Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."
- Winston Churchill

"Not necessity, not desire - no, the love of power is the demon of men. Let them have everything - health, food, a place to live, entertainment - they are and remain unhappy and low-spirited: for the demon waits and waits and will be satisfied."
- Friedrich Nietzsche

“RW=G+P,” or “Revolutionary​ ​equals Guerrilla Warfare plus Political Action.”
- Bernard Fall




1. US assesses that North Korea may be ready to conduct underground nuclear test this month
2. North Koreans roll their eyes during May Day lectures about socialism's superiority
3. U.S., South Korean Defense Leaders Condemn North Korean Missile Launch
4. The Mirage of Kim-Moon-Trump (KMT) Summit Diplomacy
5. U.S. Senate unanimously approves Goldberg as new ambassador to S. Korea
6. Biden will reaffirm U.S. commitment to defense of S. Korea, Japan through Asia tour: Psaki
7. U.S. remains capable of defending homeland against N. Korean missiles: Gen. VanHerck
8. Unification ministry to hold cultural events for N. Korean defectors next week
9. North Korea: Kim’s Power Play Trap And Nuclear Brinkmanship – Analysis
10. New Ransomware Variant Linked to North Korean Cyber Army
11. S. Korea's spy agency joins NATO cyber defense group
12. From Kim-Trump summits to missile tests: The failures of South Korea's President Moon
13. Kim Jong-un Doubles Down on Nuclear Threat
14. N. Koreans face their worst spring famine since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic
15. N. Korea issues new KPW 50,000 cash vouchers for use in commercial transactions
16. N.Korean Missile Test 'Fails'



1. US assesses that North Korea may be ready to conduct underground nuclear test this month

A welcome for President Yoon?

US assesses that North Korea may be ready to conduct underground nuclear test this month
By Barbara Starr, CNN Pentagon Correspondent
Updated 3:14 PM ET, Thu May 5, 2022 
CNN · by Barbara Starr, CNN Pentagon Correspondent
(CNN)US military and intelligence agencies assess that North Korea could be ready to resume underground nuclear testing this month, according to three US officials.
The assessment concludes that Kim Jong Un's government is making preparations at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site and could be ready to conduct a test by the end of the month. Signs of personnel and vehicle activity at the site have been seen through satellite imagery, but the officials do not know if the regime has placed nuclear material in one of the underground tunnels at the test site, which the US has been closely watching.
If North Korea conducts a test, it would be the country's seventh underground nuclear test and the first in nearly five years.
US President Joe Biden is scheduled to visit South Korea and Japan later this month. It wouldn't be the first time the threat of a nuclear test has loomed over a presidential visit: North Korea was preparing for a test in 2014 when President Barack Obama visited South Korea, and in 2016, North Korea conducted a nuclear test shortly after Obama and other world leaders departed Asia following a summit.
Last month, CNN reported that satellite imagery showed North Korea was tunneling again at its remote underground nuclear test site to potentially shorten the time it needed to conduct its next test.
Read More
North Korea has conducted six previous nuclear tests at the site, which lies north of Pyongyang, most recently in September 2017. In addition to its preparations for a possible nuclear test, North Korea has conducted repeated ballistic missile tests this year -- the latest missile launch occurring on Wednesday.
According to the satellite imagery, the crosscut tunnel at the test site intersects with one of the main tunnels beyond the entrance, meaning there is a shorter distance to the underground launch area. In 2018, North Korea blew up the original entrance to the tunnel but likely did not destroy the entire underground structure.
Pentagon spokesman John Kirby told reporters Wednesday the Pentagon was "very deeply concerned" by North Korea's missile tests, adding that the US and international community has condemned the provocations.
"There's never a good time quite frankly for the DPRK to conduct these kinds of tests," Kirby said. "We continue to call on the North to stop these provocative tests and to be willing to sit down, as we have offered we would be willing to do without pre-condition, and to discuss a diplomatic way forward here to de-nuclearize the North."
CNN's Jeremy Herb, Kevin Liptak and Zachary Cohen contributed reporting.
CNN · by Barbara Starr, CNN Pentagon Correspondent

2. North Koreans roll their eyes during May Day lectures about socialism's superiority


The eye roll as a resistance indicator.

The people know the truth.

North Koreans roll their eyes during May Day lectures about socialism's superiority
When the economy is in shambles and people are hungry, no one wants to hear how bad things are under capitalism.
By Myung Chul Lee
2022.05.05
Workers in North Korea ridiculed their government’s May Day propaganda which touted the superiority of socialism at a time when most of the people are struggling to put enough food on the table, sources in the country told RFA.
May Day, or International Workers’ Day, is an annual celebration of the fight for labor rights and an important holiday in communist countries. The North Korean government held special lectures for factory workers ahead of the holiday, where they emphasized the evils of capitalism to show why North Korean socialism is better.
At one such lecture at the Chongjin Steel Factory in the northeastern province of North Hamgyong, workers were not buying the party official’s argument.
“They gathered workers into conference rooms, pointing out the problems of capitalism for a whole hour, and then rambled on and on about socialism and how it is superior,” a source working in the factory told RFA’s Korean Service on condition of anonymity for security reasons.
“The workers scoffed at the message, saying that nothing could be further from the truth,” he said.
They even openly objected while the lecturer was speaking.
“When he said that all the workers under the socialist system live happily and receive many benefits from their government, the workers cried out, ‘How can he tell such a lie with a straight face, knowing all the hardships we are facing right now?’” the worker said.
“This kind of propaganda that reinforces the superiority of socialism is offending the workers, and we can remain silent no more,” he said.
In the northern province of Ryanggang, the subject of the lecture was how workers’ independence has been trampled in capitalist countries and they are not treated like people, a worker at a factory there told RFA on condition of anonymity to speak freely.
“Most of the workers are well aware that the lecture was unrealistic,” he said.
“These days, we all know about how the capitalist countries are the richest, and we know about the rights that workers have from foreign and South Korean movies and TV shows, and from overseas radio broadcasts,” the second source said.
The workers therefore ignored the lecture completely.
“The reality is that no matter how much the speaker stresses that workers are exploited, pressured, subjugated and repressed under the capitalist system, his words are not being heard,” the second source said.
“In the past, during these kinds of lectures, there would be many who actually agree, but these days we just don’t respond to these empty words that declare this as the ideal society in which our independent rights are guaranteed and we are all equal under the socialist system.
“Most workers feel like they are at a dead end in terms of their livelihoods, and they express their dissatisfaction by agreeing just for appearances sake.”
Translated by Claire Lee and Leejin J. Chung. Written in English by Eugene Whong.

3. U.S., South Korean Defense Leaders Condemn North Korean Missile Launch


U.S., South Korean Defense Leaders Condemn North Korean Missile Launch
defense.gov · by C. Todd Lopez

The North Koreans yesterday launched another ballistic missile over the waters to its east, alarming South Korea, Japan and the United States.
33:05
The launch is the 14th this year and is part of an effort by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to speed up development of its own nuclear capability so it can hold at risk those it perceives as adversaries.
During a press briefing today, Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby told reporters that this morning, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III talked with Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense Suh Wook via telephone to discuss both the missile launch and other defense issues.
"The two leaders strongly condemned yesterday's ballistic missile launched by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which they noted threatens the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula and the Indo-Pacific region," Kirby said. "They committed to close cooperation to enhance the U.S./ROK alliance, deterrence and defense posture."
Kirby also said Austin reaffirmed the ironclad commitment the U.S. has to the defense of the South Korea, which leverages the full range of U.S. military capabilities, to include "extended deterrent capabilities."
Next week, on May 10, Yoon Suk-yeol will assume the role of president of South Korea from incumbent Moon Jae-in. As a result of the change in administration, Suh will leave his position as minister of national defense — a position he's held since September 2020.
"The secretary also congratulated the minister on his successful tenure as Minister of National Defense, noting that the alliance had in fact been strengthened under Suh's leadership," Kirby said.
According to a press release from U.S. Forces Korea, Suh had served previously as ROK Army chief of staff, chief director of operations for the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, and commanding general of First Corps and 25th Infantry Division.

defense.gov · by C. Todd Lopez

4. The Mirage of Kim-Moon-Trump (KMT) Summit Diplomacy

Remember this? Worst statement ever made by a US president.

Excerpts:
After President Trump toured Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek on his first visit to South Korea in November 2017—which South Korea had covered 90 percent of construction costs at $9.7 billion —USFK Commander General Vincent Brooks explained to him on the helicopter flight to Seoul that South Korea had spent $460 billion on defense in the last 15 years and was about to purchase $13.5 billion more in additional weapons. President Trump replied, “This is a rich country. Look at these high-rises. Look at the highway infrastructure. Look at that train. Look at all of this. We’re paying for all of this. They should be paying for everything.” He added, “The military always tell you that the alliances with NATO and South Korea are the best bargain the United States makes but the military people are wrong … It’s a horrible bargain. We’re protecting South Korea from North Korea and, they’re making a fortune with televisions and ships and everything else … We’re suckers.”


