Russia accused Ukraine of conducting a drone strike against the Kremlin.
Russia likely staged this attack in an attempt to bring the war home to a Russian domestic audience and set conditions for a wider societal mobilization.
The rapid and coherent presentation of an official Russian narrative around the strike suggests that Russia staged this attack in close proximity to the May 9th Victory Day holiday in order to frame the war as existential to its domestic audience.
Some Russian nationalist milbloggers seized on the Kremlin drone strike to call for Russian escalation in the war despite the fact that Russia currently lacks the military capability to do so.
The Kremlin may be planning to conduct other false flag operations and to increase disinformation ahead of a Ukrainian counteroffensive in order to increase domestic support for the war.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin baselessly claimed on May 3 that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has already begun, likely in order to exploit information space anxieties and call for increased Russian military support for Wagner’s Bakhmut offensive.
Russian forces conducted a Shahed-131/136 drone strike on the night of May 2 to 3.
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks near Kreminna.
Russian forces continued to make gains in and around Bakhmut and continued to conduct ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Russian forces conducted heavy air and artillery strikes against west (right) bank Kherson Oblast.
Russian officials continue to incentivize military service by providing social benefits to families of participants in the war.
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed that it prevented a “terrorist” attack against three Crimean officials.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 3, 2023

May 3, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 3, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan

May 3, 2023, 5:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Russia accused Ukraine of conducting a drone strike against the Kremlin on May 3. Social media footage circulated on May 3 shows a drone detonating near a flagpole on top of the Kremlin Senate Palace building in Moscow as two unidentified people climbed up the dome of the building.[1] The Kremlin accused Ukraine of orchestrating “a planned terrorist attack” with the intent of assassinating Russian President Vladimir Putin and clarified that Putin was not at the Kremlin at the time of the attack and was therefore unharmed.[2] Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, stressed that Ukraine did not conduct the attack.[3]

Russia likely staged this attack in an attempt to bring the war home to a Russian domestic audience and set conditions for a wider societal mobilization. Several indicators suggest that the strike was internally conducted and purposefully staged. Russian authorities have recently taken steps to increase Russian domestic air defense capabilities, including within Moscow itself, and it is therefore extremely unlikely that two drones could have penetrated multiple layers of air defense and detonated or been shot down just over the heart of the Kremlin in a way that provided spectacular imagery caught nicely on camera. Geolocated imagery from January 2023 shows that Russian authorities have been placing Pantsir air defense systems near Moscow to create air defense circles around the city.[4] A strike that avoided detection and destruction by such air defense assets and succeeded in hitting as high-profile of a target as the Kremlin Senate Palace would be a significant embarrassment for Russia. The Kremlin’s immediate, coherent, and coordinated response to the incident suggests that the attack was internally prepared in such a way that its intended political effects outweigh its embarrassment. The Kremlin immediately accused Ukraine of conducting a terror attack, and Russian official responses coalesced rapidly around this accusation.[5] If the drone attack had not been internally staged it would have been a surprise event. It is very likely that the official Russian response would initially have been much more disorganized as Russian officials scrambled to generate a coherent narrative and offset the rhetorical implications of a clear informational embarrassment. The Kremlin has notably failed to generate a timely and coherent informational response to other military humiliations not of its own making, including the falls of Balakliya and Kherson City in September and November 2022.[6]

The rapid and coherent presentation of an official Russian narrative around the strike suggests that Russia staged this incident in close proximity to the May 9th Victory Day holiday in order to frame the war as existential to its domestic audience. The Kremlin may use the strike to justify either canceling or further limiting May 9th celebrations, actions that would likely augment the information effort framing the war in Ukraine as directly threatening Russian observance of revered historical events. ISW has previously assessed that Russia is employing an array of measures to frame the war in Ukraine as existential to Russia’s domestic audience and to prepare for wider societal mobilization.[7]

Some Russian nationalist milbloggers seized on the Kremlin drone strike to call for Russian escalation in the war despite the fact that Russia currently lacks the military capability to do so. Many pro-war milbloggers, including ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin, criticized the Kremlin for allowing Ukraine to cross multiple Russian “red lines” with no adequate retaliation and called for Russia to escalate in response, including by targeting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other Ukrainian decision-makers.[8] This sect of milbloggers emphasized their own embarrassment at the Kremlin strike, comparing it to the humiliation of a single German civilian pilot landing a small aircraft near the Kremlin in 1987.[9] Other Russian milbloggers, including those with close Kremlin affiliations, criticized the high degree of outcry in the Russian information space.[10] These milbloggers largely advocated against retaliatory military escalation on the grounds that this strike does not change the operational or strategic situation in the war, instead calling for a cautious response while acknowledging the sting of embarrassment over the strike.[11] This messaging from pro-Kremlin milbloggers could support the assessment that the purpose of this false-flag attack was to justify increased mobilization measures rather than any sort of escalation.

The Kremlin may be planning to conduct other false flag operations and increase disinformation ahead of a Ukrainian counteroffensive in order to increase domestic support for the war. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on May 2 that Russian forces in Bryansk and Kursk oblasts received Ukrainian uniforms in order to conduct a false flag operation in border areas.[12] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on May 3 that Russian forces may simulate a hostage taking and noted that “Storm” detachments of the Russian 13th Guards Tank Regiment (4th Guards Tank Division) and 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division) of the 1st Guards Tank Army of the Western Military District arrived in Ivanivske in Kursk Oblast and Yamnoye in Bryansk Oblast.[13] The 13th Guards Tank Regiment suffered massive losses early in the war in Chernihiv Oblast and in fall of 2022 during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast.[14] This report that elements of the 13th Guards Tank Regiment are in Bryansk or Kursk Oblast suggests that the regiment is not in Ukraine and is unready to return to battle. Russian milbloggers amplified a claim from state-run media outlet RT that Ukrainian forces are preparing a provocation against Transnistria and will attempt to enter Transnistria between May 9 and 15.[15] The Kremlin has previously attempted to portray Ukraine as an existential threat to Russia’s territorial integrity and to warn of supposed Ukrainian provocations to be conducted in Moldova.[16]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin baselessly claimed on May 3 that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has already begun, likely in order to exploit information space anxieties and call for increased Russian military support for Wagner’s Bakhmut offensive. In an audio recording posted on May 3, Prigozhin says that he believes that Ukraine has already begun its counteroffensive and cited an increase in Ukrainian activity “along the perimeter” of the Bakhmut front.[17] Prigozhin also claimed that Wagner’s flanks, currently held by conventional Russian airborne (VDV) troops, are “not in the best way” and stated that he will not speculate on how reliable they are to maintain “politeness.”[18] Prigozhin’s comment on the state of the flanks is likely a thinly-veiled criticism of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and its ability to help Wagner hold Bakhmut and suggests that Prigozhin is blaming the MoD for being unable to hold off Ukrainian localized counterattacks in Bakhmut. Prigozhin concluded that he anticipates a more “active phase” of counteroffensive actions to begin in the next few days.[19] Prigozhin is likely using this claim to benefit from continued concerns in the Russian information space regarding a Ukrainian counteroffensive and to lobby for increased support for Wagner amid continued pleas for the Russian MoD to provide Wagner more ammunition for its offensive on Bakhmut.[20] ISW has observed no additional evidence to support Prigozhin’s claims and does not assess that a Ukrainian counter-offensive has begun around Bakhmut.

Russian forces conducted a Shahed-131/136 drone strike against Ukraine on the night of May 2 to 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 3 that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian territory from Bryansk Oblast and the southeast coast of the Sea of Azov with 26 Iranian-made Shahed-131/136 drones and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 21 of the 26 drones.[21] The Kyiv Oblast Military Administration stated that Russian forces attacked Kyiv Oblast for the third time in six consecutive days.[22] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Shahed drones also targeted Kirovohrad and Mykolaiv oblasts.[23]

Key Takeaways

Russia accused Ukraine of conducting a drone strike against the Kremlin.
Russia likely staged this attack in an attempt to bring the war home to a Russian domestic audience and set conditions for a wider societal mobilization.
The rapid and coherent presentation of an official Russian narrative around the strike suggests that Russia staged this attack in close proximity to the May 9th Victory Day holiday in order to frame the war as existential to its domestic audience.
Some Russian nationalist milbloggers seized on the Kremlin drone strike to call for Russian escalation in the war despite the fact that Russia currently lacks the military capability to do so.
The Kremlin may be planning to conduct other false flag operations and to increase disinformation ahead of a Ukrainian counteroffensive in order to increase domestic support for the war.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin baselessly claimed on May 3 that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has already begun, likely in order to exploit information space anxieties and call for increased Russian military support for Wagner’s Bakhmut offensive.
Russian forces conducted a Shahed-131/136 drone strike on the night of May 2 to 3.
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks near Kreminna.
Russian forces continued to make gains in and around Bakhmut and continued to conduct ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Russian forces conducted heavy air and artillery strikes against west (right) bank Kherson Oblast.
Russian officials continue to incentivize military service by providing social benefits to families of participants in the war.
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed that it prevented a “terrorist” attack against three Crimean officials.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks near Kreminna on May 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna) and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops continued efforts to advance towards Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove), Dibrova, the Serebrianska forest area (10km south of Kreminna), and Bilohorivka.[25] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian forces have not advanced in “some time” on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Lyman line and are behaving cautiously but maintaining high rates of artillery fire.[26] Cherevaty noted that Russian forces fired over 565 artillery rounds at Ukrainian positions and engaged in 11 combat clashes on this line over the past day.[27]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued to make gains in and around Bakhmut as of May 3. Geolocated footage from May 2 and 3 shows that Russian forces advanced closer to the O0506 highway northwest of Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut) and captured the Bakhmut Medical College in western Bakhmut.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces continued fighting north of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) and that Wagner Group forces advanced in western and southern Bakhmut.[29] Another milblogger claimed on May 2 that Russian and Ukrainian forces continued fighting north of the O0506 highway.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued attacking in Bakhmut and conducted unsuccessful ground attacks towards Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), Predtechyne 14km southwest of Bakhmut), and Niu York (30km southwest of Bakhmut).[31] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on May 2 that Ukrainian forces control 2.7 square kilometers of Bakhmut, which is largely consistent with ISW’s current assessed Ukrainian control of 1.89 square kilometers in Bakhmut.[32]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) acknowledged limited Ukrainian counterattacks in the Avdiivka area. The Russian MoD claimed on May 3 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian ground attack on May 2 in an unspecified area of the Oleksandro-Kalynove direction, referring to the area between Avdiivka and Toretsk.[33] ISW has not observed visual evidence of successful Ukrainian counterattacks in the Avdiivka area, and these attacks are likely part of an ongoing pattern of limited and localized attacks, as ISW has recently assessed.[34]

Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on May 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Sieverne (7km west of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka), and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are regrouping west of Novobakhmutivka (9km northwest of Avdiivka) and that Ukrainian targeting of Russian firing positions has slowed down the pace of Russian artillery fire.[36] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces broke through Ukrainian defensive lines and established a foothold on the southern outskirts of the Horhaz enterprise in southwestern Marinka.[37] A Russian milblogger indicated that elements of the “Patriot” private military company (PMC), which is reportedly affiliated with the Russian MoD, is operating along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City axis.[38]

A Ukrainian official stated that Russian forces are increasing preparations for hostilities in rear areas of western Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Vadym Skibitskyi stated that Russian forces are restoring infrastructure, including port infrastructure, necessary to conduct hostilities and circular defense in the Mariupol area.[39] Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 3.[40]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces conducted heavy air and artillery strikes against west (right) bank Kherson Oblast on May 3. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian troops carried out 110 artillery strikes against areas on the west bank with over 550 shells and struck civilian infrastructure in Kherson City.[41] Geolocated imagery posted on May 3 shows the aftermath of Russian shelling of the “Epicenter” hypermarket in Kherson City.[42] The Southern Operational Command also reported that Russian tactical aviation launched five guided aerial bombs at Kizomys, just west of Kherson City.[43] Russian forces continued to shell along the line of contact in Zaporizhia Oblast.[44]

Ukrainian forces continued striking Russian concentration areas on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on May 3. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian troops conducted 100 fire missions against Russian weapons, equipment, and personnel concentrations on the east bank.[45] A local Kherson Oblast Telegram channel posted an image of a pamphlet on the east bank (potentially distributed by Ukrainian partisans) that warns residents to avoid being near positions of the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) in the Nova Kakhovka area due to potential Ukrainian strikes on these positions.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian troops shelled a number of settlements along the east bank on the night of May 2 to 3.[47]

Russian sources continue to disproportionately amplify claims of routine Ukrainian activity along the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline in order to suggest that the counteroffensive may have already begun. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed on May 3 that a mechanized Ukrainian group “went on the offensive” south of Orikhiv and reported that Russian forces stopped the advance and forced Ukrainian troops to withdraw.[48] Rogov has made frequent claims over the past few months that Ukrainian forces are preparing to launch a counteroffensive in Zaporizhia Oblast and has frequently used such claims to further information operations, as ISW has previously assessed.[49] Russian milbloggers and other sources routinely report on Ukrainian activity near Orikhiv.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials continue to incentivize military service by providing social benefits to families of participants in the war. United Russia Secretary Andrey Turchak claimed on May 3 that the “special military operation” working group submitted a bill to the Russian State Duma that would provide the children of volunteers and all soldiers who died in the war in Ukraine with priority enrollment in kindergartens, schools, and summer camps.[50] Turchak claimed that this bill is part of the wider Russian effort to expand social benefits to all participants of the war and their families.[51]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed that it prevented a “terrorist” attack against three Crimean officials on May 3. The FSB claimed that it had arrested seven people connected with the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) on May 3 under allegations that they were planning to assassinate occupation head of Crimea Sergey Aksenov and other Russian occupation officials based in Crimea.[52]

Russian occupation officials are likely purposefully engaging in corrupt and provocative activities in occupied areas of Ukraine in order to generate instability and target pro-Ukrainian sentiment. Deputy Ukrainian Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on May 3 that Russian forces are importing groups of trained provocateurs to occupied territories in an effort to increase the number of conflicts between pro-Russians and Ukrainians in public places.[53] Malyar stated that Russian investigative bodies solve cases involving public fights in favor of pro-Russian provocateurs, pardoning them of criminal liability in an effort to sow fear of anti-Russia expression in occupied territories.[54] Malyar stated that Russia had previously used “thieves in law” to destabilize Ukraine in 2014 and 2015, which created unstable internal environments and further promoted criminal activity.[55] Former Donetsk People’s Republic official Pavel Gubarev recalled first-hand accounts on May 3 of cases in which Russian occupation authorities fabricated criminal cases, imprisoned and tortured innocent people, and engaged in corrupt financial dealings in Kherson Oblast, and suggested that releasing this information may undermine Russian moral justifications for occupying Ukrainian territory.[56]

Russian occupation authorities continue to announce medical examinations of Ukrainian children, likely in connection with the ongoing deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of rehabilitation. Occupied Kherson Oblast Ministry of Health stated on May 3 that doctors from Crimea and Russia will conduct medical examinations on 4,336 more children in occupied Kherson Oblast by the end of the 2023 school year.[57]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that Belarusian forces will begin the next stage of an ongoing comprehensive combat readiness check on an unspecified date in May. The Belarusian MoD claimed that Belarusian forces stationed in Grodno, Brest Oblast and in Minsk Oblast will participate in this new phase of the readiness check.[58] The Belarusian MoD also claimed that it will not call up more than 1,000 reservists as part of the readiness check.[59] The Belarusian MoD also claimed that the readiness check includes the formation of people’s militias and the performance of combat tasks to maintain martial law.[60]

The Belarusian MoD claimed that Russian Aerospace Forces and Belarusian Air and Air Defense Forces will conduct joint patrols of Belarusian airspace.[61]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1653727329691004928; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1653738331270676482; https://t.me/rian_ru/201579; https://t.me/readovkanews/58065; https://t.me/readovkanews/58066; https://t.me/readovkanews/58070; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1653734693257314304; https://twitter.com/Faytuks/status/1653728913711943680 ; https://twitter.com/michaelh992/status/1653734342626091011 ; https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1653743589040566275 ; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/1902; https://t.me/istories_media/2459; https://t.me/bazabazon/17350; https://t.me/astrapress/26037

[2] https://t.me/rian_ru/201566; https://t.me/rian_ru/201567; https://t.me/rian_ru/201576; https://t.me/rian_ru/201575; https://t.me/rian_ru/201571; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/5967398?from=top_main_1; https://t.me/rian_ru/201569; https://t.me/rian_ru/201568; https://t.me/readovkanews/58064

[3] https://t.me/RBC_ua_news/49332; https://hromadske dot ua/ru/posts/u-zelenskogo-prokommentirovali-zayavlenie-rf-ob-udare-po-kremlyu-nagnetanie-situacii-pered-9-maya; https://twitter.com/Podolyak_M/status/1653746627037863937

[4] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1616937082366349312

[5] https://t.me/rian_ru/201569; https://t.me/rian_ru/201568; https://t.me/readovkanews/58064

[6] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept10; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept9; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept8

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012023; https://isw.pub/UkrWar03042023; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive...

