Quotes of the Day:

“The further a society drifts from the truth, the more it will hate those who speak it.”

– Selwyn Duke


“All the brains in the world are powerless against the sort of stupidity that is in fashion.”

– Jean de La Fontaine

"Imagination is more important than knowledge. Knowledge is limited, whereas imagination embraces the entire world, stimulating progress, giving birth to evolution.”

– Albert Einstein

1. White House Shrinks National Security Council

2. Scoop: Trump, Rubio take aim at National Security Council's "Deep State"

3. The President’s Daily Brief: No Assembly Required?

4. Army Report Links Pentagon Equipment Glitch to Aborted Landings at D.C. Airport

5. Hegseth announces pay raise for Army paratroopers

6. U.S. Navy Seeking Elite Warfighters with New “Spotlight” Campaign

7. Trump to Allow Nippon-U.S. Steel Deal to Move Forward

8. Can Trump's pricey 'Golden Dome' missile defence system be done?

9. Vance Tells Midshipmen Their Service Will Not Be Squandered on Rudderless Missions

10. Taiwan Is Getting Serious About Self-Defense

11. US Forces Abroad Protect the Homeland

12. You Need Allies to Win a Trade War

13. Defense Secretary Hegseth, bedeviled by leaks, orders more restrictions on press at Pentagon

14. “See Without a Sound”: New 2-Pound Goggles Let US Marines Hunt in Total Darkness With Stealth Precision Never Seen Before

15. Regional and Global Responses to a Taiwan Contingency

16. The New Madrid Fault Line: America’s Overlooked Earthquake Threat

17. Relearning The Lessons We Never Learned From World War I

18. Civilizational multipolarity in a post-Pax Americana world

19. EU to sustain Radio Free Europe with emergency funding after Trump cuts

20.  Radio Free Asia silenced by Trump's spending cuts

21. How Much Discrimination Do Americans Say Groups Face in the U.S.?

22. 30% of Americans Consult Astrology, Tarot Cards or Fortune Tellers

23. Optimizing U.S. and Allied Forces for Deterrence and Defense Throughout Indo-Pacom: From Korea to Australia and Everywhere in Between

1. White House Shrinks National Security Council

But we must appoint a "Brent Scowcroft" to make an NSC "A team" function efficiently and effectively for the President.

White House Shrinks National Security Council

More than 100 staffers were dismissed from their roles or sent to other posts as part of reorganization

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/white-house-shrinks-national-security-council-2a291fff

By Meridith McGraw

Follow and Alexander Ward

Follow

Updated May 23, 2025 8:57 pm ET

The NSC has been the target of attacks by some Trump allies who claim officials are insufficiently loyal to the president. Photo: nathan howard/Reuters

Key Points

What's This?

• More than 100 NSC officials have been removed from their roles or detailed back to their agencies as part of a restructuring under Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
• The move aims to streamline processes, empower the State and Defense departments, and speed up national-security decision-making, according to officials.
• The restructuring follows Mike Waltz’s removal as national security adviser, with Rubio replacing him on an acting basis.

More than 100 National Security Council officials have been removed from their roles or detailed back to their agencies, part of a broader restructuring process under Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who is also serving as interim national security adviser. 

Three administration officials confirmed the decision to transfer roughly 100 staffers—around half of the current NSC—to the agencies they were detailed to before joining the National Security Council. 

The goal, according to one official, is to streamline processes within the NSC, which coordinates national security and foreign policy for the president, and empower the State Department and Department of Defense. The officials said the revised structure would give more power to President Trump to dictate policy and speed up national-security decision-making.

The NSC referred questions to the White House, which didn’t respond to a request for comment.

About 4 p.m. Friday, officials said Rubio called a meeting of senior directors to praise them for their work but also announce that there would be a “realignment” and they would work to place officials in different government positions, according to an official. NSC chief of staff Brian McCormack then sent out emails informing officials of the decision to move them off the NSC. Axios earlier reported the restructuring. 

Andy Baker, Vice President JD Vance’s national security adviser, and White House adviser Robert Gabriel, will hold deputy national security roles as part of the reconfiguration, according to an official.

The move comes three weeks after Mike Waltz, who previously led the NSC, was removed from his role and nominated to be ambassador to the United Nations. Trump tapped Rubio to succeed Waltz on an acting basis. 

Since the beginning of the administration, the NSC has been the target of attacks by some Trump allies who claim officials are insufficiently loyal to the president or his agenda. 

The NSC acts as an advisory and policymaking hub for the president within the White House for national-security and foreign-policy decisions, but it has shrunk in size since Trump took office. Under former President Joe Biden, the NSC had around 350 staffers.

Write to Meridith McGraw at Meridith.McGraw@WSJ.com and Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com

Appeared in the May 24, 2025, print edition as 'White House Halves National Security Staffers'.

2. Scoop: Trump, Rubio take aim at National Security Council's "Deep State"

​I hope we do not burn out the SECSTATE/NSA. But there is something to be said for the consolidation of all non-defense national security elements of power in one authority. The distraction of unhelpful deep state rhetoric aside, the consolidation of all instruments of power short of war, gives us a chance to actually conduct political warfare properly (with the help of CIA and DOD/SOF) and along the lines that George Kennan envisioned, but adapted for the 21st century.

Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP), and “white” propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of “friendly” foreign elements, “black” psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269

​But we need a new Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Asia and the successor to USAID. And most important we need to build, sustain, and evolve political and military alliances.

16 hours ago -Politics & Policy

Scoop: Trump, Rubio take aim at National Security Council's "Deep State"

https://www.axios.com/2025/05/23/white-house-national-security-council-trump-rubio?utm

• Marc Caputo
• ,
• Alex Isenstadt

Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the 61st Munich Security Conference in February. Photo: Sean Gallup/Getty Images

President Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have orchestrated a vast restructuring of the National Security Council, reducing its size and transferring many of its powers to the State and Defense departments.

Why it matters: Trump's White House sees the NSC as notoriously bureaucratic and filled with longtime officials who don't share the president's vision.

• A White House official involved in the planning characterized the reorganization as Trump and Rubio's latest move against what they see as Washington's "Deep State."
• "The NSC is the ultimate Deep State. It's Marco vs. the Deep State. We're gutting the Deep State," the official said of the move, which will cut the NSC staff to about half of its current 350 members. Those cut from the NSC will be moved to other positions in government, officials said.
• "The right-sizing of the NSC is in line with its original purpose and the president's vision," Rubio told Axios in a statement. "The NSC will now be better positioned to collaborate with agencies."

Zoom in: White House officials point to an NSC structure that's filled with committees and meetings that they say slow down decision-making and produce lots of jargon and acronyms.

• There's a "sub-PCC," an advisory body to the "PCC" (Policy Coordination Committees) and they feed the DCs (Deputies Committee), which in turn advise the PC (the Principals Committee of the Cabinet secretaries).
• "That's the bottom-to-the-top approach that doesn't work. It's going away," a senior White House official said. "All those things feeding up to principals are the unnecessary piece."
• A third senior White House official said the NSC's focus would be to "coordinate and advise — not carry out — policy."

Zoom out: Supporters of the NSC's longtime system have long said it promotes healthy debate and discussion about policies.

• A senior Trump administration official said the NSC's bureaucracy may have been necessary for other presidents who've had secretaries and agencies at war with each other — but not Trump's team.
• "If you have officials fighting each other and their agencies always involved in turf wars, you maybe need this process," the official said.
• "That's not what you have here. Rubio, [Treasury Secretary Scott] Besssent, [Defense Secretary Pete] Hegseth, [Attorney General Pam] Bondi — all of them know each other and like each other, and they know they're there to execute the president's will."

Administration officials cite the example Trump's move last week to call for the elimination of sanctions against Syria.

• After Trump made the announcement, a White House official said, Hegseth, Bessent and Rubio all told their deputies to follow Trump's orders. Bondi, whose department had classified Syria's leader as a terrorist did as well.
• "It was complete reverse workflow: Here's what the president wants, get it done," the official said. "It wasn't, 'Oh, let's get the sub-PCC to send it to the PCC to go to the DC to go to the PC.' "

Inside the room: Rubio will continue to also be the acting national security adviser, according to two people familiar with the shuffle.

• Trump wants Rubio there "as long as possible," according to one person with direct knowledge of the move. "Marco is the one in charge and calling the shots."
• Andy Baker and Robert Gabriel will serve as deputy national security advisers under the new arrangement. Baker currently is national security adviser to Vice President Vance, and he will continue in that role while taking on this new responsibility.
• Gabriel currently is assistant to the President for Policy.

Flashback: Rubio became acting national security adviser earlier this month, after Mike Waltz left the role and was nominated to be UN ambassador.

• Rubio, who presided over the gutting of USAID and is trying to streamline the State Department, has long viewed some career staffers in the agencies as impediments to Trump, which the then-senator mentioned to the president when he crafted his Cuba policy in 2017.
• "What you've committed to do on Cuba, what you want to do on Cuba, is never going to come from career staff. It's going to have to come from the top down. You're going to have to tell them what to do," Rubio told Trump.
• 
  

3. The President’s Daily Brief: No Assembly Required?

​Excerpts:

Sanner: As Deputy DNI for mission integration, mission integration meant two things for me. One was the intelligence community integration. And the second thing was to try to integrate the elements of the units that worked for me. And that included the mission managers, the National Intelligence Council, the PDB and the oversight group that did more technical things. I did not feel that those teams were collaborating enough. 

So I would say that on one hand, the idea of bringing all these units together and having them collaborate more is actually a good thing on the face of it. I wanted the PDB folks to talk to the national intelligence officers because I wanted to double check – is this dissent that someone has, is this valid? What do you think about the evidence? Have we edited this correctly? Or is the line consistent with the previous line in terms of the analytic conclusions? So I wanted people to work together.

But the problem with moving the PDB is that it’s a really complex ecosystem that is run by CIA. CIA is an executive agent. And people think they are just editors. It’s not just editors. It’s literally the technical part of it, the technical support for travel, the use of electronic media, the graphics people, the editors — all of that comes together at CIA headquarters. It is hard in some circumstances to do that without being in person. I do not know how the briefers, if they’re sitting a mile, two miles down the street, how will they pick up their materials? How are they going to get their tablets? How is that all going to work? 

My view here is that if anybody wants to put their thumb on the scale of analysis in the PDB, you do not need to move the PDB. That’s not right. If they want to, they can just tell the briefer – which would not be right – don’t brief that. Or when the briefer finishes, Tulsi Gabbard or [CIA Director John] Ratcliffe could chime in and say that they disagreed and think that that’s not good analysis. There are lots of ways of putting your thumb on the scale. You don’t need to move it. So this idea from the ODNI that it would allow them to respond more quickly to requests for information, that is an opposite world statement. It will make it harder, not easier.

I just think that they’re not really understanding the technical part of this, even though I don’t disagree with the idea of consolidation in terms of trying to get people to work more closely together as part of the ODNI.

The President’s Daily Brief: No Assembly Required?

New questions about the production - and consumption - of the President's Daily Brief

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/the-presidents-daily-brief-no-assembly-required

A briefer holds a briefing book prior to the Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) in the Outer Oval Office 3/10/09. (Photo by: HUM Images/Universal Images Group via Getty Images)

Posted: May 23rd, 2025

By The Cipher Brief

EXPERT INTERVIEW — It’s a document that rarely makes news, for obvious reasons: the whole point of the President‘s Daily Brief (PDB) – a summary of intelligence and analysis about national security threats and the world’s hot zones – is that it’s put together with classified intelligence and information. Lately, however, the PDB has made headlines involving how it’s prepared – and how it’s consumed. 

Last week, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard said she was moving the assembly of the PDB away from the Central Intelligence Agency, which has traditionally been tasked with doing the work, to her own department. That may seem like a minor bureaucratic change, but it raised eyebrows among some in the intelligence community who have participated in the process. 

They noted that the infrastructure involved in producing the briefing is housed in the CIA, and that moving it could prove problematic. Beth Sanner, a Cipher Brief expert former Deputy Director of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, who oversaw the PDB during the first Trump administration, said it would be “a huge mistake.” 

“It would create inefficiencies and risk miscommunication and mistakes,” Sanner told The New York Times.

Gabbard’s office said the move was ordered to offer the president more “timely and actionable” intelligence.

Also last week, Politico published a report saying that President Trump – who is known to prefer verbal rather than written presentations of intelligence, has all but ceased to receive the PDB in any fashion. The report said that in the first 100 days of Trump’s second term, he had received the PDB only 12 times. 

The White House responded to the Politico report by saying that the president gets everything he needs from his top national security aides – whose leaders also receive presentations of the PDB. 

“The president is constantly apprised of classified briefings and is regularly in touch with his national security team,” said Davis Ingle, a White House spokesperson. “The entire intelligence community actively informs President Trump in real time about critical national security developments.”

Intelligence community veterans were less charitable. 

“The point of having an $80 billion intelligence service is to inform the president to avert a strategic surprise,” a former CIA analyst told Politico. 

How much do these things matter?  

The Cipher Brief reached out this week to Sanner, the PDB presenter for President Trump during his first term. She spoke about the recent PDB news with Cipher Brief Managing Editor Tom Nagorski. Their conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

THE CONTEXT

• The President’s Daily Brief (PDB) was formally introduced in 1964 for President Lyndon B. Johnson. A prototype of the PDB, called the “President’s Intelligence Check List,” was produced in 1961 for President John F. Kennedy. 
• The PDB is coordinated by the Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence (ODNI) and draws on all-source intelligence from the CIA, NSA, FBI and other parts of the intelligence community (IC). It is intended to provide intelligence to the president. It is also used to inform other senior national security officials, including the vice president, the national security advisor, and the secretaries of State and Defense.
• Tulsi Gabbard, the Director of National Intelligence, is moving the assembly of the PDB from CIA headquarters to the ODNI. Officials say the move aims to shore up the role of the ODNI amid vows by the Trump administration to “overhaul” the IC. CIA officers write much of the analysis that goes into the PDB. 
• Politico reports that between Inauguration Day and early May, President Trump sat in on only 12 presentations of the PDB by intelligence officials. President Trump reportedly met with intelligence officials to hear the PDB presentation more often – though still less regularly than his predecessors – during his first term. 

Beth Sanner

Beth Sanner served in the U.S. Intelligence Community for 35 years holding senior roles at ODNI and CIA. She was former Deputy Director for National Intelligence at ODNI, and served as daily briefer to the president during the Trump Administration.

The Cipher Brief: Can you give us a 101 explanation of the PDB. What is it and why does it exist? 

Sanner: It’s basically a classified newspaper or newsletter. It’s not as long as a newspaper. Most of the [intelligence] community at one point contributes in some way, but most of it right now is written by CIA analysts. 

It goes out every day; it’s delivered by briefers to the top couple of dozen senior national security officials in the government, from the war fighters to economic policy makers to the regular foreign policy people you would expect, at the secretary and deputy secretary level. But it’s prepared with the president in mind. It’s his book. 

Each president has a very different style with consuming the PDB.

I was the head of the PDB for the ODNI for two years, and then I became the president’s briefer when I became deputy DNI. I saw how that worked. With [President Trump], we did oral briefings two to three times a week, my predecessor and myself. That lasted basically a half an hour to as much as an hour. And so that was how he consumed information. But he didn’t read.

The Cipher Brief: You said two or three times a week, so not a daily presentation. On those other days, did the PDB just goes into the ether? Did the president not get the briefing?

Sanner: It goes to everybody else, including the National Security Advisor, the Vice President, the Chief of Staff. Generally, all these people in the West Wing are getting it and taking briefings with a briefer, as well as going through the book with their briefer. Some people choose to read, and don’t have a briefer.

But in any case, there are multiple people in the West Wing who are getting it on a daily basis. And our assumption, and I think a fairly good one, is that if anything is happening that is urgent, any one of those people would walk in or would make a call up to the residence. I personally did not worry about the cadence of two to three times a week. And in fact, I felt that in a way it worked better, because it allowed me to consolidate multiple stories from different agencies and different sources, the PDB being the central part of that.

I call it storytelling. I don’t mean that like a child’s book, but I mean putting stories together in a little bit more granularity and complexity. I think it’s easier to absorb than going through a book that has six things that are totally not related to each other. You can create a flow, and you can make sense and connect the world a little bit better when you have a cadence that is a long period of time, but spaced out. 

But this new report about him only getting [the briefing] maybe once a week now, I personally do not think that that is enough, given the complexity of the world and all of the things going on. I would say it needs to be three times a week.

The Cipher Brief: That report said that in President Trump’s first roughly a hundred days, there had been 12 sessions of in-person presentations of the PDB. The White House was asked for comment and they said the president, whenever he needs something, he has his national security team around him to get it. What’s wrong with that answer, if anything?

Sanner: It’s not different than a lot of other presidents. I want to be clear about that. I think the difference for President Trump is that many presidents who did not take briefings – for example, President Clinton took almost no briefings — but he read. So you kind of want that backstop, of the President looking at it.

President Trump was never upset at me for disagreeing with him or telling him something that he didn’t want to hear. I mean, certainly there were moments, just like with any president, where it’s not the best briefing in the world that day. I had friends who briefed different presidents who had those awkward moments and difficult moments. But I always came back the next time. And there was never a problem when I walked in the door the next day. And I think that this is the idea, and it’s in the statute itself, which says that the intelligence community is supposed to provide objective, timely, relevant intelligence without regard for policy preference.

