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Quotes of the Day:
"Their sacrifice was great, their dedication was complete, and their courage was unwavering."
– Unknown
"Our flag does not fly because the wind moves it. It flies with the last breath of each soldier who died protecting it."
– Unknown
"Freedom makes a huge requirement of every human being. With freedom comes responsibility."
– Eleanor Roosevelt
1. Hegseth Highlights Importance of Remembering Korean War
2. S. Korean candidate Kim Moon-soo backs Trump summit with Kim Jong Un: adviser
3. Lee Jae-myung vows to work to better North Korean human rights, eyeing moderates
4. Could America Lose South Korea to Communist China?
5. Indo-Pacific Crossroads: Indonesia, Singapore, And South Korea
6. South Korea’s Presidential Frontrunner Calls Himself a Pragmatist. Skeptics Aren’t Convinced.
7. Koreans, Heading to the Polls to Elect a New President, Worry That Trump Will Pull Some American Forces
8. North Korea arrests more officials in capsized warship probe: State media
9. North Korea using balloons to salvage doomed warship: Analyst
10.Exclusive: South Korean AI spots North Korean warship capsize in near real time
11. N. Korea pursues unofficial technology transfer to upgrade key western port
12. Well-connected students use propaganda troupes to dodge N. Korean farm labor
13. N. Korean TV drama criticizing farm officials sparks mixed reactions among viewers
14. The Rise of AI Manufacturing in China and South Korea
15. Independence fighter's bust to remain at military academy after relocation row
16. Investigation into SK Telecom data breach expands to KT, LG Uplus, Naver, Kakao: sources
17. Court to hold 1st preparatory hearing of ex-President Moon's trial next month
1. Hegseth Highlights Importance of Remembering Korean War
Photos at the link: https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4197116/hegseth-highlights-importance-of-remembering-korean-war/
Hegseth Highlights Importance of Remembering Korean War
May 25, 2025 | By David Vergun, DOD News |
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth began Memorial Day weekend by joining his children and others Saturday to clean the statues and markers at the Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington.
Hegseth said the effort was more than a cleanup — it was a chance to educate a new generation about the sacrifices made by Americans during the Korean War and other conflicts.
"It gave me a moment to remind the kids about the Korean War — what was it, why did it matter, what the strategic environment was, who were we fighting, how many people we lost, and why are we still there," he said. "All of those conversations that otherwise may not come up around a dinner table."
He said he hopes this encourages families across the country to take similar opportunities to reflect and discuss the meaning of Memorial Day.
"We have to very intentionally infuse it into the minds and hearts and souls of young kids so that they understand why it's special — and want to pass it [along] as well," Hegseth said.
Veterans Affairs Secretary Douglas A. Collins also attended the event.
2. S. Korean candidate Kim Moon-soo backs Trump summit with Kim Jong Un: adviser
The candidates are courting opposition voters. The liberal voters want engagement with the north and conservative voters want a good relationship with President Trump. Candidate Kim is trying to influence both.
World News May 26, 2025 / 5:35 AM
S. Korean candidate Kim Moon-soo backs Trump summit with Kim Jong Un: adviser
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/05/26/Kim-Moon-soo-Trump-Kim-Jong-Un-summit-presidential-candidate-support-foreign-policy/3221748249200/
By Thomas Maresca
1 of 3 | Policy advisor Kim Hyung-suk said Monday that People Power Party presidential candidate Kim Moon-soo would support a summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Photo by Thomas Maresca/UPI
SEOUL, May 26 (UPI) -- Conservative South Korean presidential candidate Kim Moon-soo would ''proactively support" a summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un if elected, a key policy adviser said Monday.
Kim Hyung-suk, co-chair of the Unification and Foreign Affairs Committee of the candidate's People Power Party, made the remark during a briefing with foreign media in downtown Seoul. South Korea's presidential election will be held on June 3, with Kim trailing liberal frontrunner Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party in polls.
"If Mr. Trump seeks to re-engage with Kim Jong Un on talks of denuclearization [and] addressing peace and prosperity issues on the Korean Peninsula ... [Kim Moon-soo] will proactively support the communication between the two," Kim said.
"We [would] respect and highly approve of their communications," he added.
The White House has not prioritized North Korea in its foreign policy agenda since Trump returned to office, but there has been speculation that the president may look to revive nuclear negotiations with Kim Jong Un.
During Trump's first term, the two leaders held a pair of high-profile summits and met briefly a third time at the DMZ. The diplomatic outreach failed to result in a nuclear deal, however, and Pyongyang has accelerated the development of its weapons programs in the intervening years.
At the beginning of April, Trump told reporters in the Oval Office that there has been communication with North Korea and that the two sides would "probably do something at some point."
"I have a very good relationship with [Kim]," Trump said. "I think it's very important. He's a big nuclear nation and he's a very smart guy."
Relations between the two Koreas have deteriorated dramatically in recent years, with Pyongyang officially designating the South a "hostile state" in a 2024 constitutional revision.
On Monday, Kim Hyung-suk said that a Kim Moon-soo administration would aim to "normalize inter-Korean relations" while maintaining Washington and Seoul's longtime stance calling for North Korea to dismantle its nuclear arsenal.
"The Kim Moon-soo administration will consistently strive for a phased and actionable solution for the complete denuclearization of North Korea in close cooperation with the Trump administration," he said.
The policy adviser added that Kim is eager to engage with North Korea and is making outreach plans with or without involvement from the Trump administration.
"As we know, President Trump is very busy these days due to a long list of different engagements internationally," Kim said. "I don't think we can wait years and years for the two to meet. In order to bring North Korea to the table, we are going to actively pursue communication, whether it be three-party or two-party."
Kim's opponent in the election, Lee Jae-myung, also voiced his support for engaging with North Korea while on the campaign trail Monday, but called the prospect of his own summit with Kim Jong Un "very difficult."
Lee announced a campaign pledge on Monday to improve inter-Korean communications, including restoring a military hotline that North Korea has not responded to since 2023, but said that a face-to-face meeting with Kim would pose a challenge.
"It is something that should obviously be done, but I am not sure if it would be possible," he told reporters at Ajou University in Suwon, south of Seoul. "It would be very difficult in the current situation."
3. Lee Jae-myung vows to work to better North Korean human rights, eyeing moderates
Lee the pragmatist.
Lee Jae-myung vows to work to better North Korean human rights, eyeing moderates
South Korean presidential frontrunner also pledges to help separated families and defectors, pursue talks with Pyongyang
https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/lee-jae-myung-vows-to-work-to-better-north-korean-human-rights-eyeing-moderates/
Joon Ha Park May 26, 2025
Democratic Party presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung answers questions during a press conference at the party’s election committee headquarters in Seoul on May 25, 2025. | Image: Lee Jae-myung via YouTube
South Korean presidential frontrunner Lee Jae-myung pledged to pursue tangible improvements in North Korean human rights and work to increase assistance for those affected by the division of the peninsula, including separated families and defectors, a move that one expert characterized as a calculated shift to appeal to moderate and conservative voters.
In a social media post on Monday, the Democratic Party (DP) candidate said his administration would work to enhance humanitarian assistance and improve policies for separated families, abductees, former South Korean prisoners of war, North Korean defectors and others impacted by inter-Korean division.
Lee also reaffirmed his commitment to renewing dialogue with Pyongyang and restoring communication channels, similar to his past pledges. He wrote that his administration would strive to “pursue a Korean Peninsula that coexists through deescalation and nuclear-free peace.”
“The North Korean denuclearization process has been stalled for too long, while the North’s nuclear and missile capabilities continue to grow. This situation can no longer be ignored,” the main opposition DP candidate wrote, emphasizing that meaningful progress requires close coordination with Washington and the wider international community.
At a separate event on Monday morning, Lee also addressed the possibility of an inter-Korean summit if elected president.
“It’s something that must be done, but I’m not sure it will be possible,” he said.
However, Lee noted that U.S. President Donald Trump continues to express interest in meeting North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, emphasizing that South Korea should actively support and cooperate with any progress.
He also dismissed the concerns that South Korea could be sidelined in future U.S.-North Korea negotiations, arguing that Seoul’s role remains essential.
Lim Eul-chul, a professor at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies, told NK News that Lee’s latest announcement reflects a “calculated political move” to incorporate traditionally conservative human rights priorities to appeal to centrist and right-leaning voters.
Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump shaking hands ahead of the first-ever U.S.-DPRK summit in Singapore | Image: Dan Scavino Jr. (June 12, 2018)
POLICIES FOR ROK DEFENSE AND FOREIGN RELATIONS
With just over a week until voters cast their ballots, Lee also outlined a broad vision for strengthening South Korea’s national defense and revitalizing key diplomatic alliances.
“We will enhance the U.S.-ROK extended deterrence system and our three-axis defense strategy, maintaining a strong combined posture to counter North Korea’s asymmetric capabilities,” Lee wrote in Monday’s social media post.
His defense agenda builds on his official policy pledges released on May 12, including pursuing the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) of ROK troops from the U.S. to South Korea.
Lee also pledged to reshape the South Korean military into an “invincible, smart force” by integrating advanced technologies like AI and modernizing military strategy, operations and equipment. He said these reforms are essential to addressing challenges posed by declining troop numbers.
On alliance relations, Lee emphasized a commitment to restoring trust in the U.S.-ROK alliance, which he claimed was damaged by the “illegal martial law plans under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration.”
