Quotes of the Day:

“We forget that, although freedom of speech constitutes an important victory in the battle against old restraints, modern man is in a position where much of what "he" thinks and says are the things that everybody else thinks and says; that he has not acquired the ability to think originally - that is, for himself - which alone gives meaning to his claim that nobody can interfere with the expression of his thoughts.”

- Erich Fromm, The Fear of Freedom

“Restriction of free thought and free speech is the most dangerous of all subversions. It is the one un-American act that could most easily defeat us."

[The One Un-American Act, Speech to the Author's Guild Council in New York, on receiving the 1951 Lauterbach Award (December 3, 1952)]”

- William O. Douglas

“Freedom of speech is unnecessary if the people to whom it is granted do not think for themselves.”

- Mokokoma Mokhonoana

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 28, 2023

2. Russia launches 16th air strike on Kyiv this month

3. Army special ops put 'launched effects' prototype through its paces at EDGE 23

4. Putin's former supporters say he faces growing threat from Wagner army

5. The Belt and Road Turns Into a ‘Debt Trap’ for Beijing

6. Substantial Conclusion of Negotiations on Landmark IPEF Supply Chain Agreement

7. International Day of UN Peacekeepers

8. Military intervention in Taiwan and conflict with US among top worries for Chinese surveyed in security poll

9. Opinion | Who Should We Honor on Memorial Day?

10. A secretive SEAL-like unit is leading Ukraine's shadowy battle against Russia in a vital corner of the country

11. Opinion | America’s global supremacy might be encouraging irresponsible politics

12. Releasing AI into the wild ‘like open-sourcing the Manhattan Project’: Nobel laureate Maria Ressa

13.  Russia's economy is at China's mercy. Here's why that won't be changing anytime soon.

14. Parsing China’s ambiguous Ukraine war mediation

15. Okinawa still strategically key and China knows it

16. Super-K: The myth of Henry Kissinger

17. America’s Best Bet in the Indo-Pacific: How Washington and New Delhi Can Balance a Rising China

18. JSOC: America's Joint Special Operations Command

19. What we know about China's hacking of Navy systems

20. H. R. McMaster: The Soldiers I Remember

21. What is Duty?

22. Xi Doubles Down on Ideological Indoctrination at the Expense of China’s Economic Recovery

23. The 'New Opium War': America's deadly fentanyl invasion could be China's revenge for 'century of humiliation'

24. The Green Card Soldier: Between Model Citizen and Security Threat

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 28, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2023

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces conducted the largest Shahed drone strike against Ukraine since the start of the war overnight on May 27-28.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that the Russian relief in place operation in Bakhmut may continue past his initial June 1 deadline and last until June 5.
• The tempo of Russian operations around Bakhmut remains notably low.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin appears to have again indirectly undermined Russian President Vladimir Putin’s authority and regime.
• Prigozhin may be attacking Putin for failing to give Prigozhin some promised reward for seizing Bakhmut.
• The Wagner Group held a reportedly illegal pro-Wagner rally in Yekaterinburg on May 28 despite the reported banning of the rally by Yekaterinburg authorities.
• Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov criticized former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin on May 27.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.
• Russian forces continued to fire on areas in Southern Ukraine.
• The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) asserted that Russia is now demanding that Russian citizens make additional sacrifices to support the war effort.
• Russian occupation officials continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of summer camps.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 28, 2023

May 28, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 28, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, and Fredrick W. Kagan

May 28, 2023, 3pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12pm ET on May 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces conducted the largest Shahed drone strike against Ukraine since the start of the war overnight on May 27-28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 59 Shahed-131/136 drones, of which Ukrainian forces shot down 58.[1] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat characterized this strike as the largest drone strike since the start of the war and stated that Russian forces chiefly targeted Kyiv.[2] Zhytomyr Oblast Head Vitaliy Bunechko reported that Russian drones struck an unspecified infrastructure facility in the oblast.[3] The Russian allocation of aerial munitions to targeting Kyiv rather than prioritizing infrastructure or military facilities continues to constrain this limited Russian air campaign’s ability to meaningfully degrade Ukrainian offensive capabilities for the upcoming counteroffensive, as ISW has previously assessed.[4]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that the Russian relief in place operation in Bakhmut may continue past his initial June 1 deadline and last until June 5. Prigozhin stated on May 28 that Wagner’s withdrawal from the city may take a few more days because Wagner is not able to transfer all equipment in good condition by June 1.[5] Prigozhin stated that Wagner forces intend to fully withdraw from Bakhmut to rear field camps by June 5.[6] The Washington Post reported on May 28 that Ukrainian personnel in the Bakhmut area have observed Wagner forces leaving Bakhmut City itself and regular Russian personnel taking responsibility for Wagner’s previous positions in the city.[7] The Ukrainian personnel reportedly stated that they cannot confirm that regular Russian forces are replacing Wagner throughout Bakhmut City, however.[8] Russian sources amplified footage on May 27 and 28 purporting to show elements of the ”Nevsky” volunteer battalion and the irregular 1st ”Wolves” Sabotage and Reconnaissance Brigade operating on the flanks in the Bakhmut area.[9] ISW has previously assessed that the “Wolves” Sabotage and Reconnaissance Brigade was operating in the Avdiivka area, further suggesting that Russian forces may be transferring irregular forces and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) elements from around Avdiivka to the Bakhmut area.[10] ISW previously assessed that the Russian transfer of these elements to Bakhmut may decrease the tempo of Russian offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.[11]

The tempo of Russian operations around Bakhmut remains notably low. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 28 that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), west of Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut), and in the direction of Ivanivske (6k west of Bakhmut).[12] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on May 28 that only one combat clash occurred near Bakhmut City in the past 24 hours.[13] Geolocated footage published on May 28 indicates that Russian forces made marginal gains west of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[14] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are counterattacking west of Klishchiivka but that Ukrainian forces maintain their current positions in the area.[15] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks near Orikhovo-Vasylivka on May 27, where Russian sources claimed Ukrainian forces advanced up to one kilometer on May 26.[16] Ukrainian personnel in the Bakhmut area reportedly expressed optimism that the decreased tempo of Russian operations around Bakhmut may facilitate further limited and localized Ukrainian counterattacks.[17] ISW previously assessed that the decreased tempo of Russian offensive operations in the Bakhmut area and the ongoing relief in place operation are likely providing Ukrainian forces in the area the initiative to launch a new round of operations around the city if they so choose.[18]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin appears to have again indirectly undermined Russian President Vladimir Putin’s authority and regime. Prigozhin responded to a journalist’s question about Russian state media banning any discussions about Wagner forces, stating that unnamed Russian bureaucrats will only benefit from such censorship in the near term of one to three months before the Russian people will push back and start hating the bureaucrats.[19] Prigozhin stated that Russian officials would have been able to enjoy their historic ability to censor Russian society if Russia had not started the war in Ukraine. Prigozhin then gave advice to an unnamed official: “If you are starting a war, please have character, will, and steel balls - and only then you will be able to achieve something.” Prigozhin implied that accomplishing real achievements would let the official avoid lying about the construction of new buildings, metro stations, and bridges in an effort to look good. Prigozhin notably shifted the discussion from talking about unnamed Russian officials to directly addressing a single man. Prigozhin’s comments are likely targeted at Putin whom the Russian state media has routinely portrayed as a leader minutely involved with small infrastructure projects and the lives of ordinary Russian people. Putin used to host annual hours-long “Direct Line” press conferences with constituents in which he often responded to inquiries that are best suited for local governments, for example.[20]

Prigozhin may be attacking Putin for failing to give Prigozhin some promised reward for seizing Bakhmut. Prigozhin’s previous attack on Putin’s character occurred on May 9 – a symbolic holiday that Putin may have wanted to use to portray Russia’s claimed victory in Bakhmut as an achievement equivalent to Soviet Union’s drive on Berlin in 1945.[21] Kremlin state media compared the seizure of Bakhmut city to the Soviet victory in Berlin on May 21, which likely indicates that the Kremlin was preparing to associate the victory in Bakhmut with Victory Day.[22] Prigozhin claimed that Wagner had effectively captured Bakhmut by May 10 and cleared the city by May 20, and attempted to blame the delay in Wagner’s capture of the city on the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD’s) withholding of ammunition.[23] Prigozhin also claimed that his ”Bakhmut meatgrinder” offensive operation killed half of the Ukrainian army, a statement that Russian ultranationalist Igor Girkin declared to be false.[24] Prigozhin also claimed that Wagner opened a springboard for further offensive operations in Donbas and sarcastically noted that Russian regular forces subordinated under the Russian MoD will be able to reach the Dnipro River, capture the territories of the four annexed regions, and capture Ukrainian strongholds west and north of Bakhmut.

Prigozhin’s jabs at Putin and the Russian MoD - in combination with his bragging about Wagner’s accomplishments – may suggest that Prigozhin is frustrated that he did not receive some promised compensation for his victory in the Battle for Bakhmut. The Russian MoD may have deliberately sabotaged Prigozhin days or weeks prior to May 9th to prevent Wagner from capturing the remaining few blocks in western Bakhmut before Victory Day, as Prigozhin suggests. Putin may have deliberately overlooked such MoD sabotage efforts to avoid having to fulfill whatever promise Prigozhin thinks Putin had made to him. Prigozhin has previously stated that if he was given 200,000 personnel, Wagner would have made further great advances on the frontlines.[25] Prigozhin’s May 28 statement and his previous behavior may indicate that he had envisioned expanding Wagner at the expense of Russian conventional forces or replacing Russian military officials with Wagner-affiliated personnel.[26] ISW previously assessed that Putin is a risk averse actor who is concerned over the health of his regime and thus unlikely to fully satisfy Prigozhin’s radical demands.[27]

The Wagner Group held a reportedly illegal pro-Wagner rally in Yekaterinburg on May 28 despite the reported banning of the rally by Yekaterinburg authorities. Approximately 100 to 150 cars of Wagner personnel and supporters held a procession from Yekaterinburg to a cemetery in Berezovsky, Sverdlovsk Oblast, where the supporters laid flowers at a Wagner monument.[28] Some Russian opposition sources claimed that local authorities explicitly banned Wagner from holding the rally and that Wagner held the rally in direct defiance of the ban.[29] Footage shows luxury cars participating in the procession, suggesting that some local elites may be supporting Wagner.[30] Sverdlovsk Oblast is a notable Russian defense industrial base (DIB) hub, and Russian authorities recently conducted several prominent arrests there of individuals including Wall Street Journal correspondent Evan Gershkovich on charges of espionage.[31] Gershkovich notably traveled to Yekaterinburg to report on Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s criticisms of the Yekaterinburg History Museum Director Igor Pushkarev.[32] Prigozhin has also notably feuded with Russian regional officials over allowing dead Wagner personnel to receive burials equivalent to those of regular Russian military personnel.[33]

Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov criticized former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin on May 27. Solovyov accused Girkin of discrediting the Russian military and stated that Russian authorities should have already imprisoned Girkin.[34] Solovyov complained that authorities have prosecuted other Russian milbloggers for discrediting the Russian military but have not touched Girkin. Girkin responded on May 28, noting that Solovyov is criticizing him despite his extensive military experience. Girkin highlighted that Solovyov has not criticized Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin despite Prigozhin’s criminal record and control over a “mercenary army.”[35] Rumors of an investigation into Girkin for discrediting the Russian military previously gained prominence in mid-April, during which Prigozhin may have tried to pressure Girkin and his patronage networks as part of an ongoing feud to compete for influence and patronage.[36]

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces conducted the largest Shahed drone strike against Ukraine since the start of the war overnight on May 27-28.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that the Russian relief in place operation in Bakhmut may continue past his initial June 1 deadline and last until June 5.
• The tempo of Russian operations around Bakhmut remains notably low.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin appears to have again indirectly undermined Russian President Vladimir Putin’s authority and regime.
• Prigozhin may be attacking Putin for failing to give Prigozhin some promised reward for seizing Bakhmut.
• The Wagner Group held a reportedly illegal pro-Wagner rally in Yekaterinburg on May 28 despite the reported banning of the rally by Yekaterinburg authorities.
• Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov criticized former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin on May 27.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.
• Russian forces continued to fire on areas in Southern Ukraine.
• The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) asserted that Russia is now demanding that Russian citizens make additional sacrifices to support the war effort.
• Russian occupation officials continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of summer camps.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line on May 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk) and did not conduct operations in the Kreminna area.[37] Russian Western Group of Forces (Western Military District) Spokesperson Sergei Zybinsky claimed that assault units of the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) destroyed Ukrainian positions near Masyutivka.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced from Masyutivka and expanded their zone of control in the area, although ISW has still not seen visual confirmation of these advances nor confirmation that Russian forces control Masyutivka.[39] A Ukrainian serviceman serving near Kreminna reported that Russian forces regularly conduct unsuccessful ground attacks and fire prohibited gas cylinders on Ukrainian positions near Kreminna.[40] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Bilohorivka (10km south of Kremmina), while a milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful operations near the settlement.[41] ISW has not seen visual confirmation supporting a Russian advance near Bilohorivka.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s new retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

See topline text for Bakhmut.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front on May 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces regained lost positions south of Pervomaiske but sustained losses while doing so.[43] The milblogger claimed that positional battles occurred near Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka).[44] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia published footage on May 28 purporting to show elements of the DNR 87th Regiment repelling a Ukrainian counterattack on the outskirts of Avdiivka on an unspecified date.[45] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces attacked in the direction of Novokalynove (13km north of Avdiivka) and Krasnohorivka (8km north of Avdiivka) and repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near the H-20 (Donetsk City to Kostyantynivka) highway on May 27.[46]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 28.[47]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a failed raid across the Dnipro River on May 28. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces detected and fired on Ukrainian forces as they prepared to cross the Dnipro River near the Antonivsky Bridge.[48] This report is consistent with reports of periodic Ukrainian raids across the Dnipro River.[49]

Russian forces continued to fire on areas in southern Ukraine on May 28. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two Shahed drones over Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and struck Beryslav, Kherson Oblast, with glide bombs.[50] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted airstrikes against Chervone, Zaporizhia Oblast, and Zmiivka, Kherson Oblast.[51] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian artillery units conducted 70 fire missions targeting Kherson City and its environs.[52]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

A local Sakha Republic outlet indicated that the regional “Bootur-1” volunteer battalion is part of the BARS-2 (Russian Combat Reserve) volunteer battalion.[53] Sakha Republic established the Bootur-1 volunteer battalion with 100 volunteers in late July 2022 under the command of local community member Alexander Kolesov.[54] About 90 volunteers from the Bootur-1 battalion deployed to the frontlines near Kharkiv City in July-August 2022, where the unit merged with the BARS-2 battalion.[55]

The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) assessed that Russia is now demanding that Russian citizens make additional sacrifices to support the war effort.[56] The UK MoD reported that Russian state media and business groups have petitioned the Russian Ministry of Economy to authorize a six-day work week for workers without offering additional pay in order to satisfy the demands of the wartime industrial complex. The UK MoD added that Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan noted that citizens should work for two extra hours in munitions factories after their daytime jobs.[57]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of summer camp programs. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lusohor reported that Russian occupation authorities announced the creation of a vacation summer camp in Russia for Ukrainian children from Russian-occupied Shchastia Raion in Luhansk Oblast.[58] ISW has previously reported on Russian occupation authorities using children’s camps as a guise to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia.[59]

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation officials plan to open regional “Defenders of the Fatherland” branches in June that will offer a Russian state support fund for participants of the “special military operation.”[60] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation officials will attempt to use these regional offices to collect data on residents to support expanding United Russia’s popularity in occupied Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine is extraordinarily unlikely).

Belarusian opposition leader Valery Tsepkalo claimed on May 27 that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko was rushed to a Moscow hospital following a closed-door meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin.[61] Belarusian opposition outlet the Hajun Project stated that it could not confirm Tsepkalo’s claims, however, and stated that Lukashenko returned to Minsk from Moscow on May 25.[62]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continue to arrive in Belarus to train before deploying to Ukraine.[63]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Russia launches 16th air strike on Kyiv this month

Russia launches 16th air strike on Kyiv this month

By Pavel Polityuk and Max Hunder

May 29, 20237:30 AM EDTUpdated 13 min ago

Reuters · by Pavel Polityuk

• Summary
• Ukraine says Russia has stepped up air attacks
• One person wounded in central district - mayor
• All inbound missiles shot down - city officials

KYIV, May 29 (Reuters) - Explosions rang out across Kyiv on Monday as Russia launched its 16th air attack on the Ukrainian capital this month, hours after unleashing dozens of missiles and drones overnight.

Panicked residents, some of whom initially ignored the air raid siren as they ate breakfast in cafes, rushed for cover when the sky filled with smoke trails and blast clouds.

All the Russian missiles were shot down, but one person in the central Podil district was taken to hospital, authorities said. No major damage was reported.

Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko said explosions sounded in the capital's central districts and emergency services were dispatched.

"The attack on Kyiv continues. Don't leave the shelters!" he wrote on the Telegram messaging app.

Ukraine shot down 11 cruise and ballistic missiles fired in the second of Monday's attacks on Kyiv, said Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Heavy air strikes about six hours earlier had targeted the capital, put five Ukrainian aircraft out of action in the west of the country and caused a fire in the Black Sea port of Odesa.

"I would say there has been an activisation, a serious activisation...there are fewer missiles flying, but the regularity of strikes has increased," said air force spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat.

Russia's main targets are typically stocks of Western weapons, energy facilities and government buildings, but the fact the missiles over Kyiv were shot down made it difficult to establish their target on Monday, he said.

Russia has increased the frequency of air attacks as Ukraine prepares to launch a counteroffensive.

Kyiv metro stations were packed with people taking shelter although many residents ignored the air raid alarm until they heard loud blasts in city centre.

A local television report from a junction on a busy highway showed missile wreckage that appeared to have hit a traffic light.

Additional reporting by Olena Harmash and Dan Peleschuk, Writing by Tom Balmforth; Editing by Timothy Heritage

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Pavel Polityuk

3. Army special ops put 'launched effects' prototype through its paces at EDGE 23

Army special ops put 'launched effects' prototype through its paces at EDGE 23 - Breaking Defense

“As you would imagine coming out of a rapid prototyping [effort], there's numerous options” on how to proceed with acquiring the new small drone system, said Program Executive Officer for Aviation Maj. Gen. Robert Barrie.

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque · May 25, 2023

An Air Launched Effects (ALE) system is loaded onto a UH-60L Black Hawk as capabilities testing commences during Project Convergence, at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, September 15, 2020. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Javion Siders, 92nd Combat Camera Company)

WASHINGTON — Army acquisition officials are poised to decide on the path ahead for acquiring “launched effects” drones later this year, but in the meantime the service’s community of special operations aviators took their turn this month to examine what that new swarming capability might mean for them, according to special ops official.

Last week the service wrapped up its third iteration of the Experimental Demonstration Gateway Exercise, or EDGE 23, out a Yuma Proving Ground, Ariz., which ran from May 1 to 18. The event was designed, in part, to break through data-sharing roadblocks and also test out 100-plus new technologies.

For the US Army Special Operations Aviation Command (USASOAC), this year’s event involved testing out ways it could best deploy “launched effects” — read: small drones shot out of something else — mid-flight from a Gray Eagle UAV and MH-60M Black Hawk, deputy commander Col. Brian Morgan told reporters during a May 18 call. Specifically, his command spent that time learning how to “best launch these effects and then to be able to link in with them, receive data from them and be able to disseminate that data.”

Although Morgan did not detail what conclusions his command gleaned from this year’s desert event, Aviation Cross Functional Team chief Maj. Gen. Wally Rugen said the broader service is still favoring a wolf pack formation for the drones. By using this formation, one drone essentially acts as the pack leader with each other drone following into a hierarchy and given a specific job.

The idea is that the drones would carry a variety of “payloads,” from different sensors to their own munitions. Part of the recent tests involved evaluations of UVision’s one-way Hero-120 drone and its explosive-laden payload. The HERO-120 is a loitering munition designed to target tanks 38-plus miles away, with a weight just over 39 pounds, to include a 10-pound warhead.

