Quotes of the Day:

"Another voice, Mercy Otis Warren, a philosopher and historian during our revolution put it this way, "The study of the human character at once opens a beautiful and a deformed picture of the soul. We there find a noble principle implanted in the nature of people, but when the checks of conscience are thrown aside, humanity is obscured." I have had the privilege for nearly half a century of making films about the US, but I have also made films about us. That is to say the two letter, lowercase, plural pronoun. All of the intimacy of "us" and also "we" and "our" and all of the majesty, complexity, contradiction, and even controversy of the US. And if I have learned anything over those years, it's that there's only us. There is no them. And whenever someone suggests to you, whomever it may be in your life that there's a them, run away. Othering is the simplistic binary way to make and identify enemies, but it is also the surest way to your own self imprisonment, which brings me to a moment I've dreaded and forces me to suspend my longstanding attempt at neutrality."

– Ken Burns

"Let us realize that: the privilege to work is a gift, the power to work is a blessing, the love of work is success!"

– David O. McKay

"Formal education will make you a living; self-education will make you a fortune."

– Jim Rohn

1. ROK-US alliance and Trump's possible return

2. North Korea’s Fiery Spy-Satellite Test Shows More Than Failure

3. ROK-US alliance and Trump's possible return

4. China, Japan and South Korea Hold Regional Summit Overshadowed by U.S.

5. Seoul says N. Korea's next spy satellite launch likely to take 'considerable' time

6. N. Korea apparently voices complaint against China via rebukes on trilateral summit: Seoul

7. U.S. condemns N. Korea's rocket launch, warns its isolation will only intensify

8. Yoon asks for China's cooperation on N.K. defector issue

9. Chronology of North Korea's space vehicle launches

10. Nuclear envoys of S. Korea, U.S., Japan condemn N.K. spy satellite launch attempt

11. S. Korea, U.S. stage joint air drills amid tension over failed N.K. satellite launch

12. S. Korea seeks educational support for N. Korean defectors' children born abroad

13. Return to Reforger: A Cold War Exercise Model for Pacific Deterrence

14. It’s time to rethink US military ties with South KoreaIt’s time to rethink US military ties with South Korea

15. North Korea blames ‘new-type engine’ for satellite launch failure

16. Serious misconduct in Kim Jong Un's personal guard unit leads to personnel reshuffle

1. ROK-US alliance and Trump's possible return

Who is the 2024 Asian/Korean "X"?

Excerpts:

Against this background, it may be time for the U.S. Embassy in Korea to prepare for a long telegram like what George Kennan did some 70 years ago. A thorough yet striking, patriotic yet balanced recommendation should be delivered to Trump and his aides when and if he is elected. George Kennan's long telegram from his diplomatic compound in Moscow spoke volumes on how serving it can be to the motherland. Since then, we have not heard of such a daunting undertaking by an American embassy, a task that shaped the foundation of an American foreign policy that would be long-lasting with a sounding base.

...

An "X" from the American Embassy in Seoul should prepare for a long telegram. It will not only serve the interests of America and its allies in the region but also our commitment to upholding the liberal international order against revisionists. Our commitment to the liberal international order is founded on the Indo-Pacific Strategy. The Strategy is premised on the perpetual effectiveness of the American alliance system. Vexing questions raised by Trump and his aides in recent times are not big enough to accommodate the fate of the Pacific Ocean and the security of America's homeland. I am sure Trump and his aides won't want to be remembered as those who allowed far flung threats to have reached the shores of America.

ROK-US alliance and Trump's possible return

The Korea Times · May 27, 2024

By Choo Jae-woo

The talk of the town in Seoul lingers around Trump's almost derogatory-like contempt for the value of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Should he get elected as the next president of the United States come November, a rift, if not rupture, may arise among the allies. Internal moves have been triggered by former President Donald Trump, who's seeking another chance at the post, and his former aides like Eldridge Colby, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and power development and Chris Miller, former interim secretary of defense.

They have been persistent in challenging the alliance's solidarity, integrity and core values. Questions like who should pay more to keep the alliance and why the U.S. should defend Korea are only vexing to those who deeply care about the strategic interests of the U.S. and its allies, let alone world peace and stability.

Against this background, it may be time for the U.S. Embassy in Korea to prepare for a long telegram like what George Kennan did some 70 years ago. A thorough yet striking, patriotic yet balanced recommendation should be delivered to Trump and his aides when and if he is elected. George Kennan's long telegram from his diplomatic compound in Moscow spoke volumes on how serving it can be to the motherland. Since then, we have not heard of such a daunting undertaking by an American embassy, a task that shaped the foundation of an American foreign policy that would be long-lasting with a sounding base.

There is not an alliance of America as unique as that with the Republic of Korea. Not for its military capacity or defense capability but for its geographical location and geostrategic implications, in addition to its eclectic demographic structure, should it stand tall above all other allies. For these reasons, Korea is different from other allies. The gist of the difference is that it has its own exit to fall back on should America keep playing with its commitment to the alliance. It is also for the same reasons adversarial competitors would like to conceive Korea as one of the weakest links in the American alliance system.

Korea's own unique demographic structure is one area that makes the alliance vulnerable. Since the country was partitioned before the war in 1950, one natural consequence was that there exists a great portion of the Korean people who are sympathetic to North Korea for separated families and homesickness reasons. The division of the Korean Peninsula perpetuated such a sentiment to only congeal a hard feeling toward those external forces responsible for the divided situation.

Those in the South who would like to defer the responsibility to the U.S. are in the same line as those in the North. They are sympathetic toward political factions, including those holding anti-U.S., anti-Japan and pro-China stances. They could act with a jolt should the next American administration overwhelm the Korean public with excess demands on cost sharing or pressure it with a possible withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. If this were to happen, the prospect of the ROK-U.S. alliance being thrown forwards cannot be discarded.

The premise of the alliance should, therefore, be built on one critical foundation: its geographic location, geostrategic implications and military capacity are non-negotiable. Trump and his aides should ruminate on this aspect of the alliance. The ROK-U.S. alliance is located in the center of China's first-island defense zone. By the alliance's sheer location, America has already nullified China's anti-access/area denial strategy. With Japan having a constraint like the so-called Peace Constitution effective to date and preventing it from making a full-fledged offensive military assistance to America's cause, and Australia being physically too far apart and having undersized military capacity with active duty combat forces standing at a mere 57,000, one-tenth of Korea's, no allies in the Indo-Pacific region can fight hand-in-hand with the U.S. No doubt the ROK-U.S. alliance is the linchpin to the American alliance system. The alliance is irreplaceable.

Trump, should he become the next president, must read Mira Rapp-Hooper's book, "Shields of the Republic." It will evoke the original notion and purposes of the American alliance system. The intent was to keep potential threats as far from the U.S. as possible by fortressing forward defense capabilities in ally countries. The second purpose is to deter far-flung threats from daring to militarily challenge the U.S. allies in the region. The last purpose is to, therefore, keep America's homeland safe and secure by keeping its distance from the threats and not allowing them to reach the shores of America. The ROK-U.S. alliance fulfills the entire prerequisites to the defense of America's homeland.

Without the ROK-U.S. alliance, the defense of America's first island-chain would be impossible. It will be turned over to China. China's aggressive approach to the South Pacific also makes the third island-chain and beyond already vulnerable. If Beijing succeeds in securing the South Pacific as it envisions, the second island-chain will be sandwiched, putting the fate of Guam and Saipan in danger. China's ambition has been long-standing. It became first known in 1896 when one of the Chinese reformists Liang Qichao was on his way to the U.S. He had a chance to appreciate the vastness of the Pacific Ocean in Hawaii and shared the same thought the incumbent Chinese leader Xi Jinping once expressed in 2013. The Pacific Ocean is vast enough to accommodate both China and the U.S.

An "X" from the American Embassy in Seoul should prepare for a long telegram. It will not only serve the interests of America and its allies in the region but also our commitment to upholding the liberal international order against revisionists. Our commitment to the liberal international order is founded on the Indo-Pacific Strategy. The Strategy is premised on the perpetual effectiveness of the American alliance system. Vexing questions raised by Trump and his aides in recent times are not big enough to accommodate the fate of the Pacific Ocean and the security of America's homeland. I am sure Trump and his aides won't want to be remembered as those who allowed far flung threats to have reached the shores of America.

Choo Jae-woo (jwc@khu.ac.kr) is a professor of international relations at Kyung Hee University and director of the China Center at the Korea Research Institute for National Security. He was a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution.

The Korea Times · May 27, 2024

2. North Korea’s Fiery Spy-Satellite Test Shows More Than Failure

Here are my thoughts on yesterday's failed launch:

My first thought is that the ROK continues to lead in the space race.

Did the north receive any technical assistance from Russia? If so, it clearly was not enough. However, if the intent was to advance its space and missile programs we should always keep in mind that we can often learn more from failure than success. While this is an apparent setback it could lead to improvements in future launches.

The regime seems like it might be desperate for some kind of success. It has obviously failed in this case.