The DP candidate also voiced strong support on Monday for deepening trilateral cooperation with Washington and Tokyo, calling the latter “an important partner.”
Regarding China, Lee acknowledged its role as a key trading partner and influential player in Korean Peninsula security, promising to manage the relationship with Beijing “stably and pragmatically” while noting ties had “deteriorated significantly” under Yoon.
On Russia, he said the Ukraine war has entered a new phase and vowed to manage relations with Moscow based on ROK national interests — a statement that implies avoiding strident criticism of Russia’s invasion to protect South Korean businesses and sustain economic exchange.
At the same time, he expressed support for Ukraine’s reconstruction, while reaffirming his commitment to strengthening South Korea’s security and economic opportunities.
Meanwhile, ruling People Power Party (PPP) candidate Kim Moon-soo, who is trailing Lee in the latest polls, has laid out a more assertive military and security agenda centered on enhancing Seoul’s nuclear deterrence capabilities against Pyongyang.
He vowed to use nuclear weapons to counter North Korean weapons of mass destruction, including the development of indigenous nuclear-powered submarines and the possible redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula.
Kim also called for a major upgrade to South Korea’s three-axis defense system, pledging to expand the country’s low-altitude missile defense project into a broader “Sky Dome” system and accelerate the development of laser-based interceptors. Under the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation strategy, he emphasized securing sufficient ballistic missile stockpiles and enhancing counterstrike capabilities.
Edited by Alannah Hill
4. Could America Lose South Korea to Communist China?
Of course we would like to wave this away as being too far-fetched. But two points. I know many Koreans who are afraid of this coming true. And most importantly, China's United Front Work Department is actively engaged in subversion to make this come true. This is exactly the type of conditions China is trying to create. Of course the best case is that Korea does come under China's sphere of influence. But if not, the next best thing is the political divide in Korea is worsened and this creates a dilemma for the US. Chinese subversion of South Korea is a wise investment for the CCP.
Could America Lose South Korea to Communist China?
In the left’s upside-down worldview, Beijing is no longer seen as a threat — but as a model of post-Western order.
DAVID EUNKOO KIM
Published: May. 25, 2025 03:14 AM ETUpdated: May. 25, 2025 08:43 AM ET
nysun.com
South Korea stands at a critical political crossroads. The impeachment of the pro-American conservative president, Yoon Suk-yeol, has triggered a snap presidential election on June 3, which will decide whether the country will continue its strategic alignment with the United States, or become Communist China’s satellite state.
South Korea is now locked in an ideological crisis. Postmodernism and cultural Marxism have penetrated the nation’s core institutions. These ideas have found political shelter within the leftist Democratic Party of Korea.
At the heart of this ideological subversion, there is a calculated revision of history. The South Korean left promotes the idea that the Republic of Korea was a betrayal, engineered by pro-Japanese collaborators and propped up by American imperialism.
South Korea’s main opposition Democratic Party leader, Lee Jae-myung, bottom center, at Seoul on December 7, 2024. The signs read ‘Punish the rebellion leader.’ AP/Ahn Young-joon
This narrative assigns moral legitimacy to North Korea, portraying the regime as the “true Korea,” supposedly forged in resistance against foreign domination. Never mind Pyongyang’s record of tyranny, famine, and forced labor — the myth of anti-imperialist purity prevails.
These distorted narratives function as political weapons. By undermining the Republic’s moral foundation, they sow anti-Americanism and pave the way to sympathy toward Communist China. In this upside-down worldview, China is no longer seen as a threat — but as a model of post-Western order. That illusion is not only false — it is dangerous.
The leftist DPK presidential candidate, Lee Jae-myung, advocates for improving relations with China and criticized the “inequality” of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, making him a prominent pro-China politician. Lee advocates for “autonomous and balanced diplomacy centered on national interests.”
He even mentioned that, if elected, he would cancel the deployment of an advanced American anti-ballistic missile defense system and take wartime operational control of South Korean forces. Mr. Lee embraces a dangerous revisionist interpretation of Korean history — one that casts doubt on the very legitimacy of the Republic itself, absolves the violent legacy of communism, and promotes anti-American resentment.
North Korea’s Kim Jong Un at a launching ceremony of what is says a new nuclear attack submarine ‘Hero Kim Kun Ok’ on September 6, 2023. Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP
The roots of this revisionist impulse run deep. Many within the DPK are not only ideological heirs of the South Korean Workers’ Party but are connected to it by lineage. President Roh Moo-hyun’s father-in-law, Kwon Oh-seok, was a lifelong unrepentant communist and political prisoner. These are not mere coincidences — they reflect a clear line of ideological continuity between Korea’s radical past and its contemporary political elite.
If America and its allies fail to recognize how historical narratives are being weaponized to undermine the moral foundation of free societies, they will forfeit critical ground — not only in Korea, but across the broader fight for truth in the Indo-Pacific.
The DPK’s embrace of revisionist history has translated into real-world deference to authoritarian regimes, most notably China. Under President Moon Jae-in, Seoul announced the “Three No’s” policy in 2017: no additional American ballistic missile deployments, no integration into an American-led missile defense system, and no trilateral military alliance with the United States and Japan. In effect, the policy conceded strategic leverage to Beijing.
The consequences have been more than symbolic. In late 2024, South Korea’s Board of Audit and Inspection uncovered evidence that sensitive details about the anti-ballistic missile deployment may have been leaked to China during Mr. Moon’s presidency. This revelation followed Mr. Moon’s 2017 pledge at Peking University to support China’s so-called “national dream” — a message that sent a clear signal of alignment rather than neutrality.
A North Korean guard post near the truce village of Panmunjom inside the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, July 19, 2022. Kim Hong-Ji/pool via AP
On the ground, the situation is even more alarming. Chinese nationals have repeatedly been caught photographing sensitive South Korean and American military installations – ranging from United States Navy assets at Busan to the headquarters of South Korea’s intelligence agency. Yet under current law, espionage is defined exclusively in relation to the “enemy state,” which is North Korea. Efforts to revise the law to include other hostile foreign actors were blocked — and notably, by the DPK.
As a result, those caught gathering intelligence for China face, at most, a fine or deportation. There is no real deterrent. Critics call it what it truly is: passive collusion.
Meanwhile, Chinese state-run outlets such as Global Times and CCTV fear the victory of conservative People Power Party’s presidential candidate Kim Moon-soo and portrayed instead the DPK presidential candidate, Mr. Lee, as a friendly and reliable figure in South Korean politics — coverage that, in China’s tightly controlled media environment, is rarely incidental.
If Washington ignores China’s influence in South Korea, it risks losing not just a partner — but the geopolitical anchor of democracy in Northeast Asia.
_______
This piece was adapted from a report published by the Middle East Media Research Institute.
nysun.com
5. Indo-Pacific Crossroads: Indonesia, Singapore, And South Korea
Conclusion:
Looking ahead, these divergences present both challenges and opportunities. A formalized middle-power coalition—perhaps an “Indo-Pacific Partnership” of like-minded democracies—could harness complementary strengths in defense, digital infrastructure, and sustainability, while reinforcing ASEAN unity and regional economic frameworks. This essay urges Jakarta, Singapore, and Seoul to institutionalize regular trilateral consultations, initiate joint digital economy projects, and endorse a code of conduct for maritime cooperation with ASEAN. Such a coordinated approach would not only safeguard their respective sovereignties and prosperity but also contribute significantly to strategic stability across the Indo-Pacific region.
Indo-Pacific Crossroads: Indonesia, Singapore, And South Korea – OpEd
eurasiareview.com · by Simon Hutagalung · May 25, 2025
In 2025, Indonesia, Singapore, and South Korea reach a crucial turning point in the evolving strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific. Confronted with an escalating rivalry between the US and China—encompassing military posturing, economic competition, and technological leadership—these nations, each with their unique historical paths and domestic priorities, formulate policies that balance the pressures of great powers with their need for autonomy, stability, and growth. This essay argues that, despite their differing approaches, all three nations are subtly adjusting their foreign-policy doctrines. They are combining hedging strategies with active multilateralism to strategically advance their interests in an increasingly contested and fragmented global landscape.
In 2025, the Indo-Pacific region is marked by unprecedented strategic complexity. The Department of Defense estimates that American defense spending in the area is around USD 800 billion, while Chinese military expenditures are steadily rising, nearing USD 290 billion. This situation signals an intensifying security dilemma. At the same time, ASEAN’s share of regional trade, valued at USD 3 trillion annually, continues to demonstrate economic interdependence. However, surveys reveal that 60 percent of ASEAN member-state policymakers are concerned about Beijing’s increasing assertiveness in maritime affairs.
The South China Sea and surrounding areas experienced over fifty reported incidents in 2024, highlighting the risks of escalation. In response to these challenges, minilateral frameworks such as the Quad (comprising the US, Japan, India, and Australia) and AUKUS, along with the US-Indo-led Economic Pacific Framework (IPEF), have gained significance as practical means to address security and economic issues. Global supply-chain surveys reveal that about 45 percent of firms are diversifying their sourcing away from China. This trend has led to the emergence of middle-diplomatic power initiatives focused on developing alternative trade corridors and fostering digital-economy partnerships.