The service has been working on an “air-launched effects” prototype for several years and in 2020 awarded 10 contracts for companies to mature technologies. It then whittled that list down to a handful of companies and tasked them with collaborating on a prototype, according to the companies involved: Anduril Industries is providing the air vehicle; Collins Aerospace, the mission system; Aurora Flight Sciences the integrator; and two others working on payloads. (Anduril acquired air-launched effects maker Area-I in 2021.)

While this effort was previously referred to as “air-launched effects,” the service has since stripped that first word to better relay that those swarms of these small drones can also be released from ground vehicles and maritime vessels. And at EDGE 23, Rugen said the prototypes were also launched from an unspecified ground platform.

While testing continues, the acquisition community is deciding which way to proceed, Rugen and Program Executive Officer for Aviation Maj. Gen. Robert Barrie told reporters last month at the Army Aviation Association of America’s annual conference in Nashville, Tenn.

By the end of fiscal 2023, or Sept. 30, the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) will meet to update its accelerated capability development plan.

“Mission system architecture, payload architecture, and all-up round — those activities are where we’ve been focusing, to say, independent of size or specific capability, here’s what we want to communicate to the industry,” Barrie said. Work developing the current prototype is slated to run through FY24, but before that window closes, Barrie said the service will “signal” to industry what it’s planning to do next.

“As you would imagine coming out of a rapid prototyping [effort], there’s numerous options,” he added. “There’s a milestone C where we go into potentially low-rate production, there’s rapid fielding [where] we can go with another Middle Tier of acquisition. It’s really premature on determining exactly what we’re going to do other than the intent is to continue momentum that we initiated in rapid prototyping by delivering some capability. We just have to figure out exactly what that means and how we’re going to do that.”

4. Putin's former supporters say he faces growing threat from Wagner army

Is this feasible? Are we ready for what happens next? What actions will we take if he is overthrown?

Putin's former supporters say he faces growing threat from Wagner army

Are moves already underway to OVERTHROW Putin? Russian leader’s former supporters say he faces growing threat from Wagner mercenary army and border-region rebellions

• Wagner army could be used to overthrow Putin, despot's former supporter said

By WILL STEWART

PUBLISHED: 05:13 EDT, 29 May 2023 | UPDATED: 07:03 EDT, 29 May 2023

Daily Mail · by Will Stewart · May 29, 2023

Vladimir Putin is facing a growing threat of a coup from the fearsome Wagner mercenary army and anti-Kremlin rebellions on the border regions of Russia, the despot's former supporters have said.

Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin is acting with unidentified figures within Putin's circle in a bid to oust the dictator, war analyst Igor Strelkov, ex-defence minister of Donetsk People's Republic, claimed.

Strelkov said that now that the Wagner army is pulling out of the war zone around the Ukrainian city of Bakhmut, the mercenaries could be used as military muscle to oust Putin.

Meanwhile, former Putin speechwriter Abbas Gallyamov forecast a revolution starting not in Moscow but on the edge of Putin's sprawling empire in regions bordering Ukraine that are falling to anti-Kremlin groups.

And today it emerged that several frontier settlements in Russia's Belgorod border region were being shelled simultaneously by Ukrainian forces, the local governor said.

Vladimir Putin is facing a growing threat of a coup from the fearsome Wagner mercenary army (pictured) and anti-Kremlin rebellions on the border regions of Russia, the despot's former supporters have said

Former Putin speechwriter Gallyamov forecast a revolution starting on the edge of Putin's sprawling empire in regions bordering Ukraine. He highlighted recent incursions from Ukraine into Belgorod region by anti-Putin Russian partisans (pictured)

In a statement published on the Telegram messaging app, Vyacheslav Gladkov said two industrial facilities in the town of Shebekino had been shelled and that four employees had been wounded.

Strelkov said the 'smuta' - pre-revolutionary turmoil - has already started.

He claimed Prigozhin is acting with unidentified figures inside Putin's power structures and one serious blow to Russia's war effort by Ukraine could trigger huge changes.

'No later than late summer the internal political situation in the country might change beyond recognition,' Strelkov, who has 800,000 Telegram followers including many mid-ranking Russian soldiers, said.

'Prigozhin has declared war on part of the military and state elite,' he said. 'Naturally he is not alone. If he was just by himself, he would have been eliminated,' Strelov said, pointing to how there are thousands of Wagner mercenaries.

'Naturally he has a very strong roof [close to Putin's circle],' said Strelkov, an ex-FSB colonel who was key to Russia grabbing Crimea and part of the Donbas in 2014.

Strelkov continued: 'He is a member of the ruling mafia, of one of its groupings. And now we are observing how one of the groupings is breaking the current situation.

'We see the declaration of a coup attempt…I don't know what will happen next. Wagner is rushing to move its men back to bases. And its bases are scattered all around European Russia.

'This allows me to conclude that [pre-revolutionary] social turmoil has started [against Putin].'

Former Putin speechwriter Gallyamov forecast a revolution starting on the edge of Putin's sprawling empire in regions bordering Ukraine.

He highlighted recent incursions from Ukraine into Belgorod region by anti-Putin Russian partisans.

'The recent events in the Belgorod region - primarily the inefficiency demonstrated by the domestic security forces - made me think that now it is impossible to exclude the transfer of part of the Russian border territories under the control of the Russian Volunteer Corps [RDK], which is fighting on the side of Ukraine,' he said.

Strelkov (pictured) said that now that the Wagner army is pulling out of the war zone around the Ukrainian city of Bakhmut, the mercenaries could be used as military muscle to oust Putin

And former Putin speechwriter Abbas Gallyamov forecast a revolution starting not in Moscow but on the edge of Putin's (pictured) sprawling empire in regions bordering Ukraine that are falling to anti-Kremlin groups

An anti-Kremlin volunteer fighter is pictured alongside a captured Russian armoured personnel carrier

'The mood in Belgorod, Voronezh, Bryansk and other regions located along the border is now most likely much more oppositional than in the country as a whole.

'The war hit them much harder than the capital, and such an unequal distribution of hardships creates a serious negative potential.

'I think that the Belgorod region residents now have a feeling that Moscow has incited them into an adventure and left them to the mercy of fate.

'Such interpretations destroy loyalty literally completely.'

Last week, experts claimed the daring attacks of native Russian anti-Kremlin fighters on the western Russian region of Belgorod could 'rattle' Moscow and disrupt Russian troops ahead of a much-anticipated Ukrainian counterattack.

The Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC) and Freedom of Russia Legion, armed with armoured vehicles, small arms and a pair of tanks, surged over the border from Ukraine's Kharkiv region and took a string of urban settlements to occupy roughly 3-5 miles of Russian soil.

They later launched a pair of drone attacks on FSB and Interior Ministry buildings in Belgorod city overnight into Tuesday, prompting regional governor Vyacheslav Gladkov to order the evacuation of nine Russian towns and the Kremlin to admit 'serious cause for concern'.

Gallyamov - a Putin loyalist-turned-foe, said: 'I think that local residents will not show any particular resistance to the advancing RDK units.

'The logic of their reflections will be something like this: 'The new authorities are also Russians, only they are against Putin and for democracy.

'And what about Putin? Why should I now take a machine gun in my hands because of him? [He can] go to hell.

'It's his own fault, he invented this stupid war….we are sick with [his] corruption'.'

An area bordering Ukraine could be labelled a 'new - free from Putin - Russia', he said.

'After the creation of authorities there, it will be possible to gradually move inland, capturing more and more new settlements.'

He predicted: 'I am still far from suggesting that the RDK will storm Moscow, but it is obvious that [this] scenario…will lead to a large-scale political crisis in Russia.

'The situation may develop in such a way that it will not even be necessary to take the Kremlin by storm.

'A completely demoralised Putin himself will hand over power to a successor, and the regime will soon thereafter [be forgotten].

'I am not going to declare this scenario mainstream, but I will not completely dismiss it now either.'

China and Cuba both had revolutions starting on the edge, not in the centre, he said.

Strelkov - real name Igor Girkin - is a long campaigner for full mobilisation and martial law.

He says he was blocked from taking an active part in the war but has not been arrested despite regular criticisms of Putin and his commanders.

Daily Mail · by Will Stewart · May 29, 2023

5. The Belt and Road Turns Into a ‘Debt Trap’ for Beijing

Is this assessment correct? Is One Belt One Road backfiring?

If so, what can or should we do?

Or do we listen to Bonaparte when he said, "Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake."

Graphic at the link.

The Belt and Road Turns Into a ‘Debt Trap’ for Beijing

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/belt-and-road-initiative-debt-trap-china?utm

Xi Jinping’s plan to provide infrastructure to the world backfires

MAY 29, 2023

By: Salman Rafi Sheikh

With dozens of the member countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) club pushing to renegotiate their loans from China, the BRI is rightly said to have become a project of debt collection rather than one characterized by Beijing’s ‘win-win’ formula of mutual development. With China’s money virtually stuck – and even deeply buried – and its banks facing global pressure to renegotiate and/or provide additional financial help, it seems the trillion-dollar program is entering a self-defeating phase.

As the year-on data compiled by the US-based Rhodium Group shows, the pace of renegotiating, or even writing off, debt has increased sharply. Between 2017 and 2019, China renegotiated and/or wrote off loans worth US$17 billion. Between 2020 and March 2023, China renegotiated and/or wrote off loans worth US$78.5 billion – money otherwise invested in signature projects such as roads, railways, ports, airports, etc. China has also sharply cut the pace of funding BRI projects, especially as the Covid-19 Coronavirus crisis has bit into global economic growth.

This policy of renegotiation and/or writing off loans is in addition to the newish policy of doling out so-called ‘rescue loans’ to help the BRI recipients avoid sovereign default. In the past two months or so, China has extended this ‘help’ to Pakistan twice, providing over US$4 billion. Pakistan is where the flagship China-Pakistan Economic Corridor was initiated in 2013 but so far has failed to yield any positive results for the host cash-strapped country now facing a potential default.

According to data compiled by AidData, a research institute at the Virginia-based William & Mary University, between 2000 and 2021, China did a total of “128 separate rescue lending operations” spread across 22 countries, including Argentina, Ecuador, Suriname, and Venezuela in Latin America; Angola, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania and Kenya in Africa; Turkey, Oman, and Egypt in the Middle East; and Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Mongolia and Laos in Asia. The total amount spent stood at a whopping US$240 billion.

While China’s purpose is to make sure that the BRI members continue to service their projects, the Sri Lankan case shows that Beijing doesn’t always find success. Since Sri Lanka’s sovereign default more than a year ago, the country has been struggling to find money, with the International Monetary Fund finally coming to its rescue earlier this year when it extended a US$3 billion lifeline.

Zambia, which owed more than US$6 billion to China before its sovereign default in 2020, had its loans canceled six times by China. Yet, the strategy failed to prevent a default. This is despite the fact that Zambia hosts the second-largest number (after Angola) of Chinese construction firms that work on and operate China’s loan-financed projects. Moreover, Zambia has agreed to lines of credit with at least 18 distinct Chinese lenders. But access to these lenders is far from a blessing. Instead, it is making it very complex for the host country and the lenders to coordinate projects and debt repayments. In other words, access to loans is far from a solution. Hence, the default.

Ethiopia is another African state currently in talks with China for a “rescue operation.” The story of Ethiopia is one of the excessive loans taken over the years ultimately proving futile to bring around economic progress. Between 2009 and 2019, Ethiopia borrowed more than US$13 billion from Chinese lenders. Yet, instead of seeing its situation improve, the Ethiopian government is once again pursuing Beijing for help.

The situation is failing to change in most of these countries – Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Zambia, Ethiopia, etc. – primarily because most of these renegotiated loans are being used not for servicing the projects but for providing basic necessities i.e., electricity and fuel and paying salaries to government employees to avoid a sovereign default. A sovereign default is bad for China as well, as it contributes to framing China as a key reason for the situation. But countries remain in trouble, as incurring more and more loans means divesting more and more revenue towards debt servicing.

Pakistan owes more than one-third of its total external debt to China. In the fiscal year 2022-23, external debt servicing accounted for 56.4 percent of total tax revenue. The actual amount, however, has increased sharply due to the rupee devaluation – something that two loan rollovers since the start of 2023 have failed to prevent. Angola, another interesting case that owes more than 40 percent of its total external loans (US$73 billion) to China, is spending about 70 percent of its revenue on debt servicing.

These countries’ economic situation is further compromised by the fact that many of the projects financed by Chinese loans aren’t yielding enough revenue. Whether it is the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka or the strategic port of Gwadar, or even the entire CPEC in Pakistan, or whether it is Uganda, learning perhaps from the failure of the Chinese-funded SRG project in Kenya, unplugging from the China railway project and turning towards other countries to connect with neighboring Kenya, there is a growing realization that partnership with China doesn’t mean an automatic transition to profit and development. In fact, 128 rescue operations show that profit and development are far from possible.

This realization not only means a potential shift in many countries away from China but also for the BRI countries to shift towards other countries. Uganda turned towards Turkey, which has thus far invested more than US$70 billion in the African continent.

Many studies have found that while building infrastructure has meant incalculable help to bring some impoverished countries into the 21st century, the payback, both for China and the recipient countries has been far less than anticipated. With Chinese projects not working and with China finding it crucial to keep inflating these countries with loans – including “rescue loans” – many other countries, including western ones, are stepping in.

So far, it is the IMF that seems to be becoming a replacement for China. Between 2020 and 2022, IMF loans for Sub-Saharan Africa saw a substantial increase. The Fund provided more than US$50 billion, which is more than twice the amount provided in a decade since 1990. The fact that this increase parallels BRI going out of steam means that there is opportunity for China’s global economic rivals to fill the vacuum with a development plan of their own.

6. Substantial Conclusion of Negotiations on Landmark IPEF Supply Chain Agreement

Substantial Conclusion of Negotiations on Landmark IPEF Supply Chain Agreement

https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2023/05/substantial-conclusion-negotiations-landmark-ipef-supply-chain

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Saturday, May 27, 2023

The proposed IPEF Supply Chain Agreement would make our supply chains more resilient and competitive, and would establish a framework for lasting cooperation on issues like workforce development, supply chain monitoring, investment promotion, and crisis response.

Completing negotiations on the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement is a major achievement in support of the President’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and a win for consumers, workers, and businesses in the United States and throughout the region.

The IPEF partners will now take steps, including further domestic consultations and a comprehensive legal review, to prepare a final text for signature.

Today, the United States joined its IPEF partners – Australia, Brunei, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam – in announcing the substantial conclusion of negotiations on a landmark IPEF Supply Chain Agreement.

The proposed IPEF Supply Chain Agreement seeks to ensure that American workers, consumers, and businesses benefit from resilient, reliable, and efficient supply chains. It would support the President’s effort to revitalize U.S. manufacturing, facilitating the steady supply of the materials, components, and inputs that U.S. companies rely on to compete effectively on the world stage.

The agreement would foster coordination to identify potential supply chain challenges before they become widespread disruptions. Moreover, through the Agreement, partners would work collaboratively to increase the resilience, efficiency, productivity, sustainability, transparency, diversification, security, fairness, and inclusivity of our supply chains.

The IPEF Supply Chain Agreement would create an IPEF Supply Chain Council to oversee the development of sector-specific action plans designed to build resilience and competitiveness in critical sectors, including by helping companies identify and address supply chain vulnerabilities before they become significant bottlenecks. 

Through the proposed agreement, the IPEF partners would also create an IPEF Supply Chain Crisis Response Network that can serve as an emergency communications channel when one or more partners faces an acute supply chain crisis, facilitating more effective responses that can benefit American workers, businesses and consumers. 

The proposed Agreement would also establish an innovative tripartite IPEF Labor Rights Advisory Board to help identify areas where labor rights concerns pose risks to the resilience and competitiveness of the partners’ supply chains. The proposed Agreement would also create a mechanism to cooperate with partners to address facility-specific allegations of labor rights inconsistencies.

The IPEF partners will now take steps, including further domestic consultations and a comprehensive legal review to prepare a final text for signature and then ratification, acceptance, or approval. However, the United States and its Partners will begin work immediately to realize the benefits of cooperation on supply chains, including through private sector engagement and the utilization of technical assistance and capacity building activities to increase investment in critical sectors, key goods, physical and digital infrastructure, transportation, and workforce projects. 

“The proposed IPEF Supply Chain Agreement would be a win for American consumers, workers, and businesses. It shows that an innovative approach to economic policy that is focused on meeting the challenges of the 21st century in close coordination with partners can deliver meaningful results,” said Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo. “By having a network in place ahead of time, we can respond more effectively to supply chain challenges. That is what will make this agreement so unique and so important for the American people.”

In support the goals of the proposed Agreement:

• The United States will hold a series of trainings and symposiums on issues related to supply chain monitoring and operations, inviting experts from each of the IPEF markets to improve cargo risk assessment practices, share best practices in incident response planning to help industries affected by natural disasters and cyber incidents recover faster, and enhance the ability of IPEF partners to identify import dependencies and other potential supply chain bottlenecks.
•  
• The United States will launch an IPEF STEM Exchange Program to match early- and mid-career professionals from IPEF countries with professional development opportunities related to supply chain operations.
•  
• Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo will join the President’s Export Council on a fact-finding mission to select IPEF markets.
•  
• The Department of Commerce will also lead up to ten trade missions to IPEF markets over the next five years focused on linking American exporters to opportunities in sectors that IPEF Partners are seeking increased diversification and resilience.
•  
• The United States will work towards Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) with the eight IPEF Partners’ Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) Programs that currently do not have MRAs with the United States’ Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) program.
•  
• The United States will announce its support for cooperation on digital shipping including pilot projects with IPEF Partners starting with the Port of Singapore.
•  
• The United States will also announce several new feasibility studies and reverse trade missions, which brings experts from IPEF markets to the United States to meet with leading U.S. exporters to support supply chain modernization in IPEF markets, while creating new business opportunities for American firms and workers.

As part of the Biden-Harris Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, President Biden launched IPEF one year ago in Tokyo Japan. IPEF is a new platform for sustained economic cooperation with a group of like-minded countries that are aiming to address many of the unique challenges we have faced in recent years because of an increasingly global economy, rapidly changing technology, and an increase in competition. IPEF will help the United States and its partners shape the future of economic cooperation and trade in a region that is home to 40 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) and a key source of inputs for American manufacturers – as well as a key export market for American-made goods.

President Biden has overseen a revitalization of the American manufacturing base. The Administration has made generational investments in new manufacturing capacity with a focus on industries of the future, with $400 billion of new private sector investment in major manufacturing projects in sectors like clean energy, semiconductor fabrication, and biotechnology, since President Biden took office. This has resulted in nearly 800,000 new manufacturing jobs and the most robust manufacturing growth since the 1950s.

BUREAUS AND OFFICES

Department of Commerce

7. International Day of UN Peacekeepers

International Day of UN Peacekeepers

PRESS STATEMENT

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, SECRETARY OF STATE

MAY 29, 2023

https://www.state.gov/international-day-of-un-peacekeepers-2/

This May 29th, on the 75th anniversary of UN peacekeeping, the United States reaffirms its enduring commitment to UN peacekeepers and recognizes their indispensable role in addressing shared threats to international peace and security.

Today we honor the more than 4,200 military, police, and civilians who have given their lives for the cause of peace, reconciliation, and recovery. And we salute the bravery, service, and sacrifice of the more than one million men and women from 125 countries who have served – or are now serving – in UN peacekeeping missions around the world.

Since the first mission in 1948, UN peacekeeping has proven to be remarkably important to advancing the cause for peace. Its core objective is what we strive to deliver: To help countries move from conflict to sustainable peace.

The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping over the last 75 years. We also provide training and equipment to help partners develop key enabling capabilities and invest heavily in long-term bilateral capacity-building partnerships essential to mission success through efforts such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative.

The United States invests in peacekeeping because it works. Data from the last seven decades show that peacekeeping reduces violence, contains civil wars, brings leaders to the table, and increases the odds of lasting peace. Peacekeeping is a shared responsibility that benefits all nations and peoples, and the United States will continue to be its leading proponent.

8. Military intervention in Taiwan and conflict with US among top worries for Chinese surveyed in security poll

It seems that the amount and type of information available has an impact on the views of the respondents. Is this an indication of the effectiveness of PRC domestic propaganda?

