Quotes of the Day:

"Watch out for the fellow who talks about putting things in order! Putting things in order always means getting other people under your control."

– Denis Diderot

“No matter how isolated you are and how lonely you feel, if you do your work truly and conscientiously, unknown friends will come and seek you out.”

– Carl Jung

“For what it's worth… It's never too late, or in my case too early, to be whoever you want to be. There's no time limit. Start whenever you want. You can change or stay the same. There are no rules to this thing. We can make the best or the worst of it. I hope you make the best of it. I hope you see things that startle you. I hope you feel things you've never felt before. I hope you meet people who have a different point of you. I hope you live a life you're proud of, and if you're not, I hope you have the courage to start over again.”

– F. Scott Fitzgerald

1. "North Korea is now in a state of ideological confusion... It must be filled with external information" [Washington Report]

2. Back-to-Back Resignations Throw South Korea’s Acting Presidency Into Turmoil

3. After Ukraine, Trump might renew his North Korea peace-deal quest

4. US security policy in Asia shows some continuity in sea of change

5. America is in Asia, but not of Asia

6. Strengthening Nuclear Deterrence in the Far East

7.  Kim Moon-soo tapped presidential candidate for People Power Party

8. Russia-N. Korea partnership will impact Trump's leverage in diplomacy toward Pyongyang: expert

9. Security tightened for presidential candidate Lee amid alleged threats

10. Hegseth orders crafting of 2025 defense strategy to prioritize allies' burden sharing, China deterrence

11. S. Korea, U.S. agree to further cooperate to achieve shared security goals for Korean Peninsula, Indo-Pacific

12. 2nd high-level APEC preparatory meeting begins in Jeju

13. A free and unified Korea: advancing U.S. national security interests

1. "North Korea is now in a state of ideological confusion... It must be filled with external information" [Washington Report]

This is a Google translation of an interview on a Korean website (Newsis)

Greg Scarlatoiu is the President and CEO of the US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. I wish President Trump would appoint him a s the US Special Envoy and Ambassador for north Korean human rights.

Not mentioned is that Greg wrote a column for RFA to broadcast into Korean every Wednesday for the past two decades. And regardless of his intense travel and work schedule he never missed a week writing it until the recent decision to scale back operations due to the cut off of funding.

"North Korea is now in a state of ideological confusion... It must be filled with external information" [Washington Report]

https://mobile.newsis.com/view/NISX20250503_0003163724

Article registration 2025/05/03 06:28:46

Last modified 2025/05/03 06:32:56

• 
  
• gaga

Interview with Greg Scarlatoiu, Chairman of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea

Trump Criticizes VOA, RFA Operation Shutdown… “Mistake”

"Acknowledging North Korea's nuclear program is a huge mistake... leading to global chaos"

"Kim Jong-un must have gained confidence after seeing the political chaos in South Korea"

[Washington = Newsis] Correspondent Lee Yoon-hee = Greg Scarlatoiu, Chairman of the Human Rights Committee for North Korea (HRNK), is being interviewed by Newsis at the HRNK office in Washington, D.C., on May 30 (local time). 2025.05.03.

[Washington=Newsis] Correspondent Lee Yoon-hee = Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA), which have been at the forefront of reporting on trends in North Korea and the reality of the Kim Jong-un regime, have seen their activities significantly reduced since US President Donald Trump took the measure of downsizing the United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM) in March.

Greg Scarlatoiu, president of the Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), who has been campaigning for North Korean human rights in the United States for over a decade, called this a “mistake” and emphasized that “if there is an ideological vacuum that Kim Jong-un has created, we need to fill it with information from the outside world.”

Scarlatoiu met with Newsis at the HRNK office in Washington, D.C. on the 30th of last month and said, “VOA and RFA activities have decreased dramatically.”

Scarlatoiu said, “Kim Jong-un is destroying the cult of his grandfather, Kim Il-jung, and his father, Kim Jong-il, in order to strengthen his own personality cult,” and cited the change in the unification policy and avoidance of mentioning the Day of the Sun as examples.

He said, "This is a dangerous game because he is the leader of North Korea because he is the grandson of Kim Il-sung and the son of Kim Jong-il." He also said, "I've talked to a lot of high-ranking North Korean officials, and they are in a state of ideological confusion. Imagine saying to a Catholic, 'Jesus? Actually, that's not real. '"

This confusion has created a kind of gap in the Kim Jong-un regime's control, and this is a good opportunity to accelerate the inflow of outside information into North Korea.

However, as the Trump administration pushes for federal government reform, the North Korea-related media function that the United States has built up for a long time is not functioning.

“I would love to see VOA and RFA come back,” said Scallatoiu, noting that “there’s a saying in English: ‘You throw the baby out with the bathwater.’” He added that while Elon Musk and the Department of Government Efficiency have done a good job of curbing fraud, waste and abuse, there are a lot of good programs that have been cut. “I don’t think there’s been enough thought given to the value of the programs that RFA and VOA run.”

[Washington = Newsis] Correspondent Lee Yoon-hee = Greg Scarlatoiu, Chairman of the Human Rights Committee for North Korea (HRNK), is being interviewed by Newsis at the HRNK office in Washington, D.C., on May 30 (local time). 2025.05.03.

President Trump has spent a hectic 100 days since taking office in January, but the issues of human rights on the Korean Peninsula and in North Korea were not on his radar. Domestically, he focused on federal government reform, border control, and immigration deportations, while externally, he worked on tariff policies, the Ukraine war, and the Iran nuclear deal.

However, Chairman Scarlatoiu believes that President Trump is aware of the North Korean human rights issue and will look into the North Korean issue in earnest after the current issues are resolved.

When President Trump visited Korea in 2017, he met with seven defectors at the National Assembly, and the following year, he invited former Congressman Ji Seong-ho to the State of the Union address to the U.S. Congress. Chairman Scarlatoiu, who was the executive director of HRNK, was deeply involved in this process.

Chairman Scalatu predicted that, regarding future North Korea-US talks, “President Trump is an excellent and tough negotiator. He will not make unconditional concessions to the Kim Jong-un regime,” and that, “The goal is still complete, irreversible, and verifiable denuclearization (CVID) and final, complete, and verifiable denuclearization (FFVD).” He continued, “We cannot and must not recognize North Korea as a nuclear state. That would be a huge mistake,” and pointed out that, “It would send a signal to the world’s rogue regimes that, ‘If you develop nuclear weapons and hold out until the end, the United States, the UN, and the international community will also back down.’ If that happens, the entire world will fall into chaos.”

On the other hand, North Korea’s position is that South Korea must also be free from the United States’ nuclear umbrella, so he said that it would be difficult to find a common ground for negotiations, saying, “It will be a very difficult task.”

He also emphasized that human rights issues should not be overshadowed by security issues in the approach to North Korea.

Chairman Scallatoiu said, “In the process of dialogue with North Korea, human rights are pushed to the back burner. Human rights are always sacrificed.” He added, “The George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations have all been interested in North Korean human rights, but when it comes to dealing with difficult military and security issues, they have put human rights aside. This has been the case for 35 years. Why not try a different approach?”

He added, “Since human rights and security are interrelated, it may be possible to address both.” He added, “That is why I hope (the approach to North Korea) starts with abductees of Koreans, prisoners of war, and Japanese abductees. This could be a good way to build trust with North Korea.”

[Washington = Newsis] Correspondent Lee Yoon-hee = Greg Scarlatoiu, Chairman of the Human Rights Committee for North Korea (HRNK), is being interviewed by Newsis at the HRNK office in Washington, D.C., on May 30 (local time). 2025.05.03.

Meanwhile, he expressed concern that the ongoing political turmoil in South Korea would give confidence to the Kim Jong-un regime.

“Kim Jong-un and Putin have acknowledged that North Korean troops were on the front lines in Ukraine, which means they are more emboldened,” said Chairman Scallatoiu. “They are also encouraged by the political situation in South Korea. We have been talking about the collapse of the North Korean regime since December 2011 (when Kim Jong-un took power), but who is more stable now?”

He added, “Of course, South Korea is an economic powerhouse, and it is a highly developed and civilized country, not just politically. But at this moment, Kim Jong-un must be feeling quite confident.”

The Yoon Seok-yeol government has caused this chaos, but at least he gave high marks to its North Korea policy. The Moon Jae-in government has neglected and suppressed North Korean human rights issues in the international community under the pretext of dialogue with North Korea, but at least in this regard, South Korea has regained its international leadership.

He stressed that dialogue with North Korea should be centered on the North Korean people rather than the elite class such as Kim Jong-un and his family, and that “there is nothing wrong with dialogue with Kim Jong-un, but we must mobilize all the tools and arsenal at our disposal. While we are talking to Kim Jong-un, we must support civil society and encourage grassroots involvement.”

