Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“The saddest aspect of life right now is that science gathers knowledge faster than society gathers wisdom.”
-Isaac Asimov

"Today is only one day in all the days that will ever be. But what will happen in all the other days that ever come can depend on what you do today. It's been that way all this year. It's been that way so many times. All of war is that way."
- Ernest Hemingway

“Write while the heat is in you. The writer who postpones the recording of his thoughts uses an iron which has cooled to burn a hole with. He cannot inflame the minds of his audience.”
- Henry David Thoreau


1. Address by the President of Ukraine on the Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation
2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 8 (PUTIN'S WAR)
3. Pentagon’s China Warning Prompts Calls to Vet U.S. Funding of Startups
4. Historian Niall Ferguson details 'Cold War II' — which 'began some time ago'
5. Russo-Ukraine War Update - May 9, 2022 | SOF News
6. US diplomats arrive in Kyiv ahead of resumption of embassy operations
7.  Biden admin accelerates plans to reopen Kyiv embassy
8. China says it conducted exercises near Taiwan
9. Ukraine spoils Vladimir Putin’s May 9th parade
10. Putin tries to justify Ukraine invasion in Victory Day speech
11. Inside the battle on the Eastern Front
12.  The Erosion of Liberal Democracy and the Rise of Strongman-ism
13. A Pot of U.N. Money. Risk-Taking Officials. A Sea of Questions.
14. Al-Qaida chief blames US for Ukraine invasion in new video
15. Is America Ready for Chinese-Russian Liminal Warfare?
16. NATO Should Admit Finland and Sweden ASAP
17. Elon Musk Responds After Being Threatened By Russia
18. The Slippery Slope of Intelligence Sharing with Ukraine
19. Stay Calm and Consider 5 Steps on Solomon Islands
20. Don’t Call It a Gray Zone: China’s Use-of-Force Spectrum
21. Can Ukraine’s Military Keep Winning?
22. A Force for the Future - A High-Reward, Low-Risk Approach to AI Military Innovation
23. Too Fragile to Fight: Could the U.S. Military Withstand a War of Attrition?




1. Address by the President of Ukraine on the Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation

The master class on strategic communications continues from President Zelensky.

Video at the link.



Address by the President of Ukraine on the Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation
8 May 2022 - 09:05


Can spring be black and white? Is there eternal February? Are golden words devalued? Unfortunately, Ukraine knows the answers to all these questions. Unfortunately, the answers are “yes”.
Every year on May 8, together with the entire civilized world, we honor everyone who defended the planet from Nazism during World War II. Millions of lost lives, crippled destinies, tortured souls and millions of reasons to say to evil: never again!
We knew the price our ancestors paid for this wisdom. We knew how important it is to preserve it and pass it on to posterity. But we had no idea that our generation would witness the desecration of the words, which, as it turned out, are not the truth for everyone.
This year we say "Never again" differently. We hear "Never again" differently. It sounds painful, cruel. Without an exclamation, but with a question mark. You say: never again? Tell Ukraine about it.
On February 24, the word "never" was erased. Shot and bombed. By hundreds of missiles at 4 am, which woke up the entire Ukraine. We heard terrible explosions. We heard: again!
The city of Borodyanka is one of the many victims of this crime! Behind me is one of many witnesses! Not a military facility, not a secret base, but a simple nine-story building. Can it pose a security threat to Russia, to 1/8 of the land, the world's second army, a nuclear state? Can anything be more absurd than this question? It can.
250kg high explosive bombs, with which the superpower shelled this small town. And it went numb. It cannot say today: never again! It cannot say anything today. But here everything is clear without words.
Just look at this house. There used to be walls here. They once had photos on them. And in the photos there were those who once went through the hell of war. Fifty men who were sent to Germany for forced labor. Those who were burned alive when the Nazis burned more than 100 houses here.
250 soldiers who died on the fronts of World War II, and a total of almost 1000 residents of Borodyanka who fought and defeated Nazism. To ensure: never again. They fought for the future of children, for the life that was here until February 24.
Imagine people going to bed in each of these apartments. They wish good night to each other. Turn off the light. Hug their loved ones. Close their eyes. They dream of something. There is complete silence. They all fall asleep, not knowing that not everyone will wake up. They sleep soundly. They have a dream of something pleasant. But in a few hours they will be awakened by missile explosions. And someone will never wake up again. Never again.
The word "never" was dropped from this slogan. Amputated during the so-called special operation. They stabbed a knife in the heart and, looking into the eyes, said: "It's not us!" Tortured with the words "not everything is so unambiguous." Killed "Never again", saying: "We can repeat."
And so it happened. And the monsters began to repeat. And our cities, which survived such a heinous occupation that 80 years are not enough to forget about it, saw the occupier again. And got the second date of occupation in their history. And some cities, such as Mariupol, got the third. During the two years of occupation, the Nazis killed 10,000 civilians there. In two months of occupation, Russia killed 20,000.
Decades after World War II, darkness returned to Ukraine. And it became black and white again. Again! Evil has returned. Again! In a different uniform, under different slogans, but for the same purpose. A bloody reconstruction of Nazism was organized in Ukraine. A fanatical repetition of this regime. Its ideas, actions, words and symbols. Maniacal detailed reproduction of its atrocities and "alibi", which allegedly give an evil sacred purpose. Repetition of its crimes and even attempts to surpass the "teacher" and move him from the pedestal of the greatest evil in human history. Set a new world record for xenophobia, hatred, racism and the number of victims they can cause.
Never again! It was an ode of a wise man! Anthem of the civilized world! But someone sang out of tune. Distorted "Never again" with notes of doubt. Silenced, beginning his deadly aria of evil. And this is clear to all countries that have seen the horrors of Nazism with their own eyes. And today they are experiencing a terrible deja vu. See it again!
All nations who have been branded "third-class", slaves without the right to their own state or to exist at all hear statements that exalt one nation and erase others with ease. They claim that you don't really exist, you are artificially created, and therefore you have no rights. Everyone hears the language of evil. Again!
And together they acknowledge the painful truth: we have not withstood even a century. Our Never again was enough for 77 years. We missed the evil. It was reborn. Again and now!
This is understood by all countries and nations who support Ukraine today. And despite the new mask of the beast, they recognized him. Because, unlike some, they remember what our ancestors fought for and against. They did not confuse the first with the second, did not change their places, did not forget.
The Poles didn’t forget, on whose land the Nazis began their march and fired the first shot of World War II. Didn't forget how evil first accuses you, provokes you, calls you an aggressor, and then attacks at 4:45 am saying it's self-defense. And they saw how it repeated on our land. They remember the Nazi-destroyed Warsaw. And they see what was done to Mariupol.
The British people did not forget how the Nazis wiped out Coventry, which was bombed 41 times. How the "Moonlight Sonata" from the Luftwaffe sounded, when the city was continuously bombed for 11 hours. How its historic center, factories, St. Michael's Cathedral were destroyed. And they saw missiles hit Kharkiv. How its historic center, factories and the Assumption Cathedral were damaged. They remember London being bombed for 57 nights in a row. Remember how V-2 hit Belfast, Portsmouth, Liverpool. And they see cruise missiles hit Mykolaiv, Kramatorsk, Chernihiv. They remember how Birmingham was bombed. And they see its sister city Zaporizhzhia being damaged.
The Dutch remember this. How Rotterdam became the first city to be completely destroyed when the Nazis dropped 97 tons of bombs on it.
The French remember this. Remember Oradour-sur-Glane, where the SS burned half a thousand women and children alive. Mass hangings in Tulle, the massacre in the village of Ascq. Thousands of people at a resistance rally in occupied Lille. They saw what was done in Bucha, Irpin, Borodyanka, Volnovakha and Trostyanets. They see the occupation of Kherson, Melitopol, Berdyansk and other cities where people do not give up. And thousands of them go to peaceful rallies, which are beyond the power of the occupiers, and all they can do is shoot at civilians.
The Czechs have not forgotten this. How in less than a day, the Nazis destroyed Lidice, leaving only ashes from the village. They saw Popasna destroyed. There are not even ashes left from it. The Greeks, who survived massacres and executions throughout the territory, the blockade and the Great Famine, have not forgotten.
This is remembered by Americans who fought evil on two fronts. Who passed Pearl Harbor and Dunkirk with the Allies. And together we are going through new, no less difficult battles.
This is remembered by all Holocaust survivors - how one nation can hate another.
Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Danes, Georgians, Armenians, Belgians, Norwegians and many others have not forgotten this - all those who suffered from Nazism on their land and all those who defeated it in the anti-Hitler coalition.
Unfortunately, there are those who, having survived all these crimes, having lost millions of people who fought for victory and gained it, have desecrated the memory of them and their feat today.
The one who allowed the shelling of the cities of Ukraine from his land. The cities that, along with our ancestors, were liberated by his ancestors.
The one who spat in the face of his "Immortal Regiment", placing torturers from Bucha next to it.
And challenged all mankind. But forgot the main thing: any evil always ends the same - it ends.
Fellow Ukrainians!
Today, on the Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation, we pay homage to all those who defended their homeland and the world from Nazism. We note the feat of the Ukrainian people and their contribution to the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition.
Explosions, shots, trenches, wounds, famine, bombing, blockades, mass executions, punitive operations, occupation, concentration camps, gas chambers, yellow stars, ghettos, Babyn Yar, Khatyn, captivity, forced labor. They died so that each of us knows what these words mean from books, not from our own experience. But it happened differently. This is unfair to them all. But the truth will win. And we will overcome everything!
And the proof of this is called "Werewolf". This is Hitler's former headquarters and bunker near Vinnytsia. And all that is left of it is a few stones. Ruins. The ruins of a person who considered himself great and invincible. This is a guide for all of us and future generations. What our ancestors fought for. And proved that no evil can avoid responsibility. Will not be able to hide in the bunker. There will be no stone left of it. So we will overcome everything. And we know this for sure, because our military and all our people are descendants of those who overcame Nazism. So they will win again.
And there will be peace again. Finally again!
We will overcome the winter, which began on February 24, lasts on May 8, but will definitely end, and the Ukrainian sun will melt it! And we will meet our dawn together with the whole country. And family and loved ones, friends and relatives will be together again! Finally again! And over the temporarily occupied cities and villages our flag will fly again. Finally again! And we will get together. And there will be peace! Finally again! And no more black and white dreams, only a blue and yellow dream. Finally again! Our ancestors fought for this.
Eternal honor to all who fought against Nazism!
Eternal memory to all those killed during World War II!


2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 8 (PUTIN'S WAR)


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 8
May 8, 2022 - Press ISW

Karolina Hird, Mason Clark, and George Barros
May 8, 4:00 pm ET
Russian forces did not make any significant advances on any axis of advance on May 8. The Ukrainian counteroffensive northeast of Kharkiv City has likely forced Russian troops to redeploy to Kharkiv instead of reinforcing stalled Russian offensive operations elsewhere in eastern Ukraine. Russian forces are continuing their attempt to reach the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but have not made substantial territorial gains since securing Popasna on May 7.
Key Takeaways
  • Russian forces are likely amassing in Belgorod to reinforce Russian efforts in northern Kharkiv to prevent the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive from pushing closer to the Ukraine-Russia border.
  • Russian forces near Izyum focused on regrouping, replenishing, and reconnoitering Ukrainian positions in order to continue advances to the southwest and southeast of Izyum.
  • Russian forces continued their ground attacks to drive to the borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but did not make any territorial gains
  • Russian troops continued to assault the Azovstal Steel Plant and advanced efforts to economically integrate occupied Mariupol into the wider Russian economy.
  • Russian troops may be preparing for a renewed offensive on the Southern Axis but are unlikely to be successful in this endeavor.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the five primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:
  • Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and four supporting efforts);
  • Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
  • Supporting effort 1—Mariupol;
  • Supporting effort 2—Kharkiv City;
  • Supporting effort 3—Southern axis;
  • Supporting effort 4—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces did not conduct confirmed attacks in any direction from Izyum on May 8. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces continued to regroup units, replenish reserves, and reconnoiter Ukrainian positions to continue offensives in the Izyum-Barvinkove and Izyum-Slovyansk directions.[1]
Russian forces intensified ground, air, and artillery attacks in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts on May 8. Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Popasna, confirming that Russian forces established full control of the city in the last few days.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces are attempting to reach the administrative borders of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, which is confirmed by social media footage of ongoing fighting along existing Russian lines of advance.[3] Ukrainian sources reported active fighting in Bilohorivka, Vojevodivka, and Lysychansk, indicating that Russian forces may intend to encircle Severodonetsk from the south (in support of ongoing operations in Rubizhne, north of Severodonetsk) and push west toward the Luhansk Oblast border.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division are operating around Lyman in the vicinity of Shandryholove and Oleksandrivka, which both lie less than 20 kilometers from the Donetsk Oblast border. [5]

Supporting Effort #1—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)
Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations in the Azovstal Steel Plant on May 8. Commander of the Azov Regiment Denis Prokopenko stated that the Ukrainian defense remains in Azovstal after the evacuation of all civilians and that fighting is ongoing within parts of the plant itself.[6]
Russian authorities are advancing efforts to integrate Mariupol into Russian economic systems. Head of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Denis Pushilin visited Mariupol’s commercial port alongside Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Construction and Regional Development Marat Khusnullin on May 8 and claimed that products will start moving through the port later this month.[7] Khusnullin’s visit to Mariupol is likely indicative of the Kremlin’s broader desire to capitalize on Mariupol’s port access and integrate the city’s transport capabilities into Russia’s regional economic agenda.

Supporting Effort #2—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Retain positions on the outskirts of Kharkiv within artillery range of the city and prevent further Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces are likely amassing in Belgorod to deploy to the Kharkiv City region to prevent the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area from reaching the international border. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that units of the 1st Tank Army are concentrating in Belgorod, Russia, for deployment to areas near the Ukraine-Russia border.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the main Russian effort around Kharkiv City is oriented around preventing Ukrainian counteroffensives from pushing Russian forces to the international border.[9] ISW previously assessed that the Ukrainian counteroffensive northeast of Kharkiv City has forced Russian forces to deploy reinforcements to the Kharkiv city area instead of deploying them to Russian axes of advance.[10] The Ukrainian counteroffensive did not make any confirmed advances on May 8.

Supporting Effort #3—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces did not make any confirmed ground attacks on the Southern Axis on May 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces may be preparing for a potential offensive in order to improve their tactical positions and fix Ukrainian forces in place.[11] Russian forces focused on reconnaissance and regrouping frontline units in likely preparation to renew offensive operations on the Southern Axis, although the likelihood of their ability to do so successfully is doubtful.[12] Satellite imagery notably showed Russian forces concentrating anti-aircraft missile forces and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in Filatovka, northern Crimea, between April 27 and May 5.[13] Such reconnaissance and renewal measures indicate that Russian troops are preparing to restart offensive operations, likely in the direction of Zaporizhia and Kryvyi Rih, in the coming days.

Russian forces additionally continued to target Odesa with missile strikes on May 8.[14] The situation in Transnistria remains tense but unchanged. [15]

Supporting Effort #4—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)
There were no significant events on this axis in the past 24 hours.
Immediate items to watch
  • Russian forces will likely continue to merge offensive efforts southward of Izyum with westward advances from Donetsk in order to encircle Ukrainian troops in southern Kharkiv Oblast and Western Donetsk.
  • Russia may change the status of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, possibly by merging them into a single “Donbas Republic” and/or by annexing them directly to Russia.
  • Russian forces have apparently decided to seize the Azovstal plant through ground assault and will likely continue operations accordingly.
  • Ukrainian counteroffensives around Kharkiv City are pushing back Russian positions northeast of the city and will likely continue to force the Russians to reinforce those positions at the cost of reinforcing Russian offensive operations elsewhere.
  • Russian forces may be preparing to conduct renewed offensive operations to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in the coming days.
[2] https://t dot me/luhanskaVTSA/2417; https://t dot me/RKadyrov_95/2055; https://t dot me/RKadyrov_95/2054; https://t dot me/istorijaoruzija/61770
[4] https://t dot me/luhanskaVTSA/2417
[7] https://t dot me/pushilindenis/2194; https://t dot me/stranaua/40916
[13] https://t dot me/stranaua/40896
[14] https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1523048350073110528; https://t dot me/stranaua/40926; https://t dot me/istorijaoruzija/61926

3. Pentagon’s China Warning Prompts Calls to Vet U.S. Funding of Startups

Makes good sense: both for the Chinese to try to do this and for the US to do a better job of vetting. Another example of Chinese Unrestricted Warfare.

Excerpts:

In 2020, the Journal reported that Sen. Marco Rubio (R., Fla.) had questioned how agencies participating in SBIR and STTR programs were ensuring awardees “do not have improper ties to foreign entities” after a Harvard University professor connected to one recipient of SBIR money was charged with lying about receiving millions of dollars in Chinese funding.
Last year a jury found the professor, Charles Lieber, guilty on six counts related to payments he received from a Chinese government talent program. His lawyer has asked the judge to revisit the verdict.
A previous lawyer for Mr. Lieber had told the Journal in 2020 that his client hadn’t provided any intellectual property to any Chinese organization and that he wasn’t involved in directing the SBIR recipient’s research or its grant proposals.

Pentagon’s China Warning Prompts Calls to Vet U.S. Funding of Startups
Defense Department report cites examples of U.S. government financing of small businesses it says benefited Chinese interests

By Kate O’KeeffeFollow
May. 8, 2022 9:00 am ET
WASHINGTON, D.C.—Congress may soon require government agencies to vet tech startups seeking federal funding, after a Defense Department study found China is exploiting a popular program that funds innovation among small American companies.
The study, which was viewed by The Wall Street Journal, found China is using state-sponsored methods to target companies that have received Pentagon funding from the Small Business Innovation Research program. The SBIR program for decades has sought to promote innovation through a competitive U.S. government award process.
The April 2021 report, which has been circulating among lawmakers on Capitol Hill, details eight case studies it says have “national and economic security implications.” The studies include examples of program participants who dissolve their American companies, join Chinese government talent programs and continue their work at institutions that support the People’s Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Communist Party.
The report also documents instances of SBIR recipients taking venture-capital money from Chinese state-owned firms and of working with Chinese entities that support the country’s defense industry. The report concludes that the SBIR program needs a due-diligence process to identify entities of potential concern that would then receive a more detailed review.
Some in Congress are now echoing those calls, as lawmakers seek a five-year reauthorization of the SBIR and a related Small Business Technology Transfer program, or STTR, as part of a sweeping, bipartisan legislative package working its way through Capitol Hill. The broader bill is an initiative designed to boost the U.S.’s competitiveness, particularly against China.
Sen. Joni Ernst of Iowa, for example, a senior Republican on the Small Business Committee, said she would reject reauthorization of the award programs should the legislation fail to respond to the call for vetting.
“We can and should take serious steps to compete with the Chinese Communist Party, but pouring billions of dollars into research and development with little oversight or accountability is not the answer,” Sen. Ernst said Wednesday.

Sen. Joni Ernst said she wouldn’t reauthorize small-business funding programs if the companies aren’t vetted.
PHOTO: MICHAEL BROCHSTEIN/ZUMA PRESS
Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D., N.Y.), chair of the House of Representatives’ Small Business Committee, has proposed renewing the programs for five years without policy changes. When asked about the Pentagon report, she said she welcomed steps to ensure the security and integrity of the programs. But she also warned against “a shutdown that would hurt small businesses and stifle American innovation.”
The report’s conclusions are reminiscent of similar Chinese threats that U.S. counterintelligence officials have alleged in other areas such as academia. U.S. officials say China is frequently targeting unclassified research in a way that may not break any current U.S. laws or regulations but which will ultimately harm U.S. national security and economic competitiveness.
“China’s achievements in scientific and technological development have come not from stealing or robbing, but from the hard work of the Chinese people, China’s continued investment in research, and the continuous improvement of its research and innovation capacity,” said Liu Pengyu, a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington.
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The U.S. expects to award $3.9 billion in funding through the SBIR program during the current fiscal year ending Sept. 30, according to the Small Business Administration, which coordinates the program but leaves award decisions to participating agencies. The departments of Defense, Energy and Health and Human Services are among the biggest participants.
The Defense Department report said China typically targets entities for technology “after they demonstrate capabilities, knowledge, and/or placement and access to federal grants or investments.”
One example flagged in the report as problematic focuses on a U.S. developer of polymer solar cells called Solarmer Energy Inc., which received SBIR funding from the Defense Department and others. Solarmer then dissolved its U.S.-based businesses and transferred its research, development and intellectual property to a Beijing-based subsidiary, the report says.

Rep. Nydia Velázquez, chair of the House’s Small Business Committee, warned shutting down the program would stifle American innovation.
PHOTO: MICHAEL BROCHSTEIN/ZUMA PRESS
The subsidiary works with a Chinese government-run lab and has undertaken research with defense applications, according to the report. Current and former company representatives in China and the U.S. didn’t respond to requests for comment.
Authors of the Pentagon report cautioned that their study “represents a small data sample and should not be considered comprehensive or exhaustive.” The Defense Department provided the researchers with a list of SBIR applicants and grantees totaling more than 10,000 firms. The report authors then cross-referenced the list with a separate Pentagon database on Chinese state-sponsored talent recruitment programs and conducted more research to identify the case studies they chose to highlight in the final report.
Pentagon researchers cited another example, Soluxra LLC, a now-dissolved firm developing solar technology for spacecraft and drones, that received four Defense Department SBIR grants. The report said two of the company’s co-founders and one of its research scientists were allegedly recruited by Chinese government talent programs while employed by the company and then joined universities affiliated with a Chinese defense agency, the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense.