Military intervention in Taiwan and conflict with US among top worries for Chinese surveyed in security poll

• Some 2,661 mainland citizens polled by the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University on the outlook for international security
• Results show Japan is viewed almost as unfavourably as US and 80 per cent believe US and Western countries are ‘most accountable’ for Ukraine crisis

Hayley Wong

+ FOLLOW

Published: 12:00pm, 28 May, 2023

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3221969/military-intervention-taiwan-and-conflict-us-among-top-worries-chinese-surveyed-security-poll

Chinese people perceive international military intervention in Taiwan and confrontation with the United States as the top security threats facing their country besides the pandemic, a domestic study has found.

In general, mainland Chinese citizens were most concerned about the United States which, in their eyes, exerted the greatest impact on their country’s security than six other nations and regions mentioned, and respondents most favoured Russia, according to the survey published by the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University.

The centre published a public-opinion poll on the Chinese outlook on international security on Wednesday, in which 74.1 per cent of respondents said security threats against China from “confrontation and conflicts between China and the US” were high or somewhat high.

“It is worth our attention that people in China and the US have negative views about the other country,” institute director Da Wei said, noting that the views were deteriorating along with US-China relations.

The survey data could help policymakers to better assess public sentiment towards security and strike a balance with elites’ views while providing a more accurate reference for overseas observers, he said.

The other threats drawing high attention were “international forces’ intervention in Taiwan” and the global pandemic, which were both deemed by 72.4 per cent of respondents as high and somewhat high threats against China.

The research institute surveyed 2,661 mainland citizens in November 2022, a time when Covid-19 restrictions were still looming and the same month Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden met for the first time in Biden’s presidency, in hopes to repair fractured communications.

Bilateral ties have been hitting low points since the China-US trade war began in 2018, with mounting tensions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.

Along with an intensified Chinese military build-up in the region, there have been increasing fears of armed conflict in relation to Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a renegade province, to be brought under mainland control

Most countries, including the US, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, although Washington opposes the use of force to change the status quo.

Da, the leading researcher, was surprised by finding that China’s public remained generally positive about international security changes, with more than half thinking the world would become safer in five years’ time.

“This has contrasted quite largely with my personal expectation … but higher educated respondents also showed less sense of security, which might imply that those accessing more information or overseas experience have more direct understanding of insecurity,” he said.

China, US exchange barbs at ‘candid trade talks’, vow to manage rising tensions

26 May 2023

But attitudes towards the direction of US-China relations are more ambivalent. While about 45 per cent believed the situation would improve, about 30 per cent did not expect change. About 25 per cent said the relationship would deteriorate.

The online responses were collected randomly from population subgroups whose sex, age, region and census register (urban or rural) proportionally reflect the latest national census.

More than half the respondents said at the time the US had a “great” impact on China’s security, about triple the figure for Russia or Japan, the second and third countries reported by respondents to have the most impact on China.

China’s military simulates precision strikes on Taiwan after island’s leader returns from US visit

The US is also the least favoured country among the respondents, with almost 60 per cent of Chinese surveyed describing it as “unfavourable”, contrasting with the most favoured country, Russia, of which about 8 per cent of respondents said was “unfavourable”.

Da said the result was “unsurprising” and echoed opinion polls in the US which show a worsening impression of China among Americans.

According to an annual poll by the Washington-based Pew Research Centre, unfavourable views towards China hit a record 83 per cent of respondents in 2023.

In the Chinese survey, 36 per cent thought the US-China tensions were mainly because of “US factors only”, in contrast with the slight 2.6 per cent who said the issues were caused by “China factors only”, with the rest believing the major factors were “conflicting interests between China and the US”, “different ideologies” and “lack of mutual trust”.

‘Pit of fire’: Chinese envoy’s remark to Japan over Taiwan policy slammed

11 May 2023

Among seven countries or regions – including India, South Korea, the European Union and Southeast Asia – the Chinese respondents’ impression of Japan had a similar pattern as that of the US.

Some 57.5 per cent of respondents described their impression of Japan as somewhat unfavourable or very unfavourable compared with 59.1 per cent giving the same negative impression of the US.

China and Japan historically have had a strained relationship, largely stemming from the Japanese occupation of World War II and territorial disputes over the Senkaku Islands, known in China as the Diaoyus. But Tokyo’s recent push for greater security cooperation with the US, as well as its increased military expenditure, have heightened Chinese concerns.

On the war in Ukraine, 80.1 per cent of Chinese respondents believed the US and Western countries were “most accountable”, followed by Ukraine (11.7 per cent), and Russia (8.2 per cent).

CONVERSATIONS (13)

Hayley Wong

+ FOLLOW

Hayley joined the Post as a reporter on the China Desk in 2022. She graduated from the Chinese University of Hong Kong and previously wrote for Bloomberg News and Stand News.

9. Opinion | Who Should We Honor on Memorial Day?

A thoughtful essay. We lose too many to suicide.

Opinion | Who Should We Honor on Memorial Day?

The New York Times · by Kayla M. Williams · May 28, 2023

Guest Essay

Who Should We Honor on Memorial Day?

May 28, 2023, 9:24 a.m. ET

• Send any friend a story
• As a subscriber, you have 10 gift articles to give each month. Anyone can read what you share.

By

Ms. Williams, a former assistant secretary in the Department of Veterans Affairs in the Biden administration, was an Arabic linguist in the Army and deployed to Iraq in 2003 for a year.

In 1866, four women placing spring flowers on the graves of Confederate soldiers at Friendship Cemetery in Columbus, Miss., noticed that the nearby graves of Union soldiers were barren. They took it upon themselves to decorate those, too.

Lately I have been thinking about those women as Memorial Day approaches. Their decision to expand the notion of whom they chose to remember lies at the heart of what Memorial Day should be about. For those women in Mississippi, the Union soldiers, enemies in a war that divided not only a nation but also families and left some 750,000 dead, also deserved respect and flowers.

Their gesture, memorialized by F.M. Finch’s poem “The Blue and the Gray” in The Atlantic Monthly in 1867, was one of numerous expressions of remembrance around the country following the Civil War that gave rise to what today is Memorial Day. The United States has set aside the day to remember, honor and salute our fallen service members. But not all of those we should recognize fit neatly into that box.

Take, as an example, some of the first U.S. deaths in World War I: two Army nurses, killed by shrapnel when a naval gun exploded during target practice while they were traveling by Navy ship to Europe. Edith Ayres and Helen Burnett Wood were Red Cross nurses who were inducted into the Army, serving without rank or commission, since women’s status as soldiers was not yet settled. They probably are not among those who spring to mind when we imagine American military deaths in that war, yet they made the ultimate sacrifice in service to the nation while on their way to save lives.

A more recent example, much closer to me, is someone I served with in the 101st Airborne Division. While I worked in signals intelligence in Iraq, my friend Alyssa Peterson worked in human intelligence. In 2003, near Mosul, she killed herself, and though her name is recorded on lists of those who died in Operation Iraqi Freedom, deaths like hers are often viewed differently from those in combat, perhaps because of the stigma attached to suicide.

And what of veterans who end their lives after they have returned? In 2020, more than 6,100 veterans died by suicide. Last year, Dean Lambert wrote in Military Times about the suicide of his son, Adam, a Marine who died a year after returning home from Afghanistan. “When I found him lifeless, wearing his desert combat uniform, clutching his dog tags in his left hand, there was no doubt he brought the war back with him,” Mr. Lambert wrote. Memorial Day, he argued, should be for “remembering not only the heroes who lost their lives from physical wounds, but those who also died fighting mental injuries they sustained on the same battlefields.”

How someone dies is not the only factor that influences how we honor our war dead. When matters, too. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial, better known as the Wall, is inscribed with over 58,000 names of Americans who died in or supporting combat, or within 120 days of injuries or illnesses incurred in the combat zone.

It’s the 120 days that gets me. What of those who died years later from what they were exposed to in Vietnam? We now know that Agent Orange is associated with health problems including cancer and Parkinson’s. An untold number of veterans have died of those service-connected conditions. Their names will not be inscribed on the Wall, though the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund is seeking to memorialize them in other ways.

Toxic exposures are not limited to those who served in Vietnam. My friend Kate Hendricks Thomas died of breast cancer last year; her doctors told her the cause was most likely the chemicals from burn pits that she was exposed to during her time as a Marine in Iraq. I will forever mourn and honor her, too, among our war dead this and every Memorial Day, whether or not her name is ever inscribed on a list of those killed in the global war on terrorism.

And how might we consider the long-term psychological or spiritual trauma that those who experience war so often suffer? I’m talking about those who died from substance use, excessive risk taking or the cumulative stresses of homelessness. Even if they were not killed in action, many no doubt were killed by action. Should we inscribe their names on war memorials as well? Their families’ grief, I promise you, is just as deep. Their wounds, though less visible, were as grievous.

Congress, for one, seems to be taking a more expansive approach to government responsibility for these long-term health consequences of military service.

Lawmakers recently expanded the Department of Veterans Affairs’ funding for suicide prevention programs. Congress also lengthened the list of health conditions presumed to be related to toxic exposures during military service, expanding benefits not only for veterans but also for surviving family members of those who died before these new benefits became law.

These widening notions of who we honor, and how, are signs of progress — but they are just a start. After I came home from Iraq, in 2004, and found myself a stranger in a country seemingly oblivious to war, I encountered a quotation from Gen. Douglas MacArthur that resonated with me deeply: “The soldier, above all other people, prays for peace, for he must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war.”

But today, for this Memorial Day, I wonder whether such a sentiment rings true.

I’m thinking about Ukraine, where Russian forces have tortured, raped and summarily killed men, women and children, and have destroyed homes, hospitals, schools, power plants and churches. And Syria, where millions have fled their homes, spikes in poverty have led to hunger, and a child’s life expectancy has declined by 13 years. And Sudan, where gun battles are taking place in residential neighborhoods, morgues are filling with bodies and the health care system is collapsing.

Such atrocities remind us that the cost of war is not borne solely by soldiers on the field of battle, and that for too many, the field of battle is unavoidable. In Iraq, for instance, the United States lost 4,418 military personnel, while nearly half a million civilians died in the war and the eight-year American occupation.

These civilians did not volunteer. They did not sign up, as I did, nor were they drafted, like others whose names we inscribe on our war memorials. And yet they died just the same. Their families mourn just as deeply. How should we remember them? Can we make space in our hearts for them, too, this Memorial Day?

Kayla M. Williams, a senior policy researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, served in the United States Army as an Arabic linguist and was deployed to Iraq in 2003 for a year. She was an assistant secretary in the Department of Veterans Affairs during the Biden administration and is the author of “Love My Rifle More Than You: Young and Female in the U.S. Army.”

If you are having thoughts of suicide, call or text 988 to reach the 988 Suicide and Crisis Lifeline (veterans press 1) or go to SpeakingOfSuicide.com/resources for a list of additional resources.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

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The New York Times · by Kayla M. Williams · May 28, 2023

10. A secretive SEAL-like unit is leading Ukraine's shadowy battle against Russia in a vital corner of the country

A secretive SEAL-like unit is leading Ukraine's shadowy battle against Russia in a vital corner of the country

Stavros Atlamazoglou May 28, 2023, 5:37 PM EDT

Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou

A mine danger sign by the Dnipro River in Kherson, Ukraine on January 25, 2023.

REUTERS/Nacho Doce

• A quiet but intense battle is raging near Kherson, which Ukraine recaptured from Russia last year.
• The fight is happening along the Dnipro River, which divides Ukrainian and Russian-held territory.
• The 73rd Naval Center of Special Operations appears to be leading the effort for Ukraine.

Although Bakhmut and the fighting in the Donbas dominate the headlines, there has been intense but disjointed fighting around the city of Kherson in southern Ukraine.

In November, the liberation of the western bank of the Kherson Oblast and of the provincial capital, Kherson City, brought the Ukrainian military within range of the Russian positions across the river. Now the two sides are fighting a deadly battle in the islands, marshes, and inlets of the Dnipro delta.

For Ukraine, the 73rd Naval Center of Special Operations, a secretive SEAL-like unit, is leading the shadowy battle against Russia.

Ukrainian Navy SEALs

The collapsed Antonovskiy Bridge over the Dnipro River in Kherson City in November 2022.

Narciso Contreras/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

For months now, Ukrainian special-operations forces, including frogmen of the 73rd Naval Center of Special Operations, have been conducting riverine raids against Russian positions along the Dnipro River.

In January, for example, frogmen from the unit raided the eastern bank and took out a Russian command-and-control post. Using drones and gunboats, the Ukrainian frogmen attacked the Russians and destroyed the position before slipping away in the night.

Frogmen from the unit have also been conducting reconnaissance missions on the Kinburn Spit, a finger-like strip of land that stretches into the Black Sea where it meets the Dnipro River, south of the Dniprovska Gulf. Outposts there give Russian forces a vantage point from which to track and attack ships in the river as well as launch strikes on Ukrainian cities and ports.

Ukrainian raids help wear down those forces, but they are not simple.

A burned vehicle in Oleksandrivka, a town south of Mykolaiv on the Dniprovska Gulf, on January 3.

Pierre Crom/Getty Images

"Riverine operations require a lot of coordination between the raiding and supporting elements. When you put together a bunch of heavily armed guys in the middle of the night, there is plenty of opportunity for something to go wrong," a former Navy SEAL officer told Insider.

"The guys on the ground depend on the firepower of the boat guys. But the overall commander must synchronize the two elements to prevent a friendly-fire incident," added the former SEAL, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of ongoing work with the US government.

"That being said, a properly planned riverine raid is hard to defend against," the former SEAL officer said.

Special operators from the 73rd Naval Center of Special Operations were also among the first Ukrainian troops on the famous Snake Island after Russian forces evacuated it.

A small island on the Black Sea, Snake Island had been contested for months before the Ukrainians finally liberated it in July. Combat swimmers with the unit reportedly approached the island in underwater vehicles, looking for mines or obstacles that could hinder the landing forces.

US and Hungarian special-operations forces train with Special Operations Craft-Riverine in the Danube River in May 2021.

US Army/Spc. Therese Prats

The 73rd Naval Center of Special Operations was based on the Soviet-era 17th Naval Special Purpose Brigade. Set up as a training unit, it has become known for its small-boat raids and reconnaissance missions conducted behind Russian lines along the Dnipro River.

The unit is structured on roughly the same lines as a US Navy SEAL Team and is headquartered in the Mykolaiv Oblast, just west of Kherson Oblast. It comprises four sections, one dedicated to underwater demolitions, one to clearance divers, one to reconnaissance, and one to logistical support. The unit likely has a few dozen special operators.

The 73rd Naval Center of Special Operations could play a significant role in future large-scale fighting. If Ukraine's military launches major attacks in the south, the eastern bank of the Kherson would be a likely target, but getting there would require moving troops and vehicles by boat.

To do that, the 73rd Naval Center of Special Operations would likely be sent in first to scout beaches, clear obstacles, and secure beachheads — or to divert Russian attention with raids elsewhere.

Starting from scratch

Ukrainian, Romanian, and US Army Special Forces soldiers train in Romania in May 2021.

Romanian army/Capt. Roxana Davidovits

Like the 73rd Naval Center of Special Operations, most of the Ukrainian military emerged from the Soviet military. By 2014, when Russia attacked Ukraine and seized Crimea, the Ukrainian military's training, tactics, and weapons were still much like that Soviet force.

Ukrainian forces were caught off-guard and hard-pressed to deal with the crisis in 2014. Since then, Kyiv has sought to improve its military training and upgrade its hardware, working with Western countries to do so.

Ukrainian special operators also had to work hard to achieve the level of professionalism and proficiency they now display on the battlefield. With extensive Western support, Ukraine's special-operations community has come a long way over the past decade.

Ukrainian commandos are now proficient in small-unit tactics and understand the vital importance of proper mission planning. Another crucial difference is their ability to take the initiative on the battlefield.

Under the Soviet model, there was no corps of non-commissioned officers — experienced enlisted troops who often lead small units — leaving frontline troops dependent on higher-level officers for guidance. Russia's performance in Ukraine has shown the weakness of that model.

Western-trained and battle-hardened, Ukrainian special operators are a force to be reckoned with, as Russians in the islands and marshes of the Dnipro River are learning.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate. He is working toward a master's degree in strategy and cybersecurity at Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies.

Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou

11. Opinion | America’s global supremacy might be encouraging irresponsible politics

Interesting thesis from Mr. Zakaria. And some interesting facts as well from economic power, finance, AI, energy, and of course the military.

Excerpts:

The U.S. military remains in a league of its own, far superior to those of its rivals in Russia or China. China is catching up to the United States, but the lead remains vast across many dimensions of warfare. And in Ukraine, as the Republican foreign policy adviser Kori Schake has noted, the United States, at minimal cost and with no American troops, is inflicting ruinous damage on Russia’s army. Washington is also transforming the Ukrainian army into the most powerful fighting force in Europe — giving it another potent ally. The great force multiplier of U.S. power remains its alliances. The United States has more than 50 treaty allies; China has one (North Korea). And it has about 750 military bases of some kind around the world; China has one (in Djibouti).

I could go on. Unlike most rich countries, the United States has a strong working-age cohort that will not shrink, thanks to immigration. We still take in more than 1 million legal immigrants per year on average. China and Russia are both facing demographic declines that are almost impossible to reverse, and which will put a long-term damper on their growth.

Opinion | America’s global supremacy might be encouraging irresponsible politics

The Washington Post · by Fareed Zakaria · May 26, 2023

The United States’ debt ceiling crisis is, once again, provoking the usual commentary about the country’s presumed dysfunction. But the truth is that this unprovoked madness, causing self-inflicted wounds, is taking place against a backdrop of astonishing strength.

The facts cannot be disputed. The United States has recovered from the coronavirus pandemic faster than any major economy in the world. As Bloomberg’s Matthew A. Winkler recently pointed out, unemployment is stunningly low. Gross domestic product growth has grown at three times the average pace as under President Donald Trump, real incomes are rising, manufacturing is booming, and inflation has eased for 10 straight months. Even the budget deficit, which was at 15.6 percent of GDP at the end of the Trump presidency, has dropped to 5.5 percent of GDP at the end of last year.

The picture is even better when viewed more broadly. The United States remains the world’s leader in business, especially in cutting-edge technology. Scholars Sean Starrs and Stephen G. Brooks found that, looking at the globe’s top 2,000 companies, Chinese firms come first in shares of global profits in only 11 percent of sectors, but U.S. firms are ranked first in 74 percent of sectors.

Or look at artificial intelligence, which most agree is the bold new frontier of technology, likely to shape every industry. U.S. companies such as OpenAI, Microsoft and Google produce the best applications on the market, and a host of other new start-ups are surging forward. As Paul Scharre points out in a Foreign Affairs essay, “Of the top 15 institutions publishing deep learning research, 13 are American universities or corporate labs. Only one, Tsinghua University, is Chinese.” He notes that while China publishes much more AI research than the United States, American papers are cited 70 percent more often. These U.S. advantages are likely to grow dramatically now that China has been blocked from the advanced chips that are absolutely essential to developing and using AI.

Or consider finance. Despite the recent banking crisis, the biggest U.S. banks are now more dominant than they have ever been worldwide. They have passed rigorous stress tests and built up their capital reserves, and as a result they are now better positioned than their European and Japanese counterparts. China’s state-owned banks are saddled with huge government debt and cannot operate in the open global financial system because that would almost certainly trigger massive outflows of funds, as the Chinese people seek to move their money to safer locales. And despite many challenges and efforts to unseat it, the dollar remains the global reserve currency (as the International Monetary Fund’s managing director said recently), which gives the United States a financial superpower. (It is one that I worry we are misusing, which will trigger even more efforts to replace it. But there is no denying that the dollar, for now, reigns supreme.)

A somewhat under-noticed development in recent years has been the United States’ rise as an energy powerhouse. Because of fracking and natural gas, the United States is now the world’s largest producer of liquid hydrocarbons. And as Columbia University’s Jason Bordoff has noted, America’s ability to ship liquefied natural gas has made it an energy superpower, able to provide or cut off energy to countries around the world. Add to these traditional energy sources the dramatic ramp-up of green energy, thanks to the vast tax credits and incentives in the Inflation Reduction Act, and you have a picture of truly astonishing, comprehensive energy capacity.

