Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Water does not resist. Water flows. When you plunge your hand into it, all you feel is a caress. Water is not a solid wall, it will not stop you. But water always goes where it wants to go, and nothing in the end can stand against it. Water is patient.

Dripping water wears away a stone. Remember that, my child. Remember you are half water. If you can't go through an obstacle, go around it. Water does.”

~Margaret Atwood

“If you want to know where your heart is, watch where your mind goes when you daydream.”

– Walt Whitman

“Throughout history, poverty is the normal condition of man. Advances which permit this norm to be exceeded – here and there, now and then – are the work of an extremely small minority, frequently despised, often condemned, and almost always opposed by all right-thinking people. Whenever this tiny minority is kept from creating, or (as sometimes happens) is driven out of society, the people then slip back into abject poverty. This is known as “bad luck.”

– Robert A. Heinlein – Time Enough For Love

1. Trump’s Foreign Policy Crossroads

2. As Trump Seeks Iran Deal, Israel Again Raises Possible Strikes on Nuclear Sites

3. The Future of Iran: A North Korea or South Korea Scenario?

4. White Paper Offers Chinese Wisdom at the Crossroads of History

5. Opinion | Trump should build millions of cheap drones, not Golden Dome

6. Poland Asserts Its Role as a Central European Military Leader with K2 Tank Deployment in Slovakia

7. Musk blasts Trump's spending bill for 'undermining' DOGE and claims D.C. treated them as 'whipping boys'

8. Land forces tool up for potential Pacific conflict

9. USS Truman conducted largest airstrike in Navy history, official says

10. Only Two Companies Make Parachutes for U.S. Troops. Deportations Would Crush One.

11. The real Golden Dome opportunity – defense acquisition reform

12. Navy SEAL Team 6 operator will be the military's new top enlisted leader

13. Why Trump Won't Sacrifice Taiwan

14. Time for China’s belt and road partners to pony up as debt comes due, think tank finds

15. Pentagon Accused of Illegally Wiretapping Foreign Aides

16. Cerberus Eyes Darwin Port, Australia Reviews Chinese Control

17. Ukraine’s New Way of War

18. Buried Lessons: Leading Through Innovation

19. Success in Syria, Failure in Ukraine: The Russian T-90 Main Battle Tank in Combat

20. Trump Is Killing American Innovation

21. The Era of DEI for Conservatives Has Begun

22. America’s Democracy Is Still Resilient

23. Trump’s ‘Golden Dome’ Riles Nuclear-Armed Foes

1. Trump’s Foreign Policy Crossroads

Typical mainstream media. They did not describe the entire CRInK. They neglected the very real threat from north Korea. (Yes, I am biased).

Perhaps if we don't talk about north Korea and ignore it, it will just go away. But the truth is north Korea is not and never has been "cool" to policy makers and pundits. You have to be crazy or a glutton for punishment to focus on north Korea.

Trump’s Foreign Policy Crossroads

The President faces key moments of decision on U.S. adversaries.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/donald-trump-foreign-policy-russia-china-iran-adversaries-b36e8f80

By The Editorial Board

May 27, 2025 5:42 pm ET

President Donald Trump Photo: Jacquelyn Martin/Associated Press

President Trump’s foreign policy has been coasting so far on his verbal threats and public cajoling. But he’ll soon face moments of decision on U.S. adversaries that will echo throughout his second term and could determine his legacy.

The first year of presidencies often sets the tone for the events that follow on foreign policy. Joe Biden’s Afghan withdrawal gutted U.S. deterrence and convinced Vladimir Putin and Iran’s mullahs they’d meet little resistance if they sought military gains. Barack Obama let China occupy islands in the South China Sea and steal U.S. secrets with little resistance.

Ronald Reagan rebuilt U.S. defenses and began the pushback against the Soviets that led to victory in the Cold War. Mr. Trump sent an early deterrence message in his first term with a robust campaign against Islamic State.

But the world has changed in eight years, and Mr. Trump now faces crucial decisions on Russia, Iran and China. Those adversaries are increasingly working together against American interests. Will the President send a message of deterrence or weakness?

• Russia and Ukraine. The President entered office promising to end the war in short order, but Vladimir Putin isn’t cooperating. The Russian seems intent on continuing the war until Ukraine submits to his terms, and he is mobilizing forces for a summer offensive.

Ukraine will soon confront weapons shortages that make it more vulnerable to a Russian breakthrough. That’s especially true for air defenses, including U.S.-made Patriot missile interceptors. Ukraine has been able to block most of Mr. Putin’s recent barrages of drones and missiles. But as its defenses wane, Ukraine will have to choose between defending its civilians in cities or its forces on the front lines. Mr. Trump is worried about needless deaths, and rightly so. Those deaths will increase if he fails to rearm Ukraine.

Mr. Trump has mused about leaving the two countries to fight it out. But walking away won’t insulate America from the consequences. If Ukraine succumbs, Mr. Putin will advance his forces closer to more of the NATO border. As important, Mr. Trump will send a message to Chinese President Xi Jinping that the U.S. can’t sustain support for an ally under siege.

Beijing will conclude that its support for Russia’s war carried little cost, and that its alliance with Russia has paid off. The message will be that if China moves on Taiwan, Mr. Trump is unlikely to respond with more than verbal protests or toothless sanctions. Instead of restoring U.S. deterrence, Mr. Trump would further undermine it.

• Iran’s nuclear program. Mr. Trump began his second term by restoring sanctions “maximum pressure” and issuing an ultimatum to Tehran: Dismantle your nuclear program in verifiable ways, or the U.S. will dismantle it by force. This is a red line of the President’s own drawing, and the world is now watching to see if he’ll enforce it.

Iran is trying to do what it has always done in negotiations: String out talks and press for loopholes that will let it retain the ability for a nuclear breakout on short order. That’s what the dispute over Iran’s domestic uranium enrichment is all about.

If Iran resists a deal on the terms Mr. Trump has laid down, the President will have to act with force, or support Israel in doing so, or his threats will be seen as hollow. This will be seen as another case in which Mr. Trump stakes out a maximalist position but will settle for much less. U.S. deterrence will suffer another credibility setback.

Military action always carries risks, including that it might not destroy all of Iran’s buried centrifuges. But it would set back the program for months or years. More important, it would signal that Mr. Trump means what he says about nuclear proliferation.

• China. Mr. Trump told Journal editors in October that Mr. Xi wouldn’t blockade or invade Taiwan because the Chinese leader knows Mr. Trump would impose crippling tariffs. But the President has already imposed such tariffs and retreated when financial markets rebelled. This can’t have impressed Mr. Xi. The problem is that broad-based tariffs hurt the U.S. as much as they do China, which is why Mr. Trump backed down.

Mr. Trump has to decide what kind of relationship he wants with China, and on much more than trade. Mr. Xi will want to use any trade concessions he makes, if he offers any, to win Mr. Trump’s concessions on Taiwan or America’s role in the Pacific. But so far it isn’t clear what Mr. Trump wants—other than a smaller U.S. trade deficit.

The President has more time to decide on China than he does Iran or Russia. But what he chooses on the latter two will influence what is possible with Beijing. The next few months may be as significant for America’s role in the world as any since the end of the Cold War.

As Trump Seeks Iran Deal, Israel Again Raises Possible Strikes on Nuclear Sites

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, wary of a diplomatic solution to curbing Iran’s nuclear program, continues to press for military action that would upend President Trump’s push for a negotiated deal.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/28/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-israel.html

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President Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel at the White House last month.Credit...Haiyun Jiang for The New York Times

By Julian E. Barnes David E. Sanger Maggie Haberman and Ronen Bergman

May 28, 2025

Updated 2:32 a.m. ET

As the Trump administration tries to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has been threatening to upend the talks by striking Iran’s main nuclear enrichment facilities, according to officials briefed on the situation.

The clash over how best to ensure that Iran cannot produce a nuclear weapon has led to at least one tense phone call between President Trump and Mr. Netanyahu and a flurry of meetings in recent days between top administration officials and senior Israeli officials.

Mr. Trump said on Sunday that there could be “something good” coming about his effort to limit Iran’s nuclear program in the “next two days.”

Others familiar with the negotiations said that at best there would be a declaration of some common principles. The details under discussion remain closely held and would likely only set the stage for further negotiations, starting with whether Iran could continue to enrich uranium at any level, and how it would dilute its stockpiles of near-bomb-grade fuel or ship them out of the country.

The New York Times reported in April that Israel had planned to strike Iranian nuclear sites as soon as this month but was waved off by Mr. Trump, who wanted to keep negotiating with Tehran. Mr. Netanyahu, however, has continued to press for military action without U.S. assistance.

Israel is not a participant in the negotiations between the United States and Iran. At the core of the tension between Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Trump is their differing views of how best to exploit a moment of Iranian weakness.

In October, Israel destroyed key elements of Iran’s strategic air defense system, which helped to protect the country’s nuclear facilities. That would enable Israeli aircraft to approach Iran’s borders without fear of being targeted.

And Israel has crippled Hezbollah and Hamas, which have been supported by Iranian money, arms and rockets. In dealing a blow to Hezbollah in particular, Israel removed the concern of the group threatening Israeli aircraft on their way to Iran and retaliating with missile attacks on Israel after any strike.

Mr. Netanyahu has argued that Iran’s vulnerability will not last long, and that the time is right for an attack. Mr. Trump has argued that Iran’s weakness makes it a perfect moment to negotiate an end to Iran’s enrichment program, backed up by the threat of military action if talks fall apart.

Israeli officials fear Mr. Trump is now so eager for a deal of his own — one he will try to sell as stronger than the one the Obama administration struck in 2015 — that he will allow Iran to keep its uranium enrichment facilities.

Last month Mr. Netanyahu insisted that the only “good deal” would be one that dismantled “all of the infrastructure” of Iran’s vast nuclear facilities, which are buried under the desert in Natanz, deep inside a mountain at a site called Fordow, and at facilities spread around the country.

This account of the tensions between the two men is based on interviews with officials in the United States, Europe and Israel — who have been involved in the diplomacy and the debate between the American and Israeli governments. They insisted on anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss delicate diplomacy.

Ron Dermer, Israel’s minister of strategic affairs, and David Barnea, the head of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency, met in Rome on Friday with Mr. Trump’s chief negotiator, Steve Witkoff.

The two men then traveled to Washington for a meeting on Monday with John Ratcliffe, the C.I.A. director. Mr. Dermer met again with Mr. Witkoff on Tuesday, though the topic of that meeting was not immediately clear.

Asked for comment, White House officials pointed to Mr. Trump’s remarks this weekend, when he said he would “love to see no bombs dropped.” Mr. Netanyahu’s office commented after this article was published, sending a two-word statement to describe it: “Fake news.”

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Steve Witkoff, the special envoy to the Middle East, at the White House this month.Credit...Eric Lee/The New York Times

The central divide in the negotiations between Mr. Witkoff and his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, focuses on the Trump administration’s position that Iran must halt all enrichment of nuclear material on its soil. Mr. Araghchi has repeatedly rejected that restriction, repeating in a social media post on Tuesday that if the Western powers insist on “ ‘zero enrichment’ in Iran” then “there is nothing left for us to discuss on the nuclear issue.”

In an effort to keep negotiations from collapsing, Mr. Witkoff and Oman, which is acting as a mediator, are discussing creative options. Among them is a possible regional joint venture to produce fuel for nuclear power reactors with Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Arab powers, as well as some U.S. involvement. But where the actual enrichment would take place is undetermined.

Trump Administration: Live Updates

Updated May 27, 2025, 11:04 p.m. ETMay 27, 2025

Mr. Witkoff, participants say, has also dropped his early objections to an interim understanding that lays out principles for a final deal. But that may not satisfy Israel, or Congress’s hawks on Iran.

That is reminiscent of what the Obama administration did in 2013, though it took two more years to complete a final arrangement. Mr. Trump campaigned against that agreement when he ran for president in 2016, calling it a “disaster” because it allowed Iran to continue enriching at low levels and expired completely in 2030.

Mr. Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018 and reimposed economic sanctions on Iran.

Over the past four years, the Iranians have not only revived and improved their nuclear facilities, they have also produced uranium enriched to 60 percent purity, just below what is considered “bomb grade.” It would take a few weeks to turn that into 90 percent enriched fuel for a bomb, and somewhere between a few months to a year to produce an actual nuclear weapon, American intelligence officials have estimated.

Mr. Ratcliffe traveled to Israel last month to discuss possible covert actions against Iran with Mr. Netanyahu and Israeli intelligence officials. The two countries have cooperated in the past on covert efforts to cripple Iran’s ability to enrich uranium, including an effort during the Bush and Obama administrations to attack the facilities with a sophisticated cyber weapon.

Throughout his decades in government, Mr. Netanyahu has long been skeptical of diplomatic overtures to Tehran. He opposed, and sought to derail, the 2015 agreement, even addressing a joint session of Congress to argue for killing it.

This time, Israeli officials have dusted off an old playbook: threatening to strike Iran, even without American help. They insist they are not bluffing, even though they have made such threats and backed away several times over nearly two decades.

Israeli officials signaled to the Trump administration shortly before Mr. Trump’s first formal foreign trip, to the Middle East this month, that they were preparing to attack Iran’s nuclear sites, according to two people briefed on the discussions. U.S. intelligence also detected Israel’s preparations for a strike.

That led Mr. Trump to speak with Mr. Netanyahu, who did not deny that he had ordered his military and intelligence agencies to prepare for a strike and argued that he had a limited window for one.

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Some officials are not certain an Israeli strike on Iran would be effective without U.S. military support.Credit...Jack Guez/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

But U.S. military officials are skeptical about how effective an Israeli strike conducted without American support would be. In the call, Mr. Trump acknowledged Iran’s weakness but said that gave the U.S. leverage to make a deal to end the nuclear program peacefully, officials recounted.

The Israelis are particularly suspicious of any interim deal that might keep Iran’s facilities in place for months or years while a final agreement is reached. And, initially at least, the Trump administration was also skeptical. Mr. Witkoff, the lead American negotiator, told his Iranian counterpart that Mr. Trump wanted a final deal in a matter of two months or so.

But that deadline is about to expire, and there is still a major gap over the issue of whether Iran will be permitted to continue to enrich uranium, which Tehran says is its right as a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Now, the Trump administration seems more open to some kind of interim declaration of common principles, because it could help hold off an Israeli strike.

In order to satisfy the Israelis and the Iran hawks in Congress, experts say, any interim deal would almost certainly have to require that Iran ship its near-bomb-grade fuel out of the country or “down blend” it to a far lower level. That would enable Mr. Trump to claim he had eliminated, at least temporarily, the threat that Iran could speed its way to a weapon.

One concern for American officials is that Israel could decide to strike Iran with little warning. U.S. intelligence has estimated that Israel could prepare to mount an attack on Iran in as little as seven hours, leaving little time to pressure Mr. Netanyahu into calling it off.

But that same American military assessment raised questions about how effective a unilateral Israeli strike would be without American support. And some Israeli officials close to Mr. Netanyahu believe the U.S. would have no choice but to assist Israel militarily if Iran counterattacked.

Israeli officials have told their American counterparts that Mr. Netanyahu could order a strike on Iran even if a successful diplomatic agreement is reached.

After his White House meeting with Mr. Trump in April, Mr. Netanyahu ordered Israeli national security officials to continue planning for a strike on Iran, including a smaller operation that would not require U.S. assistance, according to multiple people briefed on the matter. Israel already has many different plans on the shelf, ranging from the surgical to days and days of bombing Iranian facilities, including some in crowded cities.

David E. Sanger, Maggie Haberman and Julian E. Barnes reported from Washington and Ronen Bergman from Tel Aviv. Adam Entous contributed reporting from Washington and Farnaz Fassihi from New York.

Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades.

David E. Sanger covers the Trump administration and a range of national security issues. He has been a Times journalist for more than four decades and has written four books on foreign policy and national security challenges.

Maggie Haberman is a White House correspondent for The Times, reporting on President Trump.

Ronen Bergman is a staff writer for The New York Times Magazine, based in Tel Aviv.

3. The Future of Iran: A North Korea or South Korea Scenario?

Excerpts:

The United States and its allies must recognize the internal struggle in Iran—not just between factions, but between two future models. Sanctions and deterrence remain essential to constrain the regime’s malign behavior. But they must be paired with support for Iranian civil society, secure digital access, educational exchanges, and human rights advocacy. The West should prepare not only for containment but for post-Islamic Republic reconstruction. This includes support for constitutional reform, institutional development, and economic recovery in a democratic Iran.

The Islamic regime in Iran today looks more like North Korea than ever before, it may want isolation, militarization, and ideological purity. But the people want freedom, prosperity, and peace. The Islamic Republic is trying to lock Iran into a North Korea future. But history has not closed the door on the South Korea alternative. The Iranian people are still fighting for it. The world should stand with them.

The Future of Iran: A North Korea or South Korea Scenario?

realcleardefense.com · by Fariba Parsa May 27, 2025

As Iran nears a historic turning point, the question before policymakers and analysts is no longer whether the Islamic Republic can sustain its ideological project, but what comes next. Will Iran evolve into a regional democracy like South Korea, or will it sink into isolation and totalitarianism like North Korea?

The regime in Tehran is increasingly signaling its desire to emulate North Korea’s path—ideological rigidity, nuclear brinkmanship, militarized control, and rejection of the West. In contrast, the Iranian people have made clear, through repeated uprisings and acts of civil defiance, that they want a future akin to South Korea: democratic, modern, economically open, and integrated with the global community.

The struggle between these two futures is intensifying, and the outcome will define not only Iran's destiny, but also the security architecture of the Middle East.

A Tale of Two Models

After World War II, the Korean peninsula split into two drastically different political and economic models. North Korea, under Kim Il Sung and his successors, embraced a militant, isolationist ideology of self-reliance (Juche), enforced by a dynastic totalitarian regime. It poured resources into its nuclear weapons program while its people starved and remained cut off from the world. South Korea, though initially authoritarian, gradually opened up. It began liberalizing its economy in the 1960s and implemented democratic reforms in the 1980s. Today, it is a thriving democracy, one of the world’s top economies, and a technological innovator closely aligned with the West. The contrast is stark: prosperity versus poverty, openness versus repression.

Iran at a Fork in the Road

Iran, under the Islamic Republic, has long portrayed itself as a unique “third way”—neither capitalist nor communist—but in practice, it is increasingly resembling North Korea. The regime’s ideology, rooted in Velayat-e Faqih (rule of the Islamic jurist), demands absolute obedience to a supreme religious authority. Its militarization of politics through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and its reliance on proxy wars, have made Iran a regional spoiler rather than a stabilizer. Iran’s nuclear program serves not only as a security tool but as a symbolic anchor of its ideological resistance. As of May 2025, the regime continues to negotiate for the right to enrich uranium at 3.75%, a level below weapons-grade but rich with symbolic and strategic value. This insistence reveals the regime’s intent: to preserve its revolutionary posture at all costs, even as it strangles Iran’s economy and isolates its people.

The People Want South Korea

But while the regime pushes Iran toward the North Korea model, the people have chosen otherwise. The 2009 Green Movement, the 2017 and 2019 economic protests, and the 2022–2023 “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising all revealed a society deeply disenchanted with clerical rule and ideological dogma. Iranians—especially women, youth, and the educated middle class—want dignity, freedom, and opportunity. They are not seeking reform within the existing system. They are demanding its replacement toward a secular democracy. Iran’s civil society, though battered, remains vibrant. Underground cultural networks, digital activism, and diaspora engagement continue to resist the regime’s repression. Unlike North Koreans, Iranians have access to outside information, communicate globally, and maintain a sense of national identity distinct from the state’s ideology. These differences matter—and they make a South Korean trajectory possible, if the political system allows it.

The Decline of Political Islam

Once the flagship of political Islam, the Islamic Republic is now its most visible failure. The ideology that claimed to liberate Muslims from Western imperialism has become a tool of domestic oppression and regional chaos. Iran’s efforts to export this ideology—via Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq and Syria, and Hamas in Gaza—have bred bloodshed, not solidarity. The October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack on Israel, widely believed to have had IRGC backing, triggered devastating consequences and further alienated Iran from Arab populations and governments alike. Across the region, political Islam is in retreat. Sunni-majority Arab states are normalizing ties with Israel, prioritizing economic growth, and distancing themselves from Tehran’s revolutionary agenda. Inside Iran, mosques are emptying. Clerical authority is no longer revered. Political Islam is seen not as a sacred duty but as the regime’s excuse to cling to power.

Nuclear Brinkmanship: A Strategic Dead-End

For the regime, enriched uranium is more than a fuel—it is a symbol of defiance. Yet this symbolism carries a high cost. Nuclear brinkmanship ensures continued sanctions, blocks foreign investment, and stokes regional tensions. The regime’s military adventurism has failed to deliver tangible gains, and its axis of resistance is fragmenting under pressure. This path may sustain the regime in the short term, but in the long term, it leads only to collapse or permanent isolation—a North Korea outcome. The irony is that North Korea survives by exporting weapons to Russia and China. Iran, with vastly more potential, is choosing the same bleak model despite having access to better options.

A South Korean Model for Iran: What It Requires

If Iran is to emulate South Korea, several strategic shifts are essential:

1. Abandoning the Nuclear Program

Iran must go beyond temporary agreements. It needs to dismantle its nuclear infrastructure, join global norms, and open itself to inspections and international cooperation. This would pave the way for the full lifting of sanctions and restore investor confidence.

2. Ending Ideological Imperialism

Iran must stop exporting political Islam. This means disbanding proxy militias, ending support for non-state actors, and reinvesting in domestic reconstruction. Like South Korea reintegrated with Asian economies, Iran must prioritize economic partnerships over ideological alliances.

3. Dismantling Theocratic Rule

A true transition requires ending clerical supremacy. A new constitution must enshrine secular governance, pluralism, and civilian control. Democratic elections, rule of law, and freedom of expression are non-negotiable if Iran is to thrive.

4. Reviving the Private Sector

The IRGC’s stranglehold over Iran’s economy must be broken. South Korea’s rise was powered by market competition, innovation, and education. Iran has the talent and diaspora capital to do the same—if it frees its economy.

5. Empowering Civil Society

Iran’s civil society is its greatest asset. A South Korean-style future depends on freedom of association, independent media, women’s empowerment, and the return of exiled professionals who can rebuild national institutions.

Strategic Implications for the West

The United States and its allies must recognize the internal struggle in Iran—not just between factions, but between two future models. Sanctions and deterrence remain essential to constrain the regime’s malign behavior. But they must be paired with support for Iranian civil society, secure digital access, educational exchanges, and human rights advocacy. The West should prepare not only for containment but for post-Islamic Republic reconstruction. This includes support for constitutional reform, institutional development, and economic recovery in a democratic Iran.

The Islamic regime in Iran today looks more like North Korea than ever before, it may want isolation, militarization, and ideological purity. But the people want freedom, prosperity, and peace. The Islamic Republic is trying to lock Iran into a North Korea future. But history has not closed the door on the South Korea alternative. The Iranian people are still fighting for it. The world should stand with them.

Dr. Fariba Parsa holds a Ph.D. in social science, specializing in Iranian politics with a focus on political Islam, democracy, and human rights. She is the author of Fighting for Change in Iran: The Women, Life, Freedom Philosophy against Political Islam. Dr. Parsa is also the founder and president of Women's E-Learning in Leadership (WELL), a nonprofit organization dedicated to empowering women in Iran and Afghanistan through online leadership education and training.

realcleardefense.com · by Fariba Parsa May 27, 2025

4. White Paper Offers Chinese Wisdom at the Crossroads of History

Conclusion:

White papers may not be authoritative policy documents and may serve specific messaging purposes. They nevertheless provide a useful window into how the Party wishes to frame its ideas for the world and the broad contours of the policies it is taking to achieve its goals. This latest document indicates that it sees significant risks for itself and the international system, of which the United States is the primary source. More importantly, however, it evinces confidence that world historical trends favor the Party and its ambitions of achieving national rejuvenation. The rhetorical question it poses to all other countries is crystal clear: We have now come to a historical crossroads; which path will you choose?

White Paper Offers Chinese Wisdom at the Crossroads of History

Publication: China Brief Volume: 25 Issue: 10

By: Arran Hope

May 23, 2025 02:04 PM Age: 4 days

jamestown.org · by Arran Hope · May 23, 2025

Executive Summary:

A new white paper titled “China’s National Security in the New Era” is targeted to both domestic and international audiences and offers “Chinese wisdom” and solutions to contemporary challenges.
In a bid for global leadership, the document frames “unstoppable” world historical trends as aligning with its mission of national rejuvenation and rebukes the United States for being a destabilizing international actor.
Claiming the world is at a “historical crossroads,” the document is a call for countries to fall in line behind its vision of ensuring peace, development, stability, and order in the international system.

