Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:


"Frustrated that the Services were not taking their unconventional capabilities seriously, Senators William Cohen (Maine) and Sam Nunn (Georgia) took matters into their own hands and pursued legislation that went much further than just forming a task force or advisory panel."

"But reforming special operations would be tricky, Locher said. It was not included as a provision in Goldwater-Nichols because so few lawmakers understood the issue, Cohen and Nunn were afraid the provisions would get lost during debate. That is why it became an amendment to the 1987 National Defense Authorization Act instead."

“I think the overall reason was the kind of missions that special operations forces were going to take on — counterterrorism, counter-insurgency, peacekeeping, contingency operations — those were the kinds of things that the Pentagon really did not want to get involved with,” Locher said. “We had the American way of war, which was really conventional force-on-force. Indirect aggression, for a long time, we had treated as lesser-included cases. So the kinds of things the Cohen-Nunn amendment were trying to improve our ability to address were things that the mainstream Pentagon officers and officials did not want to be part of the Pentagon’s responsibility.”
​– From multiple sources


​1. The Original Mastermind Behind North Korea’s Cult-of-Personality Propaganda Dies

2. Report to Congress on North Korea-Russia Relations 

3. Kim Jong Un demolishes his North Korean winter palace in ‘unusual’ move: report

4. Letter: Origins of the east Asia miracle relied heavily on protectionism

5. Kim Jong Un elevates provocations amid self-idolization efforts

6. Sinpho South Shipyard: Indications of New Submarine Construction

7. Increased Attention on Japanese Citizens Abducted by North Korea

8. N. Korean leader voices 'firm support' in his message to Putin over Victory Day

9. Unification ministry to install artwork symbolizing N.K. abductees at Seoul festival

10. Yoon apologizes for wife's 'unwise conduct'

11. Ruling party praises Yoon's 'frank' press conference; opposition criticizes lack of 'self-reflection'

12. Washington’s willingness to engage Pyongyang exposes rare rift with Seoul

13. Hundreds of North Koreans enter Russia in first quarter amid burgeoning ties

14. Canada to deploy aircraft to monitor illegal North Korean ship-to-ship transfers

15. Seoul to pursue amicable ties with Moscow despite North Korean arms trade: Yoon

16. [INTERVIEW] 'Trump's possible return will be mixed bag for South Korea'

17. Rapport between Kim Jong-un and Trump

18. N. Korea's monitoring of political tendencies won't work




1. The Original Mastermind Behind North Korea’s Cult-of-Personality Propaganda Dies


Something to be said for propaganda continuity. But since his retirement in 2017 and now his passing has the regime lost its propaganda mojo?


In the last 6 months I think we have seen some critical changes in messaging that may turn out to be miscalculations. KIm may no longer be able to maintain control of the people through the combination of ideological indoctrination and iron handed security forces. This is because of his failed promise that nuclear weapons would bring peace and prosperity to the Korean people in the north. And the statements about no longer seeking peaceful unification have teksn hope away from the korean people in the north because they believed that unification was the path to a better life.



The Original Mastermind Behind North Korea’s Cult-of-Personality Propaganda Dies

Kim Jong Un will lead state funeral for the late official who served all three of North Korea’s leaders

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/the-original-mastermind-behind-north-koreas-cult-of-personality-propaganda-dies-44e656c5?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1

By Dasl Yoon

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May 8, 2024 7:33 am ET



Kim Ki Nam’s career spanned six decades and included collaboration with all three of North Korea’s leaders. PHOTO: CHUNG SUNG-JUN/GETTY IMAGES

SEOUL—Kim Ki Nam, the architect of North Korea’s cult-of-personality propaganda and a childhood mentor of the regime’s current leader, died on Tuesday. He was 94 years old.

Kim Ki Nam’s career as an influential Workers’ Party official spanned six different decades and included close collaboration with all three of North Korea’s leaders. In 2011, he was one of eight officials—including current leader Kim Jong Un—to walk alongside the state hearse carrying the late leader Kim Jong Il’s casket. 

In addition to his role as regime mouthpiece, Kim Ki Nam twice led North Korean delegations to Seoul, one as recently as 2009, when he met then-South Korean President Lee Myung-bak.