One of Soluxra’s co-founders, Alex Jen, who the report alleges went on to work at the defense agency-affiliated Zhejiang University, said he has always complied with all U.S. laws and regulations when applying for grants. A second co-founder, Yip Hin Lap, said he wasn’t involved in any defense research while at South China University of Technology, another school affiliated with the Chinese defense sector.
Both men are now professors at the City University of Hong Kong, which the report says doesn’t claim to be engaged in defense research.
The third former Soluxra scientist mentioned in the report, Li Chang-Zhi, didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Charles Lieber, leaving federal court in Boston in 2020, was found guilty of lying about his ties to a Chinese government talent program.
PHOTO: KATHERINE TAYLOR/REUTERS
In 2020, the Journal reported that Sen. Marco Rubio (R., Fla.) had questioned how agencies participating in SBIR and STTR programs were ensuring awardees “do not have improper ties to foreign entities” after a Harvard University professor connected to one recipient of SBIR money was charged with lying about receiving millions of dollars in Chinese funding.
Last year a jury found the professor, Charles Lieber, guilty on six counts related to payments he received from a Chinese government talent program. His lawyer has asked the judge to revisit the verdict.
A previous lawyer for Mr. Lieber had told the Journal in 2020 that his client hadn’t provided any intellectual property to any Chinese organization and that he wasn’t involved in directing the SBIR recipient’s research or its grant proposals.
Aruna Viswanatha contributed to this article.
Write to Kate O’Keeffe at kathryn.okeeffe@wsj.com




4. Historian Niall Ferguson details 'Cold War II' — which 'began some time ago'

Will we begin using "Cold War II?"


Excerpt:
"Cold War II is different, though, because in Cold War II, China's the senior partner, and Russia's the junior partner," Ferguson explained. "And in Cold War II, the first hot war breaks out in Europe, rather than Asia. This is a bit like the Korean War was, in 1950, where suddenly discovering that cold wars sometimes run hot, but this time, Ukraine is the battlefield."
Historian Niall Ferguson details 'Cold War II' — which 'began some time ago'
finance.yahoo.com · by Aarthi Swaminathan
The world is currently embroiled in "Cold War II" — and has been for a while — and the path ahead is lined with the geopolitics of nuclear weapons, says one historian.
"And we've now forgotten so much of that history that we don't realize that Cold War II began some time ago," Hoover Institution Senior Fellow Niall Ferguson recently told Yahoo Finance's Andy Serwer at the Milken Institute Global Conference (video above).
"Cold War II is different, though, because in Cold War II, China's the senior partner, and Russia's the junior partner," Ferguson explained. "And in Cold War II, the first hot war breaks out in Europe, rather than Asia. This is a bit like the Korean War was, in 1950, where suddenly discovering that cold wars sometimes run hot, but this time, Ukraine is the battlefield."

Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during their meeting on the sideline of the 11th edition of the BRICS Summit, in Brasilia, Brazil November 13, 2019. (Sputnik/Ramil Sitdikov/Kremlin via REUTERS)
During the first Cold War between communist U.S.S.R and the capitalist U.S., the conflict became "hot" during the Korean War in 1950. The Korean War was a significant point as the two countries fought a proxy war in the peninsula at the 38th parallel. The Soviet Union and China supported the communist North Korea, and the U.S. supported South Korea. The peninsula remains divided today.
In terms of the ongoing war in Ukraine, "it's very important that we understand that this is part of a cold war because nuclear weapons are involved," Ferguson added. "This is not the kind of war we saw after 9/11, against regimes, Saddam Husseins, or the Taliban, which were actually very poorly armed. We're dealing here with Russia, and the fact that Russia has nuclear weapons radically alters the dynamics and creates much greater risks than the wars that we saw after the first Cold War."

The latest UK update of the Russia-Ukraine war. (Source: UK Defence)
Ukraine, NATO, and nukes
Ferguson highlighted two key geopolitical aspects of the war in Ukraine: The West's failed promise of Ukraine joining NATO and Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons after the first Cold War.
Countries who joined NATO at the end of the first Cold War — such as former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact countries — "are all thanking God that they were let into NATO, because that's the thing that makes them feel safe," Ferguson said. "Ukraine's problem is not that we made it a NATO member. Its problem is that we didn't. We promised, in 2008, that Georgia and Ukraine could be in consideration for NATO membership, and that was an insincere promise. There was never any serious effort to make that happen."
Ferguson stressed that the "the worst possible thing that we can do is to talk about NATO membership without delivering it. That was what made Ukraine so vulnerable."

NATO in Erupe. (Reuters)
Furthermore, since Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in 1994 as part of the Budapest Memorandum, the geopolitical situation becomes even more sensitive — and also a lesson for other countries.
"One of the most interesting consequences of this war is that all around the world people are going to realize: 'We need nuclear weapons,'" Ferguson said. "'Look what the Ukrainians did. They gave them up, and now they are in a terrible state.' So the end of the era of nonproliferation is upon us. Whatever happens in Ukraine, we will see rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons all around the world, and that is going to make the world a much more dangerous place than at any time since the end of the last Cold War."

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky speaking from the city of Borodyanka in a video release on May 8, 2022. (screenshot/Ukraine government)
Aarthi is a reporter for Yahoo Finance. She can be reached at aarthi@yahoofinance.com. Follow her on Twitter @aarthiswami.
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finance.yahoo.com · by Aarthi Swaminathan


5. Russo-Ukraine War Update - May 9, 2022 | SOF News


Russo-Ukraine War Update - May 9, 2022 | SOF News
sof.news · by SOF News · May 9, 2022

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, Ukrainian defense, and NATO. Additional topics include refugees, internally displaced personnel, humanitarian efforts, cyber, and information operations.
Photo: Soldiers assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armored Regiment fire an AT4 anti-tank weapon at Zdar Military Area in Northwest Czech Republic, March 4, 2022. The soldiers are participating in Saber Strike 22, a two-week, multinational exercise that enhances readiness and relationships between NATO allies in the European region. Photo courtesy of DoD.
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Big Picture of the Conflict
Could Monday (May 9) see a general mobilization announced by Putin on Victory Day? An escalation of the war by Russia could give the Russian forces momentum in the Ukraine War in future months, but the risks would be enormous. A mobilization would be admitting that the ‘special military operation’ has not gone well and could ignite domestic opposition. (The Washington Post, May 7, 2022, suscription). The annual spring conscription for the Russian armed forces is now being conducted. (Aljazeera, May 5, 2022). Some visitors went to Ukraine over the weekend – to include Premier Trudeau from Canada (Kiyv area) and First Lady Jill Biden (western Ukraine).
Russian Generals – Getting Killed on the Battlefield. Senior Russian commanders are visiting the frontlines in an attempt to fix the difficulties in command and control and to take personal leadership of operations. This has led to high losses of general officers in the conflict. (UK Ministry of Defence, Twitter, 8 May 2022). Read more in “Why Russia has Suffered the Loss of an ‘Extraordinary’ Number of Generals”, Lobo Institute, May 8, 2022. See also a report on news that the United States is passing intelligence to Ukraine that helps it target Russian senior commanders. “Officials Push Back on Report US Intel Helping Ukraine Target Russian Generals”, Lobo Institute, May 8, 2022.
Ground Situation. The Russian advances in eastern Ukraine over the past few days have been minimal. They have lost territory in the Kharkiv region due to Ukrainian counterattacks.
Fight for the Skies. The Russians are paying more attention to Ukrainian airfields in recent days. By hitting the airstrips with long-range rockets the Russians hope to destroy Ukrainian aerial capacity and establish air superiority.
Maritime Activities. An amphibious landing force on several ships is still positioned in the Black Sea off the coast of Odessa to land a substantial element of Russian naval infantry. The Russian blockade of Ukrainian shipping continues. Chuck de Caro argues that the delivery of US Navy Mark-VI’s could make a difference in the Black Sea. Read “Ukraine: Think Naval War”, Small Wars Journal, April 29, 2022. According to Ukrainian officials, Turkish-supplied TB2 drones have destroyed two Russian patrol craft in the Black Sea. (The War Zone, May 2, 2022). Ukraine has struck Snake Island in the Black Sea with Su-27 Flankers, hitting multiple targets. (The War Zone, May 7, 2022). Sources of info on the Russian navy: A weekly analysis with graphics.
Ukrainian Defense
What is Victory? Public support in the United States and allied countries is critical to the outcome on the battlefield. The war is heading into a protracted fight – and the need to manage allied cooperation unity and public opinion in the U.S. and other allied countries will become a priority. A big question remains – what is victory? “As war grinds on, the definition of victory remains murky”, The Washington Post, May 7, 2022. (subscription)
Azov Battalion. The unit is made up of like-minded volunteers with a mission to protect the Donbas region from the Russian invaders. “Ukraine: What is the Azov Battalion?”, Forces.net, May 5, 2022.
Ukrainian SOF and Their ATV Tank Hunters. Ukrainian special operations forces are using a specially outfitted ATV to attack Russian tanks. It is mounted with a Stugna-P anti-tank guided missile. This is a Ukrainian produced ATGM that can pierce through armored targets. It is estimated that the ATV and missile costs about $32,000 each unit. “Ukrainian Special Forces Have “Stug-Buggies” Out Hunting Russian Tanks”, SOFREP, May 5, 2022.

Tactical Situation
Kyiv. The U.S. embassy staff and U.S. Charge d’Affaires Kristina Kvien arrived in Kyiv on Sunday (May 8).
Kharkiv. The Ukrainian’s counteroffensive in the area around Kharkiv is having some success. They are retaking territory as they move outwards from the city’s limits. The Ukrainian forces may soon approach the Russian border.
Mariupol. According to numerous news accounts all women and children have been rescued from the besieged city of Mariupol located on the coast of the Sea of Azov. They were evacuated from a steel plant on Saturday (May 7) where the last of the Ukrainian defenders are gathered. Elderly civilian men were part of the evacuation. The United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross negotiated the civilian evacuations from the steel plant. The Russians conducted another assault on the Ukrainian positions on Saturday (May 7). “All women and children rescued from besieged Mariupol steel plant”, Washington Examiner, May 7, 2022.
There is an attempt to negotiate the evacuation of the remaining Ukrainians at the Azovstal steel plant – including combatants, wounded soldiers, and medics. This is being referred to as the second phase of the evacuation. The commander of Ukraine’s 36th Marine Brigade has made an appeal to the international community for the evacuation of the remaining soldiers from Mariupol.
Mykolayiv and Odessa. One big question is whether or not the Russians will try to move west towards Odesa and perhaps to the Moldova border. Both cities continue to experience missile attacks. Located on the west bank of the Dnieper River close to the coast of the Black Sea, Mykolayiv is a strategic objective for the Russians that is on the road to Odessa located further west along the coast of the Black Sea.
Situation Maps. War in Ukraine by Scribble Maps. View more Ukraine SITMAPs that provide updates on the disposition of Russian forces.
General Information
Negotiations. More prisoner exchanges have taken place over the weekend. Ukraine has received a mixed of military and civilians who had been captured or detained by Russia.
Refugees, IDPs, and Humanitarian Crisis. View the UNHCR Operational Data Portal – Ukraine Refugee Situation (Updated daily), https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine.
Future Scenarios. There are a number of scenarios that could play out on May 9th. Putin could announce victory in Ukraine, state that Russia has achieved its primary objectives – liberation of additional areas of Donbas, a ‘land bridge’ from Russia to Crimea along the coast of the Sea of Azov, and control of the southern end of the Dnieper River allowing Crimea to once again enjoy the flow of fresh water to the peninsular. On the other hand, Putin could announce a general mobilization with the aim to continue the attack on Ukraine in the future – securing more of the Donbas region and extending its control of southern Ukraine by pushing towards Odesa and Moldova, denying Ukraine of any coastline and seaports. Some commentators think Putin may declare war on Ukraine, upgrading the conflict from a ‘special military operation’ to that of war.
World Response
Funding for Ukraine. As of late April 2022, the Biden administration had submitted to Congress two emergency supplemental requests to address the crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. There is relatively broad congressional support for further emergency supplemental funding for Ukraine – but the proposal from the Biden administration has become more complicated due to the inclusion of other funding request not related to Ukraine. For instance, the request includes money for the Afghanistan Adjustment Act (AAA), which many lawmakers are still trying to sort out. In addition, the Democrats want to add $10 billion in funding for Covid vaccines and treatment. The Democrats see an opportunity to spend money on non-Ukraine related issues due to the Republican support for Ukraine. The Republicans prefer to have a ‘clean bill’ that will pass quickly and not delay needed assistance for Ukraine. Read more in a report by the Congressional Research Service entitled Supplemental Funding for Ukraine, CRS IN11877, May 2, 2022, PDF, 4 pages.
Sanctions on Ukraine. The Russian economy is worse off across a range of metrics since Putin ordered the invasion his neighboring country. Russia’s economy will likely contract by almost 9% in 2022 and inflation will probably get as high as 24%. Unemployment will also increase. There will also be some significant impacts on the global economy. Read more Russia’s War on Ukraine: The Economic Impact of Sanctions, Congressional Research Service, CRS IF12092, May 3, 2022, PDF, 4 pages.
$150 Million More. The U.S. Department of State released a press statement saying that more money will be used to provide military assistance to Ukraine. The equipment will come from U.S. military equipment stocks (referred to a ‘drawdown’). This is the ninth drawdown of U.S. stocks to provide assistance to Ukraine. (DoS, May 6, 2022). According to a DoD statement it includes 155mm artillery rounds, radars, and electronic jamming equipment. (DoS, May 6, 2022).
Commentary
Russia Hypes Polish Invasion of Ukraine. Russian state media and pro-Russian social media channels have spent some time the last few weeks asserting that Poland, along with NATO allies, may invade western Ukraine in an attempt to seize and annex western regions of Ukraine. This would be under the guise of ‘peacekeeping’ or ‘humanitarian action’. “Explainer: The Kremlin’s ‘Polish Invasion’ Narrative”, Centre for Information Resilience, May 6, 2022.
Russia’s Victory Day – May 9th. In Russia, a celebration of the Russian victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War takes place every year in early May. A big event in Moscow to commemorate the day is a military parade. Many observers once noted that President Putin would take this occasion to announce victory in Ukraine as well. He will likely point to the liberation of ‘oppressed Russians’ in the Ukrainian Donbas. “What is Russia’s Victory Day and could it affect the war in Ukraine?”, Forces.net, May 6, 2022.
Russian Nukes Against Ukraine? Julian Spencer-Churchill examines four scenarios of tactical nuclear weapons use by Russia. “Four Important Thresholds of Russian Nuclear Weapons Use in Ukraine”, Real Clear Defense, May 9, 2022.
Ukrainian Welcome Mat, but the Afghans? Many human rights advocates hail the administration’s response to the exodus triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But others feel deeply frustrated that those left behind in Afghanistan have not received equal treatment. “Biden welcomes Ukrainian refugees, neglects Afghans, critics say”, The Washington Post, April 28, 2022. (subscription)
Videos, Podcasts, and Reports
Video – How Ukraine Won the First Phase of the War. The online video examines the first phase of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Covered is the build-up to the new stage of the Russo-Ukrainian War, how Putin’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine continued, and the events that took place between February 24th and April 7th. Kings and Generals, YouTube, May 1, 2022, 34 minutes.
Video – Former U.S. Marine Creates Team of Special Ops Vets to Train Ukrainian Soldiers. A group of American and British military veterans called “The Mozart Group” is a team of special operations vets who are training and equipping Ukrainian soldiers. The group is headed up by Andy Milburn, a retired Marine who spent years in special operations. NBC News, May 4, 2022, 6 minutes.
Podcast – Role of Drones in Russia’s Ukraine Invasion. Two drone researchers explain some of the lessons we’ve learned about drone-assisted warfare after almost three months of war in Ukraine. Defense One Radio, May 6, 2022, 26 minutes.
Report – Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Implications for Global Food Prices and Food Security, Congressional Research Service, CRS IN11919, May 2, 2022, PDF, 4 pages.

SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, defense, or the current conflict in Ukraine then we are interested.
Maps and Other Resources
UNCN. The Ukraine NGO Coordination Network is an organization that ties together U.S.-based 501c3 organizations and non-profit humanitarian organizations that are working to evacuate and support those in need affected by the Ukraine crisis. https://uncn.one
Maps of Ukraine
sof.news · by SOF News · May 9, 2022


6. US diplomats arrive in Kyiv ahead of resumption of embassy operations
Good. Let's get back to work in Kyiv.

US diplomats arrive in Kyiv ahead of resumption of embassy operations
The Hill · May 8, 2022
U.S. diplomats are beginning to arrive in Kyiv as America prepares to restart embassy operations in the Ukrainian capital city for the first time since Russia began its invasion.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken told Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba during a phone call on Sunday that a small group of diplomats, in addition to State Department security, took a trip to the embassy in Kyiv to prepare for its resumption of operations.
“The Secretary informed Foreign Minister Kuleba that our Charge d’Affaires Kristina Kvien and a small group of diplomats, accompanied by State Department security, traveled to Kyiv to conduct diplomatic engagement in advance of the planned resumption of Embassy Kyiv operations, as the Secretary pledged to President Zelenskyy they would during his most recent visit to Kyiv,” State Department spokesman Ned Price wrote in a readout of the call.
The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv announced on Twitter on Sunday that Kvien had arrived in Kyiv.
“Just arrived in Kyiv! Delighted to be back on Victory in Europe Day. Slava Ukraini! We #standwithUkraine,” the tweet from the embassy reads.
The return of diplomats to the embassy in Ukraine’s capital city comes after the U.S. suspended embassy operations in Ukraine in February as Russia’s invasion was just beginning. The U.S. had initially moved operations from Kyiv to the western city of Lviv before relocating to Poland.
Last month, Blinken told reporters that American diplomats would return to Ukraine and “then start the process of looking at how we actually reopen the embassy itself in Kyiv.”
“I think that will take place over a couple of weeks, would be my expectation. We’re doing it deliberately, we’re doing it carefully, we’re doing it with the security of our personnel foremost in mind, but we’re doing it,” Blinken added.
The announcement came following a visit by Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.
Blinken on Sunday also spoke to Kuleba about additional aid the U.S. will send to Ukraine to help bolster its defense against Russia’s invasion. President Biden late last month asked Congress to authorize $33 billion worth of additional security, economic and humanitarian assistance to support Ukraine.
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) on Wednesday said the lower chamber could vote on the Ukrainian aid legislation as soon as this coming week.
“The Secretary emphasized the United States’ enduring commitment to Ukraine and its ultimate victory against Russian aggression,” Price said in the readout.
Blinken also commemorated Ukraine’s Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation, which marks the anniversary of World War II ending in Europe.
“Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke by phone today with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba to commemorate Ukraine’s Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation to recognize the sacrifices of those lost in World War II,” Price said.
The Hill · May 8, 2022




7. Biden admin accelerates plans to reopen Kyiv embassy

Excerpts:

  • It's the culmination of a behind-the-scenes effort led by Blinken to have U.S. diplomats return to Kyiv at the earliest possible date after their evacuation in the weeks before Russia's invasion on Feb. 24.
  • "The secretary relayed to his senior team and to [Ukrainian] Foreign Minister [Dmytro] Kuleba that our return to Kyiv is a testament to Ukraine's success, Moscow's failure and our effective and enduring partnership with the government and people of a sovereign, democratic and free Ukraine," said the senior official.
Biden admin accelerates plans to reopen Kyiv embassy
Axios · by Jonathan Swan,Zachary Basu · May 8, 2022
The Biden administration is accelerating plans to reopen the U.S. embassy in Kyiv, a senior State Department official told Axios, part of an increasingly bold and potentially risky approach to the Russia-Ukraine war.
Why it matters: Secretary of State Antony Blinken has told his Ukrainian counterpart that this progress — marked by Kiev Embassy charge d'affaires Kristina Kvien's visit Sunday to commemorate V-E Day — is "a testament to Ukraine's success [and] Moscow's failure" in the early phase of Vladimir Putin's war, the senior official told Axios.
  • It's the culmination of a behind-the-scenes effort led by Blinken to have U.S. diplomats return to Kyiv at the earliest possible date after their evacuation in the weeks before Russia's invasion on Feb. 24.
  • "The secretary relayed to his senior team and to [Ukrainian] Foreign Minister [Dmytro] Kuleba that our return to Kyiv is a testament to Ukraine's success, Moscow's failure and our effective and enduring partnership with the government and people of a sovereign, democratic and free Ukraine," said the senior official.
Between the lines: These bold statements from the Biden administration are not without risk.
U.S. officials are keenly aware President Putin has his pride and identity at stake with his invasion of Ukraine.
  • A humiliating defeat is not an option for him. Senior Biden officials want to avoid a situation in which Putin feels like his own survival, or the survival of his regime, is threatened.
  • In that "existential" scenario, Putin may resort to the most extreme measures, including the use of nuclear weapons, according to sources familiar with the sensitive discussions inside the administration.
The recent leaks of extremely sensitive information from the Biden administration have seriously concerned senior officials including, reportedly, the president himself.
  • President Biden was reportedly "livid" about recent stories reporting that U.S. targeting intelligence has helped Ukraine kill Russian generals, according to the New York Times' Thomas Friedman.
  • And after an NBC News report in which anonymous U.S. officials took credit for helping sink the Moskva, Russia's flagship warship, Pentagon press secretary John Kirby slammed the leaks as "manifestly unhelpful."
Behind the scenes: When Putin attacked, some senior U.S. officials privately expected Kyiv to fall within days. It didn't.
The Ukrainian military has fought bravely and outperformed many analysts' expectations — making the war increasingly costly for the Russian president.
  • When Blinken met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky last month in Kyiv, he promised his team would return to the capital city promptly.
  • Blinken "instructed his team — including undersecretary for management John Bass and our diplomatic security team — to work closely with [Kvien] to make it happen, consistent with the safety and security imperatives," the senior official told Axios.
  • Blinken privately discussed the plan with Biden, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and national security adviser Jake Sullivan. The logistical conversations have intensified during the past two weeks.
What to watch: Russia's May 9 holiday commemorating the Soviet Union's defeat of Nazi Germany is viewed as an especially sensitive moment in which Putin could dramatically escalate his assault on Ukraine.
  • Western governments announced new sanctions on Sunday and were engaged in a flurry of activity as part of an effort to counter Russia's propaganda surrounding its Victory Day celebration on Monday.
  • In addition to U.S. diplomats visiting Kyiv on Sunday, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and first lady Jill Biden made surprise visits themselves.
  • Biden traveled to Uzhhorod, Ukraine, where she met with Ukrainian first lady Olena Zelenska. Trudeau visited Irpin, Ukraine.
Axios · by Jonathan Swan,Zachary Basu · May 8, 2022


8. China says it conducted exercises near Taiwan

Excerpts:
The People's Liberation Army's Eastern Theatre Command said in a statement that naval and air force assets carried out drills from Friday to Sunday to the east and southwest of Taiwan to "further test and improve the joint combat capability of multiple services and arms". It did not elaborate.
...
Japan last week reported eight Chinese naval vessels, including an aircraft carrier, passed between islands in Japan's southern Okinawa chain, to the northeast of Taiwan.
Taiwan also carried out pre-announced missile and other drills off its southern and southeastern coasts last week.
China says it conducted exercises near Taiwan
Reuters · by Reuters
SHANGHAI, May 9 (Reuters) - China's armed forces carried out another round of exercises near Taiwan last week to improve joint combat operations, the People's Liberation Army said on Monday, after the Chinese-claimed island reported a spike in activity.
Taiwan has complained for the past two years about frequent Chinese military activity near it, mostly concentrated in the southern and southwestern part of the island's air defence identification zone, or ADIZ.
Taiwan's air force scrambled planes on Friday to warn away 18 Chinese aircraft that entered its air defence zone, and reported further incursions on Saturday and Sunday, though with fewer aircraft. read more

The People's Liberation Army's Eastern Theatre Command said in a statement that naval and air force assets carried out drills from Friday to Sunday to the east and southwest of Taiwan to "further test and improve the joint combat capability of multiple services and arms". It did not elaborate.
Taiwan's Defence Ministry said China deployed bombers, fighters and anti-submarine aircraft.
No shots were fired and the Chinese aircraft had not been flying in Taiwan's air space, but in its ADIZ, a broader area Taiwan monitors and patrols that acts to give it more time to respond to any threats.
Taiwan has raised its alert since Russia invaded Ukraine, wary of China making a similar move, though the government in Taipei has not reported any signs this is about to happen.
Taking questions in parliament on Monday, Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu said China was continuing to pose a threat.
"But we have the determination to defend our country," he said.
Japan last week reported eight Chinese naval vessels, including an aircraft carrier, passed between islands in Japan's southern Okinawa chain, to the northeast of Taiwan.
Taiwan also carried out pre-announced missile and other drills off its southern and southeastern coasts last week.
China has never renounced the use of force to bring democratically ruled Taiwan under its control, and the Taiwan Strait remains a potential military flashpoint.
Taiwan's government rejects China's sovereignty claims, saying only the island's 23 million people can decide their future.

