Quotes of the Day:
"Diplomacy can only be directly connected to the lives of each and every one of our citizens. Therefore diplomacy is our lifeline."
- Pak Jin, ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs
"From to-day I enter upon my 64th year. The paralysis that first affected me nearly ten years ago, has since remain’d, with varying course — seems to have settled quietly down, and will probably continue. I easily tire, am very clumsy, cannot walk far; but my spirits are first-rate. I go around in public almost every day — now and then take long trips, by railroad or boat, hundreds of miles — live largely in the open air — am sunburnt and stout, (weigh 190) — keep up my activity and interest in life, people, progress, and the questions of the day. About two-thirds of the time I am quite comfortable. What mentality I ever had remains entirely unaffected; though physically I am a half-paralytic, and likely to be so, long as I live. But the principal object of my life seems to have been accomplish’d — I have the most devoted and ardent of friends, and affectionate relatives — and of enemies I really make no account."
- Walt Whitman
“When I was a boy I was told that anybody could become President; I’m beginning to believe it.”
– Clarence Darrow
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 25 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. As Russian Forces Retreated, Mock Executions and Beatings Increased in Ukraine
3. Are Americans Prepared to Fight a Nuclear War Over Taiwan?
4. Opinion | What the U.S. military needs is an infusion of immigrants
5. The Army's reputation for sexual harassment and suicide is keeping Gen Z from joining up, Army secretary says
6. China's foreign minister starts Pacific tour in the Solomons
7. Inside Ukraine's Daring Helicopter Missions Into Russian-Occupied Mariupol
8. 'Horrifying' conspiracy theories swirl around Texas shooting
9. China’s Pacific plan jeopardises regional privacy and sovereignty
10. Former CENTCOM commander skeptical of counterterrorism strategy for Afghanistan
11. Turkey's wooing of Israel may lead to Hamas ouster - opinion
12. Turkey: NATO’s problem child
13. Polls show US support for Ukraine waning as Biden administration steps up aid
14. Opinion: How the Quad can become more than an anti-China grouping
15. NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China
16. Recovering the Balance of Power for the 21st Century
17. U.S. Speeds Up Reshaping of Taiwan’s Defenses to Deter China
18. Marine Corps now has 2 fully operational F-35B stealth fighter squadrons in Japan
19. The Moment Putin’s Ticking Time Bomb of Failure Could Explode
20. Why the battle for the Black Sea may be the most important showdown in the war — for Ukraine and for the world
21. Ukraine Is Using Quiet Electric Bikes to Haul Anti-Tank Weapons
22. Opinion: Biden’s visit to Asia highlights the continent’s ‘Finlandization’ – a desire to steer clear of conflict between Russia and the West
23. ‘Collaborative, Portable Autonomy’ Is the Future of AI for Special Operations
24. Another Killer Dressed Up Like a Special Operator
25. President on statements by Kissinger and NYT: They want to exchange lives of millions of Ukrainians for illusion of peace
26. The Best Counter to Misinformation is More Information
27. The Hazards of Optimism
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 25 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 25
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 25
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Frederick W. Kagan, and George Barros
May 25, 7:15 pm ET
Some pro-Russian milbloggers on Telegram continued to criticize the Kremlin for appalling treatment of forcefully mobilized Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) servicemen–contradicting Russian information campaigns about progress of the Russian special military operation. Former Russian Federal Security Service officer Igor Girkin (also known by the alias Igor Strelkov) amplified a critique to his 360,000 followers from a smaller milblogger discussing a video wherein a DNR battalion appealed to DNR Head Denis Pushilin about maltreatment of forcefully mobilized forces.[1] The milblogger blamed Russian leadership, not Pushilin, for beginning the invasion with insufficient reserves and unprepared, forcefully mobilized forces. The milblogger added that Russia did not provide the soldiers of its proxy republics with new weapons, despite claiming that Ukrainian forces prepared to attack occupied Donbas areas for a year prior to Russian invasion. The milblogger also claimed that the Kremlin failed to mobilize and adequately prepare the next batch of reserves, while Ukrainian forces are successfully preparing their troops for counteroffensives. Girkin also criticized the Kremlin for failing to pay the DNR battalion for three months. Some milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces staged the video, but the video still gathered attention of pro-Russian Telegram users.[2]
The incident highlights a continuing shift in the Russian-language milblogger information space regardless of the video’s authenticity. Milbloggers would likely have either attacked or dismissed such a video loudly and in near-unison earlier in the war, when they all generally focused on presenting optimistic pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian narratives. The response to this video in the Russian-language milblogger space demonstrates the strong resonance anti-Kremlin narratives can now have. It is impossible to know what effect this change in this information space might have on general perceptions of the war in Russia, but it is one of the most visible and noteworthy inflections in the attitudes of previously strongly pro-Kremlin ostensibly independent Russian voices speaking to Russians that we have yet seen.
Today’s statement by DNR Militia Head Eduard Basurin explaining that Russian forces would focus on creating “smaller cauldrons” rather than on a single large encirclement is likely in part a response to a critique that surfaced both in the milblogger space and in the Russian Duma that Russian forces had failed to form and reduce “cauldrons” of the sort they used in 2014.[3] Basurin’s statement, along with other changes in the ways in which Russian officials have spoken about cauldrons and Russian operations in the east following those critiques suggest that the Russian and proxy leadership is sensitive to shifts in this information space.[4]
Russian forces are increasingly facing a deficiency in high-precision weaponry. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that due to an increasing lack of high-precision weapons Russian forces are seeking other methods of striking critical infrastructure and have intensified the use of aircraft to support offensives.[5] The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) noted that up to 60% of Russia’s high-precision stockpile has already been exhausted, which is consistent with previous reports by Western defense officials that Russian forces have been increasingly relying on “dumb bombs” because they are facing challenges replenishing their supplies of precision munitions in part due to sanctions targeting Russia’s defense-industrial production.[6] A lack of high-precision weapons will likely result in an increase in indiscriminate attacks on critical and civilian infrastructure.
The Kremlin is attempting to expand the pool of Russian passport-holders in occupied areas. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on May 25 that will simplify the procedure for obtaining a Russian passport within Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts.[7] This renewed campaign of so-called ”mass passportization” is occurring in occupied territories and likely represents an effort to set conditions for some sort of post-conflict political arrangement (the precise form of which Putin prefers remains unclear) through manipulating access to Russian citizenship.[8] Occupation authorities may additionally attempt to exploit this new decree to carry out covert mobilization in occupied areas, as having a Russian passport would make conscription-eligible residents of occupied territories subject to forced military service.
The Kremlin and Russian military commanders are introducing new regulations aimed at addressing the diminishing level of combat-ready reserves. The Russian State Duma and the Russian Federation Council passed a bill raising the maximum age for voluntary enlistment into the Russian military from 40 to 50.[9] Russian Telegram channels also reported that Russian leadership forced operational officers and commanders of the Russian Border Guards of southern Russian regions including Rostov Oblast and occupied Crimea to indefinitely cancel all summer vacations--a rather unsurprising step in light of the military situation in principle, but an indication of the next source of manpower to which Putin will apparently turn.[10] Russian Border Guards will reportedly deploy to training grounds for unspecified exercises in late May. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces are forming new reserve units within the Southern Military District.[11]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces prioritized advances east and west of Popasna in order to cut Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) southwest of Severodonetsk and complete encirclement efforts in Luhansk Oblast.
- Russian forces have likely entered Lyman and may use this foothold to coordinate with advances southeast of Izyum to launch an offensive on Siversk.
- Russian forces may start the Battle of Severodonetsk prior to completely cutting off Ukrainian GLOCs southwest and northwest of Severodonetsk.
- Russian forces struck Zaporizhzhia City in an attempt to disrupt a key logistics hub for Ukrainian forces operating in the east.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time. We have stopped coverage of Mariupol as a separate effort since the city’s fall. We had added a new section on activities in Russian-occupied areas:
- Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
- Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv City;
- Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Militia Head Eduard Basurin confirmed that Russian forces have adopted an approach of creating smaller cauldrons to deprive Ukrainian troops of logistics and reinforcements, rather than pursuing a single large-scale encirclement on the Donetsk Oblast administrative border.[12] ISW has previously assessed that Russian commanders have likely abandoned the objective of completing a large-scale encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Donbas.[13]
Russian forces prioritized three advances east and west of Popasna in an effort to cut Ukrainian GLOCs southwest of Severodonetsk and complete the Luhansk Oblast cauldron. Russian forces continued to advance east of Popasna to seize settlements on the T1303 highway to Lysyschansk, northeast to cut Ukrainian access to T1302 highway from Bakhmut to Lysychansk, and southwest along the T0504 highway from Popasna toward Bakhmut.[14] Russian forces reportedly made advances towards Bakhmut from Svitlodarsk, a settlement just north of Debaltseve, and continued heavy shelling likely in preparations for a ground offensive.[15]
Russian forces seem to be prioritizing efforts to cut the two highways to Severodonetsk over launching offensive operations on Bakhmut at this time.[16] Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai refuted reports that Russian forces had cut off or blocked the T1302 highway on May 25.[17] Russian forces are unlikely to completely isolate Ukrainian forces from GLOCs just by seizing the southwestern T1303 and T1302 highways to Severodonetsk given the network of alternate if smaller roads in the region and will need to block or disrupt Bakhmut and Siversk to complete the Luhansk cauldron.
Russian efforts to isolate Severodonetsk and Lysychansk may not be well synchronized in time and space with an impending direct Russian assault on Severdonetsk, although it is too soon to tell. The Russians are likely some days away from even cutting off the GLOCs to Severdonetsk and Lysychansk, and it would likely take some time for the disruption of those GLOCs to affect the cities’ defenders’ abilities to continue fighting. The intensity of Russian artillery and air attack, however, combined with the massing of Russian forces drawn from elsewhere in theater for the assault on Severodonetsk suggests that the assault could be launched before the GLOCs have been cut or before their disruption could have a material effect. The drive to cut the GLOCs could also be an effort to create an outer encirclement ring, however, to prevent Ukrainian forces from attempting to reinforce Severodonetsk as it is attacked or to relieve it if it is isolated or falls.
Russian forces may need to conduct a ground offensive on Severodonetsk in upcoming days to maintain their pace after committing a significant portion of personnel, artillery, aviation, and logistics to the front.[18] The Ukrainian Defense Ministry reported that Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the vicinity of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk on May 25.[19] Haidai stated that Russian forces will lose the momentum of their heavy shelling and motivation if they do not launch an attack on Severodonetsk by Sunday.[20] Haidai reported that Russian forces already committed over 10,000 troops - approximately 25 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) composed on 300 to 500 servicemen each - and military equipment including S-400 surface-to-air missile systems.[21] Russian military commanders likely had to withdraw these forces from other axes, slowing down Russian advances in Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Kharkiv Oblasts. Russian forces have also reportedly reached mortar range of Severodonetsk.[22]
Russian forces continued unsuccessful attempts to improve tactical positions in the direction of Slovyansk and advance southeast of Izyum on May 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to launch another ground assault on Dovhenke, approximately 18km south of Izyum.[23] Russian forces also tried to advance towards Lyman from the Izyum area but did not gain any new ground from this direction.[24]
Social media videos of Russian soldiers claiming to have entered Lyman from the east suggest that Ukrainian forces could have withdrawn from the settlement on May 25.[25] Russian forces in Izyum could possibly try to coordinate efforts with Russian units in Lyman to launch an offensive on Siversk, a settlement located on a major highway 30km west of Severodonetsk. An offensive on Siversk would assist Russian forces in cutting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Severodonetsk from the northwest.
Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to seize settlements east and west of Avdiivka, and did not achieve any territorial gains on Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border.[26] Russian forces reportedly shelled railway tracks near Avdiivka on May 25, likely to further shake up Ukrainian fortifications in the area.[27] Unconfirmed social media reports reiterated that Russian forces made advances to encircle Ukrainian positions from the northwest, but ISW cannot independently confirm these claims.[28]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Russian forces intensified artillery attacks against Ukrainian positions and focused on maintaining and regaining control of territory north of Kharkiv City on May 25.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces shelled Ternova, Ruski Tyshky, and Rubizhne and that Russian troops attempted a ground offensive near Ternova, indicating that control of settlements in northern Kharkiv Oblast remains contested.[30] Russian forces did not make any confirmed advances on this axis on May 25.
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces focused on improving their tactical positions and conducted air, rocket, missile, and artillery strikes along the Southern Axis on May 25.[31] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian troops clashed with Ukrainian defense in northeastern Mykolaiv Oblast while attempting to advance towards Kryvyi Rih.[32] Russian forces conducted a rocket strike against residential areas of Zaporizhzhia City, which the Russian Defense Ministry claimed was an attack on Ukrainian production workshops at the Motor Sich plant.[33] The direct attack on Zaporizhzhia City is likely intended to disrupt a key logistics hub for the Ukrainian army operating in the east. Russian forces additionally fired on areas Kryvyi Rih and elsewhere in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Mykolaiv, and Kherson Oblasts.[34] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command noted that the Russian grouping in Crimea continued to bolster air defense and deployed two additional S-400 anti-aircraft missile divisions to the northwestern part of Crimea.[35]
Activity in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Occupation authorities continued to take measures to consolidate administrative control of occupied territories on May 25. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on May 25 that simplifies the procedure for obtaining Russian passports in Zaporizhia and Kherson Oblasts.[36] The Ukrainian Resistance Center referred to this decree as an attempt at “mass passportization,” which is likely an indicator that occupation authorities could seek to facilitate annexation directly into the Russian Federation and strengthen administrative control over occupied areas.[37] Russian occupiers in Kherson Oblast are reportedly trying to force locals into occupied areas to cooperate with occupation organs and are attempting to mobilize Ukrainians into the Russian army.[38] Russian forces around occupied Berdyansk and Vasylivka are reportedly blocking exits from the cities with concrete slabs, indicating that occupation authorities seek to stem the flow of people from occupied territories and allow for the implementation of further controls.[39]
Russian forces continued to strengthen occupation control in Mariupol on May 25. The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that Russian and proxy forces completed the demining of the seaport and that the city is beginning to function on more regular basis.[40] Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko stated that authorities of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) are beginning a new policy in Mariupol wherein citizens will be eligible to directly obtain Russian passports without obtaining DNR passports.[41] Such “passportization” measures may be intended to further set conditions for the direct annexation of Mariupol into the Russian Federation. Occupation authorities additionally continued filtration and deportation measures in Mariupol under the supervision of Federal State Security (FSB) agents and Russian “volunteers.”[42]
Immediate items to watch
- Russian forces are likely reinforcing their grouping north of Kharkiv City to prevent further advances of the Ukrainian counteroffensive towards the Russian border. Russan forces may commit elements of the 1st Tank Army to Northern Kharkiv in the near future.
- Russian forces are prioritizing cutting off two major highways to Severodonetsk but may start to storm the city before they successfully cut GLOCs.
- Occupation forces in Mariupol will continue to strengthen administrative control of the city but are likely unsure as to what the ultimate annexation policy will be.
- Russian forces are likely preparing for Ukrainian counteroffensives and settling in for protracted operations in Southern Ukraine.
[8] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/05/25/okupanty-mayut-problemy-iz-prymusovoyu-pasportyzacziyeyu-harkivshhyny/
[18] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/05/25/za-pidtrymky-aviacziyi-protyvnyk-vede-nastupalni-diyi-shhob-otochyty-nashi-pidrozdily-i-vyjty-na-adminkordon-luganskoyi-oblasti/
[19] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/05/25/za-pidtrymky-aviacziyi-protyvnyk-vede-nastupalni-diyi-shhob-otochyty-nashi-pidrozdily-i-vyjty-na-adminkordon-luganskoyi-oblasti/
[36] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/v-op-vidpovili-na-sproshennya-vidachi-pasportiv-rf-dlya-zhiteliv-hersonskoyi-ta-zaporizkoyi-oblastej; https://ria dot ru/20220525/grazhdanstvo-1790612394.htm
[37] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/05/25/okupanty-mayut-problemy-iz-prymusovoyu-pasportyzacziyeyu-harkivshhyny/
2. As Russian Forces Retreated, Mock Executions and Beatings Increased in Ukraine
The evil nature of the Putin regime is revealed (again).
Photos at the link.
As Russian Forces Retreated, Mock Executions and Beatings Increased in Ukraine
After nearly two weeks of beatings, the thought of dying was no longer so terrifying for captive Maksym Didyk. But the bullet whizzed past his ear.
| Photographs by Serhii Korovayny for The Wall Street Journal
May 26, 2022 5:30 am ET
NOVYI BYKIV, Ukraine—The Russian soldier calling people outside to be shot must have had a change of heart, Maksym Didyk recalled thinking.
After nearly two weeks of beatings, the thought of dying was no longer so terrifying, he said later. He was ready. But the bullet he thought was meant for him whizzed past his ear and hit the ground where he was kneeling.
Some of the 21 people with whom he had been locked up wouldn’t survive.
Eleven days earlier on March 19, Mr. Didyk had been enjoying an uneasy freedom. Though Russian troops had taken over Novyi Bykiv, a small settlement dotted with one-story houses 50 miles east of Kyiv, he was able to keep up with work in the village. That Saturday morning, he went out with a family friend to feed his pigs and milk his cows, he and his friend said.
For nearly two weeks, Mr. Didyk’s parents didn’t know where he was.
As they were walking home, Mr. Didyk, a tall 21-year-old with dark hair, caught the eye of a Russian patrol. They asked if he had been giving away their positions to Ukrainian forces, he and the family friend said.
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“Is that why we keep getting hit with artillery?” Mr. Didyk remembered one of them asking as they searched him for tattoos that might give him away as a combatant. They scrolled through his phone, he said, to see if he had sent any photographs of Russian troops. The family friend said it was a thorough interrogation.
The Russians didn’t find anything incriminating but took Mr. Didyk and his friend to a nearby cellar, he said, where they were beaten with the butt of a pistol and a rifle. They took a hammer to Mr. Didyk’s knees and threatened to brand him with a red-hot fire iron, he said. The family friend said Mr. Didyk was roughed up badly, with the soldiers targeting his ribs.
The basement of the village community center that Russian soldiers used as their command base.
Mr. Didyk’s ordeal echoes that of many of Ukrainians in the weeks immediately following Russia’s invasion. Caught out by drone attacks and ambushes, Russian patrols began targeting civilians for interrogation, convinced that many were taking photos of their positions or passing other information about their formations to the Ukrainian armed forces.
Some of those snared in the dragnet would spend days or weeks not knowing if they would live. Some are still missing.
After three days in different basements, the Russian soldiers told Mr. Didyk and his friend, who is also a distant relative, that it was time to go, he said. They placed an open backpack over his head and fastened it around his neck with tape, he said, before leading him into a Tigr military transport vehicle. Once the motor started, he counted the seconds to keep track of the distance he was traveling, but the vehicle soon stopped and they were rounded up with other prisoners.
“All of you, stand in a row. Hold on to each other. I’m not going to lead you one by one,” Mr. Didyk said he heard a soldier yell.
Still hooded, Mr. Didyk and his friend were led to an external boiler room made of concrete and brick where two Ukrainian soldiers were chained to a radiator. Mr. Didyk said the Russians pushed him and his friend inside and forced them into a small storage space below the floor, he said, together with a third man: Aleksandr Ignatov, who had been hit by a car some years before and suffered from chronic memory loss.
The building where Mr. Didyk was held.
The cellar where some of the prisoners were kept captive.
A neighbor said Russian troops had detained Mr. Ignatov after they tired of him repeatedly coming to a checkpoint to ask them what was going on. Mr. Didyk and another prisoner said he angered them in detention too, pulling off his blindfold to ask the same questions, again and again. Mr. Didyk said the Russian soldiers would break bottles over his head and laugh.
For the first days in the basement, Ukrainian soldiers there took care of those in the tiny room, giving them sips of water and lemonade looted from nearby stores, surviving prisoners said.
As days wore on, more civilians were brought in and the Ukrainian soldiers were taken away. On March 24, another man from Novyi Bykiv, Mykola, 65, was brought inside. He said he and the other new arrivals had been questioned at the local village schoolhouse before being dispersed around several detention centers.
None of the Russian soldiers had any identifying markings, only white tape around their arms or legs, said Mr. Didyk and Mykola, whom The Wall Street Journal agreed to identify by only his first name. The prosecutor’s office in Ukraine’s Chernihiv province said three Russian units had been in Novyi Bykiv: the 21st Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, the 15th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Alexandria Brigade and the 37th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. Ukrainian prosecutors have already started war crimes proceedings against them for the detention, killing and disappearances of Ukrainian citizens.
The main street in Novyi Bykiv.
Mykola was wary of joining the others in the cramped basement, which was filled with blankets soiled with blood and human waste. He immediately felt a strong sense of claustrophobia and asked the Russian soldiers to shoot him instead, he recalled.
“‘Don’t worry we’ll still find time to shoot you,’” Mykola remembered one of the Russians as saying before they closed the trapdoor above them, plunging the tiny space into darkness.
A few days later, a 25-year-old mathematics teacher joined them. Mr. Didyk recognized her instantly. He said he and Viktoria Andrusha had grown up in similar circles. Mr. Didyk and Mykola recalled that she said she had been watching in the next village over from Novyi Bykiv as Russian forces trundled along the main road. Her father said he made an inventory of the equipment, peeping over their garden fence, as Ms. Andrusha relayed the information to a friend in the military.
On March 25, Ms. Andrusha’s father said, around 15 Russian soldiers broke into the family home to look for her. They took her upstairs, where they searched through her phone and she admitted sending information to Ukrainian forces. The Russians blindfolded her, gathered her clothes, and drove her away, her father said.
Ms. Andrusha was covered with bruises when she arrived at the boiler room, Mr. Didyk said.
She also upbraided their captors for invading Ukraine, Mykola recalled.
“She had no problem calling them occupiers. She asked why they came here to ruin our peaceful lives,” he said, admiring her courage. “You should have seen the Russians’ faces.”
From then on, until she was led out days later, the Russians left her alone and treated her with respect, Mykola said.
A photograph of Mr. Didyk and his girlfriend at his home in Novyi Bykiv.
More Ukrainians arrived the following day from across the area, Mr. Didyk and his friend said. With the Ukrainian soldiers now gone, Mr. Didyk said, the Russian guards asked him to look after the rest of the prisoners, and he began to act as an intermediary, which Mykola confirmed.
