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Quotes of the Day:
“But there seems to have been an actual decline in rational thinking. The United States had become a place where entertainers and professional athletes were mistaken for people of importance. They were idolized and treated as leaders; their opinions were sought on everything and they took themselves just as seriously – after all, if an athlete is paid a million or more a year he knows he is important…”
– Robert A. Heinlein – To Sail Beyond the Sunset
"History is full of people who out of fear, or ignorance, or lust for power have destroyed knowledge of immeasurable value which truly belongs to us all. We must never let that happen again."
– Carl Sagan
"The ultimate tragedy is not the oppression and cruelty by the bad people but the silence over that by the good people."
– Martin Luther King, Jr
1. North Korea Detains Officials Blamed for Kim Jong Un’s Capsized Warship
2. North Korean human rights a global issue, speakers tell U.N. General Assembly
3. Donald Trump betrays one more ally of US in Asia, India’s friend is in danger, China to become…?
4. Inside Kim Jong Un’s Threat Perception
5. N. Korea urges U.S. to stop military threats
6. North Korea Makes Arrests Over Failed Ship Launch That Angered Kim Jong-un
7. DP candidate Lee pledges to set up task force to handle economic crisis
8. PPP candidate Kim pledges to keep president out of party affairs
9. South Korea’s Democracy Remains Vulnerable
10. Editorial: Cut in U.S. forces in Korea could become reality—Seoul should be ready
11. North Korea’s failed warship launch underscores its urgent bid for naval power
12. US troop reduction in South Korea
13. Lee Jae-myung signals hesitation on attending June NATO summit if elected
1. North Korea Detains Officials Blamed for Kim Jong Un’s Capsized Warship
I will bet "unscientific empiricism" is punishable by death in north Korea. (note I have never heard of "unscientific empiricism" before)
I am sure the only question is what method of execution to use and what public venue would be best to send the regime's message of ultimate brutality.
And who will want to be associated with shipbuilding in the future?
So as an aside I asked AI about the phrase "unscientific empiricism." It appears to be pretty much unique to Kim Jong Un's Propaganda and Agitation Department. Maybe they could get a dictionary or some other reference entry.
The term "unscientific empiricism" is not a standard concept in philosophy or science. However, it has been used in specific contexts to critique certain practices. For instance, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un used the phrase to describe the failed launch of a warship, attributing the mishap to "absolute carelessness, irresponsibility, and unscientific empiricism" .
Combining these, "unscientific empiricism" refers to a reliance on experience or observation without the rigorous application of scientific principles. It implies drawing conclusions based on anecdotal evidence or unsystematic methods, leading to unreliable or invalid results.
Usage in Context
In the context of the North Korean warship incident, Kim Jong Un's use of "unscientific empiricism" likely criticizes the engineers' reliance on practical experience without adhering to established scientific protocols. The failure of the ship's launch mechanism suggests that empirical methods were applied without the necessary scientific rigor, leading to the accident.
Conclusion
While "unscientific empiricism" is not a widely recognized term, it serves as a critique of practices that depend on experience or observation without the support of systematic scientific methods. In the case mentioned, it underscores the importance of integrating empirical observations with scientific rigor to ensure reliable and valid outcomes.
North Korea Detains Officials Blamed for Kim Jong Un’s Capsized Warship
Botched launch of 5,000-ton destroyer represents an ‘unpardonable criminal act,’ state media says
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/north-korea-warship-launch-officials-detained-c9264e52?st=FT2iuL&utm
By Timothy W. Martin
Follow
May 25, 2025 3:38 am ET
A satellite image from Saturday shows blue tarps covering the damaged warship in Chongjin, North Korea. Photo: 2025 planet labs pbc/Reuters
Key Points
What's This?
- Three North Korean officials were detained over the failed launch of a warship.
- Kim Jong Un blamed the mishap on carelessness, and state media called it an unpardonable crime.
- The warship is partially submerged, but North Korea said repairs could be done in two weeks.
SEOUL—Three senior North Korean officials were detained over the failed launch of the country’s newest warship, an accident that has drawn the wrath of leader Kim Jong Un and been called an unpardonable crime.
The 41-year-old dictator considers a modernized naval fleet so vital to North Korea’s future that he attended the ship’s Wednesday unveiling in person. But Kim witnessed a calamity: One part of the 5,000-ton destroyer made it off the quay, while the other did not.
The vessel remains partially submerged at a shipyard in the northeastern coastal city of Chongjin. Blue tarps are draped over the warship, satellite imagery shows.
Kim blamed the mishap on “absolute carelessness, irresponsibility and unscientific empiricism.” In recent days, public prosecutors and naval experts have hauled in the shipyard’s manager and inspected the ship, above and below water.
North Korea said damage to its Choe Hyun-class warship wasn’t serious and could be repaired in roughly two weeks, a turnaround time doubted by independent naval experts.
Following a confirmation of key details, the Chongjin shipyard’s chief engineer, a deputy manager for administrative affairs and the head of the hull-construction workshop were detained, North Korea’s state media said Sunday. The officials, the report said, are those “who are responsible for the accident.”
The detained officials, if charged, would have little expectation of a fair trial, including a right to legal defense or the ability to file an appeal, according to defectors and human-rights experts.
Since taking power in late 2011, Kim has sidelined, purged and executed various officials—including his own uncle—for policy errors or other misgivings.
Those at fault for the warship accident “can never evade their responsibility for the crime,” state media said Friday, calling it an “unpardonable criminal act.”
Write to Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com
2. North Korean human rights a global issue, speakers tell U.N. General Assembly
We cannot raise enough attention on the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity in north Korea.
We must not stop raising our voices until the 25 million Koreans in the north are free.
De Oppresso Liber - to free the oppressed or better: to help the oppressed free themselves.
World News May 21, 2025 / 6:07 AM
North Korean human rights a global issue, speakers tell U.N. General Assembly
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/05/21/North-Korea-human-rights-UN-General-Assembly-meeting/1011747816656?utm
By Thomas Maresca
1 of 2 | North Korean escapee Kim Eun-joo spoke at a high-level U.N. General Assembly meeting on North Korean human rights Tuesday, warning that "silence is complicity." Screenshot/UN Web TV
May 21 (UPI) -- Activists, officials and defectors highlighted North Korean human rights violations at a high-level meeting of the United Nations General Assembly Tuesday, with many directly tying Pyongyang's systemic abuses to its growing nuclear weapons and missile programs.
The meeting on the North's human rights violations, the first of its kind held at the General Assembly, featured testimonies by two escapees who shared harrowing stories of oppression and implored the world to hold North Korean leader Kim Jong Un accountable.
"Silence is complicity," said Kim Eun-joo, who was 11 years old when she fled with her mother and sister in 1999 to escape starvation in rural North Korea.
After crossing the Tumen River into China, Kim and her family faced years of human trafficking before finally making it to South Korea.
She pointed to North Korea's military cooperation with Russia, particularly its deployment of troops to aid Moscow in its war against Ukraine, as a "new kind of modern-day slavery."
"[The soldiers] have no idea where they are, whom they are fighting against or why," she said. "Their lives have become a means for the Kim Jong Un regime to make money."
Pyongyang has deployed around 15,000 troops to Russia, Seoul's spy agency said last month. Some 600 of the soldiers have been killed and another 4,100 injured, the National Intelligence Service told lawmakers in a briefing.
Seoul and Washington also accused North Korea of supplying artillery and missiles to Russia. In exchange, Pyongyang is believed to be receiving much-needed financial support and advanced military technology for its own weapons programs.
Participants in the U.N. meeting highlighted the close link between North Korea's human rights abuses and the regime's growing arsenal.
"The regime preserves itself through producing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles," Greg Scarlatoiu, president and CEO of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, said.
"North Korea is no longer just a Korean Peninsula threat. The DPRK is no longer just a Northeast Asian threat," Scarlatoiu said.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the official name of North Korea.
"The DPRK is exporting instability to the Middle East and to Europe," Scarlatoiu said. "And the root cause of this is the human rights violations that the DPRK perpetrates."
North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Kim Song condemned the meeting, calling it a "burlesque of intrigue and fabrication" staged by "hostile forces" including the United States.
