|
Quotes of the Day:
“Everything is your fault if you are any damn good.”
– Ernest Hemingway
“One of the saddest lessons of history is this: If we’ve been bamboozled long enough, we tend to reject any evidence of the bamboozle. We’re no longer interested in finding the truth. The bamboozle has captured us. It’s simply too painful to acknowledge, even to ourselves, that we’ve been taken. Once you give a charlatan power over you, you almost never get it back”
– Carl Sagan
“They handed you speed, not to help you – but to keep you from noticing the shortcuts they took.”
– Aldous Huxley
1. Hegseth Outlines U.S. Vision for Indo-Pacific, Addresses China Threat
2. Hegseth urges Asian allies to boost defense spending, do 'their part' in face of 'real' China threats
3. Hegseth Warns of ‘Devastating Consequences’ Should China Seek to ‘Conquer’ Taiwan
4. Iran Builds Up Near Weapons-Grade Uranium Stockpile Despite Nuclear Talks
5. The U.S. Plan to Hobble China Tech Isn’t Working
6. Denying Visas to Chinese Students Could Backfire on America
7. Experts Who Warn of Risks Posed by Chinese Students Are Skeptical of Trump Plan
8. Intelligence Staffer Critical of Trump Charged With Seeking to Pass Classified Documents to Foreign Government
9. World Scientists Look Elsewhere as U.S. Labs Stagger Under Trump Cuts
10. It’s Waymo’s World. We’re All Just Riding in It.
11. Overwhelmed by China, Manila looks for deal in flashpoint South China Sea
12. Irregular Warfare on the Sea Floor and the Case for National Resilience
13. Allies are more than customers of America’s defense industrial base. They can help rebuild it.
14. The wrong time for a collective defence pact in Asia
15. They fled their home countries to report from the safety of the U.S. Now, they fear they're in danger
16. Tip of the Spear, Edge of the Mind: Neurotechnology’s Roles in the Future of Special Operations
17. Demobilization and Disengagement: Lessons from the Philippines
18. Massacres, Looting, and Guerrilla War: A Partisan’s Story of Russia’s Invasion Part 1
19. How Dismantling the US Millennium Challenge Corporation Will Undermine Mongolia
20. Foreign Influence in the Arctic: The “Great Game” in the Arctic and how FMI Promote Conflict within NATO
21. Trump administration to prioritize ‘patriotic Americans’ for federal jobs
22. Pentagon to cut ties with contracts that outsource work
23. Is the NSC Dead? Trump guts the Biden administration’s most powerful foreign-policy advisory body.
24. Weaponized storytelling: How AI is helping researchers sniff out disinformation campaigns
1. Hegseth Outlines U.S. Vision for Indo-Pacific, Addresses China Threat
Key points (the key point is the three lines of effort):
While once again reiterating the U.S. seeks peace as opposed to war, Hegseth said the U.S. must also be prepared for armed conflict.
"If deterrence fails — and if called upon by [the] commander in chief — we are prepared to do what the Department of Defense does best: to fight and win, decisively," he said.
Hegseth then revisited the topic of reestablishing deterrence in the region.
The U.S. is working that line of effort in three ways, he said: improving DOD's forward force posture, helping allies and partners strengthen their defense capabilities and rebuilding U.S. and ally countries' defense industrial bases.
"Across the board, the United States, our allies and our partners have made great progress in these — and many other — areas toward achieving peace through strength," Hegseth said.
"But we have to do this quickly, and we have no time to waste," he added.
Hegseth wound down his remarks by emphasizing those who long for peace must prepare for war, and the U.S. is looking to its partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific to do just that.
"Our time is now," Hegseth said, adding the threats the U.S. and its allies are facing will not wait.
The three lines of effort should be described as America First, Allies Always - Allies Are America's Asymmetric Advantage. To have burden sharing each country must first own its defense burden (from burden sharing to burden owning to allow effective strategic burden sharing among all the myriad threats facing all friends, partners, and allies in Asia and the Indo-Pacific). They require partnership as the arsenal of democracies.
To put a finer point on it - "old think" is "burden sharing" with the US coming to the defense of a treaty ally. "Burden owning" requires that a country fully own its defense burden while both the country and the US live up to treaty obligations. The new "burden sharing" is the recognition of and the sharing of threats from a holistic perspective in the region rather than stovepiped with only one threat per country. The new burden sharing requires all countries recognizing that the threats against one could result in threats against others or all and that therefore there must be a collective deterrence architecture.
This is especially important because our intelligence communities now assess the "adversarial cooperation," collaboration, and collusion of our CRInK opponents (whose relationships are based on fear, weakness, depression, and envy).
The lines of effort must also defend against the political warfare strategies of our adversaries who seek to undermine alliances and force the US to prioritize one alliance over others so as to undermine US legitimacy and credibility and split alliances. It is imperative the US and allied leaders recognize the CRInK strategies, understand them, EXPOSE them to inoculate allied nations against them, and then attack those strategies with a superior political warfare strategy - the essence of which is to maintain strong and unbreakable alliances.
Hegseth Outlines U.S. Vision for Indo-Pacific, Addresses China Threat
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4202504/hegseth-outlines-us-vision-for-indo-pacific-addresses-china-threat/
May 30, 2025 | By Matthew Olay, DOD News |
While delivering plenary remarks at a Singaporean security summit today, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth outlined to numerous Asian ally countries DOD's vision for the Indo-Pacific region, while also addressing the strategic threat posed by China.
Speaking at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Shangri-La Dialogue, Hegseth began his remarks by underscoring the Defense Department's priorities of achieving peace through strength by focusing on restoring the warrior ethos, rebuilding the military and reestablishing deterrence.
The secretary then used the topic of deterrence — noting, specifically, that our allies around the world are beginning to invest more in their self-defense — to segue into speaking about the Indo-Pacific region.
"As our allies share the burden, we can increase our focus on the Indo-Pacific: our priority theater," Hegseth said.
Stating the futures of the U.S. and its Indo-Pacific allies are "bound together," Hegseth said the security and prosperity of Americans are linked to the security and prosperity of U.S. ally countries' citizens.
"We share your vision of peace and stability, of prosperity and security and we are here to stay," he said.
The future vision for the Indo-Pacific is one "grounded in common sense and national interests," Hegseth said, where the U.S. and its allies work together while respecting their mutual self-interests and engaging on the basis of sovereignty and commerce, as opposed to war.
The secretary pointed out, as President Donald J. Trump continues to lead European allies to step up in their self-defense, the U.S. can then focus more resources on the Indo-Pacific region.
"This enables all of us to benefit from the peace and stability that comes with a lasting and strong American presence here in the Indo-Pacific," Hegseth said.
"These benefits, they only multiply when our allies and partners are also strong," he added.
Regarding American influence in the region, Hegseth said the U.S. isn't interested in the approach to foreign policy of the past.
"We are not here to pressure other countries to embrace and adopt our politics or ideology; we are not here to preach to you about climate change or cultural issues; [and] we are not here to impose our will on you. We are all sovereign nations," Hegseth said, adding the U.S. seeks to work with its allies in areas where mutual interests align for peace and prosperity.
"On this sure foundation of mutual interests and common sense, we will build and strengthen our defense partnerships to preserve peace and increase prosperity," he said.
Pivoting to the threat China poses to the region, Hegseth made clear the U.S. is not actively seeking conflict.
"We do not seek conflict with communist China. … But we will not be pushed out of this critical region and we will not let our allies and partners be subordinated and intimidated" he said.
Noting China is "credibly preparing to use military force to alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific," Hegseth said any attempt by China to conquer neighboring Taiwan would result in "devastating consequences" not just for the Indo-Pacific, but the entire world.
"There's no reason to sugarcoat it: the threat China poses is real, and it could be imminent," Hegseth said, adding while nobody truly knows what China might ultimately do, the U.S. and its allies must nonetheless be ready with "urgency and vigilance."
While once again reiterating the U.S. seeks peace as opposed to war, Hegseth said the U.S. must also be prepared for armed conflict.
"If deterrence fails — and if called upon by [the] commander in chief — we are prepared to do what the Department of Defense does best: to fight and win, decisively," he said.
Hegseth then revisited the topic of reestablishing deterrence in the region.
The U.S. is working that line of effort in three ways, he said: improving DOD's forward force posture, helping allies and partners strengthen their defense capabilities and rebuilding U.S. and ally countries' defense industrial bases.
"Across the board, the United States, our allies and our partners have made great progress in these — and many other — areas toward achieving peace through strength," Hegseth said.
"But we have to do this quickly, and we have no time to waste," he added.
Hegseth wound down his remarks by emphasizing those who long for peace must prepare for war, and the U.S. is looking to its partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific to do just that.
"Our time is now," Hegseth said, adding the threats the U.S. and its allies are facing will not wait.
"And nor can we," he concluded.
2. Hegseth urges Asian allies to boost defense spending, do 'their part' in face of 'real' China threats
I wish he would say allies (which are America's asymmetric advantage) should do more against the entire range of threats in the Indo-Pacific posed by the CRInK (and especially China, north Korea, and Russia). Focusing solely on China will lead to strategic failure as China will exploit the other threats to undermine us. it is the adversarial cooperation that we must be concerned with. There is a "real" threat from north Korea and there is a really "real" threat from Chinese and north Korean collusion both from a threat of major conflict to political warfare (that could be coordinated and synchronized or just one taking advantage of the other in a more symbiotic relationship).
(LEAD) Hegseth urges Asian allies to boost defense spending, do 'their part' in face of 'real' China threats | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 31, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS more info in paras 2, 12; CHANGES photo; ADDS photo)
By Song Sang-ho
SINGAPORE, May 31 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth called Saturday for Asian allies to increase their defense spending and do their part as "force multipliers," as he portrayed China's evolving threats as "real" and potentially "imminent," and warned against economic "entanglement" with the Asian superpower.
Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual defense forum in Singapore, Hegseth also reassured allies and partners of America's commitment to the Indo-Pacific and vowed to increase the United States' focus on the region "if allies share the burden."
His remarks came amid lingering concerns that President Donald Trump's America First policy might lead to a scaling back of the U.S.' costly overseas security engagements in the midst of increasingly complicated challenges from China, North Korea, Russia and others.
"It is hard to believe a little bit, after some trips to Europe that I am saying this, but thanks to President Trump, Asian allies should look to countries in Europe as a newfound example. NATO members are pledging to spend 5 percent of their GDP on defense, even Germany," he said. GDP is short for gross domestic product.
"It doesn't make sense for countries in Europe to do that, while key allies and partners in Asia spend less on defense in the face of an even more formidable threat, not to mention North Korea."
His remarks appeared to mark a subtle shift from the Trump administration's focus on some members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that the president once called "delinquent."
U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth delivers his speech during the 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue summit in Singapore on May 31, 2025, in this photo released by the Associated Press. (Yonhap)
Hegseth stressed that defense spending should reflect "the dangers and threats we face today."
"Deterrence does not come cheap," he said. "Time is of the essence. We must step up and move out with urgency."
Speculation has persisted that the Trump administration might call for a rise in South Korea's share of the cost for stationing the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea. Trump has said that America was not sufficiently "reimbursed" for what he called its "big-time" military protection of the Asian ally.
Hegseth highlighted the need for U.S. allies to do their part to help counter Chinese threats.
"We ask -- indeed, we insist -- that our allies and partners do their part on defense. Sometimes, that means having uncomfortable and tough conversations. Partners owe it to each other to be honest and realistic ... This is the essence of a pragmatic, common-sense defense policy," Hegseth said.
"But you will also see that we are -- and will remain -- loyal to our allies and partners ... In fact, the only way to ensure lasting alliances and partnerships is to make sure each side does its part and see the benefit."
Moreover, he said that an alliance cannot be "ironclad" if "in reality or perception," it is seen as one-sided."
The secretary reiterated that "America First" does not mean "America alone," as he requested that U.S. allies and partners work as "force multipliers" alongside the U.S. in the midst of shared threats.
"We will stand with you and work alongside you to deter Chinese aggression. And we will do so in a rational and pragmatic manner," he said. "Each day, together, creating more and more dilemmas and complications, should they decide to overturn the status quo."
He went on to say that no one should doubt America's commitment to its Indo-Pacific allies and partners.
"We will continue to wrap our arms around our friends and find new ways to work together -- not only our treaty allies here, but also our key defense partners in ASEAN and across the Indo-Pacific," he said. ASEAN stands for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth delivers his speech during the 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue summit in Singapore on May 31, 2025, in this photo released by the Associated Press. (Yonhap)
Excoriating China's assertive behavior in the region, the secretary cautioned against the perils of economic reliance on the Asian power.
"We know that many countries are tempted by the idea of seeking both economic cooperation with China and defense cooperation with the United States ... But beware the leverage the CCP seeks with that entanglement," Hegseth said. CCP is short for the Chinese Communist Party.
"Economic dependence on China only deepens their malign influence and complicates our decision space during times of tension or conflict."
He strongly castigated China's threats against Taiwan and in the South China Sea.
"China seeks to become the hegemonic power in Asia. No doubt it hopes to dominate and control too many parts of this vibrant and vital region," he said. "Through its massive military build-up and growing willingness to use military force to achieve its goals, including gray zone tactics in hybrid warfare, China has demonstrated that it wants to fundamentally alter the region's status quo."
China's behavior towards its neighbors and the world is a "wake-up" call, he noted, calling attention to Chinese President Xi Jinping's order for his military to be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027.
"To be clear, any attempt by Communist China to conquer Taiwan would result in devastating consequences for the Indo-Pacific and the world," he said. "There is a no reason to sugarcoat it. The threat China poses is real. And it could be imminent. We hope not."
However, he pointed out that Washington does not seek conflict with its Asian competitor.
"The U.S, especially under President Trump, does not seek war. We do not seek to dominate or strangle China ... We do not seek regime change," he said.
"Instead, we seek peace. But we must ensure that China cannot dominate us -- or our allies and partners. Maintaining the status quo requires strength. That's just a rational, common sense goal that we should all be able to live with."
In another stern message to China that he views as seeking regional dominance, Hegseth underlined that America will continue to stay as an Indo-Pacific nation.
"Here in the Indo-Pacific, our futures are bound together. The prosperity and security of the American people are linked to those of your people," he said. "We share your vision of peace and stability, and of prosperity and security, and we are here to stay."
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 31, 2025
3. Hegseth Warns of ‘Devastating Consequences’ Should China Seek to ‘Conquer’ Taiwan
Asia is the priority.
I can make the same, if not stronger case, that if South Korea falls to north Korea (with support from China) it will have even greater "devastating consequences."
Excerpts:
Despite words of support to Asian allies, Hegseth urged them to spend more on their own defense, pointing out current efforts in Europe to spend more to combat a less formidable threat. “It doesn’t make sense for countries in Europe to do [more on defense] while key allies and partners in Asia spend far less in the face of a far more formidable threat, not to mention North Korea,” Hegseth said.
Hegseth also warned against the economic influence Beijing wields over many Asian countries, whose largest trading partner is often China.
“We know that many countries are tempted by the idea of seeking both economic cooperation with China and defense cooperation with the United States. Now that is a geographic necessity for many,” Hegseth said. “Beware the leverage the [Chinese Communist Party] seeks with that entanglement. Economic dependence on China only deepens their malign influence and complicates our decision space during times of tension.”
Some allies were eager to amplify the U.S. message of support for Asia. Singaporean officials titled a press release after a discussion between the U.S. and Singaporean leadership as “U.S. Secretary of Defense Reaffirms Strong Ties.”
Hegseth Warns of ‘Devastating Consequences’ Should China Seek to ‘Conquer’ Taiwan
The defense secretary said Asia is the administration’s priority region
https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/hegseth-pledges-u-s-support-to-taiwan-in-case-of-chinese-aggression-bfae306c
By Nancy A. Youssef
Follow
and Chun Han Wong
Follow
Updated May 31, 2025 8:17 am ET
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth Photo: edgar su/Reuters
Key Points
What's This?
- Defense Secretary Hegseth vowed ’devestating consequences’ if China seeks to conquer Taiwan.
- Hegseth warned that threats to Taiwan from China “could be imminent,” and said Asia is the U.S. priority.
- Hegseth urged Asian allies to spend more on defense and warned against China’s economic influence.
SINGAPORE—Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth vowed that there would be “devastating consequences” should China seek to “conquer” Taiwan, in a speech that appeared aimed at easing concerns in Asia over the U.S. commitment to its allies in the region.
In what was his most assertive statement to date on Taiwan, Hegseth issued a stark warning that threats to the island from China “could be imminent.”
Hegseth said that the U.S.’s goal is “to prevent war” through deterrence with allies. “But if deterrence fails, and if called upon by my commander in chief, we are prepared to do what the Department of Defense does best, to fight and win decisively,” he said.
He also said Asia is the Trump administration’s priority region. The U.S. has long struggled to recalibrate its commitments in Europe and the Middle East to focus on Asia. President Trump came into office promising to end the conflict in Ukraine, but his efforts have so far been frustrated.
Hegseth made the remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, a security conference attended by many top defense officials from Asian and Western countries.
“To be clear: Any attempt by Communist China to conquer Taiwan by force would result in devastating consequences for the Indo-Pacific and the world. We are not going to sugarcoat it. The threat China poses is real. And it could be imminent,” Hegseth said without outlining what those consequences would be.
At the same time, he said that “Communist China will not invade Taiwan on [President Trump’s] watch.”
The defense secretary didn’t elaborate as to how the U.S. would respond to Chinese aggression against Taiwan. Beijing claims Taiwan as its territory and has refused to rule out using force to take control of the self-governed island.
Rear Admiral Hu Gangfeng, China’s top delegate at the Shangri-La Dialogue, pushed back against what he called “groundless accusations against China” made at the conference, without specifying what comments he was responding to.
“Some of the content was fabricated from nothing, some of it inverted black and white,” Hu, vice president of China’s National Defense University, told delegates in a breakout session after Hegseth’s speech. “They were basically meant to provoke disturbances, create divisions, instigate confrontation and cause disorder in the Asia Pacific.”
“We should enhance mutual trust through candid exchanges,” Hu said. “We must seek common ground and resolve differences.”
could one day be used to deliver
0 of 7 minutes, 27 secondsVolume 0%
00:0307:27
Beijing’s new ships can land on beaches and link to form massive mobile piers. Analysts say they’re intended to rapidly offload military equipment, setting the stage for a D-Day-style invasion of Taiwan. Photo Illustration: WSJ
Despite Hegseth’s tough comments, it was unclear whether the speech would be enough to reassure anxious partners, particularly as the Trump administration has proposed stiff tariffs across the region and its movement of some military equipment out of the region.
“The message of painting China as a security threat is going to receive a mixed reception” in the Asia Pacific, said Dylan Loh, an assistant professor at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University. “Even as countries here want to be reassured of an enduring U.S. presence, not all of them are willing to accept or agree with Washington’s threat perceptions.”
The prospect of an armed conflict with China—whether over Taiwan or the contested shipping lanes of the South China Sea, where Beijing has aggressively asserted illegal territorial claims—has increasingly consumed U.S. military planning. In recent years, China built up the world’s biggest navy—a title once held by the U.S.—and a formidable arsenal of missiles aimed at making swaths of the Pacific off-limits to its adversaries.
Meanwhile, Taiwan is racing to overhaul its military in preparation for what it sees as a potential invasion by China. Beijing has intensified its military exercises around the island, including by staging simulated blockades that Taiwan and the U.S. both say could turn without notice into an actual attack—an event that would trigger a global crisis.
Nonetheless, Hegseth’s presence at the Shangri-La Dialogue will offer some comfort to governments seeking signals of continuity in U.S. policy toward the Indo-Pacific region, notwithstanding the lack of details, Loh said.
China, which had sent its defense minister to the last four editions of the Shangri-La Dialogue, downgraded the level of its representation this year by sending a senior military academic—a one-star rear admiral—to lead its delegation, the lowest-ranking chief delegate from China in nearly two decades.
Hegseth, during his speech, appeared to note the Chinese defense minister’s absence, saying the U.S. was at the dialogue while “somebody else isn’t.”
Zhou Bo, a senior fellow at Beijing’s Tsinghua University and a retired senior colonel in the Chinese military, said that China traditionally hasn’t regarded the Shangri-La Dialogue as a particularly important event, as the discussions have tended to be negative toward Beijing. China instead places more value on its own security conference—the Xiangshan Forum—held in Beijing, said Zhou, a member of the Chinese delegation in Singapore.
Some analysts say China’s decision to not send its defense minister might be intended to avoid complications that could arise from unscripted and potentially fractious interactions with Western counterparts like Hegseth.
“The political risk to the defense minister himself and to the state outweighs any ‘rewards’ that may be had,” Loh said. While there is a missed opportunity to meet with other top defense officials, “they do not want to go off script or be construed as going off script in what is a sensitive period for U.S.-China relations.”
Despite words of support to Asian allies, Hegseth urged them to spend more on their own defense, pointing out current efforts in Europe to spend more to combat a less formidable threat. “It doesn’t make sense for countries in Europe to do [more on defense] while key allies and partners in Asia spend far less in the face of a far more formidable threat, not to mention North Korea,” Hegseth said.
Hegseth also warned against the economic influence Beijing wields over many Asian countries, whose largest trading partner is often China.
“We know that many countries are tempted by the idea of seeking both economic cooperation with China and defense cooperation with the United States. Now that is a geographic necessity for many,” Hegseth said. “Beware the leverage the [Chinese Communist Party] seeks with that entanglement. Economic dependence on China only deepens their malign influence and complicates our decision space during times of tension.”
Some allies were eager to amplify the U.S. message of support for Asia. Singaporean officials titled a press release after a discussion between the U.S. and Singaporean leadership as “U.S. Secretary of Defense Reaffirms Strong Ties.”
Write to Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com and Chun Han Wong at chunhan.wong@wsj.com
Appeared in the May 31, 2025, print edition as 'Hegseth Pledges U.S. Support to Taiwan in Case of Chinese Aggression'.
4. Iran Builds Up Near Weapons-Grade Uranium Stockpile Despite Nuclear Talks
Excerpts:
European diplomats have said if Iran failed to cooperate with the agency, they would follow up Saturday’s report with a push to declare Iran in noncompliance with its obligations as a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The treaty seeks to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
A noncompliance resolution could be voted on at the coming meeting of the IAEA board of member states, which starts June 9.
European officials have said they will decide by the summer whether to press ahead with the so-called snapback of sanctions on Iran at the U.N. Security Council, if Tehran doesn’t start to fully cooperate with the nuclear probe. The option of reimposing the sanctions expires in October under the 2015 agreement.