Chairman Scalatu was born in Romania under the communist regime. While he was a freshman in the English Literature Department at the University of Bucharest, he participated in the December 1989 anti-communist revolution, and the following year, he was selected as the first South Korean government scholarship recipient in Romania.

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After studying abroad, he entered Seoul National University’s Department of Diplomacy and received a master’s degree. After living in Korea for a total of 10 years, he moved to the United States and studied at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He has been actively involved in the North Korean human rights movement since 2011, when he took on the role of HRNK Secretary General, and was elected as the first president of HRNK early this year.

An American citizen, he is fluent in his native Romanian, English, and French, and can also interpret Korean at the same time. Regarding the time he devoted to the North Korean human rights movement, he said, “I think it was a calling. I am still very happy that I made that choice.”

◎ Sympathy Media Newsis sympathy@newsis.com

2. Back-to-Back Resignations Throw South Korea’s Acting Presidency Into Turmoil

Excerpts:

Critics from the conservative camps have condemned the DP’s moves to impeach the Cabinet members who had reportedly been involved in Yoon’s declaration of martial law, accusing the opposition of attempting to throw the country into anarchy. However, the DP and the other opposition parties have clearly stated that the most important priority is to eradicate the so-called “insurrection” forces who tried to open a new chapter of dictatorship. That means every Cabinet member should be thoroughly investigated to find out who supported Yoon’s illegitimate declaration of martial law. 

Meanwhile, the race to elect a new president was also thrown into turmoil on Thursday, with South Korea’s Supreme Court overturning the acquittal of Lee Jae-myung, the DP candidate and the heavy favorite to win. Lee now faces a retrial that could see him barred from standing in an election – if the legal process moves quickly enough to conclude before June 3. If not, the People Power Party would almost certainly seek to challenge a Lee victory on legal grounds, and it will ceaselessly raise questions on his eligibility to run the country even if he wins the election. 

...

With the Supreme Court’s unprecedentedly quick ruling throwing into question the political fate of the favorite presidential candidate, South Korea’s political and constitutional chaos has entered a new phase, one that will likely last even after the June 3 presidential election.

Back-to-Back Resignations Throw South Korea’s Acting Presidency Into Turmoil

South Korea’s political and constitutional chaos have entered a new phase, one that will likely last even after the June 3 presidential election.

https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/back-to-back-resignations-throw-south-koreas-acting-presidency-into-turmoil/

By Shannon Tiezzi and Mitch Shin

May 02, 2025

South Korea’s then-Prime Minister and Acting President Han Duck-soo presiding over a Cabinet meeting on Apr. 29, 2025. Han resigned on May 1.

Credit: Prime Minister’s Secretariat, Republic of Korea

In a hectic day for South Korea’s already beleaguered political scene, Acting President Han Duck-soo resigned – almost immediately followed by the resignation of his successor-to-be, Choi Sang-mok. The chaos on May 1 suggests South Korea won’t see stability at the top level of its government until the result of the presidential election on June 3 – and possibly not even then. 

Han Duck-soo, the prime minister, became acting president after Yoon Suk-yeol was impeached for his illegal declaration of martial law. (Han himself was impeached by the National Assembly in December, but was restored to office by the Constitutional Court shortly before the same court unanimously upheld Yoon’s impeachment.) Yet Han has been hinting at seeking the office in a more permanent capacity, repeatedly refusing to rule out the possibility of running in the presidential election. 

On May 1, Han officially resigned. 

“I made a final decision to step down from my position to do what I can do and what I have to do to overcome the crisis we are dealing with,” Han said during his farewell address on Thursday. 

Even though he did not specifically elaborate the main reason for his resignation, it is widely expected that he will announce his bid for the presidency on May 2, as Han said he put down the heavy responsibility of the acting presidency to do more important tasks. 

However, the public seems cold to Han’s candidacy. In the past weeks, polls clearly showed the majority of the public would not support Han’s bid, as he worked for Yoon as the prime minister. In light of what caused the snap presidential election, it is ironic that the prime minister for the impeached government would choose to run. In addition, most South Koreans wanted Han to prioritize the stable running of the government, including the fair management of the presidential election, rather than pursuing his own political ambitions.

Han was set to be replaced as acting president by Choi Sang-mok, the deputy prime minister and finance minister, who also held the office while the Constitutional Court deliberated on Han’s impeachment case. But Choi’s return to the acting presidency ended before it officially began. The National Assembly, which is controlled by the opposition Democratic Party (DP), submitted an impeachment bill against him late on the evening of May 1 for his repeated refusal to abide by the verdict of the Constitutional Court over the appointment of a justice for the court while he was acting president. The DP had discussed impeaching Choi during his first tenure on the same charges.

At 10:28 p.m. local time, Choi announced he was resigning. He had been set to take over as acting president at midnight.

Later that evening, Woo Won-shik, the speaker of the National Assembly, dismissed the impeachment bill against Choi after confirming his resignation. 

Now, the acting presidency will fall to Lee Ju-ho, the deputy prime minister and minister of education. 

The extraordinary sequence of events underscored the chaos that has plagued South Korean politics since Yoon’s shocking declaration of martial law on December 3. The office of the president (or acting president) has changed hands five times: from Yoon to Han, Han to Choi, then back to Han, then back to Choi, and now to Lee. And there’s no guarantee that it will end there, as South Korea’s opposition has called for every member of Yoon’s Cabinet to be investigated over their roles in the martial law declaration. 

Critics from the conservative camps have condemned the DP’s moves to impeach the Cabinet members who had reportedly been involved in Yoon’s declaration of martial law, accusing the opposition of attempting to throw the country into anarchy. However, the DP and the other opposition parties have clearly stated that the most important priority is to eradicate the so-called “insurrection” forces who tried to open a new chapter of dictatorship. That means every Cabinet member should be thoroughly investigated to find out who supported Yoon’s illegitimate declaration of martial law. 

Meanwhile, the race to elect a new president was also thrown into turmoil on Thursday, with South Korea’s Supreme Court overturning the acquittal of Lee Jae-myung, the DP candidate and the heavy favorite to win. Lee now faces a retrial that could see him barred from standing in an election – if the legal process moves quickly enough to conclude before June 3. If not, the People Power Party would almost certainly seek to challenge a Lee victory on legal grounds, and it will ceaselessly raise questions on his eligibility to run the country even if he wins the election. 

According to the Constitution, a sitting president is protected from being investigated or prosecuted except on charges of insurrection or treason. Lee’s case involves the Election Probation Act; in November 2024 he was found guilty of violating the act by lying during his campaign for the 2022 presidential election. If the case has not been resolved by June 3, and Lee does win the election, there will be fierce arguments that a ruling must be made even after he assumes the presidency.

In this case, if Lee wins the election, the Constitutional Court may again be forced to make an all-important ruling: this time on whether a sitting president is protected from any ongoing trials that had been underway before his election. So far, legal experts generally say that the cases against Lee will be paused should he become president and resume after he completes his term. 

With the Supreme Court’s unprecedentedly quick ruling throwing into question the political fate of the favorite presidential candidate, South Korea’s political and constitutional chaos has entered a new phase, one that will likely last even after the June 3 presidential election.

Authors

Staff Author

Shannon Tiezzi

Shannon Tiezzi is Editor-in-Chief at The Diplomat.

View Profile

Contributing Author

Mitch Shin

Mitch Shin is a chief correspondent for The Diplomat, covering the Korean Peninsula.

View Profile

3. After Ukraine, Trump might renew his North Korea peace-deal quest

Paper does not trump steel. A "peace deal" with north Korea would not secure South Korea or protect America. We must understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime before we try to engage with it. Unfortunately the progressives in South Korea do not appear to have sufficient understanding of the regime.

Excerpts:

One factor potentially affecting the prospects for a Trump-Kim negotiation is the role of South Korea. During the first Trump administration, the progressive government of President Moon Jae-in played a significant role in facilitating those talks. The conservative government of President Yoon Suk Yeol was opposed to that outreach and took a much tougher stance on the resumption of any dialogue with Pyongyang.

The presidential election in early June, however, could bring a return to progressive rule in South Korea. While a new government may not have the same channels to the North, it will likely not stand in the way of a resumption of engagement, experts in Seoul say.

“We want a restoration of South-North relations and we are not critical of US-North Korea talks,” says former South Korean diplomat Cho Hyun, a close advisor to the progressive leadership of the Democratic Party. “We believe it will be helpful in getting peace on the peninsula.”

Cho acknowledges that a new South Korean government may not be invited as a key player in any talks between Trump and Kim but hopes that Seoul will have a place at the table. “I don’t think we will be brushed aside,” the former senior Foreign Ministry official told this writer.