In a contested environment, Indonesia has renewed its focus on strategic autonomy while striving to maintain its central role in ASEAN. The country’s gross domestic product is expected to grow by 5.3 percent in 2024, alongside a modest 9 percent increase in defense spending, raising Jakarta’s military budget to approximately $11.5 billion. This fiscal boost is funding accelerated naval modernization and a 30 percent increase in coastal patrols in the South China Sea. Jakarta’s strategy reflects a recalibrated non-aligned stance: while foreign direct investment from China exceeded $20 billion in 2024, Indonesia has simultaneously strengthened joint military exercises with the United States and balanced its relations with Australia, leveraging Beijing’s economic influence alongside enhanced security partnerships. Domestically, the Prabowo administration—building on President Jokowi’s legacy—has tapped into nationalist sentiment to justify defense upgrades. However, it remains committed to ASEAN’s diplomatic agenda, particularly in hosting the bloc’s 2025 summit, aimed at reinforcing mechanisms for regional external relations amidst growing tensions.
In contrast, Singapore exemplifies an adaptive hedging strategy that combines extensive economic engagement with China and strong security cooperation with the United States. In 2024, bilateral merchandise trade with China constituted 28% of Singapore’s total trade, while US-Singapore defense collaborations led to the signing of a new logistics agreement. The city-state’s investment in “smart power” tools—such as cyber-defense centers, AI-driven strategic foresight units, and a fintech sovereign start-up fund—has allowed it to excel in digital economy forums. Multilateral trade remains a priority: Singapore’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and its leadership in RCEP digital trade working groups have solidified its position as a regional convenor. Additionally, Singapore’s hosting of three Track 1.5 security dialogues in early 2025 has strengthened its reputation as a reliable mediator capable of bridging East-West divides during periods of increased tension.
In Seoul, the post-Yoon administration has initiated a strategic realignment that balances traditional alliance commitments with an enhanced multilateral outreach. South Korea is set to allocate approximately 2.6 percent of its GDP to defense, amounting to USD 52 billion in 2024. Its exports to China (27 percent) and the United States (16 percent) highlight ongoing economic interdependence. However, the government has increased funding for regional forums by 20 percent, revitalizing ties with ASEAN and the Global South through a “comprehensive partnership” initiative. This shift is reflected in Seoul’s sponsorship of a digital connectivity summit in Jakarta and its co-chairing of the Southeast Asia–Korea dialogue on resilience. On the economic and technological front, South Korea’s “semiconductor diplomacy” has led to expanded chip agreements and a 14 percent increase in Vietnam’s green technology exports to India in 2024. These initiatives aim to reduce overreliance on any single market, despite the ongoing challenge of maintaining strategic ambiguity in alliance politics.
To conclude, despite their varied strategies, Indonesia, Singapore, and South Korea share three overarching characteristics: an emphasis on resilience through the diversification of partners, reliance on domestic political consensus to underpin foreign policy shifts, and proactive engagement in both security and non-security domains, ranging from climate and health to technology and digital trade. However, their approaches differ in emphasis: Indonesia prioritizes ASEAN centrality and regional leadership; Singapore leverages its role as a network hub to facilitate dialogue and economic integration; and South Korea pursues a hybrid model that balances alliance loyalty with broader multilateralism.
Looking ahead, these divergences present both challenges and opportunities. A formalized middle-power coalition—perhaps an “Indo-Pacific Partnership” of like-minded democracies—could harness complementary strengths in defense, digital infrastructure, and sustainability, while reinforcing ASEAN unity and regional economic frameworks. This essay urges Jakarta, Singapore, and Seoul to institutionalize regular trilateral consultations, initiate joint digital economy projects, and endorse a code of conduct for maritime cooperation with ASEAN. Such a coordinated approach would not only safeguard their respective sovereignties and prosperity but also contribute significantly to strategic stability across the Indo-Pacific region.
The opinions expressed in this article are his own.
References
-
Valockova, Barbora. “ASEAN Centrality and Its Narratives in an Evolving Regional Order.” E-International Relations, 26 March 2025. Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
- Chan, Lai-Ha, and Pak K. Lee, editors. China–US Great-Power Rivalry: The Competitive Dynamics of Order-Building in the Indo-Pacific. Routledge, 2024.
- Taqfir, U.S. “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) and ASEAN Centrality: ASEAN’s Role in Enhancing Political Economic Cooperation.” Jurnal Wacana Politik, vol. 10, no. 2, 2025.
eurasiareview.com · by Simon Hutagalung · May 25, 2025
6. South Korea’s Presidential Frontrunner Calls Himself a Pragmatist. Skeptics Aren’t Convinced.
A pragmatist or a shrewd political operative?
Excerpts:
A defining feature of Lee’s 2025 campaign has been his visible shift to the political center, a move widely referred to in South Korean slang as “right-clicking.” Over the past several months, Lee has recast himself not as a populist tribune of the left but as a centrist champion of economic revitalization and national resilience. His messaging emphasizes economic growth, industrial competitiveness, and middle-class security, while blaming the PPP for the current political crisis after Yoon tried to implement martial law and was later impeached. Polling from Gallup Korea suggests this repositioning gained traction: In the most conservative regions of the country, Lee’s polling has climbed from 19 percent to 34 percent (in Daegu and Gyeongbuk) and from 27 percent to 41 percent (in Busan, Ulsan, and Gyeongnam) from the end of March to the end of May.
Political strategists such as Park Sung-min caution, however, that this momentum could stall if Lee’s image as a dominant party leader—backed by a supermajority in the National Assembly—begins to evoke concerns about unchecked power. Park noted that Korean voters retain a deep wariness of absolute power, and Lee’s ability to project moderation while holding sweeping institutional control may prove a delicate balancing act—one that may depend less on the DP’s actions and more on whether the PPP shows real signs of reform. In this sense, Lee and the DP are walking a tightrope between projecting an image of national unity on the one side and evoking perennial concerns over an imperial presidency—which led to the current political crisis in the first place.
South Korea’s Presidential Frontrunner Calls Himself a Pragmatist. Skeptics Aren’t Convinced.
Whether Lee Jae-myung’s posture is a simple campaign tactic or a precursor to strategic renewal will be consequential for both Korean voters and Washington policymakers.
by Darcie Draudt-Véjares
Published on May 22, 2025
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South Korea’s progressive foreign policy tradition is undergoing a profound recalibration. For several decades, the country’s approach to the world has been rooted in inter-Korean engagement and post-authoritarian nationalism that puts ideals ahead of tactics. This shift reflects not only short-term incentives tied to the country’s June 3 presidential election but also deeper anxieties about South Korea’s strategic footing amid intensifying great power competition.
At the center of this transformation is Democratic Party (DP) leader Lee Jae-myung. Lee is not merely the election frontrunner—currently polling at 51 percent, well ahead of conservative challengers Kim Moon-soo (29 percent) and Lee Jun-seok (8 percent)—but also the embodiment of a new strategic posture: one that favors electoral flexibility, economic nationalism, and calibrated engagement with traditional allies over a Peninsula-centric ideological focus.
Lee’s political rise reflects the unraveling of the institutional and generational infrastructure that long anchored progressive foreign policy. Following his razor-thin loss to Yoon Suk Yeol of the conservative People’s Power Party (PPP) in 2022, Lee consolidated control of the DP, sidelining factions aligned with former president Moon Jae-in and elevating loyalists. Yet this power consolidation has not yielded a unified ideological agenda. Like Korea’s other mainline parties, the DP under Lee operates primarily as a personalist vehicle—nimble in messaging, responsive to shifting public moods, and increasingly detached from its historic policy identity.
A defining feature of Lee’s 2025 campaign has been his visible shift to the political center, a move widely referred to in South Korean slang as “right-clicking.” Over the past several months, Lee has recast himself not as a populist tribune of the left but as a centrist champion of economic revitalization and national resilience. His messaging emphasizes economic growth, industrial competitiveness, and middle-class security, while blaming the PPP for the current political crisis after Yoon tried to implement martial law and was later impeached. Polling from Gallup Korea suggests this repositioning gained traction: In the most conservative regions of the country, Lee’s polling has climbed from 19 percent to 34 percent (in Daegu and Gyeongbuk) and from 27 percent to 41 percent (in Busan, Ulsan, and Gyeongnam) from the end of March to the end of May.
Political strategists such as Park Sung-min caution, however, that this momentum could stall if Lee’s image as a dominant party leader—backed by a supermajority in the National Assembly—begins to evoke concerns about unchecked power. Park noted that Korean voters retain a deep wariness of absolute power, and Lee’s ability to project moderation while holding sweeping institutional control may prove a delicate balancing act—one that may depend less on the DP’s actions and more on whether the PPP shows real signs of reform. In this sense, Lee and the DP are walking a tightrope between projecting an image of national unity on the one side and evoking perennial concerns over an imperial presidency—which led to the current political crisis in the first place.
Lee’s campaign has deliberately embraced a centrist tack to expand the DP tent. He has muted his once combative rhetorical style and steered clear of polarizing issues unless strategically necessary. Political analyst Yoon Tae-gon notes that Lee has avoided responding directly to the Yoon debacle, which could invite backlash. Meanwhile, Jung Han-wool, a scholar at the Korean Social Research Institute, argues that although Lee’s approach is calibrated to resonate with Korea’s “new center”—a bloc of ambivalent but politically engaged voters—it ultimately misses the mark. According to Jung, what the Korean center wants most now is political stabilization after Yoon, not the ideological commitment to the left or right per se.
But this approach also raises questions about whether Lee’s repositioning is a genuine strategic pivot or a temporary campaign tactic—an uncertainty not limited to his domestic critics. In Washington, alliance-watchers and policymakers remain uncertain about Lee’s long-term intentions.
