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Quotes of the Day:
“It is not who is right, but what is right, that is important.”
– Thomas Huxley
“People do not seem to realize that their opinion of the world is also a confession of their character.”
– Ralph Waldo Emerson
“The less talent they have, the more pride, vanity, and arrogance they have. All these fools, however, find other fools who applaud them.”
– Erasmus of Rotterdam
1. The ‘quiet’ crisis brewing between the US and South Korea
2. A turning point in strategic thought on Asia policy?
3. South Korea: A simple guide to the 2025 presidential election
4. The Case for a Pacific Defense Pact
5. Lights out: Trump silences a lonely bastion of journalistic integrity in Asia.
6. Jeju peace forum to kick off this week with focus on regional, global security challenges
7. Interagency meeting held to discuss maritime zone row with China
8. S. Korea to send invitations to APEC member states as soon as new gov't launches
9. S. Korea to bolster cooperation with World Bank in helping developing nations: ministry
10. Ex-White House official highlights need for intelligence sharing to prevent cyberattacks
11. Inside Korea's shipyards, a new kind of workforce is taking shape
12. Editorial: S. Korea holds the cards in industries Trump wants most
13. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs
14. North Korean security chief departs for Moscow, expected to meet Sergei Shoigu
15. ROK man arrested for helping North Korea rake in millions from gambling sites
16. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Explaining the Ukraine War to Citizens: "Russia's Patriotic War," "A Favorable Situation for Our Revolution" - Silence on Troop Deployment and Casualties
17. North Korean POWs in Ukraine excluded from Moscow-Kyiv prisoner swap: South lawmaker
18. N. Korean police create 'invisible hierarchy' based on wealth and family ties
19. Pyongyang elite face surprise electricity checks despite living in luxury apartments
20. Korea's 2025 presidential race: Three visions for unification and national security
1. The ‘quiet’ crisis brewing between the US and South Korea
As I told Elbridge Colby on a Voice of America broadcast in February 2024, his words are in complete support of Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy. They also undermine any pressure the US and the ROK/US alliance might try to put on north Korea to drive them to support deterrence, retaistrin their behavior, or move them to negotiate. Anything President Trump might try to do is undermined by Kim's assessment that his political warfare strategy is working. Mr. Colby confirms it with his words.
And from a South Korean perspective, Koreans must respect the fact that there is more to Indo-Pacom security than the Korean threat. And the Korean threat is intertwined with the Chinese and even Russian threats. Koreans also cannot be myopically focused on the Korean threat, just as the US cannot be myopically focused on the Chinese threat.
Ironically these words gave greater license to China to expand its aggressive political warfare against South Korea to continue to try to subvert the ROK government and Korean society and drive a wedge in the ROK US alliance with its Unrestricted Warfare and Three Warfares. Unfortunately Colby's words support China's efforts in South Korea.
The bottomline is we must recognize that South Korea is a battleground of strategic competition with China and that what happens on the Korean peninsula will have global effects. We should ask ourselves why is that China's and north Korea's political warfare strategies are working and if we want them to be successful.
Excerpts:
Elbridge Colby, now a senior official in charge of overseeing policy development at the Pentagon, told South Korean media in May last year, while out of office, that “South Korea is going to have to take primary, essentially overwhelming responsibility for its own self-defence against North Korea because [the US doesn’t] have a military that can fight North Korea and then be ready to fight China”.
“The fundamental fact is that North Korea is not a primary threat to the US,” he added.
That may result in Washington intensifying pressure on Seoul to consent to US troops being redeployed or rotated elsewhere in the region as Washington sees fit.
“South Korea has two great fears: either that it will be abandoned by the US to face North Korea alone, or that the US will rope it into a war with China,” says Work. “Washington shifting attention from North Korea to Taiwan touches both these nerves at once.”
The ‘quiet’ crisis brewing between the US and South Korea
https://www.ft.com/content/337ee9b3-208b-447c-9172-8e8f29f7d15d
The ‘quiet’ crisis brewing between the US and South Korea Trade tensions are building, the military alliance is under pressure and Korean domestic politics is fraught. Can Seoul negotiate a way out?
Financial Times
Christian Davies in Seoul
Published 2 HOURS AGO
This month, South Korea and the US staged their latest joint naval drills. Destroyers and patrol aircraft rehearsed responses to potential incursions by North Korean drones and special forces across the maritime border.
“With the overwhelming power of the South Korea-US combined fleet, we will strongly retaliate against any enemy provocation,” South Korean navy commander Ryu Yoon-sang declared.
But behind the boilerplate expressions of common resolve, experts describe a series of possible crises brewing in US-South Korea relations. Despite an alliance that goes back decades, the two countries are threatening to diverge on sensitive questions of trade, regional security and the growing North Korean nuclear threat.
When US President Donald Trump announced a 25 per cent “reciprocal” tariff on Korean imports, South Korean officials were shocked. They had believed a long-standing, comprehensive free trade agreement under which South Korea in effect does not levy tariffs on American goods would set them apart.
Policymakers in Seoul also worry that America’s fixation on the rise of China will lead it to neglect deterrence efforts against Pyongyang, while also pressuring South Korea into a more confrontational stance towards Beijing.
While many of these fears reflect long-standing tensions, they have been exacerbated by the return to power of Trump, whose repeated declarations of admiration for North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un stand in contrast with his often contemptuous attitude towards the South.
During his first term, Trump threatened to pull out of the Korea-US (Korus) free trade agreement that came into force in 2012, and to withdraw US troops from the Korean peninsula in a dispute over cost-sharing. The fact that South Korea has a record trade surplus with the US has only added fuel to the fire.
Since returning to office in January this year, Trump has declared his intention to reopen negotiations with Kim, fuelling South Korean fears of a deal between Washington and Pyongyang over Seoul’s head that could leave it even more vulnerable to North Korean nuclear blackmail.
And South Korean anxieties have been compounded by economic weakness and political instability at home. Even before then-president Yoon Suk Yeol’s ill-fated declaration of martial law in December, growth in Asia’s fourth-largest economy was slowing amid persistently weak domestic demand and intensifying competition from China.
Seoul’s ability to respond to these escalating challenges has been undercut by the prolonged political crisis that followed the martial law debacle.
Yoon was removed from office by South Korea’s constitutional court in April, and this month both acting president Han Duck-soo and finance minister Choi Sang-mok resigned within hours of each other. That has left the country in the hands of a weak caretaker administration led by the education minister until fresh presidential elections are held next week.
The frontrunner, leftwing opposition leader Lee Jae-myung, has in the past described the US as an “occupying force”, and more recently advocated for South Korea to take a more conciliatory line with China.
Whether Lee or his conservative challenger Kim Moon-soo prevail, highly sensitive discussions that have been put on hold in recent months cannot be postponed for much longer. The results could have ramifications for economic and security relationships across east Asia.
“The alliance is in a state of quiet crisis that few people have noticed,” says Victor Cha, a former White House official and Korea chair at the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) think-tank in Washington. “But . . . the crisis is unlikely to remain quiet for long.”
At first, South Korean officials were confident they would be spared the worst of the US president’s aggressive trade policies, Seoul-based diplomats recall.
In addition to their long-standing security relationship, dating back to the Korean war, and the trade agreement, Korean companies including chipmaker Samsung and auto giant Hyundai are investing tens of billions of dollars in manufacturing facilities in the US.
But that illusion was shattered in March, when Trump singled South Korea out for censure during his State of the Union address. Claiming falsely that the east Asian country imposes tariffs “four times higher” on the US than vice versa — because of the free trade agreement, the correct number is in effect zero on both sides — the US president suggested that Seoul was benefiting unfairly. “We give so much help militarily and in so many other ways to South Korea,” Trump said. “This system is not fair to the United States and never was.”
Since then, Korean exporters have been hit by Trump’s tariffs on steel and autos, and are bracing themselves for levies that target chips, smartphones and pharmaceuticals. Trump’s “reciprocal” 25 per cent tariff rate is suspended only until July.
Donald Trump claimed, incorrectly, that South Korea imposed tariffs ‘four times higher’ on the US than vice versa, before hitting the country with tariffs on steel and autos © Brendan Smialowski/AFP/Getty Images
“Korean officials were extremely disappointed and dismayed by the fact that they were assigned such a high tariff rate,” says Wendy Cutler, a former US trade official who helped negotiate the Korus pact and is now vice-president of the Asia Society Policy Institute think-tank.
“That said, they’re pragmatic, and given their security alliance they have no choice but to work with this administration,” Cutler adds.
Korean efforts to resolve tensions have been severely hampered, however, by prolonged political turmoil at home. According to several people familiar with the ongoing talks between US and Korean officials, last month then acting president Han made a push for a quick deal that he could present to the South Korean electorate before standing in June’s election himself. Trump administration officials also hoped for a speedy agreement, which they could present as evidence that the US president’s economic brinkmanship was yielding quick results.
But those hopes were dashed after it became clear that Han did not have the political authority to deliver a deal that would have bound the hands of his elected successor. When he and Choi both resigned, the prospect seemed dead.
Even if high-level talks resume as expected soon after the election, observers note that they could yet prove contentious.
Potential outcomes include South Korea securing some degree of tariff relief by demonstrating willingness to reduce its trade surplus, including by buying more US liquefied natural gas. The two countries also hope to secure an arrangement for Korean shipbuilders to build vessels for the US Navy, and Seoul has signalled willingness to address US concerns over a range of Korean non-tariff barriers.
But people with knowledge of the talks privately acknowledge the proposals under discussion are unlikely to make a significant short-term dent in South Korea’s trade surplus in goods with the US, which is now $55bn.
Chul Chung, president of the Korea Economic Research Institute, says Trump’s July tariff deadline may prove “too tight” for a new administration in Seoul.
“Making a deal too early is not a good strategy, as it would give other countries a benchmark against which they could negotiate something better,” Chung says. “But if we wait too long, we could end up without any bargaining power.”
“We have known for some time that economic over-dependence on China was a risk,” says a former senior Korean government official. “But now we know that over-dependence on the US is a risk for us too.”
For many South Koreans, the potential for trade tensions to spill over into the defence alliance with the US is even more concerning.
“Our economic relations are a matter of richer or poorer, but our security relations are a matter of life or death,” says Yeo Han-koo, a former South Korean trade minister now at the Peterson Institute for International Economics think-tank in Washington.
Trump has publicly linked the two, writing in a social media post last month that he had discussed “payment for the big time Military Protection we provide to South Korea” in a call with then-acting president Han.
“We are bringing up other subjects that are not covered by Trade and Tariffs, and getting them negotiated also. ‘ONE STOP SHOPPING’ is a beautiful and efficient process!!!” Trump wrote.
While Trump is expected to demand that Seoul make a larger financial contribution to the presence of the 28,500 US troops stationed on the peninsula — it will pay 1.52tn won ($1.19bn) in 2026, up 8.3 per cent from 1.4tn won in 2025, in a deal renegotiated just before the US election — more concerning for many analysts is what appears to be a growing divergence of views on the purpose of their defence relationship.
South Korean soldiers walk past a US C-130 Hercules military transport aircraft. Washington wants Seoul to take more responsibility for its own defence © Anthony Wallace/AFP/Getty Images
Clint Work, a fellow at the US National Defense University, a research institution affiliated with the Pentagon, notes that whereas South Korea has historically insisted the alliance be focused on the threat from North Korea, the US increasingly views this as secondary to the risk of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Elbridge Colby, now a senior official in charge of overseeing policy development at the Pentagon, told South Korean media in May last year, while out of office, that “South Korea is going to have to take primary, essentially overwhelming responsibility for its own self-defence against North Korea because [the US doesn’t] have a military that can fight North Korea and then be ready to fight China”.
“The fundamental fact is that North Korea is not a primary threat to the US,” he added.
That may result in Washington intensifying pressure on Seoul to consent to US troops being redeployed or rotated elsewhere in the region as Washington sees fit.
“South Korea has two great fears: either that it will be abandoned by the US to face North Korea alone, or that the US will rope it into a war with China,” says Work. “Washington shifting attention from North Korea to Taiwan touches both these nerves at once.”
South Korea has two great fears: either that it will be abandoned by the US to face North Korea alone, or that the US will rope it into a war with China
Victor Cha, Korea chair at the CSIS
Says Cha of CSIS: “It is almost inconceivable to me that there won’t be some adjustment to the US force posture in Korea, and they may inform rather than consult the South Koreans about it.”
Speaking on condition of anonymity, a US official in Korea says that the policy now being pursued within the Pentagon is “100 per cent” in line with Colby’s previous remarks. They add that the outcome of talks between on the alliance, including those on cost-sharing, would determine whether American troop numbers go up or down — noting that maintaining the status quo was the “least likely option”.
While this will probably prove uncomfortable for whoever wins next week’s presidential election, analysts say tensions could be particularly acute in the event of a victory for leftwing frontrunner Lee, who insists that South Korea has no direct interest in the outcome of a conflict involving Taiwan.
“We must keep our distance from a China-Taiwan contingency, if such a crisis should occur,” Lee said during a television debate this month. “We can get along with both China and Taiwan.”
Work says a Lee administration could find common cause with the Trump administration if a modest reduction of US troops in South Korea were presented in terms of Seoul assuming more responsibility for its own defence — something that has been a goal of successive leftwing governments.
Protesters call for the ousting of president Yoon Suk Yeol in December. Political turmoil compounded by economic weakness has left Seoul at a disadvantage in talks with the US © Anthony Wallace/AFP/Getty Images
But that would probably provoke a backlash from Korean conservatives. And members of both the US and South Korean military establishments remain doubtful about South Korean armed forces’ readiness to assume a leading role in confronting the North, says Work.