Iran has warned it could withdraw from the NPT and change its nuclear doctrine if sanctions are reimposed. The country’s leadership has pledged not to pursue nuclear weapons.
While Iran’s structured work on a nuclear weapon is believed to have ended in 2003, Western officials say it has continued with nuclear weapons-related experiments since then. In 2024, U.S. intelligence officials said Iran was carrying out work that would help Tehran learn how to make a nuclear weapon.
The agency said in its report that Iran’s lack of “technically credible answers” leaves open the possibility that Iran may still have undeclared nuclear material that it is able to use for non-civilian purposes.
Iran Builds Up Near Weapons-Grade Uranium Stockpile Despite Nuclear Talks
U.N. atomic agency reports that Iran hasn’t cooperated with nuclear probe, raising prospect of snapback of sanctions on Tehran
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-builds-up-near-weapons-grade-uranium-stockpile-despite-nuclear-talks-2f371dae
By Laurence Norman
Follow
Updated May 31, 2025 6:59 am ET
Iranians have suffered the economic consequences of international sanctions on their country. Photo: abedin taherkenareh/Shutterstock
Iran has continued to produce highly enriched uranium at a pace of roughly one nuclear weapon’s worth a month over the past three months despite talks between Washington and Tehran on a new nuclear deal, the United Nations atomic agency said.
The International Atomic Energy Agency said in a confidential report circulated to member states that Iran had grown its stockpile of 60%-enriched uranium to 408.6 kilograms from 274.8 kilograms in early February, an increase of around 50%. The Wall Street Journal viewed a copy of the report.
That means Iran has enough highly enriched uranium for roughly 10 nuclear weapons, based on IAEA measures of the minimum fissile material required, up from at least six at the time of the last report.
U.S. officials say it could take Iran less than two weeks to convert this highly enriched uranium into enough weapons-grade 90% fissile material for a nuclear weapon.
Iran says its nuclear work is purely peaceful. The U.S. says that Tehran hasn’t decided to build a nuclear bomb but that it would need only a few months to assemble one.
While the report doesn’t provide a monthly breakdown, it presented no evidence that Iran has slowed the accumulation of 60%-enriched material since the start of talks with the U.S. on April 12. Iran is the only non-nuclear-armed country producing 60%-enriched uranium.
The IAEA has said it can’t verify that Iran’s nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.
“The significantly increased production and accumulation of highly enriched uranium by Iran, the only non-nuclear-weapon State to produce such nuclear material, is of serious concern,” IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said in the report.
Iran and the U.S. have held five rounds of nuclear talks and are seeking to complete a framework for a deal that would set out joint positions on key issues to be decided. President Trump has said the talks are progressing well, although the two sides are divided on whether Iran can continue to enrich uranium under a deal.
Even if a framework is agreed, it could take protracted and difficult technical talks to reach a final deal. Trump withdrew the U.S. in 2018 from the 2015 nuclear agreement, which placed tight but temporary restrictions on Iran in exchange for the lifting of international sanctions.
In its documents circulated to member states on Saturday, the IAEA also presented a comprehensive, longer report detailing Iran’s failure to cooperate with a probe, started in 2019, into undeclared nuclear material found in Iran.
The report was demanded by European powers after Iran repeatedly failed to provide credible answers to IAEA questions about the nuclear material. Iran says it has answered the questions with all information available.
The agency said in its report that Iran’s “lack of answers and clarifications” has led it to conclude that Tehran had an “undeclared structured nuclear program” until the 2000s and that some activities used undeclared nuclear material.
The agency said that it assesses that “Iran retained unknown nuclear material and/or heavily contaminated equipment, and other assets, arising from” the nuclear program at a site in Tehran from 2009 until 2018, “after which items were removed from the location.”
The report is an important steppingstone in the European powers’ threat to reimpose the sanctions lifted from Iran under the 2015 nuclear deal. That could spark an immediate confrontation between Iran and Western powers over Tehran’s nuclear work, potentially scuttling the latest talks.
European diplomats have said if Iran failed to cooperate with the agency, they would follow up Saturday’s report with a push to declare Iran in noncompliance with its obligations as a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The treaty seeks to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
A noncompliance resolution could be voted on at the coming meeting of the IAEA board of member states, which starts June 9.
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi expressed “serious concern” over the growth of Iran’s uranium stockpile. Photo: Bianca Otero/Zuma Press
European officials have said they will decide by the summer whether to press ahead with the so-called snapback of sanctions on Iran at the U.N. Security Council, if Tehran doesn’t start to fully cooperate with the nuclear probe. The option of reimposing the sanctions expires in October under the 2015 agreement.
Iran has warned it could withdraw from the NPT and change its nuclear doctrine if sanctions are reimposed. The country’s leadership has pledged not to pursue nuclear weapons.
While Iran’s structured work on a nuclear weapon is believed to have ended in 2003, Western officials say it has continued with nuclear weapons-related experiments since then. In 2024, U.S. intelligence officials said Iran was carrying out work that would help Tehran learn how to make a nuclear weapon.
The agency said in its report that Iran’s lack of “technically credible answers” leaves open the possibility that Iran may still have undeclared nuclear material that it is able to use for non-civilian purposes.
Write to Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com
5. The U.S. Plan to Hobble China Tech Isn’t Working
Excerpts:
The experts I spoke with pointed out that China has a unique combination of assets that no other country in the history of America’s trade wars has possessed.
Its gigantic population is exceptionally well-trained, from skilled factory workers to engineers educated in the country’s universities. Nvidia’s Huang has said repeatedly that half of the world’s AI engineers are in China. Nvidia recently came under fire from U.S. senators for building a new engineering office in Shanghai.
It also has a huge domestic market, so it can incubate companies within its borders before they go global. And while China is dependent on the U.S. and the rest of the world for many raw materials and specialized goods, the Chinese Communist Party’s well-organized, well-funded and consistent push for self-sufficiency means those dependencies are shrinking. Year after year, the country produces a greater proportion of everything it needs, from the tiniest chip components to the biggest cargo ships.
In the best of all worlds, the U.S. would have allowed its chip and software champions to continue dominating the domestic Chinese market, says Wang. But since export controls initiated years ago have made that impossible, the only logical way forward may be to keep up the controls—and probably even tighten them.
“What we have now is not the second-best solution, but a seventh-best solution,” says Wang. “There’s certainly no way to restore trust with Chinese companies.”
The U.S. Plan to Hobble China Tech Isn’t Working
Chinese solar panels, electric vehicles and drones are better than those made in the U.S. Is AI next?
https://www.wsj.com/tech/the-u-s-plan-to-hobble-china-tech-isnt-working-56d1a512
Technicians inspect a robot equipped with DeepSeek artificial intelligence in Chuzhou, in China’s Anhui province. Photo: Cfoto/Zuma Press
By Christopher Mims
Follow
May 30, 2025 9:00 pm ET
The U.S. has tried almost everything to win the tech race against China—across areas as varied as AI, energy, autonomous vehicles, drones and EVs. So far, none of it has worked.
China’s EVs are cheaper and by many measures better than America’s. The country dominates in consumer drones. Autonomous vehicles have rolled out on the streets of Wuhan and Beijing at a pace that Waymo and Tesla have yet to match. China produces the lion’s share of the world’s solar panels and batteries. And while the U.S. and its allies maintain a narrow lead in advanced microchips and AI, the gap appears to be closing faster than ever.
The result is a fierce debate between senior leaders in the current administration, and critics outside it. White House officials and their proxies are almost uniformly in favor of choking off China’s tech advance by banning the export of AI microchips and the tools to make them. Some outside the administration—including the head of Nvidia NVDA -2.92%decrease; red down pointing triangle—say such policies are backfiring by accelerating China’s development of its own tech ecosystem.
The debate comes down to this: Is it better to have China dependent on U.S. tech, or is the national security risk of China having our tech just too great?
Chips ahoy
Among those ramping up criticism of current export controls is Jensen Huang, chief executive of U.S. chip colossus Nvidia. China could spend $50 billion on chips and servers for AI in 2026, he said, and his company would miss out on that market as a result of a new ban on advanced AI chip exports to China.
On Wednesday, during an earnings call, Huang doubled down on his criticism, saying “Shielding Chinese chip makers from U.S. competition only strengthens them abroad and weakens America’s position. Export restrictions have spurred China’s innovation and scale.” So far, Nvidia’s restricted access to China has done little to dent its revenues.
In the absence of chips from the U.S., China is turning to chips designed and manufactured entirely by Chinese companies, including Huawei, Cambricon, CXMT and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation.
The Alibaba Zhejiang Cloud Computing Renhe Data Center in Hangzhou, in Zhejiang province, China, is the city’s first super data center. Chinese electric vehicle maker Baidu's Apollo RT6 robotaxi drives in Wuhan, China.
Cfoto/DDP/ZUMA Press, Bloomberg News
Each of Huawei’s latest Ascend 910C AI chips are only one-third as powerful as Nvidia’s, but five times as many are crammed into each of the company’s CloudMatrix 384 AI supercomputers. In terms of raw power, and in the all-important metric of how much memory is crammed into each CloudMatrix computer, Huawei is already beating Nvidia.
And though Huawei’s CloudMatrix 384 requires four times as much electricity, China has a huge advantage in terms of energy production, says Doug O’Laughlin, an analyst at SemiAnalysis who has studied Huawei’s new AI supercomputers. “China has been adding energy production for the past 10 years, and has the entire supply chain on lock to continue to do that,” he adds.
SMIC, which makes Huawei’s processors, is now the third-biggest chip maker in the world, and has managed to innovate in the manufacture of high-quality chips despite having older-generation, pre-export-ban tech.
Bryan Burack, a China analyst at the Heritage Foundation, the conservative DC think tank with significant influence in the current administration, says export controls on tech like AI are more important than ever because the U.S. is in a new Cold War. Burack was a member of the National Security Council until last week, when 100 staffers were cut, and says his time on the council strengthened his convictions on the matter.
“Are we comfortable helping China create dual-use AI that can be used to acquire targets for guided weapons,” Burack says, “even if it’s a sound business?”
Over and over again, China has purchased advanced tech from the U.S. and copied it, then scaled it into huge businesses, a process O’Laughlin likens to a student copying another’s homework. “I sound almost antibusiness saying this, but I really can’t express enough that we shouldn’t make their jobs easier,” he adds.
You may also like
Embed code copied to clipboard
Copy LinkCopy EmbedFacebookTwitter
0:45
Paused
0:03
/
5:48
Click for Sound
U.S. efforts to keep China’s biggest chipmaker, SMIC, in check appear to have had the opposite effect. WSJ explains how China is catching up in the global AI race. Photo Illustration: Ryan Trefes/James Park/Bloomberg
Trump’s first term
Concerns about China’s progress in tech are hardly new in Washington, but the push to hamper its development kicked into high gear during President Trump’s first administration, according to industry insiders.
In 2018, then-commerce secretary Wilbur Ross cut off Chinese telecom company ZTE from U.S. tech, such as microchips, over national-security concerns. This effectively ended the global ambitions of the Chinese government-connected company.
“At a stroke, the U.S. government demonstrated to China’s government and China’s tech companies that it had an at-will ability to kneecap China’s tech leaders,” says Dan Wang, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.
A string of restrictions on microchips and software followed, notably for Chinese smartphone and telecom giant Huawei. At that time, even Chinese tech companies were unwilling to buy domestically made chips because they were inferior to American-designed chips manufactured in the U.S., South Korea and Taiwan, says Rui Ma, a Silicon Valley-based angel investor and China-tech analyst. With no other option, China’s tech companies were forced to buy local.
This kicked off huge investments by China’s tech companies and its government. The better China’s chips got, the more the U.S. attempted to slow down China’s advance, including by banning the export of chipmaking machinery and materials to China.
A Kirin 9000s chip fabricated in China by Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. being removed from inside a Huawei smartphone. Shoppers at a Huawei store in Shanghai.
James Park/Bloomberg News, HECTOR RETAMAL/AFP/Getty Images
This doesn’t mean China’s domestic chipmaking ecosystem is equal to what can be marshaled by the U.S. and its allies. But the idea that it is far behind—or will remain so forever—flies in the face of history, says Patrick Moorhead, a semiconductor-industry analyst who was an executive at AMD for 11 years.
“I’ve been in tech for 30 years, and I’ve heard a lot of, ‘Oh, China won’t figure this out,’” he adds. “Now I think the only question is when they will figure it out.” In the long run, China could be in a position to locally source everything it needs to match or even exceed the capabilities of companies like Taiwan’s TSMC and U.S.-based Intel, he says.
Why China?
The experts I spoke with pointed out that China has a unique combination of assets that no other country in the history of America’s trade wars has possessed.
Its gigantic population is exceptionally well-trained, from skilled factory workers to engineers educated in the country’s universities. Nvidia’s Huang has said repeatedly that half of the world’s AI engineers are in China. Nvidia recently came under fire from U.S. senators for building a new engineering office in Shanghai.
It also has a huge domestic market, so it can incubate companies within its borders before they go global. And while China is dependent on the U.S. and the rest of the world for many raw materials and specialized goods, the Chinese Communist Party’s well-organized, well-funded and consistent push for self-sufficiency means those dependencies are shrinking. Year after year, the country produces a greater proportion of everything it needs, from the tiniest chip components to the biggest cargo ships.
In the best of all worlds, the U.S. would have allowed its chip and software champions to continue dominating the domestic Chinese market, says Wang. But since export controls initiated years ago have made that impossible, the only logical way forward may be to keep up the controls—and probably even tighten them.
“What we have now is not the second-best solution, but a seventh-best solution,” says Wang. “There’s certainly no way to restore trust with Chinese companies.”
Write to Christopher Mims at christopher.mims@wsj.com
SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS
Should the U.S. reconsider its strategy around export controls? Join the conversation below.
Appeared in the May 31, 2025, print edition as 'How China Shrugged Off The U.S. Plan to Hobble Its Tech'.
6. Denying Visas to Chinese Students Could Backfire on America
Excerpts:
“Deng Xiaoping insisted I call you now, to see if you would permit 5,000 Chinese students to come to American universities,” said the official, Frank Press.
“Tell him to send 100,000,” Mr. Carter replied.
By Christmastime that year, the first group of 52 Chinese students had arrived in the United States, just ahead of the formal establishment of U.S.-Chinese diplomatic relations on New Year’s Day. A month later, Mr. Deng, China’s top leader, made a historic visit to America during which he watched John Denver sing “Take Me Home, Country Roads” and was photographed wearing a cowboy hat.
It’s almost hard to believe how little contact there had been between the United States and modern China before that. The Sinologist John K. Fairbank wrote in 1971: “Since 1950 Washington has officially sent more men to the moon than it has to China.” The visits by Mr. Deng and, more important, by those first Chinese students began a new chapter that would fundamentally change China — and the world. The United States gained access to a vast market and talent pool, while China found a model and a partner for transforming its economy.
Now that chapter has closed, after the Trump administration announced on Wednesday that it would begin “aggressively” revoking the visas of Chinese students.
...
As one commenter put it on the U.S. Embassy’s WeChat account, “How could any Chinese not be associated with the Party?”
The policy is also very likely to backfire.
Researchers found that Chinese undergraduates in American universities were more predisposed to favor liberal democracy than their peers in China. However, they said, exposure to xenophobic, anti-Chinese comments by Americans significantly decreased their belief that political reforms are desirable for China. Those who experienced discrimination were more likely to reject democratic values in favor of autocratic ones.
Chinese who have studied abroad also face growing suspicion at home. The government and some employers believe that exposure to Western values makes their fellow Chinese politically unreliable.
Dong Mingzhu, chairwoman of the appliance giant Gree Electric, said recently that her company would never hire a graduate from a foreign university. “There are spies among them,” she said.
On the Chinese internet, some people compared her to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who announced the visa policy.
Dong Jielin, the former student who was among the first to come to the United States, said the experience had a profound impact on her life, giving her the opportunity to explore the frontiers of science and technology.
It is understandable, she said, that the government is raising screening standards for student visas. “But I believe the vast majority of those who stay in the U.S. will, over time, become loyal American citizens,” she said, just like herself.
Denying Visas to Chinese Students Could Backfire on America
Protecting the borders from espionage is essential. It’s something else to deny students because they are Chinese and hope to pursue a STEM degree in the United States.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/30/business/china-student-visas-trump.html
The Trump administration announced it would begin revoking visas for some Chinese students. For the millions of Chinese who have studied in the United States, it is a sobering and disheartening development. Credit...Rachel Wisniewski for The New York Times
By Li Yuan
May 30, 2025
The DealBook Newsletter Our columnist Andrew Ross Sorkin and his Times colleagues help you make sense of major business and policy headlines — and the power-brokers who shape them. Get it sent to your inbox.
One night in 1978, President Jimmy Carter got a phone call at 3 a.m. from a top adviser who was visiting China.
“Deng Xiaoping insisted I call you now, to see if you would permit 5,000 Chinese students to come to American universities,” said the official, Frank Press.
“Tell him to send 100,000,” Mr. Carter replied.
By Christmastime that year, the first group of 52 Chinese students had arrived in the United States, just ahead of the formal establishment of U.S.-Chinese diplomatic relations on New Year’s Day. A month later, Mr. Deng, China’s top leader, made a historic visit to America during which he watched John Denver sing “Take Me Home, Country Roads” and was photographed wearing a cowboy hat.
It’s almost hard to believe how little contact there had been between the United States and modern China before that. The Sinologist John K. Fairbank wrote in 1971: “Since 1950 Washington has officially sent more men to the moon than it has to China.” The visits by Mr. Deng and, more important, by those first Chinese students began a new chapter that would fundamentally change China — and the world. The United States gained access to a vast market and talent pool, while China found a model and a partner for transforming its economy.
Now that chapter has closed, after the Trump administration announced on Wednesday that it would begin “aggressively” revoking the visas of Chinese students.
For the millions of Chinese who have studied in the United States, myself included, it is a sobering and disheartening development. It marks a turning point that America, long a beacon of openness and opportunity, would start shutting its doors to Chinese who aspire to a good education and a future in a society that values freedom and human dignity.
By curbing people-to-people exchanges, President Trump is taking a decisive step toward decoupling from China. To treat Chinese students and professionals in science and technology broadly not as contributors, but as potential security risks, reflects a foreign policy driven more by insecurity and retreat than by the self-assurance of a global leader.
Image
Deng Xiaoping and President Jimmy Carter in Washington in 1979.Credit...Dirck Halstead/Liaison, via Getty Images
The reaction to the new policy inside China, reflected in the U.S. Embassy’s social media accounts, was mixed. Some commenters thanked the United States for “sending China’s brightest minds back.” Others drew historical parallels, comparing the Trump administration’s isolationist turn to China’s Ming and Qing dynasties — once global powers that declined after turning inward and were ultimately defeated in foreign invasions. One commenter remarked that the policy’s narrow-mindedness would “make America small again.”
The shift also comes when many young Chinese, disillusioned by political repression and economic stagnation under Xi Jinping’s leadership, are trying to flee the country to seek freedom and opportunities.
Want to stay updated on what’s happening in China? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.
“Xi is pushing many of the best and the brightest to leave China,” said Thomas E. Kellogg, executive director of Georgetown’s Center for Asian Law and a leading scholar of legal reform in China. “The U.S. should be taking advantage of this historic brain drain, not shutting the door to many talented Chinese young people.”
The number of Chinese students in the United States dropped to about 277,000 in the 2023-24 academic year, a 25 percent decline from its peak four years earlier, according to government data. Students from China remained the second-largest group of international students, after those from India. In fact, applications for postgraduation temporary employment permits rose 12 percent in 2023-24 from the prior year, signaling more interest in working in the United States despite the challenges.
The new visa policy will leave many of these students with little choice but to leave, or at the least reconsider their future in the United States.
I interviewed a doctoral candidate in computer science at a top American university, a young man from China who first dreamed of studying in America at 17, when he began to question Chinese government propaganda. He arrived eight years ago and never seriously considered returning. But now, facing the threat of visa revocation, he said he was no longer sure if he could — or even wanted to — stay.
Image
“The U.S. should be taking advantage of this historic brain drain, not shutting the door to many talented Chinese young people,” said Thomas E. Kellogg, executive director of Georgetown’s Center for Asian Law. Credit...Tingshu Wang/Reuters
“America doesn’t feel worth it anymore,” he said, asking me not to identify him for fear of retribution from Washington. The immigration process is fraught with anxiety, he said, and the returns no longer seem to justify the stress. He said he was exploring work visa options in Canada, Australia and Western Europe, even though he has a job offer from a big tech company on the West Coast.
“The pay might be lower,” he said, “but those countries offer more personal freedom.”
His experience is in stark contrast to that of Dong Jielin, who was among the first Chinese students to come to the United States after the Cultural Revolution. When she arrived at Carnegie Mellon in 1982 on a U.S. scholarship, she knew little about the country beyond what the Chinese state media had portrayed: a capitalist society in perpetual crisis and a people living in misery.
Updated
May 30, 2025, 10:44 p.m. ETMay 30, 2025
It didn’t take long for her perception to shift. “The moment I walked into a supermarket, I could see that life here was far from miserable,” she told me in an interview. Encounters with Americans quickly dispelled other myths as well. “They were not vicious or hostile,” she said. “They were warm and kind.”
Ms. Dong went on to earn a doctoral degree in physics, build a career in finance and technology, become a U.S. citizen and raise a family.
The U.S. government has good reasons to worry about national security risks from China, including espionage and intellectual property theft. The Federal Bureau of Investigation calls the Chinese government the most prolific sponsor of talent recruitment programs that aim to transfer scientific and technological breakthroughs to China.
It also makes sense to block people with ties to China’s military industrial complex.
But it’s something else entirely to deny visas to 18-year-old students simply because they are Chinese and hope to pursue a STEM degree in the United States.
American officials often say they aim to distinguish between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people. That distinction was emphasized during Mr. Trump’s first term. It’s largely absent now.
Image
The number of Chinese students in the United States fell to 277,000 in 2023-24, but they remain the second-largest group of international students, after those from India.Credit...Hiroko Masuike/The New York Times
U.S. policy now targets anyone with ties to the Chinese Communist Party. But the party has nearly 100 million members, about one in 14 Chinese. And most children in China grow up as members of the Young Pioneers and Communist Youth League, school-based party organizations. It’s just the way of life in a country ruled by a Leninist party.
As one commenter put it on the U.S. Embassy’s WeChat account, “How could any Chinese not be associated with the Party?”
The policy is also very likely to backfire.
Researchers found that Chinese undergraduates in American universities were more predisposed to favor liberal democracy than their peers in China. However, they said, exposure to xenophobic, anti-Chinese comments by Americans significantly decreased their belief that political reforms are desirable for China. Those who experienced discrimination were more likely to reject democratic values in favor of autocratic ones.