For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the world is in constant, complex motion; in flux. There are “trends” (动态) and “flows” (流动). History has “tides” (历史潮流) and thought has “currents” (思潮). A scientific analysis of the world tells us that any movement in time and space has two qualities: magnitude and direction. Time moves relentlessly in one direction. Nothing else does. In some cases, the direction of travel is upward (升); in others, it is in reverse (逆). There is, however, an overall direction (大方向). The Party, in a white paper on “China’s National Security in the New Era” (新时代的中国国家安全), now tells us with confidence that that direction aligns with its vision: “The historic tide … is unstoppable; the overall direction of human development and progress, and the overall logic of world history, have not changed” (历史潮流不可阻挡，人类发展进步的大方向、世界历史曲折前进的大逻辑没有变) (State Council Information Office, May 12).

Ingrained in the Party’s ideological frame is a fear of the human vulnerabilities that exposure to unwelcome movement—turmoil (变乱) and turbulence (动荡)—brings. Its response to this fear is an overwhelming preoccupation with immovability—or, in other words, stability (稳) and order (序). (‘稳’ appears more than 70 times in the text, which runs to over 20,000 characters, and ‘序’ nearly 20.) Stability is achieved through shaping one’s environment. [1] Stability over the long term relies on controlling one’s environment to the greatest extent possible. For a nation-state operating in an interconnected world where conflict threatens the social fabric (变乱交织的世界) and in which “the spatial and temporal domains are wider than at any time in history, and the internal and external factors are more complex than at any time in history” (时空领域比历史上任何时候都要宽广，内外因素比历史上任何时候都要复杂), stability is achieved by ensuring national security. “Among the great matters of state,” the preface of the White Paper begins, “security is essential” (国之大者，安全为要). “National security,” the preface later explains, “is an important basis for the stability and longevity of Chinese modernization” (国家安全是中国式现代化行稳致远的重要基础).

White Paper Promotes Party Concepts on Security for the World

The preface provides a succinct articulation of national security. The definition is worth quoting in full:

“China’s national security in the new era is the general security of holistic, systemic, and relative power. It is a security that takes the people’s security as its guide, political security as its root, and national interests as its criterion. It is a security that serves and promotes high-quality development, that adjusts according to trends in economic and social development, that supports stepping up high-level opening up, and that functions within the norms of the path of ruling by law. China plans as a whole for its own security and common security. It opposes the generalization of security, does not carry out security coercion, and does not acquiesce to threats or pressure. It maintains its independence and autonomy, and is confident and self-reliant. It resolves security issues on the basis of its own power, maintaining the path of national security with Chinese characteristics.” [2]

This definition lays out some of the main themes that the rest of the white paper explores in detail. In particular, these include the Party’s assessment of its own power and position within the international system, its approach to interacting with all other parts of the international system, the identity of security with development, and the reforms needed within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to better ensure national security.

The preface concludes by presenting a rationale for releasing the white paper. It has done so, the authors write, to “explain the innovative conception and active implementation and construction of the work of China’s national security in the new era, to share its experience and methods, to promote world peace and development together with other countries, and to promote the construction of a community of common destiny for mankind” (为全面阐释新时代中国国家安全工作的创新理念、生动实践和建设成果，分享经验做法，与其他国家一道推动世界和平和发展，推动构建人类命运共同体).

The PRC government releases white papers for both a domestic and an international audience. According to the State Council Information Office’s website, it has published 173 since 1991—roughly five per annum. Although it only began publishing official English translations in 2010, the topics—which tend to focus on aspects of PRC governance that have been most concerning to foreign observers—reinforce the notion that the intended audience is global. The latest white paper is the first to be dedicated specifically to “national security” (国家安全), though national defense has been a regular focus since 1998 (China Brief, June 19, 2015, July 31, 2019). Another first is the release of a short English “abstract” to accompany the white paper, in lieu of a full English translation (Xinhua, May 13). While the absence of a full translation might not appear to square with the desire to court an international audience, it aligns with a general trend toward curtailing public government information. The Party may also believe that there are certain aspects of its approach to national security that the international community should focus on, while other elements are better not stated so explicitly. [3]

The Party Bids for Global Leadership

The Party sees the current moment as critical—both for itself and for the world. The white paper repeatedly describes the present as a “critical period” (关键时期) or a “key stage” (关键阶段) in the country’s development and on its path to achieving “national rejuvenation” (民族复兴) through Chinese modernization. This characterization is based on an assessment of the PRC’s place within the longue durée. History, another preoccupation of the Party’s, features prominently throughout the white paper. (历史 appears 21 times in the document.) In part, this is done is to intone the articles of faith in the Party’s narrative arc of historical inevitability: China was born 5,000 years ago; China has risen from the brink of death through the Party’s shouldering of the historic mission; China will come again, providing “new concepts and methods” (新理念、新办法) for bringing about a secure and peaceful world.

The Party’s assessment of the contemporary context is laid out in the first of its six main chapters, which is titled “China Injects Determinacy and Stability Into a World in Turmoil” (中国为变乱交织的世界注入确定性和稳定性). The first section of the chapter, one of thirty in the document, is titled “The World, Amid New and Turbulent Changes, Stands at a Crossroads in History” (世界在新的动荡变革中站在历史的十字路口). [4] At present, the Party believes that “changes in the world, the times, and history are unfolding in an unprecedented manner” (世界之变、时代之变、历史之变正以前所未有的方式展开) and that society is faced with “the critical choices of peace or war, prosperity or recession, and unity or confrontation” (和平还是战争、繁荣还是衰退、团结还是对抗的关键抉择). The previous century—often referred to as the American Century—was plagued by war, and “old thinking, such as spheres of influence, hegemonic stability, and the alliance system” (势力范围、霸权稳定、同盟体系等旧思维) dominated. Such thinking “cannot cope with new security challenges” (应对不了新安全挑战). The PRC, which does not have such “genes” (基因), offers an alternative path to the world, which it brings on an “unstoppable historic tide” (不可阻挡历史潮流) of peace, development, cooperation, and mutual profitability (“win-win”).

The Party argues that it has stellar credentials for taking on the mantle of global leadership. From its perspective, it is the great power with the best record on matters of peace and security (在和平和安全问题上，中国是世界上纪录最好的大国). It has “always stood on the right side of history” (始终站在历史正确的一边) (a line so good it appears twice in the paper) and has never initiated any war or conflict (从来没有主动挑起过任何一场战争和冲突). [5] Looking ahead, the Party asserts that its ability to maintain and shape its national security “has never been greater, and its determination is unwavering” (前所未有，决心矢志不渝). As a result, “it is certain to make new and greater contributions to … the promotion of world peace and development (必将为 … 促进世界和平发展作出新的更大贡献).

The Party frames Xi Jinping Thought, which integrates traditional Chinese culture with Marxism, as twenty-first century Marxist orthodoxy (The Asan Forum, May 7). The white paper indicates the importance of traditional culture by referencing ancient texts, including the Daodejing, the Lost Book of Zhou, the Book of Documents, and the Zuozhuan. The combination of these ideas with Marxism—which holds the “guiding position” (指导地位)—underpins the “holistic national security concept, which General Secretary Xi Jinping has creatively put forward” (习近平总书记创造性提出总体国家安全观). As the white paper explains, one part of this concept is promoting international common security, because national rejuvenation “requires a peaceful and stable international environment” (需要和平稳定的国际环境).

To engineer an environment in which it can thrive, the Party offers solutions packaged for the rest of the world as “Chinese Wisdom” (中国智慧). In a section titled “The Global Security Initiative Contributes Chinese Wisdom” (全球安全倡议贡献中国智慧), the white paper describes the initiative as a “new ‘Security Chapter’ of the community of common destiny and a ‘World Chapter’ in the concept of holistic security” (既是人类命运共同体的“安全篇”，也是总体国家安全观的“世界篇”). The scholar Daniel Tobin has argued that the community of common destiny concept—also known as the community of shared future—refers to a proposed alternative global order (The Asan Forum, May 7). As of 2024, it had the support of 119 countries and international organizations. The white paper goes on to describe the Global Security Initiative as “a Chinese solution that China offers for global security governance … rooted in China’s practice and implementation of an independent and autonomous peaceful diplomacy and originating from a Chinese culture and wisdom that fosters trustworthiness, friendship, harmony, and coexistence” (是中国对全球安全治理给出的中国答案 … 植根于中国独立自主的和平外交政策与实践，来源于讲信修睦、和合共生的中华文化与智慧).

Conclusion

According to “China’s National Security in the New Era,” since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, the PRC’s comprehensive national power, international influence, and ability to resist risks have strengthened significantly (进入新时代，中国综合国力、国际影响力、抵御风险能力显著增强). The white paper concludes, however, by warning that the country still has work to do: “On the new journey,” it says, China’s national security “will still rely on the people to make history” (新征程上，仍然要依靠人民创造历史). In a symbolic rhetorical flourish, it calls for “building an unbreakable Great Wall of national security” (筑起国家安全坚不可摧新的长城) and finishes by saying that this will take “hard work and struggle” (努力奋斗)—thereby finishing on an appropriate, ideologically charged, note.

White papers may not be authoritative policy documents and may serve specific messaging purposes. They nevertheless provide a useful window into how the Party wishes to frame its ideas for the world and the broad contours of the policies it is taking to achieve its goals. This latest document indicates that it sees significant risks for itself and the international system, of which the United States is the primary source. More importantly, however, it evinces confidence that world historical trends favor the Party and its ambitions of achieving national rejuvenation. The rhetorical question it poses to all other countries is crystal clear: We have now come to a historical crossroads; which path will you choose?

Notes

[1] One framework for Chinese civilization writ large conceives of it as an “hydraulic society.” Originally associated with the Marxist historian Karl August Wittfogel and his theory of “oriental despotism,” its claims that the need for flood control and irrigation in certain societies gave rise to a centrally-coordinated and competent bureaucracy have largely been invalidated. (In China, for instance, the rise of the state predated the ability to exert control over water through large infrastructure projects.) The ability to marshal resources to control the flow of water throughout the state, however, were characteristic of many successful early Chinese polities. It is interesting to speculate that such a view of state capacity and state functions might inform the Party’s approach to exercising power today. If you are aware of any research on this topic, please get in touch with the editor: cbeditor@jamestown.org.

[2] 总体 can also be translated as “comprehensive”; however, official English translations tend to use “holistic.” The original text reads as follows: 新时代的中国国家安全是总体的、系统的、相对的大安全，是以人民安全为宗旨、以政治安全为根本、以国家利益为准则的安全，是服务和促进高质量发展的安全，是根据经济社会发展动态调整的安全，是支撑进一步扩大高水平开放的安全，是在法治轨道上规范运行的安全。中国统筹自身安全和共同安全，反对安全泛化，不实施安全胁迫，不接受威胁施压，坚持独立自主、自信自立，把解决安全难题放在自身力量的基点上，坚持中国特色国家安全道路。

[3] An analysis of the English “abstract” is beyond the scope of this article, so this claim ought to be taken as somewhat speculative.

[4] The document includes a preface, 27 sections across the six chapters, a conclusion, and an appendix listing 15 key laws from the new era that relate to national security.

[5] If this claim provokes skepticism in the reader, there is good reason for it. Such patently false assertions offer a window into the Party’s primary mode of messaging, which operates by rules that place a much higher value on utterances that are ideologically correct and coherent than on those that seek to present empirical facts.

jamestown.org · by Arran Hope · May 23, 2025

5. Opinion | Trump should build millions of cheap drones, not Golden Dome

Apples and oranges: Golden Dome versus drones.

I do not think this should be either/or but rather both/and. Perhaps in addition to the Golden Dome we should develop "Golden Drones". We need to defend the homeland but we also need to invest in drones in quantity to fight future wars.

Opinion | Trump should build millions of cheap drones, not Golden Dome

Forget Trump’s hugely expensive, impractical Golden Dome shield. Drones are the future of warfare.

May 27, 2025 at 7:45 a.m. EDT

Washington Post · by Max Boot

The future of war has arrived in Ukraine. That country’s defenders are able to hold back a Russian advance, even though the Russians have a manpower advantage of as much as 5-to-1 along some parts of the front line, largely by using drones. By some estimates, unmanned aerial systems are now inflicting 70 percent of all casualties on both sides, reducing traditional weapons such as tanks and artillery almost to irrelevance. The war has also ushered in the use of ground-based and sea-based drones — indeed, using the latter, Ukraine managed to defeat Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.

The drone revolution necessitates an urgent effort by the U.S. military to catch up, but instead of looking to the 2020s and beyond, the commander in chief has his eyes firmly fixed on the 1980s.

President Donald Trump came to office with dreams of reviving President Ronald Reagan’s plans for using space-based interceptors to protect the United States from nuclear missile attacks. He initially called his blueprint Iron Dome for America, after one of the systems that help protect Israel (a country the size of New Jersey) from missile attack. Now, in keeping with Trump’s fixation with gold (the dominant motif in the redecorated Oval Office), it has been renamed Golden Dome.

Last week, Trump unveiled more details about Golden Dome during an Oval Office event, and named a manager (U.S. Space Force Gen. Michael Guetlein) for the project. Trump claims Golden Dome will cost $175 billion to build; protect America not only against intercontinental ballistic missiles but also hypersonic missiles, cruise missiles and drones; and be operational by the time he leaves office in 2029.

And, if you believe that, the president has some memecoins he would be happy to sell you. In reality, the cost of developing and operating space-based interceptors is estimated by the Congressional Budget Office to be as high as $542 billion over the next 20 years, and missile-defense experts say it will take at least 10 years for such a system to be operational — if it’s possible at all. And, even if such a system is deployed, it is very unlikely to provide an effective defense for the entire country against nuclear attack.

As Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution argues in the Wall Street Journal, there is a case for a less ambitious missile-defense system augmenting and linking together existing capabilities such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the Navy’s Aegis Combat System. But that would still be mainly a defense against a small-scale attack from a rogue state such as North Korea or Iran. A space-based interceptor system to protect the United States against a massive nuclear attack from Russia or China remains as much of a fantasy today as when Reagan first proposed it in 1983.

Instead of devoting defense dollars to Golden Dome, the Trump administration would be better advised to focus on building lots and lots of cheap drones. The Defense Department estimates that the United States has the capacity to manufacture 100,000 drones a year. That sounds like a lot, but actually it’s a pittance. Last year Ukraine produced 2.2 million drones, and this year it’s aiming to build 4.5 million.

Admittedly, most of the Ukrainian drones are cheap, first-person-view models that are far less sophisticated than high-end drones like the $28 million MQ-9 Reaper or the $140 million RQ-4 Global Hawk that defense contractors sell to the Pentagon. But the Russia-Ukraine conflict has shown the value of cheap, disposable drones. They now dominate the battlefield. By contrast, bigger, more sophisticated drones may be too vulnerable to modern air defenses to be cost-effective: The Houthis shot down seven Reapers in less than six weeks over Yemen, costing the United States $200 million worth of aircraft.

Unfortunately, the United States lacks the capacity to build small drones in large numbers, even though U.S. scientists were pioneers in developing unmanned systems in the first place. The Chinese government used state subsidies to help build up a massive drone-manufacturing industry as part of its Made in China 2025 initiative. China was able to produce high-quality drones so cheaply that it made it impossible for manufacturers in the United States and other countries to compete.

Now just one Chinese company, DJI, is estimated to have 90 percent of the global drone market. Most of the drones that Ukraine makes employ Chinese-made parts, but obviously the Defense Department cannot be reliant for drone parts from a country that might become a wartime adversary. (Indeed, the Defense Department is forbidden under U.S. law from buying drones that have any electronic components made in China.) Last year, the House passed legislation, known as the Countering CCP Drones Act, to forbid DJI drone sales in the United States. But the bill did not advance in the Senate, in part because there is no viable, cost-effective, domestically produced alternative to DJI drones on the commercial market.

That needs to change, and fast. Congress and the administration need to recognize the strategic necessity of America developing a large drone industry of its own — one that cannot only supply U.S. consumers and companies but also the U.S. armed forces. The good news is that making drones isn’t that expensive, and it can utilize America’s high-tech know-how.

The Trump administration defense budget calls for spending $25 billion on Golden Dome this year. Imagine how far that money could go if the United States were to invest it in drone production. Kyiv is allocating $2.6 billion this year to build 4.5 million first-person-view drones at an average cost of just $580 apiece. If the United States were able to build drones as quickly and cheaply as Ukraine, it should be possible to build 43 million drones for $25 billion.

If the United States could produce 43 million drones a year, that would create a far more effective deterrent to Chinese aggression than any amount of investment in the unproven technologies of Golden Dome. The Chinese armed forces, which are buying large numbers of their own drones (actual numbers are secret), would know that they could never invade and occupy Taiwan in the face of such massive drone swarms.

Of course, it will never be as cheap to build drones in the United States as it is in Ukraine, because of the higher wages of U.S. workers — and the stultifying effect of the Defense Department’s procurement bureaucracy. But Ukraine is discussing the possibility of exporting drones to raise money for its war effort. The Trump administration could defend both the United States and Ukraine by investing in Ukraine’s drone industry and leveraging Ukrainian expertise to help build drones in America. As Post columnist Rahm Emanuel has argued, America needs drone technology from Ukraine far more than its mineral wealth.

A possible model is the 2022 Chips and Science Act passed during the Biden administration to revitalize America’s semiconductor industry. Drones, like microchips, are a strategic technology that deserves federal subsidies — and substantial procurement from the Pentagon. That would be a far more effective investment than the Golden Dome boondoggle.

Washington Post · by Max Boot

6. Poland Asserts Its Role as a Central European Military Leader with K2 Tank Deployment in Slovakia

Excerpt:

The operational deployment of K2 Black Panther tanks in an international setting reflects a fundamental shift in Poland’s strategic posture. Supported by advancing technology, a growing defense industrial base, and an assertive defense policy, Warsaw is gradually establishing itself as a key regional military power. By strengthening its deterrence capabilities, industrial sovereignty, and credibility within NATO, Poland is emerging as a central actor in the security architecture of Central and Eastern Europe.

Poland Asserts Its Role as a Central European Military Leader with K2 Tank Deployment in Slovakia

armyrecognition.com · by Halna du Fretay

Poland carried out the first international deployment of its K2 Black Panther main battle tanks during the multinational military exercise 'Slovak Shield 25,' held in Slovakia in May 2025. The event carries both symbolic and operational significance, reflecting Warsaw's effort to adapt its defense posture to evolving regional threats in an increasingly tense Eastern European context. The tanks involved in this deployment were recently assigned to the 1st Tank Battalion of the 9th Armored Cavalry Brigade in Braniewo, the primary unit operating the new fleet, and were mobilized just six months after entering service.

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This rapid deployment illustrates the accelerated development of Poland’s land forces, launched with the July 2022 contract for 180 K2 tanks from South Korean manufacturer Hyundai Rotem. As of now, 110 units have been delivered, with the remaining 70 expected by the end of the year. These vehicles are being distributed within the 16th Pomeranian Infantry Division, which includes the mechanized brigades of Gieżycko, Bartoszyce, and Braniewo. A portion has also been allocated to the Army Training Center in Poznań for crew training. Poland thus becomes the first European country to operationally deploy the K2 within a NATO multinational context, underscoring its ability to rapidly integrate advanced systems and its intent to play a central role in regional military cooperation.

The Slovak exercise also highlighted the logistical effectiveness of the Polish Armed Forces, which transported the tanks using low-loader trailers operated by the 16th Logistics Regiment. Beyond its military scope, the deployment carries political and industrial weight. Slovakia is currently considering replacing its aging fleet of T-72M1 tanks and may procure up to 104 modern vehicles, with the K2PL, a Polish-adapted version of the K2 still in development, among the leading candidates. The live demonstration of South Korean-built K2 tanks under Polish operation could influence Bratislava’s procurement decisions and support the development of strategic industrial cooperation between the two countries. Through this visibility, Poland seeks to position itself as a regional hub for the production, maintenance, and export of next-generation armored vehicles, in the context of its reinforced partnership with Seoul.

The K2 Black Panther, designed by South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development (ADD), represents a fourth-generation technological advance in heavy armor. Powered by a 1,500-horsepower engine, the tank reaches speeds of up to 70 km/h and can overcome extreme terrain, including 60% gradients, trenches nearly 3 meters wide, and water depths exceeding 4 meters using a snorkel system. It's fully adjustable ISU hydropneumatic suspension allows the tank to modify its ground clearance and inclination, improving firing precision and reducing visibility depending on terrain conditions. It is a highly mobile and resilient platform suited for contemporary combat scenarios.

Its primary weapon is a 120 mm L/55 smoothbore cannon with an autoloader capable of firing 15 rounds per minute. It supports a range of advanced munitions, including KSTAM top-attack guided rounds designed to engage hidden targets. The main gun is complemented by a 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun and a 12.7 mm heavy machine gun. The entire weapons system is guided by an advanced fire control system that includes millimeter-wave radar, laser rangefinders, meteorological and thermal sensors, and stabilization algorithms that ensure accurate fire while on the move. The K2 is also equipped with C4I technology, enabling real-time coordination with other vehicles and enhancing situational awareness and tactical responsiveness.

In terms of protection, the tank is fitted with layered composite armor, explosive reactive armor (ERA) modules, and the KAPS active protection system, which can detect and disrupt incoming threats. Additional defensive equipment includes optical and infrared decoys (VIRSS), laser and radar warning sensors, jamming systems, missile detectors, and an automatic fire suppression system. Combined with its automation and communication systems, the K2 aligns with modern operational standards for high-intensity conflicts.

Simultaneously, East Front News issue #46 highlighted other aspects of Poland’s military capability expansion. Notably, a cooperation agreement between Huta Stalowa Wola (HSW) and U.S. manufacturer Allison Transmission was signed to localize gearbox production in Poland, particularly for combat vehicles such as the Borsuk. This strategic relocation aims to secure Poland’s defense supply chain and increase the autonomy of its defense industrial base.

Furthermore, the U.S. State Department’s approval of Poland’s purchase of 1,400 GBU-39/B precision-guided bombs, valued at $180 million, marks another step in reinforcing NATO’s eastern flank. These GPS-guided munitions, deployable from F-16s and future F-35s, expand the operational scope of Poland’s air force in precision strike and deterrence roles. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) emphasized that this sale supports U.S. foreign policy and strengthens European collective security.

On the domestic front, internal security remains a key priority. On May 21, 2025, the Polish Sejm voted to extend for 60 days the temporary suspension of the right to seek asylum at the Belarusian border, citing concerns over orchestrated migration pressures from Minsk and Moscow. The measure, adopted by a large parliamentary majority, aims to prevent irregular flows and counter hybrid tactics threatening national and European stability, while maintaining humanitarian exceptions for vulnerable individuals.

Regionally, tensions remain high. Peace talks held in Istanbul on May 16 between Russian and Ukrainian representatives yielded no substantial progress, with Moscow’s demands remaining unacceptable to Kyiv. While a prisoner exchange was proposed, Poland, adhering to its proactive defense posture, continues to monitor the situation closely while consolidating its role as a forward-positioned NATO member.

The operational deployment of K2 Black Panther tanks in an international setting reflects a fundamental shift in Poland’s strategic posture. Supported by advancing technology, a growing defense industrial base, and an assertive defense policy, Warsaw is gradually establishing itself as a key regional military power. By strengthening its deterrence capabilities, industrial sovereignty, and credibility within NATO, Poland is emerging as a central actor in the security architecture of Central and Eastern Europe.

armyrecognition.com · by Halna du Fretay

7. Musk blasts Trump's spending bill for 'undermining' DOGE and claims D.C. treated them as 'whipping boys'

I guess the honeymoon is over.

Perhaps DOGE was a good idea but there were just problems with execution (or with the executioners). You have to admit that the "Doge Wiz Kids" were an easy target for satire if not whipping boys.

Then again, Musk does seem to be consistent in wanting to reduce the deficit. Are his criticisms of the bill (and his frustration with attacks on DOGE) valid?

Musk blasts Trump's spending bill for 'undermining' DOGE and claims D.C. treated them as 'whipping boys'

By BRITTANY CHAIN FOR DAILYMAIL.COM

Published: 01:54 EDT, 28 May 2025 | Updated: 04:13 EDT, 28 May 2025

Daily Mail · by BRITTANY CHAIN FOR DAILYMAIL.COM · May 28, 2025

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14755911/elon-musk-donald-trump-bromance-doge.html

Elon Musk's bromance with President Donald Trump has taken a hit after the tech billionaire blasted the White House for 'undermining' him and treating DOGE like 'whipping boys.'

The billionaire Tesla CEO spoke to the press before launching a SpaceX Starship into the stratosphere on Tuesday night and unleashed on Trump's $3.8 trillion spending bill.

'It undermines the work that the DOGE team is doing,' Musk bluntly told CBS.