The Mirage of Kim-Moon-Trump (KMT) Summit Diplomacy
While the period from 2017 to 2020 was an era of summit diplomacy among Chairman Kim Jong Un, President Moon Jae-in and President Donald Trump (K-M-T), today nuclear-tipped North Korean missiles are flying over our heads. The 27 letters between Trump and Kim disclosed in the Washington Post journalist Bob Woodward’s book, Rage (2020), only scratched the surface but nonetheless offered some perspectives about how U.S.-North Korea summit diplomacy unfolded. The present situation requires that we reflect upon and draw lessons from the mirage created by K-M-T summit diplomacy.
During the Trump administration, the South Korea-U.S. alliance suffered quite a bit of damage. President Trump ignored the fact that alliances are about shared values. He seemed to view the ROK-US alliance as a cost-benefit transaction. In the aftermath of the Korean War, South Korea’s per capita gross domestic product was $67 dollars. Had the United States viewed its alliances in transactional terms, it would have had no reason to sign a mutual defense treaty with such a poor country.
After President Trump toured Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek on his first visit to South Korea in November 2017—which South Korea had covered 90 percent of construction costs at $9.7 billion —USFK Commander General Vincent Brooks explained to him on the helicopter flight to Seoul that South Korea had spent $460 billion on defense in the last 15 years and was about to purchase $13.5 billion more in additional weapons. President Trump replied, “This is a rich country. Look at these high-rises. Look at the highway infrastructure. Look at that train. Look at all of this. We’re paying for all of this. They should be paying for everything.” He added, “The military always tell you that the alliances with NATO and South Korea are the best bargain the United States makes but the military people are wrong … It’s a horrible bargain. We’re protecting South Korea from North Korea and, they’re making a fortune with televisions and ships and everything else … We’re suckers.”
During the four years from 2016 to 2019, the United States spent $13.4 billion on its forces stationed in Korea, while South Korea contributed $3.2 billion towards their presence. At the end of 2019, President Trump demanded that South Korea’s annual defense cost-sharing contribution be increased fivefold to $5 billion. On this, John Hamre, President of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), criticized President Trump by noting that “USFK are not mercenaries who defend South Korea in return for money,” and that “the U.S. is stationing troops in South Korea for its own interests … U.S. troops serve the purpose of defending the United States.” It is worth recalling that South Korea signed a mutual defense treaty with the United States to prevent another North Korean invasion, while the United States signed it to use South Korea as a shield at the forefront of liberal democracy on the eastern tip of Eurasian continent against the expansion of communism.
According to a book by Washington Post journalists Carol Leonnig and Philip Rucker, titled I Alone Can Fix It, President Trump allegedly told his aides that if he were to be re-elected, “I’ll blow up the U.S. alliance with South Korea.” According to Maryland Governor Larry Hogan, President Trump said at a dinner with Republican governors in February 2020 that “South Koreans were terrible people.” Conversely, President Trump said of Kim Jong Un, “He likes me. I like him. We get along.” That is very disappointing.
When North Korea test-fired two intercontinental ballistic missiles in July 2017, President Trump threatened, “they [North Koreans] will be met with ‘fire and fury’ like the world has never seen,” and reviewed military options against North Korea. When South Korean National Security Advisor Chung Eui-yong went to the White House and delivered Kim’s desire to meet President Trump in March 2018, President Trump made an impromptu decision to meet Kim in person. President Trump was more interested in commanding the media’s attention than in yielding substantive outcomes from the summit with Kim. And Woodward recounts that President Trump loved the U.S. media’s description of his forthcoming summit with Kim as “a breathtaking gamble.” President Trump’s approach to the summit produced assessments that he was “ratings-minded” and was indulged in “self-grandiosity.” Trump administration officials touted North Korea’s lack of nuclear and missile tests as an accomplishment, but North Korea actually continued to develop its nuclear and missile programs and only refrained from additional provocations because President Trump was moving in Kim’s preferred direction by doing things such as stopping ROK-U.S. combined military exercises. On April 1, 2022, the report by Panel of Experts on the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea stated that “During the reporting period, the DPRK continued to maintain and develop its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in violation of Security Council resolutions.”
Evan S. Medeiros, who served as President Obama’s Asia policy advisor, said, “Kim will never give up his nukes,” and that “Kim played Moon and is now playing Trump.” After having three meetings with Kim, President Trump said in an interview with Bob Woodward, “You know what I did? I met (him). Big deal. It takes me two days. I gave up nothing. I didn’t give up sanctions. I didn’t give him anything.” However, no sitting U.S. president prior to the Singapore Summit had ever met a North Korean leader in person and it was the Moon administration that made the meeting happen. Since 2018, President Trump and Chairman Kim met three times and what followed was the suspension of ROK-U.S. combined military exercises, not the denuclearization of North Korea. President Trump drew criticism from the international community that he had given the North Korean leadership the international standing and legitimacy it had long sought.
To have a summit, it is necessary to have preparations including analysis of the counterpart and some guarantee of tangible outcomes. It is hard to find such things in the Singapore Summit. It is illustrative that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) characterized Kim as “cunning,” “crafty,” and “ultimately stupid,” but President Trump called him “smart” and “tough.”
At the June 2018 Singapore Summit, President Trump and Chairman Kim announced they would work toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula but did not specify what steps North Korea would take. This was weaker than the September 19, 2005, Six-Party Talks Joint Statement in which North Korea pledged to remain “committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to IAEA safeguards.”
Under the ambiguous Singapore statement, President Trump made a risky decision to downscale or altogether suspend South Korea-U.S. combined military exercises. Three months after the Singapore Summit, in September 2018, at a rally during the U.S. mid-term elections, President Trump told an audience that he “fell in love” with Kim. According to opinion surveys conducted by CNN after the 2018 Singapore Summit, 70% of U.S. respondents said North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons, suggesting that the American public knew more than President Trump about Kim’s intention.
President Trump and Chairman Kim exchanged letters and compliments, promising to implement the outcomes of the Singapore Summit. At the end of July 2018, Kim wrote President Trump a letter suggesting that the United States and North Korea should declare an end to the Korean War because hostilities ceased under the terms of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. As North Korea attempted to create the mood for the withdrawal of U.S. troops by adopting the end of war declaration, Victor Cha, Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), pointed out that “[the declaration] can raise questions in the United States about if there’s peace, why don’t we bring the troops home?”
During the second summit held in Hanoi in February 2019, eight months after the Singapore Summit, what did the United States expect, and what did Kim want as he made a 66-hour train journey to Hanoi? At the summit, President Trump demanded that North Korea shut down its five nuclear facilities while Kim insisted on only closing the Yongbyon facility, calling it “our biggest,” which Trump rejected by saying, “Yeah, it’s also the oldest,” thus bringing the summit to a sudden end.
As the Hanoi Summit ended with ‘no deal,’ the bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea seemed to have ended. However, three months after Hanoi, at the G-20 Summit in Osaka, Japan, President Trump tweeted an open invitation to Kim, “If Chairman Kim of North Korea sees this, I would meet him at the Border/DMZ just to shake his hand and say Hello(?)!” President Trump also sent a letter to Kim on June 29 in which he wrote “As you may have seen, I am travelling today from Osaka, Japan to the Republic of Korea, and since I will be so close to you I would like to invite you to meet me at the border tomorrow afternoon. I will be near the DMZ in the afternoon and propose a meeting at 3:30 at the Peace House on the southern side of the military demarcation line.” At the Panmunjom meeting in the afternoon of June 30, President Trump reportedly did not want President Moon’s attendance. President Moon had insisted on being present but the United States refused due to North Korean opposition. President Moon instead escorted President Trump and Chairman Kim to Freedom House at Panmunjom. President Trump crossed over the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and took 20 steps into North Korean soil. He boasted that he was the first sitting U.S. president to step over the MDL and hung a photograph he took with Kim in the White House. At Freedom House, President Trump said to Chairman Kim, “if [you] didn’t show up, the press was going to make me look very bad. So, you made us both look good, and I appreciate it.” Although President Trump said after the meeting that he and Kim agreed to designate teams and work out some deals “within weeks,” it took nearly four months to hold talks in Stockholm, Sweden, and the talks ended up falling apart.
During the time of K-M-T summit diplomacy, the Moon administration rushed to complete the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) without securing reconnaissance capabilities to monitor North Korean moves, interceptors, and precision strike weapons. It pressed ahead with declaring an end to the Korean War which had been proposed by Kim to remove U.S. troops from Korea.
On September 22, 2018 at the 73rd UN General Assembly, President Moon Jae-in de facto represented North Korea’s position by stating that “On September 9, in the ceremony marking the 70th anniversary of its foundation, Chairman Kim expressed its commitment to peace and prosperity instead of boasting its nuclear capabilities.” And three days later, during the meeting at Council on Foreign Relations, President Moon said “Kim Jong Un is young, very candid and polite, treating the elders with respect … I believe that Kim Jong Un is sincere and he will abandon nuclear weapons in exchange of economic development.” Bloomberg News criticized President Moon for becoming Kim Jong Un’s top spokesman. This characterization of Kim Jong Un is hard to understand since he is the grandson of Kim Il Sung, who invaded South Korea and massacred millions of innocent people, and even today himself continues to put more than 20 million North Koreans under political oppression and economic poverty.