Chinese who have studied abroad also face growing suspicion at home. The government and some employers believe that exposure to Western values makes their fellow Chinese politically unreliable.
Dong Mingzhu, chairwoman of the appliance giant Gree Electric, said recently that her company would never hire a graduate from a foreign university. “There are spies among them,” she said.
On the Chinese internet, some people compared her to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who announced the visa policy.
Dong Jielin, the former student who was among the first to come to the United States, said the experience had a profound impact on her life, giving her the opportunity to explore the frontiers of science and technology.
It is understandable, she said, that the government is raising screening standards for student visas. “But I believe the vast majority of those who stay in the U.S. will, over time, become loyal American citizens,” she said, just like herself.
A correction was made on May 30, 2025: An earlier version of this column misstated the proportion of Chinese who are members of the Chinese Communist Party. It is one in 14, not one in seven.
When we learn of a mistake, we acknowledge it with a correction. If you spot an error, please let us know at nytnews@nytimes.com.Learn more
Li Yuan writes The New New World column, which focuses on China’s growing influence on the world by examining its businesses, politics and society.
7. Experts Who Warn of Risks Posed by Chinese Students Are Skeptical of Trump Plan
Experts Who Warn of Risks Posed by Chinese Students Are Skeptical of Trump Plan
Some former spy-hunters see the State Department’s plan to revoke visas of some Chinese college students as heavy-handed and counterproductive.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/31/us/politics/trump-china-student-visas-crackdown-risks.html
A poster of Harvard University is seen on the wall at an overseas education agency in Beijing.Credit...Jade Gao/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
By Devlin Barrett
Reporting from Washington
May 31, 2025, 12:00 a.m. ET
The F.B.I. has spent decades investigating some professors and students from China suspected of using their studies to secretly spy for their home country. As the Trump administration tries a new, more aggressive effort to stop such activity, experts fear it will do more harm than good for American research.
The plans the State Department announced this past week to revoke visas of some Chinese college students strike even some former spy-hunters as a heavy-handed attempt to solve a more complicated problem.
“The overall number of People’s Republic of China students that actually pose some type of national security risk is relatively low compared to the number of students that will continue to support and further U.S. research,” said Greg Milonovich, a former F.B.I. agent who managed the counterintelligence division’s academic alliance program as well as the national security higher education advisory board.
In announcing the move late Wednesday, Secretary of State Marco Rubio gave few specifics, offering only that the U.S. government would “aggressively revoke visas for Chinese students, including those with connections to the Chinese Communist Party or studying in critical fields.”
How that vaguely defined standard will be enforced is not yet clear, but the directive is part of a broad campaign by the Trump administration to force major changes in American higher education. College campuses, administration officials say, are in crisis, and only the federal government is willing and able to fix the problems.
The senior White House adviser Stephen Miller outlined on Friday what the administration viewed as a threat to its interests. “We’re not going to be awarding visas to individuals who have a risk of being engaged in any form of malign conduct in the United States, which of course would include espionage, theft of trade secrets, theft of technology or other actions that would degrade the security of our industrial base,” he said.
Some 277,000 students from China attended school in the United States last year, second only to the number of students from India. Federal authorities have long grappled with the challenge of trying to prevent individuals from within that large group from stealthily siphoning critical technology or expertise to Chinese companies or government officials.
Mr. Milonovich said that American officials had long worried about the risks posed by some Chinese students but that the administration’s most recent push would ultimately harm the advancement of U.S. technology.
Some students arrive in the United States with pre-existing affiliations with Chinese government and intelligence agencies, while “many others are contacted, recruited or co-opted while they are in the U.S. studying,” he said.
The authorities say that is what happened when Yanqing Ye came to study science at Boston University. Ms. Ye, according to an indictment unsealed in 2020, was a lieutenant in the Chinese Army before she arrived in the United States, and as a student in Boston, she continued to carry out assignments for her Chinese superior officers, sending American documents and information to China.
Updated
May 30, 2025, 10:44 p.m. ETMay 30, 2025
Still, Mr. Milonovich added, given that the United States employs “tremendous numbers” of scientific and technological experts originally from China or other foreign countries, “we need this continued pipeline of intellect and skill.”
Peter Zeidenberg, a lawyer who has defended college professors accused or suspected of economic espionage, said that the administration had yet to articulate the national security danger it is trying to avoid, but that it had already succeeded in scaring talented people away from the United States.
“This is a self-defeating and self-destructive strategy, if you can call it a strategy,” he said. “These students fill our labs and they perform all the research. They’re some of the smartest, most talented scientists in America and I have no idea how these labs are going to operate without them.”
F.B.I. officials have long argued that China is engaged in a relentless and far-reaching effort to steal as much scientific expertise as it can from the United States, to benefit Chinese companies and markets. National security officials say that while much of that suspicious activity occurs in the business world, a great deal also goes on among college researchers. To counter that threat, federal agents have for years delivered classified briefings to select college officials, and broader warnings to colleges generally.
While those efforts have produced a significant number of tips and criminal cases, they also have elicited some controversy and distrust between educators and investigators.
In 2018, the F.B.I. director, Christopher A. Wray, faulted what he called the “naïveté” of some college administrators toward the danger posed by Chinese students, teachers, and researchers.
“The use of nontraditional collectors, especially in the academic setting — whether it’s professors, scientists, students — we see in almost every field office that the F.B.I. has around the country,” he said.
That year, the Justice Department began what it called the China Initiative, to crack down on trade secret theft, including at universities.
Most of the criminal cases that emerged from the initiative focused on professors rather than students. Yet not all of those indictments won convictions in court, and critics accused federal prosecutors and agents of casting a cynical eye at people of Chinese descent. In the face of such criticism, the Biden administration shuttered the initiative in 2022, though it continued to investigate possible crimes by Chinese academics.
The security concerns around Chinese students did not disappear, and in fact go back decades. In 1998, a congressional report warned that the F.B.I. “has inadequate resources in light of the extensive numbers” of visitors from China, including “students, diplomats, business representatives and others who may be involved in intelligence and military-related technology transfer operations in the United States.”
Current and former officials have said that the resources to monitor and investigate possible student spies only face further strain given the administration’s focus on immigration. It has pressed hundreds of F.B.I. agents into duty backing up Department of Homeland Security agents seeking to apprehend and deport undocumented immigrants.
Devlin Barrett covers the Justice Department and the F.B.I. for The Times.
See more on: U.S. Politics, Communist Party of China, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Homeland Security Department, U.S. Justice Department, State Department
8. Intelligence Staffer Critical of Trump Charged With Seeking to Pass Classified Documents to Foreign Government
Pogo: We have met the enemy and he is us (or at least within us).
Excerpts:
Joshua Skule, a former FBI official who was the bureau’s executive assistant director for intelligence, said recent personnel cuts in intelligence agencies make them even more vulnerable to security leaks by disaffected employees, but noted that many previous administrations have seen similar cases.
“There is a huge insider threat within the government with the cuts,” he said.
Laatsch transcribed classified information onto a notepad at DIA and took the materials out of the building, prosectors said. The thumb drive he left at a drop site in the park contained secret and top secret documents and a message saying that the documents demonstrated “the range of types of products” he could provide.
This month, Laatsch transcribed additional pages of notes while logged into his DIA classified workstation. He tucked these pages into his clothing and took them from the building, prosecutors said. The FBI arrested Laatsch Thursday when he attempted to hand off classified documents.
Intelligence Staffer Critical of Trump Charged With Seeking to Pass Classified Documents to Foreign Government
FBI agents posing as handlers allegedly caught employee leaving classified documents for pickup at a public park
https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/intelligence-staffer-critical-of-trump-charged-with-seeking-to-pass-classified-documents-to-foreign-government-b1ec14eb
By Brett Forrest
Follow
Updated May 30, 2025 4:38 pm ET
The Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. Photo: brendan smialowski/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
A Defense Intelligence Agency employee was charged with attempting to pass classified intelligence to a foreign government, offering to spy because he didn’t agree “with the values” of the Trump administration, the Justice Department said.
Nathan Vilas Laatsch, a civilian information technology staffer at DIA, was arrested in Northern Virginia Thursday after a three-month Federal Bureau of Investigation investigation during which he allegedly left a thumb drive containing classified documents at a public park for pickup by a “friendly” foreign government.
In fact, his messages had been intercepted by FBI agents. An agent had been communicating with him for weeks, posing as a foreign handler after the bureau received a tip that Laatsch had offered his services as a spy, according to the Justice Department.
“The recent actions of the current administration are extremely disturbing to me,” Laatsch wrote in a March email. “I don’t agree or align with the values of this administration and intend to act to support the values that the United States at one time stood for,” according to an affidavit in support of a criminal complaint.
Nathan Vilas Laatsch Photo: Uncredited
He was “willing to share classified information that I have access to which are completed intelligence products, some unprocessed documentation,” he said. He didn’t seek “material compensation,” but was seeking citizenship in the foreign country because he didn’t “expect things here to improve in the long term,” he allegedly told an FBI agent.
The Justice Department didn’t identify the country Laatsch sought to contact.
His arrest comes at the same time as Trump administration intelligence officials have launched a wide-ranging crackdown on information leaks, especially from employees of intelligence agencies, whom Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard has accused of “politicization” and “leaking of classified information.”
“This case underscores the persistent risk of insider threats,” FBI Director Kash Patel wrote on X. “The FBI remains steadfast in protecting our national security and thanks our law enforcement partners for their critical support.”
Laatsch made his initial court appearance Friday afternoon and will remain detained pending a hearing scheduled for Wednesday.
Laatsch, 28 years old, was assigned to DIA’s Insider Threat Division, which is responsible for identifying employees who could be a risk to national security, and held a top secret security clearance, according to the Department of Justice.
Before joining DIA in 2019, Laatsch had worked for a decade as a cashier at supermarkets in Florida, according to his LinkedIn profile. He had been home-schooled and later earned a cybersecurity degree at Florida Polytechnic University, the profile said.
DIA is a Pentagon agency that collects intelligence about the military capabilities and intentions of foreign states. A DIA spokesman confirmed that Laatsch is employed by the agency and said that DIA “has been cooperating with the FBI on this matter from the beginning of this investigation.”
“The United States will never stand for attempts to degrade our national security and threaten Americans’ safety,” Rep. Rick Crawford (R., Ark.), the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, said in a statement on Laatsch’s arrest. Counterintelligence threats “are only increasing and becoming more persistent.”
The DIA is a Pentagon agency that collects intelligence about the military capabilities and intentions of foreign states. Photo: Patrick Semansky/Associated Press
Joshua Skule, a former FBI official who was the bureau’s executive assistant director for intelligence, said recent personnel cuts in intelligence agencies make them even more vulnerable to security leaks by disaffected employees, but noted that many previous administrations have seen similar cases.
“There is a huge insider threat within the government with the cuts,” he said.
Laatsch transcribed classified information onto a notepad at DIA and took the materials out of the building, prosectors said. The thumb drive he left at a drop site in the park contained secret and top secret documents and a message saying that the documents demonstrated “the range of types of products” he could provide.
This month, Laatsch transcribed additional pages of notes while logged into his DIA classified workstation. He tucked these pages into his clothing and took them from the building, prosecutors said. The FBI arrested Laatsch Thursday when he attempted to hand off classified documents.
Write to Brett Forrest at brett.forrest@wsj.com
Appeared in the May 31, 2025, print edition as 'Intelligence Staffer Is Charged With Offering to Spy'.
9. World Scientists Look Elsewhere as U.S. Labs Stagger Under Trump Cuts
World Scientists Look Elsewhere as U.S. Labs Stagger Under Trump Cuts
With the welcome mat withdrawn for promising researchers from around the world, America is at risk of losing its longstanding pre-eminence in the sciences.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/31/world/asia/us-science-cuts.html
Dr. Raj Ladher, a professor at the National Center for Biological Sciences in Bangalore, India, with Ph.D. students.Credit...Samyukta Lakshmi for The New York Times
By James Glanz
May 31, 2025, 12:01 a.m. ET
For decades, Bangalore, India, has been an incubator for scientific talent, sending newly minted Ph.D.s around the world to do groundbreaking research. In an ordinary year, many aim their sights at labs in the United States.
“These are our students, and we want them to go and do something amazing,” said a professor at the National Center for Biological Sciences in Bangalore, Raj Ladher.
But this is not an ordinary year.
When Professor Ladher queried some 30 graduates in the city recently about their plans, only one had certain employment in the United States. For many of the others, the political turmoil in Washington has dried up job opportunities in what Professor Ladher calls “the best research ecosystem in the world.” Some decided they would now rather take their skills elsewhere, including Austria, Japan and Australia, while others opted to stay in India.
As the Trump administration moves with abandon to deny visas, expel foreign students and slash spending on research, scientists in the United States are becoming increasingly alarmed. The global supremacy that the United States has long enjoyed in health, biology, the physical sciences and other fields, they warn, may be coming to an end.
“If things continue as they are, American science is ruined,” said David W. Hogg, a professor of physics and data science at New York University who works closely with astronomers and other experts around the world. “If it becomes impossible to work with non-U.S. scientists,” he said, “it would basically render the kinds of research that I do impossible.”
Research cuts and moves to curtail the presence of foreign students by the Trump administration have happened at a dizzying pace.
Sign up for Your Places: Global Update. All the latest news for any part of the world you select. Get it sent to your inbox.
The administration has gone so far as moving to block any international students at all from attending Harvard, and more than $3 billion in research grants to the university were terminated or paused. At Johns Hopkins University, a bastion of scientific research, officials announced the layoffs of more than 2,000 people after losing $800 million in government grants. An analysis by The New York Times found that the National Science Foundation, the world’s pre-eminent funding agency in the physical sciences, has been issuing financing for new grants at its slowest rate since at least 1990.
It is not merely a matter of the American scientific community losing power or prestige.
Image
A rally in support of international students at Harvard University on Tuesday.Credit...Lucy Lu for The New York Times
Dirk Brockmann, a biology and physics professor in Germany, warned that there were much broader implications. The acceptance of risk and seemingly crazy leaps of inspiration woven into American attitudes, he said, help produce a research environment that nowhere else can quite match. The result has been decades of innovation, economic growth and military advances.
“There is something very deep in the culture that makes it very special,” said Professor Brockmann, who once taught at Northwestern. “It’s almost like a magical ingredient.”
Updated
May 30, 2025, 10:44 p.m. ETMay 30, 2025
Scientists believe that some of the international talent that has long helped drive the U.S. research engine may land elsewhere. Many foreign governments, from France to Australia, have also started openly courting American scientists.
But because the United States has led the field for so long, there is deep concern that research globally will suffer.
“For many areas, the U.S. is absolutely the crucial partner,” said Wim Leemans, the director of the accelerator division at DESY, a research center in Germany, and a professor at the University of Hamburg.
Professor Leemans, who is an American and Belgian citizen and spent 34 years in the United States, said that in areas like medical research and climate monitoring, the rest of the world would be hard pressed to compensate for the loss of American leadership.
There was a time when the U.S. government embraced America’s role in the global scientific community.
In 1945, a presidential science adviser, Vannevar Bush, issued a landmark blueprint for post-World War II science in the United States. “Science, the Endless Frontier,” it was called, and among its arguments was that the country would gain more by sharing information, including bringing in foreign scientists even if they might one day leave, than by trying to protect discoveries that would be made elsewhere anyway.
The blueprint helped drive the postwar scientific dominance of the United States, said Cole Donovan, an international technology adviser in the Biden White House. “Much of U.S. power and influence is derived from our science and technology supremacy,” he said.
Now the United States is taking in the welcome mat.
Professor Brockmann, who studies complex systems at the Dresden University of Technology, was once planning to return to Northwestern to give a keynote presentation in June. It was to be part of a family trip to the United States; his children once lived in Evanston, Ill., where he taught at the university from 2008 to 2013.
He canceled the talk after the Foreign Ministry issued new guidance on travel to the United States following the detention of German tourists at the American border. That warning he said, “was kind of a signal to me: I don’t feel safe.”
Mr. Donovan said it was too early to tell whether Europe, say, or China could take over an international leadership role in science. Professor Ladher, the Bangalore researcher, said that so far, Europe has been taking up some of the slack in hiring his graduates.
“Austria has become a huge destination for many of our students,” he said.
Image
Ph.D. students at the National Center for Biological Sciences in Bangalore.Credit...Samyukta Lakshmi for The New York Times
In Bangalore, one graduate student who is waiting to defend her doctoral thesis on cell signaling and cancer, said it was widely believed in India that U.S. labs were unlikely to hire many international students this year. That has led many of her colleagues to look elsewhere, said the student, who asked not to be named because she still planned to apply for positions in the United States and did not want to hurt her chances.
The American scientific community, she said, has long been revered abroad.
“It is sad to see that the hero is coming down from the pedestal,” she said.
James Glanz is a Times international and investigative reporter covering major disasters, conflict and deadly failures of technology.
10. It’s Waymo’s World. We’re All Just Riding in It.
I spent some time taking rides in Waymo vehicles (Jaguers) in San Francisco last month. I am a believer. The "driver" drove more smoothly and capably than me.
Some day (probably sooner rather than later) we will be riding on trains and buses and flying in helicopters and airplanes without a "driver."
It’s Waymo’s World. We’re All Just Riding in It.
Google’s driverless-taxi company just cracked 10 million rides. If you haven’t taken one, you will soon.
https://www.wsj.com/tech/waymo-cars-self-driving-robotaxi-tesla-uber-0777f570
EMIL LENDOF/WSJ, WAYMO
By Ben Cohen
Follow
May 30, 2025 8:03 pm ET
The website of the California Public Utilities Commission is not the first place you would go looking for signs of progress in one of the world’s sexiest industries.
But every few months, this agency tasked with regulating passenger transportation publishes a bunch of spreadsheets with valuable information about self-driving cars and how many people are riding in them. And in the latest data that was recently dumped online, there was a telling update about a company identified simply as PSG0038152.
It’s better known as Waymo.
Unless you live in one of the few cities where you can hail a ride from Waymo, which is owned by Google’s parent company, Alphabet GOOGL -0.07%decrease; red down pointing triangle, it’s almost impossible to appreciate just how quickly their streets have been invaded by autonomous vehicles.
Waymo was doing 10,000 paid rides a week in August 2023. By May 2024, that number of trips in cars without a driver was up to 50,000. In August, it hit 100,000. Now it’s already more than 250,000.
After pulling ahead in the race for robotaxi supremacy, Waymo has started pulling away.
This is not just because Waymo is expanding into new markets. It’s because of the way existing markets have come to embrace self-driving cars.
In California, the most recent batch of quarterly data reported by the company was the most encouraging yet. It showed that Waymo’s number of paid rides inched higher by roughly 2% in both January and February—and then increased 27% in March. In the nearly two years that people in San Francisco have been paying for robot chauffeurs, it was the first time that Waymo’s growth slowed down for several months only to dramatically speed up again.
The numbers also showed that Waymo’s cars are self-driving toward an inflection point: They were novel—and now they’re becoming normal.
This is a crucial phase of the classic diffusion curve that explains how people adopt new technology. From the Model T to ChatGPT, there is a long history of magical products that come along and follow a similar path to success.
At first, these innovations appeal to a niche market of tech geeks and early adopters. Only then do some of those products become part of everyday life. It tends to happen gradually, then suddenly, so it can be hard to recognize those breakthroughs in real time.
In San Francisco, self-driving cars are now more of a tourist attraction than cable cars. Photo: Poppy Lynch for WSJ
But if you study the Waymo data, you can see that curve taking shape.
It cracked a million total paid rides in late 2023. By the end of 2024, it reached five million. We’re not even halfway through 2025 and it has already crossed a cumulative 10 million. At this rate, Waymo is on track to double again and blow past 20 million fully autonomous trips by the end of the year.
“This is what exponential scaling looks like,” said Dmitri Dolgov, Waymo’s co-chief executive, at Google’s recent developer conference.
Waymo’s autonomous taxis are only available in a few cities right now, including Phoenix, Los Angeles and San Francisco, where self-driving cars are more of a tourist attraction than cable cars.
But the trajectory suggests what’s happening there might just happen everywhere—and sooner than you think.
“I’m confident that in a year, we’ll look back at this stage and realize Waymo was just getting started,” Co-CEO Tekedra Mawakana told me.
The real competition is just getting started, too. In the coming weeks, Tesla is planning to unveil the robotaxi service that Elon Musk has long promised. Waymo has the first-mover advantage, but the company is not profitable and it has burned through billions of dollars to make the surreal dream of self-driving cars a reality. The world’s richest man is betting that he has a less expensive strategy to help Tesla catch up.
But the longer that Waymo has the only driverless cars on the road, the bigger its lead gets.
It’s becoming more popular in the places that it has already conquered even as it pushes into new cities. Earlier this year, it entered Austin, Texas, through a partnership with Uber. This summer, it’s planning to launch in Atlanta. Next on the list are Miami and Washington, D.C. The cars are now mapping Boston, Nashville, New Orleans, Dallas, Las Vegas and San Diego. This past week, the company announced that it’s testing Orlando, Houston and San Antonio. Waymos have even crossed the ocean to begin collecting data in Tokyo.
‘In a year, we’ll look back at this stage and realize Waymo was just getting started,’ Co-CEO Tekedra Mawakana said. Photo: Eric Thayer/Getty Images)
And that kind of exponential scaling was made possible by months, years and even decades of incremental steps along the way.
“Waymo’s growth is a direct result of compounding progress across the company,” Mawakana said.
It all began when students and professors from a Stanford artificial-intelligence laboratory built a robot named Stanley and won the Darpa Grand Challenge driverless-car competition in 2005. The team’s key members were later recruited to lead Google’s self-driving-car project, which the company revealed in 2010. The next milestones included the first completely autonomous ride on a public road in 2015 and driverless cars opening for business in 2020.
But it’s 2025 that might just be remembered as the Waymo moment.
I recently took my first Waymo on a visit to San Francisco, where I ordered a sleek white Jaguar topped with a spinning lidar sensor that looked like a crown. The car parked itself right in front of me. I unlocked the doors with my phone, buckled up and prepared to brave the uncanny. Then I confirmed that I was ready for a very strange ride.
I knew how it would work. But I had to get inside a Waymo to understand how it would feel.
As the car started moving with an empty driver’s seat, I was intrigued, slightly freaked and intensely aware of my surroundings. At first, I paid attention to upcoming stop signs from the back seat like I was behind the wheel. The only thing that made me more nervous than going up one of the city’s treacherous hills was going down. But that unease lasted only a few blocks. Waymo’s robotic drivers tend to be careful and deferential, which helps build trust with humans who are naturally skeptical. By the time we rolled up to my destination, I was busy scrolling on my phone and barely noticed.
