Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Their sacrifice was great, their dedication was complete, and their courage was unwavering."

– Unknown

"Our flag does not fly because the wind moves it. It flies with the last breath of each soldier who died protecting it."

– Unknown

"Freedom makes a huge requirement of every human being. With freedom comes responsibility."

– Eleanor Roosevelt

1. Memorial Day 2025 – A few thoughts by Dr. Cynthia Watson

2. U.S. Aims to Keep Chinese Navy Guessing With New Missile System

3. US’ 500 military personnel in Taiwan an ‘open test’ of Beijing’s red lines

4. China’s space ambitions ‘forcing’ Washington’s Golden Dome strategy: commander

5. Trump Calls Putin ‘Crazy’ After Massive Russian Aerial Assaults on Ukraine

6. Trump’s Vision: One World, Three Powers?

7. Haiti’s Beleaguered Government Launches Drones Against Gangs

8. China Is Trapped in the South China Sea 'Gray Zone'

9. Poland, Romania lead a drone bonanza in Eastern Europe

10. Donald Trump purges dozens of National Security Council officials

11. Discover the Secret World of CIA’s Elite Paramilitary Operatives

12. Why Three Years Isn’t Enough For Trump’s Golden Dome

13. America's military humiliation – The Houthis exposed its waning power

14. The US military spent $6 billion in the past 3 years to recruit and retain troops

15. Hegseth to attend Asia defense summit, with no China meeting planned

16. Japan’s Ishiba Calls for Closer Weapons Development With Allies

17. Fiscal Hawks in Senate Balk at House’s Bill to Deliver Trump’s Agenda

18. The Rise of AI Manufacturing in China and South Korea

19. China's strategy for conquering Taiwan without firing a shot

20. The US plan for countering China in South America

21. Of Fists and Fathers: A Remembrance

1. Memorial Day 2025 – A few thoughts by Dr. Cynthia Watson

A lot of reflections written for today. I found these brief thoughts and Lincoln's words to very much resonate with me.

Memorial Day 2025

A few thoughts

https://cynthiawatson.substack.com/p/memorial-day-2025?utm

Cynthia Watson

May 26, 2025

Memorial Day commemorates the hundreds of thousands who gave their lives in service to this country. The overwhelming majority did it with honor, even in the face of pervasive fear. Some may have had doubts about what they were asked to do but they had sworn to serve by taking an oath to the Constitution, that amazing set of ideals rather than any single individual, as the generations before and after them.

I hope you can spare a moment to consider their sacrifices today. The most appropriate words our nation has, in my book, were scribbled by an Illinois president in November 1863 as he dedicated a federal cemetary— the country actually has far more of those grassy areas populated with white headstones across this nation than most people realize—in south central Pennsylvania. While his words were about recent events on that bloody ground, the sentiment of sacrifice and commitment he recalled is more universal than that place alone; it’s also reminding us of something bigger than any individual among us.

“Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.

Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate – we can not consecrate – we can not hallow – this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us – that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion – that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain – that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom – and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”—Abraham Lincoln, 19 November 1863

Flags are ubiquitous in this country, predominantly the Stars and Stripes. My wish for today is that all remember that flag, like the sacrifices we memorialize today, symbolizes a commitment to that same ideal enunciated in the Constitution and spelled out by Lincoln above. We too have unfinished work for which so many have given so much.

Thank you for reading Actions Create Consequences today. I welcome your thoughts, objections, reflections, memories, or any feedback.

Be well and be safe. Also give thanks. FIN

Abraham Lincoln, “The Gettsyburg Address”, constitutioncenter.org, 1863, retrieved at https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/historic-document-library/detail/abraham-lincoln-the-gettysburg-address-1863?gad_source=1

2. U.S. Aims to Keep Chinese Navy Guessing With New Missile System

Excerpts:

The Philippines, America’s oldest treaty ally in Asia, is a key part of that new push. The government of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has given the U.S. military access to more bases, on which it can build facilities, pre-position equipment and refuel and maintain aircraft and vessels.

Since the U.S. has no permanent troops based in the Philippines, Washington would have to airlift fighters and weapons to small, hard-to-access islands, under the threat of enemy fire.

Extensive drills mean some U.S. troops now rotate through Philippine bases for much of the year. That not only improves coordination with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, but also allows Marines and Air Force pilots to get more familiar with the topography of the Pacific theater. On practice flights and reconnaissance missions, they scope out mountains and other features that could serve as cover.

“We get really low and hide,” said Capt. Benjamin Dorsey of the 39th Airlift Squadron, which moved the Nmesis to Batan.

Lehane said the successful deployment of the Nmesis should signal to potential adversaries that the Marines’ island fighters are ready for combat.

“A lot of folks are still perceiving our unit as experimental and it’s absolutely not experimental,” he said. “The most important thing is to get folks accustomed to the fact that where you see 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment, you should expect that there are Nmesis with us.”

U.S. Aims to Keep Chinese Navy Guessing With New Missile System

As China dominates swaths of the Pacific, the U.S. is looking for ways to push back. The Nmesis is a key part of that.

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/nmesis-missile-system-us-china-pacific-ce7e1f7c?mod=hp_lead_pos11

By Gabriele Steinhauser

May 25, 2025 11:00 pm ET

The Nmesis, seen on Batan Island in the Philippines, comprises a missile launcher on an unmanned truck. Photo: U.S. Marine Corps

Key Points

What's This?

U.S. Marines deployed a Nmesis missile system to Batan Island, Philippines.
Nmesis is an antiship missile launcher on a remote-controlled truck, designed to deter Chinese warships.
The Philippines is key to a broader overhaul meant to make the Marines more agile.

BATAN ISLAND, Philippines—The Air Force C-130 transport plane dipped down on the sun-baked airfield of this remote island in the northern Philippines, delivering a weapon system designed to give the U.S. an edge in the intensifying superpower standoff in the Pacific.

The Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, or Nmesis, is an antiship missile launcher mounted on a remote-controlled truck. The dumbbell-shaped islet where it landed lies just 120 miles south of Taiwan.

For the Marines, the Nmesis’s flight to Batan was a key test in a high-stakes retooling aimed at readying the military’s rapid-response force for a war with China in some of the world’s most strategic, but increasingly tense, waterways.

The prospect of an armed conflict with China—whether over Taiwan, the self-governed democracy Beijing claims as its own, or the contested shipping lanes of the South China Sea—has the U.S. playing catch-up. While American forces were bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, China built up the world’s biggest navy and a formidable arsenal of missiles aimed at making swaths of the Pacific off-limits to its adversaries.

The Nmesis—pronounced “nemesis”—was designed to erode that lead. It takes advantage of natural chokepoints like Batan to raise the cost of access for Chinese warships. Initially built to be launched from ships, the Norway-made Naval Strike Missiles the Nmesis fires can sink vessels some 115 miles away, skimming the water and adjusting their trajectory to follow and hit a moving target.

East China Sea

CHINA

Fuzhou

Taipei

TAIWAN

Range of Naval Strike Missile

(115 miles)

Kaohsiung

Batanes

Archipelago

Batan Island

Philippine

Sea

PHILIPPINES

South

China Sea

Luzon Island

Manila

Source: Raytheon (missile range)

Emma Brown/WSJ

With the Nmesis, Marines can now shoot these high-precision missiles from land, including from remote, mountainous islands like Batan, where launchers are far easier to conceal than on the open water. The main vehicle carrying the missiles is unmanned. Its operators work from a distance, based in two support vehicles that place them outside the line of fire of anyone trying to take out the launchers.

The Nmesis’ mere presence on strategic islands in the Pacific complicates decision-making for adversaries, who have to weigh the threat it poses for any vessel that may find itself within striking distance, said Col. John Lehane, the commander of the Hawaii-based Marine regiment that deployed the system to Batan late last month as part of an annual exercise.

“Once you put it on the ground, it is there. It can move around. It is hard to find,” Lehane said.

The Nmesis’s antiship capabilities give it an edge over other land-based missile systems, such as the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or Himars, which helped transform the battlefield in Ukraine but has struggled to hit moving targets at sea, Lehane said.

Rommel Ong, a former vice commander of the Philippine navy and now a senior research fellow at the Ateneo School of Government in Manila, likened the Nmesis’ presence on islands in the Western Pacific islands to a “shell game.”

“You keep the other side guessing and that creates the uncertainty and in a way that creates the deterrent effect,” he said.

Lehane’s 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment was the first Marine unit to take delivery of the new system late last year. The Nmesis is a centerpiece of a broader overhaul of the Marines aimed at making the force more agile, able to swoop into action even after a conflict has already erupted.

A U.S. C-130 plane delivers Nmesis equipment in the north of the Philippines as part of joint drills. Photo: Jim Gomez/AP

The Philippines, America’s oldest treaty ally in Asia, is a key part of that new push. The government of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has given the U.S. military access to more bases, on which it can build facilities, pre-position equipment and refuel and maintain aircraft and vessels.

Since the U.S. has no permanent troops based in the Philippines, Washington would have to airlift fighters and weapons to small, hard-to-access islands, under the threat of enemy fire.

Extensive drills mean some U.S. troops now rotate through Philippine bases for much of the year. That not only improves coordination with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, but also allows Marines and Air Force pilots to get more familiar with the topography of the Pacific theater. On practice flights and reconnaissance missions, they scope out mountains and other features that could serve as cover.

“We get really low and hide,” said Capt. Benjamin Dorsey of the 39th Airlift Squadron, which moved the Nmesis to Batan.

Lehane said the successful deployment of the Nmesis should signal to potential adversaries that the Marines’ island fighters are ready for combat.

“A lot of folks are still perceiving our unit as experimental and it’s absolutely not experimental,” he said. “The most important thing is to get folks accustomed to the fact that where you see 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment, you should expect that there are Nmesis with us.”

Write to Gabriele Steinhauser at Gabriele.Steinhauser@wsj.com

3. US’ 500 military personnel in Taiwan an ‘open test’ of Beijing’s red lines

It is not like there have not already been reports of US personnel on Taiwan (and Kinmen).

From 2024:

Breaking a Seven-Decade Taboo: The Deployment of US Special Forces to Kinmen

https://www.hudson.org/security-alliances/breaking-seven-decade-taboo-deployment-us-special-forces-kinmen-miles-yu

US Army Special Forces Train Taiwan Troops Near China's Coast

https://www.newsweek.com/american-special-forces-train-taiwan-soldiers-penghu-kinmen-china-coast-1868009

Taiwan Acknowledges Presence of U.S. Troops on Outlying Islands

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/taiwan-acknowledges-presence-of-u-s-troops-on-outlying-islands-c81c3b6b

US admiral denies permanent special forces in Kinmen

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2024/03/22/2003815294

But we should re-establish the Special Forces Taiwan Resident Detachment that was present on Taiwan from 1957 until 1973 when 1st Special Forces Group inactivated.

US’ 500 military personnel in Taiwan an ‘open test’ of Beijing’s red lines

Some analysts downplay the number, but others say the revelation puts Beijing in a challenging position

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3311807/us-500-military-personnel-taiwan-open-test-beijings-red-lines?utm

Enoch Wong

Published: 6:00pm, 26 May 2025

Washington’s disclosure that around 500 US military personnel are stationed in Taiwan signals more open and substantial defence support for the island – a pivot from a previously discreet partnership that is openly testing Beijing’s red lines, according to analysts.

The disclosure, made on May 15 by retired US Navy Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery during congressional testimony, was the first official acknowledgement of such a substantial American military presence on the self-governed island.

Taiwanese experts say the number refers to training personnel. It also vastly exceeds the previously known 41 personnel that were confirmed in a US congressional report a year earlier.

Montgomery told lawmakers that the US military involvement was essential to training Taiwan to become a credible “counter-intervention force” capable of real combat or complicating Beijing’s military options.

“If we’re going to give them billions of dollars in assistance, sell them tens of billions of dollars’ worth of US gear, it makes sense that we’d be over there training and working,” he said.

Days after the hearing, mainland Chinese state broadcaster CCTV took the rare step of airing commentary on Montgomery’s remarks about the American military presence on the island.

The broadcast did not outline specific plans for a response by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), but it featured residents of the island criticising US actions as “pushing Taiwan towards the danger of war”.

Su Tzu-yun, a research fellow at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defence and Security Research, a Taipei-backed think tank, said Montgomery was likely to have been referring “to training personnel rather than combat troops” – distinct from the reported active-duty US military personnel stationed on the island who are serving in administrative roles.

Chen Wen-chia, an international affairs scholar at Taiwan’s National Chengchi University, also downplayed the significance of the number, emphasising that “joint training missions are short-term and technical in focus, not equivalent to a permanent US military presence”.

Retired Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery says US military involvement is essential to training Taiwan to become a credible “counter-intervention force”. Photo: US Navy

The Pentagon has not confirmed the updated number. However, Chen said the growing visibility of US military personnel signalled “a gradual US move away from strategic ambiguity towards greater clarity”.

Strategic ambiguity is the long-standing US policy to not take a clear position on whether it would come to Taiwan’s defence if it was attacked by mainland forces.

Beijing regards Taiwan as part of China, to be reunited by force if necessary. Like most countries, the US does not recognise the island as an independent state. However, Washington is opposed to any unilateral change to the status quo.

While the United States is legally obliged to provide arms for the island’s defence, its ambiguous position is understood to serve the dual purpose of complicating the PLA’s calculations without encouraging Taiwan independence de jure.

“While a 500-troop presence remains limited in scale, it marks a shift in US-Taiwan military ties – from symbolic engagement towards more substantive, practical and operational cooperation,” Chen said.

In 1979, when Washington formally recognised the People’s Republic of China as “the sole legal government of China”, it also withdrew thousands of troops from Taiwan and enacted the Taiwan Relations Act – which enshrined continued US defence support, mainly through arms sales.

But with tensions between Beijing and Taipei on the rise, both Taiwanese authorities and the US government are pushing the envelope by disclosing the extent of the American military presence in Taiwan.

In October 2021, then-Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing-wen publicly acknowledged for the first time that US military personnel were stationed on the island. Shortly afterwards, the Pentagon’s Defence Manpower Data Centre began to release limited figures, showing small annual increases in the military presence.

In February this year, Taipei shared an image on social media of US Major General Jay Bargeron of the Indo-Pacific Command taking part in tabletop drills alongside Taiwan’s defence leaders.

Taiwan sees spike in PLA military activity as island stages defence drills

A month later, videos emerged showing US naval vessels conducting joint exercises with Taiwanese forces. These were widely circulated on social media.

Similar signals have also come from Washington, especially under the Biden administration, with then-president Joe Biden repeatedly asserting that the US would defend Taiwan if it came under attack.

Each time, the State Department rushed to clarify that there had been no change to Washington’s one-China policy.

The heightened military visibility, now confirmed by the US, places Beijing in a challenging position, according to experts.

Sasha Chhabra, a visiting research fellow at the Institute for National Defence and Security Research in Taipei, pointed out that “full-scale war would open not just with bombs and missiles raining down on Taiwan, but on American bases, killing American troops”.

Weapons could be destroyed or captured without international repercussions, but American blood spilled would mean that “America will have no choice but to respond with full force”, forcing an escalatory response, Chhabra argued.

Oriana Mastro, a fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, suggested that, compared with arms sales, actual US personnel on Taiwanese soil carried a stronger signal of commitment.

“There is no scenario in which Taiwan can defend itself without direct US military intervention,” Mastro said, adding that on-the-ground military engagement would be necessary.

She said this was because of the island’s geography, which would prevent resupply in wartime, making direct, sustained training critical to deterrence.

Ukraine’s response against Russia has prompted the US to adopt deterrence strategies that incorporate concepts such as “defence in-depth”, involving multiple defensive layers designed to slow or exhaust invading forces.

US strategists have also flagged Taiwan’s “porcupine” defence model, an asymmetric approach designed to inflict heavy losses on an aggressor through guerilla-style resistance and dispersed weapon systems, making any invasion prohibitively costly.

During the same hearing, Montgomery called for a doubling of the troop presence in Taiwan to 1,000 – underlining that effective deterrence and defence depended on close, ongoing military integration.

Yet, this strategy carries risks of unintended consequences and could backfire, according to William Matthews, senior research fellow at British think tank Chatham House, who warned that these actions may lead Beijing to “perceive a limited window in which it can act”.

“Beijing increasingly believes that forceful intervention could be necessary,” Matthews said, particularly if Washington were to take “pre-emptive actions which would make future unification challenging, militarily or politically”.

Enoch Wong

Enoch Wong joined the Post in 2024 as a Senior Reporter on the China Desk after over a decade with institutions like Tsinghua University and UN-affiliated organisations across Asia, Africa and Europe. A Schwarzman Scholar at Tsinghua University specialising in China-US relations and9p

4. China’s space ambitions ‘forcing’ Washington’s Golden Dome strategy: commander

Excerpts:

“They have built capabilities to hold at risk our space systems,” he said. “Golden Dome is part of making sure we’re ready.”

Whiting said Beijing’s strategy included deploying weapons in orbit, developing jamming systems and fielding kinetic anti-satellite missiles – all with the explicit aim of blinding and disrupting US military operations during a crisis.

“China has ambitions to be the world’s greatest space power,” he said. “And they are backing that up with action.”

Unveiled this week with an initial US$25 billion investment, the Golden Dome is a sweeping plan to build a layered missile defence architecture to protect the US from long-range and hypersonic threats.

Modelled in part on Israel’s Iron Dome but with a vastly larger scope, the system is set to integrate both ground and space-based technologies, including a planned network of orbiting interceptors and sensors.

Announced via executive order in January and formally introduced by Trump on Tuesday, the project is expected to cost at least US$175 billion. But costs could spiral beyond US$800 billion over the next two decades, according to the US Congressional Budget Office.

Trump has said the goal is for the initiative to be operational by the end of his term in January 2029.

China’s space ambitions ‘forcing’ Washington’s Golden Dome strategy: commander

General Stephen Whiting tells Chicago forum that Beijing has spent three decades preparing to target US infrastructure

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3311461/chinas-space-ambitions-forcing-washingtons-golden-dome-strategy-commander?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article

Igor Patrickin Washington

Published: 5:00pm, 23 May 2025Updated: 5:06pm, 23 May 2025

The head of US Space Command has warned that China’s expanding arsenal of anti-satellite weapons is forcing Washington to accelerate defences in orbit, calling the threat “real” and immediate, amid growing scrutiny of President Donald Trump’s proposed missile shield.