In March 2018, then-National Security Advisor and later Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong debriefed the press after his visit to Pyongyang as a special envoy. He said, North Korea “made it clear that if its security were to be guaranteed, there will no reason for the country to possess nuclear weapons.” During his press conference at the White House after sharing the results of his meeting in Pyongyang with President Trump, Ambassador Chung said, “I told President Trump that, in our meeting, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said he is committed to denuclearization. Kim pledged that North Korea will refrain from any further nuclear or missile tests.”
During Ambassador Chung’s visit to Pyongyang, Kim allegedly told the South Korean delegation that “North Korea would refrain from the use of not only nuclear weapons, but also conventional ones.” And he added “how can I use nuclear weapons against my compatriot South Koreans?” If the Moon administration felt assured by this pledge, it fell prey to the Stockholm Syndrome, “contested illness that hostages develop psychological bond with their captors during captivity, and accordingly taking the side of their captor.” The wishful thinking that appeasement may one day lead to peace is the Korean version of Stockholm syndrome. Rather than trying to break free of captivity, South Korea is relying on the favor of its North Korean captor.
It is time to reflect on whether South Korea, in the course of its messenger role between Pyongyang and Washington, exaggerated or distorted North Korea’s position on denuclearization or made a mistake causing misunderstanding. North Korea made it clear that the withdrawal of the U.S. troops should precede denuclearization. It is questionable whether Ambassador Chung accurately conveyed to the United States North Korea’s demand for the withdrawal of the U.S. troops as precondition for denuclearization. It must be scrutinized whether the Moon administration, in want of the Singapore summit, did not fully and accurately explain the aspects of North Korean demands Washington would find problematic. The contents of three phone call conversations Kim allegedly had with the Moon administration during his 66-hour train journey to Hanoi must also be revealed.
What does North Korea actually think when it deals with South Korea? It claims that the United States is an “imperialist power” that makes military threats, and that because the South is a “U.S. puppet,” its society must be ‘liberated’ from imperialist control. It also argues that securing conventional forces and a nuclear deterrent are defensive means to protect against the threats of “U.S. imperialism.” Although it is imperative for the North Korean regime to exhibit accomplishments to justify its three-generation hereditary system from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il and to Kim Jong-Un, there have thus far been no visible accomplishments while North Korean people remain gripped by poverty and oppression. For Kim, the existence of a free and prosperous South Korea is a political threat and the stability of his regime can only be assured after bringing South Korea to submission by nuclear weapons and achieving reunification by force.
Knowing that he needed to separate the United States from South Korea to accomplish the goal of unification under communist flag, Kim exploited President Trump’s fondness for self-grandiosity. Four months after the collapse of the Hanoi Summit, President Trump wrote Kim a letter in June 2019 saying that they had shared “a unique style and a special relationship” and could end the hostile relationship between their two countries. After the Panmunjom meeting in July, President Trump wrote Kim another letter that included 22 photographs they had taken at Panmunjom. A month later, Kim wrote President Trump his longest letter, which in journalist Bob Woodward’s assessment had a tone of disappointment. In the letter, Kim complained that South Korea-U.S. combined military exercises had not fully stopped, stating, “Now and in the future, South Korean military cannot be my enemy.” On April 1, 2022, South Korean Defense Minister Suh Wook said that the country’s military has the “ability and readiness to conduct a precision strike against the launch site and command and support facilities if there is a clear sign of [North Korean] missile launch.” Next day, in response to South Korean Defense Minister Suh Wook’s comment, Kim Yo-Jong, Deputy Department Director of the Publicity and Information Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea,. warned that North Korea is a nuclear armed state and South Korea without nuclear weapons is no match by stating that Defense Minister Suh Wook “dare mentioned the preemptive strike at a nuclear weapons state, in his senseless bluster. Two days later, she threatened South Korea in her statement that says “The South Korean military will have to face a miserable fate little short of total destruction and ruin.”
At a confirmation hearing held at the South Korean National Assembly a month after Kim announced the development of tactical nuclear weapons and a nuclear-powered submarines in January 2021, Ambassador Chung, then-minister nominee, said, “Kim Jong Un is still committed to denuclearization.” In March 2022, at a session of the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee of the National Assembly, Foreign Minister Chung said, “if an answer can simply be ‘yes or no,’ how simple and good would the world be,” in effect he misleads the people with sophistry watching a fire across the river.
In 2021, the Biden administration entered office and in May 2022, a new government will take office in Seoul. In the South Korea-U.S. leaders’ joint statement of May 2021, the Biden administration announced that it would “begin a new chapter” in the partnership.
Given that South Korean President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol pledged to transform the South Korea-U.S. alliance into “a comprehensive strategic alliance,” South Korea and the United States are expected to be more closely aligned than ever. The issue is that they will have to overcome a crisis of trust in their relationship produced over the past years and put their partnership back on a solid rock.
Amid increasing nuclear threats from North Korea, public support in South Korea and the United States for the relationship is crucial for maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula. The attitudes of citizens in South Korea and the United States toward each other’s countries remain positive. According to a March 2021 opinion survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, South Koreans viewed the United States most favorably of all nations, and according to the same institute’s July 2021 survey, 63% of U.S. respondents said they supported defending South Korea in the event of a North Korean invasion.
  • Bank of Korea, “GDP Per Capita, 1953,” https://ecos.bok.or.kr/flex/EasySearch.jsp.
  • Congressional Research Service, “U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Issues for Congress,” In Focus (March 14, 2022), p. 2.
  • Bob Woodward, Rage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020), p. 85.
  • Woodward, Rage, p. 186.
  • U.S. Government Accountability Office, Burden Sharing: Benefits and Costs Associated with the U.S. Military Presence in Japan and South Korea (March 2021), pp. 43-44.
  • Statistics Korea, “E-National Statistics, Status of Shared Defense Costs,” https://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1712.
  • “US forces in Korea not mercenaries: US think tank,” The Korea Herald (November 27, 2020). http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20191127000648.
  • Carol Leonnig and Philip Rucker, I Alone Can Fix It – Large Print Version (New York: Random House, 2021), pp. 503-504. When Trump’s top aides, including Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, told him that shredding the alliance with South Korea would be politically dangerous, he said, “We’ll do it in the second term.”
  • Larry Hogan, “Fighting alone: I’m a GOP governor. Why didn’t Trump help my state with coronavirus testing?” The Washington Post (June 16, 2020). https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/07/16/larry-hogan-trump-coronavirus/.
  • Woodward, Rage, p. 183.
  • “Trump Threatens ‘Fire and Fury’ Against North Korea if It Endangers U.S,” The New York Times (August 8, 2017).
  • Woodward, Rage, p. 179 and 181.
  • “In surprise summit concession, Trump says he will halt Korea war games,” Reuters (June 12, 2018).
  • Final Report of the Panel of Experts submitted pursuant to resolution 2569 (2021), United Nations Security Council 1718 Sanctions Committee (DPRK), March 1, 2022.
  • Woodward, Rage, p. 92.
  • Woodward, Rage, p. 92.
  • “The Troubled ROK-U.S. Alliance,” The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Issue Brief 2022-02 (January 21, 2022), p.10.
  • Woodward, Rage, p. 183.
  • “President Donald Trump on Kim Jong Un: ‘We fell in love’ over ‘beautiful letters’,” USA Today (Sep 30, 2018). https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/09/30/trump-north-koreas-kim-love-beautiful-letters/1478834002/.
  • “How to Understand North Korea’s Demand for the Withdrawal of ROK-U.S. ‘hostile policy’,” The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Issue Brief (January 20, 2022), p. 4.
  • Woodward, Rage, p. 172.
  • “The Troubled ROK-U.S. Alliance,” The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Issue Brief 2022-02 (January 21, 2022) p. 12.
  • Woodward, Rage, p. 175.
  • “In a tweet, Trump appears to invite Kim Jong Un to meet him at the Korean demilitarized zone,” The Washington Post (June 28, 2019).
  • “Kim Jong Un felt annoyed by Moon Jae-in trying to intervene between himself and Trump,” Sisajounral, (April 12, 2022), p. 17.
  • [단독] “美北 판문점 회동때, 트럼프도 김정은도 文동행 원치 않았다”[Neither Trump nor Kim Jong Un Wanted Company of Moon at U.S.-D.P.R.K Panmunjom Meeting], 조선일보 [Chosun Ilbo] (June 22, 2020).
  • “Trump Steps Into North Korea and Agrees with Kim Jong-un to Resume Talks,” The New York Times (June 30, 2019).
  • “Address by President Moon Jae-in of the Republic of Korea at the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” Cheong Wa Dae (September 26, 2018). https://english1.president.go.kr/briefingspeeches/speeches/73
  • “South Korea’s Moon Becomes Kim Jong Un’s Top Spokesman at UN,” Bloomberg (September 26, 2018)
  • “정의용 수석특사 방북 결과 언론발표,” [Special Envoy Chung Eui Yong’s Press Conference after visit to Pyongyang], 대한민국 정책브리핑 [Republic of Korea Policy Briefing] (2018. 03. 16). https://www.korea.kr/news/blueHouseView.do?newsId=148848672.
  • “The Troubled ROK-U.S. Alliance,” The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Issue Brief 2022-02 (January 21, 2022) p. 13.
  • “하노이 ‘훈수’에 불만 … 김여정, 청와대에 ‘배신자’ 말폭탄,” [Disgruntled with backseat gaming at Hanoi, Kim Yo Jung characterized Cheongwadae as ‘traitor’” 중앙일보 [JoongAng Ilbo] (June 25, 2020).
  • Woodward, Rage, p. 181.
  • Woodward, Rage, p. 177.
  • Woodward, Rage, p. 172.
  • Woodward, Rage, p. 180.
  • “Of grass, winds and principles,” Korea JoongAng Daily (April 6, 2022).
  • “Press Statement of Kim Yo-Jong, Vice Department Director of CC, WPK,” Korea Central News Agency (April 3, 2022)
  • “Press Statement of Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK Kim Yo Jong,” The Rodongshinmun, April 5, 2022.
  • “정의용 ‘김정은 비핵화 의지’ 강조에 … 미 ‘아무런 증거 없다’ 반박,” [Chung Eui Yong emphasizes ‘Kim’s commitment to denuclearization’ while U.S. rebuts ‘no evidence’], 조선일보 [Chosun Ilbo] (2021. 02. 07).
  • “‘문 정부 평화프로세스 사망’ 국힘 공세 … 정의용 “‘실패 아나’,” [Chung grilled by People Power Party for Moon’s Korean Peace Process and said it’s not failure], 연합뉴스 [Yonhap News Agency] (2022. 03. 28).