The weirdest thing about the Waymo experience was that it no longer felt weird.
The next day, I needed a ride and faced a choice: driver or driverless? I tapped the Uber and Waymo apps. The wait times were similar. So were the prices.
I picked the Waymo.
My Waymo driverless ride through San Francisco.
The success of robotaxis will ultimately depend on this sort of change in human behavior—and the latest data indicates the shift is already under way.
“This isn’t science fiction,” Mawakana recently told CNBC. “It’s not the future. It’s happening now.”
Even people in San Francisco weren’t especially psyched when it was starting to happen. Before they were novel or normal, self-driving cars were mostly a nuisance.
Waymo began offering paid driverless rides there on a limited basis in 2023 before opening to everyone in 2024. They have since won over the city.
Ubers and Lyfts generally cost less than Waymos, but the prices end up being comparable because you don’t have to worry about tipping Waymo drivers. (Or making small talk with them.) The fleet has gotten larger—the company says it now has more than 600 cars in San Francisco—and wait times have gotten shorter. Its territory is wider, too, now that Waymo is available in parts of Silicon Valley, the patch of land with the highest concentration of early adopters anywhere on the planet.
These days, the main complaint from users is that they can’t Waymo everywhere.
Despite receiving the green light from state regulators last year, the company does not yet offer the public driverless rides on the freeways around San Francisco. In the Waymo-crazy Bay Area, people are eager to be ferried by self-driving cars to the airport. If they fly to Phoenix, they can already get picked up by a Waymo and dropped off curbside for their flight back. The company has finished mapping San Francisco International Airport but hasn’t given a timeline for Waymos operating there.
Of course, you don’t need a Waymo’s lidar, radar and 29 cameras to spot all the obstacles on the road ahead.
Waymo’s driverless cars tend to be deferential to pedestrians, cyclists and other vehicles. Photo: Poppy Lynch for WSJ
The company now has a safety record over more than 50 million driverless miles—the equivalent of driving across America roughly 20,000 times. There are millions of car crashes in the U.S. every year that kill more than 100 people every day, but one terrible accident is all it would take to slam the brakes on Waymo’s momentum.
Then there is the competition.
Most companies that tried to beat Waymo have given up. Uber and Lyft ditched their efforts to develop self-driving cars. General Motors scrapped its Cruise robotaxi program. Amazon has Zoox, but Waymo’s most formidable rival in America at this point appears to be Tesla.
Six years ago, Musk tantalized investors and consumers with his prediction that robotaxis were just a year away. Now it might be a matter of days. His company is planning a June launch of its own ride-hailing service in Austin, where empty Teslas could soon find themselves at traffic lights next to driverless Waymos.
The two companies have taken radically different approaches to the technology and economics of autonomous cabs. Tesla’s model runs on cameras and AI. In addition to loads of AI, Waymo’s system also relies on maps, sensors and human feedback, which makes it so expensive. The company raised $5.6 billion of funding last year, when Alphabet’s “Other Bets” division, which includes Waymo, reported a $4.4 billion loss.
“The issue with Waymo’s cars,” Musk said in April, “is they cost way-mo money.”
“For us, it’s really important to focus on safety and then cost,” Mawakana said on CNBC. “Not cost and then safety.”
She added: “There’s probably a lot of ways it can be done. But we’re the only ones that have done it.”
Now that it’s been done millions of times, people have already changed their behavior to put themselves and their families in a car without a driver. And in those cities, you don’t need any ridership data to see the future.
All you have to do is look outside.
Write to Ben Cohen at ben.cohen@wsj.com
Appeared in the May 31, 2025, print edition as '‘Exponential Scaling’ Waymo Is On the Road to Everywhere'.
11. Overwhelmed by China, Manila looks for deal in flashpoint South China Sea
The West Philippine Sea.
I am always reminded of this quote:
“The West Philippine Sea, not Taiwan, is the real flashpoint for an armed conflict,”
– Ambassador Jose Manuel Romualdez February 28, 2024
Overwhelmed by China, Manila looks for deal in flashpoint South China Sea
washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon
By - The Washington Times - Thursday, May 29, 2025
A version of this story appeared in the daily Threat Status newsletter from The Washington Times. Click here to receive Threat Status delivered directly to your inbox each weekday.
SEOUL, South Korea — Hounded, harassed and bullied by China in the South China Sea, Filipino leaders are scrambling to cut a deal with Beijing in hopes of avoiding a military showdown over contested islands, reefs and fishing spots off the western coast of the Philippines.
China’s mounting pressure campaign on another key American ally in the region ups the stakes this weekend for Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Mr. Hegseth is due in Singapore to attend the Shangri-La Dialogue, Southeast Asia’s high-profile annual defense conference, which starts Friday.
Mr. Hegseth is expected to again make the case for U.S. allies to stick with the Trump administration, despite tariffs and growing concerns about America’s willingness — or even ability — to counter China.
In Manila, worried politicians are looking for a deal as the Chinese military ramps up its harassment in the South China Sea.
“We underscore the urgent need to accelerate the adoption of a legally binding code of conduct in the South China Sea,” Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. told the 46th Association of Southeast Asian Nations Summit in Malaysia this week. “This is to safeguard maritime rights, promote stability and prevent miscalculations at sea.”
Concerns are that a Philippines-China incident could escalate into a shootout, dragging in America.
On May 21, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel, roughly twice the size of its target, bore down on a Philippines Fisheries Department vessel, rammed it amidships, then hosed it down with water cannon, point-blank.
Jay Tarriela, spokesperson for the Philippines Coast Guard, condemned “the hostile actions by the Chinese Coast Guard” in a tweet on X, accompanied by footage.
Advertisement
The drama occurred off Pag-Asa Island, or Sandy Cay, the only Philippine community in the Spratly Islands, 276 miles west of the Philippine island of Palawan — where U.S. Marines were exercising this month. The island is 646 miles southeast of China’s nearest landmass, Hainan Island.
On Wednesday, the Philippines returned fire symbolically, staging a public relations victory: Its Coast Guard escorted a convoy of civilians and journalists to a concert on an isle off Palawan.
Three Chinese Coast Guard vessels kept their distance. Chinese state media called the incident a “farce” and a “desperate attempt to grab attention.”
Beijing claims some 90% of the South China Sea, a vast space encompassing commercial shipping lanes, rich fishing grounds and underwater resources. South of China, it is enclosed by Southeast Asia nations east, west and south.
But while the sea’s myriad — and inherently valuable — maritime features are claimed by multiple nations, only two are actively confronting Beijing.
Advertisement
Vietnamese forces have clashed with China’s ships, but currently, most confrontations are off the Philippines.
On Thursday, a senior Philippine official said Mr. Marcos will keep Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr., who is among the most vocal critics of China in Asia, especially its increasingly assertive actions in the South China Sea, as Mr. Marcos overhauls his cabinet.
The two countries reached an agreement last year to address China’s concerns about a makeshift Philippine base — the grounded hulk of a World War II-era vessel, the Sierra Madre. But elsewhere, tensions constantly flare and fade over reefs, atolls and fishing grounds.
Next year, Manila assumes chairmanship of ASEAN — a regional economic, rather than security, group. Hopes of a China-ASEAN code of conduct — as referenced by Mr. Marcos — which has been under negotiation since 2002, look vain.
Advertisement
Per Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post, an anonymous poll about the chances of it being signed was taken among attendees of the inaugural ASEAN Maritime Security 2025 Forum in Manila, from May 20-23.
One attendee believed it would be inked within three years, 18 assumed a decade and 28 assumed never.
“China’s current focus is to isolate the Philippines as far as possible within ASEAN, since Manila has publicly defied Beijing’s attempts to establish dominance and has revived its military alliance with the U.S.,” wrote the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in a May 20 report. “From Beijing’s perspective, ASEAN’s collective trajectory might be summarized as ‘losing without fighting.’”
Subsequently, Philippine Secretary for Foreign Affairs Enrique Manalo said, per Reuters, that Manila is open to “anything within the scope of diplomatic means or peaceful means or cooperation” to compromise with Beijing.
Advertisement
So far, Manila’s pleas have drawn little interest from Beijing — and options for the Philippines seem to be deteriorating daily.
ASEAN is toothless. Legal means have failed: Manila won a 2016 international arbitration on maritime territorial issues that was slammed, then ignored, by Beijing. Renewed security cooperation between Manila and Washington has not halted Chinese encroachment.
In 2023, the two allies upgraded their Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement to rotate more U.S. troops through the Philippines. Under it, GIs have deployed to locations including Palawan and northern Luzon.
Palawan faces Chinese encroachment in the west. Luzon lies south of the Bashi Channel, the naval choke point between the Philippines and Taiwan.
Advertisement
GIs in the Philippines have deployed “Typhon” rocket systems capable of striking coastal China, as well as NMESIS anti-shipping missiles that could deny the Bashi Channel to Chinese warships.
These big-war assets may reassure Taiwan, but they are not halting China’s gray-zone maneuvers off the Philippines.
Beijing’s expansion of maritime terrain follows a well-practiced model, used to inch forces not only toward the Philippines, but also toward Vietnam, Taiwan, and — with less success — Japan’s Senkaku Islands, known as the Diaoyus by China.
The strategy is spearheaded by “blue hulls” — maritime militias, weaponized elements of China’s huge fishing fleet — backed by “white hulls” — large and intimidating Coast Guard vessels. “Gray hulls” — warships — are usually kept at a distance, on overwatch.
Maritime militias outnumber Philippine fishing boats and even form floating area-denial cordons. Coast Guard vessels ram, hose and release motorboats filled with boarding parties.
Backing those mobile assets are 27 air-sea outposts China has terraformed on reefs and islets across the South China Sea: sensor bases, missile bases, warship docks, even jet fighter runways.
Manila cannot compete against Beijing in a single metric. Washington failed to prevent the construction of China’s South China Sea bases and is likewise poorly postured.
“The U.S. Navy is overstretched,” said Alex Neill, a Singapore-based security expert with Pacific Forum. “I don’t think the U.S. Coast Guard has the remit to operate in the South China Sea and the U.S. does not have a maritime militia: that is distinct to China.”
Regional allies are joining the effort, through training and equipment transfer, to upgrade Manila’s capabilities.
“Japan and Australia and the U.S. are trying to develop the Philippines’ capability but the challenge they are facing is that the capability gap is so large, it is hard to see how to fill it quickly and effectively,” said Garren Mulloy, a professor of international relations at Japan’s Daito Bunka University.
The Pentagon, having seen its high-tech, high-lethality forces humiliated in Afghanistan by low-tech, local forces, has no apparent desire to engage in seaborne guerilla scuffles in the IndoPacific.
Doubly so given Mr. Hegseth’s prioritization of lethality — the opposite of China’s inch-by-inch, sub kinetic approach.
• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.
Copyright © 2025 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.
washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon
12. Irregular Warfare on the Sea Floor and the Case for National Resilience
Excerpts:
To counter the evolving threat, international investment and development must focus on four key areas that historical analysis suggests are most effective: enhancing monitoring and surveillance capabilities, fostering international cooperation through formal agreements and joint operations, employing advanced cable hardening techniques, and leveraging diplomatic pressure to establish clear consequences for aggressors. By prioritizing these measures within a coherent national resilience strategy, the United States and its allies can significantly enhance the security of global undersea cable infrastructure. Infrastructure protection efforts—from World War I telegraph cable security to Cold War submarine detection systems—demonstrate that multi-layered, adaptive approaches consistently outperform single-focus strategies. In an increasingly uncertain strategic environment characterized by hybrid warfare and gray-zone operations, protecting the invisible backbone of global communications represents not merely a technical challenge but a fundamental requirement for maintaining international security and economic stability.
Public concern and anxiety would likely increase during a deliberate information blackout, particularly if it extends beyond brief periods. Western societies have developed deep dependencies on digital connectivity for many daily functions, from banking to communications, making temporary disruptions increasingly problematic to normal operations. While creating conditions for panic and civil disobedience may not be the primary driver of sabotage, it could be an insidious aspect of a cable attack, especially if such an attack coincides with other disruptive attacks. It does not have to be so. Sweden and Finland, for example, have done credible work to prepare their citizens for crisis or war and total defense. The key points in the Nordic model of national resilience emphasize drawing individuals, communities, societies, and governments together into a cohesive unit that is robust and capable of dealing with strategic shock and panic without completely collapsing. Both models emphasize a social posture that insulates against disinformation and misinformation and places a high premium on home preparedness.
There is a fundamental lesson for the rest of the West in thinking about resilience through the Swedish and Finnish model: be as prepared ahead of time as one can, such that panic does not take over when something serious inevitably happens. No solution to cable sabotage will be perfect, and a determined adversary will doubtless find ways to circumvent measures used to insulate cables from attack. But the resilience framework and the Nordic examples outlined above offer a multitude of alternatives to panic and economic destruction in the event of major disruptive cable attacks.
Irregular Warfare on the Sea Floor and the Case for National Resilience
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/30/irregular-warfare-on-the-sea-floor-and-the-case-for-national-resilience/
by Andrew Rolander
|
05.30.2025 at 06:00am
The global seabed has emerged as a critical domain of strategic competition, where fiber-optic cables—the unseen arteries of modern civilization—now represent both vital infrastructure and strategic vulnerability. Since the laying of the first telegraph cables in the mid-nineteenth century, undersea communication networks have transformed from purely commercial endeavors into critical components of national security architecture. Today, with over 95% of international data traversing these submerged pathways, the security of undersea cables has become inseparable from global economic stability, information dominance, and strategic resilience. This reality demands a comprehensive approach to national resilience that integrates military capacity, civil preparedness, technological adaptability, and international cooperation. By developing multilayered defensive strategies, including enhanced monitoring systems, international security cooperation, physical cable hardening, and credible diplomatic pressure, the United States and its allies can significantly reduce both the likelihood and potential impact of undersea infrastructure attacks in an increasingly contested global environment.
Strategically, the significance of undersea communication infrastructure has evolved dramatically since the laying of the first telegraph cables in the mid-nineteenth century. Today, undersea fiber-optic cables represent a critical vulnerability in the global security architecture, one that aligns ominously with the warning in the 1986 Joint Low Intensity Conflict Report: “Our adversaries are confronting us with political violence short of conventional war to achieve their goals. If most forecasts are correct, this is precisely the form of conflict that will confront us in the years ahead.” This assessment has proven prophetic, as the character of warfare has shown itself, again, to be Clausewitz’s chameleon in its newest adaptation—a multi-domain, multi-modal conflict landscape where strategic effects can be generated on the seafloor with something as seemingly innocuous as a ship’s anchor.
The military significance of such cables quickly became clear during the Spanish-American War of 1898, when one of America’s first operational activities involved cutting Spanish telegraph cables to isolate and disrupt communications. During World War I, British naval forces systematically targeted German undersea cables, forcing communication through channels that could be more easily monitored. The Cold War subsequently saw the rise of sophisticated submarine operations targeting undersea infrastructure for intelligence-gathering purposes rather than disruption. The transition from copper telegraph cables to fiber-optic technology in the 1980s and 1990s fundamentally transformed both the capacity and vulnerability profile of undersea infrastructure. As undersea cables have grown more vital to the globalized, they have simultaneously become more vulnerable to sophisticated attacks that can achieve strategic effects without triggering military responses.
The persistent deliberate targeting of undersea cable infrastructure represents a significant evolution in the methods used for conducting undersea warfare, triggering the need for proactive multifaceted approaches to counter such methods rooted in national resilience. By establishing a comprehensive resilience framework—using enhanced monitoring and surveillance, international cooperation, cable hardening techniques, and diplomatic pressure—the United States and its allies can significantly enhance the security of undersea cable infrastructure and effectively mitigate the domestic and global security, economic, and sociopolitical implications of disruptions in critical data dataflows. Such measures are essential to ensure the continued flow of vital communications and safeguard against both state and state-sponsored actors seeking to achieve asymmetric advantages.
Nearly all international data flows through undersea fiber-optic cables, making them vital for global communication, finance, and commerce; they are the backbone of global communications. In more granular detail, undersea cables support most of the international data traffic, including emails, webpages, and video calls, making them essential for global connectivity. In addition, these cables support everything from financial transactions to national security communications; essentially, most of the world’s internet relies on these cables to function effectively. In other words, when compared to other communications architecture like broadcast, multicast, or cloud communications, no other system has the same data transmission speed or bandwidth as undersea cables.
Undersea Cable Attacks: A Mode of Irregular Warfare
Attacks on undersea cables represent an increasingly likely vector of attack by state and state-sponsored actors in strategic competition and conflict. These attacks align with the characteristics of irregular warfare, as they employ asymmetric methods to achieve political objectives below the threshold of conventional military conflict. Given the strategic importance of cable infrastructure, it would be prudent to consider that potential adversaries may be developing capabilities to target undersea cables as part of broader operations intended to disrupt regional stability. In the global competitive strategic environment, major revisionist powers like Russia and China seek to disrupt or destroy global undersea cable infrastructure to generate their own competitive advantage and erode or neutralize U.S. and allied capabilities.
Beyond the immediate global connectivity effects of a deliberate attack, cascading secondary and tertiary economic effects could significantly disrupt the global economic ecosystem, which relies heavily on continuous communication to function efficiently. For example, the Apollo North cable system, part of the wider Apollo system, is arguably the most important undersea link between the US and the UK, designed to carry large amounts of data traffic. While there is redundancy in the system, it stands to reason that all such cables could become targets during a conflict. If this cable architecture were disrupted temporarily or destroyed, the financial consequences could substantially impact international money markets while the initial shock was absorbed and may have longer term consequences as investors sought to protect assets. More troubling is that in a conflict scenario, it could then take weeks or months to get a cable-laying ship in place to repair the splice in the fiber, re-lay the cable, test it, and put it back in service.
Given the critical importance of undersea cables, it is no surprise that such cables have been identified as key targets for sabotage and destruction. In the case of Apollo North, infrastructure is deep underwater, on average at about 4,000 meters below the surface, which makes it a relatively easy target for an aggressor to damage with sophisticated naval vessels, underwater drones, or commercial shipping traffic, all of which can be unattributable or otherwise difficult to prove malicious intent. Regardless of attribution, the ability to disrupt internet access and other vital services offers key competitive advantages to an aggressor seeking to manipulate the strategic environment. Disrupting data flows could provide an aggressor with a potential strategic advantage in the early phases of a conflict, complicating the US and allied ability to coordinate certain aspects of their response, though dedicated military communications systems maintain significant redundancy. The same logic could apply to economic warfare, where an aggressor trying to generate economic advantage may disrupt or destroy cable architecture to force another nation to make economic concessions. Plausible deniability to generate advantage or create tension without armed conflict is an asset, especially in the murky liminal space between war, competition, and peace.
Such malign operations are particularly concerning in regions with high geopolitical tension, such as the Baltic and South China Sea, which are home to U.S. allies and partners, major shipping lanes and port infrastructure, and global adversaries. In regions like these, where important cables are densely concentrated and more accessible to potential adversaries, cable infrastructure is more vulnerable because of proximity, capability, and opportunity. Choke points in regions with multiple states, like the Baltic or South China Sea, or in coastal areas with major port infrastructure, like Los Angeles or Rotterdam, in which the maritime domain is constantly busy, are easy targets for targeting, disruption, or destructive operations.
But cable infrastructure is also globally dispersed and often far from shore, out of sight and out of mind. Distance, therefore, creates additional operational challenges in terms of undersea cable defense and definitively attributing acts of sabotage to an aggressor. In other words, as cables move away from densely populated and thus more closely monitored areas, the opportunity to attack cable infrastructure unnoticed grows exponentially. The Trans-Pacific Cable (TPC), for example, is a series of cable networks that link Japan, Guam, Hawaii, and the mainland United States. The vastness of the Pacific Ocean offers ample space to hide sabotage far from shore and obfuscate who or what was used to execute the operation, significantly complicating attribution efforts and extending timelines for cable repair operations.
Though the immediate economic and communications problems resulting from data disruption are acute on their own, there is the additional potential for social unrest, political instability, and violence due to limited access to information and, by extension, fear in a world accustomed to instantaneous and uninterrupted global communications. This fear will compound as data disruption prevents individuals from accessing bank accounts, removing the ability to purchase daily necessities—food, water, fuel, and medicine—and complete routine housing, debt, and service payments. Businesses, unable to track sales and shipments, will be unable to maintain stock or temporarily halt operations, quickly creating scarcity and unrest as citizens look to secure access for their families. While loss of access to information is highly disruptive, prolonged inability to access electronic payment systems could create significant challenges for purchasing essentials like food and medicine, particularly for vulnerable populations without alternative payment methods. The systemic disruption caused by disruption of data flows further obfuscates the precise target sector or intended outcome of a cable attack, making this emerging threat methodology one of the most insidious and effective.
A complicating facet of undersea cable attacks is that the data transmitted by each cable is multinational and owned by individual citizens, private companies, and governments. The complexity and fragmented nature of data ownership offers the aggressor the ability to hide a specific target in the white noise of modern transmission methodologies, further complicating definitive attribution efforts. For example, an attack intended to disrupt government communications will likely also disrupt private communications and economic connectivity. Thus, an attacker can layer effects and amplify the damage and confusion created by an attack. When used as a component part of a broader strategy to destabilize a targeted country without triggering a full-scale conventional or irregular military conflict, undersea cable sabotage or destruction operations offers an attacker an attractive option for a fait accompli without necessarily triggering a casus belli.
When relatively inexpensive unattributable operations can create major disruptions to internet access and communication networks, affecting everything from financial transactions to data flows, reappraisal of several fundamental assumptions about competitive advantage, information dominance, and cognitive maneuver becomes necessary. Reappraisal of these assumptions, like the unconstrained flow of information of all kinds, is rendered more complex because an attack on undersea cables could impair a nation’s emergency response capabilities, potentially degrading decision-making and communication effectiveness during a critical period. The United States and its partners and allies should develop the capacity to effectively manage and mitigate the potential threat of widespread information and communications disruptions and the economic challenges that might follow in order to minimize the immediate damage and secondary effects of a deliberate undersea cable attack. Facilitating systemic resilience across critical sectors at the national, international, and global levels can help to insulate and defend against the shocks produced by undersea cable disruptions and increase the effectiveness of any response strategies.
