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Quotes of the Day:
"First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win."
– Mahatma Gandhi
"The most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed."
– Steve Biko
"Not everything that is faced can be changed, but nothing can be changed until it is faced."
– James Baldwin
1. I CARRIED OUT THE STRIKE THAT KILLED SOLEIMANI. AMERICA DOESN’T UNDERSTAND THE LESSON OF HIS DEATH.
2. What Hamas Called Its Female Captives, and Why It Matters
3. The masterpiece of our time On The Gulag Archipelago at fifty.
4. Don’t Cede Historic American Symbols to Bad Actors
5. America’s New Island Fighters Are Preparing for Conflict—a Stone’s Throw From Taiwan
6. Losing hearts and minds: The desperate state of US influence operations
7. Gaza Cease-Fire Talks Could Restart as Pressure Increases on Israel
8. Should Cyber Force become the next service?
9. Optimistic About the War in Ukraine, Putin Unleashes a Purge at Home
10. Russia Steps Up a Covert Sabotage Campaign Aimed at Europe
11. Three Times Faster and Cheaper: Russia Outpaces West in Artillery Shell Production
12. PRC Military Drills near Taiwan (State Department Press Statement)
13. War Correspondence while Asian
14. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 25, 2024
15. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, May 25, 2024
16. U.S. and allies move to tap frozen Russian funds despite Kremlin threats
1. I CARRIED OUT THE STRIKE THAT KILLED SOLEIMANI. AMERICA DOESN’T UNDERSTAND THE LESSON OF HIS DEATH.
A long and worthwhile read.
This is a key excerpt:
We watched Soleimani get into a car and pull away alongside a security vehicle. They began to negotiate the warren of ramps, parking areas, and streets to get to Irish. It was now 4:42 p.m. I had long since passed the authority to strike to the JSOTF commander, and he had further passed it down to the team that would release the weapons. Hard experience had taught us that devolving this authority to the lowest possible level as early as possible allowed for those with the best knowledge of the situation to act quickly, without referring back to headquarters.
I CARRIED OUT THE STRIKE THAT KILLED SOLEIMANI. AMERICA DOESN’T UNDERSTAND THE LESSON OF HIS DEATH.
Inside the decision to assassinate Iran’s ruthless general
The Atlantic · by Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. · May 24, 2024
Any assessment of the Middle East’s future must contend with an unpleasant fact: Iran remains committed to objectives that threaten both the region and U.S. interests. And those objectives are coming within reach as the country’s ballistic-missile arsenal and air-defense systems grow, and its drone technology improves.
All of this was on display last month, when Iran launched a barrage of missiles and drones at Israel. No lives were lost—the result of not only Israel’s capable defenses but also the contributions of U.S. and allied forces. The attack showed that America’s continued presence in the region is crucial to dissuade further aggression. But our current policy isn’t responsive to this reality. U.S. military capabilities in the Middle East have steadily declined, emboldening Iran, whose leverage strengthens as international support for Israel wanes. Moreover, America’s clear desire to draw down in the region has undermined our relationships with allies.
Recent history demonstrates that a strong U.S. posture in the Middle East deters Iran. As the leader of U.S. Central Command, I had direct operational responsibility for the strike that killed Qassem Soleimani, the ruthless general responsible for the deaths of hundreds of U.S. service members. Iran had begun to doubt America’s will, which the strike on Soleimani then proved. The attack, in early 2020, forced Iran’s leaders to recalculate their months-long escalation against U.S. forces. Ultimately, I believe, it saved many lives.
Read: Is Iran a country or a cause?
The situation in Iran has changed, but the Soleimani strike offers a lesson that is going unheeded. Iran may seem unpredictable at times, but it respects American strength and responds to deterrence. When we withdraw, Iran advances. When we assert ourselves—having weighed the risks and prepared for all possibilities—Iran retreats. Soleimani’s life and death are a testament to this rule, which should guide our future policy in the Middle East.
Soleimani is a central character in the modern history of U.S.-Iran relations. Over 30 years, he became the face of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a distinctly independent branch of the armed forces tasked with ensuring the integrity of the Islamic Republic. Soleimani joined the IRGC in 1979, one year before Saddam Hussein invaded Iran. In the ensuing war, Soleimani developed a reputation as fearless and controlling, rising to the rank of division commander while still in his 20s. He emerged from the war with a bitter disdain for America, whose aid to Iraq he blamed for his country’s defeat.
This article has been adapted from McKenzie’s new book.
In 1997 or 1998, Soleimani became the commander of the Quds Force, an elite group within the IRGC that focuses on unconventional operations beyond Iran’s borders. Soleimani was indispensable in its development, relying on his charisma and fluent Arabic to expand Iran’s influence in the region. As commander, Soleimani had a direct line to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, becoming like a son to him. He was promoted to major general in 2011 and by 2014 was a hero in Iran, having been the subject of an extensive New Yorker essay. I often heard a story—perhaps apocryphal—about a senior official in the Obama administration plaintively asking an intel briefer, “Can’t you find a picture of him where he doesn’t look like George Clooney?”
As Soleimani’s fame grew, so did his ego. He became dictatorial, acting across the region often without consulting other Iranian intelligence entities, the conventional military, or even the larger IRGC. He shrewdly supported the return of American forces to Iraq, prompting the U.S. to do the heavy lifting of defeating the Islamic State. Then he drove us out of Iraq, killing U.S. and coalition service members, as well as innocent Iraqis and Syrians, with staggering efficiency. In his mind, he was untouchable: Asked about this in 2019, he replied, “What are they going to do, kill me?”
When I first joined Centcom as a young general, I watched the Obama administration—and the Bush administration before that—fail to counter the dynamism and leadership that Soleimani brought to the fight. I also watched the Israelis try their hand against him with no luck. So when I took over as commander in March 2019, one of the very first things I did was inquire if we had a plan to strike him, should the president ask us to do so. The answer was unsatisfying.
I directed Centcom’s joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commander to develop solutions. Other organizations were interested in Soleimani as well—including the CIA and regional partners—and we saw evidence that some of them had lobbied the White House to act against him. Several schemes were debated and set aside, either because they weren’t operationally feasible or because the political cost seemed too great. But they eventually grew into suitable options if the White House directed us to act.
Beginning two months into my tenure as commander, and continuing through mid-December 2019, American bases in Iraq were struck 19 times by mortar and rocket fire. Soleimani was clearly orchestrating the attacks, principally through his networks within Kataib Hezbollah, a radical paramilitary group in Iraq. The series of strikes culminated on the evening of Friday, December 27, when one of our air bases was hit by some 30 rockets. Four U.S. service members and two Iraqi-federal-police members were injured, and a U.S. contractor was killed. Whereas the previous attacks had been intended to annoy or to warn, this attack—launched into a densely populated area of the base—was intended to create mass casualties. I knew we had to respond.
Early the next morning, key members of my staff crowded into my home office, in Tampa, to review a range of options that we had been refining for months. This was all anticipatory; the authority to execute an attack could come only from President Donald Trump through Mark Esper, the secretary of defense, but we knew they would want us to present them with choices. We had a target in Yemen that we had been looking at for some time: a Quds Force commander with a long history of coordinating operations against U.S. and coalition forces. Other possible targets included an intelligence-collection ship crewed by the IRGC in the southern Red Sea—the Saviz—as well as air-defense and oil infrastructure in southern Iran.
After all of the options were thoroughly debated, I told my staff that we would recommend targets only inside Iraq and Syria—where we were already conducting military operations—to avoid broadening the conflict. We felt that four “logistics targets” and three “personality targets” were associated with the strike. Two of the personalities were Kataib Hezbollah facilitators; the third was Soleimani. We would also forward but not recommend action on the Yemen, Red Sea, and southern-Iran options.
By mid-morning, I had sent my recommendations to Secretary Esper through Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By late afternoon, we’d received approval to execute my preferred choice: striking a variety of logistics targets but not Soleimani or the facilitators.
We would strike the next day, Sunday, after which Esper and Milley would brief Trump at Mar-a-Lago. Milley had suggested to me that Trump might not think the attacks were enough. I knew how those meetings worked—I’d been in a few of them—and I had complete confidence in Milley. He could hold his own in the rough-and-tumble of a presidential briefing, which often featured lots of opinions from lots of people, not all of whom knew the full risks involved in an operation or those that would emerge after it was completed.
The author in a meeting at Centcom’s headquarters in Tampa in 2019 (Department of Defense)
Because I knew the president remained very interested in Soleimani, on Saturday evening I put my final edits on a paper that outlined what could happen if we chose to strike him. There was no question that he was a valid target, and his loss would make Iranian decision making much harder. It would also be a strong indication of U.S. will, which had been absent in our dealings with Iran for many years. But I was extremely concerned about how Iran might respond. The strike could have a deterring effect, or it could trigger a massive retaliation. After careful consideration, I believed that they would respond but probably not with an act of war—a possibility that had worried me for many years. But they still had lots of alternatives to cause us pain. I sent the paper to the secretary, routed through the chairman. I did not recommend against striking Soleimani, but I described the risks it entailed.
Read: Qassem Soleimani haunted the Arab world
We flew the Kataib Hezbollah strikes on Sunday afternoon with good results. We struck five sites across Syria and Iraq all within about a four-minute span. In at least one location, we struck during a Kataib Hezbollah staff meeting, killing several key leaders. After the strike, as Esper and Milley flew to Mar-a-Lago, we provided them with damage assessments and any other details we could gather from the attacks. We put together a simple one-slide presentation that Milley used to brief the president.
The chairman called that evening with a report on the briefing. As Milley had warned, Trump wasn’t satisfied; he instructed us to strike Soleimani if he went to Iraq. I was in my home office when Milley relayed this. My staffers were crammed around me, but I didn’t have the phone on speaker, so none of them could hear. I froze for a second or two, then asked him to repeat himself. I’d heard correctly.
Milley also told me that the president had approved strikes on the Quds Force commander in Yemen and on the Saviz, Iran’s ship in the Red Sea. There was a sense in the meeting, he said, that these strikes would bring Iran to the bargaining table. I could tell that the chairman did not agree with this position—and neither did I. We felt the strikes might restore deterrence, but we didn’t see a path to broader negotiations.
As we ended our call, I read back to the chairman what we’d been told to do—a product of a lifetime of receiving orders under stressful conditions. I called in the few members of my staff who weren’t already on hand for a 7 p.m. meeting. Everyone’s head snapped back just a little when I told them our instructions. We all knew what could come from these decisions, including the possibility that many of our friends on the other side of the world would have to go into the fire. We didn’t have time to dwell on it.
I knew that we could execute quickly on the Saviz and the commander in Yemen, but Soleimani was a more challenging target. In late fall, we had developed options to strike him in both Syria and Iraq. We preferred Syria; a strike against him in Iraq would inflame the Shiite militant groups, possibly resulting in a strong military and political backlash. It now looked like those concerns, which I knew the chairman shared, would be overridden.
The kind of targeting we were pursuing has three steps: finding, fixing, and finishing. Finding is a science, but fixing—translating all we know about the target’s movements and habits into a narrow window of time, space, and opportunity—is an art. Finishing, too, is an art: hitting a target while keeping collateral damage to an absolute minimum.
The Soleimani fix and finish solutions had come a long way since I’d first inquired about them in the spring. We now knew that when Soleimani arrived in Iraq, he typically landed at Baghdad International Airport and was quickly driven away. Thankfully traffic was often light on the airport’s access road, which generations of soldiers, airmen, and Marines knew as “Route Irish,” its military designation during the Iraq War. Quite a few U.S. and coalition service members had died on it thanks to Soleimani and his henchmen. The fix part of the equation grew complicated when Soleimani got off Route Irish and entered the crowded streets of Baghdad.
Striking Soleimani in the moments after he deplaned would also likely minimize collateral damage. We would use MQ-9 uncrewed aircraft armed with Hellfire missiles to attack his vehicle and that of his security escort. As always, there were significant constraints—the MQ-9s couldn’t stay above the airport for too long, so we had to know roughly when he would arrive. Our preference was to execute at night, with no cloud cover, but to some extent we were at the mercy of Soleimani’s schedule.
We had information suggesting that he would fly from Tehran to Baghdad on Tuesday, December 31. After much discussion, we decided to strike Soleimani first and then, within minutes, the commander in Yemen, so that he couldn’t be warned. We decided to save the Saviz for later; I wasn’t eager to sink it (and fortunately, we wouldn’t have to).
Meanwhile, protests began to develop at our embassy in Baghdad in response to the Kataib Hezbollah strikes. The images were disturbing and seemed to harden the desire in Washington to strike Soleimani. The specter of a Benghazi-like episode underlined everything we did. We ordered in Marines for added security and put AH-64 gunships overhead in a show of force. I grew more worried about what could happen after we hit Soleimani. Would it spur the crowd to try to overrun the embassy? What would our relationship with the Iraqi government look like in the aftermath of an attack?
Read: Iran is not a ‘normal’ country
I sensed that the National Security Council—which includes the secretaries of state and defense, and the national security adviser—was operating under the view that Iran would not retaliate against the United States. Even Milley told me, “The Shia militant groups will go apeshit, but I don’t think Iran will do anything directly against us.” I disagreed. To his great credit, the chairman understood my arguments and made sure we were prepared if it did.
The author in Afghanistan in August 2021 (1st Lt. Mark Andries / U.S. Marine Corps)
I went into Centcom headquarters early on December 31, the day we hoped to strike. The morning wore on while we waited for signs of Soleimani’s movement. Two huge monitors hung on the far wall. One showed a rotating series of black-and-white images from the MQ-9s. The other showed the hundreds of planes, including civilian airliners, that were crossing Iraq and Iran.
Soleimani finally left home and boarded a plane in Tehran, though we weren’t sure if the flight was chartered or commercial. The jet took off at about 9:45 a.m. ET for a two-hour flight to Baghdad. We were ready for him: Our aircraft were overhead and in good positions. When his plane approached Baghdad, however, it didn’t descend. I was on a conference call with Milley and Secretary Esper as we watched it pass the city at 30,000 feet.
Someone from the Pentagon asked me, “Can you shoot this fucker down?” Without deciding to execute the request, I called my air-component commander in Qatar. “If I give you an order to shoot this aircraft down, can you make it work?” The Air Force responded quickly, and we moved two fighters into a trail position behind the jet. We now had an option in hand to finish the mission if we were told to do so. We worked feverishly to determine if the flight was chartered or commercial.
It soon became apparent that the plane was headed to Damascus. We also learned that the jet was a much-delayed civilian flight, meaning at least 50 innocent people were probably on board. I immediately advised Milley that we should not shoot. Not even Soleimani was worth that loss of life. He and I quickly agreed that we would not engage. Our fighters rolled off, and the jet began its descent into Damascus. We also pulled back our aircraft from the mission in Yemen. We all took a deep breath and reconsidered our options. “Guidance from the president remains,” I told the staff and commanders at 10:48 a.m. “We’re going to take a shot when we have a shot.”
There were indications that Soleimani would travel from Damascus back to Baghdad in the next 36 hours. We still had another opportunity.
New Year’s Day came. I had an obligation in Tampa to deliver the game ball for the Outback Bowl. My security and communications teams came with me. The day was nearly cloudless; I hoped it would be in Baghdad too. The game went well—if you were cheering for Minnesota. We were among the Auburn faithful, so it was a long afternoon.
Before halftime, I received a call from Esper. I spent most of the second half on the phone with him and Milley, crouching in the suite’s bathroom, talking on a secure handset as my communications assistant stood outside the door, holding a Wi-Fi hotspot in the air. I told them that our latest intelligence suggested that Soleimani would leave Damascus soon, as early as the next day, and fly to Baghdad. The call ended in time for me to watch the end of a very disappointing game. It was a restless night.
The next day, I went to Centcom headquarters. By late afternoon, tension had begun to build. The flight we expected Soleimani to take was delayed an hour, and then another. I sat quietly at the head of the table and drank copious amounts of coffee. Everyone is looking at the commander during times like this; I knew that any unease on my part would be felt by all. I was confident that we were prepared, but many things were outside our control, and we would need to be ready to adapt. The countless hours that staff members and commanders had put into contingency planning were now ready to pay off. Time turns against you in these moments. It becomes compressed and precious. You need to rely on the work done before time becomes the most valuable commodity in the universe.
Finally, movement! Soleimani was delivered to the airplane in Damascus, boarding from the tarmac. The jet backed out and taxied for takeoff. The flight, a regularly scheduled commercial jet, took off from Damascus at 3:30 p.m. ET. I called the chairman. He and the secretaries of defense and state would monitor the action from a secure conference room in the Pentagon. The aircraft soon appeared on our tracking systems, and I watched it crawl east. Remembering our disappointment of a few days before, I kept a close eye on the altitude. Thankfully the plane began descending over Baghdad, landing at 4:35 p.m., shortly before midnight local time.
It was cloudy. Our MQ-9s flew low to maintain visibility, which meant they initially had to stay some distance away to avoid being heard or seen. We watched as stairs were rolled up to the front cabin door. At 4:40 p.m., we confirmed that it was Soleimani. My JSOTF commander called me and said, “Sir, things will now happen very quickly. If there’s any intent to stop it, we need to make that call now.” I had my orders, so I simply told him, “Take your shot when you have it.”
We watched Soleimani get into a car and pull away alongside a security vehicle. They began to negotiate the warren of ramps, parking areas, and streets to get to Irish. It was now 4:42 p.m. I had long since passed the authority to strike to the JSOTF commander, and he had further passed it down to the team that would release the weapons. Hard experience had taught us that devolving this authority to the lowest possible level as early as possible allowed for those with the best knowledge of the situation to act quickly, without referring back to headquarters.
The two vehicles picked up speed. Everyone’s eyes were glued to the big monitors. No one spoke. Then, suddenly, a great flash of white arced across the screen. Pieces of Soleimani’s car flew through the air. After a second or two, the security vehicle was struck. There was no cheering, no fist-bumping—just silence, as we watched the cars go up in flames. A minute later, we attacked again, dropping eight more weapons. The operation appeared to be a success, but we couldn’t yet confirm.