So unlike anyone else that goes to see the president, you know that you are the person who needs to be delivering that uncomfortable truth or that difficult fact that didn’t actually go that way. I called myself the skunk at the garden party and joked about it, because it’s really the only way you can do it. Everybody else is incentivized to please. I was incentivized to say what other people didn’t want to say.

In fact, with many people on his team, I thought of it as very much a team sport. [They said] Beth, are you gonna brief this today? Of course I’m gonna brief that. Good. I always got full support from everyone on the team, because they really wanted the president to get information. 

And so it shocks me in a way that this team, I wouldn’t say they didn’t feel the same way, but maybe they don’t have the appreciation of what this should be or what this is supposed to be, because it’s actually in their interest. Maybe they don’t want to have the “Hey, boss” conversation, but that’s our job.

Experts are gathering at The Cipher Brief’s NatSecEDGE conference June 5-6 in Austin, TX to talk about the future of war. Be a part of the conversation.

The Cipher Brief: Mike Collins, head of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) recently lost his job and it appears that it was because the intelligence assessment he provided on an issue pertinent to Venezuela did not line up with policy. Is that an example of the same thing, do you think? Something they might not have wanted to hear?

Sanner: Sure. Yes, that is an uncomfortable assessment. And I noticed that National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, when asked about it, he said, well, look, I agreed with the FBI position in that memo. And to me, this is why it’s so good and important for the intelligence community to do the kind of work that that NIC memo did.

It laid out what they thought, why they thought that, and provided ample space for a dissenting opinion, for analysis that wasn’t the agreement of everyone. And I think that’s crucial because sometimes that dissenting view is correct, sometimes it’s not. But generally what I found in my experience was that almost all of the recipients of PDBs and NIC products actually appreciated having those views even when they disagreed with them, because it helped them think. 

The intelligence community is not like asking people to hit the easy button and the “I agree with you” button. That’s not our role. Our role is to say what we think and why we think it. But also we have to have humility in that. The intelligence community isn’t always right. But when done correctly and behind closed doors, I cannot understand why anybody would say that presenting an intelligence assessment that disagreed with policy needed to stop, or was an example of deep state. It’s not. And it’s really important.

The Cipher Brief: The news also came out last week that the PDB was being effectively moved out of CIA headquarters. Some of us might think, OK, that just sounds like an in-the-weeds bureaucratic reshuffle. Is it?

Sanner: As Deputy DNI for mission integration, mission integration meant two things for me. One was the intelligence community integration. And the second thing was to try to integrate the elements of the units that worked for me. And that included the mission managers, the National Intelligence Council, the PDB and the oversight group that did more technical things. I did not feel that those teams were collaborating enough. 

So I would say that on one hand, the idea of bringing all these units together and having them collaborate more is actually a good thing on the face of it. I wanted the PDB folks to talk to the national intelligence officers because I wanted to double check – is this dissent that someone has, is this valid? What do you think about the evidence? Have we edited this correctly? Or is the line consistent with the previous line in terms of the analytic conclusions? So I wanted people to work together.

But the problem with moving the PDB is that it’s a really complex ecosystem that is run by CIA. CIA is an executive agent. And people think they are just editors. It’s not just editors. It’s literally the technical part of it, the technical support for travel, the use of electronic media, the graphics people, the editors — all of that comes together at CIA headquarters. It is hard in some circumstances to do that without being in person. I do not know how the briefers, if they’re sitting a mile, two miles down the street, how will they pick up their materials? How are they going to get their tablets? How is that all going to work? 

My view here is that if anybody wants to put their thumb on the scale of analysis in the PDB, you do not need to move the PDB. That’s not right. If they want to, they can just tell the briefer – which would not be right – don’t brief that. Or when the briefer finishes, Tulsi Gabbard or [CIA Director John] Ratcliffe could chime in and say that they disagreed and think that that’s not good analysis. There are lots of ways of putting your thumb on the scale. You don’t need to move it. So this idea from the ODNI that it would allow them to respond more quickly to requests for information, that is an opposite world statement. It will make it harder, not easier.

I just think that they’re not really understanding the technical part of this, even though I don’t disagree with the idea of consolidation in terms of trying to get people to work more closely together as part of the ODNI.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

4. Army Report Links Pentagon Equipment Glitch to Aborted Landings at D.C. Airport

Between the Pentagon and Reagan National, except for the President, many of our key national security leaders (civilian and military) are operating in this airspace almost daily.

I wonder if someday we may have to shift all civilian air traffic to Dulles and Baltimore to better protect the DC airspace and reduce the chances of future accidents. I recall some congressmen have pushed back on this idea because of the convenience of Reagan National for their personal travel but if we cannot operate this airspace safely we are going to have to do something.

Army Report Links Pentagon Equipment Glitch to Aborted Landings at D.C. Airport

The diversion of two commercial flights on May 1 has raised new questions about equipment and safety in some of Washington’s busiest airspace.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/23/us/politics/army-black-hawk-aborted-landings-dc-airport.html?utm

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The May 1 episode at Ronald Reagan National Airport, which included aborted landings of a Delta Air Lines flight and a Republic Airways flight, has been under scrutiny because of the recent spate of problems in U.S. aviation.Credit...Kent Nishimura for The New York Times

By Kate Kelly

May 23, 2025

Two commercial flights were diverted from Ronald Reagan National Airport on May 1 in part because of a communications glitch between an Army Black Hawk helicopter and Pentagon air traffic controllers, according to an Army official who was briefed on an internal review of the matter.

The Black Hawk helicopter had tried to land on the helipad near the Pentagon but was asked to fly around and land a short while later, according to an Army statement issued Friday. That request, which came from air traffic controllers at the Pentagon, arose from a short period in which the controllers lost audio and visual contact with the helicopter just moments before it was set to land, the official said.

The helicopter “initiated a go-around due to a delay in clearance from the Pentagon Tower,” the Army wrote in its statement. The Associated Press earlier reported details of the Army review.

The Federal Aviation Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board are also investigating the event and declined to comment.

The May 1 episode, which included the aborted landings of a Delta Air Lines flight and a Republic Airways flight, has been under unusual scrutiny because of the recent spate of problems in U.S. aviation.

In January, a midair collision near National Airport between a different Army Black Hawk helicopter and a commercial flight from Wichita, Kan., killed 67 people. And in recent weeks, air traffic control centers from Philadelphia to the Denver area have been affected by equipment outages that have frightened controllers, raising concerns about air safety.

The F.A.A. oversees the National Airport air traffic control tower and has been working to address the equipment and staffing troubles. At a Senate hearing last week, Franklin McIntosh, then the deputy chief operating officer of the F.A.A., said that his agency had not known until the May 1 episode that a hotline linking the Pentagon’s controllers to their counterparts at the National Airport tower had been inoperable for three years. In the meantime, the two entities were communicating over a landline, officials have said.

“We were extremely troubled by the incident that occurred,” Mr. McIntosh said, adding that the Defense Department had suspended certain operations in the National Airport airspace afterward. A repaired hotline would be necessary in order for the flights to resume, the F.A.A. official added.

The aviation agency recently restricted a particularly treacherous helicopter flight route in the National Airport vicinity and mandated that Army flights operate with a location broadcasting system called ADS-B Out. The Army said on Friday that the Black Hawk in the May 1 episode was using ADS-B Out at the time and that it was also flying on an approved route.

The Army also said in its statement that one of the commercial flights was diverted because of a problem with National Airport controllers’ “sequencing” of air traffic. The second diversion request stemmed from conflicting aircraft location data, the statement added, without providing details.

Kate Kelly covers money, policy and influence for The Times.

5. Hegseth announces pay raise for Army paratroopers

​No back pay for us old guys! :-)  (But I am thankful for the titanium hip the Army gave me as compensation).

Hegseth announces pay raise for Army paratroopers

By Matthew Olay army.mil2 min

May 22, 2025

View Original

FORT BRAGG, N.C. — Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced a pay raise for Army paratroopers today during remarks to current and former members of the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Hegseth made the announcement during the 82nd's All American Week, a four-day event that brings past and present paratroopers together to celebrate their service through competitions and camaraderie.

"I've got a bit of an announcement today that might be of interest to this community," Hegseth said to the formation of Soldiers.

"For the first time in [decades], here [as] the secretary of defense, through the secretary of the Army, we are increasing jump pay," Hegseth said, eliciting an enthusiastic response from the crowd.

Hazardous duty incentive pay — commonly referred to as "jump pay" — is set to increase from $150 per month to $200 for rank-and-file paratroopers.

Additionally, Hegseth added, jumpmasters — the senior paratroopers responsible for training and teaching the techniques for jumping from aircraft — will receive an additional $150 per month on top of the $150 in HDIP they already earn.

"Here's to our paratroopers, our jumpmasters, who do the difficult things in difficult places that most Americans can never imagine," Hegseth said following the announcement.

He emphasized that service members remain central to decision-making at the Pentagon.

"I want you to know [that] inside the corridors of the Pentagon, you are on our minds — with the decisions we make in budgets, in planning, in deployments, in orders [and] in reorganizations," he said." We have you and your families in mind."

Hegseth then spoke about rebuilding the military and reestablishing deterrence — two of his top three priorities, along with restoring the warrior ethos, as outlined in his Jan. 25, 2025, message to the force.

"President [Donald J.] Trump is committed to historic investments inside our formations," Hegseth said. "Our promise to you is that when the 82nd Airborne is deployed — if we have to call 911 for America's response force — you will be equipped better than any other fighting force in the world."

He added that under the current administration, the 82nd Airborne will always maintain a superior advantage in battle.

"That's my promise to you," he said.

On deterrence, Hegseth said the department is focused on restoring "peace through strength."

"When I look out at this formation, the eyes of the men and women and these flags, I see the eyes of deterrence; I see the eyes of American strength; I see the eyes that will deter the wars that we don't want to fight," he said. "Those who long for peace must prepare for war."

Hegseth closed his remarks by expressing gratitude to the division's troops, veterans and their families in attendance.

"Like those who came before you, you keep showing the world the stuff you're made of," Hegseth said.

"Because we know you are ready for the important work that lies ahead."

Related Links

Transcript: SD Hegseth Speech at 82nd Airborne, Ft. Bragg, NC

Video: Hegseth Speaks at Fort Bragg, N.C.

6. U.S. Navy Seeking Elite Warfighters with New “Spotlight” Campaign

U.S. Navy Seeking Elite Warfighters with New “Spotlight” Campaign

navy.mil

May 22, 2025

View Original

When most people hear the term “U.S. Navy Special Operations,” they typically think of Navy Sea, Air, and Land Teams (SEALs), as the elite, unconventional warfare experts who endure the hardest training the U.S. military has to offer. But while SEALs are deserving of the high esteem in which they are held, the team often overshadows the other exclusive roles that comprise the Navy Special Ops community – Aviation Rescue Swimmers, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technicians, Hospital Corpsmen-Advanced Technical Field, Divers, and Special Warfare Combat Crewmen.

All Navy Special Operations roles share two things in common – each requires superior physical and mental toughness, and each creates recruiting challenges for the Navy. After all, only one percent of potential Navy recruits has what it takes to join this elite warfighting community.

To raise awareness for the full range of Navy Special Operations roles and opportunities, and to inspire prospective Sailors who may have what it takes to join the Navy’s most distinguished force, Navy Recruiting Command and its marketing and advertising agency, VML, have created a new campaign called “Spotlight,” which targets 17-to-30-year-olds who shine in big moments and are seeking their next big challenge.

The “Spotlight” campaign comprises one 90-second film, three 30-second films, three 15- second films and one 6-second film. The content will air on major professional sports broadcasts, including Major League Baseball games and WWE Raw, and across top streaming platforms, such as YouTube, Roku, Peacock, and Netflix.

"The Navy’s Special Operations roles aren’t for everyone – and that’s the point. We’re looking for the one percent who thrive under pressure and never settle for average,” said Rear Adm. Jim Waters, Commander, Navy Recruiting Command. 'Spotlight' is a challenge to those individuals to step up and see if they have what it takes."

"Everyone thinks they know what Navy Special Operations is, but most have no idea,” said VML Chief Creative Director Ryan Blum. “This campaign exposes the broader, hidden world of Special Ops, and is designed to inspire those who instinctively rise to the types of challenges others avoid."

For more information about joining U.S. Navy Special Operations, visit www.Navy.com.

7. Trump to Allow Nippon-U.S. Steel Deal to Move Forward

​I wonder if this will help us move toward a JAROKUS Shipbuilding consortium (Japan, ROK, US) to solve our shipping (civilian and combatant ships) shortfalls.

Trump to Allow Nippon-U.S. Steel Deal to Move Forward

Japanese company pitched new American plant and billions of dollars in additional investments to win support from Washington

https://www.wsj.com/business/deals/nippon-us-steel-deal-trump-negotiations-326ce33e

By Bob Tita

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 and Lauren Thomas

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Updated May 23, 2025 10:20 pm ET

U.S. Steel’s Edgar Thomson Plant in Braddock, Pa. Photo: Gene J. Puskar/AP

Key Points

What's This?

• Trump conditionally approved Nippon Steel’s U.S. Steel takeover, defining it as a partnership with key details pending.
• The deal, opposed by Biden and initially by Trump, could reshape the U.S. steel industry with Nippon investing in U.S. Steel’s plants.
• U.S. Steel shares rose 21%; Nippon pledges no layoffs through 2026. It is aiming to offset declining sales in Japan.

Nippon Steel 5401 0.74%increase; green up pointing triangle received a conditional green light from President Trump to take control of U.S. Steel X 21.24%increase; green up pointing triangle under what he described as a partnership. 

Key aspects of the deal still need to be ironed out. But Trump’s announcement signaled that the Tokyo-based company could eventually enter the American steel market and make the big investments envisioned when it reached a $14.1 billion deal to take over U.S. Steel. 

Trump defined the agreement as a partnership, spurring some confusion at the companies on Friday afternoon, according to people involved in the deal talks. Both Nippon and U.S. Steel were seeking more guidance from the administration about how much ownership Nippon could ultimately gain. 

In a post on Truth Social Friday, Trump said the partnership between the two companies would result in at least 70,000 jobs and add $14 billion to the U.S. economy. The bulk of that investment will occur in the next 14 months, the post said. 

“For many years, the name, ‘United States Steel’ was synonymous with Greatness, and now, it will be again,” said the post, adding that the company’s headquarters would remain in Pittsburgh. Trump plans to visit U.S. Steel’s operations in the city for a May 30 rally. 

White House officials didn’t immediately respond to inquiries about the deal’s terms. 

The announcement represented a remarkable turn for a controversial transcontinental deal that had been opposed by both Trump and former President Joe Biden, who moved to block it in January before Trump took office and rekindled discussions with the companies. The deal could also reshape the American steel industry, adding a deep-pocketed backer for U.S. Steel, whose older mills have been hurt by years of losses and deferred maintenance.

Nippon Steel’s investment plan, mentioned by Trump, confirmed reports in The Wall Street Journal and other outlets. Major projects already pledged include equipment upgrades at plants in Gary, Ind., and near Pittsburgh. The company has also committed to build a new steel mill at an undetermined location. 

Nippon Steel and the Trump administration are working to complete a national-security agreement in the coming weeks, according to a person familiar with the matter.

President Trump held a press conference with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba in February to discuss the steel companies. Photo: Hu Yousong/Zuma Press

Nippon Steel would name a separate board to oversee its North American business operations, said people familiar with the steelmaker’s offer to the administration. A majority of the board would be U.S. citizens and the company’s top managers would be Americans as well. A federal monitor would be appointed to oversee the board’s compliance with the national-security agreement outlining spending commitments and other requirements of Nippon Steel.

Investors treated the announcement as though a big hurdle had been cleared. Shares in U.S. Steel gained more than 21% to $52.01 in Friday trading. For months, the stock traded at a steep discount to Nippon Steel’s $55-a-share offer, reflecting skepticism that a deal would clear regulatory hurdles.

Shares in U.S. Steel rivals faltered. Cleveland-Cliffs declined 7%, with Steel Dynamics down 3.5% and Nucor down 2%.

Executives at Nippon Steel, the world’s fourth-largest steelmaker, have pushed for full ownership of U.S. Steel. They argued that the large expenditures in equipment and steelmaking technology wouldn’t be possible without owning the whole company.

Still, the announcement from Trump was considered “good news” by the people close to the deal, who said it put Nippon Steel a step closer to completing a transaction, without calling it one, which the president wanted to avoid.

In separate statements, Nippon Steel and U.S. Steel commended the president and his efforts to protect American workers and industry. “President Trump is a bold leader and businessman who knows how to get the best deal for America, American workers and American manufacturing,” U.S. Steel said in a statement. 

Trump had previously opposed the takeover proposed by the Japanese steelmaker, saying that U.S. Steel should remain domestically owned. The president signaled openness earlier this year to Nippon investing in but not owning U.S. Steel. 

Over the past few months, Nippon Steel executives have met several times with Trump administration officials in Washington to outline their plans and spending commitments. 

A new negotiating window opened between the administration and Trump when he ordered a second national-security assessment of the deal in April. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., or Cfius, sent its report to Trump this week.

The president typically has 15 days to act once Cfius issues its report. Nippon Steel had a deadline of its own: Its merger agreement with U.S. Steel had been set to expire June 18, though the deadline could be extended. 

