase orders that would take years—and use the money to backfill deliveries, buying new, better, different, or more articles than those that were sent. (That also means that the value of what the United States actually sends to Ukraine is less than the PDA numbers imply—a point most critics of Ukraine aid conveniently ignore.) Contracts to replenish stocks have already been signed, and Congress is appropriating more money for replenishment than the value of what is being sent to Ukraine. After Congress approved a PDA for Taiwan worth up to $1 billion per year, the Pentagon announced a first $500 million arms package for Taiwan. A tool Congress first refashioned for use for Ukraine is now helping provide material support to Taiwan. Enabling PDA for Taiwan would not have been possible without the political coalition created on Capitol Hill on behalf of Ukraine.

The United States is still not moving fast enough to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan, but U.S. military aid to Ukraine is helping it get off the blocks. From modernizing its own forces faster and revving up defense industrial production to spurring defense budget increases and getting weapons to Taiwan more quickly, aid to Ukraine has been a catalyst like no other since World War II. As a result, the United States is finally beginning to take the military side of the China challenge more seriously. As Lockheed Martin CEO Jim Taiclet recently told the Wall Street Journal: “We want to get the fragility out of the system, so if this ever happens again, it’s six months instead of three years to get a meaningful improvement in capacity.”

Biden’s policies could still lead to the worst of both worlds. Slow, insufficient, and inadequate aid to Ukraine will neither defeat Russia nor generate enough of a slipstream to aid Taiwan. As long as Biden and the U.S. Congress are unwilling to rapidly scale up arms deliveries to Taiwan and increase the U.S. defense budget to Cold War levels, supporting larger and faster aid to Ukraine is currently the best thing the United States can do to preserve peace and stability in Asia.

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Foreign Policy · by Gabriel Scheinmann · May 24, 2023

14. ASEAN and the Quad Inch Closer Together

Conclusion:

In a strategic environment increasingly marked by intensified Sino-U.S. competition, ASEAN has a key role to play to alleviate tensions. The Quad, for its part, has indicated the importance to “ensure all nations, large and small, continue to have a voice.” As views across Southeast Asia shift toward a more positive take on the Quad, now is the time for both blocs to seize the opportunity and move toward closer ASEAN-Quad cooperation.

ASEAN and the Quad Inch Closer Together

Southeast Asian skepticism toward the foursome is softening.

By Sharon Seah, a senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute and the coordinator of its ASEAN Studies Centre, and Kei Koga, an associate professor at Nanyang Technological University.

Foreign Policy · by Sharon Seah, Kei Koga · May 24, 2023

Australia was supposed to host the third in-person summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad) in Sydney on Wednesday, May 24, but plans hit a snag when debt-ceiling shenanigans in the U.S. Congress forced President Joe Biden to cut his travels short. Instead, the leaders of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States met at the sidelines of the G-7 summit in Hiroshima, Japan, last Sunday. Despite the abrupt change of schedule, the Quad issued an unprecedentedly detailed joint statement on practical initiatives, such as the launch of the Quad Infrastructure Fellowship, the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, and the Quad Investors Network. The four leaders also emphasized cooperation with regional institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Australia was supposed to host the third in-person summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad) in Sydney on Wednesday, May 24, but plans hit a snag when debt-ceiling shenanigans in the U.S. Congress forced President Joe Biden to cut his travels short. Instead, the leaders of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States met at the sidelines of the G-7 summit in Hiroshima, Japan, last Sunday. Despite the abrupt change of schedule, the Quad issued an unprecedentedly detailed joint statement on practical initiatives, such as the launch of the Quad Infrastructure Fellowship, the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, and the Quad Investors Network. The four leaders also emphasized cooperation with regional institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Quad has had more than its share of fits and starts since it was launched in 2007 by the four countries to coordinate strategy and policies affecting the Indo-Pacific. In particular, the Quad long struggled to find acceptance in Southeast Asia, a region increasingly at the center of geopolitical competition. Some Southeast Asian countries can appreciate the Quad’s humanitarian agenda, including vaccine cooperation, disaster relief, and other humanitarian assistance. But there has also been a healthy dose of skepticism and discomfort with the Quad’s narrative of containing China. There are few geopolitical developments Southeast Asians fear more than their region getting caught in the maelstrom of superpower competition—and having to choose sides.

Lately, however, there seems to be a shift in attitudes, with Southeast Asia’s policy community increasingly open to the Quad. According to the State of Southeast Asia 2023 survey published by the ASEAN Study Centre, slightly more than half of Southeast Asian experts polled said that a stronger Quad will be a positive development for the region—with only 12 percent disagreeing. When asked what ASEAN-Quad cooperation would mean for the region, 69 percent view the Quad as beneficial for the region or complementing the ASEAN’s own efforts to facilitate cooperation in Southeast Asia and beyond. Surprisingly, just 10 percent of respondents fear that engaging with the Quad will force ASEAN countries to choose sides, and not even 7 percent are afraid that ASEAN-Quad cooperation will provoke China.

Why the shift in favor of the Quad in Southeast Asia? Part of the answer is that today’s version of the Quad is vastly different from its earlier iterations, when the group focused primarily on security strategy and countering China. Under the Biden administration, the Quad’s emphasis has shifted to focus on delivering regional public goods and services that Indo-Pacific countries are keenly interested in, including global health care, climate policy, infrastructure, disaster response, and education. By inserting ASEAN-friendly language in its vision—for example, the phrase “free, open, prosperous, and inclusive”—the Quad has reframed its purpose from exclusively countering China to a broader vision that appears to support ASEAN countries.

ASEAN’s long-standing suspicion of the Quad stemmed from the latter’s genesis and initial development in the context of geopolitical competition. Linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans in a single strategic vision—and framing it as a grand struggle between democracy and autocracy—did not go over well in Southeast Asian countries, few of which are Western-style liberal democracies.

From the vantage point of ASEAN countries, cooperation with the Quad brings several strategic advantages.

While the original motive may have been to form a traditional security framework, the reality within the Quad is that its members often had diverging national interests. In 2008, for instance, then-Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd decided that his country should switch course, accommodate China, and disengage from the Quad. Several years of dormancy followed until geopolitical changes, including China’s rising assertiveness in the region, led to the Quad’s revival in the waning years of the Obama administration. Under the Trump administration, Washington’s vision of the Indo-Pacific and the Quad was essentially security-oriented and targeted against Beijing.

The Quad’s refocusing from security to delivering practical, tangible benefits has been much better received in Southeast Asia—especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, when the Quad first shifted its focus. In fact, it was largely the pandemic that catalyzed the Quad’s shift to public health and other civilian policies, as the Biden administration worried China was successfully using vaccine diplomacy to enhance its ties in the global south. Meanwhile, Washington has pursued the security aspects of Indo-Pacific policy, including defense and containment, through the newly formed Australia-United Kingdom-United States pact (known as AUKUS) and various bilateral relationships, which has freed up the Quad for civilian objectives.

That said, there are limits to Southeast Asian countries’ willingness to engage with the Quad. Talk of Quad membership expansion to include countries in the region—such as the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally that is expanding security ties with Japan—has been summarily dismissed. Such a step is widely seen as a threat to ASEAN unity and cohesion, and no member would risk stepping out of line.

What’s more, the Quad’s emphasis on political values, such as freedom and democracy, are difficult agendas for many Southeast Asian countries to fully support, given how few countries in the region are fully democratic. But the Quad’s other core principles do resonate with ASEAN countries: respect for the rule of law, sovereignty and territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes without resorting to threat or use of force, objection to unilateral attempts to change the status quo, and the freedom of navigation and overflight.

From the vantage point of ASEAN countries, cooperation with the Quad brings several strategic advantages. First, Quad resources can go a long way in building ASEAN members’ capacity in dealing with crises and challenges, such as future pandemics. Second, institutional cooperation can help ASEAN influence the Quad’s strategic thinking on the future of the Indo-Pacific. Third, ASEAN can help shape a division of labor between itself and the Quad.

For the Quad, cooperation with ASEAN will raise the former’s visibility in the Indo-Pacific region and give it more legitimacy to shape and nurture regional norms and rules. Perhaps most importantly at this stage of the Quad’s development, such cooperation will counter suggestions that this grouping is merely a tool to contain China.

As ASEAN members work toward greater unity, cohesion, and policy coordination in the region—a goal the group calls “ASEAN centrality”—some of them worry that Quad policies could undermine their efforts at unity. Indonesia, the group’s rotating chair this year, has made it a top priority to implement the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, a guidance document outlining the group’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Indonesia plans to organize an ASEAN Indo-Pacific Forum that aims to strengthen collaboration with China, Quad countries, and other external partners in infrastructure, business investment, the digital economy, and other fields. This diplomatic momentum opens a window for greater cooperation with the Quad, to the benefit of both sides.

The main remaining issue is how to manage China’s perceptions of closer ASEAN-Quad relations. China remains wary that the United States’ preponderant role in the region will be further strengthened by ASEAN-Quad cooperation.

To make China feel less threatened, ASEAN can take an incremental approach to the Quad, selecting areas of cooperation that will promise benefits not only to Southeast Asia and the Quad countries, but also to China and other key partners, such as South Korea and the European Union. One such area could be to help manage technology supply chain issues, which have risen to the fore as an area of strategic competition between Beijing and Washington. Here, Southeast Asia has the opportunity to buffer the impacts of sudden policy moves by either side.

An incremental approach to ASEAN-Quad relations also means experimenting with various levels of institutional cooperation. This could entail inviting ASEAN secretariat officials to Quad meetings, which would help facilitate an understanding of current and future Quad plans. This could be followed by informal ASEAN-Quad consultations in one or two policy areas of particular concern to ASEAN members, such as energy security. The development of functional cooperation that can produce tangible, practical benefits for the region will be viewed more favorably—including by China—than political statements of grand intent that only raise suspicions.

In a strategic environment increasingly marked by intensified Sino-U.S. competition, ASEAN has a key role to play to alleviate tensions. The Quad, for its part, has indicated the importance to “ensure all nations, large and small, continue to have a voice.” As views across Southeast Asia shift toward a more positive take on the Quad, now is the time for both blocs to seize the opportunity and move toward closer ASEAN-Quad cooperation.

Foreign Policy · by Sharon Seah, Kei Koga · May 24, 2023

15. 160 Senior Military Signed DEI Letter To Congress

Former military.

The entire list and the letter can be accessed at the link: https://armedforces.press/160-senior-military-signed-dei-letter-to-congress/

160 Senior Military Signed DEI Letter To Congress

armedforces.press · by Staff Writer · May 24, 2023

The attached press release is an update as to suggested actions to be taken regarding our WOKE Department of Defense (DOD).

Also attached is a letter signed by more than 160 senior military leaders to our U.S House of Representative leadership requesting action.

