Quotes of the Day:

“Someplace between apathy and anarchy is the stance of the thinking human being; he does embrace a cause, he does take a position, and he can't allow it to become business as usual. Humanity is our business.”

– Rod Serling.

“Putting people first has always been America’s secret weapon. It’s the way we’ve kept the spirit of our revolutions alive, a spirit that drives us to dream and dare, and take great risks for a greater good.”

– Ronald Reagan

"A sign of intelligence is an awareness of one's own ignorance."

– Niccolo Machiavelli

1. Joint Declaration of the Ninth ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Summit

2. China Courts U.S.’s Top Asian Allies on Trade, but Will It Succeed?

3. Why NATO matters By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

4. North Korea drops balloons carrying trash in South

5. Quick Take: North Korea Jabs at China in Reaction to Trilateral Summit

6. Rare spat shows China, North Korea still at odds on nuclear weapons

7. Another Failed Satellite Launch at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station - Beyond Parallel

8. The North Korean and Chinese Threats Are Growing. But so Is the Trilateral Response.

9. Beijing’s nearest security threat isn’t in Taipei – it’s in North Korea

10. South Korean province awakes to North Korea ‘air raid’ alarm

11.  N. Korea sends over 260 balloons carrying trash into S. Korea: Seoul military

12. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Regime hands out rice to rural food-short households, “Pay back in the fall with 30% interest”

13. N. Korean leader slams S. Korea's show of force against Pyongyang's satellite launch

14. S. Korea mulls suit against N. Korea in case of Pyongyang's full-scale use of Kaesong complex

15. Young N. Koreans want to watch hit S. Korean movie "Exhuma"

1. Joint Declaration of the Ninth ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Summit

 I can see why north Korea is upset with this statement (note reference to denuclearization, though somewhat watered down compared to the past statement in 2019 which was slightly stronger.). Did China throw north Korea under the bus - or at least give it a gentle push?

I can make the case that "political settlement" of the Korean peninsula issue can be interpreted as support for peaceful unification in accordance with paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice that calls on nations to support the political settlement of the "Korea question." The Korea question refers to the unnatural division of the peninsula. 

Excerpt: 

"35. We reaffirmed that maintaining peace, stability and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia serves our common interest and is our common responsibility. We reiterated positions on regional peace and stability, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the abductions issue, respectively. We agree to continue to make positive efforts for the political settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue."

Joint Declaration of the Ninth ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Summit | News > Briefing Room

eng.president.go.kr · by Office of the President

Joint Declaration of the Ninth ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Summit

1. President of the Republic of Korea Yoon Suk Yeol, Prime Minister of Japan Kishida Fumio, and Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Li Qiang convened in Seoul, Republic of Korea on May 27, 2024, on the occasion of the Ninth Trilateral Summit.

2. Recalling that this year marks the 25th anniversary of the trilateral cooperation, we shared the view that the previous eight Trilateral Summits held since 2008 and the establishment of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) in 2011 have laid a solid foundation for institutionalizing the trilateral cooperation. We reaffirmed our commitment to implementation of the Trilateral Cooperation Vision for the Next Decade adopted at the Eighth Trilateral Summit. We appreciated that the trilateral cooperation has deepened in various areas, benefiting the three countries and peoples and positioning itself as a meaningful platform for regional cooperation.

3. We reaffirmed our commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and to an international order based on the rule of law and international law. In this context, we shared the importance for states to abide by their commitments under the international law and agreements among states.

4. We shared the view that the Ninth Trilateral Summit carries valuable meaning for revitalizing the trilateral cooperation. Japan and the People’s Republic of China expressed appreciation for the Republic of Korea’s efforts as the chair country to bring the trilateral cooperation on track in close collaboration with Japan and the People’s Republic of China.

5. Recognizing that the Republic of Korea, Japan and the People’s Republic of China are neighboring countries sharing everlasting history and infinite future with significant potentials for cooperation across multiple domains, we concurred on the following, but not limited to, three directions in developing the trilateral cooperation:

6. First, we will strive to institutionalize the trilateral cooperation by holding the Trilateral Summit and Ministerial meetings on a regular basis, and continue to promote the capacity-building of the TCS.

7. Second, recognizing that the support of the peoples of the three countries constitutes an important driving force for deepening the trilateral cooperation, we will make efforts to ensure that peoples of the three countries can enjoy substantive benefits emanating from this cooperation.

8. To this end, we will identify and implement mutually-beneficial cooperation projects centered on six key areas closely related to the everyday lives of the peoples: people-to-people exchanges; sustainable development including through climate change response; economic cooperation and trade; public health and ageing society; science and technology cooperation, digital transformation; and disaster relief and safety. In particular, we will seek to deepen the bonds of cooperation in the field of exchanges between future generations, as we share the view that such exchanges are crucial in consolidating a long-term basis for the trilateral cooperation.

9. Third, we will promote ‘Trilateral+X Cooperation’ to ensure that the benefits of the trilateral cooperation extend to other countries so that the three countries can prosper together with other regions.

10. With this in mind, we decided the following:

Institutionalization of the Trilateral Cooperation

11. Recalling that the three countries decided to hold the Trilateral Summit on a regular basis through the Joint Statement for Tripartite Partnership adopted at the First Trilateral Summit and reaffirmed this through the Joint Declaration for Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia adopted at the Sixth Trilateral Summit, we reaffirm the need to hold the Trilateral Summit and the Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on a regular basis without hiatus in order to further advance the trilateral cooperation. We reiterate that promoting the institutionalization of the trilateral cooperation enhances the respective bilateral relations and fosters peace, stability, and prosperity in the Northeast Asian region and helps to promote a world in which countries, big or small, could be universally benefited.

12. Furthermore, we will strengthen substantive trilateral cooperation through inter-governmental consultative mechanisms such as high-level meetings and Ministerial Meetings in areas including education, culture, tourism, sports, trade, public health and agriculture. In doing so, we commit to working closely together to ensure that our peoples enjoy the tangible benefits of the trilateral cooperation.

Trilateral Cooperation Projects for the Peoples of the Three Countries

13. (People-to-People Exchanges) Noting the need to revitalize people-to-people exchanges so as to foster mutual understanding and trust, we concur on the importance of enhancing amity and friendship by facilitating exchanges between peoples from all walks of life, especially future generations, thereby paving the way to strengthen the foundation of future trilateral cooperation. Also, we strive to increase the number of people-to-people exchanges among the three countries to 40 million by 2030 through promoting exchange including culture, tourism and education.

14. Recognizing the importance of cooperation in the education sector in promoting exchanges between future generations, we appreciate the exemplary role of CAMPUS Asia, an inter-university exchange program initiated in 2011, which has expanded to encompass universities in ASEAN member states. We note that the program has garnered the participation of 15,000 university students, and will actively support this project with the goal of having 30,000 students by the end of 2030.

15. We share the view that fostering exchanges and friendship among teenagers and youths of the three countries will serve as an important initial step towards shaping a brighter future for the trilateral cooperation. To this end, we will continue various exchange programs, including the ROK-Japan-China Children’s Story Exchange Programme, the Junior Sports Exchange Meet, the Trilateral Youth Camp, and the Joint Training Program for Young Public Servants. Furthermore, we value the efforts of the TCS in conducting various youth exchange projects, including the Trilateral Youth Summit, the Young Ambassador Program, and the Trilateral Rural Young Leaders’ Exchange Program.

16. Recognizing that culture plays a bridging role in connecting the peoples of the three countries, we will continue to expand platforms through which our peoples can cultivate a sense of shared understanding and interact with each other through such initiatives as the Culture City of East Asia, the Trilateral Arts Festival, and the Trilateral Cultural Content Industry Forum. We will also designate 2025-2026 as the Year of Cultural Exchange among the three countries.

17. Welcoming the launch of the Trilateral Visionary Group initiated by the TCS bringing together eminent figures from the three countries, we look forward to the constructive work and proposal to be issued for further improving the trilateral process. We support the Network of Trilateral Cooperation Think-Tanks to upgrade its relevance in trilateral cooperation. We also share the view that public diplomacy plays an important role in enhancing mutual understanding and deepening friendship among the peoples of the three countries.

18. (Sustainable Development including through Climate Change Response) We reaffirm our commitment to achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the importance of building a future of peace and prosperity where people live in harmony with the planet. We recognize the need to work together in transitioning toward a net zero greenhouse gases emissions/carbon neutrality, green economy and society. Welcoming that the 24th Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting in November 2023 adopted a Joint Communique, we will continue our cooperation on eight priority areas. We also welcome that the 4th Trilateral Ministerial Meeting on Water Resources in May 2024 adopted a Joint Statement, which reaffirms the commitment of trilateral water cooperation to address climate change and build a resilient water infrastructure.

19. We will take solid action and support efforts to achieve the Paris Agreement temperature goal to address the climate crisis in this critical decade, and we will come forward with ambitious next Nationally Determined Contributions, reflecting the outcome of the first global stocktake. We will also contribute to global efforts toward clean, sustainable and affordable energy transitions through various pathways.

20. Through the ‘Trilateral+X Cooperation’ framework, we will collaborate with Mongolia on reducing dust and sandstorms in East Asia. We will promote collaboration on marine environmental conservation to achieve sustainability of the ocean for future generations. We will work together towards the ambition to complete the work of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution at its fifth session (INC-5) which will be held in Busan, Republic of Korea, in November 2024.

21. Recognizing our commitment to end illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which is one of the most serious threats to the conservation and sustainable use of marine living resources, we will carry out robust and effective measures to prevent, deter, and eliminate IUU fishing through various tools. We commit to the swift, full and effective implementation of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF).

22. (Economic Cooperation and Trade) We share the recognition that joint efforts in the economic and trade field among the three countries play a significant role for the prosperity and stability of the regional and global economy. We will endeavor to narrow the regional development gap and achieve common development.

23. We reaffirm our support for the open, transparent, inclusive, non-discriminatory and rules-based multilateral trading system, with the World Trade Organization (WTO) at its core. We commit to reforming and strengthening all WTO functions, including having a fully and well-functioning dispute settlement system by 2024. We call on all WTO members to support the Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) on the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement to be incorporated into the legal framework and commit to working towards the prompt conclusion of negotiations on the JSI on E-commerce.

24. Affirming the importance of ensuring implementation in a transparent, smooth and effective manner of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement as the basis of a Trilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA), we will keep discussions for speeding up negotiations for a Trilateral FTA, aiming at realizing a free, fair, comprehensive, high-quality, and mutually beneficial FTA with its own value. Reaffirming that RCEP is an open and inclusive regional engagement, we encourage the RCEP Joint Committee to accelerate the discussion on the accession procedures of new membership to RCEP.