Kim Ki Nam wasn’t a blood relative of the ruling Kim family. But his passing was so significant that Kim Jong Un, the 40-year-old dictator, will make the rare move of leading the state funeral himself. State media praised Kim Ki Nam as “boundlessly loyal” and as someone who had thoroughly established the “monolithic leadership system of the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un.”


North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, in a suit, visiting the body of Kim Ki Nam on Wednesday. PHOTO: ASSOCIATED PRESS

Kim Ki Nam was born in 1929 during Japan’s colonization of Korea, in an area that is now a northeast province of the North. State media described him as having a childhood of hardship, born into a stevedore’s family. He attended the elite Kim Il Sung University—where he later served as a professor—and studied abroad at a state university in Russia.

After leaving academia in the 1960s, Kim was appointed deputy director of the Workers’ Party’s propaganda and agitation department—serving directly under Kim Jong Il, the eventual second-generation leader. The two were known to be close drinking buddies.

The following decade, Kim Ki Nam assumed the editorship of the North’s main Rodong Sinmun newspaper where he oversaw a mythological overhaul of the country’s origin story—one that ideologically paved the way for Kim Jong Il’s succession and established a hereditary transfer of power.

It was in the pages of Rodong Sinmun that Kim Jong Il was said to have been born on Mount Paektu, the nation’s most sacred mountain. State media at the time christened the second-generation heir apparent as the “Shining Star.” Historians outside North Korea believe Kim Jong Il was born in Khabarovsk, Russia, when his father was a Soviet officer.  

But in article after article then, researchers were said to have found decades-old messages from Communist Revolutionaries taken from the sacred mountain and nearby towns, with some proclaiming, “The Shining Star has risen over Mount Paektu.” That was intended to cast Kim Jong Il’s ascendancy to power as something akin to prophecy, close regime watchers say.

North Koreans, even now, are taught that the so-called “Mount Paektu bloodline”—or those who are direct descendants of the ruling Kims—represent an essential requirement for top leadership.

“In the 1970s, North Korea’s state ideology developed to become the core of all North Korean education and policies, and the propaganda department played a crucial role in shaping the Kim dynasty’s profile around that ideology,” said Jung Won-hee, who researches North Korean politics and propaganda at South Korea’s Kangwon Institute for Unification Studies. 


In 2011, Kim Ki Nam, far left, was one of eight officials to walk alongside the state hearse carrying the late leader Kim Jong Il’s casket. PHOTO: ASSOCIATED PRESS

There were other changes. Under Kim Ki Nam’s watch, only photos of then-leader Kim Il Sung were allowed on the front page of Rodong Sinmun, a break with the prior practice that permitted images of other officials. 

His longevity was unique, too, as few North Korean officials held senior positions under all three Kim leaders. Many others have been purged, with even family members being executed after falling out of favor. 

Kim Ki Nam’s closeness with the current leader and his sister was apparent in spring 2009. As state media started to present Kim Jong Un as a potential next leader, a grainy photo emerged of the then-twentysomething. It was one of the first public images ever shown of Kim Jong Un. He was flanked by his siblings, bodyguards and a single North Korean official: Kim Ki Nam.

Well into his 80s, Kim Ki Nam officially left his role as North Korea’s propaganda chief in 2017, handing the reins to Kim Yo Jong, the younger sister of the current leader, who is now a senior Workers’ Party official. 

“Kim Ki Nam made significant contributions to North Korea’s succession by actively engaging in grooming the leaders,” said Kim In-tae, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy, a government-affiliated think tank in Seoul. 


2. Report to Congress on North Korea-Russia Relations 


Download the 3 page report from the Congressional Research Service here: https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24651154/in12355.pdf



Report to Congress on North Korea-Russia Relations - USNI News

news.usni.org · by U.S. Naval Institute Staff · May 7, 2024

The following is the May 6, 2024, Congressional Research Service report, North Korea-Russia Relations: Current Developments

From the report

Since 2023, North Korea (officially known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) and the Russian Federation (Russia) have upgraded their partnership, a development that could potentially boost Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and increase North Korea’s military capabilities and its willingness to engage in provocative actions against the United States and U.S. allies in East Asia.