Reporting by Shanghai newsroom; Writing and additional reporting by Ben Blanchard in Taipei; Editing by Kim Coghill, Robert Birsel
Reuters · by Reuters
9. Ukraine spoils Vladimir Putin’s May 9th parade
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And the rain too from what I hear from press reports. They could not fly their 77 plane formation.


Ukraine spoils Vladimir Putin’s May 9th parade
Russia’s army is struggling and Volodymyr Zelensky is the better showman
For the past week, shiny Russian tanks have rumbled down Tverskaya Street, Moscow’s main drag. Thousands of soldiers have marched across Red Square under Soviet flags as fighter planes buzzed above the city. All were preparing for the parade on May 9th, Russia’s annual celebration of its victory in the second world war. Vladimir Putin has portrayed his barbaric war against Ukraine as a continuation of the Soviet war against Nazi Germany.
The Victory Day parade had been billed as a crucial moment in the war, a military showcase which Mr Putin could use as a substitute for success on the battlefield—or, alternatively, as a moment to declare he is mobilising the nation’s reservists to redouble the war effort. In the event, he made no big announcements.
But while the world waited to hear what Mr Putin would say, Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, managed to upstage him. Mr Zelensky, a former actor and pitch-perfect communicator, orchestrated a day-long political show of resistance and solidarity. Justin Trudeau, Canada’s prime minister, arrived in Kyiv, where he participated in an online meeting of the G7 with Mr Zelensky as the guest of honour. The group issued a statement declaring its resolve that “President Putin must not win his war against Ukraine”, saying they owed it to “the memory of all those who fought for freedom in the second world war.”
Bärbel Bas, president of the German parliament, showed up in Kyiv as well. Bono and the Edge of U2 performed with Ukrainian musicians in a metro station being used as a bomb shelter. Jill Biden, the wife of Joe Biden, America’s president, made an unexpected appearance in western Ukraine alongside Olena Zelensky, Mr Zelensky’s wife.
As for Mr Zelensky, he released one of his trademark videos, this time in stark black-and-white in front of a building wrecked by Russian missiles. The day before, Russian forces had bombed a school in the east, killing 60 of the 90-odd people sheltering there. "Darkness has returned to Ukraine, and it has become black and white again," said Mr Zelensky, wearing a T-shirt that read “I’m Ukrainian”. "Evil has returned, in a different uniform, under different slogans, but for the same purpose."
Russia’s war itself was planned as a parade, a lightning march to Kyiv which was supposed to have been completed in 72 hours. But 74 days later, it has become a display of military failure. Nothing has gone to plan. A map captured from Russian troops by Ukrainian forces displays a red line which Russian tanks were supposed to follow to the capital. But the 28-page map dates from 1987, says Oleksiy Danilov, the head of Ukraine’s National Security Council. A junction it showed was long gone. The Russians took a wrong turn and ended up bogged down in Bucha, a middle-class suburb, where they committed a host of war crimes.
If Russia’s leaders thought such violence would break Ukrainians’ resolve, they were wrong. Russian-speaking cities in eastern Ukraine became bastions of resistance. In Mariupol, a port city levelled by Russia (and where Russian propagandists plan to stage a Victory Day parade on May 9th), Ukrainian fighters of a semi-independent unit called the Azov Battalion continue to hold out in tunnels underneath the giant Azovstal steel plant. On May 8th, using Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite internet system, they managed to stage a press conference via Zoom from their bunkers, even as Russian forces showered the plant with bombs. “We showed what is impossible, and the impossible has become routine for us,” said Ilya Samoilenko, one of the Azov fighters. “Our message is: don’t waste our effort.”
For all its blunders, Russia has gained control over a land corridor that connects Crimea, the peninsula it seized from Ukraine in 2014, to its own territory. Whereas before the war it occupied about a third of the Donbas region, in eastern Ukraine, it now controls about 80%. But its offensive to capture the rest is advancing at a crawl. The fiercest fighting has been around the city of Izyum, the northern tip of a pincer that Russia hopes to close around a Ukrainian-held salient. But Ukrainian forces are dug in, in trenches and bunkers, lessening the impact of the Russians’ ever-heavier artillery barrages and making it harder for the invaders to advance.
Meanwhile Ukraine is staging a counter-offensive north-east of Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-biggest city, pushing Russian forces back towards the border. To slow Ukraine’s advance, Russia has blown up three bridges. “Armies generally only destroy bridges if they have largely decided they will not attempt to cross the river in the other direction anytime soon,” notes the Institute for the Study of War, an American think-tank.
Russia has also managed to occupy or blockade Ukraine’s seaports. Before the war 90% of Ukrainian steel and grain was exported by ship. Ukraine is scrambling to find alternatives. The Russians are not having an easy time holding such towns. In Kherson, an occupied port city, Russia announced on May 6th that residents could apply for Russian passports. Few have taken up the offer; Ukrainian prosecutors have opened cases against those who have. Despite intimidation, arrests and beatings, demonstrations against the occupation continue.
Given Mr Putin’s total control over Russian media, it may be enough for him to declare victory while continuing to wear Ukraine down in a war of attrition. Whether that succeeds depends on Ukraine’s ability to counter-attack. Russia has more artillery but has problems with troops and motivation. Ukraine has sufficient motivation and troops, but currently lacks the firepower to launch big counter-offensives along multiple fronts, Ukrainian officials suggest.
Ukraine’s defensive, entrenched posture in Donbas, the limited road network in the area and the muddy ground of recent weeks have made it hard for either side to move and concentrate their forces for rapid, large-scale offensives. But a Western official says that America and European countries are giving increasing volumes of heavy weaponry to Ukraine—including artillery and tanks—at least in part to encourage such efforts.
The medium- and long-range artillery systems which Ukraine desperately needs have been promised, but have been slow in coming, says Andriy Yermak, Mr Zelensky’s chief of staff. “Time is of the essence. We want to save our heroes, not to celebrate them posthumously,” he says.
Ukraine’s counter-attacks will have limits. Its army is unlikely to reverse all of Russia’s territorial gains since February 24th, something that Mr Zelensky described on May 6th as a prerequisite for negotiations. But there is every chance Ukraine can grind Russian forces to a bloody halt, as it did north of Kyiv in February and March. Mr Putin is now unlikely to be able to take the entirety of the Donbas, let alone restore Russia’s control over what it calls Novorossiya, the region stretching along the Black and Azov seas. That is an unambiguous strategic defeat.
Read more of our recent coverage of the Ukraine crisis



10. Putin tries to justify Ukraine invasion in Victory Day speech


Putin tries to justify Ukraine invasion in Victory Day speech
Axios · by Rebecca Falconer · May 9, 2022
Russian President Vladimir Putin railed against NATO as he spent much of his Victory Day speech in Moscow on Monday trying to justify his troops' invasion of Ukraine, per multiple reports.
Why it matters: Putin didn't use his Victory Day speech to officially declare war on Ukraine or fully mobilize Russia's reservists, as some Western officials feared he would.
  • Instead, he turned his ire and propaganda on the U.S., NATO and the "Nazis" they support in Kyiv — claiming that a clash was "inevitable" and that Russia moved preemptively against Ukraine to defend itself.
What he's saying: In his speech for Victory Day, an annual commemoration of the Soviet Union's defeat of the Nazis in World War II, Putin did acknowledge the loss of Russian troops in Ukraine, the BBC reports. "The death of every soldier and officer is painful for us," he said, pledging to do "everything" to help bereaved families.
A man holds a Russian flag with the letter Z during Victory Day celebrations in the far eastern city of Vladivostok on Monday. Photo: Pavel Korolyov/AFP via Getty Images
The big picture: Russia's defense ministry said its invasion of Ukraine would form a key part of this year's event, with eight MiG-29SMT fighters flying over Moscow's Red Square "in a flight formation resembling the letter Z in support of Russian troops."
  • The letter has become a symbol of support for the invasion, which AFP notes has taken longer and proven to be costlier than the Kremlin had planned.
Yes, but: Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Monday this aspect of the parade had been canceled, the BBC reports.
Of note: The annual parade showcasing Russia's military power was taking place hours after Ukrainian officials accused Putin's forces of killing 60 people sheltering in a school in Ukraine's eastern Donbas region.
By the numbers: The Kremlin has said that parades would take place in 28 cities, involving 65,000 people, 2,400 items of military hardware and over 400 aircraft.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted in a Sunday night address denouncing Russian shelling that the words "peace" and "never again" were typically associated with Victory in Europe Day on May 8 and Russia's May 9 Victory Day, "which are repeated all over the free world every year on the days of remembrance of the victims of World War II."
  • "Russia has forgotten everything that was important to the victors of World War II," Zelensky added, according to a transcript posted to the presidential website.
Between the lines: The U.K. Ministry of Defense said in an intelligence report Monday that the invasion of Ukraine "has revealed shortcomings" in the Russian military's ability to conduct precision strikes at scale, despite publicly promoting its "ability to conduct surgical strikes and limit collateral damage" at the start of the war.
  • Instead, Russian forces have "subjected Ukraine’s towns and cities to intense and indiscriminate bombardments with little or no regard for civilian casualties," the defense ministry said.
  • As the conflict "continues beyond Russian pre-war expectations, Russia's stockpile of precision-guided munitions has likely been heavily depleted," according to the report.
"This has forced the use of readily available but ageing munitions that are less reliable, less accurate and more easily intercepted. Russia will likely struggle to replace the precision weaponry it has already expended."
— U.K. Ministry of Defense
Axios · by Rebecca Falconer · May 9, 2022


11. Inside the battle on the Eastern Front

The human domain.

Excerpts:
At breakfast the next day before anyone is allowed to eat, the chef makes them recite a line or two of Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko. It’s a poem about death. “When I die…” it begins. The soldiers laugh.
That afternoon we begin the long drive back to Dnipro. Dima, it turns out, is a big Queen fan. “Another one bites the dust — this is the song for war,” he laughs. Then he suddenly becomes serious. There is silence for long stretches of road. “I want it all!” sings Freddie Mercury. I think of the soldiers I’ve met. How many of them may not return. “You know,” says Dima as we turn off the motorway and enter Dnipro once again, “there should be no wars of nationalism between people who listen to the same music.”


Inside the battle on the Eastern Front
I was given access to a secret Ukrainian base
unherd.com · by David Patrikarakos · May 8, 2022
David Patrikarakos is a Contributing Editor at UnHerd. His latest book is War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. (Hachette)
Barbed wire knots together sky and earth. Burned-out vehicles, modern-day carcasses of industrial warfare, dot the landscape. The ground is strafed and cratered: Eastern Ukraine has been disembowelled by shelling. The war here is fought with 21st-century drone technology, but it flies over soldiers who carry 50-year-old Kalashnikovs. The black snouts and brown handles of these guns line the eastern front, which is a frieze cast in metal and wood, and is where, in the late afternoon of a warm spring day, I see Jesus.
He is about a foot tall and half as wide, and is being carried by a man with a ponytail and scraggly black beard. Dressed in jeans and a tracksuit top, he cradles the icon in his arms. “Is this the way to Mariupol?” he asks the group of us standing by the road: me, Dima, the soldier taking me to the front, and my friend the journalist, Vladislav Davidzon. Mariupol — which has been almost destroyed by the Russian army — is almost 300km south. “Um, not really,” Dima replies. “Who are you?”
“I am a pilgrim,” he replies. “I’m going to get people out of the city.” He shows me what appears to be the business card of a UNHCR official — a psychologist it appears. I look at him. He has the glazed, trembling look of a pilgrim; of a smaller, scrawnier Rasputin (and, disconcertingly, Harry Kane). We talk for a few minutes before I watch him walk off into the distance, a lone madman clutching his Christ amidst the destruction.
“Well,” says Dima as we get back into the car. “If he makes it to Mariupol, it really will be divine fucking intervention.”
Is he Jesus? “I am a pilgrim,” he replies.
***
Several hours earlier, in a cafe in the city of Dnipro, Dima shows me an image on his phone. Four bodies lie in the dirt. The image is grainy, but their ragged outlines are clear. Just 20 or so metres away, their comrades sit and eat. “It’s incredible,” says Dima. “​They’re eating lunch right by the decomposing bodies of their friends.” He continues: “I don’t understand the Russians. Sometimes they just drop the bodies of their mates into trenches. We found a grave of 15 bodies. They’d thrown a bit of dirt on them, but that was it. They don’t even respect their own people.”
Dima is an officer in the Drone intelligence section of the Dnipro 1 Volunteer Battalion fighting in the Donbas on the frontlines. It was here that I saw Russian troops trundle across the border back in April 2014. They had come to aid local “separatists” seize key cities in the region. Back then, the Kremlin didn’t want to conquer Ukraine, merely destabilise it to stop it drawing closer to the EU and Nato.
A few months ago, Moscow decided destabilisation was no longer enough; it was time, it said, to take Kyiv and “denazify” the country. It failed. Now its goals have shifted again. Now it hopes to “liberate” the Donbas by holding a bogus referendum. The eventual goal is to create a landbridge from the Russian border to Crimea, cutting off a large part of Ukraine’s access to the sea.
In their way stands Dima — and tens of thousands like him. Now 32, he was 24 when the war began in 2014 and he volunteered to serve in Dnipro 1. He fought for two years before leaving to work as an IT product manager. But when the war started earlier this year, he re-joined.
Dima: “I’m in charge of your security now. You need to do what I say.”
“We are fighting over [the town of] Rubizhne at the moment,” he tells me. “It’s one of the hottest spots right now. We’re desperately trying to hold it. But it’s close to Sievierodonetsk and [Russian-occupied] Luhansk so it’s tough. The Russians are throwing everything at us there. Missiles, artillery, tanks, men, drones: the works. A guy I know who was in Afghanistan twice said it was like a playground compared to eastern Ukraine.”
Yet the Ukranians remain confident, having already pushed the Russians back from Kyiv. More than this, they are angry. Mass graves discovered in towns such as Bucha mean no one I meet is interested in territorial compromise. “Even if they drop a nuclear bomb on Kyiv they will not win,” Dima tells me. He snorts at Russia’s plans to take southern Ukraine and link Russia up with Transnistria. “Sometimes you play poker with a bad hand, but Russia is playing without any cards at all. Their tactics are insane. Take Chernobaivka: it has a small military airport. Seventeen times they’ve tried to take it. Seventeen times we’ve smashed them. Still they come. Our soldiers ask: ‘Are they dumb?’ No, just incapable of independent thought. They just follow orders — no matter how crazy.”
Ukraine’s problem is resources: the army doesn’t have enough ammunition and artillery, but this is also something of a blessing: it forces them to be creative. “The Russians use Soviet military tactics that were out of date 30 years ago,” he says. “But we study the Afghanistan war and Israeli tactics. Russia just tries to press with mass.”
What about the feared Chechen soldiers, I ask? “We call the Kadyrovites [named for Chechnya’s leader Ramzan Kadyrov] TikTok soldiers. They’re always filming. We found one who was wounded and trying not to fight, but to take a selfie. I heard a story from the [battle for] Hostomyal airport. There were a load of conscripts refusing to fight. So the Kadyrovite commander asked them: ‘Who doesn’t want to fight?’ One guy raised his hand and the commander shot him. ‘Now, who else wants to go home?’ he asked. It’s Soviet tactics.”
From the beginning, Dima tells me, the Kadyrovites had a reputation for committing war crimes. The locals hate them and there are sometimes problems when the Ukrainian army captures one and the locals want revenge. But he says he’s never seen anyone mistreat a prisoner. “Our guys understand the Geneva convention, and also that prisoners are a resource. For every Russian we capture we can get one of ours back. I’m not a general, but at a guess I’d say maybe 1,000 of our guys are prisoners. Prisoner exchanges take place continuously and quietly.”
***
I convince Dima to take us to his base on the frontlines near Rubizhne. He’s reluctant: its location is classified as it’s so close to Russian firepower. Not even the BBC or CNN have been given access to a place like this. But in the end, he relents. “Ok, I’m in charge of your security now. You need to do what I say.”
We drive out of Dnipro and onto the highway; after a couple of hours we enter the Donbas. On the Donetsk Oblast (region) sign hangs a small flag showing a flower sprouting from a prostrate human. “Russian occupiers make the best fertiliser,” it reads.
“Russian occupiers make the best fertiliser.”
​​Dima continues to talk as we drive. He’s from Kryvyi Rih, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s hometown. “I knew him a bit when I was younger,” he says. “I used to see him around the place in a cheap coat. I thought he was a great guy but not suited to running a country. Now I support him 1,000%. The most important thing that he did was stay. It was vital that the people saw that the head of the government didn’t flee.”
Beyond Ukraine, Dima is especially positive about two things, or rather, two people. “Elon Musk’s Starlink is what changed the war in Ukraine’s favour,” he tells me. “Russia went out of its way to blow up all our comms. Now they can’t. Starlink works under Katyusha fire, under artillery fire. It even works in Mariupol.”
“I know you British have a complicated relationship with your Prime Minister, but here Boris Johnson has become something of a national hero,” he continues. “The NLAWs you have given us are the best. Easy to use — lock, load and move. Without them we wouldn’t be taking out so many Russian tanks. We knew from the beginning that Britain was a very ancient and important nation. Now we know it’s a country that stands by its word.”
The closer we get to the front the more the world morphs into something profoundly alien. Almost all the vehicles on the road are military. We breeze through a succession of checkpoints manned by soldiers hardened by war. The Ukrainians have been fighting here for eight years. We pass through several villages. On each side of me I see small, perfectly kept houses with immaculate gardens. I’m told it’s a Ukrainian thing. Even war is no excuse to let standards slip.
As we draw closer to the front, we meander around potholed roads. Dima tells me there’s intense fighting at the moment. We get stuck behind two pheasants waddling in front of us. “They’re totally deaf,” he says. “Shelling has blown out their eardrums. We can hoot all day and they’ll never hear.”
He becomes reflective. “I won’t survive being a POW,” he says. “Dnipro I is considered a terror group by Russia. If caught, I expect to be tortured and summarily executed.”
***
Out on the base, soldiers are everywhere — in their green and beige camouflage, as if they’ve sprouted from the earth itself: from the forests and fields that dot the Donbas. Daily life here is quietly relentless. In a small courtyard, crates of supplies are stacked on top of one another. Soldiers sit around and smoke and talk and clean their weapons. They tinker with armoured vehicles caked in mud and grime.
Everything is geared toward staying hidden. We are asked not to gather in groups outside for fear of Russian drones flying overhead. Night falls. Inside, the lights must be switched off. Windows are always covered.
The base’s command centre sits in a compact bunker. Flat-screen TVs fixed to cement walls show live feeds of the battlefields. In a storage room, crates of ammo stand five feet high. A bust of Lenin, sitting in the corner, gazes over them.”Our commander is keen to give the old boy a good burial,” says Dima. “Come on,” he continues. “You’ll laugh your arse off when you see where our office is.”
We pile into a small room filled with an array of detritus: Kit Kats, vacuum-packed meals and old Soviet uniforms. I meet some of Dima’s drone team. ​​All of them are volunteers who work in IT. They could have paid bribes to leave the country, he tells me. But they chose to stay.
The drone reconnaissance unit has a vital job. They travel ahead of the artillery to a sector, usually just 1 or 2km from the front, and send up a drone to look for a target — anything from armour or troops (or sometimes to cover their infantry). Then they figure out the coordinates, telegraph the artillery guys and observe the subsequent strike. If it’s not accurate, they calibrate accordingly. Each evening, they return to base and watch a video of the day’s work.
They are watching one as I walk in. The footage could be from a video game: I see artillery strike a building and a Russian soldier run out and start hopping around. “He’s having a panic attack,” says Dima’s friend, Pasha. In another, a Russian soldier writhes on the ground after a strike scythes him almost in half. “And here’s half a Russian,” says Dima. “Yup, 50% of a Russian,” his friend Pasha chips in.
The door opens and in walks the battalion commander, Yuriy Bereza. A former politician famous for attending parliament in his military uniform, he is one of Ukraine’s most famous fighters. Everything about Bereza is big. His head is big. His smile is big. His belly and arms are big. His hands are huge. He is something very rare: a man who is tough to his core.
He beams at me. “With your permission?” he asks before taking a bite of chocolate and sitting down. “First,” he says. “I want to tell you about one of my heroes, John McCain.” Bereza tells me he met McCain in Washington DC following an official invitation. Bereza had commanded Ukrainian forces at the battle of Iloviask in which many of his troops had died — a disaster Bereza blamed on then-President Petro Poroshenko. He was filled with rage. “I didn’t view Poroshenko as my president, but McCain told me: ‘You have a bright future, but understand if you wear the uniform you must accept him as your president. You can throw him out at the ballot box later.’ And then we got drunk together. Then McCain came here to visit us. We showed him videos of what the Russians were doing in Ukraine. He watched the whole thing and all he said at the end was ‘fucking Russians’.”
The soldiers bunk down together to sleep, but are constantly on alert
Bereza has his own — unvarnished — thoughts on war. “When I was in the Soviet army in the Nineties so many Russians told me: ‘You fucking Banderites, we’re going to conquer you.’ I knew we were going to have to fight these fucking paedophiles.” He continues: “By 2014 I knew with every fibre of my being that there would be war. For me, the IDF is the ideal army because like Israel, Ukraine is surrounded. Israeli citizens live normally despite their fucked-in-the head neighbours who continually fire rockets at them. I told Poroshenko back in 2014: this is just the beginning; we need to militarise society; everyone needs to go to the supermarket with a gun.”
I ask him why the Russians have fought so badly. “For the reason the guy who looks after their tanks shot himself,” he replies. “Me and Dima were buying equipment from those fucks for ten times less than it was worth. Thanks to their very effective corruption we very effectively killed their own guys.”
I ask if he minds if I take photos of him. “Take as many photos as you want,” he replies. “I spit on these bastards.” He’s into his stride now. “Look at General Zhukov, the ‘Great Marshal’ who was just a butcher. The Russians are fighting like Zhukov. They send wave after wave but our guys figured out they fight just like Soviets. The tank commander is always in the first tank, so we shoot it. Once you shoot the first and last tanks, they’re immobilised.”
He leans forward and gives me his final thoughts. “Look, we are standing with our blood for Western values. The more you focus on us the more we will break the back of the TV, the press, the foggy mind — all of it: the collective Putin inside Russians.”
That night I bunk down with the soldiers. There must be 20 of us in the room, which is filled with cots and mats; sleeping bags and blankets are strewn across the floor. Everyone is constantly on alert, leaving to go on missions to the front throughout the night. Alongside rucksacks and helmets and uniforms, the room is filled with weapons. Everything from pistols to AK-47s and even a light machine gun is here. But that’s not the most striking thing about the room: that’s the smell. That mix of feet and sweat and fear and testosterone that I know so well. Next to me, Vlad leans over and whispers: “You know what that is,” he says with a chuckle. “That’s toxic masculinity.”
***
At breakfast the next day before anyone is allowed to eat, the chef makes them recite a line or two of Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko. It’s a poem about death. “When I die…” it begins. The soldiers laugh.
That afternoon we begin the long drive back to Dnipro. Dima, it turns out, is a big Queen fan. “Another one bites the dust — this is the song for war,” he laughs. Then he suddenly becomes serious. There is silence for long stretches of road. “I want it all!” sings Freddie Mercury. I think of the soldiers I’ve met. How many of them may not return. “You know,” says Dima as we turn off the motorway and enter Dnipro once again, “there should be no wars of nationalism between people who listen to the same music.”
unherd.com · by David Patrikarakos · May 8, 2022