General Stephen Whiting told a public forum in Chicago on Thursday that the ambitious defence system known as the Golden Dome was a response to how China had spent the past three decades preparing to target American space infrastructure.

“They have built capabilities to hold at risk our space systems,” he said. “Golden Dome is part of making sure we’re ready.”

Whiting said Beijing’s strategy included deploying weapons in orbit, developing jamming systems and fielding kinetic anti-satellite missiles – all with the explicit aim of blinding and disrupting US military operations during a crisis.

“China has ambitions to be the world’s greatest space power,” he said. “And they are backing that up with action.”

Unveiled this week with an initial US$25 billion investment, the Golden Dome is a sweeping plan to build a layered missile defence architecture to protect the US from long-range and hypersonic threats.

Modelled in part on Israel’s Iron Dome but with a vastly larger scope, the system is set to integrate both ground and space-based technologies, including a planned network of orbiting interceptors and sensors.

Announced via executive order in January and formally introduced by Trump on Tuesday, the project is expected to cost at least US$175 billion. But costs could spiral beyond US$800 billion over the next two decades, according to the US Congressional Budget Office.

Trump has said the goal is for the initiative to be operational by the end of his term in January 2029.

US Space Force General Stephen Whiting says the Golden Dome is a response to how China has spent the past three decades preparing to target American space infrastructure. Photo: Getty

The Chinese government has strongly criticised the plan, warning that it carries “strong offensive implications” and increases “the risk of space becoming a battlefield”.

China’s foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning accused Washington of violating the principle of shared international security and called on the US to abandon the project. In a joint statement earlier this month, Beijing and Moscow called the Golden Dome “deeply destabilising in nature”.

In his remarks, Whiting pushed back on those criticisms, saying that China’s own space posture undermined its calls for restraint. “It’s fascinating when the Chinese or the Russians talk about concerns with militarisation of space,” he said.

“When I look up and I see their on-orbit anti-satellite weapons, when I see their direct ascent anti-satellite rockets, when I see their high-energy lasers, when I see their jammers … their hypocrisy is evident for all to see.”

Whiting warned that Beijing had developed hundreds of reconnaissance satellites able to “find, fix, track, and target” US military assets. These systems were designed to detect US naval movements and enable over-the-horizon missile strikes in the event of conflict, he said.

“If there were to be a conflict with China, we have to be prepared in space,” Whiting said, noting that Chinese President Xi Jinping told the People’s Liberation Army to be ready by 2027 to forcibly reunify Taiwan with the mainland.

“We need to take Xi Jinping seriously. If he has told his forces to be ready by 2027, we need to make sure we are equally ready.”

Trump’s Golden Dome shows US ‘obsessed with absolute security’, China says

Space Command, created in 2019 alongside the US Space Force, is tasked with leading US military operations in space. Its mandate includes protecting satellites, coordinating with allies, and preparing for potential space-enabled conflict.

The general described recent Chinese tests of hypersonic and orbital delivery systems, including a “fractional orbital bombardment system” that could evade early warning radars and strike targets with little notice, as “very destabilising”.

Whiting also emphasised the role of commercial innovation in strengthening US readiness. “Commercial industry is really what has driven innovation over the last 10 to 15 years,” he said, citing the ability of companies to mass-produce satellites and reusable rockets as “advantages that will definitely support the development of the Golden Dome”.

The US is working to improve its space domain awareness – the ability to track and interpret activity in orbit – as the number of objects in space nears 50,000.

Whiting noted that since Space Command’s creation, tracked objects had increased by 90 per cent, due to both satellite launches and space debris created by anti-satellite missile tests, including one by China in 2007.

The general urged more responsible behaviour from all nations, lamenting that despite issuing warnings to both China and Russia about debris collisions, the US received no such notifications in return.

Asked whether space had already become a military theatre, Whiting did not hesitate. “We don’t want a war to start in space or to extend into space. However, we’ve got to be ready for that potential reality,” he said.

“The best way to avoid war is to be prepared for it.”

Igor Patrick

Igor Patrick has worked in different media outlets in Latin America, mainly covering Brics and China. In addition to his bachelor's degree in journalism (PUC Minas), he holds two master's degrees from the Yenching Academy (Peking University) and Schwarzman Scholars (Tsinghua University). Before joining the Post, he was a fellow at the Wilson Center, where he wrote t

5. Trump Calls Putin ‘Crazy’ After Massive Russian Aerial Assaults on Ukraine

From @realDonaldTrump on Truth Social:

I've always had a good relationship with Vladimir Putin of Russia, but something has happened to him. He has gone absolutely CRAZY! He is needlessly killing a lot of people, and I'm not just talking about soldiers. Missiles and drones are being shot into Cities in Ukraine, for no reason whatsoever. I've always said that he wants ALL of Ukraine, not just a piece of it, and maybe that's proving to be right, but if he does, it will lead to the downfall of Russia! Likewise, President Zelenskyy is doing his Country, no favors by talking the way he does. Everything out of his mouth causes problems, I don't like it, and it better stop. This is a War that would never have started. If I were President. This is Zelenskyy's, Putin's, and Biden's War, not “Trump’s,” I am only helping to put out the big and ugly fires, that have been started with Gross Incompetence and Hatred. May 25, 2025 at 8:46PM

This is US strategic communications (and strategic guidance). However, no mainstream media (conservative or liberal) has posted the entire statement, only experts. I am not sure why not because as I said this is US strategic communications.

Two key points from this - he is stating what most have long thought, i.e., that Putin wants all of Ukraine. Second, if he seeks to take all of it, it will lead to the downfall of Russia. What are we planning to do if Putin does not back down? Are we prepared (or preparing) to end Putin's regime? I would be interested in knowing how the commanders and planners in EUCOM, NATO, and the Pentagon are interpreting this strategic guidance and how they are taking it for action. Certainly this guidance demands that they present POTUS with options to back up his words.

Trump Calls Putin ‘Crazy’ After Massive Russian Aerial Assaults on Ukraine

At least 12 killed and dozens injured as strikes across the country hit residential buildings, Ukrainian officials say

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russia-launches-massive-aerial-assaults-on-ukraine-defying-trumps-peace-calls-f0a28234?st=MwdZ3u&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

By James Marson

and Ievgeniia Sivorka

Updated May 25, 2025 9:59 pm ET

Trump’s Vision: One World, Three Powers?

President Trump’s recent actions and statements suggest he might want an arrangement where the United States, China and Russia each dominate their sphere of influence.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/26/us/politics/trump-russia-china.html

President Trump and his aides have been trying to exert greater American influence from the Arctic Circle to South America’s Patagonia region.Credit...Eric Lee/The New York Times

By Edward Wong

Edward Wong covers U.S. foreign policy and is the author of a new book on China. He reported this article from Washington and from a trip in the Western Hemisphere with Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

May 26, 2025, 5:00 a.m. ET

For President Trump, anytime is a good time for deal-making, but never more so than now with the leaders of China and Russia.

Last week, Mr. Trump said he wanted to normalize commerce with Russia, appearing to lessen the pressure on Moscow to settle its war with Ukraine. And he is trying to limit the fallout from his own global trade war by urging China’s leader to call him.

“We all want to make deals,” Mr. Trump said in a recent interview with Time magazine. “But I am this giant store. It’s a giant, beautiful store, and everybody wants to go shopping there.”

Mr. Trump may have something even bigger in mind involving Russia and China, and it would be the ultimate deal.

His actions and statements suggest he might be envisioning a world in which each of the three so-called great powers — the United States, China and Russia — dominates its part of the globe, some foreign policy analysts say.

It would be a throwback to a 19th-century style of imperial rule.

Mr. Trump has said he wants to take Greenland from Denmark, annex Canada and re-establish American control of the Panama Canal. Those bids to extend U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere are the clearest signs yet of his desire to create a sphere of influence in the nation’s backyard.

Image

Vice President JD Vance and his wife, Usha Vance, toured the U.S. military’s Pituffik Space Base in Greenland in March. President Trump has said he wants to take Greenland from Denmark. Credit...Pool photo by Jim Watson

He has criticized allies and talked about withdrawing U.S. troops from around the globe. That could benefit Russia and China, which seek to diminish the American security presence in Europe and Asia. Mr. Trump often praises President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and Xi Jinping, China’s leader, as strong and smart men who are his close friends.

To that end, Mr. Trump has been trying to formalize Russian control of some Ukrainian territory — and American access to Ukraine’s minerals — as part of a potential peace deal that critics say would effectively carve up Ukraine, similar to what great powers did in the age of empires. Mr. Trump and Mr. Putin spoke about Ukraine in a two-hour phone call on last week.

“The tone and spirit of the conversation were excellent,” Mr. Trump wrote on social media.

Monica Duffy Toft, a professor of international politics at Tufts University’s Fletcher School, said that the leaders of the United States, Russia and China are all striving for “an imaginary past that was freer and more glorious.”

“Commanding and extending spheres of influence appears to restore a fading sense of grandeur,” she wrote in a new essay in Foreign Affairs magazine. The term “spheres of influence” originated at the Berlin Conference of 1884-5, in which European powers adopted a formal plan to carve up Africa.

Some close observers of Mr. Trump, including officials from his first administration, caution against thinking his actions and statements are strategic. While Mr. Trump might have strong, long-held attitudes about a handful of issues, notably immigration and trade, he does not have a vision of a world order, they argue.

Yet there are signs that Mr. Trump and perhaps some of his aides are thinking in the manner that emperors once did when they conceived of spheres of influence.

“The best evidence is Trump’s desire to expand America’s overt sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere,” said Stephen Wertheim, a historian of U.S. foreign policy at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

But setting up a sphere of influence in the post-imperial age is not easy, even for a superpower.

Last month, Canadians elected an anti-Trump prime minister, Mark Carney, whose Liberal Party appeared destined to lose the election until Mr. Trump talked aggressively about Canada. Leaders of Greenland, an autonomous territory of Denmark, have rejected the idea of U.S. control. Chinese officials are threatening to stop a Hong Kong company from selling its business running two ports in the Panama Canal to American investors.

Image

Prime Minister Mark Carney of Canada celebrating his victory on election night in April. His Liberal Party appeared destined to lose the election until President Trump made aggressive comments about Canada. Credit...Cole Burston for The New York Times

“China will not give up its stakes in the Western Hemisphere so easily without a fight,” said Yun Sun, a China analyst at the Stimson Center in Washington.

Even so, Mr. Trump and his aides persist in trying to exert greater American influence from the Arctic Circle to South America’s Patagonia region. When Mr. Carney told Mr. Trump this month in the Oval Office that Canada was “not for sale,” Mr. Trump replied: “Never say never.”

In March, Vice President JD Vance visited a U.S. military base in Greenland to reiterate Mr. Trump’s desire to take the territory.

And it is no coincidence that Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s two most substantial trips since taking office have been to Latin America and the Caribbean.

In El Salvador, Mr. Rubio negotiated with Nayib Bukele, the strongman leader, to have the nation imprison immigrants deported by the U.S. government, setting up what is effectively an American penal colony. Mr. Rubio also pressed Panama on its ports.

As a senator representing Florida, Mr. Rubio said at a hearing in July 2022 that focusing more closely on the Western Hemisphere was “critical to our national security and our national economic interests.”

“Geography matters,” he said, because “proximity matters.”

During that trip to the region, Mr. Rubio was asked by a reporter whether administration officials had discussed setting up spheres of influence, which would entail negotiating limits on each superpower’s footprint, including in Asia.

Mr. Rubio, who has more conventional foreign policy views than Mr. Trump, asserted that the United States would maintain its military alliances in Asia. Those alliances allow it to base troops across the region.

“We don’t talk about spheres of influence,” he said. “The United States is an Indo-Pacific nation. We have relationships with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines. We’re going to continue those relationships.”

Image

Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with President Nayib Bukele of El Salvador in February and negotiated to have the nation imprison immigrants deported by the U.S. government. Credit...Pool photo by Mark Schiefelbein

Some analysts say Mr. Trump’s approach to the war in Ukraine is consistent with the concept of spheres of influence. The United States is talking to another large power — Russia — about how to define the borders of a smaller country and is itself trying to control natural resources.

Mr. Trump has proposed terms of a settlement that would mostly benefit Russia, including U.S. recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea and acknowledgment of Russian occupation of large swaths of eastern Ukraine. This week, Mr. Trump even seemed to back off his demand that Russia agree to an immediate cease-fire with Ukraine. Earlier, he got Ukraine to sign an agreement to give American companies access to the country’s minerals.

Supporters of Mr. Trump’s settlement proposal say it reflects the reality on the ground, as Ukraine struggles to oust the Russian occupiers.

But Mr. Trump’s praise of Mr. Putin and of Russia, and his persistent skepticism of America’s role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, has inflamed anxieties among European nations over a potentially waning U.S. presence in their geographic sphere.

The same is true of Taiwan and Asian security. Mr. Trump has voiced enough criticism of the island over the years, and showered enough accolades on Mr. Xi, China’s leader, that Taiwanese and U.S. officials wonder whether he would waver on U.S. arms support for Taiwan, which is mandated by a congressional act.

Mr. Trump says he wants to reach a deal with China. Whether that would go beyond tariffs to address issues such as Taiwan and the U.S. military presence in Asia is an open question.

“Beijing would love to have a grand bargain with the U.S. on spheres of influence,” Ms. Sun said, and “its first and foremost focus will be on Taiwan.”

Trump administration officials have not detailed how far the United States would go to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. At his confirmation hearing, Elbridge A. Colby, the under secretary of defense for policy, was asked by Senator Tom Cotton, Republican of Arkansas, why Mr. Colby’s stance on defending Taiwan appeared to have “softened” recently.

Mr. Colby said Taiwan was “not an existential interest” for the United States, and affirmed a vague commitment to Asia: “It’s very important the core American interest is in denying China regional hegemony.”

Edward Wong reports on global affairs, U.S. foreign policy and the State Department for The Times.

See more on: Russia-Ukraine War, Marco Rubio, Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, Xi Jinping

7. Haiti’s Beleaguered Government Launches Drones Against Gangs

Even one of the most poor and destitute countries in the world is turning to drones.

Haiti’s Beleaguered Government Launches Drones Against Gangs

Small drones bearing explosives are escalating chaos in the Caribbean nation’s capital

https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/haiti-drones-gangs-fight-27e8341f?mod=world_lead_story

By Kejal Vyas

May 24, 2025 7:00 am ET

A drone takes flight during a Haitian police operation. Photo: Patrice Noel/Zuma Press

A new front for drone warfare has opened a two-hour flight south of Miami. Haiti’s besieged government is using drones strapped with explosives to strike gangs that have turned the nation’s capital into a hellscape.

The government is relying on lightweight drones carrying rudimentary bombs to reach beyond the 10th of Port-au-Prince it controls. But the hundreds of people killed in those explosions since February don’t include any gang leaders, human-rights organizations said.

“It’s showing how weak the government forces are,” said Vanda Felbab-Brown, a scholar on conflict at the Brookings Institution. “They are desperate.”

The administration of Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, who took over as acting leader in November, didn’t respond to requests for comment. Fils-Aimé created a task force to operate the drone strikes as part of escalating action against gangs it considers terrorist entities, people close to Haiti’s leadership said.

“The state will not give in to terror. Victory against the gangs is coming. Haiti will take back control of its destiny,” Fils-Aimé’s office said on March 1 when the task force began a new offensive.

Gang-fueled violence has ravaged Haiti since 2021. Photo: fildor pq egeder/Reuters

Sounds of explosions and gunfire have become commonplace as police, armed civilian groups and gangs fight across the city. Rights groups in April documented detonations around a neighborhood where police are fighting to keep control of the last escape route for civilians fleeing Port-au-Prince.

Drones have become a valuable tool for militaries and insurgencies worldwide, from Ukrainian forces to East African Islamists and Brazilian prison gangs. Mexico’s Jalisco New Generation Cartel for years has deployed drones with explosives to hit government compounds and push civilians off territory, Felbab-Brown said.

The strikes in Haiti mark an escalation in the gang-fueled violence that has ravaged the Caribbean country since President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated in 2021. Warlords commanding poor youths have overwhelmed police, terrorized residents and forced two interim governments to resign.

The latest government is turning to private U.S. security contractors for help. Blackwater founder Erik Prince met senior Haitian leaders in April to discuss work on security and essential-goods deliveries, a spokesman for Prince said.

Fils-Aimé’s administration is working to pacify the country enough for presidential elections scheduled for November. Outmanned and underfunded, the Haitian National Police have failed to regain control of the city. A Kenya-led, U.S.-backed multinational security force deployed last year has struggled without all the funding and personnel allies promised.

Haitian Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé meeting with the Kenyan police force in Port-au-Prince. Photo: Odelyn Joseph/Associated Press

Gangs have perpetrated thousands of murders, kidnappings and mass rapes. They have choked off distribution of food and fuel. Half of Haiti’s 12 million people are facing acute food shortages, and the number of people displaced by violence has more than tripled in the past year to more than one million, according to the United Nations.

More than 300 people have been killed in drone strikes over the last three months, according to Pierre Esperance, who leads the National Human Rights Defense Network, an advocacy group. Some 80 people were killed in a series of strikes on May 6 targeting a slum called Village of God, where the rapper-turned-warlord Johnson Andre, who goes by Izo, rules.

Assessing collateral damage from the strikes has been hard because the government has provided little information and conflict sites are difficult to access, aid workers and rights researchers said. But Esperance said his organization hadn’t logged any civilian deaths so far and that he supports the use of drones against the warlords: “What should we do? Wait for the gangs to come to us and kill us?”

The U.S. State Department this month designated Haiti’s two largest gang confederations—Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif—as terrorist organizations. The U.S., a top defense supplier for Haiti, has provided nonlethal surveillance drones to Haitian authorities and has policies in place to ensure they are only used for that purpose, a State Department spokeswoman said.

“The U.S. government hasn’t supplied lethal drones to any element in Haiti,” she said.

Demonstrators marched toward the office of Prime Minister Fils-Aimé during a protest last month. Photo: fildor pq egeder/Reuters

Write to Kejal Vyas at kejal.vyas@wsj.com

8. China Is Trapped in the South China Sea 'Gray Zone'

It seems to me that one response is for the US to demonstrate strategic reassurance and strategic resolve so that US commitments are never in question. Or do we think strategic ambiguity (beyond Taiwan) works to our favor?