The Russian soldiers beat the prisoners ferociously over the following days, especially the new arrivals, Mr. Didyk said. The Russian assault on Kyiv was being hampered by insurgent attacks on supply lines and frustrations were boiling over into violence. Conditions were worsening, with sanitation a growing problem. Mr. Ignatov’s health was fading, Mykola said.
On March 27, the Russians took Ms. Andrusha and Mr. Ignatov away. Nobody has heard from them since, their families said. The Chernihiv prosecutor’s office said it had unconfirmed information that she had been detained in Russia’s Kursk province, near the Ukrainian border. Ms. Andrusha’s father worries she may have been taken to Russia to be traded in a prisoner exchange.
“I would give anything I have just to get her back,” he said.
Two days later, Mr. Didyk said, one of the Russian soldiers told the prisoners filling the boiler room and the basement space that they would soon be freed.
Instead, things got worse.
Graffiti reading “humans” at a house near Novyi Bykiv.
The next morning, a Russian soldier opened the door to the boiler room at 8:30 a.m., earlier than normal. He appeared intoxicated, Mr. Didyk and Mykola said, and told the detainees that he needed bodies. He approached an older man who prisoners remembered as Mikhailo Ivashko.
“Are you ready?” the soldier asked the man, Mr. Didyk recounted.
“No,” the man said.
The Russian soldier gave him a shot of vodka and asked again, “Are you ready?”
“No,” the man said.
The Russian told him to sit and think a bit, then left and went to the edge of the nearby road to smoke. In a few minutes he returned, and the old man said he was ready.
The Russian soldier led him out. A few minutes later, Mr. Didyk and Mykola said, they heard a single gunshot.
The Russian came back, and asked whether anyone would volunteer to be next. “We need eight bodies,” he repeated, Mykola said.
When no one stepped forward, the soldier turned to Mykola and asked if he was ready. He said he demurred.
Mr. Didyk inside the boiler room.
The Russian then approached Mr. Didyk, he recalled. The soldier took him aside and asked him to choose who among the other prisoners would die.
Mr. Didyk said he refused, and told the soldier that he wouldn’t be able to live with himself. Instead, Mr. Didyk said, he volunteered to be next.
The Russian soldier gruffly pulled Mr. Didyk out of the boiler room, he recalled, led him to the edge of a nearby cemetery in silence and told him to get on his knees. Mr. Didyk said he did as he was told and waited. A shot rang out and the bullet went past his ear and hit the ground in front of him. He said he stayed on his knees in silence.
The Russian pulled him up, telling him he never wanted Mr. Didyk to talk that way again.
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After that, the soldier chose several prisoners to shoot, Mr. Didyk and Mykola said, while others volunteered—each given a shot of vodka before they were taken away.
That night, 12 prisoners were left in the boiler room, where they ate a small meal of buckwheat, Mr. Didyk recalled.
The next morning, the Russian soldier returned at 5:30 a.m. and said he and his comrades were leaving. Mr. Didyk and Mykola said the soldier instructed the prisoners to stay put for a while and be careful when they emerged. They listened for the troops’ engines to start up and fade into the distance.
Less than an hour later, the men left the unlocked boiler room. Mr. Didyk described how they walked to the nearby graveyard, where they found six of those who had been led away for executions still alive. At the entrance to the cemetery, they found three men from the boiler room lying dead on the ground, their faces shattered by bullets. One man was still missing, Mr. Didyk and Mykola said.
The graveyard where prisoners say three of them were killed.
The handcuffs Mr. Didyk says were used to restrain another prisoner.
Human Rights Watch said some 20 people had been detained in all in the boiler room and cited a prisoner who said that three had been killed.
Mr. Didyk said he then walked home, accompanied by a man who had spent the night in the graveyard and was still wearing handcuffs.
His parents had gone to the next village to escape the shelling, but he found a neighbor who called them.
His mother, when they saw each other, told him how hard she had tried to find him.
“I called you on your phone, but the Russians already had it, I guess,” she recalled, crying as she described the episode. “They said you were busy.”
3. Are Americans Prepared to Fight a Nuclear War Over Taiwan?
Another way to ask this important question is do Americans want to deter a war in Taiwan? These questions are of course interrelated.
Excerpts:
The more than 23 million people of Taiwan deserve to set their own destinies. They have created a democratic policy, market economy, and vibrant society. However, risking their homeland is a high price for Americans to pay, too high. War with China means personnel killed, planes downed, ships sunk, and bases bombed. War with China also means the possibility of nuclear-tipped missiles hitting American cities. And even a U.S. victory likely would be transitory, as China could retreat and prepare for another round, rather like Germany between World Wars I and II.
Better to seek a regional modus vivendi, which ensures that Taipei eschews claims of independence and military relationships with other nations, while Beijing reduces military threats and affirms peaceful reunification.
Washington also should consider the lessons of Ukraine: arming and training Taiwanese forces, preparing global sanctions in response to an attack, and developing asymmetric military responses. The goal should be to put the greatest responsibility on Taiwan while raising the price more for China than for America.
The president’s inability to control his mouth is dangerous. Failing to consider the full consequences of war with China over Taiwan is worse. And expecting Americans to accept without debate the costs and risks of full-scale combat with the PRC is a political crime. The Biden administration should address all three issues before the Taiwan Strait becomes the world’s latest crisis.
Are Americans Prepared to Fight a Nuclear War Over Taiwan?
The consequences of a U.S.-China war over Taiwan need to be understood: A president suffering from an occasional case of verbal diarrhea about political infighting is an embarrassment. A president repeating loose comments about international affairs is dangerous.
On his trip to East Asia, intended to convince friends and allies that Uncle Sam can walk and chew gum at the same time, the president’s statement roiled the region. When asked if he would defend Taiwan, he responded “yes,” adding that “it’s a commitment we made.” His words circled the globe at warp speed, appearing to yet again repudiate the policy of “strategic ambiguity,” by which Washington refused to clarify its position toward a Chinese attack on Taiwan.
Since the Carter administration dropped diplomatic ties with Taiwan, legally the Republic of China, and recognized the PRC, America’s defense ties with Taipei have been ambiguous. Washington retains unofficial diplomatic ties with the island state and is committed by law to sell the latter defensive weapons. However, Taiwan enjoys neither a defense treaty, as possessed by Japan and South Korea, nor any other formal military commitment. Making U.S. policy a straightforward “maybe.”
The Strategy of Strategic Ambiguity
In theory, the uncertainty and possibility of forfeiting U.S. support are supposed to deter Taipei from recklessly challenging Beijing. At the same time, the PRC is supposed to avoid taking military action, lest Washington decides to intervene. Voila, America achieves the best of both worlds. However, the opposite result also is possible. The Taiwanese might believe eight decades of cooperation in war and peace mean the U.S. would intervene on the former’s behalf. And the Chinese might decide that no rational American president would risk Los Angeles for Taipei.
In fact, strategic ambiguity looks like an excuse to avoid deciding. As long as policymakers need not give a clear yes or no, they need not clearly decide yes or no. And they can simply hope the contingency never arises.
China is Not Ambiguous About Reunification
However, this strategy is becoming increasingly untenable. There is no sign of an imminent Chinese military action, but noted by the Quincy Institute’s Michael Swaine: “this possibility cannot be discounted over the longer term if present trends continue.” Beijing’s patience appears to be diminishing: Chinese President Xi Jinping has inveighed against the issue being “passed on from generation to generation.” The PRC has increased diplomatic and military pressure on Taiwan, while the brutal crackdown in Hong Kong suggests the Xi government has given up citing the special administrative region as an example to negotiate voluntary reunification.
Time for the U.S. to Take a Position?
As a result, U.S. policymakers should know their mind. If China acts, they need to be ready to respond. That could mean marshaling diplomatic and economic power around the globe against Beijing. That could mean indirectly striking Chinese interests – for instance, interdicting trade with and air travel to the PRC. Most seriously, that could mean directly intervening against Chinese military forces. Whatever the case, Washington should be ready to act, or not act, and not be caught unprepared if Beijing strikes.
Most importantly, the issue should be discussed now. The largely unstated consensus within the Beltway appears to be that of course, Washington should intervene. To most foreign policy professionals it is inconceivable that America would not respond militarily. The main disagreement of late is over whether strategic ambiguity should be replaced with strategic clarity – by stating a firm military commitment, as the president seemed to do.
Is America Ready for Strategic Clarity?
However, the American people should be consulted, starting now, Admitted Rep. Michael McCaul, ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. “I don’t know how many Americans would want to go to war over a tiny island they know nothing about,” he said. And if they fully understood the cost of defending Taiwan from China – the possibility of conventional defeat and nuclear disaster – they might firmly oppose doing so.
If a crisis explodes, the president should be prepared to act and Congress should be prepared to vote. Most importantly, the latter should fulfill its constitutional responsibility and debate a declaration of war, necessary for a presidential decision to intervene militarily. Such a momentous decision requires an informed citizenry.
Taiwan is China’s most important strategic objective, outside of protecting the mainland. Beijing leadership, along with most Chinese including younger generations – which I have found to be profoundly nationalistic even when otherwise liberal – believe Taiwan to be part of China. The island was stripped from the decrepit Chinese empire by Japan in 1895 and returned after the latter’s defeat in 1945. In 1949 the Chinese Communist Party overthrew the ROC and ousted the Nationalist Party government, which fled to Taiwan. Backed by the U.S. military, the ROC maintained a separate existence but gradually lost the diplomatic game as most of the world, including America, formally accepted only “one China” and recognized the PRC.
For the mainland leadership, reuniting the two – meaning subordinating Taiwan to the PRC – is the final step to end “the Century of Humiliation” in which China suffered foreign invasion and occupation. The only comparable U.S. experience in terms of nationalism at its most raw is the American Civil War, in which northerners refused to allow secession. After the eleven southern states seceded over slavery, the national government fought over the union, and some 750,000 Americans, roughly eight million in today’s terms, died in the process.
U.S. policymakers want to believe that America would triumph. Some, such as former defense secretary and CIA director Leon Panetta, simply assume that the threat to intervene would suffice to protect Taipei and that the PRC would back down. All the US must do is declare its willingness to act, and the Chinese leadership will retreat to Zhongnanhai, heads hung low, and accept American suzerainty forevermore.
Others either believe that America would win, or they just ignore the possibility of losing. Believing it imperative that Washington act, they ignore the likely consequences. Everything simply must turn outright.
Alas, fighting the PRC over Taiwan would be nothing like America’s recent military experience. Iraq and Afghanistan were cakewalks compared to high-intensity war against the well-armed and highly motivated People’s Liberation Army, generously stocked with missiles and an expanding nuclear arsenal. At its worst, air and naval combat between the U.S. and PRC would take Americans back to World War II’s Pacific war, which surely no one wants to relive, with a possible nuclear twist if such weapons were used against America.
And Beijing appears ready for war, if necessary, though that certainly is not its preference. The PRC desires a negotiated surrender by Taiwan. If it comes to war, some PRC officials don’t believe the U.S. would fight, leading to the infamous taunt that America would not risk Los Angeles for Taipei. And that is a fair assumption based on any normal balancing of interests. Taiwan matters far more to China than America. Imagine the PRC announcing that it was prepared to defend Cuba from U.S. aggression. That would seem equally ludicrous to Washington, especially having seen the Soviet Union retreat in a comparable situation six decades ago.
However, most Chinese leaders appear to be more realistic, preparing for U.S. intervention. Beijing benefits from the tyranny of distance – Taiwan is about 100 miles from the mainland, roughly as far as Cuba from the U.S. In contrast, Taiwan is more than 7,000 miles from the American mainland and about 1.700 miles from Guam, the closest U.S. possession. Washington is at a significant disadvantage since it is easier and less costly to deter than project power. Ominously, the U.S. usually loses war games of a Taiwan conflict.
Although Washington is developing strategies to overcome the PRC’s anti-access/area-denial capabilities, it would be difficult for the U.S. to prevail even with access to allied bases in the region. Ground facilities and naval forces would be vulnerable to missile attacks. Moreover, despite Tokyo’s tougher attitude toward China and Seoul’s new conservative government, there is no guarantee that if war loomed either would join the U.S. Doing so would turn them into military targets and guarantee enduring enmity from the PRC. The allies would be especially reluctant to act if they believed Washington was at least partially responsible for igniting the crisis.
Escalation seems inevitable. China could scarcely avoid hitting Guam, a U.S. possession loaded with military facilities, and Okinawa, a Japanese island filled with American bases and personnel. The U.S. would inevitably target mainland installations, a couple of scores of which could be used to support an invasion of Taiwan. Both sides would face strong pressure to retaliate in turn. A recent wargame suggested that Beijing likely would brandish nuclear weapons early in any conflict, with potentially disastrous results.
Ultimately, the U.S. could find itself devoting much of its military budget – at a time of rapidly increasing deficits as America’s population ages – to combatting a rising, distant adversary in its own neighborhood over interests it considers to be vital. And in doing so Americans would be courting a greater chance of nuclear conflict than even during the Cold War. In short, the American people could find themselves risking national bankruptcy and destruction to confront this one contingency: defending Taiwan from China.
The more than 23 million people of Taiwan deserve to set their own destinies. They have created a democratic policy, market economy, and vibrant society. However, risking their homeland is a high price for Americans to pay, too high. War with China means personnel killed, planes downed, ships sunk, and bases bombed. War with China also means the possibility of nuclear-tipped missiles hitting American cities. And even a U.S. victory likely would be transitory, as China could retreat and prepare for another round, rather like Germany between World Wars I and II.
Better to seek a regional modus vivendi, which ensures that Taipei eschews claims of independence and military relationships with other nations, while Beijing reduces military threats and affirms peaceful reunification.
Washington also should consider the lessons of Ukraine: arming and training Taiwanese forces, preparing global sanctions in response to an attack, and developing asymmetric military responses. The goal should be to put the greatest responsibility on Taiwan while raising the price more for China than for America.
The president’s inability to control his mouth is dangerous. Failing to consider the full consequences of war with China over Taiwan is worse. And expecting Americans to accept without debate the costs and risks of full-scale combat with the PRC is a political crime. The Biden administration should address all three issues before the Taiwan Strait becomes the world’s latest crisis.
A 1945 Contributing Editor, Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. He worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry. He writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine, National Interest, the Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Times. Bandow speaks frequently at academic conferences, on college campuses, and to business groups. Bandow has been a regular commentator on ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC. He holds a JD from Stanford University.
4. Opinion | What the U.S. military needs is an infusion of immigrants
Given the large anti-immigrant sentiment in our country we will never again benefit from the Lodge Act.
AMERICA’S FOREIGN LEGIONNAIRES
The Lodge Act Soldiers, Part I
https://arsof-history.org/articles/v5n1_lodge_act_part_1_page_1.html
AMERICA’S FOREIGN LEGIONNAIRES
The Lodge Act Soldiers – Part II
https://arsof-history.org/articles/v5n2_lodge_act_part_2_page_1.html
The MAVNI program was doomed to failure because of our bureaucracy and lack of focus on the importance of immigrants (the narrow focus on language as a band aid for the lack of language ability of most Americans).
Guide to the MAVNI Program
https://www.stilt.com/blog/2021/06/mavni-program/
MILITARY ACCESSIONS VITAL TO NATIONAL INTEREST (MAVNI)
RECRUITMENT PILOT PROGRAM
https://dod.defense.gov/news/mavni-fact-sheet.pdf
These Recruits Were Promised Citizenship in Exchange for Military Service. Now They Fear the US Has Forgotten Them
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/03/13/these-recruits-were-promised-citizenship-exchange-military-service-now-they-fear-us-has-forgotten.html
Defending Your MAVNI Client - Security Clearance Revocations and Separations
https://tjaglcs.army.mil/tal-2021-issue-1/-/asset_publisher/jhkg/content/practice-notes-defending-your-mavni-client
Opinion | What the U.S. military needs is an infusion of immigrants
Margaret D. Stock, lieutenant colonel (retired), is an attorney with the Anchorage office of Cascadia Cross Border Law Group LLC. She transferred to the Retired Reserve of the U.S. Army in June 2010 after serving 28 years as a Military Police Corps officer in the Army Reserve. She is a member of the Council on National Security and Immigration.
Today’s U.S. military is facing a personnel deficit that is affecting our nation’s readiness and threatening our national security. But if our leaders are willing to act, there’s an obvious solution to this problem: immigrants.
Last year, the military failed to meet its recruiting goals, even though at least one branch, the Army, was offering a record $50,000 signing bonus to anyone willing to commit to a tour of six years. Part of the problem is that, like other employers, the armed services are competing for candidates in the midst of a labor shortage. They also, however, face a fundamental demographic challenge: The total U.S. population is growing at its slowest rate in history.
On top of that, there’s the quality-candidate issue. Increasingly, Americans who do apply are rejected. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, even if they wanted to join, 71 percent of young people cannot meet military requirements. One in four is overweight. Others either fail to meet the education requirements necessary to serve in a high-tech 21st-century military or have mental health challenges or a drug abuse or criminal record.
But a key reason the military can’t meet its recruiting goals is our nation’s problem with immigration.
The U.S. population is now 13.5 percent foreign born, but foreign-born individuals make up less than 4 percent of the military. Thousands of qualified, U.S.-educated potential recruits cannot sign up. That’s because the Defense Department requires a green card — lawful permanent residence — for enlistment. But getting a green card these days is a herculean task that is beyond the reach of many otherwise lawful and qualified immigrants.
The average wait for a green card for nationals of some countries is upward of 15 years. By the time immigrants get a green card, they are often too old to serve in the military. In addition, the most common ways in which people obtain green cards are through marriage or civilian employer sponsorship. Those who benefit from these routes are not the people most likely to be looking to join the military. Others, such as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals recipients and other dreamers, are not eligible for a green card at all.
Under President George W. Bush, I piloted an idea called the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program. The idea was to fast-track the path to military service and, ultimately, to citizenship for lawful immigrants with skills the U.S. military needed. These immigrants did not need a green card, but were required to possess such skills as foreign-language proficiency or U.S. medical licenses and to be willing to serve for eight years.
As the New York Times reported, “The program’s success stories include Paul Chelimo, a native of Kenya who won a silver medal for the United States in the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro; Saral Shrestha, a Nepalese national, who was named the United States Army soldier of the year; and Dr. Marco Ladino, originally from Colombia, who works at the VA hospital in Miami.”
Despite the MAVNI program’s success, its fate has been subject to the political winds of the moment.
In 2009, the program was temporarily shut down during the Obama administration after Army major Nidal Hasan killed 13 people in a mass shooting at Fort Hood in Texas. The tragedy sparked a xenophobic and anti-immigrant backlash and brought the MAVNI program to a halt — which was strange not only because Hasan was a native American born in Arlington, Va., but also because three of his victims were immigrants.
The MAVNI program was eventually reinstated, but then paused again in 2016 due to questionable “security concerns," putting thousands of military recruits, who had relinquished their prior legal status upon entering the program, at risk of deportation. MAVNI was then permanently halted under the Trump administration.
Programs such as MAVNI are necessary to make up for the declining number and quality of American recruits. And there is a further and broader solution: Our lawmakers could boldly address the need for reforms across the U.S. immigration system, from the asylum process to refugee vetting to legalizing agricultural workers and dreamers, to make it easier for immigrants to get green cards.
The demographic challenges and declining number of eligible recruits is a national security threat from within our own borders at a time of global instability, a domestic labor shortage and multiple crises facing the usual pool of younger military recruits. Our leaders must act now with the urgency that this demographic threat demands.
5. The Army's reputation for sexual harassment and suicide is keeping Gen Z from joining up, Army secretary says
We must pay attention to this important national security issue.
Do more to address their concerns? We need to understand what is happening in our military and how the coming generation(s) view that and what impact that will have on our all volunteer force and ultimately on national security. This is not something people can scoff and say, grow up snowflakes as people on social media often say. This is a real problem.
The Army's reputation for sexual harassment and suicide is keeping Gen Z from joining up, Army secretary says
“I think we do need to do more to address their concerns."
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To recruit Generation Z, the Army has to clearly and publicly show the effort they’re making to address sexual harassment and assault, and suicide, Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said.
“I think we do need to do more to address their concerns,” Wormuth said of Gen Z in an interview with Task & Purpose on Monday. She recalled reading something that explained how the “mainstream media’s coverage of the Army” tends to focus on sexual assault and harassment, suicide, and safety violations. But there are “a lot of fantastic things that are happening in the Army that just don’t get covered,” she said.
“Setting that aside, you know whether I like that or not, I do think there is information out there that Generation Z sees and they’re like, ‘Why would I want to be a part of that?’” Wormuth said. “So I do think we have to both get the positive things out there for the Army, but also frankly … we need to show that we are doing something about sexual harassment and sexual assault in the Army. We need to show that we are doing something about suicide prevention in the Army.”
For several years now, the service has been looking for ways to get the attention of Gen Z, the generation born after 1996. The service started focusing on other cities outside of the more conservative southern states that are reliable recruitment hotbeds. They launched a marketing campaign titled “What’s Your Warrior?” in 2019, tailored to give the youths what the Army thought they wanted: to be a part of something bigger than themselves. They made a new series of commercials called “The Calling,” which the Army Enterprise Marketing Office said was meant to “close the relatability gap between Gen Z and the Army.” The Army even started offering up to $50,000 enlistment signing bonuses for those ready to ship out within 90 days and sign up for things like Airborne and Ranger school.
Maj. Gen. Anthony R. Hale, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence and Fort Huachuca commanding general, enlists six Soldiers into the U.S. Army in Elizabeth City, North Carolina, May 11. (Capt. Cory Deaton/U.S. Army)
Nevertheless, the Army’s 2023 budget request, announced earlier this year, includes a reduction in their total end strength, going from 1,010,500 to 998,500 soldiers. Army Undersecretary Gabe Camarillo said in March that the reduction was not a “budget-driven decision,” but one the Army was making in order to focus on recruiting, and retaining, the best soldiers they can.
“We want the highest quality caliber recruits that we can bring into the Army, and so we made the decision to just temporarily reduce end strength, as opposed to lowering our standards,” Camarillo said at a press briefing.
And while standards of recruits may be an issue — a press release from the Military Health System in February took particular issue with the “sedentary lifestyle” led by today’s young people — there are also legitimate concerns held by Gen Z. Among them, as Wormuth mentioned, are sexual assault and harassment, and suicide.
Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth listens as Col. Eli Lozano, commander of Army Medical Activity-Alaska, discusses ongoing behavioral health projects taking place at U.S. Army Alaska installations. (John Pennell/U.S. Army)
Wormuth said on Monday that while the year isn’t over yet, compared to this time last year the Army is seeing fewer suicides than it did in 2021. She added that the potential decrease is “reflective of some of the things we have done to try to address that problem, and the light we have shone on that.”