Kim also slammed the invitation of the North Korean escapees, calling them "the scum of the earth who don't even care about their parents and families."
Elizabeth Salmon, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on human rights in North Korea, told the General Assembly that North Korea has diverted resources toward militarization at the expense of human rights and basic necessities such as food, healthcare and sanitation.
"As the DPRK expands its extreme militarization policies, it exacerbates the extensive reliance on forced labor and quota systems, showing how peace, security and human rights are strongly interrelated," Salmon said.
She added that North Korea's border closures at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in January 2020 worsened its human rights situation, as Pyongyang used the isolation to enact brutal new laws restricting access to information from the outside world.
A 2014 landmark U.N. Commission of Inquiry report documented North Korean crimes against humanity, including torture, rape, execution, deliberate starvation and forced labor, that were "without parallel in the contemporary world."
South Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Hwang Joon-kook echoed calls to more closely tie North Korea's human rights violations to its nuclear ambitions, which he said were "deeply interconnected."
"For far too long the DPRK's human rights violations have been overshadowed by its nuclear threats," he said. "Their nuclear program is sustained by systemic repression, forced labor, diverted national resources and total control of its people."
Hwang called North Korea "a real-life version of George Orwell's novel 1984."
"However, the DPRK's horrendous crimes do not stop at the border," he said. "If human rights violations are stopped, nuclear weapons development will also stop."
3. Donald Trump betrays one more ally of US in Asia, India’s friend is in danger, China to become…?
A view from India.
This is not an unexpected interpretation of the Washington Post (originally Wall Street Journal) report on Friday. This is being interpreted as a possible prelude to the withdrawal of troops from the Indo-Pacific.
We have to help our friends, partners, and allies to NOT interpret every change to force posture as a reduction of commitment. And simply counting numbers of troops is the wrong metric to evaluate commitment though it is the simplest (or simplistic) measure.
Donald Trump betrays one more ally of US in Asia, India’s friend is in danger, China to become…?
This move could have serious implications in the entire region.
https://www.india.com/news/india/donald-trump-betrays-one-more-ally-of-us-in-asia-indias-friend-is-in-danger-china-to-become-north-korea-japan-south-korea-pentagon-russia-taiwan-7839884/?utm
Published: May 24, 2025 7:00 PM IST
By Tahir Qureshi |Edited by Tahir Qureshi
New Delhi: It seems that Donald Trump’s administration has changed America’s foreign policy. Japan, Britain, Canada, Australia, France, Ukraine, and India, every country that previous American administrations have worked hard to make an ally, Donald Trump has strained the relations. In his nearly four months of administration, Donald Trump has not touched America’s enemies, but he has not missed an opportunity to trouble friends. Now, The Washington Post has claimed that the Trump administration has decided to withdraw thousands of its soldiers from South Korea. Trump’s decision could open the door to North Korean aggression against South Korea.
According to the report by The Washington Post, U.S. officials have indicated that the Trump administration is considering bringing back thousands of its troops stationed in South Korea, raising deep concerns among America’s allies in Asia. The Washington Post stated that the Pentagon is considering recalling around 4,500 troops.
Officials stated that the Pentagon’s proposal has not yet reached the President’s desk, but discussions are ongoing intensely. Meanwhile, a Pentagon spokesperson did not dismiss this report and stated that ‘there is currently no announcement to be made on this policy.’ While the spokesperson for the U.S. National Security Council, Pete Nguyen, did not address the issue of troop withdrawal, he mentioned that Donald Trump is committed to the ‘complete denuclearization’ of North Korea. The South Korean Ministry of Defense has refused to comment. Donald Trump has been considering changing the presence of American troops in South Korea since his first term, where about 28,500 American soldiers are deployed.
Last month, top commanders overseeing the U.S. military in Asia warned about the reduction of troops from America to South Korea. The soldiers stated that this reduction would jeopardize their capacity against North Korea and also affect their capability in potential conflicts against China and Russia in Northeast Asia. According to the post, U.S. Army Commander in Korea, General Javier Brunson, said in the American Parliament that “reducing the number of soldiers will make the situation quite difficult.”
According to a report by Reuters, South Korea’s Defense Ministry has stated that there have been no discussions about the withdrawal of troops with the United States at this time. They have expressed a commitment to maintaining a strong joint defense posture with the U.S., which serves as a deterrent against North Korea.
However, the withdrawal of troops could have serious implications for South Korea’s security, raising concerns among investors and potentially leading to economic instability. Furthermore, this move could increase China’s influence and prompt South Korea to consider alternative security options. There is a strong sentiment among the American public to strengthen security ties with South Korea. Recent surveys indicate that most Americans support the long-term maintenance of U.S. military bases in South Korea and view the withdrawal of troops as a threat to regional security.
In addition, the withdrawal of the South Korean army could create a state of concern among America’s allies in the Indo-Pacific. South Korea, along with Japan and the Philippines, relies on close coordination with the U.S. military to defend itself and to demonstrate its power in this increasingly contested region. Furthermore, Taiwan may also find itself in danger. Trump’s decision could be interpreted by the allies in a negative light and raise serious trust issues between Washington and its allies.
It is very much possible that if Pentagon reduces its military presence in the region, then China could invade Taiwan.
Also Read:
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4. Inside Kim Jong Un’s Threat Perception
This is important to help us understand the three key things we need to know about the Kim family regime: its nature, objectives, and strategy.
However, it ignores one major strategic assumption (And I use assumption deliberately because we cannot know this for a fact and I could be and hopefully will be wrong but I believe it is the assumption we must plan against): Kim will never negotiate away his nuclear weapons.
Also, this doesn't describe how Kim needs the perception of the external threat to deny human rights, to justify the sacrifice and suffering of the Korean people, to maintain internal stability, all so Kim can remain in power.
We cannot overlook the internal threats to the regime. And we must come to understand that Kim's greatest fear is internal and not the US or the ROK/US military alliance.
However, the bottom line is that I believe that the only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program and military threats as well as the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a free and unified Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people. A free and unified Korea or in short, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK)
Inside Kim Jong Un’s Threat Perception
Understanding North Korea’s view of South Korea-U.S. extended deterrence sheds light on the security dilemma.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/inside-kim-jong-uns-threat-perception/?utm
By Hyunseung Yu
May 24, 2025
In this image provided by North Korean state media, Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un gives a speech at the launch ceremony for the new Choe Hyon destroyer, Nampo Shipyard, Apr. 26, 2025. This content of this image is as provided and cannot be independently verified.
Credit: KCNA
On April 26, North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un delivered a highly symbolic and strategic speech at the Nampo Shipyard, while presiding over the launch of a new 5,000-ton destroyer. While the occasion marked a milestone in North Korea’s naval modernization, his speech was far more than a celebration of shipbuilding progress. It provided candid insights into how Kim views the current security environment on the Korean Peninsula.
Kim views reinforcing South Korea-U.S. extended deterrence as a substantial threat to the regime’s survival. Therefore, he aims to augment North Korean nuclear and military capability in all domains: land, air, and especially sea. Understanding Kim’s perception and how he plans to respond is crucial for the future of South Korea-U.S. extended deterrence.
Kim Jong-un’s Threat Perception
Kim Jong Un portrayed the South Korea-U.S. alliance’s deterrence measures – including strategic asset deployments, joint military exercises, and Seoul’s deepening integration into U.S. nuclear planning and operations – as inherently aggressive rather than defensive. Describing the regional security environment as “extremely unstable, like unpredictable ocean weather,” Kim interpreted extended deterrence measures as active preparations for war, prompting North Korea’s enhancement of nuclear and military capabilities.
Kim condemned recent South Korea-U.S. military exercises involving nuclear scenarios, accusing the alliance of escalating tensions and preparing for a potential nuclear conflict. He perceives the introduction of the new wartime operational plan, OPLAN 5022 – which explicitly includes decapitation operations and conventional-nuclear integration – as concrete evidence of preparations for nuclear conflict. Framing these drills not as routine defensive exercises but as aggressive actions targeting North Korea, Kim described OPLAN 5022 as “the clearest expression of a will to wage war,” underscoring its nuclear strike components as indicative of hostile intent.