'I was disappointed to see the massive spending bill, frankly, which increases the budget deficit, not just decreases it.'

Musk - who spoke to multiple outlets about the White House betrayal - went on to decry the treatment he and his baby-faced DOGE henchmen had received.

'DOGE is just becoming the whipping boy for everything,' he told the Washington Post.

'Something bad would happen anywhere, and we would get blamed for it even if we had nothing to do with it.'

After helping Trump win the 2024 election with outrageous financial contributions and stage-jumping endorsements, Musk earned the title of 'First Buddy' in the White House.

For the first several months of Trump's second term, Musk was everywhere - briefing Trump personally, gutting federal departments and even bringing his son, X, along to crucial meetings in the Oval Office.

Elon Musk has blasted the White House for 'undermining' him and treating DOGE like 'whipping boys.'

Musk had extraordinary access during Trump's first few months in power, showing off his 'Tech Support' shirt during the first cabinet meeting as he was given the floor to speak first

But his arrival ruffled feathers both within the political establishment and among governmental employees, particularly when he set about mercilessly slashing jobs in an effort to root out wasteful spending.

'People burning Teslas,' he told the Post. 'Why would you do that?'

As Tesla showrooms around the nation became the epicenters of violent protests, stock prices nosedived and reports emerged that the board was seriously considering replacing Musk.

'I think I probably did spend a bit too much time on politics,' Musk admitted in a separate interview with ARS Technica.

'It's not like I left the companies. It was just relative time allocation that probably was a little too high on the government side, and I've reduced that significantly in recent weeks.'

Musk twisted the knife a little further with outspoken criticism of Trump's 'Big, Beautiful Bill.'

'I think a bill can be big or it can be beautiful, but I don't know if it can be both,' he said. 'My personal opinion.'

The bill is estimated to add another $3.8 trillion to the national debt which currently stands at a monstrous $36 trillion.

'The federal bureaucracy situation is much worse than I realized,' he said.

'I thought there were problems, but it sure is an uphill battle trying to improve things in D.C., to say the least.'

Musk relished in slashing federal spending and shuttering entire departments as he sought to save cash

Musk brought his son X along to the Oval Office for a press conference about DOGE's activities

Donald Trump, Elon Musk, Donald Trump Jr, and RFK Jr are seen posing with McDonald's meals onboard Trump Force One as Speaker Mike Johnson smiles behind them

The bond market, seen as a crucial indicator for the health of the economy, tanked last week after the bill made it through the House on fears that the government won't be able to make good on its debts.

The 'Big Beautiful Bill' is intended to be an encompassing piece of legislation to allow Trump to move forward with much of his agenda, with policies ranging from tax cuts to immigration.

The legislation brings large spending increases that the GOP has fought against in recent years, including raising the debt limit by more than $4 trillion over the next two years.

Within the package is about $5 trillion in tax cuts, to be partially funded by repealing or phasing out more quickly the clean energy tax credits passed during Joe Biden’s presidency.

Several of the provisions Trump touted on the campaign trail would be temporary, lasting roughly through his second term in office.

The tax breaks for tips, overtime and car loan interest expire at the end of 2028. That’s also the case for a $4,000 increase in the standard deduction for seniors.

A focal point of the package is nearly $800 billion in reduced spending in the Medicaid program.

But his businesses suffered as a result of his reputational damage. Tesla cars around the nation were set alight as part of mass protests

Federal workers and supporters protested Musk's work with government

Tesla also faced a downturn in stock prices as Musk's reputation suffered harm during his work with DOGE

To be eligible for Medicaid, there would be new 'community engagement requirements' of at least 80 hours per month of work, education or service for able-bodied adults without dependents.

The new requirement would not kick in until Jan. 1, 2029, after Trump leaves office. People would also have to verify their eligibility for the program twice a year, rather than just once.

But any increase in debt effectively makes moot the work that Musk and his team have already undertaken with DOGE, raising questions about whether the billionaire's foray into politics - and the damage it caused his reputation and businesses - was ultimately worth it.

Musk saved an estimated $160billion in what he labeled wasteful government spending by decimating or shutting down 11 federal agencies - putting about 250,000 federal employees out of work in the process.

But even that number is a far cry from the $2trillion he vowed to save when DOGE was launched, and it has cost him immensely with mounting lawsuits and global protests against both he and his companies.

He stepped back from his high-profile role recently to refocus on his lifelong goal of colonizing Mars amid whispers his friendship with Trump was on the rocks and that he'd made enemies within the White House.

Despite all the rumors, Trump praised Musk as he revealed the billionaire had taken a step back from DOGE and said he would have been welcome to 'stay as long as you want.'

On Tuesday, as SpaceX prepared its latest test flight, Musk reiterated that his priority is with his company, saying: 'I'm physically here. This is the focus, and especially around launch. Everything comes together at the moment of launch.'

'Mars is life insurance for life collectively,' Musk warned earlier this month.

Musk switched his MAGA merch for an 'Occupy Mars' t-shirt as he seeks to return to his roots

Trump has maintained there is no bad blood between the pair and thanked Musk for his dedication to DOGE

'So, eventually, all life on Earth will be destroyed by the sun. The sun is gradually expanding, and so we do at some point need to be a multi-planet civilization because Earth will be incinerated.'

Musk said his mission is far beyond simply reaching Mars once. Instead, he wants to ensure the 'survival of civilization.'

'We have a long way to go because it's not just about landing on Mars and doing flags and footprints.'

NASA has long warned that eventually the sun will run out of energy. When it begins to die, NASA states the sun will expand into a giant red star, which could become so large it engulfs Mercury, Venus and potentially Earth.

Musk, in describing his approach to his work, admitted he had a 'maniacal sense of urgency.

'I'm just wired that way, and that's the kind of mindset that I've kind of instilled in the people at SpaceX. You have got to drive hard, and not everyone is cut out for that.'

Daily Mail · by BRITTANY CHAIN FOR DAILYMAIL.COM · May 28, 2025

8. Land forces tool up for potential Pacific conflict

Excerpts:

The Army and the Marine Corps are both amid transformation, although the Corps’ Force Design is several years ahead of the Army’s Transformation in Contact initiative. And while Force Design is more overtly focused on preparing for conflict with China, both services acknowledge that the battlefield of the future will be much different than those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Lt. Gen. James Glynn, commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, said the Marines’ efforts had “moved beyond design into what I would label as realization,” but one of the biggest lessons so far is that, “in this era, with near-peer-level competition, it’s a constantly changing environment. And so while we’ve heretofore labeled it as transformation, I think it’s going to be a process of kind of dynamic change over time.”

For U.S. Army Pacific, that transformation requires units to continue to perform their missions while simultaneously testing new equipment and providing feedback “to create change faster—and the circle of change is rotating pretty quickly,” said U.S. Army Pacific command Gen. Ronald Clark.

Lt. Gen. Matthew McFarlane is the commander of I Corps, composed of 60,000 soldiers based in Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington state. But with 40-some exercises a year across the Indo-Pacific, there are always some troops deployed to partner nations: Australia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and more. The campaign of exercises, called Operation Pathways, helps “build readiness in the environment we’re going to operate in,” McFarlane said—and also allows them to watch China “very closely.”

...

For Clark, the necessity of land forces in the Indo-Pacific is clear. “Land forces are decisive. Land forces guarantee sovereignty, security, full stop,” he told Defense One.

“Our adversary is very different than what we faced over the past 20-plus years. He’s developed an anti-access/area-denial network designed to fix our air and maritime assets and to put them at risk. They will not allow us to build combat power at our own time and choosing…so our mission, our responsibility, is to understand that, correct and attempt to neutralize their ability to impact our other domains.”

For Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces Korea, “land power is the connective tissue of the joint force.”

“You can control the skies, you can control the seas, but ultimately, you must control the ground to win and to achieve any lasting security,” Brunson said. “Our forces build the operating environments that air and maritime forces depend on.

And for Paparo, while each service is important to success and to deterrence, “fires is the capability from the Army and the land forces that I most treasure in this region,” and “protection and integrated missile defense” are “absolutely critical as well.”

“The challenges we face in the Indo-Pacific are formidable but not insurmountable,” he said. “The Army’s contribution to the joint functions are transformative and inspiring. But we all must do more. … and we need to do it now.”

Land forces tool up for potential Pacific conflict

Army, Marines pursue transformation, while exercises with partner nations grow more sophisticated.

By Jennifer Hlad

Managing Editor, Defense One

May 27, 2025 06:14 AM ET

defenseone.com · by Jennifer Hlad

HONOLULU—That U.S. Army leaders would extol the importance of land forces, even in a theater dominated by water, is as predictable as the Pacific tides. But for a naval aviator to do so? That’s a bit more surprising.

“Yes, the region is named after oceans, but human beings live on the land,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command leader Adm. Sam Paparo said at the Land Forces Pacific conference here earlier this month, echoing an expression common among U.S. Army Pacific leaders before highlighting the Army’s key role in artillery, theater-wide sustainment, missile defense, and more.

Any discussion of military power in the Indo-Pacific would be incomplete without invoking the so-called pacing challenge to illustrate just what these land forces may find themselves up against. And unlike a decade ago, when most military leaders would studiously avoid uttering the word “China,” no one here was playing coy anymore. But through keynotes, panels, and one-on-one interviews with leaders, a general consensus was clear: though everyone hopes war never comes, the military is ready for the fight.

“We still remain confident in our ability to prevail, and we should make no mistake about that,” Paparo said. “Deterrence is our highest duty…and deterrence is that combination of capability and will and your would-be adversary’s knowledge of that, that demonstrates to them that the cost, the potential cost of aggression far outweighs the benefits.”

Transforming in contact

The Army and the Marine Corps are both amid transformation, although the Corps’ Force Design is several years ahead of the Army’s Transformation in Contact initiative. And while Force Design is more overtly focused on preparing for conflict with China, both services acknowledge that the battlefield of the future will be much different than those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Lt. Gen. James Glynn, commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, said the Marines’ efforts had “moved beyond design into what I would label as realization,” but one of the biggest lessons so far is that, “in this era, with near-peer-level competition, it’s a constantly changing environment. And so while we’ve heretofore labeled it as transformation, I think it’s going to be a process of kind of dynamic change over time.”

For U.S. Army Pacific, that transformation requires units to continue to perform their missions while simultaneously testing new equipment and providing feedback “to create change faster—and the circle of change is rotating pretty quickly,” said U.S. Army Pacific command Gen. Ronald Clark.

Lt. Gen. Matthew McFarlane is the commander of I Corps, composed of 60,000 soldiers based in Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington state. But with 40-some exercises a year across the Indo-Pacific, there are always some troops deployed to partner nations: Australia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and more. The campaign of exercises, called Operation Pathways, helps “build readiness in the environment we’re going to operate in,” McFarlane said—and also allows them to watch China “very closely.”

First Corps includes one of the first three infantry brigade combat teams tapped for the TiC initiative, which McFarlane called “a huge opportunity” that is “bringing about change to divest from outdated technology and invest in the technology we need to ensure we can dominate on the battlefield today.”

Maj. Gen. Charles Lombardo, commander of the South Korea-based 2nd Infantry Division, doesn’t have one of the original three TiC brigades, but it hasn’t stopped his soldiers from also working to transform. They recently stood up a small unmanned systems unit, and have also taken lessons from the Ukraine conflict about survivable command posts, he said, and as they work closely with the South Korean military, have also been able to take advantage of some of their technology during training.

“Every training event is a rehearsal. Every exercise is an experimentation… and I think we’re taking all those kinds of opportunities to get better,” Lombardo said.

Growing partnerships

The dozens of partnerships that land forces are building and maintaining throughout the region are a critical piece of the deterrence puzzle, leaders said. That focus on partnerships was illustrated by the panoply of military uniforms on display at LANPAC—more than a dozen—as well as the variety of accents in keynotes and panels.

In April, U.S. Army Pacific’s deputy commander for homeland affairs, Maj. Gen. Lance Okamura, told Defense One that every partnership would be critical in the event of war with China.

“When push comes to shove, during conflict or crisis, we want our partners to choose us over our opponents, our adversaries,” Okamura said. “More importantly, when there’s time when we’re in dire need of assistance, we definitely want their assistance.”

The Army is building those partnerships not just through active-duty participation in exercises, but also through the National Guard’s state partnership program.

“When you start to see Idaho National Guardsmen in Cambodia; Washington Guardsmen in Thailand [and] Malaysia; Oregon in Vietnam and Bangladesh…it affects the Chinese Communist party’s decision-making cycle,” he said.

The significance of those relationships has already been proven in Cambodia, which expelled U.S. military forces in 2017—including Navy Seabees who were doing humanitarian-assistance projects throughout the country—ostensibly in exchange for China’s help in building a port. But Phnom Penh maintained its longstanding partnership with the Idaho National Guard, “and it’s because of that relationship that we’re back in Cambodia,” Okamura said.

The guard is also planning to send a Stryker brigade combat team from Washington for an exercise in Southeast Asia in 2027—the year Chinese president Xi Jinping set as a deadline for the People’s Liberation Army to be ready to take Taiwan.

“We definitely want to showcase to our opponent in 2027 that if you misbehave, there may be potential consequences. We’re trying to deter,” Okamura said.

The Army National Guard is also preparing for what happens if that deterrence fails, its commander, Lt. Gen. Jonathan Stubbs, told Defense One, because “if we’ve got a fight out here, we’ll fight as a total Army”—not just the active-duty force.

Stubbs visited Hawaii and Guam in April to get a feel for the “priority theater,” to visit with the National Guard in both locations, and to talk about ways to better integrate the Guard into training and exercises in the region.

After touring the Hawaii National Guard’s joint operations center and the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency’s operations center, Stubbs said he had a new appreciation for the “significant complexity” and isolation that would make responding to a conflict or crisis here “orders of magnitude more difficult” than on the mainland.

“You think about all the assets and the infrastructure on this island that have to be defended, and then you think about everything as you move farther to the west that has to be defended, and there is a significant place for the Army in a conflict in the Indo-Pacific,” he said.

Back at LANPAC, McFarlane said he’s seen a change in the level of engagement and number of partner nations involved in exercises, as countries large and small keep a wary eye on China.

During McFarlane’s first Operation Pathways, as a Ranger in 1996, “we parachuted into Cobra Gold” and did “small level, squad-level combined training” to help the American troops understand the jungle. Last year, more than a dozen countries participated in a “multinational forces headquarters command-post exercise where we were sharing and building proficiency across those different partners with cyber and space capabilities, as well as building warfighting proficiency at the higher-level staff.”

The interoperability “has really come a long way,” he said. “If you think about deterrence, just the number of countries that are going to multilateral exercises versus bilateral provides an aspect of deterrence. As China sees the Greater Pacific region, like-minded nations working together as we improve interoperability…and then demonstrating our capabilities together…operating as an integrated force, which is unstoppable, versus operating in a fragmented force, which is vulnerable.”

“The connective tissue of the joint force”

For Clark, the necessity of land forces in the Indo-Pacific is clear. “Land forces are decisive. Land forces guarantee sovereignty, security, full stop,” he told Defense One.

“Our adversary is very different than what we faced over the past 20-plus years. He’s developed an anti-access/area-denial network designed to fix our air and maritime assets and to put them at risk. They will not allow us to build combat power at our own time and choosing…so our mission, our responsibility, is to understand that, correct and attempt to neutralize their ability to impact our other domains.”

For Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces Korea, “land power is the connective tissue of the joint force.”

“You can control the skies, you can control the seas, but ultimately, you must control the ground to win and to achieve any lasting security,” Brunson said. “Our forces build the operating environments that air and maritime forces depend on.

And for Paparo, while each service is important to success and to deterrence, “fires is the capability from the Army and the land forces that I most treasure in this region,” and “protection and integrated missile defense” are “absolutely critical as well.”

“The challenges we face in the Indo-Pacific are formidable but not insurmountable,” he said. “The Army’s contribution to the joint functions are transformative and inspiring. But we all must do more. … and we need to do it now.”

defenseone.com · by Jennifer Hlad

9. USS Truman conducted largest airstrike in Navy history, official says

USS Truman conducted largest airstrike in Navy history, official says

militarytimes.com · by Riley Ceder · May 27, 2025

The U.S. Navy’s Carrier Air Wing 1 engaged in the largest maritime strike in Navy aviation history in terms of bomb tonnage earlier this year, a defense official confirmed to Military Times.

On Feb. 1, the aircraft carrier Harry S. Truman launched 27 F/A-18 Super Hornets as part of a coordinated airstrike against Islamic State operatives in Somalia in collaboration with the federal government of Somalia, a defense official with knowledge of the strike said. The official spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the matter.

Sixteen aircraft dropped 124,000 pounds of ordnance on targets in less than two minutes.

“The joint airstrikes targeted senior ISIS-Somalia leadership in a series of cave complexes approximately 50 miles southeast of Bosaso,” U.S. Africa Command said in a Feb. 11 statement. “The command’s current assessment is that approximately 14 ISIS-Somalia operatives were killed and no civilians were harmed.”

Navy relieves CO of USS Harry S. Truman following collision

Capt. Dave Snowden's relief comes one week after the carrier collided with a merchant vessel while operating in the Mediterranean Sea.

By Beth Sullivan

Among those killed was Ahmed Maeleninine, an ISIS recruiter and operations leader who led efforts to deploy jihadists into the U.S. and Europe, according to the statement.

Past large-scale U.S. airstrikes, like those conducted during Operation Desert Storm, involved multiple aircraft carriers and air wings, which would fly joint missions, said the defense official.

But the Feb. 1 strike was unique in that it was conducted by a single air wing.

The Truman arrived in the Red Sea on Dec. 14, 2024, to provide combat support against Iran-backed Houthi rebels, who’ve conducted missile and drone strikes against shipping and military vessels in the region since November 2023.

While there, Carrier Air Wing 1, composed of eight embarked squadrons aboard the Truman, took part in operations striking over 1,100 targets, the defense official said. The strikes killed hundreds of Houthi fighters and multiple senior Houthi officials, according to the official.

Specifically, Carrier Air Wing 1 flew over 13,000 sorties and used over 770 weapons and 1.1 million pounds of ordnance.

The Truman left the Red Sea earlier this month for its homeport of Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, according to reports, several weeks after President Donald Trump called off a nearly two-month-long airstrike campaign against Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

Still, the carrier was marred by several mishaps during its deployment in the Red Sea, including the loss of three F/A-18 Super Hornets, which cost at least $67.4 million each, according to Naval Air Systems Command. One jet was shot down by friendly fire from the guided missile cruiser Gettysburg in December. Two jets fell overboard, one in April while being towed in the carrier’s hangar bay and the other less than two weeks later after a failed landing.

The carrier also collided Feb. 13 with a civilian merchant vessel in the Mediterranean Sea near Port Said, Egypt. The Navy, as a result, relieved the commanding officer of his duties.

About Riley Ceder

Riley Ceder is a reporter at Military Times, where he covers breaking news, criminal justice, investigations, and cyber. He previously worked as an investigative practicum student at The Washington Post, where he contributed to the Abused by the Badge investigation.

10. Only Two Companies Make Parachutes for U.S. Troops. Deportations Would Crush One.

Who would have thought?

This is a second and third order effect of culture war and grievance culture.

Only Two Companies Make Parachutes for U.S. Troops. Deportations Would Crush One.

Immigrants from Ukraine and Nicaragua keep a factory in North Carolina humming; they are among 1.8 million workers with temporary legal protections

https://www.wsj.com/business/us-military-contractor-immigrant-labor-trump-deportations-0d665664?st=eP4cFT&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

By Ruth Simon

Follow | Photography by Angela Owens

May 28, 2025 5:30 am ET

Key Points

What's This?

Mills Manufacturing, a parachute maker for the U.S. military, relies on immigrant workers with temporary legal protection.
The Supreme Court’s decision to allow the Trump administration to strip protections for some immigrants puts Mills’s immigrant workers at risk.
CEO John Oswald worries about the impact on his 90-year-old business if immigrant workers lose their legal status.

ASHEVILLE, N.C.—Inside two low-slung brick buildings nestled here in the Blue Ridge Mountains, dozens of employees churn out parachutes for U.S. soldiers.

Cutting and sewing the fabric is precise work with little margin for error. To make the main canopy for the MC-6, a parachute used mostly by the U.S. Army and Marines, takes 27 steps. One single skipped stitch, among thousands, is considered a major defect.

Many of the employees have worked at these sewing machines for years. About a quarter of the staff are immigrants living and working under temporary legal protections that have come under fire from the Trump administration. The Supreme Court on May 19 allowed the administration to strip such protections for about 350,000 Venezuelans living in the U.S.

John Oswald, the chief executive of Mills Manufacturing, has dozens of workers from Ukraine, Nicaragua and other countries that are at risk of losing their legal status. The 90-year-old business is one of just two companies left that are qualified to make the MC-6 and the T-11, the main personnel parachutes for the U.S. military.

“If we lose these workers, it would be devastating to our business,” said Oswald, walking around a factory filled with the humming of sewing machines. “That puts the rest of the workforce at risk.”

Mills makes thousands of parachutes a year. Crafting a main canopy requires 22 people and more than 350,000 stitches.

Roughly 1.8 million people who entered the U.S. with temporary legal status are at risk of losing their deportation protections and work authorizations, according to the Migration Policy Institute, a nonpartisan think tank. Many entered the U.S. under humanitarian parole, a Biden-era program. Others have temporary protected status, or TPS, or entered the U.S. with parole at the border.

John Oswald has run Mills Manufacturing for 16 years.

These workers are a key cog in the tight labor market, where unemployment hovers near historic lows. They work at Amazon, GE Appliances and Marriott, and at smaller employers such as Eli’s Cheesecake in Chicago and Goodwin Living, an operator of senior living communities in Northern Virginia and Washington, D.C.

The Trump administration says that the TPS and Humanitarian Parole programs were always meant to be short-lived and that the Biden administration had used them too broadly to protect immigrants from deportation. Lawsuits have challenged the moves, leaving these workers and their employers in limbo.

For decades, Mills has hired a mix of U.S.-born and foreign-born workers to sew and cut for 10-hour shifts. Workers can earn up to $20 an hour, plus overtime, including bump ups for mastering additional skills. Oswald pays employees bonuses totaling $500 when they refer a successful hire.

At Mills, a third of the workers are Latinos and another third have come from Eastern Europe. Signs are written in four languages: English, Spanish, Moldovan and Russian. A large group gathers each Friday for a two-hour English class.

Immigrants arriving from danger zones have proved particularly important given recent labor shortages. “These individuals who have come over have filled a huge hole,” said Oswald, “not just for Mills but for a lot of companies.”

“I simply don’t see a way for my family and me to return to Ukraine. There are no truly safe places left”

Alisa Kapustyanskaja, quality finals inspector

Among the workers who stand to lose their legal work status: Alisa Kapustyanskaja, a 24-year-old Ukrainian immigrant who inspects parachute components. She grew up in Sumy, which was hit by a Russian missile attack that killed 35 people in mid-April, and has worked for Mills for more than two years.

The long shifts cause eyestrain, but Mills is a good employer for people like herself without perfect English, said Kapustyanskaja, who studied accounting in Ukraine.

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Jack Lantz, 65, her boss, said he was at risk of losing three members of his nine-person quality control team. “Some of the hardest working people we have are not from this country,” said Lantz, a self-described Air Force brat who traveled the world. He started out sewing nine years ago, but found it too monotonous and shifted to inspections.

William Gonzalez, 33, had no sewing experience when he came to Mills eight months ago after leaving Nicaragua, where he worked for a coffee bean processor. He said four relatives were already working for the parachute maker.

His task is to sew nylon straps, flaps and pockets, work that involves thicker fabric and requires more strength. He hopes to move into a job as a mechanic at Mills.

William Gonzalez, a sewer, worries he could be arrested if he returns to Nicaragua because he participated in a student protest.

New recruits spend a week in a small training room, learning basic tasks such as threading a sewing machine and counting stitches. Many have never seen a ruler with measurements in inches, not centimeters.

“The biggest challenge is the language,” said Maria Galvan, 49, a Mexican-born production supervisor, who uses Google translate to speak with Moldovan, Russian and Ukrainian colleagues. She brings over a staff member to translate more serious, technical conversations.

About 30% of Galvan’s 56-person team could lose their legal work status. When President Trump announced plans to end humanitarian parole, some asked if they would immediately lose their jobs and whether it was still safe to come to work.

A mural painted by Jack Lantz, a quality control supervisor, sits in the bigger of two Mills buildings. Sewers develop their own feel for parachute fabric, which shrinks on dry days and relaxes under humid conditions.

“If everything comes to an end and they have to leave, it’s going to be hard, emotional,” she said, “and it’s going to be hard for the company.”