But she also acknowledged on Monday that there could be other factors that will impact how long someone decides to stay in the Army. Various state laws discriminating against LGBTQ people, as well as state laws banning abortion, are “potentially” an issue in regards to retaining soldiers, she said.
Many of those laws are cropping up in states that have significant military footprints. Texas, for example, has directed that families can be investigated by the Department of Family and Protective Services if they are reported for providing gender-affirming care for transgender youth. It is also one of several states with so-called “trigger laws” in place, which would effectively outlaw abortions in the instance that the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision is overturned. But Texas is also the home to tens of thousands of soldiers at the sprawling Fort Hood, Fort Bliss, and in the National Guard.
“I think probably from a retention standpoint it’s potentially an issue,” Wormuth said of various state laws. “I don’t think it’s probably front of mind for people who are contemplating joining the Army, just because frankly at 18 years old, a lot of people that age aren’t thinking about families or starting families, things like that. But I think as folks join the Army and are getting further along in their careers, it could be something that’s of concern to them.”
Military.com reported last week that the Army was “circulating a draft policy tweak” in regards to compassionate reassignments, which would allow soldiers to request to move installations if they are in a state where they feel discriminated against based on their gender, sex, religion, and pregnancy. The updated guidance was drafted before a leak from the Supreme Court regarding a decision to overturn Roe v. Wade, Military.com reported.
Spc. Sevyn Guerra, a Human Resources Specialist, assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion, 4th Infantry Division, captured for a Pride Month photo shoot on June 22, 2021 at Fort Carson, Colorado. (Pfc. Collin MacKown/U.S. Army)
Asked about those draft policies, Wormuth said Monday that there is “not a draft policy right now to address the hypothetical of Roe v. Wade being overturned.” However, she added that the Army “has a responsibility to make sure that we’re caring for our soldiers and their families.”
But ultimately, Wormuth said that Gen Z does “want a sense of purpose,” and she can’t see a higher purpose than “being in the U.S. Army.”
“I think finding ways to tell that story and help young people see how the Army can give them that purpose and how they can find that community in the U.S. Army — that’s something I think we need to do better,” she said.
The latest on Task & Purpose
Haley Britzky joined Task & Purpose as the Army reporter in January 2019. She previously worked at Axios covering breaking news. She reports on important developments within the service, from new uniforms to new policies; the realities of military life facing soldiers and their families; and broader cultural issues that expand outside of the Army, touching each of the military services. Contact the author here.
6. China's foreign minister starts Pacific tour in the Solomons
China's foreign minister starts Pacific tour in the Solomons
AP · by NICK PERRY · May 26, 2022
China says the trip builds on a long history of friendly relations between Beijing and the island nations.
But Australia scrambled to counter the move by sending its own Foreign Minister Penny Wong to Fiji to shore up support in the Pacific. Wong had been on the job just five days following an Australian election and had just arrived back Wednesday night from a meeting in Tokyo.
In Fiji, Wong said it was up to each island nation to decide what partnerships they formed and what agreements they signed, but urged them to consider the benefits of sticking with Australia.
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“Australia will be a partner that doesn’t come with strings attached nor imposing unsustainable financial burdens,” Wong said. “We are a partner that won’t erode Pacific priorities or Pacific institutions.”
Meanwhile, the Media Association of Solomon Islands called on its members to boycott a news conference in the capital, Honiara, held by Wang and his counterpart from the Solomon Islands, Jeremiah Manele, following a meeting between the pair.
That’s because only selected media were invited to the event, and the schedule allowed for just a single question to be asked of Wang by China’s state-owned broadcaster CCTV.
“Its a tough call to make regarding the media boycott for the press event on Thursday,” wrote association president Georgina Kekea on Twitter. “Our protest is for our govt to see our disappointment. They have failed us & they failed to protect #democracy.”
More on China Visit to South Pacific
According to an official Chinese summary of the meeting, Wang told his counterpart that China would firmly support the Solomon Islands in its efforts to maintain national security and territorial integrity, while Manele described the visit as historic and a “milestone in the relations” between the two countries.
China signed a security pact with the Solomon Islands last month in a move that sent shock waves around the world.
That pact has raised fears that China could send troops to the island nation or even establish a military base there, not far from Australia. The Solomon Islands and China say there are no plans for a base.
In another move by China, a draft document obtained by The Associated Press shows that Wang is hoping to strike a deal with 10 small Pacific nations during his visit. The sweeping agreement covers everything from security to fisheries and is seen by at least one Pacific leader as an attempt by Beijing to wrest control of the region.
Wang is hoping the countries will endorse the pre-written agreement as part of a joint communique after a May 30 meeting in Fiji with the other foreign ministers.
During his 10-day visit, Wang is also planning to make stops in Kiribati, Samoa, Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and East Timor.
Earlier, Australia’s new Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said he’d sent Wong to Fiji because Australia needed to “step up” its efforts in the Pacific.
“We need to respond to this because this is China seeking to increase its influence in the region of the world where Australia has been the security partner of choice since the Second World War,” he told the Australian Broadcasting Corp.
But Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said that in recent years, exchanges and cooperation between Beijing and the island nations had been expanding in a development that was welcomed by the Pacific countries.
AP · by NICK PERRY · May 26, 2022
7. Inside Ukraine's Daring Helicopter Missions Into Russian-Occupied Mariupol
Inside Ukraine's Daring Helicopter Missions Into Russian-Occupied Mariupol
With Ukrainian troops besieged in a massive steel plant and under constant fire from Russian forces, helicopter crews sprung into action.
BY
MAY 25, 2022 6:54 PM
New details are coming to light about incredibly daring resupply missions that were flown by Ukrainian helicopter crews right into the heart of the fighting in the occupied seaport city of Mariupol. Flying two at a time and once four at a time, Ukrainian Mi-8 Hip helicopter crews braved dense Russian air defense and enemy aircraft concentrated in and around Mariupol to deliver desperately needed supplies and fresh troops to the defenders of the besieged Azovstal steel plant.
Of the 16 total helicopters involved, two were destroyed, Ukraine Brig. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, told The War Zone in an exclusive series of interviews. Another helicopter was destroyed coming to the rescue of one of the downed Hips.
“The special operation was planned and performed by Defense Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine,” said Budanov, offering previously unreported details of those dangerous missions.
For nearly three months, Ukrainian forces dug into the sprawling steel plant, surrounded and under constant bombarded by Russian forces. But as their stocks of food, water, medical supplies and ammunition ran short, and the number of critically wounded increased, so too did the desperation of the pleas for help.
There were seven missions in total, said Budanov, speaking through an interpreter. He did not offer specifics about when they took place.
A Ukrainian Mi-8 Hip like the ones flown in the resupply missions. Credit: Ukraine MoD
The Mi-8s provided troops at Avostal with arms, ammunition, medicine, food, and 72 additional fighters from the Azov Regiment, the unit defending the plant.
“All deliveries were successful,” Budanov said. But on the 5th and 7th missions, two helicopters were shot down. A third helicopter coming to the rescue on one of those was also destroyed, Budanov said.
He did not provide casualty figures.
During a speech last week in which he called for building a new An-225 cargo jet, Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky referenced the bravery of those helicopter crews.
"How many pilots gave their lives to bring everything there, from weapons to water. And how many wounded they took from there. A large number of these people died heroically," Zelensky said. "To build a Mriya for the sake of the memory of heroes is the right state position."
On March 31, Chinese TV broadcast images of a Ukrainian Mi-8 downed near Mariupol. It is unclear if this was one of the helicopters involved in the resupply efforts.
Ukraine's military "repeatedly delivered ammunition, communications, and medicine to Mariupol," said Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksiy Hromov.
But those deliveries, he said, "were possible until the information about the aid was disseminated. As a result, the enemy took measures to strengthen the air defense system, which made it difficult for us to carry out such actions and led to the loss of personnel and helicopters that evacuated the wounded."
The Azov Regiment finally surrendered last week. But even as late as May 9, defenders inside were calling for outside help.
“We need the Ukrainian government to attack the occupied territories in our direction,” Bohdan Krotevych, a major in the National Guard of Ukraine and chief of staff of the Azov Regiment, told The War Zone in an exclusive interview from inside the steel plant conducted over social media messaging apps. “We need military assistance from the world and the opening of an additional front against Russia.”
The besieged Azovstal steel plant, before Ukraine troops surrendered. via Twitter
Even against those long odds, Krotevych said his forces would not give up. You can read our full interviews with him here and here.
Though Budanov said the seven helicopter missions successfully delivered assistance, it was not enough to stave off the eventual Russian takeover of the plant, the last source of resistance in the key seaport of Mariupol.
Still, by holding out for so long, the Azovstal defenders, according to the Pentagon, were able at one point to pin down as many as 12 Russian battalion tactical groups, forces that could have been used elsewhere. Without the helicopter resupply missions, it's possible the siege would have ended sooner than it did.
Last week, Russia announced the last of those defenders were taken out of Azovstal, to locations in occupied Donbas.
The fate of Bohdan Krotevych is unknown.
Bohdan Krotevych, a major in the National Guard of Ukraine and chief of staff of the Azov Regiment, inside the Azovstal steel plant. It was the last picture he shared with The War Zone. (Bohdan Krotevych photo)
His last message to The War Zone was May 18.
“Special operation is going,” he wrote. “Can’t tell details.”
He has not responded to several messages since.
Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com
8. 'Horrifying' conspiracy theories swirl around Texas shooting
I fear this is a defining element of modern American culture. Of course conspiracy theories are nothing new. What is new is the megaphone of social media that can rapidly disseminate them to those who are susceptible to believing them.
'Horrifying' conspiracy theories swirl around Texas shooting
AP · by DAVID KLEPPER and ALI SWENSON · May 25, 2022
PROVIDENCE, R.I. (AP) — By now it’s as predictable as the calls for thoughts and prayers: A mass shooting leaves many dead, and wild conspiracy theories and misinformation about the carnage soon follow.
It happened after Sandy Hook, after Parkland, after the Orlando nightclub shooting and after the deadly rampage earlier this month at a Buffalo grocery store. Within hours of Tuesday’s school shooting in Uvalde, Texas, another rash began as internet users spread baseless claims about the man named as the gunman and his possible motives.
Unfounded claims that the gunman was an immigrant living in the U.S. illegally, or transgender, quickly emerged on Twitter, Reddit and other social media platforms. They were accompanied by familiar conspiracy theories suggesting the entire shooting was somehow staged.
The claims reflect broader problems with racism and intolerance toward transgender people, and are an effort to blame the shooting on minority groups who already endure higher rates of online harassment and hate crimes, according to disinformation expert Jaime Longoria.
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“It’s a tactic that serves two purposes: It avoids real conversations about the issue (of gun violence), and it gives people who don’t want to face reality a patsy, it gives them someone to blame,” said Longoria, director of research at the Disinfo Defense League, a non-profit that works to fight racist misinformation.
In the hours after the shooting, posts falsely claiming the gunman was living in the country illegally went viral, with some users adding embellishments, including that he was “on the run from Border Patrol.”
“He was an illegal alien wanted for murder from El Salvador,” read one tweet liked and retweeted hundreds of times. “This is blood on Biden’s hands and should have never happened.”
The man who authorities say carried out the shooting, 18-year-old Salvador Ramos, is a U.S. citizen, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott said in a news conference on Tuesday.
Other social media users seized on images of innocent internet users to falsely identify them as the gunman and claim he was transgender. On the online message board 4Chan, users liberally shared the photos and discussed a plan to label the gunman as transgender, without any evidence to back it up.
One post on Twitter, which has since been deleted, featured a photo of a trans woman holding a green bottle to her mouth, looking into the camera, headphones hanging from one ear.
“BREAKING NEWS: THE IDENTITY OF THE SHOOTER HAS BEEN REVEALED,” claimed the user, saying the shooter was a “FEMBOY” with a channel on YouTube.
None of that was true. The photo actually depicted a 22-year-old trans woman named Sabrina who lives in New York City. Sabrina, who requested her last name not be published due to privacy concerns, confirmed to The Associated Press that the photo was hers and also said she was not affiliated with the purported YouTube account.
Sabrina said she received harassing responses on social media, particularly messages claiming that she was the shooter. She responded to a number of posts spreading the image with the misidentification, asking for the posts to be deleted.
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“This whole ordeal is just horrifying,” Sabrina told the AP.
Another photo that circulated widely showed a transgender woman with a Coca-Cola sweatshirt and a black skirt. A second photo showed the same woman wearing a black NASA shirt with a red skirt. These photos didn’t show the gunman either — they were of a Reddit user named Sam, who confirmed her identity to the AP on Wednesday. The AP is not using Sam’s last name to protect her privacy.
“It’s not me, I don’t even live in Texas,” Sam wrote in a Reddit post.
Authorities have released no information on the gunman’s sexuality or gender identification.
Arizona Congressman Paul Gosar fit both unfounded claims about Ramos in a single now-deleted tweet that also misspelled his name. “It’s a transsexual leftist illegal alien named Salvatore Ramos,” Gosar tweeted Tuesday night.
Gosar’s office did not return a message seeking comment.
In some cases, misinformation about mass shootings or other events are spread by well-intentioned social media users trying to be helpful. In other cases, it can be the work of grifters looking to start fake fundraisers or draw attention to their website or organization.
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Then there are the trolls who seemingly do it for fun.
Fringe online communities, including on 4chan, often use mass shootings and other tragedies as opportunities to sow chaos, troll the public and push harmful narratives, according to Ben Decker, founder and CEO of the digital investigations consultancy Memetica.
“It is very intentional and deliberate for them in celebrating these types of incidents to also influence what the mainstream conversations actually are,” Decker said. “There’s a nihilistic desire to prove oneself in these types of communities by successfully trolling the public. So if you are able to spearhead a campaign that leads to an outcome like this, you’re gaining increased sort of in-group credibility.”
For the communities bearing the brunt of such vicious online attacks, though, the false blame stirs fears of further discrimination and violence.
Something as seemingly innocuous as a transphobic comment on social media can spark an act of violence against a transgender person, said Jaden Janak, a PhD candidate at the University of Texas and a junior fellow at the Center for Applied Transgender Studies.
“These children and adults who were murdered yesterday were just living their lives,” Janak said Wednesday. “They didn’t know that yesterday was going to be their last day. And similarly, as trans people, that’s a fear that we have all the time.”
___
Swenson reported from Seattle. Associated Press writers Angelo Fichera and Karena Phan contributed to this report.
AP · by DAVID KLEPPER and ALI SWENSON · May 25, 2022
9. China’s Pacific plan jeopardises regional privacy and sovereignty
Will there be a wakeup call in the South Pacific and among democratic nations?
My thesis: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, and displace democratic institutions.
China’s Pacific plan jeopardises regional privacy and sovereignty | The Strategist
China is seeking a security, policing and communications cooperation deal with 10 Pacific island countries, according to documents seen by Reuters. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s whirlwind tour of the Pacific beginning today in Solomon Islands will reach its peak at a 30 May foreign ministers’ meeting in Fiji.
China has pushed a draft communique to the 10 Pacific island countries involved in advance of the meeting. Almost immediately, Federated States of Micronesia President David Panuelo expressed concern about the Chinese Communist Party’s intent.
This pushback is vital for regional stability and the cynicism over China’s intent or motivation is key—why is China doing this and why now? As ASPI’s Executive Director, Justin Bassi recently wrote, China’s ‘end game is to push out US and allied interests, achieve regional hegemony, create vassal states, control access to supply chains and improve its ability to take Taiwan with minimal costs’.
Panuelo also recently wrote to Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare urging him to reconsider the potential regional security impacts of a Chinese military presence in Solomon Islands. Panuelo fears this new, broader agreement could increase tensions and spark a new Cold War between China and the West.
According to Reuters, Panuelo pointed out that this was a ‘pre-determined joint communique’. The CCP would like all Pacific island countries to blindly follow the script, but Panuelo is unlikely to be the only Pacific leader to have issues with the agreement.
The challenge for Australia and the region is that we are competing with China’s ‘predatory mercantilism’ which undermines the international rules-based system and directly threatens our interests. Australia, the US, New Zealand and others should back in the Pacific islands, which means pouring sunlight on China’s actions and intent. The draft regional agreement and Wang’s visit are clearly part of a scaled-up effort towards Chinese regional hegemony and influence in critical economic and security sectors.
Although we are yet to see a copy of any agreement or communique, there are already some reported inclusions that should raise alarm bells for all Pacific island countries and their security partners.
Some Pacific countries have existing bilateral policing relationships with China, with Fiji’s being the most developed, but a regional agreement such as this would likely aim to take engagement to new heights.
The draft communique reportedly pledges cooperation on data networks, cybersecurity and smart customs systems. This would provide the CCP with opportunities to collect biodata and conduct mass surveillance. Some of this may be used for policing, but it will also serve other purposes for the CCP. Increased transparency, including leaks, of China’s human rights abuses of religious minorities in Xinjiang and the harsh crackdowns of entire cities during the Covid-19 pandemic should be a deep concern to all in our region.
In the lead up to the APEC leaders’ summit in Port Moresby in 2018, Papua New Guinea accepted about 200 gifted surveillance cameras and a Chinese EXIM bank loan for a Huawei-built data centre. Although proving too costly to maintain, this data centre was later revealed to be highly vulnerable to remote access and the information it collected would have been readily accessible by the CCP.
China’s proposed action plan also reportedly includes the provision of forensic laboratories. China has previously gifted digital forensic labs across Southeast Asia, including to Vietnam. ASPI’s Mapping China’s Tech Giants project shows that these labs were developed in cooperation with Meiya Pico—a CCP-affiliated digital forensics and information-security company that has been linked to the surveillance software MFSocket scandal.
The CCP could use some of this surveillance data for other malign purposes that do not serve the interests of Pacific island countries. The risks that mass surveillance and monitoring technologies can pose to developing countries have already been highlighted in numerous cases across Africa.
China’s extraditions in Fiji in 2017 and Vanuatu in 2019 should also serve as a reminder that Pacific sovereignty isn’t one of Beijing’s concerns when tackling crime abroad. Both events raised concerns over China’s policing and extradition practices and questioned Fiji’s and Vanuatu’s abilities to uphold the law in their own countries.
Preventing the opportunity for surveillance activities like those identified above is part of the reason Australia has already invested enormous amounts of money into outbidding China and blocking its access to critical digital infrastructure in the region.
Mass surveillance is against Australia’s values and interests, at home and abroad. Australia’s new Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has made it clear that ‘Australia should always stand up for [its] values’.
These agreements and the potential for a Chinese military presence are not just against Australia’s interests but the entire Pacific’s, so more leaders need to make their voices heard. They also need to know they will have Australia’s ongoing support to meet their development, security and training needs.
Australia’s new government couldn’t be clearer with its intentions to listen to the Pacific and build even further on the already significant Pacific step-up investment.
Foreign Minister Penny Wong said on her first day in her new role that Australia wants to ‘help build a stronger Pacific family’ and ‘bring new energy and more resources to the Pacific’.
This includes plans to establish a new Australia Pacific defence school that will increase training programs for select Pacific countries’ defence and security forces.
Focusing on our Pacific relationships first and foremost is essential through practical support and investment in critical sectors that will drive development and security. But more money is not the silver bullet. To outcompete China without using its tactics of bribery, bullying and breaching of sovereignty, Australia needs to push back, and hard, against actions that are not in our interest and support the Pacific voices that share our concerns. This requires resources backed in by influence and power in the region, ensuring transparency of malign behaviour and a mobilisation of like-minded partnerships and alliances.
10. Former CENTCOM commander skeptical of counterterrorism strategy for Afghanistan
Excerpts:
Earlier this month, President Joe Biden opted to send roughly 500 U.S. troops to Somalia, where they had been stationed until the previous administration withdrew them in its final days, in part due to the metastasized terror threat.
The president’s decision to send them back to Somalia “flies a little bit in the face of what we did in Afghanistan,” Votel added. “I think I see some of the incongruities in all of this," though he noted that the Somali government has welcomed the return of U.S. troops, contrasting with the Taliban's likely reaction if the U.S. reentered Afghanistan.
Former CENTCOM commander skeptical of counterterrorism strategy for Afghanistan
The U.S. military is in a precarious position as it attempts to deter terrorism in Afghanistan without a presence in the country and limited help in the region, according to a former U.S. Central Command leader.
Gen. Joseph Votel, who served as the head of CENTCOM from March 2016 to March 2019, expressed doubt about the military’s planned reliance on over-the-horizon strikes as a counterterrorism strategy in an interview with the Washington Examiner.
“So the first thing is, I think we have to make sure we actually have that [capability], and I'm not so sure we do,” he said, though he noted, “I’m not in government right now, so I don't know. … I just get the feeling we don't yet have that problem solved or [are] continuing to search for an answer there."
The United States has relied on its over-the-horizon capabilities but has not used them to strike terror targets in Afghanistan since the troop withdrawal was completed last August. At the beginning of America's final month in Afghanistan, the Taliban launched a major military operation and overthrew the government within a two-week period.
With the Taliban in control, the U.S. lost an allied government in Afghanistan and also no longer had a footprint to collect intelligence or deter attacks, all of which contributed to the growth of terror groups in the past 10 months.
The threat from ISIS-K, the Islamic State group's Afghanistan affiliate, could take “a year, slightly longer, and longer for al Qaeda,” Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this month. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, who testified alongside Berrier, agreed with his assessment, acknowledging that ISIS-K is “the more concerning threat.”
The inspector general's office released its quarterly report on Operation Freedom’s Sentinel last week, laying bare many of the shortcomings of the strategy.
“Without a presence on the ground, the DOD relies on aviation assets to collect intelligence, surveil terrorist targets, and carry out airstrikes on terrorist targets. The DOD therefore requires overflight agreements with another bordering nation to enter Afghan airspace,” the report reads. The only neighboring country that allows the U.S. to use its airspace to enter Afghan airspace is Pakistan, it notes.
"I think one of the things that we've learned over the last 20, 21, 22 years is the importance of constant pressure on these networks," Votel continued. "And that's essentially what we've been doing for a long period of time, and when we pull everybody back out, when we lose access for not just the military but for our intelligence community capabilities, then we begin to lose situational awareness on what is happening. And when that happens ... that provides an opportunity for these elements to grow and cause bigger issues. So I don't know that we're any safer with regards to terrorist organizations, and I suspect we're actually in a little horrible situation as a result of our pullbacks in the U.S."