• Ukraine Tells China It Will Not Cede Territory As Part Of Peace Plan
• South African President Heads African Leaders’ ‘Peace Mission’ Between Ukraine And Russia

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armedforces.press · by Staff Writer · May 24, 2023

​16. Milley's team readying analysis for establishing new ‘Joint Futures’ organization for DOD

Excerpts:

This call for a potentially new entity to unite all the services stems partly from his awareness of the evolving needs — as well as other factors, like a recent direction from the defense secretary to designate a senior advocate for the future joint warfighter.

It’s too early to tell, but if it’s fully realized, “Joint Futures” could end up being a unified command, a new agency, a fresh office within DOD — or something else.

“Every option is still on the table. We’re not predicting or presupposing any single solution other than the argument that we need a senior advocate, and we need an organization focused on the future,” Maj. Gen. Patrick Gaydon, the Joint Futures, J-7 cross-functional team lead, told DefenseScoop in an interview at the Pentagon last week.

Milley's team readying analysis for establishing new ‘Joint Futures’ organization for DOD

DefenseScoop was recently briefed on the Pentagon's nascent cross-functional team and its exploratory process.

BY

BRANDI VINCENT

MAY 24, 2023

defensescoop.com · by Brandi Vincent · May 24, 2023

A nascent cross-functional team within the Joint Staff is preparing a comprehensive mission analysis brief to formally propose the creation of a new, first-ever “Joint Futures” organization that could solely focus on priming the Defense Department and military services for uncertain, technology-enabled combat operations in the years beyond 2030.

That team launched under Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley toward the end of last year to puzzle out complex plans and recommend the right paths forward.

Milley has long been deliberate about helping troops “innovate more like they fight” — meaning, collaboratively — and he was a primary player in the set up of Army Futures Command in 2018 when he was Army chief of staff.

This call for a potentially new entity to unite all the services stems partly from his awareness of the evolving needs — as well as other factors, like a recent direction from the defense secretary to designate a senior advocate for the future joint warfighter.

It’s too early to tell, but if it’s fully realized, “Joint Futures” could end up being a unified command, a new agency, a fresh office within DOD — or something else.

“Every option is still on the table. We’re not predicting or presupposing any single solution other than the argument that we need a senior advocate, and we need an organization focused on the future,” Maj. Gen. Patrick Gaydon, the Joint Futures, J-7 cross-functional team lead, told DefenseScoop in an interview at the Pentagon last week.

The ‘why’

Gaydon served as a battalion commander in an Army Stryker brigade during the war in Afghanistan.

“We were at the cutting edge, I would say, of data. I was responsible for governance development across southern Afghanistan,” he explained.

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An expert in geotechnology would “bring data and shape files so that we could overlay them on maps to help make decisions — we started layering information in 2009,” he noted. Most of the data and information captured were not specifically affiliated with the military — but instead was civilian, infrastructure and agricultural information, Gaydon said, “to help quickly be able to make decisions when crises were happening out there.”

“We also used Blue Force Tracker data to create heat maps showing where our combat platforms traveled over time, knowing that the Taliban were watching us. This allowed us to avoid setting patterns and not be easy targets for [improvised explosive devices],” he told DefenseScoop.

It was impactful at the time, “but we were just, like, at the edge of where I think we could go with some of this,” Gaydon said.

Three out of his last four positions in the Defense Department were associated with modernizing the Army. Now, he’s thinking through how to take some of those efforts and implement them on a larger scale across the military. The cross-functional team (CFT) he steers includes five full-time members from the military and DOD, as well as nine part-time subject matter experts.

“The Joint Force of the future has to be able to integrate seamlessly and we’ve got to be able to operate globally. This gets to the ‘why’ of a Joint Futures CFT and the effort — we have to be able to adapt to the changing character of war,” Gaydon said.

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“Precision munitions, the speed of hypersonics, artificial intelligence, machine learning, biotech,” he added, “we know that everyone’s going to have access to it. So, it’s really about how do you piece all those together? And it starts with a warfighting concept.”

On that note, the general officer also pointed to “how quickly things are progressing with large language models, neural networks, computer vision, and having machines” to support human decision-making. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements, he noted, inform how military leaders determine choices in operations and potential engagement with enemies.

“I think as we go to the future, much of that will be data-driven,” he said.

Gaydon referenced drafts of diagrams and graphics (viewed by DefenseScoop but not yet ready for public release) during the interview to further articulate apparent “organizational disunity” across the DOD’s timelines for the commands and services, and across products, authorities, processes and forums that are threatening joint force modernization — a key priority in the National Defense Strategy.

“The Joint Warfighting Concept 3.0 has been approved, and there’ll be some more information coming out. It is focused on 2027 to 2030 timeframe,” Gaydon noted.

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The DOD’s Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) steers efforts to develop overarching joint operational and integrating concepts. “The JROC looks at requirements. So the idea is that concepts that are validated through experimentation ought to inform requirements, and the JROC validates requirements, really, for about the next 15 years,” he said.

Meanwhile, the services are planning and operating via their own distinct timelines and modernization approaches. “The Army is doing force design out to 2040” and “the Marine Corps is designing the Marine Corps of 2030,” while the “Navy and Air Force are designing out to 2045,” Gaydon noted. He’s also met with members of the Space Force, who he said are “getting all the processes built out — but the budget timelines are shorter.”

“And I don’t know if it jumps out to you,” Gaydon said, pointing to one of the graphics his team created to show the concepts, doctrines, commands and military branches’ coverage in the years ahead through 2045. “The services are out here [with plans into the 2030s] and the Joint Force is not,” Gaydon noted.

Much will have to be worked out, but right now he envisions that for the Joint Futures organization “concepts and experimentation would be the focus.”

Officials within it, for example, would develop next-generation concepts for flight — “and I say that in plural because there could be multiple futures that we consider in how we would fight,” he noted.

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Broadly, the current idea is that the organization could first generate concepts and conduct rigorous experimentation to prove that the concepts work for how the joint force could fight in the future. Once validated, the concept would get moved into requirements and fed into JROC. Then, “it gets integrated across all of DOTMLPF-P,” Gaydon said, referring to doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy — which is DOD’s framework for considerations that must be made prior to undertaking new efforts.

Then-Lt. Col. Patrick Gaydon, battalion commander of 5/2 Brigade Special Troops Battalion, thanks soldiers from the 562nd Engineer Company for their hard work and dedication during their time in southern Afghanistan. The speech was given June 11, 2010, before a ceremony where Gaydon presented Army Commendation Medals with Valor to nine soldiers from the company for their bravery. (Photo by Spc. David Hauk)

“As part of our planning, I think due diligence says that there could be joint problems that aren’t being solved. And, inherently, joint services are very good at developing lethal weapons and a whole bunch of other things — but are there other problems that you can’t hand to a service to solve? You know, resilient C4, AI, integration-type things that could call for some of this,” Gaydon said.

Further, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin also recently called for a senior authoritative advocate for the future joint warfighter.

“We think [that person] would be the leader of this organization, if we stand it up,” Gaydon said. “Part of the argument is that we need a senior leader — we won’t even say what rank that leader would be — but someone that’s solely focused on thinking about how we can do what the [National Defense Strategy] tells us in that deep timeframe.”

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“[They] would be the voice for the future joint warfighter, with a seat in Pentagon decision forums. He or she would be positioned to create a ‘unity of effort,’ informing force design and future capability development across the joint force. We see the need for an enduring, unified solution for future joint force design and a permanent and constant advocate for the future joint warfighter,” he also told DefenseScoop.

His team is “digging into the authorities that exist and whether new authorities would be needed.” At this point, “we’re not sure they would,” he added.

Throughout the interview, Gaydon emphasized repeatedly that the cross-functional team is very early in the planning cycle on this possible new role.

“Nothing has been decided. Everything I’m giving you is hypotheticals that we’re considering and planning,” he said.

Lots of ‘ifs’

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The envisioned organization would help align the Joint Staff, combatant commands and the services on timelines, products, processes, forums and capabilities far into the future, according to Gaydon.

“It’s kind of hard, because I don’t know exactly what this [potential] organization is going to be. But I know enough to say what it probably isn’t going to be,” he explained.

Like Army Futures Command, the organization could potentially steer the development and refining of technology experiments and operational concepts for the joint force.

However, “the Army fully takes the concept into requirements. We don’t know if this organization would write requirements or not — but we’re working through that,” Gaydon said. He also noted that the overarching “idea is this organization would be a small, agile headquarters organization” staffed with up 500 officials, based on the present planning estimates.

If the organization is a command, the official would report to the defense secretary. If it’s “some sort of reform on the Joint Staff,” Gaydon said, “it would definitely report through the chairman.”

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“If it is an agency or some other office, there would be different permutations to it,” he noted.

Right now, Gaydon’s team is in the mission analysis phase of planning. Once approved to move into the next phase, the cross-functional team would expand. From there, with approval from the defense secretary, they’d develop those courses of action. When those are then approved by DOD leadership, they would move on to puzzling out stationing decisions, manpower analysis, functional analysis, figuring out the budget — and potentially create a proposal for legislative change.

Eventually, “we will have to talk to Congress — we’ve not updated them up to this point,” Gaydon noted.

He could not share any details about the timeline the cross-functional team is operating on.

In this very initial planning phase, they’re largely trying to build consensus and garner feedback from DOD leaders, the Joint Staff, combatant commands and other elements across the military.

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“I’ve engaged at a very high level, saying, ‘We need something like this, or we’ll be on the wrong side of history,’” Gaydon noted.

“I welcome skepticism — and I’ve gotten some of that — because it helps us relook things and put more rigor into the planning,” he said.

In This Story

• Joint Futures
• Joint Staff
• Mark Milley
• Patrick Gaydon

defensescoop.com · by Brandi Vincent · May 24, 2023

17. US Remains Under 'Heightened Threat' Alert Over Domestic and Foreign Terror Concerns

US Remains Under 'Heightened Threat' Alert Over Domestic and Foreign Terror Concerns

themessenger.com

The United States remains under a "heightened threat" for domestic and foreign terrorism, according to a renewed advisory released by the Department of Homeland Security released Wednesday.

The designation is driven in part by recent mass shootings in Texas and Tennessee, as well as alleged incidents involving white supremacists in recent months.

The advisory, in effect through Nov. 24, is the latest from the DHS, which has continually renewed the warning since at least 2021.

"Lone offenders and small groups motivated by a range of ideological beliefs and personal grievances continue to pose a persistent and lethal threat to the Homeland," the department stated.

"Both domestic violent extremists (DVEs) and those associated with foreign terrorist organizations continue to attempt to motivate supporters to conduct attacks in the Homeland, including through violent extremist messaging and online calls for violence."

The DHS said several factors could prompt individuals to commit violence in the coming months, including the 2024 general election cycle, legislative and other political issues, and judicial decisions.

