Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"The simple step of a courageous individual is not to take part in the lie."

- Alexandr Solzhenitsyn

“All these people talk so eloquently about getting back to good old-fashioned values. Well, as an old poop I can remember back to when we had those old-fashioned values, and I say let's get back to the good old-fashioned First Amendment of the good old-fashioned Constitution of the United States -- and to hell with the censors! Give me knowledge or give me death!”

- Kurt Vonnegut

"You must not fight too often with one enemy or you will teach him all your art of war."

- Napoleon Bonaparte

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 23, 2023

2. VISUALIZING INFORMATION OPERATIONS: A KEY STRATEGY FOR MANAGING THE 21ST CENTURY MILITARY

3. Australia has faced down China’s trade bans, and emerged stronger

4. Arms Flow 30% Faster to Ukraine as US Relearns Cold-War Skills

5. This 15-mile, $6.7B bridge is a symbol of China's ambitions, and its problems

6. Experts react: A ‘game changer’ G7 summit in Japan

7. ‘Partisans’ Operating in Belgorod Are Still There and Digging in

8. Just in case: Anxious retirees, social service groups among those making default contingency plans

9. Biden nominates Air Force general to lead NSA, Cyber Command

10. NATO hunger for info driving deals for commercial satellite imagery

11. Here's why the US doesn't have to pay off its $31 trillion mountain of debt, according to Paul Krugman

12. Belgorod raid: Insurgents defeated after rare cross-border incursion - Russia

13. Wagner Chief’s Feud With Russian Military Cracks Putin’s Image of Control

14. As G-7 Host, Japan Schools the World

15. Berkeley’s $220M Mistake Exposed in Massive Deal With China

16. NATO’s Front-Line Countries Are Doubling Down on Defense Spending. Others Aren’t.

17. Biden shift on F-16s for Ukraine came after months of internal debate

18. Opinion | Here are President Biden’s debt ceiling options, ranked

19. Hypersonic Hype? Russia’s Kinzhal Missiles and the Lessons for Air Defense

20. Exclusive: Chinese hackers attacked Kenyan government as debt strains grew

21. A debt ceiling fight and national security – no good choices

22. Do Americans really want “unbiased” news?

23. The U.S.-Chinese Economic Relationship Is Changing—But Not Vanishing

24. Opinion: Did Putin just reveal his grand plan for victory?

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 23, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-23-2023

Key Takeaways

Russian authorities ended the “counterterrorism” operation in Belgorod Oblast and claimed to have defeated the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and the Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) in the region on May 23.
Russian forces likely pushed the RDK and LSR forces at least to the Kozinka border settlement and possibly out of Russian territory as of May 23.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted raids across the Kharkiv-Belgorod border on May 23, but ISW has observed no confirmation that these raids occurred.
Ukrainian officials stated that the pace of fighting in the Bakhmut direction has decreased amid continued limited Ukrainian counterattacks on Bakhmut’s flanks on May 23.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Russian forces continued defensive operations in southern Ukraine ahead of the planned Ukrainian counteroffensive.
Pardoned Wagner Group convicts continue to commit crimes in Russia after finishing their military contracts with Wagner.
Zaporizhia Oblast occupation officials announced the start of preliminary voting for the ruling United Russia party.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 23, 2023

May 23, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 23, 2023

Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko and Frederick W. Kagan

May 23, 2023, 8:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 4pm ET on May 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian authorities ended the “counterterrorism” operation in Belgorod Oblast and claimed to have defeated the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and the Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) in the region on May 23. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Western Military District (WMD) Border Guards units defeated the raid and expelled all “saboteurs” from Belgorod Oblast.[1] Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov announced that the “counterterrorism” operation had ended but called on civilians who evacuated to wait before returning to the border settlements.[2] Russian authorities later announced on May 23 that authorities evacuated 100 civilians from nine border settlements in Belgorod Oblast on May 22 after Gladkov originally denied conducting formal evacuations.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not hold an emergency meeting of the Russian Security Council to discuss the Belgorod raid but will instead discuss the situation during the Security Council’s planned May 26 meeting, likely in an effort to project confidence about Russian handling of the situation.[4]

Russian forces likely pushed the RDK and LSR forces at least to the Kozinka border settlement and possibly out of Russian territory as of May 23. Kozinka is located approximately 76km southeast of Sumy City. Russian sources amplified footage of Russian forces firing on RDK and LSR vehicle positions near the Kozinka border checkpoint overnight and claimed that Russian forces recaptured Kozinka and its border checkpoint in the morning.[5] Geolocated footage from Russian state media shows damaged and destroyed vehicles at the checkpoint.[6] Some Russian sources claimed that RDK and LSR forces entrenched themselves in the Kozinka church but that preliminary reports suggest Russian forces may have ousted the pro-Ukrainian forces by the evening.[7] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces began clearing operations in Kozinka and Glotovo (immediately east of Kozinka) on May 23.[8] Geolocated footage posted on May 23 shows the aftermath of shelling Gora Podol (about 6km northwest of Kozinka) and Russian infantry conducting patrols between Grayvoron (about 7km northwest of Kozinka) and Gora Podol, suggesting that RDK and LSR personnel no longer hold or never held positions in the settlement.[9] It is unclear whether the RDK and LSR captured any villages on May 22 or May 23, however. The LSR claimed that LSR and RDK personnel continued to operate in Belgorod Oblast on May 23, however.[10]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted raids across the Kharkiv-Belgorod border on May 23, but ISW has observed no confirmation that these raids occurred. Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian and Ukraine-affiliated formations – including Azov Regiment, Kraken Regiment, Territorial Defense, and regular Ukrainian forces – and RDK personnel attempted additional raids near Gorkovsky, Bogun-Gorodok, and Tsapovka, and managed to cross the border south of Shchetinovka.[11] Other Russian sources denied claims that sabotage groups crossed the Kharkiv-Belgorod border.[12]Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces accumulated reserves less than 10 kilometers from the Kharkiv-Belgorod border and expressed fear about the threat of further raids.[13] One milblogger claimed that the Azov Regiment, Kraken Regiment, Territorial Defense, and regular Ukrainian forces all took part in a raid in Bryansk Oblast on May 22, but ISW has still not observed confirmation of this claimed raid.[14]

The Russian information space largely hyperfixated on speculated goals for the raids and on the conduct of the Russian response. Some Russian milbloggers amplified claims that a drone struck the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) building in Belgorod City and speculated that Ukrainian forces aimed to attack the FSB and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) in the raid.[15] Russian sources also amplified a photograph of Colonel General Alexander Lapin posing with a captured vehicle and claimed that Lapin led the counterterrorism operation alongside elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th Guards Combined Arms Army, Western Military District).[16] Many Russian sources praised Lapin for organizing Russian forces to conduct coherent counterterrorism operations after the Russian Border Service failed to repel the raids.[17] Some sources criticized the decision to give Lapin command and noted Lapin’s prior military failures such as the disastrous Siverskyi Donets river crossing near Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast in May 2022.[18] Lapin has notably returned to commanding Russian operations in eastern Ukraine after suffering intense criticism for commanding the operations to take Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, and Lapin has not received much praise in the information space since the campaign to undermine him led to Lapin’s dismissal in November 2022.[19] The openness of Russian milbloggers to praise Lapin for commanding the defense against an extremely small and limited border incursion suggests that at least some milblogger factions are amenable to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s tendency to rotate old and disgraced commanders.[20] The Russian reaction to the raid in the information space and in the reported military activities appears to be a highly disproportionate response to a very small and localized undertaking. Russian forces should not have required significant reinforcements—or the involvement of a colonel general—to repulse a raid conducted by reportedly 13 armored vehicles.[21]

Ukrainian officials stated that the pace of fighting in the Bakhmut direction has decreased amid continued limited Ukrainian counterattacks on Bakhmut’s flanks on May 23. The Ukrainian General Staff did not report fighting in Bakhmut City in its 1800 situational report for the first time since December 2022, suggesting that Wagner Group forces may have made further advances within the city. The General Staff also reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut).[22] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that combat operations have decreased in and around Bakhmut and reiterated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in a fortified area near the MiG-17 monument in western Bakhmut.[23] A milblogger amplified video footage purportedly showing Wagner forces near the MiG-17 monument and claimed that there are no Ukrainian forces in the area, however.[24] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian forces advanced 200 to 400 meters along the flanks of Bakhmut and still control a number of buildings and fortifications in southwestern Bakhmut.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Yahidne (1km northwest of Bakhmut) and that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Hryhorivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut) and Ivanivske (immediately west of Bakhmut).[26] Another milblogger denied reports that Ukrainian forces made gains during counterattacks northwest and southwest of Bakhmut and assessed that a Russian offensive from Bakhmut toward Ivanivske or Bohdanivka remains unlikely.[27]

Key Takeaways

Russian authorities ended the “counterterrorism” operation in Belgorod Oblast and claimed to have defeated the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and the Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) in the region on May 23.
Russian forces likely pushed the RDK and LSR forces at least to the Kozinka border settlement and possibly out of Russian territory as of May 23.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted raids across the Kharkiv-Belgorod border on May 23, but ISW has observed no confirmation that these raids occurred.
Ukrainian officials stated that the pace of fighting in the Bakhmut direction has decreased amid continued limited Ukrainian counterattacks on Bakhmut’s flanks on May 23.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Russian forces continued defensive operations in southern Ukraine ahead of the planned Ukrainian counteroffensive.
Pardoned Wagner Group convicts continue to commit crimes in Russia after finishing their military contracts with Wagner.
Zaporizhia Oblast occupation officials announced the start of preliminary voting for the ruling United Russia party.

2. VISUALIZING INFORMATION OPERATIONS: A KEY STRATEGY FOR MANAGING THE 21ST CENTURY MILITARY

The full 25 page report can be downloaded here: https://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/Managing%20the%20New%20Era%20of%20Deterrence%20and%20Warfare.pdf

The focus is on Russia and China of course (no mention of north Korea and only one mention of iran)

Excerpt:

Russian theory and doctrine regarding the information domain are the most advanced in the world, but China, Iran, and other U.S.adversaries are adopting similar approaches.Russian hybrid war doctrine goes so far as to declare that the information space is the domain in which hybrid war achieves decisive effects, and that other domains are subordinated to it in such conflicts.9 Russian hybrid warfare doctrine requires setting conditions within the information domain prior to conducting decisive operations in any domain.

VISUALIZING INFORMATION OPERATIONS: A KEY STRATEGY FOR MANAGING THE 21ST CENTURY MILITARY

May 23, 2023 - Press ISW

By Dan Chenok and Kim Kagan

A recent report and expert panel provide insights into a core new tool for operations, analysis, and decisionmaking.

The IBM Center for The Business of Government and the Institute for the Study of War recently launched a new report, Managing the New Era of Deterrence and Warfare: Visualizing the Information Domain. The report launch, seen here, featured a presentation of key findings from two of the authors, Brian Babcock-Lumish and Frederick Kagan, and an engaging expert panel discussion with Steve Hunnewell, Director of the Information Office for the US Indo-Pacific Command; Michael Rouland, Senior Strategic Advisor for the Russia Strategic Initiative with US European Command; and Emelia Probasco, Senior Fellow with the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University.

This report and the event discussions culminate a series of sessions that our two organizations led over the past year, which convened leaders from allied, partnered, and U.S. militaries, governments, academia, and industry to envision and shape future strategic advantages through visualizing information operations. The three events gathered experts and practitioners to discuss the topic from a foundational perspective, from the case of Russia and Ukraine, and finally of China.

U.S. and allied leaders increasingly need new solutions for achieving and maintaining a common operating picture that integrates information operations with air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains. This report and the discussions address the unique challenges for understanding and visualizing the information domain and its importance in managing modern defense and intelligence activity. The report also puts forward criteria for how such visualizations could be developed in the future to support managing information activities at the operational, analytical, and decision-maker levels.

As context, global leaders contributed insights to this report that converged on three core challenges of understanding and visualizing the information domain:

First, the information space is a chaotic system, in which slight variations in conditions can dramatically impact how information traverses space and time.
Second, any visualization of this mélange of data points—data from the entire information space that includes mass and social media as well as cultural and socioeconomic networks—must be useful to decision makers at multiple echelons and overlayed onto visualizations of the land, air, sea, space, and cyber domains.
Third, the vast information domain must remain bounded to build effective visualizations

This work concludes with a finding that the United States and allied partners have tremendous, indeed unique, advantages in the ability to design, build, field, and use globe spanning complex systems integrating enormous amounts and varieties of data, platforms, munitions, personnel, doctrines, and ways of thinking. Yet governments cannot keep pace with the implications of emerging technologies alone, necessitating an unprecedented public-private partnership in developing new information capabilities. Governments and stakeholders can act now to succeed in the future, by bringing new skills and capabilities to addressing the challenges posed by technological changes and by raising the prominence and importance of developing practical ways to visualize information operations in a way that support field operations, strategic analysis, and command decisions.

As noted at the launch event’s closing session, we welcome a collective of ideas for how to take actionable next steps in addressing this critically important challenge for managing modern warfare. We hope that this report and the discussions and collaborative actions that result increase understanding and collaboration around developing information visualizations that can help the U.S., allies, and partners address ever accelerating challenges.

You can also view the event on the IBM Center for The Business of Government YouTube channel.

3. Australia has faced down China’s trade bans, and emerged stronger

Conclusion:

China is the largest trade partner of a long and growing list of countries. Very few have the wealth and natural resources that protected Australia, the “lucky” country. Even so, many are studying the lessons of Australia’s escape from China’s grip.

Australia has faced down China’s trade bans, and emerged stronger

The “lucky country” may be uniquely able to endure Chinese bullying

The Economist

WHEN China launched a campaign of economic coercion against Australia in 2020, Communist Party bosses thought they had crushing leverage. The economies of the two countries—resource-rich Australia and commodities-hungry China—were complementary and closely connected. By massively curbing shipments of everything from timber to coal, lobsters, barley and wine, on pretexts including exaggerated concerns about trade practices and pest infestations, China imposed a A$24bn ($16bn) hit to Australia. Yet it did not succumb. And like a surfer surviving a shark attack with no more than a lightly gnawed board, Australia is now emerging from three years of Chinese bullying in remarkably good shape.

Its exports briefly suffered under the strictures, then surged—culminating last year in Australia’s biggest-ever trade surplus, equivalent to more than 7% of gDP. And the trade blocks, imposed after Australia’s then-conservative government dared call for an inquiry into the origins of Covid-19, are coming off. On May 18th, after a meeting between the two countries’ trade ministers in Beijing, China lifted a de facto ban on Australian timber. (“Serious study” by quarantine officials had allayed its concerns about bug infestation, explained Xiao Qian, China’s ambassador in Canberra.) Since January, Chinese importers have been quietly buying Australian coal: in the first quarter of 2023 Australia sent them A$1.2bn-worth of the stuff. Australia’s centre-left Labor government says cotton and copper exports are also resuming. China is reviewing tariffs on barley, Australia having suspended its case against them at the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

After years of unchecked Chinese bullying, on Asia’s seas, in its multilateral forums and beyond, Australia’s escape is being widely understood as a significant win. And so it is. Yet it involved, as well as strong nerves, a large dose of luck.

Chinese leaders were only half right. As their boycott began, Australia’s economy was indeed heavily reliant on China’s markets. Exports of goods and services to China accounted for 11% of Australian outbound trade in 2005. By 2020, that share stood at 37%. Mitigating its reliance a bit, Australia’s bet on China was chiefly a wager on international trade. Australia has relatively few multinationals that manufacture and sell inside China. But even without vast subsidiaries making things inside China’s borders, Australia was seriously vulnerable. The Economist’s in-house index of China exposure adds goods exports to China, services exports to China and Hong Kong, and the revenue of foreign multinationals’ affiliates operating within China. Australia’s exposure, at 8.2% of GDP in 2020, was double that of America, and close to that of Germany.

Luckily for Australia, however, as the trade curbs bit it emerged that the two economies were such a good fit that China’s businesses felt as much pain as Australia’s, if not more. And some commodities, such as Australian iron ore, were so hard to replace that China chose not to target them at all. Also fortuitously for Australia, many of its bruised exporters found alternative markets.

After China slapped a tariff of up to 80% on Australian barley, its producers sold it to South-East Asia countries. They also planted other crops. And Chinese beer-makers had to buy other countries’ barley, which was not as good. When China blocked shipments of Australian coal, similarly, it had to buy more from Russia and Indonesia. That left India and Japan short, so Australia sold to them. Meanwhile, rising world prices made Australian miners lots of money. Australian pain, though not insignificant, was concentrated: lobster fishermen struggled; wine exports to China’s middle classes plunged.