5. U.S. Senate unanimously approves Goldberg as new ambassador to S. Korea

Good news. Bipartisan support for Korean security issues.

(LEAD) U.S. Senate unanimously approves Goldberg as new ambassador to S. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · May 6, 2022
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with more details; CHANGES dateline; ADDS byline)
By Byun Duk-kun and Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON/SEOUL, May 5 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. Senate on Thursday voted unanimously to approve the nomination of Philip Goldberg, a career diplomat, as new U.S. ambassador to South Korea.
The confirmation came as Seoul and Washington seek to reinforce their alliance for stronger deterrence against North Korea's evolving military threats -- an issue likely to figure prominently in the upcoming summit between President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol and President Joe Biden slated for May 21.
Goldberg, who had served as ambassador to Colombia since 2019, is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, the highest diplomatic rank in U.S. foreign service.
He has undertaken various key posts at the State Department, including ambassadorship in the Philippines and Bolivia and the assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research.
The ambassador also worked as coordinator for the Implementation of U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1874 on North Korea from 2009-2010 -- a period when he built his expertise on the recalcitrant regime.
The coordinator position was to ensure the enforcement of sanctions slapped in the aftermath of the North's second underground nuclear test in 2009.
His past dealings with those sanctions created an image of him as a hard-liner on Pyongyang.
During last month's Senate confirmation hearing, Goldberg referred to the North as a "rogue regime" and advocated for the North's "comprehensive, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization (CVID)."
The Biden administration has refrained from using the expression CVID in an apparent move to pave the way for reengagement with the North, as the regime has balked at the term.
But Goldberg is also known to have shown a flexible stance in 2009 on the possible resumption of tours to Mount Kumgang on the North's east coast and its border city of Kaesong, saying the resumption is unrelated to UNSC sanctions.
Goldberg will replace Harry Harris, who stepped down early last year when President Biden took office.
The ambassador earned a Bachelor of Science degree magna cum laude in Journalism from Boston University.

sshluck@yna.co.kr
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · May 6, 2022

6. Biden will reaffirm U.S. commitment to defense of S. Korea, Japan through Asia tour: Psaki

The linchpin (ROK) and cornerstone (Japan) alliances and the US ironclad commitment to their defense.

Biden will reaffirm U.S. commitment to defense of S. Korea, Japan through Asia tour: Psaki | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · May 6, 2022
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, May 5 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Joe Biden will reaffirm U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea and Japan when he visits Seoul and Tokyo later this month, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki said Thursday.
The spokesperson said Biden will also reaffirm his commitment to providing "extended deterrence" to the U.S. allies.
"While he's there in South Korea and Japan, the president will hold bilateral meetings with his counterparts -- newly elected president of the Republic of Korea and Prime Minister (Fumio) Kishida of Japan," Psaki told a daily press briefing.

South Korea earlier said the U.S. president will arrive in Seoul on May 20 for a summit with the incoming president, Yoon Suk-yeol, who is set to take office on Tuesday. Biden is due in Japan on May 22.
Biden's upcoming trip follows a series of missile tests by North Korea, which also fired its first intercontinental ballistic missile in over four years in March.
Pyongyang again fired a ballistic missile on Wednesday (Seoul time), marking its 14th known show of force this year.
"In light of North Korea's continued destabilizing actions in the region, including the test launch of multiple intercontinental ballistic missiles, President Biden will make clear that our commitment to security of the Republic of Korea and Japanese allies, reiterate our commitment, I should say, including our extended deterrence commitments, is ironclad," said Psaki, referring to South Korea by its official name.
North Korea's recent missile provocations, however, do not warrant a serious security concern for Biden's upcoming trip to Asia, she noted.
"I would say we certainly always assess security as we do with any of the president's travel, but that has not been a concern as it relates to his travel coming up in just a few weeks," the White House spokesperson said when asked.
"There's no question that North Korea is going to be on the agenda when he visits South Korea and Japan," she added.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · May 6, 2022
7. U.S. remains capable of defending homeland against N. Korean missiles: Gen. VanHerck

There will be no trade of Los Angeles for Seoul.

U.S. remains capable of defending homeland against N. Korean missiles: Gen. VanHerck | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · May 6, 2022
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, May 5 (Yonhap) -- The United States remains capable of defending the homeland against missile threats from North Korea, the commander of U.S. Northern Command said Thursday.
Gen. Glen VanHerck, however, underscored the importance of deploying next-generation missile interceptors on time or sooner.
"I have confidence in my ability to defend our homeland from a rogue state such as DPRK," VanHerck said when asked about the capability of U.S. ground-based missile defense system.
DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name.

VanHerck's remarks come after North Korea fired a ballistic missile into the East Seat earlier this week, marking its 14th known show of force this year.
Pyongyang also launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in March, ending its self-imposed moratorium on long-range ballistic missile testing that had been in place since November 2017.
"As we go forward, they will continue to develop additional capacity and capability and that's why it's crucial to field the next generation interceptor on time in 2028 or sooner, and to continue with a service life extension program, which gives me additional reliance and resilience in the system," said VanHerck, who also commands North American Aerospace Defense Command.
The Air Force general earlier said the U.S. currently has 44 ground-based interceptors, with 20 next-generation interceptors scheduled to be delivered by 2028.
"I'm very comfortable with our ability to shoot down a limited attack on our homeland from North Korea or any other rogue states at this time," he reiterated.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · May 6, 2022

8. Unification ministry to hold cultural events for N. Korean defectors next week

I think the ROKG and Korean people would be better served by helping escapees with their information efforts toward the north.


Unification ministry to hold cultural events for N. Korean defectors next week | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · May 6, 2022
SEOUL, May 6 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's unification ministry said Friday its inter-Korean culture center will hold a series of events next week as part of efforts to boost a rapport between South Koreans and North Korean defectors living in the country.
The Inter-Korean Cultural Integration Center, located in western Seoul, plans to host various events to be attended by defectors, such as plays, concerts and exhibitions, from Monday to Saturday on the occasion of the 2nd anniversary of the center's opening, according to the ministry handling inter-Korean affairs.
The center opened on May 13, 2020, with the goal of encouraging communication between North Korean defectors and South Koreans.

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · May 6, 2022
9. North Korea: Kim’s Power Play Trap And Nuclear Brinkmanship – Analysis
Deterrence and peninsula domination are not mutually exclusive.