“So I think it's something we're going to have to contend with, and we're going to have to be prepared to deal with it. And I don't think we're well set up for right now," he added.
Then-Lt. Gen. Michael Kurilla, now the commander of CENTCOM, told lawmakers in February that over-the-horizon counterterrorism was “extremely difficult but not impossible," whereas earlier this month, Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, told lawmakers that he believed the U.S. has “room to improve” its capabilities, though he didn’t elaborate.
"The other thing is, I think we have to look at new ways that we can, you know, get collection of intelligence and information on the ground here. Along with the departure of our military was the departure of our intelligence community colleagues that are absolutely key enablers in all this," Votel added. "And so we've got ... to look at reestablishing human networks."
Earlier this month, President Joe Biden opted to send roughly 500 U.S. troops to Somalia, where they had been stationed until the previous administration withdrew them in its final days, in part due to the metastasized terror threat.
The president’s decision to send them back to Somalia “flies a little bit in the face of what we did in Afghanistan,” Votel added. “I think I see some of the incongruities in all of this," though he noted that the Somali government has welcomed the return of U.S. troops, contrasting with the Taliban's likely reaction if the U.S. reentered Afghanistan.
11. Turkey's wooing of Israel may lead to Hamas ouster - opinion
Conclusion:
If Ankara really does give Hamas the boot, the US will have an important role to play in pressing regional partners not to tolerate Hamas on their soil. The Biden administration recently upgraded Qatar to the status of major non-NATO ally. That accolade is indefensible, given Qatar’s long-standing patronage of Hamas. The administration should also act now to convince Malaysia that harboring Hamas would make it a pariah. Hamas could still retreat to Hezbollah-held Lebanon or Iranian territory but would expose Arouri and his ilk for what they really are: a servant of Tehran’s interests with very few friends left in the world.
Turkey's wooing of Israel may lead to Hamas ouster - opinion
As Ankara mends fences with pro-Western Arab governments and Israel, Hamas could become collateral damage and may be expelled from Turkey.
By ENIA KRIVINE Published: MAY 25, 2022 22:23
Turkey’s foreign minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, visited Israel this week, a sign that Israel and Turkey may be on a path to reconciliation, after a decade of antagonism. However, Jerusalem has made it clear to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan that the expulsion of Hamas leaders from Turkish soil is a prerequisite for closer ties. It remains unclear if Ankara has finally kicked out the Gaza-based terrorist organization. What is clear is that if Hamas loses its Turkish sanctuary, its options for a new one are limited.
For the past ten years, Saleh al Arouri has been operating a Hamas headquarters in Istanbul. Arouri is a United States-designated and sanctioned terrorist with a $5 million (NIS 16.8 m.) bounty on his head. He has the blood of tens of Israelis on his hands and languished in an Israeli jail for more than a decade until Israel released and exiled him in the context of a 2011 prisoner exchange. In 2014, Arouri claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers, an event that sparked a 50-day war between Israel and Gaza. Jerusalem is likely adamant that Arouri must go if Ankara wants better relations.
Israeli and Lebanese news outlets have reported that Turkey is giving Hamas leadership the boot. However, the reports are based on statements made by unnamed sources, and nothing is confirmed. While Turkish officials have denied carrying out deportations, it is possible Ankara simply refused reentry to Hamas leaders after trips abroad, thereby complying with Israel’s conditions while maintaining plausible deniability.
Why would Erdogan reverse himself this way after a decade of harboring Hamas leadership and cheerleading the Muslim Brotherhood? The short answer is Turkish elections in 2023. Turkey’s flailing economy and spiraling inflation have resulted in an unprecedented lack of popularity for the Turkish president.
If Erdogan’s recent charm offensive can warm relations with the Jewish state, it could help Turkey’s bottom line. Israel has proposed a pipeline that will connect Europe to the vast natural gas resources in Israeli waters, and Erdogan wants a piece of the action. However, after years of Erdogan spouting pro-Islamist, antisemitic and anti-Israel vitriol, it remains to be seen how far he is willing to go to avail himself of these economic opportunities. In the past, Turkey enjoyed prosperity without Erdogan having to compromise his Islamist agenda.
TURKISH PRESIDENT Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses supporters during a ceremony in Istanbul, last year. (credit: UMIT BEKTAS/REUTERS)
At the beginning of the last decade, things seemed to be going Erdogan’s way. Sunni Islamists – above all the Muslim Brotherhood – appeared to be on the rise politically, riding the tide of the Arab Spring. This boded well for Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has Islamist roots and promotes the Muslim Brotherhood abroad. Erdogan went all-in, applauding the fall of Arab dictatorships and the rise of Muslim Brotherhood influence.
Erdogan's change of direction
ERDOGAN’S ENTHUSIASM and support for the Muslim Brotherhood put him at loggerheads with Sunni Arab leaders that consider it an existential threat. Unfortunately for Erdogan, the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies proved to have little staying power in regional governments, leaving Ankara increasingly isolated. Erdogan’s isolation is a political liability, so a diplomatic recalibration is in full swing, and reconciliation with Israel and its Abraham Accord partners are high on Erdogan’s agenda.
Hamas may become collateral damage, as Ankara mends fences with pro-Western Arab governments and Israel. If Hamas is expelled from Turkey, it would not be the first time Hamas has been shown the door. Jordan kicked Hamas out in 1999. Saudi Arabia did the same in the early 2000s, when Riyadh cracked down on jihadist organizations, after a spate of domestic terrorism. During the Syrian civil war, Hamas sided with the anti-regime forces and quickly found itself in hot water, which led to the shuttering of its Damascus headquarters, in 2012. In 2013, a military coup brought down the short-lived Muslim Brotherhood government in Cairo and Hamas became persona non grata in Egypt.
As more Middle Eastern countries outlaw and suppress the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’s options have dwindled. The likely candidates for new host countries are Qatar, Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon or Iran. Malaysia could also be a possibility.
Qatar has been a patron of Hamas since the group left Syria and hosts the head of the Hamas politburo, Khaled Meshal. Meshal lives like royalty in Doha and is estimated to have a net worth in the billions of dollars. Over the past ten years, Doha has injected tens of millions of dollars into Gaza, sometimes arriving in suitcases full of cash.
If Ankara really does give Hamas the boot, the US will have an important role to play in pressing regional partners not to tolerate Hamas on their soil. The Biden administration recently upgraded Qatar to the status of major non-NATO ally. That accolade is indefensible, given Qatar’s long-standing patronage of Hamas. The administration should also act now to convince Malaysia that harboring Hamas would make it a pariah. Hamas could still retreat to Hezbollah-held Lebanon or Iranian territory but would expose Arouri and his ilk for what they really are: a servant of Tehran’s interests with very few friends left in the world.
The writer is the senior director of the Israel Program and the FDD National Security Network at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow Enia on Twitter at @EKrivine
12. Turkey: NATO’s problem child
Excerpts:
How does this story end? The Turkey experts I rely on believe Mr. Erdogan is savvy enough to recognize that, in the long term, he doesn’t benefit by being the spoiler who blocked an opportunity to strengthen NATO and prevent Mr. Putin from achieving one of his war aims.
If that’s right, he’ll bargain hard, win some concessions and declare victory, thus demonstrating to his domestic audiences how he stands up to the arrogant Europeans and Americans. And then he’ll welcome Sweden and Finland to the club.
Still, this contretemps serves as a reminder that Turkey, which has NATO’s largest military after America’s, has become its least reliable member, and that, within this pro-democratic alliance, it has an increasingly authoritarian president-for-life.
A bridge between Europe and the Middle East, Turkey has not become. That’s a disappointment of historic proportions.
Turkey: NATO’s problem child
Threatens to blackball Sweden and Finland
OPINION:
Turkey is a long way from the North Atlantic, yet it is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It joined in 1952, just three years after NATO’s founding. Greece was admitted at the same time. Both countries were targets of Soviet expansionism, an ambition that former President Harry Truman was determined to contain.
“It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,” he told a joint session of Congress.
This was the essence of what became known as the Truman Doctrine. Adopted on a bipartisan basis — with former Sen. Arthur Vandenberg playing the most significant role on the Republican side — it expressed core American values and interests. Seventy years later, can you think of a more accurate one-sentence description of the policy under which Americans are now helping Ukrainians defend themselves against Russian aggression?
Turkey has always been a unique NATO ally. It straddles Europe and the Middle East. It was a Muslim-majority state that separated mosque and state. It has been economically dynamic despite not having oil. And it seemed to be democratizing.
Since 2003, however, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been the nation’s strongman — first as prime minister, then as president, gaining enhanced powers in 2017. He now occupies a 1,150-room palace fit for an Ottoman sultan.
A decade or so ago, he was said to be only “mildly” Islamist. Over time, however, he has lent support, in one way or another, to the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, al-Qaida affiliate groups, the Islamic Republic of Iran and even the Islamic State.
Charges that Turkey has become “a permissive jurisdiction for illicit and terror finance” cannot be ignored, especially with Turkey’s second-largest state-owned bank, Halkbank, accused by the U.S. Department of Justice of laundering more than $20 billion for Tehran between 2012-2015
Mr. Erdogan has become a problem child in other ways as well. He jails journalists who offend him — only China’s rulers have jailed more. In 2017, he decided to purchase the S-400 surface-to-air missile system from Russia. This forced the United States to evict Turkey from the F-35 fighter program. The last thing the Pentagon wants is to give Russian technical experts the opportunity to rehearse identifying, tracking and targeting the F-35 — information Moscow could then share with Beijing, its strategic partner.
Sweden and Finland have now applied to join NATO — their response to Vladimir Putin’s brutal and imperialist war. NATO members are welcoming them — except for Mr. Erdogan. He is threatening to blackball the Nordic democracies.
He can do that because new members must receive the unanimous consent of all 30 existing members. “Neither of these countries has a clear, open attitude towards terrorist organizations,” Mr. Erdogan tut-tutted. “How can we trust them?” He was referring to various Kurdish groups.
Let me state my position clearly: Violence against civilians for political purposes is both immoral and criminal. But, as noted above, Mr. Erdogan has not upheld that principle unwaveringly.
Saying that terrorism is the wrong way to pursue the Kurdish cause is not the same as saying that the Kurdish cause is wrong. Numbering about 30 million, the Kurds are an ancient people of the Middle East who, unlike other ancient peoples of the Middle East — e.g., Turks, Arabs, Jews — have no state of their own.
They do enjoy significant autonomy in northern Iraq, a positive result of the toppling of Saddam Hussein whose persecution of the Kurds included the genocidal Anfal campaign of 1988.
However, Kurds are denied autonomy — a more modest aspiration than independence — on their ancestral lands in Turkey, as well as on their ancestral lands in Iran.
On their ancestral lands in Syria, they are fighting for whatever self-determination they can get. As leaders of the American-allied Syrian Democratic Forces, they also are combatting the battered but not yet beaten Islamic State.
Sweden has welcomed as many as 100,000 Kurdish immigrants. Many have become citizens, and a small number have won elections to parliament. Are some sympathetic toward Kurdish groups that engage in terrorism? I think that’s likely.
The Kurdish minority in Finland is much smaller and less influential. Mr. Erdogan has demanded the extradition of six alleged terrorists from that country.
More broadly, he wants both countries to take a harder line toward the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party), which is based in the mountainous regions of southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq, and has been designated by the U.S. and the European Union as a terrorist organization, and the YPG (the People’s Protection Units) which is a leading faction within the SDF in the northern and eastern Syrian territories that Turkish forces seek to control. The YPG has been designated a terrorist organization only by Turkey and Qatar.
Mr. Erdogan has other grievances — some defensible, some not.
How does this story end? The Turkey experts I rely on believe Mr. Erdogan is savvy enough to recognize that, in the long term, he doesn’t benefit by being the spoiler who blocked an opportunity to strengthen NATO and prevent Mr. Putin from achieving one of his war aims.
If that’s right, he’ll bargain hard, win some concessions and declare victory, thus demonstrating to his domestic audiences how he stands up to the arrogant Europeans and Americans. And then he’ll welcome Sweden and Finland to the club.
Still, this contretemps serves as a reminder that Turkey, which has NATO’s largest military after America’s, has become its least reliable member, and that, within this pro-democratic alliance, it has an increasingly authoritarian president-for-life.
A bridge between Europe and the Middle East, Turkey has not become. That’s a disappointment of historic proportions.
• Clifford D. May is the founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a columnist for The Washington Times.
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13. Polls show US support for Ukraine waning as Biden administration steps up aid
Not a good sign. But unfortunately not surprising.
Polls show US support for Ukraine waning as Biden administration steps up aid | The Strategist
Within days of Russian forces entering Ukraine on 24 February, pollsters were taking the pulse of US public opinion on the Biden administration’s response. The initial results revealed a high degree of caution about sending direct military support—no boots on the ground or jets in the air—while declaring high levels of moral support for the Ukrainian people and equally high levels of outrage over Vladimir Putin’s illegal invasion.
That public opinion was broadly reflected in the Biden administration’s measured (some would say tardy) response to Russia’s military advances—sending financial and select military hardware to Ukraine, while ruling out any measures that could provoke direct combat between US and Russian forces.
Yet, despite what seems like a close alignment between the American public and the US administration on how to respond to Russia’s invasion, public opinion generally marked President Joe Biden down sharply on his handling of the crisis. That likely reflected a degree of latency in US opinion in assessing the administration’s failure to deter the invasion, and a combination of misstatements (a ‘minor incursion’ anyone?) and prematurely ruling out direct military support.
On a purely political level, while the polls showed that Americans had been following events in Ukraine closely, their top concern remained runaway inflation, with 40% of respondents rating ‘inflation or increasing costs’ as their main worry.
By the end of March, however, significant changes were emerging in US popular attitudes towards the scale and scope of America’s response. According to a poll conducted by Reuters, 74% of Americans—including solid majorities of both Republicans and Democrats—said the United States and its NATO allies should impose a no-fly zone in Ukraine, even though such a move would likely pit the US military against Russian forces in Ukraine and adjacent areas. An equally bipartisan 80% of Americans said the United States should stop buying Russian oil, despite the likely inflationary impact on petrol prices.
That conundrum—support for Ukraine, but worries about inflation—was reflected in polling which showed a majority of both Republicans and Democrats would choose candidates in the mid-term elections who are in favour of providing military aid to Ukraine and who also indicate they support sanctioning Russia. At the same time, the polls reveal very high levels of concern about the impact of sanctions on prices, particularly among more economically vulnerable Americans and among women voters—both groups that tend to lean towards the Democrats.
So, support for Ukraine presents a wicked problem for the Democrats as they head to mid-term elections later this year: supporting Ukraine (very popular), means imposing an oil embargo on Russia, which will trigger rising fuel prices and increase costs across the whole economy (very unpopular).
By this month, another trend was emerging: an increase in Americans concerned that the US is doing too much to support Ukraine. A Pew Research poll found that 12% of Americans felt the US was providing too much support, up from 7% in March, even as majority support for increased military aid remained consistent at around 55%. This seeming contradiction could be explained, at least in part, by ‘sticker shock’ over the growing cost of US aid—the poll came hard on the heels of Congress approving a US$13.6 billion aid package. But that trend could be expected to continue as Congress pushes through even more aid for Ukraine, signing off on another US$40 billion just last week.
At the same time, Americans are becoming less inclined to feel the US has an obligation to defend Ukraine. According to polling firm Morning Consult, for the second week in a row in May the share of voters who believe the US has such an obligation is down, falling to 44% from a high of 50%. Republicans (32%) are the least likely to believe the US has an obligation to defend Ukraine, compared with 57% of Democrats and 40% of independents.
Only one in four Americans now say the US is doing too little to support Ukraine, a record low since Morning Consult began tracking the numbers, and down from a high of 37% in mid-March.
Whatever the reason, the trend is concerning. While solidarity with Ukraine remains strong within Congress and the Biden administration, it clearly has limits with the American electorate.
14. Opinion: How the Quad can become more than an anti-China grouping
I think Mr. Panda's subtitle gets it exactly right. It is a commitment to the rules based international order.
Opinion: How the Quad can become more than an anti-China grouping
Jagannath Panda writes: It potentially represents amalgamation of eastern and western 'like-minded' countries committed to rules-based liberal order.
Updated: May 25, 2022 9:34:56 am
Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, left, US President Joe Biden, rear left, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, rear right, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, right, attend the Quad leaders' summit in Tokyo. (AP)
On May 23, before the Quad leaders’ summit in Tokyo, the United States launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) with a diverse group of 12 countries initially — Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The US-led economic engagement is a salient attempt to allow countries to decouple from Chinese over-dependence in order to ultimately strengthen the existing free and open rules-based global order, which China has been targeting to upend, and re-establish US dominance. That the launch coincided with the Quad summit during President Joe Biden’s visit to Seoul and Tokyo signifies the essence of the Quad and its extension as a “plus” grouping.
Importantly, both the IPEF launch, and the Tokyo summit dispel any remaining misgivings about the Quad disintegrating and certify that it is a cohesive unit where it matters. The India-rest of Quad divide over Ukraine and the Western disquiet over India’s softer stance on Russia has hardly made a dent as far as the cohesiveness of the Quad and its future are concerned.
Fundamentally, the IPEF complements the “Quad Plus” process. It brings together seven critical countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), all Quad states, and dialogue partners, including South Korea, solidifying a case for the “plus” characterisation of the Quad process. The IPEF strongly imbibes a Quad Plus character at a time when two of the largest economies of the world, namely India and the US, are not a part of the China-led or ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) or the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP; China is still an applicant). Thus, it is an encouraging sign that the Quad countries are investing their strategic orientation in this regard. Yet, doubts over the relevance and merit of the Quad Plus grouping still continue to abound.
Critics might dismiss the Quad Plus as a virtual assembly of agreeable nations that were engaged during the Covid pandemic. Yet, the format holds much promise amid all the current uncertainty. It would potentially represent an amalgamation of the eastern and western “like-minded” countries. Even in its current abstract framework, it includes a wide array of states (which also comprise the IPEF) — developing and developed economies as well as middle and major powers that are committed to maintaining an inclusive, rules-based and liberal institutional order.
The inclusivity angle is suspect as the grouping is essentially what China calls a US-led “anti-China” tool. However, the criticism could be mitigated by developing — instead of a reflection of a broader democratic coalition, which is very much abstract at present — a “plus” framework based more on a shared commitment to the existing international order rather than “democratic values” that are harder to define and more exclusive in nature. Therefore, what interested states must envision is a broad, all-embracing, and comprehensive framework that can stand as a pillar for regional security and stability, multilateralism, and defence of global institutionalism and the status quo. Establishing a stronger regional economic framework that promotes a resilient and secured supply-chain connect is just the beginning.
Further, the narrative of the Quad as an anti-China tool (with a range of epithets, from “sea foam” to “Asian NATO”) promoted by China along with its belligerent tactics in the neighbourhood and beyond has only served to coalesce the Quad states. The growing synergy would only strengthen the extension of the Quad, which is a China-containment rather than an exclusively anti-China grouping, both through inclusion of more states (plus format) and agenda (security). The expanded grouping and the related Quad initiatives will build a comprehensive and integrated approach to combating shared challenges arising out of Xi Jinping’s push to promote manoeuvres that achieve his ultimate goal of rejuvenating China’s glorious past and transforming it into an absolute great power.
The IPEF — which covers fair trade, supply chain resilience, infrastructure, clean energy, and decarbonisation, among others — is likely to complement the other Indo-Pacific projects like the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI, founded by the three Quad states, Japan, Australia, and India) that also seeks to build resilient and secure trade linkages by reducing dependence on China. In this respect, the inclusion of Taiwan, which already has a critical role in the global semi-conductor supply chain network, in the SCRI and the IPEF as well as, by extension, in the Quad format, in some manner (perhaps, first as a dialogue partner and subsequently a plus inclusion), would be a welcome addition.
Taiwan is a major economy in the Indo-Pacific region (as also the US’s eighth-largest trading partner in 2021 and a critical partner in diversifying the US supply chains), which is already engaged in the US-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue that includes many of the issues proposed in the IPEF. It is also an active member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and has been consistently building its outreach within the region and beyond. Importantly, Taiwan’s inclusion would also be a geopolitical statement against coercion tactics by international actors.
A hallmark of Biden’s latest Asia visit has been South Korea’s embrace of the Indo-Pacific framework under the new Yoon Seok-yeol government; Yoon has been keen to participate in the Quad process for long. This is a long-awaited turn that could potentially lead to South Korea participating in a more meaningful manner in the Quad in the near future. During the Covid-19 crisis, the Republic of Korea (along with New Zealand and Vietnam) had joined the so-called Quad Plus meetings to coordinate actions to stem the pandemic.
Soon, the Quad Plus should take this process forward and strengthen cooperation on critical topics in the Quad’s agenda (for instance, security, critical technology, global health, climate action). States are showing their willingness, and now it is incumbent on the Quad states to allow for the creation of a “corridor of communication” that ultimately leads to a “continental connect” to strengthen a rules-based order.
Dr. Jagannath Panda is Head of Stockholm Centre for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs at the Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP), Sweden, and a Senior Fellow at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, The Netherlands
15. NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China
Excerpt:
In the coming years, NATO needs to balance the impetus toward being a “liberal bulwark” with its traditional role as a defense alliance. To do so will require a thorough understanding of the strategic environment, particularly the threat posed by Russia and the challenges posed by China. NATO must adapt by better delineating what aspects of security planning it is best suited to and what would be better delegated to other institutions, while prioritizing partnerships that share NATO values. As the drafting of the Strategic Concept is being finalized and moving toward formal adoption by the NATO allies in Madrid in June, it is crucial to avoid the temptation to define “resilience” as a core task. The Strategic Concept from 2010 outlined the core tasks of “collective defense,” “crisis management” and “cooperative security,” but adding a fourth core task this time around would further confuse what is core to the alliance. NATO needs to prioritize and refocus on collective defense, its original and continued raison d’être. The digital age and the significance of political warfare is bringing about new challenges, but the transatlantic alliance is better off tying resilience to collective defense as an integral part of it rather than risking the inflation of core tasks.
NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China
Editor’s Note: NATO faces many challenges in the years to come. Russia, of course, is at the top of the list of concerns, but the growing role of China will also shape NATO members’ thinking. Henrik Larsen of the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich assesses how NATO should plan for change in the years to come, focusing not only on how NATO should change but also on strategic temptations the alliance should avoid.