Australia’s efforts to manage the crisis politically were assisted by Chinese overreach. China’s propaganda machine fiercely denounced Australia, and almost all official contacts were frozen. In November 2020 China’s embassy in Australia made public a list of 14 grievances with the country’s then conservative government. Ranging far beyond economic questions, China moaned that members of Australia’s parliament were allowed to criticise the Communist Party and that the country’s news outlets published “unfriendly or antagonistic” reporting on China. The then-prime minister, Scott Morrison, suggested that these complaints were essentially against “Australia just being Australia”.

Encouraged by such missteps, Australia held its nerve. The election of a new government, led by Anthony Albanese, then gave China an excuse to climb down.

Mr Albanese’s government has been careful not to crow. Dispelling talk of a big win for the West, it claims to be steadfastly respectful and pragmatic in its dealing with China. The idea, ministers say, is to “co-operate where we can, disagree where we must”—meaning no gratuitous poking of the dragon. “Disagree behind closed doors, but don’t amplify your differences,” warns another Australian official. “China responds well to this.”

Alongside such caution, Australia also understood its strengths. China relented because it “saw that we wouldn’t capitulate”, the same official argues. Australia resisted demands to change laws, overturn investment bans and muffle critics. Rather, under its previous and current government, it tied its security policy tighter to America through AUKUS, a trilateral submarine-building pact that also includes Britain, and a policy of deterrence. It is also doing more diplomatically to counter China’s influence in the Pacific. The trade bans have in this sense backfired.

Australia set another useful example at the wto. China agreed to review its barley tariffs just as Australia’s case against them was concluding. Rather than force the issue to a formal judgment, Australia then suspended its action. “China does not want to be shamed in the international arena,” says Matthew Goodman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Australia was additionally helped by the fact that China wants to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a vast regional trade deal. As a CPTPP member, Australia could block China’s accession. It accordingly made clear there was no possibility of accession talks so long as China was trampling economic rules and its pre-existing free-trade agreements with Australia.

How will Australia guard against the risk of a repeat? Decoupling is not on the agenda—China still accounts for almost a third of its total goods and services exports. But three years of Chinese bullying have left a mark. Australia is trying to reduce its reliance on China by signing free-trade agreements with India and Britain. Another, with the EU, is in the works.

China’s aggression has concentrated minds among Australia’s partners and allies, too. At meetings in Japan on May 20th, leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) countries voiced concern at the “disturbing rise in incidents of economic coercion” and promised, for the first time, to collaborate against attempts to “weaponise economic dependencies”. There is more talk of solidarity and co-ordination, so countries do not profit by selling more to a bully when a friend or neighbour is being targeted. America’s ambassador to Japan, Rahm Emanuel, talks of his country offering “support and countervailing opportunities to partners in their times of need”.

China is the largest trade partner of a long and growing list of countries. Very few have the wealth and natural resources that protected Australia, the “lucky” country. Even so, many are studying the lessons of Australia’s escape from China’s grip. ■

The Economist

4. Arms Flow 30% Faster to Ukraine as US Relearns Cold-War Skills

In some ways Putin's War can be considered a rehearsal for some aspects of the US military machine. Obviously logistics is one of them.

Arms Flow 30% Faster to Ukraine as US Relearns Cold-War Skills

Logisticians are honing techniques invented to keep the Soviet Union from seizing Europe.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

Eager Ukrainian soldiers are getting their guns and ammo faster than ever, thanks to the work of the U.S. government’s top bulk shipper: the U.S. military.

The Europe-based unit in charge of shipping weapons to Ukraine has sped up deliveries by 30 percent compared to the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion last year, said a spokesperson for the U.S. Army’s 21st Theater Sustainment Command.

“We have definitely learned how to be more efficient with our transportation,” the spokesperson said.

The spokesperson attributed the improvements to increasing experience, after-action reports, and an improved ability to forecast operations.

The acceleration comes as the U.S. Army relearns Cold War-era techniques for quickly moving soldiers and materiel across the 3,000 nautical miles that separate the U.S. from its European allies.

The U.S. first began dusting off the skills necessary to speed troops and weapons across the Atlantic in 2019, when it launched the annual DEFENDER-Europe exercise. The exercise sees thousands of troops deploy from the U.S. to Europe, an echo of the REFORGER wargames that prepped NATO forces to defeat a Soviet invasion of Western Germany.

The U.S. effort to help Ukraine started out relatively small. In December 2021, the U.S. authorized $200 million in lethal aid to Ukraine amid fears Russia would invade.

A lightly staffed unit called the Doctrine Education Advisory Group, or DEAG, was tapped to help inventory the equipment when it reached Ukraine. The group more typically worked on helping Ukraine revamp its military education courses, but threw itself into the task.

“My guys were pulling equipment until we actually had to leave,” U.S. Army Col. Andrew Clark, commander of the unit that oversees DEAG, told Defense One.

Since then, the flow of weapons to Ukraine has increased exponentially. As of May 21, the U.S. has shipped or promised to ship $38 billion worth of equipment and weapons to Ukraine, much of it from U.S. stockpiles.

Among the many bulky packages delivered or coming to Ukraine are two million 155mm artillery shells, each weighing 95 pounds; and 2,000 Humvee trucks, weighing around three-and-a-half tons. A total of 749 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers have also been promised, with 31 Abrams tanks arriving in Ukraine in the fall.

This flow of arms has helped replenish Ukraine’s munitions stockpiles and bestowed new abilities to strike deep into Russian-occupied territory.

The U.S. military also increased its presence in Europe by 20,000, bringing the total of U.S. service members on the continent to 100,000.

The Army has occasionally run into speed bumps as it ramps up to once again face a Russia eager to reclaim at least some of the boundaries of the old Soviet Union.

Amid the rumbles of a possible Russian invasion, Army logisticians’ raced round the clock in early 2022 to outfit an entire Army brigade combat team arriving from the United States. They achieved their goal twice as fast as expected, earning plaudits from the Army chief of staff.

A Defense Department Inspector General investigation likewise noted the speed, but found that around 10 percent of equipment issued from pre-positioned stockpiles was not up to snuff.

Among the problems was an inability to run vehicles on exercise tracks, as called for in their maintenance instructions, as these exercise tracks had never been built.

“When the Cold War ended, the idea that you would have to rapidly pull equipment out of storage in Europe just didn’t seem very likely,” Mark F. Cancian, a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in March.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

5. This 15-mile, $6.7B bridge is a symbol of China's ambitions, and its problems

Everything serves a political purpose.

Excerpts:

Beijing hopes that the bridges can help bring together the cities in this huge and diverse area both physically and conceptually. Travel times between Zhongshan and the Shenzhen Bao’an International Airport – mainland China’s third busiest, which hosted over 37 million passengers in 2019 – are expected to be cut from two hours (using current roads) to 20 minutes.

But many observers believe the bridges are also meant to serve another, more political purpose, by subsuming what are at present quite disparate regions – Hong Kong is a former British colony, Macao a former Portuguese one – into a single Chinese identity. And, according to some critics, the scale of this undertaking dwarfs even that of the bridges.

This 15-mile, $6.7B bridge is a symbol of China's ambitions, and its problems | CNN

CNN · by Chris Lau · May 23, 2023

Editor’s Note: Sign up for Unlocking the World, CNN Travel’s weekly newsletter. Get the latest news in aviation, food and drink, where to stay and other travel developments.

Hong Kong CNN —

Even in a land known for gargantuan, record-breaking infrastructure, this project is turning heads.

At 15 miles long (24 kilometers), eight lanes wide and featuring artificial islands and an undersea tunnel, China’s $6.7 billion Shenzhen-Zhongshan Bridge is nothing if not ambitious.

To much fanfare in the country’s state media, the bridge’s builders recently claimed a new world record by paving in a single day more than 243,200 square feet (22,600 square meters) of asphalt, the equivalent of more than 50 basketball courts.

Yet strange as it may sound, this is not the world’s longest sea bridge. That honor belongs to its 34-mile long neighbor, the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge – just 20 miles away.

To some observers, the building of these giant bridges in such close proximity is testament both to China’s growing ambitions on the global stage and the problems it faces in realizing them.

Like its sister bridge in Hong Kong, when the Shenzhen-Zhongshan Bridge opens to traffic next year after eight years of construction, it will form a central plank in China’s master plan to develop its Greater Bay Area, one of the world’s largest and most populated urban areas, into an economic and technological hub that can rival San Francisco, New York or Tokyo.

It’s an ambition that, like the bridges themselves, is simply massive in scale. The Greater Bay Area is home to 68 million people, covers 21,800 square miles and encompasses 11 cities: Hong Kong, Macao and nine others including Zhongshan and Shenzhen. Shenzhen alone is home to more than 12 million people, not to mention scores of multibillion-dollar firms such as drone-maker DJI and social media company Tencent that have helped to earn it the moniker of “China’s Silicon Valley.”

Beijing hopes that the bridges can help bring together the cities in this huge and diverse area both physically and conceptually. Travel times between Zhongshan and the Shenzhen Bao’an International Airport – mainland China’s third busiest, which hosted over 37 million passengers in 2019 – are expected to be cut from two hours (using current roads) to 20 minutes.

But many observers believe the bridges are also meant to serve another, more political purpose, by subsuming what are at present quite disparate regions – Hong Kong is a former British colony, Macao a former Portuguese one – into a single Chinese identity. And, according to some critics, the scale of this undertaking dwarfs even that of the bridges.

How to cross the world's longest sea-spanning bridge

Making a statement

Austin Strange, who specializes in Chinese foreign policy at the University of Hong Kong, said the new bridge would no doubt bring “real economic value” by drastically reducing commute times between the cities while also cutting traffic.

But he said there was a secondary dimension, too, likening it to China’s efforts with its Belt and Road Initiative, in which Beijing is spending billions on funding infrastructure projects like ports and roads in countries across the world.

That project is widely seen as an effort by China to boost its economic and political clout on the world stage, with some critics accusing it of gaining leverage over smaller countries by extending loans they cannot hope to repay.

While no such debt concerns exist with the bridges, which are being built on Chinese territory, observers say the scale of the project sends a message nonetheless.

“China’s government is clearly advertising the bridge as a world-class accomplishment,” Strange said. “Infrastructure is a core part of China’s reputation in global development, and is also a key link between how China approaches domestic and international development.”

Still, how profound an impression the bridge will make on the rest of the world will depend in part not only on its size, but how successful and popular with travelers it ultimately proves.

Otherwise, it risks opening itself to a criticism often leveled at some of the more grandiose Belt and Road projects – that is an expensive white elephant.

The Shenzhen-Zhongshan bridge project features artificial islands and an undersea tunnel.

Deng Hua/Xinhua/Getty Images

Finance professor He Zhiguo from University of Chicago said that, just like the bridges that link up the coasts of the San Francisco Bay, the Chinese mega project was likely to slash travel times.

However, he said only local citizens in Zhongshan were likely to emerge as winners, with the laid-back city, known neither as a business hub nor tourist hotspot, providing few incentives for others to visit.

He also said estimates about the effect on travel times and costs should be taken with a pinch of salt as projects could easily get bloated. “That’s my worry. But without knowing more, I think it’s not a bad idea,” he said.

Not just casinos: Macao reimagines tourism post-pandemic

Bridges over troubled water

Ambitious though Beijing’s vision of the Greater Bay Area is, there have already been plenty of bumps in the road.

The idea was first raised in 2009, but experts say development has been hampered because of the disparate nature of, and barriers between, some of the cities involved.

The region incorporates three borders – with the Chinese mainland and the former colonies of Hong Kong and Macao, which are now semi-autonomous Special Administrative Regions of China, each maintaining separate immigration systems, separate legal systems and even separate currencies.

Additionally, residents carry three different passports and identity cards, and speak two different forms of Chinese (Cantonese and Mandarin).

They even drive on different sides of the road, all of which means there are plenty of obstacles to those hoping for a carefree road trip between them.

Critics say some of these problems were in evidence when the Shenzhen-Zhongshan Bridge’s sister project, the $20 billion Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge, opened in 2018.

That bridge connects the mainland Chinese city of Zhuhai with gambling hub Macao and leading financial center Hong Kong.

See the world's longest sea-crossing bridge

01:16 - Source: CNN

Even by 2019, a year after its launch, it was still struggling to draw in traffic, logging just 4,000 trips per day, according to Hong Kong’s Transport Department. (By comparison, the Channel Tunnel in Europe, which connects France and Britain, drew more than 8,000 vehicles on average per day in March this year, according to its website.)

Experts put the lukewarm response down to the need for travelers to obtain different visas and vehicle registrations to travel between the three places – especially because high-speed ferries already crisscross the three cities on a daily basis, leaving from central terminals that are often more accessible than the border areas where the bridges begin.

Traffic on the Hong Kong bridge plunged to just hundreds of vehicles a day during the Covid pandemic, as each of the three regions sealed off their borders as part of a strict “zero-Covid” policy, though usage has since increased. During the Labor Day holiday period this month state media reported up to 9,000 vehicles crossing daily.

Meanwhile, the controversy over the bridges goes beyond purely financial matters.

Some see the bridges as a political act. Opponents have criticized the Hong Kong bridge as a means by which to force assimilation and exert control on the city, which was rocked by pro-democracy protests in 2014 and in 2019.

An aerial view of the world's longest cross-sea bridge, the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge, in Zhuhai city, south China's Guangdong province, 19 March 2019.

Liang jie/ICHPL Imaginechina/AP

Don’t worry, ‘there will be traffic jams’

Still, the bridges have their fans, too.

Xiao Geng, director of Institute of Policy and Practice at the Shenzhen campus of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, said the Shenzhen-Zhongshan Bridge would help to level up the two areas.

“The west side of the coast is not as developed as the east side of the coast, and there is also a huge discrepancy in property prices between the two sides,” Xiao said.

He also said the bridge was different to its predecessor, which had been beset by the “fundamentally different” systems of the three places, which had put people off by raising the cost of travel.

The latest bridge would connect two mainland Chinese cities that were already under the same regulations, he pointed out.

“You don’t have to worry. There will be traffic jams,” he said.

Additional reporting by CNN’s Sarah Lazarus.

CNN · by Chris Lau · May 23, 2023

6. Experts react: A ‘game changer’ G7 summit in Japan

Access all the expert commentary here: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-a-game-changer-g7-summit-in-japan/?utm_source=pocket_saves

New Atlanticist

May 20, 2023

Experts react: A ‘game changer’ G7 summit in Japan

By Atlantic Council experts

Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) countries are gathering in Hiroshima, Japan, for a three-day summit in which they will try to come together on some of the world’s biggest challenges. Throughout the summit, Atlantic Council experts are taking stock of the gathering of leaders from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Japan—plus the European Union. On Saturday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy joined the G7 leaders in Japan, an appearance French President Emmanuel Macron called a “game changer” for Ukraine’s international support. Already the summit in Hiroshima is shaping up to be a game changer in a number of areas as leaders address issues ranging from artificial intelligence to Russia and China.

Read on to find out how these powerful democracies are tackling some of the world’s thorniest problems.

This post will be updated as news develops and more reactions come in.

Click to jump to an expert reaction:

Daniel Fried: The G7 brought good news for Ukraine and strong new sanctions on Russia

Josh Lipsky: Unthinkable two years ago, G7 countries are addressing China together

John E. Herbst: Hiroshima makes clear the authoritarian high-water mark has passed

Daniel Tannebaum: Continued alignment on Russia sanctions is impressive, but it’s time to finish the job

Kyoko Imai: The Quad crumbles without a corner

Dexter Tiff Roberts: What will the G7 do when China next attempts economic coercion?

Thomas Cynkin: A breakthrough in fighting China’s economic coercion, but the details must be fleshed out

Steven Tiell: The regulators are coming for your AI

Bee Yun Jo: US-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation is back on track

Jessica Taylor: Can US-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation endure beyond a photo op?

Parker Novak: Biden skipping Papua New Guinea was a missed opportunity

7. ‘Partisans’ Operating in Belgorod Are Still There and Digging in

‘Partisans’ Operating in Belgorod Are Still There and Digging in

kyivpost.com

There were more red faces in provincial west Russia when cross-border attackers, whom Kremlin officials promised would be ‘liquidated immediately’ started digging in.

by Stefan Korshak, Aleksandra Klitina | May 23, 2023, 3:24 pm |

Image of Grayvoron border checkpoint published by the Free Russia organization on May 22.

Kremlin officials on Tuesday said local defense forces had contained an armed border incursion from Ukraine but had failed to eject them from Russian territory. In response, “freedom fighters” still operating in Russia announced they were partisans fighting to liberate their country from the authoritarian Kremlin regime and had no intention of leaving.

Vyacheslav Gladkov, governor of Russia’s Belgorod region, the site of border fighting between Russian local defense forces and armed groups allegedly entering from Ukraine’s north-eastern Kharkiv region on Monday, said that “mopping up is in progress… but unfortunately, it’s not possible [for Russian government officials] to go into the two villages on the border.”