Excerpts:

In other words, the old dogma and line of deterrence by the coalition no longer hold water, at least for Kim’s new awakening. Past containing strategies are now being used by Kim against the three parties. Regional wariness on the looming threats by the Axis of Autocracies as termed by critics with the new-found strength and consolidation of support in the structure of Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang in capitalising on certain shared interests is further compounded by its internal inability to mount an equal level and effective deterrence. While regional players were temporarily relieved by Biden’s pivot to normative assurance and alliance solidification, the actual terms are deemed insufficient, and worries abound on Washington’s long-term staying power with potential changing policies in the future under different presidencies. Increasingly, they are keen to align more closely and openly with key players and Washington in signalling a clear and measurable deterring and counter actions under an expansive nuclear and conventional security umbrella.
...
Pyongyang continues to shift the gear in its newfound momentum in pushing forward the capacity for its escalatory offensive deterrence. It might use the next nuclear test in claiming the ability to build smaller warheads that will be able to be fitted on larger missiles including the capacity for a multi-warhead ICBM. These solid fuelled smaller missiles, which will be easier to remain hidden and to be manoeuvred,will give further advantage to Pyongyang by making them more difficult to be targets for pre-emptive destruction.
The next step in further polishing Pyongyang’s nuclear fortitude and tactical capacity with the progress in launching methods from submarines and deepening ICBM capacity in the near future reflect Kim’s desire and strategy to move away from the cocoon previous dogma. The goals will be to outmatch and outrun its southern neighbour in particular in the impending arms race especially in ensuring that it remains the clear winner in the nuclear gap while at the same time forcing Washington to change its sanction-based deterrence and archaic dependency of ties with Seoul as the main framework of negotiating from the position of strength.
Moving forward, Kim will stick to his strategy and desire in playing the dual game of bolstering his nuclear progression while ensuring internal economic resilience and growth, with no clear signs he will pivot away from his nuclear baggage which still forms his biggest insurance and guarantee for his internal and external survival. The next nuclear test is only a matter of when, not if. The rationale for such a move, at least in Kim’s view, warrants the subsequent international condemnation and sanctions and further narrowing the path for conciliatory dialogue and openings. Like Putin, he has long tasted Western sanctions and retaliatory responses with seemingly little detrimental and hindering effects. He can still count on Xi and Putin for now, but as the cost-benefit fulcrum increasingly tilts towards jettisoning Pyongyang for their own national needs and survival and coupled with the inescapable multi-pronged challenges to his nation’s survival, he might recalibrate his strategic manoeuvres and to grab the opening for a stunning transformation twist which will stem his legacy in a different realm. Or he might be tempted to remain defiant and to stay on to the last straw of MAD. The rest of the world certainly roots for the former. Only time will tell.

North Korea: Kim’s Power Play Trap And Nuclear Brinkmanship – Analysis
eurasiareview.com · by Collins Chong Yew Keat · May 5, 2022
The recent flurry of missile tests by President Kim Jong-un of North Korea in a show of defiant standing further upended the calculations of regional balance of power, with the latest ballistic missile test that was launched towards the east coast just days before the swearing in of President elect Suk-yeol of South Korea meant to present a stronger message. The sabre rattling with a total of 14 weapons tests so far this year with the Hwasong-17 launch being the most impactful reinforces the range of strategic manoeuvres by Kim in trying to reassert dominance in security spectrum and cost benefit calculations in his immediate need for assurances and survival.
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Although critics have argued on the real success of the Hwasong-17 ICBM which is touted by Pyongyang as its crème de la crème with its longest duration on air and the farthest range of manoeuvrability which in theory is capable to deliver multiple warheads to anywhere in the continental of the US, the operational success in these ventures further up the ante in regional fear and the subsequent retaliatory moves, with Seoul and Tokyo were the first to get the jitters and a flurry of responses were initiated.
Kim in his assertion for pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons and escalatory nuclear development with this major shift of strategic deterrence to first use preventive tools forms a new basis for him in disregarding the overtures by the West and the south. In strengthening Pyongyang’s nuclear tactical capabilities in the fastest time frame and with the threat to use it first hands if provoked, Kim desires to give a clear message and warning to Seoul in stopping its early counter-measures and precedence setting, with simultaneous messages to Washington that sanctions should and must be stopped along with the joint military drills.
Additional capabilities continue to be strengthened by the theoretical ability to accommodate higher volumes of nuclear warheads in enabling the delivery of nuclear explosive power covering the entire continental United States, compared to geographical limitations in Alaska and Guam previously. While critics and analysts continue to be sceptical of the true capabilities of the Hwasong-17, Kim’s new strategy shifts the region’s counter-reactions to a new level of risk that will invite changes in the dynamics of the military spectrum. Nuclear brinkmanship is seen and touted as more effective in restraining the counter measures taken, at least the scale of them. Whether it is a worthy experiment or otherwise, it warrants a needed shot for Kim.
In other words, the old dogma and line of deterrence by the coalition no longer hold water, at least for Kim’s new awakening. Past containing strategies are now being used by Kim against the three parties. Regional wariness on the looming threats by the Axis of Autocracies as termed by critics with the new-found strength and consolidation of support in the structure of Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang in capitalising on certain shared interests is further compounded by its internal inability to mount an equal level and effective deterrence. While regional players were temporarily relieved by Biden’s pivot to normative assurance and alliance solidification, the actual terms are deemed insufficient, and worries abound on Washington’s long-term staying power with potential changing policies in the future under different presidencies. Increasingly, they are keen to align more closely and openly with key players and Washington in signalling a clear and measurable deterring and counter actions under an expansive nuclear and conventional security umbrella.
Threats and counter threats involving nuclear annihilation in the peninsula have already created jitters even before long term solid containment measures can be drafted. Suk-yeol has already opened the floodgates to further deterioration of the regional security climate with his defiant stance for a more hard-line and hawkish deterrence against Pyongyang, with a series of defensive postures with alliances forged with Tokyo and Washington and hopeful for more assurances of defensive support from Washington which his delegations have requested during their visits to the US and a line of moves in garnering further support from regional players.
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Although he won by a thin margin from a neck and neck race with his Democratic rival, he realises that conventional methods of dealing with Jong-un do not yield the intended results, with even worse implications for Seoul’s security assurance. The efforts and policies in the past to please Kim and in practising strategic patience in dealing with Pyongyang seem to be a utopian and futile strategy for Suk-yeol. It is this reason for his promise in his campaigns in requesting for the redeployment of American nuclear capacities should conflicts flare in the peninsula. He also sensed the prevailing sentiment of the public where many would opt for hosting American nuclear weapons in putting to rest the deficiency of counter threats and deterrence that Seoul is in possession now.
It remains to be seen whether the bold risk taken by Suk-yeol will be effective or to backfire. Of pertinent interest will be whether Kim will actually take the deterrence posed seriously or will it only antagonise him in warranting further irrational actions and to undertake pre-emptive strikes in cancelling and preventing the supposed pre-emptive strikes by Seoul. With his hawkish and conservative agenda in shaping relations on the peninsula, he believes in integrated and consistent pressure on Kim in hopes of squeezing and closing the new routes Kim was trying to shape. His objectives did not seem to bring the desired results, with Kim seemingly immune and undeterred and further. Backfiring has already occurred with the new doctrine of nuclear usage by Kim that goes beyond conventional wisdom to more effective and realistic tools of arbitration and offensive power projection.
Strategic ambiguity no longer remains the useful option. Regional and global geopolitical twists remain centred on the supremacy of national strategic interests and security as well as national survival. The enemy of my enemy is my friend. The bigger enemy will force me to make a temporary alliance with my smaller enemy. This is seen in Kishida and Suk-yeol’s desire to continue to forge closer ties and preparations to deal with Pyongyang in particular and Beijing in general, ready to cast aside historical tensions at least for now.
With bigger eyes on Beijing in ultimate terms, Tokyo has long started a calculated response to the ongoing and worsening threats from both Pyongyang and Beijing. The recent 2+2 engagement with Manila involving foreign and defence overtures and the strengthening of defence ties with Canberra, coupled with the recent regional tour by Kishida signals the overarching responses by Tokyo in intensifying resilience and capacity measures against both Pyongyang and Beijing. Defensive alliance with Canberra in bilateral structure as well as strengthening its QUAD commitment remain the central pillar for Tokyo, further backed by persistent and clear foreign policy of hard deterrence against Beijing, Pyongyang and Moscow by Prime Minister Kishida. Past courting with Moscow under his predecessor’s policies is practically put to bed with Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, with Kishida keen to ensure that Tokyo remains aligned with the West’s push amidst ensuring its continuous support for Tokyo’s bigger threat from Beijing and Pyongyang. Increasing assertive postures by the Kremlin in the disputed regions in the Kuril Islands and its growing focus in its Eastern side further fuelled the impetus for Kishida to maintain the hawkish pressure.
The growing threat level has further pushed the talks for Japan to host American nukes to complete the strongest nuclear deterrence. Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe argued for this, using the case of Ukraine for having failed to have a nuclear deterrence in allowing the Kremlin to undertake the invasion. While the prospects remain slim for now, the Liberal Democratic Party has already initiated internal discussions on further bolstering nuclear deterrence. Prime Minister Kishida in his initial reaction dismissed the proposal in maintaining the long-standing nuclear principle in setting that no nuclear weapons will be produced, hosted and owned by Japan. Growing gap and threat with changing public sentiment will see a fundamental shift in this in the near future.
Beijing is deeply apprehensive of the military drills and manoeuvres by Tokyo and Seoul involving Washington, seeing these as a pretext for targeting Beijing ultimately and its potential move on Taiwan. The US THAAD missile defence installation in South Korea continues to be fiercely opposed by Beijing, with previous punitive sanctions imposed on Seoul in 2017 with wariness on its radar capacities and in tracking Beijing’s manoeuvres. The significant presence of US power projection in that country, whether defensively and deterring in nature or otherwise will always remain a thorn in President Xi Jinping’s bargaining, a point underscored by the reality that Washington will only continue to bolster its arming capacities and ally-support enhancement for Tokyo, Seoul and strategically Taipei. It is worth noting that Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek is America’s largest overseas military base with the most active airfield in the Pacific. As much as Beijing is hopeful for Kim to rein in his provocations and assertive moves, it would still very much rely on Pyongyang as a powerful bargaining tool with the West and will continue to extract the positives for now.
It is as much certain that Xi will not give up Taiwan as will Kim in not giving up his powerful nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrence and exerting power, at least in the near term. Unless clear, committee, collective and measurable assurances and guarantees are given, at the same time in terms that are not violating the long term survival of Kim’s regime, it is hard to foresee he will erode his only powerful deterrence at his disposal.
The US presidency is another factor to consider, with arguments that Kim is forced to play into the hands of Trump with his unique no holds-barred approach, and that in facing Biden, he is forced to again resort to past proven effects of this escalatory threats for greater returns in seeing no clear differences or unconventional measures from Biden. During the attempts to straighten out the positions under Trump, Kim foresaw the once in a lifetime opportunity to seal the ultimate breakthrough, but the cost-risk calculations were too lopsided for Washington to continue.
While Kim calculates that he can still rely on Xi and Putin, he is also observant of the fact that he is increasingly being used as an effective tool in their own strategic and calculated peripheries in their dealings with the West. Xi is increasingly pressured to play his greater part in reining in Kim and has had enough problems with Ukraine and Russia being used as the battering ram in further cornering his options and expectations. He would not want a further dilemma and worse, an irrefutable excuse for the West to increase its foothold and justification in bringing the entire military might to its doorstep as a result of Kim’s erratic moves.
Kim wants to be different and to stem his own legacy in aiming for a final peaceful breakthrough, but he realises that he needs Western nodding in giving him the face-saving transition and the last say to portray to the nation that Washington somehow acknowledges the wisdom and strength of the Kim regime in coming to this compromise and peaceful conflict resolution. In this regard, Kim believes he has time on his side unlike China’s Xi, with his youth and ruthless displacement of others who challenge him and an unhindered free hand in dictating policies with the support of his handy elites led by his sister Yo-Jong. The long game is his to lose, and along the way, outlines further goals to bolster his military capacities particularly in enhancing the accuracy and range of his missiles and also targeting next frontiers with the likes of nuclear submarines and multiple warhead capacity of his ICBMs.
The reality at hand does not seem to be rosy as in Kim’s projection, however. He faces both internal and external squeezes with the full-blown impact from climate challenges and a strengthened alliance of democracies and the Western order in threatening to upend internal food security and external survival. With rising inflationary pressure across the world and the squeeze in food sustainability and security, the reverberations and long-term impact will not escape the periphery of North Korea, no matter how isolated it claims to be. As time drags on, there is only so much Pyongyang can prepare for the long ball game of withstanding the natural chain effects of the non-traditional threats that will persistently pose problems for his populations more than him personally.
There is also only so much momentum and progress that he could caulk up in sustaining an effective and trusted first strike capacities and at the same time stalling the second-strike readiness and capabilities in leaving them vulnerable to first strike counter measures from Washington or even Seoul. This will render Pyongyang’s nuclear deterrence and its long held first strike threat to be less lethal and more obsolete, giving greater space for the West to act further. The prospects of deterrence and MAD (Mutually Assured Destructions) will also greatly diminish in the long run as Washington develops a better and more holistic interceptive capacity with its unrivalled technological and military advancement which will provide better first strike prevention and an enhanced second-strike impact that will render Pyongyang’s past mechanism to futility. This signals that time certainly is not on the side with Jong-un and that the window for greater dialogue, engagement and diplomacy is fast closing in terms that will be beneficial for him in the long run.
Pyongyang continues to shift the gear in its newfound momentum in pushing forward the capacity for its escalatory offensive deterrence. It might use the next nuclear test in claiming the ability to build smaller warheads that will be able to be fitted on larger missiles including the capacity for a multi-warhead ICBM. These solid fuelled smaller missiles, which will be easier to remain hidden and to be manoeuvred,will give further advantage to Pyongyang by making them more difficult to be targets for pre-emptive destruction.
The next step in further polishing Pyongyang’s nuclear fortitude and tactical capacity with the progress in launching methods from submarines and deepening ICBM capacity in the near future reflect Kim’s desire and strategy to move away from the cocoon previous dogma. The goals will be to outmatch and outrun its southern neighbour in particular in the impending arms race especially in ensuring that it remains the clear winner in the nuclear gap while at the same time forcing Washington to change its sanction-based deterrence and archaic dependency of ties with Seoul as the main framework of negotiating from the position of strength.
Moving forward, Kim will stick to his strategy and desire in playing the dual game of bolstering his nuclear progression while ensuring internal economic resilience and growth, with no clear signs he will pivot away from his nuclear baggage which still forms his biggest insurance and guarantee for his internal and external survival. The next nuclear test is only a matter of when, not if. The rationale for such a move, at least in Kim’s view, warrants the subsequent international condemnation and sanctions and further narrowing the path for conciliatory dialogue and openings. Like Putin, he has long tasted Western sanctions and retaliatory responses with seemingly little detrimental and hindering effects. He can still count on Xi and Putin for now, but as the cost-benefit fulcrum increasingly tilts towards jettisoning Pyongyang for their own national needs and survival and coupled with the inescapable multi-pronged challenges to his nation’s survival, he might recalibrate his strategic manoeuvres and to grab the opening for a stunning transformation twist which will stem his legacy in a different realm. Or he might be tempted to remain defiant and to stay on to the last straw of MAD. The rest of the world certainly roots for the former. Only time will tell.
*Collins Chong Yew Keat has been serving in University of Malaya, the top university in Malaysia for more than 9 years. His areas of interests include strategic and security studies, American foreign policy and power analysis and has published various publications on numerous platforms including books and chapter articles. He is also a regular contributor in providing op-eds for both the local and international media on various contemporary global issues and regional affairs since 2007.
eurasiareview.com · by Collins Chong Yew Keat · May 5, 2022