Excerpts:

Given this outlook, Chinese would tend to see any compromise by Chinese leaders as a surrender to attempts by rival claimants to unilaterally advance their holdings at China’s expense. Worse, all of the rival claimants are much smaller and weaker than China, so there is no excuse for Beijing declining to vigorously protect China’s purported rights.

The second reason Beijing won’t give up its policy of pressure and intimidation in the South China Sea is that the strength of the US commitment to defend its regional friends is in question. The PRC leadership sees an opportunity to test the Trump Administration’s appetite for following through with the Biden Administration’s policy of strengthening security cooperation with the Philippines. Compared to the previous US government, Trump appears more averse to a war with China over Taiwan or uninhabited rocks in the South China Sea, and more amenable to retrenching out of East Asia.

Southeast Asia’s strategic importance did not spare it from high “reciprocal tariffs” announced by Washington in April, which threaten these countries with serious economic hardship. Historical friendship and shared democratic values, which would seem to bind the US and the Philippines, seemed to count for little as the Trump Administration distanced itself from its Western European allies.

Moreover, Trump has a history of allowing his senior advisors to pursue a tough policy toward China, only to abruptly intervene with a more conciliatory approach if a bilateral economic deal appears within reach.

China’s inability to change poor-performing policies should not be underestimated. This is a government that, after spectacularly dismantling civil liberties in Hong Kong, still touts the “one country, two systems” idea for Taiwan. The Chinese appear committed to gray zone warfare, with a growing number of platforms and new bases, even as regional states stand their ground. The cart careens onward despite the anticipated danger.

China Is Trapped in the South China Sea 'Gray Zone'

19fortyfive.com · by Denny Roy · May 22, 2025

One of many vivid Chinese aphorisms is “chóng dǎo fù zhé,” which describes a cart following in the same tracks as an overturned cart further up the road. It’s a metaphor for repeating the same mistake despite fair warning. The PRC’s recent South China Sea policy fits this scenario.

The use of increasingly harsh “gray zone” tactics—so harsh they border on what are traditionally recognized as acts of war—is producing diminishing returns for China. The Chinese government should draw the conclusion that its interests are best served by seeking an amicable settlement with the other claimants. Unfortunately, however, that almost certainly won’t happen.

China’s ability to deploy navy, coast guard and maritime militia vessels into the South China Sea is unmatched by any other Southeast Asian country, and the gap is growing. China is the world leader in gray zone tactics, both in innovation and operational experience. Despite those advantages, however, China’s intimidation tactics during the last year were largely ineffective.

Although reticent to confront China publicly, Malaysia is continuing its hydrocarbon exploration in its own EEZ despite protests and harassment by China. Indonesia claimed to drive out Chinese Coast Guard vessels attempting to interfere with drilling operations in Indonesian waters. Beijing especially dislikes neighbors welcoming the US military into the region, but Malaysia and Indonesia continue to participate in joint exercises with the US armed forces.

Some Vietnamese fishermen continued to suffer ramming, beatings and confiscation of their fish catch by Chinese maritime law enforcement personnel. Nevertheless, although cautious about alarming China, Vietnam held a humanitarian training activity with American military personnel. Another aspect of Vietnam’s pushback is its extensive and dramatic land reclamation. In 2021, Vietnam had only one-tenth the amount of China’s reclaimed land in the Spratly Islands. By 2024, however, Vietnam had reclaimed two-thirds as much land as China had, and in 2025 Vietnam will probably equal China’s acreage. While China occupies the three largest features in the Spratlys (Mischief, Subi and Fiery Cross Reefs), Vietnam occupies the next four largest.

Perhaps the clearest evidence of the counterproductivity of China’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea is the case of the Philippines. Chinese harassment of Philippine vessels, especially those attempting to rotate and resupply the soldiers garrisoning the shipwrecked Sierra Madre at Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal, gained international attention in 2024. These incidents framed China as a bully, employing more numerous and larger ships to ram and water-cannon the overmatched Philippine boats.

The Chinese attacks got so bad the US government offered to escort Philippine vessels. This would have forced China to either back down or incur a much higher level of risk. Fortunately for Beijing, the Philippines was determined to rely on its own efforts and declined US help.

The Chinese government seemed to conclude that due to either reputational damage, an unacceptably high risk of escalation, or a combination of both, a truce around Second Thomas Shoal was desirable. In July 2024, China and the Philippines quietly reached an agreement intended to prevent further incidents. That agreement held into early 2025 even though the two sides disagreed about details such as whether the Philippines was required to give China advance notice of rotation/resupply missions. The Philippines managed to make sufficient repairs to the crumbling Sierra Madre in 2024 to further extend its usefulness as makeshift outpost.

The climbdown from intensifying clashes over Second Thomas Shoal was encouraging. This truce, however, does not indicate China is abandoning the harassment policy. Rather, it is shifting to other locations. A Philippine Coast Guard ship anchored at Sabina Shoal for about five months last year. The Chinese disrupted resupply missions for that ship, eventually forcing it to depart. This year, tensions heated up again around Scarborough Shoal. Incidents included a Chinese helicopter intentionally flying dangerously close to a Philippine airplane and more near-rammings by Chinese navy and coast guard ships. As if to broaden the message beyond claimants in the territorial dispute, in February a Chinese fighter aircraft released flares in front of an Australian P-8 aircraft flying in international airspace near the Paracel Islands.

Chinese harassment, intended to cow the Philippines into accommodating Beijing, has instead induced the opposite reaction. Manila has embarked on an arms buildup. It plans to buy US F-16s—the Philippines’ largest-ever foreign weapons purchase—and to accept some additional damage to its relations with Beijing by hosting advanced US Typhon and NMESIS missile systems, which would be useful in a US military conflict against China. It is also acquiring two corvettes from South Korea and 20 drones from Australia. Combined, these acquisitions represent a major upgrade in capability for the Philippine armed forces.

For its escalation of harassment against the Philippines, Beijing failed to dislodge the Sierra Madre while unintentionally persuading the Philippines to strengthen its security cooperation with the US and to beef up its own armed forces.

One reason PRC policy is unlikely to change is that the Xi government fears suffering a perceived defeat. Beijing’s understanding of the issue is firmly, and probably hopelessly, anchored to a narrative that all but precludes the Chinese government from moderating its policy. For PRC citizens, China by definition cannot be an expansionist bully because they believe this is a historical, cultural and political impossibility.

The Party line is that Philippine opposition to Chinese attempts to claim ownership of the Philippines’ EEZ is not based on legitimate national interests, but rather reflects the influence of Philippine politicians trying to get votes and a US government that uses the Philippines as a “pawn” to contain China.

Rather than China trying to force the Philippines to de-occupy Second Thomas Shoal, the PRC government presents the Sierra Madre issue as a Chinese attempt to restore the status quo. Beijing says the crumbling, World War II era Philippine Navy ship originally grounded on the shoal accidentally and Manila promised to tow it away, but later reneged on that promise. (Sources in the Philippines say the ship grounded intentionally and the Philippine government never committed to towing it away.)

The PRC narrative similarly says the Philippines first and repeatedly tried to occupy Scarborough Shoal and Sandy Cay Reef. International observers might be surprised to learn that PRC commentators even sometimes cite the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, which forbids claimants from occupying new unoccupied features, in Chinese criticisms of the Philippines.

Given this outlook, Chinese would tend to see any compromise by Chinese leaders as a surrender to attempts by rival claimants to unilaterally advance their holdings at China’s expense. Worse, all of the rival claimants are much smaller and weaker than China, so there is no excuse for Beijing declining to vigorously protect China’s purported rights.

The second reason Beijing won’t give up its policy of pressure and intimidation in the South China Sea is that the strength of the US commitment to defend its regional friends is in question. The PRC leadership sees an opportunity to test the Trump Administration’s appetite for following through with the Biden Administration’s policy of strengthening security cooperation with the Philippines. Compared to the previous US government, Trump appears more averse to a war with China over Taiwan or uninhabited rocks in the South China Sea, and more amenable to retrenching out of East Asia.

J-15 Fighter from China. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Southeast Asia’s strategic importance did not spare it from high “reciprocal tariffs” announced by Washington in April, which threaten these countries with serious economic hardship. Historical friendship and shared democratic values, which would seem to bind the US and the Philippines, seemed to count for little as the Trump Administration distanced itself from its Western European allies.

Moreover, Trump has a history of allowing his senior advisors to pursue a tough policy toward China, only to abruptly intervene with a more conciliatory approach if a bilateral economic deal appears within reach.

China’s inability to change poor-performing policies should not be underestimated. This is a government that, after spectacularly dismantling civil liberties in Hong Kong, still touts the “one country, two systems” idea for Taiwan. The Chinese appear committed to gray zone warfare, with a growing number of platforms and new bases, even as regional states stand their ground. The cart careens onward despite the anticipated danger.

About the Author: Denny Roy

Denny Roy is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu, who specializes in Asia-Pacific security issues.

19fortyfive.com · by Denny Roy · May 22, 2025

9. Poland, Romania lead a drone bonanza in Eastern Europe

Will they become partners in the arsenal of democracies?

Poland, Romania lead a drone bonanza in Eastern Europe

Defense News · by Jaroslaw Adamowski · May 23, 2025

WARSAW, Poland — As Poland’s military is developing the Drone Force, its latest military component that was launched earlier this year, the Ministry of National Defence recently signed a deal to purchase the largest number of unmanned aerial vehicles in the country’s history.

The move comes as various Eastern European allies are advancing major drone purchases, drawing lessons from Russia’s war against Ukraine.

On May 15, the Polish ministry signed a framework agreement with local private defense company WB Group to buy some 10,000 units of the Warmate loitering munition. The contract foresees deliveries until 2035.

“This is a large-scale investment – 10,000 Warmate drones are becoming a fact,” Władysław Kosiniak Kamysz, Poland’s deputy prime minister and defense minister, said at the official signing ceremony, as quoted in a statement.

“They will soon start being delivered to the Polish military. The next deals, which will be executive, will be signed in the near future,” he added.

WB Group has been expanding its portfolio of UAVs over the past years. Some of the latest additions to the company’s range include the Warmate TL-R reconnaissance system, FT5 mini tactical class drones in new variants, Warmate 20 loitering munition, and the extended-range Warmate 50. Warmate 20 has a range of “several hundred kilometers” and Warmate 50’s range exceeds that of Warmate 20, according to the company.

Remigiusz Wilk, the head of communications at WB Group, told Defense News that, since the war’s outbreak, the drone producer has observed a surge in interest in unmanned capabilities across the region.

“Drones are now considered an important protective measure for soldiers,” Wilk said. “When combined, they allow to create complex aerial systems.”

In the fighting between Ukraine against Russian invaders, sections of the front line have almost become devoid of human soldiers, with drones patrolling large swathes of land, ready to pounce on anything that moves.

“The more we push soldiers away from the battlefield and replace them with drones, the safer they are,” Wilk said. “Drones have the potential to protect many lives, and the military appreciates this now more than ever before.”

The Polish Armed Forces are showing an growing interest in buying new UAVs to develop their Drone Force, but WB Group is also using the company’s expanding manufacturing capabilities to unlock additional markets.

“WB Group is currently building new facilities to produce more drones,” the spokesman said, listing countries in Europe and Asia, including South Korea and Malaysia, as clients. “We have supplied drones to Ukraine’s military since 2015, so we are in an optimal position to draw lessons from the conflict and continue to enhance our unmanned systems to respond to the evolving battlefield requirements.”

At the same time, the Polish Drone Force will also comprise larger UAVs. In December 2024, the ministry signed a contract worth around $310 million to acquire an undisclosed number of MQ-9B Sky Guardian drones. The UAVs are to be delivered to Poland’s military by the first quarter of 2027.

Meanwhile in Romania, the country’s economy minister, Bogdan Ivan, recently paid a visit to the factories of local drone manufacturers Carfil SA and IAR Ghimbav. During his visit to their facilities, Ivan announced Bucharest intends to use a significant portion of the European Union’s funds for defense acquisitions by member states to buy drones for Romania’s military.

The Romanian minister was referring to the ReArm Europe plan, an initiative designed to bolster the EU’s defense expenditure and capacities. Mobilizing up to €800 billion ($906 billion) through various means, the program is to stimulate higher national defense budgets and finance a new loan instrument available to member states to facilitate equipment purchases.

Romanian officials hope the rising domestic drone production capabilities will allow to ramp up the military’s unmanned capacities, but also enable local producers to sell a sizable share of their output abroad, according to the economy minister.

“When you have a production line that can make up to 3,500 drones annually, we will not only produce for the Romanian military,” Ivan said, as quoted by local daily Adevarul.

About Jaroslaw Adamowski

Jaroslaw Adamowski is the Poland correspondent for Defense News.

10. Donald Trump purges dozens of National Security Council officials

Excerpts:

“There is no question that the NSC in the Biden administration had become bloated and was high-handedly trying to implement foreign policy rather than doing its traditional role of co-ordinating the implementation by the rest of the national security establishment,” said Dennis Wilder, a former top NSC official in the administration of George W Bush.

“That said, there is a danger that a severely trimmed NSC will not have the executive firepower to ‘herd the cats’ of the national security system.”

Some supporters said the move would help Trump by reducing the number of officials from other agencies who might not support his “Make America Great Again” agenda.

Donald Trump purges dozens of National Security Council officials

Supporters say move is designed to staff body with Maga-aligned people

https://www.ft.com/content/3a21c023-cb8d-468c-82e2-fb029a13fd32

Financial Times · by Demetri Sevastopulo · May 23, 2025

Donald Trump has dramatically shrunk the White House National Security Council by firing a number of officials, placing others on administrative leave and ordering many secondees to return to their home agencies.

Several people familiar with the firings said the NSC, which is being run temporarily by secretary of state Marco Rubio, had retained some staff, mostly senior directors, while eliminating dozens of positions in the office.

The move, which one person described as a “liquidation”, comes three weeks after the president fired Mike Waltz as his first national security adviser, the top position at the NSC.

The officials who lost their positions were notified on Friday afternoon. The move followed weeks of speculation about an imminent purge at the NSC.

NSC chief of staff Brian McCormack emailed the officials shortly after 4pm to tell them they had 30 minutes to remove their belongings from their desks and to exit the NSC building next to the White House.

It was unclear if Alex Wong, the deputy national security adviser, had been dismissed. Laura Loomer, a right-wing conspiracy theorist who helped persuade Trump to fire Waltz, has also been gunning for Wong, who is a well respected official with hawkish views on China.

Three people familiar with the dismissals said Ivan Kanapathy, senior director for Asia, remained but his entire team, including his China staff, had been let go. Loomer had also urged Trump to fire Kanapathy, a former fighter pilot.

Robert O’Brien, who served as national security adviser in the first Trump administration, recently wrote an opinion article calling for the NSC to be cut to about 60 officials. The NSC, which traditionally has served as a co-ordinating office but has sometimes been used to centralise power in the White House, had more than 200 officials during the Biden administration.

“There is no question that the NSC in the Biden administration had become bloated and was high-handedly trying to implement foreign policy rather than doing its traditional role of co-ordinating the implementation by the rest of the national security establishment,” said Dennis Wilder, a former top NSC official in the administration of George W Bush.

“That said, there is a danger that a severely trimmed NSC will not have the executive firepower to ‘herd the cats’ of the national security system.”

Some supporters said the move would help Trump by reducing the number of officials from other agencies who might not support his “Make America Great Again” agenda.

One person close to the White House said Trump had learned a lesson from his first administration when he came to believe that many NSC officials were quietly blocking his agenda. “He was not going to make the same mistake again,” the person said.

But others questioned the impact that the purge would have on policy, and particularly the ability to referee disagreements across the government.

“While it might seem a hobbling bureaucratic move because the NSC’s purpose is to staff the president, its significance is about far more,” said one former NSC official.

“By whittling down the NSC staff to almost nothing, you kneecap the US government’s ability to generate foreign policy options, or to potentially act as a brake on Trump’s preferences. All that remains is presidential power.”

Trump also dismantled most of NSC directorate that oversaw technology and national security policy, according to several people. The president previously fired David Feith who headed the office, which was created during the Biden administration.

That directorate was instrumental in creating export controls that were designed to make it much harder for China to obtain advanced American technology that could help its military.

The NSC did not comment. But Brian Hughes, the NSC spokesperson, said he would remain and “continue to serve the administration”. The White House press secretary did not respond to a request for comment.

Axios first reported that Trump would restructure the NSC.

Financial Times · by Demetri Sevastopulo · May 23, 2025

11. Discover the Secret World of CIA’s Elite Paramilitary Operatives

Everything you always wanted to know but were afraid to ask – because you thought if they told you they would have to kill you (apologies for the attempt at dark humor).

Photos and photocopies of memos are at the link.

Discover the Secret World of CIA’s Elite Paramilitary Operatives

https://sofrep.com/news/the-secret-world-of-cias-elite-paramilitary-operatives/

by Guy D. McCardle

22 hours ago

The CIA’s Mission

It is tasked with gathering, processing, and analyzing national security information worldwide, primarily through human intelligence (HUMINT). As one of the principal members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), the CIA reports to the Director of National Intelligence and primarily focuses on providing intelligence to the President of the United States and his Cabinet.

Unlike the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), a domestic security service, the CIA has no law enforcement function and mainly focuses on overseas intelligence operations.

The agency is supposed to be strictly an offshore organization, prohibited from conducting operations on US soil but SOFREP has had credible sources from within JSOC and the NSA tell us that the agency routinely uses foreign business proxies to spy on US soil, essentially legally bypassing the restriction.

What do we mean by this?

Imagine a wealthy Indian hotel chain owner with properties within the US who is working as a CIA asset (what they call spies). This hotel owner is being paid millions of agency dollars to record audio and video footage from “guests of interest” (e.g., imagine a cheating spouse) and reports back these activities that could be used as leverage to gain information. But back to the mission…

“The Agency,” as it is known to many, has three principal activities:

Collecting information about foreign governments, corporations, and individuals. This involves various espionage activities abroad to gather vital details on foreign activities that could impact U.S. security and interests.
Analyzing and providing intelligence on national security issues. The CIA synthesizes and analyzes the collected data to produce comprehensive reports. These reports help inform U.S. government decisions related to foreign policy and national security.
Covert action. At the President’s Request, the CIA can use its resources to carry out secret activities abroad to influence events in favor of the United States’ interests. These actions range from propaganda operations to supporting allies and undermining or destabilizing foreign governments.