[8] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84558; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24958; https://t.me/dazbastadraw/3223; https://t.me/readovkanews/58069; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11464; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11459; https://t.me/KRPRus/19; https://t.me/KRPRus/18; https://t.me/KRPRus/17; https://t.me/ordinaryczarizm/1799; https://t.me/KRPRus/16; https://t.me/strelkovii/4741; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47258; https://t.me/milinfolive/100109; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7611; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7609; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7608

[9] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7611; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7609; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7608; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84558; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24958; https://t.me/dazbastadraw/3223; https://t.me/readovkanews/58069; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11464; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11459; https://t.me/KRPRus/19; https://t.me/KRPRus/18; https://t.me/KRPRus/17; https://t.me/ordinaryczarizm/1799; https://t.me/KRPRus/16; https://t.me/strelkovii/4741; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47258; https://t.me/milinfolive/100109;

[10] https://t.me/rybar/46572; https://t.me/rybar/46576; https://t.me/sashakots/39601; https://t.me/rybar/46578; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11460; https://t.me/rybar/46580; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/13940; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84558; https://t.me/sashakots/39609; https://t.me/sashakots/39597; https://t.me/epoddubny/15810; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/23748

[11] https://t.me/rybar/46572; https://t.me/rybar/46576; https://t.me/sashakots/39601; https://t.me/rybar/46578; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11460; https://t.me/rybar/46580; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/13940; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84558; https://t.me/sashakots/39609; https://t.me/sashakots/39597; https://t.me/epoddubny/15810; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/23748

[12] https://sprotyv.mod.gov. dot ua/rosiyany-gotuyut-provokatsiyi-na-pivnichnomu-kordoni-z-ukrayinoyu/

[13] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/do-organizatsiyi-provokatsiyi-na-kordoni-ukrayiny-ta-rf-zalucheni-ponad-300-soldat-armiyi-voroga/

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[15] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24943; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84551; https://t.me/wargonzo/12295

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2023

[17] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/890

[18] https://t.me/bazabazon/17348

[19] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/890

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050123

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yM9WCQsK5sDmFjR4GCs2yPfwr2xTWTY2c6EzfHGouEnTeJyvBWBrbomHcQbPhkLKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032yp8C87U4vCs5aw3HH7pTkqPvKHBUZzCTm6ZRx8faFUqyevBhWgQc4vYr6HSjbNFl

[22] https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/1581

[23] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02HSmQNEtKEbANV8XJtKWqHjD5ahRtuSG3w5MSZB7R8hKqdBFUBpviUkkJNHTWe55al

[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0LDXPKnkjE7Q9Wk7JEoPn1H7N7SVGTQ7qFnzQEevwMhdaDye6QBMSmy126HhRyNvnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yM9WCQsK5sDmFjR4GCs2yPfwr2xTWTY2c6EzfHGouEnTeJyvBWBrbomHcQbPhkLKl

[25] https://t.me/wargonzo/12286

[26] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/05/03/mynuloyi-doby-okupanty-zavdaly-565-udariv-zi-stvolnoyi-artyleriyi-ta-rszv-na-lymansko-kupyanskomu-napryamku/

[27] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/05/03/mynuloyi-doby-okupanty-zavdaly-565-udariv-zi-stvolnoyi-artyleriyi-ta-rszv-na-lymansko-kupyanskomu-napryamku/; https://t.me/readovkanews/58055

[28] https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1653471918777876485?s=20; https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1653505461063241743?s=20; https://twitter.com/EerikMatero/status/1653457621825798151?s=20; https://twitter.com/EerikMatero/status/1653458018124611590?s=20; https://t.me/msgazdiev/1204

[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/12286

[30] https://twitter.com/EerikMatero/status/1653457621825798151?s=20; https://twitter.com/EerikMatero/status/1653458018124611590?s=20; https://t.me/msgazdiev/1204

[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0LDXPKnkjE7Q9Wk7JEoP...

[32] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/887

[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/26140

[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0LDXPKnkjE7Q9Wk7JEoPn1H7N7SVGTQ7qFnzQEevwMhdaDye6QBMSmy126HhRyNvnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yM9WCQsK5sDmFjR4GC...

[36] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47250; https://t.me/wargonzo/12286

[37] https://t.me/rybar/46582

[38] https://t.me/obtf_kaskad/2437; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2022/12/28/7382706/; https://www.svoboda dot org/a/29346941.html

[39] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/v-okupovanomu-krymu-rosiiany-boiatsia-vsoho-i-droniv-i-partyzaniv-i-raket-vadym-skibitskyi.html

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0LDXPKnkjE7Q9Wk7JEoPn1H7N7SVGTQ7qFnzQEevwMhdaDye6QBMSmy126HhRyNvn; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yM9WCQsK5sDmFjR4GC...

[41] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02HSmQNEtKEbANV8XJtKWqHjD5ahRtuSG3w5MSZB7R8hKqdBFUBpviUkkJNHTWe55al

[42] **GRAPHIC** https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1653689284606545922?s=20; https://twitter.com/Flash_news_ua/status/1653682034248744964?s=20 ; https://t.me/hueviyherson/38826 ; https://t.me/hueviyherson/38827 ; https://t.me/istories_media/2462; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1653787801853255680?s=20; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1653793018892124162?s=20 https://t.me/astrapress/26023; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/414 ; https://www.facebook.com/100003342535443/posts/pfbid032oz5B7prMT7xAuNxt9cdhfXEwQLkYZx7bkWKS1qMBfwtCTf7BT7vqqQUkxgnHhYdl/?mibextid=DcJ9fc

[43] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02HSmQNEtKEbANV8XJtKWqHjD5ahRtuSG3w5MSZB7R8hKqdBFUBpviUkkJNHTWe55al

[44] https://t.me/wargonzo/12286; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/18547; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/18549

[45] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02HSmQNEtKEbANV8XJtKWqHjD5ahRtuSG3w5MSZB7R8hKqdBFUBpviUkkJNHTWe55al

[46] https://t.me/hueviy_kherson/491

[47] https://t.me/readovkanews/58037

[48] https://t.me/vrogov/9158; https://t.me/vrogov/9157; https://t.me/vrogov/9156

[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[50] https://t.me/turchak_andrey/1253; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84562; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/11671

[51] https://t.me/turchak_andrey/1245; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2023

[52] https://t.me/readovkanews/58041; https://t.me/readovkanews/58044; https://t.me/Aksenov82/2432; https://t.me/rybar/46564; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84541; https://t.me/rybar/46563; https://t.me/readovkanews/58038; https://t.me/readovkanews/58042; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84534; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84523; https://t.me/rlz_the_kraken/58144; http://www.fsb dot ru/fsb/press/message/single.htm!id=10439711@fsbMessage.html

[53] https://t.me/annamaliar/692

[54] https://t.me/annamaliar/692

[55] https://t.me/annamaliar/692

[56] https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/23713; https://t.me/pgubarev/543

[57] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/9091

[58] https://t.me/modmilby/26659; https://t.me/modmilby/26660; https://t.me/modmilby/26667; https://t.me/modmilby/26686

[59] https://t.me/modmilby/26659

[60] https://t.me/modmilby/26659

[61] https://t.me/modmilby/26659

Opinion | The U.S. warms to a role for China in resolving the Ukraine war

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · May 3, 2023

The Biden administration appears to be weighing whether to work with China to seek a negotiated settlement of the Ukraine war after what U.S. officials predict will be Ukrainian gains in their long-planned offensive.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly described the administration’s views in a Washington Post Live interview Wednesday to mark World Press Freedom Day. His comments echoed what senior officials have been saying privately in recent days about potential American and Chinese cooperation to mediate the brutal conflict.

The predicate for any such diplomatic effort would be Ukrainian gains on the battlefield, which could put Kyiv in a stronger bargaining position. Asked about Kyiv’s prospects in its anticipated counterstrike in eastern Ukraine, Blinken answered: “I feel confident that they will have success in regaining more of their territory, and I think it’s also important to note that for Russia, this is already a strategic failure.”

When I asked Blinken about working with China to achieve a stable outcome in Ukraine, he gave a surprisingly frank answer: “In principle, there’s nothing wrong with that if we have a country, whether it’s China or other countries that have significant influence that are prepared to pursue a just and durable peace. … We would welcome that, and it’s certainly possible that China would have a role to play in that effort. And that could be very beneficial.”

Blinken said there were some “positive” items in the 12-point peace plan that China announced in February. The Chinese proposals includes respecting “the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries,” which implies a Russian troop withdrawal; “reducing strategic risks” and agreeing that “nuclear weapons must not be used”; and taking steps “to gradually de-escalate the situation and ultimately reach a comprehensive cease fire.”

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Ukraine wants China to play a mediating role, and President Volodymyr Zelensky spoke last week by phone with President Xi Jinping. Zelensky said later that the two had discussed how to achieve a “just and sustainable peace,” without territorial compromises by Ukraine. A Chinese readout stressed that “all parties should seize the opportunity to accumulate favorable conditions for a political solution to the crisis.”

Blinken said Wednesday that the Xi-Zelensky call was “a positive thing, because it’s vitally important that China and other countries that have been seeking to advance peace hear from the victim, not just the aggressor.”

Russia has been unhappy with the Chinese mediation effort, several administration officials told me. But Moscow, subordinate to Beijing economically and militarily, can’t easily resist China’s wishes. That’s one reason administration officials are intrigued by Chinese peace efforts; they believe they might prevent Russia from trying to renew the war later — after a pause. “The only stability is China as a guarantor,” one official told me.

Discussing any durable peace effort, Blinken said “it has to basically reflect the principles that are at the heart of the United Nations charter when it comes to territorial integrity, when it comes to sovereignty. It can’t ratify what Russia has done, which is the seizure of so much of Ukraine’s territory. And it needs to be durable in the sense that we don’t want this to land in a place where Russia can simply rest, refit and reattack six months later or a year later.”

Blinken continued: “As a matter of principle, countries, particularly countries with significant influence like China, if they’re willing to play a positive role in trying to bring peace, that would be a good thing. But it starts fundamentally with Vladimir Putin actually making that fundamental decision. We’ve not seen that yet.”

Blinken’s public expression of interest in a possible Chinese mediating role is part of a broader effort to define what he likes to call a “cooperation basket” between the two countries in what is otherwise an increasingly competitive relationship. He said he was hopeful that he might be able to reschedule a trip to China that was postponed after February’s spy balloon incident. Other American diplomatic contacts with China are also underway.

“There’s a clear demand signal from around the world that we manage this relationship responsibly — a demand signal on us but also on Beijing,” Blinken said. “And that starts with engagement. … At the very least, we need to have a floor under this relationship. We need to have some guardrails on it, and the way to do that is through engagement.”

Administration officials are still debating whether a parallel U.S.-China peace effort might validate a broader Chinese role in Europe at a time when the United States has been trying to keep European allies from making sweetheart deals with Beijing. But when even Zelensky — who depends on U.S. military aid for his country’s survival — is welcoming contact with Xi, excluding China might be unrealistic.

A better strategy, toward which the administration seems to be leaning, is to acknowledge Beijing’s role but insist it must act responsibly to be treated as a great power. China could start by encouraging a just peace in Ukraine.

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · May 3, 2023

4. US, Philippines vow joint defense ‘anywhere in the South China Sea’

US, Philippines vow joint defense ‘anywhere in the South China Sea’

Defense News · by Bryant Harris · May 3, 2023

WASHINGTON — The U.S. and the Philippines unveiled guidance on Wednesday to modernize their alliance in the face of an increasingly assertive China, as President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. visits Washington this week.

The Pentagon released the bilateral defense guidelines to modernize cooperation after Marcos’ meeting with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.

“Secretary Austin and President Marcos reaffirmed the United States and the Philippines’ ironclad alliance commitments under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and their shared resolve to defend against armed attacks on their aircraft, public vessels, and armed forces – to include their respective Coast Guards – in the Pacific, including anywhere in the South China Sea,” Pentagon spokesman Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder said.

“The leaders discussed ways to coordinate more closely with like-minded nations—including Australia and Japan—to strengthen shared principles, including the rule of law, freedom of the seas and respect for territorial sovereignty,” he said in a statement.

The updated alliance framework commits the U.S. to helping the Philippines modernize its military and states that the countries will collaborate on a security sector assistance roadmap “to identify priority defense platforms and force packages that will bolster combined deterrence and capacity to resist coercion.”

It says the countries will prioritize interoperable platforms while expanding “investments in non-materiel defense capacity building including through education and training exchanges, exercises and other operation activities.” It also vows to expand maritime security cooperation, “including but not limited to joint patrols.”

The countries updated the 2014 Enhanced Defense Security Cooperation Agreement earlier this year, giving U.S. patrols additional access to four additional Philippine bases. Austin and Marcos discussed plans to “to swiftly operationalize” the four new basing sites in Northern Luzon and Palawan.

Marcos’ efforts to deepen the U.S.-Philippines alliance marks a significant departure from his predecessor, former President Rodrigo Duterte who at one time publicly threatened to expel American forces.

Aircraft, vessel transfers

China frequently accosts Philippine vessels in the disputed South China Sea, and President Joe Biden reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to defending its allies when he hosted Marcos at the White House Monday.

The administration also announced that the U.S. would transfer three C-130H military transport aircraft to the Philippines as well as two Island-class patrol and two Protector-class patrol vessels.

Congress needs to approve most U.S. arms transfers to foreign countries, and Marcos also met with several lawmakers on Wednesday.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez, D-N.J., and top Republican James Risch of Idaho hosted a meeting with Marcos and other senators.

Risch said “the opportunities to deepen military cooperation and capacity between our two countries” are “vital.”

His meeting on Capitol Hill came the same day that Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., announced the drafting of a new bipartisan China bill that will stress enhanced security cooperation with Pacific allies such as the Philippines.

About Bryant Harris

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

5. Ukraine's Zelenskiy, in The Hague, says Putin must face justice

Ukraine's Zelenskiy, in The Hague, says Putin must face justice

Reuters · by Toby Sterling

AMSTERDAM, May 4 (Reuters) - Russian President Vladimir Putin must be brought to justice for his war in Ukraine, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Thursday in The Hague, calling for the creation of a war crimes tribunal separate to the International Criminal Court.

"The aggressor must feel the full power of justice. This is our historical responsibility," Zelenskiy said in a speech.

"Only one institution is capable of responding to the original crime, the crime of aggression: a tribunal. Not some compromise that will allow politicians to say that the case is allegedly done, but a true, really true, full-fledged tribunal."

An act of aggression is defined by the United Nations as the "invasion or attack by the armed forces of a state (on) the territory of another state, or any military occupation".

The ICC, which is based in The Hague and which Zelenskiy visited earlier in the day, issued an arrest warrant for Putin for suspected deportation of children from Ukraine.

But it does not have jurisdiction over alleged crimes of aggression, and the European Commission, among others, has already brought its support for the creation of a separate international centre for the prosecution of the crime of aggression in Ukraine, that would be set up in The Hague.

"We all want to see a different Vladimir here in The Hague, the one who deserves to be sanctioned for his criminal actions here, in the capital of international law," Zelenskiy said, referring to Putin.

[1/4] Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy delivers a speech titled "No Peace Without Justice for Ukraine", in the Hague, Netherlands May 4, 2023. REUTERS/Yves Herman/Pool

"I'm sure we will see that happen when we win, and we will win," he said, adding: "Whoever brings war must receive judgement."

Major legal and practical questions remain around how such a court would be legitimised, either by a group of countries supporting it or with approval from the U.N. General Assembly.

Russia is not a member of the ICC and already rejects its jurisdiction. It denies committing atrocities during its conflict with Ukraine, which it terms a "special operation" to "demilitarise" its neighbour.

Earlier in the day, in his first official visit to the Netherlands, Zelenskiy visited the ICC for just under an hour.

As he left, Zelenskiy, dressed in his trademark khaki, waved at a Ukrainian family standing outside the ICC building as they shouted "Slava Ukraini" - or Glory to Ukraine.

The Netherlands has been a strong supporter of Ukraine, with Rutte in February saying he did not rule out any kind of military support for Kyiv as long as it did not bring NATO into conflict with Russia.

Russia has stepped up attacks as Ukraine prepares for a counteroffensive to try to retake Russian-occupied land in the south and east. Russian shelling in the frontline southern region of Kherson killed at least 23 civilians on Wednesday.

Reporting by Bart Meijer; Editing by Andrew Heavens

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Toby Sterling

6. Russia accuses U.S. of orchestrating Kremlin drone attack

Russia accuses U.S. of orchestrating Kremlin drone attack

Reuters · by Mark Trevelyan

Summary
Kremlin administration shifts focus from Kyiv to Washington
Allegation goes beyond previous accusations against U.S.
Security experts: incident implausible as assassination attempt
Incident came six days before Victory Day showcase on Red Square

May 4 (Reuters) - Russia accused the United States on Thursday of being behind what it says was a drone attack on Moscow's Kremlin citadel intended to kill President Vladimir Putin.

A day after blaming Ukraine for what it called a terrorist attack, the Kremlin administration shifted the focus onto the United States, but without providing evidence to support its accusation.

Ukraine has denied involvement in the incident in the early hours of Wednesday, when video footage showed two flying objects approaching the Senate Palace inside the Kremlin walls and one exploding with a bright flash.

"Attempts to disown this, both in Kyiv and in Washington, are, of course, absolutely ridiculous. We know very well that decisions about such actions, about such terrorist attacks, are made not in Kyiv but in Washington," said Putin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov.

He said the United States was "undoubtedly" behind the alleged attack and added - again without stating evidence - that Washington often selected both the targets for Ukraine to attack, and the means to attack them.

"This is also often dictated from across the ocean. We know this well and are aware of this ... In Washington they must clearly understand that we know this."

