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Quotes of the Day:
"None are so hopelessly enslaved as those who falsely believe they are free. The truth has been kept from depth of their minds by masters who rule them with lies. They feed them on falsehoods till wrong looks right in their eyes."
- Goethe
"The sad truth is that most evil is done by people who never make up their minds to be good or evil."
- Hannah Arendt
"I never said, Well, I don't have this and I don't have that. I said, I don't have this yet, but I am going to get it."
- Tina Turner.
1. Kim Jong-un’s daughter seen in public ‘could inherit his power’
2. Dead body of suspected N. Korean found on western island coast
3. <Investigation Inside N. Korea> “Many people have died from the start of May due to starvation and disease…”
4. 1 in 6 N. Korean children under 5 suffer from stunted growth: report
5. A North Korea Collapse Means One Thing: Find the Nuclear Weapons, Fast.
6. Why North Korea Would Start a Nuclear War
7. North Korea's Mini Submarines: A Threat or 'Underwater Coffin'?
8. Who Is North Korea Trading With? [Infographic]
9. News of N. Korean family’s defection to the South spreads in China-N. Korean border region
10. New Launch Pad and Significant Expansion Underway at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station
11. Russia and North Korea to trade in 'rubles' amid surging International sanctions
12. China, Korea agree to strengthen talks on chip industry: Chinese commerce ministry
13. US reconnaissance drones arrive at air base in Japan
14. U.S. military discloses recent joint intel training with S. Korea for readiness amid N.K. threats
15. Why are Germany and South Korea sharing military secrets?
16. Yoon to hold summits with leaders of 5 Pacific island nations Sunday
1. Kim Jong-un’s daughter seen in public ‘could inherit his power’
I expect this speculation will continue for some time. It will keep us decisively engaged as we try to figure out whether he has a son or not.
Kim Jong-un’s daughter seen in public ‘could inherit his power’
May 26, 2023 IANS New Social 0
Seoul, May 26 (IANS) The daughter of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un who has been seen in public may be his first child and she may be one of the “candidates” who could inherit his power, the head of a South Korean think tank said on Friday.
The remarks by Koh Yu-hwan, head of the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul, were compared with an assessment by South Korea’s spy agency, which told lawmakers that the daughter, Ju-ae, is Kim’s second child, reports Yonhap News Agency.
The National Intelligence Service has said Kim is believed to have three children and there was information that his first child is a son, with the gender of the third one being unknown.
“Personally, I think there is a high possibility that Ju-ae may be the first child of (Kim Jong-un),” Koh told reporters without disclosing the grounds for his claim.
He said it is too early to say that Ju-ae has been groomed as a successor to the current leader, but he thinks she appears to be among “candidates” of the next leader.
Ju-ae, believed to be 10 years old, has shown up at military events since her first public appearance in November last year, when she attended the firing of an intercontinental ballistic missile, along with her father.
Despite her frequent appearance in state media, many observers see the possibility of Ju-ae becoming a hereditary successor as low, given the North’s patriarchal society and the rumoured existence of an eldest son among Kim’s children.
–IANS
ksk/
2. Dead body of suspected N. Korean found on western island coast
Not enough information is known about this specific incident. Could it be because of the declining conditions in north Korea?
Dead body of suspected N. Korean found on western island coast | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · May 27, 2023
SEOUL, May 27 (Yonhap) -- Military officials discovered the dead body of a suspected North Korean man in a coastal area of a western island last week, intelligence officials said Saturday.
They found the body, presumed to be of a North Korean civilian, last Friday on Ganghwa Island, 50 kilometers west of Seoul, prompting a joint investigation by the National Intelligence Service, the military and other related agencies, according to the officials.
Authorities have also discovered items suspected to be drugs with the body and have requested further analysis by the National Forensic Service.
They are reportedly looking into the possibility that the man tried to swim across the western Northern Limit Line, the de facto inter-Korean maritime border, while carrying drugs.
If the investigation finds that the body is of a civilian, the case will be handed over to the unification ministry in charge of inter-Korean affairs. It will then decide whether to return the body to North Korea in accordance with relevant laws and regulations.
This unrelated file composite image, provided by Yonhap News TV, shows a military outpost and a coastal area. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · May 27, 2023
3. <Investigation Inside N. Korea> “Many people have died from the start of May due to starvation and disease…”
All of this bears watching and demands that we review all our contingency planning.
Note:
※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.
Excerpts:
◆ Four people died of starvation in May
―― What is the living situation like in Hyesan these days?
B: Since the “barley period” started, there has been an increase in the number of people facing poverty and suffering from malnutrition. There are also people who are suffering from anemia due to malnutrition and can’t go outside. Since the start of May, our neighborhood watch unit has suffered four deaths. They all died of malnutrition, but the authorities said they died of disease, despite that being the same thing. There are a lot of people suffering from tuberculosis due to malnutrition. There has also been a dramatic rise in wandering homeless people. It’s a very serious situation.
―― Farm mobilizations are at their height these days. Is that having an impact on the situation?
B: My neighborhood watch unit is organizing farm mobilizations what seems like every day and, recently, people’s lives have gotten so difficult that only 20 percent of the unit’s members are participating in the mobilizations. People are fighting with whatever they have to survive, but market commerce doesn’t make any money, and people are too weak to engage in wage labor. (Weak) people are dying.
※ Starting every mid-April, urban dwellers nationwide are mobilized to work on farms.
※ Neighborhood watch units (inminban) are the lowest administrative units in North Korea. They typically manage 20-30 households in a particular area. Inminban leaders relay orders from local district offices to residents and are also in charge of keeping a close eye on the (ideological) tendencies shown by ordinary people.
※ People earn day wages from working at construction sites, collecting firewood, or transporting goods. The authorities crackdown on anyone organizing such activities, however.
<Investigation Inside N. Korea> “Many people have died from the start of May due to starvation and disease…” (3) The authorities treat starvation deaths as deaths by disease…some people even eat bark from pine trees to survive
asiapress.org
(FILE PHOTO) A young boy along with a young girl who may be his sister sleep together in front of a storage facility near a market. They have no shoes and are barefoot. Taken by ASIAPRESS in Hyesan, Yanggang Province, in August 2013.
<Investigation Inside N. Korea>Famine in the provinces : “Many people have died from the start of May due to starvation and disease…” (1) The state’s food supplies have hit rock bottom
ASIAPRESS is receiving continuous reports from provincial cities that many people are dying of starvation. After 2021, deaths occurred in some areas of the DPRK’s vulnerable class, including the elderly and the sick, but the situation inside the country has clearly become worse. The information ASIAPRESS is receiving is very specific. This is the third installment of a series on the subject that focuses on the situation in Hyesan, Yanggang Province. Three reporting partners in the area provided reports in mid-May. (KANG Ji-won / ISHIMARU Jiro)
◆ A survey conducted in Hyesan
Hyesan is located next to the Yalu River on the border with China. It is the provincial seat of Yanggang Province and has an estimated population of 200,000 people. Hyesan is located in a mountainous area and is not suitable for farming due to severe cold snaps; however, it has long been a significant center of trade with Changbai Prefecture in China’s Jilin Province, which had allowed it to boast high living standards. After the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in January 2020, however, North Korea shuttered its borders, eliminating all cross-border trade. The government slapped heavy restrictions on movement between different regions, causing a major shock to people’s lives.
Reports provided by reporting partners “B,” “C” and “D” were similar to each due to the fact they live in the same city; however, we have not summarized their reports. We used Chinese smartphones smuggled inside North Korea to communicate with them.
◆ Four people died of starvation in May
―― What is the living situation like in Hyesan these days?