25. We will continue to work to ensure a global level playing field to foster a free, open, fair, non-discriminatory, transparent, inclusive, and predictable trade and investment environment. We also reaffirm our commitment to keeping markets open and strengthening supply chain cooperation and avoiding supply chain disruptions. We share the need to continue communication in the field of export control. We welcome the Trilateral Entrepreneurs Forum to be held in 2024. We will continue to encourage local-level cooperation and enhance cooperative platforms including the Yellow Sea Rim Economic and Technology Exchange Conference.

26. Acknowledging the importance of promoting the regional financial cooperation, we welcome the progress made in ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ Meetings, in particular the endorsement of the establishment of the Rapid Financing Facility with the incorporation of eligible freely usable currencies as its currencies of choice, under the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM). We also welcome the progress on other initiatives under the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office, the Asian Bond Markets Initiative and the Disaster Risk Financing. We reaffirm our commitment and support to enhance the effectiveness of the CMIM for the regional financial safety net and task our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to explore more robust financing structures and actively discuss various financing structure options with each other as well as with the ASEAN countries.

27. We plan to leverage the ASEAN+3 Cooperation Fund to support startups, such as by hosting an information exchange symposium for startups from the three countries and the ASEAN member states. We recognize the importance of the implementation of the ASEAN +3 Leaders’ Statement on Developing of Electric Vehicle Ecosystem.

28. Noting that, at the 23rd Trilateral Intellectual Property Offices (TRIPO) Heads Meeting among the Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO), the Japan Patent Office (JPO), and the China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA), the three countries concurred on expanding the scope of cooperation to encompass new technology sectors and extending our cooperation in pursuit of ‘Trilateral+X IP Cooperation’, we adopted the Joint Statement on a 10 Year Vision for Trilateral IP Cooperation on the occasion of this summit.

29. (Public Health and Ageing Society) Recognizing the critical role of trilateral cooperation in the health field, including cooperation in response to emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, we adopted the Joint Statement on Future Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response on the occasion of this summit. In line with the outcome reached at the 16th Trilateral Health Ministers’ Meeting in December 2023, we are determined to enhance our collaboration in managing health emergencies including infectious diseases, among the national public health agencies for disease control in the three countries, such as through the Korea-Japan-China Communicable Disease Control and Prevention Forum and Joint Symposium.

30. Furthermore, we will jointly tackle our common challenges facing low birth rate, and the ageing society. Through the exchange between the governments and experts of the three countries, we concur on sharing policy expertise in promoting healthy ageing, including regarding our experience in the fields of technological development, personnel training, medical and long-term care, and income security, with a view to achieving and sustaining universal health coverage.

31. (Science and Technology Cooperation, Digital Transformation) Recognizing the growing importance of cooperation in science and technology, including Artificial Intelligence (AI), we will strive to resume the Trilateral Science and Technology Ministers’ Meeting and the Trilateral ICT Ministers’ Meeting.

32. We note the need to promptly address the possible impacts of AI on the daily lives of humanity, and the importance of mutual communication on AI. We also note the government of the Republic of Korea’s contribution to establishing global governance aimed at ensuring safe, secure, trustworthy, innovative, inclusive, and responsible AI by hosting the AI Seoul Summit in May.

33. Sharing the importance of the cooperation in science and innovation to improve our research capacity and the competitiveness of the industrial technology, we recognize the importance of academic exchanges among researchers from the three countries as well as joint research and development in areas such as green and low-carbon society.

34. (Disaster Relief and Safety) We will foster a safer environment for the peoples of the three countries through the resumption of the Trilateral Ministerial Meeting on Disaster Management and the Trilateral Counter-Terrorism Consultation mechanism in due course. Acknowledging the importance of women’s participation and leadership in disaster response and damage mitigation, we will enhance the trilateral cooperation related to the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, including through dialogue with ASEAN member states. Furthermore, we will strengthen cooperation through the Trilateral Meeting on Police Cooperation to prevent and crack down on transboundary crimes, including fraud and drug-related crimes.

Regional and International Peace, and Prosperity

35. We reaffirmed that maintaining peace, stability and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia serves our common interest and is our common responsibility. We reiterated positions on regional peace and stability, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the abductions issue, respectively. We agree to continue to make positive efforts for the political settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue.

36. Recognizing that the trilateral cooperation has developed in close partnership with the ASEAN, we concur on the need to continue to expand the trilateral cooperation in the context of ASEAN frameworks such as the ASEAN+3 (APT), the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). We also express our strong support for ASEAN centrality and unity. We appreciate the Lao People’s Democratic Republic’s efforts as the ASEAN Chair of 2024.

37. As important countries responsible for peace, stability and prosperity in Asia, we renew our determination to engage in close communication not only within the trilateral framework but also in the multilateral frameworks where all three countries participate, such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), given that the three countries are serving as members of the UNSC in 2024. In this context, we will work together for the successful hosting of the 2025 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders’ Meeting in the Republic of Korea. We also support the hosting of the Expo 2025, Osaka, Kansai, Japan, and the 9th Asian Winter Games Harbin 2025 in China.

38. We look forward to the hosting of the Tenth Trilateral Summit by Japan.

eng.president.go.kr · by Office of the President

2. China Courts U.S.’s Top Asian Allies on Trade, but Will It Succeed?

Short answer: No. At least current leadership in the ROK and Japan will not succumb to Chinese political warfare. 

China Courts U.S.’s Top Asian Allies on Trade, but Will It Succeed?

China’s premier meets leaders of Japan and South Korea, but the rare summit yields no concrete initiatives

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/china-courts-u-s-s-top-asian-allies-on-trade-but-will-it-succeed-ac287b85?mod=Searchresults_pos5&page=1

By Dasl Yoon

Follow in Seoul, Brian Spegele

Follow in Beijing and Chieko Tsuneoka

Follow in Tokyo

Updated May 27, 2024 11:55 am ET

Chinese Premier Li Qiang leaving Seoul on Monday after attending trilateral meetings. PHOTO: LEE JIN-MAN/ASSOCIATED PRESS

China sought to drive a wedge on trade between the U.S. and its Asian allies, using a rare exchange with the leaders of Japan and South Korea to champion a multipolar world without economic discrimination.

Chinese Premier Li Qiang, on a two-day visit to Seoul, touted the merits of harmonizing economic ties between the three Asian countries, as Washington has moved to raise tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and curb China’s high-tech ambitions. Chinese leader Xi Jinping carried a similar message on his recent trip to Europe.

“We should resolve suspicions and misunderstandings through honest dialogue, uphold bilateral relations with a spirit of strategic autonomy, promote a multipolar world and oppose bloc confrontation and factionalism,” Li said at a joint news conference on Monday. 

1:20

Paused

0:00

/

2:45

TAP FOR SOUND

French President Emmanuel Macron confronted Xi Jinping on China’s trade practices and for supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine during the Chinese leader’s visit to Paris. Photo: Mohammed Badra/AFP/Getty

For all the overtures toward cooperation, Japan and South Korea, like Europe, have limitations in drawing economically closer to China—even if the prevalence of U.S. tariffs brings some shared irritation. 

In a joint statement, the three leaders pledged to hold regular trilateral meetings and to cooperate on trade and clean-energy efforts. They also said they would promote people-to-people exchanges through tourism and education.

Despite China’s calls to avoid protectionism, the three countries didn’t reach any concrete initiatives to that end. Instead, they agreed to “continue communication in the field of export control.”

China ranks as the top trading partner for both Japan and South Korea, with their economic fates tied together on everything from semiconductors to electric vehicles. But in recent years, Seoul and Tokyo have hit new heights in their security and political bonds with Washington. Of the few world leaders to receive a state visit during President Biden’s time in office, two are Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, in glasses, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Chinese Premier Li Qiang held a summit on Monday. PHOTO: KYODONEWS/ZUMA PRESS

Monday’s trilateral meeting was the first such get-together between China, Japan and South Korea since December 2019. 

China’s primary concern has been discouraging South Korea and Japan from imposing further restrictions on exports to China, amid the intensifying trade rivalry between Washington and Beijing. The resumption of high-level talks mark progress, but China will continue to face limitations in convincing the U.S. allies to pursue more robust trade ties with Beijing, analysts say.

“China hopes to use the trilateral summit to prevent two of its erstwhile regional partners from drifting too far into Washington’s orbit,” said Jeremy Chan, a senior analyst at Eurasia Group, a political-risk consulting firm. 

The U.S. recently applied tariffs to $18 billion in products from China including EV batteries and semiconductors. Keeping with tradition, Li, who is responsible for day-to-day management of China’s economy, was dispatched in place of Xi, reinforcing Beijing’s message that it prefers to focus on business and trade rather than security issues. 

Li, Yoon and Kishida said they would accelerate negotiations for a first-ever trilateral free-trade agreement, which have been stalled since 2019. 

Even amid the diplomatic niceties of cooperation and partnership, the three countries’ deep differences on military and security matters bubbled to the surface. 

In separate statements, Yoon and Kishida called on North Korea to refrain from launching a military satellite, which Pyongyang had given advance notice about to Tokyo hours before the trilateral summit. Such a test violates United Nations Security Council resolutions. Li didn’t comment on North Korea’s plans, but urged “relevant parties” to exercise restraint. 

China, Japan and South Korea on Monday held the first summit between the three countries since 2019. PHOTO: JEON HEON-KYUN/POOL/SHUTTERSTOCK

Hours after Li and Kishida left Seoul late Monday evening, North Korea carried out a satellite launch from its main spaceport on the country’s west coast, Pyongyang’s state media reported. The rocket’s newly developed engine and oxidants appeared to have malfunctioned during the initial stage of the satellite launch, it added. South Korea’s military had detected a rocket breaking into fragments over North Korean waters.

In addition, Kishida, in a bilateral meeting with Li on Sunday, conveyed that Japan was closely monitoring relevant developments, including military activities, across the Taiwan Strait, calling it “extremely important” for the international community. Days earlier, China kick-started large-scale combat drills around Taiwan. Li said Taiwan is at the core of China’s interests, according to the state-run Xinhua News Agency.

Japan and South Korea can’t explicitly align with China against U.S. tariffs because it could hurt their political relationship with Washington, but the trilateral indirectly shows that unilateral policies from Washington can push its allies closer to Beijing, said Tongfi Kim, a research professor in Asian geopolitics at the Brussels School of Governance. 

“The allies’ dependence on U.S. military protection will limit their autonomy in the economic sphere, but Washington cannot expect the allies to comply with its demands blindly,” he said. 

China has repeatedly warned against NATO’s expansion into the Asia-Pacific as the group plans to set up a liaison office in Tokyo and has invited Japan and South Korea, non-NATO partners, to summits. On Sunday, Li warned Seoul against politicizing trade and economic issues.   