Once known for his nationalist skepticism toward the United States, Lee now frames the alliance as a pillar of South Korea’s economic and security strategy. In a February 2025 appearance on the popular YouTube channel Sampro TV, Lee described the U.S.–ROK relationship as a “special alliance” that “must be used well,” while cautioning against uncritical alignment: “It is not right to be dragged along unilaterally.” He has called for deeper collaboration in strategic sectors such as shipbuilding and defense—not coincidentally priorities of President Donald Trump’s administration—where South Korea holds comparative advantages over China.
Lee’s balancing act—between measured rhetoric and strategic independence—reflects his broader embrace of transactional pragmatism. He has praised aspects of Trump-era economic nationalism and signaled a willingness to pursue interest-based negotiations with Washington, particularly on defense cost-sharing and industrial cooperation. His February 2025 appointment of Kim Hyun-jong—a veteran of U.S.-ROK free-trade agreement talks and a key trade policy figure in Moon’s administration—underscores a shift toward economic statecraft as the main organizing principle of his foreign policy approach.
Still, warranted doubts remain in Korea and Washington. While this pivot has expanded Lee’s appeal, it has yet to fully reassure policymakers abroad or analysts at home or abroad that these positions will endure beyond the campaign trail. Lee’s economic overtures—such as proposals to ease working-hour limits in semiconductor production—have met with mixed reactions, particularly among moderate voters. A poll commissioned by the Korean Broadcasting System found that only 35 percent of centrists viewed his economic proposals favorably, compared to 37 percent who disapproved.
The core challenge for Lee’s campaign—and his administration, if elected—lies in converting tactical flexibility into a coherent strategic vision. Many observers see his recalibration as more reactive than programmatic, shaped by electoral incentives and shifting political conditions. That fluidity has afforded him room to maneuver during a hotly contested campaign, but it also raises concerns about future policy and governing consistency.
In another sense, Lee’s candidacy represents a test case not only for the viability of a pragmatic, post-ideological foreign policy in South Korea, but also for whether the country’s progressives can build a durable governing consensus that adapts to new geopolitical realities without forfeiting credibility. Whether Lee’s current posture is a precursor to strategic renewal or merely a campaign-era veneer remains a consequential question for both Korean voters and policymakers in Washington.
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Darcie Draudt-Véjares
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7. Koreans, Heading to the Polls to Elect a New President, Worry That Trump Will Pull Some American Forces
South Korean and US leaders need to educate our publics on why force structure changes are necessary and that they do not signal a reduced commitment and can in fact lead to stronger defensive capabilities. In addition, leaders of both countries need to educate their publics that we need to take a holistic view of deterrence and defense in the indo-Pacific. No strategic challenges can be considered in a vacuum.
Koreans, Heading to the Polls to Elect a New President, Worry That Trump Will Pull Some American Forces
DONALD KIRK
Published: May. 25, 2025 11:14 AM ETUpdated: May. 25, 2025 03:56 PM ET
‘Nobody wants the Americans to leave Korea,’ a retired diplomat says with 10 days to go before the election.
nysun.com
SEOUL – The fear is pervasive. South Koreans are responding as if they were already on notice. The Americans may soon be pulling troops out of Korea, according to one report, and South Korea will be more exposed than ever to attack. South Korea’s biggest-selling newspaper, Chosun Ilbo, headlined the concerns as if the plan for withdrawing several thousand American troops was already in the works.
“US troop cuts in Korea back on the table as Pentagon weighs Indo-Pacific shift,” the paper announced, disclosing what it believed is a basic shift in strategy. “Plan to relocate forces to Guam signals focus on Taiwan, China — and renewed cost-sharing pressure on Seoul,” the paper reports in its front-page story.
The basis of the report is a Wall Street Journal story. It reports that one version of the plan calls for slashing America’s 28,500 troops in Korea by nearly 16 percent, or 4,500 GIs. The report, which the Pentagon refused to confirm, triggered fears here of an American betrayal of South Korea in the face of the rising strength of North Korea, allied with Russia.
The North contributed about 12,000 troops needed to drive Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region abutting Ukraine. North Korea also counts on Communist China, widely viewed here as attempting to assert its political and economic influence over the South with ten days to go before a snap election for president on June 3. “Everyone worries about American troops leaving Korea,” a retired Korean diplomat tells the Sun. “Nobody wants the Americans to leave Korea.”
That view, though, is open to question. In the current presidential campaign in which the left-leaning candidate, Lee Jae-Myung, a former provincial governor and mayor, has a commanding lead over his conservative rival, Kim Moon-soo, also a former governor and, most recently, labor minister in the government of the ousted conservative president, Yoon Suk-yeol.
“Concerns are spreading that if Lee Jae-myung becomes president, the withdrawal of U.S. troops may become a reality,” Seoul’s Yonhap News reported Mr. Kim saying. “I hope that he apologizes for his past statements about (American) occupation and clarifies a firm stance on the South Korea-U.S. alliance.”
Appealing to the broad sentiments of the Korean electorate, Mr. Lee has adopted an ambivalent position. “We should maintain and strengthen our powerful defense capabilities, military power and strengthen the South Korea-US security alliance.,” Yonhap quoted him as saying, while advocating “a dialogue, cooperation, communication and coexistence where possible.”
Regardless of who wins, the topic of the American commitment to Korea is sure to come up soon after the election. Mr. Trump, who called in his first term for reducing Washington’s commitment to Korea, has said he might tie American troop strength to South Korea’s agreement on how much to contribute to the cost of keeping them here.
Washington and Seoul struck a deal while Mr. Biden was president for Seoul to contribute $1.1 billion a year, but Mr. Trump might demand more, while imposing tariffs intended to cut down the South’s 2024 trade surplus of $66 billion. The Korea Development Institute is forecasting a growth rate of less than one percent for this year partly as a result of American tariffs.
For South Koreans, the prospect of America reducing its commitment raises the question of whether the South should produce its own nuclear warheads rather than rely on the American nuclear umbrella. Korean conservatives are sure to repeat the demand while debate rages over the future of the Korean-American alliance.
A key factor is the Pentagon shifting its focus to the People’s Republic of China’s threat against the Republic of China. This shift is strongly recommended by the undersecretary of defense, Elbridge Colby, who believes the South should do more to take over its own defenses.
Dong-A Ilbo, a major newspaper here, observes that North Korea, “having advanced its nuclear and missile programs, is modernizing its conventional forces with Russian support.” The South, it said, will need to be “fully prepared to safeguard the military and economic alliance with the U.S. while deterring North Korean provocations.”
One South Korean commentator, retired Lieutenant General Chun In-bum, suggested, “Instead of reacting with alarm, South Korea should see this development as a signal to evolve its approach to alliance management.” Writing in the Korea Times, General Chun declared, “A flexible, regionally integrated U.S. force posture centered on the Korean Peninsula is not a liability — it’s a critical asset…an opportunity to modernize the alliance and deepen Seoul’s role in preserving regional stability.”
nysun.com
8. North Korea arrests more officials in capsized warship probe: State media
More. Heads. WIll. Roll.
North Korea arrests more officials in capsized warship probe: State media
KCNA reports work on track to turn the destroyer upright, but satellite imagery suggests job not yet done
https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/north-korea-arrests-more-officials-in-capsized-warship-probe-state-media/
Colin Zwirko May 26, 2025
Kim Jong Un and a top manager of the Chongjin Shipyard (left), who may be the manager named Hong Kil Ho who was arrested | Image: KCTV (March 8, 2025)
North Korean authorities have arrested more officials allegedly responsible for the capsizing of a new warship last week, according to state media reports on Monday and over the weekend, amid continuing fallout from the embarrassing public failure to launch the vessel.
The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) also said salvage work was on track as of Sunday, the day leader Kim Jong Un appeared to set as the deadline for uprighting the new 5,000-ton destroyer.
State media has now released four reports without photos on the May 21 incident, when the ship’s lateral launch into the water from the quay at the Chongjin Shipyard failed. It tipped over with the front (bow) still attached to the quay and its starboard side submerged in the water.
The capsized Chongjin warship appears to be a Choe Hyon-class destroyer largely identical to the first of its class, pictured here during a launching ceremony in Nampho on April 25 | Image: KCNA (April 26, 2025)
NEW ARRESTS
KCNA disclosed one arrest in its Monday report after naming three on Sunday and one on Friday, bringing the total so far to five people.
An official “accident investigation group” first recommended the “summoning” to an unspecified “law-enforcement organ” of Chongjin Shipyard manager Hong Kil Ho on May 22, saying he was “clearly responsible for the accident.”
Three additional factory workers — chief engineer Kang Jong Chol, head of the hull construction workshop Han Kyong Hak and deputy manager for administrative affairs Kim Yong Hak — were reportedly “detained” and also labeled “responsible for the accident” on May 24.
A day later, KCNA used stronger language to say Ri Hyong Son, vice department director of the ruling party’s Munitions Industry Department, was summoned and arrested after being found “greatly responsible for the occurrence of the serious accident.”
NK News analysis suggests Hong Kil Ho is the man seen leading Kim Jong Un around the Chongjin Shipyard during visits in July 2018 and March 2025.
The top manager who guided Kim Jong Un around the Chongjin Shipyard in July 2018 and March this year is circled in yellow. Given his prominence in the photos, it is likely that he is Hong Kil Ho. | Images: KCNA
As is typical for managers of key military factories, Hong was the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) delegate in 2019 from the 589th district of Malum-dong located near the Chongjin Shipyard.