Redundancy, System Resilience, Threat Mitigation
Clearly, vulnerabilities in undersea cables exist and are being exploited for malign purposes by revisionist powers. A recent example of such exploitation happened in the waters around Taiwan. The Taiwanese are investigating a case of undersea cable sabotage and suspect China is responsible for it. The suspected sabotage occurred near Taiwan’s northeast coast and disrupted internet connectivity. The immediate effects sparked concerns about China’s potential use of cable sabotage tactics to disrupt Taiwanese social cohesion and economics. But existing system redundancy can help to mitigate the effects a deliberate attack would have on a target nation or population. To be sure, undersea cable infrastructure is designed with a significant level of redundancy to ensure resilience and minimize disruptions if a cable is damaged or severed, allowing data traffic to be rerouted through alternative paths. Data routing, for example, is a cost-effective way to reroute information flows if a cable is damaged. Data traffic can be quickly rerouted to other available cables, minimizing any noticeable impact on network connectivity. There is also the value of having multiple cables to provide safety in numbers. The Apollo North infrastructure is a good example of a redundant system that integrates these two approaches. But in the case of a deliberate attack on cables, existing redundancy is likely insufficient to insulate a nation from the more dramatic effects such an attack would have.
The concept of national resilience, frequently invoked in defense and security discourse, requires a precise definition when applied to critical infrastructure protection. According to the Resistance Operating Concept, resilience constitutes “the will and ability of a partner nation’s government-military-people to withstand external pressure to their national sovereignty, unity, and resolve.” Building on this definition and ongoing work in resilience studies, national resilience for undersea cable protection must integrate military capacity, civil and individual preparedness, and technological adaptability to withstand and recover from strategic shock. For resilience to effectively protect undersea cable infrastructure, and any other infrastructure or society for that matter, it must incorporate these critical dimensions:
First, resilience must be inherent or embedded within existing national institutions and society rather than looked for externally. Military, government, and civilian organizations must develop organic capabilities to absorb system shocks and respond without the paralysis caused by information disruption. Second, resilience must be intentionally designed and systematically incorporated into national security architecture. This dimension requires deliberately engineered systems that enhance baseline strength, flexibility, and redundancy. Beyond traditional defense planning, this includes legislative frameworks that mandate cable protection standards, multi-level coordinating mechanisms between public and private stakeholders, and community-level preparation for communication disruptions. Finally, resilience must include additive components—external injections that bolster internal capacities. International cooperation, allied support mechanisms, and coordinated multinational responses represent crucial external elements that augment national resilience. With that said, countering undersea cable operations in the context of the resilience framework laid out above requires international investment and development in four key areas.
A Real-World Example of Cable Sabotage and the International Response
A high-profile incident in the Baltic Sea last November prompted European investigators to scrutinize a Chinese commercial vessel suspected of intentionally dragging its anchor for more than 100 miles, severing two undersea cables in the Baltic Sea. The Danish navy boarded the suspected Chinese bulk carrier, which was traveling from St. Petersburg in the Baltic during the time frame of two cable breaks on November 17-18. Its Automatic Identification System record indicates unusual course and speed changes at suspicious locations, leading to increased scrutiny from European authorities. After inspection, the anchor of the Yi Peng 3 appeared damaged, which maritime experts suggest indicates it became stuck or was dragged on the seabed. Governments around the Baltic are working on the assumption that the cable damage was intentional, with the German Defense Minister calling it a hybrid action and suspecting sabotage. Whether or not the incident was deliberate remains speculative. Regardless, some key first steps the international community can take immediately are
Increased Monitoring and Surveillance:
Several advanced monitoring systems have demonstrated effectiveness for undersea infrastructure protection. The evolution of these technologies represents a significant advance from the rudimentary patrol vessels used to protect telegraph cables in the early twentieth century. Contemporary systems include sophisticated diver detection systems (DDS), autonomous undersea vehicles (AUVs), and integrated sensor networks capable of detecting threats at considerably greater distances and with higher reliability than historical methods. The integration of DDS technology with “smart cables” represents a particularly promising development. When combined with AUVs equipped with acoustic, optical, and magnetic sensors, these systems create a comprehensive sensor network that significantly complicates covert access to undersea cables.
Still, identifying the precise location of a disruptive or destructive attack poses operational problems that will need to be overcome until comprehensive monitoring is available. A major step toward comprehensive monitoring and notification of disruption is a system developed that listens for acoustic signatures of disruption. Acoustic warning systems like this can detect a diver touching or otherwise manipulating an undersea cable or a ship dragging its anchor. Systems like this are far from perfect, and the technology remains in its infancy, but acoustic detection is an example of a novel technological solution deployed to defend against an emerging attack vector.
International Cooperation:
In the international space, implementing cable security zones, deploying cable security patrol ships, and codifying security training for the personnel who maintain and monitor undersea cables add additional layers of resilience. Designated undersea protected zones around cable routes and robust measures to restrict vessel traffic and other activities that could pose a threat around cables can only complicate aggressor operations. Baltic Sentry could be the model for international cooperation and the defense of undersea cables. Baltic Sentry amplifies NATO’s presence in the region by deploying ships, drones, and aircraft to monitor the Baltic Sea. Artificial intelligence also plays a key role in Baltic Sentry because it enables the alliance to monitor suspicious activities and detect uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs). Perhaps most importantly for its utility as a global model, Baltic Sentry enables the alliance to sanction vessels by targeting crews, owners, and intermediaries that may be acting on behalf of a malign actor. Critically, the initiative also diversifies cable routes to allow data and power flow even if a cable is cut or fails.
Cable Hardening:
Undersea cable hardening is deliberate cable routing to avoid high-traffic areas, cable armoring to defend against deliberate physical sabotage, and burial to protect from trawlers or anchors, and the added measure of using sonar and other security measures to monitor and protect the cables and their landing stations. Specifically in the case of shallow water, cable burial not only protects it from direct sabotage or a dragged anchor, it also obfuscates the location of the cable. All these measures should be employed immediately to enhance the physical survivability of cable infrastructure from accidental and deliberate attack.
Diplomatic Pressure:
International legislation dating back to the Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables of 1884 established the preliminary basis for the protection of undersea cables. Subsequent legal instruments have been iteratively established and implemented globally, creating an uneven web of protective processes that varies sometimes significantly in scope and enforcement. More robust diplomatic cooperation is required to address the critical national security implications of undersea cable infrastructure vulnerability. A coordinated international legal framework with standardized enforcement procedures would enhance deterrence against potential saboteurs. Comprehensive legal and diplomatic frameworks for the security and defense of undersea cables would also serve as a clear signal to would-be aggressors that the international community is organized to impose consequences on perpetrators of cable attacks.
Consequences for cable sabotage or disruption should include mandatory financial restitution mechanisms whereby states would be held financially liable for damages caused by vessels operating under their flag, regardless of whether malicious intent can be conclusively proven. In addition, this proposed framework should establish responses that include multilateral sanctioning, restricted access to international maritime resources, and exclusion from international telecommunications governance bodies for non-compliant states. Both the European Union, through its Critical Infrastructure Protection Directive, and the United Nations, via the International Telecommunication Union and the International Maritime Organization, are well positioned to organize this multilateral response and to exert the necessary diplomatic pressure to establish a cohesive international regime for undersea cable protection.
National Resilience and Individual Preparedness
The increasing sophistication and likelihood of sabotage operations targeting undersea cables demands a proactive approach firmly rooted in historical understanding and forward-looking resilience planning. The historical record demonstrates that undersea communication infrastructure has consistently been targeted during periods of international tension and conflict since the late nineteenth century. What distinguishes the contemporary threat environment is the potential for global impact from even limited disruptions, given the unprecedented dependence on these systems; information technology and communications networks, for example, are key extensions of undersea cable and without doubt form vital interdependent systems that are vulnerable to such disruptions. While no single solution can guarantee complete protection against determined adversaries, a comprehensive resilience-based framework offers the most robust defense against both immediate and cascading effects of disruptive cable attacks.
To counter the evolving threat, international investment and development must focus on four key areas that historical analysis suggests are most effective: enhancing monitoring and surveillance capabilities, fostering international cooperation through formal agreements and joint operations, employing advanced cable hardening techniques, and leveraging diplomatic pressure to establish clear consequences for aggressors. By prioritizing these measures within a coherent national resilience strategy, the United States and its allies can significantly enhance the security of global undersea cable infrastructure. Infrastructure protection efforts—from World War I telegraph cable security to Cold War submarine detection systems—demonstrate that multi-layered, adaptive approaches consistently outperform single-focus strategies. In an increasingly uncertain strategic environment characterized by hybrid warfare and gray-zone operations, protecting the invisible backbone of global communications represents not merely a technical challenge but a fundamental requirement for maintaining international security and economic stability.
Public concern and anxiety would likely increase during a deliberate information blackout, particularly if it extends beyond brief periods. Western societies have developed deep dependencies on digital connectivity for many daily functions, from banking to communications, making temporary disruptions increasingly problematic to normal operations. While creating conditions for panic and civil disobedience may not be the primary driver of sabotage, it could be an insidious aspect of a cable attack, especially if such an attack coincides with other disruptive attacks. It does not have to be so. Sweden and Finland, for example, have done credible work to prepare their citizens for crisis or war and total defense. The key points in the Nordic model of national resilience emphasize drawing individuals, communities, societies, and governments together into a cohesive unit that is robust and capable of dealing with strategic shock and panic without completely collapsing. Both models emphasize a social posture that insulates against disinformation and misinformation and places a high premium on home preparedness.
There is a fundamental lesson for the rest of the West in thinking about resilience through the Swedish and Finnish model: be as prepared ahead of time as one can, such that panic does not take over when something serious inevitably happens. No solution to cable sabotage will be perfect, and a determined adversary will doubtless find ways to circumvent measures used to insulate cables from attack. But the resilience framework and the Nordic examples outlined above offer a multitude of alternatives to panic and economic destruction in the event of major disruptive cable attacks.
Tags: asymmetric threat, Critical Infrastructure Protection, irregular warfare, Resilience, Undersea Cable
About The Author
- Andrew Rolander
- Andrew Rolander is an irregular warfare and strategic competition analyst supporting the US Department of Defense. He is particularly interested in maritime strategy and irregular warfare. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Department of Defense or the US government.
13. Allies are more than customers of America’s defense industrial base. They can help rebuild it.
Partners in the arsenal of democracies.
Excerpts:
At a minimum, this should include directives for US acquisition officials to actively consider allied solutions, particularly for priorities like AI, hypersonics, quantum and unmanned systems — all areas where American allies have plenty to offer. Reforms could also revisit contracting and tender processes that disadvantage non-US companies, and fine-tune export controls and information-sharing practices to encourage allies to more readily share their technologies without fear of losing control of them.
Trump could also revise US policy settings vis-a-vis international agreements like the Missile Technology Control Regime which limit what the US can arm its partners with and, perhaps more importantly, inhibit co-development and co-production initiatives through the likes of AUKUS.
Making it easier for allies to work with the Pentagon will make it easier for them to share the burdens of collective security in an increasingly insecure world. Australia, India, Japan and South Korea are ready and willing to do so, and support reforms to that end. But these efforts will only succeed if the Trump administration accounts for what these countries have to offer America’s defense industrial base, not just what they might buy from it.
Allies are more than customers of America’s defense industrial base. They can help rebuild it. - Breaking Defense
Allies like Australia, India, Japan and South Korea are willing not only to buy American defense capabilities, but help build them as well, writes Tom Corben in this op-ed.
breakingdefense.com · by Tom Corben · May 30, 2025
Cell guides on the Ane Maersk, A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S’s newest methanol-powered container ship, foreground, at the HD Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. shipyard in Ulsan, South Korea, on Thursday, Jan. 25, 2024. (Photographer: SeongJoon Cho/Bloomberg via Getty Images)
Trump administration officials speak often of the responsibility of American allies and partners to do more for the common defense.
The good news for Washington is that most of those countries agree. This is particularly true in Asia, where Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea are increasingly unsettled by Chinese maritime coercion. In response, they have sought to build-up their military capabilities and deepen their cooperation with the United States in the interests of preserving a favorable balance of power.
Yet there are differences between the administration and its allies over how best to burden share. Trump’s team have touted larger and more timely Foreign Military Sales as their preferred means for doing so. But for many allies, simply buying American weaponry — much of which won’t arrive for years — is no longer enough. They want to help design and build it, too.
It’s in that context that the looming reform blitz at the Pentagon must account for what allies can and should contribute to the foundations of American military power.
The reality is that America needs the help of these same countries to develop and produce the very capabilities that it hopes they will purchase — let alone to meet the Trump administration’s goals of rebuilding the US defense industrial base.
Rarely has US defense industrial capacity and technological prowess been under such strain. The COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and high-intensity operations in the Middle East have sapped Washington’s ability to meet both its own and its allies’ material defense needs. In Asia, these challenges are compounding with legacy maintenance and production shortfalls and with China’s growing ability to contest US military logistics, all of which pose serious challenges to America’s long-term strategic position in the region.
It’s no coincidence, then, that defense industrial and technology cooperation has become central to modernizing America’s Indo-Pacific alliances.
Indeed, partners like Australia, India, Japan and South Korea are increasingly willing and able make direct contributions to the industrial and technological foundations of American military power. This is exactly what defense innovation initiatives like AUKUS and INDUS-X, along with ship maintenance and munitions co-production agreements with all four countries, are intended to facilitate.
Trump’s team now have the chance to own that agenda.
The early signs have been encouraging. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s early engagements with his Australian and Indian counterparts and Navy Secretary John Phelan’s recent visits to Japanese and Korean shipyards have reflected an appreciation of the role that allies can play in revitalizing the US defense industrial base, through making their world-beating technologies and production capacities available to the Pentagon.
But maximizing these contributions will require reforming the ways in which the Pentagon develops and procures weaponry to make it easier for allies to work with Washington.
Fortunately, both Trump and Congress are clearly intent on doing just that. Trump’s April 9 executive order directed the Pentagon to submit plans for a “comprehensive overhaul” of relevant policy and workforce functions within the next 120 days. Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Roger Wicker’s Fostering Reform and Government Efficiency in Defense (FORGED) Act similarly proposes a sweeping overhaul to regulations and policy settings governing the way that the Pentagon buys what it needs.
These proposals emphasize speed, flexibility, and embracing commercially available solutions in the interests of outpacing Chinese and Russian military innovation and scale. But they leave it rather unclear as to where allies fit into these plans beyond buying what America is selling.
Continuing to overlook allied advantages would run contrary to the administration’s objective of bringing disruptive new players into the US defense industrial base. In other words, reforms to the Pentagon’s business practices would be incomplete without revisions to the ways in which the department works with allies and their companies, not just how they purchase American weaponry.
At a minimum, this should include directives for US acquisition officials to actively consider allied solutions, particularly for priorities like AI, hypersonics, quantum and unmanned systems — all areas where American allies have plenty to offer. Reforms could also revisit contracting and tender processes that disadvantage non-US companies, and fine-tune export controls and information-sharing practices to encourage allies to more readily share their technologies without fear of losing control of them.
Trump could also revise US policy settings vis-a-vis international agreements like the Missile Technology Control Regime which limit what the US can arm its partners with and, perhaps more importantly, inhibit co-development and co-production initiatives through the likes of AUKUS.
Making it easier for allies to work with the Pentagon will make it easier for them to share the burdens of collective security in an increasingly insecure world. Australia, India, Japan and South Korea are ready and willing to do so, and support reforms to that end. But these efforts will only succeed if the Trump administration accounts for what these countries have to offer America’s defense industrial base, not just what they might buy from it.
Tom Corben is a research fellow in the foreign policy and defense program at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney.
breakingdefense.com · by Tom Corben · May 30, 2025
14. The wrong time for a collective defence pact in Asia
A view from Australia.
We need to knit together and strengthen the silk web of bilateral, multilateral, minilateral security, economic and trade, and political relationships into an architecture that advances the interests of like minded democracies in the Asia Pacific region. Sure, just regurgitating the NATO model (Or SEATO, NEATO, or CENTO) is not the answer. We need to go beyond the current hub and spoke and reinforce and strengthen the emerging silk web of alliances. We need to be creative and do what is best for our mutual security and economic interests and by taking into account the history, cultures, and political systems in the region. We also need to think beyond all current administrations.
A defense pact may not be feasible but we need a new architecture.
The wrong time for a collective defence pact in Asia | Lowy Institute
Bec Strating
Trump’s unpredictability is already an obstacle. And diverse
interests make bilateral flexibility better than rigid military blocs.
lowyinstitute.org · by Bec Strating
In a newly published Foreign Affairs essay, former Biden administration assistant secretary of Defence Ely Ratner has proposed an Asian collective defence pact between the United States, Japan, Philippines, and Australia. This is an idea that has emerged at precisely the wrong moment. It rests on dubious assumptions about both American reliability and regional dynamics.
Ratner positions China as the primary threat to regional stability, yet he is too optimistic in assessing policy continuity between the Biden and Trump administrations. In fact, the Trump administration’s approach is undermining American influence and credibility, making a deeper partnership with the United States less attractive. The administration has explicitly and consistently campaigned on the grievance that America has been exploited by international partners.
We don’t know yet what Trump’s Asia security policy will look like. What we do know is that the administration’s aggressive tariff regime represents a form of economic self-harm that diminishes American influence while increasing market volatility and consumer prices. Rather than strengthening America’s position, these policies provide China with opportunities to present itself as the more responsible international actor. Beijing has exploited this dynamic through Xi Jinping’s charm offensive across Southeast Asia, positioning China as a stable partner in contrast to an increasingly unpredictable United States. This messaging campaign undermines the foundation upon which Ratner’s defence pact proposal rests.
But it’s America’s challenges at home that Ratner seems to breeze past. Is a collective defence pact really likely to sell to the MAGA base? Given Trump’s documented scepticism toward multilateral defence commitments – most notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – the prospect of expanding American collective defence obligations seems politically untenable. Trump’s foreign policy team largely reflects the suspicions of their boss about the prospect of foreign entanglements.
The success of existing Asian security architecture has rested on its bilateral flexibility, allowing individual nations to balance competing interests (Shaina Jupiter/US Marine Corps)
While Asia may be a different scenario from Europe – and Ratner explicitly notes his idea does not require a “pan-regional security organisation such as NATO” – officials previously considered hawkish on China, such as Mike Waltz and Alex Wong, have been marginalised. Policy coherence isn’t a hallmark of the administration. Trump’s mercurial leadership style, combined with his more transactional approach to international relations, makes the sustained commitment required for effective alliance management questionable.
Ratner’s idea for a collective defence pact also neglects both historical precedent and current realities. The failure of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and eventual dissolution in the 1970s demonstrates the challenges of implementing multilateral security arrangements in Asia. More fundamentally, the success of existing Asian security architecture has rested on its bilateral flexibility, allowing individual nations to balance competing interests and maintain strategic autonomy. The San Francisco Treaty system succeeded because it accommodates diverse national priorities while providing security guarantees.
Southeast Asian nations, already concerned about great power competition, are unlikely to view favourably the formation of an explicitly anti-China military bloc.
Few states in the region are willing to explicitly counter China. A more rigid collective defence structure could eliminate the benefits of the bilateral alliance system, potentially forcing allies into positions that may conflict with their broader strategic and regional interests.
There are also important considerations about how a collective defence pact might affect Taiwan policy. Ratner demonstrates that Japan and Philippines are already aware that a Taiwan contingency would involve them. But what about the United States? While Biden offered four explicit defence commitments regarding Taiwan, Trump – a “Taiwan critic” – has returned the US policy to one of ambiguity. This moves in the opposite direction to the Biden administration’s rhetoric. Forcing allies into premature clarity through a collective defence pact could paradoxically increase rather than decrease regional tensions. For Australia, geographic distance from key East Asian flashpoints makes unconditional defence commitments particularly problematic.
The proposal fails to account for the calculations facing allies. For example, Ratner focuses on Australia’s deepening defence relationship with the United States but neglects the recent “stabilisation” of relations with China under the Albanese government. This government just experienced a thumping election win based on its pragmatic approach to governing, including in foreign policy.
Broader regional perspectives are similarly ignored. Southeast Asian nations, already concerned about great power competition, are unlikely to view favourably the formation of an explicitly anti-China military bloc.
Rather than reinforcing dependence on an increasingly unreliable United States, regional partners should focus on arrangements that provide strategic alternatives. It seems as if many of the proposals for deepening cooperation could continue without a US-led collective defence pact. Existing quasi-alliance structures such as Reciprocal Access Agreements offer promising models for deepening cooperation while maintaining flexibility. These arrangements can strengthen regional capacity to manage security challenges independently of broader great power dynamics. In the context of Trump’s United States, these arrangements between Asian allies should be used to hedge against rather than reinforce reliance on the US.
Ratner’s proposal is a logical next stage of Biden’s “integrated deterrence” idea, built on “like-mindedness”, the idea that some states share similar strategic interests, values and objectives. In practice, it has been a superficial descriptor to group countries that fear China’s rise and are willing to work together to counter it. The problem has been, and remains, that there are few countries that are truly “like-minded” in Asia on the question of China. Even committed US allies are not always on the same page – just look at South Korea.
In Australia, we need to avoid wishful thinking about the US, and avoid assuming a level of commitment, reliability and continuity that the current evidence does not support. This means pursuing approaches that enhance rather than compromise our strategic autonomy. In an era of increasing great power competition and US unpredictability, flexibility rather than rigid commitment offers the best path forward.
Dr Bec Strating is Director of La Trobe Asia and Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations at La Trobe University, focusing primarily on maritime disputes and Australian foreign policy.
lowyinstitute.org · by Bec Strating
15. They fled their home countries to report from the safety of the U.S. Now, they fear they're in danger
I know it falls on some deaf ears. But we do have a moral responsibility to those who have served US national security interests and in many ways more so than actual American citizens.
They fled their home countries to report from the safety of the U.S. Now, they fear they're in danger
Radio Free Asia journalists could be deported as Trump targets democracy-promoting programs
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/radio-free-asia-cuts-1.7542901
Alexander Panetta · CBC News · Posted: May 29, 2025 4:00 AM EDT | Last Updated: 6 hours ago
A group of reporters came to Washington to operate in safety. Now, with the Trump administration defunding their news operation, they risk losing their right to be here. And maybe worse. (Hannah McKay/Reuters)Social Sharing
An ongoing U.S. retreat from defending liberal democracy has left some allies in danger of being exposed, stranded on a metaphorical battlefield.
Under U.S. President Donald Trump's hard-nosed foreign policy, unapologetically based on profit, not principle, multiple democracy-promotion tools are being dismantled.
This includes Radio Free Asia (RFA), which is being defunded. Created in the aftermath of China's 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, it reports in nine Asian languages, using web sites, social media and short-wave radio to get news to audiences with limited access to uncensored media.