The Biden Administration in recent months has designated for sanctions North Korean individuals and entities conducting illicit cyber and crypto activities, weapons procurement and transfers (to Russia), and fuel trade that violates U.S. and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) restrictions. North Korea’s contravention of these sanctions, with Russia’s assistance, challenges long-held U.S. policy, shaped and supported by several acts of Congress, aimed at persuading North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for a potential loosening of sanctions. Strengthened North Korea-Russia bilateral ties potentially embolden North Korea to expand illicit activities and engage in provocations, and may improve DPRK military capabilities. The Administration has worked with South Korea and Japan to increase deterrence and expand allied efforts to counter North Korea’s illicit efforts to evade sanctions, such as a new U.S.-South Korea task force to disrupt DPRK illicit imports of petroleum. Congress may consider whether to review Administration policies, examine implementation of unilateral and multilateral sanctions, and review the breadth and pace of North Korea-Russia cooperation as well as its impact on U.S. and allied forces.

An Expanding Partnership

In September 2023, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un traveled to Russia’s Far East, where he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and visited Russia’s newest spaceport, a factory producing advanced jets, and Russia’s Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok. It is Kim’s only summit since 2019. High-level Russian and DPRK officials continue to meet in each other’s capitals to develop the partnership in a broad range of areas, including economy, science, technology, and culture. In January 2024, the North Korean government said that Putin may soon travel to Pyongyang for a bilateral summit (the last time he traveled there was 2000). Some analysts have expressed concern that North Korea’s expanded capabilities and support from Russia (and China) could give North Korea greater confidence to conduct aggressive diplomatic, military, or other actions to achieve its objectives in the coming years.

Download the document here.

Related

news.usni.org · by U.S. Naval Institute Staff · May 7, 2024



3. Kim Jong Un demolishes his North Korean winter palace in ‘unusual’ move: report


I heard he wanted to replace it with a replica of Mar-a-Lago. (note satire)




Kim Jong Un demolishes his North Korean winter palace in ‘unusual’ move: report

New York Post · by Social Links for Allie Griffin View Author Archive Get author RSS feed · May 8, 2024

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has reportedly demolished several buildings on his winter palace’s estate in an “unusual move” which may signal an expansion of the country’s military operations, according to satellite images and experts.

The aerial photos of the Ryokpo Palace complex south of the capital city Pyongyang show a dirt lot where a blue-roofed mansion once stood, as first reported by anonymous North Korean analyst “Nobody German” on X.

The main residential buildings and auxiliary structures were likely torn down sometime between April 21 and April 25, according to an analysis of the satellite images by North Korea-focused news outlet NK Pro.

The aerial photos of the Ryokpo Palace complex south of the capital city Pyongyang show a dirt lot where a blue-roofed mansion once stood. @NobodyGerman / X

An expert told the publication that the demolition could indicate that Kim instead plans to use the land where the underutilized palace stood for military operations in what they said was an “unusual move.”

Recently, Kim has been ramping up efforts to modernize the military of the self-isolated country and experts believe the demolition of the opulent palace could indicate he’s working to give military leaders greater control or consolidating military facilities.

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Last month, he authorized multiple weapons tests, including salvo launches of “super-large” multiple rocket launchers and the firing of several short-range ballistic missiles.

State media said the drills represented the first test of North Korea’s nuclear weapons management and control system as it develops increasingly advanced ballistic missiles.

An expert said the demolition could indicate Kim plans to instead use the land for military operations. KCNA VIA KNS/AFP via Getty Images

Kim’s demolition of his seasonal palace comes as tensions between the country, South Korea and the US deepen over the dictator’s military ramp-up.

Kim has named its southern neighbor as North Korea’s “principal enemy” in the country’s constitution and crushed any reunification initiatives between the two countries.

With Post wires

New York Post · by Social Links for Allie Griffin View Author Archive Get author RSS feed · May 8, 2024


4. Letter: Origins of the east Asia miracle relied heavily on protectionism





Letter: Origins of the east Asia miracle relied heavily on protectionism

Financial Times · May 8, 2024

Gillian Tett notes “an important difference between policies that try to create growth by shielding domestic companies from foreign competition and those which help those companies compete more effectively on the world stage” (“How to tell good industrial policy from bad”, Opinion, May 3).

The implication is that industrial policies characterised by market protection — import substitution — are bad, while those promoting export competitiveness — export-oriented policies — are good.