B: Since the “barley period” started, there has been an increase in the number of people facing poverty and suffering from malnutrition. There are also people who are suffering from anemia due to malnutrition and can’t go outside. Since the start of May, our neighborhood watch unit has suffered four deaths. They all died of malnutrition, but the authorities said they died of disease, despite that being the same thing. There are a lot of people suffering from tuberculosis due to malnutrition. There has also been a dramatic rise in wandering homeless people. It’s a very serious situation.
―― Farm mobilizations are at their height these days. Is that having an impact on the situation?
B: My neighborhood watch unit is organizing farm mobilizations what seems like every day and, recently, people’s lives have gotten so difficult that only 20 percent of the unit’s members are participating in the mobilizations. People are fighting with whatever they have to survive, but market commerce doesn’t make any money, and people are too weak to engage in wage labor. (Weak) people are dying.
※ Starting every mid-April, urban dwellers nationwide are mobilized to work on farms.
※ Neighborhood watch units (inminban) are the lowest administrative units in North Korea. They typically manage 20-30 households in a particular area. Inminban leaders relay orders from local district offices to residents and are also in charge of keeping a close eye on the (ideological) tendencies shown by ordinary people.
※ People earn day wages from working at construction sites, collecting firewood, or transporting goods. The authorities crackdown on anyone organizing such activities, however.
A photo of Hyesan taken from the Chinese side of the border. The city was once a center of smuggling and defections, but all these activities stopped after COVID-19. Taken in July 2010 by Ri Jin-su (ASIAPRESS)
◆ The government hands out military rations, but it is still not enough
―― How is the government responding to the increase in starvation?
B: The authorities are cracking down hard on people who leave their assigned workplaces without permission, but there are so many people unable to go to work because of life’s difficulties that the authorities are loosening their crackdowns on people not showing up for work.
The authorities are saying that food aid will arrive from China, but it will take time for it to arrive in our area, so the government is releasing military rations first. In April, some companies were supplied with military rice, but each person only got 3-5 kilograms. How can anyone survive a month on that? Market commerce is also a no-go. People are now saying that they need to “avoid dying of starvation and find any way to survive.”
―― What about the markets?
B: Given it is the farm mobilization period, markets are only open from 6 PM to 8 PM, but market commerce is so bad these days that not many people work at the markets. Even food sellers are facing intensified monitoring of their sanitary conditions, making it impossible to make money.
※ People make bread, rice cakes or corn noodles at home and sell them at markets.
Food sellers have to submit sanitary confirmation certificates to market management offices. These certificates are issued by hospitals and must be stamped by neighborhood watch units in order for holders to sell food at markets. If someone fails to get confirmation they didn’t come down with COVID-19 or another infectious disease, they can’t sell food. The authorities are particularly harsh toward people suffering from hepatitis and tuberculosis. The certificate can be created through bribes, but anyone caught signing off on a false certificate can face issues, so people are cautious about doing that.
◆ Slight loosening of ban on food sales in markets
―― This year, there was a ban slapped on the sale of food displayed at market stalls. What’s the situation now?
B: The complete ban on rice and corn was recently loosened a bit recently to allow very small amounts of food to be sold. The problem is that there are few places for buyers to purchase food, and prices are set at those established by market management offices, so many sellers are shifting to selling from their homes instead of markets. At the markets, they only sell small amounts of food made at home, up to 10 kilograms. People can’t even think of selling in large quantities because roaming market patrols and local police officials conduct regular patrols.
※ These roaming patrols are made up of civilians who crack down on undesirable behavior and violations of established rules.
◆ The authorities treat starvation deaths as deaths by disease
―― Has anyone died of starvation around you?
C: The food situation is really serious. People have died. There is one person who died in my neighborhood due to malnutrition. I heard that the household didn’t even have one grain of salt. After the funeral, there was no casket available, so the corpse was placed in a burlap bag and carried away.
There’s been an increase in beggars, and there’s a lot of people who are on the verge of dying. The authorities don’t say that people have died of starvation. Death certificates say that people have died of tuberculosis, asthma, and hepatitis, not starvation.
※ Civil servants and cadres may be reporting that deaths are due to disease rather than starvation due to fear that they could get into trouble. When a large number of deaths occurred last summer due to COVID-19, civil servants and doctors rarely reported that people died of COVID-19.
―― What is the government doing about people who are starving?
C: Local doctors are going to the houses of people suffering from edema due to malnutrition and giving them IVs. However, people are getting sick because they can’t eat, so what good would IVs do?
―― What is resulting from the increase in starving people?
C: There’s been a rise in empty houses in my neighborhood. There’s a lack of food, so people are taking time from work to buy food, but who knows? There’s a lot of people who head to farming areas to get food, but the farming areas are also facing difficulties.
◆ Some people strip bark off pine trees for food
D: Recently, there’s people stripping bark off pine trees to sell. One kilogram of bark that has undergone one stage of processing goes for 700 won (around 104 South Korean won). There’s a lot of a people buying this bark up. Forestry officials are cracking down on people taking bark off trees, so they have to do it secretly. There’s also households that buy the pine tree bark on credit because they don’t have 700 won. That shows how serious the situation is.
The bark becomes similar to rice cakes after you place it in water along with ash and boil it before squeezing all the moisture from it. There were a lot of people who ate the bark from trees during the mass famine in the late 1990s.
―― That sounds serious. How are people trying to overcome these challenges?
D: There’s a lot of people who are transporting goods, collecting firewood, or doing odd jobs to buy money, all to earn enough to eat just one more meal. Everyone is in the same boat now, so the authorities aren’t cracking down that much on non-socialist behavior or jobless people. That’s because all those caught in crackdowns are just suffering from lack of food. There’s nothing to be done. Trade with China has reopened, so there’s goods in the markets, but few people are buying because there’s no money available.
Laborers are suffering so much that, starting from May, companies started giving them time to take off work so they can go out and purchase food.
※ Trade with China reopened in earnest from late last year in Sinuiju and Nampo, leading to an increase in Chinese products that had disappeared from markets. We will talk in more detail about markets and state-run “grain shops” in the next installment.
※ Starting in April, the authorities started cracking down hard on people leaving their assigned jobs and people who missed work, calling their behavior “non-socialist.” Starting in March, the authorities are forcing people to line up every morning and commute to work in groups.
※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.
Map of North Korea ( ASIAPRESS)
asiapress.org
4. 1 in 6 N. Korean children under 5 suffer from stunted growth: report
Another indicator of the potential for future instability.
1 in 6 N. Korean children under 5 suffer from stunted growth: report | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · May 27, 2023
SEOUL, May 27 (Yonhap) -- Around one in six North Korean children under the age of 5 suffer from stunted growth due to malnutrition, an international report showed Saturday.
The stunting rate of the children in the age group in the impoverished state was estimated at 16.8 percent, or 285,000 children, in 2022, according to the report on the levels and trends in child malnutrition released jointly by the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Health Organization and the World Bank Group on Tuesday.
The figure is over 10 times greater than the 26,800 children in the same age group experiencing the condition in South Korea, the report showed.
It, however, marked a decline from 2012, when 411,300 North Korean children were estimated to have suffered from the condition.
The number of overweight North Korean children in the age group stood at 47,500 last year, compared with 25,100 in 2012.
The report comes amid concerns over chronic malnutrition in the isolated country, which has implemented strong antivirus measures in recent years, such as border lockdowns, to ward off the spread of COVID-19.
This file image, captured from the website of the United Nations Children's Fund, shows this year's edition of the levels and trends in child malnutrition report jointly released with the World Health Organization and the World Bank Group. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · May 27, 2023
5. A North Korea Collapse Means One Thing: Find the Nuclear Weapons, Fast.
I disagree that it is unlikely. I subscribe to a variation of Sun Tzu's dictum: "do not assume the enemy will not attack, make yourself invincible." - "Do not assume north Korea will not collapse, prepare your contingency plans."