The U.S. military remains in a league of its own, far superior to those of its rivals in Russia or China. China is catching up to the United States, but the lead remains vast across many dimensions of warfare. And in Ukraine, as the Republican foreign policy adviser Kori Schake has noted, the United States, at minimal cost and with no American troops, is inflicting ruinous damage on Russia’s army. Washington is also transforming the Ukrainian army into the most powerful fighting force in Europe — giving it another potent ally. The great force multiplier of U.S. power remains its alliances. The United States has more than 50 treaty allies; China has one (North Korea). And it has about 750 military bases of some kind around the world; China has one (in Djibouti).

I could go on. Unlike most rich countries, the United States has a strong working-age cohort that will not shrink, thanks to immigration. We still take in more than 1 million legal immigrants per year on average. China and Russia are both facing demographic declines that are almost impossible to reverse, and which will put a long-term damper on their growth.

Could it be that it is precisely this backdrop of strength that allows Washington’s politicians — and the Republican Party in particular — to indulge in this crazy political theater? For most countries, the price of playing games with one’s creditworthiness would be sharp and severe, and that would act as a disciplining mechanism. But in Washington, the country’s enduring strength has become a license for irresponsibility.

The Washington Post · by Fareed Zakaria · May 26, 2023

12. Releasing AI into the wild ‘like open-sourcing the Manhattan Project’: Nobel laureate Maria Ressa

Excerpts:

She said the first iteration of AI – seen in machine-learning programmes – was meant to get users addicted to scrolling through social media, so that companies such as Facebook and Twitter could make more money from targeted advertisements and harvested data.

But what these programmes learnt was that lies “spread six times faster than really boring facts”, she said, adding that the algorithms that power social media platforms keep churning out lies.

“What that does to you is that… it pumps you with toxic sludge – fear, anger, hate – and when you tell a lie a million times, it becomes a fact,” Ms Ressa told ST.

This, she said, has helped populist and autocratic leaders rise to power.

Releasing AI into the wild ‘like open-sourcing the Manhattan Project’: Nobel laureate Maria Ressa

By Raul Dancel The Straits Times2 min

May 28, 2023

View Original

Artificial intelligence (AI) is exponentially magnifying the fear, anger and hate that social media has already weaponised, journalist and Nobel laureate Maria Ressa has warned.

“If the first generative AI was (about) fear, anger and hate – weaponising those – this one now leads to weaponising intimacy,” Ms Ressa, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2021 with Russian journalist Dmitry Muratov for standing up to authoritarian regimes, told The Straits Times on Saturday.

Ms Ressa, who founded the Philippine online news site Rappler, was in Singapore this weekend for the New.Now.Next Media Conference organised by the Asia chapter of the Asian American Journalists Association.

It was hosted at Google’s Singapore office from Thursday to Saturday.

She said the first iteration of AI – seen in machine-learning programmes – was meant to get users addicted to scrolling through social media, so that companies such as Facebook and Twitter could make more money from targeted advertisements and harvested data.

But what these programmes learnt was that lies “spread six times faster than really boring facts”, she said, adding that the algorithms that power social media platforms keep churning out lies.

“What that does to you is that… it pumps you with toxic sludge – fear, anger, hate – and when you tell a lie a million times, it becomes a fact,” Ms Ressa told ST.

This, she said, has helped populist and autocratic leaders rise to power.

Ms Ressa and Rappler had been in the crosshairs of a strongman, Mr Rodrigo Duterte, who was elected president of the Philippines in 2016. He was aided by a massive social media campaign that pushed his populist platform, anchored by anti-crime rhetoric.

She is currently facing civil and criminal cases lodged by the Justice Ministry and regulators under Mr Duterte that she sees as retaliation by the former president for Rappler’s critical coverage of his brutal war on the narcotics trade.

His anti-drug crusade led to more than 20,000 suspects killed in police raids or by unnamed vigilantes.

Ms Ressa added that the impact goes beyond politics, citing a report issued by United States Surgeon-General Vivek Murthy on Tuesday that showed growing evidence that social media use may seriously harm children.

Dr Murthy said that while social media can help children and adolescents find a community to connect with, it also contains “extreme, inappropriate, and harmful content” that can “normalise” self-harm and suicide.

13. Russia's economy is at China's mercy. Here's why that won't be changing anytime soon.

A potential huge burden for China? Will China bail out Russia if necessary?

Excerpts:

Zagorsky predicts that Russia would be considered a vassal state once imports and exports to and from China reach 50% – making it so reliant on Chinese trade that its foreign interests would be dominated by those of China.

"If China cuts them off, they're like, the west has already cut us off. [They're] basically at the mercy of China. And when you're at the mercy of somebody, they have control over you," he said.

Richard Connolly, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute and an expert on the Russian economy, disagreed with the term "vassal state." Russia's growing trade partnership with China is more of a natural product of sanctions rather than a deliberate decision, Connolly said, and Russia has grown more reliant on other countries for trade as well, like India.

And though Russia has become a resource hub for China, it doesn't necessarily make Russia a client state.

"Although there's an economic asymmetry, that doesn't necessarily translate into political vassal," he said, pointing to Russia's extensive trade with Europe prior to the Ukrainian invasion. "Was Russia a vassal state to Europe over the last 30 years? I would argue yes, and it had a very similar economic relationship to Russia as China does today."

Russia's economy is at China's mercy. Here's why that won't be changing anytime soon.

markets.businessinsider.com · by Jennifer Sor

• Russia's economy is becoming dependent on China and it could soon be a vassal state of Beijing, experts say.
• The two nations have ramped up trade and deepened ties as sanctions isolate Russia from the West.
• Their partnership benefits China enormously and probably isn't ending soon, economists told Insider.

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Russia's economy has been battered by Western sanctions since its invasion of Ukraine last year – and that's putting it increasingly at the mercy of one of its biggest partners: China.

Observers have pointed to Moscow's growing dependence on Beijing for months, with their two economies becoming more intertwined in trade and finance as Russia becomes further isolated. But it isn't an equal partnership, and Russia may be on its way to becoming a vassal state of China.

That assessment comes from French President Emmanuel Macron, and even sources close to the Kremlin have said that Russia is destined to become a Chinese resource colony. While Russian officials dispute that characterization, experts say it has merit.

"To me, Russia is not [a vassal] yet with China, but it's clearly headed there," Jay Zagorsky, a markets professor at Boston University told Insider, pointing to Russia's growing reliance on China as a trade partner. Russia has predicted trade volume with China will notch a new record of $200 billion this year, and other statistics show that Russia will export around 26% of its goods to China, Zagorsky said. That's double the amount before the Ukraine war, when Russia exported only 13% of its goods.

Zagorsky predicts that Russia would be considered a vassal state once imports and exports to and from China reach 50% – making it so reliant on Chinese trade that its foreign interests would be dominated by those of China.

"If China cuts them off, they're like, the west has already cut us off. [They're] basically at the mercy of China. And when you're at the mercy of somebody, they have control over you," he said.

Richard Connolly, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute and an expert on the Russian economy, disagreed with the term "vassal state." Russia's growing trade partnership with China is more of a natural product of sanctions rather than a deliberate decision, Connolly said, and Russia has grown more reliant on other countries for trade as well, like India.

And though Russia has become a resource hub for China, it doesn't necessarily make Russia a client state.

"Although there's an economic asymmetry, that doesn't necessarily translate into political vassal," he said, pointing to Russia's extensive trade with Europe prior to the Ukrainian invasion. "Was Russia a vassal state to Europe over the last 30 years? I would argue yes, and it had a very similar economic relationship to Russia as China does today."

Tit-for-tat partnership

The relationship has benefited both sides, but especially China, which has ramped up its purchases of Russian goods at steep discounts, particularly crude, natural gas, coal, and precious metals. Meanwhile, it's sending huge amounts of manufactured goods to Russia, which has the dual benefit of boosting China's GDP and adding high-value jobs to its economy, Zagorsky said.

Russia, meanwhile has been using the partnership to stay afloat as it deals with sanctions and tries to keep funding its war in Ukraine. The difficulties it is facing make it only more likely that Russia will deepen its dependence on China, Zagorsky said.

For instance, China's purchasing power GDP, which weights GDP to the cost of living, is currently around $24.8 trillion, or six times of that of Russia's. Zagorsky estimates that China's purchasing power GDP could increase to around eight times that of Russia's in the coming years.

"There comes a point when China just becomes so much more economically dominant that the choice of becoming a vassal state really is in many ways predetermined," he added.

Though political relationships can change rapidly, neither Zagorsky nor Connolly see a reason for Russia to end its relationship with China. Both countries have reasons to distance themselves economically from the west, and so far, their alliance has paid off.

"There's no reason to think that it won't last a long time," Connolly said. "At the moment, they both provide things the other needs."

markets.businessinsider.com · by Jennifer Sor

​14.  Parsing China’s ambiguous Ukraine war mediation

Excerpts:

By becoming involved in the global “Ukraine project”, Beijing can consolidate a coalition of like-minded developing countries with ambivalent stances on the Ukraine war, such as Brazil and South Africa.

China can not only strengthen its influence in the developing world but also circumvent the uncompromisingly binary “barbaric and authoritarian Russia versus civilized and democratic West” structural environment.

In doing so, Beijing can expand the room for foreign policy maneuvering, simultaneously undermining the unity and global standing of the West.

Still, China’s “peace initiatives” should not be dismissed entirely despite their limited potential to end the Ukraine war.

While they may not bring about peace talks, they can facilitate ‘talks about talks’ and talks about avoiding vertical escalation when the use of tactical nuclear weapons is no longer a distant risk but an imminent threat. Given the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, these possible outcomes make China’s recent moves a worthy endeavor.

Parsing China’s ambiguous Ukraine war mediation

China’s ‘peace initiative’ is conflicted but should not be dismissed entirely despite its limited potential to end the war 

asiatimes.com · by Alexander Korolev · May 29, 2023

After a year of diplomatic inactivity towards the war in Ukraine, the Chinese government has made demonstrable attempts to look like a peacemaker. But while these moves indicate a change in its behavior, there is little reason to anticipate that China’s efforts will end the war.

China’s 12-point “peace plan” and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s direct phone call to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on April 26, 2023, though met with skepticism and criticism in the West, led the international community to believe that China might be able to move the needle far enough to bring the Ukraine war closer to a solution or at least some sort of peace process.

But neither Russia nor Ukraine is ready to negotiate and make concessions. While the conflict is mutually detrimental, there is no clear battlefield stalemate or strategic impasse that would necessitate immediate negotiations. Neither Ukraine nor Russia is exhausted enough to engage in negotiations, with both sides digging in for a long haul.

Beijing’s relative success in brokering a Saudi-Iran agreement should not be extrapolated to the Ukraine war. In the Saudi–Iran case, a pre-established dialogue framework helped China’s late involvement. Iraq and Oman had done much of the substantive work before Beijing stepped in.

Most importantly, given the power vacuum in the region, both Iran and Saudi Arabia were willing to reach an agreement with each other.

This does not apply to the case of Ukraine, where the irreconcilability of Kiev’s and Moscow’s demands and the lack of a strong “give peace a chance” camp in Europe make protracted war the most likely scenario. If China’s mediation attempts are driven by the desire to boost its status, there is a risk for Beijing that a failure to achieve a successful outcome will damage its credibility.

The conflict between Moscow and Kiev has become an acute manifestation of global great power rivalry, an epicenter of the struggle for influence between Russia and the West rooted in long-term systemic trends.

The Russia–West stand-off in the post-Soviet space surfaced long before the Ukraine war. Soon after the August 2008 Russia–Georgia war, former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev stated that Moscow had demarcated a “traditional sphere of Russian interests”, to which then-US vice president Joe Biden rebutted, “we will not recognize any nation having a sphere of influence.”

Russia and the West ruled out any possibility of a positive-sum scenario involving Ukraine. This means that China must mediate not a Russia-Ukraine territorial dispute but a full-blown zero-sum confrontation between Russia and the West — a daunting task.

China’s own precarious position in great power politics and its deteriorating relations with the United States, aggravated by Beijing’s commitment to winning back Taiwan, make Beijing an unlikely candidate to solve tensions between Russia and the West. The crux of the problem is that Russia is China’s only great power ally, and China will rely on Russia in the event of a confrontation with the United States.

Unlike the United States and its allies, China does not want Russia to suffer a devastating defeat in Ukraine. Such a scenario would mean a triumph for the United States’ international order and global influence.

This would deal a blow not only to China’s aspirations for a new global order with “Chinese characteristics” and “dreams” but also to the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy, especially from the standpoint of unification with Taiwan. If Russia falls in its confrontation with the West, China will become the West’s next target.

In contrast, a protracted war or some form of Russian victory will erode the US-led international order, exposing its flaws and opening new avenues for China’s global rise. China will tread the tightrope of Ukraine geopolitics very carefully, coming up with unfulfillable “peace initiatives” that combine a Russia-friendly stance with a desire to protect its own interests.

Given these considerations and China’s overall knowledge of the conflict, China’s plans to mediate the conflict are questionable. China’s activities regarding Ukraine seem to be dictated by Beijing’s broader foreign policy goals.

By becoming involved in the global “Ukraine project”, Beijing can consolidate a coalition of like-minded developing countries with ambivalent stances on the Ukraine war, such as Brazil and South Africa.

China can not only strengthen its influence in the developing world but also circumvent the uncompromisingly binary “barbaric and authoritarian Russia versus civilized and democratic West” structural environment.

In doing so, Beijing can expand the room for foreign policy maneuvering, simultaneously undermining the unity and global standing of the West.

Still, China’s “peace initiatives” should not be dismissed entirely despite their limited potential to end the Ukraine war.

While they may not bring about peace talks, they can facilitate ‘talks about talks’ and talks about avoiding vertical escalation when the use of tactical nuclear weapons is no longer a distant risk but an imminent threat. Given the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, these possible outcomes make China’s recent moves a worthy endeavor.

Alexander Korolev is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Sydney.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

asiatimes.com · by Alexander Korolev · May 29, 2023

15. Okinawa still strategically key and China knows it

And it is a useful intermediate staging base for US special operations with a permanent presence of both Air Force and Army SOF. They can accept additional CONUS based SOF for staging for operations throughout the INDOPACIFIC.

Okinawa still strategically key and China knows it

Demonstrate you’re a serious military with lots of partners and an enemy is less likely to try its luck with you

asiatimes.com · by Grant Newsham · May 29, 2023

Okinawa isn’t in the news nearly as much as it was some years back when most reporting focused on noisy protest groups demanding that US military forces leave. The Japanese government sometimes even seemed to wish the Americans might go away and only return when needed.

Times have changed. Nowadays the reporting is mostly on the China threat. And Tokyo is presumably glad the Americans are still around on Okinawa.

It never hurts to remember why US forces are there.

Map of Okinawa, showing important cities and features including US military bases at Futenma and Henoko and the Senkaku Islands.

What is the strategic importance of Okinawa?

In military matters, geography is supremely important. Okinawa (using the name to refer to the entire Ryukyu Island chain, and not just the main island of Okinawa, for the sake of convenience) is key strategic geography by virtue of its location. Okinawa sits in between the southern Japan mainland, Taiwan and China. And it is also close to the Korean Peninsula.

Whoever occupies Okinawa has an advantage. For US forces, Okinawa bases allow a “forward presence” that simplifies air, sea, and ground operations in the region. And this region is where today’s “great power rivalry” is playing out most intensely. Some argue that a fight with China is likely to break out in this neighborhood.

Okinawa bases facilitate offensive military operations, of course. But they are also useful defensively, although the difference between offensive and defensive operations is often a matter of interpretation.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army has to tread carefully if it moves in the East China Sea. And even a Chinese assault on Taiwan would be vulnerable to US and Japanese forces operating out of Okinawa. Emplacing anti-ship missile batteries and anti-aircraft systems on Okinawa’s islands would also close off large areas of ocean to the Chinese navy and air force, and could do the same for parts of Taiwan.

Also, Okinawa is a useful platform for surveillance and intelligence collection activities that are an indispensable part of military operations.

Looking farther afield, Okinawa bases also allow the Americans to operate more easily throughout the entire Western Pacific and beyond. The US Marine-led response to the 2015 Nepal Earthquake in fact was launched from Okinawa. Also, Okinawan bases are available in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula.

China televises the firing of ballistic missiles into “training” areas around Taiwan and in Japan’s EEZ in Okinawa Prefecture. August 4, 2022. Photo: Weibo.

China knows the answer

China is well aware of the importance to Japan’s defense of Okinawa – and forward basing in particular. And it would like US (and Japanese) forces gone.

Consider how China has built artificial islands and established military bases in the South China Sea. This extends forward People’s Liberation Army operating capabilities. It allows the PLA to dominate or control sea and airspace much farther from the Chinese mainland than would be the case without the islands. Okinawa provides similar advantages to whoever holds its islands.

And don’t forget the political significance of Japan defending its territory against Chinese aggression. China has stated its intentions to eventually “retake” Okinawa (the Ryukyus) and not just the Senkaku Islands.

Tokyo is demonstrating political will. The joining together of the Japanese and the Americans for mutual defense of Japanese territory and to ward off Chinese expansion is a clear sign of political determination by the world’s two major democracies.

How might US forces on Okinawa be used in the case of a conflict with China over, say Taiwan?

Potentially those islands would be used as launch points for attack by air and naval forces against Chinese forces, but the Marines and Army would use them when employing long-range precision weapons, air and missile defense systems. This would help prevent Chinese forces from operating in the area. US air and, to a lesser extent, naval forces operating from Okinawa are also part of the defensive web.

Don’t forget that Okinawa is just as important to Japan and Japanese forces as it is to American forces. And for the same reasons. But the Americans are the ones who have the real capability to operate farther afield against the PLA.

Okinawan-based forces might also be employed to support the US presence in the Philippines, among other places in the region, as supporting elements in the event of a Taiwan fight.

US Military Drills were ongoing in 2017 at US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on Okinawa. Photo: The Sankei Shimbun

Are the Okinawa bases losing relevance in the new age of modern warfare?

Weapons and hardware are changing, but war itself hasn’t changed all that much. Consider the Ukraine war. It looks a lot like old-fashioned war in many respects.

But aren’t the bases sitting ducks for missile attacks?

Sort of. But sort of not. Any base anywhere is vulnerable to Chinese missile attack even Guam, Pearl Harbor, San Diego and maybe even Camp LeJeune, North Carolina. The same of course applies to Chinese military bases.

So it’s important to harden your bases as much as possible ー both physically, say with concrete aircraft shelters, and also with proper missile defenses and other defense measures. But you also want to be able to hammer the enemy hard enough so he knows he will receive as much as or more than he delivers.

What’s the alternative? Pull back to Colorado and burrow into the Rocky Mountains?

Japanese Self-Defense Force base under development at Yonaguni Island, Okinawa Prefecture. Photo: TheSankei Shimbun

Keep in mind as well the distinction between military operations before a war starts and military operations after the war starts. During peacetime, a military does all sorts of things to train, exercise, prepare and establish its position. And also things like humanitarian assistance/disaster relief activities.

If you demonstrate you’re a serious military, capable of fighting ー and positioned in a number of different places ー and with a lot of “allies” or “partners,” then an enemy is less likely to try his luck with you. And he might also worry about having to take on the entire might (military, economic, political) of the USA and its friends.

All this adds to deterrence ー which, if things go right, prevents a war from starting in the first place.

Once the shooting starts, everything is different. And that’s when you’ll know whether you did what was necessary in peacetime.

Does the US need to rethink its Pacific deployments to better contain China?

Yes, and it is doing so. Major bases of the sort that are on Okinawa are important and useful. But a military must not put all its eggs in one basket ー as the US has done. The Americans have too few major bases in Asia outside Japan.

The Americans should be operating from many different locations in Asia.

Opportunities have recently opened up in the Philippines and in a few other places such as Palau and Papua New Guinea. Also, facilities in Northern Australia are finally being used to their potential.

But the US military’s top leadership squandered 20 years. And it did not do what was necessary to establish access and position itself in as many places as possible in the region. The brass even turned down invitations by a number of countries to come and set up shop.