He notes that many on the South Korean left have long argued that the US maintains a troop presence on the peninsula not just for South Korea’s benefit but for its own “broader hegemonic goals”.
“This has contributed to a sense that you can push back hard against the Americans, because they’ll never actually leave,” Work explains.
“But if all of a sudden you realise that the Americans really are prepared to leave, that could have a very sobering effect.”
If Trump showing less interest in deterring North Korea militarily creates a dilemma for the South, the prospect of him re-engaging with Pyongyang diplomatically could prove even more frightening.
During his first term, Trump became the first sitting US president to meet a North Korean leader, although talks between the two sides eventually collapsed in 2019.
Since then, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme has gone from strength to strength. Kim has also been emboldened by his blossoming relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 — North Korean troops were sent to fight Ukrainian forces — and by Russia and China’s waning commitment to enforcing UN sanctions against Pyongyang.
“North Korea is significantly more capable, has more nuclear warheads and can threaten the US and its allies in more credible ways than it was positioned to do when Trump first took office in 2017,” says Ankit Panda, a nuclear weapons expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace think-tank in Washington. By contrast, South Korea does not possess nuclear weapons.
Panda is one of a growing number of defence experts who argue that rather than continuing to insist on the North’s denuclearisation as a condition for meaningful diplomatic engagement, Washington and Seoul should instead pursue a more realistic objective — agreeing arms control and other risk-reduction measures with Pyongyang.
Such an approach is regarded as anathema by South Korean officials, who worry this would tacitly accept North Korea’s right to possess nuclear weapons.
Kim Jong Un pictured supervising a missile test this month. North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme has gone from strength to strength since Trump was last in office © KCNA/Reuters
The Trump administration is currently reviewing its North Korea policy. But while official statements have so far restated the US commitment to pursuing denuclearisation, Trump and officials including secretary of defence Pete Hegseth have also referred to the North on several occasions as a “nuclear power” — a phrase that sounds alarm bells in Seoul.
In March, Trump claimed that his administration was already in “communication” with Pyongyang, describing the North as a “big nuclear nation”, and Kim as a “very smart guy”.
Jenny Town, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center think-tank in Washington, says that “one of South Korea’s nightmare scenarios” would be Trump cutting a deal with Kim that involves North Korea halting or scrapping its intercontinental ballistic missile programme, but retaining its shorter-range missiles and the ability to produce nuclear warheads.
Such an outcome would reduce or eliminate Pyongyang’s capacity to threaten the US, while allowing it to continue or intensify its nuclear threats against the South.
“South Korea worries that Washington and Pyongyang will cut them out of the process altogether,” says Town, “They have good reason to be concerned, given that Trump and Kim both seem much less interested in consulting them than last time round.”
Cha of CSIS adds that, if this were to happen, growing demands within South Korea for the country to acquire its own nuclear weapons might prove unstoppable — a scenario that would spark a wider security crisis throughout Asia and beyond.
“It’s not even going to be a debate any more,” he says.
2. A turning point in strategic thought on Asia policy?
Excertps:
This shift is not merely academic—it has real-world consequences. Whereas Brzezinski’s strategic planning encouraged investment in alliances, multilateral institutions, and ideological messaging, Colby’s doctrine leads to a triage mentality. Europe? Let the Europeans handle it. The Middle East? Contain terrorism, but otherwise disengage. Africa? Irrelevant. It’s a worldview where allies are not partners in a vision, but tools in a defense perimeter.
For South Korea, this shift is more than uncomfortable—it’s dangerous. Under the Cold War logic of thinkers like Brzezinski, South Korea was integral to a broader U.S. plan to prevent continental hegemony in Asia. It wasn’t just about North Korea—it was about embedding U.S. presence in Northeast Asia to shape outcomes across the entire region. But under Colby’s doctrine, South Korea is simply one node in a denial network: relevant only insofar as it helps contain China and secure Taiwan.
This leaves Seoul in a precarious position. The strategy of denial offers no long-term vision for regional prosperity or integration—only militarized stasis. And it assumes continued U.S. dominance that may not exist. As Washington’s focus narrows and its willingness to bear costs declines, South Korea may find that its security is no longer guaranteed by alliance habit, but by its own adaptability.
...
In this emerging paradigm, the world is no longer a chessboard—it is a risk map. And America, it seems, is no longer playing to win. It is playing not to lose.
It is not a chessboard or a risk map. It is a Go/Wie Chi/Baduk board.
Commentary
A turning point in strategic thought on Asia policy?
To compare Brzezinski’s Grand Chessboard to Colby’s Strategy of Denial is to compare empire-building to moat-digging. U.S. Asia policy has changed.
https://www.junotane.com/p/a-turning-point-in-strategic-thought-on-asia?r=7i07&utm
May 26, 2025
∙ Paid
The passing of Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, Henry Kissinger, and just under ten years ago, Zbigniew Brzezinski, marks more than just the end of an era of iconic U.S. foreign policy thinkers. It symbolizes a broader intellectual shift—away from expansive, global strategic frameworks rooted in Cold War imperatives, and toward narrower, regional and tactical defense doctrines.
The intellectual legacy that once prioritized American hegemony through complex balancing across the Eurasian landmass has given way to what Elbridge Colby, a central figure in Trump-era foreign policy, unapologetically calls the “strategy of denial.”
At the core of this transition lies a stark difference in scale, ambition, and underlying philosophical assumptions about America’s place in the world.
In The Grand Chessboard, Zbigniew Brzezinski argued that American primacy hinged on preventing the emergence of a Eurasian hegemon. Eurasia, he noted, was the “chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be played”.
For Brzezinski, American power was not simply regional or transactional—it was civilizational, rooted in a blend of military might, economic dominance, and ideological appeal. He conceived of power in panoramic terms: shaping the global balance from Eastern Europe to Central Asia, with American troops, values, and institutions carefully maneuvered to box out rivals.
What made Brzezinski’s approach “strategic” was its long time horizon and comprehensive scope. America was to operate as a global empire in all but name—diplomatically embedded, militarily dominant, and economically entwined with Eurasia’s key regions. This strategy wasn’t just defensive; it was proactive. Even U.S. cultural capital played a role in aligning allies and deterring adversaries. In his view, the ultimate threat to American primacy wasn’t a specific country like China or Russia, but the possibility of any power or coalition filling the Eurasian vacuum America left unguarded.
Elbridge Colby’s The Strategy of Denial is rooted in a fundamentally different worldview. While he shares Brzezinski’s concern about great-power competition, particularly vis-à-vis China, his answer is not global hegemony but regional denial. His framework assumes America can no longer do everything everywhere. The central goal is to prevent China from dominating Asia, especially through a fait accompli attack on Taiwan or similar targets. All else—European security, Middle Eastern stability, even global norms—must be subordinated to this single operational priority.
Colby’s method is unapologetically narrow. He argues the U.S. should structure its military posture to fight and win a limited war in Asia, without risking full-scale nuclear escalation. This is not about long-term diplomacy or building coalitions for shared prosperity—it’s about holding ground at specific choke points like Taiwan and denying China the ability to politically subordinate key allies. His logic is defensive and reactive: delay, deter, and if necessary, defeat China militarily in one theater, then stop.
The intellectual chasm between Brzezinski and Colby could not be wider. Brzezinski operated with the confidence of a unipolar power crafting global order; Colby operates with the anxiety of a declining hegemon preparing to fight one war at a time. Brzezinski sought to stabilize an entire continent by shaping multiple regional balances; Colby assumes that the U.S. can’t afford to fail in even a single engagement. What once was an empire of principles has become a fortress of priorities.
This shift is not merely academic—it has real-world consequences. Whereas Brzezinski’s strategic planning encouraged investment in alliances, multilateral institutions, and ideological messaging, Colby’s doctrine leads to a triage mentality. Europe? Let the Europeans handle it. The Middle East? Contain terrorism, but otherwise disengage. Africa? Irrelevant. It’s a worldview where allies are not partners in a vision, but tools in a defense perimeter.
For South Korea, this shift is more than uncomfortable—it’s dangerous. Under the Cold War logic of thinkers like Brzezinski, South Korea was integral to a broader U.S. plan to prevent continental hegemony in Asia. It wasn’t just about North Korea—it was about embedding U.S. presence in Northeast Asia to shape outcomes across the entire region. But under Colby’s doctrine, South Korea is simply one node in a denial network: relevant only insofar as it helps contain China and secure Taiwan.
This leaves Seoul in a precarious position. The strategy of denial offers no long-term vision for regional prosperity or integration—only militarized stasis. And it assumes continued U.S. dominance that may not exist. As Washington’s focus narrows and its willingness to bear costs declines, South Korea may find that its security is no longer guaranteed by alliance habit, but by its own adaptability.
That means independence—strategic, economic, and diplomatic. South Korea cannot wait for U.S. signals to define its posture. It must make its own calculations, develop its own defense capabilities, and cultivate regional relationships, even with difficult neighbors.
Most provocatively, South Korea may have to come to terms with a reality long denied in public discourse: its strategic position is ultimately dependent on China’s goodwill. Geography and economics are not changing. China is not necessarily a military threat—it is South Korea’s largest trading partner and a critical gatekeeper for regional peace. Pretending otherwise is increasingly untenable. If the U.S. sees Korea as a buffer or a pawn, Korea must begin to see China less as a threat, but as an unavoidable part of its strategic calculus.
To compare Brzezinski’s Grand Chessboard to Colby’s Strategy of Denial is to compare empire-building to moat-digging.
The former imagined a United States indispensable to world order; the latter imagines one barely holding the line. In this light, the deaths of Nye, Armitage, Kissinger, and Brzezinski mark more than generational turnover. They signify the burial of a kind of thinking that once tried to mold the world. What has replaced it is less a new strategy than a controlled retreat—realist, perhaps, but no longer grand.
In this emerging paradigm, the world is no longer a chessboard—it is a risk map. And America, it seems, is no longer playing to win. It is playing not to lose.
3. South Korea: A simple guide to the 2025 presidential election
Thank you to the BBC.
South Korea: A simple guide to the 2025 presidential election
BBC
What you need to know ahead of South Korea's snap presidential election
4 hours ago
Joel Guinto
BBC News
Getty Images
(L-R): The opposition's Lee Jae-myung and the ruling party's Kim Moon-soo are the frontrunners, according to polls
South Korea will elect a new president on 3 June to replace Yoon Suk Yeol, who was removed from office for placing the country under martial law for six hours in December.
The winner will be tasked with managing the political and economic fallout of Yoon's move, which plunged the country in deep turmoil and divided opinions.
The snap election is also being held as South Korea faces an unpredictable ally in US President Donald Trump - and that will shape long-running challenges such as the threat from North Korea, and Seoul's frosty relationship with China.
Here is what you need to know as the nation of about 52 million people chooses a new president who will lead it for the next five years.
Why is South Korea holding a presidential election?
Yoon was supposed to serve as president until 2027, but his term ended in disgrace.
He shocked the nation by declaring martial law on 3 December, citing threats from "anti-state forces" and North Korea - but it soon became clear that he was spurred by his own political troubles.
A week later, he was impeached by parliament. On 4 April, a constitutional court upheld his impeachment and removed him from office permanently, setting the stage for a snap presidential election within 60 days, as required by law.
In the six turbulent months since Yoon's martial law attempt, the country has had three acting presidents, the most recent being Lee Ju-ho, the labour minister who assumed the role one month before the election.
Lee replaced Prime Minister Han Duck Soo, who himself was impeached just weeks after taking over from Yoon as acting president. Finance minister Choi Sang-mok was acting president before Han was reinstated in March.
What are the big issues in South Korea's election?
Yoon's martial law laid bare the deep political divisions in the country, as those who supported his decision to impose martial law and those who opposed it took to the streets in protest.
Getty Images
Yoon's martial law declaration immediately triggered protests calling for his ouster
The following months of uncertainty shook public confidence in South Korea's economy. And this was at a time when US President Donald Trump unleashed his tariffs on America's trading partners, with South Korean goods facing a 25% levy.
Closer to home, relations with North Korea are a persistent challenge. While 2025 has been relatively uneventful, the year before saw heightened tensions as Kim Jong Un escalated the rhetoric, and both sides spent months sending balloons and drones carrying propaganda materials across the border.
South Korea's new leader must also balance Seoul's relations between its biggest trading partner, Beijing, and its most important security ally, Washington.
Then there is the task of arresting the country's declining birth rate, which is among the lowest in the world - 0.75.
Who could the next South Korean president be?
Polls have placed Lee Jae-myung of the main opposition Democratic Party as the frontrunner among six candidates, followed by Kim Moon-soo from the ruling PPP.
Lee, who lost to Yoon by a razor-thin margin in 2022, is hailed by his supporters as a working class hero. He worked in a factory before he became a human rights lawyer and politician. He has promised to establish a "real Republic of Korea" with jobs and a fair society.
Kim, a former labour minister, has positioned himself as a president for the economy, promising to create a business-friendly environment.
The other candidates are Lee Jun-seok of the New Reform Party, Kwon Young-guk of the Democratic Labor Party and two independents - Hwang Kyo-ahn and Song Jin- ho.
For the first time in 18 years, there is no woman running for president. The first woman to run for president was Hong Suk-Ja in 1987, but she withdrew before the vote. The election in 2012 saw four female candidates contest for the top job.
When is election day and when are results announced?
The election is scheduled on 3 June and voting precincts will be open from 06:00 local time (22:00 GMT) to 20:00. South Koreans overseas were allowed to vote early from 20 to 25 May.
Results are expected to come in after polls close and the winner will likely be known in the early hours of the following day.
When Yoon defeated Lee in 2022, he was proclaimed the winner nine hours after the close of voting, or at 04:40 the morning after election day.