The burning wreckage of the drone strike that killed Soleimani (Iraqi Prime Minister’s Press Office / NYT / Redux)
We had another target to attack, so our attention shifted to Yemen, where we carried out a similar strike on an isolated house where we believed the Quds Force commander to be. We later determined that we’d missed him, but the timing of the two strikes—13 minutes apart—was a remarkable achievement.
Soon it became clear that we had gotten Soleimani. I was home by about 9 p.m., when the first news reports started to appear. Only then did I have time to think about what had happened.
The decision to strike Soleimani was made by Trump, who was getting input from his advisers that Iran would not retaliate, a view that no one at Centcom or in the intelligence community shared. That didn’t mean the strike was unwarranted; it meant we weren’t sanguine about the aftermath.
Eliot A. Cohen: Iran cannot be conciliated
In the end, I believe that the president made the right decision. Had Soleimani not been stopped, more U.S., coalition, and Iraqi lives would have been lost as the direct result of his leadership. I believe more attacks were likely to happen in the immediate future. Soleimani wasn’t going to undertake them himself, but they would inevitably follow his trip to Iraq. The risk of inaction was greater than the risk of action.
Iran had doubted our ability to demonstrate such force, and for good reason—we had never done so over the course of at least two administrations. Now, for the first time in many years, Iran had seen the naked power of the United States. It had to recalculate. Small-scale attacks continued, particularly those that couldn’t be directly attributed to Iran. But operational guidance to both Iranian forces and their proxies had changed: Avoid major attacks on U.S. forces. This was a watershed moment in the U.S.-Iran relationship.
Striking Soleimani showed Iran a kind of resolve that had long been absent from U.S. policy. This cycle played out again last month, when Iran attacked Israel: American engagement countered Iranian aggression.
If we plan to remain in the Middle East, we must be prepared to show that same resolve. The risk of escalation is inevitable but manageable; it is the refusal to accept this risk that has hobbled our policy for so long. The lessons of the Soleimani strike are clear, and we shouldn’t forget them. The Iranians will respect our strength. They will take advantage of our weakness.
This article has been adapted from Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.’s new book, The Melting Point: High Command and War in the 21st Century.
The Melting Point: High Command and War in the 21st Century
By Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.
When you buy a book using a link on this page, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting The Atlantic.
The Atlantic · by Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. · May 24, 2024
2. What Hamas Called Its Female Captives, and Why It Matters
The inhuman treatment of captives is beyond comprehension.
Excerpts:
These are real women and victims of ongoing war crimes, so it does seem excessively lurid to suggest, without direct evidence, that they have been raped in captivity for the past several months. (“Eight months,” the Israelis noted, allowing readers to do the gestational math. “Think of what that means for these young women.”) But to assert that sabaya is devoid of sexual connotation reflects ignorance, at best. The word is well attested in classical sources and refers to female captives; the choice of a classical term over a modern one implies a fondness for classical modes of war, which codified sexual violence at scale. Just as concubine and comfort woman carry the befoulments of their historic use, sabaya is straightforwardly associated with what we moderns call rape. Anyone who uses sabaya in modern Gaza or Raqqah can be assumed to have specific and disgusting reasons to want to revive it.
...
One could read too much into the choice of words. No one, to my knowledge, has suggested that Hamas is following the Islamic State by reviving sex slavery as a legal category. I know of no evidence that it has done so, and if it did, I would expect many of the group’s supporters, even those comfortable with its killing of concertgoers and old people, to denounce the group. More likely, a single group of Hamas members used the word in an especially heady moment, during which they wanted to degrade and humiliate their captives as much as possible. Thankfully, the captives appear unaware of the language being used around them. The language suggests that the fighters were open to raping the women, but it could also just be reprehensible talk, after an already coarsening day of mass killing.
Reading too much into the language seems, at this point, to be less of a danger than reading too little into it. As soon as the Israeli translation came out, it was assailed for its inaccuracy, when it was actually just gesturing clumsily at a real, though not easily summarized, historical background. What, if anything, should the translation have said? “Female captives” does not carry the appropriate resonance; “sex-slavery candidates” would err in the other direction and imply too much. Every translation loses something. Is there a word in English that conveys that one views the battered women in one’s control as potentially sexually available? I think probably not. I would be very careful before speaking up to defend the user of such a word.
What Hamas Called Its Female Captives, and Why It Matters
Reading too much into the language seems, at this point, to be less of a danger than reading too little into it.
By Graeme Wood
The Atlantic · by Graeme Wood · May 25, 2024
This week, Israel released an appalling video featuring five female Israeli soldiers taken captive at Nahal Oz military base on October 7. Fearful and bloody, the women beg for their lives while Hamas fighters mill around and alternately threaten to kill them and compliment their appearance. The captors call the women “sabaya,” which Israel translated as “women who can get pregnant.” Almost immediately, others disputed the translation and said sabaya referred merely to “female captives” and included no reference to their fertility. “The Arabic word sabaya doesn’t have sexual connotations,” the Al Jazeera journalist Laila Al-Arian wrote in a post on X, taking exception to a Washington Post article that said that it did. She said the Israeli translation was “playing on racist and orientalist tropes about Arabs and Muslims.”
These are real women and victims of ongoing war crimes, so it does seem excessively lurid to suggest, without direct evidence, that they have been raped in captivity for the past several months. (“Eight months,” the Israelis noted, allowing readers to do the gestational math. “Think of what that means for these young women.”) But to assert that sabaya is devoid of sexual connotation reflects ignorance, at best. The word is well attested in classical sources and refers to female captives; the choice of a classical term over a modern one implies a fondness for classical modes of war, which codified sexual violence at scale. Just as concubine and comfort woman carry the befoulments of their historic use, sabaya is straightforwardly associated with what we moderns call rape. Anyone who uses sabaya in modern Gaza or Raqqah can be assumed to have specific and disgusting reasons to want to revive it.
The word sabaya recently reappeared in the modern Arabic lexicon through the efforts of the Islamic State. Unsurprisingly, then, the scholars best equipped for this analysis are the ones who observed and cataloged how ISIS revived sabaya (and many other dormant classical and medieval terms). I refer here to Aymenn J. Al-Tamimi, recently of Swansea University, and to Cole Bunzel of the Hoover Institution, who have both commented on this controversy without sensationalism, except insofar as the potential of sexual enslavement is inherently sensational.
Under classical Islamic jurisprudence on the law of war, the possible fates of enemy captives are four: They can be killed, ransomed, enslaved, or freed. Those enslaved are then subject to the rules that govern slavery in Islam—which are extensive, and are nearly as irrelevant to the daily lives of most living Muslims as the rules concerning slavery in Judaism are to the lives of most Jews. I say “nearly” because Jews have not had a state that sought to regulate slavery for many centuries, but the last majority-Muslim states abolished slavery only in the second half of the 20th century, and the Islamic State enthusiastically resumed the practice in 2014.
Read: What did top Israeli war officials really say about Gaza?
In doing so, the Islamic State reaffirmed the privileges, and duties, of the slave owner. (Bunzel observes that the Islamic State cited scholars who used the term sabaya as if captured women were considered slaves by default, and the other fates were implicitly improbable.) The slave owner is responsible for the welfare of the slave, including her food and shelter. He is allowed to have sex with female slaves, but certain rules apply. He may not sell her off until he can confirm that she isn’t pregnant, and he has obligations to her and to their children, if any are born from their union. I cannot stress enough that such relationships—that is, having sex with someone you own—constitute rape in all modern interpretations of the word, and they are frowned upon whether they occur in the Levant, the Hejaz, or Monticello.
But in the premodern context, before the rights revolution that consecrated every person with individual, unalienable worth, sex slavery was unremarkable, and the principal concern was not whether to do it but what to do with the children. The Prophet Muhammad freed a slave after she bore him a child. The Jewish paterfamilias Abraham released his slave Hagar into the desert 14 years after she bore him Ishmael. But these are cases from antiquity, and modern folk see things differently. Frederick Douglass, in the opening of his autobiography, emphasized the inhumanity of American slave owners by noting the abhorrent results of those relationships: fathers hating, owning, abusing, and selling their own kin.
Sabaya is a term in part born of the need to distinguish captives potentially subject to these procreative regulations from those who would be less complicated to own. To translate it as “women who can get pregnant” is regrettably misleading. It makes explicit what the word connotes, namely that these captives fall under a legal category with possibilities distinct from those of their male counterparts. As Al-Tamimi observes, Hamas could just as easily have used a standard Arabic word for female war captives, asirat. This neutral word is used on Arabic Wikipedia, say, for Jessica Lynch, the American prisoner of war from the 2003 Iraq invasion. Instead Hamas used a term with a different history.
One could read too much into the choice of words. No one, to my knowledge, has suggested that Hamas is following the Islamic State by reviving sex slavery as a legal category. I know of no evidence that it has done so, and if it did, I would expect many of the group’s supporters, even those comfortable with its killing of concertgoers and old people, to denounce the group. More likely, a single group of Hamas members used the word in an especially heady moment, during which they wanted to degrade and humiliate their captives as much as possible. Thankfully, the captives appear unaware of the language being used around them. The language suggests that the fighters were open to raping the women, but it could also just be reprehensible talk, after an already coarsening day of mass killing.
Reading too much into the language seems, at this point, to be less of a danger than reading too little into it. As soon as the Israeli translation came out, it was assailed for its inaccuracy, when it was actually just gesturing clumsily at a real, though not easily summarized, historical background. What, if anything, should the translation have said? “Female captives” does not carry the appropriate resonance; “sex-slavery candidates” would err in the other direction and imply too much. Every translation loses something. Is there a word in English that conveys that one views the battered women in one’s control as potentially sexually available? I think probably not. I would be very careful before speaking up to defend the user of such a word.
The Atlantic · by Graeme Wood · May 25, 2024
3. The masterpiece of our time On The Gulag Archipelago at fifty.
This book had a profound impact on me when I read it in high school and again in college in the 1970s. But after reading this essay I know I need to read it again to gain deeper insights that I did not appreciate in my youth.
Excerpts:
In “The Ascent,” the book’s key chapter, Solzhenitsyn recalls how, lying in a prison hospital, he realized it was “a good time—to think! Think! Draw some conclusions from misfortune!” He asked himself: faced with a life of torment they could not have imagined, why did so few prisoners commit suicide—fewer, even, than people on the outside?
If these millions of helpless and pitiful vermin still did not put an end to themselves—this meant some kind of invincible feeling was alive inside them. Some very powerful idea.
Could there be something beyond the survival instinct and the quest for happiness? “Poverty and prison … give wisdom,” we hear, but what is that wisdom? Not just Solzhenitsyn, but also many others asked this question. This collective autobiography guides us through their answers.
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Solzhenitsyn concedes that at that fork, “at that greater divider of souls,” most choose survival. Intellectuals—resembling many of his Western readers—usually acted swinishly because they could always find a way to justify anything.
One could also expect the worst from those who “accept that pitiful ideology which holds that ‘human beings are created for happiness.’” That, of course, is what most secular Americans take for granted. Reading this book, they are likely to ask: what else could life be about if not individual happiness? Exiled to the West, Solzhenitsyn shocked educated people by criticizing the shallowness of such thinking. Life is not just about oneself, he insisted, and one can expect arrogant bosh from those who think it is. They often responded by dismissing him as a religious fanatic.
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Solzhenitsyn realized that he had been telling his life story backward:
What had seemed for so long to be beneficial now turned out in actuality to be fatal, and I had been striving to go in the opposite direction to that which was truly necessary.
In his most evil moments, Solzhenitsyn was convinced he was doing good, and he was most mistaken when he considered himself infallible. By the same token, it was when he was most certain there was no God that God was with him. As he wrote in a poem: “God of the Universe! I believe again!/ Though I renounced You, You were with me!”
Solzhenitsyn discovered that “the meaning of life lies not, as we have grown used to thinking, in prospering, but in the development of the soul.” Recognizing he would not have discovered that meaning without suffering, he disagrees with all those writers who “considered it their duty … to curse prison… . I nourished my soul there, and I say without hesitation: ‘Bless you prison, for having been in my life!’”
Strangely enough, then, this book about countless deaths, unimaginable cruelty, and the worst of human nature turns out to be, in the final analysis, optimistic. It tells us how, even in the depths of evil, one can discern and choose the good.
The masterpiece of our time
by
On The Gulag Archipelago at fifty.
newcriterion.com
When Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago: An Experiment in Literary Investigation appeared in 1973, its impact, the author recalled, was immediate: “Like matter enveloped by antimatter, it exploded instantaneously!” The first translations into Western languages in 1974—just fifty years ago—proved almost as sensational. No longer was it so easy to cherish a sentimental attachment to communism and the USSR. In France, where Marxism had remained fashionable, the book changed the course of intellectual life, and in America it helped counter the New Left celebration of Mao, Castro, and other disciples of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin.
What was it that made this book so effective? And what did Solzhenitsyn mean by calling it “literary,” even though everything in it was factual? To answer these questions is to grasp why Gulag towers over all other works of the Soviet period and, indeed, over all literature since the middle of the twentieth century.
Before Solzhenitsyn, Western intellectuals of course knew that the Soviet regime had been “repressive,” but for the most part they imagined that all that had ended decades ago. So it was shocking when the book described how it had to be written secretly, with parts scattered so that not everything could be seized in a single raid. Solzhenitsyn offered an apology for the work’s lack of polish: “I must explain that never once did this whole book … lie on the same desk at the same time!” “The jerkiness of the book, its imperfections, are the true mark of our persecuted literature.” Since this persecution is itself one of the work’s themes, its imperfections are strangely appropriate and so, perhaps, not imperfections at all.
In 1965, Solzhenitsyn explains, “my archive was raided [by the secret police] and a novel impounded,” and thus he had to be especially careful with Gulag, since his notes for it mentioned the real names of his informants. In Russia, literature was not only persecuted but also dangerous, and not just to the writers. The fact that the book could not be published in the USSR and had to be smuggled abroad also marked the difference between the Russian and Western experiences. Russian literature was morally serious in a way American, British, and French literatures were not. The preening of Western intellectuals about social injustice began to look almost ridiculous by comparison.
Western intellectuals usually supposed that Russian dissidents might suffer the sort of punishment that in their own countries is reserved for dangerous criminals. At worst, Westerners pictured conditions like those in tsarist Russia, long considered the model of an oppressive state. That is why Solzhenitsyn devotes so many passages to contrasting what passed for tyranny in nineteenth-century Russia with ordinary Soviet conditions.
Begin with numbers. Solzhenitsyn instructs: from 1876 to 1904—a period of mass strikes, peasant revolts, and terrorism claiming the lives of Tsar Alexander II and other top officials—“486 people were executed; in other words, about seventeen people per year for the whole country,” a figure that includes “ordinary, nonpolitical criminals!” During the 1905 revolution and its suppression, “executions rocketed upward, astounding Russian imaginations, calling forth tears from Tolstoy and indignation from [the writer Vladimir] Korolenko, and many, many others: from 1905 through 1908 2,200 persons were executed,” a number contemporaries described as an “epidemic of executions.”
By contrast, Soviet judicial killings—whether by shooting, forced starvation, or hard labor at forty degrees below zero—numbered in the tens of millions. Crucially, condemnation did not require individual guilt. As early as 1918, Solzhenitsyn points out, the Cheka (secret police) leader M. I. Latsis instructed revolutionary tribunals dispensing summary justice to disregard personal guilt or innocence and just ascertain the prisoner’s class origin: this “must determine the fate of the accused. That is the meaning of the Red Terror.”
On this basis, over five million peasants (classed as “kulaks,” supposedly better off than their neighbors) were forcibly exiled to completely unsettled wastelands with no food or tools, where they were left to die. The same punishment later befell whole nationalities deemed potentially disloyal (such as ethnic Germans, Chechens, and Crimean Tatars) or dangerous because of the possibility of receiving subversive support from a foreign power (as in the case of Koreans and Poles). “The liquidation of the kulaks as a class” was followed by the deliberate starvation of millions of peasants. All food for a large area of what is now Ukraine was requisitioned, and even fishing in the rivers was prohibited, so that over the next few months inhabitants starved to death. Idealistic young Bolsheviks from the capital enforced the famine. In total, Stalin’s war on the countryside claimed more than ten million lives. As Solzhenitsyn makes clear, this crime is not nearly as well known among intellectuals as the Great Purges, which claimed fewer victims, because many purge victims were themselves intellectuals.
Arrests also took place by quotas assigned to local secret-police offices, which, if they knew what was good for them, petitioned to arrest still more. After World War II, captured Russian soldiers in German slave-labor camps were promptly transferred to Russian ones, as was anyone who had seen something of the Western world. Even soldiers who had fought their way out of German encirclement were arrested as traitors, simply because they had been behind German lines. Still more shocking, the Allies—who could not imagine why people would not want to return to their homeland—forcibly repatriated, often at bayonet point, over a million fugitives, some of whom committed suicide rather than face what they knew awaited them.
Of course, individuals, as well as groups, were charged with political crimes, a category including more than prohibited actions. The code also specified “Counter-Revolutionary Thought” and what Solzhenitsyn calls a “very expansive category: … Member of a Family (of a person convicted under one of the foregoing … categories).” There was even a special camp for wives of enemies of the people; their teenage children were arrested to forestall possible vengeance. As the prosecutor Nikolai Krylenko explained, “we protect ourselves not only against the past but also against the future.”
Punishments were both more numerous than in tsarist times and much harsher. The conditions Dostoevsky described in his autobiographical novel Notes from the House of the Dead (1860–62) seem like paradise compared with Soviet prisons and camps. After all, Solzhenitsyn points out, when Catherine the Great detained the radical Alexander Radishchev, he was not subjected to torture, and no one thought of arresting his relatives. In fact, “Radishchev knew perfectly well that his sons would serve as officers in the imperial guard no matter what happened to him … . Nor would anyone confiscate Radishchev’s family estate.”