"Likely targets of potential violence include US critical infrastructure, faith-based institutions, individuals or events associated with the LGBTQIA+ community, schools, racial and ethnic minorities, and government facilities and personnel, including law enforcement," the bulletin states.

The advisory comes as the nation experiences mass shootings at a record pace this year.

Earlier this month, a neo-Nazi opened fire at a mall in Allen, Texas, killing eight people and wounding seven others before the gunman was shot by police.

The DHS advisory also cited the mass shooting at a Christian elementary school in Nashville, Tennessee, in March that left six people dead.

The bulletin also pointed to alleged crimes involving white supremacist ideology, including an incident in March where a man allegedly attempted to burn down an Ohio church, apparently because of its plans to hold drag-themed events.

Foreign terrorist organizations, meanwhile, are continuing to use media to "call for lone offender attacks in the West, condemn US foreign policy, and attempt to expand their reach and grow global support networks," DHS said.

"Most recently, in January 2023, an individual from Maine who was inspired by a variety of foreign terrorist content was charged with federal crimes for an attack on New York City Police Department (NYPD) officers during New Year’s Eve celebrations in Times Square."

In response to the ongoing heightened threat, the DHS and FBI continue to share intelligence across the government and with the public, and DHS provides multiple resources for communities and different organizations online, the agency said.

"We conduct recurring threat briefings with private sector, state, local, tribal, territorial, and campus partners, including to inform security planning efforts," DHS said.

"DHS remains committed to working with our partners to identify and prevent all forms of targeted violence and terrorism, and to support law enforcement efforts to keep our communities safe."

themessenger.com

18. The Plot Against Russia

Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they are not really out to get you.

Excerpts:

The eclectic essence of this ideology, which has re-emerged at various stages of Russia’s historical development, was described astutely in Vladimir Nabokov’s “Conversation Piece, 1945,” a short story in which a former White Army colonel who emigrated to the United States declares, “The great Russian people has waked up and my country is again a great country.” He continues: “We [have] had three great leaders. We had Ivan, whom his enemies called Terrible, then we had Peter the Great, and now we have Joseph Stalin. … Today, in every word that comes out of Russia, I feel the power, I feel the splendor of old Mother Russia. She is again a country of soldiers, religion, and true Slavs.”

In his Victory Day speech on May 9, Putin said that Russia’s enemies were notable for their ideology of superiority. It is interesting that he uses almost everything that can be said about him—“exorbitant ambition, arrogance and permissiveness” as he put it in his speech—and lays it at the door of his opponents. Herein lies the deeper purpose of Russian anti-Americanism: to attribute everything that you yourself are plotting, all those immoral plans you are hatching, to the United States.

But this resurrected ideology also reflects the disappearance of the bipolar Cold War order and the loss of Russian greatness and power that have come with it. Thus, when Putin and members of his team talk about a new multipolar world, they are simply trying to reassert Moscow’s lost superpower status and portray themselves as a guiding light for the former Soviet republics and the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. All of this is a consequence of the psychological trauma of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which the elite who came to power in 2000 carried with them. Twenty-two years later, that trauma has resulted in a global catastrophe.

The Plot Against Russia

How Putin Revived Stalinist Anti-Americanism to Justify a Botched War

By Andrei Kolesnikov

May 25, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Andrei Kolesnikov · May 25, 2023

When two drones crashed into the roof of the Kremlin in early May, the Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov didn’t need to wait for an investigation to identify the culprit. The attack was masterminded by the United States, not Ukraine, he stated confidently. “Kyiv only does what it is told to do,” he explained. A few days later, after the Russian writer Zakhar Prilepin, a staunch Russian nationalist and outspoken supporter of the war, was nearly assassinated by a bomb placed in his car, Russia’s Foreign Ministry stated with equal confidence that the United States was behind that crime, too. This was despite the fact that the person identified as the prime suspect was clearly someone from the fringes of society who, like Prilepin, had apparently fought alongside Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine’s Donbas region.

These assertions are not casual. As Moscow’s “special military operation” in Ukraine turns into a long and difficult war, the old ideology of Russian messianism, which had already become the Kremlin’s preferred tool for manipulating public opinion, has been stirred into a sort of defining rationale for the regime. No longer is Russia simply bringing to heel a weak and feckless Ukraine that has fallen under the spell of “neo-Nazis.” According to the new framing, Russia’s real fight is against the mighty United States, which wants to destroy it, while Ukraine—just like the European Union and NATO—is merely an obedient U.S. satellite. For the Kremlin, a sinister U.S. plot offers a convenient explanation for why the war has dragged on for so long and why Putin has proved to be not such a great military strategist after all. It also helps explain to average Russians why the war was started in the first place.

Seen in this context, the “special operation” has evolved from an effort to recover lost imperial lands into a civilizational battle between the forces of good, embodied by Russia, and the forces of evil, sometimes called “satanic,” personified by the United States and its allies. Already, this simple idea has taken on extravagant proportions. In May, Nikolai Patrushev, the head of Russia’s Security Council, predicted that Americans would soon be seeking to exploit Russia’s vast expanses for resettlement purposes because an imminent eruption of the supervolcano beneath Yellowstone National Park will leave them with nowhere to live. (That a senior Russian official was endorsing such an absurd conspiracy theory prompted a social media riff borrowing from Tsar Alexander III’s famous dictum: “Russia has only three allies: the army, the navy, and the Yellowstone volcano.”)

But the Kremlin is dead serious. By fixating on the United States, Putin is tapping into the late Stalinist doctrines that made up the ideological foundations of the Cold War: the United States rules the world and has always wanted to weaken, if not destroy, us. Of course, many ordinary Russians—at least when they are not being told otherwise by the Russian state—have tended to be indifferent or even partial to the United States. But as Stalin knew and Putin has discovered, those attitudes can be shifted by effective propaganda.

By conjuring a nefarious, all-powerful adversary, the Putin regime can create a new justification for a hugely costly war that has already lasted well over a year and seems unlikely to end anytime soon. The presence of such a strong external enemy, of course, also justifies intensified repression of internal enemies—dissidents, civil rights activists, lawyers, journalists, professors, and various “foreign agents.” The late Stalinist regime operated under the same logic. In April 1951, George Kennan wrote in these pages: “No ruling group likes to admit that it can govern its people only by regarding and treating them as criminals. For this reason there is always a tendency to justify internal oppression by pointing to the menacing iniquity of the outside world.”

DAMN YANKEES

The United States was not the original focus of Russian xenophobia. During World War I, Germany was considered the main enemy, and patriotic hysteria was fueled by anti-German sentiment. Then, in the early Soviet years, France and the United Kingdom were considered the main adversaries—whereas the United States was a distant, well-developed but soulless capitalist society from which to borrow technology and industrial specialists. Turning the United States into the main enemy was more of a postwar phenomenon: even then, Stalin was initially more preoccupied with, as he put it in 1946, “the replacement of Hitler’s domination by Churchill's domination,” and in his growing Anglophobia, he overlooked the transformation of America into a leading power. But he quickly made up for it in both propaganda and repression when “Anglo-American spies” came on the scene.

Yet during World War II, things were absolutely different: Soviet soldiers and the Soviet population had a strong affinity for their Anglo-American allies. At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, the Red Army’s song and dance ensemble performed two of the Allies’ most popular melodies: the British marching song “It’s a Long Way to Tipperary, and the Anglo-American folk tune “There’s a Tavern in the Town,” known in its Russian version as “Kabachok.” Subsequently recorded for gramophone, these Russian versions were wildly popular in the Soviet Union along with other American hits, such as “Coming In on a Wing and a Prayer,” a World War II song about an Allied bombing raid that was sung in Russian as “Song of the Bombers.” Another popular song, known in Russian as “And in Trouble and in Battle,” which was performed even before the war by Alexander Varlamov’s jazz orchestra, turned out to be a Russian version of the 1934 American hit “Roll Along, Covered Wagon, Roll Along.”

It wasn’t just the music of the United Kingdom and the United States that were stratospherically popular by the end of the war. So were the Allies themselves. On the morning of May 9, after the 3 AM radio announcement of Germany’s surrender, enormous jubilant crowds poured onto the streets of Moscow. My father, who had just turned 17, was woken by a classmate at four in the morning, and they rushed toward Red Square, which was already full of people celebrating. Throughout the day, people also flocked to the nearby square where the U.S. embassy was located, as captured in photographs by Yakov Khalip and Anatoly Garanin.

In Stalin’s late years, anti-Americanism became the cornerstone of Soviet propaganda.

“We were naturally moved and pleased by this manifestation of public feeling, but were at a loss to know how to respond to it,” recalled Kennan, then chargé d’affaires at the embassy, who had not yet become famous for his “long telegram’’ on Soviet conduct. Rapturous Muscovites were hoisting up anyone in military uniform and were prepared to do the same to staff from the embassy of a friendly power. Kennan, who spoke Russian, risked climbing out onto the parapet over the embassy’s entrance to shout: “Congratulations on the day of victory! All honor to the Soviet allies!”

Although it was unnoticed by the Soviet people at the time, however, Kennan could already sense the emerging tensions of the Cold War. According to the historian John Gaddis, even in the wake of their triumph over Hitler, the members of the Big Three alliance were already at war with one another, at least ideologically and geopolitically. In the later years of the Stalin regime, anti-Americanism would serve an important strategic purpose, countering the West’s new threat to Soviet spheres of influence. Anti-Americanism became the cornerstone of foreign policy, propaganda, and counterpropaganda for the entire Cold War. Not surprisingly, a comparable confrontation with the West today has brought the old genie out of the bottle—there are no more effective means.

“THERE WILL BE BOMBS”

In 2022, the derogatory term Anglosaksy—“Anglo-Saxons”—suddenly came into frequent use in Kremlin discussions and even entered the vocabulary of ordinary Russians. But the term, which refers to scheming Americans who lead obedient European satellites, is by no means an invention of the Putin regime. It comes directly from the Soviet lexicon of power of the late 1940s and early 1950s, when it was deployed to refer to the Soviet Union’s most important adversaries. In its current ideology and propaganda, Moscow has intuitively or consciously regurgitated classic Russian conspiracy theories, which have always been—in both Soviet and post-Soviet history—a simple, universal way to explain Russia’s problems or the expansionist actions of its rulers.

During the Cold War, for example, the KGB actively promoted the idea of a secret U.S. plot against the Soviet Union. Consider the widely circulated 1979 book CIA Target: The USSR, by Nikolai Yakovlev, a Russian historian recruited by the KGB. Among other things, Yakovlev expounded a theory then popular in the Russian security agencies and in Russian nationalist circles that there was an American “Dulles Plan”—after C.I.A. director Allen Dulles— to destroy the Soviet Union. As the Russian historian Viktor Shnirelman has shown, this idea was likely inspired by an intentional misreading of a 1948 U.S. National Security Council directive that may have become known to Soviet intelligence. (The directive was in fact exclusively defensive and contained not a single word about the “destruction of the Russian people.”) The myth about the existence of the “plan” even found its way into some Russian history books.