This third point has fueled many successful thrillers. Books like The Bourne Identity, Red Sparrow, and Body of Lies come immediately to mind.

The Special Activities Center

Perhaps the most intriguing part of the Central Intelligence Agency lies in a relatively obscure yet critical component known as the Special Activities Center, or SAC. This elite division embodies the proverbial “third way” – a strategic alternative to the conventional dichotomy of diplomacy and overt military intervention. Operating under the veil of secrecy, SAC’s purview extends into covert action and paramilitary operations, making it the cornerstone of the nation’s shadow operations.

Covert vs Clandestine

Though nuanced, the distinction between covert and clandestine operations is vital to understanding the SAC’s modus operandi. Covert actions are designed to remain unattributed to the United States and aim to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad without any trace back to the country. Clandestine operations, however, prioritize the secrecy of the operation itself, focusing on intelligence collection where the operation is concealed but not necessarily the actor’s identity. This fine line delineates the SAC’s strategic engagements across the globe.

Comprising several specialized branches, the SAC operates as a multi-faceted entity within the CIA. Each branch, including the Ground Branch, Air Branch, Maritime Branch, and enigmatic Political Action Group, is tailored to execute various missions that span sabotage, intelligence gathering, psychological operations, and covert political maneuvers. These operations are undertaken with the utmost discretion, ensuring plausible deniability to safeguard national interests and maintain international stability.

The recruitment and training regimen for SAC operatives is as rigorous as secretive. They draw from the elite echelons of the military’s special operations community and other specialized domains. These individuals are sculpted into the vanguard of America’s shadow warfare capabilities, ready to be deployed to any corner of the globe where their unique skill sets are required.

Despite shrouding their operations in secrecy, the legacy of the SAC and its antecedent, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), is indelibly linked to the annals of U.S. military and intelligence history. Their contributions, often unseen and unrecognized, continue to play a pivotal role in shaping the strategic contours of the global landscape.

Let’s dig a little deeper into the SAC’s origins, operations, and organizational structure, unraveling the layers of this clandestine division of the CIA.

Origins and Evolution

The genesis of the Special Activity Center draws deeply from the legacy of World War II espionage and guerrilla warfare, with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) laying the groundwork for modern covert operations. The OSS, established during the tumult of the Second World War, was America’s first foray into the organized espionage arena, conducting sabotage, subversion, and intelligence gathering behind enemy lines. The SAC would later inherit and refine the spirit and tactics of the OSS, marking a continuum in America’s covert operational capabilities.

Covert and Clandestine Operations

In international politics and conflicts, the SAC represents the “third option,” a path less visible than diplomacy or military might but equally potent. Covert and clandestine operations, the two pillars of SAC’s strategy, serve as the United States’ silent arsenal, influencing global events from the shadows. These operations are meticulously planned and executed to leave no fingerprints, ensuring that the role of the U.S. remains obscured, thus avoiding international repercussions.

The SAC’s Multidimensional Approach

Ground Branch

The Ground Branch is the SAC’s terrestrial arm, composed of operatives with backgrounds in elite military units. Think Navy SEALs, Army Delta Force, and Marine Raiders. These operatives are skilled in a range of covert operations, including sabotage, targeted killings, and intelligence collection. The Ground Branch’s operations are marked by their stealth and precision, often carried out alone in hostile territories under darkness.

Case Study: The Rescue of Jessica Lynch

The role of the CIA’s Ground Branch in the rescue of Jessica Lynch, while not publicly detailed in specific operational terms, is a part of the broader context of intelligence and special operations forces (SOF) synergy in conducting high-profile missions.

PVT Lynch seconds after being located by US SOF personnel.

Jessica Lynch, a U.S. Army Private First Class, was captured by Iraqi forces on March 23, 2003, after her convoy was ambushed in Nasiriyah, Iraq, during the early stages of the Iraq War. Her rescue on April 1, 2003, by U.S. forces was highly publicized and underscored the capabilities of the U.S. military and intelligence community to conduct joint operations.

While specific details about the CIA Ground Branch’s involvement in the Lynch rescue are scarce due to the classified nature of their operations, it’s known that the rescue was a collaborative effort involving multiple branches of the U.S. military and Ground Branch intelligence assets in the immediate area of operations.

Here’s how operatives in the Ground Branch were involved based on general knowledge of their capabilities and knowledge of this and similar operations.

Intelligence Gathering: Before the rescue, a significant amount of intelligence work was needed to pinpoint Private Lynch’s exact location. Operatives from the Ground Branch played a key role in gathering human intelligence and signals intelligence to locate Lynch within Saddam Hospital in Nasiriyah, where she was being held.

Surveillance: The Ground Branch is known for its expertise in covert surveillance operations. In the Lynch case, they conducted discreet surveillance to confirm her presence in the hospital and to monitor Iraqi military activity in the area, ensuring that the special operations forces rescue team had the most accurate and up-to-date information on her whereabouts and condition.

Planning and Coordination: The rescue operation required meticulous planning and coordination among various U.S. military and intelligence community components. The CIA, including Ground Branch operatives, played a key role in the planning process, providing intelligence support and advising on the hospital’s layout, security measures, and approach for the rescue and egress from the area.

Direct Support: The rescue itself was carried out by multiple special operations forces teams, with CIA operatives, including members of the Ground Branch, providing direct support during the operation. This help came in the form of coordinating communications and assisting in Lynch’s extraction once she was secured. Upon entering the facility, an Iraqi physician was persuaded by an operator to take him to Lynch’s room. Upon finding her and establishing her identity, the man identified himself as an American soldier and said, “We’re here to take you home.” Lynch replied, “I’m an American soldier too.” She was quickly examined by a doctor from the 75th Ranger Regiment, strapped to a litter, and whisked to a waiting helicopter operated by the 160th Special Operations Air Regiment (SOAR).

The operation to rescue Jessica Lynch showcases the integrated capabilities of the U.S. military and the intelligence community, with various elements coming together to execute a high-risk mission successfully. Much of the Ground Branch’s precise role in this operation remains classified. Still, their involvement underscores the critical importance of intelligence and special operations forces working together in complex military operations.

Air Branch

Serving as the SAC’s eyes in the sky, the Air Branch operates a fleet of aircraft disguised as civilian airliners, drones, and other aerial vehicles for surveillance and covert insertion. This branch enables the SAC to extend its reach globally, providing critical support for operations that require aerial insertion, extraction, or remote intelligence gathering. Their fleet, often operating from hidden bases or using front companies, plays a pivotal role in maintaining the element of surprise and ensuring operational success in hostile environments.

Case Study: “Air America”

The CIA’s Air Branch established “Air America” as a passenger and cargo airline in 1946. The agency covertly owned and operated the airline from 1950 to 1976. It supplied and supported covert operations in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War, providing controversial support for drug smuggling in Laos and other paramilitary and Special Operations activities.

In April 1960, a contingent of CIA Air Branch operatives made their way to Miami, Florida, on a mission to scout for members of the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), a group of Cuban exiles opposed to Castro’s regime. These exiles, having left Cuba following Castro’s rise to power, were seen as the perfect candidates to spearhead a rebellion back in their homeland. With a budget of $13 million at their disposal, they managed to enlist 1,400 of these exiles to form what would be known as Brigade 2506.

This brigade was covertly transported to Useppa Island, a secluded isle off Florida’s coast, which the CIA had discreetly acquired for their use.

Document from US National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy to President Kennedy.

The involvement of the CIA’s Air Branch in the Bay of Pigs Invasion is a prime example of how air power, or the lack thereof, can significantly impact the outcome of covert operations. The limitations in planning, execution, and international political considerations led to a significant defeat for the United States and the Cuban exile force, marking one of the early and most notable failures in CIA’s history. The event underscored the complexities of providing covert air support in a politically sensitive operation and the ramifications of underestimating an adversary’s resilience and capabilities.

More recently white unmarked, with plain FAA N registration numbers, Boeing jets could be seen shuttling around agency operatives in and out of Iraq, Afghanistan and other hot spots globally. Like most of the branches within SAC they typically contract out these services to a number of US companies as a layer of protection and deniability.

Maritime Branch

The SAC’s Maritime Branch underscores the CIA’s capability to project power and conduct operations across the world’s oceans and waterways. Drawing recruits from naval special warfare and marine reconnaissance units, this branch specializes in amphibious operations, including underwater demolitions, covert insertions, and sabotage against maritime targets. Their operations are critical in securing littoral areas and conducting reconnaissance on naval activities, often under the guise of civilian maritime traffic to maintain plausible deniability.

Political Action Group

Perhaps the most shadowy of the SAC’s components, the Political Action Group (PAG) wields influence far beyond the battlefield. Specializing in the arts of psychological warfare, economic sabotage, and covert political influence, the PAG works to sway political outcomes in favor of U.S. interests without direct military intervention.

By manipulating mainstream media and social media, financing opposition movements, or staging cyber-attacks, this group plays a crucial role in shaping the geopolitical landscape in a manner that is both subtle and profound.

It’s well known within the agency that companies like Meta, Apple, and Google have contracts with the CIA and are allowed special access to data.

Steve Jobs was a routine visitor to the CIA’s headquarters.

Request for information for Jobs Pentagon file

Global Response Staff (GRS)

The CIA’s Global Response Staff (GRS) is another critical component of the agency’s operational capability, functioning as a specialized security wing tasked with protecting CIA personnel and assets in high-threat environments. GRS is composed of highly skilled operatives, many of whom have backgrounds in U.S. special operations forces, such as the SEALs, Delta Force, and Marine Force Recon, as well as law enforcement agencies like the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team. These individuals bring a wealth of experience in combat, surveillance, and protective operations, making them adept at navigating the complexities of covert fieldwork.

Primary Mission

The primary mission of GRS is to ensure the safety of CIA case officers when deployed in dangerous regions where the U.S. operates. Everyone assumes that case officers are Jason Bourne-like, but in reality, few are comfortable carrying or using weapons. This is where GRS agents come in.

Agents provide security during meetings with covert assets and covert vehicle convoys; they conduct snatch-and-grab operations, surveillance and reconnaissance missions, and respond to emergencies such as attacks on U.S. facilities.

GRS teams are known for their ability to blend into their surroundings, often using local dress and stolen vehicle plates to avoid detection while keeping a protective watch over their case officers.

GRS teams are deployed globally to covert CIA bases and are ready to move into potentially hostile areas with minimal support. Their expertise in fieldcraft and tactical acumen allows them to adapt to changing situations on the ground, providing a dynamic shield for CIA operations worldwide.

GRS’s work is shrouded in secrecy, with many of its operations classified to protect the methods and identities of those involved. However, GRS’s importance to the CIA’s overall mission cannot be overstated. In the unpredictable landscape of global intelligence and counterintelligence, GRS is a bulwark against threats to U.S. personnel and interests, ensuring that the nation’s clandestine efforts can proceed without interruption.

GRS Case Study: Benghazi 2012

The story of the Global Response Staff in Benghazi, Libya, is one of bravery and controversy embedded within a tragic event that highlights the dangers faced by American diplomats and intelligence operatives abroad. Their role at the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012, came into sharp focus following a series of attacks that night.

Background

In 2012, Libya was in a state of turmoil following the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

To this day, it is unclear why Hilary Clinton’s State Department (DOS) and the CIA supported the overthrow of Gaddafi, as it’s still a failed state decades later.

Also of note, it’s widely believed that this event seriously disturbed Russian dictator Vladimir Putin as a crescendo of America’s foreign policy going off the rails.

The resulting power vacuum in Libya led to widespread violence and the rise of powerful warlords and militant groups.

The U.S. maintained a diplomatic mission in Benghazi, which included a State Department compound and a nearby CIA annex, and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) conducting kill and capture missions in Benghazi.

While not the capital, Benghazi was the area that existing Libyan power players operated within and why the CIA, JSOC, and Department of State were all operating in the region, albeit on different competing and uncoordinated missions.

A SOFREP source within the White House said the rivalry between the CIA and DOS had gotten so bad that message traffic was routinely hand-couriered back and forth between compounds to track who said what and when.

The Attack

On the evening of September 11, 2012, Islamist militants launched an assault on the U.S. diplomatic compound. The attack began with the compound being overrun and set ablaze, leading to the death of U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and Information Officer Sean Smith.

Inside the US Consulate Compound on September 11, 2012

GRS Response

GRS operatives stationed at the CIA annex, roughly a mile from the diplomatic compound, quickly mobilized to respond to the attack when DOS agents called the GRS compound for help.

Despite initial orders to stand down by the CIA Chief of Base, which have been a point of contention and investigation, the GRS team leader, former Navy SEAL Ty Woods, decided to intervene, against orders, in an attempt to rescue the Ambassador and other personnel.

The team fought their way into the compound and managed to evacuate all of the surviving State Department staff back to the CIA annex but were unable to locate Ambassador Stevens.

After the initial rescue, the CIA base came under attack by militants over several hours, and in the early hours of September 12, one of the mortar attacks resulted in the deaths of CIA contractors and former Navy SEALs Tyrone S. Woods and Glen Doherty.

Aftermath and Controversy

The attacks and the U.S. government’s response to them, both during and after the events, sparked significant controversy and political debate. Questions were raised about the security preparedness of U.S. facilities in Benghazi, the intelligence regarding potential threats, the military’s response time, and the communication among various government agencies.

Several investigations by the U.S. Congress and an Independent Review Board examined the circumstances leading to and following the attacks. While improvements were recommended for security procedures and inter-agency communication, the events in Benghazi continue to be a subject of discussion and analysis, particularly regarding the role and actions of the GRS operatives.

The full play-by-play account of Benghazi can be read in SOFREP’s New York Times Bestselling book, Benghazi, The Definitive Report.

Recruitment, Training, and Operations

The pathway to becoming a CIA paramilitary operative is arduous, with candidates undergoing a rigorous selection process for each branch. Usually, candidates have served in a Special Operations unit for longer than four years and have seen combat. Typically, they are recommended by existing operators for the job, and like Air Branch, the bulk of billets are filled by trusted private military companies (formerly Blackwater, Ogara Group, and MVM to name a few) who feed them qualified candidates who work on programs as green-badged security contractors.

Green badgers are typically managed by senior paramilitary operators overseeing them who work directly for the CIA. These senior managers are called “blue badgers” by insiders, indicating the color of their agency security badge.

Selection tests their physical endurance, psychological resilience, tactical proficiency, and the ability to adapt to the dynamic environment of the CIA’s unique mission.

The training regimen, often conducted at undisclosed locations across the eastern US, like Camp Peary, frequently referred to as “The Farm,” encompasses a broad spectrum of skills ranging from advanced combat tactics, defensive and offensive driving, two-person tactics, survival skills, advanced espionage techniques, medical training, and language proficiency.

This comprehensive preparation ensures that SAC operatives are among the most versatile and capable assets in the CIA’s arsenal, ready to undertake missions in the most challenging and hostile environments around the globe.

Notable Engagements

The SAC’s history is dotted with notable engagements that have significantly impacted international affairs, though many of these operations remain classified. From supporting resistance movements behind enemy lines during World War II as the OSS to playing a decisive role in the early stages of the Afghanistan conflict post-9/11, SAC operatives have been at the heart of some of the most critical moments in recent history. Though often unrecognized, their contributions have been instrumental in shaping the course of nations and the global order.

One such operative whose name is known is Johnny Micheal Spann, a CIA officer who tragically became the first American casualty in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Spann’s assignments within the Agency were part of their clandestine operations, and he was involved in paramilitary activities at the time of his death during a prisoner uprising at the Qala-i-Jangi fortress in northern Afghanistan, where he was involved in questioning Taliban prisoners.

Summary of SAC

The Special Activities Center, with its myriad components and elite operatives, is a testament to the United States’ commitment to maintaining its strategic interests globally, using means outside the traditional confines of diplomacy and military force.

The SAC’s ability to conduct operations in the shadows, influencing events and outcomes from behind the scenes, is a crucial facet of America’s national security strategy. As geopolitical dynamics evolve, the SAC will undoubtedly play a pivotal role in safeguarding U.S. interests, leveraging its unique capabilities to navigate the complex landscape of international relations.

While the full extent of the SAC’s activities may never be publicly acknowledged, its impact on the world stage is undeniable, shaping the course of history from the shadows.

CIA and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), Working Together

The CIA and JSOC are key components of the United States national security apparatus, with distinct yet complementary roles. While the CIA is primarily an intelligence-gathering agency focusing on foreign intelligence and covert operations abroad, JSOC is a component command of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) that oversees special operations units from various branches of the U.S. military.

Despite their different mandates, the CIA and JSOC often work closely on missions requiring a blend of intelligence gathering, analysis, and direct action—particularly in counterterrorism operations and other sensitive national security issues.

Collaboration on Counterterrorism Operations

The post-9/11 era marked a significant increase in the collaboration between the CIA and JSOC, especially in the fight against global terrorism. This partnership is perhaps most visible in counterterrorism operations where intelligence collected by the CIA on terrorist networks, including their leaders’ locations, is used to plan and execute precision strikes or raids by JSOC units. Notable examples include the operation that led to the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011, which was a collaborative effort between the CIA and Navy SEAL Team Six, a part of JSOC.

Joint Task Forces and Fusion Cells

The cooperation between the CIA and JSOC is often institutionalized through joint task forces (JTF) or fusion cells that integrate intelligence and military capabilities. These collaborative units bring together personnel from the CIA and JSOC (along with other agencies as needed) to focus on specific threats or operational objectives. By combining the CIA’s intelligence collection, analysis capabilities, and JSOC’s direct action proficiency, these task forces can rapidly respond to emerging threats.

Sharing of Intelligence and Expertise

The CIA and JSOC share intelligence and expertise to enhance operations effectiveness. The CIA’s human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities and global intelligence-gathering network provide JSOC with actionable information critical for planning missions. Conversely, JSOC operations can generate valuable intelligence that feeds into the CIA’s information pool, helping refine future intelligence assessments and operations.