The other four detainees may have also been present for Kim’s recent shipyard visits, though their faces have not been identified and there is no additional public information about them.
SALVAGE WORK
A detailed KCNA report on Friday claimed that initial assessments of the severity of the damage of the ship were overblown and that it would be possible to make a complete recovery before a major party plenum convenes to discuss the incident in “late June.”
Now, an additional report on Sunday claimed “no additional damage to the warship was identified” the previous day, and that “the field rehabilitation promotion team is pushing ahead with the plan as scheduled.”
A brief KCNA report on Monday then said that “the work for completely restoring the balance of the warship is being actively conducted under the technical guidance of an expert group according to its schedule.”
In other words, state media appears to be claiming that work to raise the ship upright has not faced any major new issues.
The Friday report said “experts estimated that it will take two or three days” to upright the ship and detach the bow from the slipway where it was stuck, and “10-odd days to restore the warship’s side” after finding it did not suffer any major damage beyond being “scratched.”
This suggests Kim Jong Un could have considered Sunday — three days after the recommendation was made on Thursday — as the deadline to get the ship out of the water.
However, medium-resolution Planet Labs satellite imagery taken Monday morning suggests the task is taking longer than state media projected, showing that the ship remained in the same position partially attached to the quay and submerged in the water on its side.
It will be more difficult to determine progress on work to restore the ship’s hull through satellite imagery in the coming weeks given that authorities appear to have covered it with tarps to conceal its capabilities or the recovery efforts.
The position of the ship on Monday (this image) appears to be the same as it was on May 22 (next image) | Image: Planet Labs (May 26, 2025), edited by NK News
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The apparent Choe Hyon-class destroyer was ready for launch at the south quay of the Chongjin Shipyard on May 20, while an observation pavilion for the DPRK leader was constructed adjacent to where the ship would be side-launched into the water a day later | Image: Planet Labs (May 20, 2025), edited by NK News
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Planet Labs high-resolution imagery previously revealed that a large temporary observation pavilion for Kim Jong Un was built next to the ship in the days prior to the reported May 21 ceremony, and that it was removed by May 23.
As it was identical in size to the one he used for a large-scale ceremony launching the first of the Choe Hyon-class 5,000-ton destroyer in Nampho in late April, this suggests the ship disaster occurred in front of a crowd of hundreds of people.
The large number of potential witnesses possibly contributed to Kim’s decision to publicize the incident in state media, while the second KCNA report from Friday also said disclosures of investigations and arrests was meant to serve as “an alarm bell” to deter “irresponsibility and unscientific empiricist attitudes” in all sectors.
It is likely that state media will continue to provide updates in the coming days, as Saturday was the only day it has not done so thus far.
Edited by Bryan Betts
Updated on May 26 at 4:05 p.m. KST with new satellite imagery taken Monday
9. North Korea using balloons to salvage doomed warship: Analyst
I am guessing they need a lot of hot air.
North Korea using balloons to salvage doomed warship: Analyst
Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · May 26, 2025
New satellite imagery shows North Korea deploying what appear to be balloons to assist in the recovery of a navy ship that had keeled over during its launch last week—an accident that has embarrassed leader Kim Jong Un.
Newsweek reached out to the North Korean Embassy in Beijing by email with a request for comment.
Why It Matters
Pyongyang is building out its military amid flaring tensions with Seoul. Kim has cited joint war games between South Korea and its U.S. ally as "provocations" that justify the modernization efforts—including the country's ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs.
The new vessel, a guided-missile destroyer, was meant to be a symbol of national prestige amid efforts to strengthen the Korean People's Navy, which is largely composed of aging warships and smaller fast-attack craft. The damaged destroyer was the second to be constructed, with the first one—the Cho Hyon—reportedly undergoing weapons testing late last month.
An image captured on May 22, 2025, by U.S. commercial satellite company Planet shows North Korea's new navy destroyer, which capsized on launch on May 21 at Hambuk Shipyard in the northern port city of... An image captured on May 22, 2025, by U.S. commercial satellite company Planet shows North Korea's new navy destroyer, which capsized on launch on May 21 at Hambuk Shipyard in the northern port city of Chongjin. Planet Labs PBC
What To Know
The stricken destroyer dislodged from the slipway on Wednesday—"a serious accident," according to North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency. The launch ceremony in the northeastern city of Chongjin had been overseen by Kim himself, KCNA said.
Images supplied to Newsweek by the U.S. commercial satellite firm Planet showed much of the ship—apparently partially submerged—covered in blue tarpaulins in an apparent attempt to conceal damage to the vessel's hull.
North Korea appears to be attempting to lift up their destroyer with methods inspired by Pixar's hit 2009 film Up. Note the numerous balloons in the air above the destroyer. pic.twitter.com/aHdZpWRQu7
— Decker Eveleth (@dex_eve) May 25, 2025
Additional satellite imagery shared on Sunday by Decker Eveleth, a strategic forces analyst at the the Center for Naval Analyses, a Virginia think tank, appeared to show several balloons floating overhead as part of efforts to right the 5,000-ton vessel.
"North Korea appears to be attempting to lift up their destroyer with methods inspired by Pixar's hit 2009 film Up. Note the numerous balloons in the air above the destroyer," Eveleth wrote.
The same balloon objects have been visible in satellite imagery since Friday, according to posts on X.
North Korea's KCNA said the damage was not as serious as initially reported, and that efforts were underway to pump water out of a flooded chamber. Western analysts, however, are doubtful that Pyongyang will be able to meet the stated salvage timeline of "10-odd days."
What People Have Said
Korean Central News Agency: "At the scene of the destroyer launch accident, the work for completely restoring the balance of the warship is being actively conducted under the technical guidance of an expert group according to its schedule."
Jennifer Jun, imagery analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told The War Zone: "Even if North Korea manages to right the vessel within the '10-odd days,' restoring its original capabilities will almost certainly take longer. I'd also be remiss not to mention that given the political stakes, those responsible for reporting this to Kim have strong incentives to downplay the extent of the damage."
What's Next
Ri Hyong Son, vice department director of the ruling Workers' Party's Munitions Industry Department, has been detained after being deemed "greatly responsible" for the incident, KCNA said on Monday.
North Korean state media said previously that authorities were investigating to "expose the cause of the accident which should never occur and could not be tolerated and those responsible for it."
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About the writer
Micah McCartney is a reporter for Newsweek based in Taipei, Taiwan. He covers U.S.-China relations, East Asian and Southeast Asian security issues, and cross-strait ties between China and Taiwan. You can get in touch with Micah by emailing m.mccartney@newsweek.com.
Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · May 26, 2025
10. Exclusive: South Korean AI spots North Korean warship capsize in near real time
EnglishIndustry
Exclusive: South Korean AI spots North Korean warship capsize in near real time
TelePIX's satellite analysis tool identified the mishap at a North Korean shipyard and the recovery effort that followed
https://www.chosun.com/english/industry-en/2025/05/26/APRK2C3CPBBKZCE2MNUCVEZE4A/
By Lee Jong-hyun,
Park Su-hyeon
Published 2025.05.26. 15:27
TelePIX analyzed satellite imagery of the warship accident at North Korea’s Chongjin Shipyard using Planet Labs’ SuperDove constellation. The blue overlay indicates the location of the capsized destroyer./TelePIX
A South Korean aerospace startup used artificial intelligence to detect the apparent capsizing of a North Korean warship within hours of the incident — a striking example of how satellite imagery and automated analysis are accelerating real-time insight into the secretive regime.
TelePIX, a Seoul-based satellite and data analytics firm, released an automated report on May 22 analyzing imagery captured before and after the apparent capsizing of a North Korean warship at a shipyard in Chongjin, a northeastern port city. The report, generated using the company’s proprietary AI system “SatChat,” identified changes near the dock where a newly built warship that appears to have capsized during a launch ceremony the previous day.
“The satellite image taken before the incident showed no anomalies,” TelePIX told ChosunBiz on May 26. “But in the post-incident image, a 105-meter-long and 15-meter-wide object was detected protruding from the dock into the sea — suggesting the vessel had capsized.”
The incident occurred May 21 at the Chongjin Shipyard, when a newly constructed 5,000-ton destroyer reportedly toppled during its launch. What made the mishap particularly notable was the presence of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who was said to be attending the ceremony in person. North Korea’s state media confirmed the incident the following day — an unusual move for a regime that rarely acknowledges military mishaps.
South Korea’s Unification Ministry released satellite imagery taken on May 15 showing the warship intact and docked ahead of launch. The U.K.-based Open Source Center also published satellite photos taken by Airbus after the incident. Some analysts speculate that the North may have rushed to announce the accident before foreign media could reveal it through satellite data.
North Korea’s new 5,000-ton-class destroyer is seen before it capsized during a failed launch on May 21, 2025./News1
TelePIX, which builds high-resolution cameras for satellites and provides image analysis services, was among the first private firms to independently confirm the mishap. The company’s SatChat platform — powered by a large language model — autonomously compared satellite images taken on May 20 and May 22 by the SuperDove satellite constellation operated by the U.S. firm Planet Labs.
According to the AI-generated report, the northern dock area at Chongjin Shipyard appeared normal in the May 20 image. But by May 22, SatChat detected a large structure overlapping the dock wall by 20 to 30 meters, with an exposed surface area of roughly 1,600 square meters.
The full vessel, including parts visible below the water surface via shadow analysis, was estimated to be about 130 meters long. The ship appeared to be tilted at an angle of 60 to 70 degrees — consistent with South Korean government reports that said the bow had run aground while the stern remained submerged.
