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Quotes of the Day:
"Freedom is the only worthy goal in life. It is won by disregarding things that lie beyond our control."
– Epictetus
"No amount of evidence will ever persuade an idiot."
– Mark Twain
“If you feel pain, you’re alive. If you feel other people’s pain, you’re a human being.”
– Leo Tolstoy
1. U.S. looks to 'calibrate' USFK posture to deter China: senior official
2. Rethinking South Korea’s Naval Strategy for a Taiwan Strait Contingency
3. The Risky ‘Side Launch’ That Doomed Kim Jong Un’s New Warship
4. USFK commander rejects speculation on troop cut in Korea, reaffirms commitment
5. Crash of Navy aircraft in Pohang leaves crew of four dead
6. Reimagining the Role of U.S. Forces in Korea
7. South Korea reports unintentional gunfire at DMZ; no response from North
8. South Korean students warned over social media posts amid Trump administration crackdown
9. US shouldn’t reduce troops in South Korea without consulting Seoul, senator says
10. Get Ready for a Big, Bold, and Very Bad North Korea Deal
11. An intransigent North Korea slips from the spotlight in ROK presidential race
12. War Game suggests North Korea could survive nukes
13. Shoigu praises North Korean troops for defending Kursk as if ‘own motherland’
14. 62 Chinese students arrive in Pyongyang to study at North Korean universities
15. Who will make Korea great again?
1. U.S. looks to 'calibrate' USFK posture to deter China: senior official
It should be this statement:
The United States is looking to "modernize" its alliance with South Korea and "calibrate" U.S. force posture on the Korean Peninsula to deter China "AND to deter north Korea."
This is troubling because these officials play right into both Xi and Kim's political warfare strategies. We undermine our alliances when we pick sides and this is exactly what Xi and Kim want us to do. This undermines deterrence and is now more likely to lead to conflict.
Excerpt:
"We are prioritizing deterring China. That is one of our stated priorities. It is essential, as we do that, to work with Seoul to modernize the alliance and calibrate U.S. force posture on the peninsula to reflect the realities of the regional security environment," the official said, responding to a question from Yonhap News Agency.
(LEAD) U.S. looks to 'calibrate' USFK posture to deter China: senior official | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 29, 2025
(ATTN: RECASTS paras 6, 8; ADDS more info in 9th para)
By Song Sang-ho
SINGAPORE, May 29 (Yonhap) -- The United States is looking to "modernize" its alliance with South Korea and "calibrate" U.S. force posture on the Korean Peninsula to deter China, a senior U.S. defense official said Thursday, apparently leaving open the possibility of an adjustment to the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) presence.
In a press briefing, the official stressed Washington's desire to work with the incoming Seoul government to ensure that the bilateral partnership is "strategically sustainable," as South Korea is set to pick a new president in an election set for Tuesday.
The officials' remarks followed a recent news report that the Pentagon is considering withdrawing roughly 4,500 troops of the 28,500-strong USFK and moving them to other locations in the Indo-Pacific, including Guam. The Pentagon has dismissed the report as untrue.
"We are prioritizing deterring China. That is one of our stated priorities. It is essential, as we do that, to work with Seoul to modernize the alliance and calibrate U.S. force posture on the peninsula to reflect the realities of the regional security environment," the official said, responding to a question from Yonhap News Agency.
"We will continue to empower our allies and partners to do more for their own defense. That includes South Korea, and we look forward to working with the incoming South Korean government to ensure that our alliance is strategically sustainable, and that our combined posture on the peninsula credibly contributes to the deterrence against both China and North Korea."
His remarks appeared to be suggesting that the Pentagon is not entirely ruling out the possibility of an adjustment to the USFK troop level in an effort to keep an assertive China in check.
"We look forward to working with the new government (of South Korea) following the election next Tuesday, like I said, to make sure that the alliance is strategically sustainable," he said when asked to clarify if there is still a possibility of an adjustment to the USFK troop level.
"As we focus on deterring China, we look forward to working with Seoul to find the best way forward."
Another defense official pointed out that the U.S. examines its global military force posture "every single day," and that there are no changes in the USFK posture for the Pentagon to announce.
The briefing took place on a plane en route to Singapore as the official is accompanying Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in his trip to the city-state, where the Pentagon chief will attend the Shangri-La Dialogue and other meetings on its sidelines.
U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth (L) arrives at an airport in Singapore on May 29, 2025. (Yonhap)
On Saturday morning, Hegseth plans to deliver plenary remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue.
"He will provide an honest overview of threats China poses to the region, (and) underscore our goal is to prevent war by establishing an incredible shield of deterrence with our unmatched network of allies and partners," the official said of the secretary's planned speech.
Hegseth will also discuss how the Pentagon is reestablishing deterrence in the region by expanding the U.S.' force posture, helping its allies and partners strengthen their defense capabilities, and rebuilding its defense industrial base, the official added.
On the margins of the forum, the secretary plans to hold a four-way meeting with his counterparts from Japan, Australia and the Philippines, multilateral talks with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and a series of bilateral talks with his counterparts from Australia, Vietnam and other countries.
This visit to Singapore is the secretary's second trip to the Indo-Pacific following the first in late March.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 29, 2025
2. Rethinking South Korea’s Naval Strategy for a Taiwan Strait Contingency
This is the kind of strategic thinking Korea needs. I hope the next president of the ROK will embrace his recommendations.
Conclusion:
To counter its quantitative disadvantage, South Korea must pursue a strategy centered on qualitative superiority, distributed lethality, and multi-domain integration. The objective is not to match China in fleet tonnage or total BFMs, but rather to make any attempt at maritime aggression prohibitively costly, operationally uncertain, and strategically visible—essentially, a 21st-century form of “sea denial with teeth.” This approach should emphasize the seamless integration of emerging technologies—such as unmanned surface and underwater vehicles (USVs/UUVs)—with existing platforms like Aegis-equipped destroyers and other surface combatants. Incorporating artificial intelligence and manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) capabilities will be critical to maximizing operational efficiency. To evaluate the effectiveness of these hybrid force structures, unconventional testing methods should be explored, including the use of advanced commercial simulation platforms like Command: Modern Operations to model complex combat scenarios and optimize system integration.
Rethinking South Korea’s Naval Strategy for a Taiwan Strait Contingency
https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/rethinking-south-koreas-naval-strategy-for-a-taiwan-strait-contingency/
Opinion - May 26, 2025
By Ju Hyung Kim
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As tensions continue to rise in the Taiwan Strait, discussions have emerged over whether South Korea should deploy naval assets to support US and Japanese operations in the event of a full-scale Chinese military invasion. Some argue that if China imposes a naval blockade around Taiwan, South Korea should contribute to securing sea lines of communication (SLOC) as part of a broader regional response. While it remains unclear what specific actions South Korea would take in such a contingency, it is evident that the strategic responsibilities of the ROK Navy have steadily expanded—despite limited naval resources relative to the scale of potential missions. In 2019, I participated in a study commissioned by the South Korean Navy titled “Regional Naval Modernization Trends and Future Directions for the ROK Navy’s Core Capabilities.” The study aimed to assess what force structure would be adequate not only for the defense of South Korean waters, but also for preventing regional crises from jeopardizing national interests. This article revisits the findings of that study in light of today’s strategic environment (2025) and explores what specific measures South Korea should now consider to meet emerging maritime security challenges.
In the 2019 study, the Republic of Korea Navy’s “core capabilities” were defined as critical elements of naval power essential to protecting the nation’s key strategic interests. Specific naval platforms—such as the Sejong the Great-class Aegis destroyers, the Jang Bogo, Son Won-il, and Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class submarines, and the Dokdo-class amphibious assault ships—were designated as core assets due to their strategic relevance to several major security challenges. These included: 1) the ability to secure vital sea lines of communication critical to South Korea’s energy imports and trade, particularly in the context of potential maritime conflict between the United States and China; 2) the capacity to deter or respond to North Korea’s submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) threats; 3) the capability to counter China’s efforts to assert exclusive control over regional waters through its so-called “interiorization” strategy; and 4) the readiness to defend South Korea’s territorial waters—including the Dokdo/Takeshima island—against Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force.
A multi-method approach was adopted to assess and compare the naval power of neighboring countries and determine the appropriate scale of the Republic of Korea Navy’s (ROKN) core capabilities in the 2019 study. Four primary methodologies were employed: tonnage-based comparison, hull count-based comparison, and two variants of the Battle Force Missile (BFM) methodology.
The tonnage-based comparison is a traditional method that calculates total fleet displacement to estimate the overall size and weight of a navy. This approach has been widely used since the Washington and London Naval Conference and offers a broad understanding of fleet scale. However, it fails to capture qualitative differences among ships with varying sizes and capabilities. The analysis used data from Jane’s Fighting Ships (2018–2019).
The hull count-based method compares the number of major naval platforms each country possesses. It is useful for estimating how many platforms can be rapidly deployed to crisis zones in the event of maritime conflict. While it helps in understanding force availability, it does not account for variations in vessel size or firepower, which may lead to misleading assessments of actual combat capability.
To address the limitations of traditional methods, the study introduced a Battle Force Missile (BFM)-based approach, originally proposed by former US Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work. This method evaluates a fleet’s strength based on the number of offensive missiles it can deploy—such as anti-submarine rocket (ASROC), Harpoon, Tomahawk, and Standard Missiles—excluding short-range self-defense systems like rolling airframe missile (RAM) or evolved sea sparrow missile (ESSM). The BFM method emphasizes the importance of missile firepower in modern naval warfare, especially as smaller ships can now be equipped with high-performance anti-ship missiles. A historical case often cited to support this view is the 1967 sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat by an Egyptian missile boat using four Styx missiles. This event underscored the obsolescence of judging fleet power solely by ship size or gun caliber, highlighting the growing dominance of missile capabilities.
The study also applied an enhanced version of the BFM method—BFM Tiered Analysis—which categorizes platforms into different classes based on their missile loadouts. For instance, vessels carrying over 100 BFMs are classified as Tier 1, those with 90–99 missiles as Tier 2, and so forth down to platforms with fewer than six missiles, which remain unclassified. This tiered system allows for a more granular and realistic comparison of effective firepower across navies. It helps identify not just the total volume of firepower, but also the distribution and concentration of strike capability across a given fleet.
Ultimately, this combined methodological framework—integrating traditional metrics with modern firepower-based assessments—was used to evaluate and compare the naval capabilities of the United States, China, and Russia, and to benchmark the ROK Navy’s core forces accordingly. Emphasis was placed on the BFM approach, which the study regarded as more reflective of the evolving nature of naval warfare in the missile-dominated era.
The 2019 study concluded that, in a scenario where South Korean naval assets are deployed to protect sea lines of communication (SLOC) amid a US-China conflict over the Taiwan Strait—and face resistance from the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy)—South Korea would require a naval force capable of delivering at least 339 BFMs to establish credible deterrence and fulfill its operational objectives. Achieving this missile capacity would necessitate a combination of three key force structure enhancements: 1) the introduction of a light aircraft carrier capable of operating F-35B fighter jets armed with anti-ship missiles; 2) the acquisition of two to three arsenal ships equipped with a high number of vertical launch systems (VLS) optimized for anti-ship strike missions; and 3) the reconfiguration of existing destroyers, such as the KDX-II and KDX-III classes, by prioritizing anti-ship missiles over air-defense missiles in their primary loadouts. Collectively, these measures would provide the ROK Navy with the firepower required to counter Chinese naval forces in a high-intensity SLOC engagement.