Some Russian official sources on Tuesday claimed it wiped out militants and military hardware in the southern Belgorod region, according to a Russian defense ministry statement with the assistance of air strikes and artillery. Video published by the state-controlled Ria Novosti television channel showed an apparent nighttime artillery strike on four vehicles the official Russian news source said were "enemy".

Independent news websites, Telegram channels and the Belgorod governor himself on Tuesday contradicted that Moscow official line.

Fourteen villages in the Graivoronsk region are completely without power, and renewed electricity deliveries are impossible because "of the situation in the area", governor Gladkov said in a mid-afternoon Tuesday statement.

Ukrainian soldiers following the capture of Russia's Grayvoron border crossing checkpoint. May 22 photograph published by the Voenniy Osvedomitel' news platform.

Audio reportedly recorded in the Grayvoron region in the early afternoon seemed to show small arms firefights were still in progress. The independent Russian news platform Astra reported firing and explosions audible in the vicinity for the last 24 hours "and still continuing"

Images and text reports published by pro-Ukrainian military channels said that ethnic Russian fighters operating in the Russian border villages of Grayvoron, Kozinka and Borisovka were constructing battle fortifications on Tuesday to take on Russian government troops sent by Moscow.

I must say that roads in Belgorod region are pretty good.

Probably they prepared the roads to welcome the liberators pic.twitter.com/ZnoNYVdOta

— Alex Bond (@AlexBondODUA) May 23, 2023

During the night, explosive-toting drones operated by Ukrainian or “partisan” forces dropped grenades on at least two private homes, and a substantial force of “enemy” remains at large in the Belgorod region, Gladkov said.

“All necessary responses by state agencies [to the incursion] are in progress, and we are waiting for their completion, and an end to the anti-terrorist operation,” he said.

A direct appointee of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Gladkov on Monday in official statements said the “situation was under control” and that the cross-border attackers would be “liquidated immediately,” only to learn that the “insurgents” stayed put all night, firing fiercely on Russian army patrols coming close.

The Legion "Freedom of Russia" announced that, together with the Russian volunteer corps, it continues the operation to liberate Belgorod region. pic.twitter.com/OnYYGMFQON

— Oriannalyla (@Lyla_lilas) May 23, 2023

The night of Monday-Tuesday also saw drone strikes in the regional capital Belgorod, Gladkov said.

According to news reports and statements by the fighters themselves, fighters from the anti-Kremlin groups Freedom of Russia and Russian Volunteer Corps were responsible for the incursion and drone strikes.

The anti-Kremlin fighters – widely considered supported by Ukraine despite flat Kyiv denials of any involvement – were backing the defenses with a pair of captured Russian army BTR-82 armored personnel carriers, the news platform Voenny Osvedomitel reported.

Other anti-government fighters also had occupied fortifications near the village Gory-Podol, built in recent months by Moscow to prevent border incursions, The Ukrainian news agency UNIAN reported.

“Russians have come to their land by right. One day, we will come to stay. At the same time, the partisan movement is not bound by the framework of traditional combat operations,” said a Tuesday declaration from the Russian Volunteer Corps, one of two groups participating in the attack.

“The time for change has come to our country. The country is ready for liberation. And most of all, territories bordering the combat zone will be liberated: Kursk, Bryansk and Belgorod.”

Kremlin critic and pundit Igor Girkin, a leading participant in Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine’s Donbas region, in a Tuesday Telegram post, confirmed armed groups were still operating in the Belgorod region and that local authorities were unable to deal with them.

Kremlin officials were trying to cover up the scale of the incursion and refusing to hand out weapons to local civilians for self-defense, Girkin claimed.

Aleksei Baranovsky, a representative of the Russian Armed Opposition Political Center, an information platform closely linked to groups opposing the regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin, confirmed to Kyiv Post the anti-government fighters that drove into Russia were still in place.

“Liberation forces are present on the territory of the Gayvoron district in the Belgorod region. For now, they are staying there. We will see what happens today,” Baranovsky said.

“There will be more news. No one was prepared for this in Russia.”

Baranovsky predicted tighter restrictions on the Russian populace will follow the cross-border attack, but that anti-regime attacks will inevitably continue.

“The phase of Russia’s liberation from Putin’s tyranny has begun. As always, the reaction [by Moscow] is likely to strengthen the dictatorship – to deepen it, to clamp down on those who oppose it,” he said.

“Putin does not fully understand how serious everything is.”

Stefan Korshak

Stefan Korshak is the Kyiv Post Senior Defense Correspondent. He is from Houston Texas and is a Yalie. He has worked in journalism in the former Soviet space for more than twenty years, and from 2015-2019 he led patrols in the Mariupol sector for the OSCE monitoring mission in Donbass. He has filed field reports from five wars and enjoys reporting on nature, wildlife and the outdoors. You can read his blog about the Russo-Ukraine war on Facebook, or on Substack at https://stefankorshak.substack.com, or on Medium at https://medium.com/@Stefan.Korshak

Aleksandra Klitina

Aleksandra Klitina is a Senior Correspondent for Kyiv Post. A former Deputy Minister in Ukraine’s Ministry of Infrastructure, she has more than 10 years of experience working with private and public institutions, as a state servant and in private financial and investment companies.

kyivpost.com

8. Just in case: Anxious retirees, social service groups among those making default contingency plans

Anxious retiree here. Not anxious for me but for all my fellow military retirees who do live paycheck to retiree paycheck.

This is really just crazy. There is no excuse for this. Can these people really look themselves in the mirror when they are playing politics with the American people's lives? I am all for reducing the debt but this is not the way to go about doing it. This sickens me.

Just in case: Anxious retirees, social service groups among those making default contingency plans

AP · May 24, 2023

WASHINGTON (AP) — Phoenix retiree Saundra Cole has been watching the news about the debt limit negotiations in Washington with dismay — and limiting her air conditioning use to save money just in case her monthly Social Security check is delayed due to a default.

For her, air conditioning is no small thing in a city where the average daily high hits 94 degrees in May. If the government can’t make good on its obligations, she says, “I would be devastated.”

“What I’m worried about is food banks and electricity here because you know, we’ve had deaths with seniors because of the heat,” says Cole.

Politicians in Washington may be offering assurance that the government will figure out a way to avert default, but around the country, economic anxiety is rising and some people already are adjusting their routines.

Government beneficiaries, social service groups that receive state and federal subsidies and millions more across the country are contemplating the possibility of massive and immediate cuts if the U.S. were to default on its financial obligations.

Politics

DeSantis set to make much-anticipated presidential campaign announcement, formalizing Trump rivalry

Debt ceiling talks stuck on classic problem: Republicans demand spending cuts and Democrats resist

Trump's freewheeling, stream-of-consciousness speaking style draws legal attention amid probes

Trump makes video appearance in New York criminal case, trial date set for March primary season

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned last week that a default would destroy jobs and businesses, and leave millions of families who rely on federal government payments to “likely go unpaid,” including Social Security beneficiaries, veterans and military families.

“A default could cause widespread suffering as Americans lose the income that they need to get by,” she said.

The number of people potentially impacted is huge. According to the Census Bureau, in 2020 roughly 35% of U.S. households included someone receiving Social Security benefits, 36% received Medicaid benefits and more than 13% of the total population received food stamps.

A recent poll by The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research found that 66% of Americans said they’re very or extremely concerned about the impact on the U.S. economy if the debt limit is not raised and the government defaults, though only 21% said they’re following the debate closely.

Robert Gault, 63, who depends on a $1,900 monthly Social Security disability payment, says an economic default “would make life so real awfully hard on me.” The former longtime factory worker said he suffers from chronic back pain caused by degenerating disks in his spine.

Gault, who lives in Bradford, Pennsylvania, near that state’s border with New York, said he thinks about the debate — and the stalemate — in Washington a lot.

He hasn’t made any drastic changes to the way he lives, but said, “I’m more conscientious of everything and I think about everything I do now.”

Negotiations between the president and congressional leaders are down to the wire as they try to break an impasse. GOP lawmakers have been pressing for spending cuts in exchange for agreeing to increase the government’s borrowing authority and President Joe Biden wanted a “clean” debt ceiling increase without conditions.

Without a deal, the U.S. could default as soon as June 1, according to Yellen.

House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., was asked Monday if people should start preparing for default, and insisted “no, no, no, no.”

But people on fixed incomes and organizations that serve the poor — already feeling the after-effects of the pandemic and dealing with inflation — are bracing for a potential debt default that would deal an overwhelming blow to their finances.

Clare Higgins, executive director of Community Action Pioneer Valley in Massachusetts, said demand at the organization’s food banks has skyrocketed since the start of the pandemic, and is growing again.

With a possible debt default, she said, she’s seeing more demand for food from the three pantries that the organization either runs or financially supports.

“Yes, demand has gone up — but it was already up before,” she said.

“We’re already behind the eight-ball in what we’re able to pay teachers,” she said of the organization’s head start and early learning programs. “And the inflation that has happened in the economy has already reduced our ability to stretch the dollar.”

Higgins said while she’s hopeful that Biden and McCarthy can reach a compromise, she’s concerned the deal will include Republican-sought budget cuts that would affect the organizations she manages. And if a default does happen, Higgins said, “I hope it’s for a short period.”

William Howell, a political science professor at the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy, said the notion of older people and recipients of government benefits doomsday prepping for disruptions every time budget season comes around is symptomatic of a “dysfunctional” democracy.

“It’s not how a healthy democracy handles its business,” he said, adding that the consequences of the brinksmanship will impact the government’s ability to function and plan in coming years.

“In this era of hyper-polarization, the way you get compromise is walking right up to the edge of economic catastrophe and threatening default — on the other side we have a president almost threatening to invoke the 14th Amendment to do away with the debt ceiling,” he said. “This is the stuff of partisan politics.”

Adriene Clifford, 58, knows about balance sheets because she is an accounting professor in New York state. The Delhi resident said she was concerned enough about possible disruptions to the banking system in the event of a default that she withdrew money from the bank “just to tie me over.”

“I’ve been most concerned about the banking system going down and the FDIC not being there,” Clifford said. She was referring to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the independent federal agency that exists to maintain stability and public confidence in the U.S. financial system.

At the Kids’ Stop Learning Center in Rome, Georgia, Lance Elam, owner of the family business that has been in operation since 1984, says he’s not worried that a default will actually occur. But he still has done the calculation on how long operations could last without the subsidies that the organization receives for its three locations in Rome and Cartersville, Georgia.

“We have enough liquid funds to carry on for six to eight months,” he said, adding that state and federal funds helped the Kids’ Stop Learning Center stay in business through the pandemic.

“We have so many kids on our waiting list,” he said, that the center would likely begin dropping kids who couldn’t pay without subsidies and prioritize families that can pay out of pocket.

AP · May 24, 2023

9. Biden nominates Air Force general to lead NSA, Cyber Command

Biden nominates Air Force general to lead NSA, Cyber Command

c4isrnet.com · by Lolita Baldor · May 23, 2023

WASHINGTON — President Joe Biden has chosen a new leader for the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command, a joint position that oversees much of America’s cyber warfare and defense.

Air Force Lt. Gen. Timothy Haugh, the current deputy commander of Cyber Command, would replace Army Gen. Paul Nakasone, who has led both organizations since May 2018 and was expected to step down this year, according to a notice sent by the Air Force this week and confirmed by a person familiar with the announcement. The person spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss personnel matters not yet made public.

If confirmed, Haugh will take charge of highly influential U.S. efforts to bolster Ukraine’s cybersecurity and share information with Ukrainian forces fighting Russia’s invasion. He will also oversee programs to detect and stop foreign influence and interference in American elections, as well as those targeting criminals behind ransomware attacks that have shut down hospital systems and at one point a key U.S. fuel pipeline.

Politico first reported that Haugh was picked.

Haugh’s nomination to lead both NSA and Cyber Command reflects the White House’s intention to keep one person in charge of both organizations. That arrangement is known as a “dual-hat” posting.

Some key Republicans have long wanted to split the leadership, saying each organization is important enough to require a full-time leader. Nakasone has long advocated for keeping the dual hat, saying it gives him and future leaders access to more powers more efficiently.

The Biden administration established a small study group last year to review the leadership structure. The review signaled support for keeping the position as is.

An official familiar with the matter said the group’s review found that having a single head in charge of both agencies better mirrored how U.S. allies’ cyber and intelligence operations were structured and made it easier to act quickly on information — a critical aspect of countering cyberwarfare. The official spoke to The Associated Press on the condition of anonymity to be able to discuss sensitive matters.

The group also found that within the U.S., having a single head also streamlined decisions and enabled the U.S. to more quickly act on intelligence, rather than have the information move through the leadership of both structures before recommendations could be made on a response.

The group reviewed case studies of intelligence and cyber operations to determine whether the dual hat structure was necessary and briefed the defense secretary, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and relevant congressional committees on its findings, the official said.

According to a service biography, Haugh is a career signals intelligence officer and recipient of the Bronze Star, given to service members for heroism or outstanding achievement in a combat theater. He has been deputy commander at U.S. Cyber Command since August.

10. NATO hunger for info driving deals for commercial satellite imagery

NATO hunger for info driving deals for commercial satellite imagery

Defense News · by Colin Demarest · May 23, 2023

ST. LOUIS — The unending appetite for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance within NATO is driving deals with commercial satellite imagery providers, according to one official.

Satellite imagery is a resource of growing importance, with governments and private citizens relying on it to keep tabs on their respective surroundings. Overhead photos were used to expose Russia’s materiel buildup ahead of the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and, more recently, have shown the scale of destruction in Eastern Europe.

The imagery arrangements at NATO plug a hole where there is insufficient collection from the “normal airborne assets that we’ve known and loved,” Paul Bowman, who leads the ISR cell for NATO’s Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation Systems, said May 22 at the GEOINT Symposium in St. Louis.

The U.S. and U.K. are leading contributors to NATO joint ISR, with “everybody else” tailing, Bowman said.

NRO partners with commercial space firms on signal detection tech

The agency awarded study contracts to six companies to help operationalize its use of commercial radio frequency capabilities.

“When we’ve run NATO joint ISR exercises over the past five years, we consistently find that there’s not enough collection to really sustain the number of people that are willing to produce geospatial intelligence out of that collection,” he said. “What does that point to? That points to commercial capabilities.”

Bowman did not disclose with whom the deals were struck, nor did he specify their respective price. U.S. leaders in satellite imagery, however, include Planet Labs and Maxar Technologies. NATO’s website describes the proliferation of commercial satellite imagery as both a risk and a boon — while Russia or China can benefit, too, private players offer the alliance “cost-effective and scalable solutions that meet” demand.

NATO earlier this year launched the Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space initiative, or APSS, meant to streamline the process of gathering and disseminating reams of data collected from space for use in the alliance. It banks on existing and planned space assets from friendly countries to establish a virtual constellation known as Aquila.

“We need persistence, we need collection,” Bowman said. “But we need collection that is technically shareable.”

About Colin Demarest

Colin Demarest is a reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers military networks, cyber and IT. Colin previously covered the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration — namely Cold War cleanup and nuclear weapons development — for a daily newspaper in South Carolina. Colin is also an award-winning photographer.

11. Here's why the US doesn't have to pay off its $31 trillion mountain of debt, according to Paul Krugman

Is this really helpful? Doesn't this undermine the confidence in the US? The full faith and credit of the US financial system?

His referenced NY Times Oped is here: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/19/opinion/government-debt-pay-off.html

Here's why the US doesn't have to pay off its $31 trillion mountain of debt, according to Paul Krugman

markets.businessinsider.com · by Jennifer Sor

The US government doesn't have to pay off its $31 trillion debt, Paul Krugman said.
The government debt can't be compared to something like a household's finances, Krugman said.
"When governments for one reason or another run up large debts, it is, as far as I can tell, unusual to pay those debts off."

The US doesn't actually have to pay off its $31 trillion mountain of debt, according to top economist Paul Krugman, hitting back at the idea that government finances can be compared to household balance sheets in an op-ed weeks before the US possibly defaults on some obligations.

Though individual borrowers are expected to pay off debts, the same isn't true for governments, Krugman argued in a column for the New York Times on Friday. That's because unlike people, governments don't die, and they gain more revenue with each passing generation.

"Governments, then, must service their debts – pay interest and repay principal when bonds come due – but they don't necessarily have to pay them off; they can issue new bonds to pay principal on old bonds and even borrow to pay interest as long as overall debt doesn't rise too much faster than revenue," he added.

Though the debt-to-GDP ratio hovered around 97% last year, interest payments on that debt is only around $395 billion, according to the Office of Management and Budget, or around 1% of last year's GDP.

Historically, it's also unusual for governments to pay off large debts, Krugman said. Such was the case for Great Britain, which has largely held onto the debt it incurred as far back as the Napoleonic wars.

Krugman's argument comes amid growing contention over the US debt level, with policymakers still sparring over the conditions they want to raise the country's borrowing limit. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy has said he would reject a short-term debt ceiling increase unless spending cuts are negotiated, having proposed a bill that would slash around $4.5 trillion on spending.