The analysis also identified the presence of several rectangular patches in blue and navy tones on the vessel, which appeared to be as tarps or camouflage sheeting used to conceal the warship from view. Satellite imagery further revealed signs of a recovery operation: a large orange structure — likely a crane — appeared near the central pier, and three floating barges were positioned close to the wreck.
Oil slicks roughly 200 meters in length were also detected between the dock and the work vessels. Two white rectangular modules, believed to be temporary command centers or generators, were newly installed on the western pier.
The AI suggested that once the crane is repositioned along a north-south axis, more intensive salvage operations such as raising or cutting the vessel could begin. The size and positioning of the tarps may also provide clues about damage to the ship and the pace of repairs, according to the report.
“The SatChat system allowed us to independently confirm a chain of events — from the failed launch of the 5,000-ton destroyer, to its partial sinking, and the subsequent emergency recovery effort,” a TelePIX spokesperson said. “So far, we have not observed any secondary damage affecting port infrastructure or broader logistics operations.”
11. N. Korea pursues unofficial technology transfer to upgrade key western port
Excerpts:
North Korea has gradually expanded its roll-on/roll-off and oil storage capabilities since 2024, installing new mid-sized cranes and oil storage tanks. However, the country still faces technological limitations in operating Nampo as a port complex due to low automation levels and outdated processing equipment.
North Korea approached two Chinese machinery companies for technical cooperation; both have previously conducted small-scale equipment deals with North Korean trade delegations operating in China under the Ministry of Land and Maritime Transportation.
While North Korea and China call this arrangement an “exchange,” with a North Korean delegation traveling to China to obtain equipment blueprints, part specifications and operational procedures, the transaction more closely resembles an unofficial technology transfer.
The core of the cooperation involves introducing automated loading and unloading equipment and constructing small-scale processing modules. Through this, Nampo Port aims to develop the capability to quickly handle large cargo volumes and store and conduct primary refining of imported oil. This appears to align with North Korean authorities’ vision of transforming Nampo into a comprehensive port complex handling both cargo and energy.
N. Korea pursues unofficial technology transfer to upgrade key western port - Daily NK English
The core of the cooperation involves introducing automated loading and unloading equipment and constructing small-scale processing modules
By Jeong Tae Joo - May 26, 2025
dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · May 26, 2025
Satellite image of Nampo Port. (Google Earth)
North Korea recently requested technical assistance from civilian companies in the Chinese city of Dalian to modernize equipment at Nampo Port.
“The Cabinet’s Ministry of Land and Maritime Transportation and Nampo Port officially requested cooperation from Dalian civilian companies early this month, asking them to share advanced technology and operational experience. The Chinese company responded on May 11 that the two sides should hold working-level talks in June,” a Daily NK source in Nampo said recently.
“Authorities are coordinating with Chinese companies to send a delegation for technical exchange and cooperation to China in the second half of the year.”
An “exchange” in name only
North Korea has gradually expanded its roll-on/roll-off and oil storage capabilities since 2024, installing new mid-sized cranes and oil storage tanks. However, the country still faces technological limitations in operating Nampo as a port complex due to low automation levels and outdated processing equipment.
North Korea approached two Chinese machinery companies for technical cooperation; both have previously conducted small-scale equipment deals with North Korean trade delegations operating in China under the Ministry of Land and Maritime Transportation.
While North Korea and China call this arrangement an “exchange,” with a North Korean delegation traveling to China to obtain equipment blueprints, part specifications and operational procedures, the transaction more closely resembles an unofficial technology transfer.
The core of the cooperation involves introducing automated loading and unloading equipment and constructing small-scale processing modules. Through this, Nampo Port aims to develop the capability to quickly handle large cargo volumes and store and conduct primary refining of imported oil. This appears to align with North Korean authorities’ vision of transforming Nampo into a comprehensive port complex handling both cargo and energy.
“Developing and implementing a detailed working-level plan to make Nampo Port a world-class advanced port complex has been designated as a key task of the Eighth Party Congress,” the source said. “The latest exchange between North Korea and China is part of this effort, with working-level officials from the Ministry of Land and Maritime Transportation and Nampo Port collaborating on it.”
“The Cabinet, which wants to make Nampo a leading Yellow Sea port, has issued an internal directive to complete advanced technology adoption by year-end,” the source said. “Officials in related sectors have such high expectations for this deal that they say national trade will only survive if Nampo Port develops.”
A mutually beneficial deal
The Chinese companies also expect to benefit from the arrangement. “The fact that Dalian companies sent cost estimates and examined equipment supply possibilities was shared during internal meetings,” the source said. “The Chinese side must also be trying to secure stable clients.”
Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping called for lifting international sanctions on North Korea in a joint statement issued during Russia’s Victory Day celebrations on May 9.
The Chinese government has recently appeared willing to tacitly approve cooperation between regional civilian companies and North Korea, which seems to explain why this deal to modernize Nampo’s port equipment materialized.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · May 26, 2025
12. Well-connected students use propaganda troupes to dodge N. Korean farm labor
I wonder what this does in terms of dividing the population and the young people. Of course friction among students reduces the chances of collective action against the regime.
Well-connected students use propaganda troupes to dodge N. Korean farm labor - Daily NK English
Artistic talent isn't particularly crucial since the propaganda troupes are simply sent to farms to encourage workers, rather than staging sophisticated concerts
By Eun Seol - May 26, 2025
dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · May 26, 2025
In an article about Musan Mine on Sept. 14, 2024, the Rodong Sinmun newspaper declared that the activities of mobile artistic propaganda troupes are important for carrying out the directives of the Workers' Party of Korea. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)
With rice transplanting season underway at farms across North Korea, party committees at Pyongyang universities have been enrolling well-connected students in mobile artistic propaganda troupes to spare them from mandatory farm labor.
“The propaganda troupe at Jang Chol Gu University of Commerce suddenly gained new members in late April on orders from party committee officials. Students view troupe membership as a privilege since members are exempt from farm work,” a source in Pyongyang told Daily NK recently.
North Korean universities operate propaganda troupes that travel to farms, construction sites and major events throughout the year to boost worker morale through artistic performances, including songs and comedy skits.
These propaganda troupes exist even at elite party-run universities such as Kim Il Sung University, Kim Chaek University of Technology and Pyongyang Medical University. Kim Il Sung University is considered one of the country’s top institutions, and its propaganda troupe is renowned for exceptionally talented performers.
These troupes serve a symbolic role as the public face of their universities. To be selected, students are expected to demonstrate skill in areas such as singing, musical instruments, or public speaking.
However, talent alone isn’t enough to secure a spot. Universities expand troupe membership when spring farm mobilization begins, and recommendation from the university party committee carries significant weight in securing placement.
“Even students who lacked the skills to join the propaganda troupe when they entered college still dream of joining when farm mobilization season arrives. Party committee members often instruct the troupe leader or Youth League chair to select specific students for membership,” the source said.
Artistic talent takes the backseat
Notably, Jang Chol Gu University of Commerce is known for admitting many children from wealthy and influential families. Children from such backgrounds typically possess some artistic ability due to early arts education. This is why officials see little issue with placing well-connected students in propaganda troupes, according to the source.
Moreover, artistic talent isn’t particularly crucial since the propaganda troupes are simply sent to farms to encourage workers, rather than staging sophisticated concerts. This provides another justification for party committee interference in troupe selection.
“The propaganda troupes are supposed to focus on artistic performance, but in reality, they’ve become a way to avoid mobilization. Ultimately, students from wealthy and powerful families get an exemption from mandatory farm work. This shows how class privilege is infiltrating the classroom,” the source said.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · May 26, 2025
13. N. Korean TV drama criticizing farm officials sparks mixed reactions among viewers
Just another indicator of conditions that could lead to internal instability (to which we are paying insufficient attention).
N. Korean TV drama criticizing farm officials sparks mixed reactions among viewers
"Some sympathize with farm officials, saying they have no choice but to exaggerate because they face intense pressure from above if they can't fulfill state plans," a source told Daily NK
By Lee Chae Eun - May 26, 2025
dailynk.com
N. Korean TV drama criticizing farm officials sparks mixed reactions among viewers - Daily NK English
North Korean drama “A New Spring in the Field of Manchurian Cranes” (Screenshot from Korea Central TV)
A recent North Korean TV drama “A New Spring in the Field of Manchurian Cranes” has become a hit by criticizing the exaggerations and lies of provincial farm officials, prompting mixed reactions from North Korean viewers.
“The 20-episode drama ‘A New Spring in the Field of Manchurian Cranes’ has recently gained popularity among people in local cities and counties like Pyongsong,” a Daily NK source in South Pyongan province said recently. “This is because the drama, set on a provincial farm, closely reflects reality.”
The drama connects directly to the “Exaggeration Prevention Act” that North Korean authorities adopted in May 2022. The law aims to prevent exaggerations and false reporting across society, particularly in agricultural production.
The show focuses on how rampant exaggerations, bureaucracy and formalism among officials at a farm in Paekhak (Korean for Manchurian cranes) village disappear after a new party secretary takes charge, bringing transformation and renewal to the farm. The drama conveys the message that when officials responsibly promote work and engage people with a servant’s attitude, farmers respond positively, and farmers can improve agricultural results when they take ownership of their work.
“The drama aims to motivate farm officials and farmers during peak agricultural season,” the source said. “It tries to tighten discipline and boost agricultural production by blaming poor farming on ‘officials who do nothing but exaggerate’ and ‘farmers who don’t take ownership of their work.'”