Now fast forward to 2025, the strategic environment confronting the South Korean Navy has changed dramatically. Between 2019 and 2025, the PLA Navy has undergone a rapid and extensive buildup, expanding its fleet from roughly 335 to an estimated 395 ships, with projections reaching 435 by 2030. This expansion encompasses a wide array of capabilities, including advanced destroyers, frigates, submarines, amphibious vessels, and logistical support ships. A key highlight of this growth is China’s aircraft carrier program: while operating the Liaoning and Shandong, China has pushed the Fujian (Type 003) into sea trials and commenced construction of a fourth carrier, potentially nuclear-powered (Type 004). Alongside this, the PLA Navy has steadily fielded more sophisticated surface combatants, such as the Type 055 destroyers, and has modernized its submarine fleet. These developments underscore Beijing’s strategic intent to extend its naval reach, assert control over contested maritime areas, and build a world-class blue-water navy—profoundly altering the regional maritime balance and presenting new challenges for South Korea’s naval posture.
Given the evolving strategic environment, South Korea would require a significantly larger set of core naval capabilities—necessitating a fundamental reassessment of the force structure proposed in the 2019 study. However, considering the constraints of the national defense budget, a substantial expansion of high-cost core assets appears to be an impractical solution. Instead, the South Korean Navy must adopt a cost-effective, asymmetric, and network-centric approach to maritime defense.
In light of these limitations, I propose the following six alternative policy recommendations:
First, South Korea should prioritize the development of arsenal ships over full-sized aircraft carriers. These unmanned or minimally crewed surface platforms, equipped with vertical launch systems (VLS), provide substantial firepower at a fraction of the cost associated with traditional carriers. Accelerating the development of multi-role arsenal ships—with integrated strike capabilities, control of unmanned underwater and surface vehicles (UUVs/USVs), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems—would enhance maritime lethality without requiring a full blue-water carrier force.
Second, South Korea should expand its use of unmanned and autonomous systems. Unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) can play key roles in mine countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, and maritime surveillance. Medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) like the MQ-9B SeaGuardian could offer persistent ISR and limited strike capabilities at significantly lower cost than manned aircraft. To maximize effectiveness, these systems should be integrated into a broader C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) architecture, allowing for sustained situational awareness even against numerically superior adversaries.
Third, South Korea should move toward a distributed maritime force posture by investing in a larger number of smaller surface combatants, such as FFX-III-class frigates, corvettes, and high-speed interceptors, rather than focusing solely on large destroyers or carriers. These smaller platforms would enable swarming and multi-axis saturation attacks—tactics well-suited for deterring or countering larger Chinese naval formations in high-threat environments.
Fourth, deepening maritime interoperability with the United States and allied partners is essential. This includes enhancing integration through joint exercises and real-time data sharing via frameworks like the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). Trilateral coordination with the U.S. and Japan in overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and critical transit routes would further enhance maritime ISR coverage and regional defense.
Fifth, South Korea must invest in maritime domain awareness (MDA) infrastructure. This includes the deployment of satellites, over-the-horizon radar, and seabed sensor networks—all vital tools for detecting submarine infiltration and surface incursions before they threaten national waters.
Finally, the strategic use of the Jeju Naval Base and southern islands should be reinforced. Jeju can serve as a power projection hub, providing forward logistics and ISR support. Additionally, transforming key islands into bastions—equipped with anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missile systems, and UAV stations—would help establish layered defense zones in the southern maritime theater.
To counter its quantitative disadvantage, South Korea must pursue a strategy centered on qualitative superiority, distributed lethality, and multi-domain integration. The objective is not to match China in fleet tonnage or total BFMs, but rather to make any attempt at maritime aggression prohibitively costly, operationally uncertain, and strategically visible—essentially, a 21st-century form of “sea denial with teeth.” This approach should emphasize the seamless integration of emerging technologies—such as unmanned surface and underwater vehicles (USVs/UUVs)—with existing platforms like Aegis-equipped destroyers and other surface combatants. Incorporating artificial intelligence and manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) capabilities will be critical to maximizing operational efficiency. To evaluate the effectiveness of these hybrid force structures, unconventional testing methods should be explored, including the use of advanced commercial simulation platforms like Command: Modern Operations to model complex combat scenarios and optimize system integration.
Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, President of the Security Management Institute—a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly—led a study commissioned by the South Korean Navy titled ‘Regional Naval Modernization Trends and Future Directions for the ROK Navy’s Core Capabilities.’
The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.
3. The Risky ‘Side Launch’ That Doomed Kim Jong Un’s New Warship
Imagery is at the link. As a point of reference, South Korea has built many far superior warships (which is why Kim wants to catch up) but I do not recall it ever suffering such a catastrophic failure as Kim did.
The Risky ‘Side Launch’ That Doomed Kim Jong Un’s New Warship
The unconventional technique for launching big military vessels points to North Korea’s haste in modernizing its outdated navy and lack of resources
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/kim-jong-un-warship-launch-method-north-korea-05186298?st=Meoe1S&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
A series of satellite images of the North Korean destroyer at Chongjin port. Photo: Maxar Technologies
By Dasl Yoon
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May 28, 2025 11:00 pm ET
Key Points
What's This?
- Kim Jong Un witnessed a warship topple over during its launch, deploying a risky ‘side launch’ method.
- Naval experts cite inexperience, a rushed timetable and a top-heavy warship as factors in the failed launch.
- North Korea chose a side launch to save costs, while the U.S. and South Korea use safer floating-dock launches.
SEOUL—A week ago, Kim Jong Un traveled to North Korea’s “City of Iron,” home to a major industrial shipyard where a hulking warship awaited him. A VIP podium had been erected alongside the port for the vessel’s launch. Officials waited in anticipation.
But the moment of celebration turned into calamity.
The 5,000-ton destroyer lost its balance as it lurched into the water, toppling over and embarrassing Kim, who seeks to modernize his Soviet-era naval fleet. Four North Korean officials have been detained over the mishap, according to state media, which called it an “unpardonable crime.”
What has become clearer in the aftermath is how an unconventional choice of launch method, Kim’s rushed timetable and a top-heavy warship overladen with weapons systems was a recipe for disaster, according to satellite-imagery analysis, naval experts and North Korea’s official statements.
“I haven’t seen a failure like this one,” said Mark Cancian, a retired Marine colonel now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
‘Side launch’ goes sideways
The 470-feet-long warship—Kim’s second Choe Hyon-class destroyer—had been built at a port in the northeastern city of Chongjin, a major cargo hub near the Russian border. North Korea’s largest steel mill sits nearby. Vessels carrying oil and wheat dot the surrounding waterways.
Days before the May 21 launch, satellite imagery showed the vessel alongside the dock, resting on a sloped ramp designed to slide it side first into the water.
The Choe Hyon-class destroyer sits on the dockside before its failed launch at Chongjin port. Photo: Planet Labs
This setup meant North Korea had chosen to attempt a risky “side launch,” as opposed to other, more common methods. The country hadn’t before been observed attempting the method with other military vessels, according to 38 North, a website that analyzes North Korea. The movement requires precise calculations predicting the ship’s center of gravity and the launch angle.
With Kim looking on, the warship didn’t descend the rails evenly. Instead, only its stern slid into the water, causing the vessel to topple over into the water with its bow remaining on the dockside, according to experts who viewed the satellite images.
North Korea said the accident occurred because of “inexperienced command and operational carelessness.” Naval experts said a miscalculation of how to keep the ship balanced appears likely.
Hambuk Shipyard, Chongjin
May 22, 2025
Chongjin
Hambuk Shipyard
Detail below
Second Choe Hyon-class destroyer under tarps
O-hang Harbor
CHINA
Chongjin
N. KOREA
Sea of Japan
(East Sea)
S. KOREA
Yellow Sea
Unidentified support vessels
Second Choe Hyon-class destroyer under tarps
Unidentified support vessel
Rail-mounted tower crane
VIP pavillion
Crane barge
Telescoping cranes
Note: 11:19 a.m. local time
Sources: CSIS/Beyond Parallel (annotations); Airbus DS 2025 (satellite image)
Blue tarps now cover the warship, concealing from the outside world the extent of the damage. The bottom of the warship wasn’t punctured in the accident, North Korea’s state media reported. Pumping out seawater from the submerged part of the vessel takes several days, North Korean state media said. Getting the ship back upright should be completed by next week.
Even when a side launch is successful, the ship violently bobs back and forth before coming to a standstill. This was the case for the 2013 side launch of the USS Milwaukee, a littoral combat ship, in a video from its manufacturer Lockheed Martin. The Milwaukee is also significantly smaller than the capsized North Korean vessel, at about 3,400 tons and 388-feet long.
The USS Milwaukee is launched sideways into a river in 2013.
Lockheed Martin
The U.S. now generally avoids side launches for large warships, since other options are safer and more stable. South Korea’s military said following the North Korean accident that it avoids the method.
Time pressure
Side launches are commonly used for cargo vessels or tankers, as they have flatter hulls and are therefore easier to balance after being dropped into the water, naval experts said. The method is risky for warships, since their hulls are narrow to maximize speed and they have bulky weapons systems mounted atop them.
To North Korea, a side launch is also a less costly option and requires less advanced equipment than the common alternative, a so-called floating dock launch, in which a dock is filled with water.
This approach is considered safer and more controlled than a side launch, and is how the U.S., South Korea and other military powers typically ease their big warships into water, naval experts said.
It is also the method used by the Kim regime just weeks earlier at a different port, in the west coast city of Nampo, for the launching of the first Choe Hyon-class warship. Nampo’s shipyard is larger and more modern.
Kim was on hand for that launch, too. Standing aboard a vessel draped in North Korean flags, he smiled with his daughter as confetti fell from the sky.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his daughter at the April launch of a Choe Hyon-class warship in Nampo. Photo: KCNA/Reuters
The first Choe Hyon-class destroyer during a weapon-testing exercise. Photo: KCNA/Shutterstock
The North Korean leader’s demands for speed also likely played a role in the accident, said Neil Watts, a former South African navy captain.
“It’s a combination of lack of technical expertise and the pressure to get the ship launched in a short period of time,” said Watts, a former member of the now-disbanded United Nations panel monitoring North Korean sanctions compliance.
The first Choe Hyon-class warship had been built in roughly 400 days, North Korean state media said, with plans to deploy it by early next year. The second began construction about a year ago, according to satellite-imagery analysis of Chongjin port.
That would be a fast turnaround for a country with North Korea’s industrial limitations and inexperience, naval experts said. It typically takes Japan and South Korea about three years to build a frigate or destroyer. Europe takes three to six years and the U.S. often longer.
Moreover, North Korea appeared to have affixed roughly 70 weapons systems atop the destroyer before launch, plus other arms, whereas the U.S., South Korea and others typically mount far fewer and take years to fully equip a military vessel, said Yoon Suk-joon, a retired South Korean navy captain and now senior fellow at the Korea Institute for Military Affairs.
“North Korea got too ambitious,” he said.
Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com
Appeared in the May 29, 2025, print edition as 'Launch Method Doomed Kim’s Warship'.