Russia has said with increasing frequency that it sees the United States as a direct participant in the Ukraine war, intent on inflicting a "strategic defeat" on Moscow. The United States denies that, saying it is arming Ukraine to defend itself against Russia's invasion and retake territory that Moscow has seized illegally in more than 14 months of war.

CALLS TO KILL ZELENSKIY

However, Peskov's allegation that the United States was behind a plot to kill Putin went further than previous Kremlin accusations against Washington.

Putin was not in the Kremlin at the time, and security analysts have poured scorn on the idea that the incident was a serious assassination attempt.

But Russia has said it reserves the right to retaliate, and hardliners including former president Dmitry Medvedev have said it should now "physically eliminate" Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy.

Peskov declined to say whether Russia saw Zelenskiy as a legitimate target.

He said Russia had an array of options and the response, when it came, would be carefully considered and balanced. He said an urgent investigation was under way, but could not say when the results would be known.

Putin was in the Kremlin on Thursday and staff were working normally, he said.

The incident took place less than a week before Russia's May 9 Victory Day celebrations marking the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War Two - an important public holiday and an opportunity for Putin to rally Russians behind what he calls Russia's "special military operation" in Ukraine.

Peskov said air defences would be tightened, and this was happening anyway for the military parade on Red Square, the centrepiece of the holiday, just over the Kremlin wall from the site of the alleged attack.

He said the parade would go ahead as normal, and include a speech from the president.

Reporting by Reuters; Editing by Kevin Liffey

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Mark Trevelyan

Thomson Reuters

Chief writer on Russia and CIS. Worked as a journalist on 7 continents and reported from 40+ countries, with postings in London, Wellington, Brussels, Warsaw, Moscow and Berlin. Covered the break-up of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. Security correspondent from 2003 to 2008. Speaks French, Russian and (rusty) German and Polish.

Reuters · by Mark Trevelyan

7. U.S. had no warning of a drone attack on the Kremlin, officials say

Excerpts:

Secretary of State Antony Blinken said he’d take anything coming from the Kremlin with a “large shaker of salt” during a conversation with the Washington Post’s David Ignatius on Wednesday.

Senior Biden administration officials are still working to confirm whether the suspected attack was ordered by Kyiv, conducted by a rogue pro-Ukraine group, or a false flag operation by Russia, two U.S. officials said.

If it was Ukraine, “we had no advance knowledge,” said one of the officials, who like others was granted anonymity to discuss a sensitive issue. “We are looking into the report but aren’t able to confirm it or validate its authenticity,” said another.

Members of the Senate Intelligence Committee will be briefed by the administration at 2:30 p.m. Wednesday. U.S. intelligence agencies didn’t respond to requests for comment.

U.S. had no warning of a drone attack on the Kremlin, officials say

By ALEXANDER WARD and JONATHAN LEMIRE

05/03/2023 11:17 AM EDT

Politico

Secretary of State Antony Blinken says to take any Russian claims with a “large shaker of salt.”

Experts are skeptical that Ukraine would be brazen enough to try to kill Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Russian capital. | Manuel Balce Ceneta/AP Photo

05/03/2023 11:17 AM EDT

The Biden administration had no foreknowledge of an impending drone attack on the Kremlin, four U.S. officials said, and a top official recommends caution when it comes to Moscow’s claims.

Russia said Wednesday that two drones flew overnight into the heart of Moscow to assassinate President Vladimir Putin, even though he wasn’t in the complex. Kyiv denies the allegation and officials said Ukraine had nothing to do with the attack. Instead, they insist it’s all a pretext created by the Kremlin to escalate its 14-month war.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken said he’d take anything coming from the Kremlin with a “large shaker of salt” during a conversation with the Washington Post’s David Ignatius on Wednesday.

Senior Biden administration officials are still working to confirm whether the suspected attack was ordered by Kyiv, conducted by a rogue pro-Ukraine group, or a false flag operation by Russia, two U.S. officials said.

If it was Ukraine, “we had no advance knowledge,” said one of the officials, who like others was granted anonymity to discuss a sensitive issue. “We are looking into the report but aren’t able to confirm it or validate its authenticity,” said another.

Members of the Senate Intelligence Committee will be briefed by the administration at 2:30 p.m. Wednesday. U.S. intelligence agencies didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Experts are skeptical that Ukraine would be brazen enough to try to kill Putin in the Russian capital. “The idea that this was an assassination attempt is absolutely ludicrous,” said Alina Polyakova, president and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington, D.C. “The Kremlin is a bunker and this looked like a makeshift drone that could only cause minimal damage.”

Mykhailo Polodyak, a senior adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, said “Ukraine has nothing to do with drone attacks on the Kremlin.” Such a strike would only incentivize Moscow to send more missiles into Ukraine to terrorize the civilian population, he suggested. “Why would we need this? Where is the logic in that?”

But there have been mysterious attacks in recent months that question the level of Kyiv’s involvement. Intelligence suggests a pro-Ukrainian group damaged the Nordstream pipelines last year, though a Russian navy ship was near the energy throughway before the blast.

The U.S. also believes Ukraine orchestrated the killing of Daria Dugina, the daughter of a famous Russian nationalist. And there are multiple instances of Russian weapons depots, bridges and trains unexpectedly exploding.

But some are unperturbed even if it’s confirmed that Ukraine was behind a real drone attack. “After 14 months of deadly Russian strikes against civilian targets across all of Ukraine, the Kremlin whining about a drone strike that hits the Kremlin merits zero sympathy,” said retired Gen. Ben Hodges, the former chief of U.S. Army Europe.

Erin Banco and Nahal Toosi contributed to this report.

POLITICO

Politico

8. Opinion | A chaotic evacuation is symbolic of U.S. failure in Sudan

Excerpts:

Many experts say that democratic transition in Sudan was a long shot and imposing sanctions on the generals would not have been effective. But they, too, say the administration has mishandled the policy. If the Biden team didn’t want to bet on actual reform, they argue, it should have at least played a larger role in shaping events.

“We kind of pretended there was a transition when there wasn’t one,” said J. Peter Pham, a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former U.S. special envoy for the Sahel region. “We should have been engaging both parties with a plan to move things along rather than wagging fingers at them.”

Now, the United States has no diplomatic presence on the ground. To increase U.S. engagement in Sudan at this point would be difficult. But the United States should not simply stand aside and watch Africa’s third-largest country further descend into crisis.

Opinion | A chaotic evacuation is symbolic of U.S. failure in Sudan

The Washington Post · by Josh Rogin · May 3, 2023

For most Americans, the U.S. government’s chaotic approach to Sudan became clear only last month when fighting erupted, causing thousands of U.S. citizens to scramble for safety. But for close Sudan-watchers, the disordered evacuation effort is only the latest incident in years of failed policy.

Since April 15, when Sudan’s two most powerful generals started attacking each other, the country has descended into widespread violence, leading Sudanese and foreign nationals alike to flee the capital, Khartoum. On Monday, the United Nations warned that the humanitarian crisis in Sudan is on the verge of becoming a “full-blown catastrophe” and, if the fighting continues, 800,000 potential refugees could cause a regional crisis.

The U.S. government seems to have been caught off-guard. On April 23, military helicopters evacuated the embassy in Khartoum, but the Biden administration said security conditions prevented the rescue of private American citizens, leaving many to seek help from other nations. While several other countries evacuated their people, Americans on the ground lamented their government’s lack of support as they made life-or-death decisions.

After days of criticism, on April 29, the U.S. Defense Department deployed armed drones to protect a convoy of Americans making the harrowing trip from Khartoum to Port Sudan. Two more such convoys have since arrived in Port Sudan. In Washington, lawmakers in both parties had been calling on the administration to prepare for such a scenario.

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“The violence and ongoing crisis in Sudan are no surprise to anyone paying attention,” James Risch (Idaho), the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told me. “Why the administration, which has been working on this issue from day one, did not see the troop build-up in Khartoum or other warning signs as sufficient reason to act speaks to the more significant failures of its policy.”

As national security adviser Jake Sullivan pointed out, Sudan is not Afghanistan, where the United States had special obligations. Nevertheless, it’s hard not to notice that in both circumstances, the administration had no good plan to get Americans out, and then struggled to come up with one on the fly.

The larger U.S. policy failure in Sudan dates back at least to 2019. That’s when soldiers loyal to Sudanese Army Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and those loyal to Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the head of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), overthrew Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir following popular protests. The two forces are now fighting each other.

After Bashir was deposed, U.S. congressional leaders in both parties began calling for more diplomatic attention and resources to support Sudan’s transition to democracy. But the Trump and Biden administrations did little to either advance that reform or convince the two generals that there would be consequences if they broke their promises.

In October 2021, the generals stamped out the civilian leadership for good. But President Biden failed to impose sanctions on them for their power grab, human rights violations and increasing state corruption. As the infighting intensified, the United States ceded international diplomatic leadership to other countries and failed to properly support civil society groups opposed to military rule.

“Sudan is a prime example of what happens when the United States does not mean what it says and seeks short-term solutions to long-term problems,” Risch said.

To be sure, in the past two weeks, Secretary of State Antony Blinken has been active on Sudan, getting involved in the evacuation efforts and working to establish a meaningful cease-fire. But this stands in contrast to the lack of high-level attention paid to the country over the past two years.

John Godfrey, the American ambassador to Sudan, assumed office only last September. The State Department’s special envoy for the Horn of Africa, Ambassador Mike Hammer, is the third person to hold that job in two years. Officials say that bureaucratic turf struggles within the State Department’s Africa bureau have limited his authority on the Sudan problem.

Many experts say that democratic transition in Sudan was a long shot and imposing sanctions on the generals would not have been effective. But they, too, say the administration has mishandled the policy. If the Biden team didn’t want to bet on actual reform, they argue, it should have at least played a larger role in shaping events.

“We kind of pretended there was a transition when there wasn’t one,” said J. Peter Pham, a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former U.S. special envoy for the Sahel region. “We should have been engaging both parties with a plan to move things along rather than wagging fingers at them.”

Now, the United States has no diplomatic presence on the ground. To increase U.S. engagement in Sudan at this point would be difficult. But the United States should not simply stand aside and watch Africa’s third-largest country further descend into crisis.

Biden talks a big game about democracy, but his team has often taken a hands-off approach to countries struggling with democratic transitions. The president’s objective in the Middle East and North Africa has been described as “no more failed states.” In Sudan, that policy has failed.

The Washington Post · by Josh Rogin · May 3, 2023

9. Real or not, reported Kremlin drone attack unsettles Russia

Real or not, reported Kremlin drone attack unsettles Russia

militarytimes.com · by Jim Heintz, The Associated Press · May 3, 2023

TALLINN, Estonia (AP) — As Russian officials tell it, two Ukrainian drones flew into the very heart of Moscow under the cover of darkness, reaching the Kremlin before they were shot down at the last minute.

A cloud of questions hangs over the claim.

Why did the Kremlin announcement come about 12 hours after the purported incident? Why did no reports of explosions emerge prior to the announcement on the messaging apps that remain full of chatter despite Russia’s crackdown on media and criticism of the war in Ukraine? Why didn’t videos of the purported attacks appear until after the announcement? Why haven’t the images been verified?

A drone attack on the Kremlin would be the most severe penetration of Russian airspace since German teen Matthias Rust landed his little single-engine plane on the fringes of Red Square in 1987. Announcing the attack — or even faking it — risks Russia undermining its citizens’ trust in its frequent assertions of military superiority.

Adding to that humiliation is that the incident occurred less than a week before Victory Day, Russia’s paramount military holiday. In some of the videos of the claimed attack, the decorated viewing stands and tribune for the day’s ritual Red Square military parade can be seen prominently.

For President Vladimir Putin, the confession of Ukrainian drones reaching the Kremlin could be justification for a brutal step-up of attacks on Ukraine. Russian officials persistently contend — repeated evidence to the contrary — that the military goes after only military targets.

Severe retaliation is already in the wind, including threats aimed specifically at Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who denied attacking the Kremlin.

“After today’s terrorist act, no variant remains other than the physical elimination of Zelenskyy and his clique,” said former Russian president and deputy chairman of the Russian security council, Dmitry Medvedev,

The chairman of the powerful lower house of parliament, Vyacheslav Volodin, compared the Ukrainian government with the terrorist Islamic State and said he will demand “the use of weapons capable of destroying it.”

Russia’s nuclear doctrine says the country can use nuclear weapons if it comes under a nuclear strike or if it faces an attack with conventional weapons that threatens “the very existence” of the Russian state. The West has accused Putin of nuclear saber-rattling during the Ukraine war

But Phillips O’Brien, a professor of strategic studies at University of St. Andrews, downplayed the possibility related to the alleged Kremlin attack.

“You’re not going to say, ‘Now that there has been an attack with a tiny drone, now we can go nuclear,’” he said.

Commentator Abbas Gallyamov, a former Putin speechwriter who has fled the country, also raised doubts.

“If enemy drones reach the Kremlin, it means that any other object on the territory of the European part of Russia is generally defenseless,” he said. “Therefore, I do not believe that this was a provocation conceived by the Kremlin in order to influence public opinion.”

If Ukraine had indeed attacked, “consider it a performative strike, a demonstration of capability and a declaration of intent: Don’t think Moscow is safe,” said Mark Galeotti, a Russian military and security analyst at University College, London.

Less clear, he said on Twitter, “is whether it shakes Russians’ nerve or angers them.”

Russians’ nerves already have been frayed by attacks, either likely from Ukraine or from domestic opponents, that have risen sharply in recent weeks.

Two freight trains derailed this week in bomb explosions in the Bryansk region that borders Ukraine. Notably, the region’s authorities did not blame Ukraine, which could be an attempt to whitewash Ukrainian sabotage capacities.

But Bryansk authorities in March claimed that two people were shot and killed when alleged Ukrainian saboteurs penetrated the region. The region also has been hit with sporadic cross-border shelling, including one that killed four people in April.

Ukrainian drones reportedly have penetrated deep into Russia several times. In December, Russia claimed to have shot down drones at airfields in the Saratov and Ryazan regions. Three soldiers were reported killed in the attack in Saratov, which targeted an important military airfield.

Earlier, Russia reported shooting down a Ukrainian drone that targeted the headquarters of its Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol in Russia-annexed Crimea.

In addition, two prominent supporters of Russia’s war in Ukraine have been killed on their home ground. Darya Dugina, a commentator with a nationalist TV channel, died in a car bombing outside Moscow that officials blamed on Ukraine. And authorities said Ukrainian intelligence was behind the killing of prominent pro-war blogger Vladlen Tatarsky, who was killed in April when a bomb inside a statuette he was handed at a party exploded.

___

Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

10. Preventing Intelligence Leaks: Let’s Start Over

Conclusion:

Combatting leaks and foreign espionage shows that doing business-as-usual is a prescription for failure. Despite episodic tweaks, the presently decrepit, 75-year-old, pre-digital secrecy paradigm neither protects nor declassifies national security secrets consistently or well. If a full investigation and prosecution of the recent Discord leaker can prompt a zero-based review of the failed secrecy paradigm, it could make way for a new one, finally stimulating comprehensive reforms to implement long-overdue 21st century solutions to correct these persistent – but not intractable – failures.

Preventing Intelligence Leaks: Let’s Start Over

justsecurity.org · by James Bruce · May 3, 2023

May 3, 2023

As a former CIA career officer, I wince learning about leaks of classified documents that produce sustained headlines. I know the damage such a debacle can wreak on intelligence gathering and cooperation with U.S. allies. The hard-won intelligence that Jack Teixeira, the recently alleged Air National Guard leaker delivered via the internet to nations hostile to the United States, likely cost U.S. taxpayers billions of dollars to produce, and some of those sources and methods may never produce again.

Unauthorized Disclosures – Preventing Self-Inflicted Wounds

It is doubly painful to know that such illegal leaks can mostly be prevented. But that would require repudiating a business-as-usual approach, and a much more concerted way to thwart untrustworthy employees whose responsibilities exceed their judgment.

Ten years ago, I coauthored a think-tank study for the Department of Defense, recommending comprehensive measures to deter and prevent classified leaks. While we cannot know for certain how much these reforms might have helped, my understanding is that despite being officially endorsed, their full implementation, as some cynics had forewarned, has fallen short.

Serious unauthorized disclosures such as the documents stolen from the Air National Guard facility in Massachusetts, can damage U.S. national security. In this case, some of the leaked documents have reportedly spotlighted ways that shared intelligence has helped Ukraine defeat Russian attacks, which Russia may now be able to counter; how deeply U.S. intelligence has penetrated the Russian military, and where, by inference, such leakages may now be plugged; and how Ukraine’s shortages of specific defenses will multiply its vulnerabilities, which Russia can now better exploit. Such foolishly squandered advantages will fuel Russia’s offensive operations, increase casualties to Ukrainian forces and civilian population, and add pressures for U.S. and allied escalation.

The government’s track record controlling classified leaks has been steadfastly poor. Its impotence in dealing effectively with this problem was well characterized 40 years ago by then-Deputy Assistant Attorney General Richard K. Willard: “The whole system has been so ineffectual as to perpetuate the notion that the Government can do nothing to stop the leaks.” This harsh judgment is even more true today than it was when Willard’s stunning observation made no discernible difference.

Secrecy Paradigms – Old and New

The only approach that can ever hope to make a real difference is a transformational one. The United States badly needs a new secrecy paradigm to protect classified information, and one that also improves government transparency to enhance public understanding of issues customarily hidden in secrecy. As Ret. Gen. Barry McCaffrey recently and correctly urged, what the Pentagon needs to curtail leaks is a “zero-based review.” In plain language, that means let’s start over.