To its credit, the US military now is scrambling to spread itself out. But it’s late in the day.

Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine Corps officer and a former US diplomat. He is the author of the book When China Attacks: A Warning To America. This article was first published by JAPAN Forward and is republished with permission.

asiatimes.com · by Grant Newsham · May 29, 2023

16. Super-K: The myth of Henry Kissinger

Excerpts:

Kissinger’s fame has always reflected his image as the learned, heavily accented, historically-aware European, teaching to naïve America the harsh and inescapable rules of world politics. Not by accident, and despite his sudden rediscovery of Wilson, he was less popular and influential during the neoliberal and humanitarian euphoria of the 1980s and 1990s. And not by accident, he has regained the spotlight after the dramatic fiascos of the American wars of this century, the 2008 financial crash and the resulting radical contestation of globalization.

Like every fantasy hero, super-K is cut out for predicaments and emergencies, for what he offers is invariably a crisis discourse. Whatever we might think of him, his writings and his policies, it’s hard then to imagine a more appropriate myth for today’s age and dilemmas.

Super-K: The myth of Henry Kissinger

BY MARIO DEL PERO, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR 05/26/23 08:00 AM ET

thehill-com.cdn.ampproject.org

Henry Kissinger will turn 100 tomorrow — a remarkable feat, and one among his many. Kissinger’s longevity seems to validate the very popular and quasi-supernatural representation of him: the mystic image of “super-K” of a famous 1974 Newsweek cover — in blue tights and red mantel — ready to save the world, one diplomatic move at the time.

The old sage of world politics still gives interviews and, from time to time, writes oracular op-eds, which foreign policy buffs peruse hoping to dissipate the thick fogs of global politics (or to impress their friends at the dinner table). He remains the object of the never-ending interest, if not fascination, of legions of international relations scholars, pundits, journalists, and the informed public at large.

Expect in these days a deluge of commentaries on his centenary, the vast majority celebrating his unique acumen, erudition, and sophistication. A much smaller but not insignificant critical crowd will denounce him as an unscrupulous, authoritarian-inclined schemer, if not an outright war criminal.

Both the apologists and the detractors adhere to the idea that Kissinger was, and still is, an amoral but coherent realpolitiker. For the latter, he is a cynical and unprincipled champion of high-power politics, who has constantly justified and actively promoted its worst excesses. The former considers him the honest steward of the national interest, tutoring the public on the inescapable (and brutal) nature of the relations among nations, and exposing the inner naiveté — both dangerous and hypocritical — of human rights enthusiasts, democracy-promotion visionaries, and international law-primacy theorists.

But do we really find this coherence in Kissinger’s ponderings as an intellectual, in his actions as statesman and in his policy prescriptions as a much sought-after foreign policy guru? The answer can hardly be positive. In a career in the public domain that spans seven decades, Kissinger has often followed the political and intellectual vogues of the time more than challenged them. He has adapted — in his works, ideas, and proposals — to these vogues more than he has shaped them.

A simple survey of his writings and his most important political deeds shows this. In the mid-1950s, he reflected on the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons when it was popular and expedient to do so career-wise. Later that decade, he adhered to the belief — unfounded but politically convenient — that the U.S. suffered from a missile gap vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Moscow’s technological edge on rockets, he claimed, was permanently altering the global balance of power, with the U.S. risking losing the Cold War. (A missile gap did in fact exist, but still to Washington’s advantage.)

In the mid-1960s, Kissinger tackled another relevant topic of the day: transatlantic relations. His refined argument was that the U.S. should listen more to its European allies, and that cooperation was to be preferred to conflict. While privately harboring some doubts on the unwise American decision to scale up its military intervention in Indochina, he never questioned the strategic premises of the war in Vietnam.

Once in government, as Nixon’s national security advisor, he concurred to prolong that conflict fruitlessly. He rationalized this through a quintessential fetish of post-1945 U.S. foreign policy: the obsession with credibility and the ensuing inability to distinguish between theaters that were truly vital for U.S. security and those that were not. (Events would quickly show that Vietnam fell squarely in the latter category.) With a paradoxical reasoning, which would make any coherent realist fall out of his or her chair, super-K claimed that the U.S. had created a strategic interest by intervening in the first place, and that regardless of Vietnam’s importance, international confidence in the United States and its commitments was at stake. A withdrawal, therefore, could not be contemplated.

Four decades later, Kissinger would offer a similar argument about the intervention in Iraq and the necessity for Washington to avoid hasty retreats. The opening to China — allegedly one of his acts of diplomatic genius — had long been in the making, and we now know that it was actually Nixon’s idea. Kissinger was, in fact, very skeptical at first.

While in government, Kissinger’s analyses of various international issues were often ill-informed and dogmatic, and his policy proposals inconsistent if not outright dangerous. During the confused democratic transition in Portugal in 1974-75, to take one example among many, he completely misread the situation and applied rigid and binary Cold War lenses. He flirted with a Chilean solution (that is, a rightist military coup d’état) or a Taiwanese solution (separation of the strongly reactionary Azores Islands from the mainland; “Apparently,” he quipped, “only whites have no right to autonomy”).

In the late 1980s, he celebrated the systemic stability of the Cold War just before the implosion of the Socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and, later, the Soviet Union itself. In the 1990s, he even reconsidered his original critique of Woodrow Wilson’s idealism.

These are just a few, illustrative examples, to which many others could be added. This invites the question of why he is still so revered, admired and consulted. To answer, we need to focus on Kissinger the myth more than Kissinger the man. He has been an incessant, and often successful, promoter of his image as the wise, no-nonsense sage, daring to speak the brutal truth to those who are prone, and capable, of listening and learning from it. But there is something more to this than simple opportunism and efficacious self-aggrandizement.

Kissinger’s popularity is linked in part to modern America’s oscillation between messianic projects to rescue and transform other regions, and huge disappointments followed by demands from an ungrateful world for U.S. retrenchment. During periods of crisis, introspection and self-doubt, Kissinger’s gloomy rhetoric and clear-cut recommendations have seemed to offer a simple way out of any strategic or moral conundrum: pursue the national interest; discharge impractical melioristic utopias; don’t mistake morality for moralism.

As he once put it, during one of the crises following the Vietnam catastrophe, time often comes for the U.S. to “face the stark reality” and “learn to conduct foreign policy as other nations had to conduct it for so many centuries — without escape and without respite.”

GOP hopefuls are competing to become the next Trump The FDA is ignoring patients in clinical trials

Kissinger’s fame has always reflected his image as the learned, heavily accented, historically-aware European, teaching to naïve America the harsh and inescapable rules of world politics. Not by accident, and despite his sudden rediscovery of Wilson, he was less popular and influential during the neoliberal and humanitarian euphoria of the 1980s and 1990s. And not by accident, he has regained the spotlight after the dramatic fiascos of the American wars of this century, the 2008 financial crash and the resulting radical contestation of globalization.

Like every fantasy hero, super-K is cut out for predicaments and emergencies, for what he offers is invariably a crisis discourse. Whatever we might think of him, his writings and his policies, it’s hard then to imagine a more appropriate myth for today’s age and dilemmas.

Mario Del Pero is Professor of International History at SciencesPo-Paris. He is the author of “The Eccentric Realist. Henry Kissinger and the Making of American Foreign Policy” (Cornell University Press).

thehill-com.cdn.ampproject.org

17. America’s Best Bet in the Indo-Pacific: How Washington and New Delhi Can Balance a Rising China

Excerpts:

In the coming years, India will play a bigger role in containing China’s growing power—but on its own terms. As Tellis rightly notes, New Delhi’s limited power and its strategic priorities mean that it will refuse to be an appendage of the United States. But it will remain a potent competitor to China as it seeks to safeguard its interests and reduce its vulnerabilities. If Washington works with New Delhi to reinforce their combined posture in the Indian Ocean, helps it develop niche military capabilities, and collaborates with it in rallying international support for a free and open Indo-Pacific, the U.S.-Indian partnership can play a pivotal role in regional security.

Together, these efforts represent a better bet on India. They would make a meaningful contribution to preserving the status quo without requiring far-fetched obligations from India to support the United States in a crisis. They are also politically and practically feasible because they would not represent an offensive threat to China or require India to dramatically increase the resources it devotes to defense. But they do require that Washington and New Delhi share in-depth assessments on Chinese intent and capability, and periodically review how they could collectively meet new strategic challenges. U.S. defense policy toward India should focus on jump-starting these tasks, rather than preparing for coalition warfare.

India is an intrinsically important country that is rapidly strengthening its ties to the United States. The growing flows of trade, investment, and people between the two countries has obvious mutual benefits. But the defense relationship often suffers wild oscillations of expectations. As Washington feverishly convinces itself that it is hurtling toward war with China, some will be tempted to judge allies and partners based on their willingness to sacrifice blood and treasure in a potential conflict over Taiwan. But Washington will find itself very lonely if it imposes such an unreasonable litmus test. It has a chance, instead, to build a more realistic and resilient strategic partnership with India that will outlast a Taiwan crisis—and may even help to deter one.

America’s Best Bet in the Indo-Pacific

How Washington and New Delhi Can Balance a Rising China

By Arzan Tarapore

May 29, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Arzan Tarapore · May 29, 2023

Over the last two decades, successive U.S. administrations have sought to cultivate a strong relationship with India. As the world’s most populous country, with the second-largest military and the fifth-largest economy, India is uniquely positioned to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. Yet as Ashley Tellis argued in Foreign Affairs earlier this month, there are limits to what the United States can expect from this partnership. New Delhi will not rush to Washington’s side in the event of a security crisis with Beijing unless its interests are directly threatened. India is not a sheriff of the international order or a treaty-bound defender of U.S. interests. In Tellis’s view, this makes the U.S. policy of cultivating India as a strategic partner a bad bet.

But India has never pretended it would behave like a treaty ally of the United States, and the occasional divergences between New Delhi’s and Washington’s interests do not mean the U.S. investment in the bilateral relationship is misguided. Still, the United States can make an even better bet when it comes to its partnership with India—one that is more realistic than a security pact and that still contributes meaningfully to advancing shared interests in a free and open Indo-Pacific.

IMPERFECT ALIGNMENT

India has a long history of conflict and competition with China. After a shocking and bruising war in 1962, the two countries waited until the 1980s to restore diplomatic relations, gingerly constructing a modus vivendi through a series of confidence-building agreements. Their border remains unsettled and the scene of sporadic local crises; a major Chinese incursion in 2020 into territory claimed by India led to a deadly skirmish and another rupture in bilateral relations. India also remains anxious about China’s creeping influence across the Indian Ocean region, where China plans to maintain a permanent military presence supported by a growing network of bases.

But India’s competition with China does not mean it is perfectly aligned with the United States. Although India accelerated military cooperation with the United States after the 2020 crisis, the two countries remain divided over key regional and global issues. On Afghanistan, for instance, India was dismayed by the precipitous U.S. withdrawal, while in Myanmar it continues to engage the military junta that Washington has shunned. The differences between New Delhi and Washington have been displayed most prominently during the war in Ukraine, where India has been reluctant to alienate Russia, on which it depends for military equipment and cheap energy.

Even when it comes to their shared interest in preventing Chinese hegemony in Asia, India and the United States sometimes have differing policy priorities and use different tactics to achieve similar goals. For New Delhi, Chinese moves on the Himalayan land border naturally matter more than a potential attack on Taiwan. And as India’s foreign minister has conceded, the country’s options against its much stronger rival are limited.

These differences do not make India an outlier among Washington’s global partners. Even formal U.S. allies—those with written security guarantees—do not see eye to eye with Washington when it comes to China. Japan’s vaunted new security strategy, including its bold plan for a long-range missile arsenal, is designed for self-defense, not as a playbook for assisting the United States in the event of a conflict over Taiwan or some other crisis. France’s President Emmanuel Macron has gone further and preemptively ruled out acting in support of the “U.S. agenda” in a Taiwan crisis. The United States would be churlish to expect India to unreservedly take its side during a global crisis when it cannot expect the same from long-standing allies bound to it by formal treaties.

If Washington cannot expect India to contribute military forces in a crisis, then what is the point of the U.S.-Indian partnership? The answer involves accepting that partnerships are about more than planning for emergencies. U.S. policymakers recognize that a stronger India, one that is more capable of resisting Chinese coercion, serves U.S. interests. But in the absence of clearly defined policy goals, India’s cheerleaders in Washington may conjure up unrealistic expectations—and then sour on the partnership when they learn India will not fight for Taiwan. In addition to bolstering economic and interpersonal ties between the two countries, Washington should focus on deepening cooperation in three specific arenas in which India is willing and potentially able to assist it in constraining Beijing’s expansive regional ambitions.

SEA CHANGE

India has a formidable geographic advantage in the Indo-Pacific region. It dominates trans-Indian Ocean trade and energy routes, which Chinese strategists recognize as a vexing vulnerability. As the Chinese navy quickly builds its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean, India and the United States risk finding their interests routinely contested in the region. Greater Chinese influence over regional countries’ security policies would give it greater leverage to coerce them, predatorily extract resources, or limit others’ freedom of navigation. In times of crisis, a larger Chinese naval presence, supplemented with more port access, would give Beijing greater capacity to strike or intimidate Indian forces.

The United States, therefore, should support India’s efforts to extend its military posture in the Indian Ocean region, including by upgrading its base infrastructure and military equipment. It should also support new training procedures among partners—especially among U.S., Indian, and Australian forces—that make use of each other’s facilities. India’s military already dominates the northeastern Indian Ocean and the western approaches to the Strait of Malacca, a vital shipping lane that links the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean. With upgraded basing in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands archipelago, and bases on Australia’s northern coast and Cocos (Keeling) Islands, the three partners would be better able to host reciprocal visits and, eventually, rotational deployments.

The United States should invest in further combined military activities with India in the eastern Indian Ocean, bolstering both countries’ capacities to track and, if necessary, target Chinese forces. This would not only be a boon for Indian security but it would also change the strategic geometry of the Indo-Pacific. A more potent force within striking distance of Chinese facilities and assets in the South China Sea would severely complicate Beijing’s military planning for any invasion of Taiwan. All aspects of the Indo-Pacific theater are ultimately linked: by taking prudent steps to improve their military posture in the Indian Ocean, India and the United States can also create a ripple of added deterrence in the western Pacific. In this way, India can shape Beijing’s decision-making even without engaging directly in a Taiwan conflict.

FINDING A NICHE

The United States should also support India’s development of high-value niche military capabilities. The wholesale recapitalization of India’s ponderously large military is overdue, but replacing legacy Russian-origin kit with U.S. equipment would be slow and prohibitively expensive. The Indian military, however, does not need to replace its entire order of battle with new planes, tanks, and ships. Indeed, India’s recent acquisition of a relatively small numbers of U.S.-made transport aircraft has given it a new and valuable ability to execute high-profile humanitarian relief and evacuation operations in Turkey and Sudan.

As the war in Ukraine has shown, excellence in a niche military capability can have a disproportionate effect on the battlefield. Military modernization need not produce a standardized, wholly modern military, especially when resources are scarce. Instead, it could produce pockets of highly effective capabilities, using high technology in highly specialized roles. Rather than trying to match China’s comprehensive and resource-intensive modernization, India should tailor its capabilities to repel specific types of enemy aggression in specific theaters—and Washington should help it do so.

India faces threats from China’s incremental encroachment on its land border and gradually expanding presence in the Indian Ocean. To deter a fait accompli land grab in the Himalayas, India needs high-quality intelligence and surveillance capabilities to detect incursions early and highly mobile reaction teams to deny them. To deter a roving group of maritime militia vessels or submarines, India would benefit from long-range and long-endurance undersea drones and more air-launched antiship missiles. These are just two examples of how the United States can bolster India’s military capabilities without selling it a large fleet of F-35 fighter jets. Selective projects for weapons codevelopment or transfers can have outsized deterrent or combat effect. And over time, they can become a key pillar of the U.S. and Indian militaries’ ability to operate together.

A DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE

Finally, the United States should enhance its diplomatic coordination with India. Washington and New Delhi exert diplomatic influence over different groups of countries. In some cases, this has been a source of frustration or friction—most acutely, when India’s relationship with Russia prompted it to take a more neutral position on the Ukraine war. But in the context of strategic competition with China, such links may prove to be an asset that Washington lacks.

India brings well-developed connections to countries of the global South, mostly in Africa and Asia. Washington has traditionally neglected such states, in part because policies tailored to win influence in the developing world are not vote-winners in the United States. In today’s Washington, bellicosity on China is a much surer way to win and remain in office than investing in renewable-energy infrastructure in Africa. In contrast, India’s influence is based on a historical legacy of diplomatic leadership, diaspora links, and a perceived affinity of interests. And it is devoid of Washington’s alien-sounding appeals to a global contest between democracy and autocracy.

Whereas China has built global influence through its investment largesse, India retains a reservoir of goodwill based on its legacy as a champion of the globe’s marginalized countries. Last week, Papua New Guinea’s prime minister, James Marape, welcomed Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for a visit by declaring, in an echo of the Cold War’s Non-Aligned Movement, “we need a third big voice” on the global stage. In return, he pledged, the island nations of the Pacific “will rally behind your leadership.” This is far from a zero-sum contest for favor; the United States signed a new security agreement with Papua New Guinea at the same time. But India can often serve as an indispensable bridge—a “South Western power”—to build consensus when U.S. demands may be polarizing. At the G-20 summit in Bali last November, Indian diplomats cobbled together a joint communiqué mildly rebuking Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, declaring this is “not an era of war.” The term, which was coined by Modi months earlier, certainly does not represent a full-throated denunciation of Moscow’s actions—but it was better than nothing.

In times of crisis, U.S. and Indian diplomatic messaging may not be identical—but it can be complementary. A coordinated diplomatic campaign that includes India would extend a political consensus against Chinese coercion far beyond what Washington could achieve alone.

A BETTER BET

In the coming years, India will play a bigger role in containing China’s growing power—but on its own terms. As Tellis rightly notes, New Delhi’s limited power and its strategic priorities mean that it will refuse to be an appendage of the United States. But it will remain a potent competitor to China as it seeks to safeguard its interests and reduce its vulnerabilities. If Washington works with New Delhi to reinforce their combined posture in the Indian Ocean, helps it develop niche military capabilities, and collaborates with it in rallying international support for a free and open Indo-Pacific, the U.S.-Indian partnership can play a pivotal role in regional security.

Together, these efforts represent a better bet on India. They would make a meaningful contribution to preserving the status quo without requiring far-fetched obligations from India to support the United States in a crisis. They are also politically and practically feasible because they would not represent an offensive threat to China or require India to dramatically increase the resources it devotes to defense. But they do require that Washington and New Delhi share in-depth assessments on Chinese intent and capability, and periodically review how they could collectively meet new strategic challenges. U.S. defense policy toward India should focus on jump-starting these tasks, rather than preparing for coalition warfare.

India is an intrinsically important country that is rapidly strengthening its ties to the United States. The growing flows of trade, investment, and people between the two countries has obvious mutual benefits. But the defense relationship often suffers wild oscillations of expectations. As Washington feverishly convinces itself that it is hurtling toward war with China, some will be tempted to judge allies and partners based on their willingness to sacrifice blood and treasure in a potential conflict over Taiwan. But Washington will find itself very lonely if it imposes such an unreasonable litmus test. It has a chance, instead, to build a more realistic and resilient strategic partnership with India that will outlast a Taiwan crisis—and may even help to deter one.

• ARZAN TARAPORE is a Research Scholar at Stanford University.

Foreign Affairs · by Arzan Tarapore · May 29, 2023

​

​18. JSOC: America's Joint Special Operations Command

Images at the link:https://greydynamics.com/jsoc-americas-joint-special-operations-command/?utm_source=pocket_saves

History and relatively current information. Amazing all the info these authors collect and publish.

It is interesting how the author co-opts the Jedburg Teams for JSOC. I was at an event recently and I heard a former Delta Operator and retired Green Beret explain that Delta conducts unconventional warfare. At least this author does not list that as a core activity in this piece.