Daniel Byman
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NATO’s main task in the foreseeable security environment is to adapt to the threat posed by Russia while also trying to reach a precise understanding of the challenge posed by China. At the planned Madrid Summit in June 2022, NATO will adopt a new Strategic Concept to guide the alliance’s future political and military development, which is the right starting point for a new strategy to manage renewed great power competition. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted NATO to eliminate any doubts about its ability and resolve to defend its eastern territory against a Russian attack.
NATO is at arguably the most important juncture in its post-Cold War history. NATO must adapt not only its military preparedness but also its approach to the nonmilitary—and specifically illiberal—challenges that Russia and China pose to its resilience and cohesion. To advance their geopolitical interests, Russia and China exploited the openness of society in NATO allies and the divisions between them over the past decade. NATO must always be wary of external challenges that could undermine its unity. This was true during the Cold War in the face of an ideological rival seeking to undermine confidence in Western democratic governments, and it remains true in the face of Russia and China today.
Conversely, NATO needs to navigate its adaptation to its illiberal challenge while avoiding functional over-extension. The alliance is at risk of maladaptation, whereby it extends its own activities unnecessarily into civilian areas of security in which it lacks necessary expertise and legacy. Strong voices in the expert community call for NATO to specify resilience as a core task in the forthcoming Strategic Concept, in principle elevating it to a task of equal importance to collective defense. An influential report commissioned by Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to inspire the Strategic Concept recommends that NATO reinvent itself as a “liberal bulwark” against Russia and China and extend the alliance’s responsibilities into the realm of democratic resilience.
NATO must steer clear of the temptation to take on too many tasks and instead enhance resilience only in areas that can be reconciled with its mandate as a security and defense alliance. The encounter with illiberal powers strengthens NATO’s unity, but that does not necessarily mean that NATO is the right institution to meet the illiberal challenges that Russia and China pose. So far, the alliance’s record of responding to these threats has been uneven, and the perspectives about its role have diverged at times between the United States and its European partners. But there is a way forward, if NATO can clearly delineate what should and should not fall within its remit, be clear-eyed about its strategic environment, and prioritize international partners that share NATO’s interests and values.
Containing Russia, Watching China
NATO’s adaptation to Russia’s revisionist foreign policy has so far focused mostly on the military threat that the country poses. In response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO enhanced its capacity for rapid reaction and placed multinational battlegroups in Poland and each of the Baltic states as a “tripwire” to remind Russia of NATO’s collective defense guarantee. In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO will likely aim to demonstrate its ability and resolve to repel an attack by Russia’s forces stationed near allied territory by improving its reinforcement capability to deter major Russian military buildups like the one around Ukraine. NATO already boosted its existing forward deployments, while the rise in European defense expenditure will enable the alliance to shoulder a broader deterrence effort.
Conversely, NATO has not fully found its foothold when it comes to Russia’s political warfare, by which it has attempted to diminish the alliance’s ability to act cohesively. The digital age has enhanced the opportunities for Russia to engage in information and psychological warfare, including hack-and-leak operations to influence and discredit elections. The polarization of the political landscapes on both sides of the Atlantic over the past decade has made countries more receptive to Russian disinformation and narratives seeking to discredit the democratic process. Moreover, Russian assassination and sabotage operations on NATO territory have contributed to a public sense of vulnerability to heavy-handed authoritarian methods and doubt about the coping power of democratic institutions.
China does not compare to the direct threat that Russia poses but has nevertheless appeared on NATO’s strategic radar as an economic great power with a high-tech edge that Russia is unlikely to ever match. Chinese 5G network provider Huawei remains a pertinent topic for NATO, as several European countries, including Germany, Austria, Spain, the Netherlands and Hungary, are still undecided about relying on its potentially compromised technology or de facto allowing their national operators to use Chinese providers. Moreover, Chinese investments in continental Europe without conditionalities attached and targeting critical infrastructure (railway stations, ports and airports) raise suspicions about Beijing’s underlying political and military motives. Moreover, China is pressing ahead with military applications of artificial intelligence (AI), and its space ambitions are growing.
Since 2014, NATO has become increasingly aware of the nonmilitary challenges to its unity and resilience but has adapted only in certain respects. It adopted the so-called baseline requirements in 2016, against which it can measure individual allies’ level of resilience regarding their provision of essential services to their domestic populations. These basics that would be necessary to withstand a crisis include access to food, water and energy supplies; maintenance of core functions of government; and resilient civil transportation systems. However, the baseline requirements are technical measurements that do not adequately grasp the political nature of the challenges that Russia and China pose to alliance unity. Moreover, their focus on civil preparedness, resource management and infrastructure does not seem to fit squarely within the competencies of a defense alliance. NATO may be on a slippery slope with the scope of its resilience concept drifting further away from its defense capabilities.
NATO, as an organization and as an alliance of states, is aware of the challenges to transatlantic resilience and cohesion that Russia and China pose, but the alliance has not been able to agree on the issues to which it can bring added value. The situation today stands in contrast to the situation during the Cold War when NATO successfully calibrated resilience to the ability to resist an armed attack by focusing on civil emergency planning. Russia and China are illiberal challengers that add new meaning to transatlantic security cooperation, but NATO’s adaptation will depend on the extent to which the United States and Europe can find agreement on investment in transatlantic security.
U.S. and European Perspectives
From the U.S. perspective, the rise of China compels a harsher foreign policy prioritization that delegates more responsibilities to European states. President Biden was elected on the promise of a “foreign policy for the middle class,” which was an effort to win back some of the Trump voters dissatisfied with the United States paying the bill for transatlantic defense. The refocus on the U.S. domestic base has so far manifested itself in the precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan and the clumsy diplomatic handling of the announcement of the security pact among Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. These two decisions give Europeans reason to question the durability of U.S. leadership beyond President Trump.
It took Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for the Biden administration to play a major role in European security, which has been exercised in terms of economic sanctions against Russia and arms supplies to Ukraine. Biden’s declaration to his allies that “America is back” after assuming office had until then yielded little concrete results. Unlike its predecessor, the Biden administration is not obsessed with numerical defense spending and understands security more broadly in terms of the capacity to defend against illiberal threats. Washington expects the Europeans to be reliable allies in the competition with Russia and China, but it has not specified which functions it wishes NATO to perform.
From a European perspective, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marks a new reality of increased defense spending that will likely redress some of the military imbalance between the United States and European NATO allies since the end of the Cold War. It is positive that the United States seeks cooperation on a wider array of security issues, such as trade and technology, that are core to a resilient and united transatlantic alliance. At the same time, it is continental Europe, not North America and the United Kingdom, that risks emerging as a weak transatlantic link under growing Russian and Chinese influence and, therefore, must make the necessary adjustment.
The vagueness of U.S. expectations and the questionable durability of U.S. leadership seems to give European allies more leverage in defining the alliance’s strategic outlook on resilience. Restricting nontrusted technology and economic investments and fighting foreign subversion are mostly national decisions, but the European Union has exclusive powers with regard to trade and coordinates significant assets in other areas. The European allies can shape the U.S. push for NATO’s functional expansion by clarifying four areas in which the alliance can add value to transatlantic resilience.
Four Areas of Adaptation
First, NATO needs to make clear the aspects of resilience for which it is not placed to lead. As a rule, the more NATO engages the civilian aspects of security, the more it moves away from its mandate. The alliance seems to have no natural role in law enforcement—such as fighting foreign influence operations or weaponized corruption—because of the variety in allied legislative frameworks and the existence of other established channels for ordinary police cooperation. NATO may be able to play a bigger role in coordinating between intelligence services on counterterrorism (against Russia) and counterintelligence (both Russia and China). The challenges arising from disinformation are real, as seen during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but NATO has no role in countering foreign efforts to undermine public trust in the functioning of democratic institutions in its allies. The alliance should confine its anti-disinformation efforts to military affairs and Russian attempts to depict the alliance as an aggressor and a violator of the agreements that brought the Cold War to an end.
Second, NATO needs to identify which aspects of resilience it is positioned to lead. The most pertinent issue seems to be reducing Russian temptations to destabilize its eastern territory, notably Estonia and Latvia with significant Russian-speaking minorities, and the Lithuanian-Polish border toward the Kaliningrad exclave. Russia-instigated gray zone conflict on NATO territory seems more likely than a large-scale conventional war, especially given the poor performance of Russian forces in Ukraine. Russia still prefers to rely on disinformation and subversion to stir ethnic and political discord and may also return to using special operations incursions as a destabilization strategy, as it did during its seizure of Crimea in 2014. NATO needs to deter Russia across multiple domains of warfare by structuring and training a part of its future forces for gray zone eventualities that may precede Russia’s application of large-scale kinetic force. Integrating preparations to combat gray zone tactics into NATO’s conventional planning would allow it to implement a stronger, more crisis-ready resilience concept. NATO’s cyber defense capabilities are obviously relevant against Russian attempts to disrupt allied or national functions that may precede a conventional attack. And NATO should also work to deny hostile powers the capacity to neutralize or jam NATO and reconnaissance satellites.
Third, NATO must position itself to counter the rise of China. Although official NATO rhetoric refers to the protection of the rules-based international order, its mandate centers geographically on the Euro-Atlantic area and not the Asia-Pacific. Other than reasserting the general differences between China’s autocratic approach to the use of personal data and public-private relationships and those of NATO allies, NATO has no role in regulating transatlantic trade. The alliance may recognize Chinese acquisitions of critical infrastructure in Europe as a vulnerability to force mobility in a crisis, as well as Chinese 5G technology as an obstacle to allied information-sharing, without pretense to its ability to influence the economic choices of allied governments. Conversely, NATO has a distinct role in ensuring interoperability and the development of common principles for the responsible use of AI and other so-called emerging and disruptive technologies. NATO allies consider AI valuable for logistics and intelligence but, unlike China, are opposed to lethal uses without human authorization. China’s technological advances create pressure on NATO to ensure that North America and Europe do not drift apart in terms of interoperability and regulatory approaches to future war technology. China’s growing capabilities in cyberspace and outer space offer NATO an additional role in military threat definition and integration into allied structures and operational procedures.
Fourth, NATO should revisit its partnership policy, which allows the alliance to delegate certain aspects of resilience to third countries and actors that are better placed. The partnership policy has not been reformed since 2011, when the alliance was experimenting with the idea of “going global.” NATO presently comprises 30 allied countries—soon 32, when Sweden and Finland expectedly join. However, it also has as many as 43 partners in Europe and around the world, from Columbia to Mauritania, with little idea of what their partnerships are supposed to add. NATO needs to better differentiate among its partners as it engages competition with illiberal contenders; given the fault lines of the conflict, technologically advanced and like-minded liberal partners should assume greater importance. This primarily concerns NATO’s partnership with the European Union and Switzerland due to their shared resilience across technologically advanced and highly integrated countries that share the same values. NATO partners in the Western Balkans, Georgia and obviously Ukraine need the resilience assistance that NATO can provide them to defend against Russian and Chinese subversion. Additionally, the Asia-Pacific partners—Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand—are gaining prominence due to the values they share with NATO and their advanced experience with technological and economic decoupling from China in sectors sensitive for national security.
Implications for NATO’s Strategic Concept
In the coming years, NATO needs to balance the impetus toward being a “liberal bulwark” with its traditional role as a defense alliance. To do so will require a thorough understanding of the strategic environment, particularly the threat posed by Russia and the challenges posed by China. NATO must adapt by better delineating what aspects of security planning it is best suited to and what would be better delegated to other institutions, while prioritizing partnerships that share NATO values. As the drafting of the Strategic Concept is being finalized and moving toward formal adoption by the NATO allies in Madrid in June, it is crucial to avoid the temptation to define “resilience” as a core task. The Strategic Concept from 2010 outlined the core tasks of “collective defense,” “crisis management” and “cooperative security,” but adding a fourth core task this time around would further confuse what is core to the alliance. NATO needs to prioritize and refocus on collective defense, its original and continued raison d’être. The digital age and the significance of political warfare is bringing about new challenges, but the transatlantic alliance is better off tying resilience to collective defense as an integral part of it rather than risking the inflation of core tasks.
16. Recovering the Balance of Power for the 21st Century
Excerpt:
If we can accept as a precept the relevance of ideational, as opposed to solely mechanical, thinking in statecraft, we can move toward understanding how ideas themselves have changed over time, and whether, if at all, older interpretations are relevant or applicable to modern realities. “Ideas are nothing but the unremitting thought of man, and transmission for them is nothing less than transformation,” the philosopher Benedetto Croce wrote. In our own time, recognizing the way in which the concept of the balance of power has morphed over centuries allows us to grasp both its complexities and its potential applicability to present and future statecraft.
Recovering the Balance of Power for the 21st Century - War on the Rocks
Writing in Foreign Affairs at the start of 2021, Kurt Campbell and Rosh Doshi, now senior American officials in charge of policy towards China, argued that a balance-of-power framework was needed for the region of East Asia. Using Henry Kissinger’s study of the 1814–15 Congress of Vienna as a guide, they described such a balance as potentially serving as the foundation of “an order that the region’s states recognize as legitimate.” From what I could discern, the article received surprisingly little attention, and the extent to which this thinking now drives America’s China policy remains hidden to those outside the White House. Nonetheless, the mention of such an approach to diplomacy, particularly at a time when a consensus considers the international order to be in a moment of systemic transition, is an idea worthy of investigation.
The term “balance of power” is one of the more overused and misunderstood in the modern English lexicon. It is invoked across a range of disciplines and industries, usually to describe the arrangement of certain subjects or phenomena in relation to one another. The journalist Brian Windhorst, for example, recently described the playoff series between the Boston Celtics and Milwaukee Bucks as one in which the “balance of power [was] constantly shifting” between the teams over the course of seven games. In an entirely different context, Rae Hart writes in the Jacobin that the “balance of power in the economy” must move “away from capital and toward working people.” Such variances in meaning seem to confirm the historian Albert Pollard’s view — one nearly 100 years-old — that the term “may mean almost anything; and it is used not only in different senses by different people, or in difference senses by the same people at different times, but in different senses by the same person at the same time.”
For those concerned with American foreign policy, the concept suffers from lazy usage, a reality which gives rise to certain misconceptions around its purpose and its nature. For some, the concept is synonymous with the measure of material power, whether military, economic, financial, or technological. For example, Michael Horowitz has written of how advancements in AI can affect the balance of global power. Others see it as a tool or method of statecraft, but this tends to be of a certain school of thought — one that is colored by stark power considerations devoid of ethical principles. Along these lines, Stephen Walt has criticized the lack of a balance-of-power approach in American statecraft, yet the concept is seen to be soulless, a mechanical creation operating in an inanimate system. Like other realists, the concept of a balance of power is seen to be a hard-headed, sober approach to the distribution of power in an anarchic system of states.
Like so many other terms that are regularly invoked in the study and practice of international politics — for example realpolitik, raison d’état, prudence, nationalism, internationalism, and world order — there is a generational need to re-examine the intellectual and historical roots of these concepts, how they have evolved over time, and the ways they are used and misused in the modern day. This is because scholars and practitioners have not so much arrived at certain truths of international politics as settled on certain perceptions, ones conditioned by the time in which they live. Ideas themselves, as Alfred Vagts once put it, “are like rivers arising in a swamp or moor region rather than in a mountain spring, and often they see the light of day only after they have run for miles through subterranean caverns.”
With this reflection as a guide, this essay examines certain interpretations of the balance of power concept throughout history. It is selective rather than comprehensive, and it aims to shine light on an older, seemingly forgotten variety of the idea. Specifically, it illuminates the view that seeking such a balance is not always intended for naked self-interest and self-help. Instead, we might look to older conceptions of a balance among powers, particularly those ideas that grew up in Europe during the 15th and 16th centuries. Here a fundamental principle was that the objective of a balance of power rested not solely in the preservation of one’s interest, but in a wider interest, or unity, of the whole.
What might that be today? The exact application, if any, remains an open question, yet the basic insight here is that the concept of the balance of power should be understood as something more than a mechanical or immoral method of statecraft. It is instead an approach that can hold as its objective an ethical order deemed legitimate by the principal states or groups of states in a regional or international system. In grasping this older conception of the balance of power, we can embody an approach to statecraft that not only sees the relationship between power and ethics as intertwined but also provides a more robust intellectual framework in this period of systemic international transition. The Russo-Ukrainian War has made the most fundamental questions — of power, morals, law, institutions, and order — starkly relevant once again. For policymakers and analysts, returning to and expanding our understanding of those concepts we take for granted, the balance of power among them, is a first step towards planning for and calibrating a future international system.
American Conceptions of the Balance of Power
At various points in the first half of the 20th century, the balance of power was derided as an outdated and immoral form of diplomacy. Considering it a traditional practice of European nations, American leaders tended to see it as inherently destabilizing and an approach to politics that held great dangers for the United States. President Woodrow Wilson, who has the distinction of having ushered in a major intellectual spring of American statecraft, based his views, in part, on a philosophical aversion to the balance of power. Echoing the calls of the British politicians Richard Cobden and John Bright nearly a century before — the latter had called it a “foul idol” — Wilson stood before the Senate in January 1917 to argue that “Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. … There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.”
The failure of the League of Nations to thwart aggression in the 1930s, and the power politics that engulfed East Asia, Eastern Africa, and Western Europe over the course of that decade, led Wilson’s democratic successors in the Roosevelt administration to champion a similar message. Speaking after the conclusion of the Moscow Conference in October 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull affirmed that what the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union were planning for the post-war world would, and must, put an end to the balance-of-power system that had plagued global politics for centuries. A similar line was taken by Franklin Roosevelt, who, in what would be his last address to Congress on March 1, 1945, described the purported achievements of the Yalta Conference. “It ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries — and have always failed.”
Such statements, combined with the tendency of American statesmen to remain non-committed or “disentangled” from the politics of the European powers in the 19th century, can lead us to view the record of American diplomatic history as one traditionally averse to the balance of power concept. But is this the case?
It is no secret that American leaders have been conscious of this phenomenon in international politics. In 1787, Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist No. 11 that the United States needed to be the arbiter of the balance of European competition in the new world. Decades later, the famed Monroe Doctrine of 1823 had as its principal aim the consolidation of American power in the Western hemisphere, but as Charles Edel has rightly noted, to say that American leaders were uninterested in the European balance of power would be a discredit to their international thought. Similarly, Theodore Roosevelt grasped this concept, and while he ostensibly kept the United States out of European balance-of-power arrangements, he thought about the world balance on a more global scale — a premise that led him in part to the idea of needing to be dominant in the western hemisphere. “No other president defined America’s world role so completely in terms of national interest, or identified the national interest so comprehensively with the balance of power,” Henry Kissinger wrote of the 26th president. The record of American diplomacy in this regard led some, including Hans Morgenthau and Alfred Vagts, to argue that such notions, attractive or not, have always been a focus for leaders in Washington. Morgenthau went so far as to say that, with the exception of the War of 1812, the United States had regularly “supported whatever European power appeared capable of restoring the balance of power by resisting and defeating the would-be conqueror.”
If the balance of power as a method of statecraft was more veiled in the 19th and early 20th centuries, its application during the period of the Cold War seemed to become more apparent. Arnold Wolfers wrote in 1959 that the concept had become “intimately related to matters of immediate practical importance to the United States and its allies.” Kissinger and Richard Nixon are perhaps the American statesmen most associated with the balance of power given their policy towards China vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. As a scholar, Kissinger had cut his teeth on the study of the Congress of Vienna and the European system in the first decades after the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, but while he valued this systemic arrangement as a practitioner, he also believed that the concept had fundamentally changed. “Today’s striving for equilibrium should not be compared to the balance of power of previous periods,” he told an audience gathered in Washington in 1973. “The very notion of ‘operating’ a classical balance of power disintegrates when the change required to upset the balance is so large that it cannot be achieved by limited means.” He had in mind here the modern intensity of ideology — specifically between liberalism and communism — and how these conflicting positions ultimately prevented a common notion of legitimacy. Similarly, although for different reasons, Stanley Hoffman described the irrelevance of the term: “The balance of power familiar to students of history is the past; there is no future in our past.”
Other writers in these decades saw it differently, however, and the balance-of-power concept became further associated with the giants of the realist school of international relations. Scholars such as Kenneth Waltz and, later, John Mearsheimer, held that the balance of power, more so than a conscious method of statecraft, was simply the reality of international politics. In other words, nation-states — operating independently and instinctively — would, naturally develop toward a system in which a balance of power was the best they could hope for. It was, Waltz argued as early as 1954, “not so much imposed by statesmen on events as it is imposed by events on statesmen.” The motivations for pursuing a balance of power thus came to be seen as a kind of natural condition, one created by the conscious or unconscious pursuit of material power.
Recovering an Older Interpretation
Scholars of Western political thought have detected approaches resembling the balance of power as far back as Ancient Greece. Traces are indeed discoverable in the writings of Xenophon, Thucydides, and Polybius, among others. The Scottish polymath David Hume was one of the first writers to recognise these older influences. “The maxim of preserving the balance of power is founded so much on common sense and obvious reasoning, that it is impossible it could altogether have escaped antiquity,” he argued. “If it was not so generally known and acknowledged as at present, it had, at least, an influence on all the wiser and more experienced princes and politicians.”
The more recognisable form of the balance of power, however, both in its theory and application, has its roots in the 15th-century diplomacy of Italian city-states. It was in this period that powers like Venice, Milan, Naples, Florence, and the Papal States developed alliances to balance against one another (one example was the triple alliance of Florence, Milan, and Naples against Venice). As Francesco Guicciardini phrased it, these states
were unremitting in the watch that they kept on one another’s movements, deranging one another’s plans whenever they thought that a partner was going to increase his dominion or prestige. And all this did not make the peace any less stable, but rather made the powers more alert and more ready to bring about the immediate extinction of all those sparks that might start a fire.
Importantly, it was in these years that writers began to conceptualize and advocate such a practice, one that could be used as a tool or mechanism by statesmen of the time.
Into the 17th century, the number of writers examining and opining on the balance of power grew rapidly. The reasons for this are diverse. On the one hand, these decades were a period of great advancement in the natural sciences, particularly physics, which gave rise both to new approaches to understanding the world and to efforts to apply these methods to the study of human societies. “The modern law of inertia, the modern theory of motion,” Herbert Butterfield once described, “is the great factor which in the seventeenth century helped to drive the spirits out of the world and opened the way to a universe that ran like a piece of clockwork.” This had an important influence on those concerned with politics between societies. More so than in the preceding centuries, there was a feeling that the problems raised by political and economic competition could be solved by new, discoverable solutions. The balance of power had become, as Martin Wight once noted, the “political counterpart of Newtonian physics.”