Congress now has less than two weeks to raise the borrowing limit before the government could potentially run out of cash, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned. A default on the country's obligations could result in catastrophe for financial markets, experts have warned. Krugman has called for the debt ceiling to be abolished, as the risk of a financial crisis offers Republicans a "choke point" on fiscal policy.

markets.businessinsider.com · by Jennifer Sor

12. Belgorod raid: Insurgents defeated after rare cross-border incursion - Russia

Hard to get the ground truth.

Belgorod raid: Insurgents defeated after rare cross-border incursion - Russia

BBC · by Menu

Published
2 hours ago
comments

Image source, Telegram

Image caption,

Verified footage showed a helicopter flying low over the area

By James Gregory & Frank Gardner

BBC News

Armed insurgents who crossed the border from Ukraine to launch attacks in Russia's Belgorod region have been defeated, Moscow claims.

Villages near the border were evacuated after coming under shellfire in one of the most significant cross-border raids since the start of Russia's invasion.

Russia says 70 attackers were killed and insists the fighters are Ukrainian.

But Kyiv has denied involvement and two Russian paramilitary groups have said they were behind the incursion.

Monday's raid led Moscow to declare a counter-terrorism operation, giving the authorities special powers to clamp down on communications and people's movements.

The measures were only lifted on Tuesday afternoon, and even then, one of the paramilitary groups was claiming it still controlled a "small, but our own piece of the Motherland".

The claims by the warring sides have not been independently verified, but any assaults on Russian soil make Nato leaders nervous, and the development could prove a mixed blessing for Kyiv.

'These are Russian patriots'

Russia's defence ministry said a "unit of the Ukrainian nationalist formation" invaded its territory and was responsible for heavy shelling on the Kozinka checkpoint and other parts of the nearby area.

As well as killing dozens of what it described as "Ukrainian terrorists" in artillery and air strikes, the ministry claimed to have driven the rest of the fighters back to the Ukrainian border.

But Ukrainian officials said the attackers were Russians, from groups known as the Liberty of Russia Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC).

"These are Russian patriots who want to change the political regime in the country," Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister Hanna Maliar told Ukrainian TV.

The Liberty of Russia Legion said on Twitter on Monday it had "completely liberated" the border town of Kozinka and that its units had reached as far as the town of Grayvoron, further east.

The group said it was continuing to free the Belgorod region and Russian armed forces could not oppose it.

Separately, on Tuesday afternoon the RVC posted a video of its fighters moving towards what looked like a border check-point, saying it still controlled a "small... piece of the homeland".

Both of the paramilitary groups also told Ukraine's public broadcaster Suspilne that they were creating "a demilitarised zone on the border with the Russian Federation from which they will not be able to shell Ukraine".

Who are the fighters infiltrating Russia from Ukraine?

'Raid plays to Russian narrative'

The cross-border incursion may be embarrassing for Moscow, and go some way to offset the bad optics for Ukraine of reportedly losing control of Bakhmut after months of intense and bloody fighting.

It is also likely to be part of Ukraine's shaping operations ahead of its coming counter-offensive, aiming to draw Russian troops away from the south where Kyiv is expected to attack.

But it is not a development that is likely to welcomed by the West.

The long-range weapons they have provided to Kyiv, although not used in this attack, still come with the proviso they are not to be used to hit targets inside Russia.

Despite official denials from Kyiv, it is hard to believe this raid was launched without assistance from Ukrainian military intelligence.

It plays into the Kremlin narrative that Russia's own sovereign security is under attack from malign forces backed by the West.

It is a narrative likely to be fuelled by reports that some of those who took part are linked to far right extremism, reinforcing Moscow's claim that its trying to rid Ukraine of Neo-Nazis.

Thousands displaced

Belgorod's governor Vyacheslav Gladkov said several people had been injured in the fighting, including two civilians who were being evacuated from their homes.

Mr Gladkov said that people in several villages had been evacuated and warned those who had fled their homes not to return yet, as Russian forces carried out what he described as a "mopping-up" operation.

He added that air defences had shot down drones overnight, damaging buildings.

Temporary shelters have been set up in the Grayvoronsky district for some 9,300 people who have been displaced, according to local authorities.

The BBC has verified that a building used by Russia's main security agency, the FSB, was among those hit. It is not clear what caused the damage.

BBC · by Menu

13. Wagner Chief’s Feud With Russian Military Cracks Putin’s Image of Control

Can we exploit this? Aren't there good PSYOP opportunities with the Putin/Wagner issues?

Wagner Chief’s Feud With Russian Military Cracks Putin’s Image of Control

Prigozhin’s public criticism of Moscow’s generals and defense minister reveals strains in the mighty leadership structure the Russian president built

By Yaroslav TrofimovFollow

May 24, 2023 12:02 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/wagner-chiefs-feud-with-russian-military-cracks-putins-image-of-control-488ac37?mod=hp_lead_pos7

The owner of Russia’s Wagner paramilitary organization, Yevgeny Prigozhin, stood amid the ruins of the conquered Ukrainian city of Bakhmut on May 20 and unleashed a tirade against his foes.

Their names: Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s minister of defense, and Valeriy Gerasimov, Russia’s top general.

“Shoigu and Gerasimov have turned the war into personal entertainment,” Prigozhin thundered as he announced Wagner’s costly victory in Bakhmut. “Because of their whims, five times more guys than had been supposed to die have died. They will be held responsible for their actions, which in Russian are called crimes.”

The escalating conflict between the owner of Wagner and Russia’s top military leadership, a tale of perceived betrayal with roots in the Syrian war, represents the first significant crack in the country’s establishment since the invasion of Ukraine began more than a year ago.

The extent to which it has become public in recent weeks, affecting military operations, shows that Moscow’s setbacks on the front line are putting under strain the formidable system of power that has been created by President Vladimir Putin over the past two decades.

Russia Claims Control of Bakhmut: The Bloodiest Battle of the Ukraine War

As G-7 Host, Japan Schools the World

Amid challenges from Russia and China, the Indo-Pacific has replaced Europe as the central theater of global politics.

By Walter Russell MeadFollow

May 22, 2023 5:56 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-g-7-host-japan-schools-the-world-russia-china-threat-american-leadership-indo-pacific-europe-ukraine-932c80c9?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1

The Group of Seven summit in Hiroshima, Japan, over the weekend was unusual. It mattered.

Most of these annual summits are vacuous affairs that are quickly forgotten. Their communiqués, endlessly negotiated by diplomats and advisers, rarely have much effect on national policy or world events. Their most important function, besides providing taxpayer subsidized photo-ops where politicians strut their stuff as “world leaders,” is to let heads of government chat informally and size each other up.

The declining relevance of the group reflects important changes in the global pecking order. When Canada joined in 1976, member countries were responsible for 62% of global gross domestic product, according to the World Bank. Today, the combined G-7 share has fallen to 44%, and it continues to shrink.

In years past, Japan’s turn at the rotating presidency of the G-7 would have ensured a smoothly run, utterly forgettable summit. Reflecting the risk-averse, inward-looking and stability-seeking nature of Japanese society, Tokyo has historically preferred quiet and harmonious gatherings to dramatic events.

But as world tensions have risen, Japan has woken to a new sense of urgency. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida was determined to use Japan’s presidency of the club of rich democratic countries to drive home some important truths. He achieved his goal, and the success of the Hiroshima summit was both a personal triumph for Mr. Kishida and a milestone in the development of an allied response to the world crisis.

There were two points Mr. Kishida wanted to impress on his fellow leaders. The first is that the world faces a challenge from China and Russia that is both unified and urgent. This is a reality that Japan can’t ignore. As hoteliers and security teams scrambled to prepare for the G-7 summit, one Chinese Surface Action Group circumnavigated Japan while another transited the Ryukyu chain of islands, including Okinawa—Japanese territory stretching toward Taiwan. China and Russia are neighbors of Japan. Japan has territorial disputes with both countries dating back to World War II. Russia and China have stepped up their naval cooperation in the Sea of Japan.

Most European leaders are less than enthusiastic about the Japanese approach. With conspicuous exceptions such as Britain and Lithuania, European countries have tried to avoid framing disputes with Russia and China as part of a single unified world crisis requiring a united and coordinated response. Germany wants to sell cars in China, and France wants to hawk luxury goods; both countries would like to insulate their commercial relations with China from geopolitical tension as far as possible.

Mr. Kishida’s invitation to Volodymyr Zelensky to attend the G-7 summit was the latest step in an uncharacteristically high profile and dramatic Japanese campaign to demonstrate the importance of an integrated approach to the Sino-Russian challenge to the world order. A day after Xi Jinping visited Moscow last March to affirm his partnership with Vladimir Putin, Mr. Kishida flew to Kyiv in a surprise trip to underline Japan’s solidarity with Ukraine. This month, Japan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization said they would open liaison offices in Brussels and Tokyo to facilitate closer coordination.

Whether by meeting cordially with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi or by snubbing Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Mr. Zelensky as usual made headlines in Hiroshima. That suited his hosts. Mr. Zelensky’s high profile at a conference with an official agenda dominated by concerns about China underlined the connection between the Chinese and Russian challenges.

But Japan had another point to make. Mr. Zelensky was the only European head of government from a non-member state invited to Hiroshima. The guest list from the Indo-Pacific was much longer. Vietnam, Australia, South Korea, India and (in its capacity as chair of the Pacific Islands Forum) the Cook Islands all got coveted invitations. (Brazil, scheduled to succeed India in the G20 presidency Dec. 1, and Comoros, current chair of the African Union, were also invited.)

The message couldn’t be more pointed. While Japan cares about Ukraine and sees a deep connection between Russian action in Europe and Chinese moves in its neighborhood, the Indo-Pacific has replaced Europe as the central theater of global politics.

The country that comes closest to sharing Japan’s worldview is another island nation, on the western rim of Eurasia. At a series of off-the-record meetings in London and Cambridge last week sponsored by the Reagan Institute in Washington and the Henry Jackson Society in the U.K., a procession of senior British officials and parliamentarians made similar arguments to a visiting bipartisan congressional delegation led by Mike Gallagher (R., Wis.).

“This is no time to go wobbly,” Margaret Thatcher once said to George H.W. Bush. That appears to be the advice that both Japan and Britain are offering Americans today.

WSJ Opinion: The Republican Foreign Policy Threat to Democracy

Berkeley’s $220M Mistake Exposed in Massive Deal With China

OOPS!

U.C. Berkeley repeatedly neglected to disclose its deal with China to the U.S. government.

Yuichiro Kakutani

Updated May. 22, 2023 7:18AM ET / Published May. 22, 2023 4:59AM ET

The Daily Beast · May 22, 2023

exclusive

Photo Illustration by Luis G. Rendon/The Daily Beast

U.C. Berkeley has failed to disclose to the U.S. government massive Chinese state funding for a highly sensitive $240 million joint tech venture in China that has been running for the last eight years.

The Californian university has not registered with the U.S. government that it received huge financial support from the city of Shenzhen for a tech project inside China, which also included partnerships with Chinese companies that have since been sanctioned by the U.S. or accused of complicity in human rights abuses.

The university has failed to declare a $220 million investment from the municipal government of Shenzhen to build a research campus in China. A Berkeley spokesperson told The Daily Beast that the university had yet to declare the investment—announced in 2018—because the campus is still under construction. However, a former Department of Education official who used to help manage the department’s foreign gifts and contracts disclosure program said that investment agreements must be disclosed within six months of signing, not when they are fully executed.

Berkeley admitted that it had also failed to disclose to the U.S. government a $19 million contract in 2016 with Tsinghua University, which is controlled by the Chinese government’s Ministry of Education.

The project’s Chinese backers promised lavish funding, state-of-the-art equipment, and smart Ph.D. students for Berkeley academics researching national security-sensitive technologies, according to contract documents exclusively obtained by The Daily Beast. After the project got underway, Berkeley researchers granted Chinese officials private tours of their cutting-edge U.S. semiconductor facilities and gave “priority commercialization rights” for intellectual properties (IP) they produced to Chinese government-backed funds.

A Berkeley spokesman said that Berkeley only pursued fundamental research through TBSI, meaning that all research projects were eventually publicly published and accessible to all; it did not conduct any proprietary research that exclusively benefited a Chinese entity.

Still, Berkeley’s ties to the Chinese government and sanctioned Chinese companies are sure to raise eyebrows in Washington, where U.S. policymakers are increasingly concerned about the outflow of U.S. technology to China, especially those with military applications.

Under the radar

The project is called the Tsinghua-Berkeley Shenzhen Institute (TBSI), a joint research initiative backed by Berkeley and Tsinghua University, a top science school often called “China’s MIT.” The institute's website shows that dozens of Chinese companies, including Huawei and others sanctioned by the U.S. government, also supported the institute as industrial advisers.

Through TBSI, Berkeley built an unusually close partnership with the Chinese government. Berkeley’s then-vice-chancellor, Patrick Schlesinger, said in 2015 that the “active participation of the Shenzhen municipal government” is an “unusual feature” of TBSI that sets it apart from other U.S. universities, according to meeting minutes obtained by The Daily Beast.

And yet, Berkeley never disclosed a single cent of the financial support it received from Chinese sources to the federal government for TBSI, possibly not complying with a U.S. disclosure law that requires universities to report large donations from foreign sources.

“If the facts are as Berkeley’s documents seem to assert, this is exactly what universities must report,” Dan Currell, a former deputy under secretary at the Department of Education—who has also worked on policy related to foreign influence in U.S. universities—told The Daily Beast. He later added that “the school isn't complying with a clearly applicable federal statute.”

Memorandum of Agreement between China and UC Berkeley.

Photo Illustration by Luis G. Rendon/The Daily Beast

To this day, TBSI remains one of the most fully realized examples of U.S.-China research collaboration. In the 2021 fiscal year, the institute hosted 586 students from across the world and pumped out more than 130 science and engineering articles. According to its website, at least 20 Berkeley academics participated in TBSI, working alongside dozens of Chinese and international colleagues. At its peak, the institute hosted 18 laboratories located within three research centers, each focused on a research area relevant to national security: data science and IT; environmental science and new energy production; and public health and precision medicine.

Since the early days of the institute, the Chinese government has occupied three out of 11 seats on the governing board, according to a 2015 Berkeley document. Shenzhen’s then-mayor, Xu Qin, attended the 2014 signing ceremony that launched the institute. Tsinghua University President Chen Jining, another attendee of the signing ceremony, explicitly positioned TBSI as a “university-government-industry partnership.” TBSI also has a Party committee, which in 2018 held a seminar to study a speech by Xi Jinping.

While both Berkeley and Tsinghua contributed faculties to TBSI, the Shenzhen government was responsible for the lion’s share of the program’s funding, promising to provide the “necessary financial support” for the institute, according to 2014 contracting documents obtained by The Daily Beast. In the documents, the government said it would cover a wide range of initial expenses, including “costs of equipment, settlement allowances for newly recruited [principal investigators], as well as the cost of all day-to-day operations (ie. salaries of staff, research subsidies, and student scholarships, etc.)”

As part of the promised financial support, the Shenzhen municipal government first promised in 2014 to pitch in $52 million to support the “initial phase of work” for TBSI, according to a 2015 Berkeley document. More than half of the funding was to finance the purchase of new equipment in China “in consultation with Berkeley faculty… effectively adding facilities and equipment to Berkeley’s research capacity.”

In 2018, the Shenzhen government drastically scaled up their monetary support for the project, agreeing to spend at least $220 million to build a massive research campus in Shenzhen with nearly 1.7 million square feet of classroom space and cutting-edge research facilities. Tsinghua University also chipped in $19 million to fund TBSI.

Berkeley has repeatedly failed to disclose any of the above donations to the Department of Education. According to Currell, U.S. law requires all annual foreign donations exceeding $250,000 to be reported to the department, which in turn publicizes the donations to the general public.

A Berkeley spokesman acknowledged that it failed to report to the U.S. government the $19 million contract with Tsinghua University, but said the rules at the time were less clear.

“Like many universities across the country, UC Berkeley did not have a reporting process in place… in 2016, thus the initial sponsored research agreement was not reported. In 2018, due to national security concerns with China and countries of interest, the Department of Education’s reporting process was recertified and all universities were required to start reporting,” he said.

The $19 million—which was spread over five years from 2016—was thus never reported.

He said Berkeley also failed to report a renewal of the TBSI agreement in January 2022, an omission that he blamed on “an issue in the query pulling the data.” The spokesman said Berkeley corrected the error on Feb. 14, 2023, five days after The Daily Beast first reached out for comment for this story.

On the $220-million investment from the Chinese municipal government, the spokesman initially said: “UC Berkeley does not have any ownership of property at Tsinghua, therefore, is not required to report investments made in, or for, the Tsinghua University campus.” He later admitted that “the provision of a facility and/or equipment could qualify as an in-kind contribution and thus require disclosure.”

