Quotes of the Day:

"The noble person wants to create new things and a new virtue. The good person wants old things, and for old things to be preserved."

- Friedrich Nietzsche

"The most useful piece of learning for the users of life is to unlearn what is untrue."

- Antisthenes

"It doesn't matter how beautiful your theory is, it doesn't matter how smart you are. If it doesn't agree with your experiment, it's wrong."

- Richard P. Feynman

1. The Government Created a New Disinformation Office to Oversee All the Other Ones

2. FBI: Colombians drugged US soldiers, stole money, phones

3. Ukrainians are inspired by Finland’s heroic past and NATO present

4. Ukraine military says all 35 drones Russia launched overnight destroyed

5. Special Ops Drone Techniques Shared With Marine Corps

6. Robert Kaplan: Think “Tragically” About War and Politics

7.  You Are Not Destined to Live in Quiet Times by Walter Russell Mead

8. Nationalism versus liberalism: A South Korean view of Taiwan issues

9. Chinese Company Now Owns Tutoring Firm Contracted by Military and Schools in U.S.

10. Rethinking Tradeoffs Between Europe and the Indo-Pacific

11. It is now battered Ukraine’s turn for an offensive

12. Biden Hopes for Vietnam Breakthrough

13. How China’s Echo Chamber Threatens Taiwan

14. Taiwan: Female reservists to start training for first time today

15. Taiwan: 1st group of volunteer female reservists report for training

16. China’s Wolf Warrior Ambassador Is a Hit in Beijing, Not Paris

17. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 8, 2023

18. Planes, Trains, Automobiles, and Bodabodas: Transportation Workers and Irregular Warfare

1. The Government Created a New Disinformation Office to Oversee All the Other Ones

A potentially good initiative that will be criticized by outlets like the Intercept and will be the target of conspiracy theories. No good deed goes unpublished.

The title makes a point but the article does not really address some key questions - how are all these new initiatives that are "springing up like daisies" really integrated and synchronized? And yes, what is the oversight mechanism and process?

Excerpts:

The FMIC was established on September 23 of last year after Congress approved funding, but its creation was announced publicly only after The Intercept’s inquiry. Because it is situated within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, or ODNI, it enjoys the unique authority to marshal support from all elements of the U.S. intelligence community to monitor and combat foreign influence efforts such as disinformation campaigns.

The FMIC is authorized to counter foreign disinformation targeting not just U.S. elections, but also “the public opinion within the United States” generally, according to the law.

Haines also made clear that the effort to counter disinformation has expanded beyond not just elections and Russia, but also to other foreign adversaries: “What we have been doing is effectively trying to support the Global Engagement Center and others throughout the U.S. government in helping them to understand what are the plans and intentions of the key actors in this space: China, Russia, Iran, etc.” The GEC is a State Department entity tasked with countering foreign disinformation by amplifying America’s own propaganda.

But is this true? Has the cottage industry really developed organizations all out of proportion to the threat?

That foreign governments such as Russia spread lies as part of propaganda to advance their own interests is not in dispute. But the efforts to counter disinformation have now become a cottage industry that critics suggest has grown far out of proportion to the threat.

The Government Created a New Disinformation Office to Oversee All the Other Ones

The new Foreign Malign Influence Center oversees efforts that span U.S. military, law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic agencies.

Ken Klippenstein

May 5 2023, 6:00 a.m.

The Intercept · by Ken Klippenstein · May 5, 2023

Within the federal government, offices dedicated to fighting foreign disinformation are springing up like daisies, from the Pentagon’s new Influence and Perception Management Office to at least four organizations inside the Department of Homeland Security alone, as well as ones inside the FBI and State Department.

To oversee the growing efforts — which arose in response to concerns about the impact of Russian meddling in the 2016 election but have now expanded — the director of national intelligence has created a new office.

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee today, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines for the first time mentioned the creation of the Foreign Malign Influence Center, or FMIC. “Congress put into law that we should establish a Foreign Malign Influence Center in the intelligence community; we have stood that up,” Haines said, referring to legislation passed last year. “It encompasses our election threat work, essentially looking at foreign influence and interference in elections, but it also deals with disinformation more generally.”

The FMIC was established on September 23 of last year after Congress approved funding, but its creation was announced publicly only after The Intercept’s inquiry. Because it is situated within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, or ODNI, it enjoys the unique authority to marshal support from all elements of the U.S. intelligence community to monitor and combat foreign influence efforts such as disinformation campaigns.

The FMIC is authorized to counter foreign disinformation targeting not just U.S. elections, but also “the public opinion within the United States” generally, according to the law.

Haines also made clear that the effort to counter disinformation has expanded beyond not just elections and Russia, but also to other foreign adversaries: “What we have been doing is effectively trying to support the Global Engagement Center and others throughout the U.S. government in helping them to understand what are the plans and intentions of the key actors in this space: China, Russia, Iran, etc.” The GEC is a State Department entity tasked with countering foreign disinformation by amplifying America’s own propaganda.

Creation of the FMIC was debated in Congress for months, with senators questioning how its mission would differ from the bevy of entities that already exist. “We want to be sure that this center enhances those efforts rather than duplicating them or miring them in unnecessary bureaucracy,” Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said in January 2022, adding that there were “legitimate questions about how large such an organization should be and even about where it would fit.” Reached for comment, Warner’s office said the senator’s position hasn’t changed.

U.S. Air Force Reserves intelligence officer Maj. Neill Perry echoed the concerns in a 2022 piece in the Army’s Cyber Defense Review, a West Point-funded journal. “The decision to create a new agency is puzzling for two reasons,” Perry wrote. “First, the FMIRC [Foreign Malign Influence Response Center, an earlier name for the FMIC] duplicates the mission of the GEC. The GEC already produces assessments on influence operations, including a team of thirty data scientists who monitor the public information environment and share their analysis with the State Department and interagency partners.

“Second, Congress did not elaborate on how the FMIRC would work with the GEC. In passing this legislation, Congress did not eliminate the GEC or reduce its mission. Not only does the GEC continue to exist, it may soon wield greater resources,” he wrote. “In May 2021, the Senate passed legislation that would double the GEC’s annual budget,” Perry added. The GEC’s current budget is $12 million, and the State Department has requested a $14 million budget for the next fiscal year.

From its perch atop the intelligence community, the FMIC has been designated the U.S. government’s primary authority for analyzing and integrating intelligence on foreign influence, according to a brief entry on ODNI’s website. The FMIC’s acting director, Jeffrey K. Wichman, is a former CIA executive who previously served as chief of analysis for the agency’s Counterintelligence Mission Center.

“Exposing deception in defense of liberty” is the center’s motto, ODNI’s website says. It enjoys access to “all intelligence possessed or created pertaining to FMI [foreign malign information], including election security.”

Foreign disinformation became a focus of the U.S. government after Russia’s state-sanctioned attempts to interfere in the 2016 election, which relied in part on bots and trolls to amplify falsehoods disseminated through social media. Following the election, Congress passed a bipartisan law, the Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act, which established the State Department’s GEC.

Since then, government entities charged with combating foreign disinformation have proliferated. In the fall of 2017, the FBI established the Foreign Influence Task Force. In 2018, the Department of Homeland Security established the Countering Foreign Influence Task Force — which in 2021 was updated to include a misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation team — as well as a Foreign Influence and Interference Branch and last year, the Disinformation Governance Board.

The rapid and disjointed creation of these entities prompted the Department of Homeland Security’s inspector general to issue a report calling for a more coherent, unified strategy to counter disinformation.

More recently, the Pentagon created the Influence and Perception Management Office to oversee its various counter-disinformation efforts. As is often the case, no press release accompanied the office’s creation or any reference by the administration aside from this year’s budget request, which appears to be the only publicly available U.S. government reference to the office.

That foreign governments such as Russia spread lies as part of propaganda to advance their own interests is not in dispute. But the efforts to counter disinformation have now become a cottage industry that critics suggest has grown far out of proportion to the threat.

Related

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Last month, a Pentagon-funded think tank concluded that Russia’s efforts as of 2019 were not well coordinated and overstated in their impact. “The Russian disinformation machine has been neither well organized nor especially well resourced (contrary to some implications in popular media), and the impact of Russian efforts on the West has been uncertain,” a detailed RAND Corporation study concluded last year. The report called for greater efforts to “reduce overattribution of disinformation on social media to Russia,” warning that “pointing the finger at Russia in every instance of activity on social media resembling Russian interference distorts the understanding of the threat.” The study also stressed that “algorithms that merely pick up bots, pro-Russian content, or both on social media are liable to overattribute.”

Given its inherently subjective nature, what constitutes disinformation — and which disinformation or propaganda actually poses a threat — can quickly take on a political valence, as The Intercept has previously reported.

In 2021, Sen. Susan Collins, a Republican member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, mistakenly believed that Iran was behind the January 6 storming of the Capitol, despite abundant publicly available evidence that Trump supporters had been planning it.

Then, following widespread criticism for failing to anticipate the storming of the Capitol, the Department of Homeland Security, like many agencies, tried to get out ahead of other disruptions. On January 19, 2021, an intelligence assessment obtained by The Intercept showed that the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis believed Iran might capitalize on the unrest ahead of Joe Biden’s inauguration. Titled “Iran Is Likely Seeking to Foment Inauguration Day Unrest,” the assessment cited “credible information,” according to a copy of the report. The next day, Biden was inaugurated with no issue.

“There was a big ramp up in concern going into 2022 mostly because of a lot of foreign influence stuff in 2020, but then election day came and went without much incident as far as I saw,” a former Department of Homeland Security contractor who worked with the misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation team told The Intercept, requesting anonymity to avoid professional reprisal. “There was very little midterm election related disinformation coming from foreign actors from what I saw.”

The Intercept · by Ken Klippenstein · May 5, 2023

2. FBI: Colombians drugged US soldiers, stole money, phones

FBI: Colombians drugged US soldiers, stole money, phones

AP · by TERRY SPENCER · May 5, 2023

FORT LAUDERDALE, Fla. (AP) — Three Colombian nationals are facing federal charges in Miami accusing them of drugging two U.S. Army soldiers at a Bogota bar three years ago to steal their debit and credit cards and their phones, U.S. law enforcement officials announced Friday.

Jeffersson Arango, Kenneth Uribe and Pedro Silva have been indicted on kidnapping, assault and conspiracy charges for the alleged March 2020 drugging, abduction and robbery that left the soldiers with little memory of what happened.

According to court documents, the soldiers went to an upscale Bogota bar late one night shortly before most of the world shutdown due to the coronavirus pandemic to drink, watch a soccer game and dance with local women.

Hours later, one soldier was found stumbling down a Bogota street and the other was found passed out in his apartment, with both missing their wallets, cellphones and other possessions. Blood tests showed they had been drugged.

A joint investigation by the FBI and the Colombian National Police found bar surveillance video that shows the three and possibly others drugging the soldiers’ drinks and then escorting them out of the bar after 2 a.m. and into a waiting car. Bank and other surveillance video shows Arango using their debit and credit cards at ATMs and stores, the U.S. government alleges.

After the trio were identified, Colombian police began intercepting their phone communications where they allegedly talked about robbing people they drugged at bars and complaining that the pandemic shutdown had halted their conspiracy. Arango and Uribe were arrested in December. Documents do not show if Silva has been arrested.

FBI Special Agent Orlando Quant said in affidavit that when he interviewed Arango, he admitted drugging the soldiers with the others and taking them to a hotel. He said he was able to get one soldier’s debit card PIN by convincing him he needed to pay for something. He then told the drugged soldier that a cellphone was a payment pad and had him type in the number, which he later used to withdraw money.

They then left the soldiers on the street. It is unclear how one got back to his apartment.

Arango made his first appearance in Miami’s federal court Friday after being extradited. Court documents do not show that Uribe or Silva have been extradited. No attorneys were listed in court documents for the three.

AP · by TERRY SPENCER · May 5, 2023

3. Ukrainians are inspired by Finland’s heroic past and NATO present

Excerpts:

We need only look at Finland to see the bluster behind Putin’s threats. Helsinki’s decision to join NATO was preceded by a familiar barrage of veiled Kremlin warnings of “counter-measures” and “military and political consequences.” Yet once Finland’s membership was confirmed, Putin was reduced to meaningless platitudes. “There is nothing new for us,” he claimed. “We have nothing that could bother us from the point of view of Finland’s or Sweden’s membership. Everything is going according to plan.” Should Ukraine be admitted to NATO, Putin will have lost his main reason for invading the country. The end of the war will be closer.

As spring turns into summer and new military campaigns loom larger, Ukraine will take comfort and inspiration from the determination of our allies to welcome Ukraine into NATO, and before full membership, to provide Ukraine with security guarantees. We are reminded again of Shostakovich’s Suite on Finnish Themes, composed for that canceled victory parade in Helsinki. Embarrassed to have been dragged into a Stalinist debacle, the great composer quietly shelved the music, which was never heard in public during his lifetime. Perhaps there is a lesson for Putin in Finland’s courageous past.

Ukrainians are inspired by Finland’s heroic past and NATO present

atlanticcouncil.org · by Peter Dickinson · May 4, 2023

It isn’t easy to remain optimistic when a malevolent superpower has sent its armies to destroy your country. But thanks in no small part to Finland, Ukraine is welcoming the spring season with renewed hope and determination.

Here in Kyiv, we regard Finland’s recent accession to full NATO membership as a milestone for broader European security and for our own continuing battle against Russian imperial aggression. We are also happy to have been reminded of Finland’s inspirational record of resisting Russian bullies.

It is almost uncanny how the Kremlin of Vladimir Putin in the 2020s has come to resemble the Kremlin of Joseph Stalin in the 1930s. Back then, it was Stalin’s lust to reimpose Imperial Russia’s long-lost borders that turned his attention to strategically valuable Finnish territories.

When Helsinki refused to cede its land, a Soviet invasion loomed. Stalin’s generals were in no doubt that Finland would crumble quickly. Andrei Zhdanov, the Communist party chief in Leningrad, was so confident of a quick campaign that he ordered Russian composer Dmitri Shostakovich to produce a new piece of music to be performed by the Red Army’s marching bands at a victory parade in Helsinki.

Every student of Finnish history knows what happened next. Soviet forces invaded in November 1939 with more than 20 divisions totaling around 630,000 men. Bombs fell on Helsinki, killing dozens of civilians. The Russians, peddling lies then as now, claimed they were dropping food supplies. So heavily outgunned and outnumbered were the Finns that Soviet generals predicted Helsinki would fall by December 21, Stalin’s 60th birthday.

You can probably imagine the pleasure it gives a Ukrainian to write that Stalin never got his birthday present. The Finns fought back magnificently. Soldiers skilled at cross-country skiing launched a devastating guerrilla campaign. It is often forgotten that during this Winter War, the Finns invented the Molotov cocktail, a handmade explosive named after the Soviet foreign minister of the time.

The Red Army never made it to Helsinki. Thousands of soldiers died of frostbite. Many refused to fight. After an ambush blocked the Soviet advance on the Raate Road, Finnish soldiers found a Red Army truck full of musical instruments.

Today, it is Putin’s turn to wait for a victory parade he assumed would come so easily in Ukraine. Thousands more Russian soldiers have died in a futile attempt to crush a smaller neighbor. The Kremlin’s generals have again been humiliated.

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If Putin had hoped to occupy Ukraine to keep NATO away from Russia’s borders, he has achieved the opposite result. Finland’s accession has doubled the length of NATO’s borders with Russia. With Sweden’s admission to NATO still pending, there is no mistaking the paradigm shift in the European and Scandinavian security framework. This is the direct result of Putin’s calamitous misjudgments.

The question now is how NATO should move forward in light of Putin’s blind intransigence. The alliance’s next summit will be held in July in Vilnius. We sincerely hope that any remaining barriers to Sweden’s admission will be lifted. In Kyiv, we are convinced that NATO membership is the best guarantee of peace in Europe, not only for Ukraine, but for all countries in range of Putin’s missiles. In the face of naked Russian belligerence, it makes no sense that certain parts of Europe should be part of NATO while other countries are excluded.

Today, Ukraine is the best advertisement for NATO. The heroic fight of our people and the unity displayed by those who support us have proved that NATO is strongest security alliance in the world. That is why we continue to seek Ukrainian membership of NATO.

We are grateful to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who acknowledged during a recent visit to Kyiv that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO.” We fulfill the main requirements of membership: we are a functioning democracy with a market economy and we treat all sections of our population fairly.

Before Ukraine joins the alliance, we must first deter new aggression and another destabilization on the European continent. We expect our allies to provide Ukraine with effective and firm security guarantees reflected in the Kyiv Security Compact, drafted by an international working group under our chairmanship together with former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

Of course, we understand that some NATO members might be concerned by the security commitments required in times of war. NATO’s Article Five is based on the premise that an attack on one is an attack on all. Nobody wants another world war.

Nevertheless, there can no longer be any room for hesitation. Putin’s actions in Ukraine have demonstrated time and again the kind of threat he poses to global security and human decency. It is not enough to deny him rewards for the atrocities his armies have committed; he must be brought to justice.

We need only look at Finland to see the bluster behind Putin’s threats. Helsinki’s decision to join NATO was preceded by a familiar barrage of veiled Kremlin warnings of “counter-measures” and “military and political consequences.” Yet once Finland’s membership was confirmed, Putin was reduced to meaningless platitudes. “There is nothing new for us,” he claimed. “We have nothing that could bother us from the point of view of Finland’s or Sweden’s membership. Everything is going according to plan.” Should Ukraine be admitted to NATO, Putin will have lost his main reason for invading the country. The end of the war will be closer.

As spring turns into summer and new military campaigns loom larger, Ukraine will take comfort and inspiration from the determination of our allies to welcome Ukraine into NATO, and before full membership, to provide Ukraine with security guarantees. We are reminded again of Shostakovich’s Suite on Finnish Themes, composed for that canceled victory parade in Helsinki. Embarrassed to have been dragged into a Stalinist debacle, the great composer quietly shelved the music, which was never heard in public during his lifetime. Perhaps there is a lesson for Putin in Finland’s courageous past.

Andriy Yermak is the head of Ukraine’s Office of the President.

4. Ukraine military says all 35 drones Russia launched overnight destroyed

I hope we can learn from this (if the reports are accurate).

Ukraine military says all 35 drones Russia launched overnight destroyed

Reuters · by Reuters

May 8 (Reuters) - Ukraine's top military command said on Monday that its forces destroyed all 35 Iranian-made Shahed drones that Russia had launched overnight at different targets around the country.

"The Russian Federation (also) launched 16 missile strikes last night, in particular on the cities of Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa regions," the General Staff of Ukraine's Armed Forces said in its daily update.

It added that in addition, 61 airstrikes and 52 attacks from the heavy rocket salvo fire systems were launched over the past day on the positions of Ukrainian forces and populated areas.

"Unfortunately, there are dead and wounded civilians, high-rise buildings, private homes and other civilian infrastructure were damaged," it said.

Reuters was not able to independently verify the reports. Kyiv's Mayor Klitschko said that at least five people were injured in the capital amidst damage done to buildings and infrastructure.