Operational Support and Coordination

Sometimes, CIA operatives and JSOC units operate in the same areas or jointly execute missions. The CIA might provide language skills, cultural knowledge, or established networks within a country, while JSOC contributes with its tactical and technical military capabilities. This partnership ensures that operations are grounded in solid intelligence and executed with precision.

Training and Development of Capabilities

The CIA and JSOC also collaborate on training and developing new capabilities, including technologies and methodologies for intelligence collection, surveillance, reconnaissance, and direct action. This cooperation ensures that both organizations can maintain a technological edge and are prepared to deal with evolving security challenges.

Legal and Oversight Considerations

It’s important to note that while the CIA and JSOC collaborate closely, they operate under different legal frameworks and oversight mechanisms. The CIA’s covert operations are generally subject to presidential findings and oversight by congressional intelligence committees. In contrast, JSOC’s military operations fall under the purview of the Department of Defense and are subject to military command structures and legal standards.

Operation Red Dawn and the Hunt for Saddam Hussein

Operation Red Dawn was a military operation cumulating on December 13, 2003, with the capture of Saddam Hussein, the ousted Iraqi President who had been on the run since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March of that year. The operation was a significant collaboration between the CIA and JSOC, showcasing the integration of intelligence and military precision to achieve a mission-critical objective.

Background

After the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Saddam went into hiding. His whereabouts became one of the top priorities for U.S. forces in Iraq. The operation to capture him was named “Red Dawn” after the 1984 American film. It was planned based on actionable intelligence that suggested Saddam was hiding in the vicinity of ad-Dawr, near his hometown of Tikrit.

The Role of the CIA

The CIA’s role was crucial in the lead-up to Operation Red Dawn. The agency was deeply involved in gathering intelligence through various means, including human intelligence from informants within Iraq, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and surveillance. The CIA managed to cultivate sources within Iraq that provided information on Saddam Hussein’s possible locations and movements. The agency’s analysts worked tirelessly to corroborate these intelligence pieces and narrow down the potential hiding spots.

JSOC’s Execution of the Operation

JSOC was responsible for the operational planning and execution of the mission to capture Saddam. This command includes elite units such as Delta Force, Navy SEALs, and the 75th Ranger Regiment, all capable of conducting high-risk, high-reward operations. For Operation Red Dawn, 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (Delta Force) elements were chosen to carry out the ground operation.

Collaboration and Execution

The operation exemplified seamless collaboration between the CIA and JSOC. The Agency provided intelligence and continued to update JSOC with real-time information while JSOC planned and executed the tactical operation. On December 13, 2003, based on the intelligence supplied by CIA personnel, JSOC forces moved into the target area near ad-Dawr.

Saddam Hussein was found hiding in a small underground bunker, known as a “spider hole,” camouflaged with dirt and debris. Special operations forces captured him without firing a shot, but somehow, the encounter rendered the brutal dictator with a bloody nose and split lip.

Saddam’s identity was confirmed on the spot, marking a significant milestone in the Iraq War and demonstrating the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence and special operations capabilities.

Aftermath

Following his capture, Hussein was detained by U.S. forces before being handed over to the Iraqi Interim Government. He was tried by the Iraqi Special Tribunal for crimes against humanity, among other charges, and was executed on December 30, 2006.

Operation Red Dawn remains a significant example of how critical the integration of intelligence and military operations is in modern warfare, particularly in counterinsurgency and the global war on terror. The operation highlighted the strengths of combining the CIA’s intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities with JSOC’s precision and operational expertise.

Operation Neptune Spear: Eliminating Osama bin Laden

The operation to kill Osama bin Laden, codenamed Operation Neptune Spear, was a highly complex and coordinated effort that involved extensive collaboration between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Special Operations Command, along with other U.S. military and intelligence community assets. The operation took place on May 1, 2011, in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and was the culmination of years of intelligence gathering and planning. Here’s an overview of how the CIA and JSOC worked together in this mission.

Intelligence Gathering and Analysis

CIA’s Role: The CIA played a crucial role in gathering the intelligence that led to the identification of bin Laden’s hideout. This effort involved years of collecting data from various sources, including human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT). The agency had been tracking a courier known to be close to bin Laden, which eventually led them to the compound in Abbottabad.

Collaboration: The CIA worked with other intelligence agencies, both within the U.S. and with foreign partners, to piece together the information needed to confirm bin Laden’s presence in the compound. This collaboration involved sharing intelligence and corroborating information from multiple sources to ensure the accuracy of their findings.

Planning the Operation

Joint Effort: Once the intelligence was deemed solid, the planning phase began, which involved close coordination between the CIA and JSOC. This phase included deciding on the operational details, such as the method of attack, the composition of the assault team, and the extraction plan.

Role of JSOC: JSOC was responsible for executing the operation. This command included elements of SEAL Team Six, which conducted the raid. The planning phase involved detailed rehearsals and contingency planning, ensuring the team was prepared for various scenarios during the mission.

Execution of the Raid

Operational Secrecy: Secrecy was paramount, and knowledge of the operation was tightly controlled. The CIA and JSOC worked together to ensure operational security, with only a limited number of individuals aware of the plan’s details in their entirety.

The Raid: The operation was executed by Navy SEALs from Red Squadron of SEAL Team Six, a component of JSOC. The SEALs flew from Afghanistan to bin Laden’s compound in stealth helicopters, breached the compound, and, after a brief firefight, killed Osama bin Laden. Senior U.S. officials, including the President, watched from the White House Situation Room and oversaw the operation in real-time.

Aftermath and Intelligence Collection: After bin Laden was killed, the SEALs collected a significant amount of intelligence material from the compound before departing. The CIA was involved in the subsequent analysis of the material collected during the raid, which provided valuable insights into al-Qaeda’s operations.

Conclusion

The successful execution of Operation Neptune Spear was a testament to the effective collaboration between the CIA and JSOC, combining the strengths of intelligence gathering and military precision. This operation not only eliminated the world’s most wanted terrorist at the time but also demonstrated the capabilities of U.S. special operations and intelligence communities when working together towards a common goal.

Summary

In this somewhat cursory exploration, we look at the clandestine world of the CIA’s Special Activities Center (SAC) and Global Response Staff (GRS), revealing these units’ shadowy but pivotal role in shaping global events.

With an eye that scans the Cold War’s covert chess games and modern-day counterterrorism efforts, we see the SAC’s evolution from the legacy of the OSS to a critical instrument of American foreign policy, adept at executing operations that lie beyond the reach of conventional military and diplomatic strategies.

Equally, GRS emerges as a vital protector of CIA assets in hostile territories, embodying both the shield and spear of U.S. interests abroad. We also highlight the synergistic relationship between the CIA and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), underscoring how their collaboration, particularly in high-stakes missions like Operation Red Dawn and Neptune Spear, exemplifies the seamless integration of intelligence and military precision necessary in today’s complex security landscape.

Through stories of courage and sacrifice, such as the harrowing night in Benghazi, this piece pays homage to America’s silent warriors. It illuminates the essential, albeit often invisible, threads they weave in the fabric of international relations and national security.

As someone who’s seen what happens when the truth is distorted, I know how unfair it feels when those who’ve sacrificed the most lose their voice. At SOFREP, our veteran journalists, who once fought for freedom, now fight to bring you unfiltered, real-world intel. But without your support, we risk losing this vital source of truth. By subscribing, you’re not just leveling the playing field—you’re standing with those who’ve already given so much, ensuring they continue to serve by delivering stories that matter. Every subscription means we can hire more veterans and keep their hard-earned knowledge in the fight. Don’t let their voices be silenced. Please consider subscribing now.

One team, one fight,

Brandon Webb former Navy SEAL, Bestselling Author and Editor-in-Chief

12. Why Three Years Isn’t Enough For Trump’s Golden Dome

It is thinking like this that paralyzes us. We need to get on with it despite the naysayers (or perhaps because of them).

And a system like this will never be "finished." It will need to be a "living system" constantly adapting and evolving to address emerging threats. I hope we can field a system in three years but that cannot, will not, and must not be considered the end of the development process. The question is can we get the foundation laid in the next three years?

And the what if question is what if we had started on this project some years ago? Where would we be now? But as the Chinese saying goes, when is the best time to plant a tree? 20 years ago. When is the next best time? RIght now. Let's get to it.

Why Three Years Isn’t Enough For Trump’s Golden Dome

Ambitious plan for new U.S. missile-defense shield needs to navigate technology hurdles and budget questions

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/missile-backlogs-and-satellite-dreams-the-challenges-of-building-trumps-golden-dome-27592204

By Drew FitzGerald

and Micah Maidenberg

May 25, 2025 11:00 am ET

President Trump, with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, outlined last week his vision for the Golden Dome defense shield. Photo: Chris Kleponis/Press Pool

Key Points

What's This?

President Trump’s Golden Dome missile-defense shield would integrate ground-based missiles, orbital sensors and satellites.
Experts say the project faces hurdles including technology development and production backlogs.
Trump pegged the system’s cost at $175 billion over the coming years, while some estimates have ranged much higher.

President Trump says he wants a $175 billion missile-defense shield, before the end of his term, capable of intercepting missiles fired from across the globe.

Hitting one of those targets—let alone all three—would be a tall order, military experts said.

The White House envisions its Golden Dome incorporating missiles on the ground, a network of orbital sensors and even satellites designed to knock down projectiles soon after they launch. Some pieces, like ground-based interceptors and satellite sensors, already exist, but they are in short supply. Other emerging technologies remain unproven.

“All of the systems comprising the Golden Dome architecture will need to be seamlessly integrated,” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said last week after he tapped a director to lead the effort.

Eyes in the sky

Developing a new layer of satellites to take out missiles from orbit will take time and money. Analysts and former military officials expect the Golden Dome might need thousands of them to stop attacks effectively.

Many of those technologies remain nascent. They also need to be adaptable because adversaries could respond with decoys and other countermeasures.

U.S. agencies already operate many public and secret satellites capable of detecting rocket launches, and those would need to be brought under a shared authority and control system. The Pentagon over time has built many systems to control existing missile-defense programs, which operate separately.

Get in line for missiles

Weapons experts said the project’s first phase will probably involve placing more ground-based missile defenses on U.S. soil. The problem: There is already a backlog for such systems owing to conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.

“It takes time to build the missiles,” said Todd Harrison, a senior fellow at the conservative American Enterprise Institute. “Even things that are already in production, you would be lucky to get that delivered within two to three years.”

Lockheed Martin said it is already responding to increased demand for its ground-based missiles, which include the PAC-3 Patriot missiles and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or Thaad, system. But Patriots are suited to knocking down shorter-range cruise missiles, and Thaad interceptors can only cover a small area.

Another missile type designed to stop ballistic attacks is expected to take years to expand.

Western defense companies have been struggling to increase production. The challenge is compounded by soaring demand, tight labor markets and the need for complex parts spread across hundreds of suppliers.

A PAC-3 Patriot missile system was part of a combat-readiness exercise at an air base in Taiwan. Photo: i-hwa cheng/AFP/Getty Images

Budgets and bureaucracy

Golden Dome’s price tag is itself a moving target.

Trump this month said his plan would cost about $175 billion over the coming years. The Congressional Budget Office has issued rough estimates as high as $831 billion, partly based on historical rocket-launch costs. Sen. Tim Sheehy (R., Mont.) said the full project would probably cost trillions of dollars in the long run.

House Republicans voted last week to spend $25 billion as a down payment on the project. While the White House has yet to detail the kinds of systems the money would buy, Hegseth said the Pentagon was working with the Office of Management and Budget to develop its plan before the president submits a full fiscal 2026 budget proposal.

U.S. missile programs are prone to cost overruns. Building a smaller-scale missile defense shield in Guam has already topped $8 billion because of high construction costs and challenges integrating land- and sea-based systems that rely on separate command-and-control systems.

Sen. Ed Markey (D., Mass.) called the Golden Dome’s orbital-interceptor concept “economically ruinous” and doubted its viability. He urged the administration to focus instead on arms control, calling the Golden Dome “nothing more than a gold-plated giveaway to billion-dollar defense contractors.”

Golden Dome supporters said new technology will help keep expenses in check.

“The price point that we’re talking about is so much less than people thought it would be,” Sen. Kevin Cramer (R., N.D.) said. “We have a lot of systems already that we just need to knit together.”

Write to Drew FitzGerald at andrew.fitzgerald@wsj.com and Micah Maidenberg at micah.maidenberg@wsj.com

13. America's military humiliation – The Houthis exposed its waning power

A brutal critique. Is the author correct? I do not have sufficient knowledge and expertise to assess the MIddle East but the essay reads like it uses carefully selected information and analysis to support the author's decidedly anti-American and anti-US military view.

Excerpts:

It is very commonplace to blame reversals and even defeats in America’s various wars of choice as merely a matter of lack of will. If America really wanted to win, it would win, the story goes; the failure of the US is just one where it never commits the force necessary to finish the fight. But today, that excuse rings hollow. Trump’s Operation Rough Rider, unlike Biden’s operations, utilised many of America’s most limited, expensive, and advanced weapons to try to bring the Houthis to heel. And still it surrendered. The lessons here are thus quite bleak. America’s preferred and increasingly only viable method of warfare — aerial warfare — is no longer cost-effective nor practical. But the US has no alternative modes of warfare to fall back on, which means that its days as a military hegemon are probably coming to a close.

To understand just how big a mess the air war against the Houthis has turned out to be, it’s important to understand a very basic rule to US military inventories. For while, on paper, America has 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, an impressive figure that far outstrips any other country on the planet, that top line figure is barely relevant in practice.

...

With exploding deficits, a growing internal political crisis, and a slowly collapsing military, America is a leopard that lacks the wherewithal to even attempt to change its spots. The generals know that the jig is up: the old model is broken, there is no new model coming, and nobody has the energy left to do much about it all. And so, this massive crisis of US military power is playing out in the vein of Ernest Hemingway’s comment about the course of his own bankruptcy: gradually, then suddenly.

Once upon a time, there was always a bigger plane, a more advanced high-tech future weapon, yet another trick up the Air Force’s sleeve that you could point to in order to silence the doubters. But those days are over. The gravity of what happened in Yemen will only assert itself once the political class is ready to deal with the new world we are now living in: one in which the US has no new military rabbits to pull out of its hat, and those that it does have simply aren’t enough to get anywhere close to victory.

America's military humiliation

The Houthis exposed its waning power

unherd.com · by Malcom Kyeyune · May 25, 2025

Malcom Kyeyune

Malcom Kyeyune is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden

When, in reaction to the war in Gaza, the Houthis of Yemen started imposing their blockade on the Red Sea, it was seen as a sure sign of waning American power: a global hegemon was allowing its control over a vital sea route to be contested. In their rush to fathom why this might be happening, detractors of the then president claimed he was simply too weak, too much of an appeaser to use the full width of America’s military might to quash the problem.

In fact, in response, Biden authorised not one but two military campaigns. The first was Operation Prosperity Guardian, which aimed to combine US naval power with a coalition of willing states to protect shipping and break the blockade. That fast turned into an embarrassing debacle, as most of the coalition partners walked away and ships kept getting hit by Houthi missiles. And so, in January 2024, Operation Poseidon Archer was launched, which involved British as well as American aircraft attempting to bomb the Houthis into submission. Here again, the operation was unsuccessful, doing almost nothing to dent Houthi attacks or open up the Red Sea to shipping. But even then Biden was blamed; the mighty US military was being held back somehow. Thus, the natural conclusion was that once Trump was in office, the gloves would come off.

Biden’s critics were actually half right. Once Trump came in, the gloves did come off. Operation Poseidon Archer was followed by Operation Rough Rider, in March of this year, which attempted to show a new, much more muscular American military response against Houthi targets in Yemen — for all of six weeks. For six weeks, US warplanes pounded Yemen around the clock, with rare and expensive stealth bombers flying missions out of Diego Garcia in support of carrier-based aircraft. Yet once those six weeks were up, Trump proudly announced that Yemen had “surrendered” and that there was no more need for the US to keep up the bombing. A ceasefire had been brokered by Oman. This was trumpeted as a glorious victory for the US military, with the Houthis finally promising to not attack US ships anymore, and America graciously returning the gesture.

Of course, Trump didn’t mention the terms of the “surrender”. The Houthis only had to stop attacking American ships in exchange for America stopping the bombing; they were free to continue blockading the Red Sea or firing missiles at Israel. America, in other words, had given the Houthis carte blanche to carry on the behaviour that was the reason America had gone to war in the first place. Thus, to call this deal a surrender was entirely appropriate; it’s just that it wasn’t the Houthis hoisting the white flag.

It is very commonplace to blame reversals and even defeats in America’s various wars of choice as merely a matter of lack of will. If America really wanted to win, it would win, the story goes; the failure of the US is just one where it never commits the force necessary to finish the fight. But today, that excuse rings hollow. Trump’s Operation Rough Rider, unlike Biden’s operations, utilised many of America’s most limited, expensive, and advanced weapons to try to bring the Houthis to heel. And still it surrendered. The lessons here are thus quite bleak. America’s preferred and increasingly only viable method of warfare — aerial warfare — is no longer cost-effective nor practical. But the US has no alternative modes of warfare to fall back on, which means that its days as a military hegemon are probably coming to a close.

To understand just how big a mess the air war against the Houthis has turned out to be, it’s important to understand a very basic rule to US military inventories. For while, on paper, America has 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, an impressive figure that far outstrips any other country on the planet, that top line figure is barely relevant in practice.

For comparison, look to the United Kingdom. The UK has two large aircraft carriers, putting it near the top of the international leaderboard when it comes to the ability to project military force. But as anyone with any familiarity with the Royal Navy can tell you, that number does not tell the real story. The number of carriers the UK can actually deploy is far lower, a number which is fairly close to zero. For while the ships exist, the Royal Navy lacks the crew, the planes, the escorts, and the logistical capacity to actually put them to use for any length of time in a real war. The UK Navy has become something of a Potemkin village, where superficial on-paper strengths hide a catastrophic reality of deferred maintenance, insufficient budgets, and lack of personnel.

Though the situation for the US Navy isn’t quite as dire, in practice, the problem is the same: it cannot realistically put more than two to four carriers to sea at any given moment. The ability to surge capacity in times of crisis is limited, because the various reserve components of the US armed forces have catastrophically atrophied. If you discount the American carriers that are slated for the scrapyard, or those currently lacking a functional nuclear reactor, or those which are tied up in deep maintenance, the number of active, usable carriers is roughly a third of the on-paper number. Half of those carriers were being used against the Houthis.