Still, Berkeley has not declared the foreign investment because the campus is still under construction, according to the spokesman.

However, according to a 2019 Department of Education guidance, universities must report foreign contracts “at the time that the institution ‘enters into’” them. Currell, the former official, noted that the universities must in practice disclose the foreign investments within six months of the research partnership being signed, not when it is implemented.

“Under the rule, whenever they signed the contract is when they had a reporting obligation within six months,” Currell said.

Berkeley chancellor and the Shenzhen mayor at the ground-breaking ceremony for the $220 million campus.

Photo Illustration by Luis G. Rendon/The Daily Beast/Berkeley Press Release

Perks

The Chinese government funding directly benefited Berkeley faculty members, according to a 2015 Berkeley document obtained by The Daily Beast. The government funding benefited them as researchers, as they used the construction of the new campus as an opportunity to “procure equipment that is not presently available at Berkeley, thus extending [their] research capabilities.” It also benefited them as private individuals, as faculty members earned “consulting fees” for working as research advisors.

After the donations from the Chinese state, TBSI and Berkeley researchers gave access to their government patrons.

Throughout the late 2010s, Berkeley officials frequently gave exclusive tours of the Marvell nanofabrication laboratory, a cutting-edge facility used for semiconductor research, to Chinese delegations connected to TBSI. According to a press release, the Chinese visitors “hoped to learn information” from the lab to “build a better lab abroad”—they did not explicitly say their knowledge would be deployed back in China.

These Chinese delegations to the lab went beyond normal academic exchanges between researchers. Multiple senior Chinese officials, including the vice mayor of Shenzhen and the party secretary of Shenzhen, visited the lab, surveying one of the most advanced semiconductor fabrication facilities in the United States.

There is no evidence that Berkeley or its staff broke U.S. export-control laws by organizing private tours to help Chinese individuals build their own cutting-edge semiconductor labs. However, Robert Shaw, an export-control expert at the Middlebury Institute, said the trip would have had to be organized with the utmost care to ensure that China does not get access to controlled U.S. technology.

“That’s a tough thing, a facility tour like that,” Shaw said. “That’s something that has to be organized very carefully. They need to be extremely careful about what’s visible in there [to the visitors].”

The Chinese government also gained access to some IPs created through research at Berkeley. Shenzhen Waranty Asset Management, a state-owned enterprise controlled by the Chinese government, served as an industrial sponsor for the $19 million grant from Tsinghua University, according to Berkeley’s spokesman. In exchange for the financial support, a Waranty-owned angel investment fund received “priority commercialization rights” for intellectual properties produced by TBSI, according to its LinkedIn page.

The Berkeley spokesman explained that Waranty as the industrial sponsor got “first right to negotiate a license to IP arising under the sponsored research agreement,” an arrangement that he said was the same as those given to other industrial sponsors at American universities. The spokesman said that Waranty did not exercise their licensing rights and the three inventions that came out of the sponsored research were “dedicated to the public.”

The Berkeley spokesman emphasized to The Daily Beast that all TBSI-related research projects were “fundamental research that is openly and publicly published for the benefit of the entire scientific community,” rather than proprietary research that exclusively benefited Chinese entities. He also added that the university does not license IPs to foreign entities that are under sanctions or export control by the U.S. government.

“U.C. Berkeley takes the matter of undue foreign government influence seriously,” he said.

Tsinghua Uni prez shakes hand with a Berkeley dean.

Photo Illustration by Luis G. Rendon/The Daily Beast/Berkeley Press Release

Shaw said that while it is possible for TBSI to work with Chinese government-backed funds in a legally above-board way, the language about priority commercialization rights is a “red flag in an export-control compliance sense.”

“That sort of language sounds like the purpose of the research is IP generation versus the sharing of knowledge globally in an academic context,” he said.

In addition to its funding from the Chinese government, TBSI also courted support from dozens of Chinese companies. Executives from 21 Chinese companies sat on TBSI’s industrial advisory board, supporting the “creation of joint laboratories, collaborative research projects and visiting industry fellows” at TBSI and enjoying access to Berkeley researchers.

Companies later sanctioned or put under export control by the U.S. government—including telecom giants Huawei and ZTE and the drone company DJI—sat on the industrial advisory board; so too did Chinese firms accused of complicity in human rights abuses, such as internet company Tencent and automobile firm BYD.

Some of these companies that participated in TBSI benefited from Berkeley's innovation. Take for example Shenzhen Waveguider, a Chinese biotech company that built a joint laboratory with TBSI. Waveguider Chairman and CEO Yu Dongfang reportedly said that by leveraging Berkeley’s “best-in-the-world” biosensor technology, Waveguider was able to achieve multiple innovations in the field of diabetes medicine through its partnership with TBSI.

Berkeley’s comments regarding its Chinese corporate sponsors have also been inconsistent. A Berkeley spokesman initially told The Daily Beast that no Berkeley faculty members ever participated in TBSI’s big data research laboratory. The statement contradicted Berkeley’s own websites, which listed three Berkeley academics as participants in the lab. (The spokesman later acknowledged that one of the researchers conducted some work with the big data research lab, but said that the other two left the project in its early stages.)

For the time being, Berkeley appears intent on continuing the TBSI, albeit on a narrower scale; in 2022, Berkeley administrators announced a “phase II” for the institute, committing to support the partnership for another five years.

However, some Berkeley officials may be having second thoughts about its relationship with China. In 2018, Berkeley submitted a complaint to the U.S. Trade of Representatives, saying that Beijing’s tech regulations unduly restrict the university’s ability to license IPs in China.

And even as far back as in 2015, a member of the U.C. Board of Regents expressed reservations about Berkeley’s participation in TBSI.

“Who would decide what research directions to take or what ethical rights they should follow?” Regent Hadi Makarechian said in 2015 at a board meeting about TBSI. “Because we hear all that stuff that in China, they do all this research that’s not ethical.”

The Daily Beast · May 22, 2023

16. NATO’s Front-Line Countries Are Doubling Down on Defense Spending. Others Aren’t.

Excerpts:

That divide is greatest between neighbors Germany and Poland. Berlin this year will fall $18.5 billion short of a pivotal NATO benchmark, while Poland will spend almost exactly the same amount above that threshold, according to a new analysis by Germany’s IFO Institute, an economic think tank. The gap is particularly stark because Germany’s economy is roughly six times the size of Poland’s.

The widening gulf in defense priorities between two of Europe’s largest countries puts in sharp relief the broader tension among Western allies over their willingness to commit to the fight in Ukraine. With the conflict entering a crucial phase before an expected Ukrainian offensive and the prospect of a protracted war of attrition increasing, Kyiv’s staunchest supporters say Europe must follow the U.S. lead and prepare for an extended confrontation.

NATO’s Front-Line Countries Are Doubling Down on Defense Spending. Others Aren’t.

Despite pledges to rebuild militaries following Russia’s invasion, some alliance members say Moscow’s poor showing limits need

By Daniel Michaels in Brussels and Bertrand Benoit in Berlin

Updated May 23, 2023 5:46 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/natos-front-line-countries-are-doubling-down-on-defense-spending-others-arent-733a3ef1?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

Nations of NATO’s eastern flank are rearming and preparing for war. But Germany and most of NATO’s other biggest members aren’t.

Moscow’s attack on Ukraine last year drew promises from across the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to boost military budgets. Members have pledged to place multibillion-dollar weapons orders and put arms industries on a war footing.

But, more than a year later, countries are moving at sharply different speeds, with some believing the poor performance of the Russian military means they don’t have to reinforce so quickly.

That divide is greatest between neighbors Germany and Poland. Berlin this year will fall $18.5 billion short of a pivotal NATO benchmark, while Poland will spend almost exactly the same amount above that threshold, according to a new analysis by Germany’s IFO Institute, an economic think tank. The gap is particularly stark because Germany’s economy is roughly six times the size of Poland’s.

The widening gulf in defense priorities between two of Europe’s largest countries puts in sharp relief the broader tension among Western allies over their willingness to commit to the fight in Ukraine. With the conflict entering a crucial phase before an expected Ukrainian offensive and the prospect of a protracted war of attrition increasing, Kyiv’s staunchest supporters say Europe must follow the U.S. lead and prepare for an extended confrontation.

Watch: NATO Chief Jens Stoltenberg Makes Unannounced Visit to Ukraine

Biden shift on F-16s for Ukraine came after months of internal debate

militarytimes.com · by Aamer Madhani and Lolita C. Baldor, Associated Press · May 23, 2023

WASHINGTON (AP) — President Joe Biden’s decision to allow allies to train Ukrainian forces on how to operate F-16 fighter jets — and eventually to provide the aircraft themselves — seemed like an abrupt change in position but was in fact one that came after months of internal debate and quiet talks with allies.

Biden announced during last week’s Group of Seven summit in Hiroshima, Japan, that the U.S. would join the F-16 coalition. His green light came after President Volodymyr Zelenskyy spent months pressing the West to provide his forces with American-made jets as he tries to repel Russia’s now 15-month-old grinding invasion.

Long shadowing the administration’s calculation were worries that such a move could escalate tensions with Russia. U.S. officials also argued that learning to fly and logistically support the advanced F-16 would be difficult and time consuming.

But over the past three months, administration officials shifted toward the view that it was time to provide Ukraine’s pilots with the training and aircraft needed for the country’s long-term security needs, according to three officials familiar with the deliberations who requested anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.

Still, the change in Biden’s position seemed rather sudden.

In February, Biden was insistent in an interview with ABC’s David Muir that Ukraine “doesn’t need F-16s now” and that “I am ruling it out for now.” And in March, a top Pentagon policy official, Colin Kahl, told U.S. lawmakers that even if the president approved F-16s for Ukraine, it could take as long as two years to get Ukrainian pilots trained and equipped.

But as the administration was publicly playing down the prospect of F-16s for Ukraine in the near term, an internal debate was heating up.

Quiet White House discussions stepped up in February, around the time that Biden visited Ukraine and Poland, according to the U.S. officials.

Following the trip, discussions that included senior White House National Security Council, Pentagon and State Department officials began on the pros and cons and the details of how such a transfer might work, officials said. Administration officials also got deeper into consultations with allies.

In April, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin heard from defense leaders from allied countries during a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group who were looking for U.S. permission to train the Ukrainians on F-16s, according to a Defense Department official who was not authorized to comment publicly. Austin raised the matter during the NSC policy discussions and there was agreement that it was time to start training.

Austin also raised the issue with Biden before the G7 summit with a recommendation “to proceed with approving allies” to train the Ukrainians and transfer the aircraft, the department official said. Secretary of State Antony Blinken also was a strong advocate for pushing forward with the plan during the U.S. policy talks and conveying to Biden increasing European urgency on the issue, officials said.

U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan traveled to London on May 8 for talks with British, French and German allies on Ukraine, and F-16s were high on the agenda. They got into the nitty gritty on how to go about provide training and which countries might be willing to transfer jets to Ukraine. It was agreed that the focus would be on training first, according to one of the officials.

Sullivan, before leaving London, spoke by phone with his counterparts from the Netherlands and Poland, both countries that have F-16s and “would be essential to any efforts to provide Ukraine jets for any future use.” Denmark also could potentially provide the jets, the official added.

Biden and Sullivan discussed how the upcoming G7 summit in Hiroshima could provide a good opportunity for him to make the case to key allies on the administration’s shifting stance on fighter jets.

They also discussed Biden backing allies providing jets to Ukraine — a line he had previously appeared not to want to cross out of concern that it could draw the West into what could be seen as direct confrontation with Moscow.

Biden, in private talks with fellow G7 leaders on Friday, confirmed that the U.S. would get behind a joint effort to train Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 and that as things went on, they would work together on who would provide them and how many would be sent.

State, Pentagon and NSC officials are now developing the training plan and “when, where and how to deliver F-16s” to Ukraine as part of the long-term security effort, the official said.

U.S. officials say it will take several months to iron out details, but the U.S. Air Force has quietly determined that the actual training could realistically be done in about four months. The Air Force based the far shorter estimate on a visit by two Ukrainian pilots to a U.S. air base in March, where they got to learn about the F-16 and fly simulators. The training, officials say, would take place in Europe.

White House officials have bristled at the notion that Biden’s decision amounted to a sea change.

The administration had been focused on providing Ukraine with weapons — including air defense systems, armored vehicles, bridging equipment and artillery — that were needed for a coming counteroffensive. There also were concerns that sending F-16s would eat up a significant portion of the money allocated for Ukraine.

What changed, the official added, is that other allies got to a point where they were willing to provide their own jets as part of a U.S.-based coalition.

The Biden administration is still examining whether it will directly provide its own F-16s to Ukraine. Regardless, it needed buy-in from other allies because the U.S. wouldn’t be able to provide the full fleet of jets Zelenskyy says is needed.

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said the F-16 will give Ukraine a key capability for the long term but it won’t be a “game changer.”

Kendall told a gathering of reporters on Monday there has been an awareness that “we needed to go there at some point, but we didn’t have a sense of urgency about this. I think we’re at a reasonable place to make that decision now.”

Another potential wrinkle in the F-16 conversation involves Turkey.

Turkey wants to buy 40 new F-16s from the U.S., but some in Congress oppose the sale until Turkey approves NATO membership for Sweden, which applied to join the alliance in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has objected to Sweden’s perceived support of the banned Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, the leftist extremist group DHKP-C and followers of the U.S.-based Muslim cleric Fethullah Gulen, who Ankara claims was behind a failed military coup attempt in 2016.

Erdogan is facing opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu in a runoff election on Sunday. If Erdogan wins, as expected, White House officials are increasingly hopeful that the Turkish leader will withdraw his opposition to Sweden’s membership, according to the U.S. official.

If Erdogan drops opposition to Sweden joining NATO, it could lead to Turkey getting its long desired F-16s and may eventually add to the number of older F-16s in circulation, which could benefit Ukraine.

—

Associated Press White House correspondent Zeke Miller contributed reporting.

18. Opinion | Here are President Biden’s debt ceiling options, ranked

I fear invoking the 14th Amendment and minting the coin would backfire on us and lead to the end of the dollar as the reserve currency or at least cause the revisionist powers to take the opportunity to try to further erode US economic power.

Opinion | Here are President Biden’s debt ceiling options, ranked

The Washington Post · by Heather Long · May 23, 2023

In hindsight, President Biden and Democratic leaders in Congress should have tried much harder to abolish the debt limit when they had the chance. Even if they had too few votes to fully scrap it, they could have at least postponed the crisis so it wouldn’t hit until after the 2024 election.

The United States is on the verge of defaulting. Already, some borrowing costs are spiking, and undemocratic nations are smirking at the dysfunction. The president has no good options left. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) is trying to force a choice between default or draconian cuts to education, courts, NASA, transportation and many programs to aid the poor. So far, the few moderate House Republicans are showing little willingness to break ranks.

Biden’s best option is a deal, but there’s not much time before June 1. The basic framework of a compromise has been apparent for a while: a two-year freeze on discretionary spending in exchange for lifting the debt limit through the 2024 election. Brian Riedl, a veteran Republican budget expert, predicted as much this month. It’s a deal no one will love but most can live with and spin as a political victory. It’s also unlikely to send the economy into a recession because the cuts (flat funding is a cut in an era with more than 4 percent inflation) are meaningful but not massive.

There are details to work out. For example, would defense spending be frozen as well? What about additional work requirements on government aid recipients that McCarthy wants? It’s telling that the White House has already offered a one-year freeze and House Republicans rejected it. If the White House puts a two-year freeze on the table and McCarthy still says “no way,” then Biden needs to telegraph that he’s ready to pull an emergency relief valve. Here’s a realistic ranking of his options, from best to worst:

Short-term extension

Congress has enacted many short-term extensions to avoid default. It could do so again, but five House Republicans would have to join all Democrats to vote for it. This is not a given.

Senate vote or House “discharge petition”

The Senate has largely left this negotiation up to the White House and House Republicans. But if something close to a two-year freeze is on the table, the Senate could vote on it to pressure Republicans. House Democrats have also lined up a discharge petition, which allows a bill to be brought to the House floor with 218 signatures. (There are 213 House Democrats.)

If these options fail or appear unlikely, Biden’s next-best option is to have the Treasury Department do whatever it can to make it until June 15. That’s the magic day that businesses pay their quarterly taxes, which would give the Treasury Department sufficient funding to last most of the summer.

Temporarily raid the Social Security trust funds

These contain $2.8 trillion. The money is not supposed to be used in a debt ceiling crisis, but the nonpartisan Concord Coalition points out it can be tapped during debt limit standoffs to pay Social Security recipients. There’s a big Social Security payment due on June 2, so this could help a lot. The Concord Coalition also argues that the Treasury Department could use more of these funds by insisting that it can’t prioritize some payments over others — and that to pay Social Security recipients on time, it has to pay all government bills. This is a stretch, but it could buy time.