One potential area for collaboration is a three-way free-trade agreement. Talks first kicked off in 2012, though had stalled in recent years. 

Past efforts to pursue an agreement never got off the ground and striking deals that would go beyond light commitments are even more complicated in the current environment, said Wendy Cutler, vice president at the Asia Society Policy Institute. 

“The U.S. will be counting on its two allies not to undermine their robust economic security agenda with Washington by embracing requests from China in the technology space in particular,” Cutler said. 

But even as the U.S. cultivates stronger political ties with Tokyo and Seoul, businesses in both Korea and Japan share some common ground with the Chinese in that they all stand to lose from higher U.S. tariffs and investment restrictions. In a Sunday evening meeting with Samsung’s head, Lee Jae-yong, Li encouraged South Korean businesses including the conglomerate to expand investment in China. The Korean tech giant has faced challenges in navigating U.S. export controls to cut Beijing’s access to advanced chips. 

Japan is eager to maintain conventional supply chains with China, although it shares U.S. concerns over supplying advanced chips to Beijing, and will look to secure Chinese components “in a way that wouldn’t get on America’s nerves,” said Yorizumi Watanabe, a former Japanese diplomat and president of Fuji Women’s University.

The three sides seem content on using their meeting to signal the resumption of regular communications by committing to cooperation on common challenges, said Patricia M. Kim, a China foreign-policy expert at Brookings Institution, a think tank based in Washington, D.C. 

“No one has any illusions that the lines of alignment in northeast Asia will be redrawn through this summit or anytime soon,” Kim said. 

Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com, Brian Spegele at Brian.Spegele@wsj.com and Chieko Tsuneoka at chieko.Tsuneoka@wsj.com

3. Why NATO matters By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Dr. Hooker served on the National Security Staff in the Trump administration. A different (and positive) perspective toward NATO than other Trump administration officials (Colby and Miller) have toward the ROK/US alliance. I could take the four topics below and write the same things about the ROK/US and Japan/US alliances (changing "Russia is still a threat" to "China and north Korea are real threats"). I will be looking for the Atlantic Council experts to write similar articles about Asian alliances.

Topics covered:

Economic, political, and military benefits

Allies shoulder a fair share of the burden

The US military is still indispensable to transatlantic security

Russia is still a threat

Why NATO matters

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

atlanticcouncil.org · by dhojnacki · May 28, 2024

The 2024 US presidential election will be, among other things, a referendum on the United States’ continued role in NATO. With a combined population of more than nine hundred million people and $1.3 trillion dollars in defense spending, NATO is by far the largest, oldest, and most capable defensive alliance in the world. Increasingly, however, some argue that years of “underinvestment” in defense by NATO allies justify US disengagement or even withdrawal from the Alliance. Others see China as the “pacing” threat and argue that a wealthy and populous Europe should be left to provide for its own security. In this context, why does NATO still matter?

NATO matters to the United States because Europe does. Today, the European Union (EU) is the world’s largest trading bloc and largest trader of manufactured goods and services, ranking first in both inbound and outbound international investments. The European Union (EU) is the top trading partner for eighty countries, a statistic greatly magnified with the addition of the United Kingdom, Turkey, Norway, Switzerland, and other partners who are not EU members. (By comparison, the United States is the top trading partner for around twenty countries.) Except for energy, Europe imports more from developing countries than the United States, Canada, Japan, and China combined. Trade does not thrive amid war and instability, and NATO has been an indispensable component of international peace and the backbone of US national security since 1949. The Alliance is second only to nuclear deterrence as a guarantor of peace in Europe and a major force for global stability. Looking forward, however, NATO cannot stand on its past record. For the United States to continue as its leader and most important ally, the Alliance must be seen to serve US national interests in a direct and consequential way.

Economic, political, and military benefits

The US-Europe relationship is crucial to US prosperity. The EU and the United States, two of the three largest economies in the world, are each other’s largest trading partners in goods and services. The US-EU economic partnership is the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world, accounting for more than 4 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), while US goods and services trade with the EU totaled an estimated $1.2 trillion in 2023, 25 percent more than US goods trade with China. The US-EU trade and investment relationship is the largest in the world, with four times more US foreign direct investment than with Asia-Pacific countries. According to the US Chamber of Commerce, “no two other regions in the world are as deeply integrated as the US and Europe.” The loss or disruption of these trade relations would have an immediate and drastic impact on the US and global economies.

The benefits of close transatlantic ties also play out politically. Nuclear powers France and the United Kingdom join the United States as permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council to balance out China and Russia. And European support in the UN General Assembly and in international organizations, such as the Group of Seven (G7), the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, plays a critical role in advancing democracy and the rule of law. In the global competition between democratic and autocratic states, Europe is a vital player, often aligning with US interests and supporting US efforts to maintain a stable international system. As a community with a shared commitment to human rights, representative democracy, and the rule of law, the transatlantic region represents a bulwark against a rising tide of autocracy that threatens these ideals everywhere.

These shared values and close relationships have undergirded key European actors’ provision of materiel and assistance in numerous US-led operations, even when European interests were not directly affected. In the Gulf War in 1990, for example, NATO allies France, Italy, Canada, Turkey, and the United Kingdom each contributed in critical ways to the coalition. In humanitarian operations in Somalia in 1992 and 1993, initiated in the waning days of President George H. W. Bush’s administration, Italy, France, Belgium, and Canada provided large military contingents. The Afghanistan intervention following 9/11 was a NATO-led operation with the participation of nineteen NATO allies, which suffered more than one thousand troops killed in action. In Iraq beginning in 2003, seventeen NATO allies contributed troops and civilian aid workers, as well as financial assistance totaling in the billions of dollars. A total of twenty-three allies participated in the NATO Training Mission-Iraq from 2004 to 2011, while its successor, the NATO Mission Iraq, continues to this day. When the United States finds itself compelled to use force “out of area,” NATO allies often join in as important members of US-led coalitions.

Allies shoulder a fair share of the burden

Today, the Alliance includes thirty-one of the United States’ thirty-seven treaty allies (excluding Latin American states covered by the 1947 Rio Treaty). Japan, Australia, and South Korea are both NATO global partners and bilateral US allies. NATO allies and official partners together constitute almost 70 percent of the GDP and military power on the planet, far more than China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea combined. Although often criticized for lagging defense spending, European NATO allies are this year expected to spend $380 billion, or 2 percent of their collective GDP, on defense. (Even on a war footing, Russia spent $120 billion last year on defense). Since 2014, NATO’s European allies and Canada have spent more than six hundred billion dollars in increased defense spending over that year’s baseline military budgets. This includes an 11 percent increase in 2023 alone. While some readiness shortfalls persist, the “free rider” narrative has little basis in fact. The United States’ NATO allies are shouldering a fair share of the spending burden.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine—the largest outbreak of major-theater war in Europe since 1945—also illustrates Europe’s actual and potential contributions to regional security and international stability. Since February 2022, the EU has contributed more than $101 billion in financial, military, humanitarian, and refugee assistance to Ukraine, with another $54 billion on the way. (Actual US assistance to date totals $107 billion). Non-EU members Britain and Norway added an additional $15.2 billion and $5.2 billion, respectively.

In the opening stages of the conflict, immediate assistance in the form of anti-tank and short-range air defense weapons, along with small arms and artillery ammunition, played a crucial role in helping Ukraine stave off the massive Russian invasion. Since then, European allies have provided main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, howitzers, rocket artillery, high-altitude air defense, fighter aircraft, and secure communications systems to stiffen Ukraine’s defense against a much larger and stronger adversary. Intelligence sharing and “train the trainer” programs also represent major contributions. On a per capita basis, allies such as Poland, Norway, and the Baltic States have contributed significantly more than the United States, highlighting their resolve and commitment. NATO has been critical in coordinating allies’ aid to Ukraine.

The Alliance’s value as the principal security provider for the transatlantic community has only increased in recent months with the addition of Sweden and Finland. They bring with them effective and technologically advanced militaries, backed up by large reserve forces and comprehensive and resilient home defense. Both have increased defense spending dramatically in recent years: since 2020, Sweden has nearly doubled its defense budget, which will exceed 2 percent of its GDP this year. In the same time frame, Finnish defense spending has increased by 70 percent and is projected to reach 2.3 percent of its GDP in 2024. In geostrategic terms, NATO’s posture in the High North and in the Baltic Sea is materially enhanced by the accession of Sweden and Finland, which together with Norway and Denmark, constitute a strong regional bloc with a landmass larger than the rest of NATO’s European allies combined.

The US military is still indispensable to transatlantic security

Increases in European defense spending and new, powerful members encourage some critics to argue that Europe can stand alone without US presence and leadership. While European allies possess impressive capabilities in some categories, the US military remains indispensable to transatlantic security. Collective action across thirty-one parliaments and polities can be both fractious and ineffective without strong and consistent US leadership. In areas like strategic airlift and sealift, long-range fires, offensive cyber capacity, space-based communications and surveillance, amphibious assault platforms, tankers, nuclear-powered supercarriers and attack submarines, the United States remains by far the sole or dominant provider. Though the majority of US military power is focused away from Europe, in-place forces under US European Command or based on the eastern seaboard are formidable, contributing greatly to deterrence and defense.

The US contribution to European security is even greater in the nuclear realm. While US conventional capabilities are critical to transatlantic security, the US nuclear umbrella remains the most important guarantor of security and stability in the North Atlantic region. Should it be withdrawn, it is unlikely that European states could provide or develop credible alternatives. Russian nuclear forces dwarf those of France and the United Kingdom, which are unlikely to extend their limited nuclear assets to cover neighbors. Domestic opposition, long lead times, and the high costs involved, as well as Russian intimidation, suggest that developing nuclear weapons by nonnuclear states like Germany is also improbable. In short, without an assured US nuclear guarantee, a transatlantic security architecture is no longer viable and the prospects for renewed Russian aggression increase exponentially.

Russia is still a threat

Two years into its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and resulting Western sanctions, the Russian economy is actually expanding, while leaky international sanctions and support from China, Iran, and others continue to prop up Russian industry and economic performance. Despite heavy casualties, the Russian military continues to put growing numbers into uniform and into the field, while ramping up the production of military equipment and munitions. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ambitions to restore Russian imperial greatness and recover lost Russian territories are well-documented, regularly communicated by his closest advisers, and apparently endorsed by a majority of Russians.