12. The Erosion of Liberal Democracy and the Rise of Strongman-ism


Excerpts:
Indeed, the AUKUS agreement and similar efforts may have a grounding in similar lexicons of liberalism, democracy, and rule of law, but the key driver was a hard power security concern—China. That they speak English just made it that much easier. Further, that the Quad includes India under Narendra Modi, whose behavior is clearly of a strongman ilk, illustrates just how willing states are to put concerns about authoritarian tone and style aside in the name of pragmatism.
It is tempting to confuse tactics or operational behavior with long-term strategic activity. Rachman notes that we could well be in the latest cycle of strongman authoritarianism, which could just as quickly ebb from view. That remains very much an open question and assumes a measure of resilience in liberal democracies which are very different from country to country. Even if the excesses of the strongmen profiled by Rachman are constrained, those aforementioned political and economic strains will likely remain. If those are unaddressed, there is little to suggest that national populations won’t welcome a strongman or populist back into office—or demand that one emerges.
In the main, Rachman’s book is a welcome reflection on the global state of liberal democracy at its erosion in the face of rising authoritarian tendencies. Not surprisingly, “The Age of the Strongman” is very much in keeping with Rachman’s excellent columns: a sweeping, globe-trotting, well-informed, and thought-provoking reflection on global trends.
The Erosion of Liberal Democracy and the Rise of Strongman-ism
diplomaticourier.com · by Joshua Huminski
.
Gideon Rachman is one of the rare public foreign affairs intellectuals/journalists that I regularly read and enjoy. Whilst I don’t always agree with his analysis (which is itself a good thing), it is grounded and reflective in a way that many simply are not. Reading the opinion pages of the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and the New York Times usually leads to eye-rolls and guffaws – which lead to an occasional odd look from passersby – especially from some of the more well-known names (we all know who they are).

The Age of the Strongman | Gideon Rachman | Penguin Random House
As FT’s Chief Foreign Affairs Columnist, Rachman is uniquely suited to reflect on sweeping international developments and summarize them for his readers. In his latest book “The Age of the Strongman” Rachman does just this, exploring the emergence of the new wave of strongman-ism (my turn of phrase, not his). Rachman reflects on the modern world, where he sees liberal democracy eroding and authoritarianism rising in countries from Russia to the U.S., Turkey to the United Kingdom, with a few bulwarks like France and Germany in between. He sees President Joe Biden’s primary task as reinvigorating liberal democracy and reasserting its attendant values in the face of such authoritarian pressures, both at home and abroad.
Thumbing through the book I initially shared the concerns Sir Alex Younger (the former Chief of SIS) expressed in his FT review of “The Age of the Strongman”: that lumping such a diverse group of ostensible strongmen (and, thus far it is all men) into one group would be too much of a stretch. There is a big difference between tendencies/behaviors and actually being a strongman or authoritarian. The gulf between Prime Minister Boris Johnson and President Vladimir Putin, despite what some polemicists would suggest, is quite large—the former has yet to poison Sir Keir Starmer…yet.
Those concerns were unfounded as Rachman does a masterful job of capturing the individuals as individuals and their distinct behaviors. As standalone biographies they are sharp and poignant, highlighting what makes the individual leader a strongman, but also how they fit into the broader spectrum of authoritarianism. He rightly differentiates authoritarian behaviors, odious though they may be, from outright corruption and democratic subversion. The vignettes are great miniature biographies as much as they serve to advance Rachman’s argument of the evolution and growth of authoritarian tendencies in ostensible democracies, liberal or otherwise.
Reading these entries, one does wish that Rachman sat with the individual authoritarians and the conditions that gave rise to the strongman more than he does. While it would undoubtedly be a much longer book, it would be useful. All of these figures seized upon underlying domestic political conditions, fears, and concerns (real or otherwise) as much as they created conditions for their rise. To be sure, once in office they manipulated the courts, upset democratic norms, attacked the press, and comported themselves as a strongman would (to varying degrees). Yet it is these underlying issues that deserve due consideration if we are to fully understand why the strongman emerged in the first place.
There is an underlying theme that Rachman doesn’t fully explore though one can’t help but pick it up when reading his enjoyable book. We may finally be witnessing the death of the assumption of liberal democracy’s unchallenged ascendency. Francis Fukuyama’s oft cited but rarely read, “End of History” is often pointed to as one of the progenitors of this assumption—that in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, liberal democracy is the only viable system that is left.
That assumption seems to have underpinned an intellectual arrogance and idleness, not limited to the Western world. Surely, many thought, liberal democracy is the apotheosis of human development and nothing can undermine its expansion. The very fields that gave rise to and sustained liberal democracy’s expansion were left fallow and untended. The weeds of authoritarianism, corruption, demagoguery, and populism went unchecked. The assumption that liberal democracy would flow East was supplanted by the reality that kleptocracy and instability flowed West.
Such a proposition is horribly dangerous as an intellectual framework left alone as a foundation for policy (just look at America’s policy toward China), which it arguably was for so long. The lack of democratic stewardship in the United States undoubtedly contributed to its erosion abroad. Civic engagement in America has fallen precipitously (beyond the ballot box), but more alarmingly civic knowledge and understanding—so much so that the events of 6 January were tacitly or explicitly condoned by many, even within a major political party. Social media has led to an increased polarization and the belief that politics is a zero-sum game—and exposed a punitive streak in politics: the other side is wrong and should be made to suffer as a consequence.
At the same time, liberal democracy itself has not kept up with the demands placed upon it by citizens themselves resulting from the changes in the global economy. As Rachman writes, this is a consistent theme that gives rise to first grievance and then, later, strongmen seizing upon said grievance. If the Global Trends 2040 report authored by Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) is to be believed, the delta between expectations and the ability of governments to deliver is only set to grow in the coming years. This will create and exacerbate tensions within states and could well give rise to yet another generation of strong persons (as one suspects it is only a matter of time before a female leader rises to the fore using similar tactics).
Rachman’s analysis runs, unfortunately, into challenges of reality and geopolitics. As odious as some of these individuals’ behaviors may be, Washington and other capitals will still need to deal with them to address practical issues of security, economics, diplomacy, and climate change. This has always been the case. By way of example, two of the founding members of NATO were dictatorships when they joined—Greece and Turkey—and South Korea was a military dictatorship until 1979. Today, Hungary under Viktor Orbán is both a member of NATO and the EU. Washington works (haltingly) with China under General Secretary Xi Jinping on economic policy, security issues, and will need to do so on climate change, and works with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia to manage Iran.
Values and principles are critically important and should certainly guide policy, but they are an insufficient framework alone on which to make policy in the real world. The liberal international order did not come to the defense of Ukraine until Russian tanks were crossing the border. President Putin’s authoritarian tendencies were fine within Russia, it only became an issue when it spread beyond its borders. Washington may decry the treatment of the Uyghurs and Tibet, or Beijing’s development of an Orwellian social credit score, but securing a favorable trade deal and stymying Zhongnanhai’s hegemonic ambitions is of far greater importance.
Indeed, the AUKUS agreement and similar efforts may have a grounding in similar lexicons of liberalism, democracy, and rule of law, but the key driver was a hard power security concern—China. That they speak English just made it that much easier. Further, that the Quad includes India under Narendra Modi, whose behavior is clearly of a strongman ilk, illustrates just how willing states are to put concerns about authoritarian tone and style aside in the name of pragmatism.
It is tempting to confuse tactics or operational behavior with long-term strategic activity. Rachman notes that we could well be in the latest cycle of strongman authoritarianism, which could just as quickly ebb from view. That remains very much an open question and assumes a measure of resilience in liberal democracies which are very different from country to country. Even if the excesses of the strongmen profiled by Rachman are constrained, those aforementioned political and economic strains will likely remain. If those are unaddressed, there is little to suggest that national populations won’t welcome a strongman or populist back into office—or demand that one emerges.
In the main, Rachman’s book is a welcome reflection on the global state of liberal democracy at its erosion in the face of rising authoritarian tendencies. Not surprisingly, “The Age of the Strongman” is very much in keeping with Rachman’s excellent columns: a sweeping, globe-trotting, well-informed, and thought-provoking reflection on global trends.
About
:
Joshua C. Huminski is Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress, and a George Mason University National Security Institute Fellow. He can be found on Twitter @joshuachuminski.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

13. A Pot of U.N. Money. Risk-Taking Officials. A Sea of Questions.

Excerpts:

The financial mess threatens to undermine the broader trust of the U.N.’s member countries in the institution at a time when the U.N. is seeking millions of dollars to deal with the war in Ukraine and surging food prices. Finland, for example, had pledged $20 million to support the Office for Project Services’ investments, which were run out of an office in Helsinki, the country’s capital. But Finland has since suspended its funding, according to diplomats and a statement from its foreign ministry.
“They are investing money that the United States and other countries have provided,” Christopher P. Lu, a senior official at the U.S. mission to the U.N., said of the agency. “So they need to be good stewards of our money.”
But the U.N. is a place where accountability often comes slowly and in secret. It was unclear when, if ever, the U.N. would release the results of the investigation that it said this past week had been completed.
If there are to be broader reforms at the Office for Project Services, they would come from its executive board — a group of diplomats from U.N. member states. In the wake of the losses, the board in February demanded an “independent comprehensive evaluation” of what had happened.
It is due in June. June 2024.
A Pot of U.N. Money. Risk-Taking Officials. A Sea of Questions.
By David A. Fahrenthold and Farnaz Fassihi
May 7, 2022
The New York Times · by Farnaz Fassihi · May 7, 2022
A little-known United Nations agency decided to make an impact by doling out loans and grant money — all to a single family. It did not go well.
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The United Nations headquarters in New York. Critics of the institution say there is a culture of impunity among some top leaders, who wield huge budgets with little outside oversight.Credit...Desiree Rios for The New York Times
At the United Nations, two officials had a problem. The little-known agency they ran found itself with an extra $61 million, and they didn’t know what to do with it.
Then they met a man at a party.
Now, they have $25 million less.
In between was a baffling series of financial decisions, in which experienced diplomats entrusted tens of millions of dollars, the agency’s entire investment portfolio at the time, to a British businessman after meeting him at the party. They also gave his daughter $3 million to produce a pop song, a video game and a website promoting awareness of environmental threats to the world’s oceans.
Things did not go well.
Though U.N. auditors said the man’s businesses defaulted on more than $22 million in loans — all money meant to aid the developing world — the agency, the United Nations Office for Project Services, said in a statement last month that “funds are at risk, but to date, no funds have been lost.” The agency added that it would “pursue all available legal remedies to protect its operations and assets, including the recovery of outstanding payments owed to” it.
The story of these misbegotten investments was, at times, surreal. There was a cameo by the Italian-born man about town who had introduced Donald J. Trump to a model named Melania Knauss, the future first lady. There was a concert in the U.N.’s General Assembly hall as it sat nearly empty — where a Norwegian diplomat with a backing band crooned the ocean song (“Just a drop of rain / That’s all I am”).
But diplomats and former U.N. officials say the tale also demonstrates what critics say is a serious problem with the U.N.: a culture of impunity among some top leaders, who wield huge budgets with little outside oversight.
“What do you call it when you believe you’re God?” said Jonas Svensson, who recently left the Office for Project Services. Mr. Svensson said his bosses had a rare combination of too little preparation and too much tolerance for risk — plus the power to see bad ideas through.
“Ambition and stupidity,” Mr. Svensson said. “All the way into the wall.”
This past week, a U.N. spokesman, Stéphane Dujarric, said the institution had completed an internal investigation of the transactions in question, but he declined to say what the inquiry had found. He said that António Guterres, the U.N. secretary general, would “take appropriate action on the findings of the investigation report once it has been reviewed and analyzed.”
From left, Grete Faremo, the top official at the U.N. Office for Project Services; Vitaly Vanshelboim, the second-highest-ranking official at the agency; and Paolo Zampolli, a businessman and an ambassador for the Caribbean island of Dominica.
The top official at the Office for Project Services, Grete Faremo of Norway, remains in her post, with plans to retire in September. The second-highest-ranking official at the agency, Vitaly Vanshelboim of Ukraine, was placed on administrative leave because of the investigation.
In a statement, Ms. Faremo said: “I want to get to the bottom of what has happened, and rigorous investigative processes are underway. We know this much now: Failures have occurred.” Mr. Vanshelboim declined to comment.
A London law firm representing the British businessman, David Kendrick, and his daughter, Daisy Kendrick, released statements saying the pair had done nothing wrong. The law firm said Mr. Kendrick’s companies had been hampered by the pandemic and decisions by foreign governments.
“Our clients strongly believe in the projects they are running and in their ability to deliver these, and regret the fact that they appear to have become, through no fault of their own, the targets of a campaign seeking to harm their reputations,” wrote the law firm, Carter-Ruck.
The case has become the talk of the U.N. after a series of blog posts by Mukesh Kapila, a former U.N. official who is widely read by diplomats. The New York Times reconstructed the story of the lost millions using documents from U.N. auditors, business records and interviews with dozens of people in eight countries.
A Party in Manhattan
The party that began it all was held in 2015 in the antique-filled 5,000-square-foot Upper East Side apartment of Gloria Starr Kins — the 95-year-old editor and publisher of a diplomatic society magazine that covers U.N. parties and events.
Gloria Starr Kins in 2018. U.N. officials, a British businessman and his daughter were among those who attended a party at her Upper East Side apartment in 2015.
It was hosted by Ms. Faremo, a former justice minister and defense minister of Norway. She had taken over the Office for Project Services in 2014 — and later said she had made it faster and less risk-averse: “More than 1,200 pages of rules went into the trash.” Also in attendance was Mr. Vanshelboim, a U.N. veteran and financial whiz who describes himself on LinkedIn as a “SERIAL OVERACHIEVER.”
Their agency was one of the U.N.’s less glamorous: a kind of general contractor to the world. Other U.N. agencies hired it to build schools and roads, deliver medical equipment or perform other logistical tasks.
That job was huge and vital. But at the U.N., prestige came from standing at lecterns — giving grants and giving orders. Their office did neither.
But that was set to change.
“I wanted to move away from being the silent partner,” Ms. Faremo later wrote.
Her agency had stockpiled tens of millions of dollars in excess fees paid to it by other U.N. agencies, and now she and Mr. Vanshelboim wanted to lend out the money, like a bank, to fund profit-making projects in the developing world. Instead of a humdrum contracting hub, they would run a revolutionary in-house investment firm.
But they hadn’t found someone to lend to. That was the point of the party.
Then, through the door came Paolo Zampolli, a man who makes introductions.
One of the U.N.’s best-known characters, Mr. Zampolli is an Italian American businessman who also serves as an ambassador for the Caribbean island of Dominica. And he has long nurtured the dream of something bigger: having his own U.N.-approved conservation group called We Are the Oceans, or WATO.
“WATO is the NATO of the oceans,” Mr. Zampolli said. (He means that it would be an alliance of like-minded governments, not that it would be armed.)
When he was a modeling executive, Mr. Zampolli introduced Mr. Trump to the future first lady. At the time of the party, he was making introductions for Mr. Kendrick, the British businessman, who was selling a system for building fast, cheap, sturdy homes in the developing world. And if making the introductions worked?
“Could that bring me money? Yes, of course,” Mr. Zampolli said. “That’s called real estate.”
At that party, it worked. Mr. Kendrick and his daughter met Ms. Faremo and Mr. Vanshelboim there, according to Mr. Zampolli and an employee of Mr. Kendrick’s at the time who was present, Ramy Azoury. Ms. Faremo said she did not recall whom she met at the party, but a photo from the event shows her holding a business card for Mr. Kendrick’s company.
Ms. Faremo, right, speaking with Ramy Azoury, left, and Mr. Zampolli at the party in 2015.Credit...via Society & Diplomatic Review
From left, Daisy Kendrick, Mr. Azoury, Mr. Zampolli and David Kendrick at the party.Credit...via Society & Diplomatic Review
Later, using the acronym for the Office for Project Services, Mr. Zampolli said: “David came to me and said, ‘Paolo, these UNOPS people are very interested. They can invest.’”
In 2017, the U.N. agency gave a $3 million grant to a conservation group run by Ms. Kendrick, who was a recent college graduate.
But Mr. Zampolli said he was never paid a finder’s fee. In fact, Mr. Zampolli said he now regretted making the introduction at all. Ms. Kendrick, it turned out, had named her group We Are the Oceans.
His name.
“I was truly used,” Mr. Zampolli said.
Singing About the Ocean
The U.N. agency declined to say how — out of all the world’s environmental groups — it had chosen Ms. Kendrick’s group for such a large grant. She had set up her New York-based group as a nonprofit a year earlier but never obtained approval from the Internal Revenue Service for a tax exemption as a charity.
Ms. Kendrick signed incorporation papers that seemed to give an inaccurate picture of the group’s leadership. Mr. Azoury and Ms. Starr Kins — two other people who were at the 2015 party — were both listed as directors, but both said in recent interviews that they had no connection to the group, did not know their names had been used and had known Ms. Kendrick only in passing.
“They stole my name,” Ms. Starr Kins said. “She knows I am well-known and she used me.”
Ms. Kendrick’s group produced events, a website, ocean-themed games by the makers of Angry Birds and a pop song about the ocean that was recorded by the British singer Joss Stone. The U.N. agency said its internal investigations group had started a review of the partnership with Ms. Kendrick’s group.
Her father also seemed to play a major role behind the scenes, according to people who dealt with the group. When Ms. Stone signed a recording agreement, the agreement assigned control of the song — and the right to sell it — to a for-profit company that Mr. Kendrick was a director of, according to a copy of the contract provided by Ms. Stone. The company paid for the band that accompanied Ms. Stone.
Ms. Stone said she had agreed to record the song for free, believing it was a fund-raiser for the U.N.
The singer Joss Stone agreed to record a song for free because she believed it was a fund-raiser for the U.N.Credit...Manuel Fernando Araujo/EPA, via Shutterstock
Ms. Kendrick’s lawyers said in a statement that We Are the Oceans delivered on all of its promises to the U.N. and that “the rates paid to all WATO’s participants were at all times legitimate and fair.”
Mr. Svensson, the former employee at the Office for Project Services, said his bosses were focused on arranging a performance of the song by Ms. Faremo. He said she wanted to sing it in the U.N.’s cavernous hall during a 2017 conference about the oceans. They flew in a backing band from Britain, he said.
“Whatever it takes,” he remembered a supervisor saying.
Ms. Faremo sang. But, Mr. Svensson said, an earlier speaker ran so far over time that the hall was largely empty. Mr. Svensson said he planned to include a video of the performance in a documentary he is making about the U.N.
“I agreed to sing this due to my background as a singer,” Ms. Faremo said in her statement. Despite the delayed start, she said, “there was still a crowd in the hall.”
Loans Under Scrutiny
The next year, in 2018, the Office for Project Services announced it was making its first loans. Over the next two years, according to U.N. records, it lent $8.8 million to a company investing in a wind farm in Mexico and $15 million to another company for renewable energy projects. A further $35 million went to build housing in Antigua, Ghana, India, Kenya and Pakistan, projects overseen by a third company.
Business records show that all three companies appear to be connected to Mr. Kendrick. He owns two of them through a family office in the British territory of Gibraltar. The third, based in Spain, does not list an owner in its corporate records — but its directors are longtime associates of Mr. Kendrick, and its email address leads to a company that Mr. Kendrick appears to own half of. U.N. auditors and Mr. Kendrick’s lawyers both referred to the three companies as if they were a single entity.
Mr. Kendrick is a 58-year-old British native who has listed addresses in Spain, according to public records, and he is associated with more than a dozen interlocking companies in multiple countries, mostly in the world of construction. One video, from a project in Antigua in 2014, shows him saying: “I don’t build houses. I’m inspired to build communities.”
It is difficult to get a complete picture of his finances. But at least some of his businesses have struggled at times: U.N. auditors said one of Mr. Kendrick’s companies had lost $20.2 million in 2017 and $14.9 million in 2018.
The U.N. auditors said officials had chosen his companies because they believed his building technology “allowed for quickly built, high-quality and earthquake- and hurricane-resistant homes.” Ms. Faremo approved the loans herself, the auditors found.
Homes in the Kibera neighborhood of Nairobi, Kenya. In 2018, the Office for Project Services announced a partnership with a company owned by Mr. Kendrick to build 100,000 homes in Kenya and provided $5 million in loans to get it started.
Still, the auditors raised alarms that the Office for Project Services had concentrated all of its risk in one place. They wrote in July 2020 that they were “of the view that UNOPS did not follow a sound and transparent method in selecting a partner.”
Just a few months after that, the agency began trying to get its money back, without providing any public reason for doing so. In October 2020, according to U.N. reports, Mr. Kendrick’s companies agreed to return millions lent for the wind farm and the renewable energy projects. But they did not follow through on returning the money.
Months went by.
Finally, according to a U.N. audit report last year, one of Mr. Kendrick’s companies admitted it had used the U.N.’s loan to pay off other loans: “A large portion of the $15 million deposit had been used to discharge its pre-existing debts and liabilities,” the auditors’ report said. The U.N. auditors said last year that Mr. Kendrick’s companies had made some small payments, but the auditors expected the U.N. agency to lose $22 million.
The other loans, which were intended to fund affordable housing projects, are still officially pending. But the U.N. said that, so far, no houses had been completed.
“Not a single housing project has been built,” said P.K. Sarpong, a spokesman for the government of Ghana, where the U.N. loans were supposed to allow work to begin on 200,000 homes. Top officials in Ghana helped announce the deal, but after “the pomp and pageantry, they didn’t hear about the project again,” Mr. Sarpong said.
Mr. Kendrick’s lawyers said that his companies were in the process of restructuring their loans from the U.N. agency and that “no funds have been lost.”
The financial mess threatens to undermine the broader trust of the U.N.’s member countries in the institution at a time when the U.N. is seeking millions of dollars to deal with the war in Ukraine and surging food prices. Finland, for example, had pledged $20 million to support the Office for Project Services’ investments, which were run out of an office in Helsinki, the country’s capital. But Finland has since suspended its funding, according to diplomats and a statement from its foreign ministry.
“They are investing money that the United States and other countries have provided,” Christopher P. Lu, a senior official at the U.S. mission to the U.N., said of the agency. “So they need to be good stewards of our money.”
But the U.N. is a place where accountability often comes slowly and in secret. It was unclear when, if ever, the U.N. would release the results of the investigation that it said this past week had been completed.
If there are to be broader reforms at the Office for Project Services, they would come from its executive board — a group of diplomats from U.N. member states. In the wake of the losses, the board in February demanded an “independent comprehensive evaluation” of what had happened.
It is due in June. June 2024.
The New York Times · by Farnaz Fassihi · May 7, 2022