The Treasury Department could issue “consol bonds”

A consol bond is unique in that it has no end date when all the money has to be paid back. The Treasury Department can argue that these bonds don’t count against the debt limit because, theoretically, the federal government never has to repay the principal. The catch is that the only reason anyone would buy these bonds is if they paid a high interest rate. It’s a costly maneuver, but issuing some of these bonds between June 1 and June 15 seems preferable over alternatives such as a fire sale of U.S. gold.

Let’s say the Treasury Department is able to get to June 15 but money is running out again by the end of the summer and House Republicans still won’t agree to anything remotely in the middle of the road. That’s when some of the more outlandish ideas would start to appear reasonable.

Invoke the 14th amendment

Biden could argue that the debt limit is unconstitutional by saying it violates the 14th Amendment, which states: “The validity of the public debt of the United States ... shall not be questioned.” It will almost certainly trigger a legal challenge and call into question whether any U.S. debt issued after that point is valid. Biden has shown a lot of hesitancy to do this — and rightly so.

Mint the coin

This is where the U.S. government issues a $1 trillion platinum coin that the Federal Reserve then accepts. The U.S. Mint is allowed to issue platinum coins of any denomination, but, as Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen has pointed out, it’s a gimmick that investors would probably view as akin to a default.

The worst option is default. No one truly knows what will happen if the United States stops paying its bills, but there will be panic and pain. Even getting close to the brink hurts. Back in 2011, Standard & Poor’s downgraded the nation’s debt rating after the deal was struck and markets kept falling for weeks. This is the other lesson from 2011: Striking a deal with harsh spending cuts that last a decade also leads to lasting harm. If House Republicans refuse to budge from their extreme position, there will come a point at which Biden — and the nation — will be better off taking a leap.

The Washington Post · by Heather Long · May 23, 2023

19. Hypersonic Hype? Russia’s Kinzhal Missiles and the Lessons for Air Defense

Excerpts:

The interception serves as a reminder of the growing importance of robust defense capabilities in an era of evolving threats. As nations around the world invest in the development of unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and hypersonic weapons, the need for effective missile defense systems becomes even more crucial. These recent successful interceptions underscore the necessity for partner nations to continually enhance their air defense capabilities to counter advanced threats. Additionally, it is vital to not allow the recent successes over Kyiv to create complacency in the missile defense community. Policymakers cannot afford the luxury of assuming future hypersonic missiles will be plagued by as corrupt and inept a development as the Kinzhal.

As noted previously, the donation of Patriot systems to Ukraine was only the beginning of increasing strategic integration of Ukrainian and NATO forces. As the war rages on, increasingly capable offensive weapons such as long-range cruise missiles with stealth capabilities are being delivered as well as training Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighters. This month’s attacks have firmly reestablished Western military technology, doctrine, and missile defense as a formidable force capable of countering sophisticated threats. It has also shown that NATO must continue to reassess their defense strategies, placing a renewed emphasis on developing and acquiring advanced missile defense systems. The performance of the Patriot and IRIS-T in Ukraine will lead to a strategic reevaluation by other nations of their offensive arms programs designed to defeat these systems, potentially reshaping dynamics not only in Eastern Europe, but around the world. This advantage, like all technological advantages, is only kept as long as innovative processes are encouraged by the West. As the proliferation of effective small unmanned aircraft systems has shown, the United States and its allies could just as quickly lose their edge in the missile defense sphere.

Hypersonic Hype? Russia’s Kinzhal Missiles and the Lessons for Air Defense - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by Peter Mitchell · May 23, 2023

The May 4 interception of a Russian Kinzhal hypersonic missile by one of Ukraine’s Patriot air defense systems in Kyiv has caused a significant stir in the international missile defense community. The ensuing saturation attack against Kyiv on May 16, which according to Russian sources was specifically aimed at knocking out a Patriot system, has only further underscored the significance of advanced missile defense systems in today’s evolving security landscape. This dramatic first-ever engagement between modern Western air defense systems and the hypersonic weapons specifically designed to defeat them was marked by contrails streaking the skies over Ukraine, literally and figurately underlining the significance of this latest technological revolution.

The Kinzhal: Overhyped and Underperforming

The Kh-47 Kinzhal (Russian for “Dagger”) air-launched missile, first unveiled in 2018, has been described by Russian state media as a “uniquely capable” next-generation hypersonic weapon capable of penetrating any and all enemy air defense systems and hit London in nine minutes. Hypersonic weapons are generally defined as long-range, maneuvering, air-breathing systems that travel in excess of Mach 5. The Kinzhal is reported to have a range of around 1,500 kilometers (930 miles), which is relatively short for a hypersonic missile, especially one benefiting from the increased range that comes from being launched from an aircraft. For context, the US Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon currently in development has a planned unclassified range of 1,725 miles. Hypersonic missiles typically employ a scramjet engine or other advanced propulsion to allow for maneuverability while maintaining hypersonic speed. The Kinzhal instead uses a solid-fuel rocket engine, likely derived from the SS-26 Iskander, which—like most solid rockets—likely can’t be shut down or throttled in flight. Once the rocket motor has burnt out, the missile then coasts to its target. This raises significant doubts about whether the Kinzhal can actually maintain a sustained speed of Mach 10 throughout its flight as Russians has claimed. Air resistance would slow the Kinzhal down just as it reaches the most critical, terminal stage of its attack, leaving it vulnerable to interception. This propulsion method and meager reaction control systems along with the sheer mass of the missile (approximately one thousand kilograms) raises questions about its actual agility and maneuvering capabilities. The missile is not capable of making sharp turns or rapid changes in direction, which is a critical aspect that makes hypersonic weapons so potentially difficult to intercept. In terms of maneuverability, the Kinzhal is more akin to a giant lawn dart loaded with explosives.

With this technical analysis in mind, it appears the Kinzhal is likely to join the Su-57, T-14 Armata, and BMPT Terminator in the dustbin of vaunted Russian weapons that have severely underperformed on the battlefield.

Saturation Attack: The Patriot’s Worst-Case Scenario

The truly impressive takeaway from the Patriot systems in Ukrainian service is not the singular takedown of the first Kinzhal but the Patriot’s performance under saturation bombardment. The May 16 air raid on Kyiv featured every category of long-range precision munition in the Russian arsenal: unmanned aerial vehicles as well as cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic missiles were all used in a coordinated saturation attack intended to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and destroy their systems. The saturation attack works through filling the three-dimensional airspace with more incoming targets than the defense can handle using a combination of land-, sea-, or air-launched missile platforms, a coordinated impact time, varied altitudes and azimuths of approach, decoys and countermeasures, and sheer numbers.

The ability of the Patriots donated by the United States and Germany to detect, track, and defeat this saturation attack coming from all different directions showcases the impressive advancements and upgrades that the venerable system has experienced since the Patriot was first updated for use against tactical ballistic and cruise missiles in the 1990s after its less-than-impressive showing against those threats during the Gulf War. Modern air defense systems have never faced a threat on the level of the current Russians air raids against Ukraine. Even during the height of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, around twenty-three ballistic missiles were fired against coalition forces, of which only nine were deemed targets for interception. The Ukrainian success in utilizing Patriot systems to counter a saturation attack from modern weapons from a near-peer enemy demonstrates the remarkable evolution of defense technology and its ability to adapt to emerging challenges.

Strategic Implications

The interception serves as a reminder of the growing importance of robust defense capabilities in an era of evolving threats. As nations around the world invest in the development of unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and hypersonic weapons, the need for effective missile defense systems becomes even more crucial. These recent successful interceptions underscore the necessity for partner nations to continually enhance their air defense capabilities to counter advanced threats. Additionally, it is vital to not allow the recent successes over Kyiv to create complacency in the missile defense community. Policymakers cannot afford the luxury of assuming future hypersonic missiles will be plagued by as corrupt and inept a development as the Kinzhal.

As noted previously, the donation of Patriot systems to Ukraine was only the beginning of increasing strategic integration of Ukrainian and NATO forces. As the war rages on, increasingly capable offensive weapons such as long-range cruise missiles with stealth capabilities are being delivered as well as training Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighters. This month’s attacks have firmly reestablished Western military technology, doctrine, and missile defense as a formidable force capable of countering sophisticated threats. It has also shown that NATO must continue to reassess their defense strategies, placing a renewed emphasis on developing and acquiring advanced missile defense systems. The performance of the Patriot and IRIS-T in Ukraine will lead to a strategic reevaluation by other nations of their offensive arms programs designed to defeat these systems, potentially reshaping dynamics not only in Eastern Europe, but around the world. This advantage, like all technological advantages, is only kept as long as innovative processes are encouraged by the West. As the proliferation of effective small unmanned aircraft systems has shown, the United States and its allies could just as quickly lose their edge in the missile defense sphere.

Capt. Peter Mitchell is an air defense officer and strategic studies instructor at West Point.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Sgt. 1st Class Christopher Smith, US Army

mwi.usma.edu · by Peter Mitchell · May 23, 2023

20. Exclusive: Chinese hackers attacked Kenyan government as debt strains grew

Economic and cyber warfare supporting China's wolf and debt trap diplomacy?

Exclusive: Chinese hackers attacked Kenyan government as debt strains grew

Reuters · by Aaron Ross

Summary
Cyber spies infiltrated Kenyan networks from 2019
Hit finance ministry, president's office, spy agency and others
Sources believe Beijing was seeking info on debt

NAIROBI, May 24 (Reuters) - Chinese hackers targeted Kenya's government in a widespread, years-long series of digital intrusions against key ministries and state institutions, according to three sources, cybersecurity research reports and Reuters' own analysis of technical data related to the hackings.

Two of the sources assessed the hacks to be aimed, at least in part, at gaining information on debt owed to Beijing by the East African nation: Kenya is a strategic link in the Belt and Road Initiative - President Xi Jinping's plan for a global infrastructure network.

"Further compromises may occur as the requirement for understanding upcoming repayment strategies becomes needed," a July 2021 research report written by a defence contractor for private clients stated.

China's foreign ministry said it was "not aware" of any such hacking, while China's embassy in Britain called the accusations "baseless", adding that Beijing opposes and combats "cyberattacks and theft in all their forms."

China's influence in Africa has grown rapidly over the past two decades. But, like several African nations, Kenya's finances are being strained by the growing cost of servicing external debt - much of it owed to China.

The hacking campaign demonstrates China's willingness to leverage its espionage capabilities to monitor and protect economic and strategic interests abroad, two of the sources said.

The hacks constitute a three-year campaign that targeted eight of Kenya's ministries and government departments, including the presidential office, according to an intelligence analyst in the region. The analyst also shared with Reuters research documents that included the timeline of attacks, the targets, and provided some technical data relating to the compromise of a server used exclusively by Kenya's main spy agency.

A Kenyan cybersecurity expert described similar hacking activity against the foreign and finance ministries. All three of the sources asked not to be named due to the sensitive nature of their work.

"Your allegation of hacking attempts by Chinese Government entities is not unique," Kenya's presidential office said, adding the government had been targeted by "frequent infiltration attempts" from Chinese, American and European hackers.

"As far as we are concerned, none of the attempts were successful," it said.

It did not provide further details nor respond to follow-up questions.

A spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Britain said China is against "irresponsible moves that use topics like cybersecurity to sow discord in the relations between China and other developing countries".

"China attaches great importance to Africa's debt issue and works intensively to help Africa cope with it," the spokesperson added.

THE HACKS

Between 2000 and 2020, China committed nearly $160 billion in loans to African countries, according to a comprehensive database on Chinese lending hosted by Boston University, much of it for large-scale infrastructure projects.

Kenya used over $9 billion in Chinese loans to fund an aggressive push to build or upgrade railways, ports and highways.

Beijing became the country's largest bilateral creditor and gained a firm foothold in the most important East African consumer market and a vital logistical hub on Africa's Indian Ocean coast.

By late 2019, however, when the Kenyan cybersecurity expert told Reuters he was brought in by Kenyan authorities to assess a hack of a government-wide network, Chinese lending was drying up. And Kenya's financial strains were showing.

The breach reviewed by the Kenyan cybersecurity expert and attributed to China began with a "spearphishing" attack at the end of that same year, when a Kenyan government employee unknowingly downloaded an infected document, allowing hackers to infiltrate the network and access other agencies.

"A lot of documents from the ministry of foreign affairs were stolen and from the finance department as well. The attacks appeared focused on the debt situation," the Kenyan cybersecurity expert said.

Another source - the intelligence analyst working in the region - said Chinese hackers carried out a far-reaching campaign against Kenya that began in late 2019 and continued until at least 2022.

According to documents provided by the analyst, Chinese cyber spies subjected the office of Kenya's president, its defence, information, health, land and interior ministries, its counter-terrorism centre and other institutions to persistent and prolonged hacking activity.

The affected government departments did not respond to requests for comment, declined to be interviewed or were unreachable.

By 2021, global economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic had already helped push one major Chinese borrower - Zambia - to default on its external debt. Kenya managed to secure a temporary debt repayment moratorium from China.

In early July 2021, the cybersecurity research reports shared by the intelligence analyst in the region detailed how the hackers secretly accessed an email server used by Kenya's National Intelligence Service (NIS).

Reuters was able to confirm that the victim's IP address belonged to the NIS. The incident was also covered in a report from the private defence contractor reviewed by Reuters.

Reuters could not determine what information was taken during the hacks or conclusively establish the motive for the attacks. But the defence contractor's report said the NIS breach was possibly aimed at gleaning information on how Kenya planned to manage its debt payments.

"Kenya is currently feeling the pressure of these debt burdens...as many of the projects financed by Chinese loans are not generating enough income to pay for themselves yet," the report stated.

A Reuters review of internet logs delineating the Chinese digital espionage activity showed that a server controlled by the Chinese hackers also accessed a shared Kenyan government webmail service more recently from December 2022 until February this year.

Chinese officials declined to comment on this recent breach, and the Kenyan authorities did not respond to a question about it.

'BACKDOOR DIPLOMACY'

The defence contractor, pointing to identical tools and techniques used in other hacking campaigns, identified a Chinese state-linked hacking team as having carried out the attack on Kenya's intelligence agency.

The group is known as "BackdoorDiplomacy" in the cybersecurity research community, because of its record of trying to further the objectives of Chinese diplomatic strategy.

According to Slovakia-based cybersecurity firm ESET, BackdoorDiplomacy re-uses malicious software against its victims to gain access to their networks, making it possible to track their activities.

Provided by Reuters with the IP address of the NIS hackers, Palo Alto Networks, a U.S. cybersecurity firm that tracks BackdoorDiplomacy's activities, confirmed that it belongs to the group, adding that its prior analysis shows the group is sponsored by the Chinese state.

Cybersecurity researchers have documented BackdoorDiplomacy hacks targeting governments and institutions in a number of countries in Asia and Europe.

Incursions into the Middle East and Africa appear less common, making the focus and scale of its hacking activities in Kenya particularly noteworthy, the defence contractor's report said.

"This angle is clearly a priority for the group."

China's embassy in Britain rejected any involvement in the Kenya hackings, and did not directly address questions about the government's relationship with BackdoorDiplomacy.

"China is a main victim of cyber theft and attacks and a staunch defender of cybersecurity," a spokesperson said.

Reporting by Aaron Ross in Nairobi, James Pearson in London and Christopher Bing in Washington Additional reporting by Eduardo Baptista in Beijing Editing by Chris Sanders and Joe Bavier

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Aaron Ross

Thomson Reuters

West & Central Africa correspondent investigating human rights abuses, conflict and corruption as well as regional commodities production, epidemic diseases and the environment, previously based in Kinshasa, Abidjan and Cairo.

James Pearson

Thomson Reuters

Reports on hacks, leaks and digital espionage in Europe. Ten years at Reuters with previous postings in Hanoi as Bureau Chief and Seoul as Korea Correspondent. Author of 'North Korea Confidential', a book about daily life in North Korea. Contact: 447927347451

Christopher Bing

Thomson Reuters

Award-winning reporter covering the intersection between technology and national security with a focus on how the evolving cybersecurity landscape affects government and business.

Reuters · by Aaron Ross

21. A debt ceiling fight and national security – no good choices

I am worried. Just because it has always seemed to work out in the past does not mean it will this time or that there will not be significant negative effects. We are playing with fire.

Excerpts:

So, as the Republicans and the White House hammer out a deal, what should it look like for defense?

First, any deal should exempt funds supporting Ukraine from spending caps. The reason for doing so is simple: in Ukraine, we are degrading a strategic competitor’s capability and capacity for relatively little cost in terms of dollars and, most importantly, American lives. Moreover, we are helping to ward off an existential threat to Europe, the original strategic priority for the United States. If we allow Russia to conquer Ukraine, we certainly are going to spend more to defend the rest of Europe and, should China view us as willing to abandon partners, on the defense of Taiwan. Spending money on what Ukraine needs to win now will save money in the long run.