Getty Images
Former president Yoon Suk Yeol celebrates after winning the election in 2022
That was the closest presidential contest in the country's history, which saw Yoon win by a 0.73% difference in votes.
The new president will take office immediately and unlike many of his predecessors, will not have the advantage of a formal transition from Yoon.
What will happen to impeached former president Yoon Suk Yeol?
Yoon faces trial for an insurrection charge as a result of his attempt to impose martial law.
In January this year he became South Korea's first sitting president to be arrested after investigators scaled barricades and cut through barbed wire to take him into custody. He was released from detention weeks later on a technicality.
He was also recently indicted for abuse of power, a separate charge to insurrection.
Before the election, Yoon quit his party in what analysts said was an attempt to shore up the chances of PPP's presidential candidate Kim Moon-soo.
4. The Case for a Pacific Defense Pact
Ely puts it out there. He said the quiet part out loud. Now we need to have a robust discussion in the US and with our allies.
I am supportive of this initiative in some form.
Optimizing U.S. and Allied Forces for Deterrence and Defense Throughout Indo-Pacom: From Korea to Australia and Everywhere in Between
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/24/us-allies-deterrence-indo-pacific/
Interestingly, Ely is now at the Marathon Institute. (https://themarathoninitiative.org/)
Elbridge Colby previously worked there.
The Case for a Pacific Defense Pact
Foreign Affairs · by More by Ely Ratner · May 27, 2025
America Needs a New Asian Alliance to Counter China
May 27, 2025
Matt Murphy
ELY RATNER is Principal at the Marathon Initiative. From 2021 to 2025, he served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs in the Biden administration.
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The time has come for the United States to build a collective defense pact in Asia. For decades, such a pact was neither possible nor necessary. Today, in the face of a growing threat from China, it is both viable and essential. American allies in the region are already investing in their own defenses and forging deeper military bonds. But without a robust commitment to collective defense, the Indo-Pacific is on a path to instability and conflict.
Tactical shifts aside, Beijing’s geopolitical aspirations for “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” remain unchanged. China seeks to seize Taiwan, control the South China Sea, weaken U.S. alliances, and ultimately dominate the region. If it succeeds, the result would be a China-led order that relegates the United States to the rank of a diminished continental power: less prosperous, less secure, and unable to fully access or lead the world’s most important markets and technologies.
After decades of pouring resources into its armed forces, China could soon have the military strength to make that vision a reality. As CIA Director William Burns revealed in 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping has instructed his military “to be ready by 2027 to invade Taiwan.” But as Burns went on to note, China’s leaders “have doubts about whether they could accomplish that invasion.” To sustain those doubts—concerning Taiwan but also other potential targets in the region—should be a top priority of U.S. foreign policy. That requires convincing Beijing that any attack would ultimately come at an unacceptable cost.
With that objective in mind, the United States has invested in advanced military capabilities and developed new operational concepts. It has moved more mobile and lethal military forces to strategic locations across Asia. Crucially, it has overhauled its security partnerships in the region. In past decades, Washington’s principal focus was to forge close bilateral ties. In recent years, by contrast, the United States has pursued a more networked approach that gives U.S. allies greater responsibilities and encourages closer ties not just with Washington but among the allies themselves. These changes are creating novel military and geopolitical challenges for Beijing, thereby reinforcing China’s doubts about the potential success of aggression.
The new, more multilateral approach marks a critical step toward stronger deterrence. But the defense initiatives it has produced remain too informal and rudimentary. In the face of continued Chinese military modernization, true deterrence requires the will and capability that only a collective defense arrangement can deliver. Such an alliance—call it the “Pacific Defense Pact”—would bind those countries that are currently most aligned and prepared to take on the China challenge together: Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States. Additional members could join as conditions warrant.
Skeptics may argue that such an arrangement is infeasible with a Trump administration that appears to disavow the importance of the United States’ alliances. But the reality is that leaders in Washington and allied capitals are still working to deepen military cooperation in the Indo-Pacific despite economic and diplomatic tensions. As far as defense matters are concerned, there has been far more continuity than disruption to date. Provided the administration avoids debilitating economic measures targeting U.S. allies, the trends pointing the way toward collective defense in the region are likely to endure. And if the Trump administration ultimately lacks the vision and ambition to grasp this opportunity, defense establishments can and should still lay the foundations for future leaders.
TIMES HAVE CHANGED
This is not the first time Washington has confronted the question of how to design its security partnerships in Asia. After World War II, the United States crafted a network of alliances in the region, hoping to keep Soviet expansion at bay, entrench its own military presence—particularly in East Asia—and curb internecine tensions among its partners. This network, made up of separate security arrangements with Australia and New Zealand, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, served its constituents well. It insulated large stretches of the Indo-Pacific from great-power conflict, setting the conditions for decades of remarkable economic growth. It also proved resilient, weathering the wars in Korea and Vietnam, successive waves of decolonization and democratization, and even the end of the Cold War itself.
Notably, the network never evolved beyond a set of disparate and almost exclusively bilateral alliances. In Europe, U.S. officials embraced collective defense: an attack on one ally would be treated as an attack on all. (Such was the logic behind the founding, in 1949, of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.) In Asia, however, similar aspirations foundered. As John Foster Dulles, one of the architects of the U.S. postwar security order, wrote in these pages in 1952, shortly before becoming secretary of state: “It is not at this time practicable to draw a line which would bring all the free peoples of the Pacific and East Asia into a formal mutual security area.”
For their part, many Asian leaders preferred strong bilateral relationships with the United States over closer links with former adversaries or historical rivals. Some worried that a collective defense arrangement would draw them into a great-power clash between Washington and Moscow. Others doubted that any such institution could overcome the legacies of conflict and mutual distrust among their neighbors and bring together members that were far apart both geographically and in terms of security concerns. The only seeming exception, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, proved the point. Founded in 1954, SEATO was a motley alliance among Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It suffered from a lack of unity and quietly dissolved in 1977.
But times have changed. The conditions once preventing multilateral alignment in Asia are giving way to fresh calls for collective defense. Just before taking office last year, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba warned that “the absence of a collective self-defense system like NATO in Asia means that wars are likely to break out.” In fact, such a collective defense pact is now within reach. Three trends buttress this conclusion: a new strategic alignment centered on an advancing threat from China, a new convergence of security cooperation among U.S. allies, and the demand for a new reciprocity that gives the United States’ partners a larger role in keeping the peace.
COMMON CAUSE
China’s assertiveness throughout the Indo-Pacific is spreading a sense of insecurity, particularly as leaders in Beijing lean on the military as a central instrument in their revisionist aims. The dangerous and threatening activities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), combined with its rapidly growing capabilities, have prompted leaders across the region to adopt new defense strategies arrayed against what they perceive as a growing threat from China. New military investments and activities have followed suit.
Nowhere is this strategic reorientation more apparent than in Tokyo. Despite deep economic interdependence between China and Japan, ties between the two countries have been frail for decades, strained by historical animus, trade tensions, and territorial disputes. Relations have only worsened in recent years, as Beijing has leveraged its budding economic and military power to ramp up pressure on its neighbor. A new law, passed in 2021, allows China’s coast guard to use weapons against foreign ships sailing in what Beijing considers its sovereign waters. In the years since, Chinese incursions into the areas surrounding what Japan refers to as the Senkaku Islands—administered by Japan but also claimed by China, which refers to them as the Diaoyu Islands—have become more frequent, with greater numbers of larger and more heavily armed vessels. In March, Chinese coast guard ships entered the territorial waters around the islands and lingered for nearly 100 hours—the longest episode to date in a string of incidents that Japan’s top diplomat described as “clearly escalating.”
Tokyo is responding by loosening long-standing political and legal constraints on its armed forces. As early as 2013, the country’s first-ever publicly released national security strategy warned of China’s “rapidly expanded and intensified” activities around Japanese territories. Not long after, the Japanese government reinterpreted the country’s pacifist constitution, allowing its armed forces to work more closely with partner militaries. In recent years, it has embarked on a historic military buildup, pledging to double its military spending to roughly two percent of its gross domestic product. Tokyo has also moved beyond its erstwhile focus on defensive capabilities and now aims to acquire and deploy “counterstrike capabilities,” including hundreds of long-range Tomahawk missiles. These changes, as the political scientist and Japan expert Michael Green wrote in these pages in 2022, are establishing Tokyo as “the most important net exporter of security in the Indo-Pacific.”
The Philippines is undergoing a similar transformation. For decades, the Philippine armed forces battled insurgents in the southern reaches of the archipelago. Military investments and operations reflected that domestic focus. Today, the insurgency has weakened, but an external threat looms larger and larger: steady Chinese encroachment on Philippine maritime rights and sovereignty, primarily in the South China Sea. In the 2010s, Beijing pursued an unprecedented campaign of land reclamation and built military bases atop reefs and islets that are also claimed by the Philippines and other Southeast Asian states. China has cordoned off one of these atolls, Scarborough Shoal, denying access to Philippine fishing vessels. At another reef, Second Thomas Shoal, violent attacks by Chinese vessels have disrupted efforts to resupply Philippine military personnel. Chinese coast guard ships have even harassed vessels conducting energy exploration inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.
In Europe, America embraced collective defense; in Asia, similar aspirations foundered.
The view from Manila has sharpened accordingly. Beginning under President Rodrigo Duterte in the late 2010s and accelerating under his successor, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., the Philippine military has been undertaking an ambitious modernization effort. The government adopted a watershed defense strategy in 2024 to secure the country’s periphery with investments in additional combat aircraft, tougher cyberdefenses, and more unmanned assets for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. There is little doubt about what is driving the overhaul: the need to better monitor and confront China’s coercive activities.
In Canberra, a few thousand miles to the south, the rise of China was once considered benign and beneficial to Australian interests. A series of diplomatic and military incidents in the past decade, however, have convinced many that the opposite is true. Revelations of malign Chinese Communist Party influence in Australian elections and policymaking ignited a political firestorm. And after Australia’s government called for an independent investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic, China unleashed a barrage of tariffs and other restrictions on Australian exports.
In the South China Sea, Australian armed forces have suffered the same malign pattern of harassment by Chinese jets and warships. The PLA is also operating closer than ever to Australia’s shores. Earlier this year, Chinese naval vessels circumnavigated Australia and disrupted commercial air traffic with live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea. And amid intense efforts by China to make security inroads with Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and other Pacific Island countries, Australia’s foreign minister said in 2024 that her country is now “in a state of permanent contest in the Pacific.”
Against this backdrop, Canberra, too, is revising its defense priorities from top to bottom. As recently as 2016, the government’s official view was that a foreign military attack on its territory was “no more than a remote prospect.” By 2024, its updated national defense strategy warned that, owing to the present realities in the Indo-Pacific, “there is no longer a ten-year window of strategic warning time for conflict.” Instead of preparing for a wide variety of contingencies around the world, including counterterrorism in the Middle East, the Australian Defence Force is gearing up to fend off major threats closer to home. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has unveiled plans for record military spending, including major investments in stockpiles of critical munitions such as long-range fires, antiship missiles, and missiles for air defense. The reforms highlight a growing conviction that the country’s advantageous geography no longer offers sufficient protection against the PLA. The public shares that apprehension: according to the Lowy Institute, a leading Australian think tank, the share of Australians who believed China would become a military threat to their country nearly doubled from 2012 to 2022. It now stands above 70 percent.
QUAD GOALS
Japan, the Philippines, and Australia have not only come to recognize China as their primary and common threat; they also increasingly acknowledge that their fates are intertwined with the broader region. This is true even on issues as sensitive as Taiwan, once a taboo subject in the region: “A Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency,” former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared in 2021. “If something happens to Taiwan, inevitably we will be involved,” the Philippine military chief warned earlier this year.
The view that Chinese aggression would have massive consequences for countries throughout the Indo-Pacific has resulted in an unprecedented deepening of security partnerships among Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and other regional powers. Analysts have described defense cooperation between Australia and Japan in particular as taking on “alliance-like characteristics.” A new reciprocal access agreement allows the Australian and Japanese militaries to operate in each other’s countries. August 2023 marked the first-ever visit by Japanese F-35 fighter jets to northern Australia, followed only days later by the inaugural deployment of Australian F-35s for military exercises in Japan.
Japan is finalizing a similar access agreement with the Philippines, which has emerged in recent years as the largest recipient of Japanese security assistance. In February, defense leaders from the two countries announced a spate of measures for closer security cooperation. In what could be read only as a thinly veiled reference to China, the Philippine secretary of defense explained that Manila and Tokyo’s “common cause” was to resist “any unilateral attempt to reshape the global order.”
That newfound common cause has animated a series of overlapping, complementary initiatives—what, in 2024, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin called “the new convergence in the Indo-Pacific”—that build on the United States’ traditional focus on bilateral ties in the region. The Biden administration in particular worked to supplement the older “hub-and-spokes” model with what it envisioned as a “latticework” of relationships in Asia. The AUKUS partnership brought together Canberra, London, and Washington to help Australia build conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. As members of the Indo-Pacific Quad, Australia, India, Japan, and the United States joined efforts to provide maritime domain awareness throughout the region. American officials also stepped up trilateral security cooperation with Japan and South Korea.
Among the many partners involved in these efforts, Canberra, Manila, and Tokyo frequently stand out as common denominators. At a meeting of their leaders in 2024, the Japanese, Philippine, and U.S. governments expressed “serious concerns” about China’s “dangerous and aggressive behavior” and announced initiatives on infrastructure investment and technology cooperation, among other measures. Later that year, Australian, Japanese, and U.S. defense leaders unveiled another set of cooperative activities, including three-way military exercises and advanced defense industrial cooperation. Perhaps most promising of all is a new grouping that brings together all four of these parties—Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States. Known informally as “the Squad” (to distinguish it from the Quad), the group conducts regular naval, maritime, and air force exercises in the South China Sea. It also plans to strengthen information sharing and work together to modernize the Philippine military.