JSOC: America's Joint Special Operations Command

greydynamics.com · by Jordan Smith · May 27, 2023

Table of contents

1. Introduction

2. JSOC History

2.1. Unconventional Units

2.2. A New Type of Unit

2.3. Operation Eagle Claw

2.4. Creation of JSOC

2.5. Trouble Integrating

2.6. Finding Their Place

3. JSOC‘s Purpose

3.1. GWOT JSOC

3.2. Core Operations and Activities

4. JSOC Organization

4.1. JSOC vs SOCOM

4.2. Task Force Purple.

5. Notable Operations of JSOC

5.1. Task Force 20

5.2. Task Force Black

6. JSOC Summary

1. Introduction

The geopolitical transformation of warfare demanded an entirely new doctrine of war. Beginning during the Cold War, the rise of militant non-state actors and proxy wars established a need for a new set of unconventional forces. A force that was small, agile, and adaptable. In the 1980s the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) was created to unify these units tasked with America’s toughest missions. As America continues to expand and grow the scope of its special operations forces, so too does the command element of such forces.

JSOC’s emblem. (Source)

2. JSOC History

During the second world war, the United States first began to field unconventional forces tasked with special operations. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor to the CIA, recruited men and women from the Army to act as commandos. These teams of paramilitary commandos known as Jedburgh Teams would parachute deep behind enemy lines to conduct sabotage operations. The Jedburgh Teams was the US’s first modern foray into unconventional warfare and laid the groundwork for future special operations forces. The lineage of the OSS can be seen today in the spearhead iconography of SOCOM’s unit patch, a direct homage to the OSS’s crest.JSOC: America’s Joint Special Operations Command

OSS’s Insignia (Source)

2.1. Unconventional Units

While most unconventional units were stood down at the end of the war, the geopolitical transformation kicked off by the Cold War demanded an entirely new doctrine of war. The rise of militant non-state actors and proxy wars established a need for a new set of unconventional forces. In 1952 the US Army formally established the Special Forces aka the Green Berets. After close to a decade of attempts from the big Army to squash the Green Berets, John F. Kennedy’s advocacy for the unit permanently established the first group of unconventional warfighters.

SOCOM’s Insignia. (Source)

At the same time, other elements of the US military were beginning to establish their own unconventional forces capable of conducting difficult missions deep behind enemy lines. By the mid-60s the Navy had established the SEAL teams. These teams of special operations forces would prove their worth through intense combat during the Vietnam War. When the war ended the special operations groups remained and would continue to conduct operations across the globe.

2.2. A New Type of Unit

Despite the establishment of these special operations groups, there was still a growing need for more elite forces. Colonel Charlie Beckwith was a Green Beret and had fought alongside the SAS in Vietnam. He was one of the first people to recognize the need for an even more elite unit that could conduct operations against enemies that didn’t wear uniforms and counter-terrorism missions.

Charles “Charging Charlie” Beckwith. (Source)

After years of advocating, Beckwith was able to establish the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment – Delta aka Delta Force. By the late 1970s, terrorism was on the rise and Beckwith was ready to answer the call with his new unit. In April of 1980 Delta Force got their first real mission: conduct a covert action mission to infiltrate Tehran, Iran and rescue hostages from the American embassy.

2.3. Operation Eagle Claw

The Iran Hostage Crisis, and the subsequent operation to rescue them, would fundamentally change how the US viewed its usage of special operations forces. (Source) The plan was to fly a team of Delta Force operators, a group of Rangers, and bags of fuel via C-130s into a hasty landing zone in the Iranian desert under the cover of darkness. An advanced party of Air Force Combat Controllers would infiltrate first to establish the landing zone. Eight Sea Stallion helicopters followed the C-130s. The plan was to refuel the helicopters from the fuel bags inside the C-130s, and then they would fly the Delta operators closer to Tehran. From there they would covertly enter the capital city, raid the embassy, and extract the hostages back to the C-130s deep in the desert. Unfortunately, The plan would never make it that far.

Helicopters aboard the USS Nimitz. (Source)

A combination of intelligence failure, poor contingency planning, and a lack of dedicated units doomed the mission before it started. The C-130s made it to the desert landing site, code named Desert One, without issue. However, an ad hoc group of helicopter pilots was assembled from the best sources available to fly the mission. Unfortunately, these pilots had little experience flying under night vision and subsequently had no standard operating procedure (SOP) when unexpected variables occurred.

2.3.1. Unexpected Variables

There was very little intelligence dissemination across operational elements of the mission. Despite the US having a presence in Iran for close to 40 years, no one in the operation was aware of haboobs. Haboobs are multiple kilometre-wide and long sand storms that are common in the Iranian desert. The C-130s could fly through them without issue. However, the Sea Stallion pilots were unable to see and the helicopters were suffering from overheating. Two of the helicopters had to turn back due to mechanical issues. Some of the pilots chose to land while others pressed on. Ultimately six helicopters made it to Desert One.

A haboob in Iraq. (Source)

On the ground, things weren’t going any better. Upon the arrival of the four C-130s the Rangers onboard immediately got into action. Their primary role was to set up blocking positions along the desert road that passed through Desert One. When an Iranian fuel truck blew through the Ranger’s position, they responded by firing an anti-tank rocket at it. The night sky of the desert was illuminated by a massive fireball. Shockingly the driver of the fuel truck managed to get out and into another passing vehicle. Then a bus full of Iranian civilians showed up at the blocking position. The bus was disabled, the passengers were searched, and subsequently left stranded.

2.3.2. Out of the Frying Pan

Back at the Desert One landing strip things weren’t going smoothly either. There was no real coordination between the Air Force, Marines, or the Army. One of the C-130s had landed significantly further away than it was supposed to, causing delays. Additionally, the last of the six helicopters were 25 minutes late arriving at Desert One. Dawn was quickly approaching. As Delta was getting ready to board the helicopters to fly towards Tehran, the mission was scrapped.

One of the helicopters began having mechanical issues with its hydraulics. The minimum requirement for the mission was six helicopters, now they were down to five. Beckwith scuttled the operation. Delta and the Rangers would load back up into the C-130s and they would fly out of Iran. Once the Desert One operation centre was torn down and all the soldiers were back on board the helicopters would take off and then the C-130s would follow. An Air Force combat controller stayed on the ground directing air traffic of the landing zone and would board the last C-130 out.

2.3.3. Into the Fire

The sand surrounding Desert One was fine and loose. The rotor wash from the helicopters kicked it up into the air causing a brownout. As the combat controller was directing the first of the helicopters of the landing zone, tragedy struck. In the brownout conditions, the only point of reference the pilot could see was the blob that was the combat controller. Due to the heavy rotor wash and sand in the air, the combat controller decided to run to the ramp of the C-130 for shelter.

Wreckage of the helicopter at Desert One. (Source)

The pilot had been checking his instruments and realized the blob had moved. Thinking he was simply drifting, he manoeuvred his helicopter back into alignment with the blob who was now standing on the ramp of the C-130. That’s when the helicopter’s rotor clipped the top of the plane. The helicopter began to crash into the ground as its rotors dug into the plane’s cockpit. Petrol from the freshly refuelled helicopter covered the plane and sparks from the rotors hitting the airframe caused it to ignite. It created the second fireball of the night.

Wreckage of the C-130 at Desert One. (Source)

2.3.4. Tragedy

Delta and the air crew began to pour out of the C-130 as it was engulfed in flames. The helicopter pilot had regained consciousness, his co-pilot had already bailed out. He freed himself from his burning helicopter but would forever be scarred by severe burns covering his body. Ultimately, eight men died as a result of the crash at Desert One. (Source)

2.4. Creation of JSOC

Operation Eagle Claw was in many ways doomed before it started. There was little to no cross-agency cooperation, both in planning and intelligence sharing. An operation dress rehearsal was proposed but denied due to fear of Soviet satellites. (Source) There was very little intelligence dissemination across operational elements of the mission as seen with the haboobs. Additionally, the operation lacked a distinct command and control element. At each phase of the mission, a new commander took charge. The pilots were in control of the air mission, and Beckwith was in charge of the direct action portion. However, there was no one in control over all elements involved, able to provide concise directions and orders.

Such a critical failure was, like many military failures, an extremely insightful, albeit painful experience. The US has never been opposed to learning from mistakes, and Eagle Claw would result in the formation of many new units, departments and strategies. Such innovations prioritized the creation of special mission units (SMU) that could act as America’s reactive force against non-state actors, terror groups and insurgents. (Source)

Eagle Claw was Delta’s debut mission but despite the mission’s failure the unit remained. Beckwith’s firsthand account of the tragedy made him a staunch advocate for the formation of a new command and control element for these elite SMUs pulled from all branches of the military. On the 15th of December, 1980, only eight months after the catastrophe in the Iranian desert, the Joint Special Operations Command was formed.

2.5. Trouble Integrating

Despite the formal establishment of JSOC, its members were still largely seen as outsiders by the rest of the military. The relaxed grooming standards and unconventional nature of special operations units put them at odds with the tow-the-line mentality of the conventional military. Additionally, the secrecy surrounding JSOC only added to the disdain felt by conventional forces.

By the fall of 1983 JSOC once again had another mission. This time they were spearheading the invasion of Grenada during Operation Urgent Fury. However, JSOC was largely unhappy about this. Their mission was strictly counter-terrorism, but now they were being forced into a role they weren’t equipped for. To make things even worse, most of the conventional forces doing the heavy lifting were completely unaware of JSOC’s presence on the island. While some of JSOC’s missions were successful during Urgent Fury, others were not. SEAL Team 6 along with a few combat controllers were sent to Point Salinas to do some reconnaissance. Unfortunately, a helicopter carrying four SEALs crashed and their bodies were never recovered. The surviving SEALs attempted to complete the mission but their boats flooded while evading an enemy patrol and the mission was aborted. (Source)

Point Salinas International Airport. (Source)

2.6. Finding Their Place

Moving forward from the success of Urgent Fury, JSOC began to find its place in the US military. JSOC would see use in Operation Just Cause, Operation Restore Hope, and the Gulf War. Additionally, JSOC’s strictly counterterrorism mission was beginning to evolve. The proliferation of nuclear materials and devices was becoming a growing concern. Radical states and non-state actors could create dirty bombs with relative ease if they had the right material. JSOC had a new mission, to prevent the nuclear disaster.

Delta Force operators deep behind enemy lines in Iraq during the Gulf War. (Source)

To combat this new threat JSOC began to have its operators become impromptu nuclear experts. Elements from DEVGRU and Delta would conduct training raids on nuclear sites. Training for the event that terrorists took over a domestic nuclear reactor. Additionally, Delta recruited heavy breaches from the Green Berets. These breaching experts were given tools and training to practice breaching an enemy nuclear facility. They’d practice drilling through meters of earth to gain access to a nuclear facility. However, the concept was largely flawed as most facilities could be breached by having an operator crawl through a ventilation shaft and open the doors from the inside. (Source)

160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment dropping off Delta assaulters on a moving train. Image retrieved via Reddit. (Source)

Nevertheless, JSOC was beginning to solidify its purpose within the US military. Conventional units no longer looked down upon the teams of scruffy unconventional operators.

3. JSOC‘s Purpose

Modern JSOC has expanded its scope since its initial inception. Their initial purpose included overseeing general organization, training, equipping, tasking and operations, as well as covert mission planning and counter-terror operations. (Source) As perceived threats to the US increased, especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the need for effective special operations strike capabilities were higher than ever.

Delta conducting clandestine operations in Afghanistan. (Source)

Prior to this JSOC had two primary missions:

• 0300 – Counterterrorism
• 0400 – Counter Proliferation

However, the GWOT and the war in Iraq once again tested the limits of JSOC’s capabilities. JSOC essentially led the invasion of Afghanistan for the US military. Special operations forces outside of JSOC, like the Green Berets, were operating in the mountains along with indigenous forces. However, elements in JSOC task forces like the 75th Ranger Regiment and Delta were conducting airfield seizures and hunting down Al-Qaeda targets within the country. Elements from the 160th were setting up forward refuelling points and having Little Birds conduct search and destroy missions along Highway 1. US special operations forces both in and outside of JSOC would experience growth on all levels.

The Air Force’s 24th Special Tactics Squadron and the Army’s Intelligence Support Activity would also become critical components of JSOC. The need for more specialized enablers to the primary assault elements of DEVGRU and Delta set the conditions for ISA and the 24th STS to become JSOC elements.

3.1. GWOT JSOC

The contemporary JSOC involves a similar scope as what it was initially, with a few new additions. The study of special operations requirements and techniques, interoperability between SOF groups, equipment standardization and the development of joint special operations tactics are the responsibilities of JSOC. (Source)

Members of ISA alongside what is likely a 160th Little Bird. Image retrieved via @uriahpopp on Instagram. (Source)

The connected nature of each of these responsibilities is key to understanding the overall purpose of JSOC. Having cohesive equipment such as weapons and vehicles means larger joint operations can be planned much easier and in a more tactically consistent fashion. More cohesive design in turn allows for a more reliable standard to study and measure special operations tactics and strategy. This moulds JSOC into a capable, adaptable, and learning command that can respond to America’s increasing reliance on special operations to conduct high-stakes missions.

Planning, learning and adapting strategy is only half of JSOCs activity, with it also taking on the very active role of executing the special operations missions it designs. Its tactical operations were equally important to its development of effective SMUs.

DEVGRU training with 160th SOAR in downtown Chicago. Image retrieved via DEVTSIX. (Source)

Their tactics reflect the skills of the teams used, with each challenge that JSOC encounters being examined and tasked with the team that has the most relevant application. The success of this mission, alongside many others, is a testament to the operational and tactical skill of JSOC. (Source)

3.2. Core Operations and Activities

• Support to major combat operations & campaigns
• Counterterrorism
• Advanced Force Operations
• Hostage Rescue
• Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
• HVT kill or capture missions
• Study special operations requirements and techniques to ensure interoperability
• Equipment standardization
• Plan and conduct special operations exercises and training
• Develop Joint Special Operations Tactics

JSOC also directly follows the National Strategies, Global Campaign Plans and Theater Plans set about in both US policy and US military strategy. (Source) Additionally, units within JSOC are on a constant rotation for an 18-hour worldwide deployment package. Also known as a JSO Package, the ready squadron for Delta is known as the “Aztec Squadron”, for DEVGRU it is known as the “Trident Squadron”, and for the 160th it is known as the “Bullet Package”. Squadrons alternate being the ready squadron, the purpose of which is to be able to respond to a crisis anywhere in the world within 18 hours of notice. (Source)

4. JSOC Organization

4.1. JSOC vs SOCOM

The distinction between these two organizations can be confusing. One is the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the other is the Special Operations Command (SOCOM). However, JSOC is a command within SOCOM. SOCOM is a unified combatant command, responsible for all special operations forces across the US military. It can be thought of as the equivalent of AFRICOM or CENTCOM, only rather than a regional-based command it is an operational-based command. Ironically, despite SOCOM being the parent command of JSOC it was formed 7 years after JSOC. Additionally, it controls far more units than JSOC, including special operations forces from the Marine Corps, regular SEAL teams, the Green Berets, and many others.

4.2. Task Force Purple.

The astute observer reading the Gray Dynamics articles on the primary components of JSOC will have noticed that all of the SMUs have a colour-coded task force name. The colour given to JSOC itself was purple. On the surface, this is a colour typically given to military elements composed of multiple branches of the military. However, on a more metaphorical level purple was the colour of royalty and of the Roman emperors who had total control over the legions of the Roman Empire. The JSOC colour codes and known names of its units are as follows:

• Task Force Purple
• Joint Special Operations Command

4.2.1. Special Mission Units

• Task Force Green
• Combat Applications Group (CAG)
• Delta Force
• 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment – Delta
• “The Unit”

Delta Force’s emblem. (Source)

• Task Force Blue
• TACDEVRON
• DEVGRU
• Naval Special Warfare Developmental Warfare Group (NSW DEVGRU)
• SEAL Team Six

SEAL Team Six’s emblem. (Source)

• Task Force White
• 24th Special Tactics Squadron

24th STS’s emblem. (Source)

• Task Force Brown
• 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (160th SOAR)
• Task Force 160
• “Night Stalkers”

160th SOAR’s emblem. (Source)

• Task Force Orange
• Intelligence Support Activity (ISA)
• 1st Capabilities Integration Group (1st CIG)
• Joint Reconnaissance Evaluation Group (JREG)
• Mission Support Activity (MSA)
• Office of Military Support (OMS)
• Field Operations Group (FOG)
• Studies and Analysis Activity (SAA)
• Tactical Concept Activity
• Tactical Support Team
• Tactical Coordination Detachment
• “The Activity”
• “The Army of Northern Virginia”

ISA’s emblem. (Source)

• Task Force Red
• Regimental Reconnaissance Company (RRC)
• Regimental Reconnaissance Detachment (RRD) (1980-2001)
• Also refers to the rest of the 75th Ranger Regiment when attached to a JSOC task force.

RRC emblem. (Source)

4.2.2. Additional JSOC Support Elements

• Joint Communications Unit (JCU): Provides signals support in support of JSOC operations as well as other partner forces.
• Aviation Tactics and Evaluation Group (AVTEG): Studies, analyzes needs and tests new aviation-based technologies for JSOC to use. They tested the stealth Black Hawks used by the 160th to transport DEVGRU on the mission to kill Usama bin Laden.
• 66th Air Operations Squadron (66th AOS): Air Force element that transports JSOC units and equipment via fixed-wing aircraft.
• Technical Applications Program Office (TAPO): Procures new aviation-based technologies for JSOC to test and employ.
• Ground Applications Program Office (GAPO) Procures new technology and equipment for JSOC’s ground-based elements like Delta and DEVGRU.
• JSOC Intelligence Brigade (JIB): Analyzes intelligence collected by elements of JSOC and disseminates it throughout the command. (Source)

5. Notable Operations of JSOC

There are many operations that JSOC has participated in, as since its inception it has directed and coordinated some of the most secretive special operations missions undertaken by the United States. Some excellent representations of JSOC’s adaptability and multi-unit integration are the numerous task forces established during the Iraq War.

5.1. Task Force 20

In preparation for the invasion of Iraq, JSOC established a new task force similar to the one they had used for the invasion of Afghanistan. This new task force known as TF 20 was composed of multiple squadrons from Delta Force and DEVGRU, the 24th STS, all 3 battalions from 75th Ranger Regiment, a battalion-sized element from the 82nd Airborne Division, as well as armour assets from C Company, 2nd battalion, 70th Armor. This task force was composed of SMUs, special operations forces, and conventional forces. Together TF 20 would conduct deception operations intended to confuse Iraqi forces about the size and location of coalition forces in western Iraq. (Source) More notable actions include:

• Delta marking targets for coalition airstrikes on enemy armour.
• DEVGRU and the 75th raided chemical weapon facilities.
• Delta conducted ambush operations along the Tikrit highway to kill/capture HVTs.
• DEVGRU, Delta, 24th, and the 75th rescued PFC Jessica Lynch from Iraqi forces.
• Delta and the 75th captured Haditha Dam and held it against an Iraqi counterattack for five days.

Task Force 20 conducted hundreds of operations in Iraq. Their actions were crucial to the US’s successful invasion of the country. After the invasion was complete, the Task Force remained active. Alongside elements from the British Special Air Service (SAS), TF 20 was tasked with hunting down HVTs from the Ba’athists party. TF 20 illustrates JSOC’s capabilities and effectiveness regarding not only the integrations of SMUs, SOFs, and continental forces, but also multinational force integration.

5.2. Task Force Black

Task Force Black was the original name given to SAS elements operating in Iraq. However, as the war progressed the task force became closely integrated with JSOC following a restructuring of British special operations forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Elements from Delta and the SAS played critical roles in the post-invasion period, landing decisive blows against Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

A Delta Force operator (left) alongside a SAS operator (right) as part of Task Force Black, a multinational JSOC task force in Iraq. Image retrieved via Reddit (Source)

Following the Swords of Righteousness Brigade’s capture of four human rights workers from Christian Peacemaker, TF Black went to work searching for actionable intelligence. The task force conducted raids non-stop, day and night, until they retrieved intelligence that led to the captives’ whereabouts. In total, TF Black conducted close to 50 raids while searching for information.