The threat of Russian aggression expanding to additional countries is real. As Mark Rutte, the current Dutch prime minister and likely next NATO secretary general, has said, “If we were to accept for one moment that Putin could be successful in Ukraine, that he would get Kyiv, that he would get the whole country, it won’t end there. History has taught us that.” Should the war in Ukraine subside into yet another frozen conflict, the Russian military will regroup and rebuild its forces. Across NATO, fear of a vengeful Russia, angry over Western support for Ukraine and determined to recover its former territories, is palpable—and with good reason. After Russian aggression in Georgia in 2008, in Crimea and the Donbas in 2014, and against all of Ukraine in 2022, the West cannot afford to assume that future Russian behavior will moderate.

Capable of coping with Russia and China

Important voices today also argue that the United States lacks the capacity to deal with both China and Russia and that Europe should therefore be left to itself. In fact, the US military presence in Europe in no way prevents the ability to deter or defend against Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region. Only a small fraction of US forces is based in Europe, while the bulk of US military strength is available to deter or confront the threat from China. Should China seek to expand its territory through force, allies and partners such as India, South Korea, Vietnam, Japan, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines together represent a powerful potential coalition to counter Chinese aggression. Wavering US commitment in Europe would send a worrying signal to these countries. There are few strategic outcomes from the Ukraine war that China would value more than the fracturing of transatlantic cohesion and the NATO Alliance. Working with allies and partners is the United States’ best route to coping with both China and Russia simultaneously.

In a challenging world, NATO provides real economic, political, and military strength that enables the United States to confront serious threats elsewhere, while still securing vital US interests in Europe. It does so at bargain rates, with only 5 percent of US defense spending going to Europe and NATO. These relationships confer a broad range of benefits on the United States, including basing and overflight rights; intelligence sharing, diplomatic, economic, and military support; and a united front in support of democratic values and the stability of the international system. The benefits to the United States are clear and unmistakable, while the risks of withdrawal are profound. And the US public agrees: A strong majority, 78 percent, of Americans said the United States should increase or maintain its commitment to NATO, according to a poll last year by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

The United States supports and leads NATO not out of altruism, but because it is manifestly in its interest to do so. US national security and economic prosperity depend on it. To pull out from NATO would mean the end of the most successful alliance in history, alarming allies around the world and destabilizing an international order already under attack. Europe is experiencing its largest armed conflict since 1945, a war that directly affects the United States and the world. Now is no time to retreat.

Richard D. Hooker Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

4. North Korea drops balloons carrying trash in South

Hmmm... Some snarky comments: Bio warfare? - sending germ laden garbage to the South (note sarcasm) to create illness among the military and people?  north Korea wastes nothing – if it has trash it cannot recycle it can send it South to create problems for the South. (again note sarcasm). Could this create a sense of complacency? Send trash for a time and then send something else that could create negative effects in the South because the South was just expecting more trash and did not remain vigilant (the north is masterful at denial and deception). 

North Korea drops balloons carrying trash in South

BBC · by Kelly Ng,

North Korea drops trash balloons on the South

6 hours ago

BBC News

Reuters

Seoul authorities have warned residents to avoid going outdoors and not to touch any "unidentified objects"

North Korea has dropped at least 260 balloons carrying rubbish in the South, prompting authorities to warn its residents to stay indoors.

South Korea's military also cautioned the public against touching the white balloons and the plastic bags attached to them because they contain "filthy waste and trash".

The balloons have been found in eight of nine provinces in South Korea and are now being analysed.

North and South Korea have both used balloons in their propaganda campaigns since the Korean War in the 1950s.

South Korea's military had earlier said it was investigating whether there were any North Korean propaganda leaflets in the balloons.

The recent incident comes days after North Korea said it would retaliate against the "frequent scattering of leaflets and other rubbish" in border areas by activists in the South.

"Mounds of wastepaper and filth will soon be scattered over the border areas and the interior of the ROK and it will directly experience how much effort is required to remove them," North Korea's vice-minister of defence Kim Kang Il said in a statement to state media on Sunday.

Republic of Korea or ROK is the official name of South Korea while the North is called DPRK or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Late on Tuesday, residents living north of the South's capital Seoul and in the border region received text messages from their provincial authorities asking them to "refrain from outdoor activities".

They were also asked to file a report at the nearest military base or police station if they spot an "unidentified object".

South Korean military

South Korean authorities said the bags "contained filthy waste and trash" and are being analysed by relevant authorities

Photographs shared on social media show bags attached via string to white translucent balloons carrying toilet paper, dark soil, and batteries, among other contents.

Police and military officers are seen in some of these photographs.

South Korea's Yonhap news agency reported that "some of the fallen balloons carried what appears to be faeces judging from its dark colour and odour".

South Korea's military condemned the act as a "clear violation of international law".

"It seriously threatens the safety of our people. North Korea is entirely liable for what happens due to the balloons and we sternly warn North Korea to immediately stop this inhumane and crass action," the military said.

In addition to anti-Pyongyang propaganda, activists in South Korea have launched balloons carrying among other things, cash, banned media content, and even Choco Pies - a South Korean snack banned in the North.

Earlier this month, a South Korea-based activist group claimed it had sent 20 balloons carrying anti-Pyongyang leaflets and USB sticks containing Korean pop music and music videos across the border.

Seoul's parliament passed a law in December 2020 that criminalises the launch of anti-Pyongyang leaflets, but critics have raised concerns related to freedom of speech and human rights.

North Korea has also launched balloons southward that attacked Seoul's leaders. In one such launch 2016, the balloons reportedly carried toilet paper, cigarette butts and rubbish. Seoul police described them as “hazardous biochemical substances”.

With additional reporting by Jake Kwon in Seoul

Kim Jong Un

South Korea

Pyongyang

North Korea

Seoul

BBC · by Kelly Ng,

5. Quick Take: North Korea Jabs at China in Reaction to Trilateral Summit

It is an unusually fast reaction. What does this say about the China-north Korea relationship?   Will KJU follow the family playbook and work to play China and Russia off one another as the regime has been doing since 1949?

Excerpts:

This jab at China appears more serious when considered in tandem with the last sentence in the Foreign Ministry pronouncement: “The DPRK will…make crucial efforts to build a new mechanical structure in the region based on justice and equity.”[2] This appears to point toward North Korean efforts to improve relations with Russia.

Quick Take: North Korea Jabs at China in Reaction to Trilateral Summit

https://www.38north.org/2024/05/quick-take-north-korea-jabs-at-china-in-reaction-to-trilateral-summit/

• BY: RACHEL MINYOUNG LEE
• MAY 28, 2024

(Yang Seung Hak from the South Korean Office of the President)

In an unusually quick same-day reaction to the Ninth ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Summit held in Seoul, a North Korean Foreign Ministry “spokesperson’s press statement” on May 27 denounced the inclusion of “denuclearization” in the summit’s joint statement. Pyongyang did not issue a protest statement following the last trilateral summit hosted by China in 2019, despite its more explicit backing of denuclearization.[1]

Though the spokesperson’s press statement leveled its criticism at the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) and not at China, it took a veiled but undeniable swipe at Beijing for aligning itself with the call for denuclearization, when it warned against “anyone” denying the North’s status as a “nuclear weapons state.” The North’s relations with China have looked to be cooling over the last year, but this is the first time in recent years any signs of trouble have broken into the open. Furthermore, North Korea also notified Japan of its satellite launch plan just ahead of the trilateral summit, even though a high-level Chinese delegation was in Seoul for the major event, and then proceeded with the launch just hours after the summit ended. The timing of this launch was not a coincidence and should be viewed as part of North Korea’s messaging to China.

This jab at China appears more serious when considered in tandem with the last sentence in the Foreign Ministry pronouncement: “The DPRK will…make crucial efforts to build a new mechanical structure in the region based on justice and equity.”[2] This appears to point toward North Korean efforts to improve relations with Russia. In October 2023, a vice foreign minister used similar language when he asserted that improved North Korea-Russia relations were “ensuring the balance of the international mechanical structure.” A North Korean press release on Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui’s visit to Russia in January 2024 pointed in the same direction, though with a slightly different formulation, saying the two countries “expressed their strong will to further strengthen strategic and tactical cooperation in…establishing a new multi-polarized international order based on independence and justice.”

The Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) is scheduled to convene in late June for a plenary meeting to review each sector’s work during the first half of the year. The meeting almost certainly will discuss foreign policy and military issues, and it may be handy to recall the significance of this Foreign Ministry pronouncement then.

1. [1]
2. The 2024 ROK-Japan-China joint statement stipulated: “We reiterated positions on regional peace and stability, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the abductions issue, respectively.” This was a step down from a corresponding provision in a joint document from the 2019 trilateral summit, which said: “We are committed to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Italics added by the author for emphasis.
3. [2]
4. “Mechanical structure [ryokhak kudo; 력학구도]” is the Korean Central News Agency’s rendering in English. It would be better translated as “dynamics.”

6. Rare spat shows China, North Korea still at odds on nuclear weapons

Rare spat? There is no love between China and north Korea. Both do not like each other but both need each other.

Rare spat shows China, North Korea still at odds on nuclear weapons

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/rare-spat-shows-china-north-korea-still-odds-nuclear-weapons-2024-05-29/

By Josh Smith

May 29, 20247:36 AM EDTUpdated 22 min ago

A North Korean flag flutters at the propaganda village of Gijungdong in North Korea, in this picture taken near the truce village of Panmunjom inside the demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas, South Korea, July 19, 2022. REUTERS/Kim Hong-Ji/Pool/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

SEOUL, May 29 (Reuters) - North Korea's rare swipe at China this week underscored how Beijing and Pyongyang do not entirely see eye-to-eye on the latter's illicit nuclear weapons arsenal, despite warming ties in other areas, analysts and officials in South Korea said.

The North condemned China, Japan and South Korea on Monday for discussing denuclearisation of the peninsula, calling their joint declaration after a summit in Seoul a "grave political provocation" that violates its sovereignty.

Even though Beijing helped tone down the statement by advocating mention of the peninsula rather than the North specifically, that was enough to raise its neighbour's hackles, one analyst said.

"It is notable that North Korea criticised a joint statement that China had signed onto, even after Beijing helped water down the statement," added Patricia Kim, of the Brookings Institution in the United States.

In their remarks, the three nations "reiterated positions on regional peace and stability, denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula" but unlike the last such statements in 2019 and earlier, did not commit to pursue denuclearisation.

Since international talks with the United States and other countries stalled in 2019, North Korea has moved to reject the concept of ever giving up its nuclear weapons.

"This is about North Korea emphasising its stance that any diplomatic rhetoric suggesting Pyongyang should eventually denuclearise is unacceptable," said Tong Zhao, a nuclear expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

"After enshrining its nuclear status in the constitution and reprimanding anyone who questions it, North Korea is raising demands for formal international recognition as a nuclear-armed country."

Queried about the North's criticism at a press briefing on Tuesday, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said "China's basic position on the Korean peninsula issue remains unchanged," but did not mention denuclearisation.