10. New Ransomware Variant Linked to North Korean Cyber Army
The all purpose sword of cyber.

So many threats, so little time.

New Ransomware Variant Linked to North Korean Cyber Army
darkreading.com · May 4, 2022
A new ransomware strain called VHD has been traced to North Korean state actor APT38 by a team of researchers using detailed code analysis and following a Bitcoin trail.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has used ransomware for several years to raise money for state coffers, including the February 2016 Bangladesh bank heist in which attackers tried to use the SWIFT banking system to steal almost US$1 billion, explains Trellix researcher Christiaan Beek in a new blog post.
Beek and a team of fellow cybersecurity analysts linked North Korea's cyber army to the VHD ransomware, which they said has been used in ransomware attacks on global financial systems and cryptocurrency exchanges since March 2020. The analysts compared known DPRK code with VHD ransomware and found stark similarities, the post states. Bitcoin transactions overlapping between known DPRK-sponsored cybercrime groups were also reported by the team.
"We suspect the ransomware families described in this blog are part of more organized attacks," Beek adds. "Based on our research, combined intelligence, and observations of the smaller targeted ransomware attacks, Trellix attributes them to DPRK affiliated hackers with high confidence."
darkreading.com · May 4, 2022


11. S. Korea's spy agency joins NATO cyber defense group

South Korea is stepping up.

S. Korea's spy agency joins NATO cyber defense group | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · May 5, 2022
SEOUL, May 5 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's state intelligence agency said Thursday it has joined a cyber defense group under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the first Asian member.
The National Intelligence Service (NIS) was formally admitted into the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) based in Tallinn, Estonia, the same day and will represent South Korea in the center's training and research activities.
"We plan to strengthen our cyber response capabilities to a world-class level by increasing the number of our staff sent to the center and expanding the scope of joint training," the NIS said.
The center was established in 2008 in response to a Russian cyberattack that crippled Estonia's state networks.
South Korea's admittance increased the number of members to 32, including 27 NATO states.

hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · May 5, 2022
12. From Kim-Trump summits to missile tests: The failures of South Korea's President Moon

Although I disagreed with President Moon's north Korea policies, I do not blame him for their failure. Kim squandered his last best chance as the stars lined up with Moon and Trump and Kim did not exploit the fact they were the ones most likely to make a deal. The blame lies solely on the shoulders of Kim Jong-un and the Kim family regime who have thwarted every president in the South and in the US.