14. Al-Qaida chief blames US for Ukraine invasion in new video

The enemy of my enemy...

Al-Qaida chief blames US for Ukraine invasion in new video
AP · May 7, 2022
BAGHDAD (AP) — Al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahri made an appearance in a pre-recorded video to mark the 11th anniversary of the death of his predecessor Osama bin Laden.
Al-Zawahri says in the video that “U.S. weakness” was the reason that its ally Ukraine became “prey” for the Russian invasion.
The 27-minute speech was released Friday according to the SITE Intelligence group, which monitors militant activity. The leader appears sitting at a desk with books and a gun.
Urging Muslim unity, al-Zawahri said the U.S. was in a state of weakness and decline, citing the impact of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan launched after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Bin Laden was the mastermind and financier behind the attacks.
“Here (the U.S.) is after its defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan, after the economic disasters caused by the 9/11 invasions, after the Corona pandemic, and after it left its ally Ukraine as prey for the Russians,” he said.
Bin Laden was killed in a 2011 raid by U.S. forces on his compound hideout in Pakistan.
Al-Zawahri’s whereabouts are unknown. He is wanted by the FBI and there is a $25 million reward for information leading to his capture.
AP · May 7, 2022

15. Is America Ready for Chinese-Russian Liminal Warfare?

Excerpts:

Escalatory risk has had a profound effect in shaping their current strategies. While both China and Russia have been strengthening their nuclear arsenals—and delivery platforms—in recent years, they have also magnified their strategies with complimentary “Liminal Warfare.”

What follows draws heavily upon the brilliant work of Professor David Kilcullen, an Australian combat veteran with long experience in the Middle East and in government here with the State Department and with U.S. forces deployed in the Middle East.
...
To counter this aggressive “forward-basing platform” strategy, the United States and its allies must counter this with an “Allied Nuclear Partners” response that drives private investment in partnership with host nations—rather than the “State Enterprise Dominance” model practiced by Rosatom and CGN. Russia and China use nuclear power plant projects to directly subvert host nation sovereignty in their overt campaign of predatory mercantilism as an arm of Liminal Warfare. Going forward, “Energy Sovereignty will be the Westphalian Principle of the 21st Century” as averred by Admiral Mike Hewitt of IP3 and Professor David Gattie of the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia.

We can prevail in this widening conflict, in multiple dimensions. We must reach out to our allies from Canada to Europe, Japan, and Australia and together plan for how to understand the Sino- Russian imperial strategy and organize ourselves to again compete and reverse their aggression.

In September 2011, William Hague, the British foreign secretary, stated that “[T]he nation that is purely reactive in foreign policy is in decline.” This has surely been the case for Western nuclear powers. The Allied Nuclear Partners approach is the counter-thrust in great power rivalry, and one that provides alternatives to NATO members and Gulf Cooperation Council partners for preserving sovereignty in the face of the challenge by the China-Russia tandem.

Together, we can recover and become competitive again, but it isn’t going to happen overnight, and will require private investment, not just government spending.

Ask not what your country can do for you; rather, ask what you can do for your country. Or ask what will happen to your country if we fail to act.

Is America Ready for Chinese-Russian Liminal Warfare?
We must reach out to our allies and plan how to understand the Sino-Russian imperial strategy and organize ourselves to again compete and reverse their aggression.
The National Interest · by Robert McFarlane · May 7, 2022
Over the past five years, most Americans have become familiar with what leading journalists and academics have termed, the new era of “Great Power Competition”: a reference to the increasingly complex and worrisome armed stand-off between the United States (and its allies), and China and Russia—the two leading authoritarian powers. The alarming genocidal war launched in February 2022 by Russia against Ukraine has awakened us to the reality that our expectations at the end of the Cold War in 1991 were delusional and foolish. It is not apparent that the universal appeal of the democratic idea will not spontaneously enable a benign New World Order to take shape.
Today, we face in China a determined opponent intent on establishing a global empire beholden to it. President Xi Jinping is well along toward achieving that goal, capping it with his self-made, life-long Maoist “chairmanship.”
In Moscow, after two wars, Russia restored control over the Chechen Republic, later occupied Georgia (August 2008), then annexed the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine (March 2014). Vladimir Putin has made it clear that after subduing eastern and southern Ukraine, that he intends to move on to Transnistria and perhaps all of Moldova, before launching a campaign to restore control over one or more of the Baltic states.
Let us look at the similarities and differences between how these two regimes pursue their autocratic ambitions. Clearly, both China and Russia, as well as the United States, are nuclear weapons states. This reality has influenced the authoritarian powers thus far from avoiding escalatory actions to remain beneath the threshold of nuclear war.

Escalatory risk has had a profound effect in shaping their current strategies. While both China and Russia have been strengthening their nuclear arsenals—and delivery platforms—in recent years, they have also magnified their strategies with complimentary “Liminal Warfare.”
What follows draws heavily upon the brilliant work of Professor David Kilcullen, an Australian combat veteran with long experience in the Middle East and in government here with the State Department and with U.S. forces deployed in the Middle East.
According to Kilcullen, “liminal warfare involves the integration of political, economic, legal, military, intelligence and cyber into a single seamless mix of maneuver activity focused on the shaping of operations with the adversary before an operation is launched.”
For example, several months before launching the Georgian campaign in 2008, the Russians engaged in a program of generous passport distribution where they offered any Russian-speaking Georgian citizen a Russian passport. By the time the operation began they had a very large number of artificial “Russian citizens” inside Georgia and were able to lend a false patina of legitimacy to their aggression by invoking a bogus responsibility to protect Russian citizens.
Russia later combined political and economic warfare during its Crimea operation in the winter of 2014. Russia focused first on Germany—to assure that NATO did not react—by manipulating the price of Russian oil and gas, thus framing the issue for Germany as a Hobson’s choice of fuel or nothing (embargo). In short, you may stimulate a NATO response, but it might have an effect on the availability and cost of our oil and gas.
The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy underscored that, after two decades of squandering strategic attention and resources to fighting in the desert in Iraq and Afghanistan, great power competition with Russia and China is now the number one threat to U.S. security and economic well-being.
One of the most important “arenas” (not merely a “market”) where the great power rivalry is intensifying with both China and Russia—as a “Tandem,” coordinating on foreign policy—is the global arena for new nuclear power plants. DNI director Dan Coats highlighted in his testimony in Jan. 2019 that China and Russia are using energy and technology projects as an arm of foreign policy.
China is pursuing a more ambitious and deeper strategy in its pursuit of empire. It started by targeting emerging markets throughout Africa and Latin America but also the United States and Europe. Ironically, in its focus on developing countries it has taken a page on soft power from the American playbook and corrupted it. It involves making apparently benign offers to build various infrastructure projects such as ports, pipelines, and power plants and even to offer apparently generous loans (which usually involve predatory manipulation of the terms). Their goals in these settings are to gain control of critical commodities (i.e., cobalt in Congo, Lithium in Chile), strategic terrain such as maritime chokepoints (Djibouti at the south end of the Red Sea, and Suez in the north) to assure access to the two largest markets in the world (the United States and Western Europe), and ports sprinkled throughout these countries. China now owns ninety-six ports located in every maritime country in the world.
To those of you who are wondering how much time we have to prepare before China brings its campaign of liminal warfare to our country, consider the following. We have been running enormous trade deficits with China since its awakening in 1980, at an astounding $500 billion a year. China has literally trillions of dollars to use for buying up American companies. Just stop to consider the implications of China’s purchase of Smithfield Foods. Smithfield is the largest pork producer and processor in the world. It has facilities in twenty-six U.S. states, and it employs tens of thousands of Americans. It directly owns 460 farms and has contracts with about 2,100 others. China bought it for $4.7 billion, and that means that the Chinese will now be the most important employer in dozens of rural communities all over America.
Elsewhere, China is actually mining for coal in the mountains of Tennessee. Guizhou Gouchuang Energy Holdings Group spent $616 million to acquire Triple H Coal Co. in Jacksboro, Tennessee. Despite the Paris Agreement’s focus on reducing carbon emissions, China will be building new coal-fired power plants at home until at least 2030 (and likely beyond). So much for China’s environmental concerns.
China now controls the lithium reserves of Chile, about 40 percent of the world total—useful for vehicle batteries.
When you total up all imports and exports, China is now the number one trading nation on the planet and has more foreign currency reserves than any country in the world. And don’t forget that China produces more than 90 percent of the global supply of rare earth elements and is now the number one supplier of components that are critical to the operation of any national defense system.
My point in the foregoing litany of China’s gains and capabilities is to flag for everyone that China’s control over critical commodities and strategic terrain, their penetration of our country and more than seventy other countries, and their compromise of dozens of key U.S. industries are matters that threaten our security and supreme national security interests.
Add to this a twenty-year strategy of penetrating U.S. research universities and engineering programs. More than 300,000 Chinese nationals are now enrolled in major U.S. universities (few of them in “humanities” or “gender studies”). They (the Chinese Communist Party) pay full out-of-state tuition rates, which U.S. universities are now addicted to. The pandemic dented the numbers of Chinese students a bit, but they remain a higher number than from any other country. For further insult, China steals $400 billion annually in intellectual property according to the National Bureau of Asian Research.
Where does civilian (commercial) nuclear power (not nuclear weapons) fit in this schema? In the United States, some aspects of “civilian” nuclear power clearly fit within “economics” and trade, but in China, all commercial nuclear energy engineering and plants are owned and managed by the Chinese government (China General Nuclear, CGN). These same state-owned enterprises (or subsidiaries) in China also make the country’s nuclear weapons and fuel.
In addition, CGN bids internationally on nuclear power projects overseas, such as in Pakistan. In the case of the Karachi Plant, CGN provides an arm of China’s infiltration of the government of Pakistan to undergird Beijing’s $46 billion investment in the “Pakistan Economic Corridor,” which is part of the “Belt and Route Initiative.”
Russia is more active in using nuclear power plants to expand its sphere of influence by gaining military basing rights with those deals, “to manage fuel.”
Russia wields already-built reactors in its old Warsaw Pact (now NATO members): Czechia, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. Since 2000, it has expanded into India (at Kudankulam), Turkey (at Akkuyu), Belarus, and Bangladesh—and they have been bidding for new plants in Vietnam, Iran, Egypt, Bulgaria, and Africa. Importantly, unlike in the United States, nuclear power plant projects have been used as a strong arm of Chinese and Russian foreign policy. These are not decisions based solely on the “Lowest Cost of Electricity” framework (LCOE).
To counter this aggressive “forward-basing platform” strategy, the United States and its allies must counter this with an “Allied Nuclear Partners” response that drives private investment in partnership with host nations—rather than the “State Enterprise Dominance” model practiced by Rosatom and CGN. Russia and China use nuclear power plant projects to directly subvert host nation sovereignty in their overt campaign of predatory mercantilism as an arm of Liminal Warfare. Going forward, “Energy Sovereignty will be the Westphalian Principle of the 21st Century” as averred by Admiral Mike Hewitt of IP3 and Professor David Gattie of the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia.
We can prevail in this widening conflict, in multiple dimensions. We must reach out to our allies from Canada to Europe, Japan, and Australia and together plan for how to understand the Sino- Russian imperial strategy and organize ourselves to again compete and reverse their aggression.
In September 2011, William Hague, the British foreign secretary, stated that “[T]he nation that is purely reactive in foreign policy is in decline.” This has surely been the case for Western nuclear powers. The Allied Nuclear Partners approach is the counter-thrust in great power rivalry, and one that provides alternatives to NATO members and Gulf Cooperation Council partners for preserving sovereignty in the face of the challenge by the China-Russia tandem.
Together, we can recover and become competitive again, but it isn’t going to happen overnight, and will require private investment, not just government spending.
Ask not what your country can do for you; rather, ask what you can do for your country. Or ask what will happen to your country if we fail to act.

Robert McFarlane is chairman of international energy company IP3 and a former Assistant to President Ronald Reagan for National Security Affairs.
Andrew D. Paterson has been a leading strategic analyst at the market intelligence firm Environmental Business International since 1990, and a principal author of the “Business Case for New Nuclear Power Plants: Bringing Public and Private Resources together for Nuclear Energy,” in 2002 while serving on a task force at the U.S. Department of Energy. He is a Ph.D. Candidate in Energy Policy and Finance at George Mason University Schar School.
Image: Reuters.
The National Interest · by Robert McFarlane · May 7, 2022


16. NATO Should Admit Finland and Sweden ASAP


NATO Should Admit Finland and Sweden ASAP
It would enhance the alliance’s security and send a powerful message to Russia.


By John R. Deni
May 8, 2022 5:22 pm ET
Finland and Sweden will soon apply for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Once they do, the allies will first deliberate collectively and then begin a member-by-member ratification process. They should proceed quickly to close any window of opportunity Russia might exploit before these two applicants are covered by NATO’s Article 5 mutual-defense commitment and America’s nuclear umbrella.
Inviting both countries into the alliance will complicate NATO defense planning. Even though Finland and Sweden cooperate about as closely with NATO as any nonmembers could, extending Article 5 to them will require careful and detailed planning. This is especially so in the land domain when it comes to Finland, given its 830-mile border with Russia, and in the maritime domain when it comes to Sweden, considering the thousands of islands it has in the Baltic Sea, including strategically important Gotland.
Even after 73 years, the North Atlantic alliance remains vital for the U.S. for three reasons. First, it is the best means of ensuring the stability and security that underwrites the trans-Atlantic economic relationship. Trade in goods and services between the U.S. and the European Union is roughly double that between the U.S. and China.
Second, the alliance represents a community of shared values. Democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and national sovereignty are the bedrock of the alliance, reflected in NATO’s founding treaty and reiterated by allied leaders at every summit.

Third, America’s allies help to share the burdens of defending and promoting shared interests. During the surge in Afghanistan a decade ago, European allies provided a third of the troops on the ground. More recently, the imposition of sanctions on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine wouldn’t have nearly the same impact if Europeans—who bear the heaviest burden given their economic ties to Russia—weren’t on board.
Membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO reinforces each of these imperatives. Both are members of America’s largest trade and investment partner, the EU. Sweden has the ninth-largest economy in the 27-member EU, Finland the 15th. Both are home to advanced manufacturing and vibrant tech startup communities.
Finland and Sweden are among the world’s most robust democracies. The greatest threat to freedom in Europe today is Russia, which has invaded neighboring democracies like Ukraine and Georgia and made efforts to undermine democracy across the Continent. Given their proximity to this threat, Finland and Sweden clearly understand this.
Their perspectives are especially important as the alliance is revising its strategy and debating whether and how to privilege collective defense relative to its other two core tasks—cooperative security and crisis management. It’s also important given debates over where NATO should focus its efforts between the multi-faceted Russian threat on the one hand and the challenges posed by terrorists and nonstate actors on the other. Finnish and Swedish membership in the alliance should strengthen NATO’s determination to prioritize the Russian threat. This will likely be welcomed by Washington, given its focus on strategic competition with Russia (and China).
When it comes to burden-sharing, Finland and Sweden have already proved themselves up to the task. If they join the alliance, it will mark the first time since Spain’s 1986 accession that NATO will expand to countries that likely will be net contributors to security. Both countries decided to increase defense spending recently, despite the challenges created by the pandemic-induced recession.
Both Finland and Sweden have small but advanced professional military forces. Finland has a land-centric military force, including a national conscription system that can generate a force of 216,000 troops. Sweden’s force is somewhat smaller, but it recently reinstituted national conscription to strengthen its military capacity, and it plans on expanding Swedish force structure. Both countries contribute to the U.K.-led Joint Expeditionary Force, a multinational force capable of conducting a variety of missions. They also both participated in NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, and Sweden took part in NATO’s mission to protect civilians in Libya.
Given their capabilities and track record of participation in multinational military missions, Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO would likely lead to improved trans-Atlantic burden-sharing. This is especially important as the U.S. increases its efforts in the Indo-Pacific theater.
Allied membership for Finland and Sweden deserves careful consideration and deliberation. Nonetheless, it seems clear that from the perspective of the U.S. and its allies, Finnish and Swedish membership would strengthen NATO at a time when its values and interests are under threat.
Mr. Deni is a research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “Coalition of the Unwilling and Unable: European Realignment and the Future of American Geopolitics.”