“Seven attempts were made on the life of Alexander II himself,” Solzhenitsyn also notes. “What did he do about it? Ruin and banish half Petersburg, as happened after [the prominent Communist Sergey] Kirov’s murder? You know very well that such a thing could never enter his head.” As for the taking of hostages, “the concept didn’t exist.” Or consider Lenin’s career. Even though his brother had been hanged for an attempt on the life of the tsar, Lenin not only remained free, he was even admitted to the Kazan University law faculty. When he was expelled for organizing a student demonstration against the government (“in our day he would have been shot”), this younger brother of a would-be regicide was at last banished—not to a desolate wilderness but to his family estate of Kokushkino, “where he intended to spend the summer anyway.” Despite this record, Lenin was allowed to take the bar exam and become a lawyer. When he was arrested for founding a revolutionary organization, he was sent to prison for one year, not twenty-five. There he was allowed to receive as many books as he needed and to write most of The Development of Capitalism in Russia. He could buy whatever food or medicine he liked. Many revolutionaries regarded prison as an opportunity to meet each other and organize seminars for the study of radical texts.
When Lenin was again banished—not to the frozen North but to “a land of plenty”—he was allowed before departing to go about the capital for three days on his own and leave instructions for revolutionary circles, then to do the same in Moscow. What’s more, he was not packed into a cattle car so crowded that there was not even room for everyone to stand, as in Soviet times, but permitted to travel unsupervised in a private train compartment to his place of exile. There he published revolutionary works and, “when mosquitoes bit him while he was out hunting, he ordered kid gloves.” Pre-Soviet conditions were so lax that Stalin was able to escape from banishment four times. As Solzhenitsyn observes, “Laziness would seem to be the only reason for not escaping from Tsarist places of banishment.”
Things were rather different under the Soviets. There “is no comparison anyway,” Solzhenitsyn explains, “because none of our revolutionaries ever knew what a really good interrogation could be.” The chapter on interrogation famously begins:
If the intellectuals in the plays of Chekhov who spent all their time guessing what would happen in twenty, thirty, or forty years had been told that in forty years interrogation by torture would be practiced in Russia; that prisoners would have their skulls squeezed within iron rings; that a human being would be lowered into an acid bath; that they would be trussed up naked to be bitten by ants and bedbugs; that a ramrod heated over a primus stove would be thrust up their anal canal (the “secret brand”); that a man’s genitals would be slowly crushed beneath the toe of a jackboot; and that, in the luckiest possible circumstances, prisoners would be tortured by being kept from sleeping for a week, by thirst, and by being beaten to a bloody pulp, not one of Chekhov’s plays would have gotten to its end because all the heroes would have gone off to insane asylums.
As millions were forced to confess to crimes everyone knew were fabricated, interrogators soon found the daily torture routine boring. “The fact is that the interrogators like some diversion in their monotonous work, and so they vie in thinking of new ideas.” The types of torture were unregulated, Solzhenitsyn says, and “every kind of ingenuity was permitted, no matter what.” What happens to a person who can literally do anything to others? Tolstoy wrote about the “attraction” of power, Solzhenitsyn recalls, but for Soviet interrogators, “attraction is not the right word—it is intoxication!”
All of a sudden a new method of persuasion occurs to you! Eureka! So you call up your friends on the phone, and you go around to other offices and tell them about it—what a laugh! Who shall we try it on, boys? It’s really pretty monotonous to keep doing the same thing all the time. Those trembling hands, those imploring eyes, that cowardly submissiveness—they are really a bore.
One invention that became popular, and inspired all sorts of variations, was placing a person just arrested and still utterly confused in
the box … which sometimes is dark and constructed in such a way that he can only stand up and even then is squeezed against the door. And he is held there for several hours … or a day.
The prisoner in the box knows nothing, not even if he will die there. One ingenious variation was the “divisional pit,” a hole in the ground about ten feet deep and exposed to the weather, which for several days becomes for the prisoner “both his cell and his latrine.” Yet another creative variation was the “alcove,” where a prisoner
could neither bend his knees, nor straighten up and change the position of his arms, nor turn his head. And that was not all! They began to drip cold water onto his scalp … which then ran down his body in rivulets. They did not inform him, of course, that this would go on for only twenty-four hours.
Similar ingenuity was applied during arrests. The innocent person apprehended can only ask “Me? What for?” But he soon discovers that his life is irrevocably split in two. “That’s what arrest is: it’s a blinding flash and a blow which shifts the present into the past and the impossible into omnipotent actuality.” You suddenly lose everything: position, connections, family—for even if you survive your term, and are permitted to return to your family, they will no longer be able to understand you. You have been away so long, and endured a world so incomprehensible to anyone who has not endured it, that for them only your name is the same. Such reunions are almost never successful. So are encounters between former prisoners and anyone who has never been arrested. “We simply cease to be a single people, for we speak, indeed, different languages.”
“The Universe has as many different centers as there are living beings in it,” Solzhenitsyn observes. “Each of us is a center of the Universe, and that Universe is shattered when they hiss at you: ‘You are under arrest.’ ” But for the arresting officers, the whole procedure is often an exercise in creativity. One young woman, who had just bought some material for a dress, shared a cab with a young man—who arrested her. Important people were sometimes given new, desirable assignments and sent off in a private railway car, where they were arrested en route. Irma Mandel, a Hungarian, was given two front-row seats to the Bolshoi. She and the man courting her “sat through the show very affectionately, and when it was over,” he took her to prison in the Lubyanka (secret-police headquarters).
One has to give the Organs their due: in an age when public speeches, the plays in our theaters, and women’s fashions all seem to have come off assembly lines, arrests can be of the most varied kind. They take you aside in a factory corridor after you have had your pass checked—and you’re arrested. They take you from a military hospital with a temperature of 102, as they did with Ans Bernshtein, and the doctor will not raise a peep about your arrest—just let him try! They ’ll take you right off the operating table—as they took N. M. Vorobyev, a school inspector, in 1936, in the middle of an operation for stomach ulcer. . . . You are arrested by a meterman who has come to read your electric meter. You are arrested by a bicyclist who has run into you on the street … .
Sometimes arrests even seem to be a game—there is so much superfluous imagination, so much well-fed energy, invested in them.
People never knew when they might be arrested, or by whom, and so “there was a general feeling of being destined for destruction.” Since failure to denounce was itself a crime, and stool pigeons were everywhere, one could trust no one. In theory, socialism brought people together, but in fact it created complete atomization and utter loneliness. So anxious did some people become that arrest brought relief “and even happiness!”
What is the point of such cruelty? Why so many arbitrary arrests, and why so much energy spent on extracting unbelievable confessions that no one would ever see? Some have explained the system economically, as a source of slave labor, but Solzhenitsyn shows that the gigantic expense incurred by the state furnishing countless interrogators and guards, transport, watchtowers, and barbed wire ensured that the system never paid its way. What economic sense did it make to take a scientist with years of training and deport him to the far north to dig frozen earth and die soon of exhaustion and hunger? If one wanted to eliminate enemies, wouldn’t it be easier just to shoot them all? And why arrest people who were completely loyal? One difference between the USSR and the Third Reich was that Germans who were neither Jews nor members of some other disfavored group, and who supported the regime, did not have to live in constant fear of arrest.
Soviet terror was an end in itself. Torture alone was not cruel enough, Solzhenitsyn points out. No, the goal was absolute dehumanization, reducing people to quivering masses of flesh who had forgotten who they were and who had lost the ability to feel normal emotions one by one until only anger was left. George Orwell understood this aspect of the regime as other Western observers did not. The new society, O’Brien explains to Winston Smith in Nineteen Eighty-Four, is
the exact opposite of the stupid hedonistic Utopias that the old reformers imagined. A world of fear and treachery and torment, a world of trampling and being trampled upon, a world which will grow not less but more merciless as it refines itself… . Always, at every moment, there will be … the sensation of trampling on an enemy who is helpless. If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stomping on a human face—forever.
Why doesn’t Solzhenitsyn’s catalogue of horrors grow boring? You read three long volumes about boots trampling on human faces and your attention never flags. One reason is that Solzhenitsyn, like Edward Gibbon, is a master of ironic narration. At times, the book is unexpectedly funny. Along with The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, it stands as one of the great satires of world literature.
But it is the nature of Solzhenitsyn’s “experiment in literary investigation” that best explains why this book remains riveting. Gulag is structured as what might be called a collective autobiography. Readers learn about Solzhenitsyn’s personal experiences, and the author also records the analogous experiences of others. He seems to say: here is how I was arrested, and now here is how it happened to others; here is how I addressed the moral choices I faced; others reacted differently. Stalin is supposed to have said that one death is a tragedy but a million is a statistic. Through collective autobiography, Solzhenitsyn allows the reader to sense, if not a million tragedies, then at least many thousands of individual ones.
Solzhenitsyn does not present himself as a paragon:
I remember very well that right after officer candidate school, I experienced the happiness of simplification, of … not having to think things through; the happiness of being immersed in the life everyone else lived … the happiness of forgetting some of the spiritual subtleties inculcated since childhood.
As an officer, he regarded himself “as a superior human being” and enjoyed ordering subordinates about. Yes, “pride grows in the human heart like lard on a pig,” he says of himself. “Even at the front, where, one might have thought, death made equals of us all, my power soon convinced me that I was a superior human being,” Solzhenitsyn confesses. In his arrogance, he addressed “fathers with the familiar, downgrading form of address” and calmly sent ordinary soldiers to their deaths. “I ate my officer’s ration of butter with rolls, without giving a thought as to why I had a right to it, and why the rank-and-file soldiers did not.” Even when arrested, Solzhenitsyn, still thinking of himself as the officer he no longer was, made another prisoner carry his bag. The Lubyanka changed all that.
“The day after my arrest my march of penance began,” Solzhenitsyn recalls, and over hundreds of pages we trace the gradual changes in his character as we might trace a heroine’s development in a multivolume English novel. A key moment occurred when he met the Jewish prisoner Boris Gammerov. Commenting on a prayer offered by President Roosevelt, Solzhenitsyn “expressed what seemed to me a self-evident evaluation of it: ‘Well, that’s hypocrisy of course.’” Trembling from emotion, Gammerov asked why Solzhenitsyn could not admit the possibility that a political leader might sincerely believe in God.
This reply, coming from someone born and educated after the Russian Revolution, shocked Solzhenitsyn. He recalls that he could have given the standard response, “but prison had already undermined my certainty … and it dawned upon me that I had not spoken out of conviction but because the idea had been implanted in me from the outside.” The insight is crucial: one may not believe what one thinks one believes; it may really be an idea “implanted from outside.” How, then, does one recognize which beliefs are truly one’s own?
Learning to separate true and implanted beliefs: that is the story Solzhenitsyn tells. Gammerov and his friend Ingal kept challenging his formulaic ideas:
At the time I was committed to that world outlook which is incapable of admitting any new fact or evaluating any new opinion before a label has been found for it from the already available stock: be it “the hesitant duplicity of the petty bourgeoisie,” or the “militant nihilism of the déclassé intelligentsia.”
Solzhenitsyn slowly learned to judge for himself. The process of spiritual ascent had begun.
In “The Ascent,” the book’s key chapter, Solzhenitsyn recalls how, lying in a prison hospital, he realized it was “a good time—to think! Think! Draw some conclusions from misfortune!” He asked himself: faced with a life of torment they could not have imagined, why did so few prisoners commit suicide—fewer, even, than people on the outside?
If these millions of helpless and pitiful vermin still did not put an end to themselves—this meant some kind of invincible feeling was alive inside them. Some very powerful idea.
Could there be something beyond the survival instinct and the quest for happiness? “Poverty and prison … give wisdom,” we hear, but what is that wisdom? Not just Solzhenitsyn, but also many others asked this question. This collective autobiography guides us through their answers.
“Here is how it was with many others, not just with me,” Solzhenitsyn explains. One’s first prison experience resembles the sky over Pompeii or the heaven of the Last Judgment “because it was not just anyone who had been arrested, but I—the center of this world.” One thought occurs to everyone: one must vow to survive at any price. And one soon realizes what that means: “at the price of someone else.”
And whoever takes that vow … allows his own misfortune to overshadow both the entire common misfortune and the whole world.
This is the great fork of camp life. From this point the roads go to the right and to the left. One of them will rise and the other will descend. If you go to the right—you lose your life, and if you go the left—you lose your conscience.
Solzhenitsyn concedes that at that fork, “at that greater divider of souls,” most choose survival. Intellectuals—resembling many of his Western readers—usually acted swinishly because they could always find a way to justify anything.
One could also expect the worst from those who “accept that pitiful ideology which holds that ‘human beings are created for happiness.’” That, of course, is what most secular Americans take for granted. Reading this book, they are likely to ask: what else could life be about if not individual happiness? Exiled to the West, Solzhenitsyn shocked educated people by criticizing the shallowness of such thinking. Life is not just about oneself, he insisted, and one can expect arrogant bosh from those who think it is. They often responded by dismissing him as a religious fanatic.
Although most prisoners chose survival, many chose conscience, and Solzhenitsyn describes a few he met. They all knew that, according to official Bolshevik atheism, there are no transcendent values. Lenin and his followers scorned such ideas as “human dignity” and the “sanctity of human life.” No, Soviet citizens were taught, only the material result counted, and that meant the only moral standard was the interest of the Communist Party. People who accepted this way of thinking readily concluded that, on the individual level, too, all that matters is what promotes one’s own welfare.
Choosing conscience meant rejecting such thinking. You gradually recognize that “It is not the result that counts … but the spirit! Not what—but how.” You begin to change. Instead of being sharply intolerant, you begin to forgive. “You have come to realize your own weakness—and you can therefore understand the weakness of others.” In short, “you are ascending.”
“Your soul, which formerly was dry, now ripens from suffering.” For the first time you examine your life sincerely and “remember everything you did that was bad and shameful.” Solzhenitsyn recalls how, when he was in the hospital, the deeply wise Dr. Kornfeld, a convert to Christianity, explained to him that although you are innocent of the crime for which you were imprisoned, “if you go over your life with a fine-tooth comb and ponder it deeply,” you will be able to find real transgressions worthy of such punishment. As it happened, Dr. Kornfeld was murdered that very night. “And so it happened that Kornfeld’s prophetic words were his last words on earth. And directed to me, they lay upon me as an inheritance.”
Solzhenitsyn was not sure that everyone’s punishment was in some way deserved, but he accepted that idea for himself:
I had gone over and re-examined my life quite enough and come to understand why everything happened to me … . And I would not have murmured even if all that punishment had been considered inadequate.
Solzhenitsyn realized that he had been telling his life story backward:
What had seemed for so long to be beneficial now turned out in actuality to be fatal, and I had been striving to go in the opposite direction to that which was truly necessary.
In his most evil moments, Solzhenitsyn was convinced he was doing good, and he was most mistaken when he considered himself infallible. By the same token, it was when he was most certain there was no God that God was with him. As he wrote in a poem: “God of the Universe! I believe again!/ Though I renounced You, You were with me!”
Solzhenitsyn discovered that “the meaning of life lies not, as we have grown used to thinking, in prospering, but in the development of the soul.” Recognizing he would not have discovered that meaning without suffering, he disagrees with all those writers who “considered it their duty … to curse prison… . I nourished my soul there, and I say without hesitation: ‘Bless you prison, for having been in my life!’”
Strangely enough, then, this book about countless deaths, unimaginable cruelty, and the worst of human nature turns out to be, in the final analysis, optimistic. It tells us how, even in the depths of evil, one can discern and choose the good.
newcriterion.com
4. Don’t Cede Historic American Symbols to Bad Actors
Too many of us do not appreciate our own history.
Excerpts:
The “Appeal to Heaven” bit—sometimes styled “Appeal to God” (slogans were less consistent before one could Google them)—comes, not from the Turner Diaries or the Grand Inquisitor, but from John Locke, whose Second Treatise on Government held that “where the body of the people, or any single man, is deprived of their right, or is under the exercise of a power without right, and have no appeal on earth, then they have a liberty to appeal to heaven, whenever they judge the cause of sufficient moment.” In other words: If the king has become a tyrant, the only appeal is to the higher sovereign by way of revolution—an awkward formulation for our secular era, but this was when people believed sovereigns ruled by divine right. Revolution was a petition to the almighty to reverse the court below.
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In the office where I write this hangs a large version of the Gadsden flag—the contemporary “No Step on Snek” permutation. I also have a Gadsden headcover for the putter that’s sitting in the corner in my golf bag. I don’t particularly care that Christopher Gadsden’s symbol of American intransigence in the face of oppression was carried by those who stormed the Capitol, but it doesn’t belong to them. They carried American flags as well; that doesn’t make the Stars and Stripes their intellectual property. If tomorrow Vladamir Putin declared his love for pork ribs and collard greens, that wouldn’t turn American barbecue into Russian cuisine.
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Nor is it practical (or desirable) for justices to avoid any political allusions at any time. As it happens, we have Justice Elena Kagan’s emails from her time in the Obama administration, in which she cheers on the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Yet she has participated as a justice in every major case about the ACA anyway, because we expect jurists to strive for fairness and impartiality, not to be inhumanly detached from the affairs of man.
There are reasonable debates to be had about where and when a member of the federal bench crosses the line, but the public display of support for the American Revolution is not an expression of partisanship—unless you’re on the side of King George.
Don’t Cede Historic American Symbols to Bad Actors
No matter who co-opts it, the ‘Appeal to Heaven’ flag has historically represented patriotism.
thedispatch.com · by Reilly Stephens · May 25, 2024
Over the past year, progressive journalists have invested in wide-ranging investigations of the Supreme Court, from the justices’ friendships, to their finances, to their families—but now the New York Times has discovered a whole new category of scandal: their taste in flags.
To wit, on Thursday evening the Times announced that “Another Provocative Flag Was Flown at Another Alito Home.” For the second time in as many weeks, Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito had been discovered displaying a sigil “carried on Jan. 6” and what’s worse, this one is “associated with a push for a more Christian-minded government.”
But the offending flag, adorned with a pine tree and the caption “An Appeal to Heaven,” is not some special symbol of the alt-right or insurrection. It’s an American flag, and the rebellion it embodies is that of our forefathers against the British crown.
The “Appeal to Heaven” or “Pine Tree Flag” was originally flown by ships in George Washington’s revolutionary Navy (such as it was). The pine tree was a common insignia in colonial America, appearing on various flags, particularly in New England, from the 17th century onward; to this day it remains an official naval ensign of the state of Massachusetts (the state removed the “Appeal to Heaven” in 1971).
When colonists arrived in the 17th century, the eastern portion of North America was more or less one great forest. England had long since denuded its own forests, making American lumber such a key resource that the Massachusetts Bay colony added a “Mast Preservation Clause” to its charter ensuring that appropriate trees would be reserved for the British Navy. Hence the pine tree.