What happens next may depend on how events elsewhere, from Ukraine to Iran, unfold in the coming weeks.

After Ukraine, Trump might renew his North Korea peace-deal quest - Asia Times

A likely new South Korean progressive government wouldn’t mind, but Kim Jong Un wouldn’t be as eager as before

asiatimes.com · by Daniel Sneider · May 1, 2025

The strange scene of US President Donald Trump huddled knee to knee with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the anteroom of Pope Francis’ funeral has prompted hopes that a so-far-elusive peace deal in the war between Russia and Ukraine is within reach.

Whether that comes to pass remains to be seen. But one product of the exchange is renewed speculation that Trump may soon turn his eyes toward another long-sought deal – a “peace” pact with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

Axios reported on April 27 that senior Trump officials are actively consulting experts inside and outside the administration about the prospects of reviving talks, picking up the threads of the first Trump administration’s attempts. At least one prominent expert on the North Korean nuclear program confirmed that he had been contacted recently about a potential meeting between Trump and Kim.

“While nothing appears imminent, Trump has made clear he’d like to reconnect with Kim — perhaps face-to-face — and his national security team is preparing for that scenario,” Axios reported.

Informed diplomatic sources in Seoul believe that this process is “at a very early stage.” At this point, “Washington is gearing up to do a policy review and generate some options for North Korea,” a senior diplomat told this writer.

Wi Sung-lac, a former senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and advisor to leading presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung, echoed these sentiments. “If Ukraine stabilizes, the next turn for Trump will be North Korea, seeking a resumption of talks,” he predicted.

For North Korea, the main incentive to resume talks will be to gain US acceptance of its status as a nuclear weapons state, says Professor Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University, a respected analyst of North Korea based in South Korea. There is no interest in Pyongyang for any meeting aimed at the country’s denuclearization, Lankov says – an assessment that’s shared by many US experts, according to the Axios report.

The prospects for a deal that leaves North Korea’s nuclear capability largely intact could be improved by US negotiations with Iran that re-establish the more limited goals of the agreement that was reached under the Barack Obama administration but then was dismantled by Trump. A new agreement with Iran that simply limits its enrichment of uranium could signal that Trump is ready to accept far more limited goals in his deal-making.

After contributing to Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine, a triumphant North Korean regime may try to use the moment to its advantage. “They will try to talk to Trump,” Lankov, who was trained in the Soviet Union, said. “They are not eager, but they will do it.”

A victorious Vladimir Putin might even welcome and encourage this meeting, argued Moon Chung-in, a well-known progressive foreign policy thinker. “Putin can play a very important facilitation role with North Korea and encourage Kim to talk to Trump,” Moon told this writer recently. “Russia has been more vocal about accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state” relative to China, he said.

There is even the possibility of a trilateral meeting, according to Tae Yong-ho, a former North Korean diplomat who defected in 2016 and from 2020 to 2024 served as an elected member of the South’s National Assembly representing a Seoul district.

“If Putin ends the war and wants to raise the status of Kim Jong Un, then a trilateral summit could be possible,” Tae, who now heads the presidential advisory commission on unification, told this writer in Seoul.

Western diplomats agree that this is possible but regard it as unrealistic at this point.

How much does North Korea want a deal?

Trump’s desire to resume his quest for a grand deal with Kim is evident from his frequent references to his friendship with the North Korean dictator. But many analysts, including this writer, have questioned whether Kim is still interested in returning to what was clearly a painful failure in his bid for legitimacy and global status.

The last time around, Kim felt considerable pressure from an isolated and failing economy facing international sanctions supported by China and Russia. But those sanctions are now effectively broken, and the North Korean economy is trending upward, according to the Bank of Korea.

Chinese pipelines to North Korea pump in oil and other key imports, reports Lankov, and the Russians are supplying energy, fertilizer and foodstuffs, as well as other key inputs, in exchange for arms and soldiers supplied to the war effort. In addition, North Korea regularly mounts highly successful cyber theft operations that yield billions of dollars in cash and cryptocurrency.

The North Korean regime still faces severe internal challenges, observes former defector Tae. The younger generation is infected by the spread of ideas and culture from South Korea, even though the regime has increased its repression of any signs of that spread. “That tells me that Kim Jong Un is still very afraid of any possible contingency,” he says.

Still, argues Lankov, “they are more secure now than ever since the famines of the 1990s.”

“The elimination of sanctions is still part of their negotiation goals,” says a close observer of the North Korean economy based in Seoul. “But it is not so critical compared to previous times.”

For now, the North Korean regime may be comfortable with the status quo, the well-informed Western diplomat says. “I just don’t think Kim Jong Un is in a cooperative mood with Washington.”

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The South Korean role

One factor potentially affecting the prospects for a Trump-Kim negotiation is the role of South Korea. During the first Trump administration, the progressive government of President Moon Jae-in played a significant role in facilitating those talks. The conservative government of President Yoon Suk Yeol was opposed to that outreach and took a much tougher stance on the resumption of any dialogue with Pyongyang.

The presidential election in early June, however, could bring a return to progressive rule in South Korea. While a new government may not have the same channels to the North, it will likely not stand in the way of a resumption of engagement, experts in Seoul say.

“We want a restoration of South-North relations and we are not critical of US-North Korea talks,” says former South Korean diplomat Cho Hyun, a close advisor to the progressive leadership of the Democratic Party. “We believe it will be helpful in getting peace on the peninsula.”

Cho acknowledges that a new South Korean government may not be invited as a key player in any talks between Trump and Kim but hopes that Seoul will have a place at the table. “I don’t think we will be brushed aside,” the former senior Foreign Ministry official told this writer.

What happens next may depend on how events elsewhere, from Ukraine to Iran, unfold in the coming weeks.

Daniel C. Sneider is a non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and a lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University. This article, originally published by KEIA’s The Peninsula, is republished with permission.

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asiatimes.com · by Daniel Sneider · May 1, 2025

4. US security policy in Asia shows some continuity in sea of change

Conclusion:

A US grand strategy that reconciles “America First” with US leadership of an Asian security architecture is possible, but we have not seen it during Trump’s first hundred days. Until that happens the two lines of effort will work against each other.

Here is my "reconciliation:" recognize the American Asymmetric Advantage (AAA) – “America First, Allies Always”  

US security policy in Asia shows some continuity in sea of change - Asia Times

But Trump’s tariff war and alliance skepticism threaten further progress in building regional architecture to deter China

asiatimes.com · by Denny Roy · May 1, 2025

The first 100 days of the second Donald Trump Administration produced upheaval in many quarters, but one policy remains steady: building a regional defense architecture to deter aggression by China.

Further movement in this direction, however, is threatened by collateral damage from aspects of the new US government’s approach to foreign policy that break with the pre-Trump era. Chief among these are the “tariff war” and alliance skepticism.

How did we get to where we are now? During the first Trump Administration (2017-2021), US policy toughened toward Beijing as Washington concluded that deep economic engagement with China was not working as planned.

Increased wealth was supposed to liberalize and pacify China. Instead, the Chinese government under Xi Jinping was increasingly authoritarian at home and aggressive abroad. The pandemic drew attention to America’s dependence on Chinese supplies of vital supplies.

Trump’s government characterized China as more of an adversary than a partner. The US imposed tariffs on some Chinese imports and began working to reroute global supply chains to reduce China’s global economic centrality. At the same time, Trump expressed contempt for US alliances, arguing that allies benefited disproportionately while underpaying for US protection.

At the same time, Trump departed from the mainstream of postwar US foreign policy in important ways. He rejected American exceptionalism, sidelined liberal values as a lodestar for US foreign relationships and expressed affinity for authoritarian state leaders such as Xi, Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un.

Trump was highly critical of US global commitments, particularly the US alliances in both Europe and Asia. Instead of free trade, he touted tariffs as the solution to America’s trade deficit.

President Joe Biden (2021-2025) extended and increased some of Trump’s tariffs on China. His administration also placed restrictions on Chinese access to advanced technology and pressured other governments to do the same.

Biden, however, reversed Trump by returning to a more conventional view of alliances as force multipliers that produce a valuable if intangible strategic return on American investment.

The foreign policy of Trump II is dominated by two familiar themes from his first term: enthusiasm for tariffs and disdain for alliances. What is surprising is the intensity with which he has implemented those predilections.

The entire world is now under relatively high US tariffs (10%, compared with an average US rate of 2.5% in 2024) with the threat of much higher “reciprocal tariffs” that would kick in as soon as May.

And America has effectively abandoned NATO – by antagonizing Western Europe and Canada, by declaring that NATO members can no longer count on the US to defend them and by accommodating Russia despite Putin’s aggression against Ukraine.