Kim also argued that the United States and its allies are deploying strategic assets with unprecedented frequency and scale, which he views as a direct threat that legitimizes North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. According to a North Korean state media article, Pyongyang sees such deployments not as deterrence but as preparations for a preemptive strike.
What kinds of South Korea-U.S. strategic assets make Kim concerned? North Korean media cited U.S. ICBM interception drills and the deployment of F-35s, F-16s, and B-1B bombers with stealth capability as evidence of a first-strike, warfighting strategy.
What Is Kim’s Deterrence Plan?
To strengthen its nuclear and military deterrence, Kim Jong Un asserted a multifaceted strategy based on a legal background reinforced by offensive capability and rapid responsiveness. In 2022, North Korea codified a new nuclear doctrine that lowers the threshold for nuclear use, authorizing preemptive strikes in response to fatal military attacks on the leadership or strategic assets – such as key infrastructure or military facilities – or in the event of a conventional war to take the initiative. Kim’s April 2025 speech showed that he remains resolute in upholding the new doctrine. He continues to modernize the military with an emphasis on greater strategic strike capability, signaling North Korea’s long-term commitment to enhancing its deterrence, which is the primary objective for its nuclear weapons.
At the core of North Korea’s nuclear framework is the development of a “super-powerful preemptive strike capability” with a stronger naval force, emphasizing that deterrence requires not just defensive readiness but the ability to launch swift and overwhelming preemptive attacks through any means (including nuclear). These efforts include the deployment of nuclear weapons across all domains – air, land, and especially sea – to ensure immediate retaliatory or preemptive action. By having a lower nuclear threshold with greater offensive capability, Kim aims to reinforce deterrence against the perceived threat from the South Korea-U.S. alliance.
Expanding Naval Capacity’s Role in North Korea’s Deterrence
Kim Jong Un pledged to deepen North Korea’s deterrent posture across air, land, and increasingly sea-based platforms, emphasizing the newly launched 5,000-ton multipurpose destroyer Choe Hyon as both a symbol of military self-reliance and a critical advancement in naval nuclear deterrence.
According to Kim, the vessel is outfitted with a range of advanced systems, including anti-air, anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-ballistic missile capabilities. It is also capable of launching hypersonic cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles designed to strike ground targets. This capability allows the North Korean navy to project force beyond maritime domains and engage in land warfare, representing a fundamental shift in operational doctrine. The destroyer thus extends the reach of North Korea’s military power and signals its use as a platform for deterrence and even preemptive strikes, possibly with nuclear-tipped missiles.
Additionally, North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines, described as the “second signal flare” of its naval deterrence strategy, would significantly enhance its ability to project strategic deterrence and conduct retaliatory strikes beyond the Korean Peninsula – a goal underscored by Kim during a submarine-launched cruise missile test in January 2024.
Kim asserted that North Korea’s naval advancements would “enhance its position in the realm of nuclear use,” echoing his earlier statement in August 2023 that nuclear armament was critical for naval modernization. That goal was exemplified by the development of the Choe Hyon destroyer and future nuclear-powered submarines, forming the backbone of North Korea’s evolving naval nuclear strategy.
However, these naval advancements underscore a deepening security dilemma on the Peninsula, as the perceived threats from both sides drive this cycle.
Security Dilemma on the Korean Peninsula
Ironically, Kim’s justification for building such capabilities is rooted in the very phenomenon that spurred the South Korea-U.S. alliance to reinforce extended deterrence: North Korea’s relentless advancement of its nuclear arsenal. This interplay illustrates a classic case of what international relations theorists call the security dilemma – where one state’s defensive measures are interpreted by its adversaries as offensive threats, prompting reactive countermeasures, an arms race, and tension. It is difficult for states to distinguish whether new military capabilities are intended for attack or defense. The ambiguity of systems like destroyers armed with land-attack missiles or submarines with strike potential feeds into such a dilemma.
The United States and its allies now face a North Korea with advancing strategic capabilities in every domain, considering Kim’s interest in building up these capabilities to mitigate perceived external threats. With the lessons from the Ukraine War alongside Russian support, North Korea’s military capability will likely grow and modernize in significant leaps. In response, the South Korea-U.S. alliance will continue cooperating to strengthen extended deterrence. However, without a clear channel of communication, the potential for miscalculation grows. The line between deterrence and provocation becomes dangerously thin.
This spiral risks triggering rapid escalation, especially if North Korea conducts another provocation toward South Korea aimed at domestic legitimization, which happened during Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un’s succession periods. An incident could trigger Seoul’s prompt response based on its three-axis deterrence strategy, which includes a preemptive strike and massive retaliation. In this environment, such clashes may set off a spiral of escalation under the shadow of nuclear brinkmanship.
What Should the South Korea-U.S. Alliance Do to Prevent a Crisis?
Preventing an unwanted crisis by maintaining deterrence requires more than military signaling – it demands a robust U.S. commitment as a basis, crisis management channels as a safeguard, and establishing a political environment and will to pursue dialogue.
First, the presence of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) should remain strong under all circumstances to avoid a mistaken signal of U.S. disengagement. While some advocate for reducing USFK based on South Korea’s conventional military superiority, cost-benefit issues, and concerns over U.S. entrapment, the force’s role extends beyond troop numbers – it serves as a vital indicator of U.S. defense commitment, underpinning deterrence in the Indo-Pacific that prevents unwanted crisis. Using withdrawal as a bargaining tool in defense cost-sharing negotiations sends dangerous signals of weakening commitment, thereby eroding deterrence.
Should Washington consider reallocating regional forces for greater flexibility in the Indo-Pacific, any adjustments to USFK must be paired with clear, reinforcing measures to prevent misinterpretation. While agility may enhance strategic deterrence, it risks emboldening Pyongyang’s opportunistic provocations and unintended escalation if not backed by a visible commitment. A steadfast U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula not only deters Pyongyang but also limits escalation risks and reduces the likelihood of a dual contingency – such as one involving opportunistic moves by China in the event of the Korean Peninsula crisis – thereby preserving peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.
Second, the South Korea-U.S. alliance should establish a strategic communication channel with North Korea. In the nuclear domain, crisis management, such as establishing a military-to-military communication channel, is important to de-escalate a crisis before it becomes uncontrollable. This is especially necessary considering how quickly a crisis would escalate given the current situation on the peninsula. This possibility is realistically limited considering Pyongyang’s unwillingness to hold discussions with Washington and Seoul. However, re-establishing the line of communication should be carried through in case of future negotiations with Pyongyang.
Lastly, creating the political conditions and will to pursue dialogue is essential for breaking the vicious cycle of confrontation and bringing North Korea to the negotiation table. Although President Donald Trump has showed interest in engaging with Kim Jong Un, North Korea may remain disincentivized to negotiate with the United States due to its deepening strategic alignment with Russia amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. The resolution of the war in Ukraine could help untangle these intertwined political dynamics by weakening the mutual benefits that Pyongyang and Moscow currently derive from their wartime cooperation.
North Korea receives a wide range of advantages from Russia, including military technology transfers, economic assistance, and energy support. In return, Russia benefits from North Korean provisions mostly on the battlefield, such as ammunition, manpower (troops and labor), and medical support. However, once the war concludes, Russia’s need for such support may diminish, reducing its incentive to maintain a close partnership with Pyongyang. This shift would create an opportunity for the United States and South Korea to drive a wedge between Russia and North Korea through coordinated diplomatic efforts.
Until then, the Korean Peninsula remains trapped in a dangerous cycle, where deterrence and provocation grow in tandem, and the risk of crisis escalation looms ever larger.
Authors
Guest Author
Hyunseung Yu
Hyunseung Yu is a non-resident James A. Kelly Korea Fellow at the Pacific Forum. His research interest is Northeast Asia security issues, primarily focusing on the Korean Peninsula. He holds an M.A. in Asian Studies from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and a B.Soc.Sci. in International Relations and Peace Studies from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University.
5. N. Korea urges U.S. to stop military threats
Admit nothing. Deny everything. Make counter accusations.