A GOOD START
The new convergence in the Indo-Pacific represents a profound development in the security architecture of the region. But it is best viewed as an incomplete evolution—an important period of transition rather than an optimal end state. The shortcomings are significant. There are no mutual defense obligations between U.S. allies, only with the United States. There is no central headquarters to plan and conduct multilateral operations. And the unofficial nature of these groupings means that there is no regular drumbeat of planning among political and military staffs. Coordination is occurring, but only intermittently. As a result, it rarely receives the necessary urgency, attention, and resources.
A collective defense pact would deliver where the current mechanisms fall short. Getting there would not require a panregional security organization such as NATO, which grew from 12 original members to over 30. Instead, the logical starting point for Washington is to form a pact with the three partners that are most strategically aligned and have the fastest-growing and most robust combined military cooperation: Australia, Japan, and the Philippines.
Additional members could join later, circumstances allowing. As an advanced and stalwart ally in East Asia, South Korea would be an obvious candidate, and its contributions could be quite significant. But Seoul would have to decide whether it was willing to focus its defense forces more on China, partner more closely with Japan, and support a broader regional orientation for its own military and the tens of thousands of U.S. troops stationed on the peninsula. New Zealand would be another prospective partner, especially since it is already part of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing group alongside Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. But although New Zealand has recently shown greater willingness to challenge China and align more closely with the United States, it might not yet be prepared to enter a formal collective defense pact.
A military exercise between the United States and the Philippines, Aparri, Philippines, May 2025 Lisa Marie David / Reuters
Critical U.S. partners such as India and Singapore would not be expected to join at the outset but could still participate in certain activities as observers or in some other nonmember capacity, as is common in regional groupings. The inclusion of Taiwan would not be possible or advisable under current U.S. policy, nor would it be acceptable to the other members of the pact. As for the United States’ European allies, they are neither politically nor militarily ready to join as full members right now, but that option could be considered in the future, under different circumstances. Larger defense budgets in Europe could produce militaries with more global reach, provided the continent itself is secure and at peace.
Given the urgency of the China challenge, the United States cannot afford to wait for a perfect alignment among all its partners. There is already a core group in place and room to consider additional members in the future. Preparations should begin now. Given that alliances with the United States already exist, a first-order task is to establish mutual obligations among Australia, Japan, and the Philippines themselves. This will demand skillful leadership and intense negotiations, but the benefits of stronger deterrence and greater security should outweigh the risks of closer alignment. Besides, for Australia and Japan in particular, the practical differences between today’s defense partnership and one of mutual defense are relatively small and shrinking by the day.
From an operational perspective, collective defense could build on existing cooperative projects, including in the areas of intelligence sharing, maritime domain awareness, combined training and exercises, and command and control. One such project is the Bilateral Intelligence Analysis Cell, a new U.S.-Japanese effort at Yokota Air Base that monitors Chinese activity in the East China Sea. Japan and the United States could share the cell’s intelligence with Australia and the Philippines, which could in turn contribute personnel at the air base and provide data from their own unmanned surface and aerial platforms. Likewise, the recently inaugurated U.S.-Philippine Combined Coordination Center near Manila could include Australia and Japan, providing similar functions in the South China Sea.
A collective defense pact would deliver where current cooperation falls short.
The U.S. military has major operating bases in Japan, access to locations in the Philippines, and regular rotations of U.S. troops throughout Australia. With sufficient legal underpinning—including reciprocal access agreements among the three Asian allies— each of these arrangements could be expanded to include forces from the other members. In fact, there are already plans to integrate Japanese forces into U.S. initiatives in Australia.
The four members could also invest in shared military facilities. Major bilateral and trilateral military exercises involving different combinations of the partners could include all four. Together, they could more readily pre-position weapons to ensure sufficient stockpiles in the event of conflict, further strengthening deterrence. Establishing a headquarters for the Pacific Defense Pact and mechanisms for command and control will be essential. Japan could serve as one potential location. In July 2024, the United States announced its intent to upgrade the U.S. military command in Japan to plan and direct more missions in the region with its Japanese counterpart. As new facilities and communications links are established to support this effort, U.S. and Japanese officials should ensure that it will be possible to include military commanders and personnel from Australia and the Philippines. Alternative locations for the headquarters could be considered in Australia or at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii.
The four countries should establish a series of working groups to negotiate the full range of policy and legal issues associated with more integrated planning and operations. Military and civilian staff from defense and foreign ministries could work together to develop proposals for governance and decision-making processes, including personnel structures and consultation mechanisms that form the engine rooms of day-to-day alliance management. This breadth of tasks only underscores the need to start consultations as soon as possible.
ALL FOR ONE
In addition to deepening their collective cooperation with one another, U.S. allies will also need to rebalance their bilateral security partnerships with Washington. In their current form, those partnerships reflect the asymmetries of a different era, when American military primacy appeared uncontested and immutable. Bilateral treaties in the region were restricted in scope to specific local geographies, and the contributions of allied militaries were limited by design. In essence, the United States promised protection in exchange for military access and political-economic comity in Asia but without demanding fully reciprocal protection for itself.
This framework was sustainable—both strategically and politically—as long as the U.S. military retained its dominance in the region, the threat from China was confined, and the potential contributions of U.S. allies were limited to their own self-defense. None of these conditions holds true today. The PLA now poses serious challenges to the U.S. military and the American homeland. And U.S. allies in Asia are now among the wealthiest and most advanced countries in the world, capable of playing a significant role in both deterrence and warfighting. To adapt to this new reality, U.S. alliances need to build on a foundation not of asymmetry but of reciprocity.
Domestic politics in the United States also makes greater reciprocity necessary. Although most Americans support military ties in principle, increasing numbers would like to see U.S. allies contribute more in practice. U.S. President Donald Trump has focused in particular on the notion that allies need to pay their “fair share,” casting doubts on whether the United States would defend NATO members that failed to meet certain levels of military spending. U.S. allies do need to spend more on defense—but reciprocity should extend far beyond bigger military budgets.
Beijing will draw from its playbook of disinformation and economic coercion.
U.S. allies will also need to commit to greater degrees of mutual obligation with the United States. Washington’s security treaty with Tokyo, for instance, is bound only to “the territories under the administration of Japan.” The resulting imbalance is on display at every major bilateral summit, where U.S. leaders reaffirm their commitment to defend Japan and Japanese leaders stay silent on whether their forces would assist the U.S. military elsewhere. Instead, U.S. allies should commit to supporting the United States both in crises throughout the region and in defending the U.S. homeland.
This new reciprocity would further enable collective defense. The upshot of more mutual obligation would be that U.S. allies could take on new roles and missions in crises and conflicts, especially when combined with recent investments in their own militaries. This would, in turn, open new pathways for cooperation that do not exist today in sufficient form: members of the pact could draft combined military plans, more effectively target their defense spending toward specialized and complementary capabilities, and rehearse and improve together through tailored military exercises and operations. These measures would fortify the collective power and deterrence of the United States’ alliances far beyond what is possible under today’s informal mechanisms.
Greater reciprocity should also entail greater clarity on what military strategists refer to as “access, basing, and overflight”—that is, the ability of the U.S. military to operate in and around allied territory. Given the vast distances involved, forward-deployed U.S. forces are essential to ensuring rapid response times and sustaining the military during a contingency. More certainty surrounding U.S. military access would strengthen deterrence in the western Pacific by ensuring that the United States would have the right forces and capabilities ready to fight in the right places. More assured access would also lead to greater infrastructure investments and the deployment of more advanced capabilities, which further enhance the potential utility of various locations. While U.S. allies should not be expected to give the U.S. military a blank check, a robust Pacific Defense Pact will require more flexible and assured access for U.S. forces.
THE CORE FOUR
Collective defense touches on matters of sovereignty and treaty obligations, deeply political issues that require intense negotiations and deft diplomacy. This will be all the more challenging if the Trump administration moves forward with punishing tariffs or other measures that strain Washington’s alliances in the region. But even amid tense diplomatic relations, defense and military establishments can continue laying the foundations for collective defense. Short of a severe break in ties, the four partners should work as best they can to silo security cooperation from economic and diplomatic disagreements. The stakes are simply too high to do otherwise. It is also worth underscoring that the demand for more reciprocal relationships has become a political and strategic imperative that spans the partisan divide in Washington.
The evidence to date is that the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies are managing to deepen defense cooperation despite political and economic headwinds. This is largely owing to the mounting threat from China, the continued demand for a U.S. military presence in the region, and the growing trend of intra-Asian security cooperation. To be sure, the Trump administration may be too divided, distracted, or confrontational to play the winning hand it has been dealt. In that case, many of the building blocks can still be put in place for a future administration. Given the number of tasks ahead, a pact might not be finalized until the next U.S. administration anyway.
For their part, leaders in Canberra, Manila, and Tokyo will need to win the support of their respective domestic publics. Beyond strategic arguments about deterrence and national security, the United States can support these conversations by highlighting the potential benefits to its allies’ domestic constituencies. These could include technology sharing, infrastructure investments, and improved disaster response. In the United States, skeptics can be assured that a defense pact in the Pacific would entail no obligations for the U.S. military beyond what is already in place—but that it would reduce threats to the U.S. homeland and to U.S. troops.
Members of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force, Yokosuka, Japan, April 2025 Issei Kato / Reuters
Given the historic significance of such an arrangement, Washington should also be prepared to manage reactions and concerns from others in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. officials can underscore that a Pacific Defense Pact would be but one of several components of its approach to the region. In both rhetoric and practice, Washington should remain committed to a network of overlapping and complementary institutions, including the Indo-Pacific Quad, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea. The publicly stated objective of the pact should be the pursuit of a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” a goal shared by nearly every country in the region.
Moreover, the pact should remain focused on defense rather than subsuming or taking on the economic and diplomatic roles of other important institutions. Indeed, the pact will be most successful if complemented by a robust regional trade agenda, active diplomatic efforts, and effective foreign assistance programs.
Protests from Beijing will no doubt be as loud as they are predictable. China has long accused the United States of “Cold War thinking” and “bloc politics.” PLA officials have already warned that current U.S. efforts to bring American security partners closer together are “tying the region’s countries to the U.S. war chariot.” These refrains will feature prominently in China’s reaction precisely because a stronger coalition could stymie Beijing’s revisionist ambitions. To push back and make potential members think twice about a new pact, Beijing will likely draw from its traditional playbook of disinformation and economic coercion. With that in mind, the United States should help its allies prepare for China’s efforts to scuttle a collective defense arrangement in Asia.
None of this will be easy. But neither was the great progress that Washington’s allies have already made, not only in acknowledging the threat from China but also in taking unprecedented steps to invest in their own militaries, build ties with their neighbors, and double down on their alliances with the United States. In fact, in recent years, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines have already made moves on defense and security matters that were previously deemed implausible. The conditions are now set for strong leadership to transform a collective defense pact in Asia from something once unimaginable into a defining feature of the region’s future peace and prosperity.
ELY RATNER is Principal at the Marathon Initiative. From 2021 to 2025, he served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs in the Biden administration.
Foreign Affairs · by More by Ely Ratner · May 27, 2025
5. Lights out: Trump silences a lonely bastion of journalistic integrity in Asia.
An 8 minute video from Australia on Radio Free Asia is worth watching.
https://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/episodes/rfa/105338916?utm
The transcript is below as well.
Below the transcript are two statements from Australia; one form the head of the Australian Broadcasting Company (ABC) and onfr from the spokesperson from the Foreign Ministry.
The good thing of all this is that allies of like-minded democracies may invest more in information and try to emulate the world of RFA nad VOA in the region to fill the gap that will be filled by China and north Korea and Russia, etc. I am sure the US administration will take credit and say, see our actions caused this.
Lights out
7h ago7 hours ago
Trump silences a lonely bastion of journalistic integrity in Asia.
Read a statement from Claire Gorman here. And Foreign Minister Penny Wong here.
7h ago7 hours ago
Transcript
Now, to a real life-and-death struggle on the streets of Myanmar.
Two months on from the 7.7 magnitude earthquake that killed almost 4000 people and leveled much of the capital, thousands remain in temporary shelter grappling with a bloody civil war that rages on and on and staring down a monsoon season ahead.
While this critical news soon faded from our bulletins, one news service against all the odds stayed put to report the crisis from on the ground.
This footage was broadcast by Radio Free Asia, one of the only international outlets to capture these dramatic developments, its own headquarters closed since the coup now reduced to rubble.
Established by the US Congress in response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, Radio Free Asia has for almost three decades published independent news designed to penetrate repressive regimes. Reporting civil rights abuses in China, political persecution in Cambodia and the desperate struggle for freedom in Hong Kong.
Each week it broadcasts via shortwave radio and the internet to more than 58 million people in 10 languages. Often at great risk. At least 13 of its journalists and other staff have been imprisoned since 2008. Five remain behind bars as I speak to you tonight, including in Myanmar and Vietnam.
But in March, instead of Radio Free Asia programming, there was a sudden and awful silence as one by one its news services went dark beginning with Laos and Tibet.
Its Burmese service signed off like this:
KYAW KYAW AUNG: It is with deep sadness that we must farewell you, our audience … Our voices have been silenced. But our commitment to the truth remains unshaken.
- Radio Free Asia, 8 May 2025
And why was this programming abruptly suspended?
It turns out Radio Free Asia was finally muzzled not by civil wars or natural disasters but by Donald Trump, as its South East Asia editor Ginny Stein discovered by email:
GINNY STEIN: … our contract which had been signed late last year was no longer … funds were no longer going to be delivered to RFA … and it was just unilaterally decided that we would no longer receive those funds …
- Interview, 22 May 2025
In March, amidst a broad cost-cutting campaign, Trump shuttered America’s other global broadcaster Voice of America.