17. Elon Musk Responds After Being Threatened By Russia


Elon Musk Responds After Being Threatened By Russia
Elon Musk claims he's been threatened by the head of Russia's space agency amid the invasion of Ukraine.
Russian president Vladimir Putin's 'special military' operation has stretched into its 75th day. The death toll is still on the rise; just this past weekend, 60 people sheltering in a school were killed in a bombing by Russian forces.
In the early days of the war, Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appealed to the Tesla and SpaceX chief for help. He responded with substantial support - but he thinks it's got him on the wrong side of the Russians.
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Credit: Alamy
Fedorov tweeted: "@elonmusk, while you try to colonise Mars - Russia try to occupy Ukraine! While your rockets successfully land from space - Russian rockets attack Ukrainian civil people!
"We ask you to provide Ukraine with Starlink stations and to address sane Russians to stand."
Starlink is Musk’s concept for ‘high speed broadband internet to locations where access has been unreliable, expensive, or completely unavailable’, transmitted back down to Earth via thousands of low-orbit signals from above.
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A few hours later, Musk replied: "Starlink service is now active in Ukraine. More terminals en route."
In April, Musk said the satellites had 'resisted hacking and jamming attempts' from Russian forces. Now, Dmitry Rogozin, head of the Russian space agency Roscosmos, has released a statement referencing Musk's assistance to 'Nazis'.
The word “Nazi” doesn’t mean what he seems to think it does pic.twitter.com/pk9SQhBOsG
— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) May 9, 2022
Rogozin, who recently claimed Russia could destroy all NATO countries in 'half an hour', wrote: "From the testimony of the captured chief of staff of the 36th Marine Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Colonel Dmitry Kormyankov, it follows that the ground-based subscriber equipment of the Starlink satellite company Elon Musk was delivered to the militants of the Nazi Azov Battalion and the Marines of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to Mariupol by military helicopters.
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"According to our information, the delivery of Starlink equipment was carried out by the Pentagon.
If I die under mysterious circumstances, it’s been nice knowin ya
— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) May 9, 2022
"Elon Musk is thus involved with supplying the fascist forces in Ukraine with military communications. And for this you will have to answer in an adult way, Elon, no matter how much you'll play the fool."
Musk shared this statement to Twitter, writing: "The word 'Nazi' doesn’t mean what he seems to think it does."
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He also wrote: "If I die under mysterious circumstances, it’s been nice knowin ya."
If you would like to donate to the Red Cross Emergency Appeal, which will help provide food, medicines and basic medical supplies, shelter and water to those in Ukraine, click here for more information


18. The Slippery Slope of Intelligence Sharing with Ukraine

Important analysis and perspective.

Excerpts:
Every public release of sensitive intelligence raises the possibility of lost access to previously fragile or unique collection sources (whether human, technical, etc.) and a change in behavior by Russia to further prevent such collection—thereby making it harder to understand Russian activity in the future.
In addition, the narrative that the West has ramped up and accelerated intelligence-sharing efforts with Ukraine could enable Russia to seek similar measures with other countries whose interests are likewise inimical to the United States. China and Iran could choose to collaborate more formally on intelligence-sharing and pool their combined resources.
Lastly, reports that Western-supplied intelligence has contributed to the killing of Russian generals may further push Putin to attempt to retaliate in-kind or escalate the conflict in ways that seek retribution for these senior leadership losses in Ukraine.
On balance, the rapid and broad nature of intelligence-sharing by the United States and the West to support and enable Ukraine’s fight against Russia is a worthwhile cause and appears to have helped Ukraine mount an effective resistance. But these efforts do not come without risk and taking steps to mitigate against the loss of intelligence collection or how the disclosures are impacting Putin’s decision-making calculus will be important considerations going forward.
The Slippery Slope of Intelligence Sharing with Ukraine

May 9th, 2022 by Javed Ali, |

Javed Ali held senior counterterrorism positions at DHS, the FBI, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Security Council. He is an Associate Professor of Practice at the University of Michigan’s Ford School of Public Policy.
OPINION — More than two months into the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, a number of key security developments have emerged, some of which have broken old traditions and created new opportunities.
One of those developments is the unorthodox use of intelligence by the United States and other Western partners that enabled the Ukrainian military to operate more effectively on the battlefield against Russian forces. This tactic included the sharing of information that assisted in more precise targeting in light of the advance of Russian forces.
Western-supplied intelligence also appears to have made positive contributions toward indications and warnings of Russian military operations, propaganda efforts, and possible cyber threats, in addition to the use of intelligence to shape public perceptions based on insights about President Putin’s mindset or other Russian leadership intentions.
While some of this intelligence activity appears to be backed by a deliberate and thorough process to declassify previously sensitive intelligence and use it for these purposes, there have been other instances in which intelligence has been leaked to the media without Western government approval.
Regardless of the nature of how Western-supplied intelligence has been used to support Ukrainian efforts and advance policy objectives against Russia, one could argue that the speed, volume, and pace of these intelligence disclosures is unprecedented in the annals of modern conflict. While traditionally, intelligence supports diplomatic efforts, law enforcement investigations, military operations, financial enforcement, and other instruments of national power, it is usually done quietly and without much public revelation absent unauthorized disclosures or the selective declassification of intelligence at discrete moments in time. What has been occurring over the past few months as a result, seems different and raises a number of issues going forward about the sustainability of this approach.
On the positive side, the heightened scope of intelligence sharing appears to be making a significant impact in the fight against Russia in Ukraine. While difficult to determine from the outside, Ukraine’s ability to contest the Russian military so far, may in part, be driven by Western-supplied intelligence. Actionable intelligence allows for a better understanding of the fluid and dynamic battlefield environment and has provided Ukraine with the opportunity to better direct its capabilities against Russian forces more precisely and effectively.
Western-supplied intelligence also has been effective at exposing Russian leadership intentions and demonstrating to multiple stakeholders that Moscow’s designs on Ukraine are ruthlessly brutal and that Putin’s ambitions are cruel and unyielding. And according to multiple media reports, the sharing of Western-supplied intelligence has facilitated warnings of possible Russian cyberattacks against a range of different targets in Ukraine.
Today’s constant barrage of information makes it easy for countries to wage disinformation campaigns and your emotions are the weapon of choice. Learn how disinformation works and how we can fight it in this short video. This is one link you can feel good about sharing.
While these are just some of the positive contributions that these intelligence-sharing measures appear to have made, there are also risks and consequences to consider.
Given the volume and speed of intelligence-sharing coupled with unauthorized disclosures, intelligence leaders and policymakers need to calibrate the sustainability of these efforts going forward.
Every public release of sensitive intelligence raises the possibility of lost access to previously fragile or unique collection sources (whether human, technical, etc.) and a change in behavior by Russia to further prevent such collection—thereby making it harder to understand Russian activity in the future.
In addition, the narrative that the West has ramped up and accelerated intelligence-sharing efforts with Ukraine could enable Russia to seek similar measures with other countries whose interests are likewise inimical to the United States. China and Iran could choose to collaborate more formally on intelligence-sharing and pool their combined resources.
Lastly, reports that Western-supplied intelligence has contributed to the killing of Russian generals may further push Putin to attempt to retaliate in-kind or escalate the conflict in ways that seek retribution for these senior leadership losses in Ukraine.
On balance, the rapid and broad nature of intelligence-sharing by the United States and the West to support and enable Ukraine’s fight against Russia is a worthwhile cause and appears to have helped Ukraine mount an effective resistance. But these efforts do not come without risk and taking steps to mitigate against the loss of intelligence collection or how the disclosures are impacting Putin’s decision-making calculus will be important considerations going forward.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.
Sharing informed opinions is important. Opinion pieces represent the diverse views of The Cipher Brief audience and do not represent views of The Cipher Brief.


19. Stay Calm and Consider 5 Steps on Solomon Islands

Excerpts:
Last, don’t blame our intelligence agencies, diplomats or politicians. The Solomon Islands Government, for both external and internal political reasons, has been building up to this action for some time. Just because you know a sovereign country might do something, doesn’t mean you can stop it.
The concerns over the Chinese security agreement with the Solomon Islands has occurred during an election campaign. It will be difficult enough to deal with the consequences of this Chinese move without the melodramas of politicians on the rampage. Let’s stay calm.

Stay Calm and Consider 5 Steps on Solomon Islands

May 9th, 2022 by Peter Leahy, |

Peter Leahy AC retired as a Lieutenant General after a 37-year career in the Australian Army after a 6 year appointment as the Chief of the Australian Army. He also served as the Deputy Chief of Army. After retiring, he was appointed as a Professor and Director of the National Security Institute at the University of Canberra.
OPINION — In a world of hybrid warfare, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and threats from and through space – geography is still important. Witness the concern when the Solomon Islands recently signed a security agreement with China.
It’s thought that this agreement will allow the presence of Chinese military and police personnel, permission for Chinese vessels to replenish supplies at ports in the Solomon’s and to the extreme worry of some – that it will pave the way for a Chinese military base on the island nation.
Geography, like history – can’t be forgotten or dismissed. The Japanese occupied the Solomon Islands in WWII. Their aim was to protect the flank of their offensive in New Guinea and establish a base for interdicting allied supply lines across the Pacific. Occupation of the broad archipelago to our North and East gave them the opportunity to invade Australia.
The Solomon Islands are less than 2,000km from Australia’s Northeast coast and sit squarely astride Australia’s Sea Lines of Communications to the United States. They also straddle important submarine cable networks.
We should be wary of a Chinese base of operations able to project military power this close to Australia. This agreement also gives China an increased capability to develop their diplomatic and economic power throughout Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia.
In geostrategic terms, the Solomon Islands form part of a ‘second island chain’ stretching from Japan through Guam and Palau to its southern extremity in Micronesia.
This could act as a defence line against a Chinese breakout from the South China Sea into the Pacific.
The United States immediately reacted to the news of the agreement. In a high-level visit to the Solomons, the US warned that if China were allowed to establish a military base, then the US would respond. They also announced an expansion of their diplomatic and aid efforts in the country and more broadly across the Region.
Australia, in an immediate escalation of the rhetoric, warned that a base would be a red line and that unspecified action would be taken. This stance has been unhelpful.
How should Australia react?
First, make our own use of geography. An allied naval base in PNG would complicate resupply and support to any Chinese military base in the Solomon Islands. Australia has a current agreement with PNG to support the development of the Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island.
Current plans for Lombrum are for a modest redevelopment. Discussions should be commenced, with PNG, on a more substantial redevelopment to allow for an enhanced Australian and potentially a United States presence.
Read also Australia Must End its Pacific Stupor Before it’s Too Late by Nick Warner, former Director-General of Australia’s Office of National Intelligence
Second, remain calm and maintain our present support and aid commitments to the Solomon Islands. China has introduced competition into the aid ecosystem in the region and it is likely that other island Nations will seek their support. It is clear from experience in other parts of the world, that Chinese aid is not free money. It can often have a restraining and damaging impact on the recipient country.
We should make it known that Australia is here for the long run and is a dependable and reliable part of the neighbourhood. Under these conditions it might be anticipated that after experiencing the true nature of Chinese support the Solomons might revert to the present arrangements.
Today’s constant barrage of information makes it easy for countries to wage disinformation campaigns and your emotions are the weapon of choice. Learn how disinformation works and how we can fight it in this short video. This is one link you can feel good about sharing.
Third, focus on the Pacific Islands Forum and reenergise and properly fund the Pacific Step-up. The Pacific Island Forum is an important forum for development and cooperation. A continued focus on support, openness and transparency is required. This should focus on Australia’s attitude towards climate change and the sovereign rights of all Forum nations, including decisions on aid partners and basing rights. Another step should include regular intelligence briefings to explain Chinese intent and actions.
Fourth, review our current capabilities, force posture and basing options. Australia’s defence focus has historically been to the North. The potential for an air and maritime threat from the Northeast requires a review of our defence capabilities and disposition.
Fifth, establish operational confidence building measures in anticipation that both Australian and Chinese security and defence forces may be operating in close proximity. In the event of civil unrest in Honiara it is likely that Chinese police will have a specific mandate for protecting Chinese citizens. This will be a complicated environment and procedures must be developed and followed to ensure no clashes or unintended consequences occur.
Last, don’t blame our intelligence agencies, diplomats or politicians. The Solomon Islands Government, for both external and internal political reasons, has been building up to this action for some time. Just because you know a sovereign country might do something, doesn’t mean you can stop it.
The concerns over the Chinese security agreement with the Solomon Islands has occurred during an election campaign. It will be difficult enough to deal with the consequences of this Chinese move without the melodramas of politicians on the rampage. Let’s stay calm.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.


20. Don’t Call It a Gray Zone: China’s Use-of-Force Spectrum

Conclusion:

Finally, as a specific step to strengthen cultural empathy, the China-watching community should conduct more tracing of how, not just what, the People’s Liberation Army learns from Western concepts and doctrine when possible. Such an academic effort would help to bring Chinese military writings into perspective so that poorly defined concepts such as “gray zone strategy” will have little room to proliferate and exacerbate misconstrued Western views about how China evaluates and implements its military strategy.

Don’t Call It a Gray Zone: China’s Use-of-Force Spectrum - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Roderick Lee · May 9, 2022
Editor’s Note: One of the authors of this article is protected with a pseudonym. Regular readers of War on the Rocks know that we allow this in only the rarest of cases. Please see our submissions guidelines to read more about how we make these judgments.
On Oct. 30, 2020, Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, placed a phone call to assure his Chinese counterpart that the United States did not intend to start a war with China. Both U.S. and Chinese government circles have come to refer to this phone call and the events surrounding it as the “October surprise.” This event shows us, among other things, what happens when there are misperceptions about the use of force on both sides and the potential dangers of said misperceptions. By better understanding China’s philosophy about the use of military force, U.S. policymakers may be able to lower the chances of future surprises happening.
Xi Jinping believes in and likely mandates that the Chinese military use force in accordance with a concept he calls “peacetime employment of military force (和平时期军事力量运用).” In short, this concept guides the People’s Liberation Army to use force to prevent adversaries from reaching China’s “bottom line” in a national-security sense. The Western defense community has explored parts of this concept through studies on what the West calls China’s “gray zone operations,” though China does not have a “gray zone” military strategy. Western analysts have also explored what happens when this use-of-force concept fails, and China is forced to reconstitute its “bottom line,” through discourse on how to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. However, neither of these fields of study address the People’s Liberation Army’s “peacetime employment of military force” concept as a whole. Consequently, U.S. planners and policymakers are not only working on an incomplete theory on how China uses force, but are also failing to address a swath of potential military options that China might undertake.
Use War to Stop a Larger War
In 2016, official People’s Liberation Army media described “peacetime employment of force,” along with “holistic management and planning of war operations,” as Xi’s new national security concepts. This critical piece of Xi’s military thought is an “expansion and deepening” of China’s long-held active defense strategy. While noting that the concept is a necessity to sustain China’s growing comprehensive national power, the People’s Liberation Army describes its purpose as to “manage and control crises” and “prevent war” in the face of “intensifying tensions in [China’s] neighborhood.” Similar to the U.S. conflict continuum, it explicitly stated that “low intensity use of force in peacetime” is between “peacetime no use of force” and “wartime wholesale use of force.” “Peacetime use of military force” is a manifestation of “bottom-line thinking (底线思维),” which the People’s Liberation Army defines as using military power to warn “relevant parties not to cross [China’s] redlines.”
Xi’s belief in “using force to prevent war” featured prominently in his speech to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Korean War in October 2020. When compared with a similar public speech delivered a decade ago to commemorate the war’s 60th anniversary, Xi appears more confident and assertive, touting the accomplishment of his signature military reform before declaring that “Chinese people understand it fully that [China] must use the languages that invaders understand to communicate with them. It is to use war to stop war, to use force to prevent conflict/war (以武止戈), and to use [war] victory to win peace and earn respect.”
Nevertheless, we should understand the context in which Xi’s 2020 speech was crafted. We now know that Xi and his military leaders were under enormous psychological stress because they were (mistakenly) convinced that China was facing an imminent attack from the United States under the Trump administration. Although there is no public narrative about what instigated China’s concern about a potential war, the combination of President Donald Trump’s unusually China-focused speech on Sept. 22, the occurrence of America’s large-scale “Valiant Shield” Indo-Pacific military exercise in mid-September, and potentially the announcement of U.S. Ambassador to China Terry Brandstad’s early departure on Sept. 14 may have conveyed a bleak picture to China. On Oct. 30, merely a week after Xi’s speech publicly aired, the phone call between Milley and his counterpart took place. Xi’s high-profile speech was possibly delivered to communicate his intent to de-escalate, rather than escalate, an imminent breakout of war.
“Peacetime employment of force” is conditioned by China’s (mis)perception of its own security environment, which is largely shaped by America’s military presence, actions, and rhetoric. Xi’s “assertiveness” should be understood in the context of his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Even the origin of his “new security concept” can be traced back to an American doctrinal concept.
After years of study and assessment on the rise and fall of U.S. doctrine on military operations other than war, such as FM100-5, 1993JP 3-07, 1995, and JP3-0, 2006, Hu endorsed the Chinese version of this doctrine, called “non-war military activities,” at an enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission in 2008, and the concept was addressed in that year’s defense white paper. In 2009, the late Gen. Xu Caihou, then vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, touted China’s commitment to this concept at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.
Almost parallel to the debate within the U.S. defense community that led to the eventual removal of military operations other than war from the U.S. Joint Publications in 2006, Chinese military thinkers did not unanimously agree with the definition and utility of the concept. There was a consensus regarding the adoption of “non-war military activities” to improve China’s capability to respond to nontraditional security challenges in the 2010s, but there were subtle concerns that placing too much emphasis on the “non-war” aspect of military operations risks “demilitarizing the military.” In 2009, researchers from the World Military Research Department of the Academy of Military Science, the People’s Liberation Army’s top braintrust, highlighted the need for the army to engage in “non war military activities” not just to cope with domestic stability issues, but also to shape an external strategic condition to be conducive to China’s strategic objectives. In his 2009 bookXiao Tianliang, a deputy commandant of the People’s Liberation Army’s National Defense University, noted that military operations other than war is a useful concept for improving operational and tactical skills, yet suggested that China should think more strategically about how to “employ” military force for “non-war purposes” in peacetime. Xiao reportedly lectured the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party in 2014, and was promoted to lieutenant general in 2016. Gen. Liu Yuejun (then a lieutenant general commanding the Lanzhou Military Region), in his long 2013 article in China Military Science, similarly argued that “confrontational military activities” are critical when considering “peacetime use of force,” and that the People’s Liberation Army must “use force resolutely and use it preemptively” to defend the core interests of sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Building Out China’s Use-of-Force Spectrum
Liu’s article, among other Chinese publications, implicitly talks about the “peacetime employment of military force” occurring along a spectrum, but the People’s Liberation Army does not advertise an equivalent to America’s conflict continuum as featured in JP 3-0. However, a rough equivalent built from Chinese military literature reveals that it looks nearly the same in terms of both intensity and logic.
Liu states that under the guise of “peacetime confrontational military operations,” activities can escalate into a state of military friction, military confrontation, armed conflict, and then local war. These forms of peacetime confrontational military operations are limited in scale and scope compared to “large scale wars.” This forms the basis of reconstructing China’s use-of-force spectrum, although it lacks the specificity or context needed to be useful. But by looking at how other People’s Liberation Army sources describe specific events, one can piece together what these different military confrontational activities involve in terms of scale and intensity.

Figure 1: China’s Use-of-Force Spectrum. (Image by the authors)
One of the inherent problems with using Chinese military theory texts alone is that most of these texts are academic in nature. No known China Military Science or China Academy of Military Science publication defines what makes an event a “military confrontation” as opposed to an “armed conflict.” Examples of “military confrontations” found in texts indicate that this is when two states consistently posture military forces against each other to include the potential for an extremely limited use of violence. Historical examples provided by newspapers and journals characterize the contemporary situation between China and Taiwan, India, and Japan as states of “military confrontation.”
People’s Liberation Army texts also allude to the fact that “military confrontations” may include brief spats of violence. Issue 152 of China Military Science cites the sporadic military clashes between Japan and China in the late 19th century, such as Japan’s invasion of Taiwan in 1874, as military confrontations.
At a certain point, seemingly based on intensity and scale, a situation may evolve into an “armed conflict.” The People’s Liberation Army’s Military Dictionary defines “armed conflict” as a small-scale and low-intensity engagement between two forces that is a transitionary state into “wartime.” Issue 151 of China Military Science describes the 1962 Sino-Indian War as an “armed conflict” and the Dec. 30, 2020 issue of China’s Air Force News cites the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War as an “armed conflict.” Both conflicts lasted roughly a month and involved thousands of combat deaths.
Xi’s Use of the Spectrum Thus Far
Although the People’s Liberation Army has historically been involved in activities falling into the “armed conflict” portion of the spectrum, as of mid-2022 its activities under Xi have not yet spilled into this realm. By mapping Chinese military actions since Xi’s rise to power in late 2012, we can at least see what portions of the spectrum Xi has used thus far.
Baseline Military Deployments: Fujian Rotational Deployments
The People’s Liberation Army’s rotational deployments in Fujian represent a baseline presence to remind adversaries that military force is always an option in achieving political objectives. Starting in 1959 after the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force began rotating units through Fujian to combat perceived Nationalist Chinese airspace incursions around the Taiwan Strait. The military designated such rotations as “Fujian-Based Rotational Combat (驻闽轮战)” and early rotations saw confrontations with Nationalist aircraft. Over half a century later, the air force continues to maintain pressure on Taiwan by rotating units into Fujian under the same “Rotational Combat” nomenclature, although units no longer attempt to shoot down Taiwan’s military aircraft like their predecessors did.
Non-Standard Military Training: 5.20 Deterrence Activity
In May 2016, the People’s Liberation Army conducted a series of non-standard amphibious training events in Fujian province. Internally, the army refers to this series of events as the “Fujian 5.20 Deterrence Activity,” suggesting that it intended the training to deter Taiwan from doing anything escalatory around the first inauguration of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen on May 20, 2016. The “5.20 Deterrence Activity” represents an escalation from “baseline military rotations” in that it was a deliberate message relayed in response to a potentially troublesome event.
Nationwide Readiness and Disposition Adjustment: 922 Special Mission in Late 2020
The next step in the spectrum is nationwide military activities that aim to explicitly stop adversaries from engaging in escalatory activities. An example of this is the elevated readiness levels that occurred under the “922 Special Mission” in late 2020. Although the “922 Special Mission” appears to have started as early as 2019, People’s Liberation Army units across China engaged in non-standard deployments, heightened combat readiness, or border defense missions from September 2020 into 2021. Furthermore, militia units maintained elevated readiness levels through mid-2021 under this mission. Viewed in light of the later October call between Milley and his counterpart, it seems likely that the People’s Liberation Army intended this elevated readiness to signal to the United States that China believed that the United States was considering the use of force against it.
Non-Lethal Military Confrontation: Hai Yang Shi You 981 Standoff
China’s deployment of the Hai Yang Shi You 981 oil rig to disputed waters in the South China Sea in the summer of 2014 likely represents a low-end military confrontation. Internally, Chinese officials refer to this event as the “Zhongjiannan Security Operation.” Although this activity did not involve the demonstrative use of high-end weapon systems or the use of lethal force, Chinese and Vietnamese forces came to blows through numerous ramming incidents.
Lethal Military Confrontation: June 2020 India-China Standoff
China’s border standoff with India in the summer of 2020 represents the high-water mark of Xi’s use-of-force spectrum as of mid-2022. The People’s Liberation Army has carried out what it calls the “506 Special Mission,” involving rotational deployments of forces to the Sino-Indian Border, since the 2013 Depsang standoff. In fact, the nomenclature of “506 Special Mission” is likely a reference to May 6, the day after China and India resolved the 2013 standoff. However, the 506 Mission escalated in June 2020 when Chinese and Indian soldiers clashed in a contested part of the Himalayas, with lethal results. Based on the limited number of deaths and lack of sustained combat operations, we judge this to be a higher-intensity military confrontation than the Hai Yang Shi You 981 Standoff.
People’s Liberation Army activities under Xi remain beneath their threshold of “armed conflict,” although the military is not clear on where exactly that threshold lies. However, China’s skirmish with the Soviet Union in 1969 might be close to that line. A 2013 article in the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force’s newspaper discussing “strategic deterrence” identifies the skirmish as a “real combat deterrence activities” rather than a full-on armed conflict.