This is why an influence campaign is so important to be executed now. We need to prepare for this eventuality. We need to include the 2d ier leadership to maintain control of their WMD and secure it until it can be turned over to copetentant authorities. And during the conditions leading to collapse we need to provide these 2d tier leaders other options so they do not execute Kim Jong Un's order to attack when Kim determines that is his only option to try to survive *by winning his war). But we are so timid with influence operations and unwilling to make the massive effort (that is relatively very low cost) to try to achieve the right effects at the right time. You cannot mass produce influence efforts when the crisis occurs. You must set the foundation now. Conventional thinking and planning and employing the Iraq WMD search model that seems to influence most thinkers and planners and drives the huge numbers of soldiers required is unlikely to be successful. There are of course no guarantees for influence operations either, but the huge effects they may achieve are very wroth the time and effort and very little funding necessary to conduct them. If we do not start executing a massive and overt influence campaign now it will be too late. And those who think some covert and discreet influence activities will achieve significant effects are very misguided. Covert influence has its role but massive overt, and sustained influence activities are required to really achieve strategic effects on the scale we need.
We need to let slip the PSYOP "dogs of war." If we do not start to effectively employ our PSYOP experts on a large scale, combined with their ROK counterparts, then we are wasting a critical strategic force.
A North Korea Collapse Means One Thing: Find the Nuclear Weapons, Fast.
While such a scenario is unlikely, it would present both South Korea and the United States with a number of challenges, not the least of which would be the need to secure North Korea’s stockpile of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
19fortyfive.com · by Eli Fuhrman · May 24, 2023
Along with the resumption of major military hostilities, the possibility of a North Korean collapse is one of the most concerning potential scenarios on the Korean Peninsula.
While such a scenario is unlikely, it would present both South Korea and the United States with a number of challenges, not the least of which would be the need to secure North Korea’s stockpile of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
This would include both North Korea’s growing arsenal of nuclear weapons as well as its inventory of chemical weapons.
The Collapse Scenario
A wide range of potential sources of instability could contribute to a North Korean collapse, including such things as a major humanitarian or refugee crisis brought about by a severe economic shock or food shortage, as well as political instability resulting from the erosion of regime control over either a public increasingly exposed to outside information and ideas or a potentially disaffected group of elites. G
Given North Korea’s current food issues and the challenges facing it in the form of both international sanctions and the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, speculation has risen about the possibility of a North Korean collapse. Such an outcome appears unlikely, however, with North Korea having endured significantly worse conditions in the past.
Should a North Korean collapse take place at some point in the future, it would bring with it major security and stability challenges that would impact not just the Korean Peninsula but also potentially the region as a whole.
These challenges include a major refugee crisis and the possibility of civil war or factional fighting within North Korea, and also includes the possibility of either intentional or accidental use of North Korean WMDs – including both nuclear and chemical weapons – and the risk of the proliferation of these weapons beyond the Korean Peninsula.
OPLAN 5029
South Korea and the United States have planned for the possibility of a North Korean collapse, and have developed contingency plans for such an event in the form of Operation Plan (OPLAN) 5029. OPLAN 5029 focuses on “sudden change” crisis scenarios in North Korea and designates elements of both U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) as a combined force tasked with destroying North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction in the event of a DPRK state collapse.
In the event of a North Korean collapse, South Korean and United States military personnel will likely seek to quickly establish a cordon sanitaire around the DPRK in order to prevent the spread of North Korean WMDs. Establishing this boundary – as well as subsequently engaging in efforts to locate and secure both nuclear and chemical weapons – will likely require the introduction of a large number of additional U.S. military forces, with one estimate suggesting that a further 162,000 U.S. troops would be needed.
Finding the WMD
North Korea’s arsenal of nuclear weapons is continuing to grow, with one expert recently assessing that the DPRK’s nuclear stockpile is likely between 20 to 60 weapons with the most likely figure somewhere around 45. However, estimates do vary, complicating the challenges.
Important to note that this estimate does not mean that North Korea is currently in possession of 45 nuclear warheads, but that it has stockpiled enough fissile material to produce that many.
North Korea’s stockpile is likely to continue to increase in the coming years, which will increase the challenges associated with securing the DPRK’s entire stockpile. North Korea is believed to store its nuclear weapons and materials at dedicated sites, including at an underground facility at Yongdoktong.
In the event of a North Korean collapse, U.S. and South Korean military forces would dedicate substantial efforts to securing this and other similar facilities, and to locate any additional nuclear weapons and material storage facilities.
North Korea’s chemical weapons stockpile is believed to be somewhere between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons. This arsenal is composed of a number of different chemical agents including blister agents, blood agents, choking agents, and riot-control agents, and nerve agents. As with its nuclear weapons, North Korea is believed to store its chemical weapons at dedicated sites, of which there may be as many as 11, while as many as four North Korean military bases may also be equipped with chemical weapons. These would again be a primary target for alliance military forces in the aftermath of a collapse scenario.
19fortyfive.com · by Eli Fuhrman · May 24, 2023
6. Why North Korea Would Start a Nuclear War
There is no quick victory for north Korea through nuclear weapons. Only quick destruction of the Kim family regime.
Why North Korea Would Start a Nuclear War
19fortyfive.com · by Eli Fuhrman · May 24, 2023
The Korean Peninsula remains one of the world’s most dangerous hotspots, with the potential for the outbreak of a truly calamitous conflict.
Much of the danger stems from military concerns among the potential combatants that leave each side with strong incentives to launch a preemptive attack, potentially lowering the threshold for the start of hostilities.
This is particularly true for North Korea, whose conventional military inferiority in comparison to both South Korea and the United States strongly encourages such an opening maneuver.
Conventional Comparisons
The Korean People’s Army (KPA) enjoys a substantial quantitative advantage over the militaries of both South Korea and the United States.
Indeed, the KPA remains one of the world’s largest standing militaries, numbering close to 1.3 million total active-duty personnel with more than 6 million potential reserves.
The KPA’s numerical advantage extends to certain categories of military hardware as well, with the KPA fielding an estimated 1.5 times as many main battle tanks as the South Korean military and more than twenty times as many multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).
However, despite its large quantitative advantage, the KPA suffers from significant qualitative deficiencies when compared to the U.S. and South Korean armed forces.
Much of North Korea’s military capabilities are based on outdated Soviet or Chinese platforms acquired during the Cold War.
North Korea’s large armored force, for example, is comprised primarily of Soviet and Chinese tanks that the DPRK received during the 1970s, while its domestically produced tanks are heavily based on equally outdated Soviet designs.
The Korean People’s Air and Air-Defense Force (KPAF) operates similarly aging equipment, with the majority of its over 400 tactical fighter aircraft consisting of Soviet and Chinese designs from the 1950s and 1960s.
North Korea has attempted to offset its relative conventional deficiencies through the pursuit of asymmetric military capabilities. The DPRK’s approach to military modernization has long been guided by a desire to pursue select capabilities that provide the largest strategic benefit for the lowest possible costs in recognition of its resource constraints.
This has resulted in not only the country’s nuclear weapons program but also its development of a large and increasingly capable ballistic missile arsenal, its stockpiling of chemical weapons, and its employment of a large special operations force as well as its growing cyber capabilities.
In Search of a Quick Victory
In the event of the outbreak of large-scale conflict on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea is likely to pursue a quick and decisive end to the conflict.
This is reflective of not only the relative weakness of the country’s conventional military – which would likely struggle in the face of sustained combat with the armed forces of South Korea and the United States – but also of North Korea’s inability to sustain a conflict long term, which is limited by a stockpile of food, oil, and ammunition that the South Korean Ministry of National Defense has estimated would last only between one and three months.