From Kim-Trump summits to missile tests: The failures of South Korea's President Moon
SEOUL: Peace with North Korea and a "fair and just" society in the South - outgoing President Moon Jae-in made big promises, but after five years in power, he has failed to deliver, analysts say.
Talks between Washington and Pyongyang that Moon brokered have collapsed, North Korea is test-firing long-range missiles again, and leader Kim Jong Un last week said he was strengthening his nuclear arsenal "at the fastest possible speed".
Domestically, Moon's key housing policy backfired, landmark anti-discrimination legislation never materialised, and top luminaries in his government and party became ensnared in sex and bribery scandals.
Public frustration with his administration is what galvanised a political opposition in disarray, analysts say - Moon will hand power on May 10 to Yoon Suk-yeol, whose conservatives he ousted from government five years ago.
"Moon's biggest legacy will be the election of Yoon as president," Gi-Wook Shin, a sociology professor at Stanford University, told AFP.
An avowed anti-feminist and right-wing security hawk, Yoon is the antithesis of Moon, and his threats of a pre-emptive strike on North Korea have already undone much of Moon's cherished attempts at inter-Korean rapprochement.
Moon's diplomacy has come to nought anyway, with Kim recently issuing a veiled threat to use his nukes more expansively, Cheong Seong-chang of the Sejong Institute told AFP.
His decision to send "warm greetings" in a farewell letter to Kim last month showed "questionable" judgment in light of the fact Pyongyang is preparing for a nuclear test, Cheong said.
HISTORIC RUN
Unquestionably, Moon has enjoyed a historic run in office: In 2018, he became the first South Korean president to give a speech to the North Korean public, receiving a standing ovation in Pyongyang.
"I propose that we should completely end the past 70 years of hostility and take a big stride of peace to become one again," Moon told a packed May Day Stadium.
He helped facilitate talks which resulted in groundbreaking summits between then-US president Donald Trump and Kim, but the efforts collapsed in 2019.
Since then, Pyongyang has labelled Moon a "meddlesome mediator", blown up a Seoul-financed joint liaison office north of the border, and in March test-fired an intercontinental ballistic missile at full range for the first time since 2017.
Satellite imagery now indicates the North is preparing to resume nuclear testing.
Moon is the only South Korean president to hold three summits with Kim but he "gave too much credit to North Korea's bandwidth for engagement and peacebuilding", said Soo Kim of the RAND Corporation.
"Kim has shown us that he cannot be convinced to give up his weapons, in any shape or form, since they're so closely tied to his own survival," she told AFP.
"It's difficult to tell whether Moon's North Korea legacy bears any positive impact on inter-Korean relations."
'FAIR AND RIGHTEOUS'
Moon swept to power after his predecessor was impeached over a scandal that involved academic favours for the daughter of a presidential confidante.
In his inaugural speech in 2017, Moon promised: "Opportunities will be equal. The process will be fair, and the result will be righteous."
But his own key aide Cho Kuk was later caught in a scandal involving bribery, and Moon was seen as excessively sympathetic while his successor Yoon won praise as a fair-minded prosecutor overseeing the case.
Moon's administration has competently handled the COVID-19 pandemic, but his housing policies "failed miserably", said June Park, a political economist at Princeton University.
His repeated attempts to rein in inequality unintentionally ended up deepening it - with research by Seoul National University's Shared City Lab showing apartment prices in the capital rising nearly 120 per cent since Moon took office.
One of Moon's landmark policies, raising taxes on owners of multiple homes, made no sense economically, Park said.
The policy "does not equate to the market principles", Park told AFP, adding that the government did not recruit housing experts for policymaking.
And when ministers in his cabinet were revealed to have more than one house, contravening their own policy, it caused "chaos", Park said.
As a result of Moon's housing policies, the average South Korean's daily life has become "more palpably difficult", said Sharon Yoon, a Korean studies professor at the University of Notre Dame.
The affable-seeming Moon remains personally popular in South Korea, with an approval rating of 44 per cent - nearly double that of many previous presidents at the end of their terms.
But his failures have left his followers disillusioned while energising and motivating opposition conservatives, Vladimir Tikhonov, professor of Korean studies at the University of Oslo, told AFP.
"It was a presidency with much promise in the beginning, but little of the promise was realised in the end."

13. Kim Jong-un Doubles Down on Nuclear Threat

Conclusion:

Ignoring nuclear developments with North Korea is not an option. Whether we like it or not, North Korea is a priority issue that must be dealt with – by China, the United States, South Korea and Japan and the international community. When a nuclear weapons country like Russia puts their nuclear forces on high alert we correctly are concerned. When Kim Jong-un talks of preemptively using nuclear weapons we should also be concerned.

Kim Jong-un Doubles Down on Nuclear Threat
MAY 5TH, 2022 BY JOSEPH DETRANI | 0 COMMENTS
thecipherbrief.com · May 5, 2022
OPINION — It should be crystal clear: North Korea has nuclear weapons not only for defensive deterrence purposes but, according to Kim Jong-un, to respond to any perceived threat to North Korea and its leadership.
Kim made these comments at the April 25th military parade in Pyongyang, celebrating the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army. Kim then doubled down on April 30, as reported by North Korea’s state media, warning that Pyongyang could preemptively use its nuclear weapons to counter hostile forces.
This is a significant paradigm shift for North Korea. During almost thirty years of negotiations with North Korea, their message was consistent: Their nuclear weapons were for deterrence, self-defense, never to be used against the United States or any other country. Kim’s recent pronouncements make it abundantly clear that their nuclear weapons could be used for offensive purposes, to include its preemptive use against any perceived threat.
Kim is sending the United States and South Korea a message: The self-imposed moratorium on intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and nuclear tests is over, and we are going to build more nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them as far as the United States. The 13 missiles launched this year included the gigantic Hwasong-17, capable of reaching the whole of the United States, Hypersonic ballistic missiles potentially capable of defeating missile defenses, short-range solid fuel, and cruise missiles that threaten South Korea and Japan, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. This is the overt part of North Korea’s nuclear program. What we don’t see is the continued production of fissile material for the nuclear weapons these missiles are capable of delivering.
It’s likely the North will conduct its seventh nuclear test within the next few weeks. The last test was in 2017, assessed as a successful thermonuclear test. And work continues at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site that was closed and partially dismantled in 2018, during the Trump-Kim summits and North Korea’s goodwill gesture to refrain from any nuclear and ICBM tests. That did not, however, impede the North from testing short and mid-range ballistic missiles, an existential threat to our allies in South Korea and Japan and to Guam.
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On May 10th, President-elect Yoon Suk-Yeol will be sworn in as South Korea’s new president, replacing Moon Jae-in. Yoon, a conservative member of the People Power Party, narrowly defeated his liberal opponent from the Democratic Party, Lee Jae-Myung. Yoon has made it clear that his focus will be on a close strategic alliance with the United State and improved relations with Japan. The message to North Korea is equally clear: Complete and Verifiable denuclearization is the goal and sanctions should not be lifted until the North moves forward with denuclearization. No doubt Yoon’s comment about a preemptive strike when the South detects signs of a (missile) launch from the North also got Pyongyang’s attention. Kim Jong-un’s powerful sister, Kim Yo Jong, had criticized in early April South Korea’s defense minister, Suh Wook, for publicly talking about preemptive strikes on North Korea, made after North Korea launched the Hwasong-17 on March 24, ending the North’s four-year moratorium on ICBM launches.
Russia’s February 24 invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing war in Ukraine has Kim Jong-un’s attention. In 1994, Ukraine gave up over 1,900 nuclear warheads to Russia, in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom. That agreement, the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, obviously didn’t prevent Russia from invading and annexing Crimea in 2014 and seizing part of the South-Eastern Donbas region of Ukraine. It certainly didn’t prevent Russia from its 2022 invasion of and war with Ukraine, an independent and sovereign country that willingly gave up its nuclear weapons for so-called security assurances – a commitment that Russia brazenly ignored.
So, assuming we get North Korea back to the negotiation table, it will prove that much more difficult convincing Pyongyang that relinquishing their nuclear weapons will make North Korea more secure and prosperous. Our negotiators will have to be flexible and creative, with the goal of building trust and confidence that a path to normal relations with the United States will provide North Korea with the security assurances and economic development opportunities that a heavily sanctioned North Korea with nuclear weapons will not have. But that’s a long way from here, especially now, when all indications are that North Korea has given up on negotiations and is determined to build more nuclear weapons and stay tethered to China and Russia.
China’s Special Representative on the Korean Peninsula, Ambassador Liu Xiaoming, arrived in Seoul on Sunday for meetings with officials in the Moon Jae-in government and the incoming Yoon Suk-yeol administration. At an impromptu news conference, Liu said the United States and North Korea are responsible for resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and China and South Korea are important cooperation partners in seeking a political solution.
Hopefully, in private discussions in Seoul, Liu also talked about China’s efforts to get North Korea to return to unconditional negotiations with the United States and to refrain from additional missile and nuclear tests. A China that provides North Korea with over 90% of its crude oil and petroleum products and over 90% of its foreign trade has the leverage to be successful – if they try.
Ignoring nuclear developments with North Korea is not an option. Whether we like it or not, North Korea is a priority issue that must be dealt with – by China, the United States, South Korea and Japan and the international community. When a nuclear weapons country like Russia puts their nuclear forces on high alert we correctly are concerned. When Kim Jong-un talks of preemptively using nuclear weapons we should also be concerned.
Ambassador Joseph DeTrani is former Special envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea and the U.S. Representative to the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO), as well as former CIA director of East Asia Operations. He also served as the Associate Director of National Intelligence and Mission Manager for North Korea and the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, while also serving as a Special Adviser to the Director of National Intelligence. He currently serves on the Board of Managers at Sandia National Laboratories. The views expressed represent those of the author.
This piece by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joe DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business
thecipherbrief.com · May 5, 2022

14. N. Koreans face their worst spring famine since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic


Is there a tipping point for the Koreans in the north? Some 3 million people are estimated to have perished from the effects of the famine of the Arduous MArch in 1994-1996 but the people wer "saved" by their own development of markets and the ROK Sunshine Policy. The regime is cracking down on markets as a threat to the regime and there will not be a return to a Sunshine Policy for some time to come.