Figure 2: Xi’s use of force thus far compared to historical People’s Liberation Army events. (Image by the authors)
How to Close the Gap
Finding solutions to future land reclamations or island invasions is comparatively easy. Since 2014, the United States national security community has developed a body of research exploring China’s coercive military approach short of war and how the United States can combat that approach. For example, a 2017 Center for Strategic and International Studies report explores ways of countering maritime coercion in Asia to include Chinese military harassment in the maritime domain. There is an even larger library of work advising how to defeat a full-on invasion of Taiwan. Notably, recent experiences from the war in Ukraine provide lessons for how Taiwan might defend itself and how the United States can help. However, there is less discussion about the gap between those two points on the spectrum, despite China’s explicit willingness to “use war to stop war” in that space. We have three recommendations to address the gap.

Figure 3: What Western military analysis is missing. (Image by the authors)
The first recommendation is to consider the full range of potential activities that fall between those two points on the spectrum, and how the United States should respond from a counter-coercion policy perspective, and what the U.S. military’s role is in said response. What if China conducts punitive strikes against Taiwan with the intent to deter further murmurs of independence rather than force Taiwan to capitulate, or rapidly seizes a Filipino outpost in the South China Sea to demonstrate that the United States cannot come to the aid of its allies in time? These potential “peacetime military confrontations” pose unexplored policy and military planning challenges that the United States should resolve.
Second, and more importantly, the U.S. national security community should shift some of its attention towards developing strategic cultural empathy. Often, the United States unknowingly wanders into escalatory situations and subsequently wonders why China responded in the way that they did. The United States can fix this problem by better educating the national security community about issues to which China is sensitive, how China receives strategic messaging, and what China fundamentally values. By internalizing this understanding and acting with deliberate intent, the United States can avoid inadvertent escalation in the future or more effectively deter China.
Finally, as a specific step to strengthen cultural empathy, the China-watching community should conduct more tracing of how, not just what, the People’s Liberation Army learns from Western concepts and doctrine when possible. Such an academic effort would help to bring Chinese military writings into perspective so that poorly defined concepts such as “gray zone strategy” will have little room to proliferate and exacerbate misconstrued Western views about how China evaluates and implements its military strategy.
Roderick Lee is the research director and Marcus Clay an analyst with the U.S. Air Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
warontherocks.com · by Roderick Lee · May 9, 2022


21. Can Ukraine’s Military Keep Winning?

Conclusion:
Attempting to predict the trajectory of this war has proved an exercise in futility. And while hindsight is always 20/20, the odds of a quick, decisive victory for Russia were never good. Not for an offensive campaign that presumed to take a city the size of Kyiv without a hard fight. Certainly not once the offensive splintered across multiple urban fronts. The history of urban warfare, after all, is marked by bitter battles of attrition. The war in the Donbas is shaping up to be a largely conventional fight, fought in open terrain between two sides that are relatively well matched in numbers and equipment. Although this new operational environment in the east is forcing both Russia and Ukraine to adjust their strategies, the power parity, in this case, does not favor a quick victory.
Nor is a rapid, decisive result likely once politics are taken into account. The Ukrainians are empowered by their successful repelling of Russia’s offensive on Kyiv and outraged by the evidence of heinous war crimes against ordinary civilians. They have little incentive to accept a cease-fire that eats at their territory. At the same time, Putin is unlikely to settle for a stalemated fight with limited control beyond the already disputed parts of eastern Ukraine as the outcome of a war that promised so much more and has already cost the Russian military so dearly. Recent expert assessments suggest that Russia may be preparing diplomatically, militarily, and economically for a protracted conflict. The fight in the Donbas is therefore likely to be brutal, but it will not be swift, and it may not be decisive.
Can Ukraine’s Military Keep Winning?
As the Kremlin’s Strategy Shifts, So Must Kyiv’s
May 9, 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Margarita Konaev and Polina Beliakova · May 9, 2022
In 2014, when Russian forces entered the Crimean Peninsula, they faced remarkably little resistance. The Ukrainian military was weak, poorly trained, and corrupt. That was the Ukrainian military Russian President Vladimir Putin expected to encounter when he invaded the country again in February 2022. Assuming that the Ukrainian military would not put up much of a fight, Russia opted for a multipronged attack advancing from numerous locations in Russia, Belarus, and previously occupied Ukrainian territory. By the time it became clear that the multipronged invasion would not achieve the swift surrender that the Kremlin had expected, Russia’s forces were dispersed across a vast country and, in many cases, running critically short of supplies.
As Putin discovered, Ukraine’s military has undergone a radical transformation over the past eight years, thanks to intensive reorganization and reform efforts and billions of dollars in Western security assistance. In January 2022, the Congressional Research Service reported that the Ukrainian army had grown from about 6,000 combat-ready troops in 2014 to nearly 150,000 troops, a number that has been climbing higher since the Russian invasion, as Ukrainians from all walks of life have volunteered for military service.
The Ukrainian military has also vastly upgraded its equipment, thanks to a massive influx of Western military aid. Since 2014, the United States has provided more than $6.1 billion in security assistance to Kyiv, including more than $3.4 billion since the war began on February 24. In the weeks since the Russian invasion, the list of military equipment that Ukraine has received from the United States alone includes nearly 6,000 Javelin anti-armor systems, 1,400 Stinger missiles, 16 Mi-17 helicopters, and 90 155mm howitzer artillery systems, along with some 184,000 rounds of artillery.
In addition to hardware, Ukrainian troops have benefited from years of NATO and U.S. training. As a result of these cooperation efforts, the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces—which was first established in December 2015—now boasts seven special operations regiments, trained by the U.S. Special Operations Command Europe and capable of disrupting Russian operations, allegedly even in enemy territory. The Ukrainian military has also adopted a more sophisticated command-and-control system and created a professional noncommissioned officer corps modeled on that of the United States. Finally, although the full extent of this cooperation is unknown, the Ukrainians are receiving extensive, action-ready intelligence from the United States and NATO allies to support their defense against the Russians.
The Ukrainians have another advantage: because they are fighting an existential battle for the continued independence of their country, they are highly motivated and unified. Morale is a force multiplier. Beyond their willingness to fight, the Ukrainians are also demonstrating an impressive ability to deploy a particular style of warfare: asymmetric, insurgency-style tactics that even advanced conventional military forces of great powers have historically struggled to counter. This successful strategy blunted Russia’s attacks on Kyiv and other major cities.

As the war in Ukraine continues into its third month, one thing that became clear on its third day still holds true: that the Kremlin has severely overestimated the Russian military’s capabilities and deeply underestimated the skill and resolve of the Ukrainians. But the war’s focus has now shifted to eastern Ukraine—and the open terrain of that part of the country calls for a different approach. If the Ukrainian military is to win in the Donbas, it must fight a more conventional war in a less favorable operational environment. What got the Ukrainians here may not help them there.
UNCONVENTIONAL TACTICS
Despite expectations to the contrary, the Ukrainian military has not collapsed, and the war against Russia has not devolved into an insurgency. This fate was avoided in no small part because Ukraine’s armed forces have adopted unconventional tactics. While conventional militaries generally have the advantage in numbers and firepower, insurgency tactics allow a smaller force to compensate with flexibility, mobility, and local knowledge.
Deciding not to engage the enemy in open terrain, where Russia’s advantage in numbers and heavy weapons could prove overwhelming, the Ukrainian forces fell back to the cities, where even the best-equipped invaders face poor odds. As Russian troops tried to push toward Kyiv and other major cities, Ukrainians took advantage of the Russians’ largely undefended supply lines and their inexplicable habit of moving tanks and other military vehicles onto open roads without using dismounted infantry troops to detect potential ambushes. Operating in smaller, more mobile units, Ukrainian infantry ambushed Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers. Armed with portable antitank weapons supplied by the United Kingdom and the United States, they destroyed and captured Russian equipment and halted Russia’s advance. As a bonus, inflicting such damage on Russia’s forces through ambushes and hit-and-run tactics had the psychological effect of humiliating the supposedly superior Russian military.
Facing an existential fight for their independence, Ukrainians are highly motivated. Morale is a force multiplier.
Even territorial defense battalions, which are largely made up of volunteers with little prior combat experience, have used guerilla-style tactics effectively. Consider an episode reported by Ukraine’s territorial defense forces in early March: an untrained 20-year-old recruit with a handheld grenade launcher stopped the lead tank in a Russian column on the outskirts of Kyiv before calling in the regular Ukrainian armed forces to destroy the rest of the column. These territorial defense battalions have served as the first line of defense in some areas, taking quick action before conventional troops could mobilize. According to interviews with local authorities reported in the Ukrainian media, when Russian troops first entered the city of Sumy, in northeast Ukraine, in late February, they were repelled by territorial defense units and bands of civilians using grenades, small arms, and Molotov cocktails. These actions bought time for the Ukrainian military to deploy heavier artillery, drones, and additional forces to defend the city, even as the surrounding area fell under Russian occupation.
Ukrainian defenders’ ability to communicate effectively with one another and with local populations has been crucial to their success. Ukrainian civilians and territorial defense units have used laptops, smartphones, and even a Telegram chatbot to keep one another and the military informed about Russian movements. In late February, residents’ tips allowed Ukraine’s armed forces to destroy over 200 units of Russian military equipment in the Poltava region. Civilian volunteers have also provided Ukrainian forces with food, clothes, armored vests, medical equipment, and night-vision devices.
In Mariupol, Ukrainian forces failed to repel the Russian invasion but nonetheless employed urban defense tactics to deny the Russians a much-desired victory. For over two months, the Russians have used heavy artillery and rocket fire, air attacks, and constant bombardment of civilian structures and infrastructure to take this strategically important port city. Even so, the stiff Ukrainian resistance forced the Russians to sacrifice many troops. According to a British intelligence update, the urban battle has exhausted the Russian forces and decreased their combat effectiveness. Despite the renewed Russian attempts to take over the last stronghold of the Ukrainian resistance in the city’s Azovstal Steel Plant, the images of Ukrainian defenders holding their own against Russian attacks on Mariupol continue to play a vital role in the information war, exposing the brutality and destruction caused by Russia and rallying Western support for Ukraine.
THE WAR SHIFTS EAST
After announcing its decision to shift offensive combat operations to the Donbas region last month, Russia has withdrawn its forces from around Kyiv and Chernihiv, a city 100 miles north of the capital. The brunt of the fighting now seems concentrated in Ukraine’s east. This theater of operations offers very different conditions from those faced earlier in the campaign and will require both Russians and Ukrainians to adjust their strategies.

To win in the Donbas, the Russians must quickly pivot away from the failed strategy of trying to seize Kyiv that got them bogged down in urban centers spanning the north, east, and south of Ukraine. Instead, they must implement a plan that takes advantage of the more favorable terrain in the east. The open spaces and sprawling plains of the Donbas region present the kind of operational environment that large, conventional militaries such as Russia’s prefer. This terrain could allow Russia to amass forces, maneuver large artillery pieces such as mortars and howitzers, and advance armored assaults to surround and cut off Ukrainian troops in the east. The Russians could also employ their air force more extensively. The proximity to Russian and Russian-held territory, meanwhile, could help moderate logistical challenges on the ground.

But Russian forces may be too depleted and demoralized to fully capitalize on the operational advantages of the war’s new geography. Russia’s tank and motorized rifle units and its elite Spetsnaz and airborne forces, which would be the collective backbone of the fight in Donbas, have already suffered catastrophic losses and are particularly hard to replace. Although Russia has appointed an overall commander for the operation to help with coordination, and even sent the chief of the general staff of the Russian military, General Valery Gerasimov, to visit the frontlines, the more fundamental logistical, communications, and command-and-control problems are not easily solved. Moreover, pressure to demonstrate objectives met in time for May 9, when Russia celebrates victory over Nazi Germany, could force mistakes.

The Ukrainians face almost the opposite challenge. To win in Donbas, they will likely have to shift to a more conventional fight on open ground, where they may be more vulnerable. The terrain in the east does not offer the cover allowed by forests and urban areas, making it more difficult for Ukrainian forces to conduct the insurgency-style attacks that worked so well in the first stage of the war. In this conventional style of warfare, the Ukrainians need more tanks, artillery, and rockets to conduct a large-scale counteroffensive. But getting the weapons and equipment arriving from the Western countries to the frontlines could take more time and require covering more ground than it did before, potentially leaving the supply lines vulnerable to Russian attacks.
Numbers also matter for the Ukrainian side. A small, well-equipped, highly motivated force could defend a city against a much larger offensive force and even win. In open terrain, especially if the Ukrainians want to move from a defensive posture, regain lost territory, and expel Russian soldiers from the Donbas region, they will need serious reinforcements. There is limited information about how many Ukrainians have died in battle so far. Given the intensity of the fight and the scale of Russian losses, they are likely to be far higher than official Ukrainian estimates.
The Ukrainians have proved to be more flexible than the Russians. The diffuse command structure and the autonomy that allowed for each operational command to coordinate operations best suited to local conditions should continue to work to Ukraine’s advantage—and the forces deployed in the Donbas are some of the country’s best and most experienced, having spent the last eight years fighting the Russians and Russian-backed separatists. Although likely more dangerous in open terrain, ambushes and hit-and-run attacks against Russian supply lines can still cause damage. Morale remains high, and Western countries seem committed to supplying military aid and intelligence support. While nothing is guaranteed, the Ukrainians do have some of the main pieces in place to keep their momentum going and to adapt to the new battleground in the Donbas.
AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Attempting to predict the trajectory of this war has proved an exercise in futility. And while hindsight is always 20/20, the odds of a quick, decisive victory for Russia were never good. Not for an offensive campaign that presumed to take a city the size of Kyiv without a hard fight. Certainly not once the offensive splintered across multiple urban fronts. The history of urban warfare, after all, is marked by bitter battles of attrition. The war in the Donbas is shaping up to be a largely conventional fight, fought in open terrain between two sides that are relatively well matched in numbers and equipment. Although this new operational environment in the east is forcing both Russia and Ukraine to adjust their strategies, the power parity, in this case, does not favor a quick victory.
Nor is a rapid, decisive result likely once politics are taken into account. The Ukrainians are empowered by their successful repelling of Russia’s offensive on Kyiv and outraged by the evidence of heinous war crimes against ordinary civilians. They have little incentive to accept a cease-fire that eats at their territory. At the same time, Putin is unlikely to settle for a stalemated fight with limited control beyond the already disputed parts of eastern Ukraine as the outcome of a war that promised so much more and has already cost the Russian military so dearly. Recent expert assessments suggest that Russia may be preparing diplomatically, militarily, and economically for a protracted conflict. The fight in the Donbas is therefore likely to be brutal, but it will not be swift, and it may not be decisive.

Foreign Affairs · by Margarita Konaev and Polina Beliakova · May 9, 2022

22.  A Force for the Future - A High-Reward, Low-Risk Approach to AI Military Innovation

Excerpts:
As part of its overhaul, the Defense Department will also need to change its culture so that it is not, as Michèle Flournoy, former undersecretary of defense for policy, described it 
in these pages last year, too “risk averse.” Currently, department officials often slow-walk or avoid risky initiatives to avoid the reputational damage that accompanies failure, burying promising projects in the process. This is completely backward: trial and error is integral to innovation. Senior leaders in the Pentagon should reward program managers and researchers for the overall number of experiments and operational concepts they test rather than the percentage that are successful.
Even unsuccessful investments can prove strategically useful. The Chinese military pays close attention to U.S. military capabilities and planning, allowing the United States to potentially disrupt Beijing’s own planning by selectively revealing prototypes, including ones that did not pan out. China might respond by chasing sometimes flawed U.S. systems, while being uncertain about what the United States will actually deploy or develop next. If the U.S. military wants to remain the world’s strongest, it must continue making its adversaries follow it around.
It will also need to develop ways to effectively use whatever technologies it does decide to deploy. Military power is ultimately more about people and organizations than widgets or tools, and history shows that even the most successful militaries need to incorporate new capabilities into their plans if they want to win on the battlefield. As conventional warfare makes an unfortunate comeback, the United States will need to adapt and restructure its military for the future—rather than resting on its laurels.


A Force for the Future
A High-Reward, Low-Risk Approach to AI Military Innovation
Foreign Affairs · by Michael C. Horowitz, Lauren Kahn, and Laura Resnick Samotin · May 9, 2022
Gunpowder. The combustion engine. The airplane. These are just some of the technologies that have forever changed the face of warfare. Now, the world is experiencing another transformation that could redefine military strength: the development of artificial intelligence (AI).
Merging AI with warfare may sound like science fiction, but AI is at the center of nearly all advances in defense technology today. It will shape how militaries recruit and train soldiers, how they deploy forces, and how they fight. China, Germany, Israel, and the United States have all used AI to create real-time visualizations of active battlefields. Russia has deployed AI to make deepfake videos and spread disinformation about its invasion of Ukraine. As the Russian-Ukrainian war continues, both parties could use algorithms to analyze large swaths of open-source data coming from social media and the battlefield, allowing them to better calibrate their attacks.
The United States is the world’s preeminent technological powerhouse, and in theory, the rise of AI presents the U.S. military with huge opportunities. But as of now, it is posing risks. Leading militaries often grow overconfident in their ability to win future wars, and there are signs that the U.S. Department of Defense could be falling victim to complacency. Although senior U.S. defense leaders have spent decades talking up the importance of emerging technologies, including AI and autonomous systems, action on the ground has been painfully slow. For example, the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy joined forces starting in 2003 to create the X-45 and X-47A prototypes: semiautonomous, stealthy uncrewed aircraft capable of conducting surveillance and military strikes. But many military leaders viewed them as threats to the F-35 fighter jet, and the air force dropped out of the program. The navy then funded an even more impressive prototype, the X-47B, able to fly as precisely as human-piloted craft. But the navy, too, saw the prototypes as threats to crewed planes and eventually backed away, instead moving forward with an unarmed, uncrewed aircraft with far more limited capabilities.
The United States’ slow action stands in stark contrast to the behavior of China, Washington’s most powerful geopolitical rival. Over the last few years, China has invested roughly the same amount as the United States has in AI research and development, but it is more aggressively integrating the technology into its military strategy, planning, and systems—potentially to defeat the United States in a future war. It has developed an advanced, semiautonomous weaponized drone that it is integrating into its forces—unlike how Washington dropped the X-45, the X-47A, and the X-47B. Russia is also developing AI-enabled military technology that could threaten opposing forces and critical infrastructure (so far absent from its campaign against Ukraine). Unless Washington does more to integrate AI into its military, it may find itself outgunned.

AI is at the center of nearly all advances in defense technology today.