We should never forget that it is Kim Jong Un who has the hostile policy toward the South and the ROK/US alliance.
N. Korea urges U.S. to stop military threats | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yoo Jee-ho · May 25, 2025
SEOUL, May 25 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Sunday called on the United States to abandon its military threats against others if it has concerns about its mainland safety.
The head of the policy office at the North's defense ministry released a statement, carried by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), claiming that "the security guarantee of the U.S. mainland" depends on giving up "military threats and aggressive attempts" against other nations.
"Recently, the U.S. military is hell-bent on inciting the 'threat' from the DPRK to its mainland while attempting to increase the arms buildup on the largest scale," the statement read, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
The statement added that U.S. military officials are "picking a quarrel with the DPRK's self-defensive measures for bolstering up its nuclear force on several occasions, unhesitatingly making provocative remarks hinting at the possibility of outbreak of a war with the DPRK."
This file photo, released by the Korean Central News Agency, on May 17, 2025, shows a North Korean jet for the Guards 1st Air Division of the Korean People's Army. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Citing a recent U.S. test of an intercontinental ballistic missile, the statement said it was an "illogical way of thinking" that the U.S. military actions are considered defensive, while the North's actions are seen as a threat.
"It is none other than the U.S.' unreasonable military threat, blackmail and military muscle strengthening that caused and have steadily escalated the 'external threat' to the U.S. mainland," the statement added.
It also said North Korea is making "sustained and practical efforts" to develop a war deterrent against security instability resulting from the U.S. nuclear arms buildup.
jeeho@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Yoo Jee-ho · May 25, 2025
6. North Korea Makes Arrests Over Failed Ship Launch That Angered Kim Jong-un
How swiftly will the executions come? Will they be public?
What is the ROK/US alliance doing to exploit this failure? (If only we had a comprehensive overt information and influence campaign).
North Korea Makes Arrests Over Failed Ship Launch That Angered Kim Jong-un
Three shipyard officials were arrested, including the chief engineer, state media said. The North Korean leader was watching as the launch of a navy destroyer went wrong.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/25/world/asia/north-korea-ship-launch-arrests.html
Listen to this article · 4:07 min Learn more
A satellite image released by Maxar Technologies showing North Korea’s new destroyer, covered with tarpaulins, at a port in Chongjin on Friday, two days after the botched attempt to launch it. Credit...Maxar Technologies, via Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
By Choe Sang-Hun
Reporting from Seoul
May 25, 2025, 3:03 a.m. ET
North Korea has arrested three shipyard officials as it investigates the failed launch of a navy destroyer last week that badly embarrassed its leader, Kim Jong-un, state media reported on Sunday.
The chief engineer at the Chongjin shipyard on North Korea’s northeastern coast was arrested, as were the head of its hull-construction workshop and a deputy manager for administrative affairs, the official Korean Central News Agency reported.
Mr. Kim was watching as the shipyard tried to launch the newly built 5,000-ton destroyer on Wednesday, according to state media. Satellite images indicated that a large crowd had gathered for an elaborate ceremony to highlight Mr. Kim’s efforts to modernize North Korea’s navy.
But the ship lost its balance as engineers tried to push it sideways into the water. A satellite image taken after the accident showed the ship lying on its side, its stern in the water and its bow still stuck on the ramp. It was covered with blue tarpaulins, apparently to conceal it from spy satellites. (North Korea often carries out sensitive military construction under large canopies for that reason.)
Mr. Kim called the launch’s failure a “criminal act” and promised stern punishment, state media reported last week.
It was meant to be the North’s second launch of a destroyer in a month. The first, in April, at the Nampo port on the west coast, went smoothly; engineers set that ship afloat by letting water into a dry dock.
In a report published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a research institute in Washington, analysts said the Chongjin shipyard may have been ill-suited for launching a destroyer, the biggest class of warships the North has ever built. It has mostly produced cargo ships, fishing vessels and dredgers and “undoubtedly lacks significant expertise in manufacturing and launching large warships such as the new destroyer,” the report said.
Launching big ships sideways — a method that analysts say North Korea had never used for warships before — requires delicate balancing work, said Choi Il, a retired South Korean Navy captain. The heavy weapons mounted on the destroyer could have made the task even more difficult, he added.
South Korean analysts said that pressure from Mr. Kim to launch the destroyer, especially after the successful launch in Nampo, might have led the Chongjin engineers to cut corners.
South Korea, which has one of the world’s most advanced shipbuilding industries, no longer launches warships sideways, its defense officials said.
North Korea initially reported that the accident had torn holes into the ship’s hull. But it later retracted that assessment. Though some seawater flowed into the ship, a detailed inspection revealed that it had only sustained scratches, North Korea said on Friday.
Still, “the fact that the accident is an unpardonable criminal act remains unchanged, and those responsible for it can never evade their responsibility for the crime,” Mr. Kim’s Central Military Commission said. It said it was taking the accident seriously “to deal a telling blow” to lax attitudes “prevailing in any field.”
The commission estimated that a few days would be required to restore the ship’s balance by pumping out the seawater, which should cause the bow to leave the slipway. Fixing the damage on the ship’s side will take another 10 days or so, it said.
The North’s latest assessment of the damage could not be independently confirmed. The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ report had previously said that the destroyer would not be entering service any time soon and “may ultimately prove to be a complete loss.”
Historically, North Korea has tended to conceal accidents that could hurt the image of its leader. But Mr. Kim has often owned up to his government’s failures and punished officials for them.
Choe Sang-Hun is the lead reporter for The Times in Seoul, covering South and North Korea.
7. DP candidate Lee pledges to set up task force to handle economic crisis
"It's the economy stupid." (or so political advisors have told us).
(2nd LD) DP candidate Lee pledges to set up task force to handle economic crisis | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · May 25, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS comments in last 2 paras)
SEOUL, May 25 (Yonhap) -- Democratic Party (DP) candidate Lee Jae-myung said Sunday he will set up a task force to handle the ongoing economic crisis if he's elected president next month.
In a press conference at the DP headquarters in Seoul, Lee said establishing the task force, with the president in charge, will be the first thing he will do "if I am chosen by the people" in the June 3 election.
"Only the candidate and the party prepared to resolve problems that have piled up can overcome this crisis," Lee said. "I will quickly prepare measures to help people's livelihoods that can be implemented immediately and wage a battle against the recession."
Lee said he will try to save small business owners, who he said have been "pushed to the brink by trade issues and changing global security environments" and added the government must come up with "efficient" plans to revitalize the economy.
"Right now, all the energy should be directed toward the economic recovery and restoring livelihoods," Lee said. "Reforming the judicial system, the prosecution and the police is important but not so much that we need to expend too much energy on them early."
Lee called for a supplementary budget to address some pressing needs, with the economy in need of "short-term stimulus."
Lee also said he will consider setting up a new agency to handle regulatory reform to support corporate activities.
Lee said he will look past ideological differences when implementing policies as long as they can help the economy and the people.
Democratic Party presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung speaks at a press conference at the party headquarters in Seoul on May 25, 2025. (Yonhap)
Lee also stressed that he will "cut the vicious cycle caused by the politics of confrontations and conflict."
"Over the past three years, the president encouraged the political divide and deepened extreme confrontations, leaving us with deep scars," he said, in reference to former President Yoon Suk Yeol, whose April impeachment following an ill-fated martial law declaration set up the June election. "We must end the kind of politics built on hating each other and trying to remove each other. Reviving the culture of coexistence and communication can help restore democracy."
"I am the right person to end the politics of division because I understand better than anyone the ills of political retribution through abuse of power," Lee continued. "While I will sternly punish those behind treasonous acts that threatened the country and the people's lives, I will never engage in political retributions targeting specific individuals."
Democratic Party presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung speaks at a press conference at the party headquarters in Seoul on May 25, 2025. (Yonhap)
Lee rejected the view that if he wins the election, then the DP, which controls a majority in the 300-seat National Assembly, would be too dominant of a force in both the legislative and executive branches, calling such an idea "preposterous."