The KGB promoted the idea that there was a secret U.S. plot to destroy the Soviet Union.

Although the Soviet government moved much closer to the United States during the Mikhail Gorbachev era, the strain of extreme anti-Americanism continued to thrive in some corners of the Soviet and post-Soviet state. In the 1990s, for example, Filip Bobkov, a former senior KGB officer, claimed that the collapse of the Soviet Union had been engineered by the United States with the help of the “Yakovlev group”—this time the Yakovlev in question was Alexander, an architect of perestroika and Gorbachev’s right-hand man. These conspiracy theories had lived on, unaltered, on Russia’s nationalist fringe, including in the work of the Russian émigré philosopher Ivan Ilyin (1883-1954), whose concept of a global “world behind the scenes,” or illuminati, became fashionable in the Kremlin. (The influence of such philosophers on Putin, though, should not be exaggerated: he has quoted Ilyin on perhaps two occasions; and he has referred once to the classic Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev, although he probably knows no more about him than Brezhnev did about Marx. In essence, he was simply showing the that the historical idea of a Russianness shaped in opposition to the West has endured.)

All of the Kremlin’s theses about the dangerous West and Russia’s opposition to it, which Putin repeats nonstop, were formulated long ago in the late Stalin era, sometimes even in verse. In 1951, Pravda published “On the Soviet Atom,” a poem by the children’s poet Sergei Mikhalkov, who also wrote the words to the Soviet and then Russian national anthems. Roughly translated, it went something like: “There will be bombs! / There are bombs! / You should take that into account! / But it’s not in our plans / To conquer other countries.” Those lines could be lifted straight from one of Putin’s speeches.

Then there is the practice of portraying Russia’s American enemies as stupid. In effect, the message is, “Our opponents may be cunning, but we can see right through them.” In the late Stalin years, the Communist leadership propagated the cliché of Americans’ roaming Moscow with cameras and bribing children with candy to look sad to show the despondency of life in the Soviet Union. “Look, Alik is crying / They’ll film him for America!” joked the children’s poet Agniya Barto in the 1950s. Similarly, Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, the former Russian president and deputy chairman of the Security Council, now have a habit of naming and shaming Western enemies in their speeches as “morons” and “half-wits.” Accompanying this is Putin’s growing obsession with LGBTQ topics and obscene jokes about Westerners.

AMERICA FIRST, RUSSIA SECOND

As much as official Russia has often been anti-American, it has also long been obsessed with U.S. economic power and even U.S. goods and food. One of the main slogans from the 1960s Khrushchev era focused on matching and then overtaking the United States in terms of per capita meat, milk, and butter production. When Putin came to power, the idea of catch-up development was hardly less present. In some sense, “America first” is effectively one of Putin’s slogans: everything is viewed through the prism of the United States and the West. To be different means not looking like Western people and not living like them. More precisely, it means achieving similar successes while relying on one’s own strength, upholding sovereignty and “originality,” and practicing import substitution. In other words, both the Russian state and society continue to measure themselves against the yardstick of the United States and its European allies.

The pattern goes back to the earliest Soviet years. American “bourgeois specialists” appeared in the Soviet Union during Stalin’s industrialization drive in the 1920s and 1930s. The Soviet writer Valentin Kataev depicted them somewhat ironically, but the truth is that without U.S. technology, it’s unlikely that an industrial breakthrough would have been possible. When the United States presented the American National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959—an event that attracted more than two million members of the Soviet public, who tasted Pepsi and got their first look at American washing machines—Nikita Khrushchev and Richard Nixon had their famous “kitchen debate” at the fair site, in which they discussed the relative merits of capitalism and socialism. At the time, the Soviet leadership clearly felt its backwardness in the consumer sphere. This was also why the Soviet Union had to lead the way in the space race: to break free of the catch-up matrix.

Amerika, a Russian-language magazine about American life published by the U.S. State Department, was a coveted item, although less so than jeans, chewing gum, and soft drinks. Characteristically, the magazine was banned in 1948, when Stalinist anti-Americanism was in full force, and was released again during Khrushchev’s anti-Stalinist thaw in the 1950s. At the beginning of 1970s, Leonid Brezhnev gladly accepted prototypes from the U.S. car industry as a gift from the Americans, adding to the atmosphere of détente. And when the Soyuz and Apollo missions jointly docked in space in July 1975, it was commemorated in Moscow with the appearance of “real Virginian tobacco” in cigarettes named after the historic event: not the choking fumes of the motherland, but the fragrant aroma of another world. By the twilight years of the Soviet Union, Soviet industry was so dependent on Western supplies and technologies that the sanctions imposed on Moscow for the invasion of Afghanistan put entire industries, such as chemical engineering, in jeopardy.

For Putin, everything is viewed through the prism of the United States and the West.

Even in the post-Soviet era, the Russian fixation with U.S. models and Putin’s talk of a U.S.-imposed unipolar world created a sense of unavoidable dependence on “them.” Respondents in Russian focus groups would sometimes say that Russia’s 1993 constitution was written in Washington and that Putin’s amendments to it were required to make the country truly sovereign. At the same time, however, people understand that the United States has been an economic powerhouse from which Russia could learn a lot in order to achieve the same standard of living. Once again, a combination of Russian superiority and Russian inferiority has been simultaneously expressed in Moscow’s contradictory attitude toward its American rival.

Still, until Putin returned to the presidency in 2012 and Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, Russians’ complexes about the United States were not so noticeable. In the initial years of his rule, beginning in 2000, Putin was still adjusting to the West and wary of squandering the legacy of Boris Yeltsin, his predecessor. He did not see Russia as a trend-setter in the Western-led world order. The open hostility to the West expressed in Putin’s speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, however, marked the start of deteriorating relations with the United States—delayed only slightly by an attempted “reset” during Medvedev’s four-year presidency. By 2014, Moscow’s new emphasis on Russian pride and reawakened great-power aspirations brought back all the old hang-ups about the United States, stirring up a quasi-patriotic hysteria. But the strongest manifestation has surfaced since the “special operation” began last year.

Since then, Russian attitudes toward the United States have worsened drastically. In February 2022, 31 percent of Russians had a positive attitude about the United States. A year later, according to the Levada Center, the independent Russian opinion research organization, just 14 percent of respondents had a positive view of the United States, and 73 percent had a negative attitude. The decline in positive attitudes toward Europe is not far behind: just 18 percent of Russians polled had a positive opinion of EU countries in February 2023, compared with 69 percent who did not. When combined with conspiracy theories and Putin’s own growing isolation, Russian fixations with America have become a potent recipe for militarism.

THE SOURCES OF RUSSIAN CONDUCT

Putin’s embrace of conspiratorial anti-Americanism is especially dangerous because of his regime’s growing disregard for the old red lines. During the Cold War, at least, both sides agreed that the consequences of inflicting damage on each other would be unacceptable. Putin’s problem—in fact, the whole world’s problem right now—is that the Russian government lacks the one instinctthat since the late 1960s has consistently led to détente with the West: the willingness to negotiate. Instead, Putin has suspended cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation, discussed the possibility of a nuclear strike with infantile levity, expressed teenage grievances, and shown an unwillingness to maintain even a minimal level of dialogue. All of these actions unfavorably distinguish Putin’s anti-Americanism from that of his late Soviet predecessors.

“The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today,” Kennan wrote in 1950, “is the product of ideology and circumstances.” If one looks at the sources of Russian conduct today, the circumstances are a dictator obsessed with his mission. As for the ideology, Russia’s new foreign policy concept refers to the country’s “special position as an original state-civilization, a vast Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power”—a noteworthy new term. This concept further cites Russia’s role in consolidating “the Russian people and other peoples that make up the cultural and civilizational community of the Russian world”—a geographic space whose borders are not specified.

The eclectic essence of this ideology, which has re-emerged at various stages of Russia’s historical development, was described astutely in Vladimir Nabokov’s “Conversation Piece, 1945,” a short story in which a former White Army colonel who emigrated to the United States declares, “The great Russian people has waked up and my country is again a great country.” He continues: “We [have] had three great leaders. We had Ivan, whom his enemies called Terrible, then we had Peter the Great, and now we have Joseph Stalin. … Today, in every word that comes out of Russia, I feel the power, I feel the splendor of old Mother Russia. She is again a country of soldiers, religion, and true Slavs.”

In his Victory Day speech on May 9, Putin said that Russia’s enemies were notable for their ideology of superiority. It is interesting that he uses almost everything that can be said about him—“exorbitant ambition, arrogance and permissiveness” as he put it in his speech—and lays it at the door of his opponents. Herein lies the deeper purpose of Russian anti-Americanism: to attribute everything that you yourself are plotting, all those immoral plans you are hatching, to the United States.

But this resurrected ideology also reflects the disappearance of the bipolar Cold War order and the loss of Russian greatness and power that have come with it. Thus, when Putin and members of his team talk about a new multipolar world, they are simply trying to reassert Moscow’s lost superpower status and portray themselves as a guiding light for the former Soviet republics and the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. All of this is a consequence of the psychological trauma of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which the elite who came to power in 2000 carried with them. Twenty-two years later, that trauma has resulted in a global catastrophe.

• ANDREI KOLESNIKOV is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Foreign Affairs · by Andrei Kolesnikov · May 25, 2023

19. Okinawans March for Peace as Japan Beefs Up US Military Alliance

How many protesters are imported from mainland Japan?

Note that the 1st and 2d largest employers in Okinawa are the Japanese government and the US military.

Okinawans March for Peace as Japan Beefs Up US Military Alliance

Even while Tokyo moves to bolster its defense capabilities, residents of Okinawa continue to protest the militarization of their homeland.

thediplomat.com · by Cristian Martini Grimaldi · May 24, 2023

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Okinawa, the southernmost Japanese prefecture where many Japanese choose to spend their holidays thanks to its stunning beaches and rich cultural heritage, has evolved into the battleground of a long-running conflict. For over 60 years, the local populace has voiced its discontent with the presence of U.S. military outposts on the islands.

One of the key milestones in the history of Okinawa’s protests against the U.S. military presence occurred in the 1960s. At that time, the United States and Japan were negotiating the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control. In 1972, Okinawa was finally returned to Japanese administration, marking the end of U.S. governance. However, the issue of the military bases remained unresolved, leading to ongoing protests and demonstrations in subsequent years.

Today the island hosts around 26,000 U.S. military personnel, about half of the total complement of the United States Forces Japan, spread among 31 areas. While Okinawa constitutes only 0.6 percent of the landmass of Japan, 70 percent of the U.S. bases in all of Japan are in the prefecture.

For the U.S. and Japanese governments, the grounds for the bases’ continued existence are obvious: to protect Japan’s security and foster regional stability. But the military outposts have grown to be divisive, straining relations between Okinawans and the United States, and between Okinawans and their own central government.