But carriers are not the only example we ought to look at. For Operation Rough Rider, the US Air Force contributed some six B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, arguably the most advanced (and by far the most expensive) airframe in the US arsenal. At first blush, this seems like only a fraction of America’s power, because it has some 20 such bombers in its inventory. But a closer look at these planes suggest that those six used in Rough Rider very likely represent the entire working inventory of US stealth bombers. Because B-2s haven’t been built for decades, the only way to keep them operational is to cannibalise other B-2s for spare parts: as a result, a large number have been functionally scrapped and cannot ever hope to fly again. Only half of US bombers even qualify for so-called “mission capable” status on an average day, a status which doesn’t actually mean that the plane works; it simply means the plane isn’t completely broken and inoperable. Only two thirds or fewer of those mission capable planes can hope to qualify for what the US military instead classifies as “full mission capable” status. “Full mission capable” is your standard Pentagon-speak; it means the plane is in working order, has nothing broken that’s really important, and can realistically be used for what it was built for.

From carriers to stealth bombers, the pattern here is fairly clear, and it is further corroborated by testimonies from inside the Pentagon itself. America essentially pulled out all the stops to attack the Houthis, waging an extremely expensive and intensive air war against a militia controlling most of Yemen, the fourth-poorest nation in the world. The cost to operate a B-2 stealth bomber is extremely high on a per-hour basis; and their fragile stealth coating is not particularly fond of the warm, salty sea air at Diego Garcia. You don’t send in all of them unless you really mean business. America also committed roughly half of its active carriers, spent a fortune in land attack and air defence missiles, and it even cannibalised ammo stores and air defence systems from the Pacific theatre of operations for the sake of the operation.

But as the stories of the campaign start leaking to the press, it’s clear that none of this effort did anything good. The US couldn’t establish air supremacy, meaning it couldn’t risk flying its older, non-stealth planes for fear of losing them. This itself might seem like proof that America was once again just not trying very hard; for what kind of war is it when you’re not ready to accept losses? But the problem is, America can’t afford to replace planes that get lost and pilots that get killed. This is not a problem of cowardice, but of force generation: even if the US military suffers zero losses due to enemy fire in the years ahead, it is still slated to shrink precipitously. This shrinkage and loss of capacity is just due to America’s planes and ships wearing out, with not enough workers, dockyards, engineers, and dollars to replace them. As America burns through its massive military inheritance bequeathed by Ronald Reagan and the Eighties arms race, there is no plan to replace it. For the US military, avoiding casualties is not a matter of caution or cowardice; it is the result of a total inability to replenish the force.

The result of this American Achilles’ heel has been an extremely expensive reliance — when it has come to defending the Red Sea — on so-called “standoff” weaponry; cruise missiles, for example, that can be launched from far enough away that anti-air fire won’t be a threat. But even then, there were problems: according to leaked reports, even the vaunted F-35 stealth fighter had to dodge incoming anti-air missiles on at least one occasion. In Operation Rough Rider, the US deployed many of its most rare and bespoke weapons, such as the AGM-158 JASSM (Joint Air-To-Surface Standoff Missile) as well as heavy, specialised bunker-buster bombs. Again, by all accounts, this had little effect. Partly, this was because the US kept losing so many of its MQ-9 reaper drones, which come with a price tag north of 30 million dollars apiece, and which were supposed to provide the intel to ensure the bombing campaign found its targets.

When Biden first lost interest in defending the Red Sea against the Houthis, people were aghast. Not doing enough was akin to telling the entire world that the US was too weak to keep the Suez channel open. But Trump, after berating his predecessor, has also walked away, and de facto recognised the Houthi’s control of the channel. It would seem that the US doesn’t actually have many cards to play.

“As America burns through its massive military inheritance bequeathed by Ronald Reagan and the Eighties arms race, there is no plan to replace it.”

Trump could have sent another carrier to the region in support of his operation, bringing the total up to three. But this would hardly have made much difference to the air campaign because the problem with this offensive wasn’t lack of deck space or fighter sorties — US planes were too wary to go anywhere near Yemen’s air defence, and even stealth jets were reportedly not entirely safe. The problem was the lack of standoff munitions which can be deployed from a point of relative safety. But these are so expensive and so limited that there is no budget to replenish them when stores are depleted (a single JASSM with a 450 kilogram explosive warhead comes in at slightly under a million dollars). Wargames show the US running out of most or all such critical munitions in a matter of weeks or even days in a real conflict against a peer enemy such as China.

Even worse, much of the US military’s most advanced weapons systems are dependent on components and materials such as rare earths from China, which has already started imposing harsh export restrictions in order to slowly choke the life out of the US military industrial complex. In practice, the US does not have the economy to produce the weapons used for aerial warfare at any sort of scale, and this has only been hidden from full view because the military has coasted along on an aura of invincibility.

As the appetite for ground warfare has waned, the allure of quick, cheap and easy air campaigns has grown. But air warfare is no longer what it once was. Operation Rough Rider was supposed to be a decisive show of force against an under-equipped, internally divided third-world nation. Instead, it ended up looking like the last hurrah of a truly antiquated form of warfare, unable to cope with cheaper and better anti-air weapon systems.

All of these limitations make the current talk about a new bombing campaign against Iran utterly surreal. Iran is far bigger than Yemen, with a much more robust air defence network. Moreover, the distances involved are such that carrier-based aircraft, even when launched from the very shores of the Persian gulf, can’t actually reach places like Tehran and return on a single tank of fuel. Fighter-bombers will need aerial refuelling over the Iranian interior, and tanker planes are slow, easy to spot on radar, and pretty much defenceless. Even attempting to destroy the Iranian air defence network will take huge amounts of precision standoff weaponry, which the US cannot practically replace, even if it weren’t struggling with a massive fiscal crisis and soaring bond yields. The critical parts of Iran’s nuclear programme are kept under hundreds of feet of solid mountain; the US, using the heaviest and most advanced weapons in its entire arsenal, did not succeed against the much shallower Houthi bunkers and missile storage facilities in Yemen. All of the problems that forced America’s tacit surrender of the Suez canal would be writ large — and be far more lethal — in any campaign against Iran.

With exploding deficits, a growing internal political crisis, and a slowly collapsing military, America is a leopard that lacks the wherewithal to even attempt to change its spots. The generals know that the jig is up: the old model is broken, there is no new model coming, and nobody has the energy left to do much about it all. And so, this massive crisis of US military power is playing out in the vein of Ernest Hemingway’s comment about the course of his own bankruptcy: gradually, then suddenly.

Once upon a time, there was always a bigger plane, a more advanced high-tech future weapon, yet another trick up the Air Force’s sleeve that you could point to in order to silence the doubters. But those days are over. The gravity of what happened in Yemen will only assert itself once the political class is ready to deal with the new world we are now living in: one in which the US has no new military rabbits to pull out of its hat, and those that it does have simply aren’t enough to get anywhere close to victory.

Malcom Kyeyune is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden

SwordMercury

unherd.com · by Malcom Kyeyune · May 25, 2025

14. The US military spent $6 billion in the past 3 years to recruit and retain troops

As an aside we should keep in mind that all the great Americans our leaders deservedly and correctly celebrated at the graduations over the weekend entered the academies four years ago in 2021.

But with all due respect to our presidents, current and past, why don't we tribute this to our great young Americans who have a desire to serve, who want to be part of something bigger than themselves, and who want to serve to protect our great nation. That should be what we focus on to inspire new servicemembers every year to follow in that great tradition.lves, and who want to serve to protect our great nation.

The US military spent $6 billion in the past 3 years to recruit and retain troops

By LOLITA C. BALDOR

Updated 7:31 AM EDT, May 25, 2025

AP · May 25, 2025

WASHINGTON (AP) — The U.S. military spent more than $6 billion over the past three years to recruit and retain service members, in what has been a growing campaign to counter enlistment shortfalls.

The financial incentives to reenlist in the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines increased dramatically from 2022 through last year, with the Navy vastly outspending the others, according to funding totals provided by the services. The overall amount of recruiting bonuses also rose steadily, fueled by significant jumps in spending by the Army and Marine Corps.

The military services have routinely poured money into recruiting and retention bonuses over the years. But the totals spiked as Pentagon leaders tried to reverse falling enlistment numbers, particularly as COVID-19 restrictions locked down public events, fairs and school visits that recruiters relied on to meet with young people.

Coupled with an array of new programs, an increased number of recruiters and adjustments to enlistment requirements, the additional incentives have helped the services bounce back from the shortfalls. All but the Navy met their recruiting targets last year and all are expected to do so this year.

President Donald Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth repeatedly point to Trump’s election as a reason for the recruiting rebound. But the enlistment increases began long before last November, and officials have tied them more directly to the widespread overhauls that the services have done, including the increased financial incentives.

The Army, the military’s largest service, spent more on recruiting bonuses in 2022 and 2024 than the other services. But it was significantly outspent by the Navy in 2023, when the sea service was struggling to overcome a large enlistment shortfall.

As a result, even though the Navy is a smaller service, it spent more overall in the three years than the Army did.

The Navy also has spent considerably more than the others to entice sailors to reenlist, doling out retention bonuses to roughly 70,000 service members for each of the past three years. That total is more than double the number of troops the Army gave retention bonuses to each year, even though the Army is a much larger service.

“Navy is dedicated to retaining our most capable sailors; retention is a critical component of achieving our end-strength goals,” Adm. James Kilby, the vice chief of naval operations, told a Senate Armed Services subcommittee in March.

He said reenlistment for enlisted sailors “remains healthy” but officers are a challenge in specific jobs, including aviation, explosive ordnance disposal, surface and submarine warfare, health professionals and naval special operations. He added that the Navy has struggled to fill all of its at-sea jobs and is using financial incentives as one way to combat the problem.

The Army has seen the greatest recruiting struggles over the past decade, and by using a range of new programs and policies has had one of the largest comebacks. The Navy has had the most trouble more recently, and took a number of steps to expand those eligible for service and spend more in bonuses.

While the Army spends hundreds of millions each year to recruit troops, it also has relied on an array of new programs and policies to woo young people. A key driver of the Army’s rebound has been its decision to create the Future Soldier Prep Course, at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, in August 2022.

That program gives lower-performing recruits up to 90 days of academic or fitness instruction to help them meet military standards and move on to basic training. It has resulted in thousands of enlistments.

The Air Force increased its spending on recruiting bonuses in 2023 as it also struggled to overcome shortfalls, but lowered the amount the following year. The payments were for jobs including munitions systems, aircraft maintenance and security forces. The Space Force does not currently authorize enlistment bonuses.

The Marine Corps and the tiny Space Force have consistently hit their recruiting goals, although the Marines had to dig deep into their pool of delayed entry candidates in 2022 to meet their target. The Corps, which is much smaller than the Army and Air Force, spends the least on bonuses and tends to spread the amount among a larger number of service members.

Maj. Jacoby Getty, a Marine spokesman, said the spike in retention bonuses from $126 million in 2023 to $201 million in 2024 was because Marines were allowed to reenlist a year early for the first time. More than 7,000 Marines got bonuses as a result, a jump of nearly 2,200 over the previous year.

When asked about bonuses in 2023, Gen. Eric Smith, the Marine commandant, famously told a naval conference that “your bonus is you get to call yourself a Marine.”

“That’s your bonus, right?” he said. “There’s no dollar amount that goes with that.”

The services tailor their recruiting and retention money to bolster harder-to-fill jobs, including cyber, intelligence and special operations forces. The Army and Marine Corps also use the money to woo troops to some combat, armor and artillery jobs.

AP · May 25, 2025

15. Hegseth to attend Asia defense summit, with no China meeting planned

Hmmm.. no demand signal from the US for Europe in Asia? What about what the Asian countries and European countries want (and need)? Does this mean the US is assuring our Asian allies of our commitment to a free and open indo-Pacific and our treaty commitments?

Excerpts:

Hegseth previously visited Asia in March, where he affirmed the U.S. military would keep its focus on the region as some countries worried about an isolationist turn in American foreign policy.

“What the Trump administration will do … is truly prioritize and shift this region of the world in a way that is unprecedented,” Hegseth said in a March press conference in Manila.

Hegseth has pledged to “restore deterrence” to the Indo-Pacific as China continues a massive military buildup and grows more aggressive around U.S. partners in the Philippines and Taiwan.

...

Defense News reported in March that the new Pentagon team has urged Europeans to stay out of the region, though, and focus on defending their own continent alone.

“[There is] no demand signal from the U.S. for the Europeans to be involved in the Pacific,” a European official said at the time.

Hegseth to attend Asia defense summit, with no China meeting planned

Defense News · by Noah Robertson · May 23, 2025

U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth will travel to the Shangri-La Dialogue, the largest defense conference in Asia, where he will deliver a speech on the Pentagon’s approach to the region under the second Trump administration.

While in Singapore, though, Hegseth is not expected to meet with his counterpart from China, as his predecessor Lloyd Austin did last year. Beijing normally sends its defense minister to the summit but is unlikely to this year, downgrading its participation to a lower-level official.

The gap would make it a year since an American defense secretary has met in person with his Chinese counterpart, even as the two militaries continue speaking at lower levels.

“It is a signal that they are concerned about the level of engagement,” a U.S. defense official said of the Chinese choosing not to send their defense minister.

Incoming defense secretaries usually take the Shangri-La Dialogue to project the new administration’s policy toward the region, which America’s military has considered the most important in the world for the last decade. Austin visited Singapore all four of his years in office and used his speeches to discuss the value America put on working with like-minded countries.

While there, Hegseth is expected to meet with counterparts from Southeast Asia and U.S. allies, such as the Philippines, Australia and Japan.

Notably, Hegseth still lacks several top advisers on his Asia team. More than five months into the administration, there is no permanent appointee to run the Pentagon’s China office and no nominee to lead Indo-Pacific policy overall.

Hegseth previously visited Asia in March, where he affirmed the U.S. military would keep its focus on the region as some countries worried about an isolationist turn in American foreign policy.

“What the Trump administration will do … is truly prioritize and shift this region of the world in a way that is unprecedented,” Hegseth said in a March press conference in Manila.

Hegseth has pledged to “restore deterrence” to the Indo-Pacific as China continues a massive military buildup and grows more aggressive around U.S. partners in the Philippines and Taiwan.

Members of the Biden administration’s Pentagon team have bristled at the critique, arguing they did just that. The head of Indo-Pacific Command Adm. Samuel Paparo has said that the U.S. military would still win in a fight against China, but that he doesn’t like the trend lines with China’s industrial base outpacing America’s.

This year’s conference will be headlined by French President Emanuel Macron and feature a large group of European countries, also arriving at a moment of doubt in Washington’s policy toward the region.

After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration urged countries in Europe and Asia to grow more involved in each other’s security. To wit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy attended the Shangri-La Dialogue last year.

Defense News reported in March that the new Pentagon team has urged Europeans to stay out of the region, though, and focus on defending their own continent alone.

“[There is] no demand signal from the U.S. for the Europeans to be involved in the Pacific,” a European official said at the time.

About Noah Robertson

Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.

16. Japan’s Ishiba Calls for Closer Weapons Development With Allies

An example of some European involvement with Asia.

Excerpts:

“We should establish a strong relationship with our allies of defense equipment cooperation, including the transfer of such equipment, joint development and joint production,” he said.

Trump administration plans to develop the “Golden Dome” missile defense system to defend the US from potential attack highlight growing global concerns over the missile threat from countries such as China and North Korea.

In another international partnership with the UK and Italy, Japan is developing a sixth generation fighter jet that is scheduled for deployment in 2035.

Japan’s Ishiba Calls for Closer Weapons Development With Allies

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-22/japan-s-ishiba-calls-for-closer-weapons-development-with-allies?sref=hhjZtX76

By Alastair Gale

May 21, 2025 at 11:41 PM EDT

Shigeru Ishiba Photographer: Nicolas Datiche/Sipa/Bloomberg

Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba said Japan and its allies should deepen cooperation in the development of weapons and other defense equipment as threats mount across the Asia-Pacific region.

“It is difficult for any one country to defend itself alone, and this may be true for the US as well,” Ishiba said in a speech on Thursday at a major defense industry conference just outside Tokyo.

“We should establish a strong relationship with our allies of defense equipment cooperation, including the transfer of such equipment, joint development and joint production,” he said.

Trump administration plans to develop the “Golden Dome” missile defense system to defend the US from potential attack highlight growing global concerns over the missile threat from countries such as China and North Korea.

Japan is also plowing money into defense systems, including a joint project with the US to develop an interceptor to destroy hypersonic missiles, which have been flight tested by China and which are hard for existing defense systems to defend against.

Japan is aiming to boost its defense industry by means of a sharp increase in military spending. In 2022, Tokyo pledged ¥43 trillion ($300 billion) to a military build-up that would span five years, aiming to raise defense spending to around 2% of gross domestic product from a long-held stance of keeping it around 1%.

In another international partnership with the UK and Italy, Japan is developing a sixth generation fighter jet that is scheduled for deployment in 2035.

The pace of technological change in military equipment and the financial burden involved mean that countries with similar values have to work together, Ishiba said.

“It’s become impossible for one country to bear the costs and the risk of research and development alone,” he said in a keynote address at the Defense and Security Equipment International conference.

“Technology is advancing rapidly, and it is not an overstatement to say that technology used in the morning is obsolete by the evening,” he said.

DSEI is Japan’s largest defense industry conference, featuring global defense contractors and a growing number of Japanese companies entering the sector or expanding their defense businesses.

Follow all new stories by Alastair Gale

17. Fiscal Hawks in Senate Balk at House’s Bill to Deliver Trump’s Agenda

What is Plan B? The Administration has a lot riding on this bill.

Fiscal Hawks in Senate Balk at House’s Bill to Deliver Trump’s Agenda

Senator Ron Johnson of Wisconsin and Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky both indicated that they would seek major changes to the bill that passed the House.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/25/us/politics/fiscal-hawks-senate-house-bill.html

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Senators Rand Paul and Ron Johnson criticized the House fiscal bill.

By Catie Edmondson and Minho Kim

May 25, 2025

Two of the Senate’s staunchest fiscal conservatives said on Sunday that they would try to force significant changes to the bill passed by the House last week to deliver President Trump’s domestic agenda, signaling a precarious path ahead for the legislation.