4. USFK commander rejects speculation on troop cut in Korea, reaffirms commitment
The fundamental point that Koreans need to understand is that the ROK/US Combined Forces Command (CFC), which is charged with deterrence and defense of Korea, will always remain capable of executing that mission in all contingencies. This is the point that must be made. The ROK and US forces that are committed to CFC will remain strong, well trained, and prepared to execute the defense of South Korea and defeat the north Korean people's Army in all conditions. This is the foundation of deterrence. This should be the key talking point stressed by Korean and US commanders and spokespeople as well as political leaders. It would be good for both Korean and US political leaders to talk about the importance of the commitment to CFC's mission rather than simply troop numbers. It is the existence of CFC that provides the second most fear to Kim Jong Un (the worst fear for Kim comes internally from the Korean people in the north). And the bilateral warfighting command is the envy of many countries - certainly every member state of the UN Command recognizes the strength and power of a permanently established combined bilateral command and countries like Japan would like to emulate it in their own way. And it is a powerful example for every friend, partner, and lllu in the Indo-Pacific and its lessons can be an example for countries throughout the region.
Wednesday
May 28, 2025
dictionary + A - A
USFK commander rejects speculation on troop cut in Korea, reaffirms commitment
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-05-28/national/defense/USFK-commander-rejects-speculation-on-troop-cut-in-Korea-reaffirms-commitment/2317952?detailWord=
Published: 28 May. 2025, 19:38
- YOON SO-YEON
- yoon.soyeon@joongang.co.kr
U.S. Gen. Xavier Brunson, the new commander of U.S. Forces Korea, gives a salute as he attends a ceremony with Adm. Kim Myung-soo, chairman of the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the defense ministry in Seoul on Jan. 9, 2025, to welcome the U.S. leader, who also leads the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command. [YONHAP]
U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson dismissed a recent report on a potential troop cut of American troops stationed in South Korea on Wednesday, calling the 28,500-strong USFK a "physical manifestation of the U.S. ironclad commitment."
Brunson's remarks came just days after The Wall Street Journal reported that Washington is considering withdrawing some 4,500 troops, or 16 percent of the command, and relocating them to other locations in the Indo-Pacific, including Guam, as part of an informal policy review yet to be presented to U.S. President Donald Trump.
Related Article
Both Seoul and Washington have denied the report, with the Pentagon calling it "not true" and reaffirming that America remains "fully" committed to the defense of South Korea and strengthening the alliance.
South Korea's defense ministry also ruled out any discussion taking place over the issue, which it stressed is a matter requiring bilateral consultation.
"I've got four hats, truthfully, and one of the hats that I wear is the senior U.S. military officer assigned to the Republic of Korea, and in that role, my job is to speak at the behest of the chairman," Brunson told an online symposium organized by the Institute for Corean-American Studies when asked about the issue.
"The chairman has not called me and told me anything else," he said, referring to the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Incoming commander General Xavier T. Brunson, second from left, receives the United States Forces Korea flag from US Navy admiral Samuel John Paparo, right, commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command, during a change-of-command ceremony for the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek on Dec. 20, 2024. [AFP/YONHAP]
The report came amid speculation that Washington may partially pull out USFK to seek "strategic flexibility" to broaden the command's role to better deal with China's growing assertiveness or potentially request a hike in Seoul's share of stationing American troops in the country.
While Brunson acknowledged that "all things," including changing the force, can be up for discussion in "interwar years" to deal with technological developments and the contemporary operating environment, he underscored the strategic importance of the USFK in an ever-evolving security landscape.
"USFK is the physical manifestation of the U.S. ironclad commitment to the U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty [...] It's a strategic, dynamic presence and deterrent that's forward-postured and incredibly capable," he said.
Depicting South Korea's geographic location in the region as an "aircraft carrier" that sits between the East and West seas, as well as Japan, Brunson stressed that such a strategic presence helps curb Russian threats in the East Sea and Chinese threats in the Yellow Sea.
"No one in the U.S. military is on the Asian continent. I am," the USFK commander said. "No one other than our forces on the peninsula could achieve effects from the peninsula against the adversary in our area."
Against such a backdrop, the USFK commander, who also serves as chief of the U.N. Command (UNC) and the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, highlighted the growing significance of the UNC as a multinational framework.
Incoming commander Gen. Xavier Brunson speaks during a change-of-command ceremony for the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and the United States Forces Korea at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Korea, Friday, Dec. 20, 2024. [AP/YONHAP]
"This multilateralism is in action. It functions, and it works," Brunson said, noting the UNC's composition involving 18 member states that are also members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and AUKUS. "This matters, because if conflict comes, we won't have time to build the team."
The commander said as a means of ensuring "peace through strength," strategic flexibility could involve "sometimes to go into other places" in the face of regional circumstances, mentioning continued Russian and Chinese incursions on the Korean Peninsula.
"We have to move where the problems are that we might ameliorate them," Brunson said.
"We've got to be flexible in our planning, and we absolutely have to be flexible in our execution, because the one good thing that we have here that would allow us to demonstrate strategic flexibility is a strong ROK military, and that's unlike any place else in the world," he said, using the acronym for South Korea's official name.
When asked about whether South Korea should seek its own nuclear armament against North Korea's nuclear threats, Brunson said it is a "sovereign concern" that would be best answered by the winner of the upcoming June 3 presidential election.
Incoming commander General Xavier T. Brunson salutes during a change-of-command ceremony for the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Korea, on Dec. 20, 2024. [EPA/YONHAP]
On combined drills between the allies that will be conducted under the newly elected government, Brunson said talks are under way with the South Korean military to prepare for their annual Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise, usually conducted in August.
Despite denials from both the Korean and U.S. defense ministries, the ripple effects from a Wall Street Journal report suggesting Washington is reviewing a reduction in USFK have not faded.
Speaking at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point on May 24, President Donald Trump reinforced his “America First” message, declaring that “the days of the United States defending every country are over.”
Although Trump added that the United States would use force when its own security or that of its allies is threatened, he made clear that military commitments will depend on U.S. interests. An earlier interim National Defense Strategy under the Trump administration stated that “allies must take primary responsibility for their own security.”
BY YOON SO-YEON, YONHAP [yoon.soyeon@joongang.co.kr]
5. Crash of Navy aircraft in Pohang leaves crew of four dead
Oh no. I have fond memories of the distinct sound of the P3 and how it contributed to our operations in the Philippines. It is such a unique capability that is often overlooked because its contributions to national security do not make the news.
The concern about aging is certainly justified. But The US are still flying B-52s that were built before I was born in the 1950s. We have incredible engineers and maintenance personnel who can sustain these systems almost indefinitely it seems.
Will South Korea seek P-8s from the US? Anti-submarine warfare capabilities are critical to the defense of South Korea as well as the employment of a blue water navy throughout the Indo-Pacific region.
Excerpts:
The P-3 maritime patrol aircraft is used for anti-submarine warfare. It replaced the older S-2 anti-submarine aircraft and has been in operation since 1995. It measures 35 meters (114.8 feet) in length, 30 meters in wingspan, and 11 meters in height, and is equipped with air-to-surface guided missiles, lightweight torpedoes and depth charges.
In 1995, eight P-3C aircraft were introduced, followed by eight P-3CK aircraft — refurbished versions of the U.S. Navy's reserve P-3Bs — starting in 2010. A total of 16 units are currently in operation. Since the aircraft were produced at least as early as the 1990s, concerns about aging have been raised occasionally.
In particular, due to their role in detecting submarines from North Korea and neighboring countries, these patrol aircraft must operate 24/7 over the East and West Seas, raising concerns about airframe fatigue. For this reason, the Navy had planned to introduce six P-8A aircraft, a new-generation patrol aircraft, starting in the second half of this year. The accident occurred just before this upgrade in capability was to be implemented.
If it turns out that the accident was caused by aircraft aging, the Navy may suspend and inspect the entire fleet, which could lead to a gap in anti-submarine operational capabilities.
Thursday
May 29, 2025
dictionary + A - A
Crash of Navy aircraft in Pohang leaves crew of four dead
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-05-29/national/socialAffairs/Crash-of-Navy-aircraft-in-Pohang-leaves-crew-of-four-dead-/2319001
Published: 29 May. 2025, 19:33
Korea JoongAng Daily
Crash of Navy aircraft in Pohang leaves crew of four dead
4 min
Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI
P-3 maritime patrol aircraft [REPUBLIC OF KOREA NAVY]
A P-3 maritime patrol aircraft operated by the Navy crashed in Pohang, North Gyeongsang, killing the entire crew on Thursday. The Navy has launched an investigation to determine the cause of the accident.
The aircraft took off from its base in Pohang at around 1:43 p.m. for takeoff and landing training, but for unknown reasons, it crashed into a hill in Sinjeong-ri at around 1:49 p.m., just seven minutes later, according to the Navy.
Related Article
The aircraft belongs to the Navy's aviation command, with its home base at Jeju Naval Base. It had come to the Pohang Naval Base for training, according to the Navy.
The Navy said four people were on board, including one pilot, who was a major, one captain and two noncommissioned officers. All four bodies were recovered as of 6:35 p.m.
"We have established an accident response headquarters under the direction of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and have suspended all P-3 patrol aircraft operations," said the Navy.
The P-3CK aircraft that crashed had no previously reported structural defects. However, based on eyewitness accounts — such as "the aircraft suddenly nose-dived vertically with a roaring noise and burst into flames" — there are suspicions of maintenance issues or defects due to aging.
Firefighters conduct an extinguishing operation on a P-3C aircraft that crashed in Pohang on May 29. [NEWS1]
Some speculate that a sudden malfunction, such as a failure in the hydraulic system leading to engine shutdown, may have occurred. The P-3CK uses four turboprop (propeller-turbojet) engines, and the possibility that several of these engines suddenly malfunctioned can’t be ruled out.
The aircraft cruised for several minutes after takeoff before suddenly nose-diving, according to military sources. However, the Navy said it is “not presuming any specific causes, such as external factors affecting the aircraft.”
Unlike fighter jets, the P-3, which resembles a passenger aircraft, is equipped with parachutes and other emergency escape gear. However, in this case, it appears the crew had little time to evacuate.
This suggests that the nosedive and subsequent situation developed extremely rapidly. Given that the crash site is near an apartment complex with over 600 households, it is also possible that the pilots made efforts to minimize civilian casualties.
Smoke billows from the site where a Navy maritime patrol aircraft crashed in the southern district of Pohang, North Gyeongsang, on May 29. [YONHAP]
The P-3 maritime patrol aircraft is used for anti-submarine warfare. It replaced the older S-2 anti-submarine aircraft and has been in operation since 1995. It measures 35 meters (114.8 feet) in length, 30 meters in wingspan, and 11 meters in height, and is equipped with air-to-surface guided missiles, lightweight torpedoes and depth charges.
In 1995, eight P-3C aircraft were introduced, followed by eight P-3CK aircraft — refurbished versions of the U.S. Navy's reserve P-3Bs — starting in 2010. A total of 16 units are currently in operation. Since the aircraft were produced at least as early as the 1990s, concerns about aging have been raised occasionally.
In particular, due to their role in detecting submarines from North Korea and neighboring countries, these patrol aircraft must operate 24/7 over the East and West Seas, raising concerns about airframe fatigue. For this reason, the Navy had planned to introduce six P-8A aircraft, a new-generation patrol aircraft, starting in the second half of this year. The accident occurred just before this upgrade in capability was to be implemented.