"The ruling party went against the people's wishes, and the people gave the opposition party the majority so that it could keep the ruling party under control," Lee said. "It is extremely inappropriate to say it is a problem when a party has the executive and legislative powers simultaneously."
In response to the conservative side's criticism that his proposal for amending the Constitution to allow two four-year presidential terms would benefit him, Lee said the change, if implemented, would not apply to the sitting president.
"The people would not tolerate a president receiving additional benefits through constitutional amendments," Lee added. "They must stop launching political attacks that can confuse people."
Addressing the buildup to the election, Lee said he was "preparing for the possibility" that two conservative candidates, Kim Moon-soo of the People Power Party and Lee Jun-seok of the New Reform Party, may merge their candidacies to mount a better challenge against him.
Lee Jae-myung also sidestepped a question on whether his wife, Kim Hye-kyung, will join him during the campaign, with Kim Moon-soo's wife, Seol Nan-young, having accompanied her husband.
"I don't even know what my wife is up to," Lee said. "She will decide what she wants to do, and I won't comment further on that."
Kim Hye-kyung has been staying out of the spotlight during the campaign. She has received a court fine for violating election laws after being indicted for allegedly buying meals for wives of lawmakers and her aides in 2021 using a corporate card from the Gyeonggi provincial government, where Lee was governor at the time.
At a campaign rally at an outdoor market in Dangjin, about 80 kilometers south of Seoul, later in the day, Lee vowed to impose crushing punishments on stock market manipulators as a way to revitalize the stock market.
"Stock manipulations will be punished to the extent that offenders are reduced to beggars, and if the stock market is normalized through such measures, I expect stock prices will naturally rise," Lee said.
Democratic Party presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung speaks at a press conference at the party headquarters in Seoul on May 25, 2025. (Yonhap)
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · May 25, 2025
8. PPP candidate Kim pledges to keep president out of party affairs
Again, "it's the economy, stupid." (perhaps his advisors have not advised him of this).
(LEAD) PPP candidate Kim pledges to keep president out of party affairs | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yoo Jee-ho · May 25, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS comments from para 7)
SEOUL/OKCHEON, May 25 (Yonhap) -- People Power Party (PPP) presidential candidate Kim Moon-soo on Sunday pledged to set up "institutional measures" to prevent the president from getting involved in party operations.
"We should do away with a president-centric, vertical relationship between the party and the government, and transition to a healthy relationship of mutual respect and cooperation," Kim said in a statement following his visit to the birthplace of Yook Young-su, the late wife of the late former President Park Chung-hee, in Okcheon, some 150 kilometers south of Seoul.
People Power Party presidential candidate Kim Moon-soo speaks to reporters after visiting the birthplace of former first lady Yook Young-su in Okcheon, North Chungcheong Province, on May 25, 2025. (Yonhap)
"The president's meddling with party affairs caused so much conflict in the past. Once the president got involved in election candidate nominations, it hurt the party's autonomy and democracy, and it caused internal friction as the party was becoming too president-oriented," Kim added, referring to issues under former President Yoon Suk Yeol.
"The moment the president decides to take over the party, democracy will be shaken," Kim added. "A decision has to be made to put an end to the wrong practice."
Kim said his three key principles for the PPP constitution will cover ensuring cooperation between the government and the party, keeping the two entities separate and adopting a zero-tolerance policy on internal factions.
"I will make sure to keep the president out of key party affairs, including candidate nominations and personnel decisions," Kim said. "All party affairs will be conducted independently and autonomously, in accordance with the party constitution and regulations. There will no longer be criticism that party affairs are influenced by the president and his aides."
People Power Party presidential candidate Kim Moon-soo speaks at a campaign stop in Gongju, South Chungcheong Province, on May 25, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
Kim also urged his supporters to participate in the two-day early voting Thursday and Friday.
"If you have reservations about early voting and then miss out on the election altogether, it will be a massive loss," Kim said. "If you don't vote, we may end up with a bad government."
Conservative voters have raised issues with the early-voting system, saying it is susceptible to rigging. Kim said he was aware of the situation and said the PPP will try to ensure a clean process.
"Problems with the current early voting system have been brought up several times, and there are endless calls for improvements. However, the reality is that the system cannot be improved right away before this presidential election," Kim said. "I promise you that we at the PPP will do everything in our power to supervise and monitor the early voting system. I'd like to ask you to participate in early voting without any worries."
Kim said he plans to cast his ballot during the two-day period.
Later in the day at a campaign stop in Gongju, some 40 kilometers west of Okcheon, Kim said he will keep trying to persuade New Reform Party (NRP) candidate Lee Jun-seok to merge their candidacies for the June 3 election.
The soft deadline for the two to unify their candidacies was Sunday, when election authorities began printing ballots for the June 3 election. If Kim and Lee join forces between now and Wednesday, the eve of the start of two-day early voting, both of their names will appear on ballots on June 3. In that case, polling stations will put up a notice saying one of the candidates has resigned, but having both names still on ballots could cause confusion and produce invalid votes.
However, if Kim and Lee manage to merge their candidacies by Wednesday, ballots for the Thursday-Friday early voting will have "resigned" marked next to one of their names.
When told of the Sunday deadline, Kim said, "Since we come from the same roots, I will continue to try.
"I am pushing for plans to meet with him," Kim added. "But I am not at a point where I can tell you when and how (the merger) will happen."
Lee, former head of the PPP, has rejected overtures from the PPP to unify his candidacy with Kim's.
The PPP believes the merger will boost the conservative bloc's chance of beating the Democratic Party's Lee Jae-myung, whose lead in public polls has dwindled lately.
In a Realmeter survey conducted on 1,009 adults on Thursday and Friday last week, Lee Jae-myung led the way with 46.6 percent, down 1.5 percentage points from the previous poll. Kim checked in at 37.6 percent, and Lee Jun-seok earned 10.4 percent, creeping into double digits.
People Power Party presidential candidate Kim Moon-soo poses in front of his supporters at a campaign stop in Gongju, South Chungcheong Province, on May 25, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Yoo Jee-ho · May 25, 2025
9. South Korea’s Democracy Remains Vulnerable
Conclusion:
Perhaps Yoon’s miscalculation will jolt the country into strengthening its democracy. Perhaps it will also sharpen the Korean people’s understanding of changing domestic and foreign threats to their national security. This constitutional crisis was certainly tumultuous for South Korea, and its second presidential impeachment was a tragedy for the country regardless of one’s political loyalties. On June 3, the Korean people will have the opportunity to choose a new president. The campaign should reveal just what lessons have been learned. The outcome will impact the health of Korea’s democracy with implications for its alliance with the United States.
South Korea’s Democracy Remains Vulnerable
Democratic institutions eventually prevailed in impeaching and removing a president who employed an undemocratic tool.
https://www.cfr.org/blog/south-koreas-democracy-remains-vulnerable
Post by Duyeon Kim
May 22, 2025 4:57 pm (EST)
Duyeon Kim is an adjunct senior fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security and a visiting professor at the Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies. She is based in Seoul.
Yoon Suk Yeol was the second president to have enraged the South Korean people and been removed from office. The first time was in 2017 when the Constitutional Court upheld the National Assembly’s impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye, who had entrusted the country to a close, corrupt friend who did not hold a government position. Yoon shocked the democratic nation by declaring martial law. Both presidents embarrassed their people by making South Korea look like a backward, underdeveloped country.
Public anger at Yoon’s martial law attempt had an added and unexpected dimension, however. Unlike during Park’s impeachment, public sentiment was quickly divided, along ideological lines, on his fate. Anti-impeachment protests grew larger over time. Most of these protestors were not condoning Yoon’s action but rather they opposed the way he was held accountable. Others protested the real prospect that their country could be governed next by progressive politician Lee Jae-myung, the head of the main opposition party. Koreans knew on the night of martial law that another presidential impeachment and snap election loomed large. Lee lost to Yoon in the 2022 presidential election by only 0.7 percent. Understanding Korea’s ideological division and its legal procedures are important to understanding how two separate processes to indict and remove a Korean president from office shaped public trust, or distrust, in their democratic institutions and elected leaders.