Clearly no fan of the network, he voiced this opinion five years ago:
DONALD TRUMP: … have you heard what’s coming out of the Voice of America, it’s disgusting.
- PBS NewsHour, 15 April 2020
And brought in a trusted lieutenant to choke off funding for Radio Free Asia and Radio Free Europe, appointing failed Senate candidate Kari Lake to the organisation overseeing both services the US Agency for Global Media:
KARI LAKE: … it's a very corrupt agency I've learned since I've been here … Some people have said ‘look I've seen Marxist programming going out, I've seen anti-American programming going out, I've seen programming that supports our adversaries. Why is the American taxpayer paying for that?’
- The Matt Gaetz Show, One America News, 4 April 2025
Fellow Trump sycophant Elon Musk described the US-funded outlets as staffed by radical left crazies:
GINNY STEIN: Well I'm not a crazy left wing loon and I'm in charge of these services, I'm a credible journalist and I have been my entire career … our role is to ensure accurate information and that's something we have worked extremely hard at …
- Interview, 22 May 2025
RFA and Radio Free Europe are both fighting to stay alive and have filed lawsuits against the US Government.
In the meantime those expatriate RFA journalists who had been working from the US now face an uncertain future:
MARGARET BRENNAN: Do you think you will be deported?
KHOA LAI: I believe so but I hope not. … If I go back then the Government will snatch me right away.
- CBS News, 22 March 2025
Another casualty closer to home is RFA’s affiliate BenarNews, a digital news service which for 10 years has been filing richly reported stories from the Pacific and South East Asia exposing political repression, corruption and alleged war crimes.
Its website which hasn’t been updated since early April now carries this banner.
Benar News’ recently retrenched Pacific editor Stefan Armbruster told Media Watch the service displaced mis and dis-information across the region and focused on untold and neglected stories like:
… violence against women and massacres in Papua New Guinea, the continuing brutal conflict in West Papua … and the contestation of China’s economic, diplomatic and military expansion …
- Email, Stefan Armbruster, Former Head of News (Pacific), Radio Free Asia/BenarNews, 23 May 2025
He added:
… the Trump administration has trashed the US’s reputation in the region …
- Email, Stefan Armbruster, Former Head of News (Pacific), Radio Free Asia/BenarNews, 23 May 2025
In all, America's global news services reached a combined 427-million people every week, an extraordinary tool of influence promoting the rule of law and the institutions of democracy which the current US administration has chosen perhaps for a lack of interest in such ideals to cast aside like so much flotsam:
That Trump has surrendered a tried-and-tested tool of soft US power decades in the making, a brand trusted by overseas audiences amid the ongoing battle for ideas, can only be good news for those who RFA’s reporting sought to combat.
- The Diplomat, 27 March 2025
And stepping into the vacuum?
China for one which celebrated Trump’s cuts.
Ginny Stein told us Beijing had already been seducing local media outlets not just with free news copy which Radio Free Asia offered but with cash gifts:
GINNY STEIN: I have been met by a number of countries saying that look, we're taking material from China, we've been offered it and we’re not only being offered it, we’re being paid to take it …
- Interview, 22 May 2025
The European Union announced last week it would salvage Radio Free Europe with a five-and-a-half million Euro rescue package. No such suitor is likely however for Radio Free Asia and it’s not just locals who will now miss out:
GINNY STEIN: … it's business people, it's foreign governments, it's people trying to make decisions about investment, about trying to work out whether to come to the aid of people … decisions are made on the basis of accurate information and without that whole systems breakdown …
- Interview, 22 May 2025
Foreign Minister Penny Wong declined to tell us whether she has made representations to Washington about the shuttering of these news services but says the Labor government has awarded more than $40 million to the ABC to expand its coverage of the Indo Pacific alongside other media initiatives in the region.
The ABC’s head of international services Claire Gorman told us:
The US cuts amplify the need for Australia to step up its international media activity across the Asia Pacific … to counter narratives coming from illiberal states which seek to undermine democratic ideals and the rule of law.
- Email, Claire Gorman, Head ABC International Services, 23 May 2025
For the better part of a century Australia had relied on the US not just for its own security but as a bulwark against repressive ideology and authoritarian impulse.
Now with Donald Trump in the White House it seems we can rely on it no longer and nor can the millions across Asia who must once more make do with a sanitised world sanctioned by state-run media.
26-May-2025
Claire M Gorman - Head ABC International
· What outlook does the ABC have with respect to its Asia Pacific news and information services in light of these changes?
The US cuts amplify the need for Australia to step up its international media activity across the Asia Pacific and the ABC's vital role in achieving this. We must be able to offer audiences across the region access to independent, impartial news and current
affairs covering issues that are important to them. This is essential to counter narratives coming from illiberal states which seek to undermine democratic ideals and the rule of law.
I wrote about this challenge in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s The Strategist published in mid-April. This piece provides an up-to-date summation of our position and our pitch to Government: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/to-counter-anti-
democratic-propaganda-step-up-funding-for-abc-international/
· Has the ABC discussed these events with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade? If so, what is the nature of these conversations?
We're in ongoing discussions with DFAT and DITRDCA regarding the information environment across the region and the key role played by the ABC. We want to expand our capacity to champion local independent public interest media, provide value to regional audiences and assist in filling their information needs.
· Will the ABC be seeking additional government support to fill the vacuum
As stated above, the ABC has ongoing discussions with Government about the role we play now and could play into the future with additional funding for our Asia Pacific services.
23-May-2025
A spokesperson for the Foreign Minister
Australia is a partner our region can count on.
The Albanese Government is committed to supporting independent, resilient, and professional media in our region.
We have rebuilt our international development program, ensuring Australia remains a partner of choice for the countries in our region, with more than $2.1 billion to the
Pacific and $1.28 billion to Southeast Asia.
Recognising the impact of global aid cuts, we have reprioritised our development
assistance to dedicate 75 cents of every Australian development dollar to support the Indo-Pacific.
6. Jeju peace forum to kick off this week with focus on regional, global security challenges
Our Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, President and CEO Hee-Eun Km will be participating in this.
https://apstrategy.org/people/#:~:text=Hee%2DEun Kim is,at King%E2%80%99s College London.
Jeju peace forum to kick off this week with focus on regional, global security challenges | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · May 27, 2025
By Kim Seung-yeon
JEJU/SEOUL, May 27 (Yonhap) -- An annual international peace forum was set to kick off on South Korea's southern island of Jeju this week, focusing on peace and security challenges in regions and beyond, according to its organizer on Tuesday.
The 20th Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity is scheduled to take place at the Jeju International Convention Center for a three-day run from Wednesday, bringing together some 4,000 participants from 60 countries, including prominent former and incumbent government officials and foreign policy experts.
Under this year's theme of "Innovation for Peace and Prosperity," the forum will provide an opportunity for in-depth discussions on complex and multidimensional challenges, from the intensifying strategic competition between the U.S and China and Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine to promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula, among other issues.
Also among the key topics are efforts to tackle climate change and the escalating race for technological supremacy.
This file photo shows a session of the Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity. (Yonhap)
The forum will begin with a world leaders' session, where former U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon will deliver a main speech. Joining the session will be U.N. Under Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo and Secretary-General of the African Continental Free Trade Area Secretariat Wamkele Mene.
South Korea's acting President Lee Ju-ho will make a keynote speech in the opening ceremony, set for Thursday.
The forum will offer a special session on the present and future of bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan, ahead of the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the normalization of their diplomatic relations next month.
A diplomats' roundtable will take place to discuss efforts to enhance cooperation between South Korea and Africa, and efforts to promote the partnership with African countries.
Participants will also discuss the current diplomatic landscape following the launch of Donald Trump's second administration, offering in-depth assessments of his approach to Northeast Asia and exploring strategic directions for South Korea.
The forum will also coincide with various side events showcasing Jeju's leading policy initiatives on carbon neutrality, renewable energy, and smart tourism to a global audience.
Promotional and youth programs will also take place, with special art exhibitions offering a chance to experience Jeju's unique natural environment and cultural heritage, the organizer said.
elly@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · May 27, 2025
7. Interagency meeting held to discuss maritime zone row with China
South Korea is a battleground for Chinese strategic competition and political warfare (unrestricted warfare).
(LEAD) Interagency meeting held to discuss maritime zone row with China | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · May 27, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS details in paras 9-11)
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, May 27 (Yonhap) -- South Korea held an interagency government meeting Tuesday to discuss the recent maritime issues with China, including Beijing's installment of structures and designation of a no-sail zone in overlapping waters in the Yellow Sea, the foreign ministry said.
The meeting was led by Kang Young-shin, director-general for Northeast and Central Asian affairs at the ministry, joined by officials from the oceans and defense ministries and other relevant agencies, the foreign ministry said in a release.
The meeting came after South Korea expressed concerns to the neighboring country over the designation of a no-sail zone in the Provisional Maritime Zone (PMZ), an area where their exclusive economic zones overlap.
Seoul and Beijing have agreed to draw the PMZ line as a tentative measure to allow fishing vessels to operate safely and jointly manage marine resources in the area, while prohibiting activities beyond navigation and fishing.
However, China's installation of two semi-submersible buoys in 2018 and 2024 and a fixed steel structure in 2022 in the PMZ has heightened tensions between the two countries.
Beijing's actions have fueled speculation that it may be laying the groundwork to assert future territorial claims in the area.
"Participants discussed recent developments in the Yellow Sea, including China's unilateral actions within the overlapping maritime zone," the ministry said.
"The government will continue to closely monitor movements in the Yellow Sea through close interagency coordination and will actively respond to ensure that our legitimate rights and interests are not undermined," it added.
During their bilateral dialogue on the issue last month, China proposed that South Korean officials pay an on-site visit to the structures.
"We're reviewing (the proposal) internally and in communication with the Chinese side about it," Lee Jae-woong, ministry spokesperson, said in a press briefing.
China has not reported its designation of the no-sail zone to Japan, the regional coordinator of the International Maritime Organization, the special U.N. agency on maritime security. But it's not a requirement under international standards.
In February, the two countries engaged in a standoff in the PMZ near South Korea's west coast, when Chinese authorities blocked a South Korean ship from inspecting the Chinese steel structure in the area. China insisted it was a commercial fish farm that Seoul had no right to search.
South Korea has said it is not ruling out the option of taking a reciprocal measure in response to the installation of the structures.
This file photo, released by Rep. Um Tae-young of the People Power Party on April 24, 2025, shows a structure unilaterally installed by China in 2024 in the Provisional Maritime Zone (PMZ) of the Yellow Sea. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
elly@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · May 27, 2025
8. S. Korea to send invitations to APEC member states as soon as new gov't launches
S. Korea to send invitations to APEC member states as soon as new gov't launches | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · May 27, 2025
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, May 27 (Yonhap) -- South Korea plans to send formal invitations to the 20 member states of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) for the upcoming summit as soon as the new government launches following the June 3 presidential election, a foreign ministry official said Tuesday.
The southeastern city of Gyeongju is set to host the multilateral summit between late October and early November, during which up to 3,500 high-level government officials from the member economies are expected to attend, including the leaders.
South Korea will hold the presidential vote next week to choose the successor to former President Yoon Suk Yeol, who was removed from office on April 4 over his botched martial law attempt.
"Since this is a regular annual event, we are planning under the assumption that all member states will attend," a ministry official told reporters on background.
The APEC host country typically sends invitations twice to inform the participating countries of the event schedule before the summit takes place.
Asked about U.S. President Donald Trump's potential visit to South Korea for the summit, the official said the government has been in talks with the U.S. side over the matter.
"We've repeatedly conveyed the importance of the APEC summit and emphasized the significance of President Trump's participation," she said. "Arrangements are being made on the assumption that he will make it to the event."
The official noted though that there has been no clear signal from Washington about Trump's potential attendance.
On the possibility of Chinese President Xi Jinping attending the forum, the official said there is a "shared understanding" with Beijing that Xi's participation in the APEC summit will serve as a "good opportunity to further develop bilateral relations," without elaborating further.
This file photo, taken Feb. 24, 2025, shows the Gyeongju Hwabaek Convention Center, the main venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, set to take place in Gyeongju, South Korea, around late October. (Yonhap)
elly@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · May 27, 2025
9. S. Korea to bolster cooperation with World Bank in helping developing nations: ministry
South Korea is a global pivital state that chooses to be a peaceful nuclear power, is a partner in the arsenal of democracies and supports the rules based international order.
And it is an example for all developing nations as it is the only OECD country to go from a major aid recipient to a major donor nation.
S. Korea to bolster cooperation with World Bank in helping developing nations: ministry
en.yna.co.kr
S. Korea to bolster cooperation with World Bank in helping developing nations: ministry | Yonhap News Agency
Kim Na-young
All News 17:30 May 27, 2025
SEOUL, May 27 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will work to strengthen cooperation with the World Bank as part of efforts to help developing nations advance their agriculture and food technologies, Seoul's finance ministry said Tuesday.
The Ministry of Economy and Finance held an annual meeting with officials from the World Bank in the southeastern port city of Busan to evaluate their collaboration projects under the Korea-World Bank Group Partnership Facility (KWPF) and discuss bilateral cooperation in future development assistance programs, according to ministry officials.
The KWPF is the biggest trust fund created by South Korea within the World Bank to provide assistance to developing countries in various sectors, from digital, health, agriculture and energy to job creation and innovation.
Since its establishment in 2013, the KWPF has provided a combined US$46.8 billion in support to 99 nations.
At this year's meeting, the finance ministry and the World Bank assessed their joint projects aimed at transferring South Korea's technologies in digital and eco-friendly agriculture sectors to Tanzania, Kenya and five other countries, and discussed ways to expand their partnership.