The “Appeal to Heaven” bit—sometimes styled “Appeal to God” (slogans were less consistent before one could Google them)—comes, not from the Turner Diaries or the Grand Inquisitor, but from John Locke, whose Second Treatise on Government held that “where the body of the people, or any single man, is deprived of their right, or is under the exercise of a power without right, and have no appeal on earth, then they have a liberty to appeal to heaven, whenever they judge the cause of sufficient moment.” In other words: If the king has become a tyrant, the only appeal is to the higher sovereign by way of revolution—an awkward formulation for our secular era, but this was when people believed sovereigns ruled by divine right. Revolution was a petition to the almighty to reverse the court below.
The Times contends that the pine tree was an obscure symbol, a “historical relic” forgotten “until about a decade ago,” when it was “revived to represent “a theological vision of what the United States should be” by a conservative pastor it disapproves of. But this would be news to the producers of the 2008 HBO miniseries about John Adams, which included the Appeal to Heaven among the Gadsden and other revolutionary flags adorning its opening credits. It would also be surprising to the New York Times of not so long ago, which in 2010 wrote about how the “Tea Party [was] Rooted in Religious Fervor for [the] Constitution,” a news report that opens with an activist in a tri-corner hat holding said flag (the Times even included a picture of it, green tree and all) as the activist extolled the virtues not of theocracy but of the civil religion of American constitutionalism.
I have no particular knowledge of the intentions of Justice Alito or his wife, nor their hearts. The prior incident uncovered by the Times—in which Martha-Ann Alito hung an American flag upside down outside their home in January 2021 as part of an apparent tit-for-tat with neighbors who’d displayed their own provocative signs—was a breach of patriotic etiquette. It’s true enough that some participants carried the flag up the steps of the Capitol the wrong way up; but even the Times was forced to admit there’s nothing particularly right-wing about such a display: Causes of all sorts have flipped the Stars and Stripes over the decades. (In 2017 Salon declared such “an act of true patriotism.”)
Perhaps the Alitos have the sort of sympathy with attempts to “Stop the Steal” the Times attributes to them. Or perhaps Justice Alito simply viewed the “Appeal to Heaven” flag as an expression of patriotism, knowing it was commissioned under George Washington himself. Or perhaps the appellate jurist enjoyed the pun implied by flying a flag appealing to a higher court. Any public official wielding the power of the state is fairly subject to criticism, even for private beliefs not directly relevant to their constitutional role—and few matters are more serious than attempts to obstruct the constitutional transfer of power. But it’s not just unfair to assume a traditional patriotic symbol is being flown with some other secret intent; to assume so is to cede patriotism itself to whichever mob happens to invoke it, however noble or maligned their intent.
In the office where I write this hangs a large version of the Gadsden flag—the contemporary “No Step on Snek” permutation. I also have a Gadsden headcover for the putter that’s sitting in the corner in my golf bag. I don’t particularly care that Christopher Gadsden’s symbol of American intransigence in the face of oppression was carried by those who stormed the Capitol, but it doesn’t belong to them. They carried American flags as well; that doesn’t make the Stars and Stripes their intellectual property. If tomorrow Vladamir Putin declared his love for pork ribs and collard greens, that wouldn’t turn American barbecue into Russian cuisine.
Symbols are funny things (which is why they’re responsible for one of the more headache-inducing branches of philosophy). There are fair criticisms of those still flying Confederate flags, but Bo and Luke Duke just thought it looked cool on top of their car. Nor did I buy the Lynyrd Skynyrd T-shirt that’s probably still in some random drawer in my childhood bedroom out of fealty to the Army of Northern Virginia. The Jewish gangster in The Great Gatsby owns a front called “the Swastika Holding Company.” But Fitzgerald wasn’t making an antisemitic joke: At the time the future Nazi insignia simply represented prosperity and good fortune. Let’s concede that the Times is correct to say the pine tree is popular among Christian nationalists: the Times cites the specific case of Pastor Dutch Sheets, who has adopted the “Appeal to Heaven” meme and even gave the flag as a gift to then-President Donald Trump.* But the unilateral appropriation of a symbol by faction does not define it for all others. The Punisher Skull’s popularity among militia-types doesn’t mean fans of Marvel Comics are plotting the violent overthrow of the government.
The Times interviews many breathless legal ethicists who insist that it is some kind of breach for Justice Alito to express his political leanings. But here’s the question: What political leanings? Fealty for the cause of George Washington? An appeal for the blessing of providence? The Times relies on its prior reporting of the Alitos’ inverted Old Glory to attempt to answer that question, but that reporting indicates that this transgression of the Flag Code was committed by Martha-Ann Alito as part of a personal dispute with neighbors. Tying that incident to an entirely different and unobjectionable flag flown at a different home in the summer of 2023 is the sort of dot connecting usually carried out on a pinboard covered in red string and newspaper clippings about Bohemian Grove and the Bilderberg Group.
Nor is it practical (or desirable) for justices to avoid any political allusions at any time. As it happens, we have Justice Elena Kagan’s emails from her time in the Obama administration, in which she cheers on the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Yet she has participated as a justice in every major case about the ACA anyway, because we expect jurists to strive for fairness and impartiality, not to be inhumanly detached from the affairs of man.
There are reasonable debates to be had about where and when a member of the federal bench crosses the line, but the public display of support for the American Revolution is not an expression of partisanship—unless you’re on the side of King George.
Correction, May 25, 2024: This story has been updated to correct the first name of Pastor Dutch Sheets.
thedispatch.com · by Reilly Stephens · May 25, 2024
5. America’s New Island Fighters Are Preparing for Conflict—a Stone’s Throw From Taiwan
America’s New Island Fighters Are Preparing for Conflict—a Stone’s Throw From Taiwan
The Wall Street Journal flew out with U.S. Marines to remote locations from where they might one day fight China
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/americas-new-island-fighters-are-preparing-for-conflicta-stones-throw-from-taiwan-dd5d0fd3?mod=latest_headlines
By Niharika MandhanaFollow
Updated May 26, 2024 12:01 am ET
ITBAYAT, Philippines—The U.S. and Philippine marines arrived in waves on this little island nearly 100 miles from the southern tip of Taiwan. A platoon clutching automatic rifles and machine guns sprang from Black Hawks and took up positions around the airfield. In a whirl of hot air and dust, Chinook helicopters lowered dozens more men.
They unloaded fuel cans, sacks of ready-to-eat meals and cases of medical supplies, small drones and satellite-communications gear—everything they would need for a three-day stay.
If their ride had continued north, they would reach Taiwan in less than an hour.
This was a military exercise, the guns had no ammunition and the Javelin missile launcher had no missiles. But the marines were preparing for a real-world conflict, fine-tuning a strategy they see as critical to fighting China in its neighborhood—from strings of islands close to it.
This terrain is meant to be in their wheelhouse.
They belong to the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment, created two years ago as part of a sweeping redesign to better prepare the U.S. Marine Corps for great-power rivalry after decades of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Wall Street Journal flew out with them to Itbayat—90 minutes by helicopter from the nearest large Philippine island—and island-hopped to remote Philippine military sites they were operating from during the drills.
CHINA
TAIWAN
Tainan
Kaohsiung
Philippine military sites to which U.S.
forces gained access last year
Mavulis island
Itbayat island
Batan island
Luzon Strait
S. KOREA
JAPAN
CHINA
Area of detail
Camilo
Osias
Naval Base
Pacific Ocean
Lal-lo Airfield
PHIL.
PHILIPPINES
INDONESIA
In a conflict, these Marines would move forward—as far and as fast as possible—with missiles and radars. They would fan out in small groups across islands and coastlines. Then, they would keep moving so that China’s missiles, sensors and drones wouldn’t find them.
The adversary would have to “expend an awful lot of resources to figure out where we are and what we’re doing,” said Col. John Lehane, the commander of the 2,500-strong Hawaii-based regiment. “We complicate his decision-making.”
In practice, it isn’t that easy to do.
Operating in austere, far-flung locations presents lots of problems. Some islands have sizable runways but others have only small helipads. Remote coastal areas aren’t always connected by roads wide enough to move radar systems and missile batteries. The Marines need small ships to maneuver but don’t have them.
In war, threats would be everywhere, making it harder to bring them supplies. China has a formidable arsenal of missiles, as well as drones of all shapes and sizes. And it has an advantage—fighting in what it considers its backyard, in the vicinity of its naval fleet, military bases and an extensive surveillance network.
Part of the Marines’ goal is to bog down China in the early stages of a conflict, buying time for other U.S. forces to get in place. From the front line, they would get a close-up picture of the battle space using sensors and small drones, and fire missiles to destroy Chinese ships or send back targeting data to U.S. and allied warplanes or ships to strike.
Marines gather at the airport on the northern Philippine island of Itbayat, less than 100 miles from Taiwan. PHOTO: AARON FAVILA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
These smaller, more nimble units would act as a 21st-century littoral cavalry, said Benjamin Jensen, a senior fellow at the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies who teaches at the Marine Corps University.
“The ideal case is that you have these fluid forces that are flowing up and down the first island chain, so you’re constantly forcing [China] to look for you,” he said, referring to a stretch of territory from Japan to Taiwan, the northern Philippines and the South China Sea. That would impose a “tremendous tax” on China’s intelligence network, he said.
“Every sensor China tasks to look for a Marine Corps littoral regiment is a sensor that isn’t tasked on another target,” Jensen said. “You want them to go on wild-goose chases.”
To do that, these Marines need to square some circles.
Travel light while still being lethal. Get food, fuel and missiles across sprawling island chains. Gather tons of information about the enemy’s movements without giving away their own.
And do all that up close to China, where turning on a radio or a radar could make them a target.
Over the past two years, the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment has trained on Hawaiian islands, simulated combat in California and made four trips to the Philippines. They are rehearsing tactics to communicate while remaining hidden, such as creating a lot of noise in the electromagnetic spectrum to confuse enemy forces, or drawing attention to different aspects of the formation that might or might not be something.
Racks of servers are being replaced by equipment the size of laptops, and 3-D printers are making repair parts. “We are continually refining the balance between what is the lightest package I can put there to reduce the logistics burden while still making sure that it is combat credible and able to fight,” Lehane said.
‘Seeing it, taking pictures of it’
During the recent exercises in late April and early May, several small teams flew to three tiny islands scattered across the strategic Luzon Strait.
Their presence signaled that the island-hopping Marines were getting out, with their allies, to the places from where they might fight Chinese forces someday.
“We do assessments on the islands all the time,” said Lt. Col. Mark Edgar, who helped oversee the exercises. “Everything from what those airstrips can support to what a port can support to what a beach can support.”
They tracked how many gallons of fuel they were burning. They landed helicopters on fields, or “hasty landing sites.” They purified water from a creek using a portable system.
For three days on Itbayat, home to 3,000 civilians, they camped out in an abandoned building near the airstrip. They sent out patrols to the local town, which would be a potential source of food and water in a crisis, and to the ports. They measured roads and bridges to figure out what vehicles they could bring, and pushed up to the island’s north, which faces Taiwan, for a closer look.
A U.S. Army helicopter carrying Marines took off from Paredes Air Station in the Philippines earlier this month. PHOTO: AARON FAVILA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
U.S. Marines walk in front of a temporary camp in the Philippines while taking part in the broader Balikatan military exercises. PHOTO: TED ALJIBE/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
A different team went further to Mavulis, a tiny speck of land at the northern Philippine frontier, just 88 miles from Taiwan. They linked up with the small rotational detachment of the Philippine military—no civilians live there—and went fishing together. They learned, in planning for the trip, that they couldn’t land Osprey aircraft on the island. Out on patrols, they discovered that mountainous paths that looked walkable on satellite images were in fact not.
“Nothing replaces putting a Marine on the ground and actually looking at that terrain,” said Edgar. “That’s where we learned the most, what we call physical reconnaissance: which is just being there, seeing it, taking pictures of it, understanding it.”
They are also learning what they really need and don’t have: ships to move Marines and their gear between islands or from one point on the coast to another. Without them, the Marines are constrained by rugged terrain, small bridges and narrow roads, and dependent on helicopters, which are more visible and carry smaller loads.
Plans to produce the ships are delayed and construction hasn’t begun.
China’s ‘defensive bubble’
The littoral regiments face two problems, said Mark Cancian, a former colonel in the Marine Corps. First, resupplying missiles at austere locations inside China’s “defensive bubble” in a conflict would be hard. Cancian, who ran a wargame last year that featured island-hopping Marines, said the risk was that after a few useful strikes, they would run out.
Access was the other hurdle, he said. Manila would likely welcome the Marines if a fight broke out in the South China Sea, where it faces direct threats from Beijing. But whether it would do the same to help the U.S. repel a Chinese attack on Taiwan is much less certain.
U.S. Marines practiced securing the airfield at Itbayat earlier this month. PHOTO: AARON FAVILA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
The Marines have two littoral regiments—one in Hawaii and one based in Okinawa, Japan. A third regiment is pending.
Cancian said the Marines would be most effective if they were already in position at the time that hostilities erupt, giving the Japan-based regiment an advantage because they have the ability to move down the country’s Ryukyu Islands that stretch southwest to Taiwan, he said. The Hawaii-based Marines might have to fight their way in.
That regiment is spending more time in the Philippines. They arrived in April for the recently concluded exercises, called Balikatan, and will stay through June when they participate in another set of drills. By then, many of them will have clocked as many as five of the past 14 months in the Philippines.
That increases the chances they’ll be around if a crisis erupts.
Holding a foot in the door
The alliance between Manila and Washington is stronger than it has been in decades. The U.S. doesn’t have bases in the country, but it has an agreement giving it access to Philippine military sites to upgrade facilities on them. Washington struck a deal last year to expand that access to four more, taking the total to nine.
If China moved to invade Taiwan, American forces would want to shift some U.S. warplanes to these sites. The idea would be to disperse U.S. aircraft across an array of bases and even civilian airfields in the region to make it harder for China to target them and to provide the U.S. different avenues for strike, said Becca Wasser, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security who runs wargames.
The Marine littoral regiments, meanwhile, would mobilize to try to restrain the Chinese fleet within the first-island chain, Wasser said. That is, block them from moving outside the first-island chain and from threatening American forces attacking from further back.
The Marines would also aim to counter China’s “anti-access” strategy aimed at locking down the area and making it too dangerous for U.S. forces to come close to Taiwan.
“We hold our foot in the door so that the door can’t be slammed shut for the rest of the joint force and that puts us at risk potentially,” said Lt. Col. James Arnold, who heads the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment’s anti-air battalion. “That’s why we’re working every day on tactics that would allow us to do that effectively and survivably.”
U.S. troopers prepared a helicopter during a joint military exercise in the northern Philippines earlier this month. PHOTO: AARON FAVILA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Write to Niharika Mandhana at niharika.mandhana@wsj.com
6. Losing hearts and minds: The desperate state of US influence operations
The first problem is our focus on hearts and minds. As Matt Armstrong has counseled me we should be focused on minds and wills. A semantic difference? Not for us because we focus on hearts and minds to try to get people to like us. That is not the point. MInds and wills sharpened the focus on influence. But that is one of our weaknesses in influence operations, we want to be liked and we seem to at least tacitly make that a measure of effectiveness rather than outcomes in terms of decisions making and behavior.
Of course we are risk averse where it comes ot influence.
Excerpts:
The challenge stems, in no small part, from resistance to the idea that the U.S. government should be trying to “influence” perceptions at all. After all, why does a nation with elected leadership—politicians and officials who are in principle accountable to the public via the activities of the free press—need to influence perceptions beyond just telling the truth? It's for this reason that influence operations have historically been relegated almost entirely to a small portion of the special operations community that helps operators with very high-stakes missions.
But that effort to limit the scope of influence operations has put the United States at a distinct disadvantage. The world now accesses and absorbs truth in an environment saturated by individualized digital media streams in place of once-credible national broadcasts. Adversaries are exploiting social media to reach billions around the world with messages tailored down to the individual level. And they are increasingly able to do so as national narratives collapse and trust erodes in Western institutions, including the U.S. military.
...
But in many other areas, the government is reducing its influence activities. For example, the U.S. Army is considering a 10-percent cut to its information warfare capabilities.
“We see the cuts there,” Plitsas said. We see the significant cuts to the covert Influence Group in the [CIA]. We see the [State Department’s Global Engagement Center] funding and potential assistance at risk. So at the same time that the department is recognizing the significant threat that we face on a kinetic front, we are seeing across-the-interagency cuts to the institutions that are responsible for undermining and pushing back against what we're seeing” in the information environment.
One former defense official suggested it would help to combine public affairs, intelligence, psychological operations and move it from special operations to the office of the defense undersecretary for intelligence.
Losing hearts and minds: The desperate state of US influence operations
The United States is surrendering ground to Russia and China’s propaganda machines. That has key officials increasingly worried.
BY PATRICK TUCKER
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY EDITOR, DEFENSE ONE
MAY 24, 2024
defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker
TAMPA, Florida—Several of the nation’s top practitioners in psychological operations, including key officials with the Departments of Defense and State, gathered in a small room at the Tampa Convention Center earlier this month for a panel discussion. The topic: how the United States is positioned to influence global perceptions, particularly around critical national-security issues.
The unanimous verdict: We’re doing miserably, especially in comparison to China and Russia.
“I think the state of this enterprise is weak, quite frankly,” James Holly, who leads the defense secretary’s year-old Influence and Perception Management Office, told the audience at the SOF Week conference here.
Daniel Kimmidge, principal deputy coordinator for State’s Global Engagement Center, agreed.
“If we are going to be competitive in the information environment, as we face this convergence of [Chinese and Russian] adversarial activity, we're going to need to make this a higher priority in some way. That puts the burden back on us,” Kimmidge said.
The challenge stems, in no small part, from resistance to the idea that the U.S. government should be trying to “influence” perceptions at all. After all, why does a nation with elected leadership—politicians and officials who are in principle accountable to the public via the activities of the free press—need to influence perceptions beyond just telling the truth? It's for this reason that influence operations have historically been relegated almost entirely to a small portion of the special operations community that helps operators with very high-stakes missions.