With most of its U.S.-based staff laid off, some RFA employees who report from the safety of Washington. D.C., now risk losing not only their jobs but also their work visas and could face deportation to an uncertain future in their homelands.
Bay Fang, president and CEO of Radio Free Asia, in a near-empty newsroom that was humming with activity only weeks ago. (Alex Panetta/CBC News)
Hour Hum is one of them. He fled Cambodia in 2017 after some of his colleagues were arrested and RFA had to shutter its office. He went into hiding in Thailand.
After seven years, he finally got a work visa and came to the U.S. with his wife. He likened it to reaching heaven after years in hell.
Now, with a one-month-old to care for, he's clinging to his job as layoffs sweep across the newsroom. His wife is feeling anxious again as she did during those years in hiding, Hum said, fearing deportation.
"If they don't kill me, they'll put me in jail," he said of his prospects in Cambodia, where reporters are routinely arrested and international organizations say independent journalism is increasingly impossible to do.
"It's almost the same thing."
Part of wider cuts
The defunding of RFA comes amid a wave of similar cuts to foreign initiatives, including the complete abolition of the U.S. international-aid agency.
The Trump administration sent a letter in March announcing that RFA's funding, $60 million US a year, was terminated.
It was part of the same executive order that ended financial support for the main Canada think-tank in Washington and other U.S. government-funded news outlets, including Voice of America.
Almost 90 per cent of U.S.-based RFA staff – nearly 400 people – have been laid off, and it's not yet clear how many of those layoffs will be permanent. Several dozen remain employed, as funding is still arriving in irregular spurts while the organization fights the cuts in court, arguing the president illegally undid funding already approved by Congress.
Staff deemed most at-risk in their home countries are being kept on as long as possible while some money is still available. Some have opened asylum claims.
The front desk at Radio Free Asia's headquarters in Washington. The organization, which broadcasts in nine Asian languages, has had its U.S. government funding terminated by executive order. It's being fought in court. (Reuters)
'It's what keeps me up at night'
In her office, in a nearly empty bureau in Washington, RFA president Bay Fang recounted one anecdote after another of staff arrested over the years, along with some of their friends and relatives. In North Korea, a soldier was jailed in 2020 for just listening to RFA.
"It's heartbreaking. It's what keeps me up at night," Fang said. "[They're] thrown in jail because of their reporting.…
"Throughout it all, they wanted to keep going. They felt like it was their calling to actually let the world know what was happening in their country. The fact that now it could be the U.S. government silencing them is just heartbreaking."
USAID workers carry belongings out of headquarters after massive program cuts3 months ago
Duration0:53
USAID workers who lost their jobs were given 15-minute intervals to clear out their desks on Thursday amid a massive takedown of the widely successful program. Workers were greeted with cheers from supporters as they left the building for the final time.
How RFA angered autocrats
In the years since it was created in 1996, RFA's reporters have broken stories on camps in China for the Muslim Uyghur minority. They did early reporting on a strange new virus ripping through central China in 2020, getting tips from sources inside the country being arrested for speaking about COVID-19.
They called up crematoriums in Wuhan and heard about staggering numbers of bodies and funeral homes publishing jobs ads seeking overnight staff.
They broke stories about Chinese-controlled police stations within North America and intimidation of diaspora communities.
In Myanmar, a villager found a phone with evidence of soldiers bragging about committing war crimes, with photos and evidence of throats being slit and decapitations. He got the phone to Radio Free Asia, which broke that story.
So it's no surprise that reaction to the demise of RFA has been buoyant in some of those countries.
In this speech in Saudi Arabia, Trump ridiculed past American administrations that tried to spread U.S. values to the world. (Alex Brandon/The Asssociated Press)
In China, the government-affiliated Global Times called RFA and other U.S.-funded news operations a relic of Cold War ideological propaganda and welcomed its entry into the dustbin of history.
"The so-called beacon of freedom," it wrote, referring specifically to Voice of America, "has now been discarded by its own government like a dirty rag."
There was a celebratory Facebook post from Cambodia's longtime leader, Hun Sen, accused of rampant corruption and the killing and jailing of political opponents.
He applauded Trump for leading the world in combating what Sun called the scourge of fake news.
And as the U.S. pulls back on funding news, China and Russia are expanding their footprint, with state-run outlets like RT and CGTN opening dozens of stations and bureaus in Africa alone.
A different world
Such moves reflect a world where autocracies are spreading and the number of democracies has been shrinking for decades.
And, indeed, one argument for scaling back funding for foreign state-funded news organizations such as RFA is that the world scarcely resembles the one in which it was founded.
It was inspired by an earlier Cold War model: Radio Free Europe. Originally funded by the CIA, RFE broadcast in over a dozen Eastern European languages since the 1950s.
There was overwhelming political support for RFA as it was built over the 1990s and entrenched into law in 1997 in a 401-21 vote in Congress.
A year later, when China's government blocked RFA's reporters from covering a presidential trip there, Bill Clinton personally met with those reporters and granted them interviews.
But the world and the U.S. position in it have changed.
Back then, the internet barely counted as mass media. Today, there are more smartphones in the world than people, allowing myriad ways to communicate.
The U.S. no longer has the same power to set the terms of the global conversation as it did when it had 10 times China's GDP, unrivalled military dominance and a balanced budget, as opposed to exploding debt today, and a less-dominant military.
Part of wider cuts to government-funded media
The Trump administration itself has said virtually nothing about its rationale for eliminating Radio Free Asia, specifically.
It has justified gutting government-funded media in general, from the agency that oversees Radio Free Asia, Voice of America and Radio Free Europe to NPR and PBS.
"He was elected in large part to reduce the federal bureaucracy, right?" State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce said when asked about the cuts to Radio Free Asia.
"It's about waste and fraud, mismanagement. This is something that has to occur."
A man in Beijing stands in front of tanks on the Avenue of Eternal Peace June 5, 1989, during the crushing of the Tiananmen Square uprising. Radio Free Asia was founded seven years later as a way to get information to people who had little access to uncensored media. (Arthur Tsang /Reuters)
Fang is emphatic, however: That even in a world with countless ways to communicate, there's still a role for an organizations like hers.
She described a staffer working day and night, relentlessly calling sources in China to report on the Uyghur internment camps. "That was broken from here," she said.
U.S.-based staff, working in Mandarin, also broke stories about COVID for which there was voracious appetite inside China, she said. Video views increased eightfold at the time, including clicks from Wuhan, Fang said.
One Ipsos poll conducted for RFA in 2018 suggested as many as 44 million people a week may have accessed its content within China, about three per cent of its population.
A Gallup survey commissioned by the service in 2023 found that almost three-quarters of Cambodians surveyed were aware of RFA, and 8.5 per cent saw its work on a weekly basis.
"When we were created, it was with the understanding that having an educated citizenry in these different countries supporting democratic values would actually lead to awareness that is beneficial to U.S. interests," Fang said.
Reporters share their stories
A few remaining reporters were working on stories last week in the near-vacant newsroom in downtown Washington.
One involved a bullet-train project in Vietnam — with a look at a sole-source contract and questions about oversight.
Others touched on struggling tariff talks; a journalist arrested in Cambodia; and a Cambodian official telling Japan to avoid raising human rights during a political summit.
A man lights candles at a vigil outside the Chinese consulate in Sydney, Australia, marking the fifth anniversary of the massacre. (Reuters)
A few days earlier, there was an unusual story about a Cambodian police officer charged with drunk-driving. The arrest came after RFA posted an extraordinary crash video that drew millions of views and attention to the case.
"We made that big," said Poly Sam, director of the Cambodian service, himself a survivor of ghastly violence under the Khmer Rouge.
During a work pause, the few remaining reporters discussed their own personal stories.
Vuthy Tha is a single father of two young children who has been threatened several times by Cambodian officials over his reporting. He's among the last employees still working at Radio Free Asia, (Alex Panetta/CBC News)
Vuthy Tha is a single father of two young children, from Cambodia. He described threats from Cambodian officials, including from a cabinet minister and a spokesman for the governing party.
"We know where you live," he recalled the spokesman telling him when he was in hiding in Thailand. Some time after, he saw someone standing outside filming his home.
Asked what would happen to his kids if he's deported, Tha said he hopes co-workers might care for them.
His colleague Hum just became a dad last month. In the weeks before the birth, Hum had been worrying he'd lose his job and with it, his health coverage.
When the baby arrived March 26, and Hum still had his job, he took it as a sign and named the baby Lucky.
RFA reporter Hour Hum with his son, who is an American citizen and whom he named Lucky when he was spared in the first round of layoffs at the service. (Hour Hum)
Khoa Lai of the Vietnamese service said he arrived in the U.S. months ago, hopeful that, here, he could write without fear, unlike in his home country, where he still uses a pseudonym for some reporting.
"I think it is a phase," he said of the recent moves against organizations like RFA. "I think it will pass soon. At the end of the day, I think America is still a country of freedom."
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Alexander Panetta
Alexander Panetta is a Washington-based correspondent for CBC News who has covered American politics and Canada-U.S. issues since 2013. He previously worked in Ottawa, Quebec City and internationally, reporting on politics, conflict, disaster and the Montreal Expos.
16. Tip of the Spear, Edge of the Mind: Neurotechnology’s Roles in the Future of Special Operations
A very complex report. Not the future of special operations that we are used to reading about. To illustrate how complex and in depth this report is, Dr. Gielas is working on her second PhD - focusing on SOF and emerging neurotechnologies.
The entire report can be accessed it here: https://sway.cloud.microsoft/4XOE3w1hK69Sl77q?ref=Link
Tip of the Spear, Edge of the Mind: Neurotechnology’s Roles in the Future of Special Operations
By Anna M. Gielas, PhD
JSOU Report 25-12
https://sway.cloud.microsoft/4XOE3w1hK69Sl77q?ref=Link
May 28, 2025
DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this work are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University.
This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rapid technological advancements are revolutionizing human augmentation, making cognitive and physical enhancements for military personnel not only feasible but also a priority for global superpowers such as the United States and China. As technology advances and global competition intensifies, military scholars explore ways to enhance U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) through emerging technologies such as brain-computer interfaces (BCIs). However, current debates on cognitive and physical enhancement tend to focus on mitigating perceived operator limitations, rather than exploring the full potential of both the human and the technologies.
Instead of merely compensating for weaknesses, enhancement technologies should be leveraged to amplify operator strengths. BCI technologies offer the potential to harness operators’ inherent resources, such as tacit knowledge, and unlock latent human capabilities while reinforcing the SOF ethos that humans are more important than hardware. Additionally, to fully realize the technological potential, it is important to distinguish between enhancing the operator and augmenting the mission—two closely interrelated yet distinct goals that demand tailored strategies. This dual focus is explored through a series of practical examples, illustrating the transformative and nuanced applications of emerging BCI technologies. Ultimately, these capabilities could enable more precise, adaptive, and deniable special operations within the evolving context of strategic competition and integrated deterrence.
The BCI Future Is Already Here
Imagine paralyzed individuals walking again. (1) Or operators controlling drones through thought and communicating telepathically. (2) Scientists have already demonstrated the feasibility of all three. These significant advancements are made possible by BCIs—technologies that establish a direct link between the human brain and external devices, eliminating the need for physical controls or verbal commands. (3) While BCIs are not yet mature enough for large-scale integration into the armed forces, several U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) organizations, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Army Research Laboratory, are developing these technologies. (4) Their objective is to augment warfighter capabilities in various ways—including modulating brain activity to enhance cognitive and physical performance. (5) According to the RAND Corporation, BCI technologies will become available to the U.S. military around 2030. (6)
As early adopters of new technologies and first movers, SOF must carefully evaluate how to integrate BCI technologies and assess the implications of their use.
Currently, the global race for BCI dominance is intensifying. (7) The Chinese Communist Party has made substantial investments in BCI research, aiming to position China as the world leader in these technologies by 2030. (8) Some experts suggest that China may develop and deploy reliable BCI technologies ahead of the United States and highlight the potential of these neurotechnologies to define future warfare. (9) At the same time, private companies are driving rapid innovation. In 2024 and early 2025, Synchron, in collaboration with NVIDIA, and Elon Musk’s Neuralink achieved major technological milestones, demonstrating the accelerating pace of development. (10) Musk, a vocal advocate for human-machine integration, has asserted that “humans must become cyborgs if they are to stay relevant in a future dominated by artificial intelligence.”(11) Given the transformative, geopolitical, and military significance of BCIs, it is critical to advance the discussion of the unprecedented opportunities and unique risks that these technologies present for U.S. SOF and their missions. As early adopters of new technologies and first movers, SOF must carefully evaluate how to integrate BCI technologies and assess the implications of their use. (12)
Current scholarship on SOF enhancement includes debates of BCIs, which generally fall into two distinct categories. The first approach focuses on the use of enhancement technologies to mitigate perceived human limitations. (13) This perspective views some biological and cognitive processes—such as fatigue, cognitive overload, and the need for sleep—as hindrances to optimal performance. (14) BCIs are framed as solutions, enabling operators to maintain high levels of effectiveness over extended periods. The second category of scholarly debate takes a more futuristic approach, exploring the replacement of human organs and physiological processes with advanced artificial counterparts. (15) This approach reimagines SOF as “techno-shaped, software-defined special operations assemblages.” (16) It explores replacing natural eyes with artificial ones to provide capabilities beyond human norms, such as night vision and infrared detection. (17) These two scholarly lines of thought reflect a fundamental debate: whether enhancement should be confined to countering existing human limitations or expanded to redefine the very nature of the operator. However, both perspectives largely frame enhancement as a response to what SOF lack, rather than as an opportunity to build on their existing strengths.
A Third Approach
There is a third viable approach to enhancement—one that shifts the focus from perceived human limitations to the often-overlooked strengths of the operator that could be amplified through future BCI technologies. These latent capabilities include resources, such as tacit knowledge, and well-honed skills, like fine motor control. Moreover, to fully leverage technological potential, it is helpful to distinguish between enhancing the operator and enhancing the mission—two interconnected but distinct approaches to BCI integration. Mission enhancement emphasizes the use of BCIs to bolster operational stealth, such as evading detection, and aligns with United States Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) “security through obscurity” approach in “hyper-transparent battlefields.” (18) Drawing a clear distinction between operator-focused and mission-based enhancement encourages a broader and more creative perspective on BCI-based SOF augmentation. This conceptual shift is illustrated through a series of practical examples. Ultimately, it underscores how future BCI-based applications could enhance the precision and deniability of special operations within the framework of gray-zone activities and U.S. integrated deterrence.
Continue reading at the link: https://sway.cloud.microsoft/4XOE3w1hK69Sl77q?ref=Link
17. Demobilization and Disengagement: Lessons from the Philippines
The author overlooks the earlier history going back to the 1990s (and we could also go back to the Huk Rebellion in the 1950s for lessons as well). In 1996 the Philippine government reached an agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which established the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Some important and innovative demonvaibilization and integration techniques were employed.
At the time MNLF fighters were integrated into the Armed Forces of the Philippines Army. (Army only, not Marines or other services). In addition, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) assisted with the establishment of demobilization programs such as the Arms to Farms Program and the Livelihood Enhancement and Peace (LEAP) program which helped demobilize MNLF fighters.
We should learn about the broader history of demobilization and reintegration techniques.
May 30, 2025
SHARE |
Demobilization and Disengagement: Lessons from the Philippines
https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-may-30/
AP Photo/Nickee Butlangan
Bottom Line Up Front
- The Philippines has begun to turn the corner in its fight against terrorism, making steady progress countering a range of militant groups in the country.
- Local government and local civil society organizations working in partnership have achieved tangible successes in demobilizing, disengaging, and reintegrating militants from both Islamist extremist and communist groups.
- The 2025 Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) elections will have a profound impact on determining whether demobilization and disengagement continue.
- The Daulah Islamiyah Maute Group remains a potent jihadist threat to the Philippines.
The Philippines has ranked in the top 15 countries most affected by terrorism in 11 of the last 14 years, according to the Global Terrorism Index. This has come not only from a highly fragmented Islamist extremist ecosystem that was one part insurgency and two parts small terrorist groups, but also from communist elements. The leading insurgency actors were the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The prominent Islamist extremist actors were the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and Daulah Islamiyah (DI), all of which are highly fragmented and factionalized. The main communist threat comes from the New People’s Army (NPA).
However, over the past five years, the Philippines has begun to make important strides in attenuating many of these groups. In 2019, four years of negotiations bore fruit with the passage of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) and the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), which provided greater regional autonomy to the BARMM region with its own justice system and parliament. With this move, the MILF began the process of decommissioning its armed wing, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF). According to the Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process, as of May 2023, some 26,132 fighters from the BIAF have been decommissioned. An additional 13,868 are scheduled for decommissioning in 2025.
Surrenders from the smaller extremist groups have proceeded at a steady pace since 2018. According to researcher Kenneth Yao Yoren, between 2018 and 2023, 1,866 combatants from the BIFF, ASG, and Daulah Islamiyah Maute Group (DIMG) surrendered. The governor of Sulu, Abdusakur Tan, declared the island free of the Abu Sayyaf Group, following the surrender of 966 members in September 2023. The island of Basilan was declared ASG-free in December 2024, when the last ASG members surrendered. Finally, in the first three months of 2025, 57 members of the BIFF also surrendered to the army. One can no longer speak of the Philippines as the Islamic State’s “East Asia Wilayah” in any functional capacity; even the Daulah Islamiyah factions no longer collaborate together.
The Philippines has achieved tangible results by rejecting a policy of search and destroy in favor of a holistic approach that combines kinetic and soft elements to incentivize demobilization and reintegration. The government’s response to the 2017 takeover of Marawi City by a coalition of pro-Islamic State (ISIS) groups, which resulted in the killing of some 800 ISIS-aligned fighters, prompted defections. In the aftermath of the Marawi siege, the Philippine armed forces launched a highly targeted campaign to kill the leaders of Daulah Islamiyah, including Abu Dar and Abu Zakariah, as well as Abu Sayyaf Group leaders like Hajan and Salahuddin Sawadjaan. The Philippine army also attacked Abu Sayyaf Group strongholds. These actions disrupted terrorist group standard operating procedures, forcing them on the run and into hiding. It created the conditions for the groups to think demobilization.
However, the kinetic response would have likely failed, had it not been paired with initiatives to encourage social reintegration. Here, local governments and local civil society organizations have played a key role. According to Nurhati Tangging and Kenneth Yeo, there have been several notable governmental and civil society initiatives on the island of Basilan in particular. For example, the Program Against Violent Extremism (PAVE) offered those who were willing to defect from the ASG, first on Basilan and later on Sulu, with an alternative path, including counseling, housing, vocational training, and food assistance. According to the Institute for the Policy Analysis of Conflict, more than 200 members of the Abu Sayyaf Group surrendered to the Philippine Army in the first two years of PAVE, with 139 doing so in the first batch.
Also on Basilan, the initiative Advancing and Sustaining Gains of Good Governance (AS2G CARE) adeptly provided returnees with counseling and professional development opportunities. Another such program, Balay Mindanaw, taught literacy and elementary education to young returnees who lacked formal education and provided scholarships for them to pursue high school education. On the island of Sulu, Tumikang Sama Sama worked to resolve clan wars through shuttle diplomacy, shutting off a key feeder mechanism to extremist groups and enabling families who had joined due to clan wars to consider disengaging. The Institute for the Policy Analysis of Conflict asserts that PAVE, and subsequent reintegration programs, likely prevented a resurgence of violence by the Abu Sayyaf.
There has also been progress in demobilizing communist militants. According to the International Crisis Group, in villages where the NPA is present, there is a similar holistic approach to that of the BARMM. On the kinetic side, the Philippine army has been clearing militants from the villages. On the “soft” side, they not only provide services and skills training to encourage combatants to demobilize, but they also seek to win hearts and minds through investments in the villages. In those villages where local government actors — particularly mayors — show due dedication, these programs have borne fruit.
While much has been accomplished over the past seven years, terrorism remains a threat in the Philippines. According to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index, there were 22 attacks in the last year alone. These were small in scale but lethal, resulting in the deaths of some 31 persons. Daulah Islamiyah Maute Group(DIMG) remains arguably the most resilient of the terrorist groups in operation. It is responsible for the worst attack in Marawi since the siege in December 2023, when two DIMG members bombed a Catholic mass at Mindanao State University. Daulah Islamiyah factions continue to launch small scale attacks and are making use of social media to recruit new members.
According to Jovanie Espasor, the province of Lanao del Sur, where Marawi is located, would benefit from its own robust holistic reintegration program targeting DIMG members, perhaps modeled on the successes of the Basilan programs, but taking into account the specific traumas of the Marawi siege. To that end, they would need to identify the right local actors — from civil society organizations to trauma psychologists to clinicians to formers — to develop such a program, select the appropriate participants, conduct the appropriate needs assessments, and implement the initiative.
One cannot overstate the significance of the establishment of the BARMM for extremist group demobilization. If Moro grievances are finally being seen and heard, why continue to fight? If the October 2025 elections are free and fair, this will provide further credibility to the forces encouraging demobilization and validate the argument that Bangsamoro people, irrespective of clan, can seek redress of their grievances through formal politics, as opposed to the barrel of a gun.
Julie Chernov Hwang is a Senior Research Fellow at the Soufan Center, an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Goucher College and a Harry Frank Guggenheim Distinguished Scholar.
18. Massacres, Looting, and Guerrilla War: A Partisan’s Story of Russia’s Invasion Part 1
Long live the resistance (until Ukraine is free).
Excerpts:
Then I told my comrades, this is no longer banditry. It’s an occupation. I said, I’ve bought weapons, let’s do something. Most of us had served in the Soviet or Ukrainian army, but we had no combat experience. No one had killed before.
Did they agree?
It was very difficult. My comrades said – this was illegal under the Criminal Code. Only in 2022 did they amend it to allow for the killing of occupiers in self-defense. They said – what if the Ukrainian government returns? You’re proposing to blow up bridges used by Russians. That’s state property. We’ll be arrested. I replied – but what should we do? They’re killing civilians, raping women. Should we just wait to be next?
And so we dared to carry out our first action.
Putin said, “We’re not there.” But the Russian army hid behind local proxies, concealed tanks and APCs in towns. Near our city, in a ravine, they had a whole camp.
This is our land. Since childhood, we knew every river, every pond. We took rifles and went to their camp at night. We crept in close – we knew the terrain. We just started shooting at the camp. Some emptied one magazine, others two. Then we pulled back.
That’s how our partisan movement began.
Massacres, Looting, and Guerrilla War: A Partisan’s Story of Russia’s Invasion Part 1
kyivpost.com · by Sergii Kostezh · May 31, 2025
Volodymyr Zhemchuhov is an extraordinary individual: A miner and later a businessman who worked for a long time in the Caucasus countries, who never imagined he would become one of the main saboteurs in his native Donbas.