A South Korean foreign ministry official said there were significant differences of opinion on the North Korean issue among the three countries at the summit, adding that China had not used the term "denuclearisation" since last year.

"Considering the current geopolitical situation, I think it would be difficult to get China to agree to something like previous agreements on the issue," the official said in a briefing.

But the talks suggested that despite the weaker language, China's fundamental position on denuclearisation had not changed, the official added, calling the declaration's formal use of the term "meaningful".

NORTH KOREA MESSAGING

China is North Korea's only military ally, and by far its largest trading partner.

North Korea's failed launch of a spy satellite just hours after the Seoul summit was not a coincidence and should be seen as part of its messaging to China, researcher Rachel Minyoung Lee wrote.

"The North’s relations with China have looked to be cooling over the last year, but this is the first time in recent years any signs of trouble have broken into the open," she wrote in a report for the Washington-based 38 North programme.

Brookings' Kim agreed that the North's actions showed its ties with China were not as warm as may appear from the outside.

"Even as the two sides have kept up a steady pace of official exchanges and Beijing continues to shield Pyongyang from international pressure, longstanding mutual suspicion and disdain ... limits the depth of their alignment," she said.

Now that Pyongyang has strengthened ties with Russia, it probably believes it has greater leverage in relations with China and can afford to be less deferential to it, she added.

Washington-based Zhao said China had some reservations on the North's deepening military co-operation with Russia, which could undermine Beijing's near monopoly of influence on Pyongyang.

China is also careful not to create a perception of a de facto alliance among Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang that could work against practical co-operation with key Western nations, he added.

But the North's criticism does not necessarily indicate growing troubles in its ties with China, Zhao said.

"The China-North Korea bilateral relationship appears to be moving at a gradual and stable pace toward greater co-operation," he added.

Coming soon: Get the latest news and expert analysis about the state of the global economy with Reuters Econ World. Sign up here.

Reporting by Josh Smith; Additional reporting by Hyonhee Shin and Hyunsu Yim in Seoul, and Colleen Howe in Beijing; Editing by Clarence Fernandez

7. Another Failed Satellite Launch at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station - Beyond Parallel

Images at the link: https://beyondparallel.csis.org/another-failed-satellite-launch-at-the-sohae-satellite-launching-station/?utm

Another Failed Satellite Launch at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station - Beyond Parallel

beyondparallel.csis.org · by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha, Jennifer Jun · May 28, 2024

Military

Another Failed Satellite Launch at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station

Share this page

An April 29, 2024, image of the coastal launch pad at Sohae Satellite Launching Station, where the recent failed launch is assumed to have taken place. (Copyright © CNES 2024, Distribution Airbus DS). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

Key Findings

• The fourth launch attempt of the Malligyong-1 reconnaissance satellite on May 27, 2024, is a clear demonstration of the political importance assigned to satellite launches—particularly reconnaissance satellites—by Kim Jong-un and his desire to meet the goal of launching three satellites in 2024.
• Despite the possible technical assistance of Russian scientists, as reported by the South Korean press, the launch attempt—presumably using a modified Chollima-1 satellite launch vehicle (SLV) at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station —was not successful, suffering a catastrophic failure of the first stage of the SLV.
• Conducting a fourth SLV launch in twelve months, on top of numerous ballistic missile launches, is indicative of the physical and financial resources being dedicated to the SLV and satellite development program.
• Kim’s compressed timeline for launching SLVs could be the result of his public commitment to have three operating satellites by year-end, which also could be related to his positioning a future deal with Trump that would include a moratorium on long-range rocket launches in exchange for sanctions relief and de facto acceptance of the weapons arsenal.

On May 27, 2024, at approximately 10:44 PM KST, North Korea undertook a launch of the Malligyong-1-1 (만리경-1-1) reconnaissance satellite, using what they identified as a “new-type satellite carrier rocket,” presumably a modified Chollima-1 SLV (천리마-1), from the Sohae Satellite Launching Station. The launch suffered a catastrophic failure of the first stage and exploded shortly after launch.

The vice general director of North Korea’s National Aerospace Technology Administration (NATA) stated that the “launch failed due to the air blast of the new-type satellite carrier rocket during the first-stage flight.” The statement indicates a catastrophic failure of the first stage caused by “the reliability of operation of the newly developed liquid oxygen + petroleum engine.”

The launch was a clear demonstration of the political importance assigned to satellite launches—particularly reconnaissance satellites—by Kim Jong-un and his desire to meet the goal of launching three satellites in 2024 that was announced at the 9th Enlarged Plenum of the 8th Party Central Committee in December 2023.

North Korea has conducted four Chollima-1/Malligyong-1 launches during the past twelve months:

• May 2023 failed launch of a Malligyong-1 aboard Chollima-1 was attributed to the “low reliability and stability of the new-type engine system” and the “unstable character of the fuel used”;
• August 2023 failed launch of a Malligyong-1 aboard Chollima-1 due to “an error in the emergency blasting system during the third-state flight”;
• November 2023 successful launch of a Malligyong-1 aboard Chollima-1 which put the satellite into orbit;
• May 2024 failed launch of the “Malligyong-1-1” aboard a “new-type satellite carrier rocket” due to “the reliability of operation of the newly developed liquid oxygen + petroleum engine.”

The 75% failure rate of the Chollima-1/Malligyong-1 launches to date suggests a design under active development, some sort of systemic production/quality control weakness, or a combination of both. However, such failures are not unexpected in the process of refining launch capabilities. If North Korea can persevere through the next two announced launches, absorb and implement the lessons of its failures, and refine the Chollima-1 design, it is likely to produce a reliable SLV by this time next year.

Significantly, this fourth SLV launch event during the past twelve months, in addition to the numerous ballistic missile launches during the same period, clearly demonstrates North Korea’s determination to persevere and indicates that physical and financial resources are being dedicated to the SLV and satellite development programs. It also illustrates that there is a depth to North Korea’s SLV and satellite production infrastructure that is not typically understood.

The use of the phrase “new-type satellite carrier rocket” in describing yesterday’s launch event is likely a political phrase intended to convey significant progress in ongoing SLV development. The reality is most likely more mundane and that there was an evolutionary development of the existing Chollima-1 SLV that involved some level of modifications to the engine. The development of an entirely new SLV would represent a dramatic, unanticipated, and risky development.

What the North Korea statement meant in using the phrase “newly developed liquid oxygen + petroleum engine” is unclear. The previous liquid propellent SLV launches have undoubtedly utilized liquid oxygen (LOX) and some form of refined kerosene (typically RP-1).The phrase may have meant to indicate that the engine itself is either new or has been significantly modified from previous versions.

Finally, it appears that there may have been a relationship between yesterday’s first stage engine failure and engine tests conducted over the past year using the Yunsong Vertical Engine Test Stand at Sohae.

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is senior fellow for Imagery Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Victor Cha is senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair and the inaugural holder of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Jennifer Jun is project manager and research associate with the iDeas Lab and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Headline image Copyright © CNES 2024, Distribution Airbus DS

Special thanks to Jisoo Kim for research support.

References

1. The Malligyong 1 was previously identified by North Korea media as a “military reconnaissance satellite.” “KCNA Report,” KCNA, May 31, 2023.
2. “KCNA Report on Accident in Launch of Military Reconnaissance Satellite,” KCNA, May 27, 2024.
3. Ibid.
4. “Report on the 9th Enlarged Plenum of 8th WPK Central Committee,” Rodong Sinmun, December 13, 2023.
5. “KCNA Report,” KCNA, May 31, 2023.
6. “KCNA Report on Accident in Second Launch of Military Reconnaissance Satellite,” KCNA, August 24, 2023.
7. “NATA’s Report on Successful Launch of Reconnaissance Satellite,” KCNA, November 22, 2023.
8. Ibid.

Related

beyondparallel.csis.org · by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha, Jennifer Jun · May 28, 2024

8. The North Korean and Chinese Threats Are Growing. But so Is the Trilateral Response.

Dr. Terry's conclusion:

I left the region with some hope, seeing that both U.S. allies, South Korea and Japan, are committed to the trilateral relations and doing their part. At a dinner reception during the Nikkei Conference, Kishida emphasized Japan’s commitment to leading efforts in Asia to tackle global challenges, including AI, cybersecurity, demographic issues, and expanding ties with the Global South, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands. His key message was that like-minded allies need to think outside the box. Yoon, who has vowed to turn South Korea into a Global Pivotal State (GPS), would very much agree. So would Biden, who has invested a lot of capital in nurturing the trilateral relationship. There is much cause for concern in East Asia but also some grounds for optimism about the ability of democracies to come together to address the threats they face.

The North Korean and Chinese Threats Are Growing. But so Is the Trilateral Response.

With renewed support from Russia and China, there are fears that a North Korean crisis is coming. In light of this, the trilateral security relationship among the United States, Japan, and South Korea has reached a new level of cooperation.

President Joe Biden, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and President Yoon Suk-yeol (left to right) at the May 2023 G7 Summit in Hiroshima, Japan. Official White House Photo by Cameron Smith

Blog Post by Sue Mi Terry

May 28, 2024 9:57 am (EST)

cfr.org · 

I recently spent a few weeks traveling between Seoul and Tokyo, participating in several conferences, including the Chosun Ilbo’s Asian Leadership Conference and the Nikkei Forum on “Asia’s Future.” My contributions in both Seoul and Tokyo focused on two key issues: the persistent negative news about North Korea and the increasingly positive developments in the United States-South Korea-Japan trilateral alliance. I address both issues in my recent Foreign Affairs article, “The Coming North Korean Crisis And How Washington Can Prevent It,” and in my new Washington Post article, “This nascent trilateral relationship is the best possible answer to China,” co-written with Max Boot.

On North Korea, much of the discussion at these forums revolved around the possibility of an October surprise by Kim Jong Un before the U.S. presidential election, North Korea's game plan, and Washington’s potential North Korea policy under a Trump administration (with most experts agreeing that a Biden second term would likely maintain the status quo). There were many questions about how our allies should respond.

Experts generally agree on North Korea’s strategy: perfecting its WMD capability with little intention of returning to denuclearization talks. Kim Jong Un has no incentive to negotiate with the United States, especially with his current level of support from China and Russia, allowing him to act with impunity. Even if Kim were inclined to make a deal under a Trump presidency, advancing North Korea’s nuclear program would be a logical step to increase his bargaining leverage, particularly after the humiliation at the Hanoi summit.

Asia Unbound

CFR fellows and other experts assess the latest issues emerging in Asia today. 1-3 times weekly.

View all newsletters >

Eyes on Asia

Insights and analysis from CFR fellows on the latest developments across Asia. Monthly.