Tett illustrates this difference through “the contrasting fortunes of Malaysian automaker Proton car and South Korea’s Hyundai”. Proton failed due to market protection in Malaysia, while Hyundai became a global brand due to South Korea’s export-oriented strategy.

This account is an inaccurate description of east Asia’s industrial strategy and Hyundai’s success. South Korea and Taiwan were the most export-oriented emerging economies in the post-world war two period, but also the most import-controlling. The key to their success was to temporarily shield domestic companies from foreign competition while simultaneously helping them to become globally competitive through technology acquisition and learning.

This was nowhere more the case than in the automobile industry. The South Korean government placed tariffs on imported cars, required foreign investors to enter joint ventures and regulated local firm entry into the industry. These policies encouraged Korean firms to invest in automotive assembly for the protected domestic market, drawing on joint ventures and technology licensing with foreign firms.

The contrasting fortunes of Proton and Hyundai were due to their approach to technological indigenisation.

Hyundai invested massive resources and time into creating its own engine design, while Proton continued to license foreign technology, which came with conditions about which export markets it could access and in turn limited its economies of scale.

If anything the “east Asian miracle” of the late 20th century showed that temporary domestic market protection and subsidies are justified to help investment, learning and innovation to take place.

Now that “the policy that shall not be named” — industrial policy — has finally returned centre stage, it is important not to return to old debates about import substitution versus export-oriented policies and perpetuate myths about east Asia’s experience.

Lindsay Whitfield

Professor of Business and Development

Copenhagen Business School

Frederiksberg, Denmark

Financial Times · May 8, 2024


5. Kim Jong Un elevates provocations amid self-idolization efforts


Internal threats, the requirement for absolute control of the people requires externalizing the threat. I am more concerned with internal instability and potential regime collapse than a deliberate attack (though it would be a deliberate attack if Kim Jong Un decided to execute his campaign plan to dominate the peninsula as a response to the internal instability conditions). 




Kim Jong Un elevates provocations amid self-idolization efforts

donga.com


Posted May. 09, 2024 07:57,

Updated May. 09, 2024 07:57

Kim Jong Un elevates provocations amid self-idolization efforts. May. 09, 2024 07:57. .

When Kim Jong Un escorted his father's hearse in December 2011, the 27-year-old shed tears and looked sad. Back then, South Korean authorities were not sure that he would quickly earn the loyalty of senior party leaders and tighten his grip.


Ten years later, in 2021, the Rodong Sinmun called Kim the “Great Leader,” which had always been considered exclusive to his grandfather, Kim Il Sung. This implied that he, in effect, proclaimed himself a leader who exceeded his father and stood shoulder to shoulder with his grandfather. The National Intelligence Service then commented that North Korea attempted to adopt “Kim Jong Un-ism” as a new ideological framework of the regime, a representation of his pursuit of leaving behind the legacy of his predecessors.


Having said that, given his remarks and moves, he could not remove all the traces. Even until recently, he imitated his grandfather from the moment he was singled out as the regime's successor and tried to copy his hairstyle and body shape.


However, Pyongyang has recently shown quite a different approach. Whereas reducing its attempts to deify the previous leaders, the regime is hell-bent on idolizing Kim Jong Un outspokenly. All such change is closely associated with how confident he has become for years. “He is completely different than he was several years ago. He makes a reckless effort to differentiate himself from his predecessors,” said a South Korean government official. Such a heightened level of his confidence may have come from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s generous support, which comes with the two regimes’ close relationship, or some improvements in the food situation following the lifting of the COVID-19 lockdown.


Kim’s self-idolization tactics can inevitably have a great influence on the regime’s approach to South Korea. It is likely that the leader, self-proclaimed as the “Sun,” will take an increasingly aggressive posture with a view to making himself different from his predecessors who regarded South Korea as a homological entity. Kim already named the two Koreas countries hostile to each other, making, in effect, a declaration of war. With this in mind, he will intensify provocations against Seoul while building policy and education systems to define it as a hostile enemy. What’s worse, he may find it easier and more convenient to make it happen at a time when the Korean peninsula is affected by the trends of the New Cold War era.


The South Korean government should respond to North Korea’s explicit change of approach. First, it must be composure and cool-headed to analyze Kim’s intentions, and then it should take firm and resolute action. After all, we know well what cost it has to suffer if it does not confront head-to-head but sits on its hands when Pyongyang signals changes in its framework and policies.