Mills started out in 1935 making ladies underwear in New York City’s garment district, then shifted to manufacturing parachutes and other military items during World War II. It moved to North Carolina in 1952. It now produces about 5,000 parachutes a year.

“I don’t want to be moving because I started my life here.”

-Dmytro Sierhiei, cutter operator

Dmytro Sierhiei, a 29-year-old Ukrainian, joined Mills in 2023, with a background in industrial machine engineering. Quiet at first because his bosses in Ukraine didn’t like to hear workers’ suggestions, he now regularly offers ways to improve the cutting operation and sets the daily schedule.

“He’s like my right hand man,” said Chuck Nikolas, 52, who started as a cutter nearly a decade ago and now oversees 19 employees, two of whom he may lose. “Dyma’s become a very important cog in the wheel of cutting.”

“Immigrants are very hard workers,” said Iryna Yelenets, 49, a trainer who came to the U.S. from Ukraine at age 27 and has worked at Mills for 16 years. “They put in a lot of effort. They appreciate the job. They show up on time.”

Elba Lozano, another trainer, crossed the Mexican border with her mother at age 12, after her father died, and joined Mills as an inspector nearly two decades ago. Lozano, now 45 and a U.S. citizen, said she agrees with deporting immigrants if they are criminals, “but if they are hardworking people, doing taxes, they have a clean record give them an opportunity.”

“All you hear on the floor is fear, fear, fear.”

-Elba Lozano, a trainer

Immigrants with temporary status started arriving as Mills was looking to grow its staff in response to increased government orders in a tight labor market. Oswald, the CEO, had planned to add 24 employees in 2020, but head count fell by six.

“It just kind of happened,” said Oswald, 55, who started working at the family-owned company in 1998. “We found each other naturally, organically, and then built the support system.”

Community ties are crucial. Mills hired nearly a dozen Afghan immigrants a few years back, but most eventually left for cities with larger Afghan populations. Asheville has large Latino and Ukrainian communities.

Oswald brought in a local immigration group in April to talk to at-risk workers about their options. The CEO has also lobbied members of Congress on immigration reform. He said the response has been positive.

If Mills loses the immigrant workers, the company would have to ask government officials which orders to prioritize. “I wouldn’t have enough people to make the products we need to ship,” said Oswald. “It would leave a significant hole in our company.”

Each parachute undergoes 15 major inspections. Final inspection, by a two person team, can span an hour.

Write to Ruth Simon at Ruth.Simon@wsj.com

11. The real Golden Dome opportunity – defense acquisition reform

The real Golden Dome opportunity – defense acquisition reform

spacenews.com · by Sarah Mineiro · May 27, 2025

The Golden Dome is ambitious, alluring and amorphous. Many defense pundits have asked “What exactly is Golden Dome?” They are right to ask. The system of systems that will bring additional layered capability and capacity into the missile defense architecture under the Golden Dome is still undefined in any traditional military requirement process. Skeptics cite this as a reason for suspicion and scorn.

Nonetheless, the Golden Dome represents an opportunity to tangibly improve homeland missile defense, while also driving changes in how the Department of Defense should acquire new capabilities and integrate commercial solutions. It is not a coincidence that the Trump administration is concurrently pushing defense acquisition reform and the Golden Dome along similar paths with his Executive Orders, the program’s robust Congressional support, the support of individuals within the Department of Defense empowered to implement change.

As the Golden Dome continues to be developed, there are three natural policy tensions that will determine the success of the Golden Dome program and the viability of defense acquisition reform efforts of President Trump.

Innovation vs. institutions

Too often, a false dichotomy is drawn between innovation and the institutional imperative for rigorous programmatic management (regarding cost, schedule and performance). President Trump has said that the Golden Dome will be “done in about three years.” The reality is that to meet that timeline, the institution must innovate. The individuals and organizations responsible for the Golden Dome must have unprecedented alignment of authorities and responsibilities for requirements, budgeting and acquisition across all the military services, combat support agencies, and defense agencies. The Golden Dome may be the first real opportunity for the Department of Defense to implement the Executive Order on Modernizing Defense Acquisitions, prioritizing commercial solutions and other alternative acquisition methods. It will be a bitter pill to swallow for the oft-parochial resource jealousy witnessed in the traditional budgeting process. But it is also fundamental to the success of the program and recalls back to the culture established by naval reactors with Admiral Rickover as well as Strategic Defense Initiative under Lieutenant General Abrahamson.

Architectures vs. aspirations

There is no agreement on the specific architecture for the Golden Dome. That has not stopped the defense industry from imagineering their way into exotic aspirational capabilities that defy reality, resourcing and physics. Almost three years prior to being announced as the lead for the Golden Dome, then Lieutenant General Guetlein, Commander of Space Systems Command, made a speech where he articulated his acquisition mantra as “exploit, buy, build.” He asserted that the Space Force should exploit the capabilities that it already had access to, buy products and services from commercial partners to address existing and emerging warfighter requirements and only build what was specifically needed for national security unique requirements.

He understood that his job was to engineer a system of systems to deliver a comprehensive capability to a joint warfighter while supporting commercial participation. Said another way, Guetlein understood that his job was not to out-innovate, imagine or incentivize American industry but to enable that ingenuity. This is a delicate balance between engineering a framework that is responsible for capability delivery while also nurturing an emerging delicate ecosystem. This is the mindset that needs to be brought to the table when developing the Golden Dome. If done right, it will serve as an example of how to build an operationally responsive architecture without killing the aspirations of American defense technology companies for the betterment of homeland defense.

Integration vs. instruments (of destruction)

Lastly, most people think of the Golden Dome as a pretense for the development of space-based weapons. But the most significant technical challenge lies in operational command and control software integration. “Exploiting what we have” in the context of the Golden Dome means leveraging the command and control systems that already exist in missile defense systems — including the Missile Defense Agency’s C2BMC system, the Army’s IBCS and IFPC, and the Navy’s Aegis Combat System. Having all the offensive counterspace capabilities in the world does not protect the homeland unless those capabilities can be stitched together in an operationally relevant command and control system that is able to engage targets in any and all warfighting domains.

Again, the service rivalries around resourcing and domain unique concepts of operation are tangible but all services share the challenge of software development, acquisition, testing and operational acceptance. While perhaps not the flashiest parts of any space system — software, ground and networks are typically the most prone to programmatic failure. In order to enable its success, the Golden Dome program must appropriately address the integration challenges of the existing command and control systems — maybe even before it starts developing additional interceptors.

There is still a significant amount of uncertainty about what the Golden Dome is from a technological perspective. Skeptics will continue to be skeptical, but realistically grounded optimists have every reason to believe that the Golden Dome will present an opportunity to manifest additional homeland defense capabilities as well as defense acquisition reform. The captain of an English expedition to the Antarctic once said “optimism is real moral courage.” That captain was Ernest Shackleton, and his most notable expedition was called “Endurance” — which is exactly what will be needed if the Golden Dome and defense acquisition reform is to become reality.

Sarah Mineiro is a former staff director of the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee, focused on space, missile defense, hypersonics, directed energy and nuclear weapons. She is now an investor, entrepreneur, and owns an advisory company.

SpaceNews is committed to publishing our community’s diverse perspectives. Whether you’re an academic, executive, engineer or even just a concerned citizen of the cosmos, send your arguments and viewpoints to opinion@spacenews.com to be considered for publication online or in our next magazine. The perspectives shared in these op-eds are solely those of the authors.

spacenews.com · by Sarah Mineiro · May 27, 2025

12. Navy SEAL Team 6 operator will be the military's new top enlisted leader

Navy SEAL Team 6 operator will be the military's new top enlisted leader

Navy Fleet Master Chief David Isom is a SEAL who previously served with Navy Special Warfare Development Group, or DEVGRU — commonly referred to as SEAL Team Six.

Jeff Schogol

Published May 27, 2025 3:21 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol

Navy Fleet Master Chief David Isom, a former member of Navy Special Warfare Development Group, or DEVGRU — commonly referred to as SEAL Team Six — has been selected to serve as the U.S. military’s next top enlisted leader, defense officials announced on Tuesday.

Currently serving as the command senior enlisted leader for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Isom will become the sixth service member to serve as the senior enlisted advisor to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or SEAC, since the position was created in 2005.

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Although the SEAC is considered the U.S. military’s most senior enlisted leader, the job involves serving as an advisor to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than as a direct supervisor within a chain of command.

Isom enlisted in the Navy in 1987, and after passing Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL Training, or BUD/S, he went on to deploy with units that include DEVGRU, Naval Special Warfare Group 10, Special Reconnaissance Team 2, and SEAL Team 1, according to his official biography.

“His combat and operational deployments include Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as deployments throughout the Pacific and the Horn of Africa,” his biography says.

Isom’s military awards include four Bronze Star Medals, including two with “V” devices for valor; two Combat Action Ribbons; and a Presidential Unit Citation, according to his service record.

Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, selected Isom to be the next SEAC following two rounds of interviews, a Joint Staff spokesperson told Task & Purpose on Tuesday.

Isom will replace Marine Sgt. Maj. Troy Black, who is leaving the job after serving as SEAC for two years. The change of office is tentatively scheduled for mid-to-late June.

Black previously served as the sergeant major of the Marine Corps before he was selected as the SEAC by Army Gen. Mark Milley, and he initially served as the senior enlisted advisor to Air Force Gen. Charles “CQ” Brown Jr., whom President Donald Trump fired as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February.

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Jeff Schogol is a senior staff writer for Task & Purpose. He has covered the military for nearly 20 years. Email him at schogol@taskandpurpose.com; direct message @JSchogol73030 on Twitter; or reach him on WhatsApp and Signal at 703-909-6488.

13. Why Trump Won't Sacrifice Taiwan

Excerpts:

Randall Shriver, an assistant secretary of defense during the first Trump administration, acknowledges that “the search for the big deal is part of this president’s character.” This characteristic combined with prolonged ambiguity has led some to speculate that Trump may use Taiwan as a chip to strike a grand bargain with China. At the extreme, some officials in Taipei are reportedly asking, “Is he going to change the status quo, accepting the annexation of Taiwan?”

These concerns overlook both the significant constraints on Trump’s decision-making as well as the likely strategic rationale for studied silence. All leaders are subject to “two-level games” that require the support of domestic constituents to make international bargains. Sacrificing Taiwan is well outside the purview of what Trump’s key constituents would accept, even if Trump projects the appearance of having unlimited discretion. Past crises over Taiwan provide further evidence of the considerable leverage congressional leaders have over presidential decision-making on this key issue.

It is also far from clear that Trump would choose to sacrifice Taiwan even if he had such discretion. Calculated silence about how the United States would respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan is in line with the longstanding policy of “strategic ambiguity.” Such reticence also makes sense as part of a broader strategy that keeps China guessing while the United States fortifies its security posture.

Why Trump Won't Sacrifice Taiwan - Foreign Policy Research Institute

fpri.org · by Brendan Flynn

Introduction

The basic contours of President Donald Trump’s China policy and its implications for Taiwan remain uncertain. Many express concern Trump will sacrifice Taiwan for a grand bargain with Beijing. Rear Admiral Mike Studeman (Ret.), for example, suggests that the possibility of Taiwan being traded as “a huge blue chip” in a grand economic bargain cannot be dismissed. Such concerns overlook the key role elite and popular opinion plays in constraining President Trump’s options.

All presidents must secure domestic ratification for international agreements as part of a “two-level game,” and Trump is no exception. Historical and contemporary evidence illustrates that Trump’s maneuvering room for innovative policy on Taiwan is more limited than many assume.

Congressional Support for Taiwan

The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) does not bind the United States to take any particular action in the event of Chinese aggression, only holding that such acts would be treated with “grave concern.” This means that, from a legal perspective, the American response ultimately depends on the president’s discretion.

Yet observers should not mistake the US Congress’ lack of legal authority for lack of influence. As the Third and Fourth Taiwan Strait Crises reveal, Donald Trump would not be the first US president to have their preference for US-China stability undermined by staunch congressional support for Taiwan.

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis makes this especially clear. As Taiwan prepared for its first democratic presidential election in 1996, presidential candidate and incumbent Lee Teng-hui lobbied intensively for a US visa to speak at Cornell University, his alma mater. Speaking at Cornell would elevate Taiwan’s international standing while enhancing Lee’s prospects in the upcoming election. President Bill Clinton and his advisors, however, opposed the visit. Secretary of State Warren Christopher told his Chinese counterpart no visa would be issued, and in March 1995 the US State Department publicly announced this decision.

Clinton’s decision received immediate pushback from Congress. Resolutions urging President Clinton to grant Lee’s visa passed 97 to 1 in the US Senate and 396 to 0 in the House. As a result, Clinton “gave in to intense pressure.” Lee’s subsequent Cornell speech marked a major milestone for Taiwan on the international stage, even as it also triggered an eight-month cross-strait crisis that included nuclear escalation risks.

More recently, the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis has again highlighted congressional prerogatives overruling presidential preferences. While President Joseph Biden warned against the trip, in August 2022 Nancy Pelosi became the first Speaker of the House to visit Taiwan since Newt Gingrich in 1997. The normally fractious Congress united behind Pelosi. Michael McCaul, the senior Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, stated, “I don’t always agree with her, but on this one I applaud it.” Republican Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell likewise stated, “I have no criticism of the speaker trying to make this trip.”

Adamant bipartisan support for Taiwan has a long history. The TRA itself is an expression of congressional disapproval of the way Taiwan was seemingly sacrificed to normalize relations with China. As Richard Bush put it, the TRA was passed because congressional members “believed that President [Jimmy] Carter struck a bad bargain . . . by giving into Chinese demands that he terminate diplomatic relations with Taiwan and end[ing] the mutual defense treaty.” Congress today is arguably more supportive of Taiwan than ever. Trump would immediately find himself crosswise of a broad and passionate bipartisan coalition were he to attempt to sacrifice Taiwan in a new deal with Beijing.

Strong congressional support for Taiwan reflects broader public sentiment. New polling from Timothy Rich finds over 63 percent of Americans would support the United States defending Taiwan if it were attacked by China, including 65 percent of Republicans. Meanwhile, 77 percent of Americans and 82 percent of Republicans hold unfavorable opinions of China. After making competition with China a centerpiece of his political career, Trump cannot afford to contradict elite and popular opinion on this critical issue. Trump’s focus on “stay[ing] unified” in Congress would be fatally undermined by sacrificing Taiwan, which is why his own interests depend on the island’s defense.

Taiwan Is Not Ukraine—Republican Support for Taiwan

Trump’s unconventional, transactional approach to US foreign policy is well known. In this context, many worry Trump’s skepticism about the value of supporting Ukraine foreshadows a similar approach to Taiwan. Yet the political dynamics surrounding Ukraine and Taiwan could not be more different. At the beginning of 2025, 67 percent of Republicans thought the United States was providing “too much” assistance to Ukraine (a figure that has since declined). The fact that a similar percentage of Republicans would support the United States defending Taiwan if it were attacked illustrates how differently Trump’s political base views the two issues.

In fact, a common complaint among Republican Ukraine skeptics is that support for Ukraine detracts from cross-strait deterrence. Vice President J.D. Vance, for example, complained during the campaign that “we’re sending all the damn weapons to Ukraine and not Taiwan.” Senator Josh Hawley (R-MO) similarly advocates for reduced support for Ukraine to better defend Taiwan from China. Whatever the merits of these arguments––and there are good reasons to be skeptical of them––most Republicans are incredibly hawkish on China and are among Taiwan’s loudest champions.

This support is reflected in the words and deeds of the Trump administration. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have both expressed staunch support for Taiwan. While speaking with his Japanese counterpart, Hegseth declared that “America is committed to sustaining robust, ready and credible deterrence in the Indo Pacific, including across the Taiwan Strait.” A leaked internal Pentagon “strategic guidance” memo signed by Hegseth emphasized that the “denial of a Chinese fait accompli seizure of Taiwan . . . is the Department’s sole pacing scenario.” During his Senate nomination hearing, Rubio stated it was “critical” for the United States to defend Taiwan from China. Trump’s new undersecretary of defense for policy, Elbridge Colby, is widely known for his view that “the U.S. must prioritize Taiwan over Ukraine.”

These clearly stated hawkish positions on Taiwan by some of Trump’s key allies add to the congressional constraint. While Trump may be expert at expanding the range of what his supporters find acceptable, sacrificing Taiwan would be a bridge too far. Any attempt to do so would face a swift and forceful coalition of Republicans who on this issue are aligned with Trump’s fiercest critics. The domestic political dynamics surrounding Taiwan could not be more different than the politics surrounding Ukraine.

Vague by Design?

Concern over Taiwan is a natural consequence of Trump’s transactional style and, tariff skirmishes aside, lack of early explicit signals about US China policy. Significantly, however, American and Taiwanese audiences are not the only ones unnerved. As Bonny Lin, John Culver, and Brian Hart note, “Many in Beijing don’t know where Washington stands.” This may be by design. As Jonathan Czin pointed out in January, “Beijing craves clarity from Washington.” By prioritizing border security, negotiations over Ukraine, and the broader Middle East early in his term, Trump has heeded Czin’s advice and kept Beijing guessing.

There are clear advantages to this strategy. First, it forces China into a more restrained posture while it gradually “connect[s] the dots.” China is unable to take the initiative while it remains unclear about the broad contours of US policy. The benefit of this approach is clear when contrasted with the opportunity Beijing seized to lay down a marker early in the Biden administration. During the contentious March 2021 high-level talks in Anchorage, Yang Jiechi confidently lectured that “the United States does not have the qualification to say that it wants to speak to China from a position of strength.” Depriving China a similar opportunity at the beginning of the Trump administration is tactically sound.

Second, by first solidifying relationships across Asia, resetting expectations in Europe, and regaining the initiative in the Middle East, Trump is positioning the United States to engage China from a position of strength. The first day of the administration saw Secretary Rubio meet with his Indian, Japanese, and Australian Quad counterparts in Washington. As India’s external affairs minister explained, this “underlines the priority [the Quad] has in the foreign policy of its member states.” The US-Philippines Balikatan joint military exercises in April and Secretary Hegseth’s early visit to Guam, the Philippines, and Japan similarly bolster the US security posture in advance of more substantive engagement with Beijing.

To date, the tariff skirmish is the only major indicator of the administration’s approach to China. Whatever its merits, China’s aggressive reciprocal tariff response was unique. This led Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to claim China was “goaded . . . into a bad position” and isolated as a “bad actor.” Such isolation may have been a major factor in Beijing’s decision to send senior official He Lifeng to Switzerland for de-escalatory talks. The 16 million Chinese jobs at risk and potential 2.6 percent contraction in gross domestic product were also likely major factors in bringing Beijing to the table. Increased security leverage, economic isolation, and studied reticence facilitate US initiative in the competition with China, even if the latter aspect of this strategy has the unfortunate side-effect of unnerving Taiwan and its supporters.

Conclusion

Randall Shriver, an assistant secretary of defense during the first Trump administration, acknowledges that “the search for the big deal is part of this president’s character.” This characteristic combined with prolonged ambiguity has led some to speculate that Trump may use Taiwan as a chip to strike a grand bargain with China. At the extreme, some officials in Taipei are reportedly asking, “Is he going to change the status quo, accepting the annexation of Taiwan?”

These concerns overlook both the significant constraints on Trump’s decision-making as well as the likely strategic rationale for studied silence. All leaders are subject to “two-level games” that require the support of domestic constituents to make international bargains. Sacrificing Taiwan is well outside the purview of what Trump’s key constituents would accept, even if Trump projects the appearance of having unlimited discretion. Past crises over Taiwan provide further evidence of the considerable leverage congressional leaders have over presidential decision-making on this key issue.

It is also far from clear that Trump would choose to sacrifice Taiwan even if he had such discretion. Calculated silence about how the United States would respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan is in line with the longstanding policy of “strategic ambiguity.” Such reticence also makes sense as part of a broader strategy that keeps China guessing while the United States fortifies its security posture.

Brendan Flynn

Brendan Flynn is a Non-Resident Fellow in the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) and a PhD Candidate at Wayne State University in Detroit, MI.

fpri.org · by Brendan Flynn

14. Time for China’s belt and road partners to pony up as debt comes due, think tank finds

How can we exploit this?

Excerpts:

In 2025, about 75 of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable countries will make “record high debt repayments” totalling US$22 billion to China, according to research released on Monday by an Australian think tank, the Lowy Institute, as a result of peaks in new loan commitments made from 2012 to 2018.

The author, Riley Duke, said China was grappling with a dilemma.

“It faces growing diplomatic pressure to restructure unsustainable debt, and mounting domestic pressure to recover outstanding debts, particularly from its quasi-commercial institutions,” his report said. “But a retrenchment in Western aid and trade is compounding difficulties for developing countries while squandering any geopolitical advantage for the West.”

Duke explained that the research was being published now because China’s belt and road lending spree peaked in the mid-2010s, and those grace periods began expiring in the early 2020s – a likely “crunch period” for developing-country repayments to China.

A second article below from the Guardian as well.

Time for China’s belt and road partners to pony up as debt comes due, think tank finds

Report by Lowy Institute finds that China has shifted from a net capital provider to developing countries to their biggest debt collector

https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3311813/time-chinas-belt-and-road-partners-pony-debt-comes-due-think-tank-finds

Kandy Wong

Published: 8:00pm, 26 May 2025

China has become the leading debt collector of developing countries, shifting from a net capital provider, “as bills coming due from its belt and road lending surge in the 2010s now far outstrip new loan disbursements”, according to new research.

In 2025, about 75 of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable countries will make “record high debt repayments” totalling US$22 billion to China, according to research released on Monday by an Australian think tank, the Lowy Institute, as a result of peaks in new loan commitments made from 2012 to 2018.

The author, Riley Duke, said China was grappling with a dilemma.

“It faces growing diplomatic pressure to restructure unsustainable debt, and mounting domestic pressure to recover outstanding debts, particularly from its quasi-commercial institutions,” his report said. “But a retrenchment in Western aid and trade is compounding difficulties for developing countries while squandering any geopolitical advantage for the West.”

Duke explained that the research was being published now because China’s belt and road lending spree peaked in the mid-2010s, and those grace periods began expiring in the early 2020s – a likely “crunch period” for developing-country repayments to China.

How China’s shift to chief debt collector will impact its reputation as a development partner … remains to be seen

Riley Duke, Lowy Institute

In 54 of 120 developing countries with available data, debt-service payments to China now exceed the combined repayments owed to the Paris Club – a bloc that includes all major Western bilateral lenders.

In 2024, the trade value between China and countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative exceeded 50 per cent of China’s total foreign trade for the first time, according to figures from China’s customs.

As Beijing shifts into the role of debt collector, Duke added that Western governments remain “internally focused”, with aid declining and multilateral support waning.

“An increasingly isolationist United States and a distracted Europe are withdrawing or sharply cutting their aid support,” he noted. “Developing economies must also grapple with the impact of new trade war shocks and the spectre of punitive US tariffs being levelled against them.”

The US State Department issued a “stop-work” order in January for all existing foreign aid and paused new aid, after US President Donald Trump ordered a review of whether aid allocation aligned with his foreign policy.

“How China’s shift to chief debt collector will impact its reputation as a development partner and its broader messaging around South-South cooperation remains to be seen,” Duke added.

Citing data from the World Bank, the Lowy Institute said China was “the largest source” of bilateral debt service for developing countries, accounting for more than 30 per cent of all such payments in 2025.

How China is reshaping its economic ties with Africa

China’s net lending position has shifted from being a net provider of financing – where it lent more than it received in repayments – to a net drain, with repayments now exceeding loan disbursements, the research noted, adding that China was a net drain on the finances of 60 developing countries by 2023, up from 18 in 2012.

The Belt and Road Initiative is an ongoing effort to link economies into a China-centred trade network, largely via Chinese-backed megaprojects abroad, and Beijing says that the initiative has entered a phase with “small but beautiful” additions.

Nevertheless, China continues to finance strategic and resource-critical partners.

The research showed that China remains the largest bilateral lender in seven of its nine land neighbours: Laos, Pakistan, Mongolia, Myanmar, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

“A majority have received new Chinese loan commitments since 2019 and together account for a quarter of all disbursements since China’s lending downturn began in 2018,” Duke added.

Other developing economies that are critical-mineral or battery-metal exporters, such as Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, received more than US$8 billion in disbursements, accounting for 36 per cent of China’s total loan outflows in 2023, according to the research.

Kandy Wong

Kandy Wong returned to the Post in 2022 as a correspondent for the Political Economy desk, having earlier worked as a reporter on the Business desk. She focuses on China's trade relationships with the United States, the European Union and Australia, as well as the B

Poorest 750 nations face ‘tidal wave’ of debt repayments to China in 2025, study warns

The Guardian · by Helen Davidson · May 27, 2025

The most vulnerable nations on Earth are facing a “tidal wave” of debt repayments as a Chinese lending boom starts to be called in, a new report has warned.