Reporting by Lidia Kelly in Melbourne; Editing by Michael Perry

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

5. Special Ops Drone Techniques Shared With Marine Corps

Special Ops Drone Techniques Shared With Marine Corps

nationaldefensemagazine.org

ROBOTICS AND AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS

5/5/2023

By Jan Tegler

Lockheed Martin image

U.S. Special Operations Command’s tactics, techniques and procedures for using small drones are spreading to at least one other service.

BAE Systems' Amphibious Combat Vehicle, Command, Control, Communication/Uncrewed Aerial Systems vehicle, known as the ACV C4 UAS, is one of the candidates in a competition now underway to replace the Marine Corps' long-serving Light Armored Vehicle.

From that vehicle, Marines want to dispatch Stalker and Indago intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance drones that Lockheed Martin has refined continually since their introduction in 2006 and 2012, he said.

“Collaboration with our SOCOM and Marine Corps customers and industry partners has enabled the rapid development of needed capabilities for the warfighter,” Johnson said.

Both drones are part of ongoing contractor verification tests, he said.

The vehicle will act as a “battlefield quarterback” with Marine Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalions — collecting, processing and distributing sensor data from ground level and above the horizon to give Marines and other forces an expanded picture of what’s going on around them, he said.

The ACV C4 UAS is a candidate for what’s arguably the most important component of the USMC’s Armed Reconnaissance Vehicle program, said Mark Brinkman, BAE Systems’ program manager for ACV design and development.

“As the Marine Corps looks for a replacement for the LAV, they had to pick one variant, the C4 UAS version, to be the first of what could potentially be [a] family of vehicles,” he added.

Small, portable and able to be assembled/launched rapidly from the ACV C4, the fixed-wing Stalker and quadcopter Indago could allow operators to see up to 30 miles beyond the vehicle as part of a suite of “sensors and effectors that will enable the Marines to identify potential targets and threats and observe a large area of the battle space, understand what it is they’re looking at and then act upon it,” Brinkman explained.

Noting their complementary capabilities, Johnson said, “It’s advantageous to be operating both drones simultaneously, thinking about coverages of ranges, real estate and the data each are intended to provide.”

The pair can swap payloads quickly, with a variety of available electro-optical, infrared, and low-light cameras capable of locking onto and tracking targets day and night in all weather conditions. Stalker can fly for up to eight hours with solid oxide fuel cell and battery-powered options, while Indago can fly for a little more than an hour.

Both can take off vertically. Many of the drone users operate them from a ground control station, typically a laptop or a tablet depending on requirements for ruggedness, he said.

“We’re moving toward a common ground control software suite between Stalker and Indago,” Johnson said, adding that the software has an open systems backbone so “it’s portable to almost any hardware instantiation you’re looking for.”

“If [the Marines] want it as part of a more complex control system, controlling a wider selection of unmanned vehicles across multiple domains, we can do that,” he said. “We’re trying to give customers the same experience across a variety of UAVs and ground control stations through that common software.”

Both drones have onboard capability to process the data their sensors scoop up, he said.

“If you think about fusing data, target recognition and a variety of computationally intensive activities, we try to push those out as far as we can to optimize bandwidth,” he said. “The ideal situation is you’re pushing them to the air vehicle.”

That would speed ACV C4 UAS’ distribution of the video and images Stalker and Indago can gather for Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalions and other elements of Marine Air Ground Task Forces, Johnson said, adding that little work remains to make both drones compatible with ACV C4.

Skunk Works is already considering how multiple Stalkers/Indagos could work together. That would give ACV C4 UAS even more quarterback-like chops, he added.

“We’re thinking about how in the future we get multiple Stalkers and Indagos to collaborate in real time using artificial intelligence and machine learning,” he said. “How can we start to introduce more swarming capability?”

Correction: A previous version of this story incorrectly attributed a statement to Jacob Johnson and misstated that the ACV C4 was replacing the LAV, when it is only a candidate to replace it.

nationaldefensemagazine.org

6. Robert Kaplan: Think “Tragically” About War and Politics

As I have written before, I recommend Robert Kaplan's book.

Robert Kaplan: Think “Tragically” About War and Politics

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · May 8, 2023

Robert D. Kaplan ranks among this generation’s foremost commentators on international affairs, leavening reportage from the world’s farthest recesses with insights drawn from history, philosophy, and literature. Kaplan may have written his capstone work, but it’s more of an extended literary essay than his more traditional fare. In The Tragic Mind: Fear, Fate, and the Burden of Power, just out from Yale, Kaplan brings a bleak outlook drawn from Greek tragedy to the practice of statecraft. He wants to bend practitioners’ attitudes toward healthy caution.

This is not Kaplan’s first foray into Greek antiquity as a guide to diplomacy and warfare. Around the turn of the century he consulted classical historians such as Thucydides, often acclaimed the father of history, and Herodotus, history’s crazy uncle, along with other philosophers of bareknuckles politics—Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and kindred practitioner-scribes. He compiled his meditations into a short treatise titled Warrior Politics, subtitling it Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos.

In The Tragic Mind as in Warrior Politics, the author pleads with statesmen and soldiers to see the world as it is rather than how they want it to be. Here he turns to the inventors of tragedy, playwrights such as Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, for inspiration. His central idea is that “anxious foresight” constitutes the proper posture for makers and executors of policy and strategy. Oracles deceive; the world obtusely refuses to submit to human designs; actions have unintended and unwanted consequences; human beings are prone to hubris—outrageous pride that goes before a fall.

This is reality—and it warrants caution.

Successful practitioners of statecraft attune themselves to such unpleasant yet implacable realities. They set a high standard of proof for themselves before making the decision to launch themselves and their nations into such risky enterprises as power politics or warfare. That’s why Kaplan’s phrase anxious foresight is so well conceived. That foresight is a cardinal virtue is a staple among contributors to the strategic canon. But at the same time ancient Greeks—along with the Machiavellis and Clausewitzes of later centuries—entreat us to remember the limits to human foresight.

Humility, in other words, is as important as foresight among human virtues. It tempers ambition. All of us should be anxious about our limits—and pause to reflect before setting out to reshape the world around us. Would that Vladimir Putin had taken an anxious, fatalistic attitude before marching Russia into its military misadventure in Ukraine last year. The world would be a better place.

If you haven’t figured it out, I am a fan of The Tragic Mind, and I hope it finds wide readership among those in authority and those who oversee them. But I’m also conflicted about it as I seldom have been about Kaplan’s past works. Two critiques, one major, one minor. First, a repeated refrain in the book is that order is always better than anarchy. For example, in his commentary on Hamlet—Shakespeare is another author of Greek temperament whom Kaplan often brings up—the author proclaims that “order is paramount. It is the first step toward civilization. Only afterward can the work begin to make order less coercive.”

This Hobbesian claim seems to have come out of Kaplan’s experiences on the ground in Iraq, when he witnessed the tyranny of Saddam Hussein firsthand and later, following the 2003 invasion, saw the mayhem that convulsed that unhappy land after the despot’s overthrow. Leviathan was unpleasant but better than the alternative. Kaplan wrestles with the implications of declaring order paramount. He seems to espy two problems: how to reform a tyrannical order if suffering under one, and how to replace a tyrannical order swiftly and with minimal chaos if you decide to essay regime change.

It’s hard to see how Saddam’s rule could have been reformed from within. It was tried during the 1990s to no avail. Is a boot stamping on a human face forever really preferable to temporary anarchy that gives way to something more humane? I doubt Winston Smith would agree. Now, whether regime change should have been imposed from without is another question, and how the coalition tried to bring about regime change certainly deserves censure. It became clear fairly early on after the 2003 invasion that the U.S. military had forgotten its own counterinsurgent past. Political and military chieftains had little inkling that anarchy would sweep Iraq once Saddam’s boot was lifted, and little idea of how to replace tyranny with something better.

Needless human suffering resulted from the dearth of anxious foresight—as Kaplan points out.

Still, I would amend Kaplan’s claim slightly but significantly: order is always preferable to anarchy if there’s some realistic route to improve the existing order. That’s the point Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick made many years ago when distinguishing garden-variety dictatorships from totalitarian rule: the former could be moderated and improved over time while the latter could not. I think I’m with Kirkpatrick on this one.

Order is usually better than anarchy, but never say always.

That’s the major quibble. The minor one also relates to the invasion of Iraq and postwar anarchy. Over the past two decades Robert Kaplan has gone out of his way to remind readers that he backed the invasion and that he now considers that a mistake. I admire his honesty. It’s unusual. It’s far more common among commentators to quietly move on to some other topic after blundering, and without ever fessing up to the blunder. But Kaplan goes to the opposite extreme. I think after twenty years we can all stipulate that he believes he erred by failing to exercise anxious foresight. And we can move on without further ado, thanking him for his candor. He made a good-faith error at worst, and frankly the invasion’s aftermath would have turned out better had anxious foresight prevailed among coalition leaders.

Had political and military leaders heeded his counsel, in other words: Warrior Politics appeared on the eve of the invasion. Flinty-eyed coalition leaders may have fared better in Iraq.

For the record, I also backed the invasion. I did so “tepidly,” as I remember telling one of my University of Georgia colleagues when she asked the day before the armies stepped out. Tepidly because so much can go wrong in politics and warfare. (Not that my views mattered much back then; I was a Ph.D. student and university researcher writing for a regional newspaper in Georgia. If I was an opinion-maker, it was on a small scale.) Like Kaplan, I had humanitarian motives for going along with the endeavor, having been in the Persian Gulf in 1991 and seen the brutality that befell the Marsh Arabs and other rebellious segments of the Iraqi populace after coalition forces withdrew.

But mostly I backed the undertaking because I saw it as a defense of the U.N. system: Saddam had repeatedly defied U.N. Security Council resolutions enacted following Desert Storm, and eventually there had to be a penalty for defying the ceasefire terms and related U.N. mandates. QED.

That’s essentially the case Robert Kaplan has been making about the Biden administration’s stance toward the Russo-Ukraine war. The White House portrays the war as a struggle between freedom and autocracy; Kaplan has urged U.S. leaders to recast it as a defense of the system of international law and order, and in particular of the principle that the strong may not amend international frontiers by force of arms at the expense of the weak. That principle has been enshrined in international law at least since the League of Nations Covenant a century ago. It’s worth defending.

Granted, back in 2003 coalition leaders did not frame their case chiefly in terms of upholding the integrity of international law. But they could have, rather than burrow down the rabbit hole of weapons of mass destruction. An appeal to the rule of law would have made sense vis-à-vis Saddam Hussein’s Iraq then, and it makes sense in policy toward Russia and Ukraine today.

So enough with the regrets, Professor Kaplan—and keep the good books coming!

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. The views voiced here are his alone.

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · May 8, 2023

7. You Are Not Destined to Live in Quiet Times by Walter Russell Mead

Excerpts:

Progress has done many things for us, and few of us would exchange the dentistry, for example, of our time with that of even the recent past. But progress turns out to be paradoxical. Human ingenuity has made us much safer from natural calamities. We can treat many diseases, predict storms, build dams both to prevent floods and to save water against drought, and many other fine things. Many fewer of us starve than in former times, and billions of us today enjoy better living conditions than our forebears dreamed possible.

Yet if we are safer from most natural catastrophes, we are more vulnerable than ever to human-caused ones. Not only do we all live under the shadow of nuclear weapons and artificial general intelligence. We also live under the threat of financial catastrophe from the unanticipated convulsions of a banking system that few of us, and perhaps none of us, really understand. The impact of human industrial and agricultural activity on the natural environment threatens our future whether from climate change globally or the effects of air pollution in our hometowns. The social anomie characteristic of a decadent Blue Model society combined with the availability of cheap drugs contributes to more than 100,000 premature deaths in the United States each year. The 20th century saw stunning advances in medicine that saved millions of lives; millions more were lost in the fierce and unrelenting wars and repressions of that terrible time.

While the ever-accelerating and ascending wave of human progress has brought us to peaks of achievement and affluence that our ancestors could scarcely imagine, it has both failed to keep us safe from the most dangerous predators of all and—to the degree that the rate of progress has become a major force of destabilization—progress itself may now be the greatest source of danger humans face.

As I wrote in my last essay, we live in a singular century, and it is impossible to grasp either the psychology or the politics of our time without considering how this new reality affects a world that is already laboring under unprecedented stress.

You Are Not Destined to Live in Quiet Times

Humanity’s third major technological revolution is leading us into a future more promising and also more dangerous than any since the dawn of history. It’s coming faster than you think.

Tablet · by Walter Russell Mead · May 8, 2023

The COVID pandemic and the rise of AI have something in common. Between them, they have upended one of the most consequential debates among American tech analysts, and largely refuted the claim that progress in America was coming to an end—that the Adams curve was flattening out as a Great Stagnation cooled the dynamism of American life.

The case for stagnation was a strong one. Current technologies, advocates warned, were providing diminishing returns, and productivity growth in American life was slowing. The regulatory burden on innovation in the United States inexorably grew. Compared with the optimism that accompanied earlier innovations like electricity, indoor plumbing, the internal combustion engine, antibiotics, refrigeration, and mass communications, Americans in the internet age seemed noticeably more risk averse and pessimistic about the future.

The stagnationists make some important points. But as my friend Tyler Cowen noted in his seminal 2011 book The Great Stagnation: How America Ate All the Low-Hanging Fruit of Modern History, Got Sick, and Will (Eventually) Feel Better, stagnation was never likely to be more than a pause. By 2020, Tyler saw the pause coming to an end as advances in medicine, battery technology, computing, and distance-working made themselves felt.

The alternation between a sense of stagnation and one of dizzyingly rapid change reflects, I think, the complexity of human society’s progression up the Adams curve. As a hiker begins to climb a mountain, it becomes harder to see the summit, and harder still to see—as the trail winds through forests and takes you up onto ridges and down into valleys—whether you are in fact making any progress. But along the way, there will be moments when you get a clear view of the summit looming above you and the immense distances you have already climbed, and those doubts will be stilled.

The advent of AI and the COVID pandemic provided two such moments of clarity. The swift appearance and rapid development of practical AI applications on a mass scale has surprised and alarmed many people close to the industry. Geoffrey Hinton, widely credited with developing the intellectual foundation for modern AI, resigned from Google last week to warn about the dangers of an invention so disruptive that he regrets helping to develop it. Hinton’s warning follows a letter signed by some well-regarded tech analysts and industry leaders ranging from Steve Wozniak to Elon Musk cautioning that the unchecked development of AI could pose a threat to the stability or even the survival of civilization as we know it.

Via Meadia

The pandemic also showed us how far we have come. When COVID hit, and a panicked population looked for ways to stay safe, Americans discovered something that made this pandemic different from all others: The development of both the hardware and software in the enormous invisible realm we vaguely refer to as “the internet” had reached the point where the majority of the productive activities of American society could be conducted by tens of millions of people without leaving their homes.

But the impact of internet-empowered work from home (WFH) went far beyond helping us get past COVID. Without anybody really noticing, and with some of the world’s most acute observers lamenting the end of progress, the technological basis for a total transformation of the American workplace, urban landscape, and even family had quietly taken shape offstage. The characteristic workplace of the Industrial Revolution, the large, centralized workspace to which white-collar workers commute like clockwork five days a week, is no longer an economic necessity. The megacity of the Industrial Revolution, with an economically dominant central business district surrounded by rings of suburbs, is no longer a natural and inevitable form dictated by the nature of work. The potential for mass WFH also points toward a profound change in the nature of the family of the industrial era—when, uniquely in human history, most children and most parents in nonelite families spent most of their waking hours living separately from each other.

Productivity statistics, which essentially divide the value of a worker’s output by the amount of time spent on the job, do not capture these realities. Time spent at a desk is one thing, but the time spent commuting matters if we want to think more holistically. According to Census Bureau figures, the average commuter in the New York metro area spent roughly 75 minutes per day or 375 minutes per week commuting in 2019, the last year before the pandemic. During the pandemic, those workers produced essentially the same work without the commute, an efficiency gain of 15.6%. Factor in the reduced costs (gas, tolls, depreciation on cars, and bus and train fares), and it’s clear that the WFH model offers significant increases in the efficiency of work.

The ultimate impact on social productivity is likely to be higher still. The vast and cumbersome transit systems that the pre-internet economies required are costly to build and maintain. They contribute significantly to both public and private costs. If future economic growth can be unshackled from the need to endlessly expand these systems, so that cities and states do not have to invest such eyewatering sums in adding new lanes to existing freeways or building and operating new transit systems, a lot of money will be freed up. Similarly, workers will have fewer costs even as they enjoy more free time.

The big waves of change we call economic revolutions don’t just increase the amount of economic activity in a particular society. They change the nature of economic activity in ways that can be difficult to capture or understand. At the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, many economists shared the view of the physiocrats that agricultural production was the true basis of society and that all others were parasites. For them, agricultural productivity was the only kind that mattered. Industry, finance, and the service sector were irrelevant and unproductive. For these economists, developments like the early steam engines and spinning jennies were meaningless epiphenomena.

That would change. The Industrial Revolution would force shifts in economic theory and promote massive changes in the way economists measured and valued economic activity. Similarly, today as the economy develops and both the means of production and the objects of production mutate into radically new forms, we will have to develop new ideas about how the economy works and new measurements to tell us how well we are doing. Progress in the industrial era involved, among other things, developing new and faster ways to move commuters to and from the workplace. Progress in the information age may mean finding ways to help them achieve greater productivity without leaving their homes.

For all the talk of stagnation, the Adams curve remains a basic fact of contemporary life, and our society can expect new waves of both social and economic change as the 21st century proceeds. The best way to understand how that reality shapes our political and cultural environment is to step back from the present and look at the long view—at the role that technological and social development has played in the story of our kind. The picture that emerges is both promising and troubling.

The story of our species is full of surprises and plot twists, but just about as far back as we can explore the fossil record, the human family seems to be preoccupied with two principal fields of activity.

First, from the time of our remote ancestors to the present day, human beings have never stopped developing new tools and thinking up new ways to harness natural objects and forces to achieve human ends. Second, we’ve never ceased weaving thicker and more intricate webs of society, language, and culture. (The third thing we keep doing, having fights with other groups of humans, is, I think, best seen as a byproduct of our web-weaving activity.)

Whether measured by social or technical development, we’ve come a long way. Our culture and our technology are both unrecognizably complex compared to the achievements of our forebears. Our ancestors chipped flints on the savannah; today our telescopes scour remote galaxies for signs of the origins of the universe. We once lived in small family units and survived on what we hunted and gathered. Today we build vast cities and feast on exotic foods imported from all over the world.

Materialists like Karl Marx would say that technological progress drives cultural development. Idealists will tell you that it’s the culture and above all the ideas that drive events. To understand the arguments, think of the piano. Materialistically inclined musicologists argue that progress in the construction of new and more sonorous pianos allowed Ludwig van Beethoven to develop increasingly complex music. Their colleagues of a more idealistic or romantic bent would maintain that the unceasing demands by Beethoven and his contemporaries for better pianos to play the music they heard in their heads drove piano manufacturers to build instruments that kept the customers happy.