The first three months of Trump II have seen Washington reaffirm its intention to strengthen a counter-China defensive military coalition. As he was dealing with the fallout of the Signal scandal, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth made his first trip to Asia in March. He passed on South Korea, likely because its government was under an acting president while Yoon Suk-yeol was in impeachment proceedings.

In Japan, Hegseth said the US plans to increase joint training and cooperation in developing new weapons technologies with Japan, and will also complete the upgrade of the US military headquarters in Japan from an administrative office to a military command post, a decision first announced by the Biden Administration.

In the Philippines, Hegseth reiterated that the US-Philippine defense treaty covers attacks on Philippine government ships or aircraft anywhere in the South China Sea – an important commitment given Chinese harassment of Philippine navy and coast guard vessels in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, over which Beijing claims sovereignty.

Hegseth also announced that the US and the Philippines plan to co-produce some military systems and that the US will deploy advanced sea drones and NMESIS anti-ship missiles in Philippines territory. NMESIS indeed appeared in the Batanes Islands in the Luzon Strait south of Taiwan during a US-Philippines military exercise in April. These missiles could theoretically target Chinese warships attempting to encircle Taiwan.

The AUKUS agreement, whereby the US and the UK will help provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, is still on track, albeit somewhat shakily. On January 29, Australia made a US$500 million down payment – part of a total commitment of US$3 billion to build up the US capacity to manufacture submarines.

The shaky part includes uncertainty regarding how much Trump supports or even knows about AUKUS. On February 7, Hegseth said that “the president is very aware, supportive of AUKUS” and that Hegseth himself had “hope” that the US would deliver the promised submarines on time. A few days later, asked during a press conference if he had discussed AUKUS with the visiting UK Prime Minister, Trump replied, “What does that mean?”

While the Trump White House ordered a three-month freeze of foreign aid programs upon taking office, Secretary of State Marco Rubio approved exceptions to the freeze that included US$870 million in military assistance for Taiwan and $336 million for the Philippines.

US Navy warships transited the Taiwan Strait in February and April, indicating that Washington is still willing to annoy Beijing to demonstrate an interest in Taiwan’s security.

But while the Pentagon’s agenda in the Asia-Pacific region has seen little interruption in the transition from the Biden to the Trump Administration, it is partly undercut by Washington’s larger foreign policy shifts. Not surprisingly, rent-seeking and abandonment of friends in other parts of the world are adverse to nurturing alliances.

The tariff issue is a double whammy for US allies Japan and South Korea. Trump is unhappy with both countries for two reasons. First, they have trade surpluses with the US. Second, Trump thinks they are defense free-riders.

The governments of both Japan and South Korea have said they want to keep military issues separate from trade talks with the US. Unfortunately for them, Trump extolls the idea of “one stop shopping,” which means “bringing up other subjects that are not covered by Trade and Tariffs, and getting them negotiated also.”

The tariff issue brings delegations from theoe two countries to Washington for urgent negotiations. The Japanese, who face a possible additional 24% tariff, came to town on April 16. The Koreans, hoping to avert a planned 25% reciprocal tariff, followed on April 24. Such meetings allow the Trump team to re-visit the contentious matters of how much these allies spend on defense and how much they contribute toward the cost of hosting US military bases.

Both countries have already signed multi-year host nation support agreements with the Biden Administration. Under a deal good until 2027, Japan pays US$1.7 billion per year toward the US bases, plus an additional US$3 billion this year for other costs including construction for US Marines moving from Okinawa to Guam.

South Korea pays the US a little over $1 billion annually in host nation support under an agreement valid until 2029.

Trump, however, has recently complained that the Japanese “don’t pay anything” for US protection and that the South Koreans should pay $10 billion per year. The likely result is more stress on these alliances.

Japan is especially undeserving of such treatment. Tokyo has made itself more useful to the US strategic agenda in recent years by

• working toward raising its defense spending from 1% to 2% of GDP,
• signing a deal to buy 400 US-made Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles,
• accelerating plans to develop and deploy its own precision missiles that can hit ships and ground targets,
• establishing a Joint Operations Command to improve coordination among the different branches of the Japanese armed forces and
• strengthening its defenses in the Ryukyu Islands near Taiwan.

In Australia, the new US government has seriously damaged confidence in US reliability as an ally. Prominent Australian policy thinkers are arguing that their country can no longer count on American help in times of danger.

The Australian public feels the same. In the middle of last year, 61 percent of Australian respondents said they could “rely on the United States for defense and national security.” Polled on that same question in April, 66 percent answered in the negative.

The disillusionment down under stems from two distinctively Trump policies. The first is Washington’s rough handling of supposed friends such as NATO member countries and Ukraine.

The second antagonizing policy is the tariffs. While Washington characterized its tariffs as a means of addressing America’s many bilateral trade deficits, the US has a trade surplus with Australia. Australians nevertheless got the same tariffs as most of the rest of the world: 10% on everything, plus an additional 25% on steel and aluminum products.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese argued that “a reciprocal tariff” in Australia’s case “would be zero.” Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong asked for an exemption from the steel and aluminum tariff, but Trump rebuffed the appeal.

The damage is not yet fatal. In an opinion piece published in an Australian national newspaper, PRC Ambassador to Australia Xiao Qian gracelessly invited Aussies to “join hands” with China to “stop the hegemonic and bullying behavior of the US.” Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles shot back, “I don’t think we’ll be holding China’s hand.”

A US grand strategy that reconciles “America First” with US leadership of an Asian security architecture is possible, but we have not seen it during Trump’s first hundred days. Until that happens the two lines of effort will work against each other.

Denny Roy is a senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu.

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asiatimes.com · by Denny Roy · May 1, 2025

5. America is in Asia, but not of Asia

A very provocative essay. He really takes Elbridge Colby to task.

Graphics at the link.

https://asiatimes.com/2025/05/america-is-in-asia-but-not-of-asia/

Excerpts:

Of course, this alternate universe America would be very different and we could have much fun speculating on the endless counterfactual possibilities. Suffice it to say that a United States with over 100 million Asian Americans would forever cement the republic as not just a Pacific but an Asian power.

That, for better or for worse, is not the America we have today. The United States today may be a Pacific power, but it is certainly not Asian. America became a Pacific power after it, fearing being shut out of the opium trade by European powers, sent Commodore Perry and his black ships to force open Japan in 1852.

Ever since, the United States has been a military presence in Asia through subsequent kerfuffles like the Second Opium War, the Boxer Rebellion, World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War.

As time goes on, it is becoming ever more apparent that the United States is in Asia, but it is not of Asia. Korea is divided. So is China. Vietnam, after much carnage, was abandoned. And Japan has been kneecapped into economic stagnation and bonsaied into cultural anomie.

And now, the United States has just picked an economic war with China, which it is highly likely to lose and lose spectacularly (see here). The danger of America being in Asia but not of Asia is that it is playing on alien terrain, subject to information asymmetries, and prone to bad judgment.

...

America is falling behind not because China is modernizing its military, but precisely because America wasted trillions of dollars on unnecessary wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and now threatens to militarily challenge the biggest player that ever was.

Colby calls himself a realist, though it’s not clear that he knows exactly what he is. Just like America does not know what it is. America may want to be an Asian power, but that ship sailed in 1882. America is not Asian – it chose not to be on more than one occasion – and has demonstrated a limited capacity to understand any region outside its borders, even Canada.

To devise realist policies for Asian security requires expertise on the region’s society and politics. Otherwise, one is not weighing costs and benefits but merely pointing in ideological directions.

But nowadays that passes for “realist” thinking among America’s Asia “experts.” When all is said and done, America is in Asia because it finds itself in Asia. There is no reason: Like international school students who don’t learn the local language, they are there because that’s where they are. Not everything has a reason or lasts.

America is in Asia, but not of Asia - Asia Times

America decided 143 years ago not to be an Asian nation and its confused presence in the region is coming to a close

asiatimes.com · by Han Feizi · May 2, 2025

Everybody was kung fu fighting

Those cats were fast as lightning

In fact, it was a little bit frightening

But they fought with expert timing

– Carl Douglas

The United States of America ruined its future as an Asian power 143 years ago when it passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the first US law to prevent immigration of a specific nationality.

In the 19th century, China was turned upside down by internal chaos. The Opium Wars, the Taiping Rebellion, clan feuds, droughts and famines pushed waves of Chinese migrants out to all corners of the world – particularly Southeast Asia, Europe and America.

Starting with the California Gold Rush of 1848-1855, waves of Chinese migrants fanned out across the western United States working in mines, laundries, restaurants and on construction projects. Chinese coolies were instrumental in the arduous construction of the Central Pacific route of the first transcontinental railroad, cutting through the Sierra Nevada Mountains to connect Nevada and California.