Nippon Steel topped competing offers for the storied U.S. company with its blockbuster bid. Since then, Nippon Steel has touted investment pledges in U.S. Steel’s plants to win over skeptical union leaders, mayors and politicians. 

The United Steelworkers union had been steadfast in its opposition to the deal. The union has accused Nippon Steel of undermining the American steel market for decades by selling unfairly low-price imports. 

“Our concern remains that Nippon, a foreign corporation with a long and proven record of violating our trade laws, will further erode domestic steelmaking capacity and jeopardize thousands of good, union jobs,” USW President Dave McCall said Friday. 

Nippon Steel pledged to honor the union’s bargaining agreements with U.S. Steel and refrain from layoffs and plant closings through the end of the current contract in 2026. 

The company is keen on adding the U.S. business to help offset declining sales in Japan.

U.S. Steel, which generated nearly $16 billion in sales last year, primarily supplies sheet steel to the automotive, appliance and construction industries.

Write to Bob Tita at robert.tita@wsj.com and Lauren Thomas at lauren.thomas@wsj.com

Appeared in the May 24, 2025, print edition as 'Nippon’s Deal With U.S. Steel To Advance'.

8. Can Trump's pricey 'Golden Dome' missile defence system be done?

​I certainly hope so. MIssile defense and cyber are the two key national security capabilities we have to get right in the 21st Century.

Graphics at the link.

Can Trump's pricey 'Golden Dome' missile defence system be done?

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cyvmj6mem70o?utm_

BBC

13 hours ago

Bernd Debusmann Jr

BBC News, White House

Getty Images

Trump said the Golden Dome will be completed by the end of his term.

Warheads raining down from beyond the Earth's atmosphere. Faster-than-sound cruise missiles striking US infrastructure. Sky-high nuclear blasts.

These are just some of the nightmarish scenarios that experts warn could come true if the US's dated and limited defence systems were overwhelmed in a future high-tech attack.

Even a single, relatively small nuclear detonation hundreds of miles above the heads of Americans would create an electromagnetic pulse - or EMP - that would have apocalyptic results. Planes would fall out of the sky across the country. Everything from handheld electronics and medical devices to water systems would be rendered completely useless.

"We wouldn't be going back 100 years," said William Fortschen, an author and weapons researcher at Montreat College in North Carolina. "We'd lose it all, and we don't know how to rebuild it. It would be the equivalent of us going back 1,000 years and having to start from scratch."

In response to these hypothetical - but experts say quite possible - threats, US President Donald Trump has set his eyes on a "next generation" missile shield: the Golden Dome.

But while many experts agree that building such a system is necessary, its high cost and logistical complexity will make Trump's mission to bolster America's missile defences extremely challenging.

An executive order calling for the creation of what was initially termed the "Iron Dome for America" noted that the threat of next-generation weapons has "become more intense and complex" over time, a potentially "catastrophic" scenario for the US.

Patrycja Bazylczyk, a missile defence expert at the Washington DC-headquartered Center for Strategic and International Studies, told the BBC that existing systems are geared towards intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, such as those used by North Korea. But powerful nations like Russia and China are also investing in newer technologies that could strike not just neighbours, but adversaries an ocean away.

Among the threats publicly identified by US defence officials are hypersonic weapons able to move faster than the speed of sound and fractional orbital bombardment systems - also called Fobs - that could deliver warheads from space.

Each - even in limited numbers - are deadly.

"The Golden Dome sort of re-orients our missile defence policy towards our great power competitors," Ms Bazylczyk said. "Our adversaries are investing in long-range strike capabilities, including things that aren't your typical missiles that we've been dealing with for years."

What will the 'Golden Dome' look like?

The White House and defence officials have so far provided few concrete details about what the Golden Dome - which is still in its conceptual stages - would actually look like.

Speaking alongside Trump in the Oval Office on 20 May, defence secretary Pete Hegseth said only that the system will have multiple layers "across the land, sea and space, including space-based sensors and interceptors".

Trump added that the system will be capable of intercepting missiles "even if they are launched from other sides of the world, and even if they are launched in space", with various aspects of the programme based as far afield as Florida, Indiana and Alaska.

In previous testimony in Congress, the newly named overseer of the programme, Space Force General Michael Guetlein, said that the Golden Dome will build on existing systems that are largely aimed at traditional ICBMs. A new system would - add multiple layers that could also detect and defend against cruise missiles and other threats, including by intercepting them before they launch or at the various stages of their flight.

Currently, the US Missile Defence Agency largely relies on 44 ground-based interceptors based in Alaska and California, designed to combat a limited missile attack.

Experts have warned that the existing system is woefully inadequate if the US homeland were to be attacked by Russia and China, each of which has an expanded arsenal of hundreds of ICBMs and thousands of cruise missiles.

"[Current systems] were created for North Korea," said Dr Stacie Pettyjohn, a defence expert at the Center for a New American Security. "It could never intercept a big arsenal like Russia's, or even a much smaller one like China's."

The Congressional Research Office, or CBO, has said that "hundreds or thousands" of space-based platforms would be necessary to "provide even a minimal defence" against incoming missiles - a potentially enormously expensive proposition.

Israel's Iron Dome: an example?

Trump first revealed his concept for the Golden Dome during a joint address to Congress in March, when he said that "Israel has it, other places have it, and the United States should have it too".

The president was referring to Israel's "Iron Dome" system, which the country has used to intercept rockets and missiles since 2011.

Israel's Iron Dome, however, is designed to intercept shorter-range threats, while two other systems - known as David's Sling and the Arrow - combat larger ballistic missiles such as those that have been fired by Iran and the Houthis in Yemen.

Ms Bazylczyk described the Iron Dome as geared towards "lower tier" threats, such as rockets fired from Gaza or southern Lebanon.

The Golden Dome would go beyond that, to detect longer range missiles as well, she said.

To accomplish that, she said it will need to combine different capabilities.

"And I'll be looking out for the command and control system that can weave all of this together," she said, noting that such a thing does not currently exist.

Can it be done?

Creating that system will be an incredibly complicated - and costly - proposition.

In the Oval Office, Trump suggested that the Golden Dome could be completed by the end of his term, with a total cost of $175bn over time, including an initial investment of $25bn already earmarked for it.

His estimate is far out of sync with the CBO's, which has put the potential price tag at $542bn over 20 years on the space-based systems alone. Experts have said the total cost could eventually soak up a large chunk of the massive US defence budget.

"I think that's unrealistic," said Dr Pettyjohn. "This is complicated, with multiple systems that need to be integrated together. Every one of those steps has its own risks, costs and schedules."

"And going fast is going to add more cost and risk," she added. "You're likely to produce something that isn't going to be as thoroughly evaluated... there are going to be failures along the way, and what you produce may need major overhauls."

The creation of the Golden Dome has also sparked fears that it may lead to a new "arms race", with US foes gearing up their own efforts to find ways to overwhelm or circumvent its defences.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, for example, told reporters that the plan "heightens the risk of space becoming a battlefield".

Those involved in researching worst-case scenarios and US defence policy downplay these concerns. Potential foes, they argue, are already investing heavily in offensive capabilities.

"The Golden Dome aims to change the strategic calculus of our adversaries," said Ms Bazylczyk. "Improving homeland air and missile defences reduces the confidence of a potential attacker in achieving whatever objectives they seek."

"It raises the threshold for them to engage in this attack," she added. "And it contributes to overall deterrence."

Even a partially completed Golden Dome, Mr Fortschen said, could prevent a nightmare scenario from taking place.

"I will breathe a lot easier," he said. "We need that type of system. The Golden Dome is the answer."

9. Vance Tells Midshipmen Their Service Will Not Be Squandered on Rudderless Missions

​Another form of "idealistic realism?" (I do not mean that in a pejorative way). The VP describes a national security ideal that is very appealing, but threats evolve because the enemy has a vote and that can challenge our core interests that could demand longer term commitment. I think we should always go into military operations with a clear understanding of the US goals and objectives and seek to achieve them in a rapid decisive way (e.g, Powell/Weinberger doctrine). That also requires sound assumptions and understanding about the nature, objectives, and strategy of the adversaries we face. However, when we are facing adversaries who conduct Unrestricted Warfare, the Three Warfares, non-linear or new generation warfare, hybrid, irregular, unconventional and political warfare and operate in the gray zone it will require different applications of diplomatic, economic, intelligence, informational and military capabilities for longer durations.

I like the use of "rudderless" for the right target audience (kudos to the speechwriter). But what is the President's speechwriter going to give him as the equivalent when he speaks at West Point - "compassless?" 

Excerpts:

Referring back to the president's recent visit to the Middle East, Vance described what he considered the most significant takeaway from the trip. 

"It signified the end of a decades-long approach in foreign policy that I think was a break from the precedent set by our founding fathers," Vance told the midshipmen. "We had a long experiment in our foreign policy that traded national defense and the maintenance of our alliances for nation building and meddling in foreign countries' affairs, even when those foreign countries had very little to do with core American interests." 

Now, said Vance, foreign policy is changing — and with it, so does what the United States expects to do with its military. 

"What we're seeing from President Trump is a generational shift in policy with profound implications for the job that each and every one of you will be asked to do," he said. 

"We're returning to a strategy grounded in realism and protecting our core national interests. Now, this doesn't mean that we ignore threats, but it means that we approach them with discipline and that when we send you to war, we do it with a very specific set of goals in mind." 

The vice president cited recent conflicts with the Houthis in Yemen as an example. In the Red Sea, Iran-backed Houthi terrorists had been for years attacking U.S. ships and other nations, disrupting legal commerce for seafaring nations. In March, the U.S. launched a series of attacks at key terrorist Houthi targets to put a stop to those attacks, with a clearly stated goal of securing safe shipping in the region. 

Vance Tells Midshipmen Their Service Will Not Be Squandered on Rudderless Missions

https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4196829/vance-tells-midshipmen-their-service-will-not-be-squandered-on-rudderless-missi/

May 23, 2025 | By C. Todd Lopez, DOD News |   

Future warfighters will always have a clear mission, with clear goals, before heading out to do the nation's business, Vice President JD Vance said today during his commencement address to the 2025 graduating class of the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. 

During the ceremony, more than 1,000 uniformed young people graduated and are now bound for positions across the globe as either Navy ensigns or Marine Corps second lieutenants.  

Vance addressed them to let them know what they were getting into, what he and President Donald J. Trump expected of them during their careers, and how the president's vision of American diplomacy would change how their experience in uniform is expected to be different than the experiences of those who came before them. 

Referring back to the president's recent visit to the Middle East, Vance described what he considered the most significant takeaway from the trip. 

"It signified the end of a decades-long approach in foreign policy that I think was a break from the precedent set by our founding fathers," Vance told the midshipmen. "We had a long experiment in our foreign policy that traded national defense and the maintenance of our alliances for nation building and meddling in foreign countries' affairs, even when those foreign countries had very little to do with core American interests." 

Now, said Vance, foreign policy is changing — and with it, so does what the United States expects to do with its military. 

"What we're seeing from President Trump is a generational shift in policy with profound implications for the job that each and every one of you will be asked to do," he said. 

"We're returning to a strategy grounded in realism and protecting our core national interests. Now, this doesn't mean that we ignore threats, but it means that we approach them with discipline and that when we send you to war, we do it with a very specific set of goals in mind." 

The vice president cited recent conflicts with the Houthis in Yemen as an example. In the Red Sea, Iran-backed Houthi terrorists had been for years attacking U.S. ships and other nations, disrupting legal commerce for seafaring nations. In March, the U.S. launched a series of attacks at key terrorist Houthi targets to put a stop to those attacks, with a clearly stated goal of securing safe shipping in the region. 

"We went in with a clear diplomatic goal, not to enmesh our service members in a prolonged conflict with a non-state actor, but to secure American freedom of navigation by forcing the Houthis to stop attacking American ships. And that's exactly what we did," Vance said. 

He noted that earlier this month, the Houthis agreed to stop attacking. 

"We were able to reach a ceasefire in a conflict that had been ongoing for nearly two years," Vance said. "Our adversaries now know when the United States sets a red line, it will be enforced. And when we engage, we do so with purpose, with superior force, with superior weapons and with the best people anywhere in the world." 

As vice president, Vance said his goal is to ensure that asking America's fighting men and women to engage will always be done judiciously and purposefully. 

"The Trump administration recognizes that our most valuable resources [are] you — young people who are brave enough to put on the uniform and risk your life for this country," he said. "And we promise — I promise — to cultivate that resource, to protect it and to use it only when the national interest demands." 

The vice president also addressed the changing nature of warfare. 

"The era of American dominance of sea, air and space is over now," he said, adding that the United States and its military must adapt. 

"Innovation, increasingly, is happening on the very battlefields that you will lead troops on, so that you are not just recipients of innovation, you're not just users of tools, you will very often be developing tools in this new century," Vance said. "Our lawmakers and military brass alike must learn to adjust to a world where cheap drones, readily available cruise missiles and cyberattacks cause extraordinary damage to our military assets and our service members. And it will be you, the graduates gathered here today, who will lead the way for the rest of us." 

The vice president also reminded the graduates that on a day that is a milestone accomplishment for them, they should also remember it's an accomplishment for others as well, including parents, guardians, mentors and others who worked to get them where they are. 

"All of you are the product of an incredible legacy, people who worked hard to give you a good education, food on the table and a sense of possibility. People who took you to church, to practices, to tutoring sessions. People who prayed for you when you struggled and celebrated with you at moments just like today," he said. "Most of you are fortunate enough to have someone here to celebrate with you. Some of you don't. But whether they are here with you or not, the very best piece of advice I can give you is to begin your life in the fleet with the spirit of gratitude."

10. Taiwan Is Getting Serious About Self-Defense

​I know some guys who can help with the porcupine defense.

Taiwan Is Getting Serious About Self-Defense

Turning Taiwan into a porcupine will be essential for staving off a Chinese attack.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/05/23/taiwan-china-defense-war-military-us-geopolitics-alliances/?utm

Kroenig-Matthew-foreign-policy-columnist12

Matthew Kroenig

By Matthew Kroenig, a columnist at Foreign Policy and vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Foreign Policy · by Matthew Kroenig

May 23, 2025, 5:51 AM

The Taiwan Strait may be the most likely candidate for the place that sets off World War III. Until recently, however, Taiwan was not acting like a country facing a growing threat of invasion from a ruthless, nuclear-armed, great-power neighbor that has made its intent to control the island abundantly clear.

Fortunately, Taiwan is finally taking its self-defense seriously. This is important for many reasons, not least of which is that an “America First” president will not help a country unwilling to help itself.

I have had the privilege of visiting Taiwan on annual delegation trips for the past several years, and the change in Taiwan’s defense posture over that period has been nothing short of remarkable.

As late as 1990, after all, the Taiwanese military spent time and resources planning for Taiwan’s possible invasion of mainland China—a long-standing dream since Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek retreated to the island after losing the Chinese civil war, but now little more than a pipe dream given the power imbalances between the two sides.

U.S. defense officials have often been frustrated by Taiwan’s approach to military procurement, with its military requesting purchases of flashy and expensive weapons platforms—such as F-35 aircraft—that are ill-suited for the most likely threats it faces. Countering a Chinese amphibious invasion or blockade requires asymmetric capabilities—such as anti-ship missiles—not big, expensive targets for Chinese missile salvos.

Just two years ago, my colleagues and I toured one of the Taiwanese Navy’s corvettes. A former senior U.S. official asked them what they would do after the ship ended up at the bottom of the Strait 15 minutes after the start of a war with China.

The West prioritizes civilian leadership of the military, but the Taiwanese Defense Ministry has often been led by hidebound military officers. Taiwan’s military culture was formed under the Kuomintang’s authoritarian rule, pro-Beijing in its sympathies and resistant to reform. A previous attempt to install a civilian defense minister in 2013, for example, was resisted by the ranks and lasted all of six days.

As one example of this problem, I asked a senior Taiwanese military officer several years ago about the Chinese nuclear threat. He replied that he was not too worried because Chinese President Xi Jinping would never use nuclear weapons against Taiwan because they are all Chinese people.

Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan’s president from 2016 to 2024, was a strong leader who understood the threat from China. In attempting to balance defense strategy with societal and economic stability, she worried that focusing too publicly on the threat could needlessly antagonize Beijing, unsettle Taiwan’s population, and scare the international business community. This understandable caution sometimes came at the expense of military preparedness.

Another dent in Taiwan’s armor has been a split in public opinion. It has been governed by the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for more than a decade, but the opposition Kuomintang is more sympathetic to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Misled by aggressive CCP disinformation campaigns, a significant share of Taiwanese people believe that the DPP and their friends in Washington are primarily responsible for stoking tensions with China.

On past trips, these issues led my colleagues and I to sometimes wonder whether the United States cares more about Taiwan’s security than Taiwan does itself. Why should Americans die to defend Taiwan if the Taiwanese aren’t doing what it takes to ensure their own self-defense?

This, however, was not the takeaway from our most recent trip. There is a new energy in Taiwan—and a welcome and unprecedented seriousness about its self-defense.

The new approach starts at the top. Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te has been more aggressive than his predecessor in calling attention to the China threat and taking measures to counter it. This includes, for example, declaring China a “hostile foreign force,” reinstating military tribunals to try retired military officers engaged in espionage for China, and deporting Chinese nationals who glorify the CCP’s plans to conquer Taiwan.