The analysis, published on Tuesday by Australian foreign policy thinktank the Lowy Institute, said that in 2025 the poorest 75 countries were on the hook for record high debt repayments US$22bn to China. The 75 nations’ debt formed the bulk of the total $35bn calculated by Lowy for 2025.

“Now, and for the rest of this decade, China will be more debt collector than banker to the developing world,” the report said.

The pressure to repay was putting strain on local funding for health and education as well as climate change mitigation.

China spent $240bn on belt and road bailouts from 2008 to 2021, study finds

“China’s lending has collapsed exactly when it is needed most, instead creating large net financial outflows when countries are already under intense economic pressure,” it said.

The loans were largely issued under President Xi Jinping’s signature belt and road initiative (BRI), a state-backed global infrastructure investment programme which has underwritten national projects from schools, bridges and hospitals to major roads and shipping and air ports.

The lending spree turned China into the largest supplier of bilateral loans, peaking with a total of more than $50bn in 2016 – more than all western creditors combined.

The BRI focused primarily in developing nations, where governments struggled to access private or other state-backed investment. But the practice has raised concerns about Chinese influence and control and drawn accusations that Beijing was seeking to entrap recipient nations with unserviceable debt. Last month another analysis by the Lowy Institute found that Laos was now trapped in a severe debt crisis, in part because of over-investment in the domestic energy sector, mostly financed by China.

China’s government denies accusations it deliberately creates debt traps, and recipient nations have also pushed back, saying China was a more reliable partner and offered crucial loans when others refused.

But the Lowy report said the record high debt now due to China could be used for “political leverage”, noting that it comes amid huge cuts to foreign aid by the Trump administration.

The report also highlighted new large-scale loans given to Honduras, Nicaragua, Solomon Islands, Burkina Faso and the Dominican Republic, all within 18 months of those countries switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to Beijing.

China also continues to finance some strategic partners, including Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Laos and Mongolia, as well as countries that produce critical minerals and metals, such as Argentina, Brazil and Indonesia.

But the situation also put China in a bind, pulled between diplomatic pressure to restructure unsustainable debt in vulnerable nations and domestic pressure to recall loans amid China’s own economic downturn.

China publishes little data on its BRI scheme, and the Lowy Institute said its estimates – based on World Bank data – likely underestimated the full scale of China’s lending. In 2021 AidData estimated China was owed a “hidden debt” of about $385bn.

The Guardian · by Helen Davidson · May 27, 2025

15. Pentagon Accused of Illegally Wiretapping Foreign Aides

Below this Allsides.com article are two articles from the right (Newsmax) and the left (The Guardian).

But I think the headllne should be "former" aides.

Newsmax: Report: Pentagon Used Illegal Wiretap on Fired Aides

Guardian: White House stunned as Hegseth inquiry brings up illegal wiretap claims

Pentagon Accused of Illegally Wiretapping Foreign Aides

allsides.com · May 27, 2025

Headline Roundup

Summary from the AllSides News Team

A Pentagon investigation, led by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, has come under scrutiny following allegations Tuesday of an illegal wiretap on a former aide.

The Details: To pinpoint the source of internal leaks, an illegal wiretap was reportedly used on former aide Dan Caldwell. This was part of an investigation ordered by Hegseth, which led to the dismissal of three aides, including Caldwell. The allegation of an illegal wiretap has caused the White House to lose confidence in the investigation, according to a report by The Guardian (Left bias).

For Context: The leak in question involved a reportedly top-secret document outlining potential strategies for the US military to reclaim the Panama Canal. This document was allegedly leaked to a reporter by Caldwell. The involvement of Hegseth's personal lawyer, Tim Parlatore, in the investigation has raised further concerns. The Guardian's report alleged Parlatore as the one who disclosed the information about the warrantless wiretap, although Parlatore denied making any such claim.

How the Media Covered It: The Guardian highlighted the disbelief and alarm within the White House, stating that advisers were stunned by the allegations of illegal wiretapping. The article also painted a picture of a chaotic situation within Hegseth's office, marked by confusion and mistrust. Newsmax (Right) focused more on legality of the wiretap, stating that if true, it would be more scandalous than the leaks themselves. Both outlets emphasized the resultant lack of confidence in the investigation.

Revised by the AllSides staff (of humans) after a first draft from our custom AI. Learn more. Support our mission. Suggest an improvement to this summary.

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Tags: hegseth | illegal wiretap | leak | probe | pentagon

Report: Pentagon Used Illegal Wiretap on Fired Aides

Fred Fleitz on Sunday Report

By Mark Swanson | Tuesday, 27 May 2025 12:41 PM EDT

https://www.newsmax.com/politics/hegseth-illegal-wiretap-leak/2025/05/27/id/1212506/

A Pentagon investigation ordered by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has come under fire amid accusations that a warrantless wiretap was used on a former aide as part of the probe to find the source of internal leaks, The Guardian reported Tuesday.

White House officials, including Vice President JD Vance, were told that three aides fired by Hegseth, including former senior adviser Dan Caldwell, were outed by the illegal National Security Agency wiretap, according to the report.

As a result, the White House has lost confidence in the integrity of the Pentagon's probe, The Guardian reported. Further, White House advisers have no idea who or what to believe, the report said.

If true, the use of an illegal wiretap would prove more of a scandal than the leaks themselves, according to the report.

"President Trump is confident in the secretary's ability to ensure top leadership at the Department of Defense shares their focus on restoring a military that is focused on readiness, lethality, and excellence," a White House spokesperson told The Guardian in a statement.

Caldwell, along with Hegseth's former deputy chief of staff, Darin Selnick, and the deputy Defense secretary's chief of staff Colin Carroll were fired last month after a top secret document regarding options for the U.S. military's role in reclaiming the Panama Canal was leaked to a reporter. The leak was attributed to Caldwell.

Hegseth's personal lawyer Tim Parlatore was tasked with the investigation, according to the report.

The White House was told Caldwell printed out the top secret document, took a photo of it, and sent it to a reporter using his personal phone, according to the report. At the time, the Pentagon said Caldwell was dismissed for unauthorized disclosure of department information.

Caldwell publicly decried his dismissal and went on Tucker Carlson's podcast weeks later to say his firing, as well as those of Selnick and Carroll, were related to office politics. Parlatore was close to Hegseth's former chief of staff Joe Kasper, who left his post voluntarily in April amid the leak turmoil, according to the report.

White House officials pressed Parlatore as to how the Pentagon knew what was on Caldwell's phone, leading Parlatore to suggest that a warrantless wiretap was used, according to the report.

The warrantless wiretap has not been formally resolved, according to the report.

The investigation was transferred to Deputy Defense Secretary Stephen Feinberg's office around the same time that Parlatore needed to step away from the probe on other business, according to the report.

Mark Swanson

Mark Swanson, a Newsmax writer and editor, has nearly three decades of experience covering news, culture and politics.

White House stunned as Hegseth inquiry brings up illegal wiretap claims

The Guardian · by Hugo Lowell · May 27, 2025

The White House has lost confidence in a Pentagon leak investigation that Pete Hegseth used to justify firing three top aides last month, after advisers were told that the aides had supposedly been outed by an illegal warrantless National Security Agency (NSA) wiretap.

The extraordinary explanation alarmed the advisers, who also raised it with people close to JD Vance, because such a wiretap would almost certainly be unconstitutional and an even bigger scandal than a number of leaks.

But the advisers found the claim to be untrue and complained that they were being fed dubious information by Hegseth’s personal lawyer, Tim Parlatore, who had been tasked with overseeing the investigation.

The episode, as recounted by four people familiar with the matter, marked the most extraordinary twist in the investigation examining the leak of an allegedly top secret document that outlined options for the US military to reclaim the Panama canal to a reporter.

White House to take choice of Pentagon chief of staff out of Hegseth’s hands

The advisers were stunned again when Parlatore denied having told anyone about an illegal NSA wiretap himself and maintained that any information he had was passed on to him by others at the Pentagon.

The leak was first attributed internally to Hegseth’s senior adviser, Dan Caldwell, who was escorted out of the Pentagon and fired last month alongside two other aides, Hegseth’s former deputy chief of staff, Darin Selnick, and the deputy defense secretary’s chief of staff Colin Carroll.

But the illegal wiretap claim and Caldwell’s denials fueled a breakdown in trust between the Pentagon and the White House, where the Trump advisers tracking the investigation have privately suggested they no longer have any idea about who or what to believe.

In particular, one Trump adviser recently told Hegseth that he did not think Caldwell – or any of the fired aides – had leaked anything, and that he suspected the investigation had been used to get rid of aides involved in the infighting with his first chief of staff, Joe Kasper.

The fraught situation is sure to increase pressure on Hegseth ahead of a Senate hearing next month, and more broadly for his office, which has been roiled by the leak investigation that has now continued for nearly a month with no new evidence or referral to the FBI.

The fallout has left Hegseth with no chief or deputy chief of staff, as he relies on six senior advisers to run his front office, which is involved in setting the direction of the defense department that has a budget of nearly $1tn and oversees more than two million troops.

And while Hegseth’s former junior military aide Ricky Buria has effectively assumed the job of the chief of staff, the White House has blocked Hegseth from giving him the job permanently on account of his limited experience and role in internal office drama.

The Pentagon declined to comment on reporting for this story. A spokesperson for the White House said in a statement: “President Trump is confident in the secretary’s ability to ensure top leadership at the Department of Defense shares their focus on restoring a military that is focused on readiness, lethality, and excellence.”

White House spurred by rumors

The skepticism among the Trump advisers is widely seen as a product of several developments that started shortly after the suspensions of Caldwell and Selnick on 15 April, followed by the suspension of Carroll on 16 April, according to seven people familiar with the matter.

After the aides were fired on 18 April and issued a joint statement denying wrongdoing, the White House received its first briefing on the firings.

At that juncture, a handful of Trump advisers in the West Wing and elsewhere were told there was evidence that Caldwell had printed a document on US military plans for the Panama canal classified at the top secret level, took a photo, and sent it to an reporter using his personal phone.

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But the advisers grew uneasy in the ensuing weeks after Caldwell appeared on former Fox News host Tucker Carlson’s podcast, denouncing their firings as the product of internal office politics at the Pentagon and alleging that the investigation had become weaponized against them.

They also then learned of a rumor at the Pentagon that Air Force office of special investigations (OSI), which had been working the case for weeks beforehand, had possibly identified the leaked Panama canal document by virtue of the fact that it was a draft that lacked certain details that were in the final version of the document.

As the rumor went, the document had led Air Force OSI to focus its investigation on mid-level aides who worked in the US Southern or Central Command or for the joint chiefs of staff, and had not been told to focus on the activities of the three aides until the weekend after they had been fired.

It was not immediately clear whether the the rumor was correct or even from where it emerged. But it appears to have spurred the White House to press Parlatore to disclose the evidence against Caldwell, including how the Pentagon knew what was on his phone.

At first, Parlatore rebuffed the attempts to obtain the underlying evidence, noting it was inappropriate for the executive branch to insert itself into an ongoing criminal investigation that he said could still yield charges.

But towards the end of April, according to what the Trump advisers shared inside the White House, Parlatore suggested that there had been a warrantless wiretap on Caldwell’s phone.

Parlatore has denied making such a claim when confronted by associates, and has generally maintained during the investigation that he has only passed along information briefed to him by others. Reached by phone on Monday, Parlatore referred questions to the Pentagon press office.

Still, the Trump advisers who reeled from the claim also eventually told Hegseth they were concerned by the optics of Parlatore, who had been close to the former chief of staff Kasper, running an investigation that targeted Kasper’s perceived enemies in the office.

The warrantless wiretap episode was not formally resolved. The investigation was transferred to deputy defense secretary Stephen Feinberg’s office around the time that Parlatore had planned to step away to prepare for the trial of another client, Adm Robert Burke, on federal bribery charges.

Parlatore remains a close confidant of Hegseth and he retained his ability to make recommendations in the investigation, according to two people familiar with the situation. Commissioned by Hegseth as a commander in the navy reserve, he is subject to the uniform code of military justice and cannot be directly fired.

The Guardian · by Hugo Lowell · May 27, 2025

16. Cerberus Eyes Darwin Port, Australia Reviews Chinese Control

A whole of society (including business) approach to global strategic competition. Ports are probably one of the major pieces of key and decisive terrain in strategic competition.

Cerberus Eyes Darwin Port, Australia Reviews Chinese Control

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-27/us-s-cerberus-eyes-offer-for-port-of-darwin-the-australian-says?cmpid=BBD052725_politics&utm

The access entry to the Port of Darwin.Photographer: Darrian Traynor/Getty Images

By Ben Westcott and Sharon Klyne

May 26, 2025 at 8:29 PM EDT

Updated on May 27, 2025 at 4:02 AM EDT

US private equity firm Cerberus Capital Management LP expressed interest in purchasing the lease for Australia’s strategically important Port of Darwin from Landbridge Group, despite the Chinese firm insisting it has no interest in selling the asset.

Landbridge Australia executive director Ben Cheng said that Cerberus had held an initial meeting with the leadership of the port to express an interest in a sale, but that there had been no meeting with Landbridge yet or any official offer or bid. “Landbridge has no intention to sell the port,” he added.

Yet pressure is building for a change of ownership from Australia’s center-left Labor government, which pledged during a recent election campaign to bring the key asset back into Australian hands. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has even suggested a willingness to nationalize the port if a buyer can’t be found.

The Australian newspaper reported late Monday that Cerberus was readying a proposal to buy the 99-year lease from Landbridge at a price slightly above the A$506 million ($328 million) the Chinese company paid for it in 2015. The Australian cited an unidentified official as saying Landbridge is possibly open to offers around A$1 billion.

New York-based Cerberus has links to the Trump administration, with co-founder Steve Feinberg appointed to be US deputy defense secretary in March. Cerberus hasn’t responded to requests for comment.

The Port of Darwin is Australia’s most northern maritime facility and sits just south of Indonesia and Southeast Asia more broadly. It is located near military facilities that house rotations of US marines on deployment to the Northern Territory.

The decision to lease the port to Landbridge in 2015 triggered concern from a number of parties, including then-US President Barack Obama.

Labor lawmaker Luke Gosling, who represents the city of Darwin, told Bloomberg in May that the decision to sell the port “bordered on treasonous” and signaled there were international buyers who were interested in purchasing the lease off Landbridge.

“I have been in discussions with proponents for many months,” Gosling said in a May 15 interview. “Some of those proponents are, won’t be surprising to anyone, they’re a mixture of very large defense industrial companies with Australian footprints and entities.”

Gosling said there was “serious commercial interest” in the port and that it wouldn’t be a case of the government “desperately trying to find someone who wants to do it.” He added that it will be a question of “who gives the best value to the Australian taxpayer.”

The Port of Darwin Is Australia's Northern-Most Maritime Facility

Source: Bloomberg

Relations between Australia and China have dramatically improved in the three years since the election of Albanese’s government in May 2022, including the lifting of trade curbs imposed by Beijing at the height of tensions during the Covid-19 pandemic.

However, recent developments have tested the stabilization of ties, including the People’s Liberation Navy conducting live-fire exercises off Australia’s heavily populated east coast in February.

China’s Ambassador to Australia, Xiao Qian, warned Canberra in a statement released Sunday to tread carefully in its decision making around the Port of Darwin lease, saying Landbridge had made “significant investments” in the facility.

“Such an enterprise and project deserves encouragement, not punishment. It is ethically questionable to lease the port when it was unprofitable and then seek to reclaim it once it becomes profitable,” Xiao said in the statement.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning told reporters at a regular press conference in Beijing on Tuesday that “the relevant Chinese enterprises obtained the lease of Darwin Port through market means, and their legitimate rights and interests should be fully protected.”

An editorial published in China’s state-run Global Times newspaper warned that if Australia forcibly removed the lease from Landbridge, it would create “major enduring pitfalls for the country.”

Ports have become a new battleground between the US and China in their trade war. Among those ensnared by the confrontation is Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka-shing, who’s seeking to sell 43 ports around the world — including two in the strategic Panama Canal — to a group backed by US investment firm BlackRock Inc. for over $19 billion in cash.

While Li’s CK Hutchison Holdings Ltd. has told investors that Italian billionaire Gianluigi Aponte’s family-run business is the “main investor” in the consortium, Bloomberg reported last month that BlackRock will control the two Panama ports.

While talks on the deal are ongoing, CK Hutchison has already missed a target to sign a definitive agreement on the Panama part of the deal by April 2.

— With assistance from Shirley Zhao and Colum Murphy

(Adds Chinese foreign ministry comments in fifteenth paragraph. A previous version of this story corrected Cheng’s title in second paragraph.)

17. Ukraine’s New Way of War

Excerpts:

As Ukraine’s partners speak of peace deals and security guarantees, Ukraine’s armed forces are adapting in every way they can to continue carrying out their mission: to defend a stretch of border, to hold off Russian advances on a particular town. They cannot afford the luxury of counting on American commitments or Russian concessions, because for most Ukrainians, what matters above all is physical safety. And the only force protecting human lives in Ukraine is the Ukrainian military.

Ukraine’s New Way of War

American weapons are important, but Ukrainian drones have changed everything.

By Nataliya Gumenyuk

May 27, 2025, 8 AM ET

The Atlantic · by Nataliya Gumenyuk · May 27, 2025

Since entering office in January, President Donald Trump has pressed for a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine, largely on Russian terms. “You don’t have the cards right now,” Trump told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in their infamous February Oval Office meeting—suggesting that Ukraine could resist a Russian takeover only with continued American military backing or Russia’s voluntary restraint.

And yet, despite flagging U.S. support, Ukrainian forces continue to hold the Russians off, and their resilience points to Kyiv’s growing autonomy from the United States. In fact, the conflict’s front line, which extends for about 1,900 miles and features intense combat along 700 of them, has not moved much since Trump took office in January. What’s keeping Ukraine in the fight is not Russian mercy, or even solely American arms: It’s innovation.

In just three years, Ukraine’s military has evolved from defending itself with leftover Soviet weapons to pioneering a new kind of warfare. In 2022, observers described combat in Ukraine as 20th-century-style trench warfare, dependent on tanks. Ukrainian soldiers had little choice but to fire whatever old shells they could find. The nature of the battlefield had changed by 2023 once the United States and other Western allies began supplying Ukraine with advanced weapons systems, including HIMARS rocket launchers and ATACMS long-range missiles. Recently, however, the U.S. president has thrown the future of American military aid to Ukraine into question. Last month, he even suggested that the U.S. might hesitate to sell Ukraine Patriot missile systems.

Anne Applebaum: Nobody in Ukraine thinks the war will end soon

Fortunately for Ukraine, American weapons are not the only factor that has rebalanced the battlefield in the past three years. Starting in 2024, Ukrainian-made drones definitively changed the way both sides waged war. For Ukraine, the adjustment was not just tactical, but a broader, doctrinal evolution in how its military fights.

In March, I embedded with three different frontline brigades to see firsthand how they were engaging the enemy, and what the new technology they employed could mean if Ukraine loses access to American weapons systems. Drones now guide artillery, deliver payloads, resupply units, and even map out minefields. They’re fast, cheap, adaptable—and built right at home. Brigades across the front use them daily, and unlike tanks or long-range missiles, these systems can be updated weekly to meet changing battlefield demands. They are what’s keeping Ukraine in the fight—and they may just be changing the face of warfare more generally.

The 13th Khartiia Brigade, a combat unit of the Ukrainian National Guard, is fighting in the North Kharkiv region. At the time of my visit, the front line was relatively stable, as the Ukrainians slowly pushed enemy troops closer to the Russian border. (Full disclosure: I have family serving in the Khartiia Brigade.)

Watch: The war in Ukraine enters its fourth year

Reconnaissance drones survey the front line 24 hours a day. Nothing that happens within 20 kilometers on either side escapes their view. In the early spring, the trees were bare, and after a year of active combat, most buildings had been destroyed. The sight lines were clear, and the drones could pick up the slightest movement.

Khartiia had managed to cut off the logistics of some Russian units in the area, and early on the morning of March 19, several soldiers indicated that they were ready to surrender. Four of them followed a Ukrainian drone that guided them out of the forest—only for a Russian drone to strike two of them. Ukrainian soldiers later told me that the surviving two said they’d spent more than eight months in the area, including more than a month in a tiny dugout. They’d surrendered primarily from hunger.

At one of the brigade’s tactical operation centers, a room where one battalion monitors its territory across a multiscreen display with maps, I watched black-and-white aerial footage of Ukrainian attack drones striking a Russian dugout in the forest. A battalion commander who went by the call name Zhyvchyk—“Zest” in Ukrainian—told me that more than 18 Russian soldiers had surrendered to his battalion in the previous month. In one incident captured on video, a Russian soldier threw a grenade into his commander’s dugout before surrendering. He told the reconnaissance unit that his commanders were receiving air-dropped food parcels that they weren’t sharing with subordinates.

The Ukrainian military has developed a battlefield-management system called Delta, which integrates information from reconnaissance, drones, satellite imagery, and intelligence. Khartiia is considered one of the most technologically savvy units, with the best analytics: Its Delta map is marked with symbols and colors that differentiate among active Ukrainian and Russian dugouts, showing which have been smashed or overtaken so that drone pilots can make quick decisions and avoid wasting drones.

As sophisticated as the combat zone looks on-screen in the tactical operation center, in real life, it is very primitive. For more than a year, the Ukrainian and Russian militaries have avoided using heavily fortified trenches, because they are too visible from the sky. Instead infantry soldiers squeeze into foxholes in groups of two or three. To defend themselves from drone strikes, both armies seek to jam the signals that link drones to their operators, often using portable electronic-warfare systems. Those mounted to the tops of vehicles cost anywhere from several hundred to several thousand U.S. dollars.

The drones themselves run a gamut of cost and lethality. FPV (or first-person-view) drones, informally known as kamikazes because they destroy themselves, are the cheapest, starting at $350. Among the more expensive drones are bombers, which drop explosives for air strikes or remote land-mining and can be used multiple times. Operating them is more dangerous than the kamikazes: They need to return to their pilots for reloading, so the operators’ positions risk being spotted.

Ukrainians speak with particular pride of their heavy bombers, or Vampires. Russians have nicknamed these “Baba Yaga,” after a mythological Slavic witch who flies in a mortar and pestle. Vampires cost anywhere from $10,000 to $20,000 and are mainly used in fights, but also for logistics: They can deliver ammunition, medicine, and food to the infantry and to other pilots. A Vampire can carry as much as 33 pounds and fly more than six miles. Khartiia commanders claim that Russian delivery drones can carry no more than a pound.

During the week of my embed, the Russian military identified and destroyed a few of the Vampire pilots’ positions. Still, I was permitted to visit one pilot position where a team of three soldiers stayed up at night, sending Vampires out with parcels of ammunition, food, and medicine from dusk ’til dawn.

I asked Zhyvchyk to summarize how Ukraine’s war-fighting had changed over three years. He gave me a handwritten essay, literally titled “How the War Has Changed Since 2022.” A 28-year-old from a predominantly Russian-speaking part of the Donbas region, he had been working with a tutor to improve his written Ukrainian. That essay was his homework. It read, in part:

In 2022, all operations involved artillery, armed vehicles, and infantry. The major battles were about controlling height to observe more and react faster. In all three categories, Russia surpassed Ukraine. To support artillery so they are more precise, we started using observation drones, called “wedding drones,” which photographers often use at weddings. Later, we started using kamikaze drones and bombers. Then the land drones appeared, tasked with delivering and even evacuating the wounded. In 2022, it was still possible to create trenches in the field and successfully defend them. Today, being there means death for 100 percent of people. Nobody any longer pursues mass attacks using armored vehicles, as they’d be destroyed before they approach the front line. The infantry creates its positions when the drones cannot see it.

Photo-illustration by The Atlantic. Source: 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade.

A drone pilot by the call name of Yenot, with the 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade, fights in the Donetsk region.

Photo-illustration by The Atlantic. Source: Nataliya Gumenyuk.

FPV (or first-person-view) drones, informally known as kamikazes because they self-destruct, are the cheapest, at around $350.

My next embed was with the 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade, Kholodnyi Yar, one of Ukraine’s largest and most legendary brigades. Before the current war, it was involved in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Lebanon, and it is known for winning battles with infantry vehicles and heavy artillery. Nevertheless, drones have changed the way it fights.

The 93rd was in a part of Donbas, in the direction of Toretsk, that had seen intense engagement over the past three years. A kamikaze-drone pilot by the call name of Yenot, or “Raccoon,” told me he’d participated in some of the war’s most brutal battles, including near Bakhmut.