Viewers who have watched the drama generally agree that it accurately portrays farm life and criticize officials who constantly exaggerate.
According to the source, people say “it’s true that farm officials, who know farm conditions better than anyone, fail to help farmers and simply file false reports while enriching themselves.”
They also complain that officials “only care about filling their own stomachs and have never cared about farmers, even if they collapse from starvation,” and that farmers starve “because there’s no food, with officials working together to steal food since they only care about their own interests.”
Drama fuels discontent with regime among some
However, some viewers are uncomfortable with how the drama shifts blame for poor farming results onto officials.
“Some sympathize with farm officials, saying they have no choice but to exaggerate because they face intense pressure from above if they can’t fulfill state plans,” the source said.
People say they “can’t understand how the drama places all blame on officials when the real fault lies with authorities who force officials to exaggerate.” They also lament how authorities “take more than the target during autumn harvest while telling farms to obtain fertilizer and seeds on their own,” and that farmers “have no choice but to starve since authorities take even more than planned under various pretexts, leaving less for farmers.”
Consequently, people believe the drama “A New Spring in the Field of Manchurian Cranes” represents an attempt by authorities to escape responsibility for their own failures, ironically fueling discontent with the regime.
“Many people on farms say that failure to increase grain production isn’t because officials or farmers don’t work hard, but because of endless quotas from above when farms must solve everything on their own,” the source said.
Read in Korean
Lee Chae Eun
Lee Chae Un is one of Daily NK's full-time journalists. She can be reached at dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
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dailynk.com
14. The Rise of AI Manufacturing in China and South Korea
Excerpts:
East Asia’s rapid implementation of AI in manufacturing has significant implications for ongoing efforts in the West and emerging economies in the Global South to restructure global production away from East Asia and back to their own regions. Over the last 40 years, East Asia, led by China and South Korea, has dominated the global manufacturing landscape. This is a unique phenomenon in modern history, as no other region has maintained such long-standing industrial dominance in the post-World War II era.
The West, including the U.S. and Europe, is attempting to reclaim its lost manufacturing base through reshoring initiatives – an agenda that gained momentum under the Trump administration and remains a major policy debate within the European Union. However, given the speed and scale at which East Asia has adopted AI in manufacturing, it is increasingly unlikely that Western countries will achieve their reshoring goals, as digitalization and AI adoption remain comparatively slow in those regions.
East Asia’s rapid advancement in AI manufacturing also poses a serious challenge to emerging economies in the Global South – such as India and some Southeast Asian nations – that aspire to become the next global manufacturing hubs by replacing China and East Asia’s current dominance. While China and South Korea have clear state-driven ambitions backed by strong state-business coordination and proactive societal support for AI implementation, such strategic alignment is largely absent in many Global South economies at this stage.
Hence, the rise of AI manufacturing in East Asia, led by China and South Korea, is likely to reshape the global balance of industrial power in the new AI-powered technological era.
The Rise of AI Manufacturing in China and South Korea
AI-driven strategies in China and South Korea reinforce East Asia’s manufacturing dominance, challenging Western and Global South reshoring ambitions.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/the-rise-of-ai-manufacturing-in-china-and-south-korea/
By Rajiv Kumar
May 23, 2025
Credit: Depositphotos
Artificial intelligence (AI) is the most important technology of our time, one that is rapidly transforming economies and societies. Yet, its implementation for productive applications varies widely across the globe. While some countries are still debating whether to deploy AI, amid concerns over security and job displacement, others are rapidly adopting it to realign national ambitions, stay competitive, and lead the future economic and industrial landscape.
East Asia, led by China and South Korea, is a region that is implementing AI in manufacturing at a pace and scale not seen elsewhere. This rapid adoption is likely to help East Asia maintain its manufacturing edge amid efforts by the West and Global South to shift production in their direction.
China, the world’s manufacturing powerhouse, is far ahead of any country in terms of using AI in manufacturing. To illustrate, Chinese multinational Xiaomi operates “dark factories (暗黑工厂)” fully automated with AI, big data, and Internet of Things, enabling it to produce one smartphone per second – a rate surpassing Apple’s output. This automation has significantly reduced costs by cutting manpower and energy use. As a result, Xiaomi recently surpassed Apple to become the world’s second-biggest seller of smartphones, thanks to its rising market share in India and other Global South countries.
Xiaomi’s success is not an isolated case. In fact, many Chinese companies are racing to adopt AI in manufacturing to stay ahead in global competition. As a result, China has recently delivered remarkable outcomes: BYD has passed Tesla in electric vehicle production and sales, while Baidu has outpaced Waymo – the world’s leading self-driving tech company – in pricing, despite entering the market later. China has aggressively deployed AI across its factories, and as of February 2025, it had built 30,000 smart factories – 1,200 of which are categorized as advanced-level and 230 as excellence-level.
Following China’s rapid AI implementation, another East Asian manufacturing powerhouse, South Korea, is also rapidly adopting AI in manufacturing. In April of this year, South Korea’s LG Innotek, a subsidiary of conglomerate LG, unveiled its “Dream Factory (드림 팩토리)” in Gumi Province, which is now being transformed into an AI manufacturing hub. By deploying deep learning technologies without human intervention, the factory has cut production costs and boosted efficiency, aiming to outperform global competitors.
South Korea’s other manufacturing giants – Samsung, SK Hynix, and Hyundai – have also deployed AI in order to maintain global their market leadership in semiconductors and automobiles. Thanks to early implementation, South Korea has seen a sharp rise in AI-powered smart factories across both major conglomerates and SMEs, making it a model for latecomers in this field.
Why are China and South Korea leading in AI manufacturing? In general terms, their mission-driven strategies, robust state-business coordination, and societal support combine to enable rapid implementation.
Mission-Driven AI Deployment in East Asia
China and South Korea stand out for their goal-oriented approach to AI manufacturing, shaped by international competition and domestic priorities. In contrast, many governments elsewhere have yet to formulate a coherent long-term strategy for the sector.
Under Xi Jinping, China has come to view AI as a key means of realizing its ambition to become a global high-tech superpower while maintaining manufacturing dominance. This vision has two major dimensions. The first is to surpass its primary rival, the United States, in the high-tech industries race by establishing technological supremacy, particularly in AI-driven manufacturing. The second is to halt the recent trend of manufacturing relocation from China to countries like India and those in Southeast Asia, which have emerged as competitive alternatives due to their cheaper labor costs.
With a declining working-age population and rising labor costs, Chinese leaders view AI as a strategic tool for sustaining productivity and industrial resilience. This vision has propelled the shift from “Made in China” to “Intelligently Made in China (中国智造),” emphasizing the role of AI in upgrading the country’s manufacturing capabilities. Framed within the concept of “New Quality Productive Forces (新质生产力),” AI-driven manufacturing is central to China’s ambition to maintain its dominance in global production and assert leadership in the emerging technological landscape.
China’s push for AI in manufacturing also stems from the realization that it can compete in – and potentially win – the AI race against the U.S. through a different strategy. While the United States excels in AI innovation, it lags in deploying AI technology. Unlike the U.S., which focuses on building advanced LLMs (large language models), China has identified its strength in “physical and industrial AI” – a potential recently acknowledged by U.S. firm NVIDIA. As a manufacturing powerhouse, China’s leadership sees industrial AI as a key path to global technological leadership.
South Korea’s AI manufacturing ambitions are also driven by a set of goal-oriented geoeconomic objectives. The first is the China factor. As China accelerates AI manufacturing, South Korea faces growing pressure. There is widespread concern in Seoul that China is overtaking – or will soon overtake – strategic industries that once formed the backbone of the Korean economy, including semiconductors, automobiles, and shipbuilding. In response, South Korea recognizes the urgent need to deploy AI in manufacturing to maintain its position as a global industrial leader and emerge as one of the “world’s top three AI powers (AI 3대 강국).”
Apart from the China factor, South Korea’s demographic crisis has also pushed the country to rapidly implement AI in manufacturing. South Korea has the lowest birth rate in the world, and its working-age population has declined sharply in recent years. Addressing the labor shortage, which is expected to worsen significantly, is now considered a national emergency. As a result, the rapid adoption of AI in manufacturing is seen as a strategic response to this looming crisis.
In addition, South Korea also sees a chance to remain competitive in the AI race by adopting the “China Model” – focusing on deploying AI in manufacturing rather than competing in building LLMs, which require huge amounts of capital to compete with the global giants. Instead, South Korea, by utilizing its wealth of manufacturing data, is seen to be in a better position than others to dominate the AI landscape.
Robust State-Business Collaboration
What makes China and South Korea different from other regions in terms of development models is the tight alignment between the state and business sectors to achieve national ambitions and goals. This is clearly evident in the case of AI manufacturing. Both governments have recognized the strategic potential of AI in manufacturing and have actively promoted early adoption through strong state–business collaboration.
As Kai-Fu Lee noted in his 2018 book “AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order,” China quickly recognized the potential of AI manufacturing and pushed for its rapid implementation by giving signals to its companies to move ahead in this field. It has promoted a bold strategy by incorporating it into major national planning documents, including its Five-Year Plans and “Made in China” initiatives. It has also introduced specific plans such as the “AI Plus” initiative, which aims to provide top-level policy guidance and massive support to strengthen state-business cooperation.