The need for a quick victory would likely see North Korea act quickly in the opening stages of a conflict.
Roughly 70 percent of North Korea’s military forces are forward deployed to within 60 miles of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), giving it the ability to launch an invasion of the South quickly as well as to overcome at least some of the supply and logistical challenges associated with such an endeavor.
North Korea would also likely look to rapidly escalate the conflict utilizing its full array of asymmetric military capabilities in an attempt to secure an initial advantage.
An important facet of North Korea’s wartime strategy will also no doubt involve preventing or at least delaying the introduction of additional U.S. forces to the Korean Peninsula, and as such North Korea will look to target military bases and ports in both South Korea and Japan used for such a purpose.
There is also reason to believe that North Korea will turn towards the early use of nuclear weapons in the event of a major war with South Korea and the United States.
In addition to their obvious value in offsetting North Korea’s conventional inferiority as part of a nuclear warfighting strategy, the need for a quick end to a conflict in order to avoid a conventional defeat is likely to result in a “use it or lose it” mentality among the North Korean leadership. S
uch concerns may be reinforced by a South Korean military strategy centered around the targeting of the North Korean leadership in the event of a North Korean attack on the South.
North Korea no doubt recognizes that its ability to prevail in a conflict with South Korea and the United States is predicated on its ability to cause enough casualties and achieve relevant military objectives before the U.S. and ROK are able to effectively bring to bear their superior conventional military capabilities.
As such, North Korea will be heavily incentivized to launch a preemptive attack if it believes that a war with South Korea and the United States is on the horizon. This will likely lower the threshold for North Korean recourse to the use of force, which has significant ramifications for crisis and conflict escalation on the Korean Peninsula.
19fortyfive.com · by Eli Fuhrman · May 24, 2023
7. North Korea's Mini Submarines: A Threat or 'Underwater Coffin'?
Excerpts:
North Korea operates a Special Operations Force of roughly 200,000 highly capable soldiers trained for reconnaissance and sabotage operations, and which would likely play an important role in a major conflict on the Korean Peninsula as rear-area infiltrators.
North Korea maintains a number of capabilities for deploying its special operations soldiers, including coastal and mini-submarines operated by the Reconnaissance General Bureau, the country’s military intelligence organization. Within the RGB, the First Bureau – responsible for escort operations – is believed to operate a number of the vessels, as is the Maritime Department of the Second Bureau.
North Korea’s coastal and mini-submarines are an interesting reflection of the KPA as a whole. They are numerous, and as such pose a threat, but are themselves qualitatively limited. They are also an example of the asymmetric focus on the part of the North Korean military that has prioritized such a line of development, while their added utility as infiltration vessels also demonstrates the North Korean emphasis on strategic value in its military capabilities.
North Korea's Mini Submarines: A Threat or 'Underwater Coffin'?
North Korea’s coastal and mini-submarines are an interesting reflection of the KPA as a whole. They are numerous, and as such pose a threat, but are themselves qualitatively limited.
19fortyfive.com · by Eli Fuhrman · May 24, 2023
North Korea’s submarine fleet – one of the world’s largest – personifies some of the defining features of the North Korean military as a whole.
As a subset of the larger submarine fleet, North Korea’s many coastal and mini-submarines, in particular, stand out as intriguing encapsulations of some of the North Korean military’s important characteristics.
The Quantity Problem
North Korea’s Korean Peoples’ Army (KPA) is characterized largely by a quantity over quality dynamic.
The KPA is large, with nearly 1.3 million active-duty soldiers currently underarms, and boasts an advantage in numbers in some important areas over its Southern counterpart, including in artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), and tanks.
This advantage in overall capacity is marred by a qualitative deficiency when compared to both the South Korean and American militaries, however, with the KPA fielding largely outdated equipment whose capability is lacking in comparison to the equipment fielded by the more modern militaries of its adversaries.
Asymmetric Capabilites
To overcome this qualitative inferiority, North Korea has prioritized the pursuit of asymmetric military capabilities, with the U.S. Department of Defense assessing that the DPRK focuses its efforts on areas where it believes it may have the potential for some comparative advantage over its rivals.
This type of strategic thinking is not new for North Korea, with a similar approach to defense modernization having existed since the early 1960s when North Korea promulgated a new defense policy known as the Four-Point Military Guidelines, which included an emphasis on military capabilities that provided the greatest strategic benefit at the lowest possible cost in keeping with the country’s financial and resource constraints.
This strategic logic has contributed to North Korea’s decision to pursue its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, as well as to its focus on such capabilities as special operations forces and cyber tools.
North Korea’s submarine fleet reflects both the overriding dynamic of the KPA as well as its asymmetric focus. The DPRK’s submarine fleet – like the KPA as a whole – is large, with top-end estimates placing the total fleet at over 80 vessels, while other estimates gauge its total strength to be closer to 70 boats. The fleet is comprised primarily of aging vessels, however, and is made up of a combination of conventional attack submarines, coastal submarines, mini-subs, and an emerging ballistic missile submarine capability.
North Korea’s conventional attack submarine fleet is made up of Soviet Romeo-class submarines, the first of which was acquired by North Korea in the 1970s. In addition, North Korea is working towards developing a ballistic missile submarine capability.
The Mini Submarine Threat
The remainder of North Korea’s submarine fleet is comprised of a mix of coastal and mini-submarines, including roughly 40 Sang-O- and Sang-0 II-class coastal submarines and approximately 20 Yugo- and Yono-class mini-submarines. As with submarines more generally, these vessels fit the asymmetric mold of North Korean military prioritization.
Like their conventional brethren, North Korea’s coastal and mini-submarines lack capability when compared on a one-to-one basis with the vessels of its primary adversary navies, but are likely to still pose a threat to those vessels, ports, and enemy shipping when deployed as a swarm.
Unlike its larger conventional attack counterparts, however, North Korean coastal and mini subs are not capable of conducting extended patrols, and are limited to a coastal defense role.
The above limitations notwithstanding, these submarines remain a potential threat.
It is believed that a North Korean mini-sub was responsible for the 2010 sinking of the ROK Navy corvette Cheonan that left 46 South Korean sailors dead, demonstrating the danger posed by these vessels.
In addition, coastal and mini-submarines provide North Korea utility and flexibility that reflects the larger North Korean desire for strategic value in its military capabilities.
In addition to their potential for use against enemy ships, coastal and mini-submarines are well suited for use as infiltration vessels for the insertion of North Korean specials forces operatives.
A North Korean coastal submarine was, for example, used in 1996 to insert special forces operatives into South Korea, which kicked off a series of firefights and a day’s long manhunt.
North Korea operates a Special Operations Force of roughly 200,000 highly capable soldiers trained for reconnaissance and sabotage operations, and which would likely play an important role in a major conflict on the Korean Peninsula as rear-area infiltrators.
North Korea maintains a number of capabilities for deploying its special operations soldiers, including coastal and mini-submarines operated by the Reconnaissance General Bureau, the country’s military intelligence organization. Within the RGB, the First Bureau – responsible for escort operations – is believed to operate a number of the vessels, as is the Maritime Department of the Second Bureau.
North Korea’s coastal and mini-submarines are an interesting reflection of the KPA as a whole. They are numerous, and as such pose a threat, but are themselves qualitatively limited. They are also an example of the asymmetric focus on the part of the North Korean military that has prioritized such a line of development, while their added utility as infiltration vessels also demonstrates the North Korean emphasis on strategic value in its military capabilities.