한국어

donga.com


6. Sinpho South Shipyard: Indications of New Submarine Construction

Sinpho South Shipyard: Indications of New Submarine Construction



https://www.38north.org/2024/05/sinpho-south-shipyard-indications-of-new-submarine-construction/


On September 6, 2023, North Korea unveiled a new type of ballistic missile submarine (SSB), a “Sinpo-C” class SSB named the Hero Kim Kun Ok. The ceremony marked the second phase of developing a credible submarine-launched ballistic missile capability, in line with Kim Jong Un’s announced plans to bolster the size of the North’s submarine arsenal. However, until recently, few visible signs of efforts to build additional submarines have been observed at the Sinpho South Shipyard.  

Recent commercial satellite imagery, however, indicates that a new submarine construction campaign has begun. Hull components and equipment have appeared in the parts yard servicing the shipyard’s construction halls. Measurements of these components suggest this new submarine will likely be the same class as the Hero Kim Kun Ok SSB.

Figure 1. Overview of activity at Sinpho South Shipyard. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2024. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Construction Activity  

Over the past few months, construction equipment and submarine components—including three hull sections and supportive jigs—have been brought into the shipyard.  

The first jig was observed on imagery from late December 2023, with two more present by mid-February 2024. Jigs are utilized in construction and are removed once their sections are placed on the transfer platform for movement inside the submarine. 

Imagery from March 31 showed the presence of three hull sections—or transverse frames—measuring 5.6, 6.4 and 7 meters in diameter. To construct the submarine, these sections are stacked and welded together to build the hull. The two smaller sections were supported by the jigs; the largest of the three was placed on the rail-mounted transfer platform beneath one of the two traveling gantry cranes in the parts yard. The placement of this larger hull suggested it was ready to be rolled into the larger construction hall.  

By April 27, the largest hull section had already been moved inside the construction hall. The gantry crane had been repositioned over another hull section, supported by a jig. 

Figure 2. Largest hull section has been moved into nearby construction hall on imagery from April 27, 2024. Satellite image © 2024 Maxar Technologies. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

The measurements of all three hull sections fit within the diameter of the Sinpo-C class SSB, which is 8.1 meters. This suggests that another vessel of the same class is likely under construction, with smaller sections positioned toward the aft end of the submarine. 

Figure 3. Two hull sections and gantry cranes observed in materials staging area on imagery from April 29, 2024. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2024. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Secure Boat Basin  

Since its arrival in early September 2023, the Hero Kim Kun Ok SSB has remained in the secure boat basin under the protective awning. Recent imagery from April 27, 2024 reveals a panel section above the submarine’s sail has been removed, giving access to that portion of the vessel. Alongside the submarine, a mobile crane is parked with its boom in the stored position. No other equipment is observed in the immediate area. The purpose of this activity is unclear, though it could be to fit electronics or other equipment in the sail or to prepare the vessel for eventual sea trials. 

Figure 4. Both SINPO-Class and Hero Kim Kun Ok under protective awning in the secure boat basin. A mobile crane is parked alongside the vessels. Satellite image © 2024 Maxar Technologies. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

In early April, the older submarine (the 8.24 Yongung or GORAE/SINPO-class) had been moved from the basin wall and repositioned outboard alongside the Sinpo-C. By April 29, the 8.24 Yongung had returned to the south wall. This is the second time this maneuver has been observed, the first occurring in December 2023 for a similarly brief period. In each instance, the vessel sails were aligned. The purpose of this movement and positioning is unclear.

Figure 5. SINPO-Class SSB moved out from underneath protective awning on imagery from April 29, 2024. Image Pleiades NEO © Airbus DS 2024. For media options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Other Activity  

Construction is ongoing at other parts of the shipyard. Work on the coastal seawall that parallels the road leading to the L-shaped pier and the new storage and maintenance hall located at the south end of the site continues to progress.

Figure 6. Construction activity on coastal seawall and submarine storage and maintenance hall near L-shaped pier on imagery from April 27, 2024. Satellite image © 2024 Maxar Technologies. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.



7. Increased Attention on Japanese Citizens Abducted by North Korea


All the human rights issues connected to north Korea must be advanced, including abductees.