In his 1920 book “The Rising Tide of Color: The Threat Against White World-Supremacy”, eugenicist and racial anthropologist Lothrop Stoddard of “The Great Gatsby” infamy wrote of Chinese labor:

At home, the average Chinese lives his whole life literally within a hand’s breadth of starvation. Accordingly, when removed to the easier environments of other lands, the Chinaman brings with him the working capacity which simply appalls his competitors.

F Scott Fitzgerald dismissed Stoddard by making him an obsession of the boorish Tom Buchanan (misnaming him “Goddard” to boot). On the issue of Chinese labor, however, Stoddard merely reflected the American opinion that prevailed in the 19th century and that ultimately resulted in the Chinese Exclusion Act.

By the 1870s, Chinese men accounted for a quarter of California’s workforce. White workers were hard pressed to match the industriousness of the Chinese, reflected in the fact that the Central Pacific Railroad paid Chinese workers a premium salary: $31 per week versus $30 per week for whites.

Resentments intensified after the Panic of 1873, resulting in increasing restrictions on Chinese immigration until the broad ban of the Chinese Exclusion Act was enacted in 1882.

A harrowing “driving out period” followed the immigration ban, with Chinese evicted from communities where they had long settled. The Rock Springs massacre of 1885 and the Hells Canyon Massacre of 1887 were especially gruesome episodes of anti-Chinese violence.

The Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed in 1943, but by then, the damage had been done. Today, there are 5.5 million Americans who claim full or partial Chinese ancestry, a mere 1.6% of the population.

This compares with 38.6 million (11.3% of the population) claiming Irish ancestry, 49 million (14.4%) claiming German ancestry and 16.8 million (4.9%) claiming Italian ancestry. There are 3.6 million more Scandinavian Americans than there are Chinese Americans.

Nativists were dead set against nonwhite immigration. Cartoon image via National Public Radio.

There are 26 million Americans who claim full or partial Asian ancestry, 7.2% of the total population. If the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 had never been passed, there would certainly be far more.

At the time, China had a population of 400 million, Europe 330 million and the United States 54 million. In a counterfactual sans Exclusion Act history, it is not hard to imagine over 100 million Asian Americans today. Alcatraz Island could have been the West Coast’s Ellis Island, processing Asian immigrants well into the 20th century.

Of course, this alternate universe America would be very different and we could have much fun speculating on the endless counterfactual possibilities. Suffice it to say that a United States with over 100 million Asian Americans would forever cement the republic as not just a Pacific but an Asian power.

That, for better or for worse, is not the America we have today. The United States today may be a Pacific power, but it is certainly not Asian. America became a Pacific power after it, fearing being shut out of the opium trade by European powers, sent Commodore Perry and his black ships to force open Japan in 1852.

Ever since, the United States has been a military presence in Asia through subsequent kerfuffles like the Second Opium War, the Boxer Rebellion, World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War.

As time goes on, it is becoming ever more apparent that the United States is in Asia, but it is not of Asia. Korea is divided. So is China. Vietnam, after much carnage, was abandoned. And Japan has been kneecapped into economic stagnation and bonsaied into cultural anomie.

And now, the United States has just picked an economic war with China, which it is highly likely to lose and lose spectacularly (see here). The danger of America being in Asia but not of Asia is that it is playing on alien terrain, subject to information asymmetries, and prone to bad judgment.

There are so few Chinese Americans that they essentially have no political power. Because of that, the expertise of the Chinese Americans who do exist is distrusted and dismissed as Washington takes its cues from grifters (see here) and China “experts” who “fell in love with Mandarin” at Princeton or the like.

In the counterfactual America of 100 million Asians, Chinese Americans would surely have amassed significant political power and Washington would be able to access real experts without political suspicion. America would trust Treasury Secretary Zhang to go up against China as much as it trusted Supreme Commander Eisenhower to take on Germany.

But alas, that is the counterfactual America. The factual America chose to fight China with the ignoramuses it trusts, not the experts it needs. This is what happens when America is in Asia but not of Asia. America started a fight as though it didn’t know China is more than twice its size (see here).

To be in Asia but not of Asia when China is the size it is and still growing means to not be in Asia for long. The US military presence in Asia is an alien distortion, imposing social, economic and civilizational costs on both sides of the Pacific.

The US is not particularly reliant on Asia economically (36% of imports and 24% of exports) and is minimally integrated culturally.

English is the lingua franca in Europe and far more Americans speak Spanish than all Asian languages combined. While English is commonly spoken in Asia, it is hardly universal – not even among the highly educated. Asia, as far as most Americans are concerned, is an exotic other and vice versa.

The costs of maintaining a forward US military presence in Asia are immense. Total spending on defense is likely over US$1 trillion (including intelligence agencies and DOE nuclear weapons, etc.), or approximately 3.4% of gross domestic product (GDP).

The tyranny of distance, on top of a massive industrial base, allows China to impose highly asymmetric costs on the US. Total spending on defense by China is likely around $300 billion, or about 1.6% of GDP.

Because GDP can be squirrely given how services are accounted for in China, a more revealing comparison may be with industrial output. China’s defense spending is around 4% of its industrial output versus about 25% for the US.

One of the reasons the Soviet Union collapsed was that the US, given its technological superiority and the then USSR’s vast vulnerable landmass, was able to impose asymmetric costs on the Soviet defense budget – the Ronald Reagan strategy.

Analysts have estimated that the Soviet Union was spending 12-20% of its GDP on defense in the 1980s trying to keep up with Reagan’s Pentagon budget increases and whiz-bang Star Wars demonstrations. This time around, China is implementing the Reagan strategy with annual PLA budget increases and whiz-bang demonstrations of 6th-generation fighter planes (see here).

Can Joe Six Pack American be blamed for asking what it is all for when he is living paycheck to paycheck? America is not, after all, an Asian nation – it fatefully, for better or for worse, decided not to be 143 years ago with the Chinese Exclusion Act and confirmed that decision in WWII with Japanese American internment camps. America is not full of Zhou Six Packs with deep historical ties to Asia.

Proponents of the pivot to Asia and/or China containment policy offer up a confused litany of reasons for America’s military presence. The most visible spokesman for this position is Elbridge Colby, currently undersecretary of defense for policy at the Pentagon, who wrote the book “Strategy of Denial.”

The fear is that a hegemonic China in Asia would economically gate-keep the region from American commercial interests. Given President Donald Trump’s attempt to extort the world with his “Liberation Day” tariffs, we must concede that a hegemon may indeed behave poorly for no good reason at all.

The issue we have with Colby is once again the issue of America being in Asia but not of Asia. How good of a handle does Colby have on the costs that his strategy of denial requires? America currently suffers from a whole panoply of domestic ailments, from inadequate healthcare to lousy education to decrepit infrastructure to homelessness. Does Colby fully understand what he wants to commit America to?

Does Colby understand that China’s GDP is two to three times that of the US – something Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and team surely (dis)missed? Does Colby understand that there are 45 times as many highly capable (top 1.5%, US basis) math students in Chinese high schools as American high schools?

Does Colby understand that approximately 20-30% of Chinese high school students can score in the 99th percentile on the math section of the SAT? 99th percentile US math level is table stakes in China, nothing special, a mere B+ student in the Gaokao system.

Does Colby understand that China generates twice as much electricity, produces 13 times as much steel, 22 times as much cement, three times as many cars and has over 250 times the shipbuilding capacity as the US?

Colby’s family history perfectly illustrates being in Asia but not of Asia. He is a scion of the CIA/Carlyle Group/Yale University with a deep family history in Asia. The first Elbridge Colby (great-grandfather) was an officer in the US Army stationed in Tianjin.

Grandfather William Colby was director of the CIA and did god knows what in Asia during the Vietnam War. Father Jonathan Colby is an executive at Carlyle who spent much of his career in Japan.

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The scion himself is a product of international schools in Asia (but does not speak an Asian language). At one point, young Colby tweeted that he was “not an expert on Taiwanese society and politics”, an odd admission from someone whose life’s work is the prevention of China’s reunification with Taiwan.

This is all quite illustrative of America’s confused presence in Asia. In an interview, Colby used scare tactics, saying that an Asia dominated by China would impoverish America and China would then have the world’s largest corporations and highest-ranked universities.

Last year, the US retook Fortune’s Global 500 crown away from China with 139 companies on the list versus China’s 128. The two nations have been exchanging the top spot for the past few years.

This is a far cry from 2010, when the US had 139 companies on the list versus 46 from China. Similarly, China’s universities are rocketing up the league tables, capturing 16 of the top 20 positions on the Nature Index.

Image: Nature

While an Asia dominated by China, which then decided to gate-keep economic access, could indeed damage America, climbing the economic ladder is likely far more dependent on first-order principles like investing in education, infrastructure, public health, executing well-thought-out industrial policies, and stamping out graft and corruption.