Fanning the flames of the local anger, in recent years new problems have emerged, like the presence of pollution in the groundwater.

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On May 13, over a thousand people gathered for a peace walk along the main island of Okinawa. The next day, demonstrators held an annual symposium gathering all the peace groups of the country. Each year, similar events take place, centered around the May 15 anniversary of Okinawa’s reversion to Japanese control.

Hundreds of people gather at the Peace Action Center in Naha. (Cristian Martini Grimaldi)

Tani Masashi is the deputy secretary general of the Peace Forum. “This year marks 51 years since Okinawa came back to Japan and here we try to spread the knowledge to the young people of how strenuous the burden the American base has been to this island,” he said. “Our quality of life is the worst if compared to all other 46 prefectures.”

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Okinawa’s economy has been heavily reliant on tourism and agriculture, which typically offer lower wages compared to industries such as finance and technology that are more prevalent in other parts of Japan.

“Japan’s main island is far from here so it is hard for the central government to fully understand our problems,” Masashi said. “Sure, many think if the American bases disappear also the local economy will be badly hit, but we have to think ahead on how to replace that void.

“Except for the older generation of Okinawans, people tend to take the American presence for granted because they never got to know what it was like to live on the island without foreign military personnel.”

Professor Ishikawa (who gave only his surname) delivered a lecture in Futenma Baptist Church near city hall in Chatan, a town located in Nakagami district, where more than half of the land area is currently occupied by U.S. military bases. He painted a very vivid picture of what the island used to be before the Americans settled in.

He started his speech by showing rare pictures of Okinawa before the war. “We had green fields, lots of land for agriculture and schools. It used to be a green wealthy island… War brought us so much change and not toward peace.”

More than once in his speech, Ishikawa stressed Okinawa’s past – and, he hopes, future – status as a “peace island without weapons.”

“Americans before the war was even over already started sending reconnaissance planes to take pictures from above so to prepare this island as a military outpost. Okinawans had their land expropriated without any say at all, all they could do was to resettle around the bases,” he claimed.

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It took many years to mold Okinawan public opinion to gradually embrace the notion that the U.S. military installations were an intrinsic element of the islands’ essence. Ishikawa thinks it would take the same amount of time to make Okinawans think otherwise.

Peace Action demonstrators in Naha, in Japan’s Okinawa prefecture. (Cristian Martini Grimaldi)

While over a thousand people marched for peace in Yomitan Village on May 13, in the center of Naha a smaller group staged a demonstration. These demonstrations drew participants from all walks of life, including students, activists, local politicians, or merely concerned citizens, united in their fervent opposition to the presence of the military installations.

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The military bases are becoming more and more critical for both U.S. and Japanese security policies as Okinawa prefecture turns into a key battleground in the rising tensions between China and U.S. allies in the region.

I asked Yuko, a 23-year-old student who came to Okinawa all the way from Kyoto, what it feels like to march for peace in such a volatile geopolitical environment.

“While it is true that many nations are currently pursuing militarization, it is crucial for us to focus our efforts on avoiding an escalation into an arms race scenario,” she said.

“The incidents that have occurred during the years, and the rapes to the locals, the environmental impact of the U.S. military all have had a significant influence on the lives of the Okinawan people,” said Yuto, 24, a local activist.

A couple of years ago, a group known as Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence compiled a book to document 350 cases of sexual assault involving U.S. troops. One of the most recent was the brutal murder and rape of a 20-year-old by an American civilian contractor working at a U.S. military base.

Peace demonstrators confronted by right-wing groups in Naha. Police formed a barrier to avoid clashes between the two groups. (Cristian Martini Grimaldi)

The peaceful demonstrators provoked the attention of right-wing groups, who came prepared with loud speakers and huge trucks to disrupt the march.

Ezaki-san, 52, is a truck driver who came from Chiba Prefecture, near Tokyo, to be here for the counter-demonstration. When the pacifists, a group of 40 people, spread their flags and banners he lost his temper and at least 10 policemen had to gather to overpower him. When he calmed down, I had time to sneak in between him and the security forces that were still holding on to him to ask him about his violent rage.

“They [the pacifist demonstrators] say we want war, but that is not true,” he fumed. “They are the ones who want to divide this country by being anti-Japanese!”

He is referring to the fact that the peace protesters display a noticeable sense of resentment toward the Japanese government. Tokyo’s willingness to accept the continued presence of military bases on the island stands in contrast to the prevailing sentiment of the local population.

The American Village, an outdoor shopping mall in Okinawa. (Cristian Martini Grimaldi)

Later, I took a 90-minute bus journey to American Village, the famous rendezvous of all military stationed in Okinawa. You can spot the U.S. Marines at a glance; few foreign tourists here are in remarkable physical shape like they are.

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I talked to a few of them who were lined up at a restaurant. They all seem startled by my question about the peace protest.

“I’ve heard about the demonstration but we never discuss this topic. I wouldn’t know much about it,” said Nicholas, a 22-year-old who arrived here just a few months ago from California.

This is essentially the answer I get from most of them, with some variations on the theme. Harry, a man with a big mustache and a U.S. Southern accent, expanded: “I heard it but it’s not an issue. We don’t lose any sleep over this. It’s way over my rank and salary to worry about it.”

Then I met Tom, 24, a tall blonde wearing sunglasses, who – to my astonishment – claimed to be the person responsible for a part of the leaks that have contaminated Okinawa’s drinking water, although it’s impossible to verify his claim.

“You know… we sometimes mess up… while filling the barrels with liquid… they spill over,” he told me.

What spills over? I ask.

“That stuff that goes into the trucks…” It was all I got from him before he promptly departed after his superior shot him a piercing gaze – indicating a possible dissatisfaction with his sharing of information.

The Environmental Preservation Division of Okinawa prefecture has raised concerns about a potential link between high levels of toxic PFAS contamination in groundwater samples and the presence of U.S. military bases. The division has also made a formal request to access the U.S. bases for further testing.

In a recent groundwater survey conducted by the prefecture, 46 sites near U.S. military installations were sampled, and alarming results were found: 32 of the sites exceeded Japan’s safe drinking water standard for PFAS. The most significant levels were discovered downstream of U.S. bases, particularly Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.

Demonstrators in front of the Peace Action center in Naha. (Cristian Martini Grimaldi)

PFAS are a group of man-made chemicals that have been widely used in various industrial and consumer products since the 1940s. One of the main concerns with PFAS is their persistence in the environment. They do not easily break down and can accumulate over time.

“Exposure to PFAS has been linked to potential health risks. Some studies have associated PFAS exposure with adverse effects on the liver, immune system and even thyroid gland,” said Toshio Takahashi, 70, whom I met at the Okinawa Prefectural Museum.

Toshio started his anti-base activities when he was 18 years old and has participated in dozens, if not hundreds, of demonstrations. He is part of the committee for the Life Protection Against the PFAS Pollution.

“The levels were measured in 2016 and we know they are over the accepted standard, so we ask that the soil water to be cleaned. But Japanese can’t get inside the base. In the U.S., the Americans are purifying the whole soil around the hundreds of bases they have there, but they are not doing so in their outposts abroad.”

Despite the prefecture’s requests for access to the bases for water sampling, they haven’t received any response so far. And so the issue is added to the lengthening list of grievances Okinawans have against the U.S. military presence on the home islands.

GUEST AUTHOR

Cristian Martini Grimaldi

Cristian Martini Grimaldi is a freelance Italian journalist living in Japan contributing for La Repubblica and La Stampa. His latest book is “Japan does it better?”

thediplomat.com · by Cristian Martini Grimaldi · May 24, 2023

20. Japan Ground Self-Defense Force to Provide Ukraine With 100 Transport Vehicles

Excerpts:

In its National Security Strategy published in December, the Japanese government said it will consider updating the arms export guidelines, calling such transfers a key policy instrument “to provide assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat of force.”

The tricky thing is that the LDP’s junior coalition partner, Komeito, is reluctant to ease those guidelines. Komeito, which is backed by the nation’s most powerful religious group, Soka Gakkai, has been a pacifist party since its birth.

The LDP is striving to reach an agreement with Komeito this summer. Those discussions will be a major litmus test if Japan is indeed in the process of returning to “a normal nation” just like other G-7 countries in the long run.

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force to Provide Ukraine With 100 Transport Vehicles

The ruling LDP is striving to ease weapon export rules, with Ukraine in mind, but faces pushback from its junior coalition partner. 

thediplomat.com · by Takahashi Kosuke · May 24, 2023

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The G-7 Hiroshima Summit saw the group of wealthy democracies renew a pledge to defend a rules-based international order and continue military assistance to Ukraine as it keeps fighting against Russia.

While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was stealing headlines at the G-7 parley, U.S. President Joe Biden and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak pledged to help train Ukrainian pilots for the U.S.-made F-16 fighter jet. Reversing his previous stance, Biden also authorized U.S. allies to transfer F-16 fighter jets to Kyiv. In addition to this plan, Biden also announced a new $375 million package of military aid to Ukraine that included ammunition and armored vehicles.

Compared to these pledges, Japan’s military support for Ukraine is a drop in the ocean. Tokyo keeps taking baby steps.

In a ceremony held at the Ministry of Defense’s Tokyo headquarters on May 24, Japan handed over two Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) transport vehicles to Ukraine. This truck, officially known as the 1/2 Ton Truck, is a six-seat vehicle developed from Mitsubishi Motors’ Pajero. Each vehicle costs about 4.65 million yen ($33,600).

In his meeting with Zelenskyy in Hiroshima, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio pledged that Tokyo will provide about 100 transport vehicles to Ukraine. The ceremony on Wednesday marked the handover of the first batch.

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Besides the 1/2 Ton Truck, Japan will also provide high-mobility vehicles (worth 8.75 million yen per vehicle) that can accommodate 10 people, as well as carrier dump trucks (worth 14 million yen per vehicle) being used by the GSDF. Tokyo will also offer about 30,000 emergency food rations to Ukraine.

Under the Self-Defense Forces Law, vehicles used by the SDF cannot be transferred directly for free. So at first the vehicles must be recognized as old items that are no longer in use before being donated abroad.

With other Western nations sending advanced weapons – such as High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), precision rockets, and Javelin anti-tank weapons – to embattled Ukraine, Japan’s support appears small.

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This is because Tokyo is still bound by the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which prohibit Japan from exporting lethal weapons to a party in a conflict, except to nations that were involved in their development or production. Thus, Japan’s support has taken other forms; it has contributed funds to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to clear landmines, remove debris, and provide generators to Ukraine while providing non-lethal weapons such as bulletproof vests and helmets to Kyiv.

Although the Three Principles were rolled out in 2014, the ban on lethal weapons exports has been essentially unchanged for over 30 years. During the Gulf War, Japan provided a total of $13 billion to the multinational forces of the United States and Europe, but it was criticized as “cash diplomacy” without receiving international recognition at the time. It was a bitter experience for the pacifist nation.