Is this a response to the trilateral summit with the ROK, Japan, and China? If so it only embarrasses the regime.

Lastly and my biggest concern is whether the regime is conducting its recent malign activities because of internal stresses that threaten the regime. Is the regime deliberately trying to raise tensions to create the perception of external threats? What is going on inside north Korean that is making Kim fearful so that he must act out against the alliance? Do these activities contribute to regime stability? Or do they only increase the potential for internal instability

The above are themes/messages that should be considered for dissemination as part of an information and influence strategy to undermine the legitimacy of the Kim family regime as well as to inform the Korean and US publics as well as the international community about what Kim Jong Un is doing and why.

North Korea’s Fiery Spy-Satellite Test Shows More Than Failure

Pyongyang makes a debut attempt to use propellant technology used by space powers like the U.S. and China

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/north-koreas-fiery-spy-satellite-test-shows-more-than-failure-d1b72e0f?mod=hp_lista_pos2

By Dasl Yoon

Follow

May 28, 2024 5:18 am ET

A person watching the satellite launch at a train station in Seoul. The rocket exploded during an early stage of the flight. PHOTO: JEON HEON-KYUN/SHUTTERSTOCK

SEOUL—North Korea suffered another fireball of failure on Monday, botching its third spy-satellite launch in just a year, but the latest misstep revealed a key ambition for one of Kim Jong Un’s marquee military projects.

Pyongyang seems intent on developing a higher-thrust engine that is powerful enough to carry multiple satellites on a single rocket, weapons analysts say.

The Kim regime’s unsuccessful first go-round with advanced rocket-propellant technology shows how the country still has sizable technological gaps, despite major weapons advances elsewhere and presumed assistance from Russia.

Expectations for North Korea’s satellite launch have remained elevated after Kim traveled to Russia in September to meet President Vladimir Putin, who promised to help with North Korea’s space endeavors. Since then, South Korean officials have said many Russian technicians had entered North Korea and that several Kim regime engine tests were detected before the launch on Monday. 

In the past, North Korea appeared to have relied on hydrogen as fuel and so-called “red fuming nitric acid” as the oxidizer necessary for rocket combustion. On Monday, North Korea attributed the failure to a newly developed engine reliant on petroleum and liquid oxygen.

North Korea placed its first spy satellite into orbit last November, following two failed liftoffs.  PHOTO: KCNA/REUTERS

It isn’t unusual for satellite launches to fail, especially for countries like North Korea that have little experience launching space rockets, weapons analysts say, and even help from Russia may not have been enough in testing a new method. 

That is technology embraced by the world’s space powers, such as the U.S., Russia and China, said Yang Uk, a military expert at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul. SpaceX’s Falcon 9, for instance, uses kerosene fuel, a petroleum product, and liquid oxygen for its propellants. 

“Changing the oxidizer isn’t necessarily complicated technology,” Yang said. “But if you’ve never developed or used it, you need someone’s advice and that was likely Russia.” 

Nations with advanced space programs have also moved away from using hydrogen, due to the toxic substances released as fuel burns, the lengthy fueling time and the higher rates of explosion, said Hong Min, head of North Korean research at the Korea Institute for National Unification, a state-funded think tank in Seoul. 

North Korea’s long-range missiles overlap in technology with the country’s satellites, which is a reason why such activity is barred by the United Nations Security Council. But longer term, the new propellants could mean Pyongyang’s missiles experience fewer test failures due to hydrogen fuel that ignites easily. 

“Russia, China and even South Korea are using the same fuel, and North Korea may have taken Russia’s advice in shifting to the safer global option,” Hong said. “Eventually it could also help advance North Korea’s ICBM technology.” 

Monday’s satellite launch came shortly after the leaders of China, Japan and South Korea met in Seoul for their first trilateral meeting since 2019. The rocket was launched from Sohae Satellite Launching Station on North Korea’s west coast but exploded during an early stage of the flight, according to Pyongyang’s state media. South Korea’s military said it detected debris scattered over North Korean waters a few minutes after liftoff. 

Inside a Top-Secret U.S. Military Bunker as North Korea Tensions Rise

Inside a Top-Secret U.S. Military Bunker as North Korea Tensions Rise

Play video: Inside a Top-Secret U.S. Military Bunker as North Korea Tensions Rise

WSJ’s Timothy Martin goes inside an underground bunker complex where operations of U.S. and South Korean forces would be centralized during a war with the Kim Jong Un regime. Photo: Diana Chan

North Korea placed its first spy satellite into orbit last November, following two failed liftoffs. In January, Kim vowed to launch three more reconnaissance satellites this year as he called for an “overwhelming war response capability” to deter the U.S. 

Pyongyang received assistance from Moscow for its November launch, with Russia analyzing the data of previous launches for the Kim regime, South Korea’s spy agency said. In February, South Korea’s defense minister said the North Korean satellite appeared to be orbiting Earth without activity, despite Pyongyang’s claims that its satellite was functioning and capturing images from space. 

Footage filmed on Monday by an observation device on a South Korean patrol vessel showed what appeared to be an explosion in the sky followed by flashes. A video by Japanese broadcaster NHK showed a fiery ball flying into the sky and then bursting into flames near the border between China and North Korea. Japanese officials had briefly issued an emergency warning for residents of the island of Okinawa to take cover.

Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com

3. ROK-US alliance and Trump's possible return

Who is the 2024 Asian/Korean "X"?

Excerpts:

Against this background, it may be time for the U.S. Embassy in Korea to prepare for a long telegram like what George Kennan did some 70 years ago. A thorough yet striking, patriotic yet balanced recommendation should be delivered to Trump and his aides when and if he is elected. George Kennan's long telegram from his diplomatic compound in Moscow spoke volumes on how serving it can be to the motherland. Since then, we have not heard of such a daunting undertaking by an American embassy, a task that shaped the foundation of an American foreign policy that would be long-lasting with a sounding base.

...

An "X" from the American Embassy in Seoul should prepare for a long telegram. It will not only serve the interests of America and its allies in the region but also our commitment to upholding the liberal international order against revisionists. Our commitment to the liberal international order is founded on the Indo-Pacific Strategy. The Strategy is premised on the perpetual effectiveness of the American alliance system. Vexing questions raised by Trump and his aides in recent times are not big enough to accommodate the fate of the Pacific Ocean and the security of America's homeland. I am sure Trump and his aides won't want to be remembered as those who allowed far flung threats to have reached the shores of America.

ROK-US alliance and Trump's possible return

The Korea Times · May 27, 2024

By Choo Jae-woo

The talk of the town in Seoul lingers around Trump's almost derogatory-like contempt for the value of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Should he get elected as the next president of the United States come November, a rift, if not rupture, may arise among the allies. Internal moves have been triggered by former President Donald Trump, who's seeking another chance at the post, and his former aides like Eldridge Colby, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and power development and Chris Miller, former interim secretary of defense.

They have been persistent in challenging the alliance's solidarity, integrity and core values. Questions like who should pay more to keep the alliance and why the U.S. should defend Korea are only vexing to those who deeply care about the strategic interests of the U.S. and its allies, let alone world peace and stability.

Against this background, it may be time for the U.S. Embassy in Korea to prepare for a long telegram like what George Kennan did some 70 years ago. A thorough yet striking, patriotic yet balanced recommendation should be delivered to Trump and his aides when and if he is elected. George Kennan's long telegram from his diplomatic compound in Moscow spoke volumes on how serving it can be to the motherland. Since then, we have not heard of such a daunting undertaking by an American embassy, a task that shaped the foundation of an American foreign policy that would be long-lasting with a sounding base.

There is not an alliance of America as unique as that with the Republic of Korea. Not for its military capacity or defense capability but for its geographical location and geostrategic implications, in addition to its eclectic demographic structure, should it stand tall above all other allies. For these reasons, Korea is different from other allies. The gist of the difference is that it has its own exit to fall back on should America keep playing with its commitment to the alliance. It is also for the same reasons adversarial competitors would like to conceive Korea as one of the weakest links in the American alliance system.

Korea's own unique demographic structure is one area that makes the alliance vulnerable. Since the country was partitioned before the war in 1950, one natural consequence was that there exists a great portion of the Korean people who are sympathetic to North Korea for separated families and homesickness reasons. The division of the Korean Peninsula perpetuated such a sentiment to only congeal a hard feeling toward those external forces responsible for the divided situation.

Those in the South who would like to defer the responsibility to the U.S. are in the same line as those in the North. They are sympathetic toward political factions, including those holding anti-U.S., anti-Japan and pro-China stances. They could act with a jolt should the next American administration overwhelm the Korean public with excess demands on cost sharing or pressure it with a possible withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. If this were to happen, the prospect of the ROK-U.S. alliance being thrown forwards cannot be discarded.