Increased Attention on Japanese Citizens Abducted by North Korea

Published May 7, 2024

Author: Robert King

Category: Japan

https://keia.org/the-peninsula/increased-attention-on-japanese-citizens-abducted-by-north-korea/


The blatant abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea around 40 years ago continues to be a sensitive and controversial issue for the Japanese government and the Japanese people, as well as a serious obstacle to improved relations between Pyongyang and Tokyo. From about 1977 to 1983, North Korean military and intelligence operatives kidnapped at least 17 Japanese citizens from Japan.

The abduction issue continues to be an important and sensitive topic for the Japanese government, and the North Korean government has been concerned about the damage to its international standing from Japan’s claims. While some of the Japanese citizens who were said to have been abducted were individuals who disappeared for other reasons, the North Korean government did admit that its agents had abducted Japanese citizens. Five citizens who were kidnapped and held in North Korea were permitted to return to Japan in 2002 after a visit by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro to Pyongyang for meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il.

The release in 2002 of the five Japanese citizens was enthusiastically welcomed by Japan, but the goodwill was short-lived. Japanese and North Korean officials continued working-level discussions, and three more abductees were returned in July 2004. North Korean officials told Japanese representatives that among the specific individuals identified by the Japanese government as having been abducted, five were not found by North Korea, eight had died, and two never entered North Korea. Between 2002 and 2014, the two countries held over a dozen working-level meetings on abductees, which the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has carefully documented. However, the meetings achieved limited results.

In January 2016, Pyongyang conducted another nuclear weapons test and announced it had launched a satellite, both of which violated existing UN Security Council resolutions that imposed sanctions against North Korea. Japan, which supported the UN resolution, imposed additional unilateral sanctions against North Korea. Pyongyang responded by dissolving the “Special Investigating Committee,” which had been set up by Japan and North Korea to deal with the Japanese abductee issue.

In 2018 and 2019, Japan requested that the abduction issue be raised by US President Donald Trump in his meetings with Kim Jong-un in June 2018 and February 2019. Trump emphatically affirmed to Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo that he would raise the issue with Kim in Hanoi. President Trump said after the meeting’s conclusion that he had raised the issue with the North Korean leader. In view of the very public failure of the US-North Korea summit in Hanoi, however, it is unlikely that the topic was a high-priority issue.

Abductions Continue to Receive Attention in Japan

High-profile attention on the abductee issue continues with the current Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. His government has issued public calls for North Korea to deal with the unresolved cases of abducted Japanese citizens. While North Korean officials had permitted a small number of individuals to return to Japan in 2002 and 2004, the Japanese government saw this as the beginning of a much more extensive effort that would lead to the return of a larger number of Japanese abductees. The North Korean government, however, saw their action in 2002 and 2004 as the final steps and has called on the Japanese government to recognize that reality.

Japanese officials have sought and received US help in attempting to resolve this issue. As noted above, the Japanese government asked President Trump to raise the issue of Japanese abductees in his summit meetings with Kim Jong-un in 2018 and 2019, to which Trump emphatically affirmed that he had raised the issue with Kim.

When US President Joe Biden made his first presidential visit to Tokyo in May 2022, he met with the families of Japanese abductees. On that occasion, he called on North Korea “to right this historic wrong and provide a full accounting of the Japanese nationals who remain missing.” The head of the abductee family organization said after that meeting, “I was encouraged by [Biden’s] expression of his unwavering support.”

In April 2024, US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield made an official visit to South Korea and Japan. While in Tokyo, she met with family members of individuals who were abducted. She reaffirmed that the United States “stands with all the families, with all of Japan and with the international community in pressing for a resolution that will allow all families separated by the [North Korean] regime’s policies to be reunited.”

The first week of May 2024 has seen another outpouring of interest in the Japanese abduction cases. Family members of the Japanese abductee are in the United States holding press events and meeting with a number of US government officials. With Yokota Sakie turning 87 in June, her son Yokota Takuya is now the head of the Japanese National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea. He is heading the delegation composed of other individuals whose family members were also abducted by North Korea between 1977 and 1983. Association members are accompanied by Japanese legislators and members of the media during their visit to the United States.