If it turns out that the accident was caused by aircraft aging, the Navy may suspend and inspect the entire fleet, which could lead to a gap in anti-submarine operational capabilities.
Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
BY LEE YU-JUNG,LEE KEUN-PYUNG [kim.minyoung5@joongang.co.kr]
6. Reimagining the Role of U.S. Forces in Korea
I concur with Dr. Yu,
Excerpts:
Historically, USFK has served as a forward-deployed force focused primarily on deterring North Korean aggression. That mission remains vital, but it is no longer sufficient. The Indo-Pacific has become the principal theater of geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China, and regional security threats are increasingly multidimensional, spanning cyber, space, and the maritime domain. The Trump administration’s repeated calls for allied cost-sharing and its suggestion that U.S. troops could be repositioned if allies failed to meet financial expectations revealed a deeper strategic recalibration: forward presence was to be justified by measurable returns, not by historical legacy.
Rather than resisting this logic, South Korea can seize the opportunity to proactively shape a new strategic narrative for USFK—one that supports deterrence on the Peninsula while contributing to regional stability. A USFK capable of greater operational mobility and regional responsiveness would strengthen the broader Indo-Pacific security architecture. However, this expansion in scope must be accompanied by mutually agreed mechanisms that ensure prior consultation and transparency, particularly in scenarios where U.S. forces based in Korea may be called upon to support contingencies unrelated to North Korea.
...
The challenge for South Korea is not merely to preserve USFK as it is, but to reshape it in a way that reflects the lessons of Trump-era volatility. Security guarantees once taken for granted must now be earned and demonstrated through shared burden, shared vision, and shared capability. The alliance must evolve from a legacy of deterrence to a forward-looking engine of regional stability and strategic alignment.
Reimagining the role of USFK is ultimately about ensuring that it is fit for purpose in the 21st century. That purpose is no longer limited to defending a demilitarized zone—it is about projecting stability in a contested Indo-Pacific, enabling multilateral defense cooperation, and anchoring one of the most important strategic partnerships in the world. Doing so requires both nations to move beyond nostalgia and inertia toward a renewed alliance—one that is resilient, reciprocal, and ready.
My thoughts are here:
Optimizing U.S. and Allied Forces for Deterrence and Defense Throughout Indo-Pacom: From Korea to Australia and Everywhere in Between
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/24/us-allies-deterrence-indo-pacific/
Reimagining the Role of U.S. Forces in Korea
By Jihoon Yu
https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2025/05/28/reimagining_the_role_of_us_forces_in_korea_1112994.html
The evolving role of United States Forces Korea (USFK) must be reassessed in light of fundamental changes in U.S. foreign and security policy introduced during the Trump administration. Characterized by transactional diplomacy, strategic retrenchment, and a strong emphasis on burden-sharing, Trump-era policies challenged traditional alliance dynamics and introduced new uncertainty into U.S. commitments abroad. Nowhere is this more evident than on the Korean Peninsula, where USFK stands at the intersection of deterrence against North Korea and broader strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. Recalibrating the mission and posture of USFK is essential to ensuring that the U.S.-ROK alliance remains resilient, adaptive, and relevant in a transformed security environment.
Historically, USFK has served as a forward-deployed force focused primarily on deterring North Korean aggression. That mission remains vital, but it is no longer sufficient. The Indo-Pacific has become the principal theater of geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China, and regional security threats are increasingly multidimensional, spanning cyber, space, and the maritime domain. The Trump administration’s repeated calls for allied cost-sharing and its suggestion that U.S. troops could be repositioned if allies failed to meet financial expectations revealed a deeper strategic recalibration: forward presence was to be justified by measurable returns, not by historical legacy.
Rather than resisting this logic, South Korea can seize the opportunity to proactively shape a new strategic narrative for USFK—one that supports deterrence on the Peninsula while contributing to regional stability. A USFK capable of greater operational mobility and regional responsiveness would strengthen the broader Indo-Pacific security architecture. However, this expansion in scope must be accompanied by mutually agreed mechanisms that ensure prior consultation and transparency, particularly in scenarios where U.S. forces based in Korea may be called upon to support contingencies unrelated to North Korea.
In parallel, South Korea must grapple with the implications of U.S. transactionalism. The contentious negotiations over the Special Measures Agreement during the Trump years exposed the vulnerabilities of alliance structures overly dependent on U.S. political will. Sustaining U.S. presence now demands not only financial contributions but also strategic alignment. South Korea should frame USFK not merely as a shield for Korean territory, but as an integrated platform that advances shared interests—freedom of navigation, rules-based order, and deterrence against coercive behavior by revisionist powers. This reframing positions Seoul as a co-equal security partner rather than a passive beneficiary.
Modernizing USFK’s posture is also crucial. The current basing structure, centered around large fixed installations like Camp Humphreys, reflects Cold War-era assumptions. However, future security crises are likely to require more agile and dispersed forces capable of rapid deployment across multiple theaters. A flexible posture—supported by rotational deployments, prepositioned assets, and mobile command infrastructure—will better align with evolving operational demands. Such a shift is consistent with U.S. Department of Defense trends under Trump, which favored a global force design that minimizes political friction and enhances mobility.
For South Korea, contributing to this posture transformation through expanded logistical infrastructure, MRO (maintenance, repair, and overhaul) capabilities, and advanced command-
and-control systems will not only enhance alliance resilience but also demonstrate strategic reciprocity. As the ROK military continues to develop blue-water naval capacity and indigenous missile defense, there is growing potential for integrated operations in a regional or even global context.
Nevertheless, the principle of strategic flexibility remains politically sensitive. South Korea has legitimate concerns about being drawn into regional conflicts without clear alignment with its national interests. The Trump administration’s approach—often unilateral and abrupt—magnified these fears. Going forward, a stable framework for strategic flexibility must be institutionalized. This includes formalized protocols for allied decision-making, scenario-based joint planning, and redlines for regional contingencies. Such mechanisms can ensure that operational flexibility does not come at the expense of alliance trust or South Korean sovereignty.
Despite the Trump administration’s skepticism of multilateralism, the long-term security of the Indo-Pacific depends increasingly on interoperable partnerships. Here too, USFK has an important role to play. As the only permanent forward-deployed U.S. force on the Asian mainland, it can serve as a node for multilateral cooperation involving Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and NATO partners with growing interests in Indo-Pacific security. Hosting multilateral exercises, logistics coordination, and shared intelligence platforms within Korea can elevate the country’s strategic relevance far beyond the Peninsula.
The challenge for South Korea is not merely to preserve USFK as it is, but to reshape it in a way that reflects the lessons of Trump-era volatility. Security guarantees once taken for granted must now be earned and demonstrated through shared burden, shared vision, and shared capability. The alliance must evolve from a legacy of deterrence to a forward-looking engine of regional stability and strategic alignment.
Reimagining the role of USFK is ultimately about ensuring that it is fit for purpose in the 21st century. That purpose is no longer limited to defending a demilitarized zone—it is about projecting stability in a contested Indo-Pacific, enabling multilateral defense cooperation, and anchoring one of the most important strategic partnerships in the world. Doing so requires both nations to move beyond nostalgia and inertia toward a renewed alliance—one that is resilient, reciprocal, and ready.
Jihoon Yu is the director of external cooperation and an associate research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.
7. South Korea reports unintentional gunfire at DMZ; no response from North
Unfortunately "stuff" happens.
There is of course no excuse for a negligent discharge. But on the positive side it is good to note that weapons are loaded and prepared to fire.
South Korea reports unintentional gunfire at DMZ; no response from North
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · May 29, 2025
A portion of the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea is pictured on May 24, 2017. (Aaron Kidd/Stars and Stripes)
A South Korean soldier accidentally fired a machine gun round near the border with the North on Wednesday, marking the second such incident in less than a month, according to the South’s military.
The discharge occurred around 5 p.m. at a guard post in the western section of the Demilitarized Zone, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a text message to reporters Thursday.
The military said it immediately notified North Korean authorities and observed “no unusual activity” in response.
South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense did not respond to multiple phone calls seeking further information Thursday.
The round was fired from a K6 heavy machine gun, South Korea’s variant of the U.S. military’s M2 .50-caliber weapon, according to a report by Yonhap News Agency. The K6 can fire up to 600 rounds per minute at a maximum range of 8,100 yards, according to the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command.
The heavily fortified DMZ, which is 2 ½ miles wide and stretches about 160 miles across the Korean Peninsula, is dotted with guard posts maintained by both sides. These posts, often concealed by dense foliage, are designed to detect and deter potential incursions.
Wednesday’s incident is the latest in a series of accidental discharges involving the K6.
On April 27, a South Korean soldier accidentally fired a single round from one of the guns at another guard post within the DMZ. That round struck a reinforced door, likely preventing it from crossing into North Korean territory, according to the military.
A similar incident occurred on Jan. 28, 2023, when a South Korean soldier fired four rounds from a KR-6 — a remotely operated variant of the K6 — near the border.
On May 2, 2020, soldiers from both Koreas exchanged gunfire across the border. While no injuries were reported, a subsequent United Nations Command found that both sides had violated the armistice agreement by firing weapons at each other. The investigation was inconclusive in determining which side initiated the exchange.
David Choi
David Choi
David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.
8. South Korean students warned over social media posts amid Trump administration crackdown
Again, why are we giving the appearance that we are treating allies like enemies?
South Korean students warned over social media posts amid Trump administration crackdown
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/05/29/asia-pacific/politics/south-korea-students-social-media-trump/
The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has sought to ramp up deportations and revoke student visas as part of wide-ranging efforts to meet its hard-line immigration agenda. | REUTERS
By Ju-min Park
Reuters
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May 29, 2025
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SEOUL – President Donald Trump's administration is raising scrutiny over the social media posts of South Korean students in the United States or who plan to study there, the students and agencies that support them said.
That has triggered concerns for parents of students studying or planning to study in the United States. South Korean students are the third-largest among international students in the U.S., behind those from India and China.
The U.S. administration ordered its missions abroad to stop scheduling new appointments for student and exchange visitor visa applicants as the State Department prepared to expand social media vetting of foreign students, according to an internal cable seen by Reuters on Tuesday.
The Trump administration has sought to ramp up deportations and revoke student visas as part of wide-ranging efforts to meet its hard-line immigration agenda.
"My clients, parents are calling me constantly today to figure out what is going on," said Park Hyuntae, head of Worldnet U.S. Overseas Edu Center, an agency in Seoul that assists South Korean students.
"Those who already scheduled those interviews and will apply for interviews both are worried, nervous, but cancellations of existing interviews haven’t happened yet as far as I know."
Park said the visa interview pause could cause delays in starting the school year, and that he was advising clients to be cautious over what they post online.
"I am telling them, especially male students, do not post anything extreme or disgusting on social media, like pictures of grenades or weapons,” he said.
An email from a liberal arts college told students overseas that scheduled visa interviews might be postponed and suggested they gave their "socials a little attention."
Stiff competition to get into South Korea's top universities has driven many students to study abroad, according to the U.S. International Trade Administration.
One South Korean student who studies in the United States said he had friends who were unable to schedule visa interviews, and that he was concerned about his own plans to try to work in the United States after graduation.