As one of the great historians to examine the iterations of the balance of power concept in European history, Wight highlighted, among other phenomena, the dominant religions of the period. The “earliest stable balance” on continent, he argued, had been that between the Catholics and Lutherans, codified in the Peace of Augsburg. There was also the influence of the theory of “mixed constitution,” which had its origins in Platonic and Aristotelian political philosophy and worked out its modern form in the Netherlands, Britain, and Germany. But one of his great illuminations was the balance-of-power approach employed by William III, who negotiated the first and second Grand Alliances of 1689 and 1701. Both groupings were initiated in peacetime and designed to counter the power of France on the European continent. Though William died shortly after the second agreement, his efforts helped to bring into existence the treaties of Utrecht in 1713. The profound aspect of this diplomatic achievement was this: The balance of power principle was geared at upholding a larger moral framework, namely the “res publica Christiana” throughout Europe.
Into the 19th century, this view concerning the purpose of the balance of power was championed by the likes of the German historian Arnold Heeren, who said of the balance of power, “What is necessary to its preservation has at all times been a question for the highest political wisdom.” To see it as a simple exercise of balancing material capabilities, he warned, was to misunderstand its purpose. “Nothing […] but the most short-sighted policy would ever seek for its final settlement by an equal division of the physical force of the different states.” In other words, those aiming at a balance of power would need to hold in their minds an understanding of its ultimate purpose.
In the same century, another German historian wrote what became one of the most important reflections on the balance of power concept. Leopold von Ranke’s 1833 essay titled The Great Powers set out to examine the European order between the reign of Louis XIV and the defeat of Napoleon. The balance of power, he argued, was the key to maintaining such a system. Moreover, there was something unique about how the concept was understood in this period — something that, in equal measure, legitimized and justified its existence. In his mind, that the European powers were part of a wider European civilization, with a shared history between them, allowed them to develop and implement a balance of power, while this balance, when executed properly, allowed each society to continue to develop according to the values it held universal.
The Return of Statecraft and the Role of Ideas
The writing here has been an exercise in recovery rather than reconstitution. Its aim has been to shine light on older and diverse approaches to the concept of a balance of power, as a way of broadening the discourse around future American foreign policy in an increasingly multipolar world. Older approaches, concepts, and ideas of statecraft become buried under the succession of events and, more consequentially, shaded by the mythical notions that grow up around these moments or periods of history. It is the responsibility of historians and scholars of international politics to, from time to time, excavate and re-examine these earlier precedents. This is not to reveal truths as much as insights, ones that might be seized upon by the official or analyst looking for a guide in the maelstrom of immediate objectives.
The balance-of-power concept as understood in the United States today tends either to carry the dark undertones highlighted by Richard Cobden and John Bright and advanced by Woodrow Wilson, or to be viewed as the soulless approach of self-styled realists. What is lost is a different interpretation, one that sees the balance of power as a purposeful approach to statecraft, one that can and ideally should serve as a foundational framework for negotiated settlements that ascribe to the international politics some semblance of order.
On a practical level, there is opportunity for governments to approach future cooperation and competition through this lens. In the Indo-Pacific, governments — even those in Europe — seem to be jostling for position. Perhaps there are benefits to be gained by aiming first for a balance of military and economic power, and then toward some structures that might facilitate both dialogue and decisions about major questions in the region. Important, however, is that the powers principally concerned hold as their ultimate objective not outright victory but a negotiated order that can employ an ethical or moral basis that governments deem legitimate in this period.
In this way, we might go some way toward reversing, or at least recalibrating, the understood purpose of a balance of power in foreign policy. Such a view echoes ideas put forward by Hedley Bull, Richard Little, and Michael Sheehan, who have seen in older interpretations some important guides for contemporary policymaking. Sheehan, who has written an excellent historical study of the term “balance of power,” argues that modern understandings should return to its “Grotian form” (named after the Dutch diplomat and jurist Hugo Grotius). Writing in the period of the Thirty Years War (1618 to 1648), Grotius articulated norms and laws which, because societies shared common characteristics and experiences, could be applied to larger international context. It is the same rationale that underpinned the work of later scholars of international law, such as Lassa Oppenheim, who wrote in 1905 that a “law of nations can exist only if there be an equilibrium, a balance of power, between the members of the family of nations.”
Through this understanding of older interpretations, we arrive, too, at a more fundamental aspect of statecraft. Specifically, try as some might, ethical considerations cannot and should not be viewed as separate from or subordinate to considerations of power. At the highest level of policy, these aspects — power and ethics — are fused together in ways that a great deal of modern commentary on international politics obscures. To take one example, when a writer like Eliot Cohen, one of the great thinkers in American foreign policy over the preceding decades, calls in Foreign Affairs for future American statesmen and women to turn away from grand strategy and toward statecraft, we are forced to pause. For not only is grand strategic thinking, properly understood, an essential dimension of statecraft, but at its root is the most fundamental dilemma of politics — how to strike the balance between ethics and power — which Western thinkers (to say nothing of other civilizations) have been grappling with for millennia. And far from a seminar exercise, the question plays out in real time. Looking at the Russo-Ukrainian War, for example, the moral question is a simple one to answer. The political, not so much.
It is this acceptance of the ever relevant, if intractable, dilemma of power and ethics that brings us to a final point: the role of ideas in domestic and international order, and the necessity of strategists, especially those focusing on the longer term, being able to recognize and grapple with the influence and impact of such phenomena. When asked what set George Kennan apart from other distinguished American diplomats of his era, the philosopher Isaiah Berlin remarked of his friend that:
Interest in ideology. Intellectualism of a certain kind. Ideas. Deep interest in, and constant thought, in terms of attitudes, ideas, traditions, what might be called cultural peculiarities of countries and attitudes, forms of life. Not simply move after move; not chess. Not just evidence of this document, that document, showing that what they wanted was northern Bulgaria, or southern Greece. But also mentalités.
If we can accept as a precept the relevance of ideational, as opposed to solely mechanical, thinking in statecraft, we can move toward understanding how ideas themselves have changed over time, and whether, if at all, older interpretations are relevant or applicable to modern realities. “Ideas are nothing but the unremitting thought of man, and transmission for them is nothing less than transformation,” the philosopher Benedetto Croce wrote. In our own time, recognizing the way in which the concept of the balance of power has morphed over centuries allows us to grasp both its complexities and its potential applicability to present and future statecraft.
Andrew Ehrhardt is an Ernest May Fellow in History and Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School.
17. U.S. Speeds Up Reshaping of Taiwan’s Defenses to Deter China
One recommended action (of many necessary): Re-establish the Taiwan Resident Detachment (Special Forces) that was permanently assigned from the 1950s through the 1970s from Special Action Force Asia (SAFASIA) (1st Special Forces Group)
Excerpts:
Both U.S. and Taiwanese officials say Taiwanese troops need better training, but each government wants the other to take more responsibility.
“The Taiwanese troops barely have opportunities to conduct exercises with the allies,” said Shu Hsiao-huang, a researcher at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, which is funded by the government of Taiwan. “Military cooperation between Taiwan and the United States should be strengthened in the aspects of regional exercises and the deployment of weapons.”
Ms. Glaser said Taiwan needed to create a strong reserve force and territorial defense force that could wear down an invading military, as the Ukrainians did.
“The U.S. has encouraged Taiwan’s military for years to talk to countries with a robust defense force,” she said. “Taiwan has sent delegations to Israel, Singapore, Finland, Sweden, some of the Baltic States. Now the situation is far more serious and far more urgent. There’s a lot more pressure.”
U.S. Speeds Up Reshaping of Taiwan’s Defenses to Deter China
May 24, 2022, 8:02 p.m. ETMay 24, 2022
May 24, 2022
May 24, 2022, 8:02 p.m. ET
F-16 fighter jets in Chiayi, Taiwan. Chinese leaders face a complicated calculus in weighing whether their military can seize Taiwan without incurring an overwhelming cost.Credit...Ann Wang/Reuters
WASHINGTON — The Biden administration has accelerated its efforts to reshape Taiwan’s defense systems as it projects a more robust American military presence in the region to try to deter a potential attack by the Chinese military, current and former U.S. officials say.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has made American and Taiwanese officials acutely aware that an autocrat can order an invasion of a neighboring territory at any moment. But it has also shown how a small military can hold out against a seemingly powerful foe.
U.S. officials are taking lessons learned from arming Ukraine to work with Taiwan in molding a stronger force that could repel a seaborne invasion by China, which has one of the world’s largest militaries.
The aim is to turn Taiwan into what some officials call a “porcupine”— a territory bristling with armaments and other forms of U.S.-led support that appears too painful to attack.
Taiwan has long had missiles that can hit China. But the American-made weapons that it has recently bought — mobile rocket platforms, F-16 fighter jets and antiship projectiles — are better suited for repelling an invading force. Some military analysts say Taiwan might buy sea mines and armed drones later. And as it has in Ukraine, the U.S. government could also supply intelligence to enhance the lethality of the weapons, even if it refrains from sending troops.
American officials have been quietly pressing their Taiwanese counterparts to buy weapons suitable for asymmetric warfare, a conflict in which a smaller military uses mobile systems to conduct lethal strikes on a much bigger force, U.S. and Taiwanese officials say.
Washington increasingly uses the presence of its military and those of allies as deterrence. The Pentagon has begun divulging more details about the sailings of American warships through the Taiwan Strait — 30 since the start of 2020. And U.S. officials praise partner nations like Australia, Britain, Canada and France when their warships transit through the strait.
In ramping up its posture and language, the United States is trying to walk a fine line between deterrence and provocation. The actions risk pushing President Xi Jinping of China to order an attack on Taiwan, some analysts say.
On Wednesday, the Chinese army described organizing combat drills in the waters and airspace around Taiwan to send a blunt message to the United States. The statement was ambiguous as to whether such drills had already taken place recently or were still to come.
A Chinese offensive against Taiwan could take many forms, such as a full-scale sea and air assault on the main island with missile barrages, an invasion of small islands closest to China’s southeast coast, a naval blockade or a cyberattack.
Read More on Biden’s Trip to Asia
“Are we clear about what deters China and what provokes China?” said Bonnie S. Glaser, director of the Asia program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. “The answer to that is ‘no,’ and that’s dangerous territory.”
“We need to think long and hard on how to strengthen deterrence,” she said.
U.S. officials often discuss potential deterrent actions that end up being dropped because they are deemed too provocative. In the Trump administration, National Security Council officials discussed putting U.S. troops in Taiwan, one former official said. White House and Pentagon officials also proposed sending a high-level U.S. military delegation to Taiwan, but that idea was killed after senior officials at the State Department objected, another former official said.
President Biden’s strong language during a visit to Tokyo this week tiptoed up to provocation, Ms. Glaser and other analysts in Washington said.
The president asserted on Monday that the United States had a “commitment” to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan — the third time he has made such remarks during his presidency. And he explicitly said he would take measures that go beyond what the United States has done in Ukraine. While Beijing could see the words as belligerent, they are consistent with the new emphasis in Washington on forceful deterrence.
President Biden’s strong language during a visit to Tokyo this week tiptoed up to provocation, analysts said.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
On Tuesday, Mr. Biden said in Tokyo that the decades-old policy of “strategic ambiguity” — leaving open whether the U.S. military would fight for Taiwan — still stands. “The policy has not changed at all,” he said.
Harry B. Harris Jr., a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea and a retired admiral who led the U.S. Pacific Command, said the United States now needed to adopt “strategic clarity” rather than “strategic ambiguity” to serve as a deterrent. China, he said, “isn’t holding back its preparations for whatever it decides it wants to do simply because we’re ambiguous about our position.”
The United States has been urging allies to speak up on Taiwan in an effort to show Beijing that Washington can rally other nations against China if it attacks the self-governing democratic island. On Monday, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan said at a news conference with Mr. Biden that the two leaders had affirmed “the importance of peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait.”
In the three months of war in Ukraine, Washington has held together a coalition of European and Asian partners to impose sanctions against Russia. U.S. officials say they hope the measures send a message to China and other nations about the costs of carrying out the type of invasion overseen by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. U.S. officials are already discussing to what extent they could replicate the economic penalties and the military aid deployed in defense of Ukraine in the event of a conflict over Taiwan.
“I want P.L.A. officers to wake up each day and believe they cannot isolate Taiwan in a conflict and must instead face the decision of initiating a costly, wider conflict where their objectives are beyond their reach,” said Eric Sayers, a former senior adviser to the U.S. Pacific Command who is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, referring to the People’s Liberation Army.
The statement from the Chinese army on Wednesday described China’s drills near Taiwan as “a solemn warning” to the United States and Taiwan. The spokesman for China’s Eastern Theater Command, Senior Col. Shi Yi, said in an online statement: “It is hypocritical and futile for the United States to say one thing and do another on the Taiwan issue.”
U.S. intelligence analysts have been studying the evolving relationship between China and Russia and the lessons Beijing might be drawing from Ukraine.
Chinese leaders face a complicated calculus in weighing whether their military can seize Taiwan without incurring an overwhelming cost.
A Pentagon report released last year said China’s military modernization effort continued to widen the capability gap between the country’s forces and those of Taiwan. But the Chinese military has not fought a war since 1979, when it attacked Vietnam in an offensive that ended in a strategic loss for China.
To take Taiwan, the Chinese Navy would need to cross more than 100 miles of water and make an amphibious assault, an operation that is much more complex than anything Mr. Putin has tried in Ukraine.
And in any case, perceived capabilities on paper might not translate to performance in the field.
“As we have learned in Ukraine, no one really knows how hard a military will fight until a war actually starts,” said James G. Stavridis, a retired four-star admiral and former dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. “China is probably not ready to take a risk of an invasion with current force levels and capabilities in terms of attacking Taiwan.”
American officials are not making that assumption. They have pressed Taiwan to buy weapons systems that they deem suitable for asymmetric warfare against China. The Biden administration recently told the Taiwanese Defense Ministry not to order MH-60R Seahawk helicopters made by Lockheed Martin, and it has also discouraged orders for more M1A2 Abrams tanks.
Admiral Stavridis said the United States needed to get weapons into the hands of the Taiwanese quickly if an invasion looked imminent, with a focus on systems that would wear down Chinese offensive capabilities.
“That would include smart mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, cybersecurity capability and special forces who can neutralize Chinese advance teams, and air defense systems,” he said.
U.S. officials consider mobility to be critical and are encouraging Taiwan to buy mobile land-based Harpoon anti-ship missiles. Stinger antiaircraft missiles could also be valuable for staving off the Chinese air force.
The pace of Taiwan’s weapons purchases has increased. Since 2010, the United States has announced more than $23 billion in arms sales to Taiwan, according to the Pentagon report from last year. In 2020 alone, authorizations totaled more than $5 billion. The sales included advanced unmanned aerial systems, long-range missiles and artillery, and anti-ship missiles.
Taiwan’s annual defense budget is more than 2 percent of its gross domestic product. President Tsai Ing-wen has increased the annual figure by modest amounts.
Both U.S. and Taiwanese officials say Taiwanese troops need better training, but each government wants the other to take more responsibility.
“The Taiwanese troops barely have opportunities to conduct exercises with the allies,” said Shu Hsiao-huang, a researcher at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, which is funded by the government of Taiwan. “Military cooperation between Taiwan and the United States should be strengthened in the aspects of regional exercises and the deployment of weapons.”
Ms. Glaser said Taiwan needed to create a strong reserve force and territorial defense force that could wear down an invading military, as the Ukrainians did.
“The U.S. has encouraged Taiwan’s military for years to talk to countries with a robust defense force,” she said. “Taiwan has sent delegations to Israel, Singapore, Finland, Sweden, some of the Baltic States. Now the situation is far more serious and far more urgent. There’s a lot more pressure.”
John Ismay and Julian E. Barnes contributed reporting from Washington, Paul Mozur from Seoul, and Amy Chang Chien from Taipei, Taiwan.
18. Marine Corps now has 2 fully operational F-35B stealth fighter squadrons in Japan
Probably enough to inflict significant damage on north Korea. Mr.Kim: how do you feel about these aircraft?
Marine Corps now has 2 fully operational F-35B stealth fighter squadrons in Japan
A Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II stealth fighter taxis the runway at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, Feb. 4, 2022. (Lennon Dregoiw/U.S. Marine Corps)
A second squadron of F-35B Lightning IIs became fully operational this month at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, bringing the total number of stealth fighters there to 32.
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 242 as of May 17 has the required pilots, aircraft and maintenance capabilities needed to take part in missions with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, according to an email Tuesday from Capt. Tess LaBossiere, a spokeswoman for the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The 31st MEU, based on Okinawa, is a crisis response force of more than 2,200 Marines.
The Marine Corps on Sept. 9 approved the squadron for smaller scale operations with 10 jets, a little over one year after being designated as an F-35B squadron in October 2020, LaBossiere said.
Now fully operational, the squadron fields 16 jets.
“[This] milestone is the culmination of well over two years of planning and execution, all while being forward deployed and in the face of a global pandemic,” squadron commander Lt. Col. Michael Wyrsch said in a May 19 news release from 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
Squadron 242 joins Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 121, which arrived at MCAS Iwakuni in January 2017. It also fields 16 F-35Bs.
“U.S. Forces Japan now has two [fully operational] F-35 squadrons prepared to receive tasking from higher header quarters in order to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific,” LaBossiere said in the email. “It enhances posture and preparedness and lethality in the region.”
A Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II stealth fighter takes off from Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, Feb. 4, 2022. (Lennon Dregoiw/U.S. Marine Corps)
The squadrons’ establishment follows a trend of U.S. military expansion and modernization across the Indo-Pacific. The strategy is a response to mounting tensions with China, which the Defense Department routinely refers to as its “pacing challenge” in the region.
The F-35B, one of three variants, is capable of short takeoffs and vertical landings that allow it to operate from flat-deck amphibious assault ships like the USS America, homeported at Sasebo Naval Base.
The Marines also fly the F-35C, which can operate from the aircraft carriers. The service’s first squadron of F-35Cs, Fighter Attack Squadron 314, went to sea in January aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln.
The service considers the F-35 the “future of Marine Corps tactical aviation” and the replacement for its inventory of AV-8B Harriers, F/A-18 Super Hornets and EA-6B Prowlers, according to the wing’s news release.
The F-35 is also flown by the Air Force and Navy and is the costliest weapon system in Defense Department history, the Government Accountability Office said in an April 2021 report.
Each aircraft has a price tag of approximately $103 million, according to manufacturer Lockheed Martin, and the estimated costs over the life of the program exceed $1.7 trillion.
19. The Moment Putin’s Ticking Time Bomb of Failure Could Explode
An ominous warning. Not sure how likely this is, but if it happens it surely will be bad. Are we (Ukraine, NATO, US) prepared for Ukrainian catastrophic success when the Russian army fails?
The Moment Putin’s Ticking Time Bomb of Failure Could Explode
CRASH AND BURN
Ukraine’s top military intelligence official says he knows just how long Vladimir Putin’s army can last.
Updated May. 24, 2022 3:57PM ET / Published May. 24, 2022 2:37PM ET
Photo Illustration by Kelly Caminero / The Daily Beast / Getty
As Russian forces enter the third month of war in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin only has enough supplies and equipment to last him another 12 months on the war effort, according to Ukrainian intelligence.
“The active phase should go to the maximum decline by the end of the year,” Budanov told local newspaper Ukrayinska Pravda. “Russia has 12 months of resources to wage a normal war.”
The Russian military has been losing a large amount of personnel and equipment in the last several months as Putin has launched assault after assault on the Ukrainian people with countless logistics problems. As of Tuesday, Russian forces had lost 29,350 troops, 1,302 tanks, 3,194 armored vehicles, and 606 artillery systems, according to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
But that exact prediction might not play out entirely, said Ronald Marks, a former special assistant to the assistant director of central intelligence for military affairs at the CIA, noting that Moscow still appears capable of buying and resupplying for the war effort.
“No one ever lost a war because they ran out of ammunition. If he can't build it, he'll buy it somewhere,” Marks said. “There’s a sufficient amount of oil money still.”
And yet, it’s not clear how long Putin's forces will last, and given that he has experienced so many losses already, the war might be headed into a longer-term phase in which Putin has his sights set on inflicting more pain on Ukrainians than he already has, Marks said. In a sign that Putin is likely to dig in and try to make Ukrainians bleed, Russia has already started bringing in barrel bomb experts from Syria who could help the Russian military inflict much more damage on civilians, according to a Guardian report.
“When you're not winning—and they're not—the one thing that you’re going to do is inflict pain,” Marks told The Daily Beast, referring to the barrel bombs. “It's a way of sort of ramping up a level and also terrorizing the population.”
“It will end in one thing: the return of our occupied territories.”
The director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Scott Berrier, told lawmakers earlier this month that the war had reached a “stalemate” phase, indicating that the two sides may be at loggerheads for some time.
And although Ukraine has insisted that it wants to regain all the territory Russia has taken, the matchup between Ukraine and Russia might be headed towards a sort of armistice, à la North and South Korea, which are technically still at war, Marks said.
“I think we’re going for a Korean War stalemate. I don’t think the Ukrainians have sufficient resources, even if we give it to them all, to push them back out of Donbas. I don’t think the Russians have the wherewithal to take all of Ukraine,” Marks told The Daily Beast. “I think what you’re going to end up with at some point is some form of armistice that’s going to settle on a border in which the Russians have still a… portion of Ukraine.”
For now, though, Putin’s exact game plan is not entirely clear, according to U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.
"In terms of what his overall strategy is, that's unknown," Austin told reporters Monday.
Budanov, Ukraine’s top military intelligence official, has one thing straight: Ukraine plans to take back all of the land that Russia has taken or annexed in recent years, including Crimea.
“It will end in one thing: the return of our occupied territories,” Budanov said.
20. Why the battle for the Black Sea may be the most important showdown in the war — for Ukraine and for the world
Will there be a Russian naval confrontation with NATO and the US?
It would seem we must not allow food to be blocked from getting to the markets of the world.
Why the battle for the Black Sea may be the most important showdown in the war — for Ukraine and for the world
The maritime front isn’t just strategically key for Ukraine, it’s crucial for millions who rely on food shipments.
Global Security Reporter
May 25, 2022
In April, crowds in Kyiv waited in line, some for more than four hours, to purchase a special edition stamp issued by the Ukrainian post office depicting a solitary soldier flipping the bird at a naval vessel in the distance. The stamp commemorated one of the iconic (if somewhat embellished) stories of the first day of the war in Ukraine, in which one of the border guards defending Snake Island, a small rock outcropping in the Black Sea, replied to the Russian cruiser Moskva’s demand that his men surrender with the now-immortal line: “Russian warship, go f--- yourself.”