The premise of the alliance should, therefore, be built on one critical foundation: its geographic location, geostrategic implications and military capacity are non-negotiable. Trump and his aides should ruminate on this aspect of the alliance. The ROK-U.S. alliance is located in the center of China's first-island defense zone. By the alliance's sheer location, America has already nullified China's anti-access/area denial strategy. With Japan having a constraint like the so-called Peace Constitution effective to date and preventing it from making a full-fledged offensive military assistance to America's cause, and Australia being physically too far apart and having undersized military capacity with active duty combat forces standing at a mere 57,000, one-tenth of Korea's, no allies in the Indo-Pacific region can fight hand-in-hand with the U.S. No doubt the ROK-U.S. alliance is the linchpin to the American alliance system. The alliance is irreplaceable.

Trump, should he become the next president, must read Mira Rapp-Hooper's book, "Shields of the Republic." It will evoke the original notion and purposes of the American alliance system. The intent was to keep potential threats as far from the U.S. as possible by fortressing forward defense capabilities in ally countries. The second purpose is to deter far-flung threats from daring to militarily challenge the U.S. allies in the region. The last purpose is to, therefore, keep America's homeland safe and secure by keeping its distance from the threats and not allowing them to reach the shores of America. The ROK-U.S. alliance fulfills the entire prerequisites to the defense of America's homeland.

Without the ROK-U.S. alliance, the defense of America's first island-chain would be impossible. It will be turned over to China. China's aggressive approach to the South Pacific also makes the third island-chain and beyond already vulnerable. If Beijing succeeds in securing the South Pacific as it envisions, the second island-chain will be sandwiched, putting the fate of Guam and Saipan in danger. China's ambition has been long-standing. It became first known in 1896 when one of the Chinese reformists Liang Qichao was on his way to the U.S. He had a chance to appreciate the vastness of the Pacific Ocean in Hawaii and shared the same thought the incumbent Chinese leader Xi Jinping once expressed in 2013. The Pacific Ocean is vast enough to accommodate both China and the U.S.

An "X" from the American Embassy in Seoul should prepare for a long telegram. It will not only serve the interests of America and its allies in the region but also our commitment to upholding the liberal international order against revisionists. Our commitment to the liberal international order is founded on the Indo-Pacific Strategy. The Strategy is premised on the perpetual effectiveness of the American alliance system. Vexing questions raised by Trump and his aides in recent times are not big enough to accommodate the fate of the Pacific Ocean and the security of America's homeland. I am sure Trump and his aides won't want to be remembered as those who allowed far flung threats to have reached the shores of America.

Choo Jae-woo (jwc@khu.ac.kr) is a professor of international relations at Kyung Hee University and director of the China Center at the Korea Research Institute for National Security. He was a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution.

The Korea Times · May 27, 2024

4. China, Japan and South Korea Hold Regional Summit Overshadowed by U.S.

Did China make any progress in trying to drive wedges in the US alliance system? I think not.

Excerpts:

China is betting that it can court Japan and South Korea by offering greater access to its market and diminish some of Washington’s influence. To that end, China has agreed to restart talks on a free-trade agreement between the three neighbors, emphasizing greater economic cooperation as a means to maintain regional peace and stability.

It has cast the United States as a meddler in Asian affairs that is pressuring Japan and South Korea to form a bloc to keep China’s development in check. Washington has imposed a wall of restrictions to deny Beijing access to the latest semiconductors, and is urging allies like Japan and South Korea to cooperate.

On Monday, Mr. Li indirectly criticized Washington by calling for a “multipolar” world order and opposing any attempt to create “blocs” and to “politicize” trade issues.

In recent years, Japan and South Korean have grown closer, improving relations long strained by historical disputes. They have also expanded trilateral military cooperation with the United States to deter North Korea and China.

Japan and South Korea urged China to address their increasing difficulty in doing business in China. Mr. Kishida called for the early release of Japanese nationals detained in China on suspicion of espionage.

During bilateral talks on Sunday, South Korea and China agreed to start new channels to discuss security issues and cooperation in supply chains, said Kim Tae-hyo, a deputy national security director in Mr. Yoon’s office.

Mr. Yoon’s policy of aligning South Korea more closely with the United States has overlapped with a sharp drop in South Korea’s exports to China. The United States this year replaced China as South Korea’s biggest export market for the first time in two decades, according to government data.

China, Japan and South Korea Hold Regional Summit Overshadowed by U.S.

In the first trilateral meeting since 2019, the neighbors sought common ground in trade and cultural exchange while tiptoeing around thorny security issues.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/27/world/asia/china-japan-korea-trilateral.html?referringSource=articleShare&smid=nytcore-ios-share&utm

President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea, center, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan, left, and Chinese Premier Li Qiang at a joint news conference in Seoul on Monday.Credit...Pool photo by Kim Hong-Ji

By Choe Sang-Hun

Reporting from Seoul

May 27, 2024

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The leaders of South Korea and Japan on Monday sought to restore economic cooperation with China, their biggest trading partner, after years of souring relations, but their three-way talks were overshadowed by heightened tensions between China and the United States, Seoul and Tokyo’s most important military ally.

The trilateral meeting — featuring President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan and Premier Li Qiang, the second-highest official in China — was the first in four and a half years.

Talks focused mainly on areas where common ground could more easily be found, such as protecting supply chains, promoting trade and cooperating on the challenges of aging populations and emerging infectious diseases. The leaders tiptoed around thorny regional security issues like Taiwan and North Korea.

“The three nations agreed to expand practical cooperation in a way their people can feel its benefits,” Mr. Yoon said during a joint news conference with Mr. Kishida and Mr. Li, announcing 2025 and 2026 as the “years of cultural exchanges” among the three nations.

But North Korea helped highlight the major differences among the three neighbors on Monday. Hours before their meeting began, it announced a plan to place a military spy satellite into orbit. It followed through after the summit ended, launching a long-range rocket carrying the satellite from its space station in northwestern North Korea.

The country is barred by United Nations Security Council resolutions from launching such rockets because they use the same technology needed to build intercontinental ballistic missiles.

More on China

• A Recipe for Total Control: Reviving a Mao-era surveillance campaign, Chinese authorities are tracking residents, schoolchildren and businesses to forestall any potential unrest.
• Housing Crisis Plan: China has nearly four million apartments that no one wants to buy, a combined expanse of unwanted living space roughly the area of Philadelphia. Xi Jinping, the country’s leader, and his deputies have called on the government to buy them.
• Military Drills Around Taiwan: China launched two days of military drills surrounding Taiwan in what it called a “strong punishment” to its opponents on the self-governing island, after Taiwan’s new president pledged to defend its sovereignty.
• Challenges for Chinese Businesses: As the distrust between China and the United States deepens, Chinese companies are caught between their own authoritarian government and a hostile U.S. government.

North Korea’s increasingly aggressive military posture has deepened concerns in South Korea and Japan. The North has also expanded arms trade with Russia in defiance of U.N. sanctions, shipping artillery shells and missiles for Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine, according to American and South Korean officials. In return, Moscow is accused of providing energy and technological assistance that could help North Korea’s missile program.

South Korea and Japan have called on China, North Korea’s biggest benefactor, to use its economic influence to help rein in Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs. So far, Beijing has been reluctant to use that leverage, considering North Korea a buffer against the American military on the Korean Peninsula.

Image

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan and President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea during the trilateral summit on Monday.Credit...Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images

On Monday, both Mr. Yoon and Mr. Kishida vehemently criticized North Korea’s satellite launch plan. But Mr. Li, who serves under Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, did not denounce North Korea, only calling for all parties to “exercise restraint” and work for a “political settlement.”

As the news conference was wrapping up in Seoul, 20 South Korean warplanes conducted an airstrike drill south of the inter-Korean border as a warning of “immediate and strong” retaliation against North Korean provocation.

China, Japan and South Korea had agreed to hold a trilateral meeting every year starting in 2008 to discuss regional cooperation. But the plan has often been disrupted by diplomatic spats and most recently by the pandemic. The meeting held in Seoul on Monday was the ninth such gathering and the first since December 2019.

During the yearslong gap, the strategic competition between Washington and Beijing has intensified, also souring relations between China and the two United States allies. China has flexed its military muscle and expanded its territorial ambitions in the South and East China Seas, while the United States, Japan and South Korea have increased joint military drills and strengthened missile defense and other security cooperation.

China’s ties with the two U.S. allies have become so testy in recent years that analysts observed that simply reviving the trilateral summit was an achievement. But common interests compelled Beijing and its two neighbors to revive it.

Mr. Yoon said on Monday that the three nations agreed to hold the summit meetings regularly.

The East Asian neighbors, which together account for more than one-fifth of global economic output, need regional stability and cooperation, especially in supply chains, to recover from their post-pandemic economic slowdown. Although Japan and South Korea consider the United States their most important ally, together hosting 80,000 American troops on their territories, their leaders have faced pressure at home from businesses vying to improve access to China.

China is betting that it can court Japan and South Korea by offering greater access to its market and diminish some of Washington’s influence. To that end, China has agreed to restart talks on a free-trade agreement between the three neighbors, emphasizing greater economic cooperation as a means to maintain regional peace and stability.