These chicken and egg controversies are hard to settle, but for my part, I’ve always thought Aristotle had the right approach. His definition of human beings as political animals points us to an understanding of human nature that integrates the “spiritual” and “material” elements of our lives into a seamless whole. As animals, we are grounded in the material world, but it is also part of our nature to engage with the world of abstractions and cultural meaning that go into our common existence. We are amphibians, intellectual and spiritual beings who spontaneously and naturally engage in logical reasoning, aesthetic creation, and moral discernment; and we are physical beings who live and act in the material world from which we draw our sustenance.

Whether you go with the materialists, the idealists, or us incarnationists, the outlines of the story are the same. As far back into the distant past as we can peer, human beings have been developing tools and techniques to impress their will on the natural environment, and they’ve been interacting with each other to create an ever-thicker web of social interaction and cultural meaning.

This may seem tediously obvious, but if there’s one thing I’ve learned over the decades, it’s the importance of interrogating the obvious. What could be more obvious and even humdrum than an apple falling from a tree? Many of the great discoveries and achievements come about because a determined person grabs hold of some apparently obvious phenomenon, demands to understand it and, like Jacob wrestling with the angel, says “I will not let you go until you bless me.”

There are three admittedly obvious things about the long story of human progress that I find indispensable when it comes to making sense of our times. The first is that while technological change and social and cultural change go hand in hand, they do not always move in the same direction or at the same pace—a fact that is particularly important when the pace of change is extremely rapid.

Living as we do in a time of rapid technological and social change, the gap between the world our institutions and cultural values took shape in and the conditions we live in today means that many of our most important institutions do not work very well. It is as if we were trying to run the software of the 2020s on computer hardware and operating systems from the 1990s.

Our political parties and institutions took shape long before the internet and social media existed. Our government bureaucracies, our schools, and our legal system were all built for conditions that no longer exist. Many of our labor market policies assume that people will work for one employer for most of their working lives.

Unfortunately, this is not just a matter of institutional hardware. Many of our political ideas and ideological assumptions also reflect the conditions of an earlier era. If society’s operating system is running on the equivalent of a long-outdated version of Windows, that makes real reform difficult to imagine, and harder still to carry out.

The bad news is that this creates a pervasive and self-reinforcing sense of alienation and frustration as people interact with many different institutions that are not fit for the purpose. The good news is that thinking clearly about these gaps and their causes can help us develop a reform agenda that can substantially improve the way America works—and those changes, because they make our institutions more efficient as well as more effective, will often save money rather than require greater spending.

It looks as if we are entering an age of permanent revolution, in which radical technological and social changes cascade across the world largely nonstop.

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The second feature of the story of human progress that matters today is that we happen to be caught up in one of the three great waves of change that most historians dignify with capital letters and associate with revolutions. The Neolithic, Industrial, and Information Revolutions all mark major milestones in the human story. The reality that we are now living through one of them is a fundamental feature of our time and one of the chief causes behind many of the problems and controversies we face.

Revolution is one of the most overused words in the political lexicon, but no lesser word adequately describes the scale, disruptiveness, and consequences of these three explosive events in the human story. The Neolithic Revolution, as the wave of changes connected to the development of settled agriculture is often called, was much more than a revolution in the ways people fed themselves. It was, literally, the dawn of history, as the first writing systems developed to handle the greater needs for permanent recordkeeping and commercial transaction under the new conditions. Those systems did not just enable the rise of bureaucracies and mercantile trade. Oral traditions were written down, forming the basis of organized religion. Scientific enquiries and philosophical debates could transcend the limits of space and time, as scholars could read the words of their predecessors.

The Neolithic Revolution was a time of explosive social change. The rise of cities and the elaborate political structures needed to govern them are just some of the consequences of the shift. Class systems developed along with increased specialization of labor as the relatively homogenous communities of previous eras gave way to a world of kings, nobles, priests, merchants, artisans, peasants, and slaves. Armies with professional soldiers appeared for the first time, along with wars of conquest.

The consequences of the Industrial Revolution were similarly far-reaching. At the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, cavalry officers still charged across battlefields sword in hand. The last great war of the industrial era concluded with the detonation of nuclear bombs. From the Enlightenment and the French Revolution to the rise of Marxism and the Russian and Chinese revolutions, the intellectual and political movements of the last 250 years have transformed the face of the world and led humanity on a series of adventures both magnificent and tragic.

The development of railroads, automobiles, and airplanes introduced changes in human culture and civilization that we still struggle to process. Unprecedented developments in mining, industry, and methods of energy generation and transmission have covered the Earth with the works of mankind. Urbanization, the rise of the industrial working class, the growth of nationalism, the development of mass public education, the cultural impact of mass entertainments like Hollywood movies: Each of these changes emerged from the all-conquering impact of the Industrial Revolution.

These are still early days, but the Information Revolution seems fated to be more dramatic still. A cascade of interlocking, interrelated social and technological change is driving global upheaval at an unprecedented speed. Before its work is done, the Information Revolution is likely to drive social, political, cultural, economic, and geopolitical transformations more sweeping and profound than anything the Industrial Revolution produced.

This is both a wonderful and a terrifying thing. On the one hand, humanity is becoming more productive and affluent than ever before. Already the average person with a cellphone has faster access to more information than anybody in the history of the world. New methods of research incorporating artificial intelligence have already accelerated the development of new treatments for disease, and the promise of these and similar technologies is only beginning to be fulfilled.

But that is not the whole story. New technologies enable government and corporate snooping on a scale that would have astounded (and delighted) Josef Stalin. Manufacturing and clerical jobs have been automated out of existence or outsourced to poor countries at rates that match the collapse of family farming in the 19th and 20th centuries. IT-enabled weapons and cyberattacks could make wars even deadlier and harder to avoid. Global and national financial systems, experiencing unprecedented rates of change and development as AI and other new technologies enable financial markets to achieve levels of complexity and velocity that the unaided human mind cannot comprehend, could experience devastating crises costing trillions of dollars and upending millions of lives.

Meanwhile, the Industrial Revolution continues across much of the world. Factories are still springing up in rice paddies across Asia; the first textile mills are popping up in some African countries. The massive migration to the cities across much of Africa and Asia continues even as the disruptions of the Information Revolution reverberate around the globe. The children of illiterate herdsmen scan social media on their cellphones. The world has never seen anything like this concatenation of explosive transformations, and the world that emerges from this era will be like nothing humanity has ever seen or dreamed.

This brings us to another feature of the ancient story of human progress that matters especially in our era: the tendency of human development to accelerate and intensify over time.

For thousands of years, the pace of humanity’s growing technological prowess and social complexity was almost unnoticeable over an individual lifespan. Archeologists can trace the spread of new techniques for chipping flints and making tools through prehistoric human society; historians and archeologists can work together to understand the spread of new metalworking techniques in the Bronze and Iron ages. But change was slow, and many people around the world never saw a tool or had an idea that would not have been familiar to their grandparents. And even when change happened, it was usually seen as an exceptional development, a stone falling into a pool that would, after the ripples died down, resume its previous and natural calm.

But over the last 700 years, the rate of human progress began perceptibly to pick up steam. Starting in Western Europe, the rate of technological and social change accelerated as a new kind of dynamism made itself felt. Windmills, double-entry bookkeeping, cannons, printing presses: World-changing inventions poured forth at an unprecedented rate.

This acceleration changed the way that history works. The Neolithic Revolution, associated with settled agriculture and the invention of writing, came thousands of years before the Industrial Revolution. The Industrial Revolution was only about two centuries old when the Information Revolution started to hit late in the 20th century. Increasingly, especially with advances in genetics and the science of the brain coming so quickly, it looks as if we are entering an age of permanent revolution in which radical technological and social changes cascade across the world largely nonstop. For people in our time, rapid and accelerating change is the norm; we hardly know anymore what stability feels like.

Much of the intellectual history of the last two centuries revolves around the efforts of great thinkers to wrap their heads around the Great Acceleration. The family of intellectual and political movements generally known as the Enlightenment grew out of the recognition of thinkers ranging from Voltaire to Goethe that something fundamental in the human condition had changed. Philosophers like Kant and Hegel were not just, like many of their predecessors, interested in unraveling the nature of existence. They found themselves drawn to the study of change. They were aware that the social and technological basis of European society was changing from decade to decade and even year to year. They wanted to understand what this meant, why it was happening, and what it portended for the future.

A heightened awareness of human progress and its impact on events led to the integration of philosophy and politics. “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways. The point however is to change it.” Those words inscribed on Karl Marx’s tomb highlight the new sense of mission that impelled generations of thinkers to turn their understanding of the historical process into a concrete political program. Liberals and socialists developed competing programs to accelerate the process of progress and share its benefits more widely based on their understanding of the technological and sociological forces at work.

These debates still echo in politics today, but many 21st-century thinkers and activists have increasingly moved from a fascination with the fact of change to an alarmed analysis of the effects of its relentlessly accelerating rate. Change itself is old hat for us today. In 18th-century Europe, reflective people understood that the rate of historical change was significantly greater than in past times, and they were conscious of ongoing progress in technology and society as the unavoidable background of their own lives. In the 21st century, we don’t just feel the presence of progress. We feel the acceleration of progress as the Information Revolution unfolds. It is the consequences of that acceleration—both as we experience it today and as we extrapolate it into the future—that engage our attention and, increasingly, our concern.

Apocalypse used to be a religious, even a mythological concept. But in our time, it is becoming a political possibility.

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Progress in small, measured doses is an exhilarating and energizing thing. But can there be too much of it? Can an individual or a society overdose on progress? Can the rate of social, economic, cultural, and technological change drive a particular society into a political, psychological, and moral spiral of crisis and dysfunction?

Judging from the history of the Industrial Revolution, the answer is yes. The Russian Revolution and the Nazi rise to power are only two examples of societies overwhelmed by the social and political stresses that rapid modernization brought. The Industrial Revolution and the international conflicts that accompanied it shook the foundations of social order around the world and produced a uniquely stressful international situation. Tested to the breaking point by the combination of the domestic and international consequences of the Industrial Revolution, Germany fell into one kind of abyss, Russia into another.

They were not alone. The multiethnic, multicultural states that characterized much of 18th- and 19th-century Europe disappeared in orgies of bloodletting as the Hapsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman empires dissolved. The collapse of Iran into the dismal fanaticism of the Islamic Republic, the serial disasters of Maoist China, genocides in Cambodia, Rwanda, and beyond: Each of these tragedies has its own distinct set of causes and consequences, but without the domestic and global upheavals associated with the Industrial Revolution and its numerous transformations of the human arena, it’s unlikely that any of these tragedies would have occurred.

The Anglo-American world was spared the worst of these upheavals, and after the horrors of World War II much of Western Europe and Japan seemed to have made their peace with the Industrial Revolution. During the long Cold War era, and with even more confidence after the fall of the Soviet Union, most people in these societies assumed that the political stability and social peace they had finally managed to build was a lasting and permanent achievement.

But is it? What if the Information Revolution, as seems likely, arrives faster, propagates more widely, hits harder, and digs deeper than the Industrial Revolution ever did?

As the rate of change increases globally, even the nimblest and most adaptable societies must struggle to adjust. The social and political unrest and dissatisfaction in the United States, leading some to fear an irretrievable breakdown in our political system, reflects America’s difficulties in coming to terms with the latest wave of tech-driven social and economic change.

America’s difficulties are not unique. Both democratic and authoritarian political systems around the world are facing new strains under the pressure of economic disruption, cultural conflict, and the corrosive impacts of social media.

The sense is widespread today, among elites as well as among the public at large, that the dogs of technological and economic change have slipped the leash: that things are happening to us faster than we can understand, much less control. “Things are in the saddle and ride mankind,” as Emerson wrote in the turmoil of the Industrial Revolution. Today, as I’ve written before, many feel that we don’t surf the web as much as the web surfs us.

Faced with the evident consequences of an accelerating rate of progress on an already-frayed social fabric, both intellectuals and activists have, since the early stages of the Industrial Revolution, looked for ways to slow, stop, or reverse the incoming tide. It didn’t work for King Canute, and it didn’t work for the 19th-century Luddites or the 20th-century Agrarians. Genies are not easily persuaded to return to their bottles. Progress is not going away, and change is not going to slow because humanity would like a mental health break.

The answer to the perils of progress cannot be less progress. As we’ve seen, the processes of technological and social development that we call progress are grounded in human nature itself. William Blake might have moaned about the “dark Satanic mills” overspreading the beautiful English countryside as the Industrial Revolution lurched into existence, but those mills could no more be stopped from proliferating than the sun can be stopped from rising.

Nor should those mills have been stopped. For all the evils of the Industrial Revolution, and for all the toxic social and environmental consequences we have inherited from it, both the material and social conditions of human life substantially improved because of it. Billions of people moved from illiteracy to fuller participation in the riches of human knowledge, from subordination to fuller participation in political and cultural life, from subsistence to affluence and from bondage to freedom. To cite a much higher authority, the blind saw, the deaf heard, the lame walked, and the poor had good news shared with them.

The Industrial Revolution was both soaring triumph and searing tragedy, glorious cultural and scientific achievement and unspeakable cruelty and crime. Far from being unique to that epoch, the mix of great good and great evil is what we see wherever we look in the long annals of our kind. The rise of the Roman Empire, the allied victory in World War II, the decolonization of Africa, and the history of the United States of America all combine these features of extraordinary accomplishment and shocking horror.

That is how we human beings roll. Our story of progress is not a made-for-children television special. History is rated X, not G, crammed to the bursting point with violence, injustice, foul language, nudity, and smoking. We’ve sailed on bloody seas to get to where we are, and the outlook is for more of the same. Trigger warnings should be posted in every delivery room. The world is not a safe space, and the arc of history is nobody’s poodle.

The way to cope with the onrushing waves of change and upheaval at home and abroad is to use the unprecedented financial, technological, cultural, and intellectual resources that progress creates to address the wrenchingly urgent and stupefyingly complex problems it inevitably brings. As a political movement the Luddites made nothing better for anyone. It was the wealth that the Industrial Revolution created, and the new forms of social and political organization that accompanied it, that allowed reformers to make the mills less dark and satanic over time.

If we are to surf the waves of change now rolling toward us instead of being overwhelmed by them, it will be because we have the wit, the wisdom, and the maturity to keep our psychological balance as we learn to bring the unprecedented resources of the Information Revolution effectively to bear on the unique demands of our time.

That would be a difficult task if the only challenge we faced came from the accelerating pace of change that defines our era. But there is one other complexity to consider. As the pace of change surges at an ever-increasing rate, the prospect of a fundamental change in the conditions of human existence looms larger from year to year. Will AI supersede humanity, leaving us inferior to the machines we have made? Will we upload our consciousness into cyberspace, perhaps downloading again into cloned designer bodies? Will we blow ourselves up in a nuclear holocaust or destroy ourselves in a series of climate catastrophes?

Apocalypse used to be a religious, even a mythological concept. But in our time, it is becoming a political possibility. The Silicon Valley tech lords speak of the Singularity even as some of them invest billions in longevity and consciousness research they hope will make them immortal. Climate activists warn of an imminent catastrophe even as the great powers rearm.

Progress has done many things for us, and few of us would exchange the dentistry, for example, of our time with that of even the recent past. But progress turns out to be paradoxical. Human ingenuity has made us much safer from natural calamities. We can treat many diseases, predict storms, build dams both to prevent floods and to save water against drought, and many other fine things. Many fewer of us starve than in former times, and billions of us today enjoy better living conditions than our forebears dreamed possible.

Yet if we are safer from most natural catastrophes, we are more vulnerable than ever to human-caused ones. Not only do we all live under the shadow of nuclear weapons and artificial general intelligence. We also live under the threat of financial catastrophe from the unanticipated convulsions of a banking system that few of us, and perhaps none of us, really understand. The impact of human industrial and agricultural activity on the natural environment threatens our future whether from climate change globally or the effects of air pollution in our hometowns. The social anomie characteristic of a decadent Blue Model society combined with the availability of cheap drugs contributes to more than 100,000 premature deaths in the United States each year. The 20th century saw stunning advances in medicine that saved millions of lives; millions more were lost in the fierce and unrelenting wars and repressions of that terrible time.

While the ever-accelerating and ascending wave of human progress has brought us to peaks of achievement and affluence that our ancestors could scarcely imagine, it has both failed to keep us safe from the most dangerous predators of all and—to the degree that the rate of progress has become a major force of destabilization—progress itself may now be the greatest source of danger humans face.

As I wrote in my last essay, we live in a singular century, and it is impossible to grasp either the psychology or the politics of our time without considering how this new reality affects a world that is already laboring under unprecedented stress.

Tablet · by Walter Russell Mead · May 8, 2023

8. Nationalism versus liberalism: A South Korean view of Taiwan issues

Excerpts;

These observations shed a new light on the mismatch between Beijing’s nationalistic rationale of unification and the Taiwanese people’s liberal aspiration for autonomous life. Beijing justifies its unification policy based on the assumption that Taiwanese share the same aspirations for national unification. During the 20th Party Congress, Xi asserted that “realizing China’s complete reunification is … a shared aspiration of all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation,” and that the people of Taiwan are members of “one family bound by blood.” However, survey data consistently indicates that those who support unification are a tiny minority in Taiwan. Thus, Chinese leaders’ assumption that “Taiwan compatriots” share the same dream of unification exists only in their imagination. It remains unclear why Chinese leaders continue to promote the unrealistic narrative of popular support for unification in Taiwan. One possible explanation is that they are worried about the rise of liberal forces within China itself and are trying to maintain control through a nationalistic unification campaign.

In short, South Koreans could be sympathetic to the shifting attitudes of Taiwanese citizens toward unification. The survey data and the comparative analysis above suggest that, while South Koreans may understand the Chinese aspiration for national unification, many would not support Beijing’s refusal to denounce war as a means of unification. The South Korean view reinforces the liberal logic that, although the international community may recognize Taiwan as a part of China, it opposes the tragedy of war that would entail Chinese forces killing Taiwanese citizens in the name of unification.

Nationalism versus liberalism: A South Korean view of Taiwan issues

Sungmin Cho

Professor - Daniel K. Inouye Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies

sungminchohi

The Brookings Institution · by Sungmin Cho · May 5, 2023

The Taiwan issue is often viewed by leaders of the United States and its allies as a contest between democracy and authoritarianism. From a South Korean perspective, however, the Taiwan issue also represents a clash between nationalism and liberalism. While democracy is defined by the process of forming a government through general elections, liberalism is centered on the ideas of individualism and the protection of inalienable rights against state coercion. Both South Koreans and Taiwanese citizens share a liberal aspiration to preserve their individual rights and protect their freedoms from being forced to sacrifice for the glory of national unification.

Despite their many differences, the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait are worth comparing. As Chinese officials frequently highlight, South and North Korea are recognized as two sovereign states, having been simultaneously admitted to the United Nations in 1991. In contrast, Taiwan’s sovereignty is not recognized by many countries, which only maintain diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. As a result, Taiwanese people must consider the consequences of declaring independence, which is not a concern for the general public in South Korea. However, when viewed through the lens of nationhood rather than statehood, similarities between the two regions begin to emerge. Benedict Anderson famously described a nation as “an imagined community.” Based on this definition, while Beijing claims that Taiwan is part of the Chinese state, Chinese leaders implicitly acknowledge that Taiwan is still a separate nation. Otherwise, why would they bother to speak of “national” unification? Therefore, while South Korea and Taiwan differ in their statehood, they deal with the similar issue of national unification.