19fortyfive.com · by Eli Fuhrman · May 24, 2023
8. Who Is North Korea Trading With? [Infographic]
Please go to the link to view the interesting infographic. https://www.forbes.com/sites/katharinabuchholz/2023/05/26/who-is-north-korea-trading-with-infographic/?sh=2b5b5dd21496
Who Is North Korea Trading With? [Infographic]
Forbes · by Katharina Buchholz · May 26, 2023
North Korea might be the hermit kingdom, but data from the UN Comtrade database reveals that goods worth a combined $1 billion were still traded in and out of the reclusive country in 2022. According to reports from Reuters, imports from China to North Korea have surged in April after also increasing in 2022 due to the end of a Covid-induced trade freeze.
Observers of North Korea have pointed out that some of these shipments consisting of goods used for wigs and hairpieces (and the finished products going the other way) indicated increased prison labor in North Korea. The country has used forced labor before for the tedious process of producing the highly priced goods. In 2022 as a whole, China was already responsible for 99% of goods shipped into the country—or around $894 million worth. In April, imports jumped up by $166 million compared with the same month in 2022.
This chart shows the share of North Korean imports and exports, by origin/destination (2022).
Statista
China is dominating imports to North Korea, but exports from the country are a little more mixed. Again, China is the biggest player with a share of almost 70% of North Korean exports destined for the country. A handful of European countries are also buying North Korean, however.
Poland imported iron, steel and plastic products as well as pharmaceutical products, electrical and other machinery worth almost $10 million last year. Half of the Netherlands' imports worth around $8 million in total consisted of nickel and nickel products, with some substantial amounts of polyethylene and airplane parts also imported.
Mislabeled clothes and arms deals
Both European countries have maintained diplomatic relations in some form with North Korea and their trade with the country can be classified as symbolic. However, it is a different type of import that has been labeled as problematic in Europe. The Dutch University of Leiden in 2019 identified clothing made in North Korea under exploitative labor conditions that had made its way to the Netherlands and other Western countries labeled as of Chinese origin—once more exemplifying the strong trade bond and few-questions-asked relationship North Korea has with its only real economic partner.
MORE FOR YOU
While Mozambique's 2022 imports of North Korean transformers and other machinery were likely above board, the country was investigated in 2017 for its arms deals with the country that violated UN sanctions. At least seven countries in Africa were part of the investigation. Regular economic ties with North Korea, which are not the subject of sanctions, were increasing in African countries at the same time, according to the Voice of America.
Overall, North Korean trade—especially imports—slumped heavily during the Covid-19 pandemic after having previously been cut down by heavier international sanctions after 2017. The developments before the pandemic already delivered a serious blow to the North Korean economy. Covid-19 trade embargoes finally led to extreme shortages of food, drugs and other essentials, prompting several diplomatic missions to leave the country in 2021.
—
Charted by Statista
Forbes · by Katharina Buchholz · May 26, 2023
9. News of N. Korean family’s defection to the South spreads in China-N. Korean border region
News does travel fast in the north. Another indicator that influence operations can be effective. Who would think it might be easier to escape by sea rather than over the Chinese border.
Excerpts:
A reporting partner based in Yanggang Province told Daily NK that “Here [in Yanggang Province] it’s hard just to get near the Yalu River, and even then you can’t get to South Korea without first going through China, which is also dangerous. For an entire family to go all together, and directly to South Korea at that, makes people quite jealous. Some people are saying they’d be happy if they could even send just their children [to South Korea].”
These expressions of envy suggest that many people also want to defect, the reporting partner claimed.
“It is only getting harder to make a living these days, no matter how hard you work. So it’s natural that people want to defect. Until the government ensures that people no longer starve, there will always be people who will try to leave, no matter how strictly the state enforces its policies or implements punishments.”
News of N. Korean family’s defection to the South spreads in China-N. Korean border region
Many people in Hoeryong and Hyesan are expressing envy toward those who defected, a reporting partner told Daily NK
By Lee Chae Un - 2023.05.26 10:30am
dailynk.com
FILE PHOTO: A view of Yanggang Province from the Chinese side of the China-North Korea border. (Daily NK)
News of an entire family defecting to South Korea on a wooden boat across the West Sea’s Northern Limit Line (NLL) is spreading rapidly among people living in the China-North Korea border region.
Speaking on condition of anonymity due to security concerns, a reporting partner in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Tuesday that “people who have daily contact with other countries, like China or South Korea, are the ones spreading the news.”
According to the reporting partner, rumors spreading in the region are saying that “two families from Kangryong [in South Hwanghae Province], relatives and a young couple, took a boat to South Korea,” and that “they prepared to take the East Sea route for over half a year, including building the boat themselves, before arriving safely [in South Korea].”
The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has led to harsher crackdowns in China-North Korea border areas like Hoeryong, making it difficult for people to defect from the country. Many Hoeryong residents are envious of those who defected, the reporting partner said.
“Border residents have long depended on smuggling to make a living, but the pandemic border closure cut off all smuggling. People are now facing hard times comparable to the hardships suffered during the Arduous March. Some people might want to defect, but border guards will shoot anyone even approaching the border area, so dreams of defecting stay nothing but dreams.
“We have heard plenty of rumors about people who risked their lives to cross the border following the outbreak of COVID-19. These attempts were unsuccessful, and those involved were either dragged off to political prison camps or shot and killed by border guards. Everyone was relieved to hear news about not just one or two people but an entire family escaping here [North Korea] successfully.”
North Koreans express envy toward those who defected
The reporting partner said that people are whispering to each other about the incident, saying for example: “It’s such a relief they made it safely,” “I feel so happy about it, almost like I was the one who defected,” “People living near the ocean have it good because they can take a boat to the South,” and “I hope we’ll get that kind of opportunity, too.”
Some people are making comments such as “I get goosebumps just imagining how nerve-wracking it must have been to try take a child onto the boat while dodging detection from so many places,” and that “the whole family] could have died in a split-second, but they must have had someone above looking out for them.’
News of the family’s defection by boat has also spread to the city of Hyesan, with city residents likewise expressing envy toward the family that escaped. Those who heard the news were both surprised to hear an entire family had successfully defected, but could only let out a deep sigh when comparing the escaped family’s fortunes to their own.
A reporting partner based in Yanggang Province told Daily NK that “Here [in Yanggang Province] it’s hard just to get near the Yalu River, and even then you can’t get to South Korea without first going through China, which is also dangerous. For an entire family to go all together, and directly to South Korea at that, makes people quite jealous. Some people are saying they’d be happy if they could even send just their children [to South Korea].”
These expressions of envy suggest that many people also want to defect, the reporting partner claimed.
“It is only getting harder to make a living these days, no matter how hard you work. So it’s natural that people want to defect. Until the government ensures that people no longer starve, there will always be people who will try to leave, no matter how strictly the state enforces its policies or implements punishments.”
Translated by Rose Adams. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of reporting partners who live inside North Korea and China. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com
10. New Launch Pad and Significant Expansion Underway at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station
Please go to the link to view the imagery. https://beyondparallel.csis.org/new-launch-pad-and-significant-expansion-underway-at-the-sohae-satellite-launching-station/?utm_source=pocket_saves
New Launch Pad and Significant Expansion Underway at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station - Beyond Parallel
beyondparallel.csis.org · by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. · May 26, 2023
Military
New Launch Pad and Significant Expansion Underway at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station
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New launch pad under construction at Sohae Satellite Launching Station, May 23, 2023. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023) Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Key Findings
- Satellite imagery of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station—from where North Korea previously launched three-stage space launch vehicles (SLV)—shows accelerated expansion and an unusual number of construction resources allocated to the station. The level and nature of activity observed clearly indicate that North Korea is moving to develop, transport, and launch larger, more sophisticated SLV and missiles.
- Unprecedented activity at Sohae includes the addition of a new launch pad about 2.7 kilometers southeast of the original launch pad. Although the original launch pad is designed to launch liquid fuel rockets or SLV, it is unclear if the new launch pad will be likewise configured or dedicated to launching solid- fuel ballistic missiles.