But in 2014, after the Russians occupied his hometown in the Luhansk region, he managed to organize a network of saboteurs and demolitionists consisting of several dozen people. They carried out dozens of bombings on roads and railways, several assassination attempts on terrorist leaders – with some operations not only planned by him but also executed personally. During the last one, he lost his hands and was captured by Russian forces.
JOIN US ON TELEGRAM
Follow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official.
How did he manage it? Why did he end up captured by the enemy, and what is the state of the partisan movement today?
About eleven years ago, the hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation in Donbas began – after the annexation of Crimea. You remember well how it happened. Tell us, what was it like?
Since 2007, I had been living and working in Georgia.
I went to Tbilisi and opened a private company there. I was a leader in the supply of packaging, bottles, and caps for beverages across the Transcaucasus region. I came to Luhansk just for Easter to visit relatives.
It was April 2014. I met a friend at Donetsk airport, brought him home to the city of Krasny Luch, and on the way, we passed an intersection on the Kharkiv-Rostov-Luhansk-Donetsk highway.
Other Topics of Interest
The Russian government has proposed resuming negotiations on a ceasefire in Istanbul on Monday and said it will set out its terms in a memorandum.
Krasny Luch in 2013, Photo by Wikipedia.I saw barricades made of tires. I asked my friend, “What is that?” He waved it off – said, “It’s just local pro-Russians gathering.”
We were also ethnic Russians by surname, and we even laughed. I was born and raised in Luhansk region. I don’t remember anyone ever being bullied for speaking Russian. I remember from childhood, from school, that kids who spoke Ukrainian – those were the ones laughed at.
But as for the humiliation of Russian speakers – I remember no such thing.
So, I approached those people and asked – “Who are you? What do you want? What are your demands?”
At first, they were very frightened.
Pro-Russian separatists sit beside the destroyed Savur Mohyla World War II memorial in Snizhne, some 80km east of Donetsk, on October 15, 2014.(Photo by DOMINIQUE FAGET / AFP PHOTO)Who were those people? Workers?
I had worked in Krasny Luch at several enterprises until 2007, including as a manager.
Krasny Luch has a population of one hundred thousand. I knew many people there, and I recognized some of those I saw.
Some were from a social layer of alcoholics and unskilled laborers – people who could be hired to dig a garden or haul trash, paid in cash at the end of the day. I saw those people there.
They said, “We have no demands.” The mayor of Krasny Luch, Filippova, hired us. We don’t do anything – we just sit here and act as a crowd. At the end of each day, they bring us money, food, vodka. It’s great. A cool job.”
Then I understood – this would be just like Crimea, Abkhazia, Ossetia – the same scenario… Where they couldn’t find enough people to sit at barricades, the rates went up to $50.
If you sat at a checkpoint for twenty-four hours – $50. For these people, $50 a day was fantastic money.
So, the support for pro-Russian movements in Luhansk region… it wasn’t really grassroots?
All for money. Enterprise managers forced their workers to go out to these events and form crowds.
Among the population – no more than twenty percent supported Russia. And of those, most were in it for the money. Ideological supporters? Maybe one, two, at most eight or nine percent.
Another twenty percent actively supported Ukraine. The remaining sixty percent – that was an amorphous mass, the general population. They were just observing.
An important point to clarify. Around Krasnodon and Sverdlovsk, there really was a “hole” on the border. It had existed since the 1990s.
Quiet during the day, but at night it was like Moscow’s ring road in the opposite direction. Back then, small trucks from Russia brought in flour, sea fish, etc., and from Ukraine – sugar, non-ferrous metals.
Through that same hole in spring 2014, weapons were brought in, and a general of the so-called Don Cossack Host, Kozitsyn, entered with his people and captured the city of Antratsyt.
They took power. There were no military units in Luhansk region. The nearest unit was in Donetsk region, in Kramatorsk. So cities were guarded only by police.
Half of the police switched to the Russian side for money, and half just stepped aside. Russians entered cities in small detachments – seventy to ninety armed men – and captured police stations first, where weapons and potential resistance were located.
After that, they did whatever they wanted.
How did people react?
People were scared by the weapons.
Then the terror began. Bodies were found outside cities – hands tied behind their backs with tape, gunshot wounds to the head. It frightened people.
Now I know what 1937 looked like – Stalin’s time.
No one was touched during the day, but at night they came after 2 a.m. A convoy would arrive, break down doors, torture, rob, rape wives, demand cooperation.
If someone refused to cooperate with the Russians, they were taken outside the city – often to old silage pits – and executed.
They were mostly businessmen?
Not just businessmen. Police officers, Ukrainian government employees, local deputies [council members] – people with social influence, supported by the population.
You had no combat experience. How did you decide to start a partisan struggle in that atmosphere?
Where did you get weapons? Where did you find people to work with you?
It started in the spring. I knew it would be like Abkhazia, then Karabakh, Moldova, Crimea.
I took my family to Georgia and returned alone.
At that time, we weren’t thinking about a partisan movement – just self-defense. We united for that. Some had hunting rifles, others different weapons.
In 2004, I supported the Orange Revolution. There were already local groups, people I knew in Krasnodon, Rovenky, Lutuhyne, Luhansk. The same people who supported Ukraine in 2004 began uniting now.
Still, the question of weapons is relevant. What was happening in the city at that time?
When the Russians came, they started looting. The “Russian Myr” [a word meaning world and, ironically, peace – Ed.] began with looting. ATMs, banks, cars, businesses. They looted all of May and June. By July, there was nothing left.
Then the Russians, pro-Russian locals, and local “Cossacks” started selling weapons because they ran out of money.
Cossacks – Russian or local?
Local alcoholics. They were given weapons and ammunition without any control. In the summer, they started selling them.
A Kalashnikov rifle cost $200, a Kalashnikov machine gun $300, a grenade $50, a Makarov pistol $700 – because everyone wanted one. Ammo was $1 per round. I bought weapons with my own money to arm my comrades.
How did they not figure out who was buying weapons?
We didn’t buy in large quantities. There weren’t many of us.
We had already divided into partisans and the underground.
Partisans were those who decided to start armed resistance. In Krasnodon – two people, in Rovenky – three people, Sverdlovsk – four, Antratsyt – five, Krasny Luch – four, Lutuhyne – two, Luhansk – three, Snizhne – four.
That’s already a few dozen people.
For a region – not many. But the underground included thousands – people tracking Russian movements, making patriotic graffiti, collecting data on collaborators and Russian positions.
How did you coordinate – mobile communication? It was being cut off, and you could be monitored…
It still worked then. Mobile networks disappeared in summer. Internet still worked. Russians weren’t prepared for local partisan resistance. We used open lines and Viber.
No counter-sabotage operations until 2016 – that’s when the first of our partisans, after me, was caught.
What was your first partisan operation?
It happened at the end of August. On August 24, 2014, the full-scale invasion began. Putin sent in regular troops to support Cossack battalions. The Russian army entered Luhansk and Donetsk regions. They defeated our army near Ilovaisk and Luhansk airport. Our army retreated, and only the Minsk agreements stopped the Russians.
Situation in eastern Ukraine in August 2014, just before the Russian invasion. Krasny Luch pointed by orange. Photo by MediaRNBO.On August 23–24, the Zhytomyr brigade was retreating from Savur-Mohyla through Snizhne and Krasny Luch. As Ukrainian tanks moved, Cossacks and locals fled their checkpoints. There was no authority in the city for a whole day.
Then on August 24, a Russian tank column entered Antratsyt – the Ryazan Airborne Division, Chechen and Dagestani battalions. Contract soldiers. They fought the Zhytomyr brigade, which resisted, but the Russians were too many.
After the battle, I went to the outskirts of Krasny Luch, near Miusynsk. I saw burned Ukrainian APCs, dead soldiers, and the Ryazan division torturing the wounded. That pushed me to resist. These Kadyrovites [members of Chechen squad named after Kadyrov – the head of occupied Chechen republic in Russia] – they liked filming everything on smartphones, they already had them. One posed with his foot on a dead Ukrainian soldier, raising his rifle for a photo. I couldn’t stand it. I told him, “What are you doing? He’s already dead. Where are you from so wild? Do you have a mother? You’re monsters!”. Civilians were around, so he seemed to be ashamed and walked away.
Then I told my comrades, this is no longer banditry. It’s an occupation. I said, I’ve bought weapons, let’s do something. Most of us had served in the Soviet or Ukrainian army, but we had no combat experience. No one had killed before.
Situation in eastern Ukraine in winter 2014, after the Russian invasion. Photo by mediaRNBODid they agree?
It was very difficult. My comrades said – this was illegal under the Criminal Code. Only in 2022 did they amend it to allow for the killing of occupiers in self-defense. They said – what if the Ukrainian government returns? You’re proposing to blow up bridges used by Russians. That’s state property. We’ll be arrested. I replied – but what should we do? They’re killing civilians, raping women. Should we just wait to be next?
And so we dared to carry out our first action.
Putin said, “We’re not there.” But the Russian army hid behind local proxies, concealed tanks and APCs in towns. Near our city, in a ravine, they had a whole camp.
This is our land. Since childhood, we knew every river, every pond. We took rifles and went to their camp at night. We crept in close – we knew the terrain. We just started shooting at the camp. Some emptied one magazine, others two. Then we pulled back.
That’s how our partisan movement began.
kyivpost.com · by Sergii Kostezh · May 31, 2025
19. How Dismantling the US Millennium Challenge Corporation Will Undermine Mongolia
I will be traveling to Mongolia with some colleagues later next month (June). I will ask my Mongolian friends for insights on this. This could harm Mongolia's "third neighbor policy" and efforts.
How Dismantling the US Millennium Challenge Corporation Will Undermine Mongolia
Shutting down development agencies such as the MCC will force Mongolia to rely more on Russia and China for funding.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/how-dismantling-the-us-millennium-challenge-corporation-will-undermine-mongolia/
By Monica Weller
May 29, 2025
President of Mongolia Khurelsukh Ukhnaa (center right), Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Acting Vice President of Compact Operations Cameron Alford (second from left), and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink (center left) break ground on a water recycling plant – the first of its kind in Mongolia.
Credit: Millennium Challenge Corporation
While the United States has previously served as Mongolia’s “north star” guiding the country symbolically toward democracy, the future of U.S. support remains uncertain. The dismantlement of U.S. development agencies undermines Mongolia’s ability to strive for good governance, build durable infrastructure for Mongolians, and align itself with democratic partners.
In the past seven years, U.S. assistance to Mongolia has remained fairly consistent, with approximately $13.25 million requested in the fiscal year 2025 foreign operations budget. One of the largest current direct U.S. investments into Mongolia is the five-year, $350 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact to provide clean, sustainable water infrastructure for Ulaanbaatar. But this too is on the verge of being cut in the midst of the Trump administration’s dismemberment of U.S. development aid.
The MCC is an independent government agency established in 2004 under the Bush administration. The MCC provided targeted investments in developing countries through five-year “compacts” intended to promote economic growth, reduce poverty, and strengthen government institutions. Its model is based on local oversight and implementation, and all compacts are implemented with a team of local employees with just a few U.S.-based staff. The MCC has provided more than $17 billion in grants, and is one of the best-regarded U.S. development agencies in terms of its transparent finances and long-term effectiveness.
The Mongolia Water Compact with the MCC was signed in 2018 and entered into force in March 2021. In addition to the $350 million grant provided by the U.S. government, the government of Mongolia promised to contribute up to $111.8 million to support the investment, one of the largest partner country contributions in the MCC’s history. All told, then, the project would invest a total of $461.8 million into Ulaanbaatar’s water supply. This is a critical, necessary investment in Mongolia’s infrastructure given that the capital city has nearly tripled in size in less than three decades and demand for water will likely exceed supply.
The MCC compact intended to increase Ulaanbaatar’s water supply by 80 percent through three key investment activities: constructing new groundwater wells with an advanced water purification plant; wastewater recycling to increase the quantity of freshwater available for household consumption; and a focus on water sector sustainability via policy reforms, capacity building, and technical assistance. All of these steps will ultimately improve access to and the quality of Ulaanbaatar’s long-term water supply – if the contract is upheld.
While there were initial concerns that the MCC would be dismantled alongside the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in late January, it was originally allowed to continue its work, albeit under tense circumstances amid sharp cuts demanded by the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE, which despite its name is not an official government department). During a meeting on April 19, however, MCC staff were told by DOGE staff members that all of the agency’s programs would be immediately terminated and staff numbers minimized.
Amid the rapid closures, several programs were given extensions to wrap up in-country programming. The Mongolia Water Compact was allowed three months to end programming. However, this means that the compact would end in July 2025, well short of its intended end date in March 2026. According to the MCC’s website, nearly $215 million of the $350 million grant has already been spent.
Mongolian government officials at the Embassy of Mongolia in the United States said that “if the project is not completed by the U.S., the Mongolian government will not have enough funds to complete the project on their own and will need to seek out other partners.”
Given the limitations and pressures on many donor governments – including Japan, South Korea, and the European Union – to cut back on development funding, the Mongolian officials implied that they would feel pressured to reach out to China or Russia for additional financial assistance to complete the project.
Mongolia’s history with the MCC has not always been smooth. The first MCC compact, a five-year $285 million investment, was a mixed affair. It was signed between the U.S. and Mongolia in 2007, with a stated focus on reducing poverty and promoting sustainable growth through four projects. The largest of these projects was intended to be a $188 million rail project to upgrade Mongolia’s only north-south railway.
However, according to Dr. Alicia Campi in her book “Mongolia’s Foreign Policy,” a lack of coordination with Russian officials on the board of the Ulaanbaatar Railway resulted in the veto of the rail project two years after the compact had been signed, leaving MCC staff scrambling to reorganize the contents of the compact. While the compact was ultimately completed within its five-year framework in 2013, with estimated benefits to over 2 million Mongolians over the course of 20 years (according to its Closed Compact Report), the intended impacts of advancing Mongolia-U.S. business ties and investments did not transpire in the way envisioned by the compact.
Mongolia is already struggling to uphold its governance standards amid a series of public protests against ongoing corruption by government leadership, as covered by The Diplomat. According to an MCC employee covering the Water Compact, “Mongolia has not successfully passed the MCC’s corruption indicator for the past three years on the project.” Despite these governance failures, the MCC was committed to finalizing the project and Mongolia maintained an overall passing scorecard, allowing it to continue work on the compact.
While the general Mongolian public is not familiar with the Millennium Challenge Corporation or its work, projects like the Water Compact have an indelible impact on the quality of life for Mongolians. By investing in the future of Ulaanbaatar, the city at the heart of Mongolia will increase its potential to expand and grow, creating greater opportunities for the entire country. Shutting down development agencies such as the MCC will instead undermine Mongolian relations with the U.S. as a whole, driving Mongolia closer to Russia and China if further “third neighbor” support fails to materialize. We’ve seen this in the case of Nepal, which also had a much-needed MCC compact scrapped amid the DOGE cuts.
However, Mongolian Embassy officials were surprisingly hopeful about the future of the Mongolia Water Compact, noting that they “were in talks with counterparts” at the U.S. Department of State to complete the compact, although U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio “has the last word.”
In his own words during a recent Senate Appropriations Committee hearing on the fiscal year 26 Department of State budget request, Rubio testified that the Millennium Challenge grant is “outside my direct control of purview…and there will be efforts at reform…and potentially even expansion in one of them, although that won’t be my decision solely.”
There are some reassuring developments. As of this writing, the MCC website continues to be functional with all content present, unlike USAID’s website, and a procurement notice for a reclaimed wastewater consultant for MCC’s Mongolia Water Compact was released on May 16 – although that too could be terminated at any moment. Given the intense back and forth on development aid under the Trump administration, any agency working in this space is at risk, and Mongolia is certainly not the only country to be cut off from promised U.S. investments.
Authors
Guest Author
Monica Weller
Monica Weller is a program officer for U.S. Policy and Government Affairs, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The views and opinions expressed in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of any entities they represent.
20. Foreign Influence in the Arctic: The “Great Game” in the Arctic and how FMI Promote Conflict within NATO
We are not sufficiently focusing on the Arctic. There is really no area of the world that we can afford to neglect but as I look at the geography and what is happening the Arctic for the potential for economic development and trade I think we are creating strategic vulnerability by ceding to the influence of malign actors (China and Russia).
From an interesting organization here: https://edgetheory.com/resources/foreign-influence-in-the-arctic
The entire 18 page report can be downloaded here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UryDcZL2Ky4kJ7HSuzB1vx1JO20vEGzN/view?usp=sharing
Foreign Influence in the Arctic
The “Great Game” in the Arctic and how FMI Promote Conflict within NATO
Geopolitical competition in the Arctic is accelerating, raising sharp risks for industries with interests in the region. Energy, shipping, technology, and financial sectors face growing exposure as military tensions, regulatory uncertainty, environmental scrutiny, and reputational threats intensify. Russia and China are advancing coordinated influence operations to portray Western involvement as aggressive, destabilizing, and hypocritical. These narratives, driven by Foreign Malign Influencers (FMI), aim to fracture NATO unity, weaken Western legitimacy, and pull global opinion toward Russian and Chinese objectives. By amplifying themes such as environmental protection, indigenous sovereignty, and economic partnership, FMI crafts a distorted counter-narrative to Western-Arctic engagement.
EdgeTheory’s narrative intelligence platform delivers a critical advantage against these coordinated operations. In its latest analysis, EdgeTheory identifies how Russian and Chinese state-linked sources use misinformation to shape global perceptions and accelerate geopolitical fragmentation. These insights emerged from thousands of media data points across social and traditional channels. Through advanced real-time narrative tracking, the platform surfaced four dominant themes: sovereignty disputes, environmental accusations, military tensions, and economic opportunism. By equipping leaders with early visibility into emerging influence patterns, EdgeTheory enables businesses and policymakers to anticipate operational risks and respond to disinformation with precision. This capability positions EdgeTheory as a vital asset
for defending strategic interests in contested regions like the Arctic.
Introduction
The evolving narrative landscape surrounding the Arctic has widespread impacts across a range of industries, risking multinational security interests and military confrontations. Energy companies are confronting both operational and reputational challenges as discussions about Arctic drilling, sanctions, and environmental concerns intensify. In shipping and logistics, the emergence of the Northern Sea Route introduces new opportunities alongside amplified risks tied to shifting regulations and insurance uncertainties driven by evolving geopolitical posturing. Technology and infrastructure initiatives in the region are under increasing scrutiny for their security and environmental implications, especially amid growing Russian and Chinese involvement. Even financial services are affected, as investors and insurers must carefully evaluate their exposure to geopolitical and reputational risks that can influence asset values and underwriting decisions. Together, these interconnected pressures risk undermining both business investments and political efforts in the Arctic region.
By tracking narrative items published by foreign Malign Influencers (FMI) discussing the Arctic, EdgeTheory identified a distinct Russian strategy to promote national interests in the Arctic region by sowing discord between NATO allies while promoting supposed Russian attempts to create peaceful resolutions. Chinese sources are also involved, particularly regarding strategic posturing of political connections and economic agreements to boost entrenchment in critical regions such as Greenland.
If these coordinated attempts go unaddressed, decision-makers, politicians, and business executives risk losing public support, being pushed out of strategic markets, or expending excess capital on risky ventures. Narrative Intelligence (NARINT) reveals the tactics behind influence and propaganda campaigns, identifying the primary risks posed by foreign actors in rapidly evolving geopolitical landscapes.
Key Judgements
1. Escalating Geopolitical Narratives
Foreign Malign Influencers (FMIs) are amplifying claims of US and NATO encroachment in the Arctic, framing Western actions as threats to Russian sovereignty and regional stability. This narrative risks fueling regulatory and operational uncertainty for companies with Arctic supply chain exposure
2. Resource Security and Infrastructure Risks
FMI narratives highlight the Arctic’s resource wealth and the strategic importance of the Northern Sea Route, signaling potential supply chain disruptions from increased militarization or sanctions targeting energy, shipping, and critical minerals.
3. Reputational Threats via Environmental and Sovereignty Claims
Amplified stories accuse Western actors of environmental hypocrisy and disrespect for indigenous and national sovereignty, raising the risk of activist-driven reputational
attacks on companies operating or sourcing from the region.
4. Early Warnings for Irregular Warfare
The geospatial spread of narratives—from Moscow to global media hubs like Copenhagen, Washington DC, and Beijing—demonstrates how quickly risk signals can
shift, requiring proactive monitoring to avoid operational surprises.
21. Trump administration to prioritize ‘patriotic Americans’ for federal jobs
There is a single definition for a "patriotic American:" Those who will take the oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. A deeper definition could be those who were/are willing to sign a blank check to give their lives for their country. But the former is the only criteria and is the fundamental definition of a patriotic American and there can be no other vetting standard. To use any other standard would be well... "un-American."
Trump administration to prioritize ‘patriotic Americans’ for federal jobs
By Robin Bravender
05/30/2025 05:20 PM EDT
Politico
Applicants for government jobs will be required to write essays explaining how they will advance President Donald Trump’s policy priorities.
President Donald Trump takes part in a press conference in the Oval Office at the White House on Friday. | Francis Chung/POLITICO
By Robin Bravender
05/30/2025 05:20 PM EDT
As President Donald Trump moves to slash the size of the federal workforce, his administration unveiled a plan to ensure that any new hires are “patriotic Americans” who vow to advance the president’s policy priorities.
The White House and the agency that serves as the government’s human resources arm Thursday released directives for departments to use when recruiting employees in a memo that represents a dramatic shift in federal hiring procedures.
The administration’s “merit hiring plan” comes after Trump ordered a revamp to the federal hiring process on his first day in office. The resulting plan issued this week says it aims to ensure that “only the most talented, capable and patriotic Americans” are hired by the government.
The “overly complex Federal hiring system overemphasized discriminatory ‘equity’ quotas and too often resulted in the hiring of unfit, unskilled bureaucrats,” says the memo authored by Vince Haley, assistant to the president for domestic policy, and Charles Ezell, the acting director of the Office of Personnel Management.
Trump and his allies have railed against civil servants, accusing them of working to undermine the president’s policy priorities. The new hiring plan will require job applicants to write short essays describing how they plan to advance Trump’s priorities.
Under the plan, all federal job vacancy announcements starting at the GS-5 pay grade or above will require short essay responses to questions about their commitment to the Constitution, how they plan to improve government efficiency, how they plan to advance Trump’s executive orders and policy priorities, and about their work ethic.
Critics called the requirements a loyalty test for the administration, while saying they could make future recruiting even harder.