Daily News Brief

A summary of global news developments with CFR analysis delivered to your inbox each morning. Weekdays.

The World This Week

A weekly digest of the latest from CFR on the biggest foreign policy stories of the week, featuring briefs, opinions, and explainers. Every Friday.

By entering your email and clicking subscribe, you're agreeing to receive announcements from CFR about our products and services, as well as invitations to CFR events. You are also agreeing to our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use.

View all newsletters >

Additionally, discussions highlighted concerns over the burgeoning North Korea-Russia alignment, with North Korea shipping weapons to Moscow and the potential for Moscow to provide sensitive technology to North Korea in return. One expert noted that Washington will soon need to prioritize its focus—either on the unrealistic pursuit of denuclearization or on preventing the North Korea-Russia nexus from expanding and improving North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.

The main debate, however, was on what U.S. policy might look like if Trump returns to the White House and on how Washington and Seoul should respond to the North Korean threat. South Korean media extensively covered remarks by Elbridge Colby, a former Pentagon official in the Trump administration, who argued that U.S. extended nuclear deterrence against North Korea is losing credibility. He suggested that the U.S. military is no longer powerful enough to win multiple wars simultaneously and that addressing issues other than China risks U.S. defeat. His advice to South Korea was to be prepared to defend against North Korea alone or consider developing its own nuclear weapons, as the United States may not provide a viable defense umbrella. These comments, given South Korean perceptions of Colby’s potential role as national security advisor to President Trump, have understandably alarmed South Koreans.

While the potential of another Trump term is cause for concern in Asia (and elsewhere), the United States-South Korea-Japan trilateral relationship is a bright spot amid numerous global crises. The Biden, Yoon, and Kishida administrations agree on the urgency of deepening cooperation, particularly in economic security, intelligence sharing, and defense policy, to address the challenges from North Korea and China. One positive sign: Kishida’s first call to a foreign leader after returning from his summit with Biden was to Yoon. That would have never happened in the past, and it shows how the Japan-South Korea relationship is rapidly progressing.

A recent sign of China’s eagerness to regain diplomatic momentum was the China-South Korea-Japan summit in Seoul, the first such meeting since 2019. While no significant breakthroughs occurred, the leaders agreed to work together on supply chains, environmental, health issues, and restarting free trade talks. As noted in our Washington Post article, China’s desire to meet is seen as an attempt to interject itself into the close Japanese-South Korean alignment with Washington. Previously, such gatherings highlighted Sino-South Korean suspicion of Japan; now, they highlight Japanese-South Korean suspicion of China, which has become deeply unpopular in both countries.

The concern with the trilateral alignment is its sustainability amid potential leadership changes in the United States, South Korea, and Japan, where all three leaders face low approval ratings. Yoon, with three years left in office, remains committed to improving trilateral ties despite his ruling party losing to the opposition parties in the recent National Assembly election. Kishida is also likely to secure support within his party, whereas Biden faces immediate electoral danger. There is anxiety in both South Korea and Japan about a potential Trump return and its implications for the trilateral relationship. As a result, one emerging theme from these forums is the importance of reinforcing the South Korea-Japan leg of the trilateral relationship through a more formal strategic partnership or bilateral security agreement. This would enhance real-time intelligence sharing, joint military exercises, missile defense cooperation, defense industrial production, and command structure.

Additionally, fostering a friendly atmosphere between the younger generations of both nations is crucial. South Koreans love Japanese anime and food, while Japanese youth enjoy K-pop and K-drama. Building people-to-people ties and cultural exchanges can genuinely improve bilateral relations.

I left the region with some hope, seeing that both U.S. allies, South Korea and Japan, are committed to the trilateral relations and doing their part. At a dinner reception during the Nikkei Conference, Kishida emphasized Japan’s commitment to leading efforts in Asia to tackle global challenges, including AI, cybersecurity, demographic issues, and expanding ties with the Global South, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands. His key message was that like-minded allies need to think outside the box. Yoon, who has vowed to turn South Korea into a Global Pivotal State (GPS), would very much agree. So would Biden, who has invested a lot of capital in nurturing the trilateral relationship. There is much cause for concern in East Asia but also some grounds for optimism about the ability of democracies to come together to address the threats they face.

Creative Commons: Some rights reserved.

This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) License.

View License Detail

cfr.org · 

9. Beijing’s nearest security threat isn’t in Taipei – it’s in North Korea

A useful analysis of the China-north Korea relationship.

Excerpts:

But as a de facto nuclear-armed state, Pyongyang still condemned the three countries on Monday for merely mentioning the “denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula” in the summit statement, calling it a “grave political provocation and sovereignty violation”.

Citing South Korean officials, the newspaper report noted China’s shifting stance on North Korea’s nuclear issue, with Beijing largely refraining from using the term “denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula” since 2023.

While it shows how far China is willing to go to bend to accommodate its unruly neighbour, it would be a major blow to Beijing and its much-touted influence over North Korea if Pyongyang refused to even talk about limiting its nuclear arsenals.

Under the pressure from Washington, Beijing may feel justified to side with Pyongyang and exonerate it from any responsibility for its wrongdoings. But such generosity could boomerang on China one day if not handled with extreme caution. That is a question Beijing will have to weigh carefully: with friends like North Korea, who needs enemies?

Beijing’s nearest security threat isn’t in Taipei – it’s in North Korea

• Compared to the pragmatic tone from Taiwan’s new leader, North Korea’s Kim Jong-un presents a far more potent security threat for Beijing
• With Russia’s help, Kim poses a bigger danger to China and the world than William Lai

Shi Jiangtao

+ FOLLOWPublished: 6:36pm, 28 May 2024

https://www.scmp.com/opinion/article/3264428/beijings-nearest-security-threat-isnt-taipei-its-north-korea

Despite intensified intimidation tactics by mainland China, Lai last week in his inauguration speech described Taiwan as “a sovereign, independent nation” and said Beijing and Taipei “are not subordinate to each other”.

For Beijing, those words may sound more provocative than what Lai has said in the past, including an assertion that there is no need to declare formal independence because Taiwan is a de facto independent state.

Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te speaks to military personnel during a visit to an air base in Hualien on Monday. Photo: EPA-EFE

But flexing military muscles over Taiwan amid heightened tensions in the South China Sea between Beijing and Manila could push China’s fragile detente with the United States to the breaking point and raise the spectre of an unwanted armed conflict.

Washington has “strongly urged Beijing to act with restraint”, while Tokyo has also voiced serious concerns about the situation in the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea.

With the cross-strait military balance of power increasingly shifting in mainland China’s favour, Beijing should have some confidence in itself after Lai’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party failed to hold a majority in the legislature amid deeply divided public opinion in Taiwan over the island’s future.

Thus the priority at the moment should be about how to prevent those 60 per cent of the Taiwanese voters who didn’t vote for Lai in January slipping further away from mainland China in the absence of direct communication with Lai’s government.

Besides, Lai has repeatedly signalled he will not pursue formal independence during his presidency – an apparent bid to avoid enraging both Beijing and Washington.

Compared to the pragmatic tone of the elected official in Taipei, Beijing has a far more potent security threat to deal with: unruly North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who remains isolated and highly capricious.

US intelligence officials told American broadcaster NBC last week that they believe Pyongyang may be planning the “most provocative” military action ahead of the coming US election in November, including a possible nuclear test.

A possible election-year provocation would be designed to “create turmoil … possibly at the urging of Russian President Vladimir Putin”, and would illustrate the growing military alliance between Pyongyang and Moscow in the midst of the war in Ukraine, NBC reported on Friday.

One of six US officials quoted in the story said that China likely did not want instability in the region, and given China’s close ties with Russia, Moscow might hesitate to get involved in such a North Korean scheme.

A potential “October surprise” in the US elections, and the possibility it is being planned by two of China’s purported close friends behind its back would be deeply unsettling in Beijing, if confirmed.

Given that North Korea remains China’s only treaty ally, with a location that makes it a useful buffer state against Washington’s two closest allies in East Asia – South Korea and Japan – Pyongyang’s nuclear brinkmanship, including repeated missile tests, is increasingly becoming a strategic liability for Beijing.

It would not be the first time that Beijing, North Korea’s top diplomatic backer and economic lifeline, was betrayed by Pyongyang. Two years ago, Kim not only skipped the Beijing Winter Olympics, but also threatened to resume nuclear tests on the eve of the extravaganza, while China was struggling to deal with a series of diplomatic boycotts led by the US.

Beijing is also wary that it has largely been excluded from Moscow’s growing military cooperation with Pyongyang over the past two years, especially since Kim’s Russia visit in September last year.

It is widely believed that Chinese President Xi Jinping raised the North Korea issue during Putin’s China visit earlier this month, seeking greater clarity from the Russian leader about his recent overtures toward Kim.

Underlining China’s deepening dilemma over North Korea, Beijing reportedly took pains to avoid criticising its communist neighbour during a trilateral summit with Seoul and Tokyo on Monday, and sought to water down the Pyongyang-related part of a joint statement, according to The Korea Herald.

But as a de facto nuclear-armed state, Pyongyang still condemned the three countries on Monday for merely mentioning the “denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula” in the summit statement, calling it a “grave political provocation and sovereignty violation”.

Citing South Korean officials, the newspaper report noted China’s shifting stance on North Korea’s nuclear issue, with Beijing largely refraining from using the term “denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula” since 2023.

While it shows how far China is willing to go to bend to accommodate its unruly neighbour, it would be a major blow to Beijing and its much-touted influence over North Korea if Pyongyang refused to even talk about limiting its nuclear arsenals.

Under the pressure from Washington, Beijing may feel justified to side with Pyongyang and exonerate it from any responsibility for its wrongdoings. But such generosity could boomerang on China one day if not handled with extreme caution. That is a question Beijing will have to weigh carefully: with friends like North Korea, who needs enemies?

South China Morning Post · May 28, 2024

10. South Korean province awakes to North Korea ‘air raid’ alarm

South Korean province awakes to North Korea ‘air raid’ alarm

The alarm was sent after the North threatened to send ‘mounds of filth’ across the border.

https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/north-korea-balloons-05292024032514.html

By Taejun Kang for RFA

2024.05.29

Taipei, Taiwan

A screenshot of an alert sent to residents in Gyeonggi Province.

 RFA

At 11:34 p.m. on Tuesday, mobile phones in parts of South Korea’s Gyeonggi province screeched out an alert from authorities warning of an “air raid”, sparking panic among residents living close to one of the world’s most heavily fortified borders.

“Air raid? I panicked because I thought they were talking about some kind of attack,” a resident of the city of Paju who received the alert told Radio Free Asia, referring to the English-language phrase “Air raid preliminary warning” in the alert.