But that effort to limit the scope of influence operations has put the United States at a distinct disadvantage. The world now accesses and absorbs truth in an environment saturated by individualized digital media streams in place of once-credible national broadcasts. Adversaries are exploiting social media to reach billions around the world with messages tailored down to the individual level. And they are increasingly able to do so as national narratives collapse and trust erodes in Western institutions, including the U.S. military.
“With social media, everything has become subjectivist reality. So what each of us views as what our reality is [is] customized to us as individuals. This is a huge problem, because that means what we define as what it is to be American, my definition may actually only fit for me. And we're not reading any of the same stuff. This is a huge problem because it undermines those national identities,” Jason Schenker, chairman of the Futurist Institute, told the crowd.
That makes it harder for U.S. officials to fight disinformation at home, where any effort to discredit or even track foreign influence campaigns can be painted as partisan. In 2022, the Biden administration established a Disinformation Governance Board—only to suspend it three weeks later amid right-wing threats to its members.
What losing influence looks like
What are the consequences of losing the influence competition on the global stage? Some have already revealed themselves. In Niger, Russian influence operations helped install a new government hostile to the United States.
Something similar occurred in Slovakia last September, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines recently told lawmakers.
“Two days before the parliamentary elections in Slovakia,” Haines said, “a fake audio recording was released online in which one candidate discussed how to rig the upcoming election with a journalist. The audio was quickly shown to be fake, with signs of AI manipulation, but under Slovakia law there is a moratorium on campaigning and media commentary about the election for 48 hours before polls open, and since the deepfake was released in that window, news and government organizations struggled to expose the manipulation, and the victim of the deepfake ended up losing in a very close election.”
Experts say information operations can shape the battlefield and secure victory before the first jet leaves the runway. That’s what happened in the weeks before Russia’s initial invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine in early 2014, said Alex Plitsas, a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism for the Defense Department.
Russian state television began “talking about all of these anti-Russian Ukrainian fascists running around, beating and murdering people. And this is the seed of all the hostility that's going on. And I'm in Lviv, shopping and going to chocolate shops with tourists milling about, and none of this nonsense is real,” said Plitsas, now a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs’ at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.
Understanding the problem
Recent steps the U.S. government is taking to better understand its adversaries’ edge in information operations include the March 2023 establishment of the Perception Management Office.
Another is a five-year, nearly $1 billion contract signed in 2021 with Peraton “to achieve operational advantages in the information space and to counter threats to U.S. national security.” The main thrust of that contract is developing ways to assess how China and Russia are waging influence warfare and shaping perceptions against the United States, officials told Defense One. That number is a small fraction of the billions China and Russia spend on influence operations.
“We are now once again confronted by what I would argue are malign actors in a strategic competition that are using communications technology to shape public opinion around the world. And they do that at a global scale, but then they tailor their messages at a very localized level to shape public opinion and therefore put political pressure on their leadership to to position themselves,” said one Peraton official.
Another Peraton official said Russia, China, and Iran are increasingly coordinating their information warfare efforts. This started during the COVID-19 pandemic, when China, Russia, and other actors embarked on a loosely-coordinated campaign to blame the virus on the U.S. military. Today, they are involved in “opportunistic” coordination on hot-button issues such as Israel’s military operations in Gaza.
“Within a short period of time, oftentimes within a single day, the same topics are being amplified, similar themes being put forward,” said another official.
One of Peraton’s big goals right now under the contract is to develop techniques to reveal how adversaries are using advanced AI tools like large language models to scale up their operations through generative content creation. “I think we're about six months to a year away,” said the second official.
But in many other areas, the government is reducing its influence activities. For example, the U.S. Army is considering a 10-percent cut to its information warfare capabilities.
“We see the cuts there,” Plitsas said. We see the significant cuts to the covert Influence Group in the [CIA]. We see the [State Department’s Global Engagement Center] funding and potential assistance at risk. So at the same time that the department is recognizing the significant threat that we face on a kinetic front, we are seeing across-the-interagency cuts to the institutions that are responsible for undermining and pushing back against what we're seeing” in the information environment.
One former defense official suggested it would help to combine public affairs, intelligence, psychological operations and move it from special operations to the office of the defense undersecretary for intelligence.
Perhaps the most important thing that the United States can do now to better compete is to raise the status of information and influence activity, said Holly, of the Influence and Perception Management Office. Besides more money, influence warfare needs centralization and a leader with the sufficient authority to be taken seriously, not just by the Department of Defense but also the White House.
“All of this [information operations activity] occurs at the two-star level and below in little stovepipes of excellence. [Military Information Support Operations] is in a pipeline. Public affairs is in another pipeline…and none of that rises above the two-star level for a single person in charge. Unity of command is a thing we talked about on the battlefield but in this supposedly No. 1 most important thing we're doing—at least our strategic documents, say that rhetorically—we're misaligned.”
defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker
7. Gaza Cease-Fire Talks Could Restart as Pressure Increases on Israel
Gaza Cease-Fire Talks Could Restart as Pressure Increases on Israel
Progress comes after International Court of Justice order for Israel to halt Rafah operations
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-signals-intent-to-continue-war-in-gaza-as-global-pressure-mounts-f1b00edc?mod=latest_headlines
By Carrie Keller-Lynn, Dov LieberFollow
and Summer SaidFollow
Updated May 26, 2024 4:18 am ET
Mediators are making efforts to restart cease-fire talks between Israel and Hamas to halt fighting in the Gaza Strip, a day after an international court ordered Israel to scale back military action in Rafah.
Talks to pause fighting in Gaza and return some Israeli hostages held in the enclave could resume as early as next week, according to Israeli officials, who want discussions to be renewed. Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns, Mossad Director David Barnea and Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani met in Paris on Friday to discuss the matter, said an Israeli official who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter.
Restarting talks would depend upon whether Hamas agrees to engage, Arab mediators said. Hamas has been approached but hasn’t yet agreed to participate, they said. The U.S.-designated terrorist organization cited what it described as a concern that Israel isn’t serious about reaching a deal. A senior Hamas official later denied that the organization had been informed “about anything related to the resumption of negotiations,” in a Saturday interview with Al Jazeera.
The U.S., Israeli and Qatari officials discussed restarting talks based on a fresh set of proposals, the terms of which weren’t immediately clear, after an earlier attempt this month fell apart over terms for ending the war and returning hostages. The newest round of talks would be mediated by representatives of Egypt, Qatar and the U.S., according to the Israeli official.
Israel continues to fight Hamas across the Gaza Strip, even as the International Court of Justice on Friday ordered Israel to stop operations that could lead to the complete or partial destruction of the Palestinian population in Rafah, the southern Gaza city where hundreds of thousands of Palestinians are sheltering. The court also ordered Israel to increase humanitarian aid to Gaza.
The International Court of Justice ordered Israel to halt military operations that could lead to the complete or partial destruction of the Palestinian population in Rafah. PHOTO: KOEN VAN WEEL/ZUMA PRESS
On Saturday, part of the support system for a floating pier built by the U.S. to boost humanitarian aid to Palestinians broke off amid choppy waters off the Gaza coast, the U.S. military said in a statement.
Four boats stabilizing the $320 million structure detached, U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for military operations in the Middle East, said Saturday. Two of them floated northward, eventually landing on the beach in Ashdod, Israel, it said. Two others are now anchored on the beach near the pier, the military said, adding that the dock remains operational despite the damage.
Separately on Saturday, Hamas claimed that it had captured Israeli soldiers during fighting in Jabalia, a city in northern Gaza, in circumstances that remain unclear. If true, it would mark a significant first that could complicate cease-fire talks. The Israeli military swiftly denied that any soldiers had been kidnapped.
Meanwhile, in the wake of Friday’s action by the ICJ, Israel said it hasn’t broken humanitarian law in its conduct of the war, hewing to language from the order of the United Nations body.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken reiterated President Biden’s opposition to a full-scale military operation in Rafah in a phone call with Israeli counterparts, the State Department said Friday, even as U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan signaled his comfort with Israel’s revised plans after being briefed by Israeli officials.
Lawmakers from across Israel’s political spectrum criticized the ICJ order. War cabinet minister Benny Gantz said national security obligates Israel to continue the fight, while opposition leader Yair Lapid condemned the verdict as a moral failure for not conditioning any halt to Israel’s military operations on the release of the more than 120 Israeli hostages still believed to be held by Hamas in Gaza. Party leaders on Israel’s far-right dismissed the ruling as antisemitic, saying it didn’t take Israel’s right to defend itself seriously.
A humanitarian-aid vessel detached from the U.S.-built floating pier off the Gaza Strip, floated northward and landed on the beach in Ashdod, Israel. PHOTO: AMIR COHEN/REUTERS
For the broader Israeli public, analysts say the ICJ ruling didn’t trigger the same level of anger or interest as other setbacks in recent days or weeks.
The ICJ order represented the third major international pressure point placed on Israel in the past week.
On Monday, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, an independent tribunal that is separate from the ICJ, announced his intention to seek war crimes indictments against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his defense minister for an alleged plan to starve Gaza. The ICC is also seeking warrants for three Hamas leaders for their role in the Hamas-led Oct. 7 invasion of southern Israel, which triggered the now seven-month-long war.
On Wednesday, three European countries said they would each recognize a Palestinian state, in a largely symbolic move that aligns them with more than a hundred other countries.
“Israel is becoming more isolated,” said Ronny Leshno-Yaar, formerly Israel’s top diplomat to the United Nations in Geneva. “The pressure is getting bigger and bigger and nobody is offering a realistic solution to the security problems of Israel.”
Israel is a party to the 1948 Genocide Convention, which enabled fellow treaty party South Africa to bring an enforcement action against Israel at the ICJ in late December. The convention gives the court jurisdiction over actions intended to destroy or decimate particular population groups, but not over ordinary military actions—even those that may give rise to allegations of war crimes.
People scramble for humanitarian aid dropped by a plane in the southern Gaza Strip city of Khan Younis. PHOTO: RIZEK ABDELJAWAD/ZUMA PRESS
Hamas, as a nonstate actor, isn’t a party to the treaty and is outside of the court’s jurisdiction, experts say.
Danny Shek, a former Israeli ambassador to France, said he believed that the ICJ order reflected an unfair standard against which Israeli actions were to be held.
“Generally there is a strong focus on what is happening here and I’m OK with that, but I wish the same kind of focus would apply to [other] wars,” said Shek, who also advocates on behalf of hostages taken by Hamas. “Wars all around the world should be examined under the same kind of standards.”
Against the backdrop of international pressure, Israel is pressing ahead with fighting in Gaza, which is currently focused in Rafah and a swath of northern Gaza, where Hamas has re-established a military foothold. An Israeli official on Saturday confirmed that Israel plans to continue operating in Rafah.
Smoke rises during an Israeli airstrike in Rafah. PHOTO: MOHAMMED SALEM/REUTERS
Biden said this past week that Israel’s war against Hamas doesn’t qualify as genocide. The U.S. has said aid flows into Gaza have improved as the U.S. pushes Israel to do more to alleviate severe hunger and support a medical system on the brink of collapse in the Gaza Strip.
The ICJ also ordered Israel to keep the Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt open for humanitarian aid to the strip. Israel said in response that it would allow continuous aid to flow from Egypt into Gaza.
Egypt on Friday agreed to allow trucks to enter Gaza through Kerem Shalom, a border crossing at the junction of Egypt, Gaza, and Israel, after it closed the border at Rafah following Israel’s move to take control of the Gaza side of the crossing earlier this month. Egyptian officials said that reopening the Rafah crossing is contingent upon Israel vacating that area.
Hamas called on Israel to return the Rafah crossing to Palestinian hands as part of an effort to address humanitarian needs in the strip.
Nancy A. Youssef contributed to this article.
Write to Dov Lieber at dov.lieber@wsj.com and Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com
8. Should Cyber Force become the next service?
Perhaps we should just turn every military branch into its own service. How many services can we really have?
Should Cyber Force become the next service?
defenseone.com · by David DiMolfetta
U.S. Army National Guard soldiers from four Cyber Protection Teams completed their validation exercise near U.S. Cyber Command headquarters in Maryland in 2021. Army National Guard / Steven Stover
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The House will vote on a proposal to study the question as part of the 2025 defense authorization bill.
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May 24, 2024 12:00 PM ET
By David DiMolfetta
Cybersecurity Reporter, Nextgov/FCW
May 24, 2024 12:00 PM ET
A measure requiring the National Academy of Sciences to study the creation of an independent Cyber Force military branch advanced out of a key House panel late Wednesday.
The amendment, led by Rep. Morgan Luttrell, R-Texas, was lodged in the House Armed Services Committee’s National Defense Authorization Act, an annual must-pass defense policy bill that funds the U.S. military and national security apparatus across the Defense Department, and the intelligence community.
The measure comes amid studies and complaints from military personnel and outside analysts who have called the current U.S. military cyber formations inadequate and cumbersome. A Foundation for Defense of Democracies research paper released in March urged Congress to create a new cyber branch that sits alongside the Air Force, Navy and other armed forces, arguing current configurations don’t give the U.S. the best chance at combating adversaries in cyberspace.
The FDD study proposed that the branch should be tethered to the Army and granted 10,000 personnel with a $16.5 billion budget, arguing the DOD’s current cyber staff buildout has caused multiple shortfalls, including inability to fully use cyber talent and tools and poor culture that damages troops’ morale.
The U.S. military’s cyberspace oversight is currently anchored to Cyber Command, one of several unified combatant commands that amalgamates service staff across multiple branches. The head of CYBERCOM has joint command of the cyber operation and the National Security Agency, focusing on defending Pentagon networks and offensive military operations in cyberspace. The command was established after a 2008 DOD malware infestation linked to Russian operatives that originated on a USB drive, resulting in a 14-month cleanup operation dubbed Buckshot Yankee.
The nearly $900 billion defense package now moves to the House floor for consideration by all lower chamber lawmakers before making its way to the Senate.
A draft of last year’s must-pass defense policy bill called for a study on the creation of a cyber force, but that Senate-side provision was ultimately cut in the final version, leaving the upcoming 2025 defense bill as the next opportunity for lawmakers to include the measure.
Standing up a Cyber Force would have at least some short-term implications, FDD said in its study. For instance, transferring proper IT personnel to the new branch would take time and could risk depleting essential staff already at CYBERCOM. The potential new military entity would follow the 2019 creation of the Space Force.
9. Optimistic About the War in Ukraine, Putin Unleashes a Purge at Home
Optimistic About the War in Ukraine, Putin Unleashes a Purge at Home
By Paul Sonne and Anatoly Kurmanaev
Reporting from Berlin
May 26, 2024, 3:15 a.m. ET
The New York Times · by Anatoly Kurmanaev · May 26, 2024
Despite years of criticism, President Vladimir V. Putin has only now changed his defense minister and allowed high-level corruption arrests.
Listen to this article · 7:57 min Learn more
A military parade this month in Moscow.Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times
May 26, 2024, 3:15 a.m. ET
Periodic outcries over incompetence and corruption at the top of the Russian military have dogged President Vladimir V. Putin’s war effort since the start of his invasion of Ukraine in early 2022.
When his forces faltered around the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, the need for change was laid bare. When they were routed months later outside the city of Kharkiv, expectations of a shake-up grew. And after the mercenary leader Yevgeny V. Prigozhin marched his men toward Moscow, complaining of deep rot and ineptitude at the top of the Russian force, Mr. Putin seemed obliged to respond.
But, at each turn, the Russian president avoided any major public moves that could have been seen as validating the criticism, keeping his defense minister and top general in place through the firestorm while shuffling battlefield commanders and making other moves lower on the chain.
Now, with the battlefield crises seemingly behind him and Mr. Prigozhin dead, the Russian leader has decided to act, changing defense ministers for the first time in more than a decade and allowing a number of corruption arrests among top ministry officials.
The moves have ushered in the biggest overhaul at the Russian Defense Ministry since the invasion began and have confirmed Mr. Putin’s preference for avoiding big, responsive changes in the heat of a crisis and instead acting at a less conspicuous time of his own choosing.
Sergei K. Shoigu, then the defense minister, last year in India. President Vladimir V. Putin has replaced Mr. Shoigu and chosen Andrei R. Belousov, one of his longtime economic advisers, as the new defense minister.Credit...Harish Tyagi/EPA, via Shutterstock
“We have to understand that Putin is a person who is stubborn and not very flexible,” said Abbas Gallyamov, a former Putin speechwriter who now lives outside Russia. “He believes that reacting too quickly and rapidly to a changing situation is a sign of weakness.”
The timing of Mr. Putin’s recent moves is most likely a sign that he has greater confidence about his battlefield prospects in Ukraine and his hold on political power as he begins his fifth term as president, experts say.
Russian forces are making gains in Ukraine, taking territory around Kharkiv and in the Donbas region, as Ukraine struggles with aid delays from the United States and strained reserves of ammunition and personnel. Top officials in the Kremlin are feeling optimistic.
“They likely judge the situation within the force as stable enough to punish some in the military leadership for its prior failures,” said Michael Kofman, an expert on the Russian military and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Demand for change at the top of the Russian military has been pent up since the invasion’s earliest days, when stories circulated about Russian soldiers going to war without proper food and equipment and losing their lives while answering to feckless military leaders.
The anger crested with an aborted uprising led last year by Mr. Prigozhin, who died in a subsequent plane crash that U.S. officials have said was most likely a state-sanctioned assassination.
A makeshift memorial in Moscow for Yevgeny V. Prigozhin, who died last year in a plane crash.Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times
Mr. Prigozhin, a caterer turned warlord who grew rich on state contracts, was an unlikely messenger. But he put high-level corruption on the minds of Russia’s rank and file and the public more broadly, releasing profanity-laced tirades against Sergei K. Shoigu, then the defense minister, and Russia’s top uniformed officer, Gen. Valery V. Gerasimov. At one point, Mr. Prigozhin filmed himself in front of a pile of dead Russian fighters and denounced top officials for “rolling in fat” in their wood-paneled offices.
His subsequent failed mutiny showed that the problems festering in the Defense Ministry under Mr. Shoigu for over a decade had boiled over and that the populace craved renewal, said a person close to the ministry who spoke on the condition of anonymity in order to discuss sensitive topics.