Our archaic system for keeping classified information secure is terminally flawed, and no amount of triage tinkering can hope to fix it. As the Discord leaker demonstrated once again, classified information held in a SCIF (sensitive compartmented information facility) is not always secure. A zero-based review will reveal that our inertia-shackled system for protecting official secrets is just as broken as our system for declassifying them. Both parts of the classification equation now demand fundamental transformation.

Who Gets Cleared? The government urgently needs to re-examine who genuinely requires classified information to conduct their work. And all who gain such access must be trustworthy. Huge numbers of people hold U.S. security clearances today – not just among intelligence agencies and senior government officials, but legions who work in the departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, Energy, and Justice. According to a 2019 estimate, about 4.2 million Americans have security clearances, a number roughly equivalent to the population of Australia or Singapore. That is simply too many. And 1.3 million of those hold top secret clearances. Holders of these privileged accesses who do not need them should not have them.

What’s more, vetting procedures for getting clearances – especially for top secret – must be significantly upgraded. In addition to much more rigorous background checks, these assessments cannot compromise on maturity, integrity, and trustworthiness of applicants. Many such checks do not dig deeply enough, and clearance adjudications may overlook red flags that should be disqualifying such as a penchant for violence, racism, and fascist ideologies. Through no-exception psychological testing, investigations must screen out narcissists who believe that rules don’t apply to them. They show a proclivity to abuse their access, and this trait appears disproportionately among leakers and spies. (And, indeed, we need more empirical research on what characteristics correlate with leakers and apply such findings toward evidence-based vetting processes.) Finally, with rare exceptions, no candidate for top secret codeword clearances should escape the polygraph, both screening and lifestyle. Polygraphs are not perfect. But they generally get good marks in both screening and deterrence.

New and inexperienced employees with classified access also need much more intensive training — mandatory and graded — on how to handle classified materials, as well as meaningful education on their responsibilities for keeping national secrets, and a clear understanding of the penalties they might face for improperly handling such material.

Who Can See What? The cold war “need-to-know” concept has, for years, remained an abstract principle. Not only does it have no precise definition, but there has also been essentially no practical way to enforce it. Worse, it has been mostly superseded by a post-9/11 concept of “need-to-share,” while powerful search engines can open the classified floodgates. True, wider distribution of classified information can reduce intelligence failures. But it also elevates the risk of unauthorized disclosures when sensitive information becomes available to the wrong people. These contradictory need vs. share tensions can and must be resolved.

A new access management system could, for instance, “bin” classified information into finite categories of substantive knowledge (e.g., Russia, China, terrorism, WMD, etc.) Controlled access to each category could then be enforced through strict need-to-know criteria, determined by supervisors held accountable for the compliance of each cleared employee they supervise. Unproven and junior employees would be granted access to fewer bins than more senior employees. The most restrictive need-to-know standards would apply to access top secret codeword bins.

Confusing Rules Abound. Likewise, the disparate rules throughout the national security enterprise need to be more centralized and consistent, namely the laws, executive orders, classification guides, and related rules that regulate access and management of classified information. A wide disparity prevails in definitions and standards of classification; in hiring, vetting, and monitoring practices; in personnel, document, and physical security regulations, and in penalties, across the 17 intelligence agencies, the military services, and the numerous departments and organizations that use classified information.

The recent pioneering accomplishment of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to consolidate its previous 65 classification guides into a single volume showed that simplifying and standardizing is a viable approach: It yielded an 82-percent reduction in classified line items, made 45 classification downgrades, and eliminated the Confidential category altogether. This bold initiative to build “higher walls around fewer secrets” should serve as an exemplar for government-wide action.

Culture of Leaking. The government also needs to grapple with a lax culture surrounding leaks. One study found that the primary sources of serious leaks come from senior political appointees, policymakers, and senior executives from executive branch agencies, along with members of Congress and their staffs. Citing data from a Harvard survey of former federal policymaking officials, 42 percent of respondents acknowledged leaking classified information to the media. Agencies that use classified information must require training to develop a professional secrecy ethic for everyone cleared for classified information as a core competency spanning both protection and transparency goals, then vigorously investigate violations and apply severe administrative or criminal sanctions to transgressors.

Technology – Double-edged Sword. Technology has been the weak link – aiding tech-savvy leakers (e.g., IT administrators like Edward Snowden and now the alleged Jack Teixeira) as much or more than protecting the information they can access. Damage to U.S. intelligence and national security interests by high-volume leakers Chelsey (Bradley) Manning and Snowden is inestimable, and the accused Teixeira may soon join their ranks. Across government, there should be vigorous efforts to develop and integrate 21st-century technologies into secrecy management, such as zero trust architecture for cyber security, especially those aimed at insider threats such as enhanced monitoring of IT systems, and continuous evaluation of cleared personnel. Both will help deter and detect potential leakers and spies by tracking the classified documents they access, download, or print.

Laws That Don’t Work Well. With disproportionate emphasis on the 1917 espionage statute (18 USC §§ 793 and 798), U.S. law is ill-equipped for prosecuting damaging leakers. Comprehensive anti-leaks legislation can clarify legal boundaries and responsibilities, define legitimate whistleblower interests, and establish end-to-end accountability processes to identify and prosecute leakers responsible for their criminal conduct.

Overclassification and Transparency. As the Public Interest Declassification Board has made clear – and executive order 13526 has failed to correct – declassification processes are just as broken as protection measures. A new secrecy paradigm would also enhance government transparency by reducing the growing backlog of declassification releases, prioritizing historically significant information for declassification through a topic-based approach, and implementing cutting-edge technologies to reduce the labor-intensive declassification burdens that cannot possibly match the snowballing growth of newly classified documents.

Why Wait? Start Over Now

Combatting leaks and foreign espionage shows that doing business-as-usual is a prescription for failure. Despite episodic tweaks, the presently decrepit, 75-year-old, pre-digital secrecy paradigm neither protects nor declassifies national security secrets consistently or well. If a full investigation and prosecution of the recent Discord leaker can prompt a zero-based review of the failed secrecy paradigm, it could make way for a new one, finally stimulating comprehensive reforms to implement long-overdue 21st century solutions to correct these persistent – but not intractable – failures.

Editor’s Note: The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not represent the CIA, U.S. Government, or the RAND Corporation.

Image: Folder marked classified (via Getty Images).

justsecurity.org · by James Bruce · May 3, 2023

11. Report: China is increasingly stopping people from leaving the country

Population and resources control measures.

Report: China is increasingly stopping people from leaving the country

The Washington Post · by Meaghan Tobin · May 2, 2023

The Chinese government has significantly increased the use of exit bans to stop people — Chinese and foreign nationals alike — from leaving the country since top leader Xi Jinping took power in 2012, according to a new report describing how a web of vague laws are being expanded for political reasons.

The report comes amid growing concern about the environment for foreign businesses in China, after the wide-ranging overhaul last week of the country’s espionage law and raids on corporate consultancies Mintz Group and Bain & Co.

“Anyone may be a target — human rights defenders, businesspeople, officials and foreigners,” the rights group Safeguard Defenders said in the report, “Trapped: China’s Expanding Use of Exit Bans.”

The report found that the Chinese Communist Party has used exit bans to silence activists, intimidate foreign journalists, control ethnic and religious groups and pressure people to return to China to face investigation — and that evidence suggested the number of politically targeted exit bans had grown in the past five years.

Beijing has added to the number of laws regarding exit bans since 2018, according to the report, expanding the ambiguity surrounding activities that could afoul of the rules.

“China has continued to introduce new laws and regulations on exit bans, further complicating and confusing the legal landscape,” said the report.

A review by The Post identified seven laws and regulations enacted or amended in that time period provided for exit bans.

Exact statistics on exit bans are not available in China’s opaque bureaucracy, but Safeguard Defenders found a number of indicators showing that their use had risen significantly.

These include the number of times exit bans were mentioned in the Supreme People’s Court’s official database rising eightfold between 2016 and 2020. “Even though the number of entries does not equal the number of exit bans, this dramatic jump likely mirrors a similar trend in exit bans recorded on the database (mostly civil disputes),” the report said.

China’s Ministry of Public Security did not respond to questions about how many individuals are subject to exit bans.

While Beijing has recently insisted the country is open for business, under Xi’s leadership it has repeatedly cracked down on the private sector and moved to control information flows.

In recent weeks, foreign businesses operating in China have had growing cause for concern. In March, authorities raided the Beijing office of U.S. due diligence company Mintz and detained five local staff members. The company’s Singaporean executive is unable to leave China, according to Reuters.

Authorities have also put imports from American chip maker Micron Technology under review, detained an employee of Japanese drugmaker Astellas Pharma and questioned staff at consulting firm Bain & Co. in Shanghai.

The increased scrutiny has raised concerns that Beijing is moving to deepen the divide between China’s business environment and the international business community.

Earlier this year, state-owned firms were reportedly encouraged to stop working with the big four international accounting firms. In the past month some foreign subscribers said they had been cut off from critical Chinese sources of knowledge and data, including the country’s largest academic database, China National Knowledge Infrastructure, and widely used financial repository Wind.

A particularly concerning development has been the sweeping overhaul of China’s counter espionage law late last month, which broadly described espionage to include any “documents, data, materials or items related to national security and interests.”

The law, which did not define national security interests, already allowed for an exit ban to be imposed on anyone under investigation.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce on Friday said that the revised spy law risked shaking investor confidence, pointing out that the law “casts a wide net” over materials considered relevant to national security.

“In the context of China’s new Counter Espionage Law … the additional scrutiny of firms providing essential business services dramatically increases the uncertainties and risks of doing business in the People’s Republic,” it said in a statement.

Analysts and observers have expressed concern that previously ordinary research activities could now fall under the law’s vague umbrella. The wide-reaching revision, in combination with the increased scrutiny on foreign firms, has undermined Beijing’s messaging that the country is open for business after three years of strict pandemic controls stifled growth.

When asked about the raid on Bain’s offices last week, China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said she wasn’t aware of the incident, but that Beijing was committed to fostering a world-class business environment. “China is a law-based country. All companies in China must operate in accordance with the law,” said Mao.

The raids and detentions have heightened unease among executives and investors about the risks of continuing to operate in the country.

The Japanese government warned its nationals to be on alert not to violate the law, and Japanese media reported that since 2014, at least 17 Japanese nationals had been detained in China for alleged spying.

Lyric Li in Seoul contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Meaghan Tobin · May 2, 2023

12. Ukraine Situation Report: HIMARS Shown Being Stashed In 'Soviet Bunker'

Photos at the link: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-himars-shown-being-stashed-in-soviet-bunker

Ukraine Situation Report: HIMARS Shown Being Stashed In 'Soviet Bunker'

Ukraine’s info war is in full swing as “Capt. HIMARS” taunts Russian troops by saying contrary to Kremlin claims, none have been destroyed.

HOWARD ALTMAN

PUBLISHED MAY 3, 2023 8:38 PM EDT

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · May 3, 2023

Ukraine on Wednesday combined two of its most effective weapons - U.S.-donated M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS and its own top-notch information warfare operation - to taunt Russian troops.

In a high-octane video tweeted out by the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, a masked soldier calling himself Capt. HIMARS mocks Russia’s repeated claims that it has destroyed many HIMARS.

As of January, the Russian MoD claimed it destroyed 27 HIMARS. That despite the fact as of today, only 18 of 38 promised by the U.S. had been delivered, the Pentagon told us. The remainder will be procured through Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) funding and contracting. The Pentagon is not aware of any HIMARS that have been destroyed, a U.S. defense official told The War Zone Wednesday.

The video opens with the soldier standing in front of a HIMARS launching its vaunted Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) munitions from an undisclosed location. These munitions, which can reach up to about 50 miles, have proven a game-changer for Ukraine as it has been able to conduct deep strikes on Russian logistics and supply hubs far beyond the front lines.

"Capt. HIMARS" in front of an M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System launching munitions. (Ukraine MoD screencap)

Standing amid a cloud of rocket exhaust and flying debris, he delivers an ominous message in a computer-altered voice.

“Russian soldier! My name is Capt. HIMARS. I stand by my words. I don’t strike the barracks in sectors from where I get coordinates for armored vehicles and ammo depots.”

The video then cuts to the soldier standing inside what appears to a shelter with circular metal-ribbed support beams, as he waves a HIMARS launcher inside and continues his message.

"Capt. HIMARS" waiving the HIMARS into a Soviet-era bunker. (Ukraine MoD screencap)

“You’re constantly being lied to that there are barely any HIMARS left. Take a look at the conditions under which we store HIMARS. These are military facilities built during the Soviet Union period. They can even withstand nuclear strikes. Since the beginning of the war, not a single HIMARS system has been destroyed.”

The video then cuts to the soldier standing back outside as a HIMARS system prepares to fire.

“Russian soldier!” he says. “Keep sending me target coordinates so that death does not fall down from the skies on you.”

He then puts the walkie-talkie he is carrying up to his mouth.

“Fire!” he says.

The video then cuts to the HIMARS launching a GMLRS.

The video includes an email for Capt. HIMARS.

We reached out to him to see if he could tell us more about the bunkers and whether he has any concerns about operational security given that Russia would likely know where old Soviet bunkers are located.

We will update this story if he responds.

Before we head into the latest updates from Ukraine, The War Zone readers can catch up on our previous rolling coverage here.

The Latest

A Russian attack on Kherson Wednesday killed 21 and wounded another 48, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on his Telegram channel.

"A railway station and a crossing, a house, a hardware store, a grocery supermarket, a gas station - do you know what unites these places? The bloody trail that Russia leaves with its shells, killing civilians in Kherson and Kherson region."

There were several Russian claims of drone strikes against their interests Wednesday, including on the Kremlin. Ukrainian officials pushed back on that assertion. You can read more about it in our story here.

On the battlefield, Yevgeny Prighozin, the capo di tutti capi of the Wagner mercenary group, claimed in an audio posted on his Telegram channel that the long-expected Ukrainian offensive is already underway.

Prigozhin said that the "active phase" of the counteroffensive would begin in the coming days, Reuters reported.

"I believe the advance of the Ukrainian Army has already begun ... We are seeing the greatest possible activity both on the perimeter and within the front lines," Prigozhin said.

"I therefore believe that it has all already started. And I believe it will all enter an active phase in the very near future. It could be a matter of days."

The War Zone could not confirm Prigozhin's claims.

Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin says Ukraine's offensive is underway. (Photo by Diego Herrera Carcedo/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

To aid Ukraine's efforts to defeat Russia, the Pentagon on Wednesday officially announced its latest tranche of military aid to Ukraine on Wednesday, a package valued at up to $300 million that for the first time includes air-launched unguided Hydra 70mm (2.75-inch) rockets.

The other capabilities in this 37th Presidential Drawdown Authority Package include:

Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
155mm Howitzers;
155mm artillery rounds;
120mm, 81mm, and 60mm mortar rounds;
Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
AT-4 and Carl Gustaf anti-armor weapon systems;
Small arms and small arms ammunition;
Demolition munitions for obstacle clearing;
Trucks and trailers to transport heavy equipment;
Testing and diagnostic equipment to support vehicle maintenance and repair;
Spare parts and other field equipment.

Speaking of U.S. weapons donations, it appears the M109A6 Paladin 155mm self-propelled howitzers are now in Ukraine, according to the Ukraine Weapons Tracker OSINT group. The Pentagon announced the first donation of 18 Paladins back in January as part of a Presidential Drawdown Authority tranche of aid.

The European Union (EU) on Wednesday moved ahead with plans to buy urgently needed artillery shells for Ukraine as well as ramping up the bloc's ability to produce munitions, Reuters reported.

EU nation ambassadors agreed on details of a 1 billion euro ($1.1 billion) effort to jointly buy ammunition for Ukraine after weeks of wrangling that had frustrated leaders in Kyiv.

Meanwhile, the European Commission, the EU's executive, launched a plan to use more than $553 million to help European arms firms boost capacity by upgrading equipment, opening production lines and training staff.

But Ukraine isn't getting everything it asks for. Finnish President Sauli Niinisto told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that his country won't give Ukraine any of its 62 F/A-18C/D multirole fighter jets. Zelensky was in Finland on an unannounced visit with Nordic leaders.

"We have Hornet fighters, which are quite old" and should be replaced by new planes, Niinisto said during a joint press conference, according to the Interfax news agency.

"Because we need strong protection," Niinisto said.

Finland must first receive the F-35 fighters it has already ordered before it can decommission its current aircraft fleet, Niinisto said. "We could not give up the Hornets before we get the new ones, and unfortunately the Hornets at that time practically finished," he said.

Hornets could potentially be sourced from other countries though, as we discussed in-depth recently.

Finland's president said he can't provide Ukraine with F-18s because his country needs them. (Finnish MoD photo)

Still, Zelensky said he is convinced Western allies will provide more modern combat aircraft after the looming offensive is shown to be a success.

"Why am I sure we will get aircraft?" Zelensky said during the press conference. "Because soon we will have offensive actions. And after them, I am sure we will be given aircraft."

Zelensky also said that Ukraine expects clear signals from NATO in support Ukraine's membership in the Alliance.

"We will not be in NATO as long as the war continues. We are clearly aware of this. But we would like our partners to make powerful steps towards us, in addition to the 'open doors', that would motivate Ukrainian society. We would like support today."

An important manifestation of NATO's political support for Ukraine, he added, should be the provision of effective security guarantees on the path to membership in the Alliance.