It has cast the United States as a meddler in Asian affairs that is pressuring Japan and South Korea to form a bloc to keep China’s development in check. Washington has imposed a wall of restrictions to deny Beijing access to the latest semiconductors, and is urging allies like Japan and South Korea to cooperate.

On Monday, Mr. Li indirectly criticized Washington by calling for a “multipolar” world order and opposing any attempt to create “blocs” and to “politicize” trade issues.

Image

Chinese Premier Li Qiang speaking in Seoul on Monday.Credit...Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images

In recent years, Japan and South Korean have grown closer, improving relations long strained by historical disputes. They have also expanded trilateral military cooperation with the United States to deter North Korea and China.

Japan and South Korea urged China to address their increasing difficulty in doing business in China. Mr. Kishida called for the early release of Japanese nationals detained in China on suspicion of espionage.

During bilateral talks on Sunday, South Korea and China agreed to start new channels to discuss security issues and cooperation in supply chains, said Kim Tae-hyo, a deputy national security director in Mr. Yoon’s office.

Mr. Yoon’s policy of aligning South Korea more closely with the United States has overlapped with a sharp drop in South Korea’s exports to China. The United States this year replaced China as South Korea’s biggest export market for the first time in two decades, according to government data.

David Pierson contributed reporting.

Choe Sang-Hun is the lead reporter for The Times in Seoul, covering South and North Korea. More about Choe Sang-Hun

5. Seoul says N. Korea's next spy satellite launch likely to take 'considerable' time

How much help have they received from RUssia and how much can they expect and will such help pay off?

Seoul says N. Korea's next spy satellite launch likely to take 'considerable' time | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · May 28, 2024

By Lee Minji and Chae Yun-hwan

SEOUL, May 28 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean military said Tuesday that engine combustion problems are behind North Korea's botched space rocket launch and Pyongyang would need "considerable time" to prepare for its next spy satellite launch.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) made the assessment a day after a North Korean rocket carrying the satellite, the Malligyong-1-1, exploded soon after liftoff from the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground on the North's northwest coast.

An official of the North's national aerospace agency said the launch "failed due to the air blast of the new-type satellite carrier rocket during the first-stage flight," adding the "accident" was attributed to the operational reliability of a new "liquid oxygen plus petroleum" engine.

"Following its first launch (in May), the North said it will conduct an additional launch as soon as possible, but this time the North only said a preliminary conclusion has been made, raising views it will take considerable time," the JCS official told reporters.

This photo, provided by South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 28, 2024, shows the explosion of a North Korean rocket allegedly carrying a military reconnaissance satellite in midair, which a South Korean patrol boat stationed in the country's northwest sea captured the previous night. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

The official said the failure will likely affect the North's plan to place three more spy satellites into orbit this year. In November, Pyongyang successfully placed its first military spy satellite into orbit after two failed attempts in May and August. South Korea's Defense Minister Shin Won-sik told reporters earlier this year that the North's Malligyong-1 spy satellite appears to be orbiting Earth without activity.

Noting that the rocket exploded during its first-stage flight, the official said there may have been issues related to engine combustion but said further analysis is needed. The JCS earlier said the rocket was detected as "multiple fragments" in the North's waters.

On whether Russia supplied the first-stage rocket for the latest launch, the official said while such a possibility cannot be ruled out, more analysis is needed on the extent of technological assistance provided by Moscow.

The botched launch came as Pyongyang and Moscow have been deepening cooperation in a wide range of areas following a rare meeting between their leaders in September.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · May 28, 2024

6. N. Korea apparently voices complaint against China via rebukes on trilateral summit: Seoul

So was the failed satellite launch supposed to be a message to China from the north? Some speculation.

Excerpts:

"The strong backlash from North Korea shows that the joint declaration of the summit was significant," Lim said.

"North Korea will never be recognized as a nuclear-armed state," Lim added, urging Pyongyang to return to the path of denuclearization.

For North Korea, it could be disturbing to see that China has held a three-way summit with South Korea and Japan at a time when Beijing appears to be cautious about joining Pyongyang's drive to deepen trilateral solidarity with Russia and China.

Still, other observers said North Korea might have taken into account China, as the country launched its military spy satellite Monday night after Li left Seoul. A new rocket carrying the satellite exploded in a mid-air flight.

Meanwhile, the ministry official said it will likely take time for North Korea to determine the cause of the failure in the latest satellite launch, given that it did not disclose the timing of its future launch.

Pyongyang earlier said it will fire three more spy satellites in 2024, after it successfully placed its first spy satellite into orbit in November.

(LEAD) N. Korea apparently voices complaint against China via rebukes on trilateral summit: Seoul | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · May 28, 2024

(ATTN: ADDS foreign ministry's comments in paras 9-12)

SEOUL, May 28 (Yonhap) -- North Korea appears to have indirectly expressed its complaint against Beijing when it slammed a joint declaration issued after the latest trilateral summit among leaders of South Korea, China and Japan, Seoul's unification ministry said Tuesday.

The North's foreign ministry denounced South Korea on Monday for stating its commitment to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the joint declaration with Japan and China, rejecting it as "wanton interference" in North Korea's internal affairs.

The angry reaction came hours after President Yoon Suk Yeol, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Chinese Premier Li Qiang met in Seoul, marking the resumption of a long-stalled trilateral summit after 4 1/2 years. They reaffirmed their commitment to promoting peace and stability on the peninsula.

The unification ministry in charge of inter-Korean affairs said Pyongyang's condemnation seems to be aimed at marring Seoul's diplomacy with Tokyo and Beijing, and hampering the spirit of the joint declaration of the trilateral summit.

"Though the North's rebukes were focused on the South, it was rare for North Korea to publicly denounce a (diplomatic) meeting attended by China," a ministry official told reporters on condition of anonymity.

President Yoon Suk Yeol (C) speaks at a press conference at the former presidential office of Cheong Wa Dae on May 27, 2024, after he held a trilateral summit with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Chinese Premier Li Qiang. (Yonhap)

The North has not publicly denounced summit meetings involving China's top officials, except the 2015 summit between South Korea and China.

The ministry official noted that North Korea dubbed the latest trilateral summit as the ROK-Japan-China summit, not as the summit involving China, Japan and the South in its previous order of countries.

The North also warned Monday that if "anyone" tries to preach the benefits of denuclearization, the country will regard it as the most serious infringement upon sovereignty. Some experts said "anyone" here could mean China.

North Korea's strong reaction rather illustrates the significance of the joint declaration, Lim Soo-suk, Seoul's foreign ministry spokesperson, said.

"As confirmed by numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions, North Korea's complete abandonment of nuclear weapons and its denuclearization are the consensus and unified goal of the international community," Lim said in a briefing.

"The strong backlash from North Korea shows that the joint declaration of the summit was significant," Lim said.

"North Korea will never be recognized as a nuclear-armed state," Lim added, urging Pyongyang to return to the path of denuclearization.

For North Korea, it could be disturbing to see that China has held a three-way summit with South Korea and Japan at a time when Beijing appears to be cautious about joining Pyongyang's drive to deepen trilateral solidarity with Russia and China.

Still, other observers said North Korea might have taken into account China, as the country launched its military spy satellite Monday night after Li left Seoul. A new rocket carrying the satellite exploded in a mid-air flight.

Meanwhile, the ministry official said it will likely take time for North Korea to determine the cause of the failure in the latest satellite launch, given that it did not disclose the timing of its future launch.

Pyongyang earlier said it will fire three more spy satellites in 2024, after it successfully placed its first spy satellite into orbit in November.

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · May 28, 2024

7. U.S. condemns N. Korea's rocket launch, warns its isolation will only intensify

Unfortunately I think Kim has deliberately chosen isolation for the foreseeable future (save for its fellow axis of dictators - China, Russia, and Iran).

(LEAD) U.S. condemns N. Korea's rocket launch, warns its isolation will only intensify | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 28, 2024

(ATTN: CHANGES headline, lead; UPDATES throughout with State Department's comment)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, May 27 (Yonhap) -- The United States condemned North Korea's botched space rocket launch as a breach of U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on Monday, vowing to send a "strong" signal to the recalcitrant regime that its actions will only intensify its isolation.

The North said that it launched a new rocket carrying a military reconnaissance satellite from a launching site on its northwest coast on Monday, but the launch failed due to the air blast of the rocket during the first-stage flight.

"The United States condemns the DPRK's May 27 launch, which incorporated technologies that are directly related to the DPRK's ballistic missile program and took place in violation of multiple UNSC resolutions," a State Department spokesperson said in response to a question from Yonhap News Agency.

DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

U.S. Senior Official for North Korea Jung Pak has been in close consultation with her South Korean and Japanese counterparts regarding the launch, the spokesperson noted.

"We will continue to work with the international community to send a strong signal to the DPRK that its actions will only intensify its isolation as it undermines stability and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula," the spokesperson said.

"We urge all countries to condemn the DPRK's unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs and press the DPRK to engage in serious dialogue. Our commitments to the defense of the Republic of Korea and Japan remain ironclad," the official added. WMD is short for weapons of mass destruction.

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command also issued criticism of the North's latest launch.