We drove to his position at 4 a.m. at high speed, passing obliterated villages. Once we’d settled into the dugout, I watched a live video feed of the territory and was struck by the wasteland Donbas had become. What soldiers called “gardens” were trees burned to ashes. Not even the skeletons of houses remained, only rubble. But Yenot still found targets: some movement near a dugout, a Russian observation drone, a vehicle.

Yenot, now 36, served in the 93rd Brigade during the first Russian invasion, in 2015 and 2016. Back then, he was wounded in a fight near the Donetsk airport, by a sniper who shot him from less than a quarter of a mile away. He told me he could no longer imagine fighting at such close range. Now, from a basement, he could kill a Russian soldier several kilometers away with greater precision than that sniper.

A Russian soldier appeared on Yenot’s screen, riding a motorbike. He was most likely delivering ammunition to one of the dugouts, Yenot told me—“a suicide mission,” in his estimation. He dispatched a drone to strike the Russian man, but the explosive did not detonate. Then he sent a second, which struck him dead.

To compare drone warfare to a video game is a cliché, Yenot told me, that doesn’t begin to capture the tension of knowing that the enemy is constantly searching out your position for attack. When a soldier leaves his dugout to launch a drone strike, or even to use the bathroom, he first checks with neighboring units and scans interactive maps to see if an enemy drone is nearby. In the summer of 2024, a dugout where Yenot was piloting observation drones came under attack. For more than eight hours, he ran between dugouts seeking shelter as the foxholes were smashed one by one.

Before joining the army, Yenot studied marketing and worked at a bank in Dnipro, a large city in the South. He had never studied to become a drone pilot. On the job, he learned to be one of the best in his battalion.

Read: I’ve seen how this plays out for Ukraine

The day I spent watching Yenot, his work was unremitting. He fought and communicated with other units continuously, making innumerable high-pressure decisions about how much ammunition to use when. His only breaks came when the battery for the observation drones that support the attack drones needed to recharge. He didn’t have time for a proper meal—he did drink six or seven energy drinks that day, which he told me was typical.

At one point, Yenot spotted a Russian tank moving through his terrain. Tanks are tough to destroy with kamikaze drones, and Ukraine had no nearby artillery unit for support. But if he could pull it off, he’d be removing a $1 million piece of Russian equipment from the field. Yenot ordered his subordinates to experiment with the different types of explosives their drones could deliver. Some payloads might not be effective; others might be lost because of signal jamming. He expended five drones, each costing $500 to $600, then agonized over whether to keep going. He had to hold some drones back, until the next shipment, for self-defense. In the end, he decided he’d done enough damage to the tank—the soldiers in it probably survived, but the tank now had some vulnerabilities that a more powerful Ukrainian weapon could successfully exploit.

The brigade’s press officer suggested to me that a drop-off in Western weapon supplies might not be as devastating as once thought. At this point, some 40 percent of weapons on the front line are produced in Ukraine. And foreign supplies have never been a cure-all. During the grueling battle for Bakhmut, Yenot told me, Ukraine had too few shells, and those it did have had been produced by a hodgepodge of foreign companies. This made precise targeting difficult to calibrate, because every shell was different. Today artillery shells are still in short supply—but the 93rd mainly uses them when drones need to be recharged.

My last visit was to the area around Pokrovsk, in the region of Donetsk, where I embedded with the 68th Jaeger Brigade. The 68th was formed in early 2022, from civilians, and is not as well known or resourced as the tech-savvy Khartia or the legendary 93rd.

The soldiers in the reconnaissance squad had worked before the war in commerce, construction, and even car smuggling. They were initially in infantry reconnaissance, but now they were all pilots. Not one I spoke with had ever flown in a passenger plane. The unit commander went by the call name Zmiy, or “Snake.” When I visited, his squad was testing the mobile launch of a Ukrainian-made observation drone, called Leleka, from a field by a forest to avoid detection. A Leleka drone can fly up to 62 miles round-trip and provide both a livestream and a recording. It costs more than $38,000—a significant expense for this team, so the unit was extremely careful handling it.

Photo-illustration by The Atlantic. Source: Nataliya Gumenyuk.

A soldier from the reconnaissance squad of the 68th Jaeger Brigade tends to a Leleka drone after its flight.

Ukrainian-made reconnaissance Leleka drone can fly up to 62 miles round-trip and provide both a livestream and a recording. It costs more than $38,000—a significant expense for this team, so the unit was extremely careful handling it. Donetsk region, Eastern Ukraine. Pokrovsk direction

Milka, the commander of one of the 68th’s infantry squads (his call name means “Chocolate Bar”) told me he was tasked with preparing teams for a battlefield surveilled constantly from the air. When infantrymen arrive at their positions, they have less than an hour to dig foxholes that can accommodate two or three men for a period of days. What they can’t carry on their backs is delivered by drones. Exiting the foxhole for any reason is dangerous. On the worst days, soldiers relieve themselves into plastic bags. The brigade rotates its infantry only on days when fog, rain, snow, or heavy wind limit the enemy’s visibility. On some occasions, infantrymen have been stuck in their positions for weeks or even months.

Drones are “the scariest weapon ever,” Viktor, a medic with the 68th Brigade, told me. In years past, medics could hope to evacuate wounded soldiers in time to save their lives. That’s rarely practical now. When the 68th first arrived in the Pokrovsk area a year ago, its predecessors told the medics not to drive anywhere, because their ambulance didn’t have electronic-warfare capabilities that could help it evade drone strikes. Even retrieving the dead has become risky. The medics have taught soldiers how to treat themselves and one another. Infantrymen and women carry medicine with them on their missions, and their medics often guide them remotely, learning as much as they can about the types of injuries sustained and sending needed equipment by drone.

Oleksandr Pipa, a Ukrainian rock musician of the 1990s, runs a workshop in Kyiv that makes drones. The drone sector is full of such people from creative fields, particularly filmmaking. A young worker I spoke with in Pipa’s shop—a veteran of the battle of Bakhmut—knew nothing of his boss’s fame.

As many as 150 Ukrainian companies now produce some 100,000 drones a month, Oleksandr Kamyshin, an adviser to President Zelensky and a former minister for strategic industries, told me. Pipa’s outfit is relatively small, but it is in regular contact with frontline soldiers and upgrades its products almost every other week to suit their needs, Pipa told me. Because Ukrainian drone production is highly diversified, the Russian military never really knows what specific product it will be confronting. This confers an advantage on Ukraine—Pipa compares the country’s drone producers to an “army of ants.”

Modern military doctrine is all about controlling the airspace, Andrii Zagorodniuk, a former Ukrainian minister of defense, told me. And what Ukraine lacks in missiles and airpower, it has partly made up for with drones, such that Russia can’t fully control the airspace in its war with Ukraine.

Of course, Russia is adapting its technology, too. It has started using fiber-optic drones, which are tied to the ground by thin fiber-optic cables that unwind as the drone flies. This makes them impossible to jam, but they have to fly low and can therefore be tangled by physical nets.

Photos: Ukraine’s battlefield drones

Ukraine’s innovation in unmanned aerial systems is a homegrown response to an asymmetrical war. Drones will never eliminate the need for other kinds of weaponry. If Ukraine had more long-range weapons and aircraft, it could destroy Russian command and control centers farther from the line of contact and hinder approaching enemy infantry. But without enough such military capabilities, the Ukrainian army has been forced to find other solutions, even at a cost in lives. Its inventiveness is now its best insurance against an uncertain future.

If the U.S. does reduce or suspend military aid to Ukraine, the military’s first concern will be missiles for American-produced Patriot air-defense systems, which are mainly used to protect civilian populations in urban areas. According to the Ukrainian analytical center Texty.org.ua, Russian drone and missile strikes on 12 frontline and neighboring Ukrainian regions have doubled in Trump’s first two months in office, compared with the last two months of Joe Biden’s term. To push Ukraine to surrender, Moscow may be forcing Ukraine to use up its stockpiles of air-defense interceptors, so that it can then rain terror on these towns later.

In early March, the United States briefly suspended the military aid and intelligence that the Biden administration had promised Ukraine. After some delay and confusion, the delivery flights resumed. But Trump has made clear, repeatedly, that he has little interest in continuing to supply Ukraine with weapons, and that what he wants is a peace deal, which has so far eluded him.

I asked soldiers and army press officers how the military was responding to the changing winds from Washington. Most said a version of the same thing—that war has taught them to focus on the assignment in front of them and not to worry too much about what’s beyond their control.

“Never, never watch the news, that’s what I tell my people,” Milka, from the 68th Brigade, told me. “I am very practical. If I’m invited to eat borscht, I do it if I see it on the plate in front of me. Yet if someone tells me that we might go and eat borscht somewhere tomorrow, I won’t even bother about that.” Yenot, from the 93rd Brigade, offered a different analogy: “Any soldier can see as far as his gear allows, whether it’s binoculars, a Mavic drone, or satellite. The commander in chief may know the whole situation: He knows whether we have no ammunition and no money left to continue fighting.”

As Ukraine’s partners speak of peace deals and security guarantees, Ukraine’s armed forces are adapting in every way they can to continue carrying out their mission: to defend a stretch of border, to hold off Russian advances on a particular town. They cannot afford the luxury of counting on American commitments or Russian concessions, because for most Ukrainians, what matters above all is physical safety. And the only force protecting human lives in Ukraine is the Ukrainian military.

The Atlantic · by Nataliya Gumenyuk · May 27, 2025

18. Buried Lessons: Leading Through Innovation

Excerpts:

As the Marine Corps undergoes force design changes and prepares itself for future crises, innovation is no longer optional: it is a tactical imperative. Yet tension persists between the reforms the Marine Corps needs and its commitment to maintaining discipline within its ranks.

The internal struggles Carlson faced still echo in the Corps. The debate surrounding the Raiders mirrors the ongoing discourse surrounding Force Design 2030. Under Commandants General David Berger and now General Eric Smith, Force Design has attracted numerous high-profile detractors, notably retired Marine general officers. While some see debate as a symptom of institutional strain, the discourse is an indication of health.

Evans Carlson exemplifies a leader who challenged convention to make the Corps more lethal and agile. Carlson’s career provides a blueprint for reconciling innovation with tradition—a critical lesson as the Corps pivots to Pacific operations against a peer adversary.

A recent War on The Rocks interview with former Marine Corps Commandant David Berger underscored the need for innovation amid turbulence. Platt’s biography of Evans Carlson arrives at an opportune moment, as the Marine Corps navigates new policy guidance from the current Administration, reshapes its force structure, and counters a rising, bellicose China. Carlson’s iron will, intellectual rigor, and combat heroics offer today’s reformers an instructive—yet cautionary—case study of leadership through disruption.

Can the Marine Corps afford to bury its next Evans Carlson?

Buried Lessons: Leading Through Innovation

By Benjamin Van Horrick

May 27, 2025

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/05/27/buried_lessons_leading_through_innovation_1112713.html

Buried Lessons: What Evans Carlson Can Teach the Marine Corps about Leading Through Innovation

In 1947, the Marine Corps declined to fund the transport of Evans Carlson’s remains from the West Coast to Arlington National Cemetery. Carlson’s exploits won the loyalty of his men, but his maverick tendencies generated resentment among his superior officers. In The Raider, author Stephen R. Platt chronicles the tumultuous life and career of the famed Marine who formed and led the Marine Raiders. Carlson’s career challenged the Corps’ resistance to its mavericks, emphasized the value of working with regional allies, and fostered unit cohesion. More than a combat biography, Platt’s book serves as a case study on partner force development and the challenges of overcoming institutional inertia in order to innovate. As the Marine Corps again prepares for distributed operations across the Pacific, Carlson’s example offers lessons on innovating, partnering, and fighting in the Pacific.

Ralph Waldo Emerson’s writings animated Evans Carlson’s life, inspiring the preacher’s son to run away from his New England home at 14, which served as his moral compass. Guided by self-reliance, an insatiable intellectual curiosity, and a fervent belief in justice, Carlson excelled when partnering with military forces in China and Nicaragua in the 1920s. From writing intelligence reports in Shanghai to quelling unrest in Nicaragua, he proved himself a thoughtful and effective combat leader. These tours gave Carlson an appreciation for the political dynamics and social networks that animate political and military action at the local level. His time on independent duty instilled in him the confidence needed to operate in complex environments, where he trusted his judgment and won the trust of his partners.

A chance posting to the presidential retreat in Warm Springs gave Carlson access to and the ear of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Carlson’s keen intellect and affable manner helped him build a relationship with the President and his eldest son, James. Before Carlson departed for China in 1937, President Roosevelt requested that Carlson write dispatches on his travel in China to be read only by the commander-in-chief. His dispatches influenced US–China policy; later, Carlson’s advocacy influenced the President to advocate for forming the Raiders. Buoyed by Roosevelt’s confidence, Carlson began his most formative tour to date.

In 1937, Carlson embedded with Chinese forces during the Second Sino-Japanese war, shaping his understanding of the allies’ needs, the enemy’s tactics, and a new way of war. Carlson observed the Chinese Eighth Route Army, gaining insight into the mental and physical demands of combat that his Marines would later face in the Pacific. Carlson traveled with the unit—on horseback and by foot—on a grueling 250-mile march deep into Japanese-controlled territory. Carlson observed the Eighth Route Army’s focus on unit cohesion and decentralized execution, a model that informed the development of the Raiders. The Eighth Route Army found itself fighting far from supporting units. His Chinese counterparts were impressed with Carlson’s unrivaled work ethic and his willingness to share risk. His proficiency in Chinese and his outgoing personality helped him to earn their trust and respect. Later, on Makin Island and Guadalcanal, Carlson’s Raiders faced similar conditions as the unit relied on its morale and the individual skills of its Marines.

Carlson’s on-ground reporting in China during the Sino-Japanese War contradicted the prevailing US diplomatic narrative. In the Eighth Route Army, Carlson found willing, capable partners who made tenuous but meaningful gains. US diplomatic cables ignored nuance while calcifying narratives. However, Carlson’s dispatches to FDR offered a grounded perspective. Carlson’s experiences prepared him for this next challenge: forming the Raiders.

Platt’s background as a Chinese historian is ideal for telling Carlson’s story. To understand the exploits of the Raiders during World War II, one must understand the impression the Sino-Japanese War in the 1930s had on Carlson. Platt supplies the needed context, showing how Carlson’s encounters with the potential Chinese ally and the determined Japanese foe seared lessons into Carlson’s mind. The type of warfare Americans soon would face remained speculative to outside, but Carlson left China with a clear –and chilling– view. His extraordinary intellect captured the lessons of the conflict: the importance of skilled, independent, autonomous units capable of decisive action with little external support. With the goal of building units with initiative, Carlson began rethinking Marine hierarchies. Forging such a unit demanded individual agency, rather blind obedience, and unit cohesion over rigid command. This mindset became the hallmark of the Raiders and would help carry them to victory.

Today, the American military, like in the interwar period, is not directly engaged in conflict but remains a ravenous observer of wars like Ukraine and Gaza. However, interest does not guarantee an understanding or sensible adaptation informed by these wars. What remains unclear is whether the joint force, as Carlson did, can apply the lessons from Ukraine and Gaza – or whether they will simply calcify existing narratives. Platt demonstrates how Carlson the isolation from external influences while embedded with the Eighth Route Army, gave Carlson the mental and physical space to draw incisive observations. Today’s observers of Ukraine and Gaza do not have the same luxury of isolation.

Platt’s most insightful writing focuses on the institutional infighting after Pearl Harbor, from which the Raiders emerged. Carlson and James Roosevelt proposed a Commando-like unit modeled on British counterparts, but the Commandant of the Marine Corps rebuffed the reforms. The commander-in-chief then intervened, making Carlson’s vision a reality.

Informed by the Eighth Route Army’s distributed operations, deep in enemy territory, Carlson devised a hellacious pre-deployment training schedule for the Raiders. As a commander, Carlson taught fieldcraft skills, fostered individual agency, and replicated combat conditions. Beyond tactics, however, Carlson cultivated an ethos. The Raiders hosted “Gung Ho” meetings—complete with frank discussions breaking down barriers between officers and enlisted men. Carlson instilled in the unit the belief they were fighting for a more just, equitable America, rather than merely exacting revenge for Pearl Harbor. Senior Marine leaders dismissed Carlson’s methods as a threat to discipline.

The Raiders’ successes on Makin Island and Guadalcanal soon vindicated Carlson’s methods. However, Carlson’s star burned too bright, and the Marine Corps promoted him out of command. His successors soon dismantled the unit’s unique culture, reinstating rigid hierarchies and ending the Gung Ho meetings.

Carlson’s career is not a historical footnote—it is an instructive case study for the Marine Corps and the joint force. Advisors and liaisons in the Pacific face similar challenges when influencing decision making. As the U.S. military reorients its focus toward strategic competition with China, Carlson’s experience offers a blueprint for overcoming bureaucratic inertia, leveraging partner forces, and leading through institutional resistance.

As the Marine Corps undergoes force design changes and prepares itself for future crises, innovation is no longer optional: it is a tactical imperative. Yet tension persists between the reforms the Marine Corps needs and its commitment to maintaining discipline within its ranks.

The internal struggles Carlson faced still echo in the Corps. The debate surrounding the Raiders mirrors the ongoing discourse surrounding Force Design 2030. Under Commandants General David Berger and now General Eric Smith, Force Design has attracted numerous high-profile detractors, notably retired Marine general officers. While some see debate as a symptom of institutional strain, the discourse is an indication of health.

Evans Carlson exemplifies a leader who challenged convention to make the Corps more lethal and agile. Carlson’s career provides a blueprint for reconciling innovation with tradition—a critical lesson as the Corps pivots to Pacific operations against a peer adversary.

A recent War on The Rocks interview with former Marine Corps Commandant David Berger underscored the need for innovation amid turbulence. Platt’s biography of Evans Carlson arrives at an opportune moment, as the Marine Corps navigates new policy guidance from the current Administration, reshapes its force structure, and counters a rising, bellicose China. Carlson’s iron will, intellectual rigor, and combat heroics offer today’s reformers an instructive—yet cautionary—case study of leadership through disruption.

Can the Marine Corps afford to bury its next Evans Carlson?

Major Benjamin Van Horrick, USMC is the 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade Current Logistics Operations Officer.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

19. Success in Syria, Failure in Ukraine: The Russian T-90 Main Battle Tank in Combat

Excerpts:

Though praised by Vladimir Putin as the “best in the world,” the much-lauded T-90 has shown to be anything but that, proving vulnerable to Ukrainian armor, anti-tank weapons, and UAVs. The fact that the T-90 is newer than many of the Ukrainian weapons systems that have defeated it – the original Carl Gustaf design dates from way back in 1948 – is an especially disappointing aspect of this tank’s combat record in Ukraine. As mentioned above, some variants of the T-90 were created to be sold to militaries outside Russia, most notably India. It is not hard to envision Russia having difficulty in selling the T-90 to new buyers in the future, given its now tarnished reputation.

If it is ever to encounter Western-made MBTs in a tank-versus-tank engagement, whether in Ukraine or elsewhere, it is doubtful that the T-90 would pose much of a threat to opposing tanks. Rather, since the M1 Abrams and Leopard 2 have been described as exceptional tanks by Ukrainian tankers familiar with them and other Soviet- and Russian-made tanks, both from operating and fighting against the latter, we can assume the M1 and Leopard 2 would probably best the T-90 if they ever came into combat with each other. For countries like Finland and Poland which operate the M1 and/or the Leopard 2 (the older Leopard 1 tanks operated by Ukraine have been largely phased out of other European militaries), and which might face Russian aggression in the future, this should be of some comfort for them.

Much has been said and written about Russia’s heavy losses of tanks, including T-90s, in Ukraine and their overall dwindling stocks of operational armor. Given that relatively few T-90s were originally made, many have been lost, and Russia cannot produce replacements rapidly, we might say that the T-90 is an “endangered species” of a tank that will roam the fields of Ukraine in fewer and fewer numbers. Between this, and the likely unwillingness of foreign buyers to consider procuring them from Russia, the T-90 does not seem destined to have a long and impressive record of wartime service. Rather, it may soon be discarded upon the scrap pile of history.

Success in Syria, Failure in Ukraine: The Russian T-90 Main Battle Tank in Combat

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/28/t90-tank-failures-ukraine-combat-analysis/

by Nathan Stueve

05.28.2025 at 06:00am

Abstract

Although it had been in use for over a decade, the T-90 main battle tank (MBT) had not seen major combat until the recent conflicts in Syria in Ukraine. Initially praised as the most advanced tank in Russian frontline service, the T-90 saw some success in Syria, being able to withstand the older anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) employed in that warzone. However, upon encountering a variety of effective anti-armor weapons systems in Ukraine, the T-90 has proven to be far from invincible.

Executive Summary

When it comes to Soviet- and Russian-made armor, a number of well-known weapons systems easily come to mind. There is the venerable T-34 heavy tank, which held its own against Axis forces in WWII and UN forces in the Korean War. There is the not-so-venerable T-72 main battle tank (MBT), which saw poor performance in Iraqi service when up against superior Western tanks during the Gulf War. Then there is the T-14 Armata, referred to by some as a “stealth tank,” which is yet unproven in combat, but is still a subject of keen interest and dynamic discussion.

However, when it comes to the T-90 MBT, the first Russian tank to enter service after the fall of the Soviet Union, much less seems to be known and much less attention seems to be paid. Indeed, unlike other better-known Soviet and Russian tanks, a cursory overview of publicly available books on armored warfare shows a clear lack of mentions of the T-90. Although the T-90 entered production in 1994, this state-of-the-art Russian tank saw little actual combat for almost two decades – that is until Russian forces launched their full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022.

The ongoing fighting in Ukraine grants observers a unique, and heretofore unrealized, opportunity to evaluate the Russian T-90 MBT and its performance in Ukraine. Here are the key takeaways available from OSINT sources on this topic:

The T-90 is the most advanced tank the Russian military is able to deploy in combat.
The T-90 has proven vulnerable to a variety of weapons systems operated by Ukraine.
The Russian military has relatively few T-90s, has experienced heavy losses of T-90s, and lacks the ability to rapidly manufacture more of them.
The T-90 is likely to fare poorly if it encounters Western-made MBTs in future combat.
The poor combat record of the T-90 in Ukraine is likely to harm its export potential.

Origins, Features, and Variants of the T-90

On paper, the T-90 appears to be an impressive weapons system, especially when compared to its Soviet predecessors. Based on the earlier T-72 MBT, it features a crew of three (commander, gunner, driver), a 125mm main gun, a 7.62mm coaxial machine gun alongside the main gun, an additional 12.7mm machine gun on a swivel mount atop the turret roof, and explosive reactive armor (explosive charges meant to detonate outward to counteract incoming shells and missiles) on the front of the hull and the front and sides of the turret. However, unlike its predecessors, the T-90 possesses additional technology meant to increase its protection and effectiveness, like a superior fire control computer, improved optics, and an active protection systems.

Though praised by Vladimir Putin as the ‘best in the world,’ the much-lauded T-90 has shown to be anything but that, proving vulnerable to Ukrainian armor, anti-tank weapons, and UAVs

The original mass-produced variant, the T-90A, is equipped with a Shtora “soft-kill active protection” system, intended to detect and jam the guidance systems of early anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and is easily recognizable from the two “red eyes” on the front of the turret, which glow that color when the system is warming up. Included in this system are also laser warning receivers, mounted on the top of turret, which detect and locate the lasers emitted from enemy targeting systems. While the Shtora can counter earlier ATGMs, it is obsolete against newer ones.

In addition to the T-90A, there is the T-90K command tank variant, the T-90S and T-90MS export variants, and the most advanced Russian tank to ever see combat – the improved T-90M.

The T-90 in Syria

In November 2015, an estimated six Russian T-90s were provided to the government forces of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and its militia proxies to combat rebel forces, as well as to better combat test the vehicle and display its capabilities to potential foreign buyers. T-90s first saw combat in Syria in December 2015, and they took part in multiple successful tactical moves against opposition forces. In February 2016, the first use of an ATGM by opposition forces against a T-90, specifically one of their older and numerous US-made BGM-71 TOW models, was recorded with the missile striking the turret and failing to destroy the vehicle. Additional accounts from Syria indicate that TOWs were ineffective in penetrating the frontal armor of T-90, thanks to the aforementioned explosive reactive armor. Luckily for the SAA and their Russian allies, the TOW missile was the best ATGM opposition forces had, possessing nothing more advanced that could pose a real threat to the T-90.

T-90s in Ukraine

Though T-90 made a good account of itself in Syria, the experience of the T-90 in Ukraine has been quite a different story.

Weaknesses of the T-90

Although reports of this are largely unverified, some Russian T-90s may have been sent into Ukraine in 2014 during Russian’s partial occupation of that country, prior to their full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It is thought that the older, inferior tanks then operated by Ukraine were ineffective against the supposedly state-of-the-art T-90. It is also theorized that the alleged effectiveness of the T-90 against Ukrainian armor circa 2014 encouraged Russia to send T-90s to fight in Syria in 2015. However, in more recent and better documented accounts of the T-90 operating in Ukraine from 2022 onwards, the story is far less favorable for this Russian MBT.