The ongoing battle for Snake Island is more than just a meme. It’s a key facet of the larger battle off the southern coast of Ukraine. It’s a front where — the sinking of the Moskva notwithstanding — Russian forces have had an easier time accomplishing their strategic objectives than their counterparts on land. Given the strategic and economic importance of shipping lanes in this area, the battle for the Black Sea may also be the key fight when it comes to Ukraine’s struggle to keep its battered economy afloat. And it’s not an exaggeration to say it could directly impact the lives of millions of people around the world.
The blockade
When the invasion began, it appeared that one of Russia’s goals was to take the entire southern coast of the country, from Mariupol in the east through Odessa in the west to the Romanian border, cutting off Ukrainian access to the sea. That didn’t happen: The Russians have had their hands full in eastern Ukraine, and for now Odessa is under fire but in little immediate danger of conquest. However, via naval power, the Russians have effectively turned Ukraine into a landlocked country.
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Russia had an advantage in the Black Sea from the start. Prior to 2014, both countries maintained naval fleets in Crimea under a treaty signed in the 1990s. When Russian President Vladimir Putin’s forces annexed the Crimean Peninsula, they also took over about 75 percent of Ukraine’s fleet, leaving it reliant on a “mosquito fleet” of mostly small patrol boats to defend its southern coast.
In the early days of the current war, Russia’s navy moved quickly to enact a blockade of the Ukrainian coast. It closed off the Kerch Strait, which connects the smaller Sea of Azov to the Black Sea. The important Sea of Azov port cities of Berdyansk and Mariupol have since fallen to Russian forces. Some 20 Russian naval vessels including six submarines are also patrolling the southern coast.
Further west, Russian warships and the forces now stationed on Snake Island are also enforcing a blockade on Odessa, Ukraine’s largest seaport. Ukrainian forces have been fighting to retake the now-iconic outcropping, hoping to prevent the Russians from setting up surface-to-air missile capabilities there.
Adding to the danger are hundreds of sea mines that both sides placed off Ukraine’s coast in the early days of the war. Many of these mines have become unmoored and are floating into open waters, imperiling shipping.
The result is that, even though Russia has not formally declared a blockade, that’s the current reality. “No one’s going to take a chance of going in there right now, either running astray of mines or the Russian navy,” Sal Mercogliano, a former merchant mariner and shipping historian, told Grid. Even if a shipping company were willing to take the risk, insurance rates are skyrocketing, making travel to Ukrainian ports prohibitively expensive. At least 80 merchant ships are stuck in Ukrainian ports, and at least 10 have been attacked.
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A few ships have been moving along coastal routes between Odessa and the Black Sea’s outlet to the Danube River at the town of Izmail. In theory, this could allow Ukraine to ship goods as far west as the Netherlands via Europe’s inland waterways. Unfortunately, Izmail also lies within artillery range of Snake Island.
Economic impact
The World Bank projects that Ukraine’s economy will contract by up to 45 percent this year. Some of this is pure physical destruction: The Kyiv School of Economics estimated that as of the beginning of May, the war had caused $94 billion in infrastructure damage. Then there’s the lost economic output of the 6 million Ukrainians who have left the country, and the roughly equal number who have been internally displaced.
But when asked about the first thing the international community could do to support Ukraine’s economy, Natalie Jaresko, the country’s former minister of finance, answered “unblock the ports.” Prior to the war, Black Sea shipping accounted for half of the country’s total external trade and 90 percent of its trade in grains including wheat and sunflower oil. Ukraine is the world’s fourth-largest grain exporter, and losses could top $6 billion. “There’s about 20 million tons sitting in storage that has to be exported to make room for the new harvest,” Jaresko said. “Otherwise, we know something’s going to rot.”
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All of these goods have traditionally left Ukraine by sea.
The shutdown of Ukraine’s most important trade route has left the country heavily dependent on foreign aid. The good news for Ukrainians: They are receiving quite a bit of aid. The $40 billion economic assistance package passed by Congress last week includes $8.76 billion in economic assistance. But these funds are neither sufficient nor sustainable in the long run.
Shipping analyst John Konrad said Russia’s blockade is a reminder of the still-critical role of shipping in the global economy. “We have a kind of global ‘sea blindness,’” he told Grid. “We think everything can just be airlifted out. It can’t. Grain is too heavy and bulky. And it would be extremely expensive to truck it all.”
The best available alternative to shipping, for the moment, is rail, but that presents its own complications. Red tape, logistical challenges and equipment shortages have at times left thousands of train cars loaded with grain and other commodities sitting at Ukraine’s borders. The biggest problem involves the rails themselves: Ukraine’s railways use a Soviet-era gauge that is wider than those of its neighbors, meaning goods must be reloaded onto new trains as they cross borders. Romania is currently working to refurbish a disused Soviet-era rail line to facilitate trade with Ukraine.
The European Union is exploring ways to move more goods in and out of Ukraine over land, and in the long term, the war may spur investments in the kind of infrastructure needed to make that happen. But in the short term, as the war rages, Ukraine’s economy is choking and there are few appealing alternatives to the sea.
What can be done
Is there any way around the blockade? Jaresko, the former finance minister, favors international naval escorts to protect merchant ships in the Black Sea, as was done to protect shipping from piracy off the coast of Somalia about a decade ago. But a number of political issues make this difficult.
Early in the war, Turkey, which controls access to the Black Sea from the Mediterranean via the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, triggered a 1936 treaty known as the Montreux Convention, which obligates it to cut off access to the sea to naval ships during wartime. Controversially, Turkey is interpreting the convention as applying to all ships, including NATO vessels, not just the belligerents in this war. However, the convention allows naval ships based in the sea, such as Russia’s Black Sea fleet, to move about and return to their Black Sea bases. And many Russian vessels were already there anyway. So the Russian navy effectively has free rein.
And as with other proposals to provide Ukraine with direct protection, such as a no-fly zone, NATO countries will be reluctant to put their sailors in a situation where they might get involved in direct combat with the Russians.
Instead, Ukraine’s backers are considering doing the same thing they’ve done for the land war: Provide Ukraine more firepower to fight the blockade themselves. It was announced this week that Denmark would be delivering a ground-based Harpoon anti-ship launcher and missiles to Ukraine, in order to help break the blockade. These missiles, which cost about $1.5 million per round, have a range of almost 200 miles.
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These weapons could make life very difficult for the Russian ships patrolling the Black Sea coast. And the Ukrainians have already destroyed a number of Russian landing craft, complicating plans for amphibious assaults.
The problem is that this is one front in the war where the strategic dynamics clearly favor the Russians. They don’t need overwhelming naval superiority. They just need to make the region too dangerous for international shipping.
Mercogliano suggested that if the sea war escalates, it could involve the Russians striking Ukrainian merchant ships attempting to leave the sea via the Danube. There have also been reports of Russian merchant ships carrying stolen Ukrainian grain to Syria. These could come under fire from the Ukrainians. This could start to resemble something like the “Tanker War” between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s. “The danger becomes that the Black Sea becomes much like the Persian Gulf of the 1980s,” Mercogliano said, “where both sides start targeting each other’s vessels and neutral ships.”
The consequences
Critical as it is for Ukraine, the effects of the blockade are being felt globally via disruptions to the international food supply, particularly in food-vulnerable countries in the Middle East and Africa that were heavily dependent on Ukrainian grain. Ukraine grows enough food to feed 400 million people around the world, at a time when prices were already on the rise. World Food Programme Executive Director David Beasley warned last month, “Millions of people will die because these ports are blocked.” Or as Jaresko put it to Grid, “what Putin has done is declare war against the world’s poor.”
The battle for control of the Black Sea has gotten less international attention than the fights over territory on land. One could argue it’s the front of this war that matters most for the rest of the world.
Thanks to Lillian Barkley for copy editing this article.
21. Ukraine Is Using Quiet Electric Bikes to Haul Anti-Tank Weapons
Ukraine Is Using Quiet Electric Bikes to Haul Anti-Tank Weapons
The e-bike is ideal for moving snipers and anti-tank weapons quickly and quietly around the battlefield.
The Ukrainian military is using stealthy electric bikes modified to carry next-generation light anti-tank weapons (NLAWS) to fight Russia.
Soldiers on electric bikes have been spotted across Ukraine since the early days of the war, mostly on ELEEK brand bikes. e-bikes are fast and, critically, much quieter than a gas powered bike. They allow soldiers to perform quick guard patrols or move swiftly into position.
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On Telegram last week, pictures surfaced of the Delfast branded bikes that had been modified to carry massive anti-tank weapons. The two photos showed the e-bike modified with a crate on the back and a huge missile launcher poking from the back.
The e-bikes are used for transporting the launchers; the anti-tank weapons aren’t fired from the back of the bikes. The quiet design and fast speed—a Delfast can reach speeds up to 50 mph—allow the bikes to move NLAWS into position and quickly flee once fired.
Both Delfast and ELEEK are Ukrainian companies. When reached for comment, representatives of Delfast in the United States denied it had sold Ukraine any of its bikes. “Delfast continues to support the people of Ukraine. We are working with governments and the larger tech community to end this war,” a representative of Delfast in the U.S. told Motherboard. “We have not sold Delfast bikes or made modifications to our e-bikes to support any military action. We are also donating 5% of all sales to fund humanitarian efforts in Ukraine.”
This is technically true: Delfast has not sold the Ukrainian military any of its bikes. It gave them away. Daniel Tonkopi, CEO of Delfast, is Ukrainian. When the pictures of the modified e-bikes surfaced on Telegram, Tonkopi shared them on his personal Facebook page and explained what was going on.
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Image via Telegram.
“Delfast has been providing electric bikes to the Ukrainian Army since the first day of the war,” he wrote on Facebook. “We transferred electric bikes to the front line, but we did not talk about it—we do some things quietly. Now we've gotten permission from the command, and we're publishing these pictures.”
Tonkopi also shared some quotes he said were feedback from the Ukrainian military about the bike. “The bike was great and can really work for mobile groups,” a member of the Ukrainian military said, according to Tonkopi. “Plans to use it for aero driving tours and with equipment for work on tanks.”
“It was very hot out there. Three cars came back with holes, the guys intact luckily,” said another unnamed member of the Ukrainian military, according to Tonkopi. “One of them got his arm caught on the edge. All in all, your bike was highly appreciated by the guys.”
Tonkopi also mentioned the donations on his Facebook page. “We help the Ukrainian Army from our own pocket,” he said in his post. “Since the first day of the war, we have been donating at least 5% of all revenues to help Ukraine.”
Militaries across the world have been developing electronic stealth bikes for around a decade. Australia has been testing them for the scouting missions and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)—the Pentagon’s mad scientists—began throwing money at the problem in 2014. The development has led to two prototypes: the NightHawk and the Nightmare. The SilentHawk is a hybrid model that sounds about as loud as a vacuum cleaner and can get up to 80 mph. Less is known about the Nightmare.
The speed and low heat signature make e-bikes ideal for reconnaissance and special operations. In addition to the NLAW hauling Delfast bikes, reports have flourished online of Ukraine using e-bikes to move snipers around the battlefield and quickly deliver medical supplies.
22. Opinion: Biden’s visit to Asia highlights the continent’s ‘Finlandization’ – a desire to steer clear of conflict between Russia and the West
Now that Finland may join NATO will we have to find an alternative term for "Finlandization?"
Opinion: Biden’s visit to Asia highlights the continent’s ‘Finlandization’ – a desire to steer clear of conflict between Russia and the West
Takatoshi Ito is a former Japanese deputy vice-minister of finance, professor at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University and senior professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo.
The term “Finlandization” describes a commitment to strategic neutrality that a small country might make, in order to avoid provoking a much larger and more powerful neighbour. The term is derived from Finland’s Cold War-era policy of strict military non-alignment with either the Soviet Union or the West – a policy that it had until recently maintained vis-a-vis Russia, but that its recent application for NATO membership has upended. Even as Finland abandons Finlandization though, many Asian countries may well be set to adopt it.
Unlike Finland and its European partners, most Asian countries have refrained from vocal or vociferous condemnations of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Of the 35 countries that abstained from the United Nations General Assembly vote on a resolution demanding that Russia end its invasion of Ukraine, 11 were in Asia.
Two of those abstaining countries were large powers: China and India. For China, the decision to abstain may have been less about Russia, with which it signed a co-operation agreement just weeks before the Ukraine invasion, than about the West. China’s leaders harbour plenty of skepticism about Western values, and they fear the weaponization of Western-led international institutions. If or when China decides to invade Taiwan, it hopes to avoid the high international costs Russia has incurred over its aggression in Ukraine.
India, for its part, probably abstained because of its long-standing ties to Russia. India led the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1950s and 1960s – a period when it also pursued Soviet-style socialist economic policies. India abandoned those policies in the early 1990s – around the same time communism was collapsing in Europe – but has continued to rely on Russia for military supplies, including warplanes and tanks. Given the importance of these supplies, India cannot afford to alienate Russia, despite the Kremlin’s increasingly close partnership with China, which has been waging a stealth war with India in the Himalayas.
The smaller abstaining countries – Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, and Vietnam – are even more likely to be replicating a version of Finlandization, reflecting pressures from Russia and China. Meanwhile, Japan and South Korea remain the West’s front line in the region, confronting threats from both powers, along with North Korea (which voted against the resolution).
United States President Joe Biden is currently in Asia attempting to strengthen that front. In his meetings with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Mr. Biden has sought to lay the groundwork for deeper co-operation, including by planning for a variety of contingencies, such as a North Korean missile attack on any of the three countries’ territories. Mr. Biden has even vowed to defend Taiwan militarily in the event of an invasion.
But Mr. Biden has also held separate bilateral meetings with Mr. Yoon and Mr. Kishida. For the front line to hold, South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. must construct a viable three-pronged strategy to confront the security challenges Asia faces.
Here, Mr. Yoon’s electoral victory last March offers reason for hope. Having defeated the incumbent party’s candidate, Mr. Yoon is expected to break from the foreign policy of his predecessor, Moon Jae-in. This includes abandoning Mr. Moon’s appeasement policy toward North Korea, the biggest military threat to the South, and replacing his policy of “strategic ambiguity” in the Sino-American rivalry with deeper ties to the U.S. In fact, during their recent meeting, Mr. Biden and Mr. Yoon affirmed the critical importance of extended deterrence in their joint policy toward the North Korean regime.
Another policy mistake Mr. Moon made was to allow South Korea’s relationship with Japan to be poisoned by historical disagreements dating back to the Second World War. Rather than remaining weighed down by the burden of history, the leaders of South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. must together carry the burden of peace. One hopes that Mr. Yoon understands this.
Mr. Kishida, too, is breaking from his predecessors’ policies, which embodied a gentler approach to Russia, in the hope that Russia would return to Japan the four Kuril Islands that Joseph Stalin seized at the end of the Second World War. Shinzo Abe – Japan’s longest-serving prime minister, whose tenure ended in 2020 – met with Russian President Vladimir Putin 27 times between 2012 and 2020, and provided Russia with substantial economic assistance.
Those efforts turned out to be for naught. Mr. Putin never came close to engaging in serious negotiations about the islands. In any case, Japan has now abandoned the enterprise. Following the invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Kishida’s administration swiftly announced that it would join the rest of the G7 in imposing strict sanctions on Russia. It has since suspended most of its economic engagement with Russia.
Both Japan and South Korea seem committed to maintaining a united front with the U.S. and Europe in confronting Russia. That unity must be maintained – at the very least, until the voluntary Finlandization of Asia that the Ukraine war has spurred begins to reverse.
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23. ‘Collaborative, Portable Autonomy’ Is the Future of AI for Special Operations
Who is working on AI to enable the unconventional warfare mission? How does USSOCOM intend to employ AI to help the SF, PSYOP, or Civil Affairs operator on the ground?
‘Collaborative, Portable Autonomy’ Is the Future of AI for Special Operations
Creating autonomous teams in contested environments will be a challenge of technology—and policy.
For a future fight against a near-peer military, U.S. special operators say they need smart, networked sensors and drones that can work together in contested environments with little human supervision. But as “collaborative autonomy” comes within technical reach, just how independent should these things get?
“We are going to use a lot of sensors, whether they're unmanned aerial systems, unmanned ground systems, unmanned maritime systems, unintended sensors, all working together, and what our goal is to have those working together collaboratively and autonomously,” SOCOM’s top acquisition executive, James Smith, said at NDIA’s SOFIC conference in Tampa, Florida, last week.
SOCOM has “a specific line of effort where we're focused on what we're calling ‘collaborative autonomy,” said David Breede, who runs a program executive office at SOCOM. That “line of effort” is concerned with such questions as “How do I get an unattended ground sensor talking to an unmanned aircraft and having an unmanned aircraft react based on the information that it got from that unmanned ground sensor? Not only collaboration across technologies and capabilities, but collaboration across program offices, right?” Breede said. In other words, special operations forces need sensors on the ground, in the air, and in space constantly working together to autonomously detect changes and sound the alert.
But SOCOM doesn’t just want networks of sensors to collaborate better. They also want the underlying autonomy software to work the same on everything from a 3-D printer to a $10,000 drone.
“We have a goal of what we're calling ‘portable autonomy,’ so being able to port software, virtual algorithms across different classes,” of small drones. “We would have an autonomy developer actually have their software algorithms on a payload and then integrate that onto a third-party platform and demonstrate the ability to control that platform without talking to that third-party platform provider,” Breede said.
Among the obstacles: battlefield radio communications are expected to become much more difficult. SOCOM’s Col. Paul Weizer said the command is trying to “untether” itself from radio.
“So how do I operate completely in an untethered way, whether it's with unattended ground sensors or whether it's unmanned vehicles or otherwise?”
Part of the answer is to put more information and computing power on the battlefield instead of counting on being able to “reach back” for it. The military and SOCOM in particular have been trying to bring cloud capabilities much closer to the battlefield, an effort exemplified by the Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps and Amazon Web Services to create a tactical cloud environment.
That will also make battlefield decision-making much easier, said Quentin Donnellan, the president of the Space and Defense division of AI company Hypergiant, which is working with AWS and the Army on the effort.
“If I turn on my radios, people are going to know where I'm at. So I don't want to turn on my radios, right?” Donnellan said. “So the idea for these use-cases is ‘How do we deploy AI and machine learning out tactically where I can make those decisions’” in a communications-denied environment. “If I've got the tools that allow me to, like, leverage AI to put it out to the edge, I should be able to do my job even if my cloud connection is denied.”
One example of tactical cloud use is integrating radar sensor data for air defense in the field—closer to the threat—rather than receiving an alert from a headquarters. “That's kind of a really tactical and specific example of, ‘Hey, if you deploy AI out there, [you could] potentially leverage weather or ground-based radar to be able to do things like object detection and classification, but not not relying on the connectivity back down,” Donnellan said.
Shield AI co-founder Brandon Tseng said his company—known for drones that navigate without GPS—is working with SOCOM on “portable autonomy” to operate ever-larger drone swarms. Since 2018, Shield AI has been developing a software-based autonomy product called Hivemind for drone piloting; they’ve recently installed it on V-BAT drones to develop swarming and maritime domain awareness capabilities.
The company is working closely with the U.S. military to figure out how to penetrate enemy air defenses with drone swarms, he said. “Something that we're super excited about is operationalizing swarms of three V-BAT aircraft in 2023, four craft in [20]24, eight aircraft in [20]25 and 16 aircraft in [20]26 that are working as a highly intelligent team together…. I think it's adjacent to where SOCOM is and it definitely plays into their interests. But we're also integrating it on fighter jets and we expect to have it running on an F-16 later this year.”
But the technology aspect of portable, collaborative autonomy isn’t actually the hardest part of the challenge; the larger policy and ethics questions are.
Take the Switchblade from AeroVironment, the small kamikaze drones that have helped the Ukrainian military push back Russian forces. The drone sends video directly to an operator nearby without having to travel long distances over radio.
Brett Hush, vice president of tactical mission systems at AeroVironment, said his company is experimenting with artificial intelligence for automatic target recognition. “Those capabilities are in development. We've demonstrated with the DOD our ability to do that to identify like… 32 tanks” and potentially strike them with no need for communication with an operator.
“Now, fielding that capability is where we're gonna cross, you know, policy,” he said. “Today, everything that's done with our loitering missiles, there's a man on the loop. Once we go to field in the [automatic target recognition] and with more autonomy, we've got to really, as a country, think through where would that be allowed and not allowed.”
24. Another Killer Dressed Up Like a Special Operator
Sounds like Mr. Baron is challenging USSOCOM to conduct a psychological operation.
Another Killer Dressed Up Like a Special Operator
The SOF community could do more to protect what they’ve earned and shame wannabes who dress to kill.
In fact, many of these murderers act and dress like they’re going on a high-value target assault mission, from the signature AR-15 rifle (civilian counterpart to the military’s M16) to the hat, vest, gloves, and cargo pants of full tactical battle rattle. Too many American males fetishize the SOF-warrior aesthetic, and so perhaps it could help–and bear with me–if leaders in the special operations community do more to call out these pretenders for the stolen valor that this is, and tell the public: stop acting like us, stop dressing like us, and stop trying to shoot like us.
But you also see SOF-chic among harmless everyday fellas who say they just like to shoot guns and love America. You see it on paid Instagram hotties, posing in bikinis and American flag tank tops with semi-automatic weapons. The warrior fetish has even gone so mainstream that a version of it—“warcore”—is now embraced by alternative kids, like the new goth, apparently.
Influenced by techno clubs, military-esque looks, video games and Japanese street style; techcore, darkcore and warcore focus on dressing for imminent doom. Think: cargo pants with pockets you can actually use, layered utility belts, bomber jackets with secret compartments, combat boots and surgical masks. If the end of the world is going to happen on the way to the shops, these kids will be prepared.
Whatever the origin, being dressed to kill is now a style choice. And you see it on these lost boys who turn into mass murderers. Modern schoolyard killers like the Columbine shooters in 1999 first were described as “kids who sometimes wore trench coats,” looking more like Neo in The Matrix, but with an arsenal of guns and bombs for what the Denver Post called their “twisted commando mission.” Their style was invoked in 2007 by the mentally disturbed 23-year-old who sent photos of himself to NBC News dressed in black and tan, with handguns, a holster, and a tactical-looking ammo vest. Then he murdered 33 people at Virginia Tech. In 2018, the Parkland shooter donned a black Kevlar vest to match his baseball cap as he stalked children floor by floor, like an operator clearing rooms in Fallujah. (Disclosure: a close relative of mine was on the campus that day.)