"On this path, while we have a war going on, we need security guarantees today, while we are not yet in NATO," Zelensky said. "But in any case, our goal is to achieve full membership in the Alliance."

Zelensky apparently traveled to Finland via a U.S. Air Force C-40B transport, according to OSINT trackers. We reached out to the Air Force for more details and will update this story with any information provided. You can read more about these aircraft, a 737 variant, in our story here.

The brutality of war is vividly captured in this video produced by Ukraine's 3rd Separate Assault Brigade as it attacks Russian troops.

Ukraine's Air Force claims that the German-donated German-made IRIS-T air defense system has destroyed more than 60 targets since October. Germany earlier this week announced that it has delivered a second IRIS-T system to Ukraine as part of its ongoing aid to Kyiv.

The battle for Bahkmut has imposed tremendous costs on both sides in terms of personnel and equipment. Several Ukrainian armored vehicles, including a T-64BV tank, are seen destroyed in this video below.

And finally, the Kyiv Post had some fun with today's incident at the Kremlin, playing off a postage stamp Ukraine released depicting the infamous invective uttered by Ukrainian Border Guards responding to a demand from the crew of the Moskva to surrender on Snake Island with the defiant retort "Russian warship, go fuck yourself!"

That's all for now. We will update this story when we have more news to report about Ukraine.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · May 3, 2023

13. JSOU Paper - SOF Quills for the Porcupine | SOF News

JSOU Paper - SOF Quills for the Porcupine | SOF News

sof.news · by John Friberg · May 4, 2023

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has failed for the most part – Kyiv still stands and Ukraine has recaptured much of the territory it had lost in the initial phases of the war. The remarkable resistance of Ukraine has surprised many national security observers, caused embarrassment to Russia, and have had many looking to apply lessons learned to a future Taiwan conflict.

In April 2022, General Richard Clarke (Ret.) – former commander of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), stated that many U.S. officials share the desire that “Taiwan, just like Ukraine has been, to be an indigestible porcupine.”

The U.S. and other nations have been reluctant to directly engage in open conflict with Russia or China. This leaves some strategic deterrence gaps – areas that special operations forces can fill. Many studies of have been done on how the Ukraine conflict can provide some lessons on how to deter the People’s Republic of China from invading Taiwan. However, most of these are focused on conventional warfare and seem to omit the applicability of SOF.

This JSOU paper aims to fill that research gap by gathering lessons from SOF activities in Ukraine and applying them to Taiwan – adding quills to Taiwan’s defensive capability. The lessons gathered include the strengthening of resistance capabilities, fostering long-term alliances, and dominating the information war.

**********

SOF Quills for the Porcupine: Applying Lessons from Ukraine to Taiwan, by Scott Simeral, Lieutenant Colonel Steven Skipper, and Lieutenant Colonel Giovanna Espegio, Joint Special Operations University Press, March 2023, PDF, 18 pages.

https://www.jsou.edu/Press/PublicationDashboard/225

Image from the cover of the paper cited above. A porcupine with quills containing the Fairbairn-Sykes dagger, an international symbol for Special Operations Forces, against a backdrop of Ukraine and Taiwan flags. Claire Luke for JSOU Press.

sof.news · by John Friberg · May 4, 2023

14. Intelligence Leak Fuels Senate Effort to Protect Government Secrets

Intelligence Leak Fuels Senate Effort to Protect Government Secrets

A pair of bills aims to overhaul handling of classified material and security clearances after alleged leaks by Jack Teixeira

By Dustin VolzFollow

and Lindsay WiseFollow

May 3, 2023 12:57 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/intelligence-leak-fuels-senate-effort-to-protect-government-secrets-14cdb4e9

WASHINGTON—A bipartisan group of senators plans to introduce legislation as soon as this week seeking to overhaul how the U.S. government classifies and protects its most sensitive national-security secrets, according to people familiar with the matter, a push that comes in the wake of a recent damaging leak of intelligence files.

A pair of complementary bills would attempt to both reduce the ever-expanding amount of material that is classified by, among other things, investing in automated technologies that would make it easier to downgrade material or make it public, the people said, while also looking to plug perceived gaps in the existing security-clearance process, which has failed to catch an array of leakers since changes after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks loosened access controls to some classified material.

The effort has been in the works for months and long predated the alleged disclosures from Massachusetts Air National Guardsman Jack Teixeira, some of the people said, but the leak has added pressure to address longstanding vulnerabilities to the system.

Sen. Mark Warner of Virginia, the top Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, and Sen. John Cornyn of Texas, a powerful Republican close to Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, have drafted measures dealing with overclassification and security clearances, respectively, and are co-sponsoring each other’s legislation as well, the people said.

Sen. John Cornyn, a Republican from Texas, has drafted legislation addressing security clearances. PHOTO: WILL OLIVER/SHUTTERSTOCK

Sens. Ron Wyden (D., Ore.) and Jerry Moran (R., Kan.) also are expected to support both bills. The two have authored legislation in previous Congresses that would update the declassification system to assist federal agencies struggling to process a large volume of secret information that is no longer sensitive, such as backlogged historical records Congress has said must be released and deploy automated technologies designed to improve the process. That plan by Messrs. Wyden and Moran, who have said classification costs taxpayers about $18.5 billion annually, is part of the larger suite of classification-system changes now being pursued under Sen. Warner’s bill, the people said.

Among the security clearance changes being sought is a requirement that agencies study the necessity of different clearances and to keep the number of cleared individuals to a minimum, one of the people said.

Though classification and security clearance overhauls have attracted expanding bipartisan interest recently, the prospects for legislation moving forward amid a busy congressional schedule ahead of a presidential election year weren’t clear. Despite widespread agreement of shortcomings in both areas, lawmakers, intelligence officials and experts haven’t coalesced around specific overhaul proposals, and it wasn’t clear whether the Biden administration would support the congressional action. Past presidential administrations have historically sought to retain control over classification issues.

Senior intelligence officials, including Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, have been publicly critical of the current classification regime, which government transparency advocates have said has been abused for decades to cover up embarrassment and shield controversial activities, such as drone strikes and brutal interrogation programs, from public view. A two-year review of the U.S. classification system based on interviews with dozens of current and former officials from the Pentagon, intelligence agencies, the State Department and elsewhere found that overclassification hobbles national defense objectives and jeopardizes congressional oversight of the executive branch.

A courtroom sketch of the detention hearing for Jack Teixeira, an Air National Guardsman accused of leaking military intelligence. PHOTO: MARGARET SMALL/REUTERS

All four senators sit on the intelligence panel, which has scrutinized security clearance issues and classification issues in the past. It wasn’t clear whether other lawmakers would also co-sponsor the legislation upon introduction.

Congressional aides said the bills were still being written and negotiated and could change before they are introduced. Among other potential ideas being considered was a plan to move oversight of classified files from the National Archives to either the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or the executive office of the president, according to people familiar with the matter. Other sections being drafted sought to deal more directly with the discoveries of classified documents at the offices and residences of President Biden, former President Donald Trump and former Vice President Mike Pence including by mandating security reviews of some White House files, such as when an administration leaves office, the people said.

The movement in the Senate comes as the Biden administration has also been working on one or more executive orders concerning the government’s classification rules, which are still governed by an Obama-era order that current and former intelligence officials and transparency activists have said is outdated. That effort, which began early last year, has been moving slowly, and it is unclear when or whether a new executive order might be signed, people familiar with the matter said. A National Security Council spokesman didn’t immediately comment.

Poland Is the Indispensable NATO Ally

Warsaw is doing more than others in Europe to defend itself.

By The Editorial BoardFollow

May 3, 2023 6:27 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/poland-weapons-nato-vladimir-putin-russia-ukraine-3c26615e?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

Americans sometimes ask, with good reason, why Western Europeans don’t do more to defend themselves. Behold Poland, a NATO state setting an example for all of Europe as it goes on an arms-buying spree to deter Vladimir Putin or the next Russian czar.

Last week Poland announced a $2.3 billion deal to buy missiles and missile launchers from the U.K. for its air-defense systems. The company MBDA says the purchase is “the largest European short-range air defence acquisition programme in NATO” since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.

Poland understands that Mr. Putin’s territorial ambitions don’t stop at the 330-mile border Poland shares with Ukraine. Russian atrocities against Ukrainian civilians have further fortified Polish determination to deter aggression. A year ago Warsaw passed the Homeland Defense Act that mandates defense spending of at least 3% of GDP, a level it has already exceeded this year. Defense spending rose to some $23.5 billion for 2023 from less than $14 billion in 2022, according to the Polish government. A separate Armed Forces Support Fund will provide up to some $11 billion more this year.

Last year’s law calls for Poland to increase its military manpower to 300,000 from some 143,500 in 2022. This will include 50,000 part-time warriors in the Polish Territorial Defense Forces. Last autumn Poland had $20 billion in military orders with the U.S. that are in the process of being fulfilled, according to the State Department. In February State approved the Polish purchase of another $10 billion in Himar rocket launchers and related ammo and equipment.

Yet America’s defense production capacity isn’t keeping up with the demand generated by growing global threats. Poland’s top general recently told the publication Breaking Defense that “we just took our suitcases with money and [are] going like hell around the world and trying to buy,” but “the biggest friction point globally is the capability of industry.”

Poland finalized the purchase of 32 F-35 fighter jets from the U.S. in late 2019 and early 2020, but deliveries begin next year and won’t be completed until 2030. The first shipment of missiles for Patriot air-defense systems provided under a 2018 agreement finally arrived this spring. The 250 Abrams tanks requested in 2021 won’t begin to arrive until 2025.

Poland has tried to offset these delays in part with $12.3 billion in arms purchases from South Korea, which can deliver some weapons faster. The Polish shopping list in Seoul includes nearly 200 K2 battle tanks, nearly 50 FA-50 fighter planes, as well as hundreds of howitzers and multiple rocket launchers.

Plans are also underway to work with Korean firms to build hundreds of tanks and howitzers in Poland. Even before the Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine, Poland was one of only nine of NATO’s 30 members to meet the defense-spending benchmark of 2% of GDP.

Poland’s financial and military commitments to Ukraine now exceed 0.6% of GDP, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, a German research outfit. That includes more than $2.5 billion in military support—more than France, whose economy is about four times larger than Poland’s. Poland has provided Ukraine with hundreds of tanks. Ukrainian troops also train in Poland, and the country is now a refuge for more than 1.5 million Ukrainians who fled the war.

Poland may be replacing Germany as the indispensable NATO ally in Europe. The U.S. has some 10,000 service members in the country and could consider more as their presence has popular support. As a front-line NATO state, Poland deserves front-line treatment for weapons.

Samsung Is a Case Study in How Manufacturers Leave China

Company still has significant operations in China but its smartphone manufacturing business pulled up stakes years ago

By Jacky WongFollow

May 3, 2023 9:17 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/samsung-is-a-case-study-in-how-manufacturers-leave-china-5dcb2dcf?page=1

“De-risking” is the latest buzzword describing Western governments’ strategy toward China. While it sounds less ambitious than “decoupling,” the basic idea is similar: reducing reliance on China for manufacturing, especially for key technological goods.

Driven by both geopolitics and commercial needs, the trend seems likely to pick up further steam: Even Apple AAPL -0.65%decrease; red down pointing triangle, the most visible beneficiary of the “made in China” phenomenon in the tech space, is starting to push its suppliers more aggressively toward India and other alternatives. But the practicalities of even a partial move away from China-based manufacturing are daunting.

Luckily there is at least one conspicuous example of a major high-technology company that has successfully relocated large parts of its production apparatus: Samsung Electronics SSNHZ 0.00%increase; green up pointing triangle, the global electronics giant and Apple’s smartphone rival.

Samsung still has significant operations in China, including for its crucial memory chip business. But from a head-count perspective, it has been edging away from China for years. The company had over 60,000 employees in China in 2013 according to its 2014 Sustainability Report, but that number had fallen to less than 18,000 by 2021. Samsung closed its last smartphone factory there in 2019.

Lower labor costs in other Asian countries are a big draw. But geopolitics was probably also an important factor. In 2016 and 2017 Beijing and Seoul became embroiled in a major diplomatic spat over South Korea’s plan to host a high-tech U.S. missile defense radar system. In an early preview of the coercive economic tactics that China has employed against a widening range of countries in recent years, Beijing effectively forced the sale of Korean conglomerate Lotte Group’s China supermarket business and curtailed tourist visits to Korea.

Even as China Reopens, Security Visits Spook Foreign Businesses

By Daisuke Wakabayashi, Chris Buckley and Keith Bradsher

May 4, 2023, 5:00 a.m. ET

The New York Times · by Keith Bradsher · May 4, 2023

Fears are growing that the Communist Party’s increasing focus on control over information about markets and companies is behind the questioning of firms.

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The closed office of the Mintz Group in Beijing in March.

May 4, 2023, 5:00 a.m. ET

With China’s pandemic restrictions dismantled and its leaders wooing executives flying into the country again, this was supposed to be a springtime of renewed investor confidence in the world’s second-biggest economy.

But a drumbeat of government security measures, including a broadening of counterespionage laws, and unannounced visits by investigators to the Chinese offices of several foreign firms have sent a shiver of worry that under Xi Jinping, economic pragmatism could again give way to a heightened focus on state control.

International consulting and advisory firms are among those that have faced questioning from Chinese security officers in recent weeks, adding to fears among foreign investors that the authorities may be trying to choke off their access to unvarnished information about markets, competitors and potential deals in China. The scrutiny has left some companies questioning whether their China operations are at risk.

Officers visited the Shanghai office of Bain & Company, a major American consulting firm, and questioned employees, Bain said in late April. And the Mintz Group, an American company specializing in corporate investigations, said in late March that officials visited its Beijing office and detained five Chinese employees.

“The business community is nervous given the number of visits that foreign companies are getting without any explanation as to why,” said Michael Hart, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce in China.

Broadly, they appear to reflect the demands from Mr. Xi and other senior leaders to fortify national security and, in particular, seal off the flow of potentially sensitive information to foreign governments and investors. Since coming to power in 2012, Mr. Xi has urged vigilance against the United States and Western influence. His wariness has redoubled as relations with Washington have deteriorated sharply under the Trump and Biden administrations.

President Biden meeting with the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, in Bali, Indonesia, in 2022.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

“The Chinese Communist Party is taking a multipronged approach to achieving supremacy in the control of data, and, through that, broader societal and geopolitical control,” Matthew Johnson, a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, wrote in a new report on China’s quest for data dominance.

Mr. Xi and other senior officials have said the United States is pursuing a long-term offensive to stymie China’s rise by cutting off its access to technology for cutting-edge industries and military innovations. The Biden administration’s stringent restrictions on sales of advanced semiconductors and chip-making equipment to China, ushered in last year, appear to have heightened Mr. Xi’s conviction that Washington is engaged in “all-around containment, encirclement and suppression of China.”

American consulting firms, in particular, seem to be attracting the attention of China’s Ministry of State Security, with officials showing up to ask questions about the firms’ work and their contacts with embassies.

It is part of an increasingly perilous environment for foreign companies. Beijing ordered a cybersecurity review of the U.S. chip maker Micron Technology in a move seen as retaliation for the semiconductor trade restrictions. A Japanese pharmaceutical executive was detained on suspicion of espionage. China has also intensified its use of exit bans to prevent people such as business executives from leaving the country.

In Shanghai, an office of Micron Technology, which has been targeted by China’s cybersecurity investigators.

While China has come down on foreign companies in the past, the targets were often big consumer brands, and the shaming played out in the media. The latest crackdowns are different. Mintz and Bain are cogs in the global business machinery, but they are not household names, and China has said little about the visits.

Official Chinese media reports have suggested that Beijing’s concerns about security vulnerabilities could be driving the activity.

An official report, issued to mark China’s annual National Security Education Day on April 15, said that an unnamed consultancy in southern China had delivered research to a foreign group about labor in Xinjiang, which the United States has put under heavy trade restrictions over allegations of forced labor by Uyghurs, a largely Muslim ethnic group.

The Chinese government denies that forced labor has occurred in Xinjiang’s cotton, textiles, mining and other industries. The consulting company’s work on Xinjiang amounted to a violation of anti-espionage laws and rules and “brought severe risks and hazards to national security and interests,” the Chinese report said.

To fortify China and the Communist Party, Mr. Xi has pushed a sweeping program for “comprehensive” national security, extending new security measures throughout the economy, businesses and data management.

A call by China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, to expand state control over data has rippled throughout the government. Credit...Andy Wong/Associated Press

“We must effectively ensure national data security,” Mr. Xi said in March at a meeting of the Politburo, the Communist Party’s two dozen most senior officials, that discussed China’s “big data” strategy.

Mr. Xi’s security demands have rippled throughout the Chinese government.

Last year, the Cyberspace Administration of China introduced new rules for data that is transferred abroad, requiring that it be assessed by the agency for its “degree of sensitivity” and possible risks to “national security.”

Since March, China National Knowledge Infrastructure, or CNKI, a company that distributes Chinese research papers, dissertations and statistics to foreign universities and other users abroad, has severely restricted access to them. CNKI cited the need to suspend such services while it figures out how to enforce the data export rules introduced last year.

Since a Communist Party congress in October, Mr. Xi has elevated a cohort of security officials who appear eager to continue this drive for tighter controls.

“Along with the profound changes in the international and domestic environment, the scope of national security is constantly expanding,” Chen Yixin, the minister for state security, wrote in an article for the party’s chief ideological journal last month.

Chinese legislators last month approved changes to the Counterespionage Law, widening the already broad definition of spying to include providing “documents, data, materials or objects bearing on national security and interests.”