"We are aware of the DPRK's May 27 launch using ballistic missile technology, which, is a brazen violation of multiple unanimous UN Security Council resolutions, raises tensions, and risks destabilizing the security situation in the region and beyond," the command said in a statement.

"We are assessing the situation in close coordination with our allies and partners," it added.

The North has planned to launch three more satellites this year. In November, it successfully put its first military spy satellite into orbit.

The botched launch came amid speculation that deepening military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow might have helped the North advance its weapons and other military programs.

This Nov. 22, 2023, file photo carried by the Korean Central News Agency, shows the North Korean military spy satellite Malligyong-1. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 28, 2024

8. Yoon asks for China's cooperation on N.K. defector issue

It is the right thing to do to press China on this. But CHina will not change its position. From its perspective not only does it want to sustain adequate relations with north Korea if China did the right thing and treated these escapees as refugees who have the right to seek asylum in the country of their choice, it will probably open the floodgates that are holding back escapees from north Korea and China could become overwhelmed with escapees.

Yoon asks for China's cooperation on N.K. defector issue | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · May 27, 2024

SEOUL, May 27 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol on Monday asked Chinese Premier Li Qiang for Beijing's cooperation on the issue of North Korean defectors, the presidential office said.

Yoon made the request during one-on-one talks held on the sidelines of a trilateral summit also involving Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in Seoul, according to presidential spokesperson Kim Soo-kyung.

Yoon further asked that China play a "constructive role" in maintaining the global nonproliferation regime as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, a reference to Beijing's role in reining in North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

Li responded that China has worked for the peaceful resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue and considers political stability to also be important.

"We are well aware of South Korea's concerns, and let us continue to communicate in the future," he was quoted as saying by the presidential office.

President Yoon Suk Yeol (C) shakes hands with Chinese Premier Li Qiang (R) at the 8th South Korea-Japan-China Business Summit at the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Seoul on May 27, 2024. On the left is Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · May 27, 2024

9. Chronology of North Korea's space vehicle launches

Chronology of North Korea's space vehicle launches | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · May 28, 2024

SEOUL, May 28 (Yonhap) -- North Korea launched a projectile assumed to be a military spy satellite Monday after putting its first one into orbit in November. The following is a chronology of the North's purported space vehicle launches since 1998.

-- Aug. 31, 1998: North Korea launches the Kwangmyongsong-1 satellite on the Taepodong-1 rocket from its launch site in Musudan-ri in North Hamgyong Province, but it ends in failure.

-- April 5, 2009: North Korea launches the Kwangmyongsong-2 satellite on the Unha-2 rocket at the Musudan-ri launch site, but it ends in failure.

-- April 13, 2012: North Korea launches the Kwangmyongsong-3 satellite on the Unha-3 rocket from its launch site in Tongchang-ri in North Pyongan Province. But the rocket crashes in pieces into the sea shortly after takeoff.

-- Dec. 12, 2012: North Korea launches the Kwangmyongsong-3 Unit 2 satellite on an improved version of the Unha-3 from the Tongchang-ri launch site in North Pyongan Province. The North says it successfully put the satellite into orbit.

-- Feb. 7, 2016: North Korea launches the Kwangmyongsong-4 satellite on the Kwangmyongsong rocket from the Tongchang-ri launch site. The North says it successfully placed the satellite into orbit.

-- May 31, 2023: North Korea launches the Malligyong-1 military reconnaissance satellite on the Chollima-1 rocket from the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground in Tongchang-ri. The launch fails due to the "abnormal" startup of its second-stage engine, according to its state media.

-- Aug. 24, 2023: North Korea launches the Malligyong-1 military reconnaissance satellite on the Chollima-1 rocket from the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground in Tongchang-ri. The launch fails due to an error in the "emergency blasting system" during the third-stage flight, according to its state media.

-- Nov. 21, 2023: North Korea launches the Malligyong-1 military reconnaissance satellite on the Chollima-1 rocket from the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground in Tongchang-ri. The North claims it accurately put the satellite into orbit.

-- May 27, 2024: North Korea launches a projectile believed to be a military reconnaissance satellite but it was detected as multiple pieces of debris in the North's waters, according to the South Korean military.

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · May 28, 2024

10. Nuclear envoys of S. Korea, U.S., Japan condemn N.K. spy satellite launch attempt

Nuclear envoys of S. Korea, U.S., Japan condemn N.K. spy satellite launch attempt | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · May 28, 2024

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL, May 28 (Yonhap) -- Nuclear envoys of South Korea, the United States and Japan on Tuesday strongly condemned North Korea's latest attempt to launch a military spy satellite, casting it as a blatant violation of U.N. resolutions and a serious threat to peace.

Lee Jun-il, director general for Korean Peninsula policy, discussed the North's botched space rocket launch in three-way phone talks with his U.S. and Japanese counterparts, Jung Pak and Yukiya Hamamoto, respectively, Seoul's foreign ministry said in a release.

"The three sides strongly condemned that North Korea, despite the repeated warnings from the international community, went ahead with the launch of the military reconnaissance satellite," the ministry said.

The envoys "stressed that it was a blatant violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions banning the North from any such launches using ballistic missile technology, and that its provocations pose serious threats to peace and security in the region and beyond."

The three sides vowed to continue coordination trilaterally and with the international community to prepare for the North's potential additional provocation, saying such acts will "only strengthen the three-way security cooperation."

The phone talks came after the North said it launched a new rocket carrying a military reconnaissance satellite from a launching site on its northwest coast Monday. The launch failed due to the air blast of the rocket during the first-stage flight.

It was the first launch attempt by Pyongyang after it successfully put its first military spy satellite into orbit in November last year, following the two previous botched attempts in May and August, respectively.

This EPA photo shows people at a station in Seoul watching a television screen broadcasting the news of North Korea's alleged launch of a military spy satellite on May 28, 2024. (Yonhap)

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · May 28, 2024

11. S. Korea, U.S. stage joint air drills amid tension over failed N.K. satellite launch

The operative words: "regular combined live-fire drills."

S. Korea, U.S. stage joint air drills amid tension over failed N.K. satellite launch | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · May 28, 2024

SEOUL, May 28 (Yonhap) -- South Korean and U.S. military aircraft have staged regular combined live-fire drills to strengthen readiness against North Korean threats, Seoul's Air Force said Tuesday, amid heightened tensions over Pyongyang's failed satellite launch.

More than 90 aircraft, including the South's F-35A stealth fighters and the U.S. A-10 attack aircraft, have been mobilized for the four-day exercise that began Monday over waters off South Korea's west coast, according to the Air Force.

The exercise is focused on strengthening the participating pilots' strike capabilities and bolstering readiness against possible enemy provocations, it said.

This week's drills will take place in the wake of North Korea's botched attempt to launch a military spy satellite into orbit Monday night.

The North's rocket exploded minutes after liftoff from the North's major satellite launch site on the northwestern coast, according to the South's military.

A South Korean F-15K fighter jet fires an AIM-9X air-to-air missile at an aerial target during air drills over waters off the South's west coast on May 28, 2024, in this photo provided by the Air Force. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · May 28, 2024

12. S. Korea seeks educational support for N. Korean defectors' children born abroad

S. Korea seeks educational support for N. Korean defectors' children born abroad | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 28, 2024

SEOUL, May 28 (Yonhap) -- The unification ministry said Tuesday it will push to provide educational support for North Korean defectors' children who were born in third countries in an effort to tackle the blind spot in the welfare system.

The move is part of the fourth three-year basic plan to support the resettlement of North Korean defectors. The ministry in charge of inter-Korean affairs held a pan-government meeting earlier in the day to review and approve the 2024-2026 plan.

Under the blueprint, the government plans to draw up legal grounds to provide educational support to North Korean defectors' children born in third countries, mostly in China.

Currently, only youths who were born in North Korea and defected to South Korea are entitled to receive tuition and other financial support and get a chance for special admission to colleges. But North Korean defectors' children born abroad have been excluded from such benefits.

This computerized image depicts North Korean defectors' escape from their home country. (Yonhap)

As of 2023, the proportion of the defectors' children born in third countries accounted for 71 percent of the total elementary, middle and high schoolers in North Korean defectors' households.

An increasing number of North Korean defectors find themselves stranded in China or other countries, unable to reach South Korea despite escaping their repressive home country. As a result, more defectors give birth to children in such third countries.

"The basic plan contains measures to make up for the blind spot in the existing policy and to better support the North's defectors," Vice Unification Minister Moon Seoung-hyun said at the meeting.

The unification ministry also plans to push to "legalize" the principle of accepting North Korean defectors at the incoming 22nd National Assembly.

In 2022, the ministry proposed a revised act on the defectors' protection and support for their resettlement in a bid to prevent such refugees' forceful repatriation.

Under the former liberal Moon Jae-in administration, two North Korean fishermen were deported in 2019 to North Korea against their will as they confessed to killing 16 fellow crew members before they were captured near the eastern sea border.