- North Korea announced on May 17 that its “military reconnaissance satellite No. 1” is “ready for loading after undergoing the final general assembly check” and that all plans have been approved by Kim Jong-un. This, combined with the frenetic pace of construction activity at Sohae, strongly indicates that a launch is in the offing.
- However, both the original and the new launch pads are not yet operational, and no missiles and/or fueling activities have yet been detected. If North Korea plans to launch the reconnaissance satellite in the immediate future without a launch pad, it will likely do so using a mobile launcher.
- Any reconnaissance satellite launch would involve the use of domestically developed or covertly acquired ballistic missile technology, which is currently banned by the UN and would be a violation of existing UNSC resolutions. If successful, the satellite would provide North Korea with an immensely improved capability to monitor locations within East Asia and the world.
On May 17, 2023, North Korean state media reported on Kim Jong-un’s inspection of the Reconnaissance Satellite Launch Preparatory Committee, which is responsible for the launching of the country’s “military reconnaissance satellite No. 1.” The satellite was described as “ready for loading after undergoing the final general assembly check and space environment test,” and Kim “approved the future action plan of the preparatory committee.”
Kim Jong-un providing on-the-spot guidance to the Reconnaissance Satellite Launch Preparatory Committee on May 17, 2023. (KCNA)
With the reported progress on the satellite, attention has been focused on the Sohae Satellite Launching Facility, where North Korea previously launched three-stage space launch vehicles (SLV). In March 2022, Kim Jong-un announced several tasks to be completed at the site that will expand its satellite launching capabilities. A few months later, in December 2022, the country declared it would “finish the preparations for the first military reconnaissance satellite” by April 2023.
A May 23, 2023, satellite imagery of Sohae Satellite Launching Station shows an accelerated expansion and an exceptional number of construction resources allocated to the station. The level and nature of activity observed indicate that North Korea is moving to develop, transport, and launch larger, more sophisticated SLV and missiles.
Original Launch Pad
Recent satellite imagery show that the supplies, equipment, and prefabricated steel framework components, which were seen laid on the original launch pad area since August 2022, were cleared in early May. Throughout the first half of the month, new construction materials were seen on the pad. The rail-mounted transfer structure, with a new roof and walls, has been moved back to its original position alongside the processing building. Imagery from May 23, 2023, shows the launch pad clear of supplies and equipment. Liquid fuel and oxidizer storage adjacent to the launch pad continued to be expanded and rebuilt. The clearing of the launch pad increases the likelihood that the launch pad is closer to being operational. However, no rocket or fueling activities have yet to be detected. With the construction of a new launch pad to the southeast, the use of this original launch pad for the new reconnaissance satellite is unclear.
Overview of the Original Launch Pad Area, May 23, 2023. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023) Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Close-up view of the western section of the original launch pad, May 23, 2023. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023) Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Close-up view of the eastern section of the original launch pad, May 23, 2023. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023) Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
New Launch Pad
A new launch pad is being built approximately 2.7 kilometers southeast of the original launch pad, significantly expanding Sohae Satellite Launching Station’s future capabilities. The new launch pad measures approximately 132 meters by 40 meters and is smaller than the original launch pad, which measures approximately 192 meters by 63 meters.
The location was previously a site of a small road and building. By April 12, 2023, imagery shows the start of ground razing. Concrete for the launch pad was poured around mid-May, and rapid construction has continued.
While the new launch pad is still under construction, several elements have been added to the pad, including a likely rail-mounted environmental shelter or processing building (approximately 55 meters by 30 meters), four light and camera towers, two lightning towers, a launcher strongback, an exhaust deflector with a covered opening, and a support building. The presence of two telescoping cranes, numerous construction vehicles, personnel, and construction materials suggests that the work at this site is a high priority for North Korea. Additionally, informed sources suggest that an umbilical tower could be added before construction is complete.
It is yet unclear if the new launch pad will be designed to launch liquid fuel rockets or SLV like the original launch pad or be dedicated to launching solid-fuel ballistic missiles. However, both the original and the new launch pads are not yet operational, and no SLV/missiles or fueling activities have yet been detected. Nonetheless, if North Korea plans to launch the reconnaissance satellite in the immediate future, it could do so using a mobile launcher at either of these or a third location.
New launch pad under construction at Sohae Satellite Launching Station, May 23, 2023. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023) Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
New VIP Observation Area
Approximately 1.3 kilometers northeast of the new launch pad, a new VIP observation area has been recently added. The observation area measures approximately 1,075 square meters. Roadwork and landscaping are observed in the May 23, 2023, image. The observation area provides an unobstructed view new launch pad and will likely be used when Kim Jong-un visits and oversees a launch at the new pad.
New VIP observation area, May 23, 2023. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023) Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Yunsong Pier Construction
Approximately 1.3 kilometers southeast of the new launch pad, the Yunsong pier is still under construction. Adjacent to the pier, concrete pilings are being placed along the now dirt-filled shoreline for a seawall. It is unclear how large the pier and seawall will be upon completion or if it will be further developed into a port.
Yunsong pier construction, May 23, 2023. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023) Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
The coast along which the pier is being constructed is known to be inhospitable to vessel traffic due to shallow waters and a high tidal range. However, the addition a pier at this location will allow larger SLVs or ballistic missile components to be transported via water. Informed sources suggest that this pier could become a viable alternative to the current use of rail transportation.
Ongoing Road Construction Along East Coast
In our previous report, the need for significant road development to host larger SLVs at Sohae was mentioned. Recent imagery shows that such road construction work is in progress in the eastern section of the site. One example is located approximately two kilometers northwest of the Yunsong pier and approximately one kilometer northwest of the new launch pad, where the previous dirt and rock quarry has been developed into the main service road of the site’s eastern section. Several graders, rollers, and bulldozers are seen on the road. The western section of the road is connected to a larger fork, allowing for wider turns into the new road. The construction is likely part of continuing work to create a more extensive road network to support the movement of larger space launch vehicles and missiles at Sohae.
Ongoing road construction along the east coast of Sohae, May 23, 2023. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023) Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
New Construction Warehouse Facility at Yunsong
The high-priority nature and impressive level of construction activity throughout the eastern section of Sohae are evidenced by the addition of a new construction warehouse facility. Located between the pier and the new launch pad, the facility includes several warehouse and support buildings, a motor vehicle storage and maintenance area, as well as a large barracks or support building still under construction. The facility is similar to a preexisting construction support area on the western section.
New construction warehouse facility at Yunsong, east of Sohae, May 23, 2023. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023) Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Yunsong Vertical and Horizontal Engine Test Stands
No significant changes to the Yunsong vertical test stand have been observed, except for the ongoing changes to the size and shape of the sand/dirt piles, which are likely used as part of the construction throughout the site.
Yunsong vertical engine test stand, May 23, 2023. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023) Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Similarly, no significant activity has been observed at the Yunsong horizontal engine test stand and the nearby ballistic missile test silo, which was the site of an SRBM test in March. The May 23, 2023, image shows a 6-meter-by-6-meter cover on the silo.
Yunsong horizontal engine test stand and nearby ballistic missile silo test facility, May 23, 2023. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023) Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Tunnel Construction Sites
At both west and east construction sites of the tunnel further north, visible activity has decreased, likely because resources are being drawn elsewhere throughout the facility. However, both sites still appear to be under construction, as evidenced by the water draining from the portal and the presence of forms used for the finishing of the interior roof.
West construction site of tunnel, May 23, 2023. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023) Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
East construction site of tunnel, May 23, 2023. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023) Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Northern Section of Facility
Although less dramatic than the eastern section, the northern area of Sohae Satellite Launching Station also shows progress in existing construction and the movement of supplies to support the expansion activities. At the newer rail-served warehouse, supplies are laid out in the open. At the nearby headquarters and administration building, vehicle traffic of SUVs, buses, vans, and trucks is observed.