He has also appointed Taiwan’s first truly civilian defense minister, Wellington Koo, who is pushing through much-needed reforms. These include consolidating the policy to extend mandatory military service from four months to one year and holding unscripted military exercises.

Taiwan’s past defense strategies unrealistically envisioned stopping China’s military at the water’s edge. But under Koo, the Taiwanese military has adopted what he called an “erosion” defense strategy, designed to attrit China’s invading forces and fight for every inch of the island, buying time for outside (primarily U.S.) intervention. The strategy is supported by a boost in defense spending from 2 percent of GDP 6 years ago to around 2.5 percent in 2025; Lai has pledged to raise this figure to 3 percent.

Although some of Taiwan’s defense procurements, such as locally produced submarines, are still questionable, the resources are mostly being spent on precisely those asymmetric capabilities that will be needed to block a Chinese amphibious invasion of the island, including anti-ship missiles and air and missile defense. Indeed, U.S. officials report that Taiwan is now buying everything that American defense planners are asking them to buy.

In fact, as our Taiwanese counterparts frequently reminded us, the biggest obstacle to Taiwan’s defense buildup now is the sorry state of the U.S. defense industrial base and Washington’s inability to fill Taiwan’s large backlog of orders. We consoled our counterparts by pointing out that at least they are not alone in getting defense equipment behind schedule and over budget. Washington does that to everyone, including itself.

To supplement U.S. arms deliveries, Taiwan is prioritizing the development of its own next-generation weapons. To this end, Taiwanese Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim helped set up an office modeled after the U.S. Defense Department’s Defense Innovation Unit. On our latest trip, we visited companies like Geosat, a producer of sophisticated aerial drones, and Lungteh Shipbuilding, which builds unmanned kamikaze surface ships.

But it is not just armies or navies that go to war. How resilient is Taiwan’s society to a large-scale Chinese invasion or blockade? In the event of war, China would likely sever Taiwan’s connection to the outside world by cutting undersea cables and blocking maritime energy imports, which Taiwan depends on for more than 95 percent of its supply. In the face of these and other threats to life on the island, will the Taiwanese be willing to resist and fight back, like the Ukrainians did, or will they fold and simply accept their new Chinese communist overlords?

To address the societal challenge, Taiwan’s government has closely collaborated with the United States to develop a new whole-of-society defense resilience committee. Among other steps, Taiwan has set up a system of satellites to supply internet access even after undersea cables have been cut and is making major investments in locally produced energy, including offshore wind. Government ministries are conducting exercises to plan for the provision of essential services in a crisis. An aptly named All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency—all-out is always better than halfway when prepping for a war—has been established to organize, train, and equip a reserve force of more than 1.5 million, drawing from Taiwan’s large pool of former military conscripts.

Mass communication is contributing, as well. A new television miniseries will be released this summer that aims to bring the threat home to the average citizen: Zero Day, a graphic portrayal of a fictional Chinese attack on Taiwan. As older voters—who tend to be more sympathetic to Beijing—age out of the population, they are leaving behind younger cohorts with a stronger Taiwanese national identity, greater antipathy toward the CCP, and willingness to fight for Taiwan’s survival.

Taiwan’s new military preparedness is also backed by surging economic confidence. On the back of steady economic growth of 3 to 4 percent annually in recent years, its people are getting wealthier, with GDP per capita now higher than that of Japan.

This is all good progress, but there is more work to be done.

While Taiwan has been right to boost defense spending, the current level is still not enough. A top Trump administration defense official recently said that Taiwan should be spending 10 percent of GDP on defense, which is more than three times what it is spending now. That would be excessive, but NATO allies are on track to commit to a new defense spending pledge of 5 percent at their annual summit at The Hague next month, and this would also be a reasonable target for a country like Taiwan, which is every bit as exposed as NATO’s eastern front-line states; Lithuania, for example, plans to spend 5.25 percent next year.

The 1.5 million reservists might look impressive at first glance, but they are little more than names in a Defense Ministry database at this point. Taiwan needs to prioritize equipping these forces with rifles, ammunition, drone training, and other basics—as well as the logistics of deploying them—before throwing money at high-end capabilities like the F-35.

Taiwan’s move toward greater energy independence is real, but it is starting from a very low baseline. The island’s stockpiles of liquefied natural gas, for example, are legally required to last a minimum of only eight days in the event of a blockade. A major war would almost certainly last longer, forcing Taiwan to ration energy. The DPP government should reconsider its pledge to ban nuclear energy, extend the lifespan of current reactors, and consider deploying a new generation of small, modular reactors.

But none of this should take away from the impressive improvement in Taiwan’s self-defense. Turning Taiwan into a porcupine will be essential for staving off a Chinese attack.

In the future, the United States will be more likely to help those who help themselves. Even if Taiwan becomes a porcupine, global peace and stability will likely depend on continued U.S. support for the island. Ensuring that support—and thereby making the risk of war incalculable for China—may be the single most consequential reason why Taiwan’s new seriousness on defense should be so welcome.

Foreign Policy · by Matthew Kroenig

11. US Forces Abroad Protect the Homeland

​

I concur. Strongly. And I would advocate for more forward deployed forces in the modern era (of course I am very biased since I spent the majority of my military career stationed overseas in Korea, Japan, the Philippines - and Germany during the Cold War). Yes, it is cliche to say it is "better to fight the away game" or "fight them over there rather than here." But those cliches have merit.

Excerpts:

These deployed forces protect the U.S. homeland by imposing costs on adversaries who behave aggressively, and by keeping acts of violence at the lowest levels possible and as far from America’s shores as possible. American troops in Europe and South Korea are not being diverted from protecting the homeland. Protecting the homeland is their raison d’être.

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said during his recent trip to the Philippines that “we need to reestablish strength and deterrence in multiple places around the globe.” To fulfill this goal and contend with threats emerging from a China–Russia–Iran–North Korea axis, the United States will need a force posture that can respond to crises across various regions.

The Pentagon, in close coordination with allies, will therefore need a carefully designed plan that will allow the U.S. to deter both a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and other adversaries’ potential opportunistic aggression. U.S. forces deployed abroad — whether on the western edge of Eurasia in Europe or on the eastern edge in Korea — help provide Washington with this force.

May 23, 2025

The National Review

US Forces Abroad Protect the Homeland

Forward-deployed military forces impose costs on aggressive adversaries and keep violence as far from America’s shores as possible.

https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/us-forces-abroad-protect-homeland-rebeccah-heinrichs-mark-melton

Rebeccah L. Heinrichs & Mark Melton

Arising axis comprising China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea threatens American interests across the Eurasian continent — from East Asia to Europe to the Middle East. It would be a mistake to overly compartmentalize the regions. A crisis in one theater could quickly spiral into a conflict elsewhere. For example, if China can pin down the United States in the Taiwan Strait, Russia and Iran may seize the moment to attack their neighbors. Such opportunistic aggression has occurred regularly throughout history, such as when America focused heavily on deterring a Soviet invasion of Europe but was then surprised and unprepared when the communist regime in North Korea attacked U.S.-supported South Korea.

The United States should be careful as it adapts its military posture at a time in which allies are actively preparing to contribute more of the responsibility for conventional deterrence within NATO. Relocating some U.S. forces from one theater to another may be a prudent policy, but withdrawing too many or too quickly or focusing exclusively on deterring China in a single scenario risks disaster. Testimony from two recent congressional hearings should remind Americans of this point.

In a recent hearing, Roger Wicker (R., Miss.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, cited reports that “mid-level officials in the Pentagon” are considering withdrawing some U.S. forces from South Korea, and he asked how this would affect the missions that U.S. forces conduct from there. General Xavier Brunson, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, responded, “To reduce the force becomes problematic. I won’t speak to policy, but what we do provide [in the Korean Peninsula] . . . is the potential to impose costs in the East Sea to Russia, the potential to impose costs in the West Sea to China, and to continue to deter North Korea.” Put another way, U.S. forces in Korea not only defend South Korea from a “non-China” threat but also protect the American homeland by deterring aggression in multiple theaters.

Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, agreed. Removing U.S. forces, he said, “would reduce our ability to prevail in conflict,” and “there’s a higher probability” that North Korea would invade South Korea.

Perhaps some might be willing to risk a new war in Korea, but if the Chinese client state in North Korea were to invade South Korea, it would be detrimental to U.S. interests, to put it mildly. South Korea is a necessary American ally whose advantages in geography, technology, logistics, and manpower benefit the United States. The Trump administration, in apparent recognition of the need to capitalize on the advantages bestowed by our alliances, is looking into striking a shipbuilding deal with Seoul to rapidly grow the U.S. fleet, which will be necessary for deterring China.

The following week in a House hearing, Mike Rogers (R., Ala.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, praised Europe’s new commitments to rearm and shoulder more of the collective hard-power responsibility of the NATO alliance. But in light of rumors that some inside the Pentagon are recommending a withdrawal of as many as 90,000 U.S. troops from Europe, he cautioned, “Europe’s rearmament will take time. Pulling back prematurely would risk inviting further Russian aggression — potentially even against NATO. That’s why I strongly support maintaining the current U.S. force posture in Europe at this time.”

In that same hearing, Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Christopher Cavoli stated that he and the U.S. forces under his command were in Europe “exclusively to pursue U.S. interests and to defend U.S. interests.” He further highlighted U.S. European Command’s important role in defending American interests beyond Europe, such as by protecting U.S. commercial shipping in the Red Sea. These missions are possible as “a result of the infrastructure, the bases, the forces we have located [in Europe], and very importantly the government-to-government agreements we have that permit us to use non-U.S. territory to stage our operations.”

Both hearings elevated an important concept in American strategy: U.S. forward-deployed military forces conduct multiple missions against multiple adversaries in multiple theaters simultaneously.

These deployed forces protect the U.S. homeland by imposing costs on adversaries who behave aggressively, and by keeping acts of violence at the lowest levels possible and as far from America’s shores as possible. American troops in Europe and South Korea are not being diverted from protecting the homeland. Protecting the homeland is their raison d’être.

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said during his recent trip to the Philippines that “we need to reestablish strength and deterrence in multiple places around the globe.” To fulfill this goal and contend with threats emerging from a China–Russia–Iran–North Korea axis, the United States will need a force posture that can respond to crises across various regions.

The Pentagon, in close coordination with allies, will therefore need a carefully designed plan that will allow the U.S. to deter both a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and other adversaries’ potential opportunistic aggression. U.S. forces deployed abroad — whether on the western edge of Eurasia in Europe or on the eastern edge in Korea — help provide Washington with this force.

Read in The National Review

12. You Need Allies to Win a Trade War

​Oh no, this conclusion:

Excerpt:

China is thus arguably the biggest geopolitical winner of Trump’s trade wars. Whereas an invasion of Taiwan may previously have entailed paralyzing trade sanctions by a united Western alliance, China now faces a disunited West. Western cohesion will get further eroded as China deepens its economic ties with Western countries now spurned by the United States. If Trump’s goal was to bolster China’s global standing, it is hard to see how he could have been more effective.

You Need Allies to Win a Trade War

Trump could have cornered China—instead, it’s the biggest winner of his attack on global trade.

By Ricardo Hausmann, the founder and director of Harvard University’s Growth Lab, and Eric Protzer, a senior research fellow at Harvard University’s Growth Lab.

Foreign Policy · by Ricardo Hausmann, Eric Protzer

May 23, 2025, 9:41 AM

Trump’s Second Term

Ongoing reports and analysis

Financial markets and U.S. businesses relying on imports have forced U.S. President Donald Trump to significantly climb down from his recent tariff broadside against most of the world but especially Western allies and China. However, he could have extracted more concessions from Beijing if he had pursued a strategy of all against one, rather than one against all.

The United States may account for more than half of global stock market capitalization and roughly a quarter of world GDP, but it only produces 9 percent of global good exports and takes in 14 percent of global goods imports. No single country—not even the United States—is a unipolar superpower when it comes to trade in goods, which is where Trump wants to fight his war. A coalition of countries could have more seriously challenged China, but collective action now looks impossible, given the extent to which Trump has alienated Washington’s traditional allies.

Financial markets and U.S. businesses relying on imports have forced U.S. President Donald Trump to significantly climb down from his recent tariff broadside against most of the world but especially Western allies and China. However, he could have extracted more concessions from Beijing if he had pursued a strategy of all against one, rather than one against all.

The United States may account for more than half of global stock market capitalization and roughly a quarter of world GDP, but it only produces 9 percent of global good exports and takes in 14 percent of global goods imports. No single country—not even the United States—is a unipolar superpower when it comes to trade in goods, which is where Trump wants to fight his war. A coalition of countries could have more seriously challenged China, but collective action now looks impossible, given the extent to which Trump has alienated Washington’s traditional allies.

In 2023, China exported $449 billion in goods to the United States, while it imported only $144 billion in the reverse direction. Given this difference, the same tariff rate would have raised three times more money in the United States than China. Perhaps for this reason, Trump assumed that tariffs would be a lot more painful to China than to the United States. When China raised tariffs on U.S. imports in response to Trump’s trade broadside, he suggested that Chinese President Xi Jinping “panicked” and that the Chinese economy “cannot afford” such a policy.

But a tariff is a tax on a transaction that involves an importer and an exporter. The importer pays the tax, but who ultimately absorbs the extra cost depends on what options each side of the transaction has. Importers are weak if they have few alternative options to source the goods; they would have to absorb the cost of the tariff and pass as much of it as they could to the importing country’s consumers. Exporters are weak when they have few alternative markets for their products, so they would have to lower their prices and absorb the tariff that way.

What matters is each side’s ability to find alternatives to the transaction that is being taxed. The United States would be strong if it exported many products on which China depended yet it did not depend that much on the Chinese market. In this situation, there would be no strategic value for China to impose tariffs, as it would experience significant pain while U.S. exporters could sell their products elsewhere.

We used bilateral trade data covering more than 1,200 product categories to check how extensive the list of products is for which the United States is in a strong position, meaning that (1) a majority of Chinese imports in that category came from the United States, (2) a minority of U.S. exports in the category went to China, and (3) the U.S. export value to China was significant, exceeding $500 million. We found only four product categories that met the criteria, and they were not the most sophisticated: animal feed, miscellaneous nuts, miscellaneous cellulose, and agricultural machinery. Altogether, these exports to China were worth just $2.2 billion in 2023.

The equivalent list of exports that could exert significant pressure on China runs to three categories each for Germany, Japan, and South Korea; four for New Zealand (all agricultural); and one each for France and Australia. Together, these add up to just over $20 billion in export value. Other countries, such as Britain and Canada, have no such products.

Beyond these product categories, there are narrower technological categories for which Washington has attempted to restrict Beijing’s access to Western goods, including the high-end semiconductor chips (and the equipment to manufacture them) that are critical for artificial intelligence applications. China has in part managed to circumvent this restriction by using foreign data centers, developing its own advanced chips, and making machine learning more efficient and thus requiring fewer hardware resources, as evidenced by DeepSeek’s breakthrough AI model.

From this perspective, China’s strategic trade situation could not be more different. The same calculation for Chinese exports to the United States yields 49 product categories worth $88 billion in total, including household appliances, household utensils, mattresses and bedding, sports equipment, toys, and games. In these markets, Trump would inevitably face greater pressure for tariff relief from U.S. importers than from Chinese officials. And that is exactly what happened.

What these numbers make clear is that a unified Western effort could have been much more effective. When we pool the United States together with the European Union, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, the list of products on which China depends grows to 181, worth $396 billion. Each individual country may account for just a fraction of exports, but together they represent a huge portion of the world’s advanced industrial output. These products include a variety of industrial machinery and instrumentation, auto and aircraft parts, and chemical compounds that China’s manufacturing juggernaut vitally depends on. Rather than launching a general tariff war, Western allies could have imposed an embargo on these goods to threaten the Chinese economy.

It can’t be said often enough that the system of Western economic, military, and diplomatic alliances, carefully cultivated by the United States over many decades, has long been a source of strength in times of crisis. Trump was elected twice in part because he was among the first politicians to treat the impact of Chinese trade on American workers as a crisis. In an alternate universe, he may have drawn on the West’s vast collective power to materially change Chinese trade behavior.

Of course, Trump has never really articulated what he actually wants from his trade war. Laudable goals might include halting Chinese intellectual property theft, limiting subsidized dumping practices, and granting more equitable access to Chinese consumer markets. Other Western countries frequently complain about these problems, and Trump would likely have found many sympathetic ears.

To be sure, coordinated trade pressure from Western allies in the past has typically been exerted on countries that are far from essential to global value chains, such as South Africa during apartheid, Iran due to its nuclear ambitions, and Russia following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. China’s magnetic pull toward Western businesses due to its economic heft poses a major hurdle toward unified trade action or other pressure. For example, Volkswagen was notoriously slow to address the ethical implications of operating a joint venture in Xinjiang, where the Chinese state heavily persecutes Uyghurs, including through forced labor. Sufficiently cajoling the Western world into action could realistically only have come from a highly motivated U.S. president.

But Trump squandered this possibility outright by launching an offensive against U.S. allies. Nearly 60 percent of Canadians, for instance, are now actively boycotting imported U.S. products in response to the trade war and Trump’s threats to annex their country. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has declared that the long-standing relationship with the United States “is over,” and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen affirmed that “the West as we knew it no longer exists.”