N. Koreans face their worst spring famine since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic - Daily NK
A comparison of spring food prices during the three years since North Korea closed its borders shows that this year’s grain prices are the highest of all
By Seulkee Jang - 2022.05.06 3:00pm
dailynk.com · May 6, 2022
Farmland in Chongsan-ri, between Nampo and Pyongyang. (Flickr, Creative Commons)
As North Korea’s food shortages are worsening amid rising grain prices, the country’s people are facing their worst spring famine since the country closed its borders due to COVID-19 in early 2020.
According to Daily NK’s regular price survey, the market price of 1kg of rice as of May 1 was KPW 5,100 in Pyongyang, KPW 5,300 in Sinuiju and KPW 5,550 in Hyesan. The price of rice has remained above KPW 5,000 for a month since reaching that level in early April.
The market price of corn has also remained in the upper KPW 2,000s, with 1kg of corn selling for KPW 2,700 in Pyongyang, KPW 2,800 in Sinuiju and KPW 2,850 in Hyesan, also as of May 1.
A comparison of spring food prices (early March to early May) during the three years since North Korea closed its borders shows that this year’s grain prices are the highest of all.
In the spring of 2020, immediately after the borders were closed, the average price of 1kg of rice was in the upper KPW 4,000s (KPW 4,700 in Pyongyang, KPW 4,680 in Sinuiju and KPW 4,991 in Hyesan). During the same period last year, the average price was in the upper KPW 3,000s and lower KPW 4,000s (KPW 3,720 in Pyongyang, KPW 3,890 in Sinuiju and KPW 4,200 in Hyesan).
Rice prices were somewhat lower in 2021 because the North Korean authorities were focusing on stabilizing grain prices while a network of state-run food stores began operations on a trial basis.
This is the first year the price of rice has been above KPW 5,000 in the spring, when it is particularly difficult for North Koreans to keep food on the table. And since the price of corn — a staple food for low income earners — has also reached its highest point this year, these prices are likely to feel even more expensive for North Koreans.
From early March to early May 2020, the average price of 1kg of corn was in the mid-KPW 1,000s (KPW 1,413 in Pyongyang, KPW 1,365 in Sinuiju and KPW 1,600 in Hyesan). In spring 2021, the price was in the low-to-mid-KPW 2000s (KPW 2,280 in Pyongyang, KPW 2,300 in Sinuiju and KPW 2,480 in Hyesan).
However, the price of corn this year has risen above KPW 2,700, or more than half the price of rice. The marked rise in corn prices may be due to the fact that the North Korean authorities are expanding wheat cultivation at the expense of corn.
In a policy speech before the Supreme People’s Assembly at the end of September 2021, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un gave orders to “more than double the area cultivated with wheat and barley and increase the area of upland and lowland rice cultivation around the country. We need to increase yields of white rice and wheat so as to create the conditions for the public to adopt more civilized dietary habits.”
However, wheat and barley crops were damaged by snowfall reported in North Hamgyong Province and other parts of North Korea through the end of March and a lack of rainfall from April to the present is likely to create drought conditions.
The State Hydro-Meteorological Administration — which serves as North Korea’s weather service — reported that April temperatures were about 2.3 degrees Celsius higher than usual, while the country only saw about 44% of its typical rainfall.
That has reportedly prompted officials from North Korea’s Agricultural Commission to visit major collective farms and scrutinize crop growth and development.
Under those circumstances, the state-run food stores have dispatched purchasing agents to collective farms to set aside as many potatoes as possible from the June harvest.
“The inminban [people’s units] are instructing people to hang on until the potato harvest in June, since the price of rice should go down a little at that point. We’ll have to wait and see whether the potatoes will be supplied to the public and whether that will bring down the price of rice and corn,” a source in the country recently told Daily NK.
Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
dailynk.com · May 6, 2022




15. N. Korea issues new KPW 50,000 cash vouchers for use in commercial transactions

The regime trying to maintain control of its currency and economy?


N. Korea issues new KPW 50,000 cash vouchers for use in commercial transactions - Daily NK
The new vouchers are part of a broader effort to phase out bank slips, which the authorities believe have been misused
By Seulkee Jang - 2022.05.06 3:37pm
dailynk.com · May 6, 2022
North Korean authorities have recently issued KPW 50,000 cash vouchers, or donpyo, for use in commercial transactions with a view to resolve problems related to cashless bank slips.
According to a high-ranking source in North Korea on Tuesday, North Korean authorities recently ordered provincial enterprises ranked class 4 and below to actively use the newly issued donpyo.
When buying supplies or products, North Korean enterprises generally use cashless bank slips (haengpyo) that allow the transfer of money within a set collateral limit. Cashless bank slips are a kind of guarantee, a certificate of a guaranteed payment from a bank.
However, North Korean authorities believe that enterprises have been overusing and misusing the bank slips, which is leading to not only the waste of resources, but also rampant corruption with public money diverted to personal use.
For example, when a company needs seven tons of steel costing USD 95 a ton, it would issue a slip for USD 700 instead of the actual cost of USD 665, with the company or cadres pocketing the remaining USD 35.
The authorities also believe that with enterprises relying on bank slips rather than cash, companies are buying more supplies than they need, leading to waste.
The source said to resolve this issue, North Korean authorities have issued donpyo of KPW 50,000, a relatively small denomination for corporate transactions. They have also advised provincial enterprises to use them instead of bank slips.
By encouraging enterprises to use the donpyo, the authorities intend to create a clear paper trail and prevent the misuse of resources and money.
This goal contrasts with the KPW 5,000 donpyo the authorities issued to absorb private cash holdings and to bolster state finances.
A picture of KPW 5,000 foreign currency vouchers currently in circulation in North Korea. (Daily NK)
Daily NK reported last November that North Korean authorities held lectures for Central Committee cadres, Central Bank officials, cadres from state-run shops, and other workers to explain that “donpyo are supyo.” Supyo are checks.
North Korean authorities have apparently had plans to expand the use of donpyo to replace bank slips since late last year.
However, given the widespread use of bank slips for corporate transactions, the authorities are encouraging the use of the new donpyo even as they are used alongside the bank slips, rather than the outright suspension of issuing bank slips.
Meanwhile, North Korea is allowing large enterprises ranked class 3 and above to continue using the existing system of bank slips. However, the authorities plan to reform their usage and scale within the year.
Enterprises based in the country’s provinces are reacting negatively to the order, complaining that yet another needless payment method has emerged.
In particular, they complain that the state’s itemization and scrutinization of corporate transactions could restrict production growth at their companies. Boosting production is a government priority that requires companies to store reserve supplies; however, if the companies are only allowed to buy exactly what they need, they lose flexibility in the use of their resources. The companies are worrying that production could fall if they are unable to immediately respond to unforeseen business circumstances.
Lim Song, an economist with the North Korean Economy Team of the Bank of Korea’s Economic Research Institute in Seoul, said that what is currently known about the donpyo suggests they mix the characteristics of bank slips and cash.
Lim added, however, that if the new KPW 50,000 vouchers more strongly connote the role of bank slips, they will have an impact on North Korea’s state and market economy.
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
dailynk.com · May 6, 2022


16. N.Korean Missile Test 'Fails'

Interesting report. I look forward to the assessments from the experts.


N.Korean Missile Test 'Fails'
North Korea seems to have failed again in testing an intercontinental ballistic missile on Wednesday after a previous failure in March, sources here said Thursday.
State media have kept quiet about the launch attempt, which is itself a good indication that it went awry. A government source here said, "It seems that the North failed to solve a defect in the missile," which is believed to be the same one that blew up in mid-air a few seconds after launch on March 16.
According to a military source, the ICBM's second-stage engine stopped for unknown reasons during ascent after the first-stage engine was extinguished.
South Korean military radars detected debris from the missile, which seem to have been shed when it was deliberately blown up to prevent the first-stage engine from falling on a residential area.
The missile, dubbed Hwasong-17 by Western boffins but not North Korea, was unveiled during a military parade in October 2020. It is 23 to 24 m long and had to be carried on a 22-wheeled mobile launch vehicle.
With its estimated range of 13,000 km, it would be capable of hitting the U.S. mainland. The missile was also on display during a nighttime parade marking the 90th anniversary of the North Korean army last month.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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