Paju is just south of Panmunjeom, a village on the de facto border between the two Koreas, where for decades the armies of North and South Korea have faced off.

The alert told residents to report any unidentified objects, which turned out to be more than 200 balloons floated over the border from North Korea carrying trash and manure.

Authorities later announced that the phrase “air raid” had been used in error. 

Balloons with trash

North Koreans defectors based in the South and rights activists have for years sent balloons over the border into the North, invariably trying to stir up dissent and opposition to the North Korean state.

The balloons from the South infuriate the North, which regularly demands a stop to them and threatens retaliation.

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, or JCS, said on Wednesday that North Korea had sent more than 200 balloons over the border carrying various pieces of trash such as plastic bottles, batteries, shoe parts and even animal dung. The JCS advised residents to report any strange objects and not to touch anything.

Beginning late on Tuesday, the balloons drifted south over various parts of South Korea, as far as the southeastern province of South Gyeongsang, scattering their trash as they came down to earth, the JCS said.

The JCS said the balloons could be dangerous, noting damage to a vehicle and a roof in 2016 caused by North Korean balloons.

“These acts by North Korea clearly violate international law and seriously threaten our people's safety,” the JCS said. “We sternly warn North Korea to immediately stop its inhumane and vulgar act.”

It added that it would draft safety measures with the police and government, noting that it was closely cooperating with the U.S.-led U.N. Command in charge of overseeing the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas.

A balloon believed to have been sent by North Korea, carrying various objects including what appeared to be trash and excrement, is seen over a rice field at Cheorwon, South Korea, May 29, 2024. (Yonhap via Reuters)

The latest balloons from the South were floated into the North this month by the Seoul-based Fighters for a Free North Korea. The group said on May 13 it had sent 300,000 leaflets and 2,000 USBs containing K-pop music videos to the North by suspending them from 20 big balloons.

A banner attached to the balloon accused the North’s leader of treachery: “Kim Jong Un, you are nothing but an unchangeable traitor, an enemy of the Korean people.”

North Korea said on Sunday it would scatter “mounds of wastepaper and filth” over the border areas in a “tit-for-tat action” against the latest anti-Pyongyang leaflets.

Analysts say isolated North Korea fears that outside information could threaten the grip of its leadership. 

The balloons have long been another source of tension between the two Koreas, which are still technically at war since the 1950-53 Korean War ended in a truce, not a peace treaty.

Edited by Mike Firn.

11. N. Korea sends over 260 balloons carrying trash into S. Korea: Seoul military

260 bags of garbage. A lot effort wentinto this. What effect is the regime trying to acheive?

(5th LD) N. Korea sends over 260 balloons carrying trash into S. Korea: Seoul military | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · May 29, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with latest details; CHANGES headline, lead para)

By Chae Yun-hwan

SEOUL, May 29 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has launched hundreds of balloons carrying trash and waste across the inter-Korean border, Seoul's military said Wednesday, after the North warned of "tit-for-tat action" against anti-Pyongyang leaflets sent by the South's activists.

As of 4 p.m., the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it had detected some 260 balloons sent from the North since Tuesday night, which fell in various locations across the country, including border areas, Seoul and even the southeastern province of South Gyeongsang.

It marked the largest number of North Korean balloons sent into the South, compared with previous similar instances between 2016 and 2018, the JCS said, noting that none of the balloons were still floating in the air.

The fallen balloons appeared to have carried various pieces of trash, such as plastic bottles, batteries, shoe parts and even manure, a JCS official said, with no damage being reported so far.

The military deployed personnel from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear response teams and bomb disposal units to collect the objects for a detailed analysis.

"These acts by North Korea clearly violate international law and seriously threaten our people's safety," the JCS said. "(We) sternly warn North Korea to immediately stop its inhumane and vulgar act."

This composite photo, provided by a reader on May 29, 2024, shows a balloon presumed to have been sent by North Korea across the inter-Korean border discovered in South Korea's border city of Paju, 37 kilometers north of Seoul. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

According to regional authorities, a series of suspected North Korean balloons were found and reported in many parts of the South, including as far south as the southeastern county of Geochang, 218 kilometers south of Seoul.

A vineyard owner in Yeongcheon, about 250 km from the border, reported to police early Wednesday morning that he heard a thumping sound and went out to find a heap of plastic waste and filth, which had damaged a plastic greenhouse on his farm.

Earlier in the morning, a plastic bag filled with waste paper and plastic bottles was found dangling from two floating balloons in a rice field in Geochang. Police in the southern county of Muju were alerted about a balloon stuck between utility pole cables, carrying a similar plastic bag.

Such plastic bags found elsewhere overnight reportedly contained manure, batteries, pieces of shoes and other waste.

Police were trying to determine whether the retrieved materials were those sent by North Korea.

The JCS advised residents in the areas not to touch the objects and to report them to nearby military or police authorities upon their discovery, and cautioned of possible damage from the balloons, citing property damage due to such balloons in 2016.

It said that it will come up with safety measures with the police and the government, noting that it is cooperating with the U.S.-led U.N. Command overseeing activities in the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas.

This photo, provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 29, 2024, shows balloons presumed to be sent by North Korea discovered in the central province of South Chungcheong. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

On Sunday, North Korea said it will scatter "mounds of wastepaper and filth" over the border areas in a "tit-for-tat action" against the distribution of anti-Pyongyang leaflets.

For years, North Korean defectors in South Korea and conservative activists have flown the leaflets to the North via balloons to help encourage North Koreans to eventually rise up against the Pyongyang regime.

North Korea has bristled at the propaganda campaign amid concern that an influx of outside information could pose a threat to its leader Kim Jong-un.

North Korea has repeatedly called for an end to the leafleting campaign. The issue has long been a source of tension between the two Koreas, which are still technically at war because the 1950-53 Korean War ended in a truce, not a peace treaty.

Meanwhile, the South's military also detected attempts by North Korea to jam Global Positioning System (GPS) signals near the de facto inter-Korean sea border in the Yellow Sea early Wednesday, another JCS official said, noting that they did not impact the military's operations.

The North's moves came amid heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula after Pyongyang's botched attempt Monday night to launch its second military spy satellite into orbit. The launch failed due to the explosion of the rocket during its first-stage flight, according to the North's state media.

South Korea, the United States and Japan have condemned the latest launch, calling it a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions banning the North from any such launches using ballistic missile technology.

This photo, provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 29, 2024, shows debris of a balloon presumed to have been sent by North Korea and carrying waste discovered in western Seoul. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · May 29, 2024

12. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Regime hands out rice to rural food-short households, “Pay back in the fall with 30% interest”

The regime gouges its own people.

＜Inside N. Korea＞ Regime hands out rice to rural food-short households, “Pay back in the fall with 30% interest”

asiapress.org

(FILE PHOTO) A woman leads a cow through a rural village. Photo taken in October 2008 in a rural area on the outskirts of Pyongyang. Photo by JANG Jeong-gil (ASIAPRESS)

◆Authorities crack down on illegal loans by donju and cadres

Food-short households in rural areas have been given rice set aside by the state for emergencies, but they have to pay it back with interest in the fall, an ASIAPRESS reporting partner's investigation has found. The state is taking over usury, an illegal practice that has long been relied upon by urban donju (North Korea’s wealthy entrepreneurial class) and local officials, but why and for what purpose? (JEON Sung-jun / KANG Ji-won)

◆ Why is the state giving out food with high-interest rates?

In mid-April, some food-insecure households in rural areas received national emergency rice, according to a reporting partner in the northern part of the country. Food-insecure households are families who have run out of food at home and cash to buy food.

"Chinese rice was distributed (by the state), and for every kilo of rice, they deducted 1.3 kilograms from the distribution in the fall. The (interest) is lower than what private lenders charge, so people tried to get (the rice)."

The authorities have distributed food every spring to prevent farmers from not coming to work for lack of food. But this is the first time they've had to pay the food back with interest in the fall. Even then, the amount was not enough, and only food-insecure households received a week's worth of food.

Locals found it strange that while the state was cracking down on high-interest lending by individuals as non-socialist behavior, the state was now doing the same thing.

To understand why people think this way, let's take a closer look at the background of high-interest lending in rural areas.

◆ Why high-interest loans exist in rural areas

A rural woman walking on a country road carrying a large backpack. Photograph by ASIAPRESS in July 2021.

Spring is a difficult season for North Koreans, especially in rural areas, where winter food is scarce and grains such as barley and potatoes are not yet available, leading to the annual emergence of food-insecure households at this time of year, also known as the "Barley Hump."

The state has virtually ignored food-insecure households without taking effective measures against them. They borrow food from cadres with surplus food or from urban donju with interest, to be paid back in the fall. In rural areas, peer-to-peer lending has become a kind of bailout, given in lieu of direct government support.

But the problem was that the interest rates were too high. As the reporting partner mentioned earlier, if you borrowed one kilogram of food from a private lender in the spring, you would have to pay back two kilograms in the fall. That's 100% interest in less than half a year. The rural cadres and urban donju made huge profits, while those who borrowed food had their homes and lives destroyed.

People run out of rice before winter even arrives, and are forced to sell their homes because they have no way to repay the debt. The government has criticized this as a "modern-day landlord revival."

◆ Government crackdowns have not led to improvement

Since around 2019, Kim Jong Un's regime has been cracking down on usury in rural areas as part of its fight against non-socialism. Here are some typical examples sent in by our reporting partners in the northern region.

In December 2020, the authorities sent crackdown teams to rural areas in North Hamgyong Province to punish farmers, work unit leaders and other cadres involved in usury, and confiscated all food and cash obtained through usury.

In addition, the government announced to food borrowers that they would not have to repay the lenders if they reported usury, and encouraged them to do so anonymously, which reportedly resulted in many people getting out of debt.

The authorities' crackdown resulted in the confiscation of property and legal penalties for the moneylenders who had given out food on credit, as well as for urban individuals who had taken their wealth and invested it in rural areas. However, this later became a bigger problem as the authorities' crackdown left few people willing to lend food, leaving poor farmers to suffer the consequences.

Here is a report from a reporting partner in rural Ryanggang Province in April 2021.

"They treat those who fall prey to usury as exploiters like landlords and rich farmers, and urge us to fight against it as an act that eats away at a healthy socialist way of life."

The state's inability to solve their problems and cut off their only way to get by on credit has made it even harder for those in need, the reporting partner said.

◆ High-interest loans continue to be widespread in rural areas

This situation continued during the COVID period, and usury was reported to be widespread in rural areas. In early May, a reporting partner in Ryanggang Province said that while the authorities have stepped up crackdowns and punishments, the means and methods of usury are evolving.