5.2.1. Stopping the Bombs

In less than five years TF Black killed or captured over 3,500 terrorists operating in the Baghdad area. As a result, bombings in Baghdad dropped from over 150 per month to on average two. (Source) Additionally, after months of near misses, TF Black was able to hunt down and kill Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s leader.

Despite Task Force Black being a primarily British-run task force, it helps to solidify the concept of JSOC as a whole. Much of what TF Black was doing in Iraq would not have been possible without JSOC’s support. JSOC is much more than a couple of groups of highly skilled shooters. It is also a collection of thousands of men and women who work behind the scenes in support of these operations. It is a support, research, and integration command as much as it is an operational one.

6. JSOC Summary

The Joint Special Operations Command was born out of failure. A failure which serves as a reminder of why its existence is so critical to the US military. JSOC’s original mission was counterterrorism but has evolved over the decades. It serves as an overarching command for the most elite units within the US military. It serves to not only support but also integrate these units, allowing for better cohesion and devastating capabilities on the battlefield. Capable of planning and conducting joint force and multinational operations, JSOC has become an essential tool for the US military. It is capable of being anywhere in the world, ready to fight, in less than 18 hours. With US foreign policy becoming more and more reliant on the use of JSOC’s special mission units, it is doubtful that they will continue to play a large role wherever US interests lie.

greydynamics.com · by Jordan Smith · May 27, 2023

19. What we know about China's hacking of Navy systems

What we know about China's hacking of Navy systems

Hackers were "pursuing development of capabilities that could disrupt critical communications between the United States and Asia" in a crisis.

BY NICHOLAS SLAYTON | PUBLISHED MAY 28, 2023 5:23 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton · May 28, 2023

Chinese-backed hackers breached American infrastructure, including technology systems belonging to the U.S. Navy, government officials confirmed this past week.

Technology company Microsoft first reported on the hack, identifying the group and the techniques used to pull it off. The operation aimed to gain access to communications systems in the United States and U.S. Navy infrastructure on Guam. The island is home to several military installations, including a large contingent of B-52 bombers and U.S. Navy submarines.

In response the United States and allies published a report on how to detect and protect against such intrusions.

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Who is behind it?

Microsoft Corp. first reported the apparent hack on Wednesday, May 24. It identified the perpetrators with “moderate confidence” as Volt Typhoon, a “state-sponsored actor based in China that typically focuses on espionage and information gathering.” The group has been active since at least 2021.

This specific hack saw Volt Typhoon using legitimate credentials to gain access to the systems, getting inside and then using small-office routers to disguise where the intrusion is coming from. Cybersecurity experts call this approach “living off the land.” They obtained initial access by targeting Fortinet cybersecurity devices, taking advantage of a flaw in the system to gain credentials.

The Chinese government has denied the allegations, calling them a “collective disinformation campaign” by the countries that make up the Five Eyes intelligence sharing organization, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

What was affected?

The full extent of the hack is not clear, but the infrastructure targeted “span the communications, manufacturing, utility, transportation, construction, maritime, government, information technology, and education sectors,” Microsoft said.

“Microsoft assesses with moderate confidence that this Volt Typhoon campaign is pursuing development of capabilities that could disrupt critical communications infrastructure between the United States and Asia region during future crises,” Microsoft wrote in its statement.

Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro told CNBC on Thursday, May 25 that the Navy “has been impacted” by the hackers, but did not specify what areas were targeted or what it means for the Navy’s operational readiness. He did however say that it was “no surprise” that China initiated such a cyber attack.

Guam’s military assets and its location in the Pacific make it a major part of the U.S. military’s strategy in the region, including potential threats from China, both to the U.S. and to Taiwan.

This is not the first Chinese-backed cyberattack to affect the U.S. Navy. In 2018 hackers gained access to a Navy contractor’s computer, which had files on submarine warfare plans, including new missiles.

What’s being done?

Microsoft said that it had contacted all groups affected by the hack.

In response to the news, the cybersecurity agencies of the Five Eyes member nations issued a joint advisory on the hack and how to detect similar ones. The new report identifies several steps governments can take to prevent “living off the land” style intrusions.

“For years, China has conducted aggressive cyber operations to steal intellectual property and sensitive data from organizations around the globe,” Jen Easterly, director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency said in a statement. “Today’s advisory highlights China’s continued use of sophisticated means to target our nation’s critical infrastructure, and it gives network defenders important insights into how to detect and mitigate this malicious activity.”

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• Air Force F-15 takes an accidental bath in drainage canal after botched landing
• Fort Cavazos battalion commander fired for misconduct

taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton · May 28, 2023​

20. H. R. McMaster: The Soldiers I Remember

H. R. McMaster: The Soldiers I Remember

thefp.com · by H.R. McMaster · May 29, 2023

In World War II, America lost 291,557 military lives in combat. But, as Pulitzer Prize–winning author Rick Atkinson wrote, “each death is as unique as a snowflake or a fingerprint. The most critical lesson for every American is to understand, viscerally, that this vast host died one by one by one; to understand in your bones that they died for you.”

Perhaps back then, it was easier for more Americans to feel that reality in their bones. These days, with a relatively small all-volunteer force, the American people are more distant from those who fight in their name.

Combat veterans suppress dreadful memories of battles, but never forget their comrades who fell alongside them one by one. Their countenances, often smiling or laughing, flash before our mind’s eye. I see them unexpectedly. Sometimes they come in waves.

This Memorial Day, in between the backyard barbecues and parades, Americans might hear statistics of our fallen soldiers, like the approximately 650,000 who died in battle since the beginning of the War of Independence 240 years ago. They might know that 7,054 American military personnel died in the most recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But most are unfamiliar with the stories of individual soldiers who made the ultimate sacrifice. That is a shame.

To help our fellow Americans appreciate such a sacrifice, we who served alongside those heroes should tell the stories of our fallen comrades as we lost them: one by one.

Today, I would like to share my memory of Private First Class Joseph Knott, the first trooper killed in action after the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment returned to Iraq for its second combat tour of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Even now, I still see Joseph, smiling, in my mind’s eye. Just 21, from Yuma, Arizona, he was the very model of a cavalry scout. In fact, his photo, in silhouette standing guard in the gunner’s station of his Humvee as the sun set behind him, was selected for the cover of our regimental magazine only a week before his death.

The date was April 17, 2005. As always, I briefed our security detachment—really a small scout platoon—before we departed our base in Iraq. Six of the battalion’s soldiers had been wounded the day before. I made sure I met and shook the hands of every soldier in the battalion task force that had been attached to our regiment.

Our mission that day was to assess the situation in the so-called “triangle of death” area south of Baghdad so we could refine our plans to defeat the enemy. The area—filled with infiltration routes, or “ratlines,” from Syria along the Euphrates river valley—was well-suited to al-Qaeda terrorists. Narrow roads paralleling the canals that crisscrossed the area made our forces easy to spot and vulnerable to attack. It was the perfect place to manufacture bombs and suicide vests for attacks in Baghdad. And al-Qaeda needed to behead only a few people in the small towns before all the locals understood that they were to see nothing and hear nothing about the explosive device factories the group had established there.

Halfway through the patrol, I switched places with our Command Sergeant Major, John Caldwell, a charismatic and courageous larger-than-life man whose bad back would have more than justified him forgoing another combat tour. But “Big John’s” dedication to his soldiers overwhelmed the constant pain he endured to lead our troopers back to Iraq.

Our eight-vehicle convoy of six armored Humvees and two Bradley fighting vehicles headed out on the Mullah Fayad Highway—a narrow, two-lane road lined by tall reeds alongside a canal. Caldwell’s vehicle, containing three other soldiers including Joseph, was positioned in the center of our column.

Suddenly I sensed that tingling feeling at the back of my neck. The evil presence of al-Qaeda was palpable. From the front right seat, I grabbed the hand mike and pressed the transmit button, instructing our troopers to “be vigilant and stay low.”

A moment later, fifty yards in front of me, a large explosion washed over Caldwell’s Humvee. A cloud of black smoke and debris obscured the road.

“Punch through it!” I told the driver. We drove to the far side as I reported the attack, requesting medical evacuation at a secured landing zone just ahead of us. Then I jumped out and met our platoon sergeant, Staff Sergeant Matt Hodges, at Caldwell’s Humvee. Sergeant First Class Donald Sparks and our interpreter, Mr. Kamel Abbo, were injured, and Caldwell was seriously wounded. We treated him and got him to the landing zone just as the medevac helicopter landed. But we were unable to save his gunner, Private Joseph Knott. I held Joseph’s hand and said a prayer. Hodges and I folded his arms across his chest and covered his body.

Two days later I eulogized Joseph, surrounded by his fellow cavalry troopers at our base in Baghdad. I wish that more Americans could witness combat memorials to the fallen so they could understand how fortunate we are to have selfless young men and women willing to fight and sacrifice in our name. Eighteen years later, I welcome Free Press readers back to that ceremony, with the speech I gave about Joseph.

We are here to honor and say goodbye to one of our Brave Rifles brothers, a great cavalry trooper and a fine man, Private First Class Joseph Knott. Private First Class Knott, like all of you, volunteered to serve his nation in time of war. On 17 April during operations in the South Baghdad area, he made the ultimate sacrifice to bring peace to this difficult region, defeat the forces of terrorism and hatred, and permit children, both in Iraq and in our own nation, to live free of fear. Our thoughts and prayers are with him and with his family—his father Jerry, his mother Pamela, his sisters Susan and Sheela, and his brother Jerry.

I then shared the reminiscences of Joseph from soldiers in our platoon. Grief shared is grief divided.

Corporal Dillard recalled how “he strived for excellence in everything he did and always kept the morale of his fellow troopers high.”

Staff Sergeant Hodges, who I know has the highest standards, described Joseph as an “exemplary soldier. . . motivated and disciplined.”

Specialist Bruce recalled that “everything he did, he put all of his energy into it and made sure it was done right.”

Sergeant Braxton recalled that “he was the type of person who would do everything he could to help the next person.”

PFC Ryan said that PFC Knott “was always the one to make us laugh. He was always singing or looked like he was posing for a picture and smiling.”

Sergeant Harris said “he always had a smile on his face and served our country proudly.”

Military units conduct memorial services to renew their commitment to each other and the mission as well as mourn the loss of their comrades. I went on to highlight our responsibility to Joseph and his memory:

We should also draw strength from Joseph Knott’s example. I, for one, will do my best to follow his example—to put fellow troopers before myself, to do my very best to win this fight against terrorists and the enemies of freedom, to maintain my sense of humor and enjoy the company of my fellow troopers. If I could sing, I would sing louder. Today we honor PFC Joseph Knott with words as we pray for him and his family. I ask that tomorrow we all do our best to honor PFC Knott with our deeds as we continue to serve our nation in this great Regiment.

Our troopers did honor PFC Knott and others who fell alongside him in South Baghdad and in western Ninewa Province as they defeated modern-day barbarians while demonstrating compassion for the Iraqi people. As the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment departed Iraq a year after Joseph’s death, the mayor of the Iraqi city of Tal Afar, Major General Najim Abed Abdullah al-Jibouri, wrote the following to the families of our fallen troopers:

To the families of those who have given their holy blood for our land, we all bow to you in reverence and to the souls of your loved ones. Their sacrifice was not in vain. They are not dead, but alive, and their souls hovering around us every second of every minute. They will never be forgotten. . . . We see them in the smile of every child, and in every flower growing in this land. Let America, their families, and the world be proud of their sacrifice for humanity and life.

Combat memorial ceremonies help military units, which take on the qualities of a family, communalize grief and resolve to continue the mission. At the end of the ceremony, soldiers kneel one by one, or with their squad, in front of the fallen soldier’s boots and helmet, which sit on top of an inverted rifle. The soldier’s ID tags dangle from the trigger housing. At the end of the ceremony, each soldier grasps the ID tags for a moment to pay a personal, silent tribute to their brother or sister.

I wonder if, on this Memorial Day, all of us might imagine reaching out, holding those ID tags for a moment, and pledging to live well, strengthen our Republic, and treasure the freedoms that Private First Class Joseph Knott and all of our fallen warriors fought to preserve.

H. R. McMaster was the 71st Commander of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment. He is a senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, and served as an officer in the United States Army for thirty-four years.

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thefp.com · by H.R. McMaster · May 29, 2023

​21. What is Duty?

As we remember the fallen today, we should perhaps reflect on this essay as one way to honor their sacrifices and memories.

What is Duty?

By David Kim

May 29, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/05/29/what_is_duty_902164.html

Memorial Day is a powerful time to reflect on a question essential to citizenship: what is duty

to country, and how is it relevant to our lives today?

How often have we pondered the dimensions of duty to our nation, much less spoken about it to our children? Odds are not much – according to Google, the use of the word duty has been down 25% since 1988 (the year I joined the Army) and down by a factor of three over the last 100 years. So, it’s not surprising that in our “me-centered” culture, the concept of duty is becoming increasingly unfamiliar. Where do we look for guidance and inspiration?

Steven Pressfield’s Gates of Fire captivatingly illustrates how duty can transmute from obligation to honor, from a vision of the present to an investment in eternity. It’s the story of the Battle of Thermopylae and the 300 Spartans who chose to stand and die, giving Greece precious time to organize a defense against the invading Persians. I’m sure many Greeks initially acted out of what we commonly consider duty – the dictionary definition of an obligation. Or perhaps a desire to avoid shame or to fulfill the requirements of the role – soldiers are expected to fight, after all.

But surely this most elemental form of duty alone can’t explain their decision to fight to the death. Every soldier knows they’re taking a risk in war, but the Spartans knew this was a suicide mission. Why, then, did they choose to lay down their lives for their country?

It was love. Love for the men on their right and left who were willing to die for them. Love for the freedom their sacrifice would bequeath to their families and their countrymen. And midwife, to this sacrifice born of love, was the hope that their example would inspire future generations to bear the heavy burdens that freedom demands.

This is how they transformed duty from obligation to the sublime, from an act that shaped not only their present but also spoke to ages hence. This is duty to country in its most shining and unalloyed form. Twenty-five hundred years later, we can still draw inspiration from this noble and multi-layered example of duty by serving the defense of our nation in ways large and small. After all, our freedoms stand on the foundation of our armed forces. This is the lesson of Memorial Day.

Few know that we are facing a national security crisis whose remedy lies in reinvigorating a dedication to duty among our youth. The Army missed its recruiting goals last year by about 15,000 soldiers. That’s roughly the size of one division. They’ll miss the recruiting goal again this year. Let that sink in – we’re running short one division a year when we only have ten. How many more years until our Army is too small to be effective? This major security threat is emerging just as an era of geopolitical power struggle intensifies with a totalitarian Chinese Communist foe explicitly dedicated to dominating the world order.

Just as the Spartans did in her time of need, America’s youth must step forward to serve our nation in uniform. All Americans can be part of the solution by using our voices and influence to encourage a renewed sense of duty to country across this great land. To lift, like Sparta did, a commitment to service in uniform to stand among our highest national values. Advocate for military service to your communities, to your schools, and especially to your children. From those to whom much has been entrusted, much is expected. And all Americans have been abundantly blessed. Let’s rekindle our nation’s sense of duty – it’s our honor and privilege to do so.

David Kim is a combat veteran, entrepreneur, philanthropist, and father of a son and a daughter in the U.S. Army.

Co-Founder & Chief Executive Officer, Children of Fallen Patriots Foundation

David is the global co-head of investor relations for Apax Partners, a leading global private equity investment firm with 7 offices across the world. Founded in 1983, Apax is one of the world's largest private equity firms, having raised over $60 billion in capital to provide long-term equity financing to growth companies. David has been with Apax since 2000 and is responsible for fundraising and investor services in North and South America as the firm invests its latest pool of capital which is $11 billion in size. He has been in the private equity industry since 1994.

David is an honors graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and the Harvard Business School. He also served as an artillery officer in the U.S. Army where he participated in Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989 with the 7th Infantry Division. David is a graduate of the U.S. Army Airborne, Ranger, and Jungle Warfare Schools and completed the New York City Marathon and Triathlon. He is married and has four children, two of whom attend the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. His wife Cynthia serves as the volunteer Programs Director for Fallen Patriots.

22. Xi Doubles Down on Ideological Indoctrination at the Expense of China’s Economic Recovery

Excerpts:

Xi’s ideological push reflects his long-held fears about the Soviet Communist Party’s overnight collapse on account of its “ideals and beliefs” being “shaken.” Going forward, Xi’s paranoia will increasingly drive Chinese decision-making, likely leading him to embrace ever-more radical policies in pursuit of ideological purity. As a result, Xi may assume a more combative approach in his dealings with Washington, all while ramping up unannounced inspections and pre-dawn raids of U.S. multinationals operating in China.

Xi Doubles Down on Ideological Indoctrination at the Expense of China’s Economic Recovery

fdd.org · by Jack Sullivan · May 24, 2023

May 24, 2023 | Policy Brief

Craig Singleton

China Program Deputy Director and Senior Fellow

Cate Kanapathy

Intern

In several speeches and policy pronouncements this spring, Chinese leader Xi Jinping outlined plans for a sweeping indoctrination drive aimed at tightening his hold on power. Xi’s declarations re-affirm his fixation on ideological control at the expense of economic growth, a move likely to further strain Sino-U.S. relations and increase the risks faced by American companies operating in China.

Since securing a third term last October as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi has convened semi-regular “collective study sessions” with various party organs. Chief among them is China’s powerful Central Committee, which oversees the CCP’s Propaganda and United Front Departments. The Central Committee held its most recent study session in late March; however, Xi’s remarks only became public in mid-May when they were published in the CCP’s leading news magazine, Qiushi.

During the March session, Xi announced a national-level “theme education” (or mass study) program to promote his political doctrine, called “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” commonly shortened to ‘Xi Jinping Thought,’ or more recently, just ‘The Thought.’ Xi’s program mirrors one Mao Zedong instituted after the Great Leap Forward, a failed industrialization campaign that left 30 million dead between 1958 and 1962.

Xi’s study program aims to neutralize any residual opposition to his leadership within the party’s ranks. Like Mao, Xi’s campaign employs ostensible “investigation and research,” almost certainly in the form of purges and forced confessions, to facilitate “in-depth” and practical “self-criticism” at “all levels.” Xi’s goal is to implement ‘The Thought’ in “all aspects of reform, development, stability, domestic and foreign affairs, national defense, and governance of the party, country, and military.” Xi noted ‘The Thought’ would solve “various contradictions and problems in [China’s] economic and social development” – a reference to his desire to deepen the party-state’s influence in China’s commercial sector and the lives of all Chinese citizens.

Later, in April, Xi established the Central Theme Education Leading Group to manage his indoctrination drive. Like other leading groups charged with overseeing CCP priorities, such as military reform and Taiwan affairs, this group reports to Xi and the CCP’s Standing Committee, China’s highest-level decision-making body. Its responsibilities include launching 58 ideological steering groups throughout the government and the private sector to ensure total compliance with ‘The Thought.’

Also in April, Xi launched a new state-run website and WeChat group to promote ‘The Thought.’ The platforms offer “publicity and interpretation of the important events attended by and remarks given by” Xi and “showcase the progress and results of the [study] campaign.” Such moves build upon Xi’s extensive use of technology to propagate his preferred political narratives and conduct mass surveillance.

Amidst this backdrop, in late April, China’s rubber stamp legislature passed a new “Anti-Espionage Law.” To root out foreign influence, the law expands the scope of what counts as espionage activity to include all data gathering. The law also grants extensive powers to Chinese spy agencies to investigate firms engaged in routine business activities, such as conducting due diligence, which could lead some Western businesses to exit China.

Xi’s ideological push reflects his long-held fears about the Soviet Communist Party’s overnight collapse on account of its “ideals and beliefs” being “shaken.” Going forward, Xi’s paranoia will increasingly drive Chinese decision-making, likely leading him to embrace ever-more radical policies in pursuit of ideological purity. As a result, Xi may assume a more combative approach in his dealings with Washington, all while ramping up unannounced inspections and pre-dawn raids of U.S. multinationals operating in China.

Craig Singleton is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and deputy director of FDD’s China Program, where Cate is an intern. For more analysis from Craig and the China Program, please subscribe HERE. Follow Craig on Twitter @CraigMSingleton. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.