Moreover, other Western countries are less likely to put pressure on China through trade action when their access to the U.S. market has just been curtailed. On the contrary, they may see an opportunity to eat away at U.S. market share in China to make up the ground they are losing in the United States. For example, China imported $9.6 billion in medical instruments in 2023. Of this total, 37 percent came from the United States, but 15 percent came from Germany, 12 percent from Japan, and 5 percent from the Netherlands. Companies in the latter countries may enjoy a surge in orders if Beijing’s tariffs on U.S. imports hand them a price advantage.

China is thus arguably the biggest geopolitical winner of Trump’s trade wars. Whereas an invasion of Taiwan may previously have entailed paralyzing trade sanctions by a united Western alliance, China now faces a disunited West. Western cohesion will get further eroded as China deepens its economic ties with Western countries now spurned by the United States. If Trump’s goal was to bolster China’s global standing, it is hard to see how he could have been more effective.

This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage of the Trump administration. Follow along here.

Foreign Policy · by Ricardo Hausmann, Eric Protzer

13. Defense Secretary Hegseth, bedeviled by leaks, orders more restrictions on press at Pentagon

​There will always be (and must be) an adversarial relationship with the Fourth Estate. But we are better for it.  

Leaks are not a problem because the press. Leaks are a personnel and leadership problem. Restricting the press will not prevent "leaks." We need to understand why people are supposedly "leaking."

Defense Secretary Hegseth, bedeviled by leaks, orders more restrictions on press at Pentagon

By  DAVID BAUDER

Updated 8:22 PM EDT, May 23, 2025

AP · May 24, 2025

Bedeviled by leaks to the media during his short tenure, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth issued a series of restrictions on the press late Friday that include banning reporters from entering wide swaths of the Pentagon without a government escort — areas where the press has had access in past administrations as it covers the activities of the world’s most powerful military.

Newly restricted areas include his office and those of his top aides and all of the different locations across the mammoth building where the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Space Force maintain press offices.

The media will also be barred from offices of the Pentagon’s senior military leadership, including Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine, without Hegseth’s approval and an escort from his aides. The staff of the Joint Chiefs has traditionally maintained a good relationship with the press.

Hegseth, the former Fox News Channel personality, issued his order via a posting on X late on a Friday afternoon before a holiday weekend. He said it was necessary for national security.

“While the department remains committed to transparency, the department is equally obligated to protect (classified intelligence information) and sensitive information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could put the lives of U.S. service members in danger,” wrote Hegseth.

The Pentagon Press Association expressed skepticism that operational concerns were at play — and linked the move to previous actions by Hegseth’s office that impede journalists and their coverage.

“There is no way to sugarcoat it. Today’s memo by Secretary Hegseth appears to be a direct attack on the freedom of the press and America’s right to know what its military is doing,” it said in a statement Friday night. “The Pentagon Press Association is extremely concerned by the decision to restrict movement of accredited journalists within the Pentagon through non-secured, unclassified hallways.”

Hegseth also said reporters will be required to sign a form to protect sensitive information and would be issued a new badge that more clearly identifies them as press. It was not clear whether signing the form would be a condition of continued access to the building.

Two months ago, the department was embarrassed by a leak to The New York Times that billionaire Elon Musk was to get a briefing on the U.S. military’s plans in case a war broke out with China. That briefing never took place, on President Donald Trump’s orders, and Hegseth suspended two Pentagon officials as part of an investigation into how that news got out.

The Pentagon was also embarrassed when the editor-in-chief of The Atlantic, Jeffrey Goldberg, was inadvertently included in a group chat on the Signal messaging app where Hegseth discussed plans for upcoming military strikes in Yemen. Trump’s former national security adviser, Mike Waltz, took responsibility for Goldberg being included and was shifted to another job.

The administration has taken several aggressive actions toward the press since Trump took over, including FCC investigations into ABC, CBS and NBC News. Restrictions imposed on The Associated Press’ access to certain White House events earlier this year led to a court battle that is ongoing.

The White House has also increased access for conservative media that are friendly to the president. Nevertheless, a study released earlier this month found that Trump had more frequent exchanges with reporters during his first 100 days in office than any of his six predecessors.

Hegseth, however, has been far less available. He has yet to speak to the press in the Pentagon briefing room. Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell has held only one Pentagon press briefing since Jan. 20. The Pentagon has taken other steps to make it more difficult for reporters, including taking office space away from eight media outlets, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, CNN and NBC.

___

David Bauder writes about media for the AP. Follow him at http://x.com/dbauder and https://bsky.app/profile/dbauder.bsky.social.

AP · May 24, 2025

14. “See Without a Sound”: New 2-Pound Goggles Let US Marines Hunt in Total Darkness With Stealth Precision Never Seen Before

​A game changer?

I am reminded of the horror film that was based on sound/silence.

“See Without a Sound”: New 2-Pound Goggles Let US Marines Hunt in Total Darkness With Stealth Precision Never Seen Before

In a groundbreaking move to enhance nighttime combat capabilities, the US Marine Corps has awarded a $112 million contract to Elbit Systems of America for the production of advanced night vision goggles, promising a significant tactical advantage in low-light and no-light conditions.

https://www.rudebaguette.com/en/2025/05/see-without-a-sound-new-2-pound-goggles-let-us-marines-hunt-in-total-darkness-with-stealth-precision-never-seen-before/?utm

Eirwen WilliamsMay 19, 2025 at 6:12 AM

Illustration of US Marines using advanced night vision goggles in low-light conditions. Image generated by AI.

• IN A NUTSHELL The US Marine Corps has awarded a $112 million contract to Elbit Systems of America to produce advanced night vision goggles.
• The Squad Binocular Night Vision Goggle (SBNVG) system enhances situational awareness with superior nighttime viewing capabilities.
• The SBNVG system is versatile, aiding in urban warfare, safe night driving, and reconnaissance missions.
• Training with the SBNVG prepares Marines for night missions, improving their readiness and operational effectiveness.

The modern battlefield is constantly evolving, and with it, the need for advanced technology that provides tactical advantages. The US Marine Corps is taking significant strides to enhance its nighttime operational capabilities by investing in cutting-edge equipment. A recent example is their $112 million contract with Elbit Systems of America to produce Squad Binocular Night Vision Goggle (SBNVG) systems. These state-of-the-art goggles are designed to help Marines detect and engage targets in low-light and no-light conditions, offering a critical edge during missions around the globe.

Enhanced Situational Awareness for US Marines

The SBNVG system is a technological marvel that significantly enhances the situational awareness of US Marines. It integrates the AN/PVS-31D (F5032) night vision goggle with the Optics 1 Enhanced Clip-On Thermal Imager (E-COTI), providing superior nighttime viewing across various environments. With Gen 3 Gated Pinnacle tubes, the goggles offer optimum resolution and high gain, supporting a 40° nominal field of view and 1X magnification.

Weighing about 2.3 pounds, the SBNVG is designed for long missions, featuring a built-in compass for direction and a near-infrared (NIR) illuminator for effective underground operations. Its long-lasting battery ensures reliability during extended use, setting it apart from other products on the market. Elbit America has delivered over 15,000 SBNVG systems to the US Marine Corps since 2019, reinforcing the effectiveness of these goggles and the Corps’ emphasis on advanced technology.

Erik Fox, Senior Vice President and General Manager of Warfighter Systems at Elbit America, emphasized the decisive advantage SBNVGs provide, allowing Marines to see, detect, and react more quickly than their adversaries. The partnership between Elbit America and the Marine Corps continues to improve the readiness of Marines worldwide.

Use Case of Binoculars

The versatility of the SBNVG system makes it invaluable across a range of military operations. In urban warfare, these goggles prove especially useful in low-light environments, allowing Marines to navigate buildings, tunnels, and alleyways while spotting potential threats and obstacles. This capability enhances safety during night operations.

The SBNVG system is also essential for safe night driving, enabling drivers to identify hazards, navigate challenging terrain, and collaborate effectively, thus improving safety and efficiency. During reconnaissance missions, the goggles allow soldiers to see clearly in the dark, track enemy movements, and assess the terrain without being detected. This capability is crucial for gathering information in dangerous areas.

Additionally, the thermal imaging feature of the SBNVG is a game-changer for search and rescue missions. By detecting heat, it can locate people or equipment in low-light situations, accelerating searches and potentially saving lives. This advanced capability underscores the system’s importance in various military applications.

Training and Preparedness

Training with the SBNVG system is crucial for preparing Marines for night missions. Regular practice with these goggles helps Marines acclimate to real operational conditions, enhancing their readiness and effectiveness. The SBNVG system combines advanced imaging technology with a simple and durable design, which significantly improves how the US Marine Corps carries out diverse missions.

The strategic investment in SBNVG systems reflects the Marine Corps’ commitment to leveraging advanced technology to stay ahead of potential threats. By incorporating these night vision systems into their training regimens, Marines can operate with greater precision, accuracy, and confidence during nighttime operations.

Luke Savoie, President and CEO of Elbit America, highlighted the advanced systems’ role in building on over six decades of night vision innovation, enabling the US Marine Corps to maintain its edge on the battlefield. This focus on technology and preparedness ensures that the Marines are well-equipped for the challenges of modern warfare.

The Future of Marine Corps Operations

As the battlefield continues to evolve, the need for advanced equipment like the SBNVG system becomes increasingly apparent. The US Marine Corps’ investment in these night vision goggles demonstrates their commitment to maintaining a tactical advantage in various operational environments. The integration of advanced technology into military practices is essential for adapting to the complexities of modern warfare.

The partnership between Elbit Systems of America and the Marine Corps exemplifies the collaborative efforts required to innovate and enhance military capabilities. By focusing on the development and deployment of cutting-edge technologies, the Marine Corps is positioning itself to effectively address the challenges of future conflicts.

With the SBNVG system setting a new standard for nighttime operations, how will the US Marine Corps continue to evolve its strategies to maintain its edge in increasingly complex global scenarios?

Our author used artificial intelligence to enhance this article.

15. Regional and Global Responses to a Taiwan Contingency

​The 26 page report can be downloaded here: https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/taiwan-contingency-final.pdf

EXSUM and Introduction below.

May 21, 2025

Regional and Global Responses to a Taiwan Contingency

Gauging the Prospects for Coalition-Building Under Fire

https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/regional-and-global-responses-to-a-taiwan-contingency

By: Jacob Stokes, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey and Thomas Corel

Executive Summary

A​ contingency across the Taiwan Strait has the potential to reshape the Indo-Pacific and even global security environment. This report explores how states beyond the United States and Taiwan would respond to a major Taiwan contingency. It defines a major Taiwan contingency as a conflict that might start in the so-called gray zone between peace and war but clearly escalates into a larger campaign that has unification as the near-term objective of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Specifically, the report examines how geopolitical interests, values, and material power might determine the approaches of countries across the region and the world.

Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The report details four key structural factors that would shape states’ responses: the specific nature of the Taiwan contingency, the global trade and technology landscape when the contingency occurs, Taiwanese and U.S. capabilities and responses, and the spectrum of intervention options.

Beyond those structural factors, the response from four groups of states would play a major role in determining the outcome of a major Taiwan contingency. The first group is Japan and the Philippines. Both U.S. allies would be on the front lines of a Taiwan conflict and host U.S. forces but are also the most exposed to military retaliation from China. The second group is close U.S. allies and partners South Korea, Australia, and India. Their locations are farther from the main battlespace, but each would have to consider how its response would affect its own security concerns and relations with the United States in the future.

Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation.

The third group includes the other states in Southeast Asia. Thailand and Singapore would have to consider their defense ties to Washington, while Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar might get requests from Beijing. Other Southeast Asian states would adopt a studiously neutral stance. The fourth group is Europe and the rest of the world. European states now pay more attention to Taiwan, and many see parallels with Ukraine’s plight. But uneven ties with China and a lack of power projection capabilities would mostly limit direct European intervention. Meanwhile, the developing world would likely side with Beijing. And it lacks the political will—much less the proximity or military power—to come to Taipei’s aid.

Several findings flow from the analysis: First, it is unlikely that any other states will come to Taiwan’s aid if Taiwan does not fight fiercely and the United States does not intervene on a large scale. Second, geographic proximity increases a country’s stake in the defense of Taiwan, but that same closeness also makes countries more vulnerable to PRC retaliation. Third, any Taiwan contingency would cause massive economic harm, so states would try to balance protecting their economic interests—especially access to high-end semiconductors—with ending the conflict just to stem the disruption caused by the fighting. Fourth, states’ choices will reflect their national interests and values, but those responses will depend to a significant degree on what others do.

U.S. policymakers should take the following actions to best position Washington to mount an effective coalition defense of Taiwan during a contingency, should those policymakers choose to do so:

• Prioritize preventing a Taiwan contingency.
• Reinforce with Taipei how much would hinge on Taiwan’s contingency response, both in terms of demonstrating will and capabilities.
• Expect limited contributions but be creative in exploring what in the spectrum of intervention might be possible.
• Deepen intra-Asian and Euro-Asian security ties that include the United States.
• Support and, where possible, facilitate the growth of intra-Asian security ties that do not rely on the United States as the hub.
• Plan for humanitarian evacuation operations as a means to encourage Southeast Asian countries to think through a Taiwan contingency.

Introduction

A contingency across the Taiwan Strait has the potential to reshape the Indo-Pacific and even global security environment. That possibility has prompted numerous analyses of how Taiwan (officially, the Republic of China or ROC) and the United States might respond to aggression from China (officially, the People’s Republic of China or PRC). The ways other states in the Indo- Pacific region and beyond might respond, however, have received considerably less attention and would be a critical factor shaping any cross-Strait contingency.

This report explores how those other states might respond to a Taiwan contingency.1 Specifically, it examines how geopolitical interests, values, and material power might determine the approaches of countries across the region and the world. This analysis employs an approach with three defining characteristics. First, it charts a middle path between two analytic extremes: either saying “it depends” due to the myriad variables that would influence Taiwan contingency responses, or the false certainty of offering highly detailed forecasts based on just one possible scenario. Second, the report is deliberately concise, highlighting only the central actors and the critical factors shaping their behavior. Third, the text focuses on what the authors call a major Taiwan contingency, meaning a conflict that might start in the so-called gray zone between peace and war but clearly escalates into a larger campaign that has unification as Beijing’s near-term objective.2

The report proceeds as follows. It starts by exploring key structural factors that would shape states’ responses to Taiwan contingencies. Next, it examines the contours and determinants of how four key groups of states might respond to a Taiwan contingency. The four groups are the geographic frontline states of Japan and the Philippines; close U.S. allies and partners South Korea (officially, the Republic of Korea or ROK), Australia, and India; Southeast Asian states (other than the Philippines); and the rest of the world, including Europe and the developing world. The report concludes by detailing findings and recommendations for policymakers in Washington as well as like-minded capitals.

16. The New Madrid Fault Line: America’s Overlooked Earthquake Threat

​When I was at SAMS in 1995-1996 we used this potential natural (and national) disaster as a scenario to learn about military support to civilian authorities. What I recall is that if this causes an earthquake it will have catastrophic effects over a wide area. When it last "quaked" in 1811-12, it could be felt all the way to DC.  

Failure to plan is planning to fail.  

The New Madrid Fault Line: America’s Overlooked Earthquake Threat - discoverwildscience

https://discoverwildscience.com/the-new-madrid-fault-line-americas-overlooked-earthquake-threat-1-288427/?utm

discoverwildscience.com · by Annette Uy · April 6, 2025

Annette Uy

When we think of earthquakes in the United States, our minds often drift to the tremors of California’s infamous San Andreas Fault. However, there lies a less conspicuous yet equally significant geological threat nestled within the heart of the nation—the New Madrid Fault Line. While not as widely recognized, this seismic zone holds a formidable power that could potentially reshape the landscape of the central United States. The New Madrid Fault Line is a reminder of nature’s unpredictable ferocity, one that has been quietly lurking beneath the surface for centuries.

Unraveling the History of the New Madrid Fault

Unraveling the History of the New Madrid Fault (image credits: wikimedia)

The New Madrid Fault Line is steeped in a history as tumultuous as its potential. This seismic zone stretches across the central United States, crossing through Missouri, Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Illinois. It was in the early 19th century when the region experienced a series of cataclysmic earthquakes, with the most notable ones shaking the earth between 1811 and 1812. These quakes were so intense that they caused the Mississippi River to momentarily flow backward, reshaping the land and leaving an indelible mark on history. The memory of these seismic events serves as a stark reminder of the power embedded within the New Madrid Fault Line.

The Science Behind Seismic Activity

The Science Behind Seismic Activity (image credits: wikimedia)

Understanding the science of earthquakes is crucial to comprehending the potential threat posed by the New Madrid Fault Line. Earthquakes occur due to the movement of tectonic plates beneath the Earth’s surface. The New Madrid Fault is an intraplate fault, meaning it lies within a tectonic plate rather than at its boundary. This makes it a unique geological feature, as most earthquakes occur at plate boundaries. The movement along this fault is caused by stress accumulation due to distant tectonic forces, which is then released in the form of seismic energy. This scientific understanding helps us anticipate and prepare for potential future tremors.