South Koreans across party lines agreed that Yoon was wrong to even consider martial law. He certainly should have used the power of persuasion through politics to build public and legislative support for his agenda. Yoon miscalculated, following the modus operandi of prosecutor generals who typically operate unilaterally and authoritatively. Many South Koreans would agree with Yoon’s assessment of “anti-state forces” within the country and even his claims of North Korea’s invisible hand in South Korean affairs. These were the basis of the “national emergency” that prompted him to declare martial law. But very few South Koreans agreed with his prescription.
Democratic institutions eventually prevailed in impeaching and removing a president who employed an undemocratic tool. To be sure, democracy won the day in this recent upheaval. However, the months leading up to the Constitutional Court’s verdict revealed three areas of fragility, indicating that South Korea’s democracy remains vulnerable. Fierce ideological divisions still infuse politics, which could impede South Korea’s chances to grow into a truly mature democracy. Relatedly, what initially began as a fight across party lines for the formal adjudication of the president’s behavior quickly devolved into a scramble for political power and a battle of values. The weaponization of political dominance in the legislature as well as stark differences in interpreting Korean laws and procedures are also factors of vulnerability. South Korea will need to work on these factors because the stakes are high.
Evidence of Fragility Alongside Strength
The fragility and strength of South Korea’s democracy were equally visible during Yoon’s martial law attempt. Fragility was demonstrated by essentially two people—President Yoon and his defense minister, Kim Yong-hyun—who were needed to declare martial law, and thus the possibility of greater crises for South Korea. However, resilience prevailed that night with democratic forces pushing back. Politicians across the political spectrum, including the head of Yoon’s own party, successfully entered the National Assembly and voted in the middle of the night, legally requiring Yoon to reverse his order. South Korea’s police and military were not aggressive. Korean media maintained its press freedom and watchful activism. Civic groups upheld their ability to protest.
Another evidence of strength was in the Constitutional Court’s unanimous decision on April 4. While South Koreans were at loggerheads in the months leading up to its verdict, it found Yoon guilty of violating the law and the Constitution seriously enough to require his removal from office. Two previous presidential impeachments, one in 2004 (impeachment dismissed) and a second in 2017 (impeachment upheld), created the impression that the Court tends to be swayed more by public opinion than by the letter of the law. The Korean media reported at length on speculation and concern that a divided public this time would tempt the justices to simply vote according to their own political preferences. Tensions between elected politicians and the public ran high. However, civic protests ended immediately and peacefully upon news that all eight justices unanimously agreed to remove Yoon from the office.
On the other hand, the events immediately following the lifting of martial law exposed more weaknesses than strengths in the country’s laws, democratic practices, and institutions. Conservatives cited the lack of due process and the rule of law as well as flaws in democratic institutions and their legal procedures. They believed that these flaws resulted from a system rigged in favor of progressives. They were also outraged by continued political coercion from progressive lawmakers, who dominate and control the National Assembly, for impeaching their Prime Minister and Acting President, even coming close to impeaching the next Acting President, throwing the country even deeper into instability. Progressive lawmakers had already taken full advantage of their dominance—they previously impeached twenty-seven government officials, forcing their immediate suspension, and refused to approve government budgets after Yoon took office in 2022. These were the main factors Yoon cited in his decision to declare martial law. While progressives may have acted within their legal voting rights, their actions nevertheless demonstrate the weaponization of politics to destroy political opponents and paralyze the government.
Progressives were further enraged when Yoon challenged the rule of law by resisting law enforcement procedures to question and arrest him—in a process separate from his impeachment process—on criminal charges of insurrection. Yoon claimed these processes and procedures violated the law, but the progressives wanted him behind bars immediately and blamed democratic institutions as inadequate to the task of challenging his power. Some progressive politicians have even demanded that Yoon be executed for instigating an insurrection for his martial law attempt, which further demonstrates the deeply destructive nature of Korean politics.
Different Interpretations of Legal Process
Koreans have a saying that “You have to begin by placing the first button [on a shirt] correctly.” In Yoon’s case, conservatives and many legal scholars claimed that the first button was not placed correctly after the National Assembly impeached him. They claimed that a criminal investigation and judicial process cannot be conducted for a sitting president before the Constitutional Court makes its verdict, pointing to the previous presidential impeachment case. The main progressive party reported Yoon for allegedly causing an insurrection and abusing his power, which put the criminal investigation in motion as a separate but simultaneous process. Demonizing Yoon with the help of the criminal court’s guilty verdict would be a win for their party.
Conservatives and many legal scholars also claimed that the Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials (CIO) does not have the legal authority to investigate, issue an arrest warrant, and execute an arrest of those charged with insurrection. This would constitute the “first button” for Yoon’s case, which they claim voids the rest of the law enforcement and judicial process. Their rationale supports Yoon’s refusal to be questioned and taken by CIO investigators for his arrest at the presidential residence. Yoon eventually relented during their second attempt. Conservatives, legal scholars, and even Yoon himself claim that only the police have authority to handle insurrection charges. While this may be legally correct, skeptics still wondered if Yoon would have abided if the police had taken the lead. Legal experts sympathetic to Korea’s progressives certainly have different views.
The CIO and its corresponding laws were created by the previous progressive Moon Jae-in government, when progressives controlled the legislature, to weaken the power of South Korea’s prosecutors. The CIO reshuffled the jurisdiction of specific cases among the police and prosecution and required them to report to the CIO. Since its establishment, the anti-corruption agency has been widely regarded as incompetent and understaffed.
Nonetheless, the CIO won the turf battle to take the lead in Yoon’s insurrection charge. Critics claim that progressive lawmakers reported Yoon to the CIO because the agency’s officials lean left-of-center. The CIO was also criticized for requesting Yoon’s arrest warrant at the wrong court to allegedly find a progressive judge who would grant the warrant. Still, some experts argue that Yoon should have honored the warrant despite the apparent flaws in court procedures.
Meanwhile, public debate over the legitimacy of legal proceedings surfaced when the Constitutional Court hearings were broadcast. Allegations were made that Yoon was not properly granted the right to defense at times. Questions about the integrity of the acting chief justice were raised, as well as debate over the adequate separation of powers among the three branches of government. Some even criticized the Constitutional Court for rushing the hearings.
Despite the intense politicization of the moment, this confusing interpretation of South Korean laws, due process, and procedures can also be attributed to the imprecision of the country’s laws. Legal scholars across the political divide agree that South Korean laws tend to be imprecise. While debate is certainly one of the cornerstones of democracy, a clear-cut process should be in place for all citizens to follow, including the president.
Fighting for Power vs. Democracy
In the months leading up to the Constitutional Court’s verdict, political parties openly put their own spin on Korean laws and sought to create narratives that benefited their interests with the public. Partisanship was also evident among the public as Korean citizens tried to press law enforcement agencies and legal institutions to make decisions their favor. In contrast, legal experts fiercely debated definitions and the legalities of rules and procedures to penalize Yoon’s martial law attempt.
Months of pro- and anti-impeachment protests were about much more than a president defying democratic norms. Progressives have been fighting against what they perceive to be a dictatorship and insurrection and fighting to win the snap presidential election. Meanwhile, conservatives have been fighting against a future in which a progressive government, which they perceive to be sympathetic to communism, might rule next.
The legislative and judicial branches certainly upheld democratic norms by checking the executive and removing a president who attempted to undermine a democracy’s “cooperative public decision-making.” Yet South Korea’s democracy remains vulnerable. An imperial presidency draws resistance. Imprecise laws invite amateur interpretations. A fierce ideological divide colors even the most obvious flaws in existing democratic institutions and practices. While conservative and progressive governments accuse each other of being undemocratic, both have exhibited a penchant for authoritarian practices.
Perhaps Yoon’s miscalculation will jolt the country into strengthening its democracy. Perhaps it will also sharpen the Korean people’s understanding of changing domestic and foreign threats to their national security. This constitutional crisis was certainly tumultuous for South Korea, and its second presidential impeachment was a tragedy for the country regardless of one’s political loyalties. On June 3, the Korean people will have the opportunity to choose a new president. The campaign should reveal just what lessons have been learned. The outcome will impact the health of Korea’s democracy with implications for its alliance with the United States.