The Cyberspace Administration of China in Beijing introduced new rules last year tightening security assessments for data that is transferred abroad.Credit...Thomas Peter/Reuters

The United States ambassador to China, R. Nicholas Burns, criticized the espionage law on Tuesday.

“This is a law that potentially could make illegal in China the kind of mundane activities that a business would have to do to seek due diligence before you agree to a major investment deal,” he said.

It appears that European firms have not attracted the attention of China’s security establishment, as Europe’s national leaders have generally taken a more accommodating stance toward China than the Biden administration. But European companies also say it is critical to maintain public access to information about markets and companies.

“There is a strong need for clarification on which information is sensitive and which is not,” said Joerg Wuttke, the president of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China.

Dan Harris, a Seattle-based lawyer who works with foreign companies in China, said that in the past week he had heard from at least two American companies looking to leave the country, having seen the signs that the Chinese Communist Party appears to be sending with the recent scrutiny.

“The message is: ‘We don’t care that much about the economy. What we care about is keeping you in line,’” Mr. Harris said. “‘And if you don’t do what we want you to do, we will come after you.’”

Ana Swanson and Edward Wong contributed reporting.

The New York Times · by Keith Bradsher · May 4, 2023

18.Western Pacific Nations Look to Washington for Leadership — But Don’t Get It

Quite a negative critique of US foreign policy. A summary of the recent writings of some major critics.

Western Pacific Nations Look to Washington for Leadership — But Don’t Get It

https://spectator.org/western-pacific-nations-look-to-washington-for-leadership-but-dont-get-it/

The Biden administration continues to ignore the reality of the Chinese threat.

by FRANCIS P. SEMPA

May 2, 2023, 11:05 PM

Village in Seoul, South Korea (T.Dallas/Shutterstock)

wo articles on the front page of the Washington Times reveal the dichotomy at work in the geopolitics of the western Pacific. Tom Howell Jr. and Jeff Mordock write about Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s seeking concrete security pledges from the Biden administration vis-à-vis China. Andrew Salmon’s piece notes that a survey conducted earlier this year showed that at least half of South Koreans “doubt that the U.S. will exercise its nuclear deterrence capabilities in the event of an emergency.” So, at the same time that the smaller nations of the western Pacific seek greater assurances about their security relationship with the United States, those same nations are fearful that the Biden administration will shrink from defending them against China and/or North Korea.

READ MORE from Francis P. Sempa: Harvard Professor Writes Fawning Piece About the CCP

Meanwhile, Japan and Australia have announced defense buildups and “overhauls,” in part because, in the words of a high-level Australian defense report, the U.S. is “no longer the unipolar leader of the Indo-Pacific.” Even Taiwan has been raising defense spending and shifting to a strategy of denial against a possible Chinese attack or invasion.

All of this comes against the backdrop of a changing balance of power in the Indo-Pacific driven by China’s decades-long military buildup and the Biden administration’s refusal to shift U.S. policy in the western Pacific from competitive engagement to geopolitical containment. Howell and Mordock note in their article that Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen in a recent speech at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies called for the frank discussion of “difficult issues” by the U.S. and China and stated that both countries “should work together when possible for the benefits of our countries and the world.” And President Joe Biden during South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s recent visit to Washington sought to assure Chinese leaders that U.S. efforts to increase domestic semiconductor manufacturing “is not designed to hurt China.” This is the language of détente, not containment. As China expert Gordon Chang writes, “Biden … does not appear ready to reestablish deterrence in an era of Chinese aggression and belligerence.”

The Biden administration continues to cling to the policy of “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan, despite the many calls on both sides of the political spectrum and in Congress to shift to “strategic clarity.” Moreover, Biden’s defense budget request for fiscal year 2024, as the Washington Examiner’s national security writer Tom Rogan explains, is a significant net decrease when factoring in the inflation rate. Rogan describes the proposed budget as “utterly incompatible with confronting the threat China poses.”

The geography of containment of China in the western Pacific is obvious when you look at a map of the region that Nicholas J. Spykman called the “Asiatic Mediterranean.” The coastal regions of China consist of marginal seas (Sea of Japan, East China Sea, South China Sea) bordered by what Hans W. Weigert described as “curving peninsular and island barriers” extending from the Aleutian Islands, the Kamchatka Peninsula, the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin Island and Japan’s main islands, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Pescadores, the Philippines, Borneo, Malaysia, and Indonesia. U.S. control of the seas and air in that region is essential to containing China. And U.S. control requires forces in place and the concrete support of key allies in the region.

China’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy and aggressive moves in the South China Sea have caused the smaller powers of the region to look to the United States for leadership. So far, as evidenced by Marcos’ request for greater security guarantees and South Korean doubts about the value and sincerity of America’s extended deterrent, they are not getting it from Biden.

19. The new — or perhaps renewed — Cold War

Excerpts:

In a cold war, the U.S. should have two primary objectives. The first was articulated most succinctly by Ronald Reagan four years before he became president: “We win, and they lose.”

That doesn’t necessarily imply the termination of CCP rule in China. It doesn’t even mean “containment” — the core of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.

It does suggest, as Mr. Pottinger has proposed, “a close cousin. Call it ‘constrainment’” — preventing the PRC from becoming the global hegemon, enforcing its rules internationally while the U.S. resigns itself to becoming a has-been power in a world where liberty dies.

...

The second vital objective in a cold war is to prevent it from becoming hot. That can most effectively be achieved through deterrence — convincing adversaries that it would be disastrous for them to challenge us militarily, or even to cross our “red lines.” If they believe they stand an even chance of defeating us, they are more likely to take their best shot.

We can debate strategies and tactics. But the first order of business is to come to terms with the ambitions and machinations of Mr. Xi, the CCP and the PRC, keeping in mind that Vladimir Putin, Ali Khamenei and Kim Jong Un are what communists would call “fellow travelers.”

The new — or perhaps renewed — Cold War

You can't win it if you don't know you're in it

washingtontimes.com · by Clifford D. May

Illustration on the current Cold War by Linas Garsys/The Washington Times more >

OPINION:

On Christmas Day 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and the Cold War ended. Or did it?

The answer depends on whether the Cold War was a conflict between two powerful nation-states or a struggle between two opposing ideologies.

If it was the latter, the Cold War didn’t end with the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Rather, following a hiatus, Communist cold warriors in Moscow were superseded by Communist cold warriors in Beijing. And leaders of the Chinese Communist Party take Marxism/Leninism at least as seriously as the last Soviet rulers did.

Why did we not see this transition? Largely because the conventional — and bipartisan — wisdom held that the People’s Republic of China was slip-sliding away from communism, embracing freer markets and freer trade in pursuit of prosperity. Other freedoms would surely follow. We Americans could facilitate these historical changes.

Notably, in 2001, President Bill Clinton successfully pushed to give the PRC permanent normal trade relations with the U.S. and membership in the World Trade Organization, a foundational institution in the rules-based international order established by Americans after World War II.

“Everything I have learned about China as president and before and everything I have learned about human nature in over a half-century of living now,” Mr. Clinton said at the time, “convinces me that we have a far greater chance of having a positive influence on China‘s actions if we welcome China into the world community instead of shutting it out.” Few Republicans disagreed.

As a senator and vice president, Joe Biden was a strong advocate of closer relations with the PRC. “As a young member of a Foreign Relations Committee, I wrote and I said and I believed then what I believe now,” he told Chinese visitors in 2011, “that a rising China is a positive, positive development, not only for China but for America and the world writ large.”

Running for president almost a decade later, he told voters that China’s rulers are “not bad folks, folks. But guess what? They’re not competition for us.”

His National Security Strategy, published last October, asserts that the Cold War is over and “We do not seek conflict or a new Cold War.”

The NSS does allow, however, that “a competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next. … Democracies and autocracies are engaged in a contest to show which system of governance can best deliver for their people and the world.”

A competition, a contest — and may the best system of governance win! Sounds like we’re discussing an Olympic sport rather than determining whether the future belongs to free nations or totalitarian dictatorships.

“It does us little good to repeat again and again that we aren’t seeking a new Cold War when the CCP has been stealthily waging one against us for years,” Matt Pottinger told the House select committee on the CCP a couple of months ago. A Mandarin-speaking former White House deputy national security adviser, Mr. Pottinger now serves as chairman of FDD’s China program.

Recognizing that a Cold War is underway is more than a semantic matter. It provides a framework for formulating policies based on lessons learned.

In a cold war, the U.S. should have two primary objectives. The first was articulated most succinctly by Ronald Reagan four years before he became president: “We win, and they lose.”

That doesn’t necessarily imply the termination of CCP rule in China. It doesn’t even mean “containment” — the core of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.

It does suggest, as Mr. Pottinger has proposed, “a close cousin. Call it ‘constrainment’” — preventing the PRC from becoming the global hegemon, enforcing its rules internationally while the U.S. resigns itself to becoming a has-been power in a world where liberty dies.

If you think I exaggerate, you’re not listening to Chinese President Xi Jinping, who has declared that it is his “historical mission” to utilize “the tools of dictatorship” to realize a future in which “capitalism will inevitably perish and socialism will inevitably triumph.”

Marxism, he has said, “was created in order to change the destiny of human history. … A collectivized world is just there, over [the horizon]. Whoever rejects that world will be rejected by the world.”

The second vital objective in a cold war is to prevent it from becoming hot. That can most effectively be achieved through deterrence — convincing adversaries that it would be disastrous for them to challenge us militarily, or even to cross our “red lines.” If they believe they stand an even chance of defeating us, they are more likely to take their best shot.

We can debate strategies and tactics. But the first order of business is to come to terms with the ambitions and machinations of Mr. Xi, the CCP and the PRC, keeping in mind that Vladimir Putin, Ali Khamenei and Kim Jong Un are what communists would call “fellow travelers.”

Michael Pillsbury, author of “The Hundred Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower” and senior fellow for China strategy at The Heritage Foundation, recently co-authored a report titled “Winning the New Cold War.” It argues that “protecting the U.S. homeland and prosperity and diminishing China’s ability to harm the U.S. will require a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach.”

That’s a heavy lift, but the alternative could be to lose this “New Cold War,” or, if my conceptualization is preferred, for historians of the future to write that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a battle won in a war lost because Americans wrongly believed the war had ended.

• Clifford D. May is founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a columnist for The Washington Times.

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Advance U.S. Interests by Giving Ukraine the Weapons It Needs Now

John Hardie

Russia Program Deputy Director

fdd.org · · May 3, 2023

Introduction

As Ukraine prepares to launch its much-anticipated spring counteroffensive, some in Washington are casting doubt on what Kyiv can achieve. Ukrainian forces no doubt will face considerable challenges, but their battlefield prospects hinge largely on the level of support they receive from the West. The United States and its allies can and must do more to aid Ukraine. Helping Kyiv defeat Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked aggression and liberate Ukrainian territory is not only the right thing to do but will enhance U.S. and allied security.

To be sure, the Biden administration and America’s Western allies deserve credit for providing Kyiv with substantial amounts of military aid. This support enabled the Ukrainian military to stay in the fight and eventually retake swathes of territory in the country’s east and south. As Kyiv prepares for its spring counteroffensive, the Western coalition has expanded its assistance to help Ukraine restore its “territorial integrity,” as President Joe Biden declared in January. Of the over $35 billion in U.S. military aid committed to Ukraine since February 2022, nearly half has come since December. Washington has provided new capabilities, such as Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and Stryker armored personnel carriers, as well as combined-arms training for Ukrainian troops. Allies have also stepped up, providing — after much debate — tanks and other armored vehicles.

Yet Ukraine still faces gaps in key areas. The United States and its allies can resolve at least some of these shortcomings if they muster sufficient political will. This additional aid would not be charity but a prudent investment in U.S. national interests. By exhausting Russian forces, America’s Ukrainian partners are diminishing the most immediate threat to the NATO alliance. Supporting Ukraine also strengthens deterrence of China and other authoritarian powers contemplating military action against their smaller neighbors.

The success or failure of Kyiv’s upcoming counteroffensive will likely determine the future trajectory of the war. If it succeeds, Ukraine will not only liberate additional territory but will likely also attract further Western support. This would put Kyiv in a strong position for future fighting and any eventual peace negotiations. But Vladimir Putin is betting that if the counteroffensive fails, U.S. resolve will falter amid calls to push Kyiv into premature peace talks.

Instead, by maximizing support for Ukraine now, the West can help Ukraine shorten the war and make good on the aid already invested. This memo identifies four essential forms of support Kyiv will need for its counteroffensive and beyond. This is not the only assistance Ukraine requires, but it is urgent.

First, the United States and its allies should provide more armored fighting vehicles to fill out the three army corps Kyiv is forming. Ukraine will need these vehicles, along with additional mine-clearing and bridging equipment, to overcome heavily entrenched Russian defenses.

Second, the West needs to address gaps in Ukraine’s air and missile defenses. Otherwise, the Russian Air Force may gain greater latitude both to support Russian ground troops and to strike deep behind the front lines. This could disrupt Ukraine’s counteroffensive.

Third, the Biden administration should grant Kyiv’s longstanding requests for Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles. This would allow Ukraine to strike key Russian military targets far beyond the range of its current Western-supplied rocket artillery systems, undermining Russia’s ability to resist attacking Ukrainian forces.

Finally, to help ensure Ukraine has enough artillery ammunition to sustain high-intensity operations, the administration should send Kyiv cluster munitions. While critics note that these munitions can endanger civilians, Ukraine’s elected leaders believe the rewards outweigh the risks. Washington should respect that judgment.

Ukraine stands a good chance of liberating more of its territory in the months ahead. But it needs the tools to do so. While Ukrainians are fighting for their homeland, their efforts contribute directly to the security of NATO and America’s national interests.

Read the entire memo here: https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/fdd-memo-advance-us-interests-by-giving-ukraine-the-weapons-it-needs-now.pdf

21. Iran’s Meaningless Concession Ahead of Key Nuclear Meeting

Iran’s Meaningless Concession Ahead of Key Nuclear Meeting

fdd.org · by Jack Sullivan · May 3, 2023

May 3, 2023 | Policy Brief

Andrea Stricker

Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program Deputy Director and Research Fellow

Anthony Ruggiero

Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program Senior Director and Senior Fellow

Richard Goldberg

Senior Advisor

Iran has begun reinstalling surveillance cameras and monitoring technologies at key nuclear sites ahead of a June International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting, according to a reporter for The Wall Street Journal. However, Tehran will not provide video recordings and data to nuclear inspectors unless the Biden administration provides Iran sanctions relief — making the reinstallation a meaningless concession designed only to ward off Western pressure.

In March, the IAEA’s director general, Rafael Grossi, brokered an agreement under which Tehran committed to reinstalling surveillance cameras and other monitoring technologies that Iran had removed in June 2022. Grossi told PBS NewsHour on April 1 that Iran was following through and the installation could take a few weeks.

Under the terms of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Tehran permitted the IAEA to install more than two dozen cameras at nuclear sites, such as centrifuge manufacturing and assembly facilities, in addition to cameras Iran already had in place under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Tehran also put in place near real-time monitoring equipment at Iran’s Natanz enrichment facility and heavy water production plant.

In February 2021, Iran announced it would no longer abide by the JCPOA’s monitoring provisions. However, Grossi brokered a deal whereby Tehran would allow the cameras and equipment to remain in place but keep the footage and data in its custody and provide it to the agency only when Iran had received Western sanctions relief.

Yet subsequent nuclear talks between Iran and six world powers, including the United States, failed to produce any sanctions relief. Tehran proceeded to announce in June 2022 that it would remove some 27 cameras, as well as the IAEA’s electronic monitors, from nuclear sites. It has never turned over video footage or data collected between February 2021 and June 2022.

By reinstalling cameras and monitoring now but not providing the footage and data to the IAEA, Iran has simply resurrected an old point of leverage to use over the West. It has conceded nothing in the way of enhanced safeguards or transparency.

The IAEA’s 35-nation Board of Governors meets next in early June. The board withheld censure of Iran at its last meeting in March and has not passed a censure resolution since November 2022. At the March board meeting, European members pushed for a censure resolution, but the United States blocked it despite Iran’s enrichment of uranium to almost 84 percent purity, which is near atomic weapons-grade — the highest level Tehran has achieved to date.

The Biden administration should reverse that error by ensuring the board acts decisively at its June meeting.

The board must censure Tehran and impose a deadline for it to halt provocative nuclear activities and comply with the IAEA’s safeguards investigation. The censure resolution should also give Tehran a deadline to reactivate reinstalled cameras and monitoring equipment and provide all past and future recordings and data to the IAEA.

The board should warn that, absent compliance by its deadline, it will refer Tehran’s case to the United Nations (UN) Security Council to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran, which remain lifted by the nuclear deal. Russia and China cannot use their Security Council vetoes to block the reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran provided any other party triggers the snapback mechanism.

The Biden administration should see Iran’s latest action for what it is: an attempt to delay consequences for its nuclear provocations. The United States and its allies should make sure this gambit fails.

Andrea Stricker is a research fellow and deputy director of the nonproliferation and biodefense program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Anthony Ruggiero is a senior fellow and senior director of the program and served as the National Security Council’s senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense in the Trump administration. Richard Goldberg is a senior advisor at FDD, directs FDD’s International Organizations program, and contributes to FDD’s Center on Economic and Financial Power. He previously served on the White House National Security Council, as deputy chief of staff to former U.S. Senator Mark Kirk, and as chief of staff to former Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner.