Second, a deal over the debt limit should not cut defense from current levels and should probably stabilize defense at a level higher than 2023. Additionally, the budget deal should protect our national security from the scourge of inflation. That’s due to the need for at least $21 billion to account for the buying power that the Pentagon has lost from inflation since the start of Fiscal Year 2021 [PDF]. If we can settle on a topline in 2024 that allows the Pentagon to plan for the next decade, this in and of itself will be a net positive accomplishment.

Lastly, a deal should have an escape hatch. The world is watching, especially China and Russia. While we often view a budget and debt ceiling deal through the lens of internal politics, there are others who will be spending every waking hour to figure out how to exploit such a deal to their advantage. The “great game” of centuries past is still alive and well today; the locations and players have just changed. Therefore, there should be a way for our elected leaders to respond quickly to global and domestic emergencies, while also providing assurance to our allies and competitors alike that we are not abandoning the world stage.

A debt ceiling fight and national security – no good choices - Breaking Defense

Even if President Joe Biden and House Speaker Kevin McCarthy find a way out of the debt limit debacle, AEI's John Ferrari and Charles Rahr argue a compromise could be just that for America's military.

breakingdefense.com · by John Ferrari, Charles Rahr · May 23, 2023

U.S. President Joe Biden and Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) depart the U.S. Capitol following the Friends of Ireland Luncheon on Saint Patrick’s Day March 17, 2023 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images)

With the US government rapidly approaching the debt limit and an ensuing economic crisis, political leaders are trying to hammer out a last-minute deal. In this new op-ed, AEI’s John Ferrari and Charles Rahr lay out the national security implications from a debt default — as well as how even an imperfect deal could still damage America’s military.

President Joe Biden and House Speaker Kevin McCarthy spent Monday night huddled in discussions around avoiding a default on the debt ceiling. That’s good for the country – the issue must be addressed before the looming deadline. But in the rush to strike a deal, it’s becoming clear that few truly understand the Gordian Knot tying the debt ceiling and national security. This isn’t just an economic issue, but one that could send shockwaves throughout the ability of America’s military to execute its mission.

For those of us old enough to remember, the comedians Laurel and Hardy used to say “This is a fine mess you’ve gotten us into.” That certainly feels apt when it comes to the question of the debt limit.

Many have been wondering what would happen to defense if the federal government breaches the debt ceiling, with some suggesting our military could possibly not get paid. Breaching the debt ceiling is very different than a government shutdown in that the government stays open, but does not have enough cash to pay its bills. It is important to note that the government is not out of money; it just does not have enough to meet all of its bills.

If the government operated like a household, they would sift through the bills that had to be paid — interest, payroll, and more — while delaying payments to others. For defense, they could pay the troops while not paying the largest defense contractors. However, it has been implied that the Treasury cannot or will do that. Our government, with its annual spend of trillions of dollars, apparently operates with a chainsaw rather than a scalpel.

Given this, the three potential options that we’re now staring down in a debt ceiling deal are all bad for national security. We can only hope our elected leaders pick the “least-worse option.”

Default: If the government doesn’t reach a deal and cannot prioritize payments like California did in 2009, thus missing interest payments, it could potentially damage our national security for decades to come in two ways.

First, moving forward, the US could pay higher interest rates to continue to borrow money, thus siphoning more funds away from other budget priorities. Second, it gives competitors such as China and Russia a huge messaging win that the Western nations and their way of doing business is corrupt, almost literally bankrupt, and not to be trusted. It is a reason for nations which haven’t yet definitively sided with any major power to hedge their bets and to not fall in line with our priorities.

Clean Debt Increase, No Reforms: Some argue that this is the path that should be taken. However, without any reform there will be less and less space to pay our nation’s defense bill due to rising interest payments on our ballooning national debt, now over $31 trillion. According to projections from the Congressional Budget Office, net interest payments are expected to exceed defense spending by 2029 [PDF]. And, in just a decade from now, it’s anticipated that those interest payments will consume 3.6 percent of our gross domestic product compared to 2.8 percent for defense [PDF]. That should be a cause for concern for everyone as the increasing need to pay off interest means that there will be less money available for other priorities, including defense.

Sequestration Part Two: As our colleagues Mackenzie Eaglen and Dustin Walker have explained, the current House GOP plan to raise the debt ceiling, the “Limit, Save, and Grow Act,” is akin to a Budget Control Act 2.0 in that its potential cuts to defense spending over time would result in reduced readiness, a smaller force, and deferred modernization. While this plan is only a starting point for negotiations, it should be noted that there are probably some elected leaders who believe cutting defense, like we did with the Budget Control Act in 2011, is not a bad idea. And given the thin margins in the House and Senate, we cannot wish away defense cuts even though the Speaker’s negotiating team now seems to be pushing for increased defense funding.

A bad debt ceiling deal that cuts defense would have real implications for the readiness of our force, which is already suffering from shrinkages in people, planes, and ships. Since its recent peak in the late 1980s, our force has been reduced by 40-50 percent; any cuts will certainly shrink the force even more.

So, as the Republicans and the White House hammer out a deal, what should it look like for defense?

First, any deal should exempt funds supporting Ukraine from spending caps. The reason for doing so is simple: in Ukraine, we are degrading a strategic competitor’s capability and capacity for relatively little cost in terms of dollars and, most importantly, American lives. Moreover, we are helping to ward off an existential threat to Europe, the original strategic priority for the United States. If we allow Russia to conquer Ukraine, we certainly are going to spend more to defend the rest of Europe and, should China view us as willing to abandon partners, on the defense of Taiwan. Spending money on what Ukraine needs to win now will save money in the long run.

Second, a deal over the debt limit should not cut defense from current levels and should probably stabilize defense at a level higher than 2023. Additionally, the budget deal should protect our national security from the scourge of inflation. That’s due to the need for at least $21 billion to account for the buying power that the Pentagon has lost from inflation since the start of Fiscal Year 2021 [PDF]. If we can settle on a topline in 2024 that allows the Pentagon to plan for the next decade, this in and of itself will be a net positive accomplishment.

Lastly, a deal should have an escape hatch. The world is watching, especially China and Russia. While we often view a budget and debt ceiling deal through the lens of internal politics, there are others who will be spending every waking hour to figure out how to exploit such a deal to their advantage. The “great game” of centuries past is still alive and well today; the locations and players have just changed. Therefore, there should be a way for our elected leaders to respond quickly to global and domestic emergencies, while also providing assurance to our allies and competitors alike that we are not abandoning the world stage.

It has been said that preparing for war is expensive, but as others have pointed out, it is much less expensive than fighting a war, and certainly much less expensive than losing a war. The current debt ceiling negotiations need to come to a successful conclusion, so that we never test this theory.

Retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. John Ferrari is a senior nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute think tank. Ferrari previously served as a director of program analysis and evaluation for the Army. Charles Rahr is a research assistant at AEI.

breakingdefense.com · by John Ferrari, Charles Rahr · May 23, 2023

22. Do Americans really want “unbiased” news?

Excerpts:

And yes, Americans’ interest in news spiked dramatically during the Trump and coronavirus era. But when Trump left and the country returned, mostly, to pre-pandemic life, that interest fell off, too. And waiting around for another calamity to re-spike that interest isn’t a real strategy: If you want to bring eyeballs back to your news site, you’re probably going to have to find something that doesn’t really have much to do with news.

The other problem with the “Americans want unbiased news” argument is a truth-in-labeling problem. It’s not that “Americans” think news is biased; it’s people who lean Republican. Democrats, by and large, think the news they get from existing outlets is reasonably trustworthy, as this helpful YouGov poll — which replicates a similar one conducted a year ago — spells out. It’s Republicans who distrust almost all outlets that aren’t explicitly aimed at them, like NewsMax. And even the Messenger’s own poll that purports to show a hunger for unbiased news underscores this: 55 percent of Democrats think coverage of their own party is fair — but only 19 percent of Republicans said the same.

Fox News, of course, figured this out from the get-go: That’s why their “fair and balanced” pitch actually means “news you’ll like if you’re on the right side of the political spectrum.” And that’s not what CNN and the Messenger say they’re selling. But if they’re not doing that, who’s buying?

Do Americans really want “unbiased” news?

CNN and the Messenger both say they’re chasing the middle. Uh-oh.

By Peter Kafka May 23, 2023, 11:30am EDT

Vox · by Peter Kafka · May 23, 2023

Former President Donald Trump participates in a CNN town hall with Kaitlin Collins on May 10.

CNN

Peter Kafka covers media and technology, and their intersection, at Vox. Many of his stories can be found in his Kafka on Media newsletter, and he also hosts the Recode Media podcast.

Item 1: Last week, the Messenger, a news operation run by the team that built and sold the Hill, launched to plenty of jeers from critics, while inside the company, staff complained that the site wasn’t ready for primetime. Within days, one of its top editors quit in frustration.

Item 2: Executives at CNN spent much of last week defending the network’s decision to air a “town hall” interview with former President Trump, while some of its 4,000 employees told reporters that morale at the news network was dismal. And Christiane Amanpour, CNN’s much-lauded international correspondent, criticized her employer publicly in a speech to the Columbia Journalism School.

Two very different news organizations with two very different problems. But they have two common threads.

The first is that both are trying to secure territory in a hostile economic environment. The Messenger is launching just as previous attempts to make digital news work at scale are throwing in the towel; CNN is trying to rebrand when the engine that has made cable TV news profitable, if not popular, is sputtering.

Just as worrisome: Both companies are trying to position themselves as an antidote to “biased media,” and promise to deliver down-the-middle news. The problem is there’s not much evidence that people are clamoring for that, which makes it hard to envision a light at the end of the tunnel for either company.

Sign up for the newsletter Kafka on Media

Peter Kafka reports on the collision of media and technology.

A quick recap: The Messenger has been a source of fascination in media circles for months, in large part because the company has been hiring journalists at a rapid clip (rare at any time, but ultra-rare in the 2023 news market) and paying above-market rates (ditto).

Messenger owner Jimmy Finkelstein also raised eyebrows by waxing on about the good old days when families would gather around the TV set to watch 60 Minutes or wait eagerly for new issues of print magazines.

But the Messenger’s main pitch to readers is that it will deliver “impartial and objective news,” as its editor Dan Wakeford put it (twice in one paragraph) in his welcome note. Just to hammer it home, on launch day the site published the results of a poll, conducted by one of its investors, that announced that “American voters want a new media source that’s free from journalists’ personal biases.” Convenient timing!

Meanwhile, CNN is attempting a full retool under new owners and new management. AT&T sold the network, along with the rest of the company that used to be called WarnerMedia, to Discovery Inc. a year ago, and Discovery boss David Zaslav installed TV producer Chris Licht to run the operation, replacing Jeff Zucker, who had run CNN for nine years.

Under Licht, CNN has promised to move away from what he described as liberal opinioneering, arguing that “too many people have lost trust in the news media.” As I’ve noted, that argument syncs with one previously expressed by John Malone, the conservative cable baron who sits on the Warner Bros. Discovery board, and has held up Fox News as a model for a TV news network.

I’m not 100 percent sure either news outlet actually believes that Americans truly want just-the-facts, down-the-middle news, despite their protestations.

A quick scan of the Messenger gives you the sense that it’s really an attempt to create a competitor to the Daily Mail, the UK tabloid that reaches a huge audience with its can-you-believe-that stories; if you’re in the market for news about former reality star Honey Boo Boo and her family, the Messenger has you covered. (Messenger journalists tell me that the site launched in bare-bones form, and that they’ll eventually have more substantive stuff on the site to balance out the likes of “Arkansas Inmate Escapes Twice in 24 Hours, Steals Guard’s Car.”)

And as CNN is overhauling much of its programming lineup, executives there believe the real upside could be its evening slate, where it thinks it can lure viewers who want entertainment, not up-to-the-minute news. Hence upcoming shows like King Charles, a talkfest hosted by former NBA star Charles Barkley and CBS host Gayle King.

Meanwhile, Zaslav spelled out one constituency he thinks really does want unbiased news, or at least the perception that it’s unbiased: “Advertisers are interested in CNN again,” he said at the MoffettNathanson investor conference last week, defending the Trump event and other changes the network had made. “They don’t want to be part of an advocacy network.”

But for argument’s sake, let’s take both the Messenger and CNN at their word: Americans are clamoring for bias-free news. Because if that’s what they truly believe, I think they’ll have a hard time proving it out, for a couple of reasons.

The first is that Americans simply don’t consume a lot of news, period. The audiences for news delivered by newspapers and TV sets have been in decline for years, and the drops preceded the internet era for some time, though the digital era sped up the pace.

CNN, which pioneered the always-on cable TV news network model when it launched in 1980, quickly realized that viewers would tune in when something truly spectacular was happening — say, a war between the US and Iraq — but generally tuned out between conflagrations.

One way to solve that problem: Position yourself as an advocacy network for liberals or conservatives, as Fox News and MSNBC have done. Another, practiced by Zucker prior to Trump’s ascent: Turn minor, tabloid-y stories — the kind the Messenger might feature on its homepage — into multi-day events, like the saga of the “poop cruise” in 2013, or the mystery of the vanished Malaysian airliner in 2014.

Vox · by Peter Kafka · May 23, 2023

23. The U.S.-Chinese Economic Relationship Is Changing—But Not Vanishing

Conclusion:

De-risking may be driven largely by the private sector, but public policy will play a vital role in shaping the eventual outcome. To succeed in its targeted approach to neutralizing potential dangers, the United States will have to persuade its allies and partners to pursue a common strategy. The May G-7 communiqué endorsing de-risking was a good first step. Export controls, investment restrictions, and subsidies have more power if they are jointly implemented by a U.S.-European superbloc. As the Biden administration has leapt forward with export controls and industrial policies aimed at subsidizing domestic production, divisions have emerged between the United States and Europe—divisions that are being actively exploited by Beijing as it seeks to isolate Washington from its partners. A shared Western framework for de-risking would offer a more coordinated, balanced, and effective approach to competition with China than racing ahead alone. It may also strengthen, rather than erode, the foundations of a stronger transatlantic alliance.

The U.S.-Chinese Economic Relationship Is Changing—But Not Vanishing

How ‘De-Risking’ Can Preserve Healthy Integration

By Jami Miscik, Peter Orszag, and Theodore Bunzel

May 24, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Jami Miscik, Peter Orszag, and Theodore Bunzel · May 24, 2023

In boardrooms and executive suites, many fear that a sweeping and potentially painful economic rupture between China and the United States is inevitable. According to a 2023 survey of Western businesses by the insurance firm WTW, more than 40 percent of corporate respondents anticipated that economic decoupling between the world’s two largest economies would “greatly strengthen” in 2023, up from under 15 percent in 2022.

In recent weeks, the Biden administration has sought to allay these concerns. In an April speech on economic policy, U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan made clear that the United States is “for de-risking, not for decoupling,” a formulation first articulated by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Sullivan explained that U.S. export controls would remain “narrowly focused on technology that could tilt the military balance,” adding that “we are not cutting off trade.” One week earlier, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen argued that the United States did not seek to fully decouple from China, an outcome that she warned would be “disastrous” and “destabilizing” for the world. The United States and its allies are now beginning to sing from the same sheet: the G-7 leaders’ communiqué at the Hiroshima summit in late May firmly endorsed an approach to China based on “de-risking, not decoupling.”

The strategy of de-risking aims to achieve three broad goals: limiting China’s abilities in strategic sectors that have national security implications, such as cutting-edge semiconductors and other advanced technologies; reducing Beijing’s leverage over the West by eroding Chinese dominance of the market for certain essential inputs, including critical minerals; and diversifying corporate economic exposure more broadly to reduce the potential costs of a sudden disruption in trade between China and the West.

That the United States is narrowly pursuing these goals rather than seeking to sever all economic relations with China is confirmed by the data: no overall decoupling has occurred so far. Although direct investment in both directions has declined, trade in goods between the United States and China hit an all-time high of $690 billion last year.

Still, many analysts doubt that a targeted approach to de-risking can succeed. Others worry that the result will be the same as that of a broader decoupling. We believe that the more nuanced approach of the Biden administration is viable, but that it will still fundamentally rewire Western economic ties with China. De-risking will move faster and go further in certain strategic sectors, such as technology and clean energy, and more slowly or not at all in others. Even if supply chains don’t move in a broad-based way, corporations are already working to mitigate the risk that a single point of failure could upend their operations.

Much of this process will be driven by the private sector, rather than by policymakers. A vivid example involves semiconductors. The United States is attempting to shift more production of chips back home in order to insulate the global economy from rising tensions over Taiwan. Yet where chips are produced in the future will depend more on the demands of large private purchasers than on government policy. Still, the United States needs to coordinate its de-risking strategy with those of its allies, ensuring that Western countries act in unison as they work to cordon off potentially dangerous areas of economic activity with China. Otherwise, Beijing will exploit their divisions.