In the U.S. and Europe, there is a sense of crisis that if they do not show a firm stance against aggressor nations like Russia, they may invite yet another act of aggression in the future. In Tokyo, there is also a growing sense of danger that “Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow,” as Kishida has repeatedly said in the past year, with China clearly in mind.

Now lawmakers at the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, led by Kishida, are trying to ease rules to authorize the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine and other nations. Proponent of the change argue that if Japan doesn’t help Ukraine, the country won’t be able to expect to receive support from partners in Europe in the case of a contingency in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (which are administered by Japan but claimed by China) or Taiwan.

In its National Security Strategy published in December, the Japanese government said it will consider updating the arms export guidelines, calling such transfers a key policy instrument “to provide assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat of force.”

The tricky thing is that the LDP’s junior coalition partner, Komeito, is reluctant to ease those guidelines. Komeito, which is backed by the nation’s most powerful religious group, Soka Gakkai, has been a pacifist party since its birth.

The LDP is striving to reach an agreement with Komeito this summer. Those discussions will be a major litmus test if Japan is indeed in the process of returning to “a normal nation” just like other G-7 countries in the long run.

CONTRIBUTING AUTHOR

Takahashi Kosuke

Takahashi Kosuke is Tokyo Correspondent for The Diplomat.

thediplomat.com · by Takahashi Kosuke · May 24, 2023

21. US-China trade war as mutually assured destruction

Excerpts:

The bottom line, Beckley concludes, is that “slowing growth makes China a less competitive long-term rival to the United States, but a more explosive near-term threat. As US policymakers determine how to counter China’s repression and aggression, they should recognize that economic insecurity has spurred great power expansion in the past and is driving China’s belligerence today.”

Clearly, China could make a similar argument about the specter of Trump getting a second shot at power after the November 2024 election. Trump, after all, recently reiterated he favors a US default.

But if the definition of insanity, as Albert Einstein said, is trying the same play over and over expecting a different result, then there’s still too much crazy in US-China relations.

US-China trade war as mutually assured destruction

As US teeters toward default and China’s recovery underwhelms it’s hard not to blame the trade war neither side seems ready to end

asiatimes.com · by William Pesek · May 25, 2023

Analysts at Fitch Ratings aren’t looking out for China as they tiptoe up to downgrading Washington’s AAA credit rating. But written between the lines in bold font is how a US default would give Beijing the big trade war win Xi Jinping has been seeking.

To be sure, China won’t love the paper losses on its stockpile of US$870 billion of US Treasury securities. Nor will Chinese leader Xi or Premier Li Qiang welcome the ways in which surging US debt yields make China’s 5% growth target less attainable.

But the immediate devastating blow to US leadership and credibility from a default would play right into Xi’s goal of increasing the yuan’s role in finance and trade — and thus giving China a bigger say in global economic affairs.

And yet, it’s not quite that simple. Just as US Congress members play games with the debt ceiling and teeter towards default, Chinese stocks are cratering.

The CSI index has erased all its gains for the year so far as China’s post-Covid recovery disappoints. It’s hard not to wonder if the common link here isn’t the trade war that neither side seems ready to end.

Call it mutually assured economic destruction. In the 855 days of the Joe Biden presidency, his White House continued predecessor Donald Trump’s punitive tariffs against China.

In many ways, Biden has gone after China with even greater verve. Biden is not doing it with blunt taxes and angry tweets, but surgical and steady efforts to deprive China of access to vital technology.

China, of course, has retaliated in kind. But as the two biggest economies face intensifying headwinds, it’s high time US and Chinese officials lowered the temperature and found a way to stop the insanity, many analysts believe.

A widely watched meeting in Vienna earlier this month between US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and China’s top diplomat Wang Yi generated some muted optimism. Both sides described the discussions as “candid, substantive and constructive.”

Another chance to return to normalcy will come at a dinner planned for May 25 in Washington, where US Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo will dine with her Chinese counterpart Wang Wentao, marking the first cabinet-level meeting in Washington between the two sides during the Biden administration.

Yet where Biden or Xi stands on the it’s-time-to-talk continuum is anyone’s guess.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden are locked in a contest for economic supremacy. Photo: Pool / Twitter / Screengrab

It’s time to admit the ongoing “decoupling” drama between the US and China is having an “adverse effect” on the companies of both nations, saysErgys Islamaj, senior economist at the World Bank.

What’s more, Islamaj notes, “the fragmentation of standards, especially between the world’s two largest markets, can not only constitute additional barriers to trade and investment between the two countries.”

The “fragmentation,” he says, “creates additional burdens and diseconomies on exporters and multinational corporations from third countries, as companies need to adjust their products and processes to comply with different regulations.”

All this is creating “additional costs and complexity in sourcing decisions” and it’s not a formula for innovation or economic confidence, Islamaj concludes.

Wang Qi, CEO of MegaTrust Investment, thinks ending what he calls an all-out “investment war” will be hard. As he puts it: “Trump started the trade war. Biden initiated the tech war. Yet they both wanted an investment war with China.”

Worries about heightened US-China tensions have weighed on Chinese stocks since late April. This is just months after the US Public Company Accounting Oversight Board completed its first round of audit inspections on Chinese ADRs, or American depositary receipts, “which reduced the delisting risk,” Wang says.

For now, at least. Many, though, “seriously underestimated the gravity of the so-called investment war, which is still on today,” Wang says. “Trying to limit Chinese companies’ growth by trade or tech sanctions is one thing. Putting an explicit cap on the US investments in Chinese stocks is another. The latter is arguably more direct and detrimental to the share price.”

US officers can, and do, make reciprocal claims about Beijing. Yet neither economy is thriving in this environment. US growth cooled in the first quarter. Gross domestic product (GDP) rose at an annual rate of 1.1% in the January to March period, down from 2.6% in the previous quarter last year.

“Compared to the fourth quarter, the deceleration in real GDP in the first quarter primarily reflected a downturn in private inventory investment and a slowdown in nonresidential fixed investment,” the US Commerce Department said earlier this month.

To Fitch economist Olu Sonola, the downshift is not a fluke. Despite unemployment sitting at a 54-year low, Sonola notes, US labor markets will weaken as aggregate demand stagnates in response to higher interest rates and tightening credit conditions, exacerbated by stress in the banking sector.

Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse could yet be the tip of the iceberg for US banks. Image: Screengrab / Twitter / TechCrunch

“Labor demand still exceeds supply, but this imbalance is declining, now at approximately 2.3% of the labor force in first quarter 2023 compared with 3.2% last quarter,” Sonola says. “Job openings have also declined by 1.6 million from peak levels. Wage growth year-over-year has decelerated significantly since last quarter in a number of states.”

Clearly, trade headwinds aren’t doing China any favors either. Retail sales, industrial output and fixed investment expanded much less than hoped in April. The youth unemployment rate hit a record high of 20.4%, raising concerns for social stability.

Economist Jeffrey Currie at Goldman Sachs says deep concerns over the health of the global financial sector, US debt ceiling risks, fears of an impending demand slowdown in the West and a disappointing recovery in China in April have all contributed to “fears of an upcoming US or global recession.”

Those fears will be turned up to 11 or higher as the US flirts with default. Enter Fitch, with a perilously timed downgrade warning as US politicians play with fire. It moved the US to “rating watch negative” the “X-date” when Washington runs out of cash.

In its statement, Fitch said “we believe risks have risen that the debt limit will not be raised or suspended before the X-date and consequently that the government could begin to miss payments on some of its obligations. Prioritization of debt securities over other due payments after the X-date would avoid a default.”

Adding to the uncertainty is where Biden and Xi might take their economic clash next.

Some think Team Biden should be careful what it wishes for. Economist Michael Beckley at the Washington-based Wilson Center says that “most debates on US-China policy focus on the dangers of a rising, confident China. But the United States actually faces a more volatile threat: an insecure China mired in a protracted economic slowdown.”

Chinese growth, he adds, has fallen by half over the past decade and is “likely to plunge in the years ahead as massive debt, foreign protectionism, resource depletion and rapid aging take their toll. Past rising powers that suffered such slowdowns became more repressive at home and aggressive abroad as they struggled to revive their economies and maintain domestic stability and international influence. China already seems to be headed down this ugly path.”

Performers dance during a show as part of the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China, at the Bird’s Nest stadium in Beijing on June 28, 2021. Photo: AFP / Noel Celis

The bottom line, Beckley concludes, is that “slowing growth makes China a less competitive long-term rival to the United States, but a more explosive near-term threat. As US policymakers determine how to counter China’s repression and aggression, they should recognize that economic insecurity has spurred great power expansion in the past and is driving China’s belligerence today.”

Clearly, China could make a similar argument about the specter of Trump getting a second shot at power after the November 2024 election. Trump, after all, recently reiterated he favors a US default.

But if the definition of insanity, as Albert Einstein said, is trying the same play over and over expecting a different result, then there’s still too much crazy in US-China relations.

Follow William Pesek on Twitter at @WilliamPesek

asiatimes.com · by William Pesek · May 25, 2023

22. Philippines-Vietnam teaming up on China in South China Sea

Philippines-Vietnam teaming up on China in South China Sea

Marcos Jr-Chinh reviving dormant de facto alliance to check, balance and challenge China in disputed and militarized waters

asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · May 25, 2023

MANILA – Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr has not only revitalized defense ties with traditional Western allies but has also doubled down on strategic cooperation with like-minded regional states pushing back against China’s South China Sea assertiveness.

In particular, Vietnam has emerged as a pivotal player in the Philippines’ emerging regional strategy to constrain and roll back China’s ambitions in the hotly contested and geostrategically crucial maritime area.

Earlier this month, Marcos Jr held his third high-level meeting with a Vietnamese official in his first year in office.

During his meetings with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh on the sidelines of the 42nd Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit and related summits in Labuan Bajo, Indonesia, the two leaders vowed to enhance strategic cooperation with an emphasis on the South China Sea.

Specifically, the Filipino leader advocated for effective agreements that prevent accidental clashes between the two sides, including their fishermen, in the disputed waters.

“I have asked our foreign ministers – our foreign secretary and then the foreign minister of Vietnam – to begin talks so that we can have an agreement so there will be no more problems like this,” Marcos Jr told the media.

The following week, the two countries held a Joint Permanent Working Group on Maritime and Ocean Concerns (JWG-MOC), where they underscored their commitment to jointly advocate for a “substantive” bilateral Code of Conduct (COC) on the South China Sea.

Among those in attendance were senior diplomats as well as Filipino officials from all relevant agencies, including the Philippine Coast Guard, National Security Council, Department of National Defense and Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources.

With Vietnam broadly supporting the Philippines’ landmark arbitration award victory against China at The Hague in 2016, the two sides also agreed “to work together to protect their rights and legitimate interests under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and enhance confidence-building measures between relevant agencies.”