Senator Ron Johnson of Wisconsin said on CNN that he saw the opportunity Republicans now have — with control of the House, Senate and White House — as “our only chance” to reset to “a reasonable prepandemic level of spending.”

Mr. Johnson accused the House of rushing through the process of putting the bill together and of approving legislation that would ultimately add to the deficit. And he suggested that enough of his colleagues in the Senate felt the same way to be able to enact major changes.

“I think we have enough to stop the process until the president gets serious about spending reduction and reducing the deficit,” Mr. Johnson said.

Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky, another fiscal conservative, criticized the House package, saying on “Fox News Sunday” that it lacked concrete measures to reduce the ballooning national debt. He said that the package was “not a serious proposal,” and that Republicans should cut deeper into major drivers of the debt, including Medicaid, Social Security and food assistance programs.

“Somebody has to stand up and yell: ‘The emperor has no clothes,'” Mr. Paul said. “Conservatives do need to stand up and have their voice heard.”

Their resistance is unwelcome news for Mr. Trump, who has implored lawmakers to quickly pass the legislation carrying his agenda, and for House Speaker Mike Johnson. Last week he attended a closed-door luncheon of Republican senators and urged them not to make drastic changes to the legislation that could imperil its passage through the House.

Some of the budget hawks in the House who lent their support to their chamber’s bill already swallowed considerable reservations about the bill to vote “yes.” Mr. Johnson has warned that any major changes could put their support in jeopardy.

“We’ve got to pass it one more time to ratify their changes in the House,” Mr. Johnson said on CNN on Sunday. “And I have a very delicate balance here, a very delicate equilibrium that we’ve reached over a long period of time. It’s best not to meddle with it too much.”

A number of Republicans have also said they believe the House bill could cut too deeply into programs their constituents rely on, including Medicaid and some of the clean energy tax credits created by the Inflation Reduction Act, the Biden administration’s signature climate law passed in 2022.

Senator Josh Hawley, Republican of Missouri, has become a vocal opponent of the legislation’s provision on Medicaid, and has argued that the bill would harm “working people and their children.”

“Over 20 percent of Missourians, including hundreds of thousands of children, are on Medicaid,” Mr. Hawley said on CNN earlier in May. “They’re not on Medicaid because they want to be. They’re on Medicaid because they cannot afford health insurance in the private market.”

Catie Edmondson covers Congress for The Times.

Minho Kim covers breaking news and climate change for The Times. He is based in Washington.

See more on: U.S. Politics, U.S. Senate, Republican Party, Ron Johnson, Rand Paul

18. The Rise of AI Manufacturing in China and South Korea

Excerpts:

East Asia’s rapid implementation of AI in manufacturing has significant implications for ongoing efforts in the West and emerging economies in the Global South to restructure global production away from East Asia and back to their own regions. Over the last 40 years, East Asia, led by China and South Korea, has dominated the global manufacturing landscape. This is a unique phenomenon in modern history, as no other region has maintained such long-standing industrial dominance in the post-World War II era.

The West, including the U.S. and Europe, is attempting to reclaim its lost manufacturing base through reshoring initiatives – an agenda that gained momentum under the Trump administration and remains a major policy debate within the European Union. However, given the speed and scale at which East Asia has adopted AI in manufacturing, it is increasingly unlikely that Western countries will achieve their reshoring goals, as digitalization and AI adoption remain comparatively slow in those regions.

East Asia’s rapid advancement in AI manufacturing also poses a serious challenge to emerging economies in the Global South – such as India and some Southeast Asian nations – that aspire to become the next global manufacturing hubs by replacing China and East Asia’s current dominance. While China and South Korea have clear state-driven ambitions backed by strong state-business coordination and proactive societal support for AI implementation, such strategic alignment is largely absent in many Global South economies at this stage.

Hence, the rise of AI manufacturing in East Asia, led by China and South Korea, is likely to reshape the global balance of industrial power in the new AI-powered technological era.

The Rise of AI Manufacturing in China and South Korea

AI-driven strategies in China and South Korea reinforce East Asia’s manufacturing dominance, challenging Western and Global South reshoring ambitions.

https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/the-rise-of-ai-manufacturing-in-china-and-south-korea/

By Rajiv Kumar

May 23, 2025

Credit: Depositphotos

Artificial intelligence (AI) is the most important technology of our time, one that is rapidly transforming economies and societies. Yet, its implementation for productive applications varies widely across the globe. While some countries are still debating whether to deploy AI, amid concerns over security and job displacement, others are rapidly adopting it to realign national ambitions, stay competitive, and lead the future economic and industrial landscape.

East Asia, led by China and South Korea, is a region that is implementing AI in manufacturing at a pace and scale not seen elsewhere. This rapid adoption is likely to help East Asia maintain its manufacturing edge amid efforts by the West and Global South to shift production in their direction.

China, the world’s manufacturing powerhouse, is far ahead of any country in terms of using AI in manufacturing. To illustrate, Chinese multinational Xiaomi operates “dark factories (暗黑工厂)” fully automated with AI, big data, and Internet of Things, enabling it to produce one smartphone per second – a rate surpassing Apple’s output. This automation has significantly reduced costs by cutting manpower and energy use. As a result, Xiaomi recently surpassed Apple to become the world’s second-biggest seller of smartphones, thanks to its rising market share in India and other Global South countries.

Xiaomi’s success is not an isolated case. In fact, many Chinese companies are racing to adopt AI in manufacturing to stay ahead in global competition. As a result, China has recently delivered remarkable outcomes: BYD has passed Tesla in electric vehicle production and sales, while Baidu has outpaced Waymo – the world’s leading self-driving tech company – in pricing, despite entering the market later. China has aggressively deployed AI across its factories, and as of February 2025, it had built 30,000 smart factories – 1,200 of which are categorized as advanced-level and 230 as excellence-level.

Following China’s rapid AI implementation, another East Asian manufacturing powerhouse, South Korea, is also rapidly adopting AI in manufacturing. In April of this year, South Korea’s LG Innotek, a subsidiary of conglomerate LG, unveiled its “Dream Factory (드림 팩토리)” in Gumi Province, which is now being transformed into an AI manufacturing hub. By deploying deep learning technologies without human intervention, the factory has cut production costs and boosted efficiency, aiming to outperform global competitors.

South Korea’s other manufacturing giants – Samsung, SK Hynix, and Hyundai – have also deployed AI in order to maintain global their market leadership in semiconductors and automobiles. Thanks to early implementation, South Korea has seen a sharp rise in AI-powered smart factories across both major conglomerates and SMEs, making it a model for latecomers in this field.

Why are China and South Korea leading in AI manufacturing? In general terms, their mission-driven strategies, robust state-business coordination, and societal support combine to enable rapid implementation.

Mission-Driven AI Deployment in East Asia

China and South Korea stand out for their goal-oriented approach to AI manufacturing, shaped by international competition and domestic priorities. In contrast, many governments elsewhere have yet to formulate a coherent long-term strategy for the sector.

Under Xi Jinping, China has come to view AI as a key means of realizing its ambition to become a global high-tech superpower while maintaining manufacturing dominance. This vision has two major dimensions. The first is to surpass its primary rival, the United States, in the high-tech industries race by establishing technological supremacy, particularly in AI-driven manufacturing. The second is to halt the recent trend of manufacturing relocation from China to countries like India and those in Southeast Asia, which have emerged as competitive alternatives due to their cheaper labor costs.

With a declining working-age population and rising labor costs, Chinese leaders view AI as a strategic tool for sustaining productivity and industrial resilience. This vision has propelled the shift from “Made in China” to “Intelligently Made in China (中国智造),” emphasizing the role of AI in upgrading the country’s manufacturing capabilities. Framed within the concept of “New Quality Productive Forces (新质生产力),” AI-driven manufacturing is central to China’s ambition to maintain its dominance in global production and assert leadership in the emerging technological landscape.

China’s push for AI in manufacturing also stems from the realization that it can compete in – and potentially win – the AI race against the U.S. through a different strategy. While the United States excels in AI innovation, it lags in deploying AI technology. Unlike the U.S., which focuses on building advanced LLMs (large language models), China has identified its strength in “physical and industrial AI” – a potential recently acknowledged by U.S. firm NVIDIA. As a manufacturing powerhouse, China’s leadership sees industrial AI as a key path to global technological leadership.

South Korea’s AI manufacturing ambitions are also driven by a set of goal-oriented geoeconomic objectives. The first is the China factor. As China accelerates AI manufacturing, South Korea faces growing pressure. There is widespread concern in Seoul that China is overtaking – or will soon overtake – strategic industries that once formed the backbone of the Korean economy, including semiconductors, automobiles, and shipbuilding. In response, South Korea recognizes the urgent need to deploy AI in manufacturing to maintain its position as a global industrial leader and emerge as one of the “world’s top three AI powers (AI 3대 강국).”

Apart from the China factor, South Korea’s demographic crisis has also pushed the country to rapidly implement AI in manufacturing. South Korea has the lowest birth rate in the world, and its working-age population has declined sharply in recent years. Addressing the labor shortage, which is expected to worsen significantly, is now considered a national emergency. As a result, the rapid adoption of AI in manufacturing is seen as a strategic response to this looming crisis.

In addition, South Korea also sees a chance to remain competitive in the AI race by adopting the “China Model” – focusing on deploying AI in manufacturing rather than competing in building LLMs, which require huge amounts of capital to compete with the global giants. Instead, South Korea, by utilizing its wealth of manufacturing data, is seen to be in a better position than others to dominate the AI landscape.

Robust State-Business Collaboration

What makes China and South Korea different from other regions in terms of development models is the tight alignment between the state and business sectors to achieve national ambitions and goals. This is clearly evident in the case of AI manufacturing. Both governments have recognized the strategic potential of AI in manufacturing and have actively promoted early adoption through strong state–business collaboration.

As Kai-Fu Lee noted in his 2018 book “AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order,” China quickly recognized the potential of AI manufacturing and pushed for its rapid implementation by giving signals to its companies to move ahead in this field. It has promoted a bold strategy by incorporating it into major national planning documents, including its Five-Year Plans and “Made in China” initiatives. It has also introduced specific plans such as the “AI Plus” initiative, which aims to provide top-level policy guidance and massive support to strengthen state-business cooperation.

Similarly, South Korea also gave early signals to its businesses that future growth would rely on AI-powered smart manufacturing. Seoul began implementing smart manufacturing policies as early as 2014, but as China accelerated its AI manufacturing through state-business collaboration, South Korea also stepped up its efforts. In 2020, South Korea announced the construction of 1,000 cutting-edge 5G+AI smart factories and 100 “K-Smart Lighthouse Factories” by 2025, by fostering strong state-business partnerships. Strengthening such collaboration has been a top policy priority across governments, from the Moon administration’s (2017–2022) Digital New Deal to the Yoon administration’s (2022–2024) National AI Strategy.

China and South Korea are also different from many other neoliberal regulatory states in the West in terms of direct financing to their private sectors to achieve national goals. Both have allocated massive public funds for R&D to stay ahead in AI manufacturing. They have also created separate direct funding mechanisms to encourage fast AI adoption in the private sector over the last few years. The latest example of this support is China’s $8.2 billion AI fund to accelerate adoption, while South Korea has pledged $7.5 billion to fast-track AI integration in manufacturing. These funds cover insurance, low-interest loans, and equity investments.

Funding is not the only support China and South Korea provide to their companies for rapidly implementing AI in manufacturing. Equally important is a comprehensive support ecosystem, including close consultation with the private sector to address specific needs. This includes infrastructure development, AI talent cultivation, targeted incentives, and strong collaboration among industry, academia, and government – all aimed at shaping and reinforcing their dominance in AI manufacturing.

Societal Readiness and Support for AI-Driven Transformation

China and South Korea also differ from others in their distinctive societal response to AI implementation, which has helped accelerate AI manufacturing in both countries.

In China’s communist system, people generally accept government plans for deploying new technologies. This holds true for AI, which many view as essential to competing with the United States and restoring China’s national strength. The government’s tight control over society enables both the state and businesses to rapidly implement AI in manufacturing. The vast manufacturing data in China is itself generated by the people’s widespread adoption of digital technologies – unlike in the West, where people are more cautious about adopting new technologies for daily uses, including shopping, payments, and transportation.

People in South Korea, an advanced liberal democracy, also support the rapid implementation of AI in both the economy and society. In fact, Korean public discourse often includes concerns that the country is falling behind China in AI, with growing calls for the government to play a more proactive role in accelerating AI adoption. This stands in contrast to Western liberal democracies, where anti-statism is more prevalent and government-led deployment of digital technologies is often viewed as a threat to privacy and individual rights. Like China, South Korea’s massive amounts of digital and manufacturing data are a direct result of people’s fast adoption of technologies, including AI services.

On the issue of AI-related job security, while people around the world are concerned about job losses due to AI, the dominant discourse in China and South Korea focuses on how many jobs AI will create in the future through its rapid implementation. This is not to say people are unconcerned about job security, but such concerns are outweighed by discussions about the positive impact of AI. In this context, people in China and South Korea are proactively learning AI, and governments are rapidly expanding AI literacy programs to prepare the workforce for the AI economy.

Challenge for the West and Global South’s Manufacturing Reshoring Ambitions

Hence, the rise of AI manufacturing in East Asia, led by China and South Korea, is likely to reshape the global balance of industrial power in the new AI-powered technological era.

Authors

Guest Author

Rajiv Kumar

Dr. Rajiv Kumar is a research professor at the Institute of Indian Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, and also teaches at the Academy of East Asian Studies, Sungkyunkwan University, both in Seoul, South Korea.

19. China's strategy for conquering Taiwan without firing a shot

These plans always work as briefed and envisioned. No war is necessary (note my extreme sarcasm).

But on a serious note I am sure they will pursue these efforts and they will have strategic effects but I doubt the PRC can win without firing a shot.

Excerpts:

Dotson and Hartmann say these exercises aim to intimidate Taiwan’s population and hold Taiwan responsible for threatening regional peace by promoting the narrative that such exercises are a necessary response to “Taiwanese independence forces.”

In line with that, Vincent So mentions in an article this month for The Interpreter that China’s threats, military exercises and propaganda aim to convince Taiwan that reunification, while not necessarily just, is inevitable.

So writes that China’s routine drills and gray zone tactics aim to portray reunification as inevitable, fostering resignation in Taiwan. At the same time, he says, China could exploit Taiwanese elites’ family and commercial ties to the mainland, making quiet accommodation and ambiguity preferable to open confrontation and principled resistance.

Asia Times has characterized such an approach as a “squeeze and relax model,” gradually increasing military and gray zone pressure on Taiwan, followed by some relaxation, a pause for reflection and then high-level talks.

So argues that such strategic encirclement could become a political invitation for bloodless, peaceful reunification. He further argues that the approach puts the US and its allies in a bind over whether military intervention is justified if Taiwan gives in under internal pressure.

China's strategy for conquering Taiwan without firing a shot - Asia Times

Invasion plan outlined in military journal aims to paralyze critical infrastructure and crash internal systems before deploying troops

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · May 26, 2025

China is refining a strategy to conquer Taiwan by weaponizing its critical infrastructure and transforming power plants, ports and data hubs into pressure points for systemic collapse, according to a Chinese military journal.

The South China Morning Post (SCMP) reports that China could paralyze Taiwan without firing a shot by targeting key infrastructure—an approach likened to the “butterfly effect” in the Naval and Merchant Ships journal.

The article identifies 30 to 40 “super critical” nodes—power, water, communications, and liquified natural gas (LNG) facilities – that, if taken offline, could crash Taiwan’s systems from within.

It cites the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) recent Strait Thunder 2025A drill, which simulated an attack on Taiwan’s largest LNG depot, highlighting China’s growing tactical fixation on energy vulnerabilities.

It claims that a well-timed strike, especially during peak conditions such as typhoons or electoral events, could rapidly destabilize Taiwan, eroding resistance and forcing capitulation under minimal military cost.

Proposed methods include precision strikes, cyberattacks, electromagnetic pulses and engineered “pseudo-natural disasters.” While the article may not reflect official doctrine, its scenarios mirror PLA drills and echo rising rhetoric around “forced reunification.”

Taiwan’s dependence on imported energy leaves it strategically exposed. The US, its chief security partner, opposes unilateral moves to change the status quo and continues arms sales to shore up Taiwan’s defenses.

As cross-strait tensions rise, China’s evolving doctrine signals a broader shift toward asymmetric warfare, victory through pressure, not open battle.

An August 2024 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report by Bonny Lin and other authors underscores Taiwan’s fragility: 97% of its energy and 70% of its food are imported.

Taiwan’s stockpiles, they note, are limited: less than two months’ worth of coal and gas, and just six months of crude oil and food. According to them, these stockpiles would be subject to Chinese bombardment in an invasion, reducing Taiwan’s capability to resist.

Chieh Chung, in an April 2025 Taiwan Times article, argues that destroying Taiwan’s LNG terminals would cripple its energy grid, reducing the repair burden on Chinese occupation forces.

While Taiwan has built air raid shelters, Chung notes it still lacks hardened logistics hubs to safeguard water, food and energy in wartime.

Striking Taiwan’s energy grid could pave the way for a broader Chinese “decapitation strike” targeting sites like the Presidential Office, meant to neutralize leadership, paralyze defenses, demoralize civilians and seize the island before the US can respond.

However, China’s ability to execute such a strike is far from assured. In an October 2022 RAND report, Sale Lilly observes that PLA thinkers focus on quick, decisive wars, unlike the drawn-out battles in Fallujah, Aleppo, Bakhmut or Gaza.

He adds that US decapitation strikes, like those in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, had little impact on the protracted, grinding conflict that followed.

Should an invasion of Taiwan turn into an occupation, Andrew Faulhaber mentions in an April 2025 article for the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs that a Taiwanese insurgency could attrit and prolong a Chinese occupation by exploiting geographic advantages, disrupting PLA logistics and mobilizing civilian resistance.

Faulhaber says Taiwan must trade space for time, luring the PLA deep into hostile terrain and using asymmetric tactics like guerrilla warfare, cyber strikes and maritime interdiction to destabilize the occupation.

By eroding Chinese control through sustained resistance, he contends that Taiwan could force China into a strategic dilemma, whether to commit extensive resources indefinitely or withdraw to preserve domestic stability.