For more analysis from the authors and FDD please subscribe HERE. Follow Andrea, Anthony, and Rich on Twitter @StrickerNonpro, @NatSecAnthony, and @rich_goldberg. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.

fdd.org · by Jack Sullivan · May 3, 2023

22. Iran Intensifies Ties with Syria

Iran Intensifies Ties with Syria

fdd.org · by Jack Sullivan · May 3, 2023

Latest Developments

Tehran and Damascus signed long-term cooperation agreements related to oil and other sectors on May 3 during a visit to Syria by Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. The deals marked an effort to strengthen economic ties between the two allies, which have long cooperated to suppress Syria’s uprising since 2011, resulting in more than half a million deaths. Raisi’s trip was the first visit to Syria by an Iranian president since 2010, although Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad has visited Tehran twice during the war, including a trip last year during which he met both Raisi and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

According to Iranian state media, Tehran and Damascus signed a total of 15 agreements in a variety of fields, “including trade interaction, oil and energy industries, technical and engineering sectors, house construction, railroad and air transportation, free trade zones, private sectors, telecommunication, earthquake safety, rescue operation, and facilitation of pilgrimage.”

Expert Analysis

“Raisi’s visit and embrace of Assad is a potent reminder of Tehran’s complicity in the full range of the Syrian regime’s war crimes and atrocities. During 12 years of civil war, Iranian leaders’ support for Assad has not wavered. Rather, Tehran has spent tens of billions of dollars to keep Assad in power while the Iranian people suffer the consequences of mismanagement and corruption.” — David Adesnik, FDD Senior Fellow and Director of Research

Iran Seeks Return on Costly Investment in Syria

Propping up the Assad regime has been extremely expensive for Tehran. An Iranian lawmaker estimated in 2020 that the effort cost between $20 billion and $30 billion. Periodically, Tehran has sought to recoup some of these costs, yet these efforts have rarely been successful, in part because Russia has proven more successful at extracting concessions. Thus, keeping Assad in power represents a continued drain on Tehran’s resources.

Syria’s Normalization in the Region

Raisi’s visit comes at a time when Arab governments are renewing engagement with Assad. Arab League states that cut ties with Assad 12 years ago for his torture, mass executions, and destruction of Syria have started to repair their relationships over the past two years. In April, Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad received a warm welcome in Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia reestablished diplomatic relations with Damascus. Last year, the United Arab Emirates welcomed Assad to Abu Dhabi, the first time in over a decade the Syrian leader had visited a foreign capital other than Damascus or Tehran.

Washington’s Misguided Support of Assad’s Rehabilitation

Rather than isolating Assad and ensuring that his regime remains a pariah, the Biden administration has quietly encouraged Syria’s normalization. In March, Barbara Leaf, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, said in an interview: “We advise our friends and partners in the region that they should get something in return for this engagement with Assad.” Assad’s rehabilitation has only come this far because the administration gave his neighbors the green light.

Related Analysis

“Israel Strikes Iranian Weapons at Aleppo Airport Ahead of Raisi’s Visit,” FDD Flash Brief

fdd.org · by Jack Sullivan · May 3, 2023

23. Biden proposes tighter national security rules around military bases after Chinese real estate purchases

Biden proposes tighter national security rules around military bases after Chinese real estate purchases

Military installations in North Dakota, South Dakota, California, Iowa and Texas would be covered

foxnews.com · by Brooke Singman | Fox News

Video

Chinese mill will not be built near a large air force base

Correspondent Alexis McAdams reports on the plans to build a Chinese corn mill near a military air base in North Dakota being scrapped over national security concerns on 'America Reports'

FIRST ON FOX: The Biden administration is proposing to tighten security around eight additional military installations across the country by requiring a strict review of foreign entities seeking to buy property around those facilities, Fox News Digital has learned.

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which is composed of several federal national security agencies, in charged with reviewing certain acquisitions and real estate transactions made by foreign. CFIUS is proposing to expand its jurisdiction to include military sites in North Dakota, South Dakota, California, Iowa and Texas, according to a U.S. official.

The proposed additions come after federal government officials, including some in the U.S. Air Force, warned of possible national security risks resulting from the purchase of land made by Chinese-owned Fufeng Group in North Dakota.

The official told Fox News Digital that the Department of Defense decided which bases to add based on an evaluation of current national security concerns. DOD is expected to continue to assess its military installations and the geographic scope around them to ensure appropriate application in light of those national security considerations.

AIR FORCE WARNS CHINESE COMPANY'S NORTH DAKOTA MILL WOULD BE 'SIGNIFICANT' NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT

Eight more military bases would come under greater protection under a proposed Biden administration plan. (GIL COHEN-MAGEN/AFP via Getty Images)

When CFIUS looks at properly transactions involving non-U.S. persons, it is required by law to consider the risk of potential intelligence collection at military installations, which could expose national security activities and increase the risk of foreign surveillance.

The proposed sites to be added include: Air Force Plant 42 in Palmdale, California; Dyess Air Force Base in Abilene, Texas; Ellsworth Air Force Base in Box Elder, South Dakota; Grand Forks Air Force Base in Grand Forks, North Dakota; Iowa National Guard Joint Force Headquarters in Des Moines, Iowa; Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas; Laughlin Air Force Base in Del Rio, Texas; and Luke Air Force Base in Glendale, Arizona.

REPUBLICANS SOUND ALARM OVER CHINESE GOVERNMENT-LINKED FARMLAND PURCHASE NEAR NORTH DAKOTA AIR BASE

The Defense Department is still reviewing its national security network for U.S. military bases. (STAFF/AFP via Getty Images)

If finalized, the proposed expansion would give CFIUS the authority to review any foreign individual purchasing land or real estate within a 100-mile radius of these bases. Reporting purchases to CFIUS, though, is a voluntary process, and some areas containing single family housing units would not be within CFIUS’ jurisdiction.

The rule is now in the notice and comment period for 30 days, during which Congress, stakeholders and the public can comment on the proposal before any changes are finalized.

CFIUS already has jurisdiction over approximately 200 military installations. Most of these are subject to a CFIUS review for transactions taking place within a 1-mile radius of the base, but CFIUS uses the 100-mile radius standard for 32 of these installations.

NORTH DAKOTA COMMUNITY FIGHTS TO STOP CHINESE COMPANY FUFENG FROM OPENING CORN MILL NEAR AIR FORCE BASE

President Biden's administration is proposing a tighter security network for America's military bases. (Photographer: Jacquelyn Martin/AP/Bloomberg via Getty Images)

CLICK TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP

In 2022, the Chinese-owned Fufeng Group bought land in North Dakota and then later tried to build a corn mill on that property. Local officials rejected the proposal.

The Chinese company paid $2.3 million to purchase 300 acres of land just 12 miles from Grand Forks Air Force Base, home to top secret drone technology. Grand Forks Air Force Base is included as one of the new additional military installations covered.

Brooke Singman is a Fox News Digital politics reporter. You can reach her at Brooke.Singman@Fox.com or @BrookeSingman on Twitter.

foxnews.com · by Brooke Singman | Fox News

24. What the end of the covid public health emergency means for you

What the end of the covid public health emergency means for you

By Lena H. Sun and Amy Goldstein

May 4, 2023 at 6:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Lena H. Sun · May 4, 2023

The Biden administration will end the public health emergency for the coronavirus pandemic on May 11.

Starting in early 2020, the emergency declaration, along with subsequent declarations, legislation and administrative actions, gave the federal government flexibility to waive or modify certain rules in the Medicare and Medicaid programs as well as in private health insurance. The goal has been to help the nation fight the worst public health crisis in a century and help some patients get care in a time of shutdowns.

As this long emergency period expires, experts say, the biggest impact for consumers will be the end of free coronavirus tests — both at-home tests and those performed by clinicians and analyzed by commercial labs — with broad implications for people’s ability to get timely covid diagnoses, prevent disease transmission and track the virus.

A recent study from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that one-third of U.S. households used free at-home covid-19 diagnostic tests from a program the White House launched in January 2022 that allowed rapid antigen tests to be ordered at no cost to consumers through the U.S. Postal Service. The study suggested that, without the kits, 1 in 4 adults who used a test would likely to have gone untested.

Here’s how major health policies will be affected when the public health emergency ends.

At-home coronavirus tests

At-home (over-the-counter) tests may become more costly for people with insurance. The public health emergency required insurers to reimburse for up to eight antigen tests a person per month. After May 11, older Americans with traditional Medicare will no longer be able to get free, at-home tests. People with private insurance or Medicare Advantage (private Medicare managed-care plans) will no longer be guaranteed free at-home tests, but some insurers may continue to voluntarily cover them.

For those on Medicaid, at-home tests will be covered at no cost through September 2024. After that date, home-test coverage will vary by state.

In addition, 18 states and U.S. territories have used their Medicaid programs temporarily to provide people who are uninsured free coronavirus testing services, including at-home tests, but that program will end with the public health emergency.

People who cannot afford at-home tests, which cost about $25 for a box of two tests, may continue to be able to find them at a free health clinic, community health center, public health department, library or other local organization.

PCR coronavirus tests

Although coronavirus tests ordered or administered by a health professional and analyzed by laboratories will still be covered for most insured people, these tests may no longer be free.

For people with traditional Medicare, there will be no cost for the test itself, but there could be cost-sharing for the associated doctor’s visit. For people with Medicare Advantage or private insurance, both the test and the associated doctor’s visit might be subject to cost-sharing, depending on the health plan. Additionally, some insurers might begin to limit the number of tests they cover or require tests be done by in-network providers. People enrolled in skimpy health plans that do not meet Affordable Care Act benefits rules will have no guarantee of coverage for tests and may have to pay full price.

People with Medicaid will continue to have access to free testing services through September 2024, after which point, states may limit the number of covered tests or impose nominal cost-sharing.

Uninsured people in the 18 states and territories that have adopted the temporary Medicaid coverage for them will no longer be able to obtain any type of free coronavirus testing services as this program ends with the public health emergency.

Coronavirus vaccines

Vaccines will remain free for people with and without insurance. That is partly because the availability and costs of coronavirus vaccines, including boosters, are determined by the supply of federally purchased vaccines, not the public health emergency. So as long as federally purchased vaccines last, coronavirus vaccines will remain free to all people, regardless of insurance coverage. Providers of federally purchased vaccines are not allowed to charge patients or deny vaccines based on the recipient’s insurance status.

Even after the federal supply of vaccines is gone, which federal officials expect to happen in the fall, vaccines will continue to be free of charge to the vast majority of people with private and public insurance. Free coverage is required for all vaccines recommended by the CDC. For the uninsured, the Biden administration announced a $1.1 billion program to ensure access to free coronavirus vaccines and treatments through December 2024.

FDA emergency use authorization

The ending of the public health emergency won’t affect products, including coronavirus vaccines, treatments and tests, that have been cleared under the Food and Drug Administration’s emergency use authorizations, which allow the agency to authorize medical products more quickly than under the traditional approval process. In addition, the agency’s ability to use emergency authorizations in the future won’t be affected, including for a retooled coronavirus vaccine that’s likely to be used in the fall. The agency’s emergency use authorization is tied to a separate emergency declaration (section 564 of the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act), which is not expiring.

Covid treatment

Medicare beneficiaries will not face cost-sharing requirements for certain covid pharmaceutical treatments, such as the antiviral Paxlovid, after May 11, as long as those doses were purchased by the federal government. Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program, meant for youngsters in working-class families, will continue to cover all pharmaceutical treatments with no-cost sharing through September 2024. After that, states may impose utilization limits and nominal cost-sharing.

Any pharmaceutical treatment doses purchased by the federal government will remain free to all, regardless of insurance coverage, based on availability. The United States has millions of doses of oral antivirals, such as Paxlovid, which are expected to last months. Once that stockpile is gone, the medications’ prices will be determined by the manufacturers. The price that individuals pay at the pharmacy will depend on their health insurance. For older Americans on Medicare, all FDA-allowed medicines to treat covid will be covered through Part D (drug coverage plans), which about three-fourths of the 65 million people on Medicare have. Such plans can require cost-sharing or limit the coverage.

Most insured people already face cost-sharing for hospitalizations and outpatient visits related to covid treatment. Private insurers were never required to waive cost-sharing for any covid treatment. Although some did so voluntarily, most insurers had already phased out these benefits more than a year ago.

Telemedicine

The Drug Enforcement Administration is extending public health emergency flexibilities for prescribing controlled medications via telemedicine. The agency has not determined how long the extension will last. During the emergency, providers writing prescriptions for controlled substances — such as the attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder drug Adderall; the addictive painkiller OxyContin; the anti-anxiety medicine Xanax, and the opioid addiction treatment drug buprenorphine — were allowed to do so via telemedicine. The Biden administration had proposed new rules to take effect as soon as the emergency ends. If the rules go into effect as drafted, patients would eventually need in-person evaluations for certain medications like Adderall and could get a 30-day supply of other drugs like Xanax before having to see a provider in person. The rules include a 180-day grace period to allow patients to come into compliance with the new in-person requirements.

Because of the pandemic, all states and D.C., temporarily waived some aspects of state licensure requirements so that providers with equivalent licenses in other states could practice remotely. Some states tied those policies to the end of the federal public health emergency so the waivers may end unless states change their policies.

The Department of Health and Human Services temporarily waived penalties against providers using technologies that don’t comply with federal privacy and security rules in the provision of telehealth services during the public health emergency. Enforcement of these rules when the public health emergency ends will restrict the provision of telehealth to “HIPAA compliant” technologies and communication productions.

Telehealth appointments for Medicare beneficiaries, especially those in rural areas or other places where health care is scarce, will remain covered through 2024, because of a spending bill approved by Congress late last year. For people on Medicaid, telehealth appointments often were covered before the pandemic and will remain available after May 11.

Data reporting

Since early in the pandemic, HHS has been able to compel labs to report the results of coronavirus tests to the CDC. That has been crucial to understanding how the shape of the pandemic has evolved, relying on positive and negative test results. States have also been sharing vaccine administration data with the CDC.

That lab reporting requirement goes away with the end of the public health emergency. Similar reporting of positive test results by hospitals and other data, such as the number of hospitalized covid-19 patients and number of N95 masks, will continue through the end of April 2024. But after May 11, hospitals will report fewer types of data, and they will report weekly instead of daily.

States also will no longer be required to submit data on vaccine administration, making it more difficult for the federal government to have a national picture of vaccinations and to evaluate vaccine effectiveness. The CDC is working to sign voluntary data use agreements with states to encourage them to share the data through the end of this year.

Pharmacy shots

A federal law that protects manufacturers and providers of covid-19 countermeasures from malpractice claims was broadened to allow more professionals — pharmacists, pharmacy technicians and pharmacy interns — to vaccinate people as young as 3 years old against the coronavirus, influenza and routine childhood immunizations. HHS plans to extend this protection from liability through December 2024, but not for routine childhood shots, unless state law allows it. That means parents will no longer be able to use the convenience of a pharmacy visit for childhood immunizations but will have to take their children to a health-care provider.

David Ovalle, Daniel Gilbert and Laurie McGinley contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Lena H. Sun · May 4, 2023

25. Remote Wyoming roads provide proving ground for Air Force special operators

As an aside: 1956. That is the date when the venerable workhorse C-130 came into service. We honor the age of the BUFF (the B52 Stratofortress) but it is the C-130 that has been the real workhorse of the Air Force.

Remote Wyoming roads provide proving ground for Air Force special operators

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · May 3, 2023

An MC-130J Commando II takes off from a state highway near Rawlins, Wyo., during Exercise Agile Chariot on April 30, 2023. Crews used the public road for the exercise as part of the Agile Combat Employment concept. (Carly Kavish/U.S. Air Force)

U.S. Air Force special operators broke ground this week when they landed planes on highways in Wyoming, marking the latest effort by commandos experimenting with ways to ensure that air power can be delivered when airfields aren’t an option.

During Exercise Agile Chariot, the Air Force for the first time landed an MQ-9 Reaper drone on a highway along with an MC-130J Commando II, two A-10 Thunderbolt IIs and two MH-6 Little Birds, the 1st Special Operations Wing, headquartered at Hurlburt Field, Fla., said in a statement Tuesday.

Lt. Col. Dave Meyer, deputy mission commander for the exercise, said the operation was unprecedented in terms of size and the number of aircraft making the roadside landings.

“An adversary that may be able to deny use of a military base or an airfield is going to have a nearly impossible time trying to defend every single linear mile of roads,” Meyer said. “It’s just too much territory for them to cover, and that gives us access in places and areas that they can’t possibly defend.”

The operations were carried out Sunday and Tuesday by Air Force special operations teams, who built on recent efforts in Sweden and Latvia, where smaller roadside landings have taken place.

Air Force Special Operations Command’s Lt. Gen. Tony Bauernfeind said the aim in Wyoming was “to hone the skills required to win a near-peer-competitor fight.”

An MQ-9 Reaper lands on a highway near Rawlins, Wyo., during Exercise Agile Chariot on April 30, 2023. Instead of relying on large, fixed bases and infrastructure, air crews practiced using smaller, more dispersed locations in line with the Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment concept. (Carly Kavish/U.S. Air Force)

An MC-130J Commando II offloads fuel to an A-10 Thunderbolt II on state Route 287 near Rawlins, Wyo., on April 30, 2023. By using the public highway as a forward arming and refueling point, crews showed they can extend their reach beyond normal airfields. (Carly Kavish/U.S. Air Force)

An MC-130J Commando II lands on state Route 287 near Rawlins, Wyo., during Exercise Agile Chariot on April 30, 2023. The ability to land on civilian roads lets military flight crews access areas far from traditional airfields. (Carly Kavish/U.S. Air Force)

Such maneuvers would likely be critical in any potential military showdown with Russia or China, which could target airfields and other military infrastructure that the Air Force typically relies on to launch and land aircraft.