"I think what is now the United States is a lot different than the United States in the past," he said, asking not to be identified.
9. US shouldn’t reduce troops in South Korea without consulting Seoul, senator says
I applaud Senator Kim's support for sustaining US troops in Korea. But we must not be trapped into a purely numbers game. The Pentagon and Indo-Pacom and USFK must provide our national command authority with options to address multiple US security interests in the region and around the world. Rather than focus on simply numbers we need to recognize that it is our commitment to deterrence and defense that is important and their are myriad ways to do that in Korea, throughout the region and throughout the world. We need to address our entire force posture in the region to ensure we have forces in the right place with the strategic agility to address contingencies (sometime multiple) with the right forces, with the right capabilities, at the right time, and in the right place. Again this takes strategic agility while looking at the Indo-P{acific security issues holistically AND in cooperation with the silk web of our alliances. This should be our overall consideration while ensure we deter war in the critical locations, Taiwan, the South China Sea, the East Philippine Sea, the Philippines, Japan, the Kuril Islands, the Senakaus, AND the Korean Peninsula. And to deter war we must have the capability to defend US interests.
US shouldn’t reduce troops in South Korea without consulting Seoul, senator says
Democrat Andy Kim emphasizes role of US forces in countering North Korea following report that Pentagon weighing changes
https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/us-shouldnt-reduce-troops-in-south-korea-without-consulting-seoul-senator-says/
Jooheon Kim May 29, 2025
A U.S. soldier throwing a practice grenade | Image: U.S. Forces Korea via Facebook (April 14, 2025)
A U.S. senator has voiced opposition to any reduction in U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) without coordination with South Korea, following a report that the Pentagon is considering decreasing the number of troops stationed on the peninsula to deter North Korean attack.
“I would oppose any substantial cuts that are done without deep consultation with Congress as well as our South Korean partners,” Democrat Andy Kim said during a press conference with ROK media on Wednesday.
“And what I continue to tell the Trump administration is that, U.S. troops in South Korea, it’s not just about to the benefit of South Korea. It is to the United States’ benefit as well.”
In a statement released last week, the senator from New Jersey emphasized that a strong U.S. military presence remains crucial against “North Korean threats and a challenging neighborhood.” He urged Trump to “listen to military leaders” and maintain support for this key ally during “a critical time in the Indo-Pacific.”
His comments follow a report by The Wall Street Journal that the Pentagon is weighing a plan to reduce the USFK by 4,500 troops.
South Korea subsequently said that it had not discussed such an option with the U.S., and a Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell also denied the report, calling the withdrawal claims “untrue.”
However, USFK Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson also said at an event on Tuesday that the Pentagon has not discussed such a reduction with him and that the size of the U.S. troop presence in South Korea remains unchanged.
Current U.S. law under the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which oversees the annual defense budget and policy, mandates that USFK troop levels remain at least at 28,500.
In response to questions about the upcoming South Korean presidential election, Senator Kim reportedly said he is ready to work with the next administration to continue advancing the strategic relationship with Washington, regardless of who is elected.
The snap presidential election to replace impeached President Yoon Suk-yeol is set for June 3, with opposition candidate Lee Jae-myung widely expected to win.
South Korea’s next leader will have to guide the country through tricky geopolitical terrain, particularly as Trump remakes U.S. strategy in Asia to center on containing China. As part of this, some members of his administration have suggested that South Korea should take on more responsibility for defending against North Korea so USFK can focus more on Beijing and potential Taiwan contingencies.
Last November, Kim became the first Korean American to be elected to the U.S. Senate.
Edited by Bryan Betts
10. Get Ready for a Big, Bold, and Very Bad North Korea Deal
I guess Victor is not in the running for the US Ambassador to South Korea or any position in the administration.
This conclusion is a brutal forecast of what must not happen.
Excerpts:
When it comes to North Korea, the United States cannot return to its policy conventions of the past—not even those from Trump’s first term. North Korea is stronger militarily than it has ever been, and with Chinese and Russian support, Kim will not succumb to economic pressure campaigns. Washington’s idleness over the past four years allowed North Korea to fight a war in Europe on Russia’s behalf, in return receiving weapons technology that deepens the nuclear threat it poses to the U.S. homeland. Doing nothing is not an option.
A U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula that might once have been regarded as dangerous and far-fetched is now within the realm of possibility under Trump. An “America first” Korea policy would likely include bold and mold-breaking measures—concessions that no other U.S. president would proffer. But Trump will not be satisfied with doing nothing on North Korea, and these radical steps might be just the ones that he would consider necessary in this changed context. The United States cannot afford to ignore Kim any longer, and after three failed summits during Trump’s first term, a fourth will have to produce tangible results rather than empty words. Those results may not sit well with many. Trump’s obsession with winning the Nobel Peace Prize, his desire to end the fighting in Ukraine, and his unique “bromance” with Kim could lead him to make a deal that recognizes North Korea’s nuclear status, sells out allies, and appeases Putin—all in the name of putting “America first.”
I will reiterate my thoughts on a "Two PLus Three Strategy" here:
President Trump did something during his first term that no president had done: “He gave it a shot.” He met Kim and he offered him a future. But it was Kim Jong Un who failed to appreciate the opportunity he had. Now in his second term President Trump has the opportunity to implement new elements of policy and strategy that have never before been attempted. These include a human rights upfront approach that keeps human rights on all agendas, a sophisticated and holistic information campaign, and the support for the Korean people's pursuit of a free and unified Korea. There are few pundits who see the opportunities that both South Korea with its 8.15 Unification Doctrine and Kim Jong Un with his new hostile policy toward the South are providing to the U.S. and ROK/U.S. alliance. It is time to recognize that the only path to denuclearization is through unification. Most importantly, the prevention of war and nuclear use, and the long term outcome on the Korean peninsula are important to the national security and national prosperity of the U.S.
–– The long term “Two Plus Three strategy” of the U.S. must rest on these two traditional efforts:
(1) the foundation of military deterrence To Prevent War as the vital US national interest and;
(2) “strategic strangulation” – the well-executed use of sanctions and all instruments of national power to prevent weapons proliferation, cyber-attacks, and global illicit activities to support the regime.
––The radical new strategy must consist of three pillars to support the Korean people in the north to create the conditions for change inside north Korea:
(1) a human rights upfront approach (emphasizing the fundamental human right of self-determination of government per the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights);
(2) an information and influence campaign to inform and educate the Korean people in the north about their human rights and provide them practical knowledge for how to take collective action and create the conditions for change;
3) support to the Korean people on both sides of the DMZ as they seek to solve the Korean question and establish a free and unified Korea, a new nation, a United Republic of Korea (ROK).
The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program, military threats, and the crimes against humanity is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a free and unified Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, free market principles, and human rights as determined by the Korean people: A free and unified Korea or in short, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK). Again, Kim can change or be changed.
Get Ready for a Big, Bold, and Very Bad North Korea Deal
Foreign Affairs · by More by Victor Cha · May 29, 2025
Trump Wants a Win, and Kim Has More Leverage Than Ever
May 29, 2025
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visiting a military training base in North Korea, April 2025 Korean Central News Agency / Reuters
VICTOR CHA is D. S. Song–Korea Foundation Chair and University Professor at Georgetown University, President of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and author of The Black Box: Demystifying the Study of Korean Unification and North Korea. He served on the Defense Policy Board during the Biden administration and as Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council during the George W. Bush administration.
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Donald Trump’s return to the White House has shaken up U.S. approaches to trade, Ukraine, the Middle East, and more. But so far, the Trump administration has paid little attention to North Korea even as the rogue dictatorship has grown stronger and more provocative. Just this year, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has conducted five missile tests, stolen $1.5 billion in cryptocurrency, sent more troops to support Russia’s brutal war of aggression in Ukraine, and unveiled his military’s largest modern missile destroyer, a 5,000-ton warship equipped with state-of-the-art armament. Kim has filled his coffers by selling billions of dollars’ worth of arms to Russia, improved his military with lessons learned from the Ukraine war, and buttressed his aerial, missile, naval, and nuclear forces with Moscow’s technical support and hardware transfers.
Leaving North Korea to its own devices will not end well. Left unchallenged, the country could perform more nuclear tests; strengthen its ties with China, Iran, and Russia; and build more advanced weapons that could credibly threaten the U.S. homeland. During the first hundred days of Trump’s first and second presidencies, Pyongyang has undertaken more belligerent acts against the United States and South Korea than it has during any same period since the Nixon administration. It would be national security malpractice to ignore such ominous signals.
The Trump administration needs to restart dialogue with North Korea to arrest these developments. The question is how. Any U.S. government internal policy review predictably would condemn the failures of past policies, and with good reason: North Korea conducted a record 162 provocations, including missile tests, bombings, and incursions into South Korea, during the Biden administration—more than during the three previous administrations combined. Trump, by contrast, has touted his “great relationship” with the North Korean leader, built during three summit meetings in his first term, first in Singapore, in 2018, then in Hanoi and in the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea, in 2019. But there has been no substantive engagement between the two countries’ leaders since then, leaving the North Koreans free to operate at will to the detriment of U.S. and allied security interests. Trump, ever the performative dealmaker, is unlikely to let this lie for long. And with “America first” priorities taking over the U.S. foreign policy agenda, Trump might be willing to make significant compromises to get a deal with Kim. That objective is the right one; achieving it is a wholly different matter. North Korea enjoys far more leverage now than it has in the recent past. For it to accept constraints and sign on to an agreement with the United States, Washington may have to offer Pyongyang big concessions, courting risks to its own national security and shocking its allies.
TURNING TABLES
North Korea is in a rather different place now than it was in 2018 and 2019 when Trump first engaged with Kim. For one, Russian leader Vladimir Putin is currently providing North Korea with everything that Kim could have wanted and more—food, fuel, hard currency, military technology, and a June 2024 defense treaty and security guarantee that harkens back to Cold War days. This has been especially key for Kim, given the desperate state of North Korea’s economy after its three-and-a-half-year COVID-19 lockdown. Kim has also been emboldened by the growing alignment among China, Iran, and Russia to act in concert to undermine global order. The UN sanctions regime against North Korea has been effectively dismantled due to Russia’s 2024 veto of the renewal of UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which had mandated a bevy of economic sanctions against North Korea after its October 2006 nuclear test and established a UN panel to monitor sanctions compliance by all UN member states. Today, neither Beijing nor Moscow is abiding by any UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea. As a result, trade in everything from seafood to oil is flowing across the Chinese and Russian borders into North Korea.
Pyongyang has significantly augmented its weapons arsenal since Kim and Trump met seven years ago, with an estimated 50 nuclear weapons, including miniaturized tactical nuclear warheads, and enough fissile material for an additional 40 weapons, according to public estimates. Kim’s arsenal continues to expand with solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, strategic reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles, and tactical nuclear and nuclear-powered submarines. The international community’s failure to stop North Korea’s arms proliferation since the last attempt at an agreement collapsed in 2009 has allowed Pyongyang to acquire a modern arsenal of this size and scope. Kim has more cards and more leverage than ever before.