However, Taiwan pulling off a successful insurgency against Chinese occupation hinges on its will to resist. Timothy Heath and other writers mention in a June 2023 RAND report that Taiwanese resistance is contingent on the quality of its political leadership and social cohesion.

Heath and others point out that while hardship could rally Taiwanese support behind their leadership, sustained economic and combat losses could just as easily sap the will to resist.

Critically, they highlight that while Taiwan could mount determined resistance for some time, without US military intervention, it would most likely fail given China’s overwhelming resources and military advantage.

While China’s capabilities to mount a decapitation strike and Taiwan’s will to resist are debatable, the performative aspect of the former’s drills may be their most important attribute.

Writing for the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) in April 2025, John Dotson and Jonathan Hartmann argue that political warfare is central to China’s military drills.

Dotson and Hartmann say these exercises aim to intimidate Taiwan’s population and hold Taiwan responsible for threatening regional peace by promoting the narrative that such exercises are a necessary response to “Taiwanese independence forces.”

In line with that, Vincent So mentions in an article this month for The Interpreter that China’s threats, military exercises and propaganda aim to convince Taiwan that reunification, while not necessarily just, is inevitable.

So writes that China’s routine drills and gray zone tactics aim to portray reunification as inevitable, fostering resignation in Taiwan. At the same time, he says, China could exploit Taiwanese elites’ family and commercial ties to the mainland, making quiet accommodation and ambiguity preferable to open confrontation and principled resistance.

Asia Times has characterized such an approach as a “squeeze and relax model,” gradually increasing military and gray zone pressure on Taiwan, followed by some relaxation, a pause for reflection and then high-level talks.

So argues that such strategic encirclement could become a political invitation for bloodless, peaceful reunification. He further argues that the approach puts the US and its allies in a bind over whether military intervention is justified if Taiwan gives in under internal pressure.

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · May 26, 2025

20. The US plan for countering China in South America

I am reminded of one of the late Geroge Carlin's jokes about industry and US security - I cannot do the joke justice but I always remember that he reminded us that the middle two letters of "industry" are "U.S." and therefore every military action we take must be to further US industry. I recall the political satire, I just cannot recall the actual humor).

Excerpts:

History shows that US foreign policy often blends commercial interest with military justification. From the Cold War’s “communist threat” to the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, the underlying continuity is a desire to maintain hegemony over resource-rich areas.

In the case of the Triple Frontier, the targets are not radicalized cells, but hydropower, water reserves and strategic transportation routes.

What makes the current strategy more insidious is the use of unproven or exaggerated threats—first Hezbollah, then the PCC—as pretexts to reshape regional governance and infrastructure alignment in ways that favor US interests.

The Itaipu Dam and the Guarani Aquifer are not just engineering feats or natural treasures—they are symbols of regional autonomy. As Washington seeks to expand its footprint in South America, cloaked in the language of security and partnership, it is essential for countries like Brazil and Paraguay to critically examine the costs of cooperation.

In resisting attempts to militarize the region under questionable pretenses, South America must assert its right to develop its resources according to its own sovereign priorities, not as pawns in a new great-power rivalry over energy, water and global influence.

The US plan for countering China in South America - Asia Times

Strategy includes tapping Paraguay power for US data centers and Triple Frontier cooperation in chasing phantom terrorists

asiatimes.com · by Nico Acosta · May 26, 2025

In May 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio publicly touted the idea of using Paraguay’s surplus electricity from the Itaipu Dam to power American data centers and artificial intelligence infrastructure.

On the surface, this appeared to be a pragmatic proposal. But beneath the rhetoric of innovation lies a deeper geopolitical strategy rooted both in rising US interest in tapping South America’s energy and water reserves under the guise of counterterrorism and hemispheric security, and countering China’s growing influence in the region.

The Itaipu Dam, co-owned by Brazil and Paraguay, is one of the world’s largest hydroelectric plants. For decades, Paraguay has sold its 50% share of the energy produced to Brazil.

However, with the 2023 expiration of the bilateral pricing agreement, the US has been lobbying to redirect some of the dam’s surplus electricity toward its energy-hungry tech infrastructure.

Rubio’s comments underscore this ambition: “Paraguay is rich in renewable energy and water. These resources can help power the next generation of AI computing, if we work together,” he declared.

Yet this newfound US interest in Paraguay’s energy is not occurring in isolation. It is accompanied by increased US intelligence and military presence in the Triple Frontier, where Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina meet, a region long stigmatized by Washington as a breeding ground for terrorism.

Since the 9/11 terror attacks, the US has sought to justify its surveillance and potential military activities in the Triple Frontier by alleging ties to terrorist groups like Hezbollah. These claims are rooted in the sizable Arab-descendant population—mainly Lebanese—in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, and Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil.

However, multiple independent studies, including a 2007 analysis by Arthur Bernardes do Amaral (PUC-Rio), have shown that these allegations were never substantiated by intelligence or law enforcement findings.

According to the US State Department’s own “Patterns of Global Terrorism” reports between 1992 and 2004, no verifiable terrorist attacks were conducted or planned from this region. Yet the narrative persisted.

This securitization—defined by the Copenhagen School as the framing of an issue as an existential threat to justify extraordinary measures—allowed the US to maintain political pressure on Brazil and Paraguay to alter their domestic laws and cooperate in intelligence-sharing frameworks like the “3+1” Commission (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and the US.).

When the narrative of Islamic terrorism failed to gain traction in Brazil, the US pivoted. Washington began urging Brazil to classify domestic criminal groups, such as the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV), as terrorist organizations—a categorization that Brazilian legal doctrine firmly rejects.

As reported by G1 and Poder360 in 2025, the Lula administration refused these demands, emphasizing that criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking should not be conflated with ideologically motivated terrorist groups.

This effort aligns with past strategies employed in Colombia and Peru, where the “narcoterrorism” label was successfully deployed to justify US military aid and intelligence operations.

The same rhetorical playbook is now being applied in the southern cone—only this time the target is not insurgents but critical infrastructure.

Brazilian officials have raised alarms that US interest in Itaipu energy directly threatens Brazil’s own energy security. For decades, Brazil has depended on Paraguayan energy to support industrial output in its southern states.

The redirection of this energy toward US tech companies would represent not just an economic loss but a strategic reconfiguration of South American energy geopolitics.

Moreover, the proximity of the Guarani Aquifer—a vital freshwater reserve—to US-interested zones raises further concerns. As Bernardes do Amaral observes, “the securitization of the region masks an ambition to assert control over water and energy assets under the umbrella of counterterrorism.”

Rising US assertiveness also poses a challenge to China’s expanding role in South America. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has gained traction through the Bi-Oceanic Railway (also known as the Capricorn Railway), an ambitious infrastructure project designed to link Brazil’s Atlantic coast with Chile’s Pacific ports via Paraguay and Argentina.

A US military and intelligence presence near this corridor could impede Chinese logistical and construction operations. By stoking regional security fears, Washington may seek to curtail the effectiveness of BRI-linked development—a move that would preserve US commercial and strategic primacy in the hemisphere.

History shows that US foreign policy often blends commercial interest with military justification. From the Cold War’s “communist threat” to the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, the underlying continuity is a desire to maintain hegemony over resource-rich areas.

In the case of the Triple Frontier, the targets are not radicalized cells, but hydropower, water reserves and strategic transportation routes.

What makes the current strategy more insidious is the use of unproven or exaggerated threats—first Hezbollah, then the PCC—as pretexts to reshape regional governance and infrastructure alignment in ways that favor US interests.

The Itaipu Dam and the Guarani Aquifer are not just engineering feats or natural treasures—they are symbols of regional autonomy. As Washington seeks to expand its footprint in South America, cloaked in the language of security and partnership, it is essential for countries like Brazil and Paraguay to critically examine the costs of cooperation.

In resisting attempts to militarize the region under questionable pretenses, South America must assert its right to develop its resources according to its own sovereign priorities, not as pawns in a new great-power rivalry over energy, water and global influence.

asiatimes.com · by Nico Acosta · May 26, 2025

21. Of Fists and Fathers: A Remembrance

I will close today's news and commentary with a thoughtful essay from a Special Forces brother and friend. We are all thinking about those we lost and he put words to paper to remind us of the sacrifices of our brothers and sisters and the decisions we all have to live with.

Thank you to Brian for sharing this most heartfelt story that gives people a glimpse into the very human side of our military profession and makes all of us think of those we lost.

Of Fists and Fathers: A Remembrance - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Brian Petit · May 26, 2025

Maj. Jim Mauldin, a U.S. Army special forces officer of mammoth size and prodigious strength, stood in my office doorway, blocking all light. He wanted something from me, his battalion commander. Jim spoke in a southern Virginia drawl with an unhurried cadence that matched his temperament. He got right to the point: “Sir, I would like permission for Master Sgt. Mark Coleman to go to Fort Benning and conduct a parachute jump with his son, who is in airborne school.” This otherwise benign request came at a terrible time. It was late fall of 2009. Our special forces battalion was preparing to deploy to southern Afghanistan. History would later record 2010 as the deadliest year for U.S. and coalition forces of the two-decade-long conflict.

Become a Member

Master Sgt. Coleman was a special forces operational detachment-alpha operations sergeant. Colloquially called “A-teams,” Coleman was the senior non-commissioned officer who, paired with a captain, led the team. Coleman was one of the finest soldiers in the battalion. If Coleman went to Fort Benning to jump with his son, he would miss a critical pre-mission training event. I was being asked to approve this absence.

“No,” I replied, more in reflexive reaction than in thoughtful response. “Jim, my job is to prepare us for combat. The distractors, absences, and taskers are crushing us. His team is young. We need Coleman in training for that week.” Mauldin was silent. He inhaled to respond, considered a moment, then retreated without protest.

Behind my desk, I pressed on, the stern and rightful protector of our training time. My duty was to prepare more than 300 soldiers of all ranks and experience levels to fight and survive in a war against a determined enemy. As commander, I was constantly repelling threats to our training time. This required clenched fists and shrewd decisions. I was the man for the job.

Two days later, Mauldin reappeared in my office doorway. He had a shiftiness about him, an indicator that we were going to be handling a difficult topic. “Sir, I strongly recommend you allow Mark Coleman to go jump with his son. He will pay his own way, he will be gone just 96 hours, and you have my assurance this will not affect his team’s readiness.” While straightforward, I understood Mauldin’s words differently: I reject your earlier decision, commander. This was bold. This was confrontational.

I sighed. I resented approving anything that chipped away at our training readiness. But Mauldin had just laid down a blue poker chip. He was a terrific company commander. He was levelheaded and analytical. When such a leader knowingly crosses into an area of respectful disobedience, that is a signal: It is time to pause and reconsider the decision. “Okay, but he pays his own way,” I said, adding a meaningless qualifier that gave the impression that I had just won a negotiation. Mauldin smiled and withdrew without a word. This towering man knew when to quietly collect his winnings and get up from the table.

Weeks later, on the eve of our deployment to Afghanistan, I ran into Coleman. “Master Sgt. Coleman, did you get to jump with your son?” I asked. A smile broke across his face and joy flashed in his eyes. “I did, sir! It was fantastic. An unbelievable moment with my son. Thanks for letting me go to Fort Benning.” Our conversation was brief, but the impact lingered with me. I was the father of three boys. To conduct a parachute jump with one’s son was a rare union of family and our chosen profession. In one exhilarating moment, this father and son hurled themselves from an aircraft flying 140 miles per hour at 2,000 feet above ground, experienced the punishing shock of a deployed canopy, and floated freely in the sky. Mark Coleman and his son would, together, enjoy a fleeting moment of floating rapture before the hard ground served up a jarring stop. A handshake and a hug would seal their union into the airborne guild. Coleman’s proud smile on that day before our deployment sent a bolt of joy into my heart, followed by a sliver of horror: I had almost ruined this. In fact, I had ruined it until Maj. Mauldin pressed the issue. I took stock of the emotion, exhaled, and strode off.

On May 2, 2010, Master Sgt. Mark Coleman, 40 years old, was killed in action by an improvised explosive device in Arghandab, Afghanistan. He died instantly.

Coleman’s team responded to a call from a nearby U.S. infantry patrol that became ensnared in a field of buried improvised explosive devices. These devices were booby-trapped with hidden, “anti-handling” mechanisms where the circuitry is configured to detonate the explosive charge in any number of ways: downward pressure, tugged or cut wires, or the slightest of nudges. Mark Coleman did not survive his cursory investigation of this homemade minefield.

Mark Coleman’s A-team was executing a unique, risky mission on their eight-month tour. U.S. special forces teams embedded in Afghan villages, living among the locals to raise and reinforce the country’s fledgling security forces. The team was fully and intentionally exposed to the enemy. They were full-time residents, inseparable from their local hosts. Together, they signaled to the enemy: We are here, and we own the neighborhood.

When Mark Coleman was killed, he was a green beret at the top of his game. Coleman’s mission demanded some alchemy of guile, audacity, restraint, muscle, diplomacy, and instinct. He was a master of weaponry, a crafter of tactics, a counselor to men, a canny strategist confined to a contested valley. He was a patient chess player one minute, a twitchy kickboxer the next. He was a combat leader. The most experienced member of the team, Coleman was developing future leaders while simultaneously navigating a dreadfully complex operational environment. Until each of his team members honed the skills and senses needed to operate confidently, he was the indispensable one. As Coleman was the father to his own son, he was a father figure to his team.

The last time I saw Mark Coleman, he and his A-team were securing a helicopter landing zone for the departure of Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top military commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan. McCrystal wanted to observe “village stability operations” in action, so he visited Coleman and his men in the Arghandab valley northwest of Kandahar. Controlling the valley and its village clusters was crucial to securing Kandahar, the Taliban stronghold.

McChrystal’s visit took place in April 2010 when the Arghandab’s prolific pomegranate orchards were in full bloom. After briefly meeting and talking with Coleman and his team, the general prepared to return to U.S. military headquarters in Kabul. Coleman’s mixed U.S.-Afghan force swarmed the landing zone on Chinese-made motorcycles, spitting up dust, guns tightly slung over backs, belted ammunition visible under dun-colored scarves, goggles fastened over battered helmets, and tattooed forearms exposed to the desert sun. It was a scene right out of Mad Max. The ground trembled under the thrum of inbound U.S. helicopters.

As I prepared to load the waiting aircraft, I turned to Coleman. “Mark, no one really knows what ‘right’ looks like out here, but you are close to it. Whatever the enemy has in store for you, remember this command trusts you.” Coleman cracked a smile: “Sir, we feel that. We appreciate that trust.” As the helicopters peeled away, I looked down into the mud-caked villages crisscrossed with foot paths and hand-dug irrigation canals. Solving sticky problems in punishing environments is exactly what green berets do and who they are. Coleman was in his element. He exhibited an unmistakable contentment in that twisted way known to combat soldiers: The senses are ablaze as never before at the prospect of taking a life or losing one’s own.

On this Memorial Day, let us always remember U.S. Army Master Sgt. Mark Coleman, other fallen teammates, and all the servicemembers who have been killed in action in the service of the nation. May their lights remain bright in our hearts and be impressed upon our memories.

Let us also thank the living. Maj. Jim Mauldin exhibited the courage that day in my office doorway that does not earn ribbons or secure promotions. His small act of resistance made possible the finest memory a father and son could want — a final memory, as it turned out. Thank you, Lt. Col. (ret.) Jim Mauldin, for helping this officer learn that a clenched fist can, with a little help, become an open hand.

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Brian Petit, a retired U.S. Army colonel, teaches and consults on strategy, planning, special operations, and resistance. He commanded the 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) in 2008–2010. He is an adjunct for the Joint Special Operations University.

Image: U.S. Army

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Brian Petit · May 26, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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Memorial Day 2025

A few thoughts

U.S. Aims to Keep Chinese Navy Guessing With New Missile System

As China dominates swaths of the Pacific, the U.S. is looking for ways to push back. The Nmesis is a key part of that.

US’ 500 military personnel in Taiwan an ‘open test’ of Beijing’s red lines

Some analysts downplay the number, but others say the revelation puts Beijing in a challenging position

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3311807/us-500-military-personnel-taiwan-open-test-beijings-red-lines?utm

China’s space ambitions ‘forcing’ Washington’s Golden Dome strategy: commander

General Stephen Whiting tells Chicago forum that Beijing has spent three decades preparing to target US infrastructure

Trump Calls Putin ‘Crazy’ After Massive Russian Aerial Assaults on Ukraine

At least 12 killed and dozens injured as strikes across the country hit residential buildings, Ukrainian officials say

Trump’s Vision: One World, Three Powers?

Haiti’s Beleaguered Government Launches Drones Against Gangs

Small drones bearing explosives are escalating chaos in the Caribbean nation’s capital

China Is Trapped in the South China Sea 'Gray Zone'

About the Author: Denny Roy

Poland, Romania lead a drone bonanza in Eastern Europe

Donald Trump purges dozens of National Security Council officials

Discover the Secret World of CIA’s Elite Paramilitary Operatives

The CIA’s Mission

The Special Activities Center

Covert vs Clandestine

Origins and Evolution

Covert and Clandestine Operations

The SAC’s Multidimensional Approach

Ground Branch

Case Study: The Rescue of Jessica Lynch

Air Branch

Maritime Branch

Political Action Group

Global Response Staff (GRS)

Recruitment, Training, and Operations

CIA and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), Working Together

The Role of the CIA

Operation Neptune Spear: Eliminating Osama bin Laden

Summary

Why Three Years Isn’t Enough For Trump’s Golden Dome

Ambitious plan for new U.S. missile-defense shield needs to navigate technology hurdles and budget questions

Eyes in the sky

Get in line for missiles

Budgets and bureaucracy

America's military humiliation

Malcom Kyeyune

The US military spent $6 billion in the past 3 years to recruit and retain troops​

Hegseth to attend Asia defense summit, with no China meeting planned

Japan’s Ishiba Calls for Closer Weapons Development With Allies

Fiscal Hawks in Senate Balk at House’s Bill to Deliver Trump’s Agenda

The Rise of AI Manufacturing in China and South Korea

China's strategy for conquering Taiwan without firing a shot - Asia Times

The US plan for countering China in South America - Asia Times

Of Fists and Fathers: A Remembrance - War on the Rocks

The US military spent $6 billion in the past 3 years to recruit and retain troops