10. Editorial: Cut in U.S. forces in Korea could become reality—Seoul should be ready
To my Korean friends: Please do not over react to potential changes. Do not count troop numbers. Let's drop strategic flexibility and focus on strategic agility. And most important please take a holistic view of the interrelated and interconnected security challenges of the region and how we together must address them for the mutual security of all allies.
And most importantly please understand how your knee jerk reactions support the PRC and north Korean political warfare strategies. They want to divide all US alliances and your reaction supports that.
We cannot be myopically focused on the number of troops in USFK especially when almost no one in the Korean or American populations as well as the press, pundits, and politicians, has sufficient understanding of the roles and missions of USFK. But unfortunately all we have are knee jerk reactions to changes in the number of troops. It is time to stop the insanity.
Editorial: Cut in U.S. forces in Korea could become reality—Seoul should be ready
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/05/25/BOAIMXT6CVFODK4YNLUH5L6ORM/
By The Chosunilbo
Published 2025.05.25. 10:41
A Patriot (PAC-3) missile system is seen deployed at Camp Humphreys, a U.S. military base in Paengseong-eup, Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, on May 23, 2025. The Wall Street Journal reported on May 22 that the Trump administration is considering withdrawing about 4,500 U.S. troops from South Korea and relocating them to other Indo-Pacific bases such as Guam. /News1
The Trump administration considered withdrawing 4,500 of the 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, according to a report by the Wall Street Journal that cited U.S. defense officials. The plan reportedly involved relocating those troops to other parts of the Indo-Pacific region, such as Guam. The U.S. Department of Defense, however, denied the report, saying it was “not true.”
Still, the idea of adjusting the American military presence in S. Korea did not originate with Trump. Long before his presidency, Washington had laid out a broader vision to expand the role and operational range of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). This strategy—often referred to as “strategic flexibility”—has been applied across all overseas U.S. forces.
It reflects a shift in focus: while the United States concentrates on countering China, allied nations are expected to take more responsibility for conventional defense, particularly against non-nuclear threats.
That shift became even more explicit last year, when the U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy said the Pentagon was reorganizing U.S. forces in Korea to focus more on China, while encouraging S. Korea to take on a larger share of the burden in deterring North Korea’s conventional military threats. In that light, the reported consideration of withdrawing 4,500 troops was not entirely unexpected.
Notably, the number aligns with the size of a Stryker Brigade Combat Team, which the United States has been rotating through S. Korea every nine months. The move now appears to signal a possible end to this rotational deployment—a development that American defense analysts have repeatedly flagged as a likely scenario.
The implications for regional security, however, may be less dramatic than they seem. In terms of conventional ground firepower, U.S. forces in Korea already play a relatively limited role.
If the 4,500 troops were pulled out, only an artillery brigade would remain among the U.S. combat units on the peninsula.
This downsizing trend has been underway for years, as the U.S. has gradually reduced its conventional presence while South Korea has significantly strengthened its own military capabilities.
Today, S. Korea’s conventional forces—across its army, navy, and air force—overwhelm North Korea’s. Meanwhile, the U.S. Air Force’s role in Korea, particularly in countering China, is expected to grow rather than shrink.
As long as Washington continues to provide support for nuclear deterrence and maintains surveillance and reconnaissance over North Korea, many defense analysts believe that the overall deterrent posture will remain stable.
What raises concern is not the troop number itself, but how it could be used politically.
A U.S. defense official told the Journal that the drawdown idea was being considered in the context of Trump’s approach to North Korea. During his presidency, Trump suspended joint U.S.-S. Korea military exercises—a cornerstone of the alliance—as part of his summit diplomacy with Kim Jong-un.
U.S. Forces Korea stands as a symbolic and strategic pillar of S. Korea’s national security. While some adjustments in troop levels may reflect broader U.S. military strategy, leveraging those forces as a bargaining chip for political theater—particularly to placate Kim—would be an entirely different matter. Given Trump’s unpredictability, S. Korea may have little choice but to prepare for every contingency.
11. North Korea’s failed warship launch underscores its urgent bid for naval power
We should keep in mind part of Kim's motivation is that South Korea has a far superior navy.
Sunday
May 25, 2025
dictionary + A - A
North Korea’s failed warship launch underscores its urgent bid for naval power
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-05-25/national/northKorea/North-Koreas-failed-warship-launch-underscores-its-urgent-bid-for-naval-power/2315139
Published: 25 May. 2025, 17:04
North Korea's 5,000-ton multipurpose destroyer Choe Hyon-ho at Nampo Shipyard is seen on April 25. [YONHAP]
North Korea’s bid to acquire a second-strike capability through naval modernization recently suffered a blow when a newly built destroyer capsized during its launch, marking a rare public failure that underscores the regime’s urgency and limitations in advancing its military ambitions.
A second-strike capability is a country’s assured ability to respond with a nuclear attack after being hit by a nuclear strike from an adversary.
Related Article
In a paper report on Saturday, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) analyzed North Korea's military intentions surrounding a recent mishap that took place at Chongjin Shipyard on Wednesday.
The ceremony, which North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attended, ended in disaster when the 5,000-ton destroyer tipped over during a side launch, tearing off part of the ship’s stern.
North Korea’s state-run Rodong Sinmun confirmed the accident on Wednesday, describing it as a “grave incident” that occurred in front of Kim.
Satellite images later showed the vessel partially capsized, with its bow still resting on the slipway.
The WSJ wrote that North Korea’s unusually public acknowledgment of the failed launch highlights the urgency Kim Jong-un places on modernizing the country’s naval forces.
The WSJ cited South Korean military assessments that estimate North Korea’s navy includes about 60,000 personnel, 420 surface ships and 70 submarines.
Despite those numbers, analysts say the navy operates more like a coastal patrol force, relying on outdated ships and obsolete weapons systems with limited open-sea capabilities.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, center, observes the first weapons test of the new multipurpose destroyer Choe Hyon-ho, held three days after its launch on April 30. [YONHAP]
North Korea launched the Choe Hyon, another 5,000-ton multipurpose destroyer, at Nampo Shipyard on April 25. The destroyer involved in the May launch failure is believed to be of the same class.
Pyongyang unveiled these modern warships as part of an effort to replace aging Soviet-era vessels and upgrade its maritime power, according to the WSJ.
Kim praised the ship’s integrated firepower system during the first weapons test for the Choe Hyonon on April 28.
“The ship, which combines hypersonic cruise missiles, strategic cruise missiles, tactical ballistic missiles and standard defense systems, represents an excellent example of our indigenous naval combat system,” he said.
The vessel reportedly includes Russian-made air defense systems.
The WSJ said that while North Korea already possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads, it seeks to strengthen its second-strike capabilities by expanding its naval power.
Experts say North Korea would need nuclear-powered submarines to truly rival the United States and South Korean navies, though such ambitions remain technically difficult and costly.
Kim has labeled the development of a “nuclear-powered strategic guided-missile submarine” as a top military priority. He recently inspected construction sites believed to be tied to that effort.
Lee Sang-kyu, head of nuclear security studies at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, estimated it would take at least 10 years for North Korea to deploy a nuclear submarine in an interview with the WSJ.
Lee said that the accident will probably push back the timeline for testing and equipping the new warship.
Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said North Korea appears determined to demonstrate a growing maritime strike capability despite limited operational capacity.
“By unveiling these vessels, North Korea signals its focus on building up naval forces for offensive purposes,” he said.
Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
BY CHO MUN-GYU [paik.jihwan@joongang.co.kr]
12. US troop reduction in South Korea
Over reaction and over reaction in Korea.
ED US troop reduction in South Korea
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open image galleryKorean and U.S. troops engage in combined defense drills in Paju, Gyeonggi Province, Jan. 13. Yonhap
- Published May 25, 2025 2:29 pm KST
- Updated May 25, 2025 3:19 pm KST
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/editorial/20250525/alleged-move-to-cut-us-troops-creates-stir-in-south-korea
Strategic recalibration or political bargaining chip?