The Russian leader now appears to be moving against the very officials that Mr. Prigozhin had been attacking.
The first harbinger of change arose last month with the arrest of Timur Ivanov, a protégé of Mr. Shoigu and the deputy defense minister in charge of military construction projects whom the Russian authorities have accused of taking a large bribe. He has denied wrongdoing. Mr. Ivanov previously attracted the attention of Aleksei A. Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation for his and his wife’s conspicuously lavish lifestyle, including yacht rentals on the French Riviera.
Then, this month, days after Mr. Putin began his new term as president, the Kremlin announced that he had replaced Mr. Shoigu and chosen Andrei R. Belousov, one of his longtime economic advisers, as the new defense minister. Mr. Shoigu was moved to run the Russian Security Council, where he would still have access to the president but would have little direct control over money.
Mr. Belousov has no military experience. But he boasts a relatively clean image and a long government career untainted by large corruption scandals.
A photograph released by Russian state media showed Timur Ivanov in Moscow in 2018. Mr. Ivanov was accused by the Russian authorities of taking a large bribe while in charge of military construction projects.Credit...Alexei Nikolsky/Sputnik, via Reuters
“If you want to win a war, corruption at a larger scale impacting the results on the battlefield is, in theory at least, not something you want,” said Maria Engqvist, the deputy head of Russia and Eurasia studies at the Swedish Defense Research Agency.
Still, Ms. Engqvist called high-level corruption in Russia “a feature, not a bug.”
“Corruption is a tool to gain influence, but it can also be used against you at any given time, depending on whether you say the wrong thing at the wrong time or make the wrong decision at the wrong time,” she said. “So you can be ousted with a reasonable explanation that the public can accept.”
Ms. Engqvist said the changes also raised questions about how long General Gerasimov would stay in his position as chief of the general staff and top battlefield commander in Ukraine.
The arrests at the Defense Ministry have gathered pace this month, with four more top generals and defense officials detained on corruption charges. Dmitri S. Peskov, the Kremlin spokesman, denied on Thursday that the arrests represented a “campaign.”
The corruption charges against top Defense Ministry officials have come alongside promises of greater financial and social benefits for the rank-and-file soldiers, an apparent attempt to improve morale and mollify populist critics.
Mr. Belousov used his first remarks after his nomination as defense minister to describe his plans to cut bureaucracy and improve access to health care and other social services for veterans of the war. And on Thursday, the speaker of Russia’s lower house of Parliament, Vyacheslav V. Volodin, and Finance Minister Anton G. Siluanov expressed support for exempting fighters in Ukraine from proposed income-tax increases.
The high-level arrests are unlikely to root out vast corruption in the Russian military establishment, but they could make top officials think twice before stealing at a particularly large scale, at least for a period, said Dara Massicot, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
“It will introduce a chill into the system and make everyone pause as they try to figure out the new code of accepted behavior,” Ms. Massicot said.
Beyond sending an anticorruption message, at least one of the arrests seemed to be aimed at settling a political score.
Maj. Gen. Ivan Popov, left, who was removed from his post last year, was apprehended on Tuesday on fraud charges.Credit...Associated Press
Maj. Gen. Ivan Popov, a top Russian commander who led forces holding off Ukraine’s counteroffensive, chided the Russian military leadership in a widely seen recording last year after he was removed from his post. He was apprehended on Tuesday on fraud charges, according to the state news agency TASS. He denied wrongdoing, his lawyer said.
“The bottom line is that the war exposed a lot of different problems — corruption, incompetence and openness to public expressions of insubordination — that the leadership feels a need to address,” said Samuel Charap, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. “Now is a good time to do this, precisely because there isn’t a short-term acute risk on the battlefield.”
Paul Sonne is an international correspondent, focusing on Russia and the varied impacts of President Vladimir V. Putin’s domestic and foreign policies, with a focus on the war against Ukraine. More about Paul Sonne
Anatoly Kurmanaev covers Russia and its transformation following the invasion of Ukraine. More about Anatoly Kurmanaev
See more on: Vladimir Putin, Russia-Ukraine War
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The New York Times · by Anatoly Kurmanaev · May 26, 2024
10. Russia Steps Up a Covert Sabotage Campaign Aimed at Europe
Russia Steps Up a Covert Sabotage Campaign Aimed at Europe
By Julian E. Barnes
Reporting from Washington
May 26, 2024, 5:03 a.m. ET
The New York Times · by Julian E. Barnes · May 26, 2024
Russian military intelligence, the G.R.U., is behind arson attacks aimed at undermining support for Ukraine’s war effort, security officials say.
U.S. and European security officials say Russia’s military intelligence arm is leading the campaign of arson attacks to slow arms transfers to Ukraine.Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times
By
Reporting from Washington
May 26, 2024, 5:03 a.m. ET
U.S. and allied intelligence officials are tracking an increase in low-level sabotage operations in Europe that they say are part of a Russian campaign to undermine support for Ukraine’s war effort.
The covert operations have mostly been arsons or attempted arsons targeting a wide range of sites, including a warehouse in England, a paint factory in Poland, homes in Latvia and, most oddly, an Ikea store in Lithuania.
But people accused of being Russian operatives have also been arrested on charges of plotting attacks on U.S. military bases.
While the acts might appear random, American and European security officials say they are part of a concerted effort by Russia to slow arms transfers to Kyiv and create the appearance of growing European opposition to support for Ukraine. And the officials say Russia’s military intelligence arm, the G.R.U., is leading the campaign.
The attacks, at least so far, have not interrupted the weapons flow to Ukraine, and indeed many of the targets are not directly related to the war. But some security officials say Russia is trying sow fear and force European nations to add security throughout the weapons supply chain, adding costs and slowing the pace of transfers.
NATO and European leaders have been warning of the growing threat. Prime Minister Kaja Kallas of Estonia said last week that Russia was conducting a “shadow war” against Europe. Prime Minister Donald Tusk of Poland announced the arrest of 12 people accused of carrying out “beatings, arson and attempted arson” for Russian intelligence.
And Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store of Norway said Russia posed “a real and serious threat,” after his country warned about possible attacks targeting energy producers and arms factories.
This image from the London Fire Brigade’s social media account shows a warehouse fire in London in March that officials believe was Russian sabotage. Four British men have been charged with arson, and one of them has been charged with assisting a foreign intelligence service.
Amid the growing concern about sabotage, NATO ambassadors are set to meet next month with Avril D. Haines, the U.S. director of national intelligence. Ms. Haines will provide an intelligence briefing on Russia’s war in Ukraine, but she will also discuss Moscow’s covert sabotage campaign in Europe.
Security officials would not describe their intelligence linking the sabotage to the G.R.U., but American and British spy services have penetrated the G.R.U. deeply. Before the war in Ukraine, the United States and Britain released declassified pieces of intelligence exposing various G.R.U. plans to create a false pretext for Russia’s invasion.
Despite the risk-taking reputation of the G.R.U., U.S. and European security officials said Russia was treading somewhat carefully with its sabotage. It wants to draw attention to the mysterious fires, but not so much attention that it would be directly blamed.
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a former U.S. intelligence official, said Russia’s plan might be to weaken European resolve. While that outcome may be doubtful, she said it was important for Europe and the United States to come together to respond to the sabotage campaign.
“Russia’s strategy is one of divide and conquer,” said Ms. Kendall-Taylor, now a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. “Right now, it’s not a very costly strategy for Russia because we are all responding separately. That is why it is important that over time, we collectivize the response.”
Hoping to do just that, British and other European diplomats have been pressing countries to call out Russian covert operations more aggressively.
A NATO mobilization exercise last month in Frankenberg, Germany. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has appeared intent on not expanding the war into NATO territory. Credit...Laetitia Vancon for The New York Times
One of the first of the recent sabotage acts attributed to Russia was a March fire at a warehouse in London. Authorities say the warehouse was connected with the effort to supply Ukraine but have provided few details.
Security officials briefed on the incident said G.R.U. operatives used a Russian diplomatic building in Sussex, England, to recruit locals to carry out the arson. Four British men have been charged with arson in the attack, and one of them has been charged with assisting a foreign intelligence service.
In response, Britain expelled a Russian military officer working for intelligence services and closed several Russian diplomatic buildings, including the G.R.U. operations center in Sussex.
The use of local recruits, security officials said, has been a hallmark of the recent sabotage campaign. U.S. and European officials said that is partly to make attacks more difficult to detect, and to make them appear to be the result of domestic opposition to supporting Ukraine.
Sabotage acts by Russia in Europe are not unknown. In 2014, Russian military intelligence blew up an ammunition depot in the Czech Republic, although the country did not publicly blame Russia until seven years later.
European governments expelled Russian spies from their capitals after a former Russian intelligence officer was poisoned in Salisbury, England, in 2018 and again following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The expulsions dramatically curtailed Russia’s ability to mount attacks, said Max Bergmann, the director of the Europe, Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
“There has been a lot of disruption of Russian intelligence activities in Europe,” Mr. Bergmann said. “That caused a pause, and Russian intelligence was consumed by the war in Ukraine. Now they have their footing back and are probably trying to build back up.”
Since the invasion, Russia has appeared intent on not expanding the war into NATO territory. But Ms. Kendall-Taylor said Russia wanted to undermine the alliance and its support for Ukraine.
In the first part of the war, the Russian military performed poorly, and its intelligence agencies were too distracted to conduct covert operations in the West. But with its recent gains on the battlefield and a rebounding military industry, it has dedicated more resources to covert operations.
“They want to take the war to Europe, but they don’t want a war with NATO,” Ms. Kendall-Taylor said. “So they are doing all these things that are short of conventional attacks.”
Forging a proper response, however, will be difficult. The United States and Europe have already imposed sanctions on Russia and expelled Russian spies.
“We are in a very delicate situation because things are already on edge, the Kremlin is already paranoid,” Mr. Bergmann said. “So Western leaders have to tread very carefully with how they respond.”
Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades. More about Julian E. Barnes
See more on: Russia-Ukraine War, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
The New York Times · by Julian E. Barnes · May 26, 2024
11. Three Times Faster and Cheaper: Russia Outpaces West in Artillery Shell Production
Three Times Faster and Cheaper: Russia Outpaces West in Artillery Shell Production - Sky News
by Kyiv Post | May 26, 2024, 1:54 pm
kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · May 26, 2024
According to an analysis shared with Sky News, despite Ukraine's Western allies' larger combined economies, they are currently lagging behind Russia in shell production rates.
by Kyiv Post | May 26, 2024, 1:54 pm
Photo: illustrative / AFP
Russian enterprises are now producing artillery shells three times faster and at a quarter of the cost compared to the United States and European Union countries, Sky News reports, citing Bain Consulting Company analysis.
Despite Ukraine's Western allies' larger combined economies, they are currently lagging behind Russia in shell production rates.
Bain forecasts indicate that in 2024, Russia will produce approximately 4.5 million artillery shells, whereas the EU and the USA together will produce around 1.3 million.
Additionally, Russian 152-millimeter shells are significantly cheaper to produce than the Western 155-millimeter versions.
The disparity in shell production has not gone unnoticed by Ukrainian military personnel.
Russian forces are able to fire five shells for every one fired by Ukraine, a situation that has forced Ukrainian troops to become more efficient in their targeting, using fewer shells to achieve their objectives.
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The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) first ran short of artillery ammunition in April 2022 and since then has suffered chronic shell shortages.
By late 2023 the shortages were crippling and by most accounts, Russian guns were outshooting Ukrainian by five to one
Ukrainian gunners for the first time in months appear to have had enough artillery shells to take on big Russian ground attacks, but supplies are still limited and long-promised Western ammunition deliveries are only just starting to show up at the front.
Other Topics of Interest
US President reaffirms his position on Ukraine: support will continue, but no American boots on the ground.
Russian armored columns attacking during May struck Ukrainian defenses supported by gunners with shells available to shoot back – as had widely not been the case for some time – on battlefields across the front, a Kyiv Post review of open-source combat data found.
Ukrainian artillerymen in the Kharkiv, Donbas and Zaporizhzhia sectors appeared to be dropping shell concentrations onto Russian tanks and armored personnel vehicles as attack columns drove into mine fields or constricted locations, battlefield accounts from both sides of the fighting.
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Massive bombardments lasting hours, a preferred Russian tactic since invading Ukraine in February 2022, were not visibly attempted by Ukrainian forces during the recent attacks.
12. PRC Military Drills near Taiwan (State Department Press Statement)
I am on the mailing list for DOS press statements, etc. But this one did not come via email. I wonder why? Why aren't we taking a stronger position on these "exercises?" What if the PLA "pulled the trigger" during these exercises and decided to assault Taiwan in some way? Has the ability of the PLA to "surround" Taiwan created a new "red line?" Does this mean the PLA can now surround Taiwan with ships and planes and expect no serious reaction from the US and the international community?
PRC Military Drills near Taiwan
PRESS STATEMENT
MATTHEW MILLER, DEPARTMENT SPOKESPERSON
MAY 25, 2024
https://www.state.gov/prc-military-drills-near-taiwan/
The United States is deeply concerned over the People’s Liberation Army joint military drills in the Taiwan Strait and around Taiwan. We are monitoring PRC activities closely and coordinating with allies and partners regarding our shared concerns.
We strongly urge Beijing to act with restraint. Using a normal, routine, and democratic transition as an excuse for military provocations risks escalation and erodes longstanding norms that for decades have maintained peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, which is critical for regional and global security and prosperity and a matter of international concern.
The United States remains committed to its longstanding one China policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances.
13. War Correspondence while Asian
I really like the war reporting of Tim Mak. I have been following him for some months now.
This is something different than his normal reporting though this excerpt is something we should all think about:
I had applied American expectations to Ukrainian reality – and in this case, I had been wrong.
I think about that a lot, about my experiences with race – growing up in Canada, and then spending most of my adult life in the U.S. – and how it’s shaped the way I see the world.
...
But here’s where we get back to Ukraine: Over the past two years, I’ve traveled to nearly every corner of this country. There are very, very few Asians in Ukraine – which means that there are not really stereotypes for Asians in Ukraine.
Ironically, this unfamiliarity with Asians has been totally liberating. When people meet up with me, I’m a blank slate. I’m very obviously not Ukrainian, but people make no presumptions about who I must be based on what I look like.
What’s freeing is that I get to write my own story. When I tell people I’m a journalist and former soldier, I don’t get raised eyebrows – “that makes sense,” I’m told in Ukraine.
My presence is unusual – which I’m happy to be – but there is no prejudice around it, such as when a child in Kyiv came walking up, pointed right at me, and shouted to his friend, “Oh my God!” before running away.
I wasn’t offended – he was only expressing how rare it is to see people like me.
...
That essay is not to say there is no racial prejudice at all in Ukraine – I’ve contributed to reporting about when it has reared its ugly head. Nor is it to say that there aren’t times where ignorance about Asians has its downsides.
But I have to say, after spending the last fifteen years in the United States being defined by my race time after time, my experience in Ukraine has been utterly refreshing.
War Correspondence while Asian
https://www.counteroffensive.news/p/war-correspondence-while-asian?utm
During a talk I gave recently at the Munk School in Toronto, I was asked how being Asian has given me a different perspective on war reporting. For AAPI heritage month, here’s a glimpse into that:
TIM MAK
MAY 26, 2024
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Editor’s note: As I like to say, party like every month is Asian American Pacific Islander Heritage Month!
These personal essays are almost always behind a paywall – please upgrade now to read on!
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I was in the central Ukrainian town of Dnipro, walking along a major thoroughfare, when someone shouted out:
“Ni Hao!”
My fists clenched. I prepared for a confrontation – after all, in the United States, this is the sort of street harassment that many Asian Americans are used to.
I whipped around… and saw myself square in front of a Chinese person, from China.
Far from being a taunt, this Mandarin-speaking man was simply using the only language he knew. Using Google Translate and the various Mandarin words I knew, we had a friendly chat about how he came to be in Dnipro, then parted ways amicably.
I had applied American expectations to Ukrainian reality – and in this case, I had been wrong.
My interlocutor in Dnipro poses for a photo after a friendly conversation.
I think about that a lot, about my experiences with race – growing up in Canada, and then spending most of my adult life in the U.S. – and how it’s shaped the way I see the world.
In Canada, I grew up in a very multicultural city: Vancouver. It’s a hub for world trade, and its residents reflect this. I played American football growing up, and the team was as diverse as the school – the quarterback was Persian, the wide receivers were East Asian, the linebackers were a smattering of white and Black and South Asian.
Due to the pedestrian nature of diversity in a multicultural city, not much was made about race when I was growing up. Sure, there would be occasional tension, but socioeconomic status felt like a much bigger dividing line.
It wasn’t until I moved to the United States in 2009, the same week Barack Obama was inaugurated, that I felt just how central race was to American life.
In America, race was and is a defining factor in the way that people are categorized and remembered; a primary reason that people point to when it comes to inequality and mistreatment; and it dominates social conversations in many different arenas.
I have, of course, been Asian my whole life. But I never felt more defined by my Asianness than when I moved to the United States.
One of the biggest chips on my shoulder for my entire professional career is that no one in America looks at me – bespectacled and with the physical features I sport – and says, “that guy must be an Army combat medic, an investigative journalist, and a surfer!”
Instead, when people guess what I am, they usually say I’m probably a computer engineer or work in finance.
How I’d prefer you to see me.
It’s also been a mixed blessing in that most Asians look younger than the age that they’re at. There’s a jokey phrase for it: ‘Asian don’t raisin.’ I can see your eyes rolling – how could looking young be a downside?
In the professional world, however, it means that you’re constantly underestimated, you’re presumed to be inexperienced, and you have to fight for every career opportunity.
For years, the four Asian American male journalists who worked in politics in Washington, D.C. would get together and swap stories about how we were misidentified for one another. We once even sat for a photo together to ensure people wouldn’t mix us up. It still happens regularly.
From left to right: Journalists Byron Tau, Tim Mak, Asawin Suebsaeng and Brian Fung.
But here’s where we get back to Ukraine: Over the past two years, I’ve traveled to nearly every corner of this country. There are very, very few Asians in Ukraine – which means that there are not really stereotypes for Asians in Ukraine.