Probably the most alarming flaw found within the T-90 is a design feature carried over from the earlier T-72. Unlike Western tanks like the US-made M1 Abrams, which contains a partition between its crew and ammunition for additional safety, the T-90 keeps its main gun ammunition in a carousel inside the crew area, stored in such a way that if it is detonated by enemy fire the explosion could blow the entire turret skyward. This effect is sometimes referred to, with grim humor, as the “jack-in-a-box,” the “carousel of death,” or “turning Russian tankers into cosmonauts.” Such occurrences of Russian T-72s and, presumably, T-90s having their turrets blown as high as 250’ in the air have been witnessed in Ukraine. Reports have also indicated that the T-90M has demonstrated a reverse speed that is slower than ideal, hampering these tanks when they are attempting to beat a hasty retreat.

Ukrainian Countermeasures to the T-90

One much publicized and effective anti-armor weapon used by Ukrainian forces is the US-made FGM-148 Javelin, which follows a “top-attack profile” to strike tanks where their armor is weakest on the turret roof. Thanks to its success against Russian forces, the Javelin has taken on a role as a symbol of Ukrainian defiance against the Russian aggressor, manifesting itself in “Saint Javelin” memorabilia. While the older TOW missiles used in Syria against T-90s may not have been fully effective, the Javelin has shown its ability to destroy T-90s in Ukraine. Along with the more modern and advanced Javelin, the T-90 has also proven vulnerable to older anti-tank weapons in Ukraine, including the unguided munitions of the Swedish-made Carl Gustaf recoilless rifle. In fact, in the first known incident of a Russian T-90M being neutralized by Ukrainian forces, the latter used a Carl Gustaf to take down the former.

The Ukrainian forces’ widespread and inventive use of small, variously sourced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or “drones”) has been a fascinating focal point of this conflict. They have also been used to attack Russian vehicles, including the T-90, in some cases positing explosives directly into enemy vehicles via open hatches. In response to Ukrainian weapons systems that may attack the T-90 and other tanks from above, like Javelins and drones, Russian forces have fastened a variety of types of “cage” or “shed” on the top of their armored vehicles in the attempt to block such munitions. These makeshift accouterments have had only limited success in stopping the Ukrainian anti-armor weapons they were to counter.

When it comes to tank-versus-tank combat, in some incidents Ukrainian tank have needed as many as three Ukrainian tanks in order to take down a Russian T-90. However, these tankers may have been referring to older Soviet-era tanks, like the T-72 and T-80, which made up the Ukrainian armor inventory at the start of the invasion in 2022.

While Ukraine received superior Western MBTs as the conflict continued, specifically the US-made M1 Abrams and the German-made Leopard 1 and Leopard 2, it is difficult to find accounts of M1s and Leopards going head-to-head with T-90s, at least as of February 2025. This is likely due to the heavy losses and fewer remaining numbers of the T-90, and the later arrival of the Western tanks onto the battlefield after many T-90s had already been lost. The M1s and Leopards are not totally invincible themselves, and a handful have been destroyed, disabled, or captured by the Russians. Still, these Western tanks are regarded as being far better than any MBT Russia has fielded in Ukraine.

We might say that the T-90 is an ‘endangered species’ of a tank that will roam the fields of Ukraine in fewer and fewer numbers.

In addition to Western tanks, the T-90 has proved vulnerable to the American-made M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle (IFV). Although seemingly not as powerful the main gun of an MBT, there have been multiple cases documented of M2s disabling or destroying T-90s using their 25mm autocannon. Considering that the M2 entered service a decade before the T-90, and the former can effectively combat the latter, this reflects quire poorly on the T-90.

An account from April 2023 describes Ukrainian tactics to counter the T-90 largely occurring in a two-step process – first immobilize the tank, then neutralize it. However, in cases when the Russian tank is immobilized and the crew abandons it, an opportunity for the Ukrainians to capture, repair, and re-use this valuable weapon system may occur, combat conditions permitting. It has been joked that the biggest supplier of weapons to Ukraine in their war against Russia is actually Russia, and T-90s are considered to be an exceptionally valuable catch when captured by the Ukrainians.

Russian T-90 Losses and Production

Estimates find that the Russian armaments industry might be able to produce as many as 90 new T-90s per year. However, like many other types of Russian equipment, losses of these tanks have been heavy. The invasion began in February 2022, and by July of the same year at least 100 T-90s were thought to have been destroyed, damaged, or captured, with total Russian tanks losses being something like 3,000 in all. Being the newest Russian tank seeing use in Ukraine, it is doubtful that Russia possesses the sizable reserves of T-90s as it does other, older tanks it has saved up from the Cold War.

Future Predictions

Though praised by Vladimir Putin as the “best in the world,” the much-lauded T-90 has shown to be anything but that, proving vulnerable to Ukrainian armor, anti-tank weapons, and UAVs. The fact that the T-90 is newer than many of the Ukrainian weapons systems that have defeated it – the original Carl Gustaf design dates from way back in 1948 – is an especially disappointing aspect of this tank’s combat record in Ukraine. As mentioned above, some variants of the T-90 were created to be sold to militaries outside Russia, most notably India. It is not hard to envision Russia having difficulty in selling the T-90 to new buyers in the future, given its now tarnished reputation.

If it is ever to encounter Western-made MBTs in a tank-versus-tank engagement, whether in Ukraine or elsewhere, it is doubtful that the T-90 would pose much of a threat to opposing tanks. Rather, since the M1 Abrams and Leopard 2 have been described as exceptional tanks by Ukrainian tankers familiar with them and other Soviet- and Russian-made tanks, both from operating and fighting against the latter, we can assume the M1 and Leopard 2 would probably best the T-90 if they ever came into combat with each other. For countries like Finland and Poland which operate the M1 and/or the Leopard 2 (the older Leopard 1 tanks operated by Ukraine have been largely phased out of other European militaries), and which might face Russian aggression in the future, this should be of some comfort for them.

Much has been said and written about Russia’s heavy losses of tanks, including T-90s, in Ukraine and their overall dwindling stocks of operational armor. Given that relatively few T-90s were originally made, many have been lost, and Russia cannot produce replacements rapidly, we might say that the T-90 is an “endangered species” of a tank that will roam the fields of Ukraine in fewer and fewer numbers. Between this, and the likely unwillingness of foreign buyers to consider procuring them from Russia, the T-90 does not seem destined to have a long and impressive record of wartime service. Rather, it may soon be discarded upon the scrap pile of history.

Tags: Anti-tank missiles, Armored Warfare, Infantry Fighting Vehicles, Russia, Russia-Ukraine War, Tank Warfare, Ukraine

About The Author

Nathan Stueve
Nathan “Nate” Stueve is an Emergency Management Specialist at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), based near Seattle. He is currently earning a Master of Arts in Security Studies at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS), located at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, CA. He previously earned a Bachelor of Arts in Urban Studies from the University of Washington – Tacoma, and a Master of Urban Planning and Master of Landscape Architecture from the University of Washington – Seattle. He lives in Seattle with his partner, Ciera, and their Pomeranian-Chihuahua mix, Maya.

20. Trump Is Killing American Innovation

I don't think the Administration buys this argument. And I fear that the culture war and grievance culture takes precedence over everything else as they have determined that that is the root of all ills in America.

But I think this author makes an important point here about globalization and innovation. We have to understand the second and order effects and seek balance as conditions change.

Excerpts:

Those who want to salvage the United States’ innovation agenda must not make the same error that the architects of globalization did. Successful innovation often causes imbalances in how the spoils are distributed, and when important segments of the country feel left behind, they can turn against innovation itself. As U.S. leaders work to promote innovation, they must respond to these imbalances with adjustments to limit China’s outsize role as a global supplier. In some cases, carefully coordinated voluntary restrictions on exports, such as batteries from China to the United States and cars from China to Europe, will be necessary. At the same time, leaders must also find ways to keep the two innovation engines of the U.S. and China more closely connected, including by encouraging scientific collaboration in safe areas that are unlikely to raise national security concerns—something that leading Chinese and U.S. scientists already favor.

China is making great strides in innovation. For now, the United States remains the global leader, thanks to the extraordinary innovation apparatus it has painstakingly built since World War II. Defending it will not be easy. Reconstituting it from ruins will be even harder.

Trump Is Killing American Innovation

Foreign Affairs · by More by David G. Victor · May 28, 2025

And China Will Reap the Benefits

David G. Victor

May 28, 2025

U.S. President Donald Trump and members of his cabinet, Washington, D.C., May 2025 Nathan Howard / Reuters

DAVID G. VICTOR is Professor of Innovation and Public Policy at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at the University of California, San Diego, a Professor at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.

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Over the last few months, an elaborate plan to ensure China prevails in the global economic competition has taken shape. The plan’s chief architects, however, are not China’s leaders—they are U.S. politicians. The Trump administration’s cuts to federal agencies are undermining the United States’ ability to innovate, the driver of its economic growth. Hostile immigration policies are making it harder for U.S. firms, industries, and universities to attract the best ideas and talent from around the world and leverage them to boost America’s prosperity. Wild threats of tariffs and restrictions on foreign supply chains are terrifying investors, who are beginning to sit on their capital and look for new opportunities away from the chaos. China, meanwhile, is becoming more competitive in the very fields the United States is kneecapping.

Washington needs to rediscover the value of innovation. Every area of future economic growth in which the United States is poised to lead—such as software, AI, oil and gas drilling, robotics, and electric vehicle production—depends on innovations that are impossible to nurture without reliable long-term support from the federal government. Both U.S. political parties once saw public investment in scientific education, training, and innovation as central to the country’s future prosperity. Today, neither party reliably understands or champions that message. Instead, they adopt well-intentioned but misguided bipartisan policies aimed at cutting the United States’ dependence on China and join together to bash Beijing, driving the rest of the world toward greater reliance on China.

Walling off the Chinese economy from the West will fail. Washington has no choice but to participate in a globalized economy it can no longer unilaterally control. The United States has spent decades and trillions of dollars to build the world’s best innovation system. That system, in turn, has become the primary source of the country’s economic and military strength. Stripping it for parts just as China is seeking to build an innovation apparatus that rivals the United States’ would be suicidal.

ONE SIMPLE TRICK

When economies are young, they have lots of ways to grow. Some herd massive numbers of low-paid workers into fields and factories; others tap into natural resources. Once an economy is mature, however, there is only one dependable recipe for sustained growth: innovation. As labor and natural resources become scarcer and more costly, innovation makes it possible to do more with less. Since World War II, at least a quarter of all U.S. economic growth has been driven by innovations that make it possible for the economy to deploy capital and labor more effectively.

The U.S. economy is a prime example of how recipes for growth change over time. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the country grew by cutting trees, expanding to occupy western lands, and marshaling huge numbers of workers (including immigrants and enslaved people) into agriculture and then factories. When the frontiers of cheap land and labor closed by the late nineteenth century, innovation started to fill the void. As the U.S. economy moved toward manufacturing, innovations such as electric power grids—perfected through decades of investment, tinkering, and research often backed by government funding—helped expand the United States’ industrial output. And as the economy later shifted to emphasize services, which today accounts for 80 percent of the United States’ economic output, revolutionary innovations in, for example, computing kept the country competitive.

The full story of how innovation shapes economies is complex, but a successful innovation system nearly always has three key elements. First, it establishes and nourishes a pipeline of new ideas. The United States has led innovation for decades because of its massive federal support for research, which began during World War II. Money from Washington is spent by research universities, national labs, and institutes; the ideas generated are spun into companies that power economic growth and competitiveness. The private sector has stepped in to supplement federal funding for R & D, especially in industries such as biotech and computing. Yet in nearly every industry, the United States’ most transformative innovations over the last eight decades depended on government funding, because the government was the most patient and reliable actor willing to take on risks for the public benefit.

This federal-funding system worked well because it married the government’s prodigious resources to a relatively stable vision. On top of that, the government has proved reasonably good at determining how to best allocate those resources. Even as the United States’ two main political parties differed on the ideal size and role of government, both saw immense value in backing innovation. When the Reagan administration tried to slash government spending, for example, total federal support for R & D stayed largely unchanged. Even during his first administration, when President Donald Trump proposed budgets that would have eviscerated R & D funding, Democratic and Republican lawmakers restored the money, keeping the nation’s innovation system intact.

This continuity of intent seems a lot less likely during Trump’s second term. Republicans have chosen to align with the president to shrink the size of government and slash budgets, including for innovation. Democrats, reeling from their election loss, seem to care more about funding priorities other than science. Just in the past few months, with barely any oversight from Congress, federal funding for innovation has fallen off a cliff. The administration has terminated about a thousand grants awarded by the National Institutes of Health, the nation’s most important funder of biomedical research, with more to come. Cuts are so severe that federally funded biological research labs are euthanizing animals used to investigate worthy topics such as the safety of new drugs and the effects of pollution on workers. Some of the nation’s leading research universities have seen their federal research funding targeted for reasons that have nothing to do with research.

HOW TO BLOW UP A PIPELINE

This funding chaos has particularly imperiled the second key ingredient of a functioning innovation system: people. Science is an enterprise steeped in hope and characterized by delayed gratification. The typical scientist, after earning an undergraduate degree, spends another four to six years in Ph.D. training, followed by a few years of poorly paid postdoctoral employment. Despite the lack of short-term financial incentives, many of the world’s best minds pursue science because their training—from tuition for advanced coursework through research apprenticeships—is largely paid for by research grants and universities themselves.

When grants dry up, so does the well of talented people pursuing innovation. Since late February, university and government labs uncertain about their future funding have been forced to make layoffs. Most of the burden of this uncertainty has fallen on young scientists. The catastrophic possibility of a lost generation of scientists now looms over the country’s innovation system.

Magnifying the loss is the government’s hostility to foreigners, especially Chinese. The success of the American innovation system has made it highly dependent on imported talent to perform much of the basic fieldwork of modern science. U.S. high schools and universities do not produce enough fledgling scientists and engineers to fully stock the country’s innovation system, and to maintain the United States’ research edge, the country must draw foreign talent. At the University of California, San Diego, where I work, about five percent of the undergraduate population, 25 percent of engineering master’s students, and 45 percent of students enrolled in engineering Ph.D. programs are not U.S. citizens. Across the United States, about half of all graduate students in STEM fields hail from other countries; in engineering, there are twice as many foreign graduate students as there are U.S. citizens and permanent residents.

The U.S. innovation system needs the best foreign talent, and until recently, it got it. In 2023, a study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ranked the United States as the most attractive place for foreign university students to study. Of all the world’s footloose international students, 15 percent come to the United States, the largest share of any country in the world. China has been the United States’ most important supplier of scientific talent. Throughout the 2010s, in any given year, nearly 400,000 Chinese students were studying in the United States, mostly in STEM fields. (By comparison, a paltry 12,000 young U.S. scientists and engineers studied in China in a given year.) Although the COVID-19 pandemic reduced these numbers, 300,000 Chinese students still currently attend U.S. universities. There are already signs, however, that this vital exchange is drying up. Co-authorship on papers in science and engineering among U.S. and Chinese scientists, for example, has been declining slowly since its 2020 peak.

The United States does need to reduce its dependence on Chinese talent: in any market, overreliance on any single supplier is almost always a recipe for insecurity. But it will take a couple of generations to rebalance the contribution of Chinese students to U.S. research. Meanwhile, harassment of Chinese citizens, including scientists, at U.S. borders and on campuses has become more prevalent, a phenomenon that anecdotally has led Chinese families to be more wary of sending their children to the United States. Such reluctance would be a catastrophe for U.S. research universities—and a gift to rival high-quality English-language universities such as in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Both rivals and partners of the United States are adopting new policies to woo foreign scientists such as boosting employment and startup visas. Meanwhile, the Trump administration is ramping up efforts to limit the enrollment of international students at U.S. universities.

TEAR DOWN THAT WALL

A third key component for a successful innovation system is access to big markets. Because innovation seeks to boost production with fewer inputs, it nearly always benefits from scale. Big markets offer cumulatively greater opportunities for innovation that makes products better through experience. In clean energy technology, for instance, the globalization of markets has been a catalyst for advancements. Early innovations in solar power, backed by the United States and Japan in the 1970s in an attempt to reduce their dependence on imported oil, helped make solar energy viable in a few niche applications. In the first decade of this century, support from the German government (which was keen to cut dependence on nuclear power and imported energy and build local industries while also cutting emissions) created another big market for solar power. As the German and global markets grew, innovations led to still better-performing solar panels. The frontier of the solar industry then moved to China, where massive innovations in manufacturing drove down costs even further and helped make solar energy even more competitive with coal and gas. Over decades, this global approach has allowed solar panels, once a fringe technology, to become the cheapest way to generate electricity in many places.

But just as it has exemplified the benefits of globalized markets, the solar industry demonstrates the damage that nationalism can do to technological innovation. Rising tariffs and bottlenecks in supply chains created, in part, by chaotic trade policies are driving up solar costs in the United States. Although onshoring policies may eventually bring more solar production to the United States, as recently as 2023 about 80 percent of equipment used for U.S. solar projects was imported—mainly from China.

Investors now have to fear the arbitrary cancellation of their projects, too: in April, for instance, the Trump administration halted the energy giant Equinor’s previously approved offshore wind project in New York. A month later, it reversed the order after pressuring New York state to greenlight an unrelated natural gas pipeline project; by then, the damage to the credibility of U.S.-based contracts had already been done. Clean energy hinges on investment. And these risks for investors explain why, according to a Bloomberg tracking service, half the planned projects to build clean energy technology factories in the United States are now getting delayed or frozen outright.

LOSING GROUND

Mounting political and legal opposition may be able to roll back many of the administration’s most noxious policies. But the signal to the rest of the world is clear: across the board, including as a backer of innovation, the U.S. government has suddenly become a lot less reliable. European governments’ attempts to reckon with this reality has inspired myriad political and economic reforms, including increased defense spending, more coordinated and less costly green energy policy, and trade agreements enabling access to new markets, all of which will make the continent more competitive.

While the United States eviscerates its innovation system, China is staying the course. Starting in the 1990s, Beijing adopted an innovation strategy aimed at transforming its economy and, since 2000, has expanded its total spending on R & D by a factor of 20. Much of that investment flows through state-connected institutions, but the private sector’s role has increased, as well. When all the sources of public and private funding are added together, the United States remains the world’s biggest spender on R & D, but China is poised to pull ahead. In 2025, China’s total R & D spending could surpass the United States’ for the first time. In the early 1990s, Chinese university programs did not rank at the top of any major STEM field. Today, according to U.S. News and World Report rankings, eight of the world’s top ten engineering programs are in China.

Chinese scientists are already revealing where they see their postgraduate future: at home. Two decades ago, about 95 percent of Chinese graduate students who studied in the United States stayed stateside for their first job after graduate school. Today, that “stay rate” has dropped to around 80 percent and is likely to fall further, possibly quickly.

Chinese returnees are going back to a country whose economy has been fine-tuned to turn innovation into production. Analysts who study innovation have often disparaged China for its focus on process improvements—for example, finding more efficient ways to use robots on production lines—rather than the invention of entirely new concepts. But process innovations have helped turn Chinese auto and battery factories into world leaders in those industries, just as they did when China’s solar industry began to boom. These less lauded achievements play a key role in making the economy more productive, which is crucial as skilled labor gets more scarce and costly in China. Moreover, they are the stepping stones to more revolutionary technologies. For example, Chinese manufacturers of nuclear plants are world leaders in process improvements that make it possible to build nuclear reactors at low cost, despite the fact that the original innovations for most Chinese commercial reactors trace back to the United States. China is now building more reactors than the rest of the world combined by applying those innovations at scale. The economy, it turns out, cares less about who was first and more about where technologies get built.

To be sure, China’s R & D boom faces its own headwinds. For innovation to truly transform the country, the broader economy must be in sound shape. Beijing is attempting to adopt reforms to reduce the Chinese economy’s massive debt and overcapacity, including by stabilizing the national property market, whose stumbles have sapped consumer confidence. But the diverging trajectories of the China and the United States are nonetheless clear.

CHAOS IS CANCER

It is not too late to save the U.S. innovation system. But doing so will take a concerted effort across the public and private sectors. Universities are pushing back against the onslaught of cuts and federal intrusion into their research programs, which has helped. But although trust in science remains high among the highly educated, it is much lower in the rest of the U.S. public. Scientists cannot be one another’s only advocates.

U.S. policymakers have not taken innovation seriously as a national priority. Just seven percent of congressional legislators belong to the High Tech Caucus, the only group in Congress dedicated to innovation. Reviving government support for science and technology requires far more than boosting membership in caucuses, however. In the absence of any credible strategy for reducing U.S. dependence on China, the prevailing anti-China consensus will continue to reward politicians who are hostile to foreign contact rather than managers who can make the most of it.

Both parties instead must make the case that federal funding for research is not a partisan hobbyhorse but a source of long-term economic and political strength. Republican Party leaders’ unwillingness to break with Trump to defend the U.S. innovation apparatus has been particularly damaging, but there is still time for them to reverse course by listening more to business leaders—who themselves must organize to advocate for the long-term economic health of the country and not just short-term priorities such as tax cuts.

Those who want to salvage the United States’ innovation agenda must not make the same error that the architects of globalization did. Successful innovation often causes imbalances in how the spoils are distributed, and when important segments of the country feel left behind, they can turn against innovation itself. As U.S. leaders work to promote innovation, they must respond to these imbalances with adjustments to limit China’s outsize role as a global supplier. In some cases, carefully coordinated voluntary restrictions on exports, such as batteries from China to the United States and cars from China to Europe, will be necessary. At the same time, leaders must also find ways to keep the two innovation engines of the U.S. and China more closely connected, including by encouraging scientific collaboration in safe areas that are unlikely to raise national security concerns—something that leading Chinese and U.S. scientists already favor.

China is making great strides in innovation. For now, the United States remains the global leader, thanks to the extraordinary innovation apparatus it has painstakingly built since World War II. Defending it will not be easy. Reconstituting it from ruins will be even harder.

Foreign Affairs · by More by David G. Victor · May 28, 2025

21. The Era of DEI for Conservatives Has Begun

Irony?

We should ask why aren't there more conservatives seeking positions as professors and journalists and others? Why does there seem to be such an imbalance? Is perhaps that conservative culture vilifies these institutions? So how do we achieve some political balances in these institutions? Are "affirmative action-like" policies for conservatives really the answer?

I also applaud the work being done at Arizona State University which is one of the most innovative universities I have ever seen.

Excerpts:

Daniels recognized these issues in a 2021 book, What Universities Owe Democracy. In it, he argues that campuses need a “purposeful pluralism” to train students to engage across differences. Jenna Silber Storey, a senior fellow at AEI and a former professor of politics and international relations at Furman University—where she estimates that “maybe 4 or 5 percent” of the faculty was conservative—read the book, and the two began discussing how to improve diversity of thought on campuses.

Hiring a conservative professor isn’t as straightforward as it sounds. At this point, few qualified conservatives are in the applicant pool in the humanities and social sciences, Teles told me. This has led some higher-education leaders to borrow tactics that were long used to redress the country’s history of racial and ethnic discrimination.

Legislatures in red and purple states across the country have shoveled money into universities to establish schools of civic thought, which are marketed as the conservative answer to academia’s leftward drift and the rise of identity-oriented disciplines. The effort started at Arizona State University, which established its School of Civic and Economic Thought and Leadership in 2017. The University of Texas at Austin, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and the University of Tennessee at Knoxville have all done the same. Now the movement is spreading to elite private universities. Yale announced at a recent conference co-hosted by Hopkins and AEI that it will open its own center for civic thought.

The Era of DEI for Conservatives Has Begun

In an effort to attract more right-leaning faculty, some elite universities are borrowing tactics long used to promote racial diversity.

By Rose Horowitch

The Atlantic · by Rose Horowitch · May 27, 2025

This article was featured in the One Story to Read Today newsletter. Sign up for it here.

No one would be surprised to learn that an elite university has a plan to counteract the structural barriers to the advancement of a minority group. Johns Hopkins University’s latest diversity initiative, however, has managed to put a new spin on a familiar concept: The minority group in question is conservative professors.

Between 30 and 40 percent of Americans identify as conservative, but conservatives make up only one of every 10 professors in academia, and even fewer in the humanities and most social-science departments. (At least they did in 2014, when the most recent comprehensive study was done. The number today is probably even lower.) Of the money donated by Yale faculty to political candidates in 2023, for example, 98 percent went to Democrats.