America is falling behind not because China is modernizing its military, but precisely because America wasted trillions of dollars on unnecessary wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and now threatens to militarily challenge the biggest player that ever was.

Colby calls himself a realist, though it’s not clear that he knows exactly what he is. Just like America does not know what it is. America may want to be an Asian power, but that ship sailed in 1882. America is not Asian – it chose not to be on more than one occasion – and has demonstrated a limited capacity to understand any region outside its borders, even Canada.

To devise realist policies for Asian security requires expertise on the region’s society and politics. Otherwise, one is not weighing costs and benefits but merely pointing in ideological directions.

But nowadays that passes for “realist” thinking among America’s Asia “experts.” When all is said and done, America is in Asia because it finds itself in Asia. There is no reason: Like international school students who don’t learn the local language, they are there because that’s where they are. Not everything has a reason or lasts.

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asiatimes.com · by Han Feizi · May 2, 2025

6. Strengthening Nuclear Deterrence in the Far East

Excerpts:

Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), as key American allies, should strengthen their conventional military capabilities, both offensive and defensive, to reinforce regional deterrence. Two critical steps are needed. First, Japan and South Korea must expand their capabilities to neutralize North Korea’s missile launchers. Second, Japan’s defense architecture should be aligned with South Korea’s Three-Axis System to create an integrated deterrence framework.

...

By implementing these measures, North Korea would be left with only a limited number of launchers capable of delivering nuclear weapons. While it is possible that some missiles could still be launched from the remaining launchers and a few might evade American missile defenses, North Korea would have to consider allocating few nuclear warheads against Japan, South Korea, and the United States. This would be necessary both to achieve its long-term political objectives and to deter US-ROK combined forces and US Forces Japan (USFJ) from retaliating in the short term.

Moreover, North Korean leadership would face significant uncertainty about whether its remaining nuclear missiles could successfully penetrate American missile defenses. In essence, by increasing their conventional strike capabilities and aligning their military strategies, Japan and South Korea could ensure that a substantial number of North Korean launchers are neutralized. This would force Pyongyang to operate with significantly reduced military options, making its attempt to create nuclear decoupling less credible.

However, this strategy is only viable as long as North Korea’s nuclear arsenal remains limited. If Pyongyang dramatically expands its warhead stockpile and launch platforms, conventional deterrence alone will no longer be sufficient, and the risk of nuclear decoupling will escalate beyond control. The US, Japan, and South Korea must act decisively—before the balance of power shifts irreversibly in North Korea’s favor. Time is running out.

Strengthening Nuclear Deterrence in the Far East — Global Security Review

globalsecurityreview.com · by Ju Hyung Kim · May 2, 2025

North Korea’s rapid advancements in nuclear miniaturization, missile technology, and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) capabilities are accelerating the risk of nuclear decoupling among the US, Japan, and South Korea—undermining the credibility of deterrence in the region. Given this grave security challenge, what realistic measures can be taken to prevent nuclear decoupling?

Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), as key American allies, should strengthen their conventional military capabilities, both offensive and defensive, to reinforce regional deterrence. Two critical steps are needed. First, Japan and South Korea must expand their capabilities to neutralize North Korea’s missile launchers. Second, Japan’s defense architecture should be aligned with South Korea’s Three-Axis System to create an integrated deterrence framework.

So far, to address concerns over potential nuclear decoupling, the US, Japan, and South Korea have explored multiple options. In addition to Washington’s repeated assurances that its nuclear extended deterrence remains intact, discussions have included modernizing American nuclear weapons, expanding nuclear-sharing agreements, redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea, and even the possibility of South Korea developing its own nuclear arsenal.

However, South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons remains highly improbable due to its significant political costs. From the 1960s to the 1980s, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-states feared the US might hesitate to retaliate with nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union launched a nuclear strike on Europe. While NATO pursued multiple strategies—most notably the dual-key system and the deployment of Pershing II missiles—these measures never fully resolved nuclear decoupling concerns.

Ultimately, NATO never confronted the full extent of this dilemma as the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Since the issue lies not in the US’s ability to retaliate but in its willingness to do so under specific conditions, the most practical approach is to adopt deterrence measures that North Korea perceives as credible.

First, Japan and South Korea should prioritize expanding their capabilities to neutralize North Korea’s nuclear missile launchers. A key advantage for the US, Japan, and South Korea—compared to NATO during the Cold War—is that North Korea is estimated to have around 50 nuclear warheads, far fewer than the tens of thousands in the Soviet arsenal.

In this context, Japan’s planned acquisition of enemy base strike capabilities should focus not only on expanding the number of available strike assets but also on improving their precision and destructive power to ensure maximum effectiveness against North Korean launch sites. At the same time, South Korea’s kill chain should further enhance its deep-strike capabilities by increasing assets like the Hyunmoo-4 missile, which is designed to penetrate deeply buried facilities.

Additionally, South Korea’s Drone Operations Command, established in 2023, should undergo a major expansion in drone assets capable of effectively detecting, tracking, and striking North Korean missile launchers. By integrating high-precision missiles and unmanned systems, both Japan and South Korea can significantly reduce North Korea’s ability to deliver nuclear strikes, thereby reinforcing deterrence.

Second, as Japan and South Korea expand their strike capabilities, Japan’s defense architecture should be aligned with South Korea’s Three-Axis System. This integration would allow both countries to allocate their finite military assets more effectively when targeting North Korea’s nuclear-related ground units. For example, given the geographic distance, Japan could focus on striking fixed targets such as command centers and underground missile storage sites while South Korea concentrates on eliminating mobile launchers that require rapid response and precision strikes.

Additionally, harmonizing Japan and South Korea’s missile defense structures would improve the likelihood of intercepting North Korean missiles. While Japan has developed its missile defense in close coordination with the United States, South Korea has opted to develop its own independent missile defense system, instead of fully integrating into the American-led ballistic missile defense framework.

However, aligning the two countries’ missile defense systems would significantly enhance regional interception capabilities. A fully integrated defense network would not only establish a more layered interception system against incoming North Korean missiles but also enable earlier response times—as Japan and South Korea deepen their real-time missile-tracking cooperation—South Korea’s response times could improve further. By improving both offensive and defensive coordination, Japan and South Korea can maximize deterrence and reduce North Korea’s nuclear strike effectiveness.

By implementing these measures, North Korea would be left with only a limited number of launchers capable of delivering nuclear weapons. While it is possible that some missiles could still be launched from the remaining launchers and a few might evade American missile defenses, North Korea would have to consider allocating few nuclear warheads against Japan, South Korea, and the United States. This would be necessary both to achieve its long-term political objectives and to deter US-ROK combined forces and US Forces Japan (USFJ) from retaliating in the short term.

Moreover, North Korean leadership would face significant uncertainty about whether its remaining nuclear missiles could successfully penetrate American missile defenses. In essence, by increasing their conventional strike capabilities and aligning their military strategies, Japan and South Korea could ensure that a substantial number of North Korean launchers are neutralized. This would force Pyongyang to operate with significantly reduced military options, making its attempt to create nuclear decoupling less credible.

However, this strategy is only viable as long as North Korea’s nuclear arsenal remains limited. If Pyongyang dramatically expands its warhead stockpile and launch platforms, conventional deterrence alone will no longer be sufficient, and the risk of nuclear decoupling will escalate beyond control. The US, Japan, and South Korea must act decisively—before the balance of power shifts irreversibly in North Korea’s favor. Time is running out.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, CEO of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.

7.  Kim Moon-soo tapped presidential candidate for People Power Party

The conservatives must demonstrate a superior vision for Korea and for its governance than simply attacking Lee Jae Myung,

(3rd LD) Kim Moon-soo tapped presidential candidate for People Power Party | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · May 3, 2025

(ATTN: ADDS Kim's remarks in paras 4-8, photos)

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, May 3 (Yonhap) -- Kim Moon-soo, a labor activist turned conservative politician, won the People Power Party (PPP)'s presidential nomination Saturday to run for the June 3 election.

Kim received 56.5 percent support in the party's primary, which combined votes from the party electorate and results from public opinion polling conducted Thursday and Friday, defeating former PPP leader Han Dong-hoon, who garnered 43.5 percent.

Kim is set to face the Democratic Party (DP) presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung in the race, which picks former President Yoon Suk Yeol's successor following his removal from office over his failed martial law bid.

Former Labor Minister Kim Moon-soo delivers an acceptance speech after winning the People Power Party's presidential nomination during a convention in Goyang, just northwest of Seoul, on May 3, 2025. (Yonhap)

With the election only a month away, Kim vowed to unite the party and work with other political forces to secure victory.