As for Korean unification, North Korea’s motivation has been driven by ethnic nationalism. In 1980, Kim Il-sung, the founder of North Korea and the current leader’s grandfather, proposed a unified state called the “Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo,” advocating for a confederal system and a gradual process, including the removal of U.S. Forces Korea. Kim Jong-un asserts that he is fulfilling the historical mission of realizing the long-awaited unification dream of the entire Korean people. This nationalistic approach is widely supported by the North Korean people. In a 2019 survey of North Korean defectors who have resettled in South Korea, 87.1% of respondents said they supported unification when they lived in North Korea. The majority of them (41.4%) hoped for unification because they believe that “North and South Koreans are the same people.” While economic development and avoiding war were also cited as reasons for support, ethnic-based motivation accounted for the highest percentage.

On the other hand, while the South Korean government officially pursues unification, South Korean citizens have shown decreasing interest in the idea over time. According to a 2021 report from the Korean Institute of National Unification, South Korean’s preference for unification has dropped from 37.3% in 2016 to 22.3% in 2020, while their support for peaceful coexistence has increased from 43.1% to 56.5%. If South Koreans do express support for unification, it is often for pragmatic reasons such as removing security threats or creating opportunities for economic development, rather than seeing North Koreans as part of a single-ethnic nation. In particular, South Korean youth in their 20s and 30s have expressed a notably negative opinion toward unification. A striking 71.4% of those born after 1991 prefer peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas over national unification.

Undoubtedly, nationalism serves as the main driving force behind Beijing’s persistent pursuit of unification with Taiwan. In his 2019 “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” Xi Jinping linked national unification with the “China dream” of rejuvenating China’s prestige. At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi reiterated that Beijing would “never promise to give up the use of force” to achieve the goal of national reunification. The majority of Chinese people seem to support the national policy of unification. From a young age, Chinese people are taught the significance of national unification; children’s textbooks explicitly underscore that Taiwan is part of China. Whenever Taiwan-related issues make headlines, the hyper-nationalism of Chinese youth becomes apparent. For instance, when then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022, Chinese netizens expressed outrage and even demanded an extreme response, such as shooting down her plane.

In contrast, Taiwanese are increasingly withdrawing their support for national unification. The percentage of citizens who support unification with China has declined from 20% in 1996 to a mere 5% in 2022. Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of 84.7% rejected Beijing’s proposal of “one country, two systems” as a formula for unification. Notably, Taiwanese are increasingly identifying themselves as “Taiwanese” rather than Chinese. According to the survey of Taiwan’s National Chengchi University, the percentage of individuals identifying as “Chinese” plummeted from 25.4% to 2.4% between 1992 and 2022, while those who identify as “Taiwanese” rose from 17.6% to 63.7%. The trends of low support for unification and the identification of Taiwanese are particularly evident among young Taiwanese. Similar to young South Koreans, Taiwanese youth do not support the goal of unification based on the rationale of nationalism.

Both young South Koreans and Taiwanese have a distinct identity that is not based on the “imagined community” of the nation but on the norms and values of liberalism. While nationalism emphasizes the importance of the group over the individual, liberalism privileges the individual. From a nationalist perspective, individuals are expected to align their preferences with the goals of the nation. However, young South Koreans and Taiwanese view their individual rights as inalienable, which cannot be violated by state coercion. Those born after 1980 in South Korea and Taiwan spent their formative years after democratization. They are highly educated, well-traveled, and culturally cosmopolitan compared to previous generations. As a result, both young South Koreans and Taiwanese do not assume that they should submit their individual preferences for the nationalistic goal of unification.

These observations shed a new light on the mismatch between Beijing’s nationalistic rationale of unification and the Taiwanese people’s liberal aspiration for autonomous life. Beijing justifies its unification policy based on the assumption that Taiwanese share the same aspirations for national unification. During the 20th Party Congress, Xi asserted that “realizing China’s complete reunification is … a shared aspiration of all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation,” and that the people of Taiwan are members of “one family bound by blood.” However, survey data consistently indicates that those who support unification are a tiny minority in Taiwan. Thus, Chinese leaders’ assumption that “Taiwan compatriots” share the same dream of unification exists only in their imagination. It remains unclear why Chinese leaders continue to promote the unrealistic narrative of popular support for unification in Taiwan. One possible explanation is that they are worried about the rise of liberal forces within China itself and are trying to maintain control through a nationalistic unification campaign.

In short, South Koreans could be sympathetic to the shifting attitudes of Taiwanese citizens toward unification. The survey data and the comparative analysis above suggest that, while South Koreans may understand the Chinese aspiration for national unification, many would not support Beijing’s refusal to denounce war as a means of unification. The South Korean view reinforces the liberal logic that, although the international community may recognize Taiwan as a part of China, it opposes the tragedy of war that would entail Chinese forces killing Taiwanese citizens in the name of unification.

The author’s views in this article are his own and do not represent the perspectives of the U.S. Department of Defense or the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies.

The Brookings Institution · by Sungmin Cho · May 5, 2023

9. Chinese Company Now Owns Tutoring Firm Contracted by Military and Schools in U.S.

Just business? Or does China think owning these companies can provide an advantage? Will they be able to support a long term Chinese influence campaign?  

Is this a supporting effort of Unrestricted Warfare? What better way to conduct subversion of a society that to influence its education.

Or will the exposure of this sale cause Americans to say we are no longer going to allow our students to be influenced by companies that could have their content controlled by the CCP. Maybe these companies will note fail under Chinese ownership.

Recognize the enemy's strategy, understand it, EXPOSE It (to inoculate the people), and attack the strategy with a superior political warfare strategy.

Chinese Company Now Owns Tutoring Firm Contracted by Military and Schools in U.S.

Princeton Review and Tutor.com were quietly sold over a year ago

By Melissa Korn

Updated May 8, 2023 1:07 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/princeton-review-and-tutor-com-are-now-owned-by-a-chinese-company-58ebea38?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1

Princeton Review and Tutor.com say a Chinese private-equity firm has received regulatory approval to buy the test-prep company and online tutoring platform, more than 15 months after the acquisition closed.

Primavera Capital Group, based in Hong Kong, quietly purchased the well-known brands from Korean education company ST Unitas in January 2022, at a time of increased scrutiny of Chinese investment in the U.S.

Investments in the tech and infrastructure industries, or ones that deal with significant amounts of potentially sensitive personal data, are sometimes reviewed by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., a federal panel that scrutinizes acquisition plans by foreign investors for national security concerns.

Cfius reviews are confidential, though companies are allowed to disclose their involvement. A spokeswoman for the Treasury Department said the committee doesn’t publicly comment on transactions that they may or may not be reviewing or have reviewed. She said the committee “is committed to taking all necessary actions within its authority to safeguard U.S. national security.” 

Tutor.com has a longstanding contract to provide its services free to active duty, reserve and other U.S. military service members, Defense Department personnel, and their dependents. It also holds contracts with school districts including those in Los Angeles, Paterson, N.J., and Loudoun County, Va., to provide online homework help and subject-matter tutoring, and is listed as a vetted vendor by the Texas Education Agency, New Hampshire Department of Education and agencies in other states.

National security analysts and lawyers who help foreign companies navigate the regulatory process for U.S. acquisitions say Chinese companies have grown more skittish about publicizing their U.S. investments, for fear of raising suspicions about data security.

The U.S. is paying closer attention to such deals as it increasingly views China as an adversary, said Elly Rostoum, a former U.S. intelligence analyst and lecturer at Johns Hopkins University who studies the national security implications of investment by Chinese companies. “There’s reason for that hype,” she said. “There’s reason for the U.S. to be worried about those transactions.” 

The U.S. government has interpreted Chinese national security laws to mean that any organization based there, whether it is a state-owned enterprise, a startup, an investment manager or a large corporation, can be compelled to share information with Beijing if asked to do so. 

Ms. Rostoum said whether or not the Chinese government has demanded such data from companies, the legislation allowing it should be enough to cause concern among American regulators.

TikTok parent ByteDance has faced significant backlash over its ties to China, with authorities saying a 2020 plan to partner with Oracle and Walmart to create a U.S.-based company didn’t protect users enough from potential interference by Beijing. Lawmakers have expressed continued concern over user data protection and whether the Chinese government could influence what the platform shows, such as pushing content supporting a preferred political candidate.

In recent years, Cfius has intensified its oversight of foreign companies with interests in technology, data and infrastructure. It can review mergers and acquisitions before or after they close, and can sign off on the plans or push for divestments or other mitigation measures if it identifies potential national security red flags.

Primavera has invested in companies including Alibaba, Yum China, ByteDance and the Chinese instant-formula business of Reckitt Benckiser Group. Last year it used a blank-check company to take luxury fashion company Lanvin Group public in the U.S. Primavera also owns Spring Education, which runs hundreds of private schools under brands including Laurel Springs School, LePort Montessori and Basis Independent Schools. 

Charlesbank Capital took Princeton Review private in 2012, and then in 2014 sold it to IAC/InterActive Corp., which had bought Tutor.com in 2013. In 2017, the combined test prep and tutoring company was sold to the Korean company ST Unitas. 

The Korea Economic Daily reported in early January 2022 that ST Unitas wanted to unload the two brands for around $100 million, in an effort to focus on its domestic offerings. Primavera declined to comment on the deal terms. 

The latest deal happened without much fanfare. There was no press release from Primavera, and neither Princeton Review nor Tutor.com are among the 54 companies featured on the private-equity firm’s list of portfolio investments. 

Tutor.com sent a letter to its tutors on Jan. 13, 2022, two days after the acquisition closed, notifying them of the new ownership while assuring them that their day-to-day interactions with the company wouldn’t change. District and state contracts show it wasn’t required to alert all of its clients, and some school administrators around the country say they only learned of the ownership change from The Wall Street Journal.

Last week, the Princeton Review and Tutor.com websites added references to their new parent company. 

Primavera, Princeton Review and Tutor.com said they weren’t hiding the deal, and that soon after the acquisition closed last year they filed the requisite notifications in the federal contracting system, which is publicly accessible.

Tutor.com collects data on users and tutors, including names, home addresses, IP addresses and recordings of their sessions. National security experts say the concern isn’t what China’s government would do with that information now, but rather how that information could be collected to create files on individuals or their families down the line, or whether information could eventually be disaggregated. 

“Our commitment to safeguarding student privacy endures,” Tutor.com and Princeton Review said in a statement to the Journal. They said no student or school data is shared with Primavera and the private-equity firm doesn’t have access to the company’s internal systems. They said they can provide information to Primavera only “on an anonymized, aggregated and de-identified basis.”

Primavera told the Journal in late March that it had submitted all required filings and notifications for U.S. government approval, without detailing where it sent those notifications. As of early May, approval had been granted, the company said.

Write to Melissa Korn at Melissa.Korn@wsj.com

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the May 9, 2023, print edition as 'Chinese Company Buys Tutoring Firm With U.S. Military Contract'.

10. Rethinking Tradeoffs Between Europe and the Indo-Pacific

Conclusion:

Europe and the Indo-Pacific are by no means the only theaters of importance in the world today. But they are the theaters that draw the bulk of U.S. military attention and capabilities, so the tradeoffs between them are particularly difficult. Under Putin, Russia once again presents a direct threat to U.S. allies in Europe. NATO should reinvest in its ability to collectively deter and defend allied territory and populations, which will require the sustained focus of its European members. But the solidarity shown by Japan, Australia, and South Korea — not to mention China’s tacit support for Russia — underlines how European security is increasingly intertwined with Indo-Pacific dynamics. Moreover, the willingness of some Asian partners to sanction Russia and provide assistance to Ukraine will no doubt spur European debate about taking reciprocal action in the event of a crisis in the Indo-Pacific, particularly one involving Taiwan.

It is therefore high time to shift the discussion from whether Europe and the Indo-Pacific are interdependent or not to how interdependence in different areas should alter strategic decision-making. Doing so can help to inform decisions about how to strike an appropriate balance between the need to set priorities on the one hand, and the existence of cross-theater synergies on the other.

So far, analysts have heaped too much responsibility on the United States, without paying adequate attention to how European and Indo-Pacific allies can help alleviate the challenge of strategic simultaneity by stepping up their roles in their respective regions and assisting efforts in each other’s regions. To get the mix right, leaders in the United States, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific should collectively reflect on how best to prioritize across these two regions in terms of time, capabilities, and policy areas. This is no easy task, but the time to have these debates is now, before like-minded countries are confronted by a more serious risk of simultaneous two-front contingencies.

Rethinking Tradeoffs Between Europe and the Indo-Pacific - War on the Rocks

LUIS SIMÓN AND ZACK COOPER

warontherocks.com · by Luis Simón · May 9, 2023

How should the United States and its allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific prioritize across these two key regions? Prioritization is central to any strategy, but today too many experts act as if U.S. strategy must be all or nothing. Some argue that Eurasia now comprises a single region and that standing together against Russia in Europe is necessary to deter China in Asia. Others insist that there is little tying the two regions together and that the war in Ukraine is distracting Washington from addressing the long-term systemic challenge posed by Beijing.

But instead of arguing over whether the United States should prioritize, the right question is how best to do so. Europe and the Indo-Pacific are separate but increasingly interconnected theaters that require prioritization across three dimensions: time, capabilities, and policy areas.

On prioritizing across time, addressing Russia’s threat to European security, degrading Russian military power, and stimulating Europe’s remilitarization can help to set the foundations for a sustainable U.S. prioritization of the China challenge in the Indo-Pacific. If simultaneous contingencies involve both regions, Washington should be prepared to hold in Europe and shift its main focus to first defeating China. Better integrating European and Indo-Pacific allies into U.S. defense planning can help to square such a two-front predicament.

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On prioritizing with regard to capabilities, Washington should emphasize new capabilities that are China-focused, while leveraging legacy assets to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression. This means creating a mixed force but with a focus on the maritime and air capabilities most needed in the Pacific.

Finally, in prioritizing areas of competition, Europe may not be a primary military player in a China contingency, but it can still play an important diplomatic, economic, and technological role. The United States should therefore ensure that its European and Indo-Pacific allies and partners are cooperating on issues ranging from an anti-coercion instrument to diplomatic messaging.

Prioritizing Across Time

The war in Ukraine has led to much speculation about whether Europe and the Indo-Pacific constitute a single theater. Thus far, the imperative of supporting Ukraine’s defense seems to have brought U.S. allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific closer together. Nonetheless, the fact that stability in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific revolve around the same factor — U.S. military power — underscores the existence of strategic tradeoffs between both regions.

Russia’s underwhelming performance in Ukraine suggests it may not be in a position to overturn the European balance of power anytime soon, let alone the global one. However, Moscow has formidable nuclear capabilities, and can still threaten U.S. allies in Europe with its conventional forces. Beyond Europe, it can continue to act as a strategic spoiler and undermine U.S. and allied interests across the globe.

The United States recognizes the growing disparity between Russia and China, calling Russia an “acute threat” while describing China as the “pacing challenge.” This puts the Indo-Pacific on a higher level strategically. But ultimately, temporal tradeoffs depend on whether China and Russia probe or strike simultaneously. The fact that China has opted not to use Russia’s war in Ukraine as a window for opportunistic aggression against Taiwan does not mean that Russia would act similarly if the tables were turned.

Determining whether simultaneous aggression in Europe and the Indo-Pacific might occur requires a careful and systematic assessment of the evolving Sino-Russian relationship. The 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy warns that China and Russia “could seek to create dilemmas globally for the joint force in the event of U.S. engagement in a crisis or conflict with the other.” Russian and Chinese views of the war in Ukraine could go a long way in determining the likelihood of them launching simultaneous challenges in each region.

China may calculate that a protracted war in Ukraine could push the United States to pivot back to Europe, undermine trans-Atlantic and Atlantic-Pacific political cohesion, and erode America’s defense-industrial capacity. However, this is by no means a foregone conclusion. The war could also revive U.S. and allied defense industrial capacity, strengthen a trans-Atlantic/trans-Pacific front against autocratic revisionism, and generate important operational lessons for the United States and its allies. Ultimately, the critical question of whether the United States, China, or Russia will benefit or lose more from the war cannot be answered with any degree of certainty.

So far, the war appears to have impacted the Sino-Russian relationship in two main ways. First, it has strengthened ties between Moscow and Beijing. Far from backing away from Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping appears to be doubling down by visiting Russia and echoing Moscow’s talking points. Second, the war appears to have altered the balance within the relationship, underscoring Russia’s growing dependence on China for diplomatic support, energy supplies, and economic diversification.

Indeed, the notion that China has all the leverage in the relationship and Russia has become the junior partner is increasingly widespread. Some have even argued that China is leveraging its influence over Russia — and supporting its actions in Ukraine — to get Moscow to deplete U.S. national security resources. While such considerations may well inform Chinese calculations, we should also avoid falling into the trap of assuming that Russia is completely beholden to China.

If Beijing sees itself as Washington’s main competitor, then it should have a strong interest in preserving an amicable relationship with Moscow. The fact that a junior status is antithetical to Russia’s foreign policy tradition — let alone Putin’s own inclination — raises questions about the sustainability of this model. Conversely, Europeans cannot rule out the possibility of further Russian aggressive behavior, should a contingency in Asia pull away America’s attention.

If two simultaneous conflicts occur, the United States would likely put Asia first. Washington would work with its European allies to hold a Russian advance while turning its main focus to terminating a conflict with China, before shifting attention and resources back to Russia. The acknowledgment that the Indo-Pacific would likely come first may lead some to reach the conclusion that U.S. force structure should be designed only to deal with China, and China’s challenge in the Indo-Pacific more specifically. But as we argue below, this logic is problematic.

Prioritizing Military Capabilities

Just as important as prioritizing across time is prioritizing across capabilities. After all, a war with Russia in Europe would primarily be a ground conflict with a significant air component, while a contingency with China in the Indo-Pacific would revolve around allied maritime and air capabilities. The fact that many of the ground forces that the United States has parked in Europe are unlikely to be required in a Taiwan contingency suggests that tradeoffs can be avoided in certain areas. On the other hand, the debate over how the United States should spend its defense dollars highlights important tradeoffs regarding the extent to which Washington should prioritize Asia-specific assets over Europe-specific ones.

To what extent should the United States prioritize fungible assets over theater-specific ones? Some assets, such as bomber aircraft and nuclear-powered ships, are highly fungible — they can be transferred relatively quickly across theaters. Others, like heavy ground units, are logistically intense and less easily moved. In addition, some assets are moveable but are likely to have more operational impact in one region — such as anti-ship missile launchers, which are more critical in an Indo-Pacific contingency.

Some experts are tempted by the idea that the United States should invest in a “global swing force” while its European and Indo-Pacific allies prioritize in-theater capabilities and logistics-intense assets. From a pure efficiency standpoint, this may make good sense. But it raises questions about the willingness of U.S. allies to trade security for autonomy by accepting a functional division of labor that reinforces their dependence on the United States. This dilemma becomes particularly acute as allies worry about being de-prioritized by Washington, or the unlikely but not unimaginable prospect of U.S. abandonment.