This undated file photo provided by the Ministry of Economy and Finance shows its office in the government complex in Sejong, about 120 kilometers south of Seoul. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
nyway@yna.co.kr
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Keywords
#World Bank
HOME All News
en.yna.co.kr
10. Ex-White House official highlights need for intelligence sharing to prevent cyberattacks
Ex-White House official highlights need for intelligence sharing to prevent cyberattacks | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · May 27, 2025
By Chang Dong-woo
SEOUL, May 27 (Yonhap) -- A former White House cybersecurity official on Tuesday stressed the need for enhanced intelligence sharing and corporate coordination in South Korea in response to a recent hacking incident involving SK Telecom Co., the country's largest mobile carrier.
Anne Neuberger, former U.S. deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technologies, also suggested that Chinese actors may have been involved in the incident, noting a history of past Chinese penetrations targeting telecom companies around the world.
"What I will say is that China has had a program of compromising telecoms around the world -- in the United States, in countries in Europe and in Australia," the former Biden administration official said at a cybersecurity seminar hosted by the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) in Seoul.
SK Telecom, with 25 million subscribers out of a population of 50 million, detected the cyberattack on April 18 and discovered signs of a large-scale leak of customers' USIM data. The incident is considered the worst hacking case in the nation's telecommunications history.
Neuberger said such intrusions could serve various objectives, including espionage or pre-positioning for disruption during a national crisis.
"If China launches cyberattacks, or in some cases puts malware and malicious software in those systems, the purpose could be espionage, for example, tracking travelers," she said. "But when it's pre-positioned in infrastructure like water systems or ports, it could be to enable China to disrupt those systems in a period of crisis or conflict."
Neuberger emphasized three key lessons learned from her time at the U.S. National Security Agency and the White House -- rapid intelligence sharing by governments, private-sector collaboration across competitors and international partnerships.
"Organizations like SK (Group) can bring companies together, CEOs and heads of technology, to privately and quietly share what they are seeing with regard to threats and what are the most effective defenses," she said. "And governments should rapidly share intelligence with those companies."
She encouraged South Korea to continue participating in initiatives, such as the country's trilateral cyber cooperation with the U.S. and Japan, and the International Counter Ransomware Initiative, a 71-country cyber cooperation platform.
Neuberger further warned of the broader escalation of cyberthreats not only from states like China, Russia and Iran, but also from criminal groups that disrupt critical infrastructure to extort money
"In the United States, we have had a significant rise in disruptive attacks against hospitals by criminals who seek to make money because they know that hospitals will pay to avoid disrupting life," she said.
This photo provided by the Federation of Korean Industries shows Anne Neuberger, former U.S. deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technologies, speaking at a cybersecurity seminar held in Seoul on May 27, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
odissy@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · May 27, 2025
11. Inside Korea's shipyards, a new kind of workforce is taking shape
We could learn from our Korean allies. But it would be best to establish a JAROKUS Shipbuilding Consortium.
Inside Korea's shipyards, a new kind of workforce is taking shape
As global workers become essential to the industry's survival, companies are creating an ecosystem of support — from language exams to halal meals and soccer leagues
https://www.chosun.com/english/2025/05/26/RYFL7UPRXVFCVHXMDMITVH4344/
By Han Yena,
Park Su-hyeon
Published 2025.05.26. 10:28
At 1:30 p.m. on May 12, inside a training room at HD Hyundai Heavy Industries’ shipyard in the southeastern city of Ulsan, about 50 workers from countries like Thailand and Sri Lanka sat with pens in hand and test papers before them. The title of the sheet: “10-Minute Test to Improve Korean Language Skills.”
On the page were illustrations of industrial tools—feeder, carriage, cutter, welder—with matching Korean terms to be identified. This wasn’t an entrance exam or a one-off language class. It was one of the twice-monthly Korean quizzes the department holds to help foreign workers better navigate the complexities of the job.
Language, here, is not just a means of communication—it’s a tool of survival, mobility, and, increasingly, upward mobility. Last year, HD Hyundai developed its own in-house language exam, the “HD TOPIK,” modeled after the official Korean proficiency test. Foreign workers who score well can be promoted to on-site supervisory roles. One top scorer among 500 test-takers, 31-year-old Vietnamese worker Go Kim-hae, said he improved his Korean by binge-watching local dramas and forming a study group with teammates.
Workers, both Korean and foreign, take a cheerful selfie after completing interior installation work on a ship at HD Hyundai Heavy Industries’ Hull 1 Team in Construction Division 2 on May 23, 2025./HD Hyundai Heavy Industries
South Korea’s “Big Three” shipbuilders—HD Hyundai, Hanwha Ocean, and Samsung Heavy Industries—are in the midst of a global renaissance. Together, they’ve secured a staggering 200 trillion won (about $150 billion) in orders just in the first quarter of 2025. But for all the headlines touting the revival of “K-shipbuilding,” there is a critical pressure point: labor.
After nearly a decade of industry slump, many skilled workers left the docks. Even now, with orders surging, recruitment remains sluggish. The work is grueling—welding, painting, assembling massive hulls under time pressure and tight safety regulations. And despite the long hours, wage competitiveness has eroded under South Korea’s 52-hour workweek cap.
Into this vacuum have stepped foreign workers.
As of the end of 2024, more than 20,000 of the 112,500 employees at the Big Three yards were foreign nationals—nearly one in six. In 2021, that figure was just 5 percent. Now, 80 percent of new hires are foreign-born, and companies expect the proportion to climb sharply in the coming years.
To retain talent, shipbuilders are scrambling to create an environment where these workers can stay, thrive—and, importantly, understand the job.
A foreign worker prepares for welding atHD Hyundai Heavy Industries’ shipyard in Ulsan, South Korea./HD Hyundai Heavy Industries
Shipyard jargon is difficult even for native speakers. Foreign workers must learn highly specific Korean terms like chubu (the precise alignment and tack welding of structures before full welds) or samtajeom junsu (keeping three body parts in contact with a ladder while climbing). These aren’t concepts that translation apps can easily explain.
Before starting shifts, safety briefings are conducted entirely in Korean. Team leaders sometimes present two photos—one of a ship’s structure with a proper safety railing, another without—and ask, “Which one shows the correct procedure?” It’s part quiz, part survival training.
“Accepting that the number of foreign workers will only grow, we decided to adapt quickly,” said Shin Sang-woon, a senior executive in HD Hyundai’s Shared Growth Division. “If we strengthen their capabilities, we strengthen Korea’s shipbuilding edge.”
Foreign workers eat lunch at a cafeteria at HD Hyundai Heavy Industries’ shipyard in Ulsan, South Korea./HD Hyundai Heavy Industries
The culture shift is visible far beyond the training room. In the shipyard cafeteria—a four-story building—entire floors are now reserved for what the company calls a “global menu.” On May 12, more than half the 400 seats were occupied by foreign workers. Forks were provided for those unused to chopsticks. Condiments included ketchup and sriracha. Ingredient labels indicated whether dishes contained beef or pork, sensitive details for workers observing religious restrictions.
The cultural convergence extends into the community. Interpreter interns from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies now do field work at the Ulsan yard. Nam Jin-woo, a 25-year-old Thai major, said, “I studied abroad in Thailand last year, but I speak more Thai in Ulsan than I did there.”
Other companies are taking similar steps. Hanwha Ocean offers a multilingual lifestyle app and winter clothing kits for workers from warmer climates. Samsung Heavy Industries runs a dedicated support center offering translation, counseling, and medical help.
Still, life outside the yard can be rough.
Cultural clashes have emerged around issues as basic as recycling. In countries like those in Southeast and Central Asia, waste sorting is often not practiced. Some foreign workers were seen collecting discarded items from recycling stations, leading to occasional friction with neighbors. To ease such tensions, companies and local governments are stepping in.
Efforts to bridge the cultural gap go beyond the workplace. In Ulsan, foreign workers have joined volunteer patrols with the local police. Earlier this year, a football club for foreign workers—“HD United”—was launched. The team plays friendly matches with local amateur leagues. After games, everyone shares bowls of seolleongtang, a traditional Korean ox-bone soup.
12. Editorial: S. Korea holds the cards in industries Trump wants most
Editorial: S. Korea holds the cards in industries Trump wants most
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/05/26/EH2HF3EUO5D7HG53GOD6YCMWFY/
By The Chosunilbo
Published 2025.05.26. 08:53
U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Phelan tours the HD Hyundai Heavy Industries shipyard in Ulsan with Chairman Chung Ki-sun on April 30. /Courtesy of HD Hyundai Heavy Industries
U.S. President Donald Trump has declared, “It’s time for nuclear,” and announced plans to quadruple the number of nuclear power plants over the next 25 years. He also signed four executive orders aimed at easing regulations on the nuclear industry. Trump has pledged to speed up nuclear plant construction and begin approving new projects within 18 months.
Electricity demand is surging amid the ongoing AI revolution. The U.S. is the world’s largest nuclear power operator with 94 reactors, surpassing France and China, which each have 57. However, China is now building more than 30 new reactors and is on track to overtake France and rival the U.S. in nuclear capacity within the next few years. While the U.S. built dozens of reactors annually in the 1960s and 1970s, construction nearly stopped after the 1979 Three Mile Island accident. Now, Trump aims to operate up to 400 reactors by 2050.
It is not just nuclear energy. In response to China’s growing naval power, Trump also signed an executive order in April to restore U.S. maritime dominance. During World War II, the U.S. led the world in shipbuilding, producing thousands of warships and massive cargo vessels in just days. This industrial strength helped establish America’s superpower status. However, decades of aggressive protectionism have weakened the U.S. shipbuilding industry, while China has strategically expanded its own, producing commercial and military vessels at scale. According to the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, China’s shipbuilding capacity is 233 times that of the U.S. Since last year, the U.S. Navy has visited South Korean shipyards, and voices within the U.S. are increasingly calling for warship production to be allowed in allied countries. Related legislation has even been introduced in Congress.
In the escalating U.S.–China rivalry, Trump’s top priorities lie in revitalizing the nuclear and shipbuilding industries, sectors where the U.S. has fallen behind while South Korea maintains global competitiveness. Rather than being dragged into Trump’s tariff battles, South Korea should leverage these two strategic industries to strengthen its negotiating power, build trust, and ultimately secure both national security and economic interests. This must be a top priority for the new administration.
13. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs
Download the 3 page CRS report here: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF10472/IF10472.39.pdf
Updated May 23, 2025
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs
Congressional Research Service
Overview
North Korea continues to advance its nuclear weapons and missile programs despite UN Security Council sanctions and high-level diplomatic efforts. The country’s ballistic missile testing, military parades, and policy statements suggest that North Korea is continuing to build a nuclear warfighting capability designed to evade regional ballistic missile defenses. Such an approach likely reinforces a deterrence and coercive diplomacy strategy—lending more credibility as it demonstrates capability—but it also raises questions about crisis stability and escalation control. Congress may wish to examine U.S. policy toward North Korea.
U.S. policy as well as UN resolutions call on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and missile programs. In recent years, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has repeatedly rejected “denuclearization” talks. According to the U.S. intelligence community’s 2025 annual threat assessment (ATA), Kim Jong-un views nuclear weapons as a “guarantor of regime security.”
In response, the United States and South Korea have conducted joint military drills and exercises, and established bilateral consultative mechanisms focused on strengthening extended deterrence such as the Nuclear Consultative Group to “discuss nuclear and strategic planning, and manage the threat the DPRK poses to the global nonproliferation regime.” The Biden Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review said, “Any nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime.” It maintains that U.S. nuclear weapons will continue to play a role in deterring “rapid strategic attacks” by North Korea in East Asia.
14. North Korean security chief departs for Moscow, expected to meet Sergei Shoigu
Collusion by two of the CRInK.
North Korean security chief departs for Moscow, expected to meet Sergei Shoigu
Russia dispatches reciprocal delegation to Pyongyang as faltering peace talks raise questions about DPRK role in Ukraine
https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/north-korean-security-chief-departs-for-moscow-expected-to-meet-sergei-shoigu/
Anton Sokolin May 27, 2025
Russian security chief Sergei Shoigu makes a speech at a banquet hosted by the DPRK defense ministry | Images: Rodong Sinmun (July 27, 2023)
A high-level North Korean delegation departed for Moscow on Monday to attend an international security meeting, which will likely feature talks with Russian security chief Sergei Shoigu amid questions about the DPRK military’s evolving role in the Ukraine war.
Led by Minister of State Security Ri Chang Dae, the delegation’s visit to the 13th International Meeting of High Representatives for Security Issues comes as U.S.-led peace talks have run aground and Moscow and Kyiv exchange massive air strikes, an escalation that one expert said could trigger additional deployments of North Korean troops and laborers.
DPRK state media reported the trip in a brief dispatch on Tuesday, while the Russian foreign ministry previously announced that Shoigu will hold talks with representatives from North Korea and other countries on the sidelines of the event.
DPRK state security minister Ri Chang Dae in April 2023 (left) and in June 2022 during party cadre reshuffles (right) | Images: KCTV (May 19, 2023), Rodong Sinmun (June 11, 2022), edited by NK News
The forum, scheduled to run from Tuesday to Thursday, has served as Moscow’s platform for discussing cooperation and security with foreign partners since 2010.
As the head of the North’s secret police, Ri met the chief of Russia’s foreign intelligence agency Sergei Naryshkin in Pyongyang last year to discuss boosting joint responses to “ever-growing spying and plotting moves by the hostile forces.”
In a reciprocal move, a delegation led by Russian deputy minister of internal affairs Vitaly Shulika landed in Pyongyang on Monday. Shulika’s ministry runs the police in Russia.