The two ASEAN nations also underscored their commitment to a full range of cooperative activities in the South China Sea, including marine environment protection, search and rescue; fisheries management; oil spill preparedness and response; and marine scientific research.

After years of strategic hiatus under the pro-Beijing Rodrigo Duterte presidency in Manila, the Philippines and Vietnam are once again exploring a potential axis of resistance within ASEAN against China’s creeping domination and militarization of adjacent waters.

Chinese President Xi Jinping shows the way to then-Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte in a file photo. Photo: AFP

Since the end of the Cold War, which pitted Manila and Hanoi against each other on ideological lines, the two Southeast Asian nations have repeatedly found themselves on the same side whenever China flexed its muscle in the region.

Under the Fidel Ramos administration (1992-1998), Manila actively advocated for Vietnam’s admission into ASEAN in order to facilitate regional integration and more stable geopolitical ties across Southeast Asia, thus setting the tone for warm bilateral relations over the succeeding decades.

When China seized the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in 1994, Manila, in tandem with Hanoi, advocated for a robust regional response, which culminated in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC).

A decade later, the Gloria Arroyo administration (2001-2010) negotiated a trilateral Joint Maritime Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) agreement with Vietnam and China as part of broader efforts to jointly manage resources in the contested maritime area.

Since most ASEAN members remained reluctant to confront Beijing, the Philippines and Vietnam often emerged as the hawkish duo within the regional body. In 2010, Vietnam took up the cudgels for ASEAN when it actively advocated for a more robust American strategic presence to counter China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea.

In response, the Obama administration explicitly identified, for the first time, freedom of navigation in the contested waters as a “national interest” priority.

Just as the Mischief Reef crisis in the mid-1990s brought the two ASEAN nations together, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal crisis provided an additional impetus for stronger strategic cooperation.

The year 2014 marked a new milestone for bilateral ties. In a highly symbolic act, Filipino and Vietnamese naval troops played volleyball and football on one of the contested land features in the South China Sea, signaling through sport a new era of friendship and camaraderie.

Then-Philippine Navy spokesman Lieutenant Commander Gregory Fabic characterized the football diplomacy act as crucial to “eas[ing] up tensions”, which he said could serve as a “model of cooperation for the other navies to emulate.”

That year also saw a crucial meeting between then Aquino and then-Vietnamese prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung. Following “productive discussions”, the two sides explored a full range of cooperative initiatives to solidify their emerging new alliance against China.

On one hand, the two sides closely coordinated on the Philippines’ decision to take the South China Sea disputes to an international tribunal in The Hague under the UNCLOS, which ultimately ruled that China’s expansive claims to the sea are unlawful. Manila repeatedly offered assistance to Hanoi should it decide to join or file a parallel case against the Asian superpower.

Moreover, the two sides also moved closer to establishing regularized joint exercises, annual defense meetings and expanded intelligence-sharing vis-à-vis Chinese maritime activities just as Vietnam stepped up its goodwill naval visits to the Philippines.

Towards the end of the Aquino administration, the two sides drafted a “Joint Statement on the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership between the Republic of the Philippines and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam” to provide a roadmap for long-term strategic cooperation.

The election of pro-Beijing Rodrigo Duterte as Philippine president in 2016, however, derailed fast-advancing Philippine-Vietnam strategic relations.

Not only did the then-new Filipino president largely snub his Vietnamese counterparts, refusing to host a single top leader from Vietnam throughout his six years, but he increasingly and subserviently parroted Beijing’s line on the sea disputes.

During his chairmanship of ASEAN in 2017, the Filipino leader repeatedly downplayed the maritime disputes, just as Vietnam urged for a stronger ASEAN stance against Beijing’s militarization of the disputes.

His top political ally and second foreign secretary, Alan Peter Cayetano, along with prominent Beijing-friendly voices in Manila went a step further by often implying that Vietnam is a threat to Philippine interests in the South China Sea.

Bilateral ties hit a new nadir following the deaths of two Vietnamese fishermen that same year following a tragic encounter with the Philippine Navy in the South China Sea. But yet another sea crisis between the Philippines and China helped boost Vietnam’s standing in Manila.

In 2019, Vietnamese fishermen rescued a dozen Filipino counterparts who were almost drowned following a collision with a suspected Chinese militia vessel at the sea’s contested Reed Bank.

The following year, Manila returned the favor by diplomatically backing Hanoi following the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel by Chinese maritime forces in the Paracel group of islands, over which Manila has no claims.

The Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) expressed “deep concern” over the incident and went so far as to state, “We have not stopped and will not stop thanking Vietnam. It is with that in mind that we issue this statement of solidarity.”

Towards the end of Duterte’s administration, yet another Filipino fisherman was saved by Vietnam, underscoring increasingly strong bilateral relations.

The election of Marcos Jr, however, has injected new energy into the bilateral relationship, reviving earlier hopes of a de facto alliance between the two ASEAN nations and South China Sea claimants.

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr and Vietnam National Assembly Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue in the Malacanang Palace, November 2022. Photo: VNA

Last November, the Filipino leader held two high-level talks with Vietnamese counterparts, one with Prime Minister Chinh on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and another in Manila with Vietnam National Assembly Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue in the Malacanang Palace.

During his first meeting with the Vietnamese leader, the two sides vowed to “boost” cooperation with Vietnam “in a wide range of areas that include food security, climate change, defense and food supply.”

The two sides reiterated the same promise during Marcos’ meeting with Vietnam’s top legislator in Manila just days later, as the two sides vowed to continue “building upon excellent relationships between our two countries” and mutually supporting each other in global fora.

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on Twitter at @Richeydarian

asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · May 25, 2023

23. China Committee wants Congress to establish a Taiwan weapons stockpile

Expand EDCA in the Philippines and use the 400 deep tunnels in Luzon for stockpiles.

China Committee wants Congress to establish a Taiwan weapons stockpile

Defense News · by Bryant Harris · May 24, 2023

The House China Committee on Wednesday advanced 10 bipartisan recommendations to deter China from attacking Taiwan, which the panel hopes will be included in the fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act.

The committee agreed by voice vote to advance the Taiwan proposals, drafted as a response to April table top war games led by the Center for a New American Security. Rep. Andy Kim, D-N.J., was the only lawmaker to vote no.

“At the select committee’s Taiwan war game, we saw the terrifying result of deterrence failure,” Gallagher said in advance of the vote. “If we want to have a hope of stopping World War III, we need to arm Taiwan to the teeth right now. We must clear the embarrassment that is the $19 billion [foreign military sale] backlog.”

The 10 recommendations include establishing a war reserve stockpile of weapons in Taiwan, prioritizing weapons delivery for Taipei and authorizing multiyear munitions procurement contracts. The proposals also call for hardening and distributing American forces throughout the Indo-Pacific region and expanding training and coordination between the U.S. and Taiwanese militaries.

The war games illustrated the difficulty the U.S. would have arming Taiwan in the event of a China crisis, the same way it has for Ukraine given the lack of a land border. To preposition critical weapons on the island, the China Committee wants the Pentagon to establish a war reserve stockpile for Taiwan and other Pacific allies akin to U.S. Central Command’s stockpile in Israel.

The FY23 National Defense Authorization Act authorized $500 million in funding through 2025 for a “regional contingency stockpile” in the Pacific. The Pentagon is using a separate authority in that bill to prepare a package of weapons for Taiwan from U.S. stockpiles.

Another recommendation is quarterly updates on the Biden administration’s efforts to address the foreign military sales backlog, especially for Taiwan. The report calls on congressional appropriations to provide “grant assistance” for Taiwan to buy more U.S. equipment.

The FY23 NDAA authorized up to $2 billion in Taiwanese military aid, but congressional appropriators decided to fund that as loans instead of grants amid concerns it would eat away at other State Department budget priorities.

The war games found the U.S. would run out of precision-guided missiles within a week in the event of a conflict with China, and Gallagher is leading a push to get appropriators on board with funding multiyear munitions procurement authorities.

Hoping to send a strong demand signal for the defense industry to ramp up munitions production, the China Committee wants the FY24 NDAA to authorize up to five years of munitions procurement contracts for long-range anti-ship missiles, naval strike missiles, precision strike missiles, MK-48 torpedoes and Harpoon anti-ship missiles.

Multiyear procurement authorities historically have been used for big-ticket items like ships and aircraft, but the Pentagon and some lawmakers have recently expressed interest in using them for munitions acquisition to encourage defense companies to ramp up production amid concern about insufficient U.S. stockpiles.

The FY23 NDAA sought to jump-start high-priority U.S. munitions production by authorizing multiyear procurement contracts for thousands of critical munitions, but congressional appropriators for the most part did not provide the needed funding. Gallagher told Defense News in an April interview he’s lobbying appropriators to fund multiyear munitions procurement this year.

The panel also recommends expanded base access with allies and partners throughout the region, and says “Congress should direct the U.S. military to invest in passive defenses, such as hardened fuel depots and other logistics facilities, and reserve supplies and direct the U.S. Air Force to increase resourcing for fielding deployable airbase sets at U.S. bases in theater.”

The remaining recommendations are:

• Building upon an FY23 NDAA provision to “establish or expand a comprehensive training program with Taiwan”
• Establishing a U.S.-Taiwan combined planning group
• Establishing a standing joint force headquarters or joint task force in the Pacific
• Bolstering U.S. cybersecurity
• Planning with U.S. allies to impose diplomatic and economic costs on China in the event of a Taiwan attack and including India in NATO Plus, an organization that currently allows South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Israel to closely coordinate with the alliance

Gallagher and seven other lawmakers on the 24-member China Committee also sit on the Armed Services Committee, putting them in position to advance many of these bipartisan proposals as amendments to the FY24 NDAA. Gallagher chairs the Armed Services Committee’s cyber panel and fellow China Committee member Rep. Ro Khanna of California serves as the top Democrat on that same panel. Rep. Rob Wittman, R-Va., and Seth Moulton, D-Mass., also sit on the China Committee while respectively serving as chair and ranking member on other Armed Services subcommittees.

The Armed Services Committee was initially set to mark up the FY24 authorization bill this month, but Republican leaders postponed it at the last minute amid gridlocked debt ceiling negotiations.

Kim, who sits on both committees, said he voted against the Taiwan recommendations because all but one focused on military deterrence.

“You have to look at that across a comprehensive approach that includes what we can be doing to build a global coalition, what diplomatic and economic tools are at our disposal, and I don’t think that was reflected in that document,” Kim told Defense News.

While Pacific fleet commander Adm. Samuel Papro briefed the China Committee after the Taiwan war games, State Department officials have yet to accept the panel’s invitation to testify.

Jacquelyn Schneider, who leads the wargaming and crisis initiative at the right-leaning Hoover Institution, stressed the difficulty of conducting campaign war games like the committee did with Taiwan, as they don’t account for classified capabilities.