Others argue that Washington’s current approach to Ukraine could be an attractive model moving forward. The logic is that preparing to fight simultaneous high-intensity wars against two major competitors is far more challenging than preparing to fight one war directly and another indirectly. Thus, the United States would provide military and security assistance to European allies and partners but limit the involvement of its own forces in this secondary theater. Yet it takes time to train and equip other militaries, so this approach could not be implemented overnight. Ukraine was not ready to fight effectively in 2014 — it took years of training and close cooperation to prepare its military appropriately.

Even if Washington decided to prioritize preparing for one war, there is still the question of whether it should be a war against China or any war involving a great power more generally. The former would require Pacific-centric capabilities, the latter all-purpose war capabilities. Due to Washington’s global responsibilities, U.S. force structure will probably strike some balance between the two. The U.S. military’s large legacy force will ensure that many existing capabilities (armored brigades, artillery, etc.) continue long into the future, even if defense strategists adopt the “divest to invest” logic advocated by some in President Joe Biden’s team. This implies that the United States will remain capable of playing a meaningful strategic role in Europe for decades. As a result, Europe is likely to count on U.S. capabilities to deter and defend against threats to European security.

Beyond this legacy dimension, the United States will probably shift its focus towards enabling European operations through command, control, and communications as well as the provision of strategic cover via missile defense, cyber defense, and nuclear deterrence. As the 2022 US National Defense Strategy notes, U.S. posture in Europe “will focus on command and control, fires, and key enablers that complement our NATO Allies’ capabilities and strengthen deterrence by increasing combat credibility.”

Prioritizing Areas of Competition

Although the security domain is important, it is by no means the only area of competition, nor arguably the most important. America’s European and Indo-Pacific allies have important roles to play in each other’s regions and around the world when it comes to diplomacy, economics, technology, global governance, and other issues. Indeed, NATO may not have a major direct role in the Indo-Pacific, but that does not deny the importance of addressing China’s actions in the Euro-Atlantic area, the potential value of European cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners, or the importance of European engagement in non-military domains. All three will be critical in the years ahead. So just because Europe and the Indo-Pacific do not constitute a single military theater does not mean that the interdependencies across the regions are unimportant.

Beijing’s coercive actions against a number of trans-Atlantic allies have helped to consolidate a unified front from NATO. Lithuania has been the top target recently, but the Czech Republic, Canada, the United States, and others have all had to deal with various forms of economic coercion, risky military behavior, and political pressure. To tackle this challenge, Euro-Atlantic allies should speak with one voice, coordinating closely on China policy in the years ahead. In a Taiwan contingency, European allies would likely be asked to take part in an economic campaign to compel Beijing to cease the use of force.

European leadership on trade, technology, and values will remain critical. The European Union, and individual member states, have a central role to play in determining the global economic rules of the road. Many European players are vital to technological innovation in key sectors, as is the case with the Netherlands on advanced semiconductors. And Europe’s support for the rules-based international order and international law plays an important role in setting expectations for behavior worldwide.

Diplomatically, Europe also plays a key role in the Indo-Pacific, and vice versa. Regular political consultations should facilitate a convergence of views between both sets of alliances on Russia, China, and their evolving relationship. Ideally, these efforts would result in a collective framework and narrative to navigate such challenges. A shared set of economic responses to coercive practices are needed, building on the European Union’s anti-coercion instrument, among other initiatives. The G7 has an important role to play in this regard.

Finally, when it comes to the security domain, there are still many questions left unanswered. To the extent that the European and Indo-Pacific theaters are linked, it makes sense for countries to deepen their alignment on defense cooperation. Even though mutual defense commitments may remain intra-regional, regular consultations on burden-sharing, force planning, and force posture could optimize the allocation of U.S. and allied resources. In particular, the United States and its European and Indo-Pacific allies should achieve greater economies of scale and efficiencies in formulating regional strategies, procuring shared capabilities, and conducting combined exercises. This would help to align their strategic approaches.

But what, specifically, might Europe contribute in a Taiwan contingency? The deployment of small numbers of European assets is unlikely to shift the military balance in a decisive manner in the Indo-Pacific, even if it may be helpful to the United States and its Asian allies. That being said, the provision of certain high-demand, low-density items could be critical, such as undersea capabilities, basing access, and intelligence gathering. In this regard, it is important to distinguish between two Europes: one that will decisively prioritize theater-specific capabilities to hold the line against Russia, and the other that will complement theater-specific capabilities with global power-projection ones.

In a protracted war, much emphasis would also be placed on resupplying Taiwan. Europeans could play an important role in this regard by helping to protect vital supply lines, which could be critical to operational success. In addition, Europeans could help to ensure that the United States and its regional allies and partners have the munitions, supplies, and equipment needed to effectively prosecute a protracted conventional conflict in Asia. All in all, Europe could play an important set of roles in an Indo-Pacific contingency. As such, a strong European signal of commitment to peace and stability in the region could affect Beijing’s cost-benefit analysis, and help to contribute to deterrence.

Conclusion

Europe and the Indo-Pacific are by no means the only theaters of importance in the world today. But they are the theaters that draw the bulk of U.S. military attention and capabilities, so the tradeoffs between them are particularly difficult. Under Putin, Russia once again presents a direct threat to U.S. allies in Europe. NATO should reinvest in its ability to collectively deter and defend allied territory and populations, which will require the sustained focus of its European members. But the solidarity shown by Japan, Australia, and South Korea — not to mention China’s tacit support for Russia — underlines how European security is increasingly intertwined with Indo-Pacific dynamics. Moreover, the willingness of some Asian partners to sanction Russia and provide assistance to Ukraine will no doubt spur European debate about taking reciprocal action in the event of a crisis in the Indo-Pacific, particularly one involving Taiwan.

It is therefore high time to shift the discussion from whether Europe and the Indo-Pacific are interdependent or not to how interdependence in different areas should alter strategic decision-making. Doing so can help to inform decisions about how to strike an appropriate balance between the need to set priorities on the one hand, and the existence of cross-theater synergies on the other.

So far, analysts have heaped too much responsibility on the United States, without paying adequate attention to how European and Indo-Pacific allies can help alleviate the challenge of strategic simultaneity by stepping up their roles in their respective regions and assisting efforts in each other’s regions. To get the mix right, leaders in the United States, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific should collectively reflect on how best to prioritize across these two regions in terms of time, capabilities, and policy areas. This is no easy task, but the time to have these debates is now, before like-minded countries are confronted by a more serious risk of simultaneous two-front contingencies.

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Luis Simón is director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy at the Brussels School of Governance, and director of the Brussels office of the Royal Elcano Institute.

Zack Cooper is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a lecturer at Princeton University. He co-hosts the Net Assessment podcast for War on the Rocks.

This commentary was developed as part of the Bridging Allies initiative, led by the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Brussels School of Governance.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Luis Simón · May 9, 2023

11. It is now battered Ukraine’s turn for an offensive

Excerpts:

Should the Ukrainian offensive follow the Russian one into failure, then the prospect will be of a continuing stalemate and another harsh winter of fighting and energy shortages. International calls for a ceasefire, preferably accompanied by a full peace settlement, will grow louder. The Ukrainians, however, are not playing for a draw. This is their best chance of a breakthrough, and their ambition is to reach the approaches to Crimea.

However much land is taken, the main objective must be to convince the Russian elite of the futility of this war and the fragility of its occupation. The war began with a decision in the Kremlin and that is where a decision must be taken to end it.

It is now battered Ukraine’s turn for an offensive

The coming battle should aim to persuade Moscow of the futility of its aggression and attempted land grabs

LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

The writer is author of ‘Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine’ 

After more than 14 months of gruelling combat, Vladimir Putin has failed to achieve any of his war aims. His original objective was to subjugate all of Ukraine. That aspiration lasted a few days, although it has never quite gone away. His current position is that peace can be discussed as soon as Ukraine acknowledges that the four oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia — illegally annexed last year, like Crimea in 2014 — are a permanent part of Russia.

Putin’s difficulty is that much of this claimed land is out of reach of Russian forces. Not long after the invasion the Russians were in occupation of some 27 per cent of Ukrainian territory. This is now down to 18 per cent. He hoped, with Russia’s recent offensive, to remedy that situation — at least by taking Luhansk and Donetsk, together known as the Donbas. But after months of effort, relying on artillery barrages and infantry assaults, they have suffered huge casualties (100,000, including 20,000 killed, since December, according to the Pentagon) while making few advances.

Bakhmut has become the symbol of this struggle. After the loss of the adjacent town of Soledar in January, it was also expected to fall. Yet Ukrainian units have clung on and kept their supply lines open. Yevgeny Prigozhin, the boss of the Wagner mercenaries that have been doing the bulk of the fighting, has complained bitterly that the defence ministry has denied his men sufficient ammunition and now threatens to abandon Bakhmut next week. Elsewhere, Russian commanders are now torn about whether to try to take ground or consolidate their current positions in anticipation of the coming Ukrainian offensive.

Russia has also failed in its systematic campaign to take out Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, particularly its electricity supplies, using drones and missiles — although deadly attacks on Ukrainian cities continue. Shelling caused the death of 23 civilians in Kherson on Wednesday. This has strengthened rather than weakened Kyiv’s determination to continue the fight. Frustrated by Ukrainian resilience, Russia must now cope with significant numbers of its facilities, notably oil depots, being struck far behind the front lines by long-range drones.

A drone attack against the Kremlin this week led the Russian leadership into such paroxysms of manufactured fury that many commentators surmised this was a “false flag” attack designed to create a pretext for retaliatory action. Yet Russia has been routinely striking Ukrainian cities without bothering with excuses, and it is hard to see why the leadership would want to expose such an embarrassing vulnerability. This clearly was not a US-inspired attempt to assassinate Putin, as Russian propagandists claim. Perhaps it was a Ukrainian provocation. The Russian mood will not have been helped by the fact that 18 out of the 24 Iranian drones sent to punish Ukraine for this “outrage” were shot down.

Absorbing the Russian offensive has not been easy for Ukraine. Casualties have been heavy and at times there have been questions about whether it would have made more sense to withdraw. Kyiv’s generals, however, feel these attritional battles have served their purpose, preventing Russia from taking much more territory while inflicting heavy losses.

Now it is their turn. Preparatory work has been under way for some time, knocking out command posts, artillery pieces, ammunition dumps and troop concentrations. Fresh brigades equipped with modern western kit are almost ready to move. But the enemy has prepared elaborate defences to block the most likely areas of Ukrainian advance and enjoys air superiority. There have been publicised concerns about gaps in Ukrainian air defences and insufficient ammunition. Leaked (but now dated) assessments doubted whether Kyiv could make any real progress. Nonetheless, the US government insists it is now more optimistic.

Should the Ukrainian offensive follow the Russian one into failure, then the prospect will be of a continuing stalemate and another harsh winter of fighting and energy shortages. International calls for a ceasefire, preferably accompanied by a full peace settlement, will grow louder. The Ukrainians, however, are not playing for a draw. This is their best chance of a breakthrough, and their ambition is to reach the approaches to Crimea.

However much land is taken, the main objective must be to convince the Russian elite of the futility of this war and the fragility of its occupation. The war began with a decision in the Kremlin and that is where a decision must be taken to end it.

Financial Times · by Lawrence Freedman · May 5, 2023

12. Biden Hopes for Vietnam Breakthrough

Excerpts:

All these obstacles aside, there are still many encouraging signals coming out of Hanoi that the relationship upgrade may very well happen—even if not this summer, as Washington hopes.

That said, the reality is that Hanoi continues to be intentionally vague and has not publicly commented on the issue of strategic partnership, probably to allow itself some wiggle room. Vietnam also knows that the United States has been wanting to elevate ties for some time, and in order to placate Washington and benefit from continued U.S. support against Beijing, Hanoi is smart to at least begin negotiations. Vietnam seems perfectly fine with things dragging on for years, avoiding a final decision, or even getting cold feet in the end. Avoidance is actually more of a feature than a bug of Vietnam’s decision-making process. The Biden administration should manage expectations by remaining skeptical until the ink is dry on any new agreement.

Biden Hopes for Vietnam Breakthrough

Washington and Hanoi have been inching closer, but it’s a complicated dance.

By Derek Grossman, a senior defense analyst at the Rand Corp.

Foreign Policy · by Derek Grossman · May 9, 2023

During a ceremony held in Washington to commemorate the Lunar New Year in 2011, then-Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States Le Cong Phung surprised the audience by announcing that the two countries would raise their ties to the level of “strategic partnership.” Phrases descripting partnerships can be nebulous, of course. But from what we know about Vietnamese diplomacy, Hanoi’s definition of strategic partnership is not just boilerplate, but signifies concrete, mutual, long-term strategic interests.

During a ceremony held in Washington to commemorate the Lunar New Year in 2011, then-Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States Le Cong Phung surprised the audience by announcing that the two countries would raise their ties to the level of “strategic partnership.” Phrases descripting partnerships can be nebulous, of course. But from what we know about Vietnamese diplomacy, Hanoi’s definition of strategic partnership is not just boilerplate, but signifies concrete, mutual, long-term strategic interests.

Vietnamese officials, however, never followed up on Phung’s newsworthy announcement. Instead, Washington and Hanoi announced a comprehensive partnership in 2013—a relationship that implies a less serious geopolitical alignment for Vietnam. The United States has been left wondering why.

The Biden administration—like at least two administrations before it—is convinced that U.S.-Vietnamese ties should be intensified, precisely because both countries share long-term strategic interests. Both countries want to prevent China from dominating the Indo-Pacific; and both have a strong interest in upholding the rules-based international order. In its 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, the Biden administration mentioned Vietnam alongside Singapore, a de facto U.S. ally in Southeast Asia, stating that both countries would help “to advance shared objectives” in the Indo-Pacific. In the administration’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, Vietnam also made the prominent list of “leading regional partners,” on par with India, New Zealand, Taiwan, and other critical countries.

In late March this year, the United States may finally have achieved a breakthrough. U.S. President Joe Biden held his first call as president with his Vietnamese counterpart, General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. While little was revealed about the content of the call, a trip to Hanoi by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken soon followed. There, Blinken told reporters “Our conviction is that [the U.S. partnership with Vietnam] can and will grow even stronger … in the weeks and months ahead.” Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, in turn, said Hanoi sought to take the relationship “to a new height.” Speculation is now rife in Washington that the stage is set for the two countries to finally establish formal strategic partnership status, maybe at the White House during Trong’s possible visit this July.

But the Biden administration would be wise to manage expectations for now. There are good reasons why Vietnam has been delaying the upgrade for so long—and why it may ultimately decide that elevating to a strategic partnership simply isn’t worth it. Of course, deepening U.S.-Vietnamese ties does not fundamentally depend on any official diplomatic status. But if Hanoi forgoes strategic partnership status with Washington, it would validate Beijing’s view that Vietnam remains firmly ensconced in China’s geostrategic orbit—and that U.S. attempts to leverage Vietnam against China not only have limits, but are futile over the long-term.

Of course, the most important obstacle to a more formalized U.S.-Vietnamese alignment is Beijing’s likely reaction. In its long history, Vietnam has been invaded multiple times by its much larger northern neighbor—most recently in 1979—and is highly reluctant to unnecessarily antagonize Beijing. Although foreign partnerships are certainly important to help Vietnam balance against China, the Vietnamese are mindful of an ancient Chinese saying: “Distant water will not quench the fire nearby.” In other words, Vietnam cannot count on faraway partners to help manage problems with China. In the end, only Vietnam can ensure that bilateral ties preclude trouble.

From Hanoi’s perspective, raising U.S.-Vietnamese ties to strategic partnership level may simply be asking for trouble. After the bloody Sino-Vietnamese war in 1979, Hanoi and Beijing normalized relations in 1991; and as part of their agreement, Vietnam imposed limitations on its own future security engagements to appease Chinese leaders. Originally known as the “Three Nos” (before becoming “Four Nos and One Depends,” more on that below), Vietnam’s post-agreement defense policy committed it to forgoing formal military alliances, military basing on its territory, and military activities aimed at a third country. Hanoi very likely worries that elevating to strategic partnership with Washington might give Beijing the impression that it is establishing a military alliance, perhaps putting it on course to violating the other Nos as well.

Chinese retaliation to a U.S.-Vietnamese strategic partnership could be severe, particularly in the South China Sea, where China and Vietnam have substantial overlapping sovereignty claims and Beijing has overwhelming military strength to enforce its side of the dispute. This leads to another reason Hanoi is likely hesitant to bolster ties to Washington: Despite Beijing’s encroachments in the South China Sea, things have been relatively quiet there since 2019, when China and Vietnam had a standoff at Vanguard Bank in the Spratly Islands. Why potentially rock the boat?

Moreover, Hanoi may believe it has already handled the situation effectively without needing Washington’s support. Following the Vanguard Bank standoff, Vietnam released a defense white paper pledging never to unilaterally use or threaten force—the fourth “No” meant to be another reassurance to Beijing. It also added the “One Depends” clause, stating that “depending on the circumstances and specific conditions, Vietnam will consider developing necessary, appropriate defense and military relations with other countries.” By adding the One Depends clause, Hanoi drew a causal link between the deterioration of Vietnam’s external security environment and the nations with which it chooses to deepen defense cooperation. A reasonable interpretation of this is that, if China’s bullying behavior in the South China Sea continues, Vietnam might finally promote the United States’ status to that of strategic partnership. Given recent stability, there has been no impetus to do so. If this interpretation is correct, Hanoi will find a potential status upgrade more useful when it is not exercised.

Another reason Hanoi might drag its feet is due to domestic politics. Over the last few months, Trong’s anti-corruption campaign has removed several high-ranking members of the Vietnamese Communist Party and state apparatus, including deputy prime ministers Pham Binh Minh and Vu Duc Dam, along with state president Nguyen Xuan Phuc. Some Western observers worry that the purge is bad news for U.S.-Vietnamese ties, since these three officials leaned toward Washington. Most significantly, Trong appointed his young conservative ally, Vo Van Thuong, to replace Phuc as president. Thuong reportedly favors China over the United States, as does Trong. Vietnam is unlikely to drift away from the United States toward China, since it seeks good ties with both. But an internal recalibration of Hanoi’s delicate balancing act between the two great powers may be underway—especially as geopolitical competition continues to intensify.

Yet another potential explanation for Vietnamese inaction on strategic partnership is that U.S.-Vietnamese relations are already operating at a de-facto strategic level, even if without the official label. For example, Vietnam has expressed implicit support for the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy; in recent years, it has received additional diplomatic and economic support—as well as military hardware and training—to counter China. What would Vietnam substantively gain, that would also be within the bounds of its strict defense policy, from elevating the partnership? Virtually anything that the U.S. military would like to do—and has done, for example, in the Philippines—such as accessing Vietnam’s bases to help it better deal with South China Sea contingencies or joint training focused on lethal operations against a third nation, could violate these rules.