“I think it’s foolish,” said Paul Light, professor emeritus of public service at New York University. “It’s hard enough to get talent these days.” Putting additional hurdles in the way of recruiting for government jobs at this point “ain’t a good thing,” he said.
It’s important to hire federal workers based on their skills, said Jenny Mattingley, vice president of government affairs at the Partnership for Public Service. But “asking every federal applicant to demonstrate work toward presidential policy priorities should not be part of the criteria.”
“Many federal employees are air traffic controllers, national park rangers, food safety inspectors and firefighters who carry out the missions of agencies that are authorized by Congress,” she said. “These public servants, who deliver services directly to the public, should not be forced to answer politicized questions that fail to evaluate the skills they need to do their jobs effectively.”
The Trump plan also says it aims to limit the government’s focus on recruiting from “elite universities.”
The memo says hiring has focused too much on “elite universities and credentials” and says it will target new recruits from “state and land-grant universities, religious colleges and universities, community colleges, high schools, trade and technical schools, homeschooling groups, faith-based groups, American Legion, 4-H youth programs, and the military, veterans, and law enforcement communities.”
The administration also bars agency heads from using racial quotas and preferences in federal hiring, recruitment and promotion.
The memo directs agencies to “cease using statistics on race, sex, ethnicity or national origin, or the broader concept of ‘underrepresentation’ of certain groups” in decisions about hiring or promotions. It orders agencies to stop disseminating information about the composition of agencies’ workers based on their race, sex, color, religion or national origin.
The hiring plan also aims to speed up the federal hiring process in response to Trump’s order directing governmentwide hiring to be reduced to under 80 days.
Hiring senior executives
Also on Thursday, the administration issued a memo detailing hiring and talent development plans for leaders within the federal government’s career employee ranks known as the Senior Executive Service, or SES.
Trump issued a memo on the first day of his administration saying that because those officials “wield significant governmental authority, they must serve at the pleasure of the President.”
The new hiring memo criticizes SES hiring as a “broken, insular” process that has “resulted in the hiring of executives who engage in unauthorized disclosure of Executive Branch deliberations, violate the constitutional rights of Americans, refuse to implement policy priorities, or perform their duties inefficiently or negligently.”
Previous qualifications for SES hiring “included unlawful ‘diversity, equity and inclusion’ (DEI) criteria for hiring Federal executives,” the memo says. The administration says it’s eliminating DEI factors in hiring for the service, and will focus on candidates’ efficiency, merit and competence, ability to lead, and ability to achieve results.
To build a pipeline of potential executive leaders, the memo says, OPM will provide an 80-hour intensive “fee-based aspiring executive development program” that’s “grounded in the Constitution, laws, and Founding ideals of our government, and will provide training on President Trump’s Executive Orders.”
That program is “designed to equip aspiring leaders with the skills, knowledge, technical expertise, and strategic mindset necessary to excel in senior leadership roles,” the memo says.
Politico
22. Pentagon to cut ties with contracts that outsource work
Pentagon to cut ties with contracts that outsource work
Stars and Stripes · by Caitlyn Burchett · May 28, 2025
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth speaks during a meeting at the Pentagon on May 27, 2025. (Defense Department)
WASHINGTON — The Pentagon is working to cut ties with outsourced contracts with the intention of redistributing funds to service members’ needs, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced Wednesday.
“We are committed to reducing bloated bureaucracy and wasteful spending in favor of increased lethality. That is a tradeoff I will take every single day — converting consultants into combat power,” Hegseth said in a pre-recorded video posted to his official X account.
In conjunction with the video, the Pentagon released three memos outlining a requirement to justify outsourcing jobs that could be done by existing civilian workers, as well as the consolidation of the department’s acquisition and sustainment office.
Specifically, outsourced information technology consulting and management services will not be approved unless the Defense Department determines the contracted work cannot be done within the department. Similarly, advisory and assistance services that provide subject matter experts, policy development and organizational assessments, must be done in-house.
“While we rely on our vital industrial base to deliver cutting-edge technology and support, we must in-source more expertise and harness the unparalleled talent of our existing experts to drive financial efficiency and operational strength. We will become lean and mean, eliminating wasteful practices and reallocating resources to fortify our strategic edge,” Hegseth wrote in one memo.
Hegseth touted $10 billion in savings has already been identified, including a $1 billion “managing consultant contract” for the Air Force.
“These are consultants — not frontline fighters. They are giving us PowerPoints that we need less of,” Hegseth said. “We need more actual application.”
Steven Feinberg, the deputy defense secretary, will work with each of the services to review consulting contracts, according to the memos. Feinberg and the services will work with Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency. The DOGE team will also have access to all unclassified contracts, according to one memo.
The Pentagon has not detailed a full list of the cost-savings identified, but previously said the department was cutting a human resources software development program that had run $280 million over budget, $30 million for unused information technology licenses, and $360 million in grants for emissions, diversity and artificial intelligence programs.
The funding, Hegseth said Wednesday, will be reinvested into “mission-related programs for our warfighters and their families.”
Hegseth’s first four months leading the department have been focused on the services’ capabilities and recruiting numbers, with little mention of longstanding quality-of-life issues that service members face, including derelict barracks and limited access to food. But the Pentagon this week began shifting its attention to some of those issues, such as the permanent change of station process and what homeschool resources are available to military families.
Reducing the frequency of permanent change of station moves, which the Pentagon has identified as a source of angst among military spouses, will potentially save $2.5 billion per year.
Caitlyn Burchett
Caitlyn Burchett
Caitlyn Burchett covers defense news at the Pentagon. Before joining Stars and Stripes, she was the military reporter for The Virginian-Pilot in Norfolk, Va. She is based in Washington, D.C.
Stars and Stripes · by Caitlyn Burchett · May 28, 2025
23. Is the NSC Dead? Trump guts the Biden administration’s most powerful foreign-policy advisory body.
Was it only the Biden Administration's most powerful foreign policy advisory body? Didn't other presidents have one too?
Is the NSC Dead?
Trump guts the Biden administration’s most powerful foreign-policy advisory body.
By Rishi Iyengar, a reporter at Foreign Policy, and John Haltiwanger, a reporter at Foreign Policy.
Foreign Policy · by Rishi Iyengar, John Haltiwanger
May 29, 2025, 6:07 PM
Welcome back to Foreign Policy’s SitRep.
Here’s what’s on tap for the day: Trump fires much of the National Security Council, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may be ready to accept a U.S. cease-fire proposal, and U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance embraces bitcoin.
(Yet Another) Friday Night Massacre
Even with the level of personnel turnover we have come to expect from U.S. President Donald Trump across his two administrations, last week’s cuts to his National Security Council (NSC) were staggering in their scale and scope.
As NSC staffers prepared to head into the long Memorial Day holiday weekend on Friday afternoon, more than 100 of them reportedly received an email from the council’s chief of staff, Brian McCormack, saying they would not need to return and giving them 30 minutes to clear out their desks.
Key individuals ousted include those charged with overseeing the council’s work on the Middle East and Europe, as well as over a dozen staffers who worked on China.
This isn’t the first NSC shake-up of Trump’s administration, either. His chosen national security advisor, Mike Waltz, was abruptly reassigned to the United Nations earlier this month following the “Signalgate” fiasco—replaced by Secretary of State Marco Rubio in a double role—and around half a dozen NSC staffers were reportedly fired or reassigned back in early April.
Trump’s shrinking NSC presents a sharp contrast to the body’s outsized power under his predecessor, former President Joe Biden, whose national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, was one of the administration’s most prominent officials and drove many of its foreign-policy priorities.
Why the purge? The White House says that reducing the NSC’s size will help “facilitate more streamlined processes.”
The changes reflect Trump’s decision-making style, which is “apparently more informal,” Michael Allen, a former NSC official in the George W. Bush administration, told SitRep.
“[Trump] likes making decisions. Most of the time we hear of fewer NSC options and papers rising to the top, and more directives given from the top down,” Allen said. “Trump knows what he wants to do. He’s looking for the people at the National Security Council to implement what he wants.”
Trump also oversaw a significant reduction of the NSC back in 2020, toward the end of his first term in office, with then-National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien slashing the council’s staff to less than half of what it was under President Barack Obama. Trump ultimately went through four national security advisors during his first term.
“There’s actually a lot of continuity with these moves with the first Trump term,” Jonathan Guyer, program director of the Institute for Global Affairs (IGA), a New York-based think tank, told SitRep, citing Trump’s preference for conducting foreign policy through individual envoys such as his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, in his first term and his Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, in his current term. “He has this kind of kitchen cabinet of advisors,” Guyer added. (The IGA published a tracker for Trump’s NSC staff last week that Guyer said has almost immediately become a “historical artifact.”)
Potential problems. For decades, the NSC has been the nerve center for shaping U.S. foreign policy—serving as a conduit between the White House and federal agencies while advising the president on pivotal security and diplomacy issues.
The NSC has two primary functions, said Allen, which are to “staff the president, to have his personal national security advisors in the building” and to “coordinate the interagency on issues that the president cares about.”
The influence of the NSC—and the national security advisor, for that matter—has varied from president to president. Trump has every right to shape it as he sees fit.
But critics of Trump’s approach say he’s depriving himself of a crucial tool and dangerously disregarding expertise at a time when Washington is contending with a range of global crises and complicated issues: the war in Ukraine, the war in Gaza, and nuclear negotiations with Iran, to name a few.
Though the White House contends that a smaller NSC will mean fewer cooks in the kitchen, the Trump administration may come to find that it’s difficult to swiftly coordinate on pressing issues with far less staff on hand.
The size of the NSC staff “definitely needed to be lower” than it was under the Obama and Biden administrations, said Allen. If the staff is “too big, it usurps the departments and the agencies,” Allen said, but if it’s too small then there’s “arguably less coordination and less expertise at the top.” This is a “trade-off” that every administration has to figure out for itself, he said.
Let’s Get Personnel
The NSC isn’t the only agency facing a purge of senior staffers under Trump. Three of the top six division heads of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) will depart the agency by the end of this month, according to an internal memo first reported by the Washington Post. Several heads of the agency’s regional offices will also leave, the memo said, along with its heads of finance, strategy, human resources, and contracting.
CISA has long been tasked with defending U.S. government systems, elections, and critical infrastructure from foreign hackers. It has also long been a target of Trump, who fired CISA director Chris Krebs in 2020 for contradicting Trump’s claim that there was widespread fraud in the 2020 election that Trump lost. (Trump has continued to target Krebs in his second term, revoking his security clearance and ordering the attorney general and other officials to review his actions during his time in that job.)
On the Button
What should be high on your radar, if it isn’t already.
Trump flirts with punishing Putin. Russia on Wednesday proposed holding another round of peace talks with Ukraine next week in Istanbul. The first round, which Russian President Vladimir Putin skipped, failed to secure a cease-fire as both Kyiv and Moscow remained far apart on key issues.
Moscow’s push for fresh peace negotiations comes as Trump has expressed growing impatience with Russia over its continued attacks against Ukraine. Russia in recent days launched some of its largest missile and drone attacks of the war. Trump, who has raised the prospect of slapping new sanctions or other economic penalties on Russia amid the lack of progress in his effort to secure a peace deal, on Tuesday warned Putin that he’s “playing with fire.”
But Trump on Wednesday told reporters at the White House that he’s holding off on taking any concrete steps yet because he believes a deal may be close and doesn’t want to “screw it up by doing that.”
Is a Gaza cease-fire on the horizon? Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Thursday told families of hostages still held by Hamas in Gaza that he has accepted a new cease-fire proposal put forward by Witkoff. This comes as Israel faces mounting criticism over the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and a controversial new aid distribution system—which is also backed by the U.S.—that’s been marred by violence and chaos this week.
Hamas is reviewing the proposal, which would reportedly involve releasing 10 living hostages and 18 dead hostages in separate phases in exchange for a 60-day cease-fire. There are 58 hostages remaining in Gaza, 20 of whom are believed to be alive.
Ruby Chen, the father of American Israeli Israel Defense Forces soldier and hostage Itay Chen, who is believed to have been killed on Oct. 7, 2023, was among those who met with Netanyahu on Thursday. After the meeting, Chen told SitRep that there’s optimism surrounding getting a partial deal across the finish line. But he added that such an agreement would be “dicey” and emphasized that the hostage families “have been advocating for a deal that shows a path to get to the last hostage.”
“If you’re able to get half, why not get all of them out?” Chen said.
More China chip curbs. The Trump administration has reportedly blocked several U.S. companies that make software used to design semiconductor chips from selling to China, further escalating a battle over access to critical technologies. It’s one of several recent U.S. broadsides against Beijing, including curbs on the sale of jet engine technology to China and an announcement by Rubio that the United States will begin revoking the visas of Chinese students.
Trump has largely continued Biden’s policy of export controls aimed at China’s semiconductor industry, in an attempt to slow down Chinese development of advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence.
Snapshot
Guests gather near a photograph of Sarah Lynn Milgrim during a remembrance and reopening ceremony at the Lillian and Albert Small Capital Jewish Museum in Washington, D.C., on May 29. The museum reopened one week after two Israeli Embassy staff members, Milgrim, 26, and Yaron Lischinsky, 30, were shot dead as they left an event at the museum.
Guests gather near a photograph of Sarah Lynn Milgrim during a remembrance and reopening ceremony at the Lillian and Albert Small Capital Jewish Museum in Washington, D.C., on May 29. The museum reopened one week after two Israeli Embassy staff members, Milgrim, 26, and Yaron Lischinsky, 30, were shot dead as they left an event at the museum. Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
Hot Mic
“You will never see this administration trying to handicap your community,” Vice President J.D. Vance said in a speech to cryptocurrency enthusiasts at the Bitcoin 2025 conference in Las Vegas on Wednesday, touting the Trump administration’s firing of former Securities and Exchange Commission chair and noted crypto-skeptic Gary Gensler (Gensler actually resigned before Trump took office).
“I’m here today to say loud and clear—with President Trump, crypto finally has a champion and an ally in the White House,” Vance said. Trump has indeed been a staunch backer of the crypto industry, establishing a bitcoin strategic reserve early in his term and signing a deal through his personal crypto firm World Liberty Financial with the United Arab Emirates before his visit earlier this month. Many in Washington have raised corruption concerns around Trump’s cryptocurrency holdings, particularly his personal $Trump meme coin, whose top backers Trump hosted for a private dinner at his golf club in northern Virginia last week.
Vance jokingly referenced those concerns on Wednesday, praising the “energy” of the crowd before saying: “I promise I’m not just saying that to juice my own meme coins.”
Put on Your Radar
Friday, May 30: The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue begins in Singapore.
Sunday, June 1: Mexico holds judicial elections following controversial reforms to the way judges are elected.
Poland conducts a presidential election runoff.
Tuesday, June 3: South Korea holds an early presidential election.
This Week’s Most Read
Quote of the Week
“I don’t know that there’s more to know, but you’re going to know everything we know.”
—FBI Director Kash Patel during a Fox News interview regarding the investigation into the July 2024 assassination attempt on Trump. Patel, who has a history of pushing conspiracy theories, threw cold water on conspiracy theories about the shooting, which took place at a Trump rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. “That’s a great example of people looking for things where things don’t exist,” he said.
Foreign Policy · by Rishi Iyengar, John Haltiwanger
24. Weaponized storytelling: How AI is helping researchers sniff out disinformation campaigns
"Narrative-aware tools."
Excerpts:
Narrative-aware AI tools can help intelligence analysts quickly identify orchestrated influence campaigns or emotionally charged storylines that are spreading unusually fast. They might use AI tools to process large volumes of social media posts in order to map persuasive narrative arcs, identify near-identical storylines and flag coordinated timing of social media activity. Intelligence services could then use countermeasures in real time.
In addition, crisis-response agencies could swiftly identify harmful narratives, such as false emergency claims during natural disasters. Social media platforms could use these tools to efficiently route high-risk content for human review without unnecessary censorship. Researchers and educators could also benefit by tracking how a story evolves across communities, making narrative analysis more rigorous and shareable.
Ordinary users can also benefit from these technologies. The AI tools could flag social media posts in real time as possible disinformation, allowing readers to be skeptical of suspect stories, thus counteracting falsehoods before they take root.
As AI takes on a greater role in monitoring and interpreting online content, its ability to understand storytelling beyond just traditional semantic analysis has become essential. To this end, we are building systems to uncover hidden patterns, decode cultural signals and trace narrative timelines to reveal how disinformation takes hold.
Weaponized storytelling: How AI is helping researchers sniff out disinformation campaigns
The human proclivity for storytelling makes disinformation difficult to combat. Westend61 via Getty Images
theconversation.com · by Mark Finlayson Associate Professor of Computer Science, Florida International University
It is not often that cold, hard facts determine what people care most about and what they believe. Instead, it is the power and familiarity of a well-told story that reigns supreme. Whether it’s a heartfelt anecdote, a personal testimony or a meme echoing familiar cultural narratives, stories tend to stick with us, move us and shape our beliefs.
This characteristic of storytelling is precisely what can make it so dangerous when wielded by the wrong hands. For decades, foreign adversaries have used narrative tactics in efforts to manipulate public opinion in the United States. Social media platforms have brought new complexity and amplification to these campaigns. The phenomenon garnered ample public scrutiny after evidence emerged of Russian entities exerting influence over election-related material on Facebook in the lead-up to the 2016 election.
While artificial intelligence is exacerbating the problem, it is at the same time becoming one of the most powerful defenses against such manipulations. Researchers have been using machine learning techniques to analyze disinformation content.
At the Cognition, Narrative and Culture Lab at Florida International University, we are building AI tools to help detect disinformation campaigns that employ tools of narrative persuasion. We are training AI to go beyond surface-level language analysis to understand narrative structures, trace personas and timelines and decode cultural references.
Disinformation vs. misinformation
In July 2024, the Department of Justice disrupted a Kremlin-backed operation that used nearly a thousand fake social media accounts to spread false narratives. These weren’t isolated incidents. They were part of an organized campaign, powered in part by AI.
Disinformation differs crucially from misinformation. While misinformation is simply false or inaccurate information – getting facts wrong – disinformation is intentionally fabricated and shared specifically to mislead and manipulate. A recent illustration of this came in October 2024, when a video purporting to show a Pennsylvania election worker tearing up mail-in ballots marked for Donald Trump swept platforms such as X and Facebook.
Within days, the FBI traced the clip to a Russian influence outfit, but not before it racked up millions of views. This example vividly demonstrates how foreign influence campaigns artificially manufacture and amplify fabricated stories to manipulate U.S. politics and stoke divisions among Americans.
Humans are wired to process the world through stories. From childhood, we grow up hearing stories, telling them and using them to make sense of complex information. Narratives don’t just help people remember – they help us feel. They foster emotional connections and shape our interpretations of social and political events.
Stories have profound effects on human beliefs and behavior.
This makes them especially powerful tools for persuasion – and, consequently, for spreading disinformation. A compelling narrative can override skepticism and sway opinion more effectively than a flood of statistics. For example, a story about rescuing a sea turtle with a plastic straw in its nose often does more to raise concern about plastic pollution than volumes of environmental data.
Usernames, cultural context and narrative time
Using AI tools to piece together a picture of the narrator of a story, the timeline for how they tell it and cultural details specific to where the story takes place can help identify when a story doesn’t add up.
Narratives are not confined to the content users share – they also extend to the personas users construct to tell them. Even a social media handle can carry persuasive signals. We have developed a system that analyzes usernames to infer demographic and identity traits such as name, gender, location, sentiment and even personality, when such cues are embedded in the handle. This work, presented in 2024 at the International Conference on Web and Social Media, highlights how even a brief string of characters can signal how users want to be perceived by their audience.
For example, a user attempting to appear as a credible journalist might choose a handle like @JamesBurnsNYT rather than something more casual like @JimB_NYC. Both may suggest a male user from New York, but one carries the weight of institutional credibility. Disinformation campaigns often exploit these perceptions by crafting handles that mimic authentic voices or affiliations.
Although a handle alone cannot confirm whether an account is genuine, it plays an important role in assessing overall authenticity. By interpreting usernames as part of the broader narrative an account presents, AI systems can better evaluate whether an identity is manufactured to gain trust, blend into a target community or amplify persuasive content. This kind of semantic interpretation contributes to a more holistic approach to disinformation detection – one that considers not just what is said but who appears to be saying it and why.
Also, stories don’t always unfold chronologically. A social media thread might open with a shocking event, flash back to earlier moments and skip over key details in between.
Humans handle this effortlessly – we’re used to fragmented storytelling. But for AI, determining a sequence of events based on a narrative account remains a major challenge.
Our lab is also developing methods for timeline extraction, teaching AI to identify events, understand their sequence and map how they relate to one another, even when a story is told in nonlinear fashion.
Objects and symbols often carry different meanings in different cultures, and without cultural awareness, AI systems risk misinterpreting the narratives they analyze. Foreign adversaries can exploit cultural nuances to craft messages that resonate more deeply with specific audiences, enhancing the persuasive power of disinformation.
Consider the following sentence: “The woman in the white dress was filled with joy.” In a Western context, the phrase evokes a happy image. But in parts of Asia, where white symbolizes mourning or death, it could feel unsettling or even offensive.
In order to use AI to detect disinformation that weaponizes symbols, sentiments and storytelling within targeted communities, it’s critical to give AI this sort of cultural literacy. In our research, we’ve found that training AI on diverse cultural narratives improves its sensitivity to such distinctions.
Who benefits from narrative-aware AI?
Narrative-aware AI tools can help intelligence analysts quickly identify orchestrated influence campaigns or emotionally charged storylines that are spreading unusually fast. They might use AI tools to process large volumes of social media posts in order to map persuasive narrative arcs, identify near-identical storylines and flag coordinated timing of social media activity. Intelligence services could then use countermeasures in real time.
In addition, crisis-response agencies could swiftly identify harmful narratives, such as false emergency claims during natural disasters. Social media platforms could use these tools to efficiently route high-risk content for human review without unnecessary censorship. Researchers and educators could also benefit by tracking how a story evolves across communities, making narrative analysis more rigorous and shareable.
Ordinary users can also benefit from these technologies. The AI tools could flag social media posts in real time as possible disinformation, allowing readers to be skeptical of suspect stories, thus counteracting falsehoods before they take root.
As AI takes on a greater role in monitoring and interpreting online content, its ability to understand storytelling beyond just traditional semantic analysis has become essential. To this end, we are building systems to uncover hidden patterns, decode cultural signals and trace narrative timelines to reveal how disinformation takes hold.
theconversation.com · by Mark Finlayson Associate Professor of Computer Science, Florida International University
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
|