Clothes don’t make a murder, obviously, but in the public arena, images matter. Often in the aftermath of American shootings, those who glorify guns are attacked by those who hate guns and gun violence. It can quickly get messy. Civilians who love their guns too much for others are called “gun nuts” and those who display military fandom a bit too much are derided as irrational fanboys of war. The generic machismo of the American male who fetishizes the Seal Team Six-look and embraces military-chic, critics argue, are part of the problem. To the wannabes and pretenders, dressing up like a U.S. special operator is cool. To the real world, they are dangerous man-children playing with lethality that is designed for two things: self-protection for U.S. troops and law enforcement officers, and killing.
Americans should know the difference between professional soldiering and mass murdering. But this nation desensitized to gun violence needs resensitizing. Special operations community leaders could speak up more loudly and publicly to deride the weekend warriors, partisan demonstrators, and yes, mass murders, who try to be like them. We should hear more about the responsibility of being an actual warrior who is trained and disciplined to kill. Speak about the seriousness in that legally-sanctioned mission. Tell Americans about the earned privilege of wearing the uniform, donning the gear, and, yes, holding the weapons of a special operator.
To me, anyone who dresses like an operator, acts like an operator, posts selfies emulating operators, is guilty of fraud akin to stolen valor. This isn’t comicon. Some will laugh at them, but imagine if these fools were shamed with the same intensity aimed at someone wearing dress blues and medals they did not earn. You want to dress like an elite warrior? Great, go earn it.
In December 2020, I asked two leading moderate conservatives in the national security community about the special ops warrior aesthetic seen so often among American right-wing extremists and President Donald Trump’s embrace of them. It was about one month after Trump lost his re-election, just weeks before the Jan. 6 insurrection.
“Those are both big problems for mild, moderate, middle-of-the-road Republicans,” said AEI’s Kori Schake, in an interview for the virtual Defense One Summit. “But it’s veterans and the defense establishment that are the counter to that,” she said, and “to confront those tendencies.”
“The difference is whether the leaders of the party or our elected leaders embrace them, ignore them, or repudiate them,” said Richard Fontaine, CEO of the Center for a New American Security and former advisor to the late Sen. John McCain. Trump “has embraced that view,” he said. Fontaine was less worried about such groups existing than that they have “political salience.” It’s up to political leaders to marginalize such groups, he said.
Three months later, after the Jan. 6 insurrection, Schake and Michael Robinson, a West Point professor, criticized tactical-geared extremists, saying, “Appropriating military iconography, equipment and cultural symbols, they attempt to benefit from the military’s credibility while posing as inheritors of a proud American military tradition.”
One of the legacies of the post-9/11 era is the indelible image of the U.S. special operator, with history and valor worth protecting. Reclaiming that image as their own may not stop the next mass murder by a gunman. But it may lessen the chance the next angry young man thinks he will receive anything but shame if puts on the costume of a warrior–or a killer.
25. President on statements by Kissinger and NYT: They want to exchange lives of millions of Ukrainians for illusion of peace
President on statements by Kissinger and NYT: They want to exchange lives of millions of Ukrainians for illusion of peace
“No matter what the Russian state does, there is always someone who says: let's take its interests into account. This year in Davos it was heard again. Despite thousands of Russian missiles hitting Ukraine. Despite tens of thousands of Ukrainians killed. Despite Bucha and Mariupol, etc. Despite the destroyed cities. And despite the "filtration camps" built by the Russian state, in which they kill, torture, rape and humiliate like on a conveyor belt. Russia has done all this in Europe,” Zelensky said in his evening address on May 25.
In this context, he mentioned the words by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who said that a piece of Ukrainian territory should be given to Russia so that Russia would not be alienated from Europe.
“It seems that Mr. Kissinger's calendar is not 2022, but 1938, and he thought he was talking to an audience not in Davos, but in Munich of that time. By the way, in the real year 1938, when Mr. Kissinger's family was fleeing Nazi Germany, he was 15 years old, and he understood everything perfectly. And nobody heard from him then that it was necessary to adapt to the Nazis instead of fleeing them or fighting them,” the President stressed.
As noted, “symptomatic” editorials began to appear in some Western media stating that Ukraine must allegedly accept so-called difficult compromises by giving up territory in exchange for peace.
Perhaps The New York Times in 1938 also wrote something similar. But now, let me remind you, it is 2022, Zelensky underscored.
“And behind all these geopolitical speculations of those who advise Ukraine to give away something to Russia, "great geopoliticians" are always unwilling to see ordinary people. Ordinary Ukrainians. Millions of those who actually live in the territory they propose to exchange for the illusion of peace,” the President stressed.
He is convinced that after the full-scale Russian invasion, the world was not ready for Ukrainian courage because, in his opinion, many in the world had no habit of taking Ukraine into account.
“That is why I pay such attention to international platforms, addresses to parliamentarians, to parliaments, to the people of other countries, to communication with the expert community, with journalists, with students. We must do everything possible for the world to get a permanent habit of taking Ukraine into account. So that the interests of Ukrainians are not overlapped by the interests of those who are in a hurry for another meeting with the dictator,” Zelensky said.
Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said at the World Economic Forum in Davos that Ukraine should give up part of its territory to Russia and that the United States and the West should refrain from seeking a defeat for Russia.
An editorial was published in the New York Times, the authors of which admitted that Ukraine would be forced to give up territories to Russia to end the war.
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba stated that Ukraine would not make concessions to Putin, because the strategy of appeasing him from 2014 to the beginning of the full-scale invasion failed and had no chance of success in the future.
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26. The Best Counter to Misinformation is More Information
The Best Counter to Misinformation is More Information
By Justin Malzac
As war spread across Ukraine earlier this year, Russia and its allies were spinning tales and stretching the truth to support a clearly unlawful use of force. First it was a claim that Ukraine was committing genocide against ethnic Russians in contested regions. Next was a claim that neo-Nazis in Ukraine posed an immediate threat to Russia, as a pretense for an unlawful invasion, or a false defense offered by the aggressors is that Ukraine was developing nuclear or biological weapons. Meanwhile, Russian censors went into overdrive back home, and the government even passed a law threatening anyone who calls the “Ukraine issue” a war with 15 years in prison. Information has now become a strategic weapon, even in conventional wars.
In a recent article I wrote for the Harvard National Security Journal, I examine the customary rules of international law as they relate to influence operations, showing that there exists a wide maneuver space for lawful information operations, especially those that are truthful or that promote compliance with international law. I argue that the fight against malicious influence cannot simply be defensive, but rather the West must expand our own influence operations against these bad actors. We must fight misinformation with the truth, by employing overwhelming fires.
There is still a lot of debate regarding which rules of international law apply to information operations (including non-kinetic cyber). For its part, the United States has consistently opined that the principle of sovereignty is not implicated when operations have de minimus kinetic effects. Previous DOD General Counsels have gone as far as to argue that sovereignty is a principle of international law without independent legal effect. Sovereignty is brought into play through other core principles of customary international law, such as non-intervention. Regardless, one need not look at sovereignty per se when examining non-kinetic information operations for which the goal is influencing populations. Affecting the behavior of other states and their populations falls squarely under the scope of intervention.
That being said, the principle of non-intervention has a significant threshold before an act becomes unlawful. Information operations violate this principle when they involve “coercive action that bears on a matter that each state is entitled, by the principle of state sovereignty, to decide freely, such as the choice of a political, economic, social, and cultural system.” Therefore, propaganda operations that have a direct and disruptive effect on fundamental government activities, such Russian misinformation operations against elections in the West, constitute internationally wrongful acts. On the contrary, information operations that seek to present truthful information or to pressure states to comply with their international obligations are lawful. This is because the obligations of states rooted in treaty or customary law are not purely domestic matters (or part of the “domaine réservé” of the state) and, thus, do not fall under the scope of non-intervention.
On the other hand, international law makes it difficult for states to restrict or prevent the spread of misinformation. International Human Rights Law protects the freedom of speech and access to information. One of the clearest example of this is stated in Resolution 424 of the fifth UN General Assembly, which affirms “the right of all persons to be fully informed concerning news, opinions and ideas regardless of frontiers” and “[i]nvites the governments of all Member States to refrain from such interference with the right of their peoples to freedom of information.”
What is a state to do when engaged in grey zone battles against misinformation? Sometimes, the only defense is a good offense. As argued by Justice Louis Brandies in his concurring opinion to Whitney v. California, “[i]If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.” The rest of this article will provide some examples that support this argument.
Prior to the outbreak of conflict in Eastern Europe, one of the hotbeds of information warfare was the Korean Peninsula. For decades, the North and South have been engaged in a pitched culture war, trying to dominate the hearts and minds of not only their domestic audiences, but all Koreans. Like Russia today, North Korea strictly controls all information inside the country and even all access points, such as the internet and any physical travel.
In recent decades, the South, both through official government actions and the private efforts of NGOs, have used K-pop culture as a dagger against the brutal authoritarian control of the Kim regime in the North. Instead of messaging that directly supporting regime change—which would likely violate international law—the South instead offers the North Korean people a glimpse into life in the 10th largest economy in the world. The hope is by revealing how severely the North’s loss of the ideological war has affected everyday life, the populace will be encouraged to promote change from below, or at a minimum, defect to the South, providing strategic gains.
The effectiveness of this campaign can be seen in the number of defectors who claim to have viewed South Korean media in conjunction with rise in the number of defectors, the increased crackdown within North Korea, and the even violent reaction of the North Korean military to dissemination. For example, in 2017 North Korea employed military force in response to loudspeaker broadcasts from the South. This was a flagrant violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement and the basic tenets of international law.
Returning to Europe, Estonia was one of the first European countries to face the rath of the rising Russian bear, when the capital Tallinn was hacked in 2007. This prompted the Western world to begin seriously thinking about the emerging cyber threat, even prompting the development of the Tallinn Manual.
But cyber defense was not Estonia’s only response. The country is also proactively combating Russian misinformation with its own influence campaign. Efforts include a Russian language TV channel and government-sponsored cultural classes. As noted in a PBS Newshour special report, the intent of these measures is “to make the Russian-speaking community feel more welcome and, it's hoped, less susceptible to grievance-based narratives spread by Russian state media.” The report suggests that efforts might be paying off, with the viewership of Etonian-sponsored content increasing among Russian speakers.
In Ukraine, long before the current armed conflict, information battles have been raging throughout the country, but none more fiercely than in the separatist regions of Donetsk and the Donbas. Some of the Russian content is typical PSYOP (psychological operations), in the form of messages to opposing troops to “surrender” and “go home.” In one case, a Russian soldier was convinced to turn over an in-tact tank in exchange for money.
But some of the content generated by Russia is far more malicious, such as directing Ukrainian soldiers to murder their commanding officers. Russia has also been spreading disinformation to civilians in order to spread chaos in the cities, such as spamming text messages to civilian cell phones stating that local ATMs had ceased functioning, in order to spread panic. Since Russia is engaged in an active international armed conflict, this may constitute a violation of the fundamental principle of distinction—that belligerents must not make civilians the target of attack. Arguably, an information operation that seeks to create manifest effects on the streets and the potential for violence approaches the threshold of an attack. In order to spread division in the ranks, and also within Ukrainian society in general, Russia has resorted to what some have called a “firehose of falsehood.”
To counter the assault, some of the Ukrainian forces began broadcasting their own radio programs. As reported by Politico, one of these programs featured “a prisoner of war who had been held and tortured by Russian insurgents in her home in Donetsk in 2014.” She spoke simply of her home, her family and baby. The effectiveness of these programs can be implied by the severe response. Not only did Russian-backed forces attempt to jam or disrupt the broadcasts, they also launched kinetic strikes on the transmission sites.
Some in Ukraine have urged for the development of Russian-language media channels, in order to fight misinformation and bring the Russian-speaking populace back into the fold. The Russian-Ukrainian language divide is one of the major factors that has fueled conflict in separatist areas for over a decade. Prior efforts in Estonia suggest these sorts of efforts could be successful.
In the current Ukraine conflict, the Ukrainians have been employing information against the iron curtain of Russian censorship. With Russia imposing prison time on anyone who uses the terms “war” or “invasion” in regards to the Ukraine issue, among other controls, along with western-based social media and news organizations pulling out of the country, the domestic audience remains without legitimate sources of information. Ukrainians are combatting this information famine by sending facts directly to those in control of the narrative in Russia. The Ukrainian government has also been disseminating to the general populace of Russia, inviting parents to come collect their sons being held as POWs, and also publishing videos of these POWs denouncing the war. Ukraine has also been publishing the comments of captured Russian troops, who convey a sense of regret for the campaign and the resultant harm to civilians. The response from some suggests the effort is having an effect.
At the strategic level, the Ukrainian parliament passed a law authorizing large payments, up to $1 million, to Russian troops who surrender significant military equipment, such as ships or fighter aircraft. However, there doesn’t seem to be a coherent strategy of how to disseminate this information to the right audiences.
As of this writing, the Ukrainian conflict is reaching its fourth month. Russia, along with China and other supporters, is clamping down on information harder than ever. This presents more opportunities for offensive information operations from the Ukrainian side. Freezing something often makes it more brittle. Hardening can create cracks and open gaps.
Currently, much of the information campaign has been waged through radio, telephones, and computers. But, with more and more Russian troops on the ground in Ukraine, perhaps the time has come for some old fashioned, physical forms of dissemination. Craig Hooper has argued in Forbes that Russian language leaflets could be distributed by drone, or even by hand. And radio ops could be intensified, targeting the cheap, unencrypted radios carried by Russian troops. In the age of cyber, Cooper argues “Old school influencing is easy and safe for both the employer and the receiver. Pamphlets are harmless. And nobody tracks a conscript who picks up a piece of paper or listens to a hijacked radio signal.” The point is to give the young and reluctant Russian solder a decision, a way to “opt out”. By convincing them that they will be treated fairly if they surrender, many just might.
One fundamental problem seems to be the lack of a coherent and unified information operations (IO) strategy in Ukraine. There are countless efforts ongoing, utilizing different media on different digital fronts, but there might not be established and measurable goals. This may be a space where the United States can provide assistance. Within the US Department of Defense, psychological operations teams are the experts for influencing audiences. In the DOD, influence operations are labeled Military Information Support Operations, or MISO, and “advise and assist” of foreign forces is now a key mission set for these teams.
US MISO teams could support senior Ukrainian IO officers by training them to consolidate their efforts under a broad operations plan that includes specified lines of effort (LOEs) and defined measures of effectiveness (MOEs). It is just as important to track and measure the results of IO efforts, as it is to come up with new dissemination concepts. Policy authority already exists for this sort of mission. It will be important for this training to be conducted remotely, such as with the Remote Advise and Assist Virtual Accompany Kits (RAAVAK) in the SOCOM inventory, or in the territory of neutral countries, in order to prevent the Unites States from being drawn into the conflict as an belligerent.
But the information effort to secure Ukraine, and to restore and maintain the global order, needs to extend far beyond the borders of a single country. Belarus, whose leader has allowed his country to be used as a staging ground for an unlawful war of aggression and who turned his country’s guns against his own people, is ripe for an awakening. While it may be unlawful to use information operations to directly promote regime change, simply informing an audience that their government is violating key tenets of international law is not. In China, the truth of the Ukrainian conflict is being blocked. This truth is essential for the Chinese people to have a full understanding of the implications of any potential attack on Taiwan. And of course, the Russian people must be informed of what their government is doing unlawfully in their name. For the United States, there is a need for both support of Ukrainian IO efforts and also unilateral action.
The information space is not the battlefield of the future. It is the battlefield of today. Unfortunately, the West does not yet seem fully committed to the fight. This must change.
About the Author(s)
Justin Malzac is the Senior Paralegal at a DOD joint component command, has worked in the field of National Security Law for almost a decade, and has significant experience with military information operations. He has an M.A. in History from Pittsburg State University and a B.A. in English from the University of Minnesota. He was previously published by the Harvard National Security Journal, the American University National Security Law Brief, and other academic journals, and he is pending publication with the Georgetown Journal of International Law. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Army, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.
27. The Hazards of Optimism
Wed, 05/25/2022 - 1:09pm
(Editor's Note: Small Wars Journal publishes serious, authentic voices from across the spectrum of stakeholders in small wars to add richness, breadth and depth to the active dialog that occurs in many cloistered venues. The views of the authors are their own and do represent SWJ positions https://smallwarsjournal.com/content/editorial-policy).
The Hazards of Optimism
“Hope is a waking dream.” – Aristotle
By G. Murphy Donovan
An old cliché tells us that “no news is good news.”
Today, that aphorism might come out of rewrite as “good news is not really news.” A recent BBC piece, under the ironic rubric of a “war on truth” told of a woman in the port city of Mariupol who heroically gave birth midst a Russian bombardment. The narrative was an inane argument about whether or not the women were a propagandist.
Given the strategic significance of Mariupol, the truth of such a yarn is moot when the real story of that day was the unarguable loss of a strategic city and the defeat of an operationally significant Ukrainian military asset. The Azov Regiment was the most iconic, albeit neo-Nazi unit in all of Ukraine. Azov fighters, some say thousands, who surrendered in Mariupol are now being shipped to Russian territory, chits for the inevitable prisoner exchange.
The 30 some odd, albeit smaller, Right Sector “volunteer” groups in nearby Donbas are now in the Russian crosshairs. If the Russian Army takes the industrial Donbas, Putin’s strategic goal of “de-Nazification” will have been achieved.
On the same day, AP also ran a piece about the Azov fighters trapped in the Mariupol Steel Plant claiming that the regiment/battalion had “fulfilled their duty,” clearly a media recitation of Kiev’s party line. Worse still was a Washington Post headline which read “Ukraine Ends Bloody Battle,” as if Kiev had any real say in the matter.
We are led to believe, according to too many western news sources, that the Russian victory in Mariupol was no big deal. If the truth were told, Russia’s southern strategy, in fact, seems to be going well.
Take the “grain war” as an example of an another under reported front where Russia also prevails.
Russia and Ukraine produce a globally significant portion of the world’s wheat, corn, and cooking oil. The loss or control of these commodities in world markets doesn’t just aggravate the persistent supply chain crisis in the West, but threatens to precipitate a global famine, to say nothing about the impact on western financial markets where inflation is already impoverishing millions.
Russia may have lost McDonald’s, but she has not lost Europe’s breadbasket.
Large scale commodity shortages put things like bread beyond reach for many, potentially undermining the polities in dozens of unstable Third World sierra hotels. Indeed, Russia has also seized the lower reaches of the Dnieper River, a vital line of communication that runs north/south from Kiev to the Black Sea. Where do you read or hear about this?
Putin’s army has also created a land bridge/resupply corridor between mainland Russia and the Crimean Peninsula along the Azov/Black Sea coastal littoral. Where have you heard about that operational milestone?
When Odessa, the last significant port still controlled by Kiev, falls; it’s game over for Ukraine – and possibly globalism.
If Mariupol is a precedent, how eager will Odessa be to suffer a similar fate? Mariupol was an industrial slum before Russia created a ruin. Odessa is a last vital port - and an iconic seaside resort city.
The Kremlin clearly has the power to put its thumb on global energy and commodity markets where the pain is felt from Berlin to Brooklyn. Yet, team Biden wishes away the ominous by claiming that inflation is “transitory” and the food crisis is only “a distribution problem.”
Really?
If we know nothing about European history, we should recall Napoleon’s and Hitler’s experience with Russia. Moscow learns quickly from tactical or operational military setbacks. Would that you could say the same about Brussels and Washington. Unlike the Pentagon, the Kremlin will sacrifice or fire as many generals as necessary until it finds Zhukov’s heir.
More importantly, Moscow’s pain tolerance, call it sacrifice quotient, is significantly higher than what we can expect from an imperial NATO or a smug EU. Most of continental Europe folded like a cheap tent in the last great war. Hungary and Turkey have already defected today. China, India, and the Muslim world were spectators from day one. Clearly, most of the world’s population is not betting against Russia in Ukraine.
George Bush had a telling slip of the lip the other day when he confused the invasion of Iraq with Ukraine. Indeed, Putin has better reasons for being in Ukraine than America ever did for invading Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria.
Moscow is also well positioned to exploit the cupidity, if not stupidity, of near universal liberal (nee socialist) bias; that globalist narrative, where Brussels and Davos are presumed to be on the right side of history. Arrogance and presumptions of moral superiority are the landmines embedded in our hubris.
As NATO, the EU, and Kiev whistle in the dark, they fail to appreciate the hazards of optimism. Pollyanna was actually a bitch. If you are candid about your opponent; no harm, no foul. When the enemy falters or fails, your truth looks prophetic. You exceed expectations.
Conversely, if you put too much faith in your presumed moral or ideological superiority, all bets are off. Globalist cant is no match for nationalism. Underestimating an enemy is a fatal strategic flaw, as in picking a fight with the wrong thug in a very bad neighborhood.
State controlled and commercial reporting on Ukraine to date has all the earmarks of impending disaster. Zelensky has been canonized as a white knight, when in fact, as autocrats go, he may just be Washington’s latest “useful idiot”. Zelensky now controls all media outlets, has eliminated opposition political parties, and even cancelled external critics like Oliver Stone by prohibiting visits to Ukraine.
Any of these official policies ring a bell?
Moscow’s end game is pretty clear; an end to NATO expansion and some assurance that Russian border states are at best, neutral; and at worst, demilitarized. In fact, the Kremlin has been asking, peacefully, for such assurances for 30 years or more. Brussels and Washington, in contrast, have ignored Moscow’s security concerns whilst stumbling East from trope to cliché with no strategic calculus, goals, or clarity.
The Kremlin is now in the process of creating the realpolitik border buffer that diplomacy, mutual respect, and common sense has not allowed since 1990.
If victory in Ukraine or improved global security is a function of leadership, Vladimir Putin vs. Joseph Robinette Biden, where would you put your money today?
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G. Murphy Donovan writes about the politics of national security.
About the Author(s)
The author is a former USAF Intelligence officer, Vietnam veteran, a graduate of Iona College (BA), the University of Southern California (MS), the Defense Intelligence College, and the Air War College. He is a former Senior USAF Research Fellow at RAND Corporation, Santa Monica and the former Director of Research and Russian (nee Soviet) Studies, ACS Intelligence, HQ USAF, serving under General James Clapper. Colonel Donovan has served at the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the Central intelligence Agency.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