Ironically, this unfamiliarity with Asians has been totally liberating. When people meet up with me, I’m a blank slate. I’m very obviously not Ukrainian, but people make no presumptions about who I must be based on what I look like.
What’s freeing is that I get to write my own story. When I tell people I’m a journalist and former soldier, I don’t get raised eyebrows – “that makes sense,” I’m told in Ukraine.
My presence is unusual – which I’m happy to be – but there is no prejudice around it, such as when a child in Kyiv came walking up, pointed right at me, and shouted to his friend, “Oh my God!” before running away.
I wasn’t offended – he was only expressing how rare it is to see people like me.
A screenshot from Laurel Chor’s website, showcasing some of her work.
“There's not really many preconceptions about being Asian or where I'm from. It's just kind of just like, ‘okay, you're from somewhere I don't know anything about,’” explained Laurel Chor, a photojournalist from Hong Kong who has extensively reported in Ukraine. “I think in Ukraine, it's really just more like you're not from here.”
And there are other personal attributes that may be more outstanding: Chor said that being a woman marked her experience in Ukraine far more than her race.
"Gender is more like something I would deal with than race," agreed Asami Terajima, a Japanese journalist who works for the Kyiv Independent covering the frontlines.
She explained that she occasionally does mistakenly get called Chinese – anyone Asian here is considered Chinese, she notes – but that prejudice becomes more distant as you approach the frontline trenches. In the Donbas region, she told me, solidarity exists regardless of race or background because survival is the central goal.
A look at Asami’s profile on the Kyiv Independent.
And when she tells people she is Japanese, Asami is usually greeted with positive reactions – people telling her how much they admire Japanese culture, or want to visit there someday.
That essay is not to say there is no racial prejudice at all in Ukraine – I’ve contributed to reporting about when it has reared its ugly head. Nor is it to say that there aren’t times where ignorance about Asians has its downsides.
But I have to say, after spending the last fifteen years in the United States being defined by my race time after time, my experience in Ukraine has been utterly refreshing.
NEWS OF THE DAY
Good morning to readers; Kyiv remains in Ukrainian hands.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE STALLING: The head of Kharkiv's government told the BBC that the Russian plan was to take the border town of Vovchansk within two days, and reach Kharkiv city within five days. The latest Russian offensive has since stalled near the border, but at great cost.
The Institute for the Study of War assessed that the Russian offensive caught the Ukrainians off guard, resulting in some tactical victories, but was also done with insufficient planning and before enough resources could be brought to bear. The earlier-than-expected offensive undermined their effort, the think tank claims.
Zelenskyy claimed that the ratio of Russian casualties to Ukrainian casualties was a staggering eight to one, highlighting Russia's disregard for the lives of its own troops.
…BUT PUTIN CONFIDENT IN HIS GRIP ON POWER: Putin is overseeing the largest overhaul of his defense ministry since the outbreak of full-scale war, seemingly secure in his political position as he starts a fifth term, the New York Times reports. Following the death (likely by assassination) of Yevgeny Prigozhin, Putin has moved to replace or arrest some of the people that Prigozhin had accused of corruption or incompetence.
RUSSIA STRIKES HARDWARE STORE IN KHARKIV: Fifteen are dead, and more than 40 people are injured after bombs hit the Epicentr hardware store in Kharkiv on Saturday, reports Reuters and the regional governor. An Epicentr is sort of like a Ukrainian Walmart. The mayor of Kharkiv said that around 120 people had been inside when the bombs hit. "This is clearly terrorism," he said.
POLISH JETS SCRAMBLE DUE TO WESTERN UKRAINE STRIKES: Russian attacks in Ukraine have led to Polish military aviation scrambling to ensure nothing crosses over into its territory. The latest incident highlights heightened tension along NATO’s eastern flank, and how quickly Russia’s belligerence could escalate to involve other countries.
Today’s Dog of War was snapped by Myroslava, who saw this pup with his pet parents at a rally where they were demonstrating in support of Ukrainian POWs.
Stay safe out there.
Best,
Tim
14. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 25, 2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2024
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces are increasingly contesting the tactical initiative in northern Kharkiv Oblast and characterized Russian operations in the area as defensive, although Russian forces are likely attempting to bring the Northern Grouping of Forces up closer to its reported planned end strength before possibly intensifying offensive operations in the area.
- The likely premature start of Russian offensive operations appears to have undermined Russian success in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
- Russian forces continue to leverage their sanctuary in Russian airspace to strike Kharkiv City to devastating effect, likely as part of efforts to depopulate the city and demoralize Ukrainians.
- Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities reportedly impacted the effectiveness of select Western weapon systems in Ukraine in 2023 as Ukraine and Russia continue to compete in a technical offense-defense race.
- Russian Ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov categorically rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy and outlined Russia's maximalist conditions for peace negotiations during an interview with Newsweek on May 25.
- Russia is likely helping North Korea develop its defense industrial base (DIB) in exchange for North Korean munitions supplies, and US officials reportedly assess that Russia may also be supplying North Korea with military equipment, weapons, or technology.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Donetsk City.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has cancelled its annual "Army Games" international competition for the second year in a row, prompting celebration among critical Russian ultranationalist milbloggers.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 25, 2024
May 25, 2024 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 25, 2024
Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan
May 25, 2024, time 7:20pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00pm ET on May 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces are increasingly contesting the tactical initiative in northern Kharkiv Oblast and characterized Russian operations in the area as defensive, although Russian forces are likely attempting to bring the Northern Grouping of Forces up closer to its reported planned end strength before possibly intensifying offensive operations in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 24 that Ukrainian forces are pushing Russian forces back from Ukrainian defenses in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[1] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces established "combat control" over an unspecified section of the border where Russian forces had initially crossed into northern Kharkiv Oblast following the start of Russian offensive operations on May 10.[2] A Ukrainian commander operating in the Lyptsi direction (north of Kharkiv City) stated that Ukrainian forces have completely stopped Russian offensive operations in the Strilecha-Hlyboke direction (north of Lyptsi) and that Ukrainian forces are now focused on regaining territory in the area.[3] The commander stated that Ukrainian forces are successfully pushing Russian forces out of captured positions but that Russian forces are saturating the area with manpower and equipment to prevent Ukrainian forces from seizing the tactical initiative.[4] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces have partially transitioned to the defensive in northern Kharkiv Oblast after consolidating captured positions and are currently focused on destroying reserves that Ukrainian forces have concentrated near Kharkiv City.[5] The milblogger assessed that Ukrainian forces would have to launch counterattacks in the area at the end of May 2024 to push Russian forces out of northern Kharkiv Oblast and that future Russian plans on this axis likely depend on the outcome of Ukrainian counterattacks.[6] Russian forces launched their offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast with limited manpower and have yet to commit significant reserves to the area, leading to a decreasing tempo of Russian advances and offensive operations.[7] This decreasing tempo is likely presenting Ukrainian forces with tactical opportunities to counterattack, although Ukrainian forces are not yet conducting a limited counteroffensive operation that aims to push Russian forces completely out of northern Kharkiv Oblast.
The disparate Russian elements currently operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Russian military's apparent hesitance to commit available reserves to fight suggests that Russian forces are likely attempting to bring the Northern Grouping of Forces up to its reported planned end strength before intensifying offensive operations and pursuing subsequent phases of the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces reportedly had roughly 35,000 personnel in the international border area as a part of the Northern Grouping of Forces when they started offensive operations on May 10, whereas Ukrainian sources had been indicating that the Russian military intends to concentrate a total of 50,000 to 70,000 personnel in the international border area.[8] Russian forces likely launched the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast earlier than intended with an understrength force hoping to establish a foothold before the arrival of resumed US military aid to the front made that task more difficult.[9] Ukrainian sources have identified elements of the 11th Army Corps [AC], 44th AC, and 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA] as the main elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces, and limited elements of these formations have participated in the offensive operation and have reportedly suffered significant casualties.[10] Zelensky stated in an interview published on May 25 that Russian forces have suffered an eight-to-one casualty ratio in northern Kharkiv Oblast in the past two weeks, although these losses do not appear to have forced the Russian military to commit significant reserves from the 11th AC, 44th AC, or 6th CAA to sustain Russian offensive operations in the area.[11]
Instead, Russian forces appear to be relying on limited elements of units that are part of various different force groupings in eastern Ukraine. Limited elements of the 47th Tank Division's 153rd Tank Regiment and 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and limited elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division's 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st GTA, MMD) are reportedly operating near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[12] Elements of the 47th Tank Division and the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division are currently heavily committed to intensified Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets previously reported that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces is "leasing" limited elements to the Northern Grouping of Forces.[13] Elements of a battalion of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division's 217th VDV Regiment are reportedly operating in a border area in Kursk Oblast, even though elements of the 217th VDV Regiment and other elements of the 98th VDV Division are participating in intensified assaults on Chasiv Yar's eastern outskirts.[14] Russian forces have either been attacking with an understrength 217th VDV Regiment in the Chasiv Yar area for some time or have recently transferred a battalion of the regiment to the Northern Grouping of Forces.
Russian forces are likely holding back reserves of the 11th AC, 44th AC, and 6th CAA in order to establish the Northern Grouping at closer to its intended end strength. The Russian military command may be waiting to intensify offensive operations and pursue a second phase of the operation because its plans require a grouping of 50,000 to 70,000 personnel strong. Russian forces likely intend to launch the second phase of their offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast following their intended seizure of Vovchansk, although positional fighting and possible Ukrainian counterattacks could require Russian forces to conduct another wave of intensified assaults in the area to complete the seizure of the settlement.[15] Russian forces currently aim to establish a "buffer zone" in northern Kharkiv Oblast and advance to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City, and it is unclear which goal a second phase of the operation will support or if Russian forces have a more ambitious operational objective in mind.[16] The Northern Grouping of Forces, even at the upper limit of its reported end strength, will lack the necessary manpower needed to conduct a successful operation to envelop, encircle, or seize Kharkiv City.
The likely premature start of Russian offensive operations appears to have undermined Russian success in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces reportedly managed to surprise Ukrainian forces on May 10 and made tactically significant gains in areas that Ukrainian officials reported were less defended.[17] The Ukrainian State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) announced on MAY 25 that it has launched an investigation into improperly prepared Ukrainian defenses in the area and the abandonment of Ukrainian positions in the Lyptsi and Vovchansk directions.[18] The SBI noted that this allowed Russian forces to advance to a second line of Ukrainian defenses in the area, although it appears that limited manpower prevented Russian forces from achieving a deeper penetration. While it is possible that the Russian military command thought the accumulation of a larger force would have alerted Ukrainian forces and prevented the opportunity for operational surprise, the Russian decision to not immediately introduce significant reserves likely prevented Russian forces from achieving rapid gains and a deeper penetration. Ukrainian forces have now established themselves at defensive positions in the area, and Russian forces have likely expended their tactical opportunity to make relatively rapid gains against lightly-held positions in this area.
Russian forces continue to leverage their sanctuary in Russian airspace to strike Kharkiv City to devastating effect, likely as part of efforts to depopulate the city and demoralize Ukrainians. Russian forces conducted four distinct missile and glide bomb strikes against Kharkiv City on May 25: a missile strike with an Iskander-M missile and S-300/S-400 air defense missiles against an educational facility just after midnight; a strike with two KAB precision-guided glide bombs against the Epicenter construction hypermarket in the city at around 1300; a strike with unspecified munitions against Central Park in Kharkiv City just after 1700; and a strike in a residential area in central Kharkiv City just after 1900.[19] The hypermarket strike sparked a fire that spread to more than 15,000 square meters and engulfed the entire hypermarket.[20] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that up to 200 people could have been in the hypermarket at the time of the strike, and Ukrainian officials have since confirmed that the Epicenter hypermarket strike has killed at least five people, injured at least 40 and that 16 are currently missing.[21] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov reported that the evening strike against a central Kharkiv residential area has injured at least 18 people.[22]
The Russian use of precision-guided bombs against civilian areas in Kharkiv City indicates that Russia likely intends for these strikes to scare Ukrainians into leaving the city. Russian forces have been heavily targeting Kharkiv City with missile strikes and glide bombs – often FAB and KAB bombs modified with glide modules frequently equipped with guidance systems – in recent weeks in part to force residents to flee.[23] Russian aircraft have conducted these strikes from their sanctuary in Russian territory without fear of Ukrainian air defenses due to Western constraints on Ukraine using Western-provided systems against military targets in Russian territory and airspace.[24] Russian forces will very likely continue these strikes as part of the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast as long as Western prohibitions prevent Ukrainian forces from adequately challenging the Russian military's sanctuary in Russian territory.
Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities reportedly impacted the effectiveness of select Western weapon systems in Ukraine in 2023 as Ukraine and Russia continue to compete in a technical offense-defense race. The Washington Post and the New York Times (NYT) reported on May 24 and 25, respectively, that senior Ukrainian military official sources and confidential Ukrainian military assessments described how Russian EW has previously decreased the effectiveness of Western weapons in Ukraine.[25] The NYT reported that the success rate of M982 Excalibur guided artillery shells fell from 55 percent to seven percent between January and August 2023 and that Ukrainian forces stopped using the shells.[26] Ukrainian forces also reportedly experienced issues with Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) guided munitions in early 2023.[27] US JDAM-ER manufacturers reportedly delivered more EW-resistant systems to Ukraine in May 2023, but Russian forces adapted their countermeasures, causing the JDAM-ER's success rate to drop to its lowest point in July 2023. The Washington Post noted, however, that the JDAM-ER's success rate was more than 60 percent for much of 2023. The Washington Post reported that the effectiveness of Ukraine's M30/M31 rockets for multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) also decreased but that the Ukrainian military assessment that the Washington Post reviewed did not discuss these issues. The NYT stated that Russian forces often deploy EW systems near headquarters and command centers, and Thomas Withington of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) told NYT that Ukrainian forces have focused on striking fixed Russian radars and other EW equipment, especially in occupied Crimea, in order to then strike Russian command posts and supply depots.[28] The Washington Post noted that the United States has the means to combat Russian EW jamming, stating that the US military would likely not experience the same issues with Russian EW since the United States has a more advanced air force and "robust" EW countermeasures.[29] Ukrainian forces have notably recently conducted successful ATACMS missile strikes on Russian targets in occupied Ukraine, including Crimea, suggesting that Ukrainian forces have been able to at least partially overcome Russian jamming and/or that Russian EW capabilities are not pervasive throughout all of occupied Ukraine.[30] Both the NYT and the Washington Post noted that Russia and Ukraine are engaged in an offense-defense race as both sides aim to adapt to the other's innovations – as ISW has frequently assessed.[31]
Russian Ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov categorically rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy and outlined Russia's maximalist conditions for peace negotiations during an interview with Newsweek on May 25.[32] Antonov denied Western statements that Russia is unwilling to negotiate with Ukraine and criticized these statements as a "deliberate attempt" to misrepresent reality. Antonov stated that any Russian-Ukrainian peace agreement must account for the battlefield situation and be signed by a "legitimate" Ukrainian leader, but that it is unclear who could sign such a document since Zelensky has "lost [his] legitimacy." ISW has previously noted that the Ukrainian constitution allows a sitting president to postpone elections and remain in office past the end of his term during times of martial law, which is currently in effect in Ukraine due to Russia's full-scale invasion.[33] Russian officials' focus on Zelensky's presidential term is only the latest talking point in the Kremlin's ongoing information operation to discredit Zelensky and frame any pro-Western Ukrainian government as illegitimate.[34] Antonov also dismissed the upcoming Ukrainian Peace Conference in Switzerland as meaningless and as part of a perceived Western effort to legitimize Zelensky's presidency.[35] Antonov threatened that Ukraine would lose much more territory if the United States continued to ignore Russia's peace proposals, highlighting the Kremlin's persistent belief that Russia could subvert Ukraine's interests and sovereignty by negotiating with the West.[36]
Antonov insinuated that Russia would reject any peace agreement predicated on the retreat or withdrawal of Russian forces from any part of occupied Ukraine, likely including recently occupied areas of Kharkiv Oblast.[37] Antonov claimed that Russia's constitution prohibits the external division of Russian territory and that Russia's "new federal subjects" — referring to the illegally annexed and occupied areas of Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — are now part of Russia's clearly marked border and thus cannot and should not return to Ukrainian control. Antonov's claim insinuates that Russian authorities have clearly determined the borders of the Ukrainian territory that Russia has illegally annexed, but occupation authorities have previously presented conflicting assessments of the extent of Russia's illegally annexed territory. Occupation authorities published conflicting maps in honor of the anniversary of Russia's illegal annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory in September 2023, with some maps showing the entirety of occupied Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts up to their administrative borders as claimed Russian territory and others showing claimed Russian territory extending roughly to the frontlines.[38] It is unlikely that the Kremlin has taken further steps to determine the boundaries of the Ukrainian territory it illegally annexed in September 2022, and it is unclear how the Kremlin envisions the previously and recently occupied areas of Kharkiv Oblast fitting into this framework. Official Russian statements continue to support ISW's assessment that Putin remains uninterested in meaningful negotiations and any peace agreement that would prevent him from pursuing the complete destruction of an independent Ukrainian state and the subjugation of the Ukrainian people.[39]
Russia is likely helping North Korea develop its defense industrial base (DIB) in exchange for North Korean munitions supplies, and US officials reportedly assess that Russia may also be supplying North Korea with military equipment, weapons, or technology. NBC reported on May 24 citing six senior US officials that the Biden administration is concerned that the Russian-North Korean relationship could help North Korea expand its nuclear capabilities.[40] US officials reportedly stated that Russia may push North Korea to conduct its "most provocative military actions in a decade" close to the US presidential election in November 2024. NBC reported that a senior US official stated that US intelligence officials assess that Russia is providing North Korea with nuclear submarine and ballistic missile technology in return for North Korea's provision of munitions to Russia. US officials reportedly assess that Russia may be helping North Korea develop a long-range ballistic missile that can re-enter the atmosphere with its payload intact — likely referring to the capability required to field an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). NBC noted, however, that US officials stated that they do not have an "entirely clear understanding" of what technology Russia is giving to North Korea as it is difficult to detect and track military technology exchanges. NBC reported that US officials also stated that North Korea may want Russian ballistic missile parts, aircraft, missiles, and armored vehicles and that Russia may help North Korea develop its own DIB. Known facts suggest that Russia is likely at least helping North Korea develop its DIB. Western officials previously stated that North Korea supplied Russia with more than one million artillery shells in 2023.[41] Although these shells are reportedly mostly old, North Korean authorities likely would have agreed to relinquish such a high quantity of munitions only if they thought they would be able to replenish their stockpiles in the near future.[42] North Korea's ability to produce such a high quantity of shells rapidly would likely require some level of Russian funding and assistance.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces are increasingly contesting the tactical initiative in northern Kharkiv Oblast and characterized Russian operations in the area as defensive, although Russian forces are likely attempting to bring the Northern Grouping of Forces up closer to its reported planned end strength before possibly intensifying offensive operations in the area.