On the economic side in particular, Vietnam still feels spurned by the Trump administration’s decision in 2017 to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) multilateral trade agreement forged under the Obama administration. In order to become eligible to join the TPP, Hanoi had to implement deep and risky systemic reforms to its economy; and in the end, these good-faith efforts went unrewarded. Washington left Hanoi (and many others) standing at the altar in a massive breach of trust. Today, the deal has been renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP); but without the United States as a member, it carries less economic and especially strategic heft as a counterbalance to China.

To date, the Biden administration has not offered a viable alternative that would allow Vietnam to bank on future U.S. economic ties, which is a serious gap in the partnership. To be sure, the United States is Vietnam’s number two trading partner after China. But the Trump administration’s TPP withdrawal not only confused and frustrated Vietnamese leaders, but also made them question Washington’s staying power in the region, particularly as Beijing’s profile—economic and otherwise—is ascendant.

Finally, it is widely known that Trong suffered a stroke in 2019 and may be too weak to travel from Hanoi directly to Washington in July. This has created a logistical dilemma and ultimately a political one: It is difficult to envision who in the Vietnamese leadership, other than Trong, would be able to announce a decision of such political and strategic magnitude. Indeed, Vietnamese interlocutors have recently linked a possible announcement of a relationship upgrade to Trong’s presence at the White House. Given the size of the strategic prize, Biden could of course travel to Vietnam, but there are no concrete plans to do so yet.

All these obstacles aside, there are still many encouraging signals coming out of Hanoi that the relationship upgrade may very well happen—even if not this summer, as Washington hopes.

That said, the reality is that Hanoi continues to be intentionally vague and has not publicly commented on the issue of strategic partnership, probably to allow itself some wiggle room. Vietnam also knows that the United States has been wanting to elevate ties for some time, and in order to placate Washington and benefit from continued U.S. support against Beijing, Hanoi is smart to at least begin negotiations. Vietnam seems perfectly fine with things dragging on for years, avoiding a final decision, or even getting cold feet in the end. Avoidance is actually more of a feature than a bug of Vietnam’s decision-making process. The Biden administration should manage expectations by remaining skeptical until the ink is dry on any new agreement.

Foreign Policy · by Derek Grossman · May 9, 2023

​13. How China’s Echo Chamber Threatens Taiwan

Excerpts:

Chinese policy elites and the public also underestimate the potential consequences of a large-scale military conflict over Taiwan. The lack of credible public research in China on how a conflict would affect the country’s population in the short and long term contributes to Chinese society’s optimistic risk assessment. International think tanks and research institutes can help the Chinese people better understand their own interests by analyzing these issues and promoting the findings. They could also conduct joint studies with their Chinese counterparts, when feasible.

Similarly, Chinese experts currently lack opportunities to reflect on and debate whether an accelerated unification agenda helps or harms China’s national interests. The international research community could provide platforms for these discussions: In expert exchanges and Track II dialogues, international experts should introduce topics that encourage Chinese experts to discuss the logic behind their sense of urgency to unify Taiwan.

The U.S. government should also refine its messaging to counter the misperception that it is blocking unification to hinder China’s successful development and national rejuvenation. When discussing the Taiwan issue, the United States and its allies should emphasize one vital message: that they respect, welcome, and support the Chinese people’s growing contribution to the international community and that achieving a noncoercive resolution to the Taiwan issue is in China’s best interest in order to realize its dream of national rejuvenation. These messages should not only be conveyed to senior Chinese leaders but also to the expert community and the general public. Officials from the United States and many other countries are already making efforts to directly engage with the Chinese public through Chinese social media, and more targeted messaging would enhance these efforts.

Most important, the United States and its allies should not dismiss mainstream Chinese narratives about the threat posed by Western countries as mere propaganda. These narratives largely reflect genuine, if mistaken, beliefs and are becoming more deeply embedded in China’s foreign policy as a result of the country’s internal feedback loop. This challenge cannot be resolved by relying solely on military countermeasures. The international community needs a coherent strategy to dispel misperceptions and convince the Chinese public and leadership of the benefits and feasibility of open-minded, good-faith discussions on the Taiwan issue. Although challenging, this is what it will take to prevent an increasingly likely war—with catastrophic consequences for all.

How China’s Echo Chamber Threatens Taiwan

Foreign Affairs · by May 9, 2023 · May 9, 2023

The risk of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait is becoming dire. On Feb. 2, CIA Director William Burns stated that Chinese President Xi Jinping had ordered China’s military to be “ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion” of Taiwan. Although Burns added that this did not mean that Xi has decided to invade Taiwan, he described Xi’s move as “a reminder of the seriousness of his focus and his ambition.”

But the main factor that will determine whether Washington and Beijing come to blows over Taiwan is not necessarily Xi’s strategy for unification but the idiosyncrasies of China’s political system. The dynamics among China’s political leadership, its policy elite, and the broader public have generated an internal feedback loop that is not entirely within Xi’s comprehension or control. This could result in China’s being fully mobilized for war even without Xi deciding to attack Taiwan.

Xi’s assertive rhetoric, combined with his demand for absolute obedience, has produced an echo chamber in Beijing. His repeated emphasis on the need for unification with Taiwan and his nationwide campaign to encourage the public to “revere the military and admire force” have generated strong political incentives for civilian and military officials to mobilize themselves as if war were inevitable. When Xi spoke at the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th Party Congress last October, his pledge that China “will never promise to renounce the use of force” to achieve unification received louder and longer applause from the over 2,000 party delegates than any other passage in his nearly two-hour speech.

This adulatory reaction is, in turn, causing Xi and other Chinese leaders to be dangerously overconfident. As media outlets muzzle any doubts about the use of force to achieve unification, the leadership could easily perceive a lack of dissent as widespread public support for its aspirations regarding Taiwan. Furthermore, Chinese propaganda agencies’ promotion of anti-American narratives has created a growing sense among the public and policy elite that the United States poses a mortal threat and that a showdown with Washington is inevitable. This puts pressure on Chinese leaders to stress the importance of war preparation, which risks setting the country on a self-fulfilling path to conflict.

Washington and its partners are doing themselves a disservice by assuming that China’s leadership has a coherent strategy on Taiwan, or that Xi’s thinking is the key factor in whether Beijing goes to war. Rather than focusing narrowly on the Chinese president’s current plans, they should think more broadly about the dynamics that reinforce the Chinese public and leadership’s belief that a decisive move on Taiwan may be necessary to defend China’s territorial integrity and break Western containment. And instead of relying solely on deterrence, the United States and other governments should craft their messaging and policies with the aim of disrupting this internal feedback loop.

GOING IN CIRCLES

Xi’s focus on unification has spurred a growing sense of urgency in Chinese society to resolve this issue. The president has described unification as “an inevitable requirement” for the achievement of what he terms “the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation,” which he has promised to deliver by 2049—the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Unlike China’s previous leaders, who were willing to leave the Taiwan issue to future generations to resolve, Xi aspires to deal with it during his tenure.

Regardless of what these statements indicate about Xi’s specific plan on Taiwan, they have set dynamics in motion that dramatically increase the likelihood of a conflict. China’s political system has become much more centralized under his leadership, and officials, policy elites, and public opinion leaders all face strong incentives to advocate policies that cater to his desires and discourage anything that may be perceived as dissent. As a result, public opinion is shaped by only the most hawkish voices: media outlets now censor anyone who expresses skepticism about a military solution to the Taiwan issue, whereas “patriotic” voices are free to express themselves, even if they promote excessively violent means to advance unification.

China’s policy elites, such as university scholars and think tank experts, contribute to the internal feedback loop by unconditionally endorsing the righteousness of Xi’s vision for unification. Although these experts acknowledge in private that voluntary unification with Taiwan is no longer feasible, they still embrace Xi’s ambition as their own and have made coercive unification the underlying assumption of almost all policy analyses and recommendations. Few question the wisdom of an accelerated and more assertive unification agenda, and instead focus on generating ideas for how to make it work. They compete with one another to offer innovative solutions for how China can develop the right types of military power, strengthen its economic resilience, and win the international support necessary to achieve unification.

These policy recommendations by scholars and public intellectuals likely reinforce Xi’s belief that his push for unification is morally just and practically feasible. But it also promises to place additional pressures on him: the president’s open antipathy toward U.S. hegemony and democracy promotion has led prominent Chinese experts to put forward theories that the United States is actively seeking a military crisis over Taiwan to contain China’s rise. A widely held belief within China’s expert community is that the United States’ true objective in the Ukraine conflict is to weaken Russia and that it is similarly keen on instigating a military conflict over Taiwan with the goal of gradually eliminating China as its primary competitor. These theories have reinforced a public perception that China faces an existential threat from the United States.

Xi’s emphasis on “self-confidence” has led state media to fixate on China’s military achievements.

This dynamic creates a popular mandate for China’s top leadership to act assertively. It could potentially compel Xi to seriously consider military action if he perceives that the risks of backing down, in terms of his domestic popularity and political position, are too high. In essence, he is boxing himself in.

Meanwhile, Xi’s demand for political loyalty and his promotion of “fighting spirit” has prevented the Chinese bureaucracy from serving as a check on these impulses. Even diplomats—the doves—have adopted a “wolf warrior” persona, using confrontational rhetoric to defend China’s official narratives and assert its rights. This makes it challenging to identify influential domestic actors who can put the brakes on China’s drift toward war mobilization. Additionally, Xi’s emphasis on “self-confidence” has led state media to fixate on China’s achievements in military modernization, feeding the public impression that coercive options are increasingly feasible.

The Chinese public and policy elites are already placing pressure on China’s top leadership to act more forcefully. When House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022, Chinese netizens dominated social media with calls for a strong Chinese response. Many of these voices expressed excitement about going to war and subsequently expressed disappointment at what they perceived as an underwhelming response from Beijing. Meanwhile, in private conversations, many senior policy experts who advise the government maintain that unification with Taiwan must be achieved at all costs, even if it means going to war with the United States.

FINDING COMMON GROUND

The Chinese government is not fully aware or in control of these internal dynamics. Having preferred to achieve unification through coercion—but without actually fighting a war—Beijing remains convinced of its peaceful intentions and does not recognize how it currently risks drifting toward war. It is crucial for the United States to refine its approach toward China with these dynamics in mind and understand how certain efforts to deter Beijing can inadvertently exacerbate the security challenge.

When foreign officials describe Beijing’s war plans against Taiwan, Chinese elites and the public perceive these statements as deliberate exaggerations designed to rally a coalition against their country. For example, when U.S. Air Force General Mike Minihan expressed a belief that Xi is likely to attack Taiwan in 2025, it contributed to Beijing’s paranoia that Washington wants to provoke a war in order to weaken China. These fears are becoming increasingly mainstream in Beijing and serve to strengthen China’s resolve to prepare for and win such a confrontation.

China’s internal feedback loop is the product of its ever more centralized and inward-looking system and represents a problem that the country itself must address. But the international community cannot afford to simply ignore these dynamics: overreliance on a military-dominated strategy to counter China in the Taiwan Strait may feed into Beijing’s misperceptions and fears, making deterrence harder to achieve. Instead, foreign countries’ deterrence strategy should consider how China’s internal dynamics shape its interpretation of and reaction to foreign actions. They should also develop a proactive strategy to use reasoning and persuasion to mitigate the perception gap separating Chinese leaders, policy experts, and the general public from their foreign counterparts.

By understanding how certain views are filtered through Chinese society and leadership, the international community can develop more effective tactics to engage the country. For instance, Chinese policy experts’ conviction that China has an unquestionable legal right to use force against Taiwan is a crucial element underlying the leadership and general public’s thinking on coercive unification. Yet, Chinese experts have failed to consider contemporary examples that contradict mainstream Chinese understanding of international norms, such as the United Kingdom’s handling of Scotland’s independence vote in 2014 or Canada’s management of Quebec’s referendum in 1995.

Many Chinese experts genuinely believe that their interpretation of international laws and norms is impeccable. As a result, they are interested in debating these issues with their Western counterparts in the hope of convincing them of this. This presents a good opportunity for international legal experts to engage with their Chinese colleagues to build a common understanding about how other countries have dealt with similar issues of national unity. Unfortunately, foreign governments and civil society organizations have not invested in such dialogues despite their potential to be a useful entry point for constructive exchanges.

The United States should not dismiss Chinese narratives about the threat posed by the West as mere propaganda.

Chinese policy elites and the public also underestimate the potential consequences of a large-scale military conflict over Taiwan. The lack of credible public research in China on how a conflict would affect the country’s population in the short and long term contributes to Chinese society’s optimistic risk assessment. International think tanks and research institutes can help the Chinese people better understand their own interests by analyzing these issues and promoting the findings. They could also conduct joint studies with their Chinese counterparts, when feasible.

Similarly, Chinese experts currently lack opportunities to reflect on and debate whether an accelerated unification agenda helps or harms China’s national interests. The international research community could provide platforms for these discussions: In expert exchanges and Track II dialogues, international experts should introduce topics that encourage Chinese experts to discuss the logic behind their sense of urgency to unify Taiwan.

The U.S. government should also refine its messaging to counter the misperception that it is blocking unification to hinder China’s successful development and national rejuvenation. When discussing the Taiwan issue, the United States and its allies should emphasize one vital message: that they respect, welcome, and support the Chinese people’s growing contribution to the international community and that achieving a noncoercive resolution to the Taiwan issue is in China’s best interest in order to realize its dream of national rejuvenation. These messages should not only be conveyed to senior Chinese leaders but also to the expert community and the general public. Officials from the United States and many other countries are already making efforts to directly engage with the Chinese public through Chinese social media, and more targeted messaging would enhance these efforts.

Most important, the United States and its allies should not dismiss mainstream Chinese narratives about the threat posed by Western countries as mere propaganda. These narratives largely reflect genuine, if mistaken, beliefs and are becoming more deeply embedded in China’s foreign policy as a result of the country’s internal feedback loop. This challenge cannot be resolved by relying solely on military countermeasures. The international community needs a coherent strategy to dispel misperceptions and convince the Chinese public and leadership of the benefits and feasibility of open-minded, good-faith discussions on the Taiwan issue. Although challenging, this is what it will take to prevent an increasingly likely war—with catastrophic consequences for all.

• TONG ZHAO is a Visiting Research Scholar at Princeton University and a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Foreign Affairs · by May 9, 2023 · May 9, 2023

14. Female reservists to start training for first time today

Mon, May 08, 2023 page1

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2023/05/08/2003799360

Female reservists to start training for first time today

• Staff writer, with CNA
• 
  
•  
•  
• A group of veteran female military personnel are today to start reservist training for the first time, a military source said yesterday.
• The women have been asked to report to a “strategic location” in Taoyuan’s Bade District (八德) to complete the same required reservist training as their male counterparts, the source said, adding that they would have separate dormitories and bathrooms.
• While the exact number of female trainees in the first group was not disclosed, the Ministry of National Defense previously said it would ask 220 women to undergo compulsory reservist training this year.
• 
  

Female soldiers pose after participating in a drill in Pingtung County on Aug. 25, 2016.

• Photo: Chen Yen-ting, Taipei Times
• As of 2021, 8,915 women were listed as reservists, and 15 percent of the nation’s 180,000 active military personnel are women, military data showed.
• The ministry in January said it would begin training female armed reserve forces, after previously only training male reservists because it did not have sufficient capacity to accommodate men and women.
• While men are required to take part in compulsory military conscription and reservist training, women are not, but can join the armed forces voluntarily.
• The military runs a dual-track reservist training program, which consists of a new, more intensive 14-day plan, launched last year, and the old system of five to seven days of training.
• The ministry said it would increase the number of reservists receiving 14 days of training from 15,000 last year to 22,000 this year, while 96,000 trainees would still participate in the old plan.
• The training in both tracks has been changed to “strategic locations” so that reservists can develop a better understanding of the terrain and key infrastructure in the area they are charged with defending.
• The change is expected to speed up mobilization and facilitate combat deployments during wartime, the military said.

​

​15. 1st group of volunteer female reservists report for training

A question is whether the Taiwans have the will to resist a PRC invasion like the Ukrainians are resisting the Russians. Is this a positive indicator?

Photos at the link.

1st group of volunteer female reservists report for training

https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202305080008

05/08/2023 03:44 PM

A female veteran (third right) reports to a location in Taoyuan's Bade District to start a five-day volunteer reservist training on Monday morning. CNA photo May 8, 2023

Taoyuan, May 8 (CNA) A group of 14 female veterans reported to a location in northern Taoyuan City to start five days of volunteer reservist training on Monday morning, making them the first women to undergo such training in Taiwan.

The 14 reservists reported to a "strategic location" in Taoyuan's Bade District before the deadline on noon Monday, according to Reserve Command Political Warfare Department chief Major General Hsieh Yung-wei (謝勇維).

The military did not make public the "strategic location" for security reason.

According to Hsieh, the 14 women will undergo the same training as their male counterparts under the five-day program.

However, they will have separate dormitories and bathrooms to the male reservists, he added.

During the training period, all reservists, regardless of gender, undergo live-fire rifle shooting exercises and other training according to their specific expertise when serving in the armed forces, Hsieh added.

CNA photo May 8, 2023

One of the veterans surnamed Chiu (邱) told reporters after reporting for duty that she was happy to be able to revisit her life in the military again for five-days.

She said it is important for women to undergo reservist training the same as their male counterparts, particularly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Another reservist surnamed Chiang (江) who was discharged from the military more than a year ago said she volunteered for the reservist training.

Chiang said she is nervous about the upcoming training, particularly as she now works night shifts and is no longer used to waking up early.

However, she added that such refresher training is important given ongoing cross-strait tensions.

"I want to do my part to safeguard the country," she added.

Chiang's husband surnamed Ho (何) who accompanied her when she reported for training told reporters they met while serving in the military as volunteer soldiers.

Ho said he has also been discharged from active military service and the couple have a one-year-old son.

He said he fully supports his wife's decision to volunteer for reservist training as the armed forces are like a big family to them.

CNA photo May 8, 2023

Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced in January that it would start asking female reservists to volunteer for the same reservist training as their male counterparts later this year.

Previously, Taiwan's military said it only trained male reservists because it did not have sufficient capacity to accommodate both men and women.

Participants in reservist training have complained for decades that this is a form of gender discrimination.

While men in Taiwan are subject to compulsory military conscription and reservist training, women are not, but they can join the armed forces voluntarily to serve as soldiers and officers.

The MND did not say it is now requiring military training for female reservists because of an increased risk of war with China, but rather that it is doing so because all veterans regardless of gender should have the same responsibility.

As of 2021, a total of 8,915 women were listed as reservists. In addition to the reservists, 15 percent of Taiwan's 180,000 active military personnel are women, according to military figures.

The MND said that a total of 220 female reservists have volunteered to undergo required reservists training this year.

(By Wu Reui-chi and Joseph Yeh)

Enditem/AW

> Chinese Version

16. China’s Wolf Warrior Ambassador Is a Hit in Beijing, Not Paris

Excerpts:

After the most recent incident two weeks ago, most Chinese netizens rallied to Lu’s defense with patriotic furor and nihilistic rationalizations. Some popular comments on Weibo read: “Offense is the best defense”; “It doesn’t matter if he succeeds or not, as long as he can make them uncomfortable”; and “As long as foreign politicians talk nonsense, can’t Chinese ones do so, too?”