Vice Unification Minister Moon Seoung-hyun presides over a pan-government meeting on resettlement support for North Korean defectors at the government complex building in Seoul on May 28, 2024. (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 28, 2024

13.vReturn to Reforger: A Cold War Exercise Model for Pacific Deterrence

I participated in Reforger in 1984 and 85 and Team Spirit in 1987 through the final one in 1993. I wonder why the authors did not use the ROK/US Allaince's Team Spirit as a reference point as well? At one time it was the largest exercise in the free world and it certainly had major deployments from CONUS as well as the region that might have lessons for the INDOPACIFIC (afterall Korea is in the INDOPACIFIC or actually the Asia-Pacific, but I am not going to get into a debate about the importance of the Asian landmass).

Return to Reforger: A Cold War Exercise Model for Pacific Deterrence - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Michael Greenberg, Benjamin Phocas · May 28, 2024

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From the Baltics to Taipei, allied governments continue to evaluate America’s staying power and willingness to employ hard power in defense of democracy. Recently, the standoff in Congress over funding for wars in Ukraine and Israel raised further questions about American resolve. Of course, this is not the first time this situation has existed. During the Cold War, the United States conducted annual emergency deployment readiness exercises in Europe to alleviate allied concerns about American military capability and commitment. These exercises strengthened American deterrence in Europe—and provide a blueprint that could be applied to other strategic problem sets facing the United States today.

Annually, beginning in the late 1960s, and stretching until 1993, thousands of US and NATO troops flooded into the German countryside, occupying pre-positioned weapons depots in a simulated defense of West Germany. These exercises were collectively named Reforger (Return of Forces to Germany). Their purpose was to assess and verify the capability of the US military and its NATO allies. Reforger trained the operation plan for moving troops across the Atlantic; a rapid process of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration with pre-positioned equipment; and deployment to the likely battlefields of West Germany.

It is time for the US military to consider a reintroduction of Reforger-style exercises—but in the Indo-Pacific. The initiation of these exercises would accomplish two major goals in the region: (1) test and improve the capability of the US military to rapidly deploy at the theater level, and (2) deter aggression through a demonstration of US capability and commitment to the defense of Pacific allies.

In 2022, President Joe Biden firmly stated the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, rhetorically breaking from a decades-long policy of strategic ambiguity. If a firm commitment to defend Taiwan is to be US policy, the US military should set the physical conditions for implementation. By the end of 2023, it was evident that American defense support would mirror the president’s rhetoric, with a grant to Taiwan for $80 million. This was significant because it was the first time US military aid to Taiwan was not in the form of a loan, punctuating American commitment to Taiwanese defense on top of billions of dollars in arms sales. However, in the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, there remains broad international concern that American commitments to allies will not be fulfilled in the face of adversity. Taiwan is not the only potential flashpoint in the Indo-Pacific region, but its seriousness—and the United States’ commitment to deterring and if necessary defending again Chinese aggression—highlights both the imperative of being able to flow combat resources into the theater and the importance of signaling US resolve.

Throughout the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact members had the advantage of having millions of troops stationed along the Iron Curtain. In the event of hostilities and facing this numerical mismatch, the United States planned to rapidly deploy combat power to the continent to halt advancing Soviet armor formations. The Reforger exercises allowed US military planners to test systems and familiarize troops with defensible terrain, and at the highest levels these exercises signaled to the Soviet Union the United States and NATO’s capability and resolve to defend West Germany. These exercises encompassed all branches of service, testing the joint capabilities of critical assets such as Air Mobility Command and Military Sealift Command. Reforger 75 also incorporated elements of the US Marine Corps’s 36th Marine Amphibious Unit, the first Marine operation on European soil since World War I.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the need for rapid deployment of corps and divisions to distant battlefields dwindled. Following the Gulf War and the subsequent drawdown of US defense spending and forces in the 1990s, the post-9/11 wars brought two decades of highly orchestrated deployments. The muscle memory of how to conduct large-scale rapid deployments ebbed as the patch chart (deployment schedule) became rotational and predictable. Pacific Pathways has been an effective way to activate Pacific deployment muscle memory, promoting ally and partner interoperability and forcing planners and operations officers to troubleshoot long-distance sustainment issues in the area of responsibility of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). And its continued evolution—under the name Operation Pathways—has expanded these important opportunities. However, even the largest of these exercises—Talisman Sabre involves thirty-five thousand personnel from thirteen nations—are much smaller than the total numbers involved in Reforger. And the scale of exercises has a direct impact on their deterrent effect vis-à-vis competitors like China or Russia. While INDOPACOM has also executed joint Warfighter exercises to enhance readiness in the Pacific, the time has come to consider a Reforger-level exercise with allies and partners in the region. To do so, of course, American officials should socialize the idea with these allies and partners to build consensus on location, scope, and a rotational schedule. But this fits naturally with the approach the United States already takes in the region. As General Charles Flynn, commanding general of US Army Pacific, has said, “We don’t do anything in any of these countries without their invitation.” In this new era of strategic competition and preparation for high-intensity, multidomain conflict, the US military’s capability to rapidly surge forces must be seriously tested, which has not occurred at the scale of the Reforger exercises in decades.

Stress Test

Across the globe, US allies and interests face the threat of aggression from states such as Russia and China and nonstate violent organizations that seek to benefit from a redrawn global political, economic, and military order. These threats, in the Western Pacific, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East, are far from American shores, and in the event of a large-scale conflict, would pose a myriad of challenges in the rapid deployment of large formations. This capability to mobilize in force to defend allies and partners was last put on display in late 1990 when Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait prompted a massive multimonth buildup of multiple US corps elements and numerous coalition combat units.

The US Army currently deploys single brigade combat teams to Korea and Europe as rotational readiness units. The US government’s ability to call upon Civil Reserve Air Fleet and Merchant Marine assets at a scale necessary to wage conventional war has remained largely untested since the 1990s with the exceptions of the buildup ahead of the Iraq invasion in 2003 and to some extent the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. With changes ongoing across the US military, the timeline for the mobilization and deployment of theater-level assets and formations could deviate from planning timelines. The US Navy’s National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) is on order to deploy a fleet of one hundred heavy-lift assets in the event of a national emergency. Can strategic planners count on the accuracy of timeline estimates by the Department of Transportation Maritime Administration (MARAD) if they are not tested at regular intervals? Within the NDRF, even with the Ready Reserve Force of forty-six civilian-operated reserve merchant vessels that can be activated in five to ten days, the head of MARAD was “not at all confident” that ships could be crewed in a crisis, much less deployed.

At lower echelons of the US military, training exercises are conducted to ensure unit readiness. Tactical-level units like companies and battalions conduct live-fire events culminating in brigade-wide exercises at the Army’s combat training centers. An Indo-Pacific version of Reforger would be a higher-level readiness exercise beyond corps-level staff exercises like Yama Sakura to certify that US combat forces are ready and able to effectively deploy in the region. The establishment of the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center offers an important organizational foundation on which to build out a larger readiness exercise. The training center already manages certification exercises for different units throughout the Indo-Pacific; its expertise could be leveraged to coordinate resources for the exercise and eventually measure units’ performance and facilitate after-action reviews.

History has demonstrated that the rapid mobilization and deployment of forces can win or lose a war, and if the system created for the deployment of troops and equipment has faults that are identified but not addressed, the system will likely fail in combat. The consequences for failure in wartime are much steeper than they are in the relatively safe confines of a training environment.

Demonstration of Commitment

The reintroduction of Reforger exercises would serve a dual purpose. The US military would get a chance to train for a major conflict, and this training would be highly visible, both to allies and partners and to potential adversaries. The demonstration of the power and reach of the US military, and the accompanying message of resolve and commitment to defend US allies and interests, would elevate deterrence, promote American interests, and strengthen alliances.

Since February 2022,the Department of Defense has “deployed or extended over 20,000 additional forces to Europe in response to the Ukraine crisis,” a strong demonstration to Russia that the United States will stand by its NATO allies. Permanent force realignment is taking place, with Poland, Romania, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Germany all hosting augmented US forces. In INDOPACOM, an optimal version of a Reforger-style exercise would also include allied forces and partners. The coalition involved in the signing of the AUKUS submarine deal in March 2023 represents a good starting point for exercises designed to contain aggression in the Indo-Pacific and would demonstrate overall Western resolve. Continued Indo-Pacific security relationships with Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines could also be leveraged to include these Pacific allies in operational planning and considerations.

Despite recent high-level exchanges between the superpowers, President Xi Jinping of China explicitly warned President Biden in December 2023 that Beijing still plans to reunify the mainland with Taiwan, and in a New Year’s address told the Chinese public, “The reunification of the motherland is a historical inevitability.” In January 2024, the Chinese defense ministry also reiterated that China will “never compromise or yield on the Taiwan issue.” Rather than be reactive to an invasion—or a crisis that emerges around any of the flashpoints in the region—the United States must coordinate with regional militaries on force flow. A Reforger-style exercise will demonstrate to China that the United States is still committed to its Pacific allies and partners.