For the United States, this new context makes reengaging with North Korea along old lines effectively pointless. Past efforts, such as the 1994 Agreed Framework during the Clinton administration or the George W. Bush administration–led Six Party talks in 2005, which both resulted in North Korea agreeing to take incremental steps toward denuclearization in return for energy and sanctions relief, won’t serve as guidebooks now. Each agreement ultimately failed to win North Korea’s commitment to genuine denuclearization. Moreover, North Korea is flush with economic support from Russia and China. Even though Pyongyang and Moscow stopped reporting trade figures at the start of the Ukraine war, satellite imagery published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies shows unprecedented levels of grain and fuel pouring southward by rail from Russia into North Korea. In addition, total bilateral trade between Beijing and Pyongyang grew 24 percent year-over-year in the first quarter of 2025, the highest since North Korea’s COVID reopening in 2023.
North Korea provides half of the munitions Russia is using in its war in Ukraine.
Kim will not preemptively surrender all nuclear capabilities in return for benefits and security. Although the United States achieved such a position with Libya in 2003, that country had only nuclear precursors and no finished weapons; Kim, on the other hand, has scores of weapons and ambitions to grow his stockpile to the size of France’s or the United Kingdom’s. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, moreover, has reminded Kim that willingly giving up one’s nuclear weapons, as Ukraine did in the 1990s, can have unfavorable consequences. (Kim presumably also saw the grisly fate that met Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi after he scrapped his nuclear weapons program.)
Nor will just relying on maximum pressure work. Squeezing North Korea’s economy—as the Obama, first Trump, and Biden administrations tried to do—has been made impossible by Russia’s and China’s noncompliance with international sanctions. Even if extended to financial and cryptocurrency sanctions, the strategy would have no teeth without Moscow’s and Beijing’s cooperation. Moreover, North Korea has proved itself to be supremely resilient. It survived more than three years of a COVID-19 border shutdown with China, its main trading partner, suggesting the regime can endure even the toughest of sanctions.
Trump is the only U.S. president to have tried summit diplomacy with Kim, but this failed. Negotiations went nowhere in part because Trump focused less on the details of denuclearization than on glad-handing the North Korean leader, hoping that direct contact, friendship, and trust building would encourage Kim to work with, rather than against, the United States. But Kim makes decisions based not on mutual trust but cold calculations of self-interest. Trump should not imagine that his bonhomie will somehow sour Kim on a lucrative relationship with Russia or convince the North Korean leader to cede the tremendous leverage he now enjoys.
REACHING THE SUMMIT
The pageantry associated with a possible fourth summit meeting could be irresistible for Trump, and he has already signaled his openness to such talks when asked about it by the press. But it is unclear how Washington could get Kim to the table to make a deal. Lifting sanctions is no longer as attractive an incentive as it was in 2018, given the collapse of the UN sanctions regime. Nor can Trump rely only on his powers of persuasion to effectuate a deal. Instead, he must enlarge the scope of incentives that a possible agreement could include, and he must be realistic about what is achievable in terms of disarming North Korea in the remainder of his presidential term.
Rather than the step-by-step process Washington undertook during negotiations with North Korea in 1994 and 2005, the Trump administration would likely view nuclear negotiations with North Korea through an “America first” prism, focusing less on nuclear disarmament and more on reducing the most proximate threats to the U.S. homeland. The core of such an agreement would be a ban on North Korea’s nuclear weapons tests, ICBM development, and fissile material production. The United States would also likely want Pyongyang to pledge not to provide weapons technology to Middle Eastern states (namely, to Iran) and nonstate actors. In making such a deal, the Trump administration would likely forgo negotiating on difficult but traditional denuclearization objectives that are important to regional allies, including disarming North Korea of hundreds of short-range missiles and thousands of artillery tubes that threaten Japan and South Korea but not the United States. Such a turn would generate fears of abandonment in Tokyo and Seoul, as well as other allied capitals both in the region and around the world.
An “America first” agenda might also seek to expand the deal beyond the Korean peninsula rather than narrow it, linking peace in Northeast Asia to peace in Ukraine. Stopping the supply of North Korean troops and ammunition to Russia, which have accounted for 50 percent of Russian munitions used in the war, according to Reuters, and allowed Putin to retake lost territory in Kursk, would help Trump decrease U.S. spending in Ukraine and push Putin to stop fighting. A cease-fire in Europe would be better sustained if the Russian military was no longer bolstered by North Korean military supplies.
PENINSULAR PARADIGMS
What could the United States possibly give to North Korea to attain these objectives? The plausible answers are both unprecedented and worrisome. For example, Trump might abandon the goal of denuclearization in favor of arms control—a long-sought North Korean objective. What Pyongyang truly craves from Washington is de facto acceptance that North Korea is a nuclear weapons state. Even though this would not provide material benefits, it is arguably more important for Pyongyang. Even in the Six Party talks almost two decades ago, where I served on the U.S. delegation, North Korean interlocutors rejected denuclearization as the premise of negotiations, instead favoring arms control and threat reduction talks between two established nuclear powers—as some said, “just like the United States did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War.”
Whether intentional or not, Trump’s statements already intimate such a view. Despite the State Department’s standard reference to denuclearization of the Korean peninsula as U.S. policy, Trump’s persistent references to North Korea as “a nuclear power,” as well as Secretary of State and interim National Security Adviser Marco Rubio’s characterization of a “nuclear-armed North Korea” effectively change three decades of U.S. policy of denying the regime’s nuclear status. This subtle but significant shift in language may make Kim more willing to engage with Washington.
This language alone, however, would not suffice for a deal. If the Trump administration wanted to achieve the objectives described above—stopping North Korean nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests, fissile material production, proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, and troop commitments and arms shipments to Russia—it would probably have to contend with Pyongyang’s call for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from the peninsula. As anathema as this would be to Washington’s alliance with Seoul, Trump has long been ambivalent toward U.S. troops in Korea—in 2011, for example, long before he entered politics, Trump said, “Why should we secure and bring great safety to all of these very wealthy nations that rip us off consistently, like as an example, South Korea and others, and not get paid for it? Why are we their security guard?” During his first term, he wanted to withdraw troops from both Afghanistan and South Korea, according to the journalist Bob Woodward. It is not at all implausible that a Trumpian Korea policy would want to end the 75 years of U.S. entanglement in the conflict there, bringing troops home (or deploying them elsewhere) and declaring peace on the peninsula. Trump’s predilections may also converge with the Pentagon’s purported plans to direct U.S. forces in Korea away from peninsular deterrence and toward defending Taiwan. The prospect of ending two wars—one in Asia and one in Europe—coupled with his infatuation with the Nobel Peace Prize, may be enough to compel Trump to take such unprecedented steps.
REGIONAL RESET
Such a deal, though possible, would raise intense abandonment fears in South Korea. Never one for respecting alliance traditions, however, Trump could alleviate some of these fears by breaking long-held taboos in alliance politics. For example, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea would amplify local calls for the country to get nuclear weapons of its own. Trump might support this move by renegotiating existing civil nuclear agreements to allow for enrichment and reprocessing, granting Seoul the fissile material for nuclear bombs while stopping short of weaponization. Nuclear latency would enhance South Korea’s ability to deter threats on the peninsula, thereby allowing the United States to focus on the threat from China.
As an added confidence-building measure for the alliance, Trump could double down on his interest in closing the shipbuilding gap with China by promoting South Korean and Japanese shipbuilding to fill interim U.S. demand for a strategic commercial fleet, and by commissioning allied shipyards to service U.S. ships. Incorporating allied help in closing the naval balance of power gap with China would be welcome, given U.S. backlogs and domestic restrictions.
While satisfying some of Seoul’s concerns and advancing certain U.S. interests in Asia, such measures would be tied to Trump’s “America first” foreign policy vision. As analyst Taehwa Hong noted in The National Interest in early May, to make the U.S.–South Korean alliance more profitable for the United States, Trump might advocate a new burden-sharing agreement in which South Korea supplies the United States with weapons and munitions as a form of supplemental payment for the alliance (in addition to the approximately $1 billion in annual payments it makes for the nonpersonnel costs of stationing U.S. troops there). Transfers of high-quality weapons and munitions, subsidized by the South Korean government, would greatly boost U.S. stockpiles and prevent defense industrial shortfalls.
Trump could even declare a new Eurasian “deal of the century,” pursuing joint investments with Japan and South Korea to turn the railway connection between Russia and North Korea—long dormant but revived in 2022 to supply Russia with arms for its war in Ukraine—from facilitating the transport of weapons to that of other goods, extending that commercial and energy link even to South Korea. An international project to refurbish these networks through to Seoul and beyond would fulfill Moscow’s long-held aspirations to connect the Russian Far East to Northeast Asian economies. The railway would provide revenue to North Korea and would promote long-stymied inter-Korean economic engagement. The sheer size of the deal, the potential commercial opportunities it could provide Trump’s family businesses, and the performative aspect of authoring such a major geostrategic bargain could encourage the president to get it done.
HIGH STAKES
When it comes to North Korea, the United States cannot return to its policy conventions of the past—not even those from Trump’s first term. North Korea is stronger militarily than it has ever been, and with Chinese and Russian support, Kim will not succumb to economic pressure campaigns. Washington’s idleness over the past four years allowed North Korea to fight a war in Europe on Russia’s behalf, in return receiving weapons technology that deepens the nuclear threat it poses to the U.S. homeland. Doing nothing is not an option.
A U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula that might once have been regarded as dangerous and far-fetched is now within the realm of possibility under Trump. An “America first” Korea policy would likely include bold and mold-breaking measures—concessions that no other U.S. president would proffer. But Trump will not be satisfied with doing nothing on North Korea, and these radical steps might be just the ones that he would consider necessary in this changed context. The United States cannot afford to ignore Kim any longer, and after three failed summits during Trump’s first term, a fourth will have to produce tangible results rather than empty words. Those results may not sit well with many. Trump’s obsession with winning the Nobel Peace Prize, his desire to end the fighting in Ukraine, and his unique “bromance” with Kim could lead him to make a deal that recognizes North Korea’s nuclear status, sells out allies, and appeases Putin—all in the name of putting “America first.”
VICTOR CHA is D. S. Song–Korea Foundation Chair and University Professor at Georgetown University, President of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and author of The Black Box: Demystifying the Study of Korean Unification and North Korea. He served on the Defense Policy Board during the Biden administration and as Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council during the George W. Bush administration.
Foreign Affairs · by More by Victor Cha · May 29, 2025
11. An intransigent North Korea slips from the spotlight in ROK presidential race
That is because "it's the economy, stupid" when it comes to election campaigns.
Will there be a "northern wind" before June 3d and if so who will benefit?
An intransigent North Korea slips from the spotlight in ROK presidential race
Candidates have shunned inter-Korean policy amid voter apathy, but DPRK nukes still lurk behind key security debates
https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/an-intransigent-north-korea-slips-from-the-spotlight-in-rok-presidential-race/
Jeongmin Kim May 29, 2025
Lee Jae-myung, Kim Moon-soo and an image released on state television of a KN-24 short-range ballistic missile launch | Images: Democratic Party (May 2025), People Power Party (May 2025), KCTV (Jan. 18, 2022)
North Korea has long been at the center of South Korean politics, with past presidential elections shaped by debates about leader-level summits, international sanctions, preemptive strike capabilities and inter-Korean cooperation.
But in the lead-up to this year’s snap election, the DPRK has arguably never been further from the domestic political zeitgeist.