Rail-served warehouse in the northern section of Sohae Satellite Launching Facility, May 23, 2023. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023) Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
South of the headquarters and administration building is a sand/gravel pile used for various constructions at Sohae over the past year. Recent imagery shows the changing size and shape of the sand/gravel pile and the presence of railcars on the tracks immediately to the left. As seen in the May 23, 2023, imagery, the sand/gravel pile is invading the adjacent rail tracks, indicating the rushed work at this location.
Ongoing railroad activity and changing size and shape of sand/gravel pile, May 23, 2023. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023) Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
At the horizontal processing building to the south, the size and shape of supplies stored throughout the building’s premises continue to change. Notably, on the rail directly to the west of the building, two probable covered gondolas and a 24-meter-long boxcar are observed. These railcars have likely delivered heavy equipment of some sort, potentially for components of the strongback and towers at the new launch pad.
Horizontal processing building at Sohae Satellite Launching Station, May 23, 2023. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023) Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Construction has progressed at the new processing (integration) facility east of the existing horizontal processing building. The outer walls around the building have now been placed, and several shovels and other equipment are seen throughout the perimeters and nearby open-air storage yards.
New probable processing facility at the site of former General Satellite Command and Control Center, May 23, 2023. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023) Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
The construction support compound, located approximately 900 meters southeast of the new probable processing facility, shows a significant increase in the number of warehouses, support buildings, and various construction vehicles. Consistent with activity observed throughout the facility, the compound is one of several sites being used to support the high level of construction at Sohae.
Construction support compound, May 23, 2023. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2023) Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an internationally recognized analyst, award-winning author, and lecturer on North Korean defense and intelligence affairs and ballistic missile development in developing countries. He is concurrently senior fellow for Imagery Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Security (CSIS); and senior adviser and imagery analyst for the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). Formerly, he has served as founder and CEO of KPA Associates, LLC, publisher and editor of KPA Journal, senior imagery analyst for 38 North, chief analytics officer and co-founder of AllSource Analysis, Inc., and senior all-source analyst for DigitalGlobe’s Analysis Center.
Victor Cha is senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair and the inaugural holder of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Jennifer Jun is project manager and research associate with the iDeas Lab and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Headline image Copyright © Airbus DS 2023
References
- “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Reconnaissance Satellite Launch Preparatory Committee,” KCNA, May 17, 2023.
- Ibid.
- “NADA Conducts Important Test for Development of Reconnaissance Satellite,” Rodong Sinmun, December 19, 2022.
- Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
-
Colin Zwirko, “Kim Jong Un and daughter watch missile test stimulating nuclear attack on US, ROK,” NK News, March 20, 2023, https://www.nknews.org/2023/03/kim-jong-un-and-daughter-watch-missile-test-simulating-nuclear-attack-on-us-rok/.
beyondparallel.csis.org · by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. · May 26, 2023
11. Russia and North Korea to trade in 'rubles' amid surging International sanctions
Good luck.
Russia and North Korea to trade in 'rubles' amid surging International sanctions
republicworld.com
Last Updated: 25th May, 2023 19:20 IST
Russia And North Korea To Trade In 'rubles' Amid Surging International Sanctions
In the arena of growing sanctions against the two nations, Russia and North Korea are working towards creating a system of settlements in rubles.
Rest of the World News
| Written By
Bhagyasree Sengupta
Image: AP
In the arena of growing sanctions against the two nations, Russia and North Korea are working towards creating a system of settlements in rubles. According to Russian news outlet Sputnik, both Moscow and Pyongyang are taking the initiative to boost trade between the two nations amid rising international sanctions. In an interview with the news outlet, Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora explained the whole ordeal. The Russian official insisted that trading in rubles is the need of the hour since the volume of bilateral trade has been small and have been severely affected by the United Nation Security Council’s sanctions against North Korea.
"Nevertheless, we have many opportunities even in these conditions to increase trade turnover. The main thing is to establish a system of settlements in rubles, and we are working on it," Matsegora told Sputnik. "Both we and our Korean counterparts are looking forward to the resumption of mutual visits, we have exchanged proposals on the matter. I hope the first visits can take place already at the end of this year," the Russian Ambassador to North Korea added. The diplomat also addressed the ongoing tensions that have engulfed the Korean Peninsula.
Brewing Tensions in Korean Peninsula
The Russian diplomat also discussed the rising tension in the Korean Peninsula and insisted that Russia wants the normalisation of relations between North Korea and South Korea. Earlier this year, both Moscow and China warned the US about the escalations of tensions between the two Koreas. However, Washington denied these allegations and called them baseless. “Russia is interested in the normalisation of relations between the two Koreas and sincerely wishes that the North and the South solve all the problems between them on an independent basis, without outside interference and on the principles of national consolidation," the ambassador asserted. "Over the past decades, we have experienced several major and a dozen 'moderate' crises here. Each of them invariably ended in detente. I think it will be the same this time," he added.
First Published: 25th May, 2023 19:20 IST
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12. China, Korea agree to strengthen talks on chip industry: Chinese commerce ministry
The ROK walking the tightrope. But this is a Chinese sourced report.
China, Korea agree to strengthen talks on chip industry: Chinese commerce ministry
The Korea Times · May 27, 2023
Trade Minister Ahn Duk-guen, second from left, attends the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation trade ministers meeting in Detroit, the United States, May 25. Yonhap
China and Korea have agreed to strengthen dialogue and cooperation on semiconductor industry supply chains, amid broader global concerns over chip supplies, sanctions and national security, according to China's commerce minister.
Wang Wentao met with Korean Trade Minister Ahn Duk-geun on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference in Detroit, which ended Friday.
They exchanged views on maintaining the stability of the industrial supply chain and strengthening cooperation in bilateral, regional and multilateral fields, according to a statement from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce the following day.
Wang also said that China is willing to work with South Korea to deepen trade ties and investment cooperation.
However, a Korean statement on the same meeting did not mention chips, instead saying the country's trade minister had asked China to stabilize the supply of key raw materials, and asked for a predictable business environment for Korean companies in China.
"The South Korean side expressed that communication is needed between working-level officials over all industries," not just for semiconductors, a source with knowledge of the matter told Reuters.
The source declined to be identified because they were not authorized to speak to the media.
Korea is in the crosshairs of a tit-for-tat row between the United States and China over semiconductors.
China's cyberspace regulator said last week that Micron had failed its network security review and that it would block operators of key infrastructure from buying from the company.
The U.S. has pushed for countries to limit China's access to advanced chips, citing a host of reasons including national security.
About 40 percent Korea's chip exports go to China, according to trade ministry data, while U.S. technology and equipment are necessary for South Korean chipmakers Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix. (Reuters)
The Korea Times · May 27, 2023
13. US reconnaissance drones arrive at air base in Japan
US reconnaissance drones arrive at air base in Japan
koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · May 26, 2023
By Yonhap
Published : May 26, 2023 - 10:28 Updated : May 26, 2023 - 10:28
This photo,captured from the US Indo-Pacific Command's website, shows an RQ-4 Global Hawk surveillance drone.
The US Air Force started positioning unmanned reconnaissance aircraft at an air base in Japan earlier this month as part of a rotational deployment, the armed service has said.
The RQ-4 Global Hawks began arriving at Yokota Air Base in Japan from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam last Monday, the US Pacific Air Forces said in a release Thursday.
The rotational deployment came at a time when North Korea has completed preparations to launch its first military spy satellite. Last week, the North's leader Kim Jong-un inspected the satellite, which is "ready for loading" on a rocket, according to the North's state media.