DPRK deputy minister of public security Ri Song Chol greeting his Russian counterpart Vitaly Shulika at Sunan International Airport on May 26, 2025 | Image: KCNA
1
2
The officials were greeted at Sunan International Airport by North Korean deputy chief of public security Ri Song Chol, whose ministry oversees the DPRK police, according to the Korean Central News Agency.
The delegation arrived aboard a Tu-154 operated by the Russian National Guard (RF-85735), with the jet flying below the radar, undetected by flight tracking services.
Ri traveled to Moscow last year to discuss “law enforcement cooperation” with internal affairs minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev. Kolokoltsev also visited Pyongyang in 2019 for talks on issues related to the extradition of criminals and DPRK overseas laborers.
The two countries signed a prisoner extradition treaty in 2017, which Moscow ratified two years later.
MORE TROOPS?
This week’s delegation exchange comes as Moscow launched its largest missile and drone attack on Ukraine over the weekend, drawing criticism from President Donald Trump amid U.S.-led attempts to broker peace. Kyiv has retaliated by launching hundreds of drones at the Russian capital and military industrial facilities.
Following the strikes, Ukraine’s Western allies, including the U.S., Germany, U.K. and France, lifted restrictions on delivering long-range missiles to Kyiv for strikes deep into Russian territory.
Chris Monday, a Russia researcher at Dongseo University, suggested that this round of talks between Russian and DPRK security officials could “set the stage for more North Korean troops entering the war.”
“Clearly the U.S.-Russia talks have hit a wall. The Kremlin war party might see this as a good time to escalate with North Korea,” he said.
North Korean paratroopers during drills at Kangdong training grounds in March 2024 | Image: KCTV (March 16, 2024)
Pointing to the West’s decision lifting restrictions on long-range capabilities for Ukraine, Monday said that Putin “has repeatedly stated this is a red line.”
“We saw this play out before,” he said. “Putin escalated asymmetrically by bringing in thousands of North Korean troops.”
Both Russia and North Korea have acknowledged the involvement of DPRK troops in repelling a Ukrainian incursion in the Kursk region. The two sides have also engaged in large-scale trade of munitions and artillery systems.
However, North Korean soldiers captured by Ukraine early this year appear to have been excluded from the largest prisoner of war swap between Moscow and Kyiv over the weekend, with the exchange of 1,000 POWs from each side as part of a deal struck during the first Russia-Ukraine talks earlier this month.
DPRK LABORERS
Another topic that could be on the agenda for this week’s security talks is the deployment of North Korean laborers to Russia.
Monday explained that the Russian police delegation in Pyongyang could discuss migration issues as a way to avoid offending North Korea after its troops didn’t join the large-scale military parade in Moscow earlier this month.
“Given Russia’s labor shortages and inflation, we could see a significant increase in the North Korean labor force,” he said, adding that Russian state media portrays North Koreans as “pure-hearted” and “ideal workers.”
North Korean laborers working on the Immortality Tower in Pyongyang | Image: NK News (Oct. 1, 2016)
Popular propaganda talk shows in Russia have also “criticized Central Asian guest workers,” he said, pointing to pundits’ calls to bring in “a million North Korean workers.”
Signs of nascent tensions between DPRK and Uzbek laborers were recently captured on camera in Vladivostok, with an argument between the two ethnic groups quickly escalating into a fight involving metal pipes.
While Russia has mainly employed North Korean workers in agriculture and its construction industry, Pyongyang also started dispatching highly trained professionals to work in Russia’s defense-industrial sector, particularly in the aircraft industry, Kyiv’s foreign intelligence chief said in a recent interview.
Thousands of North Korean nationals have entered Russia in recent years, most on student visas. But experts say education likely serves as a cover for the dispatch of foreign laborers in violation of U.N. sanctions.
Edited by Bryan Betts
15. ROK man arrested for helping North Korea rake in millions from gambling sites
Kim Jong Un survived because of support from illicit activities.
ROK man arrested for helping North Korea rake in millions from gambling sites
‘Ringleader’ of China-based syndicate worked with DPRK hackers to bring in over $17M for regime, prosecutors say
https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/rok-man-arrested-for-helping-north-korea-rake-in-millions-from-gambling-sites/
Anton Sokolin May 27, 2025
An example of an online casino developed by North Korean IT workers | Image: NIS (Feb. 14, 2024)
South Korean police have arrested an ROK national for allegedly working with North Korean cybercriminals to make and sell illegal gambling websites, raking in over $17 million for the Kim regime.
The 55-year-old man, reportedly surnamed Kim, faces charges of violating national security and concealing criminal proceeds, according to a statement by the Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office on Monday.
Seoul Metropolitan Police initially raided the man’s residence in Nov. 2023 upon his reentry to South Korea, according to prosecutors, and he has been in police custody since early May on suspicion of breaching the National Security Act by collaborating with North Korean cybercriminals affiliated with Bureau 313 in China.
The accused also faces charges under the Act on Regulation and Punishment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment. He was previously convicted in 2012 of distributing DPRK malware designed to acquire in-game items in titles like the online multiplayer game “Lineage.”
Prosecutors labeled him as the “ringleader” of a syndicate offering online casino services, stating that he sold 71 domains linked to 16 illegal gambling websites to domestic clients between 2022 and 2024.
Gambling is mostly illegal for South Korean nationals under the Criminal Act, except when recreational, but it remains widespread in the country and generates large sums of illegal revenue.
Prosecutors found that just from Oct. to Nov. 2023, the accused communicated with hackers from Bureau 313 — under control of the North’s Munitions Industry Department — and the Fifth Bureau of the General Reconnaissance Bureau on 1,181 occasions via Telegram and WeChat.
He allegedly discussed the development and maintenance of gambling sites with the hackers in Telegram chat rooms titled “Solution Error Check Room,” “Reel Game Development” and “Development Ads,” according to the statement.
As a result, Kim allegedly pocketed around $936,000 through shell accounts, disguising the money as “maintenance fees and in-game currency commissions.”
A chart outlining a scheme orchestrated by North Korean hackers to develop and distribute illegal gambling websites in South Korea with the help of a local resident who’s currently being investigated by ROK authorities | Image: Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office (May 26, 2025)
Altogether, the operation generated over $17.2 million in illicit proceeds over three years and five months, with at least 30% of the funds believed to have been transferred to DPRK cybercriminals and subsequently funneled to the North Korean regime.
“The prosecution will continue to seize and preserve confirmed criminal proceeds to block illegal profits and will strictly respond to individuals who threaten national security and democratic order for personal gain while exacerbating the risk of North Korean cyberterrorism against the ROK,” prosecutors said.
CHINA-BASED CRIME RING
According to prosecutors, the accused exploited “loose law enforcement” in China to conceal his scheme while enjoying low operating costs. His criminal ring allegedly targeted South Korean users and operated offshore to exploit limitations in ROK investigative reach.
Three of his accomplices still remain at large in China and Vietnam, with additional probes underway, prosecutors say.
The U.N.-sanctioned Bureau 313 was previously known as the Korea Computer Center and normally oversees North Korea’s IT strategy, operating offices in cities like Dandong. The outfit takes up illegal software contracts to earn foreign currency, while doubling as a cyberwarfare base against South Korea when needed, according to the prosecutors’ statement.
Seoul designated over a dozen North Korean operatives employed by Bureau 313, mostly active in China, last December in a move to crack down on Pyongyang’s schemes to raise funds for its nuclear and missile programs through thousands of IT workers stationed around the globe.
The Fifth Bureau, formerly known as Office 35, handles the DPRK’s overseas intelligence operations, according to ROK prosecutors. Office 35 previously operated in multiple Chinese cities, as well as in Japan, Europe and several African nations like Ethiopia and Tanzania.
Prosecutors noted that the Fifth Bureau’s agents often use fake Chinese identities while working for the China-based Kyonghung Information Technology Exchange Company, an entity under the control of the North Korean ruling party’s Office 39 tasked with raising cash for Kim Jong Un’s family.
The firm previously hired North Korean IT workers and created and sold gambling websites to South Korean crime rings, Seoul’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) found last year.
Kyonghung also embedded malicious code in gambling websites to obtain user data, then attempted to sell the personal information of over 1,000 South Koreans, using a server provided by its ROK partners to steal data from a local company, according to the NIS.
Researchers have estimated that North Korean cybercriminals stole nearly $800 million in cryptocurrency in 2024, or over a third of global totals, while doubling the amount last February in the $1.5 billion Bybit heist, the largest crypto theft in history.
Edited by Bryan Betts
16. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Explaining the Ukraine War to Citizens: "Russia's Patriotic War," "A Favorable Situation for Our Revolution" - Silence on Troop Deployment and Casualties
＜Inside N. Korea＞ Explaining the Ukraine War to Citizens: "Russia's Patriotic War," "A Favorable Situation for Our Revolution" - Silence on Troop Deployment and Casualties
asiapress.org
"My mother doesn't know I was sent to Russia." This is what a presumed 19-year-old soldier, captured by Ukrainian forces in early January 2025, answered during interrogation. Quoted from a video released by Ukraine.
In early May, North Korean authorities reportedly held lectures on world affairs for citizens, describing the Ukraine war as "a patriotic war by the Russian people to recover their territory." The Kim Jong-un regime secretly deployed North Korean soldiers to Russia around October last year to participate in combat against Ukrainian forces, but only officially acknowledged the deployment in late April. The "current affairs lectures" appear aimed at promoting the significance of the rapidly deepening relationship with Russia. This information was shared by a reporting partner who attended the lecture. (HONG Mari / KANG Ji-won)
◆ The Workers' Party Propaganda Department's "Current Affairs Lecture"
According to a reporting partner in Hyesan, Ryanggang Province, the current affairs lecture was held on May 7.
"Perhaps because we've sent troops to Russia, there was a lecture about world affairs for the first time in a while. A cadre from the Ryanggang Province Party Propaganda Department personally addressed gathered members of the Women's Union. The topic was 'Why are friendly cooperative relations with allied countries important?'" the reporting partner said.
※ The women's union's official name is the "Socialist Women's Union of Korea." It consists mainly of housewives who are not affiliated with workplaces.
◆ "Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un Controls World Affairs at Will"
The main points of the lecture, as conveyed by the reporting partner, were as follows:
● The United States has threatened Russia by providing weapons to Ukraine. The Ukraine war is a patriotic war by the Russian people to recover their territory.
● Russia, China, and developing countries are rising up to crush the schemes of imperialists. The person who foresaw the current situation (Kim Jong-un) is at the forefront, controlling world affairs at will.
● A favorable situation for our country's revolution is being created. Therefore, we must form good friendly cooperative relationships with allied countries based on principles of self-reliance and independence.
● Currently, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are exploiting the situation to make money by selling weapons.
However, there was no mention of North Korean troops' participation in the war during the lecture.
asiapress.org
17. North Korean POWs in Ukraine excluded from Moscow-Kyiv prisoner swap: South lawmaker
North Korean POWs in Ukraine excluded from Moscow-Kyiv prisoner swap: South lawmaker
The exclusion was in response to a request from South Korea, a lawmaker said.
By Taejun Kang for RFA
2025.05.27
https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2025/05/27/north-korea-pow-ukraine-russia-swap/
A North Korean soldier, right, identified as Ri, captured in Kursk and now at an unidentified detention center in Ukraine. Part of the image has been blurred by South Korean lawmaker Yu Yong-weon, left, who interviewed the soldier. (Yu Yong-weon)
TAIPEI, Taiwan – Two captured North Korean soldiers fighting with Russia in its war against Ukraine were not among the 1,000 prisoners of war recently repatriated by Ukraine to Russia due to a request from Seoul, said a South Korean lawmaker.
The soldiers, identified as Ri and Baek, were part of the more than 12,000 North Korean soldiers deployed to Russia’s Kursk region to fight Ukraine who occupied parts of the region in an August counteroffensive. The two were captured in January and have been in custody in Kyiv since then.
“I have confirmed through a Ukrainian source that Ri and Baek, former North Korean soldiers captured by Ukrainian forces, were excluded from the recent prisoner exchange list,” said Yu Yong-weon, a member of South Korea’s ruling People Power Party.
Russia and Ukraine agreed to a prisoner swap of 1,000 detainees each during negotiations in Istanbul, Turkey on May 16. From May 23, they exchanged around 300 prisoners daily for three days.
“Another source said that their exclusion from the exchange was in response to a request from the South Korean government, which the Ukrainian government honored,” Yu said.
“Please make every diplomatic effort to ensure they can set foot on the free soil of South Korea.”
Radio Free Asia has not independently verified the status of Ri and Baek.
Yu visited Ukraine in February and met with the two prisoners when Ri expressed a desire to defect to South Korea.
Legally, South Korea recognizes all North Koreans as citizens under its constitution. This means that any North Korean, including a prisoner of war, or POW, is entitled to South Korean nationality upon arrival.
South Korea’s foreign ministry said it had expressed a fundamental principle that it would accept any North Korean soldiers requesting to come to South Korea and had conveyed this position to the Ukrainian side.
Related Stories
Russia and North Korea have aligned closely since Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea for talks with Kim Jong Un and signed a mutual defense treaty during the Russian leader’s visit to Pyongyang last year. It elevated military cooperation and resulted in the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia.
Reports of the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia first surfaced in October. Even as evidence of their presence grew – including when North Korean soldiers were taken captive by Ukrainian forces in Kursk and interviewed – neither North Korea nor Russia acknowledged their presence until April.
South Korea’s main spy agency National Intelligence Service, or NIS, reported in April that among the North Korean troops deployed to Russia, there have been a total of 4,700 casualties, including 600 deaths.
The NIS estimated the North has deployed a total of 15,000 troops to Russia in two separate deployments.