A recent Wall Street Journal report revealed that the Donald Trump administration considered withdrawing 4,500 of the 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, relocating them to other areas within the Indo-Pacific region, such as Guam. While the U.S. Department of Defense swiftly denied the report, the idea itself is neither novel nor implausible. In fact, it reflects a broader, long-standing trajectory in U.S. military policy — one that emphasizes strategic flexibility, regional rebalancing and a recalibrated role for allies.
The notion of reducing the U.S. military footprint in South Korea is often met with concern, especially given the peninsula’s history and the ongoing threat posed by North Korea. However, this potential reduction must be viewed within the context of Washington’s evolving strategic doctrine. The U.S. has for years, been moving toward repositioning its global forces to better address the rise of China and other emerging threats. This includes encouraging allies like South Korea to shoulder more responsibility for conventional deterrence, while the U.S. retains its edge in strategic capabilities such as surveillance, missile defense and nuclear deterrence.
The 4,500 troops reportedly under review correspond to the rotational Stryker Brigade Combat Team, deployed to South Korea for nine-month tours. Halting this rotational deployment would reduce the visible U.S. ground presence but would not necessarily compromise deterrence against North Korea. South Korea’s conventional military power has grown substantially over the past decade and now surpasses the North in most key areas. In contrast, the U.S. ground presence on the peninsula has already shrunk significantly, with U.S. forces increasingly focused on air power, intelligence and rapid-deployment capabilities.
From a purely strategic standpoint, therefore, a limited drawdown could be rationalized as a reallocation of resources rather than a weakening of commitments. However, what raises genuine concern is the political framing of such decisions — especially when linked to volatile negotiations with North Korea. According to the Wall Street Journal, this reduction plan was discussed in relation to Trump’s approach to North Korea in his first term, suggesting it may have been considered not for strategic necessity, but as leverage in diplomatic dealings with Kim Jong-un.
This recalls the 2018 Trump-Kim summit, where the U.S. president suspended joint military exercises with South Korea unilaterally in an effort to court Pyongyang — catching both the Pentagon and Seoul off guard. Such politicization of military assets not only undermines alliance trust but also sends dangerous signals to adversaries. Using troop deployments as bargaining chips dilutes the credibility of U.S. commitments and encourages strategic miscalculation.
The presence of U.S. Forces Korea is not merely a military posture — it is a strategic anchor for regional stability and a tangible symbol of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Any adjustments to that presence should be the result of rigorous joint assessments, not unilateral decisions driven by political theater or campaign calculations. South Korea, too, must be vigilant in ensuring that its security is not subordinated to transactional diplomacy.
At the same time, Seoul must continue strengthening its defense posture and strategic autonomy. The days of near-total reliance on the U.S. security umbrella are fading. South Korea has made impressive strides in military modernization and should continue investing in its own capabilities, including missile defense, surveillance systems and command structures, while deepening multilateral defense cooperation with like-minded partners around the Indo-Pacific region.
In the end, the question is not simply whether U.S. troops should stay or go, but how alliance structures can evolve to reflect new strategic realities without sacrificing credibility. If a troop drawdown is indeed part of a coherent Indo-Pacific strategy grounded in shared goals and mutual respect, it can be managed responsibly. But if it becomes a pawn in erratic diplomacy, it threatens to erode the very foundations of regional stability.
As the pivotal June 3 presidential election approaches and as tensions rise across East Asia, the stakes are high. South Korea must be prepared for a range of scenarios, and most importantly, must ensure that its national security is never left to the whims of political expediency.
13. Lee Jae-myung signals hesitation on attending June NATO summit if elected
Not a good look for Korea and IP4.
Lee Jae-myung signals hesitation on attending June NATO summit if elected
koreaherald.com · by Son Ji-hyoung · May 25, 2025
Democratic Party of Korea presidential candidate Rep. Lee Jae-myung speaks at a press conference held at the party's headquarters in Seoul on Sunday. (Yonhap)
Main liberal Democratic Party of Korea presidential candidate Rep. Lee Jae-myung on Sunday expressed doubts over whether he might attend the upcoming NATO summit scheduled for June 24-26 in the Netherlands.
While not definitive, Lee’s remarks hint at a potentially more cautious approach compared to now ousted former President Yoon Suk Yeol's stance on developing South Korea's relationship with NATO member countries.
"Given the chaotic and complicated situation within the country right now, I don't know. I'm worried whether I absolutely must attend the NATO summit, unless the summit addresses specific current issues (of concern)," the front-runner in the presidential race told reporters at a press conference in Seoul.
Lee added that his first priority lies in domestic issues, such as reviving the economy for ordinary people, rather than in the handling of foreign affairs, which will come later.
His remarks show a contrast with Yoon's eager participation in the NATO summit for three straight years until 2024, alongside the other "Indo-Pacific Four" partners -- Japan, New Zealand and Australia -- as well as the 32 NATO member countries.
NATO had invited then-President Yoon to NATO summits including the IP4 for three consecutive years starting in 2022 — the first case of a South Korean president being invited to attend, following its decision to invite the IP4 leaders in 2022.
Most recently, Seoul had touted Yoon's appearance at the NATO summit in July 2024 as a means to send a strong message against the military cooperation between North Korea and Russia.
The transatlantic alliance has acknowledged since 2022 the need to team up with Indo-Pacific partners to address "shared security challenges" as it suspected a growing alignment between China and Russia concerning the Russia-Ukraine war, to which North Korean troops have been deployed.
The remarks, at the first press conference held since he declared his bid to run for president in April, came with the expectation that South Korea's newly-elected leader in the June 3 election will likely head straight into a busy month diplomatically. The new president is expected to take office immediately without a transition period.
Polls have suggested that Lee has been consistently ahead of the other candidates -- including the main conservative People Power Party's Kim Moon-soo and minor conservative New Reform Party's Rep. Lee Jun-seok -- in the race.
The Democratic Party's Lee said that he believed the government has yet to receive a formal invitation to attend the Group of Seven summit June 15-17 in Canada. "It seems it's not a matter I should immediately take into consideration," Lee said.
South Korea was not invited to the 2024 G7 summit held in Italy June 13-15. During Yoon's shortened term since 2022, Yoon was invited once to G7 summit in Japan among the three summits that occurred annually during his time in office.
Regarding the looming deadline for the 90-day suspension of US President Donald Trump's imposition of additional "reciprocal" tariffs -- 25 percent on most South Korean goods in addition to "baseline" tariffs of 10 percent -- Lee said that any talks about Seoul's trade with Washington, if he is elected, must involve "a procedure to navigate what is mutually beneficial based on mutual respect, fairness and trust," adding Seoul would "not have to be bound by" Washington's unilaterally suggested deadline of July 9.
Urgent domestic issues first
Lee, who lost to Yoon in the 2022 presidential election by the thinnest margin in South Korean history, was the main opposition party leader during Yoon's term and played a central role in rallying support for the parliament's annulment of Yoon's martial law declaration in December 2024 and for Yoon's impeachment.
As for his approach to North Korea, he said he would distance himself from the Yoon administration's hard-line stance toward the reclusive country, adding dialogue, negotiation and cooperation must be involved while maintaining strong military readiness on the foundation of the Seoul-Washington alliance.
Regarding the main liberal party's push for judiciary reform -- in the wake of the Supreme Court's recent unprecedentedly fast ruling that found Lee guilty of spreading false information during his candidacy for the 2022 presidential election -- Lee said, while it is important, now is not the right time to discuss nonurgent issues. Lee also urged caution about a proposal within the party to expand the 14-member bench of the Supreme Court to 30 and allow those who are not lawyers to be eligible to become justices.
During the press conference, Lee pledged to grant the parliament -- in which his party holds the majority of seats -- the power to recommend a candidate for prime minister and to nominate the chiefs of the prosecution, the Korean National Police Agency and the Korea Communications Commission, the broadcast watchdog. He also said he would activate a national system for the people to make recommendations for public officials as well as limit presidents' authority to veto bills.
Lee pledged he would establish an emergency economic response task force led by the president to seek an economic rebound and boost government spending to handle the recovery of people's livelihoods and small businesses, as well as full state support for cutting-edge industries such as AI.
consnow@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · by Son Ji-hyoung · May 25, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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