Some Chinese reactions highlighted Lu’s bravery in weathering the “difficult” style of Western media interviews. Nationalist pundit and former France-based reporter Zheng Ruolin enthusiastically praised Lu for “daring to speak out in an obviously hostile environment.” One Global Times reporter shared a more nuanced take on Weibo by citing an interview she conducted with Lu earlier this year. She was impressed by his “understanding of the media and public opinion,” and his willingness to accept live interviews and debates on French television, which come with “more uncertainty and uncontrollability” and “more sharp and sensitive questions” than in China.

It is unclear whether Beijing will remain as encouraging in the future. An anonymous former Chinese diplomat told the South China Morning Post, “Pending a full assessment of [Lu’s statement’s] impact, it may be necessary to keep a tighter control of senior envoys, at least for the time being.” The timing of Xi’s long-overdue call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky just days after Lu’s gaffe also may indicate Beijing’s displeasure with Lu’s damage to Sino-European relations.

But Bondaz is confident Lu will return. “Each time [he is summoned], he disappears for a few weeks and then comes back,” Bondaz said. “He’s an opportunist. Next time there’s an international event, he’ll resurface in the media and do more interviews.”

China’s Wolf Warrior Ambassador Is a Hit in Beijing, Not Paris

Lu Shaye keeps alienating his foreign hosts.

MAY 7, 2023, 6:00 AM

By Arthur Kaufman, an editor at China Digital Times.

Foreign Policy · by Arthur Kaufman · May 7, 2023

Antoine Bondaz, a research fellow at the French think tank Foundation for Strategic Research, recalled his first encounter with Lu Shaye, the Chinese ambassador to France, in their BFM TV debate in February 2020: “What really surprised me was that there was an entire Chinese delegation in the room. It was like the prince and his court.

“It was very French,” he joked.

Lu may have the ego of a stereotypical French leader, but he hasn’t made himself popular in the country. In the three years since the debate with Bondaz, Lu has thoroughly antagonized his French hosts with a barrage of incendiary media stunts that have degraded bilateral relations. Lu’s latest incident in April on French broadcaster LCI, in which he denied the sovereignty of ex-Soviet states, was perhaps his most egregious to date. “Even if the French are used to Lu Shaye’s words … often halfway between provocation and denialism, his statements reached a new level,” wrote Philippe Le Corre, a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute.

Pushback was swift. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs called his remarks “unacceptable” and told him to “ensure that his public statements are in line with his country’s official positions.” French President Emmanuel Macron said that “it’s not the place of a diplomat to use that kind of language.” Almost 80 members of the European Parliament signed a letter urging the French government to declare Lu persona non grata, and all three Baltic states summoned their Chinese ambassadors to demand an explanation. The Chinese embassy in France quickly deleted the interview transcript from its WeChat.

While Beijing distanced itself from Lu’s remarks, the incident has further confirmed him as China’s most outspoken wolf-warrior diplomat. It is only the latest in a long career marked by confrontation against the West and Western media, and awareness of the power of media to dictate narratives. Lu epitomizes Chinese President Xi Jinping’s struggle to simultaneously project an assertive China for nationalist audiences at home and cultivate diplomatic friends in Europe. These two aims are often in tension with one another, and Lu has emphatically prioritized the former.

Born in 1964 in Nanjing, China, Lu said he was relatively spared by the Cultural Revolution. His parents, however, were both doctors, and thus among the educated class often targeted by radical Maoists, and his father was imprisoned. Nevertheless, Lu joined the Communist Youth League. In middle school he studied French. After passing the university entrance examination he failed to get into his original target school, the European literature department at Peking University, and instead settled for diplomacy at China’s Foreign Affairs University—the normal route for aspiring diplomats.

Lu’s Francophile background propelled him to a number of Africa-related positions in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which he joined shortly after graduating. In 1988, he worked for several years as a staff member at China’s embassy in Guinea, and then in the 1990s climbed his way up the ministry’s Department of African Affairs. In 2001, he spent two years as a counselor at the Chinese embassy in France. His ambassadorship began in 2005, when he spent four years leading the Chinese mission in Senegal, followed by another four years directing the ministry’s Department of African Affairs starting in 2009. After a brief stint as deputy mayor of Wuhan, China, in 2014, he returned to Beijing in 2015 to direct policy research at the Central Committee’s Office of the Leading Group on Foreign Affairs.

Lu Shaye (second from left) joins local officials under an ornate Chinese gate for a picture during a visit at the Zoo de Beauval in Saint-Aignan-sur-Cher, central France, in 2019.

Lu (second from left) joins local officials for a picture during a visit at the ZooParc de Beauval in Saint-Aignan-sur-Cher, central France, on Aug. 26, 2019. Guillaume Souvant/AFP via Getty Images

Lu’s combative attitude towards the West predates Xi’s wolf-warrior diplomacy. At a conference hosted by the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) in 2011, a Jeune Afrique reporter noted Lu’s “aggressive” rebuttal of Western criticism against China, concluding: “This character is extremely offensive.” Replying to a question about the prospect of China-Africa cooperation in a 2013 interview, Lu went out of his way to say that “Western media never forgets to attack China,” adding: “What did Western countries do for Africa during the 50 years of African independence? Nothing. They in turn blame China, which is unfair.” In another state interview one month earlier, he criticized Western media for disseminating “fake information.” Such messages were often eagerly received in Africa—but were even more popular back in China.

It was in 2017 that Lu’s bellicosity found a wider, Western audience, when he was promoted to Chinese ambassador to Canada, several months before the release of the movie Wolf Warrior II. Immediately after arriving at his new post, he lectured Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government to “spend less time bowing down to Canadian journalists preoccupied with human rights and get on with negotiating an important free trade agreement with China.” In January 2019, he argued that Western calls for the release of two Canadians held hostage in China reflected an attitude of “Western egotism and white supremacy.” That same month, he also threatened unnamed “repercussions” for Canada if Huawei were banned from the country’s 5G network.

Lu was promoted to ambassador to France, a prized diplomatic position, one month before Xi gave a speech calling on Chinese officials to embrace a “fighting spirit” and have “the courage to fight.”

Truculence appeared to have paid off. In August 2019, Lu was promoted to ambassador to France, a prized diplomatic position with a more prominent role than his position in Canada, one month before Xi gave a speech calling on Chinese officials to embrace a “fighting spirit” and have “the courage to fight.” Lu’s transfer was met with caution in France. Reporters Without Borders expressed concern about his intimidation of the media, and stated: “[Lu’s] undiplomatic style will sharply contrast with the relative discretion of his predecessor.”

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic strained Sino-French relations, and Lu leaned into the conflict. In April 2020, “a Chinese diplomat in Paris” published on the embassy’s website a lengthy diatribe against Western media, vaunting the Chinese “victory” over the pandemic and claiming that nursing staff at French retirement homes had “abandoned their posts overnight … letting the residents die of hunger and sickness.” The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Lu to express its disapproval.

Lu then brought his fighting spirit to social media. In May 2020, his embassy tweeted a cartoon symbolizing death wrapped in American and Israeli flags, knocking at the door of different countries, with the caption, “Who is next?” Around that time, his embassy also began participating in an online disinformation campaign by posting dozens of conspiracy-filled tweets insinuating that COVID-19 originated in Fort Detrick in the United States. Later, his embassy tweeted about Le Point’s investigation into Chinese influence in French universities, asking, “Is the magazine Le Point a media outlet or a tool to attack China?” During Lu’s ambassadorship, IFRI researchers Marc Julienne and Sophie Hanck wrote that while a number of Chinese missions deployed communication strategies on Twitter to criticize local media, “France is undoubtedly the country in which the attitude of the diplomatic mission was the most vehement.”

Lu Shaye (center) sits at a table as he meets with members of the media at the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, on Jan. 17, 2019, when he was China's ambassador to the country

Lu (center) meets with members of the media at the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, on Jan. 17, 2019, when he was China’s ambassador to the country. Sean Kilpatrick/The Canadian Press via AP

The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Lu again in March 2021, after the Chinese embassy repeatedly insulted Bondaz, the French researcher. Bondaz had criticized China’s position on Taiwan over social media, and in response the Chinese embassy called him a “little thug” on Twitter. Two days later, the embassy published a communiqué on its website calling Bondaz an “ideological troll” and a “mad hyena” who “furiously attacks China.” Lu even refused the ministry’s diplomatic summons, and opted to show up the next day with his own demands. The ministry described the Chinese embassy’s “insults and attempts at intimidation … [as] unacceptable.”

The following year, in May 2022, Lu went on French television as then-U.N. human rights chief Michelle Bachelet was visiting Xinjiang province in China. Lu claimed that the Uyghurs reportedly detained were actually “trainees” in “education centers” and “not interned.” To date, France still maintains a ratified extradition treaty with China. Dilnur Reyhan, a professor at the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations in Paris and head of the European Uyghur Institute, finds it “incomprehensible that France still hasn’t expelled [Lu],” she said. “How are we supposed to feel safe if, after all his vulgar, insulting, and criminal excesses, France does nothing?” she told Foreign Policy.

The various summons by the French Foreign Ministry appear to have had little effect on Lu. Undeterred, he returned to LCI in August 2022 to proclaim that after reunification with mainland China, the Taiwanese people “must be reeducated,” echoing language used by Chinese officials to describe policies imposed upon Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

Lu proclaimed in August 2022 that after reunification with mainland China, the Taiwanese people “must be reeducated,” echoing language used by Chinese officials to describe policies imposed upon Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

The French establishment resoundingly judges Lu as being undiplomatic. “He displays the face of a harsh and barking diplomacy,” wrote French newspaper Libération, adding, “China certainly has better to offer than this caricature that benefits no one.” Even French journalist Richard Arzt—who received a glowing profile in Chinese state media after his five decades of covering China—wrote, “Never has any other Chinese ambassador been so offensive towards France as Lu Shaye.”

Lu’s grandeur may partly explain his provocations. Recalling her several encounters with the Chinese ambassador, French lawmaker Anne Genetet called him a “cordial but authoritarian” man who “wouldn’t listen.” Bondaz noted that “[Lu] interacts very little with people who criticize him,” and that “the echoes we hear from the embassy and Chinese diplomats is that hardly anyone dares to criticize him. He’s in a permanent bubble of self-confirmation. And he doesn’t know when to stop talking.” As with Xi, this yes-men bureaucratic support structure can lead to bad decision-making.

Lu’s confidence may indicate a somewhat privileged relationship with his bosses in Beijing, one that allows him to take risky interviews with foreign media. Beyond his frequent French television appearances, in December 2022 Lu was the very first Chinese official to publicly comment on the A4 protests, which he claimed were “taken advantage of by foreign forces” and “exaggerated reporting.” François Godement, special advisor and resident senior fellow at Institut Montaigne think tank, recently tweeted: “Lu is among those who think they interpret their boss more correctly than measly mouthed diplos, and that they will be rewarded.”

Conflicting priorities in Beijing complicate the interpretive performance. Lu’s “fighting spirit” on French television has simultaneously undercut China’s efforts to win over Europe. But given that Lu does not appear to have been reprimanded by Beijing for previous provocations, “loyalty is probably more important than diplomatic tact,” said Jérôme Doyon, a China specialist at Sciences Po’s Centre for International Relations.

Lu Shaye is surrounded by media and dignitaries during the inauguration of the Arche of Fraternity in Paris' 13th arrondissement in 2020.

Lu speaks during the inauguration of the Ark of Fraternity in Paris’s 13th arrondissement on Feb. 1, 2020.Getty Images

As Lu himself revealed in a 2021 interview: “Westerners accuse us of not conforming to diplomatic etiquette, but the standard for us to evaluate our work is not how foreigners look at us, but how people in China look at us. … Our work is evaluated by these standards, not whether foreigners are happy or not. We can’t stop doing it just because they are unhappy.” In another interview, in 2022, Lu explained that “Chinese diplomacy has really gone through some changes these past two years. We don’t want to continue with ‘lamb’ diplomacy, because as the fable goes, the lamb ends up being eaten by the wolf.”

Hence, continued confrontation is on the menu, to the delight of Chinese nationalists. After Lu’s summoning in 2021, China’s Global Times wrote: “The tough rhetoric of Lu on matters related to China’s core interests has been widely applauded by the Chinese public, and many Chinese netizens praised Lu for doing a good job in defending China, adding that Chinese ambassadors should stand up firmly for China’s core interests.” Embracing his celebrity status, he raved in a later interview: “I’m very honored to be called a “wolf warrior.”

Embracing his celebrity status, Lu raved in a later interview: “I’m very honored to be called a “wolf warrior.”

After the most recent incident two weeks ago, most Chinese netizens rallied to Lu’s defense with patriotic furor and nihilistic rationalizations. Some popular comments on Weibo read: “Offense is the best defense”; “It doesn’t matter if he succeeds or not, as long as he can make them uncomfortable”; and “As long as foreign politicians talk nonsense, can’t Chinese ones do so, too?”

Some Chinese reactions highlighted Lu’s bravery in weathering the “difficult” style of Western media interviews. Nationalist pundit and former France-based reporter Zheng Ruolin enthusiastically praised Lu for “daring to speak out in an obviously hostile environment.” One Global Times reporter shared a more nuanced take on Weibo by citing an interview she conducted with Lu earlier this year. She was impressed by his “understanding of the media and public opinion,” and his willingness to accept live interviews and debates on French television, which come with “more uncertainty and uncontrollability” and “more sharp and sensitive questions” than in China.

It is unclear whether Beijing will remain as encouraging in the future. An anonymous former Chinese diplomat told the South China Morning Post, “Pending a full assessment of [Lu’s statement’s] impact, it may be necessary to keep a tighter control of senior envoys, at least for the time being.” The timing of Xi’s long-overdue call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky just days after Lu’s gaffe also may indicate Beijing’s displeasure with Lu’s damage to Sino-European relations.

But Bondaz is confident Lu will return. “Each time [he is summoned], he disappears for a few weeks and then comes back,” Bondaz said. “He’s an opportunist. Next time there’s an international event, he’ll resurface in the media and do more interviews.”​

​Foreign Policy · by Arthur Kaufman · May 7, 2023

17. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 8, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2023

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces conducted another large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of May 7 to 8.
• Senior Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukrainian forces may be preparing to conduct counteroffensive operations in May or June.
• Russian-occupied Transnistria called on Russia to increase its peacekeepers in the region likely to support the Kremlin’s efforts to destabilize Moldova.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to use the Victory Day parade to show Russia’s continued influence in Central Asia.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces have made marginal advances within Bakhmut as of May 8 amid reports of intensified Wagner Group forces offensive operations and continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Russian forces continued defensive operations in southern Ukraine.
• Russian authorities have reportedly escalated their campaign targeting ethnic minorities for contract service in the Russian military.
• Russian occupation authorities continued to forcibly evacuate civilians in rear areas in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 8, 2023

May 8, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 8, 2023

Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

May 8, 2023, 4:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Russian forces conducted another large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of May 7 to 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 8 that Russian forces launched 16 missiles at Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts, and that Ukrainian forces shot down all 35 launched Shahed drones.[1] Kyiv Mayor Vitaly Klitschko stated that Ukrainian forces shot down 36 Russian drones targeting Kyiv out of a 60 total launched against Ukraine, however.[2] Klitschko did not specify how many total drones Ukrainian forces shot down elsewhere in Ukraine. Klitschko’s report is more likely accurate as it was posted nearly four hours after the initial round of Ukrainian reporting on the Shahed strike. The Ukrainian Red Cross stated that one Russian missile destroyed an entire Red Cross warehouse in Odesa Oblast.[3] Russian milbloggers celebrated claims that Russian forces intensified strikes against Kyiv, with one milblogger claiming that Russian forces conducted the largest strike campaign against Kyiv since the start of the war.[4] Russian sources are likely overcompensating for the ineffectiveness of the drone strikes by playing up the size and scale of the effort.

Senior Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukrainian forces may be preparing to conduct counteroffensive operations in May or June. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 7 that Ukrainian forces are preparing for “new events” in May or June 2023.[5] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Volodymyr Havrylov stated in a May 8 interview that the timing and location of a Ukrainian counteroffensive is not significant because Russian forces and leadership will panic regardless, but that he would not be surprised if “something,” possibly alluding to Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, occurred in May or June.[6] The Ukrainian Defense Forces Military Media Center stated that Russian forces continue to transfer military equipment, ammunition, and supplies to Ukraine to prepare for a defensive operation against a Ukrainian counteroffensive push.[7]

Russian-occupied Transnistria asked Russia to increase its peacekeeping contingent in the region, likely to support the Kremlin’s efforts to destabilize Moldova. A Transnistrian occupation representative to Moscow, Leonid Manakov, asked Russia to increase the number of peacekeepers in Transnistria due to claims of increasing security and terrorist risks.[8] Manakov proposed that Transnistria increase the number of peacekeepers by involving the Russians living in Transnistria in the peacekeeping operations. Manakov’s statement follows reports of Moldovan prosecutors detaining and cracking down on the members of the pro-Russian "Shor” party in mid-April and May.[9] Chisinau detained 27 protestors from the "Shor” party on May 7.[10] Kremlin’s Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov did not comment on Manakov’s proposals.[11] White House officials warned in March that individuals linked with Russian intelligence were planning to stage protests against the Moldovan government in order to install a pro-Russian administration. Manakov’s statements are likely a continuation of the Kremlin’s effort to destabilize Moldova.[12] Russia remains unlikely to deploy additional forces to Transnistria given its ongoing need for forces in Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to use the Moscow Victory Day parade to show Russia’s continued influence in Central Asia. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, and Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon are reportedly attending the Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9.[13] Kremlin-affiliated news outlet Vedemosti reported Japarov’s visit to Moscow for Victory Day on April 23, while Russian media reported Tokayev’s, Mirziyoyev’s, and Rakhmon’s visits on May 8, only one day before the Victory Day parade in Moscow.[14] Russian independent news outlet SOTA reported that Rakhmon’s press service initially announced that Rakhmon would celebrate in Dushanbe, but later stated that Rakhmon had arrived in Moscow for Victory Day.[15] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Putin also invited Turkmen President Serdar Berdymukhamedov but he did not confirm his attendance.[16] No foreign leader attended Moscow Victory Day in 2022, and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan did not hold Victory Day parades in 2022 with some citing health risks from the coronavirus pandemic.[17] The late announcement of Central Asian leaders’ attendance likely indicates their reticence to show direct and public support of the war despite Kremlin efforts to project power. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Armenian President Nikol Pashinyan reportedly also flew to Moscow to attend the Victory Day parade.[18]