Assessing the Potential Impact

Assessing the Potential Impact (image credits: wikimedia)

The potential impact of an earthquake originating from the New Madrid Fault Line is profound. An event of significant magnitude could affect millions of people across several states, disrupting lives and infrastructure. Unlike the more commonly discussed San Andreas Fault, the New Madrid Fault lies in a region with less stringent building codes designed for seismic activity. This increases the vulnerability of structures, making the potential damage even more severe. From collapsing buildings to disrupted transportation networks, the repercussions of a major quake could ripple through the heartland of America, affecting the nation’s economy and daily life.

Geological Features of the Region

Geological Features of the Region (image credits: wikimedia)

The region surrounding the New Madrid Fault Line is characterized by unique geological features that contribute to its seismic activity. This area is part of the Mississippi Embayment, a geological trough filled with sediments that amplify seismic waves. These sediments can exacerbate the shaking during an earthquake, making the effects more pronounced. Additionally, the region’s flat terrain allows seismic waves to travel further, potentially impacting a larger area. Understanding these geological characteristics is essential for developing effective mitigation strategies and minimizing the risk to communities.

Historical Lessons and Modern Preparedness

Historical Lessons and Modern Preparedness (image credits: wikimedia)

The earthquakes of 1811-1812 left behind valuable lessons that continue to shape modern preparedness efforts. Despite the passage of time, the need for vigilance remains paramount. Today, scientists and emergency planners work tirelessly to study the fault and develop strategies to safeguard communities. This includes updating building codes, enhancing public awareness, and conducting drills to ensure readiness. The historical legacy of the New Madrid Fault Line serves as a reminder that past events can inform and guide our preparation for future seismic activity.

The Role of Technology in Monitoring

The Role of Technology in Monitoring (image credits: wikimedia)

Advancements in technology play a pivotal role in monitoring the New Madrid Fault Line and mitigating its potential impact. Seismologists employ a network of sensors to detect even the slightest tremors, providing invaluable data for predicting future activity. These technological advancements enable scientists to track changes in the Earth’s crust, offering insights into the fault’s behavior. Additionally, early warning systems are being developed to provide real-time alerts, allowing communities to take immediate action in the event of an impending earthquake. Technology continues to be a vital ally in the ongoing effort to protect lives and property.

Community Involvement and Education

Community Involvement and Education (image credits: wikimedia)

Community involvement and education are crucial components of preparedness efforts surrounding the New Madrid Fault Line. Raising public awareness about the potential threat and teaching individuals how to respond during an earthquake can save lives. Schools, businesses, and local governments play a vital role in disseminating information and conducting drills to ensure readiness. By fostering a culture of preparedness, communities can bolster their resilience and reduce the impact of future seismic events. Education empowers individuals to take proactive measures, ensuring they are equipped to handle the challenges that may arise.

Environmental Considerations and Ecosystem Impact

Environmental Considerations and Ecosystem Impact (image credits: wikimedia)

Beyond the immediate threat to human life and infrastructure, the New Madrid Fault Line also poses potential environmental challenges. Earthquakes can trigger landslides, alter river courses, and disrupt ecosystems, impacting wildlife and natural habitats. The Mississippi River, a vital artery for commerce and transportation, could be significantly affected by seismic activity. Understanding the environmental consequences of an earthquake is essential for developing comprehensive response strategies that address both human and ecological needs. By considering the broader impact on the environment, we can work towards more holistic solutions.

Future Prospects and Challenges

Future Prospects and Challenges (image credits: wikimedia)

Looking to the future, the New Madrid Fault Line presents both opportunities and challenges. Continued research and monitoring are essential to unraveling its mysteries and improving our understanding of seismic activity. However, challenges remain in securing funding for ongoing studies and implementing effective mitigation measures. As the population in the central United States continues to grow, the need for proactive measures becomes increasingly urgent. Balancing economic development with safety considerations will be a key challenge for policymakers and communities alike. By investing in research and preparedness, we can better navigate the uncertainties posed by this overlooked earthquake threat.

A Call to Action: Embracing Preparedness

A Call to Action: Embracing Preparedness (image credits: unsplash)

In conclusion, the New Madrid Fault Line stands as a formidable yet often overlooked earthquake threat. Its potential to disrupt lives, reshape landscapes, and challenge communities demands our attention and action. By embracing preparedness, investing in research, and fostering community involvement, we can mitigate the impact of future seismic events. The lessons of history remind us that while we cannot predict when the next earthquake will strike, we can take proactive steps to protect ourselves and our communities. The New Madrid Fault Line is a powerful reminder of nature’s unpredictability, urging us to remain vigilant and prepared for whatever lies ahead.

Annette Uy

discoverwildscience.com · by Annette Uy · April 6, 2025

17. Relearning The Lessons We Never Learned From World War I

​One of the most anti-war (and anti-military) essays I have read in a long time. But it supports the return to Armistice Day from Veteran's Day.

Excerpts:

WWI ended on Nov. 11th, 1918, a day which was remembered as ‘Armistice Day’ in the US. Yearly we’d be reminded of this tribalistic calamity and inadvertently be made to ponder how our “great leaders” and “intellectuals” were utterly powerless to prevent the slaughters and were in fact their promoters. Unfortunately, on June 1, 1954, the Eisenhower administration renamed Armistice Day to the current Veterans Day.

Instead of thinking about the root fallacies leading to needless wars, we now praised young men for blindly taking orders to courageously and valiantly kill fellow human beings. In his classic essay “Patriotism” (1902) by the great Herbert Spencer, he describes how he once shocked a British general who was lamenting how British troops in Afghanistan were in danger when he told him: “When men hire themselves out to shoot other men to order, asking nothing about the justice of their cause, I don’t care if they are shot themselves.” This name change was a disastrous idea which may be inadvertently responsible for much of the militarism and warmongering that still plagues mankind.

Relearning The Lessons We Never Learned From World War I – OpEd

eurasiareview.com · by MISES · May 23, 2025

 May 24, 2025  0 Comments

By MISES

By Jorge Besada

By Jorge Besada

On August 10, 1915, British physicist Henry Mosely—who would’ve likely won the Nobel Prize that year—died in perhaps the most disastrous error mankind has thus far made, The First World War (1914-18). Bright and pious fellow humans that had absorbed German, French, British, Russian “identities”; students, fathers, engineers, “great minds,” and “experts,” who even shared a common European Christian heritage, reverted to their tribal ape-like nature. For “God, honor, flag, and country” they slaughtered each other, leading to about 20 million deaths and millions more left invalid. At 7:30 am, July 1, 1916 the Battle of the Somme began. On this single day, the British had about 20,000 fatalities and 35,000 wounded. Once the fighting commenced, a British soldier was killed or wounded on average every second. Taking into account about 12,000 German casualties, every 5 seconds 6 people would be killed or wounded.

Militaries—usually being the biggest competition-immune monopolies, protected by flag-waving tribalism—tend to be the most wasteful and slow changing bureaucracies around. By the beginning of the 20th century, the machine gun had already proven its worth, making cavalry charges and frontal assaults disastrous tactics. As military technology improves, toughness, valor, determination, etc. become less and less important, wounding our manly pride, and especially that of those cavalry men who were once formidable fighters, men like British Generals Douglas Haig and John French. Instead of using their reason and putting their flamboyant cavalry-riding years behind them, they spent their lives defending old techniques and downplaying the superior effectiveness of newer weapons like planes, tanks, and machine guns, at the expense of thousands of soldiers. In his 1907 book, Cavalry Studies, Haig declared that “the role of Cavalry on the battlefield will always go on increasing.” War historian John Ellis writes that according to:

…the British Cavalry Training Manual of 1907: “It must be accepted as a principle that the rifle, effective as it is, cannot replace the effect produced by the speed of the horse, the magnetism of the charge, and the terror of cold steel.” Luckily for the Germans, in the First World War, they used machine guns, pill boxes and barbed wire that seem to have been immune to such awesome tactics. That it took the British generals so long to get this through their heads is partly explained by the fact that nearly all of them were cavalry men. Thus Haig, in 1904, attacked a writer who “sneers at the effect produced by sword and lance in modern war; surely he forgets that it is not the weapon carried but the moral factor of an apparently irresistible force, coming on at highest speed in spite of rifle fire, which affects the nerves and aim of the…rifleman.” But rare were the cavalry men who came on in spite of sustained machine gun fire. Haig, above all people, should have learnt this simple lesson. Yet in 1926, in a review of a book by Liddell-Hard, Haig asserted that though there were some blasphemous spirits who thought that the horse might become extinct, at least on the battlefield, “I believe that the value of the horse and the opportunity for the horse in the future are likely to be as great as ever…. Aeroplanes and tanks are only accessories to the man and the horse, and I feel sure that as time goes on you will find just as much use for the horse—the well-bred horse—as you have ever done in the past.”

The “honor” of a military career would lead to disproportionately higher losses for the upper classes for all belligerents. Germany’s top general—Erich Ludendorff—lost two sons, as would future British Prime Minister Andrew Bonar Law. The British PM at the start of the war—Herbert Asquith—lost one. While about 12 percent of British troops would die in the war, 31 percent of Oxford’s 1913 graduating class would die. This should help abolish the popular myth that politicians are quick to bring about wars while wanting to avoid personal losses in them. Unfortunately, from an evolutionary perspective-hypothesis, human beings are tribal smarter apes that have been naturally selected to be vicious killers and to enjoy violence. Warfare-predation was an important evolutionary strategy and likely one of the reasons we are social and have evolved big brains to begin with. As popular science author Steven Pinker writes:

…men go to war to get or keep women—not necessarily as a conscious goal of the warriors (though often it is exactly that), but as the ultimate payoff that allowed a willingness to fight to evolve.

Tribal warfare, coercing each other, rape, and “the law of the jungle,” are things we’ve likely been doing for millions of years and are somewhat intuitive. Respecting private property and refraining from coercing others, and the workings of the free market—which grows and coordinates the modern, non-tribal socioeconomic order and has arisen in the last few thousand years—are not intuitive. This helps explain why we seem to intuitively fall for both warmongering violence and wealth redistribution via government, as well as “great leader” central planning. Hayek summarizes:

…man’s instincts…were not made for the kinds of surroundings, and for the numbers, in which he now lives. They were adapted to life in the small roving bands or troops in which the human race and its immediate ancestors evolved during the few million years while the biological constitution of homo sapiens was being formed.

Being social, smarter apes, fellow humans are our biggest assets, which helps explain the evolution of altruism and compassion. They are also our biggest competitors, which helps us understand our horrendous violence towards each other.

Given its importance, war patriotism easily fills us with a great sense of purpose. England’s prime minister during World War II and national hero, Winston Churchill, shows us how inspiring, exciting, and purposeful WWI was to him when he mentioned:

I think a curse should rest on me —because I love this war. I know it’s smashing and shattering the lives of thousands every moment — and yet— I can’t help it— I enjoy every second of it.

Churchill wrote to his wife: “Everything tends towards catastrophe and collapse. I am interested, geared up and happy. Is it not horrible to be built like that?” Churchill also told Prime Minister Asquith that his life’s ambition was: “to command great victorious armies in battle.” Churchill again: “My God! This is living History. Everything we are doing and saying is thrilling…. Why I would not be out of this glorious delicious war for anything the world could give me…”

Towards the end of WWII, Russia’s Red Army is estimated to have raped over 2 million German women. Equally human, the Allies-Americans were just as bad and generally saw the Japanese as an inferior race and cared little for their suffering, as US president who needlessly nuked Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Harry S. Truman, mentions in a letter: “The only language they seem to understand is the one we have been using to bombard them. When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast.”

WWI ended on Nov. 11th, 1918, a day which was remembered as ‘Armistice Day’ in the US. Yearly we’d be reminded of this tribalistic calamity and inadvertently be made to ponder how our “great leaders” and “intellectuals” were utterly powerless to prevent the slaughters and were in fact their promoters. Unfortunately, on June 1, 1954, the Eisenhower administration renamed Armistice Day to the current Veterans Day.

Instead of thinking about the root fallacies leading to needless wars, we now praised young men for blindly taking orders to courageously and valiantly kill fellow human beings. In his classic essay “Patriotism” (1902) by the great Herbert Spencer, he describes how he once shocked a British general who was lamenting how British troops in Afghanistan were in danger when he told him: “When men hire themselves out to shoot other men to order, asking nothing about the justice of their cause, I don’t care if they are shot themselves.” This name change was a disastrous idea which may be inadvertently responsible for much of the militarism and warmongering that still plagues mankind.

My favorite short books about war are John V. Denson’s A Century of War: Lincoln, Wilson & Roosevelt and Perpetual War For Perpetual Peace by one of the greatest and most courageous historians of all time, Harry Elmer Barnes. Murray Rothbard’s tribute to Barnes is a must (text, audio). Also, see the Denson-compiled The Costs of War: America’s Pyrrhic Victories. When it comes to WWI, check out In Quest of Truth and Justice: De-bunking the War Guilt Myth (1928) by Barnes, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (2014) by Christopher Clark, and Ralph Raico’s recorded presentation “The World at War” is a rite of passage for all intellectual freedom fighters.

• About the author: Jorge Besada is a computer programmer from Miami, Florida. He can be reached at [email protected], tweets at @hayekian and writes the “Hayekian” blog on Medium.
• Source: This article was published by the Mises Institute

eurasiareview.com · by MISES · May 23, 2025

18. Civilizational multipolarity in a post-Pax Americana world

​"Civilizational multipolarity" is a new term for me.

Excerpts:

From withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Climate Agreement to the chaotic exit from Afghanistan, Washington’s global posture has become more transactional. Conditional support for Ukraine and shifting rhetoric on NATO have deepened doubts about America’s reliability in its new role as an offshore balancer.

...

Yet the greater challenge may not be the retreat of the American umbrella itself but rather what emerges in its absence – a shift I call “civilizational multipolarity.”

What makes this moment distinct from any other in history is not just the redistribution of power – it is the nature of the actors now asserting that power. For the first time, multiple civilizational states – China, India, Russia and Iran – are rising within a shared global system.

Historian Professor Wang Gungwu calls this the return of “civilizational consciousness” – a dynamic in which states derive legitimacy not from universal norms but from deep structures of language, religion and institutional memory.

Civilizational multipolarity in a post-Pax Americana world - Asia Times

New order sees states derive legitimacy from deep structures of language, religion and institutional memory rather than universal norms

asiatimes.com · by Marcus Loh · May 24, 2025

In 2016, Singapore’s then-Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen was asked in Parliament how the country would respond if the United States were to pull back from its security commitments in Asia. At the time, the question was hypothetical.

Today, with Donald Trump in his second term and Ng stepping down after 14 years as Singapore’s longest-serving defense chief, the question has become reality. The American security umbrella – long taken for granted by many of its allies – appears to be fraying.

The post-WWII order, underwritten by US military dominance and financial centrality, is no longer assured. And in anticipation of a post-Pax Americana world, states are adjusting accordingly for a new order.

American fault lines

The first fault line lies in deterrence. For decades, US allies were content to rely on American protection rather than build up their own armed forces. That era is over. Germany has committed US$107 billion to defense upgrades. Poland now spends 4% of GDP on its military – more than any other NATO member.

Asia tells a similar story. Japan is doubling its defense budget by 2027, upending long-standing pacifist traditions. In South Korea, 76% of citizens now support developing nuclear weapons – an idea once unthinkable under the US nuclear umbrella. Across both regions, allies are hedging against the possibility of American abandonment.

The second fault line is financial. The American military’s reach has long been sustained by global demand for US Treasuries. But the foundations of that system are weakening. In FY2023, the US ran a budget deficit of $1.7 trillion, $1.1 trillion of which went to defense and veterans’ spending.

Meanwhile, foreign appetite for American debt is shrinking. Overseas ownership of US Treasuries has dropped from 42% in 2013 to 31% in 2023. China alone has reduced its holdings by more than $330 billion. The dollar’s share of global foreign reserves, once above 70% in 1999, has fallen to 58%.

What’s more, the weaponization of the dollar – through sanctions, export controls and financial restrictions – has spurred countermeasures. The BRICS bloc is expanding non-dollar trade and exploring alternatives like central bank digital currencies. Economist Dr Yanis Varoufakis calls this the rise of “cloud capital”, a global financial architecture slowly decoupling from American control.

The third fault line is institutional. The legitimacy of US leadership was once rooted in its commitment to multilateralism. Today, that commitment appears selective.

From withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Climate Agreement to the chaotic exit from Afghanistan, Washington’s global posture has become more transactional. Conditional support for Ukraine and shifting rhetoric on NATO have deepened doubts about America’s reliability in its new role as an offshore balancer.

The recent India–Pakistan conflict – killing over 50 civilians and inflicting $90 billion in economic damage by some estimates – revealed how quickly a confrontation between nuclear powers can now spiral without a more timely US intervention.

Rise of civilizational multipolarity

Yet the greater challenge may not be the retreat of the American umbrella itself but rather what emerges in its absence – a shift I call “civilizational multipolarity.”

What makes this moment distinct from any other in history is not just the redistribution of power – it is the nature of the actors now asserting that power. For the first time, multiple civilizational states – China, India, Russia and Iran – are rising within a shared global system.

Historian Professor Wang Gungwu calls this the return of “civilizational consciousness” – a dynamic in which states derive legitimacy not from universal norms but from deep structures of language, religion and institutional memory.