Similarly, South Korea also gave early signals to its businesses that future growth would rely on AI-powered smart manufacturing. Seoul began implementing smart manufacturing policies as early as 2014, but as China accelerated its AI manufacturing through state-business collaboration, South Korea also stepped up its efforts. In 2020, South Korea announced the construction of 1,000 cutting-edge 5G+AI smart factories and 100 “K-Smart Lighthouse Factories” by 2025, by fostering strong state-business partnerships. Strengthening such collaboration has been a top policy priority across governments, from the Moon administration’s (2017–2022) Digital New Deal to the Yoon administration’s (2022–2024) National AI Strategy.
China and South Korea are also different from many other neoliberal regulatory states in the West in terms of direct financing to their private sectors to achieve national goals. Both have allocated massive public funds for R&D to stay ahead in AI manufacturing. They have also created separate direct funding mechanisms to encourage fast AI adoption in the private sector over the last few years. The latest example of this support is China’s $8.2 billion AI fund to accelerate adoption, while South Korea has pledged $7.5 billion to fast-track AI integration in manufacturing. These funds cover insurance, low-interest loans, and equity investments.
Funding is not the only support China and South Korea provide to their companies for rapidly implementing AI in manufacturing. Equally important is a comprehensive support ecosystem, including close consultation with the private sector to address specific needs. This includes infrastructure development, AI talent cultivation, targeted incentives, and strong collaboration among industry, academia, and government – all aimed at shaping and reinforcing their dominance in AI manufacturing.
Societal Readiness and Support for AI-Driven Transformation
China and South Korea also differ from others in their distinctive societal response to AI implementation, which has helped accelerate AI manufacturing in both countries.
In China’s communist system, people generally accept government plans for deploying new technologies. This holds true for AI, which many view as essential to competing with the United States and restoring China’s national strength. The government’s tight control over society enables both the state and businesses to rapidly implement AI in manufacturing. The vast manufacturing data in China is itself generated by the people’s widespread adoption of digital technologies – unlike in the West, where people are more cautious about adopting new technologies for daily uses, including shopping, payments, and transportation.
People in South Korea, an advanced liberal democracy, also support the rapid implementation of AI in both the economy and society. In fact, Korean public discourse often includes concerns that the country is falling behind China in AI, with growing calls for the government to play a more proactive role in accelerating AI adoption. This stands in contrast to Western liberal democracies, where anti-statism is more prevalent and government-led deployment of digital technologies is often viewed as a threat to privacy and individual rights. Like China, South Korea’s massive amounts of digital and manufacturing data are a direct result of people’s fast adoption of technologies, including AI services.
On the issue of AI-related job security, while people around the world are concerned about job losses due to AI, the dominant discourse in China and South Korea focuses on how many jobs AI will create in the future through its rapid implementation. This is not to say people are unconcerned about job security, but such concerns are outweighed by discussions about the positive impact of AI. In this context, people in China and South Korea are proactively learning AI, and governments are rapidly expanding AI literacy programs to prepare the workforce for the AI economy.
Challenge for the West and Global South’s Manufacturing Reshoring Ambitions
East Asia’s rapid implementation of AI in manufacturing has significant implications for ongoing efforts in the West and emerging economies in the Global South to restructure global production away from East Asia and back to their own regions. Over the last 40 years, East Asia, led by China and South Korea, has dominated the global manufacturing landscape. This is a unique phenomenon in modern history, as no other region has maintained such long-standing industrial dominance in the post-World War II era.
The West, including the U.S. and Europe, is attempting to reclaim its lost manufacturing base through reshoring initiatives – an agenda that gained momentum under the Trump administration and remains a major policy debate within the European Union. However, given the speed and scale at which East Asia has adopted AI in manufacturing, it is increasingly unlikely that Western countries will achieve their reshoring goals, as digitalization and AI adoption remain comparatively slow in those regions.
East Asia’s rapid advancement in AI manufacturing also poses a serious challenge to emerging economies in the Global South – such as India and some Southeast Asian nations – that aspire to become the next global manufacturing hubs by replacing China and East Asia’s current dominance. While China and South Korea have clear state-driven ambitions backed by strong state-business coordination and proactive societal support for AI implementation, such strategic alignment is largely absent in many Global South economies at this stage.
Hence, the rise of AI manufacturing in East Asia, led by China and South Korea, is likely to reshape the global balance of industrial power in the new AI-powered technological era.
Authors
Guest Author
Rajiv Kumar
Dr. Rajiv Kumar is a research professor at the Institute of Indian Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, and also teaches at the Academy of East Asian Studies, Sungkyunkwan University, both in Seoul, South Korea.
15. Independence fighter's bust to remain at military academy after relocation row
Independence fighter's bust to remain at military academy after relocation row | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · May 26, 2025
SEOUL, May 26 (Yonhap) -- The Korea Military Academy has decided to retain the bust of a revered South Korean independence fighter on its campus, a lawmaker said Monday, reversing an earlier relocation plan that had sparked a heated public debate.
The bust of Gen. Hong Beom-do, a leader of Korean independence forces from the time of Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule of Korea, will stay at the Chungmu education facility inside the institution, the academy said in response to a query by Rep. Jung Sung-ho of the Democratic Party.
In 2023, the defense ministry announced plans to relocate Hong's bust to the Independence Hall of Korea in the country's central region and the busts of four other independence fighters erected at the academy to a third location. The ministry had cited Hong's controversial ties to Soviet communist forces.
The move sparked fierce debate over its legitimacy and drew strong protests from liberal political groups and advocates for independence fighters.
The busts of the five independence fighters were originally installed in 2018 at the academy under the previous liberal Moon Jae-in government. The relocation plan was therefore widely seen as an attempt by the conservative government of then President Yoon Suk Yeol to reverse Moon's initiative.
According to Jung, the academy said it also plans to keep the busts of the four other independence fighters.
Hong is known for leading Korean independence forces and spearheading major victories against Japanese troops in 1920. He moved to Russia the following year to seek refuge from Japanese forces.
He was forced to relocate to current-day Kazakhstan in 1937 under then Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's policy, along with many other ethnic Koreans before his death in 1943.
Cadets and attendees pose for a photo during the unveiling ceremony of busts honoring five independence fighters, including Gen. Hong Beom-do, at the Korea Military Academy in Seoul in this March 1, 2018, file photo. (Yonhap)
elly@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · May 26, 2025
16. Investigation into SK Telecom data breach expands to KT, LG Uplus, Naver, Kakao: sources
(LEAD) Investigation into SK Telecom data breach expands to KT, LG Uplus, Naver, Kakao: sources | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · May 26, 2025
(ATTN: UPDATES with new info in paras 1-5; RECASTS headline)
SEOUL, May 26 (Yonhap) -- A joint government-private investigation team looking into SK Telecom Co.'s recent large-scale data breach has extended its probe to the servers of other major mobile carriers and platform companies, but found no signs they have been compromised, industry sources said Monday.
Initially, the team had asked local telecommunications and platform companies to conduct their own cybersecurity inspections.
Last week, they changed their approach and conducted on-site inspections at telecom carriers KT Corp. and LG Uplus Corp., as well as four major platform companies -- Naver Corp., Kakao Corp., Coupang Inc. and Baedal Minjok, according to the sources.
The investigation was expanded amid rising concerns that hackers using BPFDoor malware variants could have targeted other Korean tech firms.
Following the probe, investigators said no traces of hacking activity have been found so far on the servers of any of the six companies inspected.
In a media briefing last week, the investigation team revealed interim findings indicating that 25 malware variants had been discovered on 23 servers belonging to SK Telecom. These included 24 variants of the BPFDoor malware and one variant of WebCell.
Two of the affected servers had been used as temporary storage for personal data, such as names, birthdates, phone numbers and email addresses, as well as international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) data.
The IMEI is a unique identifier for each device on a network and could potentially be exploited in financial transactions.
SK Telecom discovered the breach April 18.
This file photo, provided by SK Telecom Co., shows its headquarters in downtown Seoul. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
brk@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · May 26, 2025
17. Court to hold 1st preparatory hearing of ex-President Moon's trial next month
I ask only half in jest: Who would want to be president in South korea given the history of presidnts going to jail?
And again, only half in jest, why would Kim Jong Un ever want to peacefully unify with the South when he has seen what happens to former presidents in the South. He knows what would happen to him.
Court to hold 1st preparatory hearing of ex-President Moon's trial next month | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Hyun-soo · May 26, 2025
SEOUL, May 26 (Yonhap) -- A Seoul court will hold the first preparatory hearing of former President Moon Jae-in's bribery trial next month, legal sources said Monday.
Moon was indicted last month on charges of receiving bribes in the form of a salary and other payments worth over 200 million won (US$146,537) for his then son-in-law, surnamed Seo, from Thailand-based budget carrier Thai Eastar Jet.
The preparatory hearing has been scheduled for 2 p.m. on June 17 at the Seoul Central District Court, the sources said.
Seo was appointed executive director at the airline in 2018 after the company's founder and former two-term lawmaker Lee Sang-jik was appointed head of the Korea SMEs and Startups Agency.
Prosecutors suspect that Lee's appointment was made in exchange for hiring Seo at the airline, particularly given Seo's lack of experience in the airline industry at the time.
During a preliminary hearing, the court typically verifies the defendant's position and plans for future proceedings. Unlike the main trial, the defendant is not required to attend.
Former President Moon Jae-in attends a memorial ceremony of late President Roh Moo-hyun in the southeastern rural village of Bongha on May 23, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
sookim@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Hyun-soo · May 26, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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