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces conducted another large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of May 7 to 8.
• Senior Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukrainian forces may be preparing to conduct counteroffensive operations in May or June.
• Russian-occupied Transnistria called on Russia to increase its peacekeepers in the region likely to support the Kremlin’s efforts to destabilize Moldova.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to use the Victory Day parade to show Russia’s continued influence in Central Asia.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces have made marginal advances within Bakhmut as of May 8 amid reports of intensified Wagner Group forces offensive operations and continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Russian forces continued defensive operations in southern Ukraine.
• Russian authorities have reportedly escalated their campaign targeting ethnic minorities for contract service in the Russian military.
• Russian occupation authorities continued to forcibly evacuate civilians in rear areas in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on May 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna) and Spirne (26km south of Kreminna).[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Nevske (19km northwest of Kreminna), and Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna).[20] Geolocated footage published on May 7 shows an unspecified element of the Russian 98thGuards Airborne (VDV) Division conducting a drone strike against Ukrainian positions south of Torske (16km west of Kreminna).[21] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Synkivka, Novomlynsk (19km northeast of Kupyansk), and Kyslivka (22km southeast of Kupyansk).[22]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces have made marginal advances within Bakhmut as of May 8 amid reports of intensified Wagner Group forces offensive operations. Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces likely made gains in western Bakhmut.[23] Russian sources claimed on May 7 and 8 that Wagner fighters intensified assaults on Ukrainian positions in western Bakhmut and shelling of the area.[24] Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on May 7 that Wagner advanced 280m in Bakhmut and that Ukrainian forces currently control 2.37 square km of the city.[25] A Russian milblogger refuted Russian claims that some Chechen Akhmat units have deployed to Bakhmut as of May 7. ISW has not seen any visual confirmation of Akhmat units operating in the area.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 7 that Russian forces also increased assaults on Ukrainian positions near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), Chasiv Yar (13km west of Bakhmut), and Orikhovo-Vasylivka (14km northwest of Bakhmut) and conducted assaults near Bohdanivka, Predtechyne (14km southwest of Bakhmut), and Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) on May 8.[27] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on May 8 that Russian forces conducted 29 assaults in the Bakhmut direction, and that increased artillery activity indicates that Russian forces in the area do not suffer from significant ammunition shortages despite Prigozhin’s recent claims.[28] Cherevaty stated that Russian forces continue to conduct attritional ground attacks as their main tactic in the Bakhmut area.[29] Ukrainian Commander of the 127th Territorial Defense Brigade Roman Hryshchenko reported on May 7 that additional Wagner personnel arrived and are operating in the city, leading to an increased intensity of assaults.[30] Hryshchenko stated that Ukrainians have not observed any indications that Wagner intends to leave the city and that intensified shelling likely indicates that Wagner has received more ammunition.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 8 that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut), Ivanivske, Chasiv Yar, ad Stupochky (14km southwest of Bakhmut).[32]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front on May 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka, Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[33] Russian Southern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Vadim Astafyev claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operation in the Avdiivka area.[34]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 8.[35] Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Alexander Gordeev claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operation in an unspecified location in western Donetsk Oblast.[36]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces targeted Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction. Geolocated footage published on May 7 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions near Shcherbaky in Zaporizhia Oblast.[37] Russian milbloggers published footage on May 7 and 8 that purportedly showing elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) striking Ukrainian forces near Charivne and elements of the 503rd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58thCombined Arms Army, Southern Military District) striking Ukrainian forces near Orikhiv.[38]

Russian forces continue defensive operations in Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated that Russian forces are “massively mining” the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[39] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo published footage on May 8 purportedly showing him visiting fortifications in occupied Kherson Oblast.[40] Saldo claimed that the fortifications are well-equipped and that the Russian forces stationed there will receive an additional supply of anti-drone guns.

Russian forces conducted routine fire west of Hulyaipole in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.[41]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities have reportedly escalated their campaign targeting ethnic minorities for contract service in the Russian military. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported on April 18 that Russian military recruiters are targeting Central Asian migrant workers for contract service by visiting mosques and immigration centers.[42] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) assessed on May 8 that this recruitment campaign is likely part of the Kremlin’s ongoing effort to “voluntarily” recruit 400,000 military personnel and avoid another round of mobilization. The UK MoD also assessed that Russia likely sends these migrant recruits to the front lines in Ukraine, indicating that Russian authorities remain content with forcing ethnic minorities to disproportionately bear the burden of combat losses in Ukraine.[43]

Russian authorities continue to incentivize and coerce Russians into contract military service. A Russian milblogger advertised contract service through Moscow Oblast and claimed that authorities pay contract recruits 18,770 rubles ($241) for each child, 500,000 ($6,435) rubles for suffering minor injuries, and 1,000,000 rubles ($12,870) for suffering severe injuries in addition to regular monthly salaries of 50,000 rubles ($643).[44] Russian opposition media outlet Mobilization News claimed that the Sochi military registration and enlistment office sent paper summons to Russian students who just turned 18 and became eligible for service.[45]

Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec announced plans to modify the Su-25 attack aircraft based on its use in Ukraine. Rostec First Deputy General Director Vladimir Artyakov announced that Rostec plans to modify the Su-25SM3 for high-precision weapon use.[46] A Russian milblogger previously criticized the decision not to develop Su-25 aircraft on May 2 and claimed that Russian forces should develop the Su-25 and Su-23CM3 variants closer to unspecified American models that are capable of carrying a variety of munitions.[47]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities are evacuating from some settlements in Kherson Oblast to areas deep in the rear of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 8 that Russian occupation authorities suspended the Skadovsk raion and Skadovsk City administrations and loaded documents, office equipment, and other state property for transport out of the area.[48] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian occupation authorities are conducting similar activities in other settlements in occupied Kherson Oblast and are evacuating the areas with their families.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian occupation authorities plan to transport documents and looted property by sea to Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast in an effort to avoid multi-kilometer traffic jams on the Kerch Straight, which are a direct result of the partial evacuation order.[50]

Russian occupation authorities continue to announce patronage-like partnerships with Russian regions. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik stated on May 8 that he and Republic of Bashkortostan head Radiy Khabirov met to discuss ways that Bashkortostan can support the Luhansk Oblast occupation administration. Pasechnik announced that Khabirov had committed to sending a team of builders to help repair residential buildings and social facilities in Khrustalnyi, Luhansk Oblast, by May 10.[51] Pasechnik also stated that he and Khabirov discussed opening an official representative office of Bashkortostan in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[52] Pasechnik thanked Khabirov for continuing to invite children from the occupied Luhansk Oblast to recreation camps in Bashkortostan, noting that 1,500 Ukrainian children attended recreation camps in Bashkortostan in 2022.[53][54]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

18. Planes, Trains, Automobiles, and Bodabodas: Transportation Workers and Irregular Warfare

Don't neglect the human factors.

Conclusion:

For current professionals, frameworks such as the “PMESII-PT” variables—the variables the military uses to understand complex operating environments—should revise the idea of infrastructure to include the humans who operate it. This has particular importance when considering the latest FM 3-0’s discussion of “contested deployments” and how threat actors might target the movement of friendly forces into or through a theater. Deployments of US forces will continue to rely on networks of civilian transporters of various nationalities vulnerable to malign influence. Threat actors might not need to destroy rails or ports to disrupt the movement of US forces; labor strikes or simply work slowdowns at points of debarkation have the potential to frustrate the deployment of US troops in any theater. With a world grappling with increasing migration, interconnected commodity chains, and rapid urbanization, transportation workers will remain key human terrain.

Planes, Trains, Automobiles, and Bodabodas: Transportation Workers and Irregular Warfare - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Danny Moriarty · May 9, 2023

Movement is political. Whether it’s the movement of 190,000 Russian troops across borders in an act of war, the Maduro regime’s displacement of more than 6.1 million Venezuelan refugees across South and Central America, or the refusal of four black students to leave a Woolworth lunch counter in downtown Greensboro, North Carolina, in an act of protest against segregation, the positioning and shifting locations of bodies can send strong political messages. And the politics of everyday movement matters not only at a grand geopolitical scale; it also offers opportunities for irregular warfare.

For many, the buzz of daily movement blends into the background. These actors, networks, and infrastructure move people and goods, sustaining economic and social activity in both formal and informal settings. Within the United States, over ten percent of all jobs fall into the transportation sector; globally, millions work in informal transportation. In the growing “megacities” of the Global South, informal taxis, couriers, and delivery drivers move vast quantities of people and goods every day.

But they also produce alternative forms of governance that can challenge the status quo. Consider New York City’s rejection of freight transportation infrastructure in the early 20th century. During this period, manufacturing industries remained an important part of New York’s urban economy, and as a result heavily relied on thousands of dock workers, truck drivers, and railway workers operating throughout Manhattan. Concerns about anarchist elements in these worker populations led business leaders to push further freight infrastructure development to New Jersey, despite numerous proposed plans for a freight handling subway system within the city. New York City elites feared that these workers, with knowledge of and access to networks that sustained political and economic activity, could subvert the city government or disrupt economic activity by exerting control over the flow of goods into and out of New York.

The transportation sector demands special attention as a potential avenue of influence for irregular warfare and competition. Military literature on transport workers offers a starting point, but insights from researchers in geography and urban planning offer irregular warfare practitioners new lessons on how to compete and win. Far from just a component of nonstandard logistics, these workers and networks represent potent means to achieve US objectives across operational contexts.

Transporters in Unconventional Warfare and Competition

The human networks transporting and distributing goods or services are critical. Typically, discussions regarding irregular warfare and transportation sectors center on nonstandard logistics, or how special operations forces might sustain themselves and their partners through local networks. Additionally, the literature on unconventional warfare generally focuses on transportation infrastructure sabotage operations. Some scholars point to the role that transporters play across various contexts in unconventional warfare, with a value-chain analysis framework from economics to illuminate how transportation and distribution actors can enable or hinder the provision of essential services.

For example, members of a resistance movement might coopt transportation infrastructure for their own purposes. Iran delivers weapons and equipment to their Houthi allies through the support of Yemeni fishermen who would otherwise continue normal maritime trade. With their specialized maritime knowledge, these mariners successfully traffic weapons and equipment despite the threat of American interdiction. Coopting support from the human networks that conduct this distribution also serves the objectives of the resistance.

In addition to irregular warfare, transport networks and actors are relevant in the ongoing competition between the United States and powers like Russia and China. Across Africa, protests and strikes by miners and railway workers against Chinese projects offer insights into efforts to disrupt the Belt and Road Initiative. Similarly, Russia’s plundering of Sudanese gold to offset economic sanctions relies heavily on networks of local truckers to move processed material from mining towns to airports and onto planes. Without the willing support of local workers, Russia and China would be forced to expend additional resources to continue their extraction of mineral wealth from the continent, such as additional funds to meet workers’ demands for pay increases or the deployment of more aggressive tactics to gain transporters’ compliance. Working with local partners with access to transportation networks therefore offers opportunities to organize workers as part of competition.

Furthermore, urban transport workers cannot be overlooked. Taxi networks in megacities help millions of people navigate traffic, while sustaining an urban area’s economic and social flow—a critical function. These networks therefore are ripe for influence or targeting. For example, on September 1, 2022, a loose coalition of pro-Ukrainian hacktivists jammed Moscow’s traffic for over an hour through the coordinated ordering of taxis to the same location. While this specific instance was resolved without major economic damage, it nevertheless demonstrated urban populations’ reliance on both digital and physical access to transport workers. Lastly, individual acts of protest, like those of a Georgian taxi driver who abandoned Russian tourists after they expressed anti-Ukrainian views, can also socially isolate and impose costs on the populations of competing powers. Similar to developing relationships with truckers or railway workers, establishing connections with the networks of urban transport workers presents new options to disrupt adversarial powers, whether in the everyday activities of their urban populations or in their activities in foreign settings.

New Insights from Mobilities Research

Social scientists can offer new insights drawing on a field of studies known as “mobilities research.” While many geographers and urban planning scholars largely focus on static places and understanding the factors that give places distinct characters, others emphasize the daily mobilities that connect people to different places. Geographer Jacob Shell, for instance, points to the important role played by elephant transport networks in Burma not just in supplying rebel forces but also in supporting a culture of resistance that Shell refers to as “subversive logistics.” In a widely-cited article describing the “new mobilities paradigm,” sociologists Mimi Sheller and John Urry explain how:

“mobilities thus entail distinct social spaces that orchestrate new forms of social life… for example stations, hotels, motorways, resorts, airports, leisure complexes, cosmopolitan cities, beaches, galleries, and roadside parks…or connections might be enacted through less privileged spaces, on the street corners…and back alleys where the less privileged… organize illicit exchanges, meetings, political demonstrations, or ‘underground’ social gatherings.”

By bringing an analytical framework typically employed to understand static locations to these temporary places formed through an assemblage of people and infrastructure, Sheller and Urry demonstrate how banal, everyday movements can profoundly impact human societies. Going beyond a reductive view of social flow as merely a means to an end, mobilities researchers argue that the flow serves as a unique space of exchange. Irregular warfare practitioners can apply these insights by broadening their understanding of where and how resistance movements can grow. Far from popular conceptions of jungle guerilla camps or urban taverns, the temporary assemblies of people through transport can provide an escape from “effective surveillance and monitoring from authorities” and allow for a sharing of grievances and establishment of common identities.

Returning to the discussion of how these mobilities affect the daily lives of people and places, other scholars have described the “people as infrastructure.” This approach pushes analysis beyond the roads, vehicles, and technologies that aid in the movement of people and goods, focusing on those people themselves whose daily actions allow for the function of a city, region, or population. In the context of contentious politics and resistance, other scholars have pointed to alternative mobilities as a form of challenging a state’s prescribed rules for how citizens are to navigate time and space; examples include the use of skateboarding or alternative social groups temporarily appropriating public spaces that are typically off-limits. Because of how varied the politics of transportation can be, the examples below demonstrate the value of a mobilities lens for irregular warfare.

Learning from Ireland, Truckers, and Motorcycle Taxis

Transport networks are vital to building robust resistance movements. More than just the routes and vehicles that move goods, networks are also comprised of the people who live and work there. This approach has ramifications for both targeting and for building robust resistance movements. The examples of Northern Ireland during the Troubles, Canadian truckers protesting COVID-19 vaccination requirements, and motorcycle taxi drivers in Uganda demonstrate transporters’ utility beyond moving people and goods.

During the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) relied on numerous sources of support to fund its operations against British forces. One critical stream of financial and political support came from the now famous “black cabs” of Belfast. In what doubled as a form of nonviolent resistance, Catholics in Belfast created community taxi associations to serve their neighborhoods after city bus services were suspended. The fleet of black cabs from organizations like the West Belfast Taxi Association often employed former IRA members and supported elements of the IRA’s campaign, such as prisoner welfare groups. Certain cab drivers also enjoyed greater mobility across the heavily-divided neighborhoods of Belfast and other cities in Northern Ireland, earning a “cowboy” status in certain circles. With both Catholic and Protestant militias targeting taxi drivers, those willing to cross unofficial borders between neighborhoods and deliver customers helped the daily lives of civilians while also reporting on sectarian activity to their respective paramilitary organizations.

Beyond the financial aid and information provided by cab drivers during the decades of violence, Belfast’s black cabs continue to play a role in the simmering conflict. Today, “black cab tours” constitute a significant part of the tourism industry in Northern Ireland; the visual and oral history conveyed to tourists by Catholic or Protestant cab drivers has a considerable impact on how the story of the Troubles is reproduced and taught to foreign and domestic audiences. Belfast’s black cabs show how what started as a grassroots collective action transformed into a robust network of transporters providing economic and political support to an occupied population and resistance movement throughout years of violence. These types of human networks can also come together over more short-term grievances, such as dissatisfaction with strict public health measures.

Such conditions reflect the 2022 “Freedom Convoy” protests in Canada, highlighting the impacts that collective action by transporters can have on a state. Launched against COVID-19 vaccination mandates, the protests involved not just the movement of people but also hundreds of tractor-trailers in several key locations. In Ottawa, truckers positioned their bodies and their vehicles across the capital, shutting down several major avenues and bringing the city almost to a standstill. At other times, truckers created “rolling blockades” by slowly driving through already high-traffic areas. Outside the city, other protestors made blockades with their trucks at several critical border crossings, disrupting the flow of goods and costing close to $1 billion in losses by some estimates. While the history of the protest has primarily been characterized by its appropriation by political fringe groups and extremists, the Freedom Convoy still offers scholars and practitioners a stark case of how the political mobilization of often-unseen transporters can cause significant economic damage. While dramatic instances of collective action like these can garner national or international attention, the potential for influence or contentious politics also exists in everyday movements across urban spaces.

In Uganda, for example, economic activity in Kampala relies on motorcycle taxi operators or Bodaboda riders, as the capital’s population has surged past the capacity of its transportation infrastructure. Riders eventually formed unions, which over time organized collective actions and protests against municipal regulation. Union power led to Uganda’s longtime ruler Yoweri Museveni courting Bodaboda unions for political support, advocating for their rights and offering guarantees of job security to gain a powerful ally. These highly mobile supporters now serve as a quasi-biker gang for Museveni’s regime. With millions of Ugandans dependent on them to traverse Kampala’s streets, Bodaboda riders can compel support both from average citizens and from political factions that seek the unions’ alignment. As cities like Kampala and larger megacities in Africa and Asia expand and traffic worsens, these informal networks of transport workers will continue to grow in importance. Scholars point to similar struggles in cities like Bangkok and Yaoundé, Cameroon, as evidence of how critical informal transport worker unions are to urban economic activity and the political viability of local regimes.

Whether behind the wheel of an 18-wheeled tractor trailer or a 2-wheeled motorcycle, these examples of politically mobilized transporters shed light on some of the ideas proposed by mobilities scholars. The organization of these networks for collective action can create paralyzing effects on cities or entire countries through the withholding of movement expected by the state. Alternatively, resistance movements can grow and gain new sources of support through acts of movement prohibited by the state.

Irregular Mobility

Irregular warfare depends on irregular mobility. By studying the nuances of transportation worker communities, irregular warfare scholars will both understand their operating environment better, while also generating new options to resist adversarial powers and compete against the United States’ rivals. Mobilities research offers a new perspective on the everyday movement of people and networks, and how such movements comprise much more than a daily chore of getting from point A to point B. Expanding education and training opportunities on nonstandard logistics to include these concepts will broaden understandings of how to incorporate transportation networks into irregular warfare campaigns. United States Special Operations Command should therefore consider whether Training With Industry programs could improve logisticians’ understanding of nonstandard logistics.

For current professionals, frameworks such as the “PMESII-PT” variables—the variables the military uses to understand complex operating environments—should revise the idea of infrastructure to include the humans who operate it. This has particular importance when considering the latest FM 3-0’s discussion of “contested deployments” and how threat actors might target the movement of friendly forces into or through a theater. Deployments of US forces will continue to rely on networks of civilian transporters of various nationalities vulnerable to malign influence. Threat actors might not need to destroy rails or ports to disrupt the movement of US forces; labor strikes or simply work slowdowns at points of debarkation have the potential to frustrate the deployment of US troops in any theater. With a world grappling with increasing migration, interconnected commodity chains, and rapid urbanization, transportation workers will remain key human terrain.

Captain Danny Moriarty is a civil affairs officer currently attending graduate school at the University of Texas at Austin, researching civil resistance within the Department of Geography and the Environment. He previously served in the 83d Civil Affairs Battalion as a team leader and human network analysis chief and has completed deployments to Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

​

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com