China exemplifies this shift. As scholar Dr Martin Jacques observes, China views itself not merely as a nation-state but as a “civilization-state,” with 5,000 years of political tradition and moral philosophy. The Chinese Communist Party’s claim to authority is not based on liberal norms but on restoring what it sees as the Middle Kingdom’s rightful place in history.

This has far-reaching consequences. Professor Graham Allison’s “Thucydides Trap” warns of conflict when a rising power threatens a ruling one. But in today’s context, the competition is not only over power – it is over values and visions of world order.

Professor John Mearsheimer has argued that liberal internationalism cannot survive in a world governed by nationalism and realism. Civilizational multipolarity intensifies that prognosis: Powers now export governance models rooted in their own traditions rather than converging on a single set of norms.

Plurality and co-existence

Professor Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” posits that cultural and religious identities will inevitably drive global conflict in the post-Cold War era, as fundamental civilizational differences – rooted in history, religion, and values – become irreconcilable fault lines between nations and blocs.

But there is still agency in how states respond. ASEAN, for instance, offers an instructive model through its principle of “omni-enmeshment”, an approach that avoids binary alliances while encouraging engagement across civilizational lines.

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Rather than choosing sides, ASEAN states create space for dialogue and cooperation, preserving autonomy while participating in global governance. If the global community can embrace this ethos, civilizational multipolarity need not be seen as a threat, but as an opportunity: the foundation for a more pluralistic order within a shared framework.

Singapore’s new Defense Minister, Chan Chun Sing, captured this outlook well when he remarked at the 41st IISS-Asia Fullerton Lecture in 2021: “Middle powers and small states can help to build bridges, create platforms for dialogue and uphold the multilateral system. By working together, we can provide alternative pathways for cooperation, even when larger powers disagree.”

If this transition is managed wisely, the post-American era need not mark the unraveling of global order. It could instead herald the rise of a more inclusive, resilient and balanced system, one not defined by dominance, but by the peaceful co-existence and constructive engagement of civilizations.

That would be a first in human history. And perhaps, its greatest achievement.

Marcus Loh is a Director at Temus, a Singapore-based digital transformation services firm, where he leads public affairs, marketing and strategic communication. He was formerly the president of the Institute of Public Relations of Singapore.

He presently serves on the digital transformation chapter executive committee of SGTech, the leading trade association for Singapore’s technology industry. Loh completed an executive program in public leadership from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and earned master’s degrees from the Singapore Management University and University College, Dublin.

asiatimes.com · by Marcus Loh · May 24, 2025

19. EU to sustain Radio Free Europe with emergency funding after Trump cuts

Perhaps this is a useful way ahead. We could have a consortium of countries fund these organizations and provide journalist and language expertise.

VOA - Voice of America could become VOA - "Voices of Allies."

No need to change Radio Free Europe if it is funded by the US/EU/NATO countries. Radio Free Asia could remain as well and be funded by Asia-Pacific Allies and the US.

A win for President Trump's unconventional diplomacy and remaking the US bureaucracy, wins for VOA/RFE/RL/RFA, wins for the employees, and wins for the people living in denied areas under the rule of despots and dictators.

And with journalistic reporting autonomy, but funded by allied governments without editorial interference, it would reinforce the foundational principles of democracies and republics - a free press.

News

|

Donald Trump

EU to sustain Radio Free Europe with emergency funding after Trump cuts

Outlet is one of several media services whose funding was cut by the Trump administration amid an aggressive downsizing effort.

https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2025/5/20/eu-to-sustain-radio-free-europe-with-emergency-funding-after-trump-cuts

US President Donald Trump's administration accused Radio Free Europe of promoting a liberal bias and labeled its content as 'propaganda' when it cut funding [David W Cerny/Reuters]Published On 20 May 2025

20 May 2025

The European Union plans to step in to help save longtime media outlet Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) after United States President Donald Trump’s administration abruptly stopped funding it.

The bloc’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, told reporters after a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels on Tuesday that 5.5 million euros ($6.2m) will be provided to “support the vital work of Radio Free Europe”.

“It’s short-term emergency funding designed as a safety net for the independent journalism,” she added.

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Trump suspended all funding for RFE/RL in March along with other US broadcasters, including Voice of America, to slash government spending.

Critics of the administration said the cuts are also politically motivated and part of a push to control and curb news media that do not hew to its outlook.

Trump earlier this month signed an executive order slashing federal subsidies to two US public broadcasters, PBS and NPR , accusing them of biased reporting and spreading “left-wing” propaganda.

Lawyers for RFE/RL, which has been operating for 75 years, secured an order last month from a US federal judge for the Trump administration to restore $12m that was appropriated by Congress.

The money has not been sent so far as lawyers said the service will have to shut down in June without the funding.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty headquarters in Prague, Czech Republic [File: David W Cerny/Reuters]Kallas said on Tuesday that the EU funding would not cover the work of the outlet across the globe but would focus on interests closer to the agenda of the bloc.“So our focus should be really to help Radio Free Europe to work and function in those countries that are in our neighbourhood and that are very much dependent on news coming from outside,” she said.

The EU’s top diplomat said she hoped the 27 EU member countries would also provide more funds to help Radio Free Europe longer term. Kallas said the bloc has been looking for “strategic areas” where it can help as Washington cuts life-saving foreign aid.

The outlet’s corporate headquarters are in Washington, DC, and its journalistic headquarters are based in the Czech Republic. The service has aired programmes in 27 languages in 23 countries across Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East and has more than 1,700 staff.

The outlet has been heavily criticised and banned by Russia for its coverage of the war in Ukraine.

Radio Free Europe began broadcasting in 1950 in the early years of the Cold War to several Eastern European nations that had become Soviet Union satellites. Radio Liberty began broadcasting to Russia a few years later. Both were initially funded by the US Congress through the Central Intelligence Agency.

Source: Al Jazeera and news agencies

20. Radio Free Asia silenced by Trump's spending cuts

This is from NHK in Japan. Perhaps Japan and other allies will contribute to an allied consortium for RFA and VOA - Voices of Allies and resurrect this important mission that is necessary to counter the CRInK.

Mr. Musk is both ignorant and ill-informed. He should stick to Tesla. Radical propaganda? VOA and RFA have long been the only journalism platforms that inform publics in hostile, denied areas about American policy. And they would be doing the same for the current administration's policy through news reporting while demonstrating the fundamental American (and llied) value of a free press.

Excerpts:

But Trump takes a different view. His administration says the funding cut will ensure taxpayers are "no longer on the hook for radical propaganda."

Elon Musk, who heads the Department of Government Efficiency, was equally dismissive about the affected media outlets, which include Voice of America ― the largest international broadcaster in the United States.

"Nobody listens to them anymore," he said.

Radio Free Asia silenced by Trump's spending cuts

nhk.or.jp3 min

View Original

"It's really silent, not like the newsroom used to be," says RFA President Bay Fang. "It was a really sad day when everyone was gathering up their belongings."

According to Fang, about 75 percent of the organization's 300 or so staff members in the United States have been furloughed. Broadcasts in nine languages are down from about 63 hours per day to seven.

Bay Fang, left, Radio Free Asia president, shows NHK World through its emptied-out headquarters in Washington DC.

Congress created RFA following the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident in China. The outlet has since earned global acclaim for uncovering a string of alleged human rights abuses, including China's reeducation camps in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

"The idea is to actually just broadcast, not propaganda, not any kind of messaging to these different populations around Asia, but actually to give access to the truth," says Fang.

RFA broadcasts in nine languages.

Taxpayers 'off the hook'

But Trump takes a different view. His administration says the funding cut will ensure taxpayers are "no longer on the hook for radical propaganda."

Elon Musk, who heads the Department of Government Efficiency, was equally dismissive about the affected media outlets, which include Voice of America ― the largest international broadcaster in the United States.

"Nobody listens to them anymore," he said.

Fang, on the other hand, insists millions are still tuned in. "You only have to look at how countries like China, Cambodia or Vietnam, the dictators that run these countries, are celebrating the decision to defund RFA."

RFA chief Bay Fang spoke to NHK World in April.

The Global Times, a newspaper affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party, has described US government-funded media as a "lie factory." And former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen maintains Trump's cuts will eliminate the "fake news" coming out of a "propaganda machine."

Tibetans lose key voice

RFA is one of the few outlets that can reach people in the Tibet Autonomous Region via shortwave transmission. Broadcasts used to run for about five hours per day. But now, it's more like 20 minutes.

"Despite China trying to jam signals and confiscate satellites, Tibetans continue to listen secretly," says service director Tenzin Pema. "They go to the rooftops or even mountaintops to listen. It's a ritual that has sustained them for so many years. And it's a ritual that has now unfortunately been silenced."

Tenzin Pema, RFA's Tibetan service director

"For many, they've always looked to their American broadcasts from independent media organizations as a way to understand that the international community has not forgotten them. It has provided them hope for a future that is free. But now, this is being seen as symbolic of the fact that they are actually forgotten."

People across Washington are lamenting the funding cuts. They include Michael Sobolik, a Senior Fellow at leading think tank Hudson Institute, who previously served as a congressional staffer in the Senate.

Sobolik says he relied on RFA's reporting when collecting facts about China. And he calls the Trump administration's decision a "self-imposed mistake."

"I think RFA became collateral damage in a broader effort to take out the waste of Voice of America," he says. "There were some concerns about politicized opinion, politicized reporting. But the problem with how the administration went about it was taking the good out with the bad."

Hudson Institute Senior Fellow Michael Sobolik speaks to NHK World.

Regimes fill the void

Sobolik warns other nations are rushing to fill the empty air waves with their own narratives. "The message that China is pushing right now is that the US can't be trusted ― that we're capricious, that we act on a whim," he says.

Sobolik says RFA was one of the strongest elements in a "containment mechanism" against Beijing, because "every authoritarian regime is afraid of the truth."

On April 22, a federal judge blocked the Trump administration from dismantling three organizations operated by the Agency for Global Media: Voice of America, Middle East Broadcasting Networks, and Radio Free Asia.

Still, RFA is yet to receive any funding and it may be forced to lay off most of its remaining employees.

Work visas could be next on the chopping block. And deported journalists could suddenly face persecution from the regimes they've been holding to account.

21. How Much Discrimination Do Americans Say Groups Face in the U.S.?

​Pew Research.

Please go to the link to view the graphics.

• Report

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May 20, 2025

• How Much Discrimination Do Americans Say Groups Face in the U.S.?

Republicans are less likely to say there is discrimination against Black, Hispanic, Asian and White people than a year ago

https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2025/05/20/how-much-discrimination-do-americans-say-groups-face-in-the-u-s/

How we did this

Large majorities of Americans say numerous groups in the United States face at least some discrimination, including immigrants, transgender people and members of different racial and religious groups.

About eight-in-ten (82%) say immigrants who are in the U.S. illegally experience a lot of or some discrimination – including 57% who say they face a lot of discrimination, according to a new Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults.

That is the highest share for any group among 20 included in the survey. Still, there is a widespread belief that many other societal groups also are discriminated against:

• 77% say people who are transgender face at least some discrimination, with 48% saying this group experiences a lot of discrimination.
• 74% say Muslims in the U.S. face a lot of or some discrimination, while a similar share (72%) say Jews face at least some discrimination. Roughly a third say there is a lot of discrimination against those in each of these groups.
• Nearly three-quarters of Americans say Black people (74%) and Hispanic people (72%) face at least some discrimination. About two-thirds (66%) say Asian people face a lot of or some discrimination.
• While there is a widespread perception that immigrants who are in the U.S. illegally face discrimination, 65% say immigrants who are legally in this country also face a lot of or some bias.
• 70% say people who are gay or lesbian encounter at least some discrimination.

There is also variation in perceptions of discrimination across other demographic categories:

Women and men. Nearly two-thirds of adults (64%) say women face at least some discrimination, with far fewer (34%) saying the same about men.

Religious groups. A 57% majority of adults say people who are religious are subject to a lot of or some discrimination; just a third say atheists in the U.S. face at least some bias. When asked about specific religious groups, far fewer Americans (43%) say evangelical Christians face a lot of or some discrimination than say this about either Muslims (74%) or Jews (72%).

Age groups. A much larger share of the public says older people (59%) than younger people (40%) face at least some discrimination in the U.S.

Where people live. Fewer than half of Americans say that people living in rural areas or city dwellers face a lot of or some discrimination. But a larger share say rural residents are subject to at least some discrimination (41%) than say this about people living in cities (33%).

These are among the key findings of a national Pew Research Center survey of 3,589 U.S. adults conducted April 7-13, 2025.

The survey also finds that perceptions of discrimination against racial and ethnic groups – Black people, Hispanic people, Asian people and White people – have declined over the past year. These changes have been largely driven by Republicans and Republican-leaning independents. There have been virtually no changes in the views of Democrats and Democratic leaners over this period.

Republicans and Democrats continue to have very different views of how much discrimination many groups face in the U.S. While there have been some shifts since last year, the partisan patterns are consistent. 

Democrats are more likely than Republicans to say most of the groups asked about face at least some discrimination. But there are exceptions among certain groups.

Groups that Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say experience a lot of or some discrimination:

• White people (55% of Republicans vs. 21% of Democrats)
• Evangelical Christians (57% vs. 31%)
• Men (42% vs. 27%)
• People who are religious (63% vs. 51%)

Democrats are more likely than Republicans to say that 15 of 20 groups included in the survey face a lot of or some discrimination. These are the widest differences:

• People who are gay or lesbian (90% of Democrats vs. 50% of Republicans)
• Black people (94% vs. 54%)
• Immigrants who are in the U.S. legally (84% vs. 45%)
• Hispanic people (90% vs. 54%)
• Women (80% vs. 47%)

Partisan differences extend to how much discrimination various groups face. For instance, while majorities in both partisan coalitions (94% of Democrats, 69% of Republicans) say that people who are in the U.S. illegally face at least some discrimination, Democrats are about twice as likely as Republicans to say they face a lot of discrimination (75% vs. 37%).

Similarly, majorities of Republicans and Democrats say transgender people and Muslims in the U.S. face at least some discrimination. But in both cases, far larger shares of Democrats than Republicans say they face a lot of discrimination.

For some groups, however, there is little to no partisan gap in these perceptions. Sizable majorities in both parties (77% of Democrats, 69% of Republicans) say Jews in the U.S. face at least some bias, including about three-in-ten in each party who say Jews face a lot of discrimination. And Democrats (44%) and Republicans (39%) are about equally likely to say people in rural areas face discrimination.

Declining shares of Americans say the country’s largest racial and ethnic groups face at least some discrimination, and this decline is driven primarily by Republicans.

Between 2024 and 2025, the shares of Republicans who say each group faces a lot of or some discrimination declined by roughly 10 percentage points for:

• Black people (66% in 2024, 54% now)
• Hispanic people (66% in 2024, 54% now)
• Asian people (66% in 2024, 51% now)
• White people (66% in 2024, 55% now)

The shares of Democrats who say these groups face at least some discrimination are essentially unchanged from last year.

Read Chapter 1 for more on Americans’ views of discrimination against racial and ethnic groups.

Related: Views of Race, Policing and Black Lives Matter in the 5 Years Since George Floyd’s Killing

Americans are also less likely to say Muslims and Jews face discrimination than a year ago. The shares saying Muslims (34%) and Jews (30%) experience a lot of discrimination are down 10 points from early last year. The share of Americans saying Muslims experience discrimination is now lower than at any point over the last eight years. But the share saying Jews face discrimination is higher than it was from 2017 to 2021.

Read Chapter 2 for more on Americans’ views of how much discrimination there is against Muslims, Jews and evangelicals.

The share of Republicans saying there is discrimination against people who are gay or lesbian has also declined. Half of Republicans now say gay and lesbian people face at least some discrimination, down from 59% in 2021 and 64% in 2017. Democrats (90%) continue to overwhelmingly say gays and lesbians experience discrimination.

Read Chapter 3 for more on Americans’ views of how much discrimination there is for women, men, transgender and gay and lesbian people.

​22. 30% of Americans Consult Astrology, Tarot Cards or Fortune Tellers

​What is the national security relationship of this piece? It depends on the answer to this question: Are any of our national security experts and political leaders among the 30%? (note attempt at humor)

National Security professional is not one of the categories listed below.

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May 21, 2025

• Share

30% of Americans Consult Astrology, Tarot Cards or Fortune Tellers

Most say they engage in these practices for fun, rather than for insights or guidance on life decisions

https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2025/05/21/3-in-10-americans-consult-astrology-tarot-cards-or-fortune-tellers/

By

Chip Rotolo

A fortune teller arranges tarot cards on table. (Prathan Chorruangsak/Getty Images)

How we did this

Over the past decade, media reports have described rising popular interest in New Age practices such as astrology, tarot card reading and fortune-telling. These practices are frequently associated with young people, and they have developed their own social media cultures on TikTok and other platforms, especially during the period of social distancing brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic. So, how popular are these practices, and why do Americans engage in them?

A fall 2024 Pew Research Center survey finds that 30% of U.S. adults say they consult astrology (or a horoscope), tarot cards or a fortune teller at least once a year, but most do so just for fun, and few Americans say they make major decisions based on what they learn along the way.

Here are other key takeaways from the nationally representative survey of 9,593 U.S. adults.