- The likely premature start of Russian offensive operations appears to have undermined Russian success in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
- Russian forces continue to leverage their sanctuary in Russian airspace to strike Kharkiv City to devastating effect, likely as part of efforts to depopulate the city and demoralize Ukrainians.
- Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities reportedly impacted the effectiveness of select Western weapon systems in Ukraine in 2023 as Ukraine and Russia continue to compete in a technical offense-defense race.
- Russian Ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov categorically rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy and outlined Russia's maximalist conditions for peace negotiations during an interview with Newsweek on May 25.
- Russia is likely helping North Korea develop its defense industrial base (DIB) in exchange for North Korean munitions supplies, and US officials reportedly assess that Russia may also be supplying North Korea with military equipment, weapons, or technology.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Donetsk City.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has cancelled its annual "Army Games" international competition for the second year in a row, prompting celebration among critical Russian ultranationalist milbloggers.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Fighting continued near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) on May 25, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces retreated from unspecified positions near Lyptsi and that there are reports that Ukrainian forces in the area pushed Russian forces back towards Lukyantsi (northeast of Lyptsi).[43] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued assaults near Lypsti and Neskuchne (east of Lyptsi), and the Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Hlyboke (north of Lyptsi).[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are struggling to advance through lowlands north of Lyptsi that provide little concealment from elevated Ukrainian positions further south.[45] A Ukrainian intelligence officer operating in Kharkiv Oblast stated that Russian forces are conducting assaults in the Lyptsi direction with a large number of infantry and with support from extensive glide bomb strikes.[46]
Fighting continued near and within Vovchansk on May 25, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 150 meters near the Vovchansk Medical College in central Vovchansk and 300 meters deep near Tykhe (east of Vochansk), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[47] Russian forces continued assaults near Starytsya (west of Vovchansk), Vovchansk, and Tykhe.[48] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Vovchansk.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces destroyed another bridge across the Vovcha River near Tykhe and that Ukrainian forces are establishing pontoon bridges across the Vovcha River in the Vovchansk direction.[50] Elements of the Russian 153rd Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[51]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces reportedly advanced southeast of Kupyansk amid continued assaults along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on May 25. The Ukrainian General Staff acknowledged on May 24 that Russian forces achieved unspecified partial success near Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk) and Ivanivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[52] Russian sources claimed on May 25 that elements of the Russian 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) seized Ivanivka (southeast of Kupaynsk), although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer deep south of Berestove (southeast of Kupyansk) and that Russian forces control up to 70 percent of Berestove.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced 800 meters near Makiivka (southwest of Kreminna) and seized part of a road near Torske (west of Kreminna).[55] A Ukrainian intelligence officer operating in Kharkiv Oblast stated that Russian forces conduct surprise assaults on all-terrain vehicles in the Kupyansk direction.[56] Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Kyslivka, Novoselivka, Stelmakhivka; southwest of Svatove near Novoyehorivka, Druzhelyubivka, and Nevske; west of Kreminna near Terny, Yampolivka, and Torske; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area and Bilohorivka.[57]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Siversk direction near Vyimvka (south of Siversk) and near Verkhnokamyanske and Spirne (both southeast of Siversk).[58]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on May 25, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka; in eastern Chasiv Yar near the Kanal and Novyi microraions; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Shumy.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces achieved unspecified success near Klishchiivka and are trying to enter the Kanal Microraion from the south.[60] Elements of the Russian 17th Artillery Brigade (3rd Army Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[61]
Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Avdiivka on May 25, but there were no confirmed Russian advances in the area. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized Arkhanhelske, although ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of May 4.[62] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced 350 meters towards the ponds north of Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[63] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 24 that Russian forces achieved unspecified success east of Yevhenivka (northwest of Avdiivka).[64] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are clearing Netaylove (southwest of Avdiivka) and Umanske (west of Avdiivka).[65] Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka near Kalynove, Novooleksandrivka, Ocheretyne, Solovyove, Sokil, Novopokrovske, and Novoselivka Persha; west of Avdiivka near Umanske and Yasnobrodivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske and Netaylove.[66] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian ground attacks in the Pokrovsk (Avdiivka) direction increased threefold on May 25 compared to May 24.[67] Elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Sokil.[68]
Russian forces recently advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on May 25. Geolocated footage published on May 24 indicates that Russian forces advanced within Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[69] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced within Paraskoviivka (southwest of Donetsk City), near the central hospital in eastern Krasnohorivka, and 1.5 kilometers deep south of Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[70] ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka; southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka, Paraskoviivka, and Novomykhailivka; and southeast of Vuhledar near Volodymyrivka.[71] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps) are reportedly operating within Krasnohorivka, and elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District) are reporting operating near Kostyantynivka.[72]
Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka).[73]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces reportedly continued assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Robotyne and Novoandriivka (northeast of Robotyne) and northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne) on May 25.[74]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 25 that Russian forces conducted several unsuccessful assaults in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky.[75] A Ukrainian source denied recent claims that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Krynky.[76]
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian authorities released a large amount of water from the Dnipro Hydroelectric Power Plant's (DHPP) dam. Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo claimed on May 24 that Ukrainian authorities opened all of the DHPP's floodgates and released a large amount of water that could flood the islands in the Dnipro River Delta.[77] Russian milbloggers widely amplified Saldo's claim and claimed that there was a significant increase in the water level near Vasylivka in Zaporizhia Oblast and Sofiivka in Kherson Oblast, but that it will likely take several days to fully determine the consequences of the flooding.[78] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov denied Saldo's claim on May 25 and stated that the DHPP's flood gates are closed but that the dam's spillway gates are open and have been open since the March 22 Russian strike on the DHPP.[79] It is unclear why there would be a large release of water at this time if the dam's spillway gates have been open for several months. A Ukrainian source warned that increased Russian discussion of the DHPP indicates that Russian forces may conduct another strike on the DHPP or intensify hostilities in the Kherson direction.[80] Ukrainian officials and media did not comment on claims about flooding from the DHPP, and ISW is unable to independently verify the veracity of the Russian claims.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text.
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has cancelled its annual "Army Games" international competition for the second year in a row, prompting celebration among critical Russian ultranationalist milbloggers. Kremlin-sponsored outlet Izvestia reported on May 24 citing three sources familiar with the situation that the Russian MoD has decided not to hold the Army Games in 2024 and cited military experts who stated that Russia needs the materiel and manpower in Ukraine.[81] Izvestia noted that then-Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin stated in 2023 that Russia would only hold the Army Games competitions every other year in even years due to the Russian war in Ukraine. Russian milbloggers celebrated the cancellations, claiming that the competition's Tank Biathlon alone is a waste of materiel, requiring 90-100 vehicles each year and destroying roughly a tank regiment's worth of vehicles.[82] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Tank Biathlon event only tests individual tank crews' abilities to operate a tank and fire on stationary targets rather than tactical maneuvers that are effective on the battlefield.[83]
Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the JSC Tactical Missile Weapons Corporation in Korolev, Moscow Oblast on May 25, likely as part of ongoing efforts to mobilize the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and economy following the appointment of new Defense Minister Andrey Belousov.[84] Putin requested reports from the enterprise on the fulfillment of state contracts, the status of advance payments, and whether the enterprise has any unsolved issues.[85] Putin claimed that Russia has increased its ammunition production by more than 14 times, drones by four times, and armored weapons and vehicles by 3.5 times from 2021 to 2023. Putin emphasized that Russia must effectively use Russia's economy to ensure victory in Ukraine.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to test and deliver weapons and other military equipment with new technology for use in Ukraine. Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) received a batch of 9M333 anti-aircraft missiles allegedly capable of bypassing heat traps that aircraft use to avoid being struck.[86] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces are testing the "Oduvanchik" naval drone, which has a range of 220 kilometers, speed of 45 knots, and payload of 600 kilograms.[87] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are also testing a variant of the "Titan" special purpose vehicle manufactured with domestically-produced components rather than foreign-produced components.[88]
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)
ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of Russian-occupied areas today.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian ultranationalist mouthpieces portrayed a recent Ukrainian strike in Russia as escalatory, likely aimed at influencing Western debates about allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike within Russia. Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a drone strike against a Russian Voronezh-DM ground-based early warning radar system in Armavir, Krasnodar Krai on May 23, and geolocated imagery confirms damage to the system's southwest and southeast facing radars.[89] Russian milbloggers widely claimed that the West was involved or complicit in Ukraine's strike against the early detection radar system and broadly linked the system to Russia's nuclear capabilities.[90] Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and ultranationalist figure Dmitry Rogozin claimed that this strike was part of a longstanding US effort to degrade Russia's early warning detection capabilities and that the US will "fully answer" for Ukraine's "past and future crimes."[91] Ukrainian officials have not yet commented on the strike.
A prominent Russian milblogger continued on May 25 to portray ongoing NATO Steadfast Defender 2024 military exercises as Western efforts to expand control into Moldova and threaten Russia.[92] The milblogger reamplified this information operation immediately after prominent Kremlin officials claimed on May 24 that Moldova is losing its sovereignty and national identity to the West and that NATO is "dragging" Moldova into a military confrontation.[93] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin and its mouthpieces are attempting to destabilize Moldovan democracy and society, prevent Moldova's accession to the EU, and justify future hybrid or conventional military operations against Moldova.[94]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
15. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, May 25, 2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-25-2024
Key Takeaways:
- Gaza Strip: The IDF is moving “more deliberately” in Rafah, according to Israeli officers who recently left Rafah who spoke to the New York Times on May 25.
- Humanitarian Aid in the Gaza Strip: A US Army landing craft and part of the US-constructed pier in the Gaza Strip was swept away by waves to Ashdod, Israel.
- Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
- West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank on May 25.
- Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed one drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat, southern Israel.
IRAN UPDATE, MAY 25, 2024
May 25, 2024 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
Iran Update, May 25, 2024
Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Moore, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on May 25 and 26, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume on Monday, May 27, 2024.
Key Takeaways:
- Gaza Strip: The IDF is moving “more deliberately” in Rafah, according to Israeli officers who recently left Rafah who spoke to the New York Times on May 25.
- Humanitarian Aid in the Gaza Strip: A US Army landing craft and part of the US-constructed pier in the Gaza Strip was swept away by waves to Ashdod, Israel.
- Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
- West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank on May 25.
- Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed one drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat, southern Israel.
Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
- Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Jabalia on May 25. Three Israel Defense Forces (IDF) brigades are in Jabalia. The IDF Air Force killed a Hamas sniper team in the area who had fired at Israeli forces a few days earlier.[1] Palestinian militias claimed several attacks in the Beit Lahia area, north of Jabalia, indicating that the IDF is operating in some areas north of Jabalia refugee camp.[2]
The IDF 99th Division continued operations along the Netzarim corridor in southern Gaza City on May 25[3]
Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Rafah on May 25. The IDF has five brigades operating in Rafah.[4] Israeli forces located and destroyed tunnel shafts.[5] Palestinian militias engaged Israeli forces in the area using rocket propelled grenades, mortars, and rockets.[6]
The IDF is moving “more deliberately” in Rafah, according to Israeli officers who recently left Rafah who spoke to the New York Times on May 25.[7] The officers said that the IDF is using “less airpower and artillery, and fewer, smaller bombs,” which forces Israeli soldiers to clear urban areas on foot. An Israeli reserve soldier said that some Israeli forces are working near the border and others are moving into Rafah’s outskirts. This comment is largely consistent with CTP-ISW's current control of terrain assessment of reported Israeli clearing operations. The officers said that the four Hamas battalions in Rafah ”are not as well trained” as those in the northern Gaza Strip and “are not an urgent problem.” Israeli forces have described the ongoing fighting in the northern Gaza Strip around Jabalia are particularly intense.[8]
The Qatari prime minister, along with US and Israeli intelligence chiefs, agreed to resume ceasefire negotiations during a meeting in Paris on May 25.[9] Egypt did not have a representative at the meeting. An unspecified individual familiar with the talks said the meeting was “very successful” though there was no breakthrough.[10] The source said that despite Egypt’s reported actions in modifying the deal during the previous round of negotiations, Cairo will participate in the next round.[11] An Israeli media war correspondent said that Israel and the United States were disappointed with Egyptian mediators in the previous round of negotiations for unspecified reasons.[12] Egypt has dismissed Western reports that an Egyptian intelligence official secretly modified the most recent ceasefire deal before sending it to Hamas.[13] The correspondent observed that Egypt’s absence places the weight of negotiations on Qatar.[14]
A US Army landing craft and part of the US-constructed pier in the Gaza Strip was swept away by waves to Ashdod, Israel.[15] Ashdod’s Coastal Division assisted US forces on the scene.[16] Israeli media reported that a US military vessel was sailing toward the Gaza Strip when it detached from the chain of the leading ship guiding to its destination. Israeli media reported that a separate piece of the pier drifted to Ashdod. The United States has spent $320 million on the pier and deployed 1,000 soldiers and sailors to operate the pier. The pier is facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid.[17]
Palestinian militias did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on May 25. This marks the first day without such an attack since May 2.[18]
West Bank
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel
Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank on May 25.[19]
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Axis of Resistance objectives:
- Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
- Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
- Expel the United States from Syria
Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on May 24.[20]
Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
Iran and Axis of Resistance
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed one drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat, southern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on May 24.[21] Israeli officials have not commented at the time of this writing.
16. U.S. and allies move to tap frozen Russian funds despite Kremlin threats
U.S. and allies move to tap frozen Russian funds despite Kremlin threats
Kremlin officials have suggested retaliating by confiscating U.S. assets in Russia, although it’s unclear how much impact such measures could have.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/05/25/russia-assets-ukraine-yellen/?utm
By Jeff Stein
May 25, 2024 at 11:01 a.m. EDT
Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen, center, with Governor of the Bank of Italy Fabio Panetta, left, and Italian Minister of Economy and Finance Giancarlo Giorgetti on Friday at a G-7 meeting in Stresa, Italy. (Jessica Pasqualon/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)
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The United States and its Western allies took a key step Saturday toward using frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine’s war effort, moving closer to providing another key financial stream for Kyiv.
Russian officials have suggested they could retaliate by confiscating U.S. and European assets in Russia, although it’s unclear how much impact such measures could have.
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Meeting in northern Italy this week, the top financial officials of the Group of Seven nations agreed in a joint statement to tap the investment returns of “immobilized Russian sovereign assets” to support Ukraine. The Kremlin has been blocked from accessing hundreds of billions of dollars held in Western financial institutions after invading Ukraine in 2022, and European and U.S. officials have for months debated whether or how to unlock these funds to help fight off the invasion.
Russia has roughly $280 billion in sovereign assets stashed in Western financial institutions, the majority of which is held by European firms. Those funds are now frozen under the U.S.-led sanctions effort.
Under the emerging plan, the Western allies would essentially use the interest and other investment returns accruing on these assets to pay themselves back for money they give to Ukraine in the near term. The exact amount of the money that could be raised this way could vary, depending on interest rates and other financial conditions, and finance leaders are working out a thicket of complicated legal and financial questions.
Western leaders believe the plan could yield as much as $50 billion in short-term or medium-term funding for Ukraine, although key details need to be worked out. President Biden and other heads of state will aim to ratify the plan during subsequent meetings of the G-7 in Italy this June. Congress last month approved $95 billion in foreign military aid after a months-long logjam caused by House Republicans, but Ukraine’s supporters are eyeing other funding streams to buttress Kyiv’s considerable long-term financial needs.
“We are making progress in our discussions on potential avenues to bring forward the extraordinary profits stemming from immobilized Russian sovereign assets to the benefit of Ukraine, consistent with international law and our respective legal systems,” the statement says.
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Initially, Ukraine’s boosters called for confiscating and transferring the entire pool of Russian sovereign assets to Kyiv. That plan was scuttled, however, as Germany, France, and other U.S. allies had expressed unease about a plan that they feared could compromise the financial stability of the euro zone by leading investors to put their money elsewhere. The new plan would leave Russia’s underlying assets untouched. The European Union voted earlier this month as well to move forward with using the profits of the frozen Russian assets.
Russia has strongly condemned all attempts to confiscate or repurpose its financial assets as a violation of international law. President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on Thursday authorizing the confiscation of assets held by U.S. citizens and companies in Russia, in response to the West’s proposal.
“We can see they are being careful, they understand the potential danger of such decisions and the potential consequences for themselves which are inevitable. That is why they have gone for the smaller option,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters earlier this week, according to Reuters. “But even the smaller option is to us nothing less than expropriation.”
But hundreds of U.S. and European firms have already pulled out of the country in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the sanctions imposed afterward. Of the more than 1,600 international firms operating in Russia before the invasion, roughly 400 remain, with only 30 U.S.-based firms still operating there, according to Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, a professor at the Yale School of Management. Sonnenfeld called the Kremlin’s threat “inconsequential.”
Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen has led U.S. efforts to persuade European allies to use the seized sovereign Russian assets in some way, pointing to Kyiv’s long-term funding needs and the hundreds of billions of dollars in estimated damages Moscow’s war has caused its neighbor. The funds could also help ensure Ukraine has access to Western support even if Biden loses the presidential election this November.
“This is an assured source of financing,” Yellen told reporters earlier in the week. “It’s important that Russia realize that we will not be deterred from supporting Ukraine for lack of resources.”
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By Jeff Stein
Jeff Stein is the White House economics reporter for The Washington Post. He was a crime reporter for the Syracuse Post-Standard and, in 2014, founded the local news nonprofit the Ithaca Voice in Upstate New York. He was also a reporter for Vox. Twitter
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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