"I will establish strong solidarity with any forces to prevent the DP Lee Jae-myung from taking office," Kim said in an acceptance speech. "I will pursue this through a process and approach acceptable to both the people and party members."

If elected, Kim promised to push for constitutional amendments and carry out sweeping reforms across the political, judicial and electoral systems, including proposals to abolish privileges given to lawmakers and the early voting system.

He also pledged to become a "security president," committed to eliminating the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons and working toward unification with the North.

"I will ensure that extremist forces seeking to undermine our system cannot destabilize this nation. I will firmly uphold the Republic of Korea as a free and democratic country," he added.

Former Labor Minister Kim Moon-soo delivers an acceptance speech after winning the People Power Party's presidential nomination during a convention in Goyang, just northwest of Seoul, on May 3, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

Kim has gained momentum within the conservative bloc after refusing to apologize for Yoon's martial law decree in December and opposing his impeachment. In contrast, Han Dong-hoon publicly denounced the decree and supported Yoon's removal from office.

Even with the PPP's nomination, the race may not be settled.

On Friday, former Prime Minister Han Duck-soo declared his presidential bid, in a move expected to eventually seek a merger of campaigns with the candidate of the conservative party.

The former prime minister Han, who served as acting president after Yoon's impeachment, has shown higher approval ratings than the PPP contenders in recent opinion polls.

So far, the former prime minister has not been affiliated with any political party, but he is widely expected to seek coordination with the PPP nominee to unify the conservative vote against the DP's Lee, who is currently leading public opinion polls.

Kim expressed openness to unifying the conservative candidacy with Han Duck-soo, while Han Dong-hoon has criticized the former prime minister for attempting to enter the race without going through the party's primary process.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · May 3, 2025

8. Russia-N. Korea partnership will impact Trump's leverage in diplomacy toward Pyongyang: expert

Well, alliances can provide strength.  

Of course the Russian-north Korea alliance is one based on weakness, fear, desperation, and envy and will never be as powerful the ROK/US alliance that is based on shared values, aligned interests, and mutual trust.

The Russia and north Korea and the entire CRINK relationships are based on:

weakness – they all have inherent weaknesses as authoritarian regimes 

fear – they fear the strength of the silk web of relationships among friends, partners and allies of the free world.

desperation – they are desperate for mutual support and help in the face of the free world and their own inherent and internal weaknesses

envy – They envy the silk web of alliance of the US and the free world but they are unwilling to to eatbalishships based on values and trust.

Russia-N. Korea partnership will impact Trump's leverage in diplomacy toward Pyongyang: expert | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 3, 2025

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, May 2 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's deepening partnership with Russia is a variable that will impact U.S. President Donald Trump's leverage in future diplomacy with Pyongyang, a U.S. expert said Friday, as the reclusive regime's reliance on Moscow has significantly lessened the need for dialogue with the United States.

During a podcast, Sydney Seiler, former intelligence officer at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, made the remarks amid expectations that Trump might seek to revive his personal diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un for peace talks.

"Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un have laid a pathway for a protracted period of not needing to talk to the U.S. and so that really will impact the president's leverage," Seiler said during the podcast hosted by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Seiler then asked a question about what Trump could give Kim, which Pyongyang has not received from the Russian president.

"I can't think of much," he said.

Sydney Seiler, former intelligence officer at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, speaks during a podcast hosted by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on May 2, 2025, in this photo captured from the CSIS' YouTube account. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

North Korea has relied on Russia for food, fuel, security guarantees and other forms of support as it provided troops, in addition to munitions and weapons, to back Russia's war against Ukraine. The two countries' signing of a "comprehensive strategic partnership" treaty in June underscored their deepening partnership.

The expert pointed out Trump's belief that he can leverage his negotiating finesse to reengage with Pyongyang.

"Trump's own expectations ... I think he believes at the right time, in the right place, he can apply his negotiating skills in a way that can help get at least part of the North Korea issue back on some type of track where we have some interaction with them, we try to develop some influence, we try to address their concerns," Seiler said.

Thus, "now is as good time as any" for the Trump administration to start reengaging with the North, he noted.

Commenting on Trump's description of North Korea as a "nuclear power," Seiler assessed that it might have been meant to signal to Kim that the U.S. would treat him not as a "defeated state," but with respect.

He cast doubts over whether Pyongyang would act differently should a progressive president be picked in South Korea's June 3 presidential election.

"(North Koreans) said so directly that they were fooled by Moon and deceived by Yoon. Frankly, they've given up hope for talking with South Korea," he said, referring to former liberal President Moon Jae-in and former conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol.

"I think for the progressives, they must learn that this is not simply a turning back of the clock to 2018 and 2019. The difficulties in the relationship with North Korea are not the result of the hard-line Yoon administration policy toward the North ... (but) a result of Pyongyang's choices, behaviors and actions."

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 3, 2025

9. Security tightened for presidential candidate Lee amid alleged threats

Korea – please refrain from political violence. Protect your democracy.

You can't burn a village to save it.

Security tightened for presidential candidate Lee amid alleged threats | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · May 3, 2025

SEOUL, May 3 (Yonhap) -- Presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung has been placed under heightened security following reports of plots to attack him, his campaign said Saturday.

Lee of the liberal Democratic Party is "going to have difficulty having direct contact with people from now on due to continued reports of plots to attack the candidate," the campaign said via YouTube and Facebook.

During a campaign stop in the eastern coastal city of Sokcho the same day, Lee asked the locals for their understanding, saying he will not be able to hold their hands due to security concerns.

The conservative People Power Party, however, dismissed the decision as a "sham" aimed at delaying his retrial on election law violation allegations.

"The court marshal will not harm candidate Lee, so he can relax and meet him to accept the notification of his hearing," the party said in a commentary, adding that as a candidate of a major party, Lee is already provided the same level of security as a prime minister.

"We hope he rests easy and attends his trial," the party said.

On Friday, the Seoul High Court scheduled the first hearing of the retrial for May 15 and sent notification of his duty to attend both via mail and a court marshal.

The retrial was ordered by the Supreme Court earlier this week, reviving the possibility that Lee could receive a sentence barring him from running in the June 3 presidential election.

Lee Jae-myung, the presidential candidate of the Democratic Party, greets locals at a market in the eastern coastal city of Sokcho on May 3, 2025. (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · May 3, 2025

10. Hegseth orders crafting of 2025 defense strategy to prioritize allies' burden sharing, China deterrence

As General Fenton, the commander of USSOCOM says the shift is from burden sharing to burden owning. But there is no ally that owns its burden for defense more than the ROK. There is no US ally that contributes more to its own defense and to the support of US troops in its country than the ROK (in relative terms and in the aggregate). There is no ally that has built the largest US military base outside of CONUS than the ROK, just to name one of its contributions. It is a partner in the Arsenal of Democracy. What other country's defense industry provides as much advanced weaponry to US allies around the world? And of course there is no country that provides greater foreign direct investment in the US since 2023 than the ROK. We need to be smart about our alliance. Now is the time to be broadening our security architecture in the Indo-Pacific in partnership with the ROK (and our other allies, especially Japan, Australia, and the Philippines)) and benefiting from the significant contributions they can and will make to mutual defense. We should not waste our time negotiating extortion schemes for the presence of US troops.

(LEAD) Hegseth orders crafting of 2025 defense strategy to prioritize allies' burden sharing, China deterrence | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 3, 2025

(ATTN: ADDS more info in paras 3, 7-9)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, May 2 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has ordered the development of the Pentagon's 2025 National Defense Strategy (NDS) to prioritize raising "burden-sharing" with allies and deterring China threats in the Indo-Pacific, a Pentagon official said Friday.

Sean Parnell, assistant to the secretary for public affairs, said that Hegseth directed Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby to begin the NDS development, amid speculation that President Donald Trump might seek a rise in South Korea's share of the cost for stationing the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).

The Pentagon chief directed that a final NDS draft be provided to him no later than Aug. 31. The NDS is a strategic roadmap that provides a clear direction for the Pentagon to implement President Donald Trump's "America First and Peace Through Strength" agenda," Parnell said.

This photo, released by EPA, shows U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth attending a cabinet meeting at the White House in Washington on April 30, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

"Consistent with the president's intent, the NDS will prioritize defense of the U.S. homeland, including America's skies and borders, and deterring China in the Indo-Pacific," the official said in a statement.

"At the same time, the NDS will prioritize increasing burden-sharing with allies and partners around the world, in the process strengthening those relationships and setting conditions for lasting peace," he added.

Colby will lead the NDS development in coordination with the Joint Staff and other Pentagon components, according to Parnell.

Observers said that the envisioned NDS might focus on countering evolving threats from China, and call for allies and partners to step up their defense contributions to address other security challenges, including those from North Korea and Iran.