Despite recent attention to astrology, the number of Americans who believe in astrology doesn’t appear to have changed very much in recent years. On the new survey, 27% of U.S. adults say they “believe in astrology (the position of the stars and planets can affect people’s lives).” That is not significantly different from what we found when we asked an identical question in 2017 (29%). And, although the results of earlier surveys may not be directly comparable because of differences in methodology, Gallup polls from 1990 to 2005 consistently found that between 23% and 28% of Americans believed in astrology.1

On most questions we asked about these practices, there are big differences by age and gender. Younger adults – and especially younger women – are more likely to believe in astrology and to consult astrology or horoscopes. For example, 43% of women ages 18 to 49 say they believe in astrology. That compares with 27% of women ages 50 and older, 20% of men ages 18 to 49, and 16% of men who are 50 and older.

Americans who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT) are especially likely to consult astrology or a horoscope, and tarot cards.2 About half of LGBT Americans (54%) consult astrology or a horoscope at least yearly – roughly twice the share among U.S. adults overall (28%). And LGBT women are more likely than LGBT men to consult astrology at least yearly (63% vs. 40%).

In addition, 33% of LGBT adults say they consult tarot cards – making them three times as likely as U.S. adults overall to say this (11%). And 21% of LGBT Americans say that when they make major life decisions, they rely at least a little on what they’ve learned from astrology or a horoscope, tarot cards, or a fortune teller. While there is limited academic research on the topic, media publications focused on LGBTQ+ issues have described the prevalence of New Age practices in the LGBTQ+ community.

Yet, most Americans who engage in astrology, tarot cards or fortune-telling say they do it for fun, rather than for insights or guidance on life decisions. Overall, 20% of U.S. adults say they engage in at least one of these activities mostly “just for fun,” while 10% say they do them mostly because they “believe the practices give them helpful insights.”

Relatively few Americans make major life decisions based on what they learn from astrology, tarot cards or fortune tellers. Just 1% of U.S. adults say they rely a lot on what they have learned from these practices when making major life decisions. An additional 5% say they rely a little on what they have learned.

Fewer than one-in-ten Americans engage in these practices on a weekly basis. While there are now abundant ways – both online and in person – to consult a horoscope, tarot cards and fortune tellers, just 6% of Americans report that they participate in one or more of these activities at least weekly. More (14%) say they engage monthly in at least one of these practices.

Read on to learn more about how different demographic groups answer questions about:

• Belief in astrology
• Consulting astrology or horoscopes, tarot cards, and fortune tellers
• Engaging in these practices for fun versus for insight

Belief in astrology

Religiously affiliated Americans and religiously unaffiliated Americans are equally likely to believe in astrology (27% and 28%, respectively).

(Religiously unaffiliated Americans are those who identify religiously as atheist, agnostic or “nothing in particular.”)

But some religious groups are especially likely to believe that the position of stars and planets can affect people’s lives.

About one-third or more of Black Protestants, Hispanic Catholics and adults who say their religion is “nothing in particular” say they believe in astrology.

On the other hand, atheists, agnostics, White evangelical Protestants and Jewish Americans are less likely than the general public to say they believe in astrology.

The survey included respondents of many other religious backgrounds, including members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (widely known as Mormons), Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists. But there are not enough respondents from these smaller groups to report on their answers separately.

Views among demographic subgroups

More advanced statistical analyses show that belief in astrology also varies significantly across demographic categories. We ran regression analyses to examine the independent effects of a number of factors – including gender, age, race, educational attainment, political party, ideology, income level, region, and LGBT identity – on belief in astrology while holding all else equal.

In addition to differences by religion, there are sizable gaps across the following demographic categories:

• Gender: Women are about twice as likely as men to believe in astrology (35% vs. 18%). Women ages 18 to 49 are especially likely to express belief (43%).
• Age: Americans under 65 are more likely than adults 65 and older to believe in astrology.
• LGBT identity: LGBT adults are much more likely than adults who are not LGBT to believe in astrology (43% vs. 26%).
• Income: U.S. adults with lower incomes are about twice as likely as adults in the upper-income category to believe in astrology (37% vs. 16%).
• Ideology: Americans who identify as politically conservative are less likely than moderates and liberals to believe in astrology.
• Education: U.S. adults without college degrees are more likely than college graduates to believe in astrology.
• Race and ethnicity: Black Americans are more likely than White and Asian Americans to believe in astrology.

Belief in astrology among these demographic subgroups has changed little since we asked this question in 2017. A slight decline among political conservatives (4 percentage points) is the only difference that is statistically significant.

Consulting astrology or horoscopes, tarot cards, and fortune tellers

The share of Americans who say they consult astrology or a horoscope at least once or twice a year (28%) parallels the share who say they believe in astrology (27%).

Hispanic Catholics (39%), Black Protestants (33%) and adults who say their religion is “nothing in particular” (35%) are among the most likely to say they consult astrology at least annually.

About one-in-ten Americans consult tarot cards at least annually. On the whole, religiously unaffiliated Americans are slightly more likely than religiously affiliated Americans to say they consult tarot cards at least yearly (14% vs. 10%). But this is primarily due to the use of tarot cards by agnostics and people who say their religion is “nothing in particular,” rather than by atheists.

Religious differences in consulting a fortune teller are not very pronounced.

When asked about consulting astrology or a horoscope, tarot cards, or fortune tellers, White evangelicals and atheists are among the groups that are most likely to say they never engage in the practices.

Views among demographic subgroups

About half of LGBT adults (54%) say they consult astrology or a horoscope at least annually.

Also, 37% of women say they do this at least once a year – a figure that rises to 46% among women ages 18 to 49.

Americans in lower-income households are more likely than those in upper-income households to say they consult astrology annually – as are those who describe themselves as politically liberal, compared with self-identified conservatives.

While religious groups in this analysis generally don’t differ much in their propensity to consult tarot cards, there are relatively large differences by LGBT identity, gender and age.

LGBT adults are about three times as likely as non-LGBT adults to report consulting tarot cards at least annually (33% vs. 9%). And 15% of LGBT adults say they consult tarot cards at least once or twice a month. (Refer to the detailed tables for more information about how often people in different demographic groups say they engage in these practices.)

Nearly a quarter of Americans ages 18 to 29 say they consult tarot cards at least annually, compared with just 6% of Americans ages 50 to 64 and 3% of Americans who are 65 and older. There are also differences by gender, income level and political ideology, though no more than about a third of adults in any demographic group we have analyzed say they consult tarot cards at least yearly.

Consulting a fortune teller is also relatively rare among all the groups in this analysis, though there are some notable differences by age, and by race and ethnicity. For example, 14% of U.S. adults under 30 say they consult a fortune teller, compared with 2% of those ages 65 and older. And 15% of Asian Americans say they consult a fortune teller at least yearly, compared with 3% of White Americans. Overall, 6% of U.S. adults consult a fortune teller at least once or twice a year.

Engaging in these practices for fun versus for insight

A majority of U.S. adults who engage in at least one of these three practices say they do so mostly “just for fun,” rather than because they “believe the practices give them helpful insights.”

That said, Hispanic Catholics, Black Protestants and adults who say their religion is “nothing in particular” are among the most likely to say they believe that consulting a fortune teller, tarot cards or astrology gives them helpful insights.

Overall, 16% of Hispanic Catholics and 14% of Black Protestants say they engage in these practices mostly for helpful insights and not just for fun.

When asked why they take part in these practices, LGBT adults once again stand out. They are the most likely of all the demographic subgroups analyzed in the survey to say they consult fortune tellers, tarot cards or horoscopes to obtain helpful insights (29% do this).

Nearly one-in-five Black Americans and Americans ages 18 to 29 also say they engage in these practices for helpful insights.

Making major life decisions based on these practices

Respondents who said they use at least one of these three practices mostly to gain helpful insights were asked an additional question: “When you make major decisions about your life, how much do you rely on what you’ve learned from a fortune teller, tarot cards, astrology or a horoscope?” The response options were “A lot,” “A little” or “Not at all.”

Just 1% of Americans say they rely on insights from these practices a lot when making major life decisions, and an additional 5% say they rely on them a little.

Hispanic Catholics (12%) are more likely than most other religious groups to say they rely on insights from these practices at least a little when making major life decisions.

About one-in-five LGBT adults (21%) say that when they make major life decisions, they rely at least a little on what they’ve learned from a fortune teller, tarot cards, astrology or a horoscope. This is considerably larger than the share of any other demographic subgroup that says this.

Younger Americans (13%), people with lower incomes (11%) and Americans who are ideologically liberal (9%) are somewhat more likely than their counterparts (i.e., older, upper-income and ideologically conservative Americans, respectively) to say they rely on insights from a fortune teller, tarot cards, astrology or a horoscope when making major life decisions.

Likewise, Asian (12%), Black (11%) and Hispanic (9%) Americans are somewhat more likely than White Americans (4%) to rely on insights from these practices when making major life decisions.

Next: Acknowledgments

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1. Pew Research Center has previously asked some other questions about topics covered in this report, though question wording has varied. Recently, in a 2024 survey of three dozen countries, 9% of U.S. adults said they consult a fortune teller, horoscope or other way to see the future. The current survey does not specifically define astrology, horoscopes, tarot cards or fortune-telling as ways to see the future.↩
2. Respondents who did not answer the question about sexual orientation, or selected the “Don’t know” or “Something else” response options, are not included in the lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT) or non-LGBT categories.↩

23. Optimizing U.S. and Allied Forces for Deterrence and Defense Throughout Indo-Pacom: From Korea to Australia and Everywhere in Between

Opinion / Perspective| The Latest

Optimizing U.S. and Allied Forces for Deterrence and Defense Throughout Indo-Pacom: From Korea to Australia and Everywhere in Between

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/24/us-allies-deterrence-indo-pacific/

by David Maxwell

|

05.24.2025 at 06:00am

We are at a critical inflection point in the Indo-Pacific. As China, Russia, Iran, and north Korea, (collectively and informally named the “CRInK,”) expand their influence and strategic cooperation, malign activities, and threats to peace and stability. The United States and its allies must respond with agility, unity, and resolve. The core question is not just how many American troops are in a specific location, but whether U.S. forces are organized, trained, equipped, and postured in a way that deters adversaries, reassures allies, and ensures mutual defense across the entire region, from the Korean Peninsula to Australia and beyond.

Recent reports, such as the Wall Street Journal’s coverage of potential U.S. troop reductions in South Korea, have triggered concern and confusion among policymakers, the public, and our allies. Although the Pentagon immediately denied the report and reinforced support for the alliance, the underlying issue is strategic: How do we optimize U.S. and allied forces to meet current and emerging threats in the Indo-Pacific?

The Imperative of Strategic Synchronization

For the first time in decades, we have strategic alignment among the Indo-PACOM Commander, the Commander of the United Nations Command, the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces Korea. These commanders recognize that the threats from China, North Korea, and their partners cannot be addressed in isolation. Taiwan and Korea are not separate challenges. They are connected potential conflict areas in a broader strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific theater. Any review of U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific must be holistic, theater-informed, and synchronized with our treaty allies in South Korea, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines foremost among them.

This review cannot and must not be driven solely from the Pentagon. It must begin with assessments and recommendations from those closest to the threats, the theater experts who understand regional dynamics and alliance requirements. Top-down directives that ignore local insight risk repeating past mistakes, undermining deterrence, and weakening trust among partners.

Beyond Troop Numbers: Metrics of Commitment

Unfortunately, public discourse often reduces alliance commitment to a single, misleading metric: the number of U.S. troops in-country. This narrow lens not only distorts reality but also risks damaging alliance cohesion. Technology, capabilities, operational doctrine, and campaign plans, not troop numbers, must guide force posture. Modern deterrence is about capability, credibility, and will, and not just physical presence.

Whether forces are stationed in CONUS, Guam, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Hawaii, Alaska, or Australia, what matters most is that they are positioned to contribute to theater-wide deterrence, rapid response, and the mutual defense of allies. Repositioning forces to increase survivability, flexibility, and strategic agility is not abandonment, it is adaptation to a dynamic threat environment.

Every movement of troops must be understood in context: Is it part of a broader strategy to increase deterrence options across the first and second island chains? Is it enhancing our ability to support allies under threat? Is it building resilience and sustainability for long-term competition and conflict?

The CRInK Strategy and the “Silk Web” of Alliances

The CRInK powers recognize the United States’ asymmetric advantage: our global network of alliances and partnerships. Their collective strategy seeks to weaken that “silk web” by exploiting fissures in allied trust, spreading disinformation, and provoking fear that the U.S. will prioritize one ally or region over another. Pundits, policy makers, and the press inadvertently support their efforts when they focus myopically on troops numbers and whether those number indicate commitment or abandonment. If we appear to prioritize Taiwan over Korea, or vice versa, adversaries win.

To counter this, U.S. and allied leaders must reinforce two messages to their publics:

1. Strategic Resolve: The U.S. and allies will fulfill all their treaty obligations across the Indo-Pacific. Period.
2. Strategic Reassurance: Deterrence is a shared mission, and it requires shared sacrifice, coordination, and integration of U.S. and allied forces.

It is not the sole responsibility of the U.S. to bear the burden of deterrence. Allied militaries must also optimize their own force structures, modernize capabilities, and deepen interoperability with U.S. forces. The question is not only how the U.S. stations troops, but how all allies contribute to the collective defense architecture. Every country first and foremost owns its own defense burden. Therefore, there must be “burden owning” to have burden sharing.

Organize, Train, Equip, Station, Optimize

We must answer these four strategic questions:

1. How do we organize U.S. and allied forces across the Indo-Pacific to provide a deterrence architecture that is integrated and synchronized?
2. How do we train together, multilaterally and bilaterally, to ensure readiness for high-end conflict across domains and geographies?
3. How do we equip our forces with interoperable systems, resilient C4ISR, and the platforms needed to fight and win in a contested environment?
4. How do we station forces smartly, balancing forward presence, mobility, survivability, and strategic agility?

Answers to these questions cannot come solely from Washington. They must emerge from sustained dialogue between theater commands, allied militaries, and civilian leaders. The objective is not just deterrence by denial, but deterrence by integration: integrating U.S. and allied forces into a credible, combined defense posture that signals unwavering resolve.

Toward a Unified Defense Posture

The way ahead requires new structures and concepts. Some concepts for possible consideration:

• Combined Multi-Domain Task Forces positioned across the region. (e.g., build the first one in Korea initially and then in each allied country)
• Shared logistics networks and prepositioned stocks to reduce response time.
• Interoperable C2 systems to allow real-time coordination among allies.
• A Joint Arsenal of Democracy, exemplified by a JAROKUS (Japan-ROK-U.S.) shipbuilding consortium.
• Integrated exercises such as Talisman Sabre, Yama Sakura, Balikatan, and Freedom Shield and others that simulate real-world, combined response to regional crises.

Strategic Agility Platforms

It is time to break the calcified concepts of overseas basing. Each ally provides unique operational basing capabilities. Each should be viewed as a ‘strategic agility platform” that can serve multiple purposes such as a training location, a deployment platform, an intermediate staging base, and a base for permanently assigned forces. The Camp Humphreys and Osan Air Base complex can serve as a model for this. This takes particular advantage of the largest overseas U.S. military base. Forces at Camp Humphreys/Osan would serve as a deterrent force that is dual apportioned to multiple contingencies across the spectrum of conflict thus providing the US and allies strategic agility.

U.S. Forces Korea’s mission would remain nearly the same as a subunified command assigned to INDOPACOM, and a supporting command and force provider to the warfighting headquarters, the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command. Since it is already headquartered at a strategic agility platform its mission would expand as a force provider and intermediate staging base for other contingencies as required. Its comparative advantage as a proven force provider would make it a theater force multiplier while contributing to deterrence on the Korean peninsula.

Key to this concept is a robust integrated missile defense capability to defend these locations. This needs to be a high priority for US and alliance planning and development.

This could be an opportunity for building a 21st-century version of Churchill and Eisenhower’s vision of a “grand alliance,” but adapted from World War II to the Indo-Pacific battlespace and anchored in mutual defense treaties to address both great power politics and multiple potential conflicts.

Conclusion: Allies Always

We must resist being trapped by headlines and simplistic narratives. U.S. commitment to Korea or Australia, to Japan or Taiwan or the Philippines, cannot be measured in troop numbers alone. It must be measured in capability, responsiveness, and alliance cohesion.

The bottom line is we need the right U.S. and allied force with the right capabilities, in the right locations, at the right time to provide the U.S. and the leaders of the silk web alliance architecture the ability to seize the initiative and create dilemmas for our adversaries across the spectrum of conflict in the gray zone and during multiple contingencies.

We must communicate clearly: Every decision we make is in service of regional deterrence, mutual defense, and strategic agility. As the security environment evolves, so must our posture. But we evolve with our allies, not apart from them.

Let us remember: America First, Allies Always. Because in this era of great power competition, our alliances are not just our values—they are our most vital strategic and asymmetric advantage.

Tags: Deterrence, INDO-PACIFIC, INDOPACOM, strategic deterrence, US Foreign Policy

About The Author

• 
  
• David Maxwell
• David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region (primarily Korea, Japan, and the Philippines) as a practitioner, specializing in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy. He commanded the Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines during the war on terrorism and is the former J5 and Chief of Staff of the Special Operations Command Korea, and G3 of the US Army Special Operations Command. Following retirement, he was the Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is a member of the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society, on the board of advisers of Spirit of America, and is a contributing editor to Small Wars Journal.
• 
  

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com