THE END OF UNFETTERED INTEGRATION

The history of de-risking begins with the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. Although Trump failed to reduce the trade deficit between the United States and China, his administration’s tariffs on Chinese goods altered bilateral trade flows and sent a strong signal to U.S. businesses that the era of unfettered integration with China was over. To Chinese President Xi Jinping, Trump’s policies underscored that Beijing could no longer depend on the free flow of U.S. capital and trade.

The COVID-19 pandemic turbocharged this shift. Supply chain disruptions altered basic assumptions about China’s role in the global economy, undermining the view that China is always open for business and a dependable source of “just-in-time” manufactured goods. Xi’s draconian “zero-COVID” policy spurred boardrooms to reexamine their dependence on foreign suppliers. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine only heightened these concerns.

The Biden administration added a strategic lens to de-risking: thwarting China’s advancement in strategic sectors tied to national security, increasing supply chain resilience (by encouraging reshoring and “friendshoring”), and reducing U.S. dependence on China for critical goods. These efforts have involved a combination of carrots and sticks, including unprecedented export controls on advanced technology, an upcoming screening mechanism on outbound U.S. investment into Chinese technology companies, and industrial policies that encourage the relocation of manufacturing and sourcing to the United States and allied countries.

Corporate views have also evolved. In China, consumer boycotts against foreign companies—often over sensitive political topics—have grown more frequent: according to the Swedish National China Centre, there were 21 such boycotts between 2008 and 2015 and 78 between 2016 and this year. Chinese consumers increasingly prefer local brands, and Chinese firms now compete more effectively against multinational firms, partly because Chinese state regulators often tilt the scales in favor of domestic champions. China’s recent expansion of its counter-espionage law to cover a much wider array of information, coupled with raids on some advisory firms and a pickup in exit bans on foreigners, has made the business environment more uncertain. And with the possibility of a disruptive escalation over Taiwan lurking in the background, many U.S. and Western corporations have begun to rethink their exposure to China.

TOO BIG TO DECOUPLE

Despite these important shifts, little de-risking (let alone decoupling) shows up in the data at first glance. U.S.-Chinese trade in goods reached a record high in 2022, and China remains the United States’ third-largest trading partner after Canada and Mexico, accounting for nearly 20 percent of total U.S. goods imports. European trade with China is also on the rise, with EU imports from China more than doubling since 2016 and EU exports to China increasing by 50 percent.

But look closer at the data and a more complicated story emerges. Much of the increase in U.S.-Chinese trade in 2022 was due to price inflation. And as Chad Bown and Yilin Wang of the Peterson Institute for International Economics have found, overall trade between the two countries is growing much less quickly than U.S. or Chinese trade with other partners.

U.S. exports to China in 2022 were 23 percent lower than their projected levels “had they grown at the same rate as China’s imports from the world” between 2018 and 2022, according to Bown and Wang. Under the hood, a shift is underway: the United States is exporting more in agricultural goods to China and less in manufactured goods, including advanced electronics. U.S. exports of semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, for example, declined considerably in 2022, even before new U.S. export controls on semiconductors came into effect last October. Meanwhile, the nominal value of U.S. agricultural exports to China (soybeans in particular) has surged, driven by elevated prices resulting from the war in Ukraine.

No overall decoupling has occurred so far.

The same story holds for U.S. imports from China. Today, U.S. imports from the rest of the world are 38 percent higher than they were in June 2018, when Trump’s tariffs went into effect, whereas imports from China are only seven percent higher than they were in June 2018—and 18 percent below the level indicated by their pre–trade war trend. U.S. imports have responded as expected to the Trump tariffs: those facing the highest tariffs (such as IT hardware, semiconductors, and furniture) have declined the most on a relative basis, whereas those facing lower or no tariffs (such as consumer electronics) have maintained or even exceeded their pre-pandemic trajectory.

De-risking has had the greatest effect on foreign direct investment into China. It plummeted by around half in 2022 as corporations shied away from the country because of COVID-19 lockdowns and concern about geopolitical risk. Other proxies for foreign direct investment tell a similar story. According to the Rhodium Group, foreign “greenfield investment”—for instance, in new factories and facilities—in China has fallen to its lowest level in 20 years, and cross-border acquisitions of Chinese companies have declined to their lowest level in a decade.

Investment in China is also growing more concentrated among a smaller set of firms. Since 2019, the gap between the best- and worst-performing multinational companies in China has widened considerably. Those that are big and doing well are investing more and doing even better. The rest are retrenching, and fewer companies are entering the market. This concentration is apparent in the foreign direct investment data. For example, four firms (BASF, Daimler, Volkswagen, and BMW) accounted for 34 percent of all European foreign direct investment into China between 2018 and 2021, according to the Rhodium Group.

Meanwhile, supply chains are starting to shift, but slowly. Corporate interest in diversifying supply chains to Southeast Asia or Mexico is high, but action on that interest is sluggish. This more gradual path reflects the difficulty of shifting operations (only one to two percent of supply chains move every year). Moreover, alternate destinations have their own challenges: Vietnam and Mexico don’t have the capacity of China given their smaller populations, and India is plagued by perceptions of volatile regulation and subpar infrastructure.

The reality is that for many companies, the Chinese market is too big and too valuable to abandon, despite the geopolitical risks. China accounts for one-fifth of global GDP and has a consumer class of 900 million people. Its unique combination of infrastructure investments, human capital, and supplier ecosystem has made it a manufacturing powerhouse. De-risking therefore requires sacrificing revenue and efficiency, and a full break is often impractical.

FROM DE-RISKING TO DECOUPLING?

This doesn’t mean that companies are complacent. To the contrary—many corporate executives and boards are working to de-risk their exposure to China because of the challenges they face (such as local competitors and policy uncertainty).

One strategy companies are adopting is to localize their branding and operations to cater to a more nationalist market. Many are building “China for China” ecosystems, creating self-contained operational divisions in China that manufacture for the Chinese market while moving manufacturing operations for export elsewhere. The goal is to reduce the costs of a major dislocation and make operations easier to navigate should worst come to worst.

Relatedly, many firms with production or vendors centered in China are pursuing a “China plus one” strategy in which they develop a just-in-case supply chain to hedge against a disruption from China. Some are also moving final assembly or critical components outside of China—even if many of the inputs are dependent on China—to avoid the “made in China” tag and U.S. tariffs. Interestingly, Chinese companies are also proactively moving elements of production out of the mainland to places such as Mexico and Vietnam to reduce their exposure to U.S.-Chinese trade tensions.

Finally, companies are actively planning for crisis scenarios that could transform de-risking into rapid decoupling. Many companies were caught flat-footed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and don’t want to repeat the same mistake. An escalation over Taiwan is the most-discussed threat, since it would put companies operating on the mainland in an impossible position. But Taiwan is not the only worry: other triggers for decoupling could include a crisis in the South China Sea, policy changes targeting China from a more hawkish U.S. government after the 2024 election, and sanctions in response to Chinese lethal aid to Russia.

DON’T GO IT ALONE

Absent a major geopolitical event, the economic relationship between the United States and China won’t significantly weaken over the coming decade. But it will be dramatically reshaped by de-risking. Foundational technologies (such as semiconductors) and emerging technologies (such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing) will likely be cordoned off into two separate ecosystems, as both the United States and China seek leadership in these areas and limit dependence on each other. More targeted restrictions may turn into a slippery slope: despite the focus of export controls on the most advanced-node chips, many U.S. semiconductor design and machinery companies could see their broader businesses in China peter out as Beijing builds its own domestic semiconductor ecosystem to reduce reliance on Western technology.

Clean energy will also be transformed by de-risking, although a full decoupling isn’t possible any time soon. China is home to 77 percent of global lithium-ion battery manufacturing capacity and dominates 80 percent of the manufacturing stages of solar panels. China is also the global leader in the processing of critical minerals necessary for clean technologies, refining over half of all lithium, nickel, and cobalt. The hundreds of billions of dollars in incentives provided for by the Inflation Reduction Act—coupled with EU green subsidies—will diversify the West’s dependence on China for these components, but this process will take decades to play out. For example, it typically takes between five and 15 years for a greenfield mining project to deliver any output. Ten years from now, clean energy supply chains will remain mostly integrated.

Some areas, such as consumer technology and goods, will rely on China as a key market even longer than that. Many will diversify some manufacturing away from China but still depend on it. Other sectors may be little transformed by de-risking. Luxury brands will still invest heavily in China, which accounts for nearly 20 percent of global luxury spending. Industrial goods and service providers, such as chemical companies, will still fuel Chinese industry. Consumer brands that can sell into the world’s biggest consumer market will continue to do so, although some Western consumer brands in retail and apparel that are lower value and more commoditized may have their market share gobbled up by local competitors.

De-risking may be driven largely by the private sector, but public policy will play a vital role in shaping the eventual outcome. To succeed in its targeted approach to neutralizing potential dangers, the United States will have to persuade its allies and partners to pursue a common strategy. The May G-7 communiqué endorsing de-risking was a good first step. Export controls, investment restrictions, and subsidies have more power if they are jointly implemented by a U.S.-European superbloc. As the Biden administration has leapt forward with export controls and industrial policies aimed at subsidizing domestic production, divisions have emerged between the United States and Europe—divisions that are being actively exploited by Beijing as it seeks to isolate Washington from its partners. A shared Western framework for de-risking would offer a more coordinated, balanced, and effective approach to competition with China than racing ahead alone. It may also strengthen, rather than erode, the foundations of a stronger transatlantic alliance.

JAMI MISCIK is Senior Adviser at Lazard Geopolitical Advisory. From 2009 to 2015, she was CEO of Kissinger Associates. From 2002 to 2005, she served as Deputy Director for Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency.
PETER ORSZAG is Chief Executive Officer of Financial Advisory at Lazard. He was Director of the Office of Management and Budget from 2009 to 2010 and Director of the Congressional Budget Office from 2007 to 2008.
THEODORE BUNZEL is Managing Director and co-head of Lazard Geopolitical Advisory. He has worked in the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and at the U.S. Treasury Department.

Foreign Affairs · by Jami Miscik, Peter Orszag, and Theodore Bunzel · May 24, 2023

24. Opinion: Did Putin just reveal his grand plan for victory?

Facts are facts and interpretation is interpretation. Do the names on the list add up to this "analysis?" The facts are that these names are on the list. Is it that simple and obvious? What is Putin's intent? Is he baiting the media? Is this another action to sow division in the US political process? We need to recognize his strategy, understand it, expose it, and attack it with a superior political warfare strategy (and I am not talking about partisan politics).

Opinion: Did Putin just reveal his grand plan for victory? | CNN

CNN · May 23, 2023

Editor’s Note: Frida Ghitis, a former CNN producer and correspondent, is a world affairs columnist. She is a weekly opinion contributor to CNN, a contributing columnist to The Washington Post and a columnist for World Politics Review. The views expressed in this commentary are her own. View more opinion on CNN.

CNN —

As Russia prepares for an imminent Ukrainian counteroffensive, and America’s 2024 presidential race takes shape, it is becoming increasingly apparent that Russian President Vladimir Putin believes one possible path to victory in his so far unsuccessful war runs through the US election.

Frida Ghitis

CNN

The latest evidence that Putin may just expect Western support for Ukraine to end – if only Russian forces hold on until there’s a new president in the White House – came tucked away in a blistering announcement from Russia’s Foreign Ministry on Friday, declaring entry into the country would be “closed for 500 Americans.”

The blacklist, Moscow explained, targets individuals “involved in the spread of Russophobic attitudes and fakes,” as well as principals in companies supplying weapons to Ukraine.

A look at the lengthy document can be, at first, a perplexing experience, but then a rather illuminating one.

The hundreds of names are mostly members of American think tanks, along with dozens of members of Congress, current and former government officials – including former President Barack Obama – a smattering of journalists and even some comedians.

There’s CNN’s Erin Burnett and Nick Paton Walsh – a UK citizen – both of whom have reported extensively from and about Ukraine. One can see a dictator’s logic in going after journalists who tell the truth about his regime. The same can be said of late-night comedians. Tyrants are not known for their sense of humor.

But then there are some very intriguing choices. Why would Putin have any reason to target the secretary of state of a Southern US state?

Does the name Brad Raffensperger ring a bell?

Raffensperger, as it happens, is a well-known figure among anyone who has followed recent US history. He became one of the most prominent figures in former President Donald Trump’s effort to overturn the 2020 election.

Russia has banned CNN anchor Erin Burnett, late-night host Stephen Colbert, former President Barack Obama and CNN reporter Nick Paton Walsh from entering the country.

CNN, Getty Images

Moscow bans ‘500 Americans’ from Russia including CNN journalists

The recordings of a telephone conversation in which Trump tells him to “find” him enough votes to win the state is evidence in a criminal investigation that could result in the former president’s indictment this summer.

In fact, some of the oddest selections in Putin’s blacklist are connected to Trump’s troubles and those of his most fervent supporters.

Putin has blacklisted Letitia James, the New York Attorney General who filed a civil law suit against the former president and his adult children and his company for what she called “astounding” fraud.

There’s John Smith, better known as Jack Smith, appointed special counsel by the Justice Department to oversee criminal investigations into, among other possible crimes, whether Trump mishandled classified materials, another case that is gathering pace and reportedly creating high anxiety in Trump world.

In its blacklist, the Kremlin appears to defend the January 6 pro-Trump insurrectionists who tried to stop the certification of Joe Biden’s electoral victory. It bans from Russia Americans in law enforcement, “who are directly involved in the persecution of dissidents in the wake of the so-called storming of the Capitol.”

The list includes David Sundberg, the assistant director in charge of the FBI’s Washington office, which led the January 6 investigation.

It’s a list filled with intriguing choices. Perhaps not surprisingly, we see names that became famous during Trump’s first impeachment, such as Russia-expert Fiona Hill and former US ambassador to Ukraine, Marie Yovanovitch.

In its blacklist, the Kremlin appears to defend the January 6 pro-Trump insurrectionists who tried to stop the certification of Joe Biden’s electoral victory.

Frida Ghitis

Is Russia signaling its support for Trump?

The signaling was hardly necessary. The former president has made it very clear that if he wins another term, US policy toward Ukraine would be sharply different.

In a March interview with Sean Hannity of Fox News, Trump predicted that “Ultimately [Putin] is going to take over all of Ukraine.”

During CNN’s recent town hall, he was asked if he supports sending military aid to Ukraine. After launching into a wild diatribe, complete with insults against former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, he showed his hand.

Trump seldom answers with a clear yes or no, leaving himself room to deny. But the answer did not leave much doubt. “We’re giving away so much equipment,” he lamented. And asked if he wants Ukraine to win the war, he refused to say, offering instead, “I don’t think in terms of winning and losing… I want everybody to stop dying.” (He claims he could stop the war in 24 hours.)

A destroyed apartment block in Izium, Kharkiv region, in April 2023.

Maksym Sytnikov

Opinion: Don’t be fooled by the flowery name. Russia’s ‘petal’ mines are the stuff of nightmares

If Russia and Trump have already made their preferences, however indirectly, perfectly clear, the ones who may have needed some nudging are Americans who oppose aid for Ukraine and are undecided between Trump and his main Republican challenger Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis.

DeSantis, who is about to announce his candidacy, has been working assiduously to cement his position as a standard-bearer of ultra-conservative social views. Some of those views, by the way, particularly those hostile to LGBT minorities, lean in the direction of Putin’s assault on LGBT rights, which is far more draconian than what Florida has done.

But DeSantis is not Putin’s man – unless he reverses his stance on Ukraine yet again.

A few months ago, the Florida governor sparked a furious reaction from hawkish Republicans – and GOP donors – when he answered a questionnaire from the fired Fox firebrand Tucker Carlson, describing Russia’s brutal, unprovoked invasion of Ukraine as a “territorial dispute.”

DeSantis presumably wanted to sound skeptical of Washington’s strong backing of Ukraine but he went too far.

Scrambling to repair the damage, he said he had been misunderstood. Putin, DeSantis declared, “is a war criminal.”

With that, DeSantis made the Kremlin’s choice much easier. It looks like now the Kremlin is none-too-subtly signaling to the US far right that it has made its choice.

If Russia’s preference became a big issue in the US the first time Trump ran for president, America’s choice is even more important for Russia this time around.

Russian officials had told Putin that their army could conquer Ukraine rather easily. Even America’s generals believed Moscow’s forces would take control of Kyiv in a few days.

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Instead, almost 15 months in, the war has become an embarrassing debacle for Putin, sharply eroding Russia’s standing abroad, even if Putin remains popular at home. But no matter how badly the invasion is going, Putin surely believes that accepting defeat in Ukraine could prove disastrous for him.

He now seems to be betting he can outlast Biden, who has led the West’s muscular support of Ukraine. That’s why the upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive is so crucial.

As the US election ramps up, Putin is betting that the runway is growing shorter for Ukraine.

CNN · May 23, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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