"Even if the donju go to rural areas, they have to go through a distributor or a work unit leader who is in charge of distribution, but the distributor who was caught (in the crackdown) had stamped the contracts and kept them. During the house-to-house searches the contracts were found and the work unit leader was sent to a forced labor camp along with a member of the donju class."

But that's just the tip of the iceberg, according to the reporting partner.

"This time a sub-work unit leader was caught acting like a landlord, but I have heard that there are many donju who work quietly behind the scenes, collaborating with work unit leaders and other cadres. This means that people do what they can where they can.”

In addition, people who borrow food also keep their mouths shut in case times get really tough.

◆ Will the state formalize the practice of high-interest loans?

Farmers harvesting corn in a field. Photographed from the Chinese side of the border in late September 2023, Sokju County, North Pyongan Province (ASIAPRESS)

At this point, it's unclear how large or sustainable the initiative will be. As far as we can tell, the program is limited to rural areas in the northern area of the country. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that it will become formalized, as the benefits to the North Korean regime are significant.

First, state-led high-interest loans can prevent the damage caused by individual profiteering and prevent food-insecure households from starving. In fact, such a system has existed since the Three Kingdoms period as a kind of relief system, and the Hwangok system of the Joseon Dynasty also functioned as a social security system. Second, if the policy is institutionalized, it will secure tax revenue. Third, it would eliminate the non-socialist phenomena that the regime is so wary of.

But there are hurdles. One is the availability of enough food to sustain such a system. Another obstacle is the fear that the state's policy of collecting interest from the people will be seen as a retreat from socialist principles. This is because it may appear that the state is abandoning socialist principles in order to prevent individuals from becoming non-socialist.

Whether this change is a last-ditch effort by the authorities to get through the Barley Hump unscathed, or a first step toward institutional consolidation, it is significant that the Kim Jong Un regime has implemented such a measure at the national level as of spring 2024. Watch this space.

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

• ＜Inside N. Korea＞Recruitment for the world's longest military service(1)　This year 8 years for men, 5 years for women
• ＜Investigation＞Why aren’t North Korea’s women having babies anymore? (1)　The fertility rate is already severely low…It’s rare to see anyone carrying babies around
• ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Government confiscates private plots of farmland and forces people to return farming
• ＜Inside N. Korea＞Chinese RMB exchange rate surges, up 42.8% since start of year...National police agency warns individuals and businesses against using foreign currencies
• ＜Inside N. Korea＞Hungry elderly people flock to government office to demand rice, leading police to mobilize to put down unrest…Hyesan city

asiapress.org

13. N. Korean leader slams S. Korea's show of force against Pyongyang's satellite launch

(LEAD) N. Korean leader slams S. Korea's show of force against Pyongyang's satellite launch | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 29, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with more details throughout; ADDS photos)

SEOUL, May 29 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has vowed to take "overwhelmingly stern" actions against South Korea's show of force in response to the North's spy satellite launch attempt, denouncing it as a "very dangerous" provocation, state media reported Wednesday.

Kim made the remark during his visit to the Academy of Defence Sciences on Tuesday to mark the 60th founding anniversary of the agency, one day after North Korea's launch of a military spy satellite ended in failure, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

The North's leader defended the possession of a spy satellite as an "inevitable" choice to protect the country's sovereignty and denounced South Korea's military for demonstrating its show of force against its satellite launch attempt.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on May 29, 2024, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un (C) visiting the Academy of Defence Sciences the previous day to celebrate the 60th founding anniversary of the agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

South Korea's military staged an air exercise involving around 20 fighter jets Monday near the border with North Korea, hours after North Korea informed Japan of a plan to launch a satellite by June 4.

"This is a very dangerous provocation that cannot be ignored and a play with fire that we cannot forgive," Kim said, calling it a blatant infringement upon North Korea's sovereignty.

He vowed to take "absolute and overwhelmingly stern actions" against South Korea's rash decision to demonstrate a show of force against the North's satellite launch plan, according to the KCNA.

"We need to overwhelmingly perpetuate our will and capability to stage a war so that hostile forces cannot even think about use of force," he said.

North Korea launched a new rocket carrying a spy satellite, named the Malligyong-1-1, on Monday night. But the rocket exploded during the first-stage flight shortly after takeoff, the North's state media said.

In November last year, the North successfully placed a military spy satellite into orbit after two failed attempts in May and August, respectively. North Korea earlier said it will launch three more spy satellites in 2024 in a bid to monitor what it called military threats from South Korea and the United States.

In a rare move, Kim publicly acknowledged that this week's attempt to launch a reconnaissance satellite ended in failure, stressing that Pyongyang can develop by learning from failure.

"Though we've failed to achieve the goal, we will not shrink with fear over the failure. Rather we will try harder," he said. "We can learn more from failure and that's the way we could further develop."

The Rodong Sinmun, the North's main newspaper targeting the domestic audience, carried reports of Kim's speech on the first and second pages of Wednesday's edition. When North Korea's two attempts to launch a spy satellite ended in failure last year, the paper did not carry any related reports.

The South Korean military said Tuesday that engine combustion problems are behind North Korea's botched space rocket launch and Pyongyang would need "considerable time" to prepare for its next spy satellite launch.

The latest botched launch came as North Korea and Russia have been deepening military cooperation following the summit between Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin in September. Pyongyang is suspected of having provided weapons to Moscow for use in the war in Ukraine in return for Russia's possible transfer of weapons technology and food aid.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un delivers a speech on May 28, 2024, during his visit to the Academy of Defence Sciences to mark the 60th founding anniversary of the agency, in this photo carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on May 29, 2024, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un visiting the Academy of Defence Sciences to mark the 60th founding anniversary of the agency the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 29, 2024

14. S. Korea mulls suit against N. Korea in case of Pyongyang's full-scale use of Kaesong complex

Using the rule of law.

S. Korea mulls suit against N. Korea in case of Pyongyang's full-scale use of Kaesong complex | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 29, 2024

SEOUL, May 29 (Yonhap) -- The unification ministry said Wednesday it plans to take legal actions against North Korea if Pyongyang expands its unauthorized use of the now-shuttered joint industrial complex in the North's border city of Kaesong in a full-scale manner.

The move is part of the government's 2024 basic plan for the development of inter-Korean relations. The ministry sets up a yearly execution plan for a broader five-year blueprint on the government's policy on North Korea.

Under the plan, the ministry said it could take legal steps against the North's unauthorized operations of South Korean assets at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, when certain "occasions" take place.

"The government could consider lodging a compensation suit against the North when our damages have become clear, in such cases as when North Korea expands its unauthorized use of the complex on a full scale, or abolishes related legislation and forfeits assets (of South Korean firms)," a ministry official said.

This file photo, taken March 13, 2023, shows the Kaesong Industrial Complex, a joint industrial park in the North's border city of Kaesong. (Yonhap)

The government said in December that North Korea had been running some 30 South Korean-owned factories at the complex without authorization. The ministry estimated damages incurred from North Korea's illegal use of the South's assets at around 400 billion won (US$294 million).

In June 2023, the ministry filed a 44.7 billion-won compensation suit with a Seoul court against the North blowing up a joint liaison office in the Kaesong complex in 2020.

Meanwhile, the ministry said it will focus on raising public awareness of North Korea's "inhumane and anachronistic" acts, such as the country's human rights violations and its idolization of leader Kim Jong-un.

It will also analyze North Korea's psychological warfare targeting South Korea and map out response measures.

Touching on North Korea's human rights situations, the ministry plans to analyze rights abuses case by case and set up a database centering on human rights violators.

On the issue of families separated by the 1950-53 Korean War, the government said it plans to establish a digital archive to systemically manage records on their lives.

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 29, 2024

15. Young N. Koreans want to watch hit S. Korean movie "Exhuma"

More information to support the importance of information in north Korea. "Like the bomber," information will get through. 

Young N. Koreans want to watch hit S. Korean movie "Exhuma" - Daily NK English

"People are eager to watch South Korean movies and TV shows and do whatever they have to do, and 'Exhuma' is no exception," a source told Daily NK

By Lee Chae Un - May 29, 2024

dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Un · May 29, 2024

A poster of the South Korean movie "Exhuma." (Showbox)

A growing number of North Korean young people in Hoeryong are expressing interest in the South Korean movie “Exhuma,” which was released in February, Daily NK has learned.

“Rumors about the South Korean movie ‘Exhuma’ have spread rapidly in the border area this month through locals using Chinese-made cell phones,” a Daily NK source in North Hamgyong Province said Monday, speaking on condition of anonymity. “In response, a growing number of people in Hoeryong, especially young people, have been looking for the movie recently.”

In North Korea’s border region, many people earn money by using Chinese-made cell phones to communicate with the outside world. Of course, they learn about important events, news and information from outside North Korea relatively quickly.

Some locals are in the loop about cultural content from the outside world, including new movies and TV shows from South Korea or China, and introduce them to other North Koreans.

The recent surge in demand for the South Korean movie “Exhuma” in Hoeryong and other places along the border in North Hamgyong Province began with local residents using Chinese-made cell phones to contact the outside world, the source said.

According to the source, rumors are circulating in Hoeryong that “Exhuma” is a “very exciting movie that depicts what happens when a talented shaman discovers that a mysterious illness that has plagued a family for generations is due to the location of an ancestor’s grave, and she tries to move the grave to solve the problem.”

Rumors say that the movie is popular in South Korea as well, which has sparked the curiosity of Hoeryong’s youth.

“Some North Koreans also ask fortune tellers about their ancestors’ graves when they can’t solve problems at home or when illnesses don’t improve,” the source said. “This is due to the belief that misfortune will come if the ancestors are angry because their graves are poorly located or their descendants do not remember them enough. So people can understand the movie and are interested in the plot.”

In North Korea, superstition is considered a serious crime – so much so that Article 256 of the North Korean penal code outlines punishments for superstitious acts. Yet people continue to rely heavily on superstition, visiting fortune tellers and acting on their readings.

North Korea also severely punishes the consumption and distribution of video material from the outside world, including South Korea, under a law enacted in 2020 to “eradicate reactionary thought and culture.” However, North Koreans’ demand for South Korean pop culture content, including movies and TV shows, continues unabated despite threats from the authorities.

“People are eager to watch South Korean movies and TV shows and do whatever they have to do, and ‘Exhuma’ is no exception,” the source said. “Parents who are a few years older don’t show it outwardly, even if they want to see the movie, but young people actively seek out people who distribute South Korean movies and TV shows to buy it.”

A Hyeryong resident who sells and distributes so-called impure videos said that he has once again realized that the authorities “cannot suppress the craze for South Korean movies even if they crack down and instill fear,” according to the source. The man said that “several groups of young people harass vendors for movies every day, and if they had ‘Exhuma’ this time, they would have made a lot of money.”

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Un · May 29, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com