But although falling behind on AI could jeopardize U.S. power, speeding ahead is not without risks. There are analysts and developers who fear that AI advancements could lead to serious accidents, including algorithmic malfunctions that could cause civilian casualties on the battlefield. There are experts who have even suggested that incorporating machine intelligence into nuclear command and control could make nuclear accidents more likely. This is unlikely—most nuclear powers seem to recognize the danger of mixing AI with launch systems—and right now, Washington’s biggest concern should be that it is moving too slowly. But some of the world’s leading researchers believe that the Defense Department is ignoring safety and reliability issues associated with AI, and the Pentagon must take their concerns seriously. Successfully capitalizing on AI requires the U.S. military to innovate at a pace that is both safe and fast, a task far easier said than done.
The Biden administration is taking positive steps toward this goal. It created the National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource Task Force, which is charged with spreading access to research tools that will help promote AI innovation for both the military and the overall economy. It has also created the position of chief digital and artificial intelligence officer in the Department of Defense; that officer will be tasked with ensuring that the Pentagon scales up and expedites its AI efforts.
But if the White House wants to move with responsible speed, it must take further measures. Washington will need to focus on making sure researchers have access to better—and more—Department of Defense data, which will fuel effective algorithms. The Pentagon must reorganize itself so that its agencies can easily collaborate and share their findings. It should also create incentives to attract more STEM talent, and it must make sure its personnel know they won’t be penalized if their experiments fail. At the same time, the Department of Defense should run successful projects through a gauntlet of rigorous safety testing before it implements them. That way, the United States can rapidly develop a panoply of new AI tools without worrying that they will create needless danger.
FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE
Technological innovation has long been critical to the United States’ military success. During the American Civil War, U.S. President Abraham Lincoln used the North’s impressive telegraph system to communicate with his generals, coordinate strategy, and move troops, helping the Union defeat the Confederacy. In the early 1990s, Washington deployed new, precision-guided munitions in the Persian Gulf War to drive Iraq out of Kuwait.
But history shows that military innovation is not simply the process of creating and using new technology. Instead, it entails reworking how states recruit troops, organize their militaries, plan operations, and strategize. In the 1920s and 1930s, for instance, France and Germany both developed tanks, trucks, and airpower. During World War II, Germany used the combined potential of these innovations (along with the radio) to carry out its infamous blitzkriegs: aggressive offensive strikes that quickly overwhelmed its enemies. France, by contrast, invested most of its resources in the Maginot Line, a series of forts along the French-German border. French leaders believed they had created an impenetrable boundary that would hold off any attempted German invasion. Instead, the Nazis simply maneuvered around the line by going through Belgium and the Ardennes forest. With its best units concentrated elsewhere, poor communication, and outdated plans for how to fight, France swiftly fell.
It is not a coincidence that France didn’t gamble with new military systems. France was a World War I victor, and leading military powers often forgo innovation and resist disruptive change. In 1918, the British navy invented the first aircraft carrier, but the world’s then dominant sea power treated these ships mostly as spotters for its traditional battleships rather than as mobile bases for conducting offensives. Japan, by contrast, used its aircraft carriers to bring attack planes directly to its fights. As a result, the British navy struggled against the Japanese in the Pacific, and ultimately, Japan had to be pushed back by another rising power: the United States. Before and throughout World War II, the U.S. Navy experimented with new technology, including aircraft carriers, in ways that helped it become the decisive force in the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Leading military powers often forgo innovation and resist change.

But today, the United States risks being more like the United Kingdom—or even France. The Defense Department appears to be biased in favor of tried-and-true capabilities over new tools, and its pace of innovation has slowed: the time it takes to move new technology from the lab and to the battlefield went from roughly five years, on average, in the early 1960s to a decade or more today. Sometimes, the Pentagon has seemingly dragged its feet on AI and autonomous systems because it fears that adopting those technologies could require disruptive changes that would threaten existing, successful parts of the armed forces, as the story of the X-45, the X-47A, and the X-47B clearly illustrates. Some projects have struggled to even make it off the drawing board. Multiple experiments have shown that Loyal Wingman, an uncrewed aircraft that employs AI, can help aircraft groups better coordinate their attacks. But the U.S. military has yet to seriously implement this technology, even though it has existed for years. It’s no wonder that the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence concluded in 2021, in its final report, that the United States “is not prepared to defend or compete in the AI era.”
If the United States fails to develop effective AI, it could find itself at the mercy of increasingly sophisticated adversaries. China, for example, is already employing AI to war-game a future conflict over Taiwan. Beijing plans to use AI in combination with cyberweapons, electronic warfare, and robotics to make an amphibious assault on Taiwan more likely to succeed. It is investing in AI-enabled systems to track undersea vehicles and U.S. Navy ships and to develop the ability to launch swarm attacks with low-cost, high-volume aircraft. If the United States lacks advanced AI capabilities, it will find itself inevitably moving at a slower pace—and would therefore be less able to help Taiwan fend off an invasion.
RISKY BUSINESS
Given the stakes, the defense establishment is right to worry about Washington’s torpid pace of defense innovation. But outside the government, many analysts have the opposite fear: if the military moves too quickly as it develops AI weaponry, the world could experience deadly—and perhaps even catastrophic—accidents.
It doesn’t take an expert to see the risks of AI: killer robots have been a staple of pop culture for decades. But science fiction isn’t the best indicator of the actual dangers. Fully autonomous, Terminator-style weapons systems would require high-level machine intelligence, which even optimistic forecasts suggest is more than half a century away. One group of analysts made a movie about “Slaughterbots,” swarms of autonomous systems that could kill on a mass scale. But any government or nonstate actor looking to wreak that level of havoc could accomplish the same task more reliably, and cheaply, using traditional weapons. Instead, the danger of AI stems from deploying algorithmic systems, both on and off the battlefield, in a manner that can lead to accidents, malfunctions, or even unintended escalation. Algorithms are designed to be fast and decisive, which can cause mistakes in situations that call for careful (if quick) consideration. For example, in 2003, an MIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air missile’s automated system misidentified a friendly aircraft as an adversary, and human operators did not correct it, leading to the death by friendly fire of a U.S. F-18 pilot. Research shows that the more cognitively demanding and stressful a situation is, the more likely people are to defer to AI judgments. That means that in a battlefield environment where many military systems are automated, these kinds of accidents could multiply.
Humans, of course, make fatal errors as well, and trusting AI may not seem inherently to be a mistake. But people can be overconfident about the accuracy of machines. In reality, even very good AI algorithms could potentially be more accident-prone than humans. People are capable of considering nuance and context when they are making decisions, whereas AI algorithms are trained to render clear verdicts and work under specific sets of circumstances. If entrusted to launch missiles or employ air defense systems outside their normal operating parameters, AI systems might destructively malfunction and launch unintended strikes. It could then be difficult for the attacking country to convince its opponent that the strikes were a mistake. Depending on the size and scale of the error, the ultimate outcome could be a ballooning conflict.
This has frightening implications. AI-enabled machines are unlikely to ever be given the power to actually launch nuclear attacks, but algorithms could eventually make recommendations to policymakers about whether to launch a weapon in response to an alert from an early warning air defense system. If AI gave the green light, the soldiers supervising and double-checking these machines might not be able to adequately examine their outputs and monitor the machines for potential errors in the input data, especially if the situation was moving extremely quickly. The result could be the inverse of an infamous 1983 incident in which a Soviet air force lieutenant arguably saved the world when, correctly suspecting a false alarm, he decided to override a nuclear launch directive from an automated warning system. That system had mistaken light reflecting off of clouds for an inbound ballistic missile.
FAST, NOT LOOSE
The United States, then, faces dueling risks from AI. If it moves too slowly, Washington could be overtaken by its competitors, jeopardizing national security. But if it moves too fast, it may compromise on safety and build AI systems that breed deadly accidents. Although the former is a larger risk than the latter, it is critical that the United States take safety concerns seriously. To be effective, AI must be safe and reliable.
So how can Washington find a sort of Goldilocks zone for innovation? It can start by thinking of technological development in terms of three phases: invention, incubation, and implementation. Different speeds are appropriate for each one. There is little harm from moving quickly in the first two phases, and the U.S. military should swiftly develop and experiment with new technologies and operational concepts. But it will need to thoroughly address safety and reliability concerns during implementation.
To strike this balance, the U.S. military will need to make sure its personnel get a better handle on all of the Department of Defense’s data. That includes open-source content available on the Internet, such as satellite imagery, and intelligence on adversaries and their military capabilities. It also includes data on the effectiveness, composition, and capabilities of the U.S. military’s own tools.

The Department of Defense already has many units that collect such data, but each unit’s information is siloed and stored in different ways. To more effectively adopt AI, the Pentagon will need to build on its ongoing efforts to create a common data infrastructure. The department is taking an important step by integrating its data and AI responsibilities under the aegis of the chief digital and artificial intelligence officer. But this reorganization will not succeed unless the new official has the authority to overcome bureaucratic barriers to AI adoption in both the military services and other parts of the Pentagon.
Giving researchers better data will also help ensure that every algorithm undergoes rigorous safety testing. Examiners, for example, could deliberately feed a wide range of complex or outright incorrect information into an AI system to see if it creates a faulty output— such as a directive to strike a friendly aircraft. This testing will help create a baseline idea of how reliable and accurate AI systems are, establishing a margin of error that eventual operators can keep in mind. This will help humans know when to question what machines tell them, even in high-pressure scenarios.
Manufacturing innovative and secure AI will also require a tighter connection between the Department of Defense’s Research and Engineering arm and the rest of the Pentagon. In theory, Research and Engineering is in charge of the department’s technological innovation. But according to a report by Melissa Flagg and Jack Corrigan at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology, the Pentagon’s innovation efforts are disorganized, taking place across at least 28 organizations within the broader department. These efforts would all benefit from more coordination, something the Research and Engineering arm can provide. One recent reason for optimism is that Research and Engineering recently created the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve, an initiative that will allow the department to more quickly create prototypes and experiment with emerging technologies in high-need areas across the military, which should increase coordination and speed up adoption.

Military power is more about people and organizations than widgets or tools.
But the Pentagon can’t spur more effective innovation solely through structural reforms. It will need the right people, as well. The United States is fortunate to have a highly trained and educated military, yet it requires even more STEM talent if it is going to win the wars of the future. That means the Department of Defense must hire more personnel who study AI. It also means the Pentagon should offer coding and data analytics courses for existing staff and give extra cash or more time off to employees who enroll—just as it does for personnel who study foreign languages.
As part of its overhaul, the Defense Department will also need to change its culture so that it is not, as Michèle Flournoy, former undersecretary of defense for policy, described it 
in these pages last year, too “risk averse.” Currently, department officials often slow-walk or avoid risky initiatives to avoid the reputational damage that accompanies failure, burying promising projects in the process. This is completely backward: trial and error is integral to innovation. Senior leaders in the Pentagon should reward program managers and researchers for the overall number of experiments and operational concepts they test rather than the percentage that are successful.
Even unsuccessful investments can prove strategically useful. The Chinese military pays close attention to U.S. military capabilities and planning, allowing the United States to potentially disrupt Beijing’s own planning by selectively revealing prototypes, including ones that did not pan out. China might respond by chasing sometimes flawed U.S. systems, while being uncertain about what the United States will actually deploy or develop next. If the U.S. military wants to remain the world’s strongest, it must continue making its adversaries follow it around.
It will also need to develop ways to effectively use whatever technologies it does decide to deploy. Military power is ultimately more about people and organizations than widgets or tools, and history shows that even the most successful militaries need to incorporate new capabilities into their plans if they want to win on the battlefield. As conventional warfare makes an unfortunate comeback, the United States will need to adapt and restructure its military for the future—rather than resting on its laurels.

Foreign Affairs · by Michael C. Horowitz, Lauren Kahn, and Laura Resnick Samotin · May 9, 2022


23. Too Fragile to Fight: Could the U.S. Military Withstand a War of Attrition?

Conclusion:

In short, the whole joint force should seriously consider how it can continue to keep up the fight if it finds itself in an extended and costly war with a major power, or, worse, multiple adversaries. Winning the first battle will be important, but not as much as winning the last one.

Too Fragile to Fight: Could the U.S. Military Withstand a War of Attrition? - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Conrad Crane · May 9, 2022
At the turn of the 20th century, Polish Jewish banker Ivan Bloch compiled a detailed analysis of the potential effects of war between major powers. He saw a world of interconnected economies with vast industrial power and large armies. He thought future great-power war would be too costly to contemplate, as bloody wars of attrition would bankrupt participants without worthwhile results. For him, a clash of arms between major powers would “ruin both belligerents, financially and economically, long before the end would come in sight.” As we know now, he was right about the course future wars would take, and the inability of the participants to end them before suffering bankrupting costs. He was wrong, however, in predicting that war was impossible, and decision-makers rational enough to avoid it.
It has been a long time since the United States fought a high-intensity war of attrition, and the Pentagon, despite its renewed focus on large-scale combat operations, is not ready for it. Over the last half-century, the U.S. military has secured relatively bloodless conventional successes in Grenada, Panama, Operation Desert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Then it fought two long-running but low-intensity wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The National Defense Strategy remains concentrated on building a “more lethal” joint force, while the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance asserts that the United States will no longer engage in “forever wars.” As a result, current war plans still imagine relatively quick military actions with low casualties that remain within current capabilities. The resources for a longer and more brutal conflict have atrophied or been forgotten.
However, both history and the ongoing war in Ukraine suggest that such a possibility is more likely than we think. In a magisterial analysis of warfare from the Romans to World War II, Cathal Nolan argues that wars between peers or near-peers almost always become bloody contests of attrition, and these have gotten worse over time. In The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost, he writes that “modern industrial and mobilization realities” have “helped bring about wars in which mass death and destruction, on scales hardly foreseen at their outset, become the ultimate means of reaching a lasting decision in quarrels among nations and empires.”
Preparing for such a conflict will require a different mindset within the joint force, accompanied by structural and doctrinal reforms. The war in Ukraine has highlighted the importance of having competent soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines — one of America’s great strengths. But how a country fights is more important than what it fights with. While the services maintain quality personnel, they should be prepared to continue the fight as more sophisticated technologies are destroyed or depleted. The Pentagon should also be more restrained in how it deploys precision weaponry. Javelins should not be wasted on thin-skinned vehicles. Perhaps artillery or dumb bombs will suffice for some targets instead of precision-guided munitions. The joint force, and the nation that supports it, should prepare to deal with significant losses of both personnel and equipment, and relearn how to regenerate combat power, perhaps in a multi-theater fight.
Unforeseen Challenges
The recuperative powers of modern states make it increasingly difficult to achieve victory in a few decisive engagements. We are watching this happen again on our TV screens. Russian ineptitude and overconfidence combined with Ukrainian tenacity and Western military technology has turned what on paper seemed a David versus Goliath match into a near-peer fight. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley just testified before Congress that be believes this will be “a very protracted conflict, and I think it’s at least measured in years. I don’t know about a decade, but at least years for sure.”
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine, with its images of ravaged cities festooned with wrecked Russian armored vehicles, highlights the destructiveness of modern war and the lethality of the contemporary battlefield. But it also indicates the fragility of modern high-technology militaries. Many of the destroyed tanks are old T-72s. The Russian use of so many “dumb bombs” may be because they are running short of more expensive precision munitions. They are obviously suffering many logistical difficulties. As of April 12, the war bulletin from the Ukrainian Embassy claimed their armed forces had killed almost 20,000 Russians and had also destroyed 732 tanks, 1,946 armored personnel carriers, 140 helicopters, and 157 aircraft.
The American military can scoff and swear that nothing like that could ever happen to them. When I walk the halls of the Pentagon today, I still hear discussions about the importance of winning the first battle decisively. Indeed, this is also a point reinforced by classic books like America’s First Battles, which has been a standard of professional military education. In the Army wargames I attended early in the millennium, Gen. Shinseki’s proposed Objective Force always swept to victory. Air Force wargames have also produced glowing recommendations for the F-35, which claim that it will destroy 20 enemy aircraft for every loss that it takes because of its ability to exploit its stealth and network capabilities.
But what if these optimistic assumptions are wrong? In a rare example of official pessimism, the 2018 bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission concluded that the United States “might struggle to win, or perhaps lose” a war against either Russia or China, suffering “unacceptably high casualties” in the process. What if technology like the F-35 doesn’t perform as well as expected, or we suffer another case of technological surprise? In nine days of fighting over the Dunkirk beachhead, the Royal Air Force lost at least 106 air superiority fighters, Hurricanes and Spitfires. That’s almost as many F-22 Raptors as there are in the whole U.S. Air Force. How fast could the Pentagon replace losses of expensive high-technology aircraft?
This would be merely one of the challenges facing Washington in a high-intensity war of attritions. Air operations during Operation Inherent Resolve considerably depleted American stocks of precision-guided munitions, expending more than 2,000 in the first year alone. Estimates are, with current production rates, it will take three to four years to replace the Javelin missiles sent to Ukraine. Delivery time for a new weapon is 32 months, but at least they are on an active production line. Washington has not purchased any new Stingers since 2003. It could take as long as five years to make up for those shipments. Moreover, that all assumes no further similar assistance for Ukraine.
The damage Ukraine has inflicted on invading Russian forces with Javelins and Stingers brings back memories of the carnage of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Overconfident from its overwhelming 1967 victory and surprised by Arab anti-tank missiles and air defenses, the Israeli military lost a third of its air force in the early days of the conflict and over 400 tanks by the end. As in Ukraine, America was forced to expend its own stocks to resupply a proxy by airlifting tanks, helicopters, and missiles. F-4 Phantoms were even stripped from aircraft carriers and squadrons in California. American observers in postwar Israel were shocked by the lethality and demands of the modern conventional battlefield. And that war only lasted 19 days.
This raises the question of how robust America’s defense industry would be in a major war today. How fast can the United States produce precision munitions or cruise and air-defense missiles? And how about the capacity of American industry to transition to building tanks and other weapon systems? In World War II, Westinghouse converted factories from producing household appliances to making items like aircraft parts and ammunition. Would Samsung and LG do the same? The American automobile industry produced one fifth of all the military equipment the nation required for World War II. The General Motors Corporation alone furnished one tenth of all American war production. The Ford company produced more army equipment than the whole nation of Italy — their aircraft factory at Willow Run rolled out a new bomber every 63 63 minutes. Could Toyota or Hyundai match that? Would they even try? Today’s high-technology platforms would likely take much longer to build. International supply chains will complicate this further. Even the Russians have run into difficulties because some of the key parts for their tanks have been cut off by Western sanctions.
Problems with growing the force in any timely manner also abound. Prodded by the National Commission on the Future of the Army, which expressed concern about the preparedness of land forces for national mobilization, the Army in particular has begun considering how it would mobilize and expand for a major conflict involving large-scale ground combat operations. Much analysis is being done about restoring corps and division level capacities that were reduced or eliminated in the brigade-based modular force. One study of the Army’s plans to expand cited the demise of the draft and significant reductions in both the training and industrial bases in arguing that “the capacity for [past] growth was based upon institutions and practices that no longer exist or are extremely degraded.” As a result, the report concluded that the whole concept of rapid expansion has now been called into question.
Already, the military is facing difficulties just meeting current requirements for the various combatant commands, a challenge that will be exacerbated if there are simultaneous crises in multiple theaters. Realizing the potential imbalances between theater demands and force capabilities, the final report of the National Commission on the Future of the Army recommended much closer coordination between the Army and the combatant commands with their associated Army service component commands. Specifically, it called for updating “all war plans with current and programmed force structure and doctrine.” Discussions about NATO wargames in War on the Rocks have highlighted the importance of robust forward presence for effective defense or deterrence, but is there enough force structure to accomplish that in all the key hotspots?
Finally, the military is not ready to handle the casualties of a major war. The Army is only slowly relearning and rebuilding theater replacement systems, which have atrophied along with a lot of other service component command capacities. Army medical doctrine has shifted to cut close capacity in favor of evacuation to hospitals out of theater. Not only does this policy assume uncontested airspace to ensure quick and easy transport, it also reduces the possibility for “Wounded Returned to Duty,” which was a key replacement method in past conflicts. The Army only has two active mortuary affairs companies. Each is officially prepared to handle up to 400 remains per day at full strength, but even with added reserve capacity that number could be significantly less. They will be severely taxed in any conflict with the level of lethality exhibited in Ukraine.
It is small consolation that our major potential adversaries are no better prepared for a lengthy war of attrition than we are. Russian shortcomings have become evident. If the Russians do achieve success in their new campaign in eastern Ukraine, it will be based much more on traditional vast expenditures of cheap artillery than any reliance on modern precision munitions or sophisticated maneuvers. Many commentators imagine a war over Taiwan would be won or lost quickly – after too much Maotai, a Chinese general once told me that because of one-child policies he had an army of “only sons” whom he could not risk in serious combat. However, as Ivan Bloch discovered, just because there are logical reasons wars should not occur does not mean they won’t.
Getting Ready
The good news is that some in the American military are finally starting to come to grips with the challenges of mobilizing for a major war. Army wargames have highlighted many challenges, including in basing, transportation, and command and control. All the services need to look hard at their theater replacement policies and regeneration capacities, as well as at institutional training facilities. The Pentagon should also begin coordinating with defense industries to prepare for possible expansion, with a particular focus on munitions. Surge capabilities should be developed, along with practices to conserve sophisticated technologies on the battlefield. The U.S. military should be prepared to make full use of prepositioned prepositioned stocks, while retaining all older systems, such as M1 tanks, that have been replaced by newer models. A number of America’s friends and allies still have M60s, for example, which they clearly believe to be adequate for modern combat. The 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group of the Air Force Material Command is responsible for thousands of retired aircraft parked at Davis-Monthan Air Force base in Arizona. They should be prepared to refurbish these older airframes if necessary to replace losses that industry cannot. Replacing destroyed or damaged naval assets will be an even thornier problem. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has pointed out that Navy logistics in the Pacific are too small and vulnerable to support a major war there, even before any attrition occurs.
In short, the whole joint force should seriously consider how it can continue to keep up the fight if it finds itself in an extended and costly war with a major power, or, worse, multiple adversaries. Winning the first battle will be important, but not as much as winning the last one.
Conrad Crane, Ph.D., is a research historian at the Army War College. He has written widely on airpower and land-power issues. His two latest books are American Airpower Strategy in World War II, published by University Press of Kansas, and Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War, from Naval Institute Press.
The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. The author also has no special access to intelligence or any operational matters that are not otherwise available to the general public.
Image courtesy of General Motors 2017
warontherocks.com · by Conrad Crane · May 9, 2022





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David Maxwell
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V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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