A Reforger-style exercise for the Indo-Pacific coordinated by a strong bloc of interoperable US allies and partners offers the region enhanced strategic clarity. The United States should explore regional governments’ willingness to conduct the exercise in locations that already host Operation Pathways. Of course, there are risks involved, the greatest of which is a massive Chinese escalation. Any escalation would increase the chances of miscalculation and confrontation between the superpowers. Ultimately, however, the political environment in the region may make key allies and partners receptive to this significant step even if it might draw the ire of China. And fortunately, after the Biden-Xi Summit in November 2023, the US military and People’s Liberation Army reopened the US-China hotline. This hotline could be used to communicate American intentions and mitigate the risks of escalation during an exercise.

Any increase in American troop presence in the Indo-Pacific region will be heavily scrutinized. A Reforger-style exercise held in Taiwan itself could be seen as a direct contradiction of the United States’ longstanding “One China” policy; this option is not on the table right now and would likely provoke a crisis the United States can ill afford amid heightened tensions in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Historically, China has reacted belligerently to American acknowledgements of Taiwanese sovereignty, including demonstrating its capability to blockade Taiwan after a state visit by then Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi. Since then, in addition to weapons sales, several steps have been taken to bolster Taiwanese deterrence and capability. The US Navy and Air Force remain active in the Taiwan Strait, conducting several freedom-of-navigation operations every calendar year. There are also ongoing discussions about Taiwanese troops coming to the United States to gain additional training and expertise. However, all these steps stop short of a Reforger-style exercise in the region that could strengthen collective security for American allies and partners.

The US military should socialize and then introduce a Reforger-style exercise in the Indo-Pacific region to assess and improve its own ability to rapidly deploy theater-level military capabilities in the event of a major conflict and to serve as a form of strategic messaging. The US military already has a massive presence in the region—with 20 to 25 percent of the Army’s total active duty strength aligned within the US Army Pacific’s formation, US Army Pacific is twice the size of any other of the service’s theater armies. This is itself a strong message. Yet, a conflict in the region would undoubtedly require substantially more manpower and other resources. Rather than wait for China to build the combat power to match its rhetoric, the United States and its allies should embark on the planning and coordination of a Reforger-style exercise. Eighth Army in Korea hinges its mission on the “Fight Tonight” ethos; a Reforger for the Indo-Pacific will export this idea throughout the Pacific formation.

Major Michael Greenberg is a strategic intelligence officer and Council on Foreign Relations Term Member assigned to the United States Military Academy at West Point as an assistant professor of history. He is a Northwestern University graduate and earned an MA in terrorism, security, and society in the War Studies Department at King’s College London and an MA in history at New York University. His most recent operational assignment was in the Pacific where he served with 1-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team as a military intelligence company commander and infantry S-2.

Second Lieutenant Ben Phocas graduated from the United States Military Academy where he studied Defense and Strategic Studies. He was an intern for the National Center for Urban Operations and commissioned as an armor officer in May 2024.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Cpl. Kyle Chan, US Marine Corps

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Michael Greenberg, Benjamin Phocas · May 28, 2024

14. It’s time to rethink US military ties with South Korea

From the Quincy Institute.

I admire Doug Bandow's ability to spin the facts to support his withdrawal agenda.

If you want conflict on the Korean peninsula please feel free to follow his advice.

It’s time to rethink US military ties with South Korea

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Doug Bandow · May 28, 2024

Biden’s efforts to ‘Trump-proof’ the relationship will only make America less safe

1. regions asia pacific
2. korea

May 28, 2024

Biden administration officials trekked to Seoul in late May to discuss a path toward a new “Special Measures Agreement” (SMA) that will define the parameters of military cooperation between the U.S. and South Korea for years to come.

The talks, said the U.S. embassy, “underline the enduring vitality of the U.S.-ROK alliance, which remains the linchpin of peace, security, and prosperity for Northeast Asia, the broader Indo-Pacific, and beyond.” The South Koreans have a more practical goal of holding down costs, taking “the position that our defense burden sharing will come at a reasonable level to ensure conditions for a stable stationing of” U.S. troops.

The U.S. presidential election is still more than five months away, but Washington officials and their foreign friends are already preparing for the possible victory of former President Donald Trump. Their goal is to lock in what amount to “America last” policies that Trump is most likely to challenge.

So it is with those devoted to the U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea. Then-President Trump’s policies and rhetoric caused much distress in Seoul and resulted in an impasse over cost sharing. South Korean officials welcomed the return of the status quo after Trump’s defeat, with the Biden administration allowing the ROK’s cheap ride to continue.

However, South Korea now faces the possibility of Trump’s return. At best, it would mean a repeat of his insistence that South Koreans pay more for America’s protection. At worst, it would mean a withdrawal of U.S. forces. The result has been much wailing and gnashing of teeth in both capitals.

In response, the Biden administration has accelerated negotiations over the next SMA. The new accord won’t take effect until 2026 but would bind the incoming administration. The State Department claimed to have disinterested motives, but it’s hard to ignore the fact that concluding the deal before the next president is inaugurated would deny Trump the opportunity to set policy.

Unsurprisingly, the talks have reportedly been going well, since both sides have an incentive to finish before the campaign heats up. Today, South Koreans pay about $1.2 billion annually to underwrite the U.S. military presence. The two governments are likely to set a small increase in the ROK’s payment.

Some alliance advocates argue that Washingtonis getting a good deal. For instance, Troy University’s Dan Pinkston cited “the amount that Korea contributes by paying for all the electricity used by US forces here, the land used for military drills, the salaries of civilian workers on the bases and so on.” As a result, Pinkston contended “that it is actually cheaper for the US to have these troops based here in Korea than to ship them back to the US.”

Pinkston also pointed to “the intangibles at the heart of the alliance that benefited the US, such as support from Korea in cyber warfare, anti-piracy operations around the world, counter-terrorism campaigns, support for Washington in the UN and others.”

In reality, the arrangement is a sweet deal for South Korea by any measure. In exchange for a billion dollars and change — 90% of which is spent in the ROK — Seoul gets a guarantee that the world’s superpower will use military force, including nuclear weapons, to protect it from any and all enemies.

South Korean payments are not a contribution to the U.S., which is maintaining its garrison for the South’s benefit. American forces act as a tripwire to ensure that Washington political leaders have no practical choice but to go to war for the ROK, irrespective of America’s interests. The troops perform no other effective role, certainly not in confronting China, the most obvious East Asian challenge for U.S. influence.

Moreover, contrary to Pinkston’s view, South Korea does not offer a cheap location for U.S. military personnel. Force structure does not exist for its own sake but is based on security commitments. If Washington cuts its support for Seoul, it should eliminate corresponding units, personnel, and hardware rather than relocate them.

Nor does the alliance as such offer extra benefits for Americans. Washington is defending the ROK; Seoul is not defending the U.S. Moreover, Washington and Seoul can work together on other issues of mutual interest even without an American security guarantee.

Nevertheless, the Biden administration appears determined to prevent any debate over Washington’s commitment to South Korea. However, Trump could thwart this expensive cooperation by moving beyond host nation support and reconsidering America’s force presence altogether.

There are a range of good reasons to consider such a move. For one, the alliance’s costs and risks are growing. The Korean war was terrible, but American liability was limited to the battlefield. Washington fought ferociously without risking the homeland.

That would no longer be the case today. In years past, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea hoped that its conventional threat to Seoul, which sits uncomfortably close to the border, offered sufficient deterrent to allied military action, including preventive U.S. strikes. Now, Pyongang possesses a nuclear arsenal expanding in size and a missile force increasing in range. The Asan Institute and Rand Corporation warned that, in a few years, “North Korea could have 200 nuclear weapons and several dozen intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and hundreds of theater missiles for delivering the nuclear weapons.”

Although a preemptive attack from the DPRK would be suicidal, Pyongyang is likely more interested in deterring U.S. involvement in a Korean conflict. Should war occur, would a U.S. president be prepared to risk one or more American cities in defense of the South? Should a US president do so?

Such a conflict would be a human tragedy. The ROK is a worthy friend and ties between the American and South Korean people—family, cultural, economic, and more—are strong. Nevertheless, such interests do not warrant risking America’s very survival.

In reality, the South is capable of defending itself. Trump sensibly asked: “They’re a very wealthy country, so why wouldn’t they want to pay?” In 1953, South Korea was an economic wreck, its people impoverished and its politics authoritarian. Absent American support, the North’s Kim Il-Sung probably would have absorbed the South. However, the ROK soon began to race past the DPRK economically. Two decades later, Seoul embraced democracy, and it has now achieved a major international presence.

Although the ROK’s military has lagged behind the country’s resources, the force is capable. One U.S. military official traveling to the ROK described the latter’s military “as among the best in the world.”

“From a person who has worked with a lot of different countries, I put them at the high-end of capability,” the official said — not as “an absolute replacement for a U.S. capability, but combined it is very strong.” And that is without them seeking to replace U.S. forces. (Ironically, some South Koreans worry more about losing American money than troops, fearing fewer sales and jobs.)