Colby has stressed the need for a USFK overhaul to make it "more relevant" to handling China-related contingencies rather than being held "hostage" to countering North Korean challenges.

The strategy could add pressure on South Korea to jack up its financial contributions to station American troops on its soil, as Trump has claimed that the U.S. is not sufficiently reimbursed for America's security protection for the Asian ally.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 3, 2025

11.  S. Korea, U.S. agree to further cooperate to achieve shared security goals for Korean Peninsula, Indo-Pacific

Two points. The ROK government continues to function effectively despite the presidential chaos which is a testament to their professional civil servants and military.

Second, I hope Mr. Colby is coming to the realization of the importance of the ROK to his vaunted strategy of denial. I hope he is learning that "allies always" is America's asymmetric advantage. 

S. Korea, U.S. agree to further cooperate to achieve shared security goals for Korean Peninsula, Indo-Pacific | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 3, 2025

SEOUL/WASHINGTON, May 3 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States agreed to further cooperate to achieve shared security goals on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific during their key defense talks in Washington this week, Seoul's defense ministry said Saturday.

The Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) took place on Thursday and Friday. It was the first KIDD meeting since U.S. President Donald Trump took office in January.

The meeting was led by Cho Chang-rae, South Korea's deputy defense minister for policy, and key U.S. officials -- John Noh, who performs the duties of the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, and Andrew Winternitz, who performs the duties of the deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia.

The two sides assessed that the latest KIDD meeting laid a foundation for practical cooperation to further solidify the bilateral alliance, according to the ministry.

After the KIDD meeting, Cho had separate talks with U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby to discuss the results of the meeting and exchange views on ways to strengthen the alliance, the ministry said.

Seoul and Washington have held the KIDD meeting once or twice a year since it was launched in 2011 as a comprehensive senior-level defense meeting.

Cho Chang-rae (L), South Korea's deputy defense minister for policy, meets U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby after South Korea and the United States held key defense talks in Washington from May 1-2, 2025, in this photo provided by Seoul's defense ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 3, 2025

12. 2nd high-level APEC preparatory meeting begins in Jeju

Just another example of the ROK government's professionals continuing to function at a "high level." Other countries might be paralyzed by the presidential turmoil the ROK is experiencing. 

2nd high-level APEC preparatory meeting begins in Jeju | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Shim Sun-ah · May 3, 2025

SEOUL, May 3 (Yonhap) -- The second round of the high-level preparatory meeting for the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit kicked off Saturday on South Korea's southern island of Jeju, officials said.

The 14-day Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM), scheduled to run through May 16, brings together more than 3,200 government delegates and private-sector representatives from the 21 APEC member economies.

A view of the Jeju International Convention Center in Seogwipo, Jeju, on May 2, 2025, a day before it hosts the second round of the high-level preparatory meeting for the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. The meeting began on May 3 for a 14-day run. (Yonhap)

South Korea will use the occasion to highlight the details of key agenda items it has introduced for this year's summit, including cooperation on artificial intelligence and responses to demographic changes, according to foreign ministry officials.

Coinciding with the event will be ministerial meetings on finance and trade, as well as a series of conferences on economy and technology cooperation, women and economic policy partnerships, among others.

Three more SOM sessions are expected to be held before the summit, scheduled for November.

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en.yna.co.kr · by Shim Sun-ah · May 3, 2025

13. A free and unified Korea: advancing U.S. national security interests

My latest essay using Secretary Rubio's criteria.

Voices May 2, 2025 / 11:24 AM

A free and unified Korea: advancing U.S. national security interests

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/05/02/korea-us-national-interests/1231746198198/

By David Maxwell

President Donald J. Trump (R) welcomes South Korean President Moon Jae-in (L) to the Oval Office of the White House in Washington on April 11, 2019. Photo by Jim Lo Scalzo/UPI | License Photo

May 2 (UPI) -- Introduction

The pursuit of a free and unified Korea is not merely a regional aspiration but a strategic imperative that aligns with the United States' core national security interests. In evaluating this policy direction, it is essential to address the criteria outlined by Secretary of State Marco Rubio:

1. Does it make America safer?

2. Does it make America stronger?

3. Does it make America more prosperous?

Supporting the Korean people's pursuit of Korean unification under a democratic government unequivocally satisfies these criteria, thereby enhancing U.S. security, strength, and prosperity.

Enhancing American safety

A unified Korea under a democratic regime would significantly bolster U.S. national security by eliminating the persistent threat posed by North Korea's nuclear ambitions. For decades, the Kim family regime has engaged in political warfare and blackmail diplomacy, aiming to dominate the Korean Peninsula to ensure its survival. Despite various diplomatic efforts, North Korea has steadfastly advanced its nuclear weapons program, posing a direct threat to regional stability and U.S. interests, to include the U.S. homeland.

This strategic assumption is clear: North Korea will never negotiate away its nuclear capabilities as long as the Kim family regime remains in power. Therefore, the path to denuclearization lies through unification. By supporting the Korean people's pursuit of a free and unified Korea, the U.S. can address the root cause of the nuclear threat. A unified Korea would inherently lead to the dismantling of North Korea's nuclear arsenal, thereby reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation and potential conflict.

Moreover, a unified Korea would likely lead to a more stable Northeast Asia, diminishing the chances of military confrontations that could draw in the United States. The presence of a democratic Korea would serve as a deterrent against aggressive actions from neighboring adversaries, thereby contributing to regional and global security.

Strengthening American power

America's strength is amplified through a silk web of robust alliances and the promotion of democratic values. A unified Korea, aligned with U.S. interests, would serve as a formidable ally in a strategically vital region. This alliance would enhance the United States' geopolitical influence in Asia, providing a counterbalance to adversarial powers such as China and Russia.

The U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance has been a cornerstone of regional stability. A unified Korea would not only preserve but also strengthen this alliance, facilitating greater military and economic cooperation. This partnership would enable the U.S. to project power more effectively in the Indo-Pacific, ensuring that American interests are safeguarded.

Furthermore, the integration of North Korea into a unified Korea would necessitate significant security sector reforms. The U.S. can play a pivotal role in assisting these reforms, ensuring that the unified Korean military is capable, professional, and aligned with international norms. Such collaboration would enhance interoperability between U.S. and Korean forces, thereby strengthening collective defense capabilities.

Promoting American prosperity

Economic prosperity is intrinsically linked to stable and open markets. A unified Korea would transform the North's stagnant economy, opening new avenues for trade and investment. The reconstruction and development of the North would create opportunities for American businesses in sectors such as infrastructure, energy, technology, and consumer goods.

Additionally, a unified Korea would serve as a gateway to broader regional markets, facilitating increased economic integration and cooperation. This economic dynamism would not only benefit Korea but also contribute to global economic growth, from which the U.S. stands to gain substantially.

The stabilization of the Korean Peninsula would also lead to reduced defense expenditures for the U.S. Currently, significant resources are allocated to deter North Korean aggression. A unified and peaceful Korea would allow the U.S. to reallocate these resources to other pressing needs, thereby optimizing defense spending.

Strategic recommendations

To realize the vision of a free and unified Korea, the United States should consider the following strategic actions:

1. Adopt a human rights-upfront approach: Emphasize the importance of human rights in all engagements with North Korea. By highlighting the regime's human rights abuses, the U.S. can delegitimize the Kim family's rule and empower the North Korean populace to seek change.

2. Implement a comprehensive information campaign: Utilize information dissemination to educate North Koreans about their universal rights and the realities beyond their borders. Access to information can serve as a catalyst for internal transformation, undermining the regime's control over its citizens.

3. Support for the 8.15 Unification Doctrine: Back South Korea's 8.15 Unification Doctrine, which advocates for unification based on the principles of freedom, peace, and prosperity. U.S. support can lend credibility and momentum to this initiative, fostering a conducive environment for unification.

4. Enhance military readiness and deterrence: Maintain a robust military presence and readiness on the Korean Peninsula to deter potential aggression. This posture not only ensures immediate security but also signals a long-term commitment to the region's stability.

5. Engage in multilateral diplomacy: Collaborate with regional stakeholders, including China and Japan, to build a consensus on the benefits of a unified Korea. Multilateral support can alleviate regional apprehensions and contribute to a peaceful unification process.

Conclusion

The pursuit of a free and unified Korea is a strategic endeavor that aligns with the United States' national security interests. By addressing the criteria of American safety, strength, and prosperity, this policy direction offers a comprehensive solution to the challenges posed by the current North Korean regime. Through deliberate and sustained efforts, the U.S. can play a pivotal role in facilitating a unified Korea, thereby enhancing regional stability and securing a more prosperous future for both nations.

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. After he retired, he became Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is the editor at large for the Small Wars Journal.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com