Some university leaders worry that this degree of ideological homogeneity is harmful both academically (students and faculty would benefit from being exposed to a wider range of ideas) and in terms of higher education’s long-term prospects (being hated by half the country is not sustainable). Accordingly, Johns Hopkins recently unveiled a partnership with the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a center-right think tank, designed to inject some ideological diversity into the university. Steven Teles, a political scientist who wrote a widely discussed article last year for The Chronicle of Higher Education titled “Why Are There So Few Conservative Professors?,” is one of the faculty members involved with the partnership. The institutions will collaborate on a number of efforts to integrate conservative and heterodox thinkers.

Johns Hopkins is part of a growing trend. Several elite red-state public universities have recently established academic centers designed to attract conservative scholars. And institutions that haven’t sought out conservative faculty may soon find new reasons to do so. The Trump administration has demanded that Harvard hire additional conservative professors or risk losing even more of its federal funding. (Even as it made that demand, it insisted that Harvard adopt “merit-based admissions policies and cease all preferences based on race, color, national origin, or proxies thereof.”) In response, Harvard’s president said that the university is expanding programs to increase intellectual diversity on campus. The era of DEI for conservatives has begun.

Academia has leaned left for as long as anyone can remember. But for most of the 20th century, conservative faculty were a robust presence throughout the humanities and social sciences. (In 1969, for example, even as anti-war protests raged across campuses, a quarter of the professoriate identified as at least “moderately” conservative.) But their ranks have thinned since the 1990s. At the same time, moderate and independent professors have been replaced by people who explicitly identify as liberal or progressive.

A traditional free-market conservative might interpret these statistics as evidence that right-wing thinkers simply haven’t achieved at a high-enough level to become professors. But some reformers have embraced a more left-wing theory for conservatives’ anemic representation in academia. “The current injustice is a consequence of previous injustice,” Teles told me. (Teles identifies not as a conservative but as an “abundance liberal.”) “You don’t deal with structural injustice purely through anti-discrimination,” he added. In other words, action of a more affirmative variety is needed.

Rose Horowitch: The race-blind college-admissions era is off to a weird start

Opinions differ on the precise extent to which conservatives are being excluded from academia versus self-selecting into nonacademic careers. But they clearly face barriers that liberal and leftist scholars don’t. Professors decide who joins their ranks and what research gets published in flagship journals. And several studies show that academics are willing to discriminate against applicants with different political views. One 2021 survey found that more than 40 percent of American (and Canadian) academics said they would not hire a Donald Trump supporter. Then there’s the fact that entire disciplines have publicly committed themselves to progressive values. “It is a standard of responsible professional conduct for anthropologists to continue their research, scholarship, and practice in service of dismantling institutions of colonization and helping to redress histories of oppression and exploitation,” the American Anthropological Association declared in 2020.

“Professors will tell you straight up that people who hold the wrong views don’t belong in universities,” Musa al-Gharbi, a sociology professor at Stony Brook University who studies progressive social-justice discourse, told me. “That’s the difference between viewpoint discrimination and other forms of discrimination.”

One result is that universities tasked with teaching students about the world they live in employ hardly anyone who represents views that much of the population holds. Ideological homogeneity affects which fields people study (military and religious history have gone out of vogue) and what views students are willing to express in class. (A recent survey found that only one-third of Harvard seniors—and only 17 percent of conservatives—felt comfortable sharing their opinions on controversial topics.) Liberal professors of course still teach Edmund Burke and Milton Friedman, Ron Daniels, the president of Johns Hopkins, told me. But, he said, learning from faculty who are immersed in the conservative intellectual tradition is a different academic experience.

Conservative underrepresentation has also hurt higher education’s standing with the country at large. Polls show that Americans, particularly on the right, are losing trust in universities. A Gallup survey taken last year, for example, found that Republican confidence in higher education had dropped from 56 to 20 percent over the course of a decade. Respondents attributed this in part to perceived liberal bias in the academy.

Daniels recognized these issues in a 2021 book, What Universities Owe Democracy. In it, he argues that campuses need a “purposeful pluralism” to train students to engage across differences. Jenna Silber Storey, a senior fellow at AEI and a former professor of politics and international relations at Furman University—where she estimates that “maybe 4 or 5 percent” of the faculty was conservative—read the book, and the two began discussing how to improve diversity of thought on campuses.

Hiring a conservative professor isn’t as straightforward as it sounds. At this point, few qualified conservatives are in the applicant pool in the humanities and social sciences, Teles told me. This has led some higher-education leaders to borrow tactics that were long used to redress the country’s history of racial and ethnic discrimination.

Legislatures in red and purple states across the country have shoveled money into universities to establish schools of civic thought, which are marketed as the conservative answer to academia’s leftward drift and the rise of identity-oriented disciplines. The effort started at Arizona State University, which established its School of Civic and Economic Thought and Leadership in 2017. The University of Texas at Austin, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and the University of Tennessee at Knoxville have all done the same. Now the movement is spreading to elite private universities. Yale announced at a recent conference co-hosted by Hopkins and AEI that it will open its own center for civic thought.

The conservative politicians and right-wing donors behind these centers advertise them as a way to fight back against the excesses of the left. But Storey told me that they are not generally ideological; the goal is to teach students to debate across differences. Supporters see them as a safe space for conservative scholars who feel ostracized by the broader academy. There, they can hopefully generate work that earns recognition from researchers in the mainstream, just as disciplines such as gender studies and African American studies gained legitimacy over time, Teles told me.

Johns Hopkins has similarly repurposed techniques that are more commonly practiced by DEI offices. (Before she left her teaching job, Storey chaired her department’s DEI program.) The university first made funding available to hire a cadre of conservative and heterodox thinkers within the faculty of arts and sciences. So-called cluster hiring has been a popular way to create a support network for faculty of color who might otherwise feel isolated. Teles, in partnership with Storey at AEI, is also developing a mentorship program for conservative graduate students. The idea is to intervene earlier in the academic pipeline to keep right-leaning thinkers on the path to a professorship. Additionally, a fellowship program will send Hopkins professors to do stints at AEI, and vice versa. The university is trying to normalize conservative perspectives on campus and in the university’s research and public-facing statements, Daniels told me. He hopes that the effort will serve as a model for like-minded leaders.

Sian Leah Beilock: Saving the idea of the university

If the right has discovered the language of systemic discrimination, some on the left have begun speaking in terms of identity-blind meritocracy. Juliana Paré-Blagoev, an education professor at Hopkins and the outgoing president of the university’s chapter of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), told me that she’s in favor of affirmative action—just not for conservatives, because they haven’t suffered documented discrimination. “It doesn’t mean that everybody in that center isn’t a good scholar or that they can’t be competent and strong contributors, but if you look at the actuality of it, their CVs tend to be thinner than others,” Paré-Blagoev said. She is open to the possibility that conservatives are underrepresented because they don’t feel welcome, but she doesn’t think universities should make systemic changes to accommodate them. “I don’t think that an individual’s discomfort is a five-alarm fire,” she said.

François Furstenberg, a history professor at Johns Hopkins and the secretary for the university’s AAUP chapter, told me that Republicans have unfairly smeared affirmative action as a way to hire people “based on their race and not on their qualifications.” Now they’re the ones who want to hire professors based on their politics, not their fitness for the role. (Teles told me that he and Storey are focused on broadening the applicant pool for academic roles, rather than just giving people an advantage because of their political leanings.)

As with so many topics, the Trump factor has complicated the question of ideological diversity. On the one hand, the White House’s crusade against elite higher education has raised the pressure to recruit conservatives. The administration made the connection explicit in its shakedown of Harvard. After announcing that it would review $9 billion in federal grants and contracts, it issued a list of far-reaching demands that the university would have to meet in order to keep the funding. These included auditing faculty opinions and ensuring that every department and field is viewpoint-diverse. Harvard rejected the administration’s demands, but President Alan Garber has nevertheless acknowledged that ideological homogeneity is a problem on campus.

On the other hand, the viciousness and obvious bad faith of Trump’s attacks have made it more difficult for universities to pursue even changes they think will benefit their institutions, lest they appear to be capitulating to the president. “The fact that those extreme demands—for example, for government control over the curriculum—have come bundled with the notion that universities ought to be more politically diverse has tied those two things together in a way that has made political diversity much less palatable even than it was before,” Neil Gross, a sociology professor at Colby College and the author of the 2014 study on viewpoint diversity, told me.

Teles told me that the conservatives collaborating with Hopkins are intent on working within universities to reform them, not from outside to destroy them. “These are not the same people who are wrecking the financial basis of our university,” he said.

Daniels, the Hopkins president, told me that the hypocrisy of the messenger shouldn’t obscure kernels of truth in the message. As universities have debated how to respond to the Trump administration’s attacks, they’ve overlooked the fact that some of the critique is fair. “Defending the university,” he said, “actually requires that we demonstrate to America our capacity for self-criticism and self-repair.”

The Atlantic · by Rose Horowitch · May 27, 2025

22. America’s Democracy Is Still Resilient

Because the United States is a federal democratic republic.

And I am bullish on our federal democratic republic despite what the naysayers on both the extreme left and extreme right say. We are stronger than any of the naysayers believe we are. We must be careful not to overreact in either (or any) political direction.

Excerpt:

And yet, America’s 237-year-old Constitution, private organizations, and public institutions are far better positioned than their foreign counterparts under similar threat. Many of these exceptional features of American society not only make our system easier to defend—they are also a big part of why it’s so worth defending.

America’s Democracy Is Still Resilient

A distinct set of six institutions and traditions makes the country hard to subjugate to an authoritarian’s will.

By Kevin Cope and Mila Versteeg

The Atlantic · by Kevin Cope, Mila Versteeg · May 26, 2025

The first half-year of Donald Trump’s second term is not even over, and the portents of democratic erosion are already stark. The president has moved to consolidate power, purging civil servants deemed disloyal, directing federal officials to flout adverse court rulings, and ordering the Justice Department to investigate political rivals. These moves have alarmed many Americans, who see their country’s democracy as fundamentally in danger.

Regrettably, their concerns aren’t baseless. Even a long-established democracy can be undone—sometimes by a fairly elected leader. And yet, there is reason still to be hopeful; America is more resilient than many may fear. Unlike countries where democracy has recently unraveled, the United States displays at least six exceptional traits that are protecting it from the Trump-led assault: a robust network of advocacy groups, a powerful and independent judiciary, a constitutional system that makes executive preferences hard to entrench, a diverse and free private press, a federal system of government, and a uniquely speech-protective legal tradition. Some of these features may carry trade-offs in ordinary times, but they offer a clear advantage when democracy is under threat. If a Trump-like figure tried to purge nonloyalists, defy the courts, or use the government to punish rivals in places such as Poland, Brazil, and India, a popular resistance would be far less empowered.

To start, America’s network of public-interest advocacy groups is both larger and more resilient than those in countries where democracy has declined. Around the world, many governments impose outright bans on certain foreign-funded or “extremist” groups, and subject other organizations to convoluted registration rules. Some of these requirements may be mere nuisances in strong democracies. But when a would-be autocrat takes office, his power comes preloaded with the bureaucratic tools he needs to silence his critics.

In contrast, the strength of American civil society has a long history. The French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville marveled at early-19th-century America’s penchant for civic activity, calling liberty of association “a necessary guarantee” against tyranny. That tradition endures: The United States stands out for its high rates of citizen engagement and dense network of nonprofit organizations. The American Civil Liberties Union, Democracy Forward, and Republicans for the Rule of Law are just a few prominent examples of institutions now challenging the administration in the courts of law and public opinion. And thanks in part to a line of Supreme Court cases dating back to at least 1886 and continuing through the Court’s controversial recent decisions in Citizens United v. FEC and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, these organizations, like for-profit corporations, enjoy robust speech and associational rights.

Adrienne LaFrance: A ticking clock on American freedom

When these groups or other parties sue the government, U.S. courts have exceptional formal power to check a president’s agenda. Some national courts elsewhere lack a Marbury v. Madison–style power to conclusively strike down unconstitutional acts of the legislature or executive. And even where that power exists, judicial review in much of Europe and Latin America is typically centralized in a single constitutional court. Aspiring autocrats therefore need only capture a single court to effectively remove judicial constraints. In some instances, they swiftly change the composition of the court by adjusting age limits or creating additional seats. Courts sometimes resist, as with the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, which, in 2015 and 2016, struck down measures the right-wing populist party had enacted to curb the court’s power. But as the tribunal’s judges reached the end of their nine-year terms, they were replaced by party loyalists, who then approved the president’s reforms. Globally, scenarios like that aren’t uncommon. Moreover, because most judges serve fixed, not life, terms, some who decide a government case may consider their later career prospects in weighing how to vote. The result: Constitutional courts are rarely far out of step with the party in power.

The United States’ court system is built differently: Hundreds of lower-court federal judges with lifetime tenure have both the formal power and the political will to invalidate executive actions nationwide. As such, even judges appointed by Republican presidents, including by Trump himself, commonly rule against him. Trump-appointed judges have recently prevented deportations under the Alien Enemies Act and halted the forced leave of 2,700 USAID employees. Judges appointed by Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush have blocked Trump executive orders rescinding birthright citizenship. And all three of the Trump-appointed Supreme Court justices joined the full Court in upholding a lower court’s order to facilitate the return of Kilmar Abrego Garcia from an El Salvadoran prison.

Of course, courts can only do so much to enforce their rulings—especially against a defiant president. But even when courts can’t compel compliance directly, their judgments can matter. By declaring that the government has crossed a constitutional line, courts arm advocacy groups with a powerful tool: a “fire alarm” that can give dissenters the political capital they need to push out court-defying leaders.

Another source of American institutional resilience is its aversion to big or rapid legal change. In normal times, this can stifle progress, but in unusual times, it can be a bulwark against backsliding. In some other countries, leaders have cemented their illiberal agendas through sweeping legislative changes and constitutional overhauls. Viktor Orbán and his parliamentary supermajority rewrote Hungary’s constitution; Hugo Chávez began his presidency by pushing through an entirely new Venezuelan constitution; and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan transformed Turkey’s parliamentary system into a presidential one through constitutional amendment. These moves fundamentally restructured their respective political orders.

But U.S. constitutional reform is exceptionally difficult. And—in part because of the Senate’s filibuster rule—even ordinary legislation faces high hurdles, particularly for many of the sweeping changes Trump envisions. That’s why he’s thus far attempted to implement his key initiatives primarily through more than 150 executive orders, rather than via legislation or constitutional amendment. This means that many of those policies can be reversed almost as easily as they were enacted. Indeed, America’s aversion to legal change allowed President Joe Biden in 2021 to swiftly undo many Trump orders, on issues such as the Muslim travel ban, protecting federal workers, and energy policy. A future president could do the same.

Next, America’s media are independent and diversified. And at least since the Progressive era, they have repeatedly sounded the alarm on alleged government abuses. In many other places, silencing the press has proved too easy. In Vladimir Putin’s Russia, media capture was swift: Starting in 2001, Putin’s allies simply bought critical outlets and converted them to tools of state propaganda. In contrast, America’s media organizations are so numerous and varied—even after years of consolidation and closures in the industry—that capturing them all would be nearly impossible.

Federalism is the separation of powers between regional and national governments. It exists in fewer than 15 percent of countries today. Perhaps not coincidentally, those countries are on average freer and more democratic than the world at large. This system has always been quite popular in America—at least with the party out of power nationally. In the U.S., state governments can facilitate, or frustrate, immigration enforcement; state courts and prosecutors retain control of the bulk of criminal justice; and citizens may retain rights under state law even when their federal rights are diminished. But in most countries, where essentially all government authority—law enforcement, taxation, and constitutional—is concentrated in one national government, leaders find it far easier to run roughshod over the institutions meant to check executive power.

Listen: Autocracy in America

Finally, U.S. constitutional law and courts maintain a unique commitment to free speech. In places around the world—the Philippines, India, and Germany—governments have used libel laws to suppress criticism of national leaders and other dissent. But under America’s speaker-friendly defamation law, public officials face substantial hurdles in suing or prosecuting critics into silence. Sarah Palin, Devin Nunes, and Donald Trump himself each recently learned this the hard way. And while many critics of the president may despair of recent settlements by ABC News and others, the defamation laws that protect such institutions are still in place and regularly enforced.

To be clear, none of these observations either encourages complacency or diminishes the harm already caused by Trump’s authoritarian moves. Many of the more vulnerable in American society—immigrants and civil servants, for instance—are especially and justifiably afraid for the future. The threats to American democracy and the rule of law are real, and they should be taken seriously.

And yet, America’s 237-year-old Constitution, private organizations, and public institutions are far better positioned than their foreign counterparts under similar threat. Many of these exceptional features of American society not only make our system easier to defend—they are also a big part of why it’s so worth defending.

About the Authors

Kevin Cope

Kevin Cope is an associate professor of law and public policy at the University of Virginia.

Mila Versteeg

Mila Versteeg is the Martha Lubin Karsh and Bruce A. Karsh Bicentennial Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law and a senior fellow at the Miller Center for Public Affairs. She is the author of the forthcoming book, How Constitutional Rights Matter.

The Atlantic · by Kevin Cope, Mila Versteeg · May 26, 2025

23. Trump’s ‘Golden Dome’ Riles Nuclear-Armed Foes

That is good enough for me. If our enemies hate it it must mean we are doing the right thing.

Seriously, if we can develop an effective system it could be a game changer.

I sometimes wonder if the ABM treaty was the right thing to do decades ago? What if we had started developing ABM capabilities long ago - would we be in a position to keep adapting to the emerging threats or would fewer threats have emerged if our enemies realized we could consistently adapt to mitigate them?

Of course the nuclear theorists had a lot to say about this with their game theory - An ABM capability would have been destabilizing (according to them) and could have led to an early use of nuclear weapons out of fear they would no longer have utility with an effective ABM system in place.

Trump’s ‘Golden Dome’ Riles Nuclear-Armed Foes

China, Russia and North Korea—harboring weapons that could reach U.S.—assail missile-shield plan as a blow to global stability

https://www.wsj.com/world/trumps-golden-dome-riles-nuclear-armed-foes-de1957df

By Austin Ramzy

Follow, Thomas Grove

Follow and Timothy W. Martin

May 27, 2025 8:01 am ET

President Trump wants to develop a ‘Golden Dome’ antimissile shield before the end of his term. Photo: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

Key Points

What's This?

Trump’s “Golden Dome” missile-defense plan is opposed by China, Russia and North Korea, who call it a dangerous arms race.
Golden Dome combines ground-based interceptors with satellites, guarding against hypersonic missiles and other high-tech threats.
Experts warn Golden Dome could spur missile proliferation, as the US lags in hypersonic weapons; China and Russia develop counter-space capabilities.

President Trump’s “Golden Dome” plan has riled the three countries whose weapons technology poses the greatest threat to American territory, with China, Russia and North Korea claiming the missile-defense project is driving a dangerous new arms race.

Trump wants a Golden Dome shield in place by the end of his term, which would combine ground-based interceptors with satellites to guard U.S. territory against high-tech threats, including hypersonic missiles.

The Chinese, North Koreans and Russians are all developing such missiles, as well as new weapons intended to evade U.S. defenses and combat America in outer space. The three are also increasingly helping each other militarily.

North Korea slammed the Golden Dome on Tuesday as the “largest arms-buildup plan in history.” China and Russia in a joint statement earlier this month called the project “deeply destabilizing.” Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, in a briefing to journalists Tuesday, said the plan “represented a direct disruption to the foundations of strategic stability.”

All three countries have also denounced Trump’s call for space-based interceptors, saying they risk turning space into a battlefield.

Experts say that a potential risk of the Golden Dome is that a comprehensive defensive system encourages a proliferation of missiles, including nuclear-capable weapons. It comes as the last major nuclear treaty between leading nuclear powers Russia and the U.S. is set to expire next year, potentially leading Moscow to accelerate the deployment of nuclear warheads.

“This missile-defense mirage gives you the illusion you can protect yourself but you’re driving all these countries to build all these hundreds and thousands of missiles so you end up in the worst of both worlds,” said Pavel Podvig, a senior researcher at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

A Chinese guided-missile destroyer in Shandong province. Photo: Ng Han Guan/Associated Press

The U.S. says increasing threats make it necessary to build a more comprehensive missile-defense system and rejects criticism that the plan will militarize space.

“We have more recently observed China’s satellites engaging in what can only be described as dogfighting maneuvers in space,” said Brig. Gen. Anthony Mastalir, the U.S. Space Force commander in the Indo-Pacific, at a space conference in Australia on Tuesday. “These high-speed, combat-oriented operations on orbit serve as further evidence that Beijing is actively preparing to challenge the U.S. and our allies in space.”

The Golden Dome plan represents a dramatic transformation in how the U.S. aims to confront such threats.

The U.S. says its missile defenses are directed at so-called “rogue states,” primarily North Korea, which aren’t considered peer nuclear powers. Meanwhile, the U.S, Russia and China seek to prevent nuclear attack through deterrence.

Trump’s Golden Dome plan implicitly recognizes that the arms-control era has passed and mutually assured destruction is no longer a sufficient deterrent to nuclear war.

The threats

A major emerging concern for U.S. defense is hypersonic weapons, which can travel at least five times the speed of sound, fly low and maneuver before hitting a target, making them difficult to detect, let alone intercept.

In the hypersonic race, the U.S. is behind. China, the leader, tested such a missile in 2021, which flew at speeds of more than 15,000 miles an hour as it circled the globe before striking a target in China.

In a sign of the Pentagon’s progress, the U.S. military recently completed successful test flights of a reusable hypersonic rocket-powered aircraft.

When President Vladimir Putin first introduced Russia’s hypersonic weapons in 2018, an animated graphic showed a missile heading toward the West Coast of the U.S. “Missile-defense systems are useless against them, absolutely pointless,” he said.

Russian President Vladimir Putin watched the launch of a hypersonic missile in 2018. Such weapons are difficult to detect and intercept. Photo: Kremlin Pool/Zuma Press

Russia’s hypersonic weapons could potentially be stopped by a system such as the proposed Golden Dome because they travel at much slower speeds during initial launch and before hitting their target, leaving them susceptible to interceptors, said David Wright, a researcher at the Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Intercepting Russia’s strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles could be much harder. At the first stage after launch, when a rocket pushes the missile up into—and out of—the atmosphere, an interceptor would have to be extremely close to respond to it in time.

That would mean covering the territory across all of Russia’s 11 time zones to intercept the missile in time, said Podvig.

“You need to have a lot of them so that some of them are close enough to every launch point,” he said.

North Korea already has a missile with the range to potentially strike the U.S.—and leader Kim Jong Un wants more long-range weapons that can fly farther, carry bigger payloads and be deployed more quickly.

The country is pursuing hypersonic technology, underwater nuclear-armed drones and tactical weaponry, although military experts say they aren’t yet combat-ready.

The shield

The U.S. installed dozens of ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California beginning in the early 2000s, and has tested interceptors fired by the Aegis combat system to shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles, a system that was used successfully by Navy destroyers against Iranian weapons targeting Israel last year. Land-based versions of the system have been installed in Romania and Poland.

The U.S. also fields Patriot missile systems for shorter-range threats and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, or Thaad, which is used for smaller areas including in South Korea and Guam.

Trump’s goal of seeing his Golden Dome shield in place in little more than three years would be difficult to accomplish, according to military experts.

Nuclear Arms Race

The Bomb Is Back as the Risk of Nuclear War Enters a New Age

Any missile-defense shield would likely only offer protection from about 85% of incoming missiles, said Podvig. That could promote a false sense of security, while also spurring rivals to produce more weapons, he said.

Golden Dome plans for space-based interceptors have also raised concerns of a surge in space-based systems. A Congressional Budget Office assessment said that such a system for downing one or two missiles fired by a smaller adversary such as North Korea could require more than 1,000 interceptors.

To defend against Russia or China, with many more warheads, such a system would require potentially tens of thousands of satellites.

Russia and China view such space-based interceptors “as indistinguishable from offensive weapons, arguing that a better-protected United States might be emboldened to pursue more aggressive military actions,” said Tong Zhao, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “This heightens the risk of Russia and China intensifying their development of anti-satellite and other counter-space capabilities.”

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A South Korean Model for Iran: What It Requires

Strategic Implications for the West

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Publication: China Brief Volume: 25 Issue: 10

By: Arran Hope

Opinion | Trump should build millions of cheap drones, not Golden Dome

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Published: 01:54 EDT, 28 May 2025 | Updated: 04:13 EDT, 28 May 2025

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“I simply don’t see a way for my family and me to return to Ukraine. There are no truly safe places left”

“I don’t want to be moving because I started my life here.”

“All you hear on the floor is fear, fear, fear.”

The real Golden Dome opportunity – defense acquisition reform

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Trump’s ‘Golden Dome’ Riles Nuclear-Armed Foes

China, Russia and North Korea—harboring weapons that could reach U.S.—assail missile-shield plan as a blow to global stability

The threats

The shield