For the Air Force, the drills are an extension of the Agile Combat Employment concept, which has become a strategic focal point as the military looks for ways to keep powerful adversaries off balance.

During the past year, Air Force Special Operations Command has been testing other unconventional ways to deliver airpower.

For example, in November, U.S. special operations forces flew over the Arctic and rolled a long-range missile out the back of a C-130, dropping it by parachute before it blasted toward its target.

That marked the first ever demonstration in Europe of Rapid Dragon, an experimental program that uses standard air drop procedures to launch air-to-surface cruise missiles.

Part of the Wyoming exercise focused on the 15th Special Operations Squadron’s landing of an MC-130J Commando II with two MH-6 Little Birds on Wyoming’s state Route 789, where it did a quick reaction personnel recovery mission, the military said.

Meanwhile, landing the Reaper on a highway has opened the door for future capabilities, military officials said.

“The MQ-9 can now operate around the world via satellite launch and recovery,” said Lt. Col. Brian Flanigan, the 2nd Special Operations Squadron’s director of operations.

Highway landings are far from unprecedented for military pilots. But the remote Wyoming roads served as a testing ground for the MC-130J to practice resupplying other assault aircraft.

Such capability reduces the need to have a large logistical footprint or haul supplies more slowly by road, said Maj. Matt Waggy, the exercise’s director.

“It’s a major step in the right direction. … Our joint force commander can now look at these capabilities as very real options to solve real-world problems,” Waggy said.

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · May 3, 2023

26. The most popular app in the U.S. deleted mentions of its Chinese owner

Note this: Out of the 500 most downloaded apps so far in 2023, only 10 are from Chinese companies. However, four of them are in the top five. These apps are almost household names at this point; Temu, TikTok, CapCut, and Shein.

The most popular app in the U.S. deleted mentions of its Chinese owner

The Washington Post · by Shira Ovide · May 2, 2023

This article is a preview of The Tech Friend newsletter. Sign up here to get it in your inbox every Tuesday and Friday.

Most of the time, you probably don’t care what country an app is from. But right now, you might.

Lawmakers in the United States have warned that apps developed by Chinese technology companies could be gateways for China’s government to snoop on Americans, rot our brains or warp our beliefs.

You should decide for yourself whether you trust an app from China. But it may not be easy to tell where an app is based.

Four of the five most-downloaded apps in the United States are from China.

But in the iPhone and Google Play app stores, the developers behind two of those apps — TikTok and the video editing app CapCut — are listed as two different companies in Singapore. They’re both owned by China’s ByteDance.

The United States’ most popular app, the low-price shopping service Temu, recently removed from its website several references to its owner, the Chinese e-commerce giant PDD Holdings.

It’s true that ByteDance operates from Singapore and that Temu is in Boston. But that’s also not the whole story about their Chinese origins.

So how do you make a personal risk assessment when it’s not necessarily clear that apps are Chinese?

Mostly, you’ll have to do legwork online, sift through business incorporation and securities filings or rely on trusted sources to clue you in. It’s not ideal.

Temu is from Boston. Sort of.

Until about a month ago, the “About Us” section of Temu’s website said the shopping app was “founded in Boston, Massachusetts in 2022 by its parent company PDD Holdings Inc …. which also operates Pinduoduo in China.” (Pinduoduo is a popular e-commerce app.)

The website also said that Temu used PDD’s “vast and deep network” of merchants and logistics partners.

Today, Temu’s “About Us” section doesn’t mention PDD or Pinduoduo. The company’s description says that “Temu was founded in Boston, Massachusetts in 2022.”

The change was recently noticed by Ivy Yang on Twitter. I confirmed the change by checking archived versions of Temu’s website.

The company didn’t respond to my questions about why it changed the language on its website.

In the iPhone App Store and the Google Play Store for Android apps, the developer information for Temu lists a Boston address. The iPhone store description says that Temu’s developer is Whaleco Inc.

That information is accurate. Whaleco is the name registered in Temu’s business incorporation record in Massachusetts, where it is labeled as a “foreign corporation.” And Temu, which doesn’t operate its shopping service in China, is based in Boston.

Some cursory web research will show that Temu is owned by a Chinese tech company. Similarly, it’s hard to avoid the information that TikTok is owned by ByteDance in China.

But what about an app that becomes popular overnight? When this happens, there’s less information widely available.

A few years ago, an app called FaceApp became an instant hit with a feature that let people upload a selfie to see how they might look in several decades.

Then some American politicians and law enforcement officials started to worry that the app was developed by a largely unknown Russian firm and might be a national security threat.

The Russia connection may have been overblown. A deeper problem was that Americans have so few privacy protections that any app can do pretty much whatever it wants with our photos or other personal information.

But the murkiness of the app’s origin contributed to the mistrust of FaceApp.

What you can do and what the companies can do

Shein was founded in China and helps Chinese apparel manufacturers sell to shoppers in the United States and other countries. The company told me its owner is headquartered in Singapore.

ByteDance has emphasized previously that it is largely owned by investment funds in the United States and other countries outside China. TikTok’s chief executive is based in Singapore.

It’s not surprising that companies want to downplay connections to China. Congress and a majority of the American public mistrust China.

Still, haziness about tech companies’ Chinese origins isn’t helping. Lawmakers in the United States will consider ByteDance, Shein and Temu as Chinese companies no matter what the companies say.

It might be helpful to change the starting point of the conversation. Let’s say these apps are Chinese; so what?

What are the real and potential risks to you? Short of banning anything from China — including your phone or laptop, which probably was made in a Chinese factory — how should American policy approach a future in which more technology inventions are likely to come from China?

Fairly or unfairly, many Americans are worried about tech from China. It would help if app stores made a good-faith effort to list apps’ countries of origin — even though that’s sometimes tricky to pin down. Many companies have businesses incorporated in countries that are different from their countries of origin.

And no matter where an app is from, it is smart to do a little research before you download it or buy something online from a company with which you’re not familiar.

You want to see whether people are complaining about being misled or ripped off or if there are concerns about an app’s privacy protections. You may also hold off downloading a cool new app until reputable sources evaluate its potential privacy and security vulnerabilities.

It’s not fair that you have to do the work to protect yourself from potentially scammy apps or those from countries you might not trust. But you have to look out for yourself on the internet. You can’t count on companies or the law to protect you.

One tiny win

It’s been pouring rain where I live, and I’ve been spending a lot of time on weather apps. Maybe you have, too.

My colleague Heather Kelly dug up a fact that blew my mind: All weather apps are essentially the same. If you think your preferred weather app has the most accurate forecast, you’re wrong.

But you still might prefer the features or look of one app over others. Heather has advice on how to pick the weather app that is right for you.

Personally I love the hourly weather forecasts from the National Weather Service website.

The website looks like it’s from 2005, but I like the grids showing hour-by-hour dew-point forecasts and the likelihood for stormy weather. For me and fellow haters of humidity, dew-point forecasts are a must.

The Washington Post · by Shira Ovide · May 2, 2023

27. Building a US Special Forces ‘Stealth Network’ on Taiwan

Not so stealthy with reporting like this.

On the other hand if you are trying tto create "unconventional deterrence," (demonstrating the risk of attempted occuaption becausee of the potential for resistance per Bob Jones) the activities and the capabilities must be publicized to have an effect on the target audience for deterrence.

As one my friends who is an expert China watcher often points out, the fundamental issue that must be addressed is will the Taiwnese population demonstrate the will to resist? Will they first fully man their armed forces? As we know we cannot "want it" (e.g., defend Taiwan) more than them.

Excerpt:

Although leading Western analysts have consistently highlighted the Ukrainian population’s “iron resolve to fight to the death” this has often been sharply contrasted with Taiwan. U.S. special forces deployments represent a critical part of efforts to cultivate a Taiwanese capacity to wage a Ukraine-style war effort and adopt a “partisan resistance model.” Even partial success in achieving this would be a highly favorable development for Western interests in the region.

Building a US Special Forces ‘Stealth Network’ on Taiwan

The U.S. is making preparations for Ukraine-style military operations on Taiwan.

thediplomat.com · by A. B. Abrams · May 3, 2023

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) for the first time this century reported the initiation of drills simulating operations on Taiwan. The drills on April 27, which were part of annual capabilities exercises at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, were reported to involve practicing the insertion of personnel onto Taiwan. Troops fired recoilless rifles, breached tunnels, operated Switchblade drones, and, according to a report by Military.com, operated “other tools reflecting a seismic shift for the command as it prepares for potential conflict against major military rivals.”

Commander of USASOC Lieutenant General Jonathan Braga stated preceding the exercise that it reflected China’s emergence as “our true pacing challenge out there,” which he emphasized was in accordance with the latest U.S. National Defense Strategy.

Military exercises simulating fighting on Taiwanese soil, and the focus on special operations forces in particular, are especially significant when considering the recent discourse surrounding the United States’ position in the Taiwan Strait. In particular, the possibility has been raised that U.S. special forces could play a key role in contributing to a fight against the People’s Liberation Army, especially for training and logistics – a similar role to the one they are currently playing in Ukraine against Russian forces.

In late March, Congressman Mike Waltz, a former U.S. Army Special Forces service member and now chairman of the House Armed Services Committee on Readiness, spoke about U.S. moves to deeply reform Taiwan’s armed forces – and the need, in his words, to facilitate a “Ukraine-style resistance.”

“They know that their training needs to be more realistic and probably more wholesome… They’re sitting around a lot not really having realistic difficult exercises and training when they need it,” Waltz said in remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “…We particularly in the special operations community are working with them to move more towards a partisan resistance model,” he added.

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It was outlined at the time that this would include not only greater deployments of U.S. personnel to Taiwan, which have recently continued to expand significantly, but also growing deployments of Taiwanese personnel to training ranges in the United States.

At the same CSIS event in late March, former U.S. Army Special Forces serviceman and ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Accountability Congressman Jason Crow, who also served on the House Armed Services Committee, outlined the key roles U.S. special forces would play in a Taiwan contingency particularly for facilitating arms transfers to Taiwan during a potential war:

We don’t have a land border with Taiwan. [We face] the tyranny of distance and the very big challenges of resupply over an open ocean. Covert Special Operations have a very important part to play in that in addition to the pre-positioning and the hardening [of arsenals on Taiwan] that’s going to be essential. But pre-positioning and hardening alone is not going to do it. There’s going to have to be some supply chain that will largely rely on our unconventional forces to do so.

Crow contrasted this specifically to the long land borders that NATO shares with Ukraine, where, among a wide range of other roles, U.S. and other Western special forces have been key to facilitating the flow of arms from Europe to the frontlines.

One of the most significant insights into the operations of Western special forces in Ukraine was provided by a New York Times report in July 2022, which observed that the United States had set up within Ukraine’s borders “a stealthy network of commandos and spies rushing to provide weapons, intelligence and training… C.I.A. personnel have continued to operate in the country secretly, mostly in the capital, Kyiv, directing much of the massive amounts of intelligence the United States is sharing with Ukrainian forces.”

The “signs of their stealthy logistics, training and intelligence support are tangible on the battlefield,” the report observed. “Commandos from other NATO countries, including Britain, France, Canada and Lithuania, also have been working inside Ukraine… training and advising Ukrainian troops and providing an on-the-ground conduit for weapons and other aid,” it noted, stressing the sheer “scale of the secretive effort to assist Ukraine that is underway.”

As a result, Ukrainian forces have benefited significantly from tremendous quantities of intelligence, including battlefield mapping applications to target and attack Russian units and intelligence imagery from hundreds of Western military satellites. More information on the operations of Western personnel, including frontline combat operations by elite British Marine units from the war’s initial weeks, have since emerged, setting a strong precedent for similar U.S. and Western special operations on Taiwan.

Congressman Crow highlighted that this level of collaboration between U.S. special forces and local forces in Ukraine did not occur overnight. “Just about the training, you look at Ukraine. People are amazed with our ability to have interoperability with Ukraine. That’s because it started in 2014. We have been doing it for almost a decade prior.” Commentators have made frequent references to Western efforts in Ukraine having succeeded due to a full eight years of preparation, including overseeing deep reforms of the Ukrainian military. These analyses provide some indication of the likely intention behind the escalation of Western deployments and exercises on Taiwan.

The announcement of special forces operations on the territory, which are likely to similarly focus on serving as force multipliers for local units through logistics and intelligence support, is potentially one of several steps in this direction to maximize the United States’ ability to combat mainland Chinese forces through Taiwan in the event of a war as was done in Ukraine.

Although leading Western analysts have consistently highlighted the Ukrainian population’s “iron resolve to fight to the death” this has often been sharply contrasted with Taiwan. U.S. special forces deployments represent a critical part of efforts to cultivate a Taiwanese capacity to wage a Ukraine-style war effort and adopt a “partisan resistance model.” Even partial success in achieving this would be a highly favorable development for Western interests in the region.

GUEST AUTHOR

A. B. Abrams

A. B. Abrams is the author of “China and America’s Tech War from AI to 5G: The Struggle to Shape the Future of World Order” and “Immovable Object: North Korea’s 70 Years at War with American Power.” He has published widely on international security and geopolitics with a focus on East Asia, and holds related Master's degrees from the University of London.

thediplomat.com · by A. B. Abrams · May 3, 2023

28. Look to maritime domain to revive failed U.S. statecraft

Look to maritime domain to revive failed U.S. statecraft

washingtontimes.com · by The Washington Times https://www.washingtontimes.com

Chinese President Xi Jinping gestures while speaking to Russian President Vladimir Putin during their meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, on March 20, 2023. Asia’s stake in Europe’s war was made crystal clear Tuesday when the leaders of the … more >

OPINION:

American statecraft didn’t keep Russia’s Vladimir Putin from invading Ukraine. It didn’t stop China‘s Xi Jinping from building an archipelago of man-made islands in disputed regions of the South China Sea, nor did it deter him from firing missiles over Taiwan last summer.

But an adept American foreign policy should have been able to deter these events. Going forward, getting this right is critical and requires a rethink of U.S. statecraft and strengthening its tools — clear-eyed diplomacy, active economic policies and a strong military.

Instead, our leaders fall back on a reactive foreign policy based on the vague notion of “integrated deterrence,” which the executive branch describes as the planning, coordination and operation of government agencies together, along with allies.

In practice, this rather nebulous concept has been used as a cover to avoid doing what is necessary: making larger investments in our military and politically risky reforms in our institutions to better integrate military, diplomatic and economic statecraft. As a result, the root causes of failed American statecraft linger.

Integrated deterrence talks up coordination among agencies but relies disproportionately on diplomatic maneuvers. And more than diplomacy is needed to check implacable foes such as China and Russia. A healthy dose of hard power and economic heft is required, too. This is especially true now that China boasts the world’s largest modernized military and has spread its economic tentacles across the globe through its trillion-dollar investment in Mr. Xi’s Belt and Road initiative.

The weakness of U.S. statecraft has been evident for some time, but little has been done to arrest it, due largely to a lack of imagination and misplaced priorities. We desperately need a new framework for rebuilding American centers of power, restructuring institutions, mentoring the leaders needed and rolling back the caustic influences threatening our nation.

Our principal adversaries — China and Russia — are not 10 feet tall, but they represent a challenge unlike any the nation has ever confronted. A promising new framework that addresses both foes and takes the initiative is called Naval Statecraft.

Emphasizing naval and maritime power, it leverages America’s advantages in the maritime domain, to present our adversaries’ strategic dilemmas, while demonstrating the supremacy of U.S. capitalism and governance in delivering prosperity for the most people.

A maritime presence can yield tremendous economic benefits. Djibouti’s economic rise in the early 2000s was sparked when U.S. naval forces arrived to carry the fight to al Qaeda after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The increased maritime security presence enabled the deepwater port of Doraleh to become a regional commercial hub.

Sadly, U.S. leaders failed to pair the naval presence with economic and diplomatic efforts. Years later, Beijing filled that vacuum, and Djibouti has fallen deeper into China’s orbit.

Another example of Naval Statecraft came in 2020. Operating in international waters, a Malaysian-chartered oil survey ship, the West Capella, was subjected to Chinese harassment for months. The U.S. kept a measured but sustained naval presence near the ship, while diplomats rallied international support in defense of Malaysia’s economic rights. Eventually, China ceased harassing the ship, and the region was united in its antipathy toward China’s behavior. Unfortunately, that success was more luck than planning.

Naval Statecraft embraces the fact that most nations must balance economic and security interests, and thereby integrate the two together in comprehensive policies. But this causes problems for a U.S. government that typically approaches economics and security as distinct lines of effort.

We have entered a new Cold War, with China as our principal adversary. If we are to prevail, we must take military, economic and diplomatic actions backed by all institutions of American national power working together for common strategic objectives.

Naval Statecraft offers a framework for successfully competing with adversaries in peacetime, while deterring their worst behaviors. If we fail to recognize that the geostrategic tectonic plates have shifted under our feet, we risk sleepwalking into a war more costly than anything in our nation’s history.

——————

Brent D. Sadler is the author of the forthcoming book “U.S. Naval Power in the 21st Century.” The 26-year veteran nuclear-submarine and foreign-area officer is currently a senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation covering naval warfare and advanced technologies.

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RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 3, 2023

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