"The Global Hawk's mission is to provide a broad range of US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to support joint forces, and allies and partners in worldwide peacetime, contingency, and crisis operations," it said.
The unmanned aircraft has been rotationally operating from Yokota Air Base since 2017, it said. (Yonhap)
14. U.S. military discloses recent joint intel training with S. Korea for readiness amid N.K. threats
Important training. As important as the live fire training.
U.S. military discloses recent joint intel training with S. Korea for readiness amid N.K. threats | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · May 27, 2023
SEOUL, May 27 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. military has revealed it conducted combined intelligence training with South Korea in a southern city last week to enhance readiness, as the allies are striving to sharpen deterrence against persistent North Korean threats.
On the Pentagon's Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS), the Eighth Army of the U.S. Forces Korea posted a set of photos showing troops engaging in the Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Intelligence Training (RUCIT) in Pohang, 272 kilometers southeast of Seoul, on May 17.
The Eighth Army's 501st Military Intelligence Brigade and the South Korean Army's 2nd Operational Command mobilized a combined number of over 250 troops as well as various intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, according to the Army.
South Korean and U.S. soldiers engage in combined intelligence training in Pohang, 272 kilometers southeast of Seoul, on May 17, 2023, in this U.S. Eighth Army photo posted on the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The goal of the RUCIT was to "strengthen readiness and interoperability by utilizing combined information assets in a simulated battlefield environment," the Army said in a post.
The drills involved identifying "enemy" movements with intelligence assets and then reading and analyzing them together, while efforts were made to create a training situation resembling an actual battle, it added.
The exercise first began in 2021 to develop the allies' readiness for intelligence operations.
Separately, the 7th Air Force disclosed a series of photos on their communication readiness exercise that took place from May 15-19. It was aimed at practicing communications resilience across multiple networks in Korea, the unit said.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · May 27, 2023
15. Why are Germany and South Korea sharing military secrets?
Why are Germany and South Korea sharing military secrets? – DW – 05/24/2023
DW
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stayed in South Korea for only a few hours — but his visit and talks with President Yoon Suk-yeol yielded a series of agreements, most notably the pact on sharing military intelligence and streamlining supply chains for the two nations' defense industries.
The bilateral summit took place as Scholz was returning from the G7 meeting in the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Both diplomatic events focused largely on the ongoing security crisis in Ukraine and the simmering tensions in northeast Asia. And when it comes to Asia, China was once again the most important topic.
Analysts point out that the defense deals between Scholz and Yoon are just the latest examples of similar deals between various nations that, taken together, can be seen a pushback against Chinese influence.
German Chancellor Scholz visits South Korea
Beijing's own actions — from unilaterally occupying and militarizing disputed islands in the South China Sea to confrontations with Japan over islands in the East China Sea and clashes with India over territory in the Himalayas — could in turn be presented as a reason for those new alliances and agreements.
And Germany has been boosting its role in the Indo-Pacific in recent years. In 2021, a German warship was deployed to the region and carried out a series of exercises with other navies, while fighter aircraft have also taken part in joint maneuvers more recently.
South Korea-NATO ties to grow even stronger
Scholz and Yoon met at the president's office in Seoul after the German leader had travelled to the truce village of Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone that divides the Korean Peninsula. While on the heavily fortified border, Scholz said Pyongyang's ongoing development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles indicate there is "still a dangerous situation" on the peninsula and that the North remains "a threat to peace and security in this region."
In their subsequent talks, the two leaders agreed on a deal to share and protect military secrets and establish mechanisms to give military supply chains greater resilience.
Dan Pinkston, a professor of international relations at the Seoul campus of Troy University, points to "expansionist policies in Beijing" as a reason for stronger cooperation between nations not allied with China.
Scholz: 'These ballistic tests have to stop'
"I fully expect to see more of the same," Pinkston told DW in reference to the closer military ties. "It is reasonable to expect South Korean forces to take part in exercises with units from NATO and other countries with shared security concerns. These exercises are critical to ensuring the interoperability of munitions, weapons systems and components and it makes absolute sense to make sure that supply chains are guaranteed."
Ukraine war 'came as a deep shock' to South Korea
And while German navy and air force take part in drills with South Korean troops, Seoul is exporting advanced weapons systems to Europe. Last year, South Korea signed a massive defense deal with Poland, estimated to be worth €15 billion, ($16.2 billion). It includes the sale nearly 1,000 K2 main battle tanks, 648 self-propelled howitzers and 48 FA050 fighter jets.
As Poland is a member of NATO, this means German troops will take part in exercises in which they will, at some point, come up against the Korean equipment. It is important that Germany is aware of its capabilities, Pinkston said.
In the Indo-Pacific region, however, South Korea will be hoping that a closer alliance with another European power will boost its deterrence to potential rivals.
"It is clear that Korea is seeking closer and greater engagement with Western nations and that can clearly be traced back to the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, which came as a deep shock to this country," said Rah Jong-yil, a former diplomat and senior South Korean intelligence officer.
Japan, South Korea put new focus on militaries
"In this part of the world, China is of course the big worry, but we also have to keep a close eye on North Korea and Russia," he said.
China reaches out for allies
While Seoul is looking for close allies in the West, China appears to be conducting a diplomatic offensive of its own.
"In recent months, Beijing has been reaching out to a number of states in the Middle East and Central Asia as it looks to build its own alliances, so both sides are building up their partnerships and working on improving their own interests," Rah said.
Parallel to the G7 summit in Hiroshima, Beijing set up its own summit with five Central Asian nations — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in the Chinese city of Xi'an. China also recently acted as a peace broker in the Middle East and is credited with Saudi Arabia and Iran stepping back from years of animosity.
China's attempt to boost its already formidable influence in Asia will not go unnoticed in Seoul.
"North Korea is right on the South's border and is the most acute and immediate military threat," said Pinkston. "But the bigger picture is that the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, human rights and global governance issues all come back to China, and that will be the challenge going forward."
Edited by: Darko Janjevic
DW
16. Yoon to hold summits with leaders of 5 Pacific island nations Sunday
President Yoon is executing his INDOPACIFIC strategy.
Yoon to hold summits with leaders of 5 Pacific island nations Sunday | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · May 27, 2023
SEOUL, May 27 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol will hold a series of bilateral summits with the leaders of five Pacific island nations in Seoul over the weekend, his office said Saturday.
Yoon will hold talks with Kiribati's President Taneti Maamau at his office at 3 p.m. on Sunday, followed by Tongan Prime Minister Siaosi Sovaleni and Prime Minister Kausea Natano of Tuvalu.
He will also hold summits with Vanuatu's Prime Minister Ishmael Kalsakau and Prime Minister James Marape of Papua New Guinea, according to Yoon's office.
The leaders of the Pacific island nations are visiting Seoul to attend the first summit between South Korea and Pacific island nations to be held Monday and Tuesday.
The summit will be held under the theme "Navigating towards Co-Prosperity: Strengthening Cooperation with the Blue Pacific," with the participation of leaders and senior officials from all 18 members of the Pacific Islands Forum, an intergovernmental body aimed at enhancing cooperation among island countries in the region.
The 18 members are Papua New Guinea, Fiji, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Tonga, Palau, Niue, Nauru, Kiribati, the Federated States of Micronesia, Samoa, the Cook Islands, Australia, New Zealand, French Polynesia and New Caledonia.
President Yoon Suk Yeol (2nd from L) speaks during a meeting with the prime ministers and foreign ministers from 12 Pacific island countries at the presidential office in Seoul on Oct. 27, 2022, in this file photo provided by the presidential office. They visited South Korea to attend the fifth Korea-Pacific Islands Foreign Ministers' Meeting. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
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en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · May 27, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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