Combat has decreased since March as Russian forces have retaken most of the territory in the western Kursk, where Ukrainian forces had advanced, the agency said.
While there is currently no visible movement for a third deployment, the possibility remains open, it added.
The NIS also noted that North Korean forces have shown significant improvement in combat capability, as their initial inexperience has diminished and they have become more familiar with new equipment such as drones.
However, the prolonged deployment has reportedly led to “behavioral issues” among the troops, including excessive drinking and theft.
In exchange for troop deployments and arms exports, North Korea is believed to have received from Russia reconnaissance satellite and launch vehicle technology assistance, drones, electronic warfare equipment and SA-22 surface-to-air missiles.
Additionally, North Korea is reportedly in discussions with Russia to modernize 14 industries, including metals, aviation, energy, and tourism. Around 15,000 North Korean workers are estimated to have been sent to Russia, the NIS said.
Edited by Mike Firn.
18. N. Korean police create 'invisible hierarchy' based on wealth and family ties
An "underground Songbun" system for the elte?
N. Korean police create 'invisible hierarchy' based on wealth and family ties - Daily NK English
North Korean police officers are selected through a draft system, just like those in the military
By Eun Seol - May 27, 2025
dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · May 27, 2025
FILE PHOTO: A group of North Korean security officers are seen at a park in Wonsan, Kangwon Province. (Daily NK)
Police departments in some parts of North Korea are organizing night watch duties based on officers’ wealth and family connections. This has led officers to complain that discrimination is affecting their security-related assignments.
A source in South Hamgyong province told Daily NK recently that financial and political status play a major role in determining which officers have to guard the entrance to the police department in Toksong county.
Poor officers get worst shifts
Police officers from the security and training team are assigned to guard the entrance in two-hour shifts around the clock. Officers from poor families or those with questionable political backgrounds are being given the late-night and early morning shifts that everyone wants to avoid.
The source explained that it has become standard practice at the Toksong police department to assign nighttime guard duties according to an unofficial hierarchy.
“Officers often bet money, alcohol, or cigarettes in card games, and those who can’t afford to join have to stand guard at the building entrance. These card games — which only wealthy people can afford to participate in — aren’t just games, but a form of power,” the source said.
The gambling officers are typically from financially or politically influential families. Not only is their gambling overlooked, but they’re also excused from the physically demanding nighttime guard duties.
In essence, officers who can’t afford to gamble end up repeatedly covering the unpopular nighttime guard shifts. The source said department members are openly complaining that late-night guard assignments are controlled by an “invisible hierarchy.”
Money and connections divide N. Korea’s police force
North Korean police officers are selected through a draft system, just like those in the military. Police service substitutes for mandatory military service. Those chosen for police work tend to come from families considered politically reliable.
Despite this selection process, a separate hierarchy based on family wealth and reputation has apparently developed within the police force, with officers at the bottom getting unfair job assignments.
“While people undoubtedly face discrimination in any organization because of their family’s financial and political status, the reality in the force is that those who can’t rely on financial resources or family connections keep getting stuck with the most exhausting shifts in the early morning hours,” the source said.
“North Korea is a country where financial, political, and family discrimination are widespread no matter where you go or what you do.”
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · May 27, 2025
19. Pyongyang elite face surprise electricity checks despite living in luxury apartments
Pyongyang elite face surprise electricity checks despite living in luxury apartments - Daily NK English
Inspection teams made up of neighborhood watch unit heads and local people's committee officials spent three hours going around about ten towers
By Jeong Seo-yeong - May 27, 2025
dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · May 27, 2025
Jonwi Street, which is located in northern Pyongyang. (Rodong Sinmin, News1)
North Korea is monitoring electricity usage in homes located in upscale high-rise apartments in elite neighborhoods of Pyongyang.
A Pyongyang source told Daily NK recently that the Pyongyang People’s Committee ordered residents to stop using electric heating at the beginning of May, when large amounts of power are needed in rural areas to support rice planting efforts.
Neighborhood watch units distributed orders signed by the people’s committee telling local residents of new high-rise apartments on Rimhung Street in Pyongyang’s Hwasong district and Jonwi Street in Sopo district not to turn on their electric heating or kitchen space heaters, even when it gets cold.
At neighborhood meetings, watch unit leaders reminded residents that Pyongyang citizens must lead by example in saving electricity if this year’s farming season is to succeed. “We’re incredibly fortunate just to be living in these new homes thanks to the generosity of Kim Jong Un and the Workers’ Party. We should all show a spirit of frugality and help the nation’s agriculture,” one neighborhood watch unit leader told local residents.
But as soon as the meetings ended, people began quietly grumbling and complaining.
The high-rise apartments on Rimhung Street and Jonwi Street were specifically designed for electric heating, and each unit’s kitchen has a designated spot for a space heater. Because of this, people view electricity not as an optional luxury, but as something they’re entitled to use.
Some people complained that the authorities were going back on their implied promise to allow electricity use, while others speculated that it would be okay to use a small amount of power when it was available.
But starting May 11, people’s committees in the Hwasong and Hyongjesan districts have been conducting surprise electricity inspections of high-rise apartment units on orders from the Pyongyang People’s Committee.
Inspectors call out those illegally using electricity
Inspection teams made up of neighborhood watch unit heads and local people’s committee officials spent three hours going around about ten towers, randomly knocking on doors when electricity was available.
Inspectors found evidence that electric heating and space heaters were being used in nearly all the units. The names of families caught in the act were then announced over the apartment intercom system.
The surprise inspections are ongoing. According to the source, a rumor is circulating in the apartment complex about the need to “be careful when there’s steady electricity in the evening, because that’s when the dreaded inspectors will show up.”
People are taking precautions against the inspections. Some are calling their neighbors to warn them about ongoing inspections, while others are sharing tips for avoiding detection.
“If the neighborhood watch unit head suddenly knocks on your door in the evening, don’t answer — that’s a sure sign of an inspection. Keep the lights off and pretend to be asleep,” one person advised.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · May 27, 2025
20. Korea's 2025 presidential race: Three visions for unification and national security
Not mentioned is the most comprehensive unification planning ever conducted: the 8.15 Unification Doctrine. All three candidates should embrace this.
Excerpts:
The three leading candidates in the 2025 presidential election each bring distinct philosophies and strategies to unification and national security. Lee Jae-myung outlines a pragmatic strategy for realistically achieving peaceful unification. Kim Moon-soo prefers responding decisively to North Korea by reinforcing South Korea’s systemic legitimacy. Lee Jun-seok represents the efficiency-focused manager who approaches unification not as a strategic state goal but from an administrative perspective.
If we were to label each candidate’s approach, Lee Jae-myung represents “inclusive pragmatism,” Kim Moon-soo advocates “conservative deterrence,” and Lee Jun-seok embodies “efficient managerialism.”
Korea's 2025 presidential race: Three visions for unification and national security - Daily NK English
The three leading candidates in the 2025 presidential election each bring distinct philosophies and strategies to unification and national security
By Moon Dong Wook - May 27, 2025
dailynk.com · by Moon Dong Wook · May 27, 2025
Officials from the Daegu Metropolitan City Election Commission conduct a campaign on the afternoon of May 14, 2025, at Igok Rose Park in Dalseo District, Daegu, to promote voter participation in the presidential election to be held on June 3. /Photo=Yonhap News
Why unification and North Korea policy define Korea’s presidential election
As Korea approaches its presidential election on June 3, 2025, questions of national security and unification have become more complex than ever. With North Korea’s nuclear threat looming large, U.S.-China strategic competition intensifying, and domestic divisions deepening, many Koreans are grappling with fundamental questions about whether Korean unification is necessary—or even possible.
The three frontrunners—Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party, Kim Moon-soo of the People Power Party, and Lee Jun-seok of the Reform Party—have presented distinctly different policy platforms. Their approaches to unification and North Korea policy reveal not just their views on national security and foreign policy, but their broader vision for Korea’s future direction and identity.
Lee Jae-myung: Pragmatic peace through economic engagement
Lee Jae-myung’s central approach centers on “sustainable peace and joint prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.” The Democratic Party candidate takes a pragmatic stance that emphasizes “conditional engagement” while building on the progressive tradition of North Korea policy.
His platform rests on three pillars: gradually reducing North Korea’s nuclear threat, easing military tensions on the peninsula, and maintaining deterrence through the U.S.-Korea alliance. To address the nuclear issue, Lee plans to develop a denuclearization roadmap and guide North Korea toward denuclearization through step-by-step, reciprocal measures.
What stands out is Lee’s strategy of advancing inter-Korean relations and achieving denuclearization not through military pressure or traditional diplomacy, but through multilateral economic and trade engagement. This represents a practical attempt to overcome the limitations of past efforts that relied heavily on aid to North Korea.
However, Lee’s platform lacks clarity on resolving practical challenges. He offers no medium- or long-term strategy for the peninsula’s future, nor does he explain how he would achieve “sustainable peace and joint prosperity.”
Moreover, Lee provides inadequate answers for overcoming persistent obstacles like North Korea’s questionable sincerity and entrenched resistance to change. He appears to have given limited consideration to improving North Korean citizens’ lives or transforming North Korean society.
Given the stark asymmetry between South and North Korea, an approach that relies solely on external environmental changes may prove insufficient.
Nevertheless, Lee’s platform demonstrates his commitment to organizing negotiations with the international community while focusing on national interests, rather than relying on the “goodwill” that many progressives have emphasized in the past. This represents a balanced approach that pursues practical gains without abandoning the broader goal of peninsula peace.
Kim Moon-soo: Unification through strength
On national security and unification, Kim Moon-soo prioritizes systemic competition and deterrence under his “strong state” banner. His platform emphasizes robust national security, featuring plans to restore state counterintelligence capabilities, introduce AI-based counterespionage systems, enhance nuclear deterrence against North Korea’s arsenal, and expand Korea’s global defense industry reach.
Kim’s unification and defense strategy focuses not on coexistence with North Korea but on using competition and pressure to force regime change. He apparently sees little value in dialogue unless it’s premised on the North Korean regime’s relaxation or complete collapse and reorganization under liberal democratic principles.
But reality is more complex. Korean Peninsula affairs are deeply intertwined with geopolitics, and North Korea operates within a security bloc with China and Russia. In such a complex strategic environment, unilateral pressure based on hard-line security thinking is unlikely to produce change in North Korea.
Furthermore, extended nuclear deterrence or nuclear sharing require substantial technological and financial resources. While Kim proposes securing necessary funding through innovative defense budget restructuring and prioritizing national security in government spending, questions remain about implementation details.
Even assuming Kim could overcome the significant obstacle of progressive control in the National Assembly through collaborative governance, deploying tactical nuclear weapons or NATO-style nuclear sharing would require consent from geopolitical players like the U.S. and Japan.
Kim’s policies prioritize state survival, balancing practical security threats with Korea’s constitutional identity. This approach may appeal to voters who favor muscular peninsula security policy, but many questions remain about whether it’s a viable path to unification.
Lee Jun-seok: Abolishing the unification ministry for government efficiency
Lee Jun-seok doesn’t address unification policy in his official platform, but in interviews, he’s offered the most radical prescription for the unification question—eliminating the Ministry of Unification.
Lee believes it’s inefficient to separate unification work from foreign policy and wants to bring North Korea policy under the foreign ministry’s umbrella. This isn’t merely administrative reshuffling—it fundamentally challenges the unification ministry’s reason for existence and symbolizes Lee’s political stance on Korea’s unification vision.
Lee offers three reasons for closing the unification ministry: (1) overlap with foreign ministry functions, (2) institutional ineffectiveness, and (3) minimal impact of previous ministers. The Reform Party candidate clarifies that while he doesn’t oppose unification itself, he questions the ministry’s structural significance and diplomatic role.
This stance reflects Lee’s broader “small government” advocacy, which seeks to maximize administrative efficiency and reduce costs by merging or eliminating inefficient agencies. Dismantling the unification ministry aligns with his vision of smaller government through reduced presidential authority, deregulation, and decentralization. However, it lacks specific details about who would handle the ministry’s unique responsibilities, such as civilian exchanges, family reunions, and North Korean defector assistance.
Whether small government philosophy suits the Korean Peninsula’s specific geopolitical reality is questionable. Moreover, closing the unification ministry might violate the constitutional principle of “peaceful unification based on free and democratic order” enshrined in Article 4.
The unification ministry isn’t just another government agency—for 56 years, it has symbolized and demonstrated South Korea’s commitment to achieving unification through free and democratic means. Regardless of actual intentions, shuttering the ministry could signal systematic erosion of Korea’s unification commitment.
Unification as strategy or ideal?
The three leading candidates in the 2025 presidential election each bring distinct philosophies and strategies to unification and national security. Lee Jae-myung outlines a pragmatic strategy for realistically achieving peaceful unification. Kim Moon-soo prefers responding decisively to North Korea by reinforcing South Korea’s systemic legitimacy. Lee Jun-seok represents the efficiency-focused manager who approaches unification not as a strategic state goal but from an administrative perspective.
If we were to label each candidate’s approach, Lee Jae-myung represents “inclusive pragmatism,” Kim Moon-soo advocates “conservative deterrence,” and Lee Jun-seok embodies “efficient managerialism.”
This presidential election involves more than simply installing a new administration. Constitutional amendments are likely, potentially leading to new national security and unification strategies that will shape the peninsula’s destiny for years to come.
Unification cannot be achieved through sentiment or ideals alone. Equally, security and efficiency by themselves are inadequate for addressing the fundamental challenge of building a Korean Peninsula community.
South Korean voters must view candidates’ unification and national security strategies not as partisan slogans but as concrete plans that could define the peninsula’s future. Whatever policy direction these candidates pursue, they ultimately bear responsibility for protecting the nation and charting a course on unification.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Moon Dong Wook · May 27, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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