While major candidates have deployed North Korea as a rhetorical cudgel, likening one another to dictators like Kim Jong Un, neither has placed policy toward Pyongyang a core part of their campaign. This marks a sharp contrast with 2017, when Moon Jae-in campaigned on engagement, or 2022, when Yoon Suk-yeol emphasized preemptive strike strategies.
The reason for this is clear: Voters do not appear to rank the DPRK among the issues that most concern them, with foreign policy and defense appearing as low priorities, likely reflecting rising skepticism that either engagement or deterrence can bring about the North’s denuclearization.
Instead, the election has focused on crisis management in the wake of Yoon’s martial law and impeachment, as well as stabilizing the economy and addressing broader political uncertainty following Donald Trump’s return. The result has been a race in which the candidates’ inter-Korean policies appear closer than ever.
Yet while not the center of attention, North Korea and its weapons of mass destruction still lurk behind many of the issues that have defined the race, foremost among them whether Seoul needs nuclear weapons of its own.
Lee Jae-mying (left) and Kim Moon-soo (right) against a background of Kim Jong Un standing before a large replica of Seoul during his visit to the Kim Jong Il University of Military and Politics | Images: Rodong Sinmun (April 2024), Democratic Party (April 2025), People Power Party (May 2025), edited by NK News
ONE REBRANDS, ONE REINCARNATES
North Korea’s diminished role in this election is most visible in how the candidates have repositioned themselves relative to their parties’ traditional approaches to inter-Korean ties.
Democratic Party (DP) candidate Lee Jae-myung’s campaign has strategically ditched progressive engagement orthodoxy. Gone are the 2017-style pledges for inter-Korean summits or reactivating economic cooperation projects that defined Moon Jae-in’s presidency.
Lee didn’t even mention North Korea when he launched his third presidential bid in April — a notable omission given his past emphasis on peace diplomacy.
Most tellingly, Lee has adopted U.S.-aligned terminology, such as “North Korean denuclearization” instead of the progressive-favored “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
He also excluded inter-Korean summits from his pledges and has embraced conservative military concepts like the three-axis defense system, which was the centerpiece of his rival Yoon Suk-yeol’s presidency.
Despite this, Lee has still tried to woo traditional progressives by emphasizing the importance of dialogue with North Korea and promising tension-reducing measures like restoring military hotlines.
Asked about inter-Korean summits this week, he said “it’s something that should naturally be done” while cautioning that it will be “very difficult” at present. “But we should naturally prepare and make it possible,” he added.
Interestingly, Lee has also directly promised to push for improvements in North Korean human rights, unlike other progressives who have typically avoided the issue due to fears of obstructing inter-Korean dialogue.
In contrast to Lee, Kim Moon-soo has essentially promised to maintain the hardline positions of the Yoon administration, even going further by advocating nuclear sharing and tactical weapons deployment.
This dynamic illustrates how the focus is less on North Korea policy and proposing solutions than domestic political maneuvering: Kim is hoping to rally the PPP base by backing Yoon positions, while Lee is shifting right in an effort to appeal to the disaffected conservatives angered by Yoon’s declaration of martial law.
Lee’s centrist pivot has proven electorally successful, with polls showing him in a commanding lead for months and his support even growing in the conservative southeast region.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in front of a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile | Image: Rodong Sinmun
NUCLEAR DEBATE
Despite the general neglect of inter-Korean issues, North Korea has loomed over one of the race’s most substantive policy debates: whether South Korea should pursue its own nuclear capabilities.
The PPP’s Kim has made nuclear armament a centerpiece of his official platform, proposing NATO-style nuclear sharing arrangements and redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to restore “nuclear balance” with North Korea. He also advocates nuclear latency options like uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, which he has framed as legal under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
These positions reflect broader trends in South Korean conservative circles over the past two years and resonate with older conservative voters amid growing skepticism of U.S. security guarantees.
Lee Jae-myung has pushed back strongly, warning of diplomatic isolation and damage to the alliance with Washington. He argues that Yoon’s nuclear rhetoric already strained bilateral trust and contributed to South Korea’s designation as a “sensitive country” by the Biden administration.
The nuclear debate illustrates how North Korea has shifted from being a central campaign issue to serving as the backdrop for broader strategic disagreement, functioning as a stand-in for anxiety over South Korea’s strategic dependence in an era of transactionalism and U.S.-China competition.
Donald Trump shaking hands with Vladimir Putin | Image: Trump White House Archived via Flickr (July 16, 2018)
ALLIANCE HEALTH
Closely tied to the nuclear debate are questions about the health of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, especially since Donald Trump’s return. The candidates have turned alliance management into both a policy platform and a political weapon.
Kim has accused Lee of being “anti-American” and in extension, soft on North Korea, referencing Lee’s 2017 critiques of the THAAD missile interceptor deployment and his past statements seen as sympathetic to China.
He has also seized on accusations that Lee facilitated illicit remittances to Pyongyang, a charge he denies but which surfaced in all three televised debates, to argue that Washington will see Lee as someone who has defied U.S. and U.N. sanctions.
Lee, in turn, has criticized Kim’s understanding of alliance diplomacy, arguing his approach to nuclear weapons risks undermining U.S. trust. He has embraced the U.S.-ROK alliance as the “fundamental” pillar of national security, even endorsing trilateral security cooperation with Japan as serving South Korea’s national interests.
What’s different in 2025 is that these alliance-related attacks have shifted from more substantive debates over specific issues, such as THAAD or the jurisdiction of the U.S. Forces Korea and the U.N. Command in the past, to more performative displays of who can appear more trustworthy to Washington.
U.S. President Donald Trump, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, and then-ROK President Moon Jae-in outside the Freedom House at the Demilitarized Zone on June 30, 2019 | Image: Trump White House Archives via Flickr
PERIPHERAL BUT PERSISTENT
The lack of focus on North Korea in the 2025 presidential race is striking given how the election came about.
Yoon cited the need to crack down on “anti-state” and “pro-North Korea” forces when he declared martial law, following a period of heightened tensions surrounding drone intrusions, loudspeaker broadcasts and trash balloons.
Pyongyang’s muted response since then — avoiding major military activities at the border or efforts to take advantage of the power vacuum in Seoul — likely helped defuse public anxiety about inter-Korean tensions and have relegated it to the sidelines of the race.
But more than anything, the biggest factor in the neglect of North Korea issues in this election is likely the recognition that the South has few good options with Pyongyang, which has abandoned the goal of unification and shunned Seoul for the better part of six years.
Whoever wins will inherit a complex security environment defined by strengthening DPRK-Russia military ties, North Korea’s militarization of the border, increasing U.S. military focus on China and an uncertain alliance dynamics.
All this has bred public cynicism about prospects for diplomacy with Pyongyang, and pushed the candidates toward increasingly similar positions on how to deter its nuclear arsenal.
In this environment, it’s no wonder they seem to prefer to talk about anything else but the threat to the North.
Edited by Bryan Betts
12. War Game suggests North Korea could survive nukes
War Game suggests North Korea could survive nukes
https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20250529/5630128/1
Posted May. 29, 2025 07:31,
Updated May. 29, 2025 07:31
"The North Korean regime has shown several scenarios in which it could use nuclear weapons and still survive."
This line appears in the “Guardian Tiger” table-top exercise (TTX) report released by the Atlantic Council, a U.S. think tank, on May 12.
The war game scenario begins with a Chinese invasion of Taiwan that escalates into a broader conflict on the Korean Peninsula. In the simulation, North Korea launches a tactical nuclear strike on a South Korean air base. The U.S. team then faces a critical decision: whether to respond by dropping a tactical nuclear weapon near Kaesong to hold the North accountable. This decision point becomes a major dilemma.
A U.S. nuclear retaliation could trigger a chain of tactical nuclear exchanges. At the same time, China could take advantage of the situation by intensifying its offensive in the Taiwan Strait while U.S. forces are preoccupied on the Korean Peninsula. The worst-case scenario sees Taiwan falling. In other words, the burden of managing two simultaneous theaters could cause the U.S. to hesitate before retaliating against the North.
What makes this exercise especially notable is that it reportedly involved not only the Pentagon but also officials from U.S. Forces Korea. The simulation has generated significant attention in Washington, not only because it was a joint effort between the government and a think tank, but also because it reveals Washington’s sobering view of the strategic challenges posed by concurrent conflicts in Taiwan and South Korea.
The exercise also presents a grim possibility that has long been overlooked: the widely repeated warning that "the end of the Kim Jong Un regime would follow any use of nuclear weapons" may prove to be an empty threat. China, once regarded as a constant factor, could hinder the implementation of America's extended deterrence, including its nuclear umbrella.
As Washington increasingly discusses not only a Chinese invasion of Taiwan but also scenarios such as a blockade or quarantine, one thing is becoming clear: a second Trump administration is likely to focus its Indo-Pacific strategy squarely on countering China. From that perspective, the U.S. military’s push for greater strategic flexibility appears all but inevitable. Despite denials from both Seoul and Washington, the recent debate over a potential withdrawal or regional redeployment of 4,500 U.S. troops aligns closely with the number typically rotated every nine months—suggesting this may not be a coincidence.
Yet amid growing concerns among officials about when and how U.S. President Donald Trump might once again deliver his “security invoice” demanding greater South Korean contributions to defense costs, there seems to be surprisingly little focus on whether the U.S. nuclear umbrella could actually function under the pressure of Chinese intervention.
"It remains unclear whether America's expanding strategic flexibility will result in reduced U.S. troop levels in Korea, renewed demands for greater cost-sharing, or serve as a bargaining chip in a potential 'big deal' between Trump and Kim Jong Un." In this uncertain environment, the South Korean government must focus on strengthening the nuclear umbrella. If U.S. strategic priorities are now firmly centered on China, South Korea must use this shift to seek more concrete guarantees under the nuclear umbrella.
Confidence in the current Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) framework may be premature. The combined threats from China and North Korea have already emerged as a new type of security challenge that could undermine the traditional extended deterrence model. As the report warns, “In the future, conventional deterrence models may collapse.”
13. Shoigu praises North Korean troops for defending Kursk as if ‘own motherland’
As a good friend of mine from north Korea asked in his video statement to nKPA soldiers in Russia: Why do you want to die for Putin?
Shoigu praises North Korean troops for defending Kursk as if ‘own motherland’
Russian security chief says allies share ‘same trench’ in fight against Ukraine and West, meeting with DPRK counterpart
Anton Sokolin May 29, 2025
https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/shoigu-praises-north-korean-troops-for-defending-kursk-as-if-own-motherland/
DPRK State Security Minister Ri Chang Dae (third from right in the front row) attending a security meeting in Moscow on May 28, 2025. Ri is standing beside Russia’s spy chief Sergei Naryshkin. | Image: Russia’s Security Council
Russian security chief Sergei Shoigu lauded North Korea for sharing the “same trench” in the fight to build a new global order, thanking DPRK troops who defended the Kursk region against Ukraine’s incursion “as if it was their own motherland.”
The secretary of Russia’s Security Council made the remarks during a meeting with DPRK State Security Minister Ri Chang Dae on the sidelines of a security forum in Moscow on Wednesday, according to Russian state-run news agencies. He also announced that Russian party and parliamentary delegations will visit Pyongyang in August and October to mark major DPRK holidays.
“It is extremely important for us that the Korean people have taken our side. We are together in the same trench, not only defending our sovereignty and dignity, but also fighting to build a new multipolar world order,” Shoigu said according to TASS, repeating language commonly used by both sides.