The prospect of a U.S. withdrawal is not without concerns. A transfer of defense responsibility raises the possibility that South Korea could seek nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the North. The thought horrifies the usual suspects and has led U.S. policy makers to work desperately to convince South Koreans that US “extended deterrence” remains strong.

That was reflected in last year’s so-called Washington Declaration, which assumed Washington would continue to risk the destruction of American cities and slaughter of American people to protect the South. Even if South Koreans believe that Americans would do so, why should we? An ROK bomb might not be a good solution, but it might be the best among several bad options.

The SMA negotiations pale in importance compared to such issues. Why should Washington risk its people’s future to protect a nation capable of handling its own defense, irrespective of the price the latter is willing to pay? American personnel should not be rented out to even the best of friends, especially when the U.S. has no vital interests at stake.

Instead of arguing about host nation payments, the two governments should refashion the relationship and limit America’s role. The current treaty should become a blueprint for mutual cooperation. Then the U.S. troop presence should be phased out, thus terminating host nation support after the withdrawal is complete.

Doug Bandow

Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan. He previously was affiliated with the Heritage Foundation and Competitive Enterprise Institute. He writes a weekly column for the American Conservative online and Antiwar.com.

15. North Korea blames ‘new-type engine’ for satellite launch failure

Blame it on the new engine. Still a quality control issue I am sure.

The question is what did they learn from this failure?

North Korea blames ‘new-type engine’ for satellite launch failure

The North’s rocket carrying a spy satellite exploded after takeoff, state media reported.

https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/nkorea-failed-launch-05282024021314.html

By Taejun Kang for RFA

2024.05.28

Taipei, Taiwan

A rocket carrying spy satellite Malligyong-1 is launched at a location given by the North Korean government as North Gyeongsang Province, North Korea in this handout picture obtained by Reuters on Nov. 21, 2023.

 KCNA via Reuters

North Korea’s latest attempt to launch a military reconnaissance satellite was unsuccessful because of a problem with the reliability of a new rocket, which led to a mid-air explosion during the first-stage flight, state media reported on Tuesday.

The launch came just hours after leaders of South Korea, Japan and China reaffirmed their commitment to pursuing the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in their first summit in five years, in Seoul.

North Korea had earlier notified Japan of its plan to launch a satellite sometime before June 4, in violation of U.N. sanctions, and designated three areas where rocket debris could have fallen.

The rocket carrying the satellite exploded after its takeoff from the Sohae Satellite Launching Station on North Korea’s northwest coast on Monday, said the vice general director of the North’s National Aerospace Technology Administration, or NATA, the North’s Korean Central News Agency reported.

“The launch failed due to the air blast of the new-type satellite carrier rocket during the first-stage flight,” the NATA official was quoted as saying.

A preliminary examination by experts from the North’s launch preparatory committee concluded that the “accident” was attributable to the operational reliability of a new “liquid oxygen plus petroleum” engine, said the official, adding that other causes of the failure would also be examined.

A North Korean flag flutters on top of the 160-meter tall tower at North Korea’s propaganda village of Gijungdong, in this picture taken from Tae Sung freedom village near the Military Demarcation Line, inside the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, in Paju, South Korea, Sept. 30, 2019. (Kim Hong-Ji/File Photo/Reuters)U.S. Indo-Pacific Command criticized North Korea’s rocket launch, saying it was assessing the situation in close coordination with allies and partners.

“We are aware of the DPRK’s May 27 launch using ballistic missile technology, which is a brazen violation of multiple unanimous UNSC [U.N. Security Council] resolutions, raises tensions and risks destabilizing the security situation in the region and beyond,” the command said in a statement.

DPRK or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is North Korea’s official name.

Russian support

The launch came amid speculation that deepening military cooperation with Russia might have helped North Korea advance its space rocket launch capabilities and other military programs.

A senior South Korean government official told the media on Sunday that a large number of Russian experts had entered North Korea to help with its spy satellite efforts after Russian President Vladimir Putin pledged to support such a program last year. 

A South Korean military official told reporters on Tuesday that Russia may have provided the first stage propellant for the new launch vehicle.

“We have to keep open the possibility of technical assistance at all levels,” said the official. “I think we have to look at the time frame, whether it was just technical assistance, whether they provided parts, and so on.”

The official added that unlike during the two failures last year, the North has not announced plans for additional launches and has said that they have reached only preliminary conclusions about the cause of this failure, so further launches are likely to take some time.

North Korea successfully launched its first satellite in November.

‘Unusual move’

North Korea also condemned the trilateral summit declaration on the denuclearization of the peninsula as a “grave political provocation and sovereignty violation,” which South Korea’s Ministry of Unification said was an unusual reaction. 

“While [the North’s criticism] was focused on South Korea, it was unusual for it to publicly malign a meeting attended by China,” a ministry spokesperson told reporters in Seoul on Tuesday. 

It was hard to find a precedent for public North Korean criticism of a summit attended by China, the official said, with the exception of a 2015 China-South Korea summit.

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Chinese Premier Li Qiang leave after a joint press conference in Seoul, South Korea, May 27, 2024. (Kim Hong-Ji/Pool/Reuters)At Monday’s summit, the three neighbors’ first since 2019, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida denounced the North’s planned satellite launch as a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions that ban its use of ballistic missile technology.

Chinese Premier Li Qiang called on all “related countries” to exercise restraint to mitigate tensions, without referring to North Korea directly.

Edited by Mike Firn.

16. Serious misconduct in Kim Jong Un's personal guard unit leads to personnel reshuffle

Could someone with access and placement be influenced to become "Mr. X" and take drastic action against Kim Jong Un?

Serious misconduct in Kim Jong Un's personal guard unit leads to personnel reshuffle - Daily NK English

The incident was regarded as very serious because personnel had often watched foreign video content that they had confiscated from the unit or acquired off-base

By Jeong Tae Joo - May 28, 2024

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · May 28, 2024

Kim Jong Un at the plenary session, which was held from Feb. 26 to Mar. 1, 2023. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)

Serious misconduct has led to a major personnel reshuffle in a guard unit at North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s seaside villa in Kyongsong County, Daily NK has learned.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, a source in North Korea told Daily NK last Thursday that the incident began when disciplinary violations and non-socialist behavior by a senior technician of the State Security Department under the 879th Brigade of the Supreme Guard Command and his subordinates were reported to the Supreme Guard Command by the brigade’s general staff and political departments in early April.

According to the report submitted to the Supreme Guard Command, the senior technician had repeatedly engaged in problematic behavior, such as sending two of his subordinates out in civilian clothes, putting them up in his own house, and excusing them from political classes and unit training to run errands for him.

The incident was considered very serious because the subordinates often watched foreign video content confiscated from the unit or obtained outside the base.

In the end, the brigade’s general staff and political departments officially raised the issue with the Supreme Guard Command headquarters in Pyongyang, which prompted an immediate response.

“The chief technician of the 879th Brigade in charge of guarding the Supreme Leader’s villa in Kyongsong has been detained by the prosecutors of the Supreme Guard Command and is being interrogated. The subordinates who ran errands for him have been sentenced to disciplinary labor under the State Security Bureau of the Supreme Guard Command for the crimes of watching and distributing foreign cultural materials,” the source said.

Incident suggests discipline in the military is weakening

The fact that such an incident occurred in a unit under the Supreme Guard Command – where discipline is unusually strict even for the North Korean military, given its responsibility for protecting Kim Jong Un – shows how lax discipline has become in the military recently.

“The Supreme Guard Command is dealing with this issue so harshly because an official and agents of the State Security Department, who are supposed to be in charge of maintaining discipline, were themselves guilty of serious indiscipline, including breaking rules and consuming foreign cultural materials,” the source said.

Following this incident, the Supreme Guard Command reportedly replaced all senior officials in the State Security Department of the 879th Brigade, including the department head. This was not a routine reshuffle, the source said, but an attempt to restore discipline and compliance in the brigade responsible for guarding the Kyongsong villa.

“The newly appointed officials of the 879th Brigade’s State Security Department were ordered to thoroughly check all officers, soldiers and family members in the brigade to see if they had consumed foreign cultural materials and to inform the Supreme Guard Command of the results,” the source said.

“The Supreme Guard Command noted that it was unacceptable that such an incident occurred not only in any unit, but in a unit responsible for protecting the Supreme Leader, and ordered that internal ideological controls be tightened and contact with foreign cultural materials be completely restricted. The Supreme Guard Command’s restrictions on contact with such materials are expected to become even stricter in the future,” he added.

The 879th Brigade’s State Security Department is afraid after being sternly warned by the Supreme Guard Command that if something similar happens in the future, the affair will not end with a few officials being reshuffled.

“The 879th Brigade under the Supreme Guard Command was on the verge of losing the privilege of guarding Kim’s villa after a shooting incident in the spring of 2021, but was reinstated thanks to a generous pardon from Kim. But the occurrence of another incident has the entire brigade on edge, and brigade members are strictly adhering to the searches for foreign cultural materials,” the source said.

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · May 28, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com