Issues:

China

fdd.org · by Jack Sullivan · May 24, 2023

23. The 'New Opium War': America's deadly fentanyl invasion could be China's revenge for 'century of humiliation'

Revenge or an unrestricted warfare line of effort?  Or both?

The 'New Opium War': America's deadly fentanyl invasion could be China's revenge for 'century of humiliation'

China's 19th-century opium addiction crisis blamed on western powers — Communist Party fuels similar crisis in US today

foxnews.com · by Kerry J. Byrne | Fox News

Video

There is a clear recognition that China is the top threat: Elbridge Colby

Former defense official Elbridge Colby gives his take on U.S.-China relations under the Biden administration on 'The Ingraham Angle.'

The United States is losing the New Opium War with China.

Leaders in Washington, D.C. appear unwilling to acknowledge that a fight even exists.

A crisis of addiction in China in the 19th century, reportedly fed by European imperial powers, paved the way for foreign domination and sparked two conflicts called the Opium Wars.

MEET THE AMERICAN WHO EARNED THE MEDAL OF HONOR AND WAS MIA IN KOREA FOR 73 YEARS, CPL. LUTHER HERSCHEL STORY

It marked the depths of a social, cultural and political catastrophe widely known in China today as the "century of humiliation."

Revenge for this lingering insult to China’s national psyche, whether intended or tacit, helps explain America’s deadly opioid crisis today.

The Anglo-Chinese War, also known as the Opium War or the First Opium War, was a series of military engagements fought between Britain and the Qing dynasty between 1839 and 1842. This black-and-white photograph shows two undernourished Chinese men. (Universal History Archive/Universal Images Group via Getty Images)

Fentanyl, a synthetic opioid, is manufactured in Mexico by drug cartels but made with what are known as "precursor chemicals" produced in China.

About 108,000 Americans died of drug overdoses last year, according to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), with two-thirds of those deaths caused by fentanyl.

"China finds fentanyl a profitable export to Mexico with the added benefit it kills 100,000 Americans yearly."

The poison pouring across America’s porous southern border appears to be part of China’s robust multi-front asymmetric war against the United States led by a Communist Party intent on "world domination."

WHAT IS FENTANYL? HERE'S MORE TO KNOW ABOUT THE DANGEROUS DRUG

China "finds fentanyl a profitable export to Mexico with the added benefit [that] it kills 100,000 Americans yearly," military historian Victor Davis Hanson, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, told Fox News Digital.

A homeless man holds a syringe after injecting methamphetamine into his arm on March 13, 2022, in Seattle, Washington. Widespread drug addiction is endemic in Seattle's large homeless community (John Moore/Getty Images)

"So a win/win in the Chinese Communist Party’s eyes."

Fentanyl poisoning is the leading cause of death among adults ages 18 to 45, the CDC reports, killing more Americans in this age group than gun violence, auto accidents, COVID-19 or cancer.

China under the Qing Dynasty, its last imperial rulers, was flooded with opium by Great Britain and other European powers in the mid-1800s, according to commonly reported history.

It created widespread addiction, lawlessness, social strife, family crises, urban decay, the docile malaise of millions and streets filled with sad, emaciated addicts in cities such as Shanghai.

CALIFORNIA TEEN'S DEATH FROM FENTANYL UNDERSCORES DANGERS OF SOCIAL MEDIA DRUG MARKETS

First-hand accounts of China during its opium crisis sound similar to scenes of the ugly impact of opioid addiction found on the streets of many American cities today.

"By 1840 there were 10 million Chinese opium addicts, largely sustained by illegal British imports," according to the National Army Museum in the United Kingdom.

Ray Donovan, then Chief of Operations of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), stands in front of "The Faces of Fentanyl" wall, which displays photos of Americans who died of a fentanyl overdose, at the DEA headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, on July 13, 2022. (Agnes BUN / AFP via Getty Images)

The Qing Dynasty fought back in the two Opium Wars: first against Britain (1839-42) and then against Britain and France (1856-60).

China was soundly defeated. Among other outcomes, it ceded the vast port city of Hong Kong to Britain at the end of the First Opium War. Hong Kong returned to China's dominion in 1997.

"The history of the Opium Wars has cast a long shadow over China’s relations with Western countries like Britain, and also the United States," British scholar Julia Lovell, author of "The Opium War," told Fox News Digital.

"For at least a century, public memory of the First Opium War in China has served as the founding episode of Chinese patriotism."

"For at least a century, public memory of the First Opium War in China has served as the founding episode of Chinese patriotism."

WISCONSIN PARENTS LOSE SON TO FENTANYL, BEG OTHER FAMILIES TO KNOW THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DEADLY DRUG

The Opium Wars had a profound impact on geopolitics here in the 21st century.

The Communist Party rose to power in China after World War II by fomenting anger at foreign powers. The history of the opium crisis proved a powerful tool to tap into Chinese nationalist pride by highlighting the alleged evils of western influence.

The deadly synthetic opiod fentanyl trafficked into the U.S. from Mexico is manufactured largely from precursor chemicals made in China. (iStock/Fox News)

The Opium Wars, in other words, helped communist revolutionaries take control of China after it was freed from its last foreign occupier, Imperial Japan, during World War II.

The United States, ironically in hindsight, liberated occupied China, including major cities Beijing, Nanjing and Shanghai, from Japan during World War II. Tens of thousands of American troops died in the Pacific War that gained China its independence from yet another foreign oppressor.

FENTANYL'S DEATHS OF AMERICA'S YOUNG PEOPLE: ‘IMMINENT THREAT TO OUR SOCIETY’

The sacrifices made by American GIs and their families to end China's "century of humiliation" is largely unmentioned by both the Chinese Communist Party and American academia today.

It ultimately led to the increasingly ominous standoff that now exists between the U.S. and China.

There is no direct evidence that China seeds the fentanyl catastrophe in America in retribution for the Opium Wars.

A billboard put up by Families Against Fentanyl displays their message on the 10 Freeway near Peck Road in El Monte, California, on Thursday, April 6, 2023. Jim Rauh founded Families Against Fentanyl after it claimed the life of his 37-year-old son, Thomas, in 2015. (Paul Bersebach/MediaNews Group/Orange County Register via Getty Images)

"I find that speculative and unlikely," said Lovell. "There would need to be a clear evidence trail for anyone to claim that."

But China is the source of this highly addictive, highly lethal synthetic opioid killing thousands of people each month in the United States.

FENTANYL POISONING'S SURPRISING SIGNS: WHAT PARENTS AND FAMILY MUST KNOW

And this deadly attack on a western rival is consistent with a narrative that’s foundational to the Chinese Communist Party’s existence.

"China is the lead nation for the production of precursor chemicals used to make fentanyl and the Chinese chemical industry is the most unregulated industry in all of China."

The fentanyl crisis is sourced in an industry that conveniently enjoys unusually lax oversight from Chinese leaders.

"China is the lead nation for the production of precursor chemicals used to make fentanyl and the Chinese chemical industry is the most unregulated industry in all of China," Ray Donovan, the recently retired global Chief of Operations for the Drug Enforcement Administration, told Fox News Digital.

A man sleeps in the rain on the edge of the sidewalk and West 43rd Street in Midtown Manhattan on Sunday, Sept. 11, 2022, just two blocks from Times Square. Drug addiction fuels similar scenes in cities around the U.S. (Kerry J. Byrne/Fox News Digital)

"I think if China wants to do more to regulate it, they certainly can. If there was willingness to stop it, they could get ahead of the problem."

Chinese-made chemicals are also the source of the synthetic methamphetamines causing disorder and death in the United States, Donovan said.

The flood of deadly synthetic drugs may be even more sinister than just an effort to make money at the expense of American lives and social welfare.

The entire history of China’s opium crisis may be built on a lie — or, at the very least, a dramatic retelling of history for propaganda purposes.

A political cartoon from the Opium Wars in China in the mid-19th century. Imperial European powers, including Britain and France, were accused of creating widespread addiction by forcing opium into Chinese society. It sparked two conflicts called the Opium Wars in which the Qing Dynasty was easily beaten and led to a 100-year period known in China as the "century of humiliation." (PictHistory/Universal Images Group via Getty Images)

Opium was legal in China and had been imported and even grown there for centuries, Australian scholar Harry G. Gelber wrote in a 2006 Harvard University research paper titled "China as ‘Victim’? The Opium War That Wasn’t."

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The war was fought instead over a variety of other economic disputes, while the treaty ending the First Opium War "did not mention opium," he wrote.

The Opium War was "a brilliantly snappy name that sneakily prejudges the issue in very simple form: While China had done Britain no harm, the British gratuitously invaded China," reported Gelber.

"China only references the Opium War as propaganda to justify post facto this self-interested drug export policy."

Opium "is a mere incident to the dispute, but no more the cause of the war than the throwing overboard of tea in Boston Harbor was the cause of the North American revolution," former President John Quincy Adams wrote in 1841 while serving in Congress after his presidency.

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"China operates on the here and now and what is in its interests; it uses history only for propaganda purposes," said Hanson to Fox News Digital.

"It only references the Opium War as propaganda to justify post facto this self-interested drug export policy."

Kerry J. Byrne is a lifestyle reporter with Fox News Digital.

foxnews.com · by Kerry J. Byrne | Fox News

24. The Green Card Soldier: Between Model Citizen and Security Threat

A very depressing read and really insulting for this to be published on Memorial Day weekend. Yes there are a lot of facts in this piece, but it is the interpretation of those facts to fit an agenda, anti-military and anti-US, that really makes my blood boil.

But perhaps on this Memorial Day we can think about the liberty our fallen military personnel have died to protect -even that speech that we dislike. That is what makes America great - Those who would want to purify what is published and spoken to make everyone "patriots" do not understand American values and the nature of liberty.

But this does a real disservice not only to all those who have fallen in defense of our great nation and the great American experiment but specifically to our immigrant military personnel, so many of whom have sacrificed for our nation.

On the one hand I hate sending this on Memorial Day. But on the other hand this kind of insult needs to be called out. We have to respect the right of the author to publish this drivel (and I absolutely respect her right), but it does not mean we cannot call her out. 

“If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear.”

― George Orwell

“To announce that there must be no criticism of the President, or that we are to stand by the President, right or wrong, is not only unpatriotic and servile, but is morally treasonable to the American public.”

― Theodore Roosevelt

“If freedom of speech is taken away, then dumb and silent we may be led, like sheep to the slaughter.”

― George Washington

“Once a government is committed to the principle of silencing the voice of opposition, it has only one way to go, and that is down the path of increasingly repressive measures, until it becomes a source of terror to all its citizens and creates a country where everyone lives in fear."

[Special Message to the Congress on the Internal Security of the United States, August 8, 1950]”

― Harry S. Truman

“Whoever would overthrow the liberty of a nation must begin by subduing the freeness of speech.”

― Benjamin Franklin, Silence Dogood / The Busy-Body / Early Writings

“There are more instances of the abridgment of the freedom of the people by gradual and silent encroachments of those in power than by violent and sudden usurpations.”

― James Madison

“This is slavery, not to speak one's thought.”

― Euripides, The Phoenician Women

“It’s not unpatriotic to denounce an injustice committed on our behalf, perhaps it’s the most patriotic thing we can do.”

― E.A. Bucchianeri, Brushstrokes of a Gadfly

“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”

― United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Magazine / The Green Card Soldier: Between Model Citizen and Security Threat

The Green Card Soldier: Between Model Citizen and Security Threat

https://nextbigideaclub.com/magazine/green-card-soldier-model-citizen-security-threat-bookbite/42743/

Sofya Aptekar

28 May, 2023

Sofya Aptekar is Associate Professor of Urban Studies at the City University of New York School of Labor and Urban Studies. She holds a PhD in sociology. She also taught sociology and critical ethnic and community studies at University of Massachusetts Boston.

Below, Sofya shares 5 key insights from her new book, The Green Card Soldier: Between Model Citizen and Security Threat. Listen to the audio version—read by Sofya herself—in the Next Big Idea App.

 Up/Down Arrow keys to increase or decrease volume.

1. The US military creates immigrants and then recruits them as workers.

Immigrants have worked in the US military since its founding. With or without US citizenship, immigrants participated in every US war and military campaign. They were drafted, enlisted voluntarily, and have been pushed to enlist both economically and socially. When we consider the long history of immigrants and the US military, we also see immigrants resisting the military draft and organizing against US militarism.

But where do immigrants come from? Although it is common to imagine the United States as a perpetual American Dream magnet, drawing people from all over the world, migration is not a natural or passive process. In too many cases, the US military ravages and displaces communities across the globe, creating immigrants. Then it incorporates these immigrants into the military workforce to do more of the same.

In the early 20th century, the United States maintained a brutal colonial occupation of the Philippines. US forces slaughtered hundreds of thousands of Filipinos. The US military had developed its genocidal tactics in wars against Native American nations. In the Philippines, it honed them on the mass slaughter and oppression of Filipinos. Disruption at this scale, coupled with active recruitment of workers, created a stream of Filipino immigrants to the United States. The US military, particularly the Navy, recruited Filipinos and Filipino immigrants. Hundreds of thousands of Filipinos fought alongside the US military during World War II, but the promise of citizenship and veteran benefits made to them was only partially realized, and not until 50 years later. Today, Filipino immigrants, their children, and their grandchildren continue to work in the US military in disproportionate numbers.

More recently, the United States provided military training to rightwing forces in Central America to violently suppress popular socialist movements. This contributed to mass migrations of people to the United States. Today, the US military actively recruits immigrant youth from Central American immigrant communities. It touts their cultural backgrounds as extra skills they bring as workers in the service of the US imperial project in Latin America and beyond.

2. Military service is supposed to lead to US citizenship but that often doesn’t happen.

Since the Civil War, there has been an expedited track to citizenship available through labor in the military. This does not mean that military service automatically makes you a US citizen. Rather, immigrants have a reduced residency requirement to be eligible for naturalization.

“Thousands of military veterans who were not US citizens have been deported.”

About 150,000 immigrants became US citizens through the military naturalization pathway in the last 20 years. But the road to citizenship is fraught. The fit between the military and immigration systems is poor. For active-duty military workers, especially, it is difficult to go through the naturalization process while working long hours, moving often, and being limited in their ability to leave the military base. In some years, the US government rejected military naturalization applications at higher rates than it did for civilians, usually finding fault on the grounds of good moral character. This could mean committing crimes or committing fraud earlier in the immigration process. Candidates could also be disqualified by an immigration officer for some unspecified moral trait or for being labeled a “habitual drunkard,” or for being part of the Communist Party.

This matters because when immigrants become US citizens, they have protection from deportation, opportunities to sponsor the migration of family members, increased job options, and the right to vote. Being a US military veteran alone does not give one these rights and protections. Thousands of military veterans who were not US citizens have been deported.

3. Celebrating immigrant military workers helps whitewash what the US military does.

Polls show that a rising number of people in the world see US power and influence as a major threat and most Americans say that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were not worth fighting. What’s more, US veterans, whether or not they participated in these wars, say that the costs outweighed the benefits. The work of the US military includes protecting imperial resource extraction, enforcing political regimes benefiting US capital, and expanding and conquering new territory for further exploitation. Inside the United States, the military, militarized law, and immigration enforcement agencies crush popular resistance to resource extraction and white supremacy while maintaining the violence at the border with Mexico.

In this context, US political leaders can point to immigrant soldiers to try to legitimize themselves, the endless wars, and the military itself. Characterized as a choice, foreigners enlisting in the US military at the risk of injury and death makes US military operations seem approved and justified, even by those not born in the United States.

“US political leaders can point to immigrant soldiers to try to legitimize themselves, the endless wars, and the military itself.”

This is not new. During the Korean War in the mid-20th century, the US military took young Japanese Americans who grew up in US concentration camps during World War II and sent them to interrogate prisoners of war. Monica Kim explains how using these young people was meant to show Korean prisoners that the United States was an inclusive place for Asians and a benign force in Korea. Meanwhile, the US military dropped over half a million tons of bombs on Korea, destroying Korean cities. It deployed chemical weapons and napalm. The US military is responsible for the deaths of millions of Koreans.

Some immigrant advocates argue that immigrants deserve rights because immigrants serve in the military. Others push for undocumented youth to be able to enlist—something the Department of Defense also lobbies for. This type of advocacy feeds the US war machine and entrenches imperial violence.

4. Some say that the military helps immigrants assimilate, but there are injuries of assimilation.

The US military is often seen as a meritocratic, color-blind institution. It uses millions of taxpayers’ money to market itself that way. Yet, research shows a racial bias in promotions and military justice, discrimination in deployment assignments, and racial disparities in the risk of PTSD. White supremacist organizations have a significant presence in military ranks. Racism is built into the way the military functions, but the narrative of the military as an institution that repairs the racism of the US society is strong. The military assimilates immigrants into racial and gender hierarchies. Even when immigrants see military labor as a way to belong and become successful in the United States, they incur the costs of assuming their place in the hierarchy. These are what I call the injuries of assimilation.

Women in the military face sexual violence. Immigrant women are even more vulnerable. Heena, an immigrant from Nepal, enlisted in a desperate quest to survive financially. She explained what it was like to be the only woman in her training unit. Heena’s coworkers made unwanted sexual advances, told her she was unqualified for the job, and made misogynist jokes. Heena felt like she had to represent all women in the military, singlehandedly changing perceptions of women soldiers. Heena could not rely on the culture of male comradeship that structures military units—battle buddies who have each other’s back. At best she was a conditional member of her unit, having to prove herself. Rape culture and racialized misogyny are not unique to the military, but military contracts make the job difficult to leave and victims are isolated from supportive social networks. When they come forward, they are blamed and punished.

“What is labeled as service in the US military is physically and mentally harmful work.”

Immigrants in the military deal with suspicions of their loyalty and bear the burden of always having to prove themselves. When Heena broke her hip jumping from an airplane and had to take a break from intense physical training while it healed, she remembered being pushed to recover faster. She was told that the military could not keep her while injured. Despite the MRI that clearly showed her fractured hip, Heena’s commanding officer accused her of faking it. As an immigrant, Heena was suspected of only caring about getting US citizenship. Heena was still in pain when she decided to start jumping again, and she went on to break both ankles and a wrist.

What is labeled as service in the US military is physically and mentally harmful work. Military workers suffer from physical injuries to the body and brain, exposure to harmful substances, and deep psychological wounds. In a myriad of ways, their very work supports a violent global order enforced by the US military. The price of assimilation into US society is participation in the oppression and exclusion of others. This leaves a mark on the humanity of military workers and those of us whom the US military supposedly protects.

5. Green card soldiers are not simply victims.

Immigrants in the military are harmed by their labor. Yet, we must not think of them only as victims to be rescued. Immigrants are navigating intersecting systems of oppression that span the globe. Their experiences differ tremendously depending on how they fit into hierarchies of race, class, gender, sexuality, and other social dimensions.

The military labor force faces racist, misogynist, and dangerous work conditions, but military labor is not just another job. Even though many are pushed into the military by hardships and influenced by intense marketing campaigns that target children, military workers do bear responsibility for what the US military does. But so do US civilians in whose name the US military supposedly operates. As individuals, we should consider our responsibility and complicity, keeping in mind the limits of individual action while acting with moral conviction.

Among the first US military casualties of the War on Terror were immigrants. But immigrant military workers were also among the first resisters to the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Camilo Mejía was a working-class immigrant who enlisted in the military in search of financial stability and in hopes of finding a place for himself in US society. Camilo became the first soldier to refuse a deployment to Iraq. In the course of his eight years in the military, and after witnessing the bloody work of imperialism firsthand, Mejía came to see “the absolute clarity of the wrongfulness not only of the war against Iraq, but of war in general.” As he wrote in his memoir, Road from ar Ramadi, Mejía fought his own war. In his words, it was a “war against the system I had come from, a battle against the military machine, the imperial dragon that devours its own soldiers and Iraqi civilians alike for the sake of profits.”

Mejía publicly decried the way US soldiers were treated as disposable tools of the empire. They were tools of the torture, mass murder, and racism directed at Iraqis. Mejía’s act of moral courage carried the risk of losing his lawful permanent residency and foreclosing his path to US citizenship. Mejía went on to become an outspoken critic and organizer against US imperialism while living with uncertainty about his future in the United States.

​

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com