State Security Minister Ri Chang Dae (second from right in the first row) taking part in a group photo of the attendees of the 13th International Meeting of High Representatives for Security in Moscow on May 28, 2025 | Image: Russia’s Security Council
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He called the countries’ camaraderie “invaluable,” drawing parallels between the Kursk operation and the countries’ historic fight against colonial Japan, and expressed “special gratitude” to North Korean soldiers for their “heroic act” in standing “shoulder to shoulder” with Russian troops and defending Russian territory.
Shoigu also said it was “heartening” to see how Russian President Vladimir Putin “warmly greeted” DPRK military commanders in charge of the North Korean contingent in Russia at the Victory Day parade on Red Square.
His statement echoes comments made by Kim Jong Un during his May 9 speech at the Russian Embassy in Pyongyang, when he justified the DPRK troop deployment as necessary to counter the “neo-Nazi” regime in Kyiv and called Moscow a “strong defender of a multipolarized world order.”
Citing agreements between the two countries’ leaders, Shoigu added that Russia “will continue to work on honoring the memory of our fallen Korean brothers in the fight against the neo-Nazi contagion.”
Russia’s ambassador to North Korea previously flagged the possibility of building memorial monuments in Kursk to honor fallen North Korean soldiers, as well as renaming local landmarks after them.
“The fact that the DPRK leadership supported Russia after the reunification with Crimea, the Donbas republics, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions and, most importantly, after the start of the Special Military Operation speaks to the genuinely independent nature of Pyongyang’s policy, which is based on its own understanding of justice,” Shoigu said.
Chris Monday, a Russia researcher at Dongseo University, said Shoigu’s remarks show how both the Kremlin and Pyongyang are showing off their ties to policymakers in Seoul.
“It goes without saying that the ‘shared history’ is a lie,” he said, noting that DPRK founding leader Kim Il Sung wasn’t even on the Korean Peninsula when Soviet troops engaged Japanese garrisons at the end of World War II.
The security chief also announced that the head of Russia’s State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin will visit North Korea in August, when the DPRK celebrates the 80th anniversary of its liberation from Japanese colonial rule.
Similarly, Dmitry Medvedev, the former president now serving as head of the ruling United Russia party and deputy chairman of the Security Council, will visit in October “to take part in the 80th anniversary celebrations of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea,” according to Shoigu.
Wednesday’s meeting took place as part of Moscow’s 13th International Meeting of High Representatives for Security, which runs from Tuesday to Thursday and features the participation of over 120 high-level delegations from 104 countries.
Ri Chang Dae’s delegation departed for the event on Monday. The official later appeared in a group photo with the other participants, standing next to the head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service Sergei Naryshkin. The two met in Pyongyang last year.
Russian deputy minister of internal affairs Vitaly Shulika shaking heads with North Korean Minister of Social Security Pang Tu Sop on May 28, 2025 | Image: KCNA (May 29, 2025)
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RUSSIAN COPS IN THE DPRK
Also on Wednesday, deputy chief of the Russian police Vitaly Shulika and his officials held a series of bilateral meetings with counterparts in Pyongyang, according to DPRK state media.
The group met North Korean Minister of Social Security Pang Tu Sop at the Mansudae Assembly Hall in what a brief Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) report described as a courtesy call.
Shulika also held talks with Pang’s deputy Ri Song Chol, focusing on boosting exchanges between the two public security organizations and expanding bilateral cooperation. Ri met Shulika last year in Moscow when he was visiting Russia for talks about law enforcement collaboration with internal affairs minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev.
In line with routine protocol for Russian delegations, the officials toured major sites in Pyongyang before laying a wreath at the cemetery of Soviet soldiers in Sadong District.
Updated on May 29, 2025 at 3:00 p.m. KST with expert comment
Edited by Bryan Betts
14. 62 Chinese students arrive in Pyongyang to study at North Korean universities
With how much arm twisting? I doubt their college experience will be a fun one.
62 Chinese students arrive in Pyongyang to study at North Korean universities
Latest people-to-people exchange comes amid continuing suspicions of strained ties due to DPRK-Russia cooperation
https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/62-chinese-students-arrive-in-pyongyang-to-study-at-north-korean-universities/
Jooheon Kim May 29, 2025
The new group of Chinese students who arrived in Pyongyang on May 27, 2025 | Image: Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
A group of 62 Chinese students has arrived in Pyongyang to study at North Korean universities, according to the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang, a sign of continuing people-to-people exchanges between the allies despite suspicions of tense bilateral ties.
Chinese Embassy officials and staff from the DPRK’s Ministry of Education, Kim Il Sung University and Kim Hyong Jik University of Education were present to welcome the international students on Tuesday, the embassy stated in a press release.
The group’s arrival marks the second time that Chinese students have entered the country to study since the outbreak of COVID-19, with the embassy previously reporting that 41 government-sponsored students started their studies last year.
“I think many Chinese students in the DPRK plan to pursue careers in Chinese government agencies like the Ministry of Commerce or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and specialize in North Korea-related issues,” Cui Jinning, a former Chinese journalist at The Aju Daily, told NK News.
China and the DPRK appear to have taken tentative steps toward revitalizing people-to-people ties in recent months, years after the pandemic shut down almost all travel between the two countries.
In March, Chinese journalists returned to North Korea for the first time since the DPRK shut its borders in response to COVID-19, with Chinese Ambassador Wang Yajun meeting the reporters and emphasizing their role in developing bilateral ties.
Earlier this year, Pyongyang University of Science and Technology also reinstated the HSK, the official Chinese-language proficiency test, potentially paving the way for North Koreans to study in China and do business with Chinese companies. Ambassador Wang expressed hope that Chinese-language education would contribute to the DPRK-China friendship.
China is the DPRK’s biggest trading partner and one of its most important allies, with the two sides maintaining a mutual defense treaty since 1961.
But analysts have pointed to possible strained ties in recent years as North Korea has expanded military cooperation with Russia over the war in Ukraine.
NK Pro analysis of open-source data last year provided evidence of such difficulties, revealing a decline in trade, fewer high-level diplomatic exchanges and noticeable absences from joint commemorative events. It also highlighted that Kim Jong Un’s correspondence with Chinese leaders has been extremely limited, especially in contrast to exchanges with Russia.
However, strong DPRK-China trade data this year suggests that any bilateral difficulties are not impacting economic ties, with their total exchange hitting nearly $222.1 million in April.
Edited by Bryan Betts
15. Who will make Korea great again?
Thursday
May 29, 2025
dictionary + A - A
Who will make Korea great again?
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-05-29/opinion/columns/Who-will-make-Korea-great-again/2317923
Published: 29 May. 2025, 00:04
Park Hyun-young
The author is a senior economic reporter at the JoongAng Ilbo.
U.S. President Donald Trump remains deeply unpopular on the global stage. According to the 2025 Democracy Perception Index, a survey of 110,000 people in 100 countries found that global favorability toward the United States stood at minus 5 percent, compared to 14 percent for China. In most countries, China is now viewed more positively than the U.S.
U.S. President Donald Trump gestures as he departs after hosting the 2025 NCAA Champion, University of Florida men's basketball team in the East Room of the White House in Washington on May 21. [AP/YONHAP]
Trump’s unpopularity stems from the disruptive nature of his policies. Governments and corporations alike are unsettled by the unraveling of long-standing trade arrangements. For ordinary people, travel to and study in the United States has become more difficult. The impact of Trump’s presidency extends beyond American borders and shapes the political dynamics of allied nations as well.
In both Canada and Australia, centrist governments that had been trailing in the polls managed to hold onto power largely due to voter backlash against opposition parties that embraced Trump-style policies such as anti-immigration measures and civil service cuts.
Trump's tariffs have upended the global trade system. The liberal trade norms that have guided global commerce for over 80 years have been pushed aside. The tariff war Trump ignited has drawn in major economies like the European Union and China, putting the global economy at risk of serious fragmentation.
Yet against this turbulent international backdrop, South Korea's presidential election appears oddly detached. Public discourse has been dominated by issues of martial law, impeachment and judicial risk. Policy discussions are minimal, replaced by personal attacks and political theatrics. Indeed, the major candidates’ policy platforms seem to exist in a vacuum, making little mention of global economic instability or the Trump administration’s aggressive trade policies.
This disconnect is troubling for an export-driven economy like Korea’s. With a relatively small domestic market, Korea is especially vulnerable to Trump-era disruptions. The implications of U.S. protectionism — on corporate earnings, stock indices and employment — are immediate and profound. Yet no candidate, progressive or conservative, has offered a compelling vision for how to restructure the Korean economy in response.
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Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party has called for economic diplomacy and diversifying export markets, but such proposals fail to address the fundamental challenge. The United States, the world’s largest and most lucrative market, remains the key battleground for Korean exporters. Kim Moon-soo of the People Power Party has proposed negotiating tariff relief through a Korea-U.S. summit. But this seems overly optimistic given Trump’s record. Reform Party candidate Lee Jun-seok has called for the reshoring of Korean factories from China and Vietnam to domestic industrial zones, but the high-cost domestic environment makes the feasibility of such plans questionable.
Globally, Trump is viewed unfavorably, but domestically, American opinion remains divided. His approval rating hovered at 51 percent shortly after taking office, dipped to 45 percent in late April, and has since recovered to 48 percent, nearly matching disapproval ratings at 49 percent, according to RealClearPolitics. These fluctuations suggest that roughly half of Americans are still willing to give Trump’s vision of “Making America Great Again” the benefit of the doubt.
They may disagree with his methods, but they are drawn to the promise of job creation and economic renewal. For many, Trump's appeal lies not in his policy specifics but in his recognition of everyday struggles and his willingness to challenge the status quo.
Trump’s tariff-centered strategy is aimed at revitalizing American manufacturing and reclaiming blue-collar jobs lost to globalization. By pressuring foreign companies to relocate production to the United States — “build here or pay the tariff” — he has limited their ability to find loopholes in places like Mexico, Canada, Vietnam or India. Korean manufacturers are now actively considering U.S.-based investments to circumvent high tariffs, a trend that could reduce domestic employment in Korea.
This has serious implications for Korean workers and industries, yet none of the major presidential candidates have meaningfully addressed the issue. The lack of engagement with these real and urgent concerns is striking.
Economists warn that Korea may have already passed its economic peak. The OECD projects the country’s potential growth rate to fall below 2 percent. The Korea Development Institute has gone further, predicting that growth could enter the 0 percent range within six years.
U.S. President Donald Trump tries to reach a MAGA hat, on the day of his remarks on tariffs in the Rose Garden at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., April 2, 2025. [REUTERS/YONHAP]
When was Korea at its greatest? Was it during the rapid industrial expansion of the 1970s and 1980s, when export-led growth reached double digits? Or was it the 1990s and 2000s, when democracy deepened and high-tech industries matured? Perhaps it was the 2010s, when Korean culture gained global traction and individual freedoms expanded?
One thing is clear: today is not that time. With economic growth stagnating and social divisions deepening, Korea’s current state is far from “great.”
The question facing voters in the upcoming election is who will lead the nation toward greatness once more, not just by promising prosperity, but by engaging with global realities and crafting policies that secure Korea’s future in an increasingly uncertain world.
Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
15.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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