“The biggest difficulty in campaign war games, and where campaign war games did not reveal what happened between Ukraine and Russia, is it’s very difficult to model public will and that really does affect how wars transpire,” Schneider told Defense News.

She noted the outcomes highlighted issues like munitions shortages that the military and defense policy analysts are already aware of. Nonetheless, Schneider called them “an incredibly evocative experience,” adding that “if you want to convince people who have never really thought about this problem that there’s significant difficulties awaiting if you don’t preposition munitions there, then war games are extremely compelling.”

About Bryant Harris

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

24. Why the military moves faster than government on AI

Excerpts:

FT: How will the federal government struggle to determine the regulatory environment? I mean, can you even regulate something that evolves so fast and can be developed by everyday people in their own homes?

JMG: “I thought it was a great move when open AI evolved. Everybody can do this. It’s just, now, there are so many people doing it. And we have to understand who’s working on AI that doesn’t necessarily have the best interests. You can’t protect against everything, but I think we’re in for a long, long battle.

There are all these sort of lone-wolf players, gangs of people and people who just like to disrupt. And they’re very tech savvy, and they’ve largely taught themselves.

I don’t think we should try to control it totally. But we should say ‘where are the real risks?’”

Why the military moves faster than government on AI

federaltimes.com · by Molly Weisner · May 24, 2023

The White House announced federal efforts to better understand and harness artificial intelligence for government, though full embrace of the technology is still likely a ways away.

Agencies are often slow to adopt technology, even with frameworks in place, because it is costly, labor intensive and in some ways, intimidating. To find out why, Federal Times spoke with José-Marie Griffiths, a former member of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence and chairman of the Workforce Subcommittee.

Griffiths, now the president of Dakota State University where she works to educate the future workforce on AI, helped shape tech reforms and recommendations to leverage AI for the U.S. national security and defense workforces.

This interview has been edited for clarity and length.

Federal Times: The White House has said it intends to capitalize on AI to contend against national security threats and improve the functioning and efficiency of government. Where are we in this?

José-Marie Griffiths: “The federal government, and probably at state levels to some extent, too, have been slower to move than other institutions. They’ve become large institutions, and it’s hard to move them. And the mechanisms for moving quickly and updating, it’s just very hard.

The military can move a bit faster because they truly have this sort of top-down command structure. They can insist on it, to some extent.

So how do you get pockets of innovators within government? You need to find them. You need to empower them to innovate as they can and to gradually diffuse their innovations out to others.”

FT: What kind of recommendations were you making with your peers on the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence and how could those be taken up quickly?

JMG: “We were not just developing recommendations, but embodying those recommendations in language that could be absorbed directly into pieces of legislation, into existing legislation or even into executive orders. We tried to make it easy for everyone to adopt the recommendations.

Our recommendation at that time was we aren’t moving fast enough. And we perceived [that] into the geopolitical structure, [with] things going on around the world that we can no longer ignore — particularly, let’s face it, China’s ambitions, which China has been very open about and very clear about. In a way, it’s as if we let that creep up on us.

Ultimately, education and communication are going to be key.”

FT: As agencies look to cyber strategies as their North star, what steps might be easier to tackle first? How can agencies move forward?

JMG: “I think ultimately, the real dilemma is we’ve got whole layers of technology that really haven’t been changed. I mean, they’re still dealing with a fair amount of obsolete technology.

So when you want to do something new, you’ve got this really vulnerable environment. So how much effort are you going to put into protecting the vulnerable, rather than move forward and just replace what you have?

Even when there’ve been recommendations to move forward, they haven’t always been implemented, and it gets bottled down with ‘who’s going to pay for it?’ Agencies work one year at a time, so there’s no continuity in that sense.

If there were a way of saying ‘we’re going to approve a five year plan,’ now we know you’re gonna get funding every year for the next five years, unless something drastically goes wrong or we need the money because of an emergency. We don’t have that long-term view in government.”

FT: And what about workforce implications? Will humans remain a part of AI? And if they are, how can federal agencies ensure they have the staff support to shepherd this technology in light of hiring challenges?

JMG: “In most applications, we haven’t truly taken the human out of the loop. So that’s a question as we go forward: what’s the role of the human?

We don’t have a large enough workforce in the computing and information sciences generally. We have 750,000 vacancies in the United States alone in cybersecurity positions. And our prediction was there would likely be eventually even more openings for people with artificial intelligence expertise than with cybersecurity expertise. And so we face this huge shortage of people.

The number of people going into the computing related sciences, it’s going up, but the increases are our international students. And if we want to talk about the diversity of that workforce, we are way back to [late 1990s] levels of women going into those fields. We’ve made a lot of progress over a period of years, and it looks as though we’ve gone all the way back. So we do face some critical issues.”

"And while the percentage of women in computer occupations is higher than in 1970, it actually decreased between 1990 and 2019," according to data by the U.S. Census Bureau. (Image by the U.S. Census Bureau.)

FT: So, we’re in a global competition for talent as well as a domestic one.

JMG: “We have to say homegrown talent isn’t going to be enough. And have to have an immigration system that recognizes [international talent]. We can start off with the the increase in foreign students who are getting degrees and perhaps give them longer work permits, get them green cards a little bit sooner. There are ways to import technologists, share capabilities across countries, et cetera, especially the Five Eye countries where we already have intelligence sharing.”

FT: What will it take for agencies to make up workforce gaps?

JMG: “It has to be a multi-dimensional approach.

We probably need to connect people to government missions.

Internships are great, both for the agencies to learn about people and for people to learn about agencies. The federal government would have to connect, I think, to professors and instructors so that they know more.

Google and Microsoft aren’t going to pick up everyone and we know they let people go, too.

The second area [of recruiting] is people already in the workforce. There are a lot of people in the workforce who’ve got technology-related degrees, so I think up-skilling [and] re-skilling of people already in the workforce is a way to go. It’s not for everyone. But for some people, if they have the aptitude and interest, that could be a way to jumpstart. Take a group of people, get them up to speed, and then have them help you get the next level of people up to speed.

And then the third area is in our K-12 systems. We have a Cyber Academy, now that’s going to high schools in our state. Students will be able to take courses in computer science, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and come into college with a full year of college, as well as their high school diploma.

We’ve got to get out into the K-12 environment and not scare them off.

Industry is also willing to help government if we can move the technology implementation forward. We talked about a sort of national guard in IT, and reserves in cyber where people who could go and do their duty and help out as needed.

FT: How do agencies sell the mission or tell their story to draw talent in?

JMG: “We talk a lot about the skills we need, but I don’t know that government says too much about why they need them. What would it do for the government, and what it would do for the people that the government serves?

And I don’t think young people have a real idea of what government does. Their interaction with government is pretty limited. And their parents’ interaction is, you know, IRS. We hear about what’s going on in Washington, and it’s not always appealing.”

FT: How will the federal government struggle to determine the regulatory environment? I mean, can you even regulate something that evolves so fast and can be developed by everyday people in their own homes?

JMG: “I thought it was a great move when open AI evolved. Everybody can do this. It’s just, now, there are so many people doing it. And we have to understand who’s working on AI that doesn’t necessarily have the best interests. You can’t protect against everything, but I think we’re in for a long, long battle.

There are all these sort of lone-wolf players, gangs of people and people who just like to disrupt. And they’re very tech savvy, and they’ve largely taught themselves.

I don’t think we should try to control it totally. But we should say ‘where are the real risks?’”

About Molly Weisner

Molly Weisner is a staff reporter for Federal Times where she covers labor, policy and contracting pertaining to the government workforce. She made previous stops at USA Today and McClatchy as a digital producer, and worked at The New York Times as a copy editor. Molly majored in journalism at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

25. U.S. says Chinese hackers breached gear in Guam, key to Pacific defense

Unrestricted Warfare. Download it here: https://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf

U.S. says Chinese hackers breached gear in Guam, key to Pacific defense

The hacks might be an effort to disrupt military communications in the event of a conflict

By 

Updated May 24, 2023 at 6:50 p.m. EDT|Published May 24, 2023 at 5:19 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Joseph Menn · May 24, 2023

SAN FRANCISCO — A Chinese government espionage group has hacked into critical infrastructure in multiple locations, including the island territory of Guam, a key U.S. outpost in any conflict involving Taiwan, officials warned Tuesday.

Though there has been no destruction of electronic data or equipment, the intruders could be laying the groundwork to disrupt communications between North America and Asia in the event of a military confrontation, according to researchers at Microsoft, which detected the infiltration.

U.S. agencies and those of America’s closest allies issued a rare joint report advising organizations on how to hunt for signs of intrusion by the same group and how to shore up defenses. The “Five Eyes” intelligence alliance said that facilities in Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand could be targeted, as well.

The hacking activity by the group was first detected two years ago, Microsoft and others said. The newest campaign uses compromised devices protected by the cybersecurity firm Fortinet, probably taking advantage of an unpublicized flaw in that company’s software. Microsoft said it has notified those targeted.

Fortinet did not respond to an email seeking comment. The same hacking group has used undisclosed flaws in other gear for previous campaigns, according to Secureworks, including a monitoring service and access software from Citrix Systems.

More broadly, devices at the edges of networks have been targeted more heavily as more employees work remotely and more use the cloud, security experts said. Edge devices are often less well monitored and are more difficult to examine after a breach.

“We recognize the actor from a series of intrusions that have targeted air, maritime and land transportation targets, as well as other organizations,” said John Hultquist, chief analyst at Google’s Mandiant Intelligence. “There are a variety of reasons actors target critical infrastructure, but a persistent focus on these sectors may indicate preparation for disruptive or destructive cyberattack.”

Russia and the United States also penetrate networks in other nations and try to establish a persistent, undetected presence. In recent years, the Americans also have moved to disclose more about the intrusions on its shores to make adversaries work harder and use new techniques.

In this case, attributed to a Chinese group dubbed Volt Typhoon, detection is harder because the hackers use legitimate credentials and software commands to move around the networks, a technique known as “living off the land,” according to officials from the National Security Agency, the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.

The intruders hide their initial access, as well, using small-office routers before reaching the Fortinet gear. Home and small-office routers have been popular with government-backed hackers in recent years, in part because they can make it look like the connection is coming from the immediate physical area instead of another country.

In addition, even after security flaws are revealed, the owners of the infected gear are less likely to install protective software updates to them than they are for web browsers, laptop operating systems or phones, all of which require more interaction.

“Today’s advisory highlights China’s continued use of sophisticated means to target our nation’s critical infrastructure, and it gives network defenders important insights into how to detect and mitigate this malicious activity,” CISA director Jen Easterly said in a joint news statement.

A CISA spokesman declined to answer questions about the significance of Guam as a target.

The Washington Post · by Joseph Menn · May 24, 2023

​

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com