One question of concern was raised by Yokota Takuya as the delegation was preparing to leave Tokyo. He hoped that the United States would understand his group’s thinking and not oppose the Japanese government’s offer to provide humanitarian support to North Korea if North Korea returned all Japanese abductees. In Washington, the group reportedly received assurances from senior US government officials who met with the Japanese delegation that humanitarian aid from Japan to North Korea could proceed if Japanese abductees were released.

Generational Leadership Change in the Japanese Abductee Organization

One reason for the recent increase in attention to the Japanese abductee issue is that the organization established to support victims of North Korean abductions is undergoing a generational shift in leadership. The Japanese National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea was legally established in 1997 and led by the Yokota family. Yokota Megumi was abducted by North Korean agents in 1977 when she was 13 years old. She was returning to her home of Niigata, a Japanese port city on the west coast of the country, when North Korean agents surreptitiously took her and carried her back to North Korea. The Yokota family had no idea where, why, and how she was taken. As information became available over time, Yokota Megumi became the poster child of the abductions carried out by North Korea.

Megumi’s parents and twin brothers, who are a few years younger than Megumi, were instrumental in creating the abductee organization once the fate of Megumi emerged. The family has remained at the forefront of the effort to return abductees. Megumi’s father, Yokota Shigeru (1932-2020), was the first leader of the association. He was a gentle man but determined to see the abductions resolved and his daughter returned to Japan. An indication of the importance in Japan of the abductees is the fact that Prime Minister Abe attended Yokota Shigeru’s funeral in 2020. Shigeru’s wife, Yokota Sakie (born 1936), succeeded him briefly in leading the association, and she has published a book about her abducted daughter. The current leader of the abductee association is the elder of the Yokota twin sons, Yokota Takuya.

In 2002, Yokota Megumi was one of the individuals acknowledged by the North Korean government as having been abducted. The North Korean government, however, told Japanese officials that she had married a South Korean individual who resettled in North Korea and that the couple had a daughter. Megumi reportedly committed suicide after giving birth. By the 2010s, Yokota’s granddaughter was married and had a daughter of her own. Yokota Shigeru and Yokota Sakie were permitted to meet and spend time with their granddaughter and great-granddaughter in Mongolia in 2014. As US Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues during this time, I met with the Yokota family shortly after they met their granddaughter and great-granddaughter. They were delighted to see their granddaughter, and they did not seem to have any doubts that she was their grandchild. They were also pleased to know about a great-granddaughter. However, they were convinced that their daughter was still alive and was not permitted to meet with them by the North Korean government.

Yokota Shigeru made a public statement in 2002 after North Korean officials admitted that rogue officials abducted several Japanese citizens and named some of the abducted victims, including Yokota Megumi. The family, however, refused to believe that their daughter was dead. As Shigeru said at the press conference after North Korea confirmed his daughter’s abduction and death, “North Korea has insisted up until now that there had been no abductions. So, I can’t believe them.” Yokota Sakie still firmly believes that her daughter is alive.

North Korean government officials have shown little indication of willingness to negotiate the return of the missing family members. The last discussion took place more than six years ago, and North Korea has shown little, if any, interest in resolving the situation. However, it appears that this issue is not one that is going to die out with the passing of the older generation. A second generation is assuming leadership on this issue, and the claims and counterclaims by Japan and North Korea appear to be continuing. The Japanese government has supported claims in favor of the abductees, and this is also likely to keep the issue alive.

 

Robert R. King is a Non-Resident Distinguished Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI). He is former US Special Envoy for North Korea Human Rights Issues (2009-2017). The views expressed here are the author’s alone.

Featured Image: U.S. President Joe Biden on his last visit to Tokyo meets with leaders of the organization for the return of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea. Photo from the Japanese Prime Minister’s Office on Wikimedia Commons.

KEI is registered under the FARA as an agent of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, a public corporation established by the government of the Republic of Korea. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.


8. N. Korean leader voices 'firm support' in his message to Putin over Victory Day


The axis is active.



(LEAD) N. Korean leader voices 'firm support' in his message to Putin over Victory Day | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 9, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with more details in last 3 paras)

SEOUL, May 9 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has sent a congratulatory message to Russian President Vladimir Putin over Victory Day, expressing his "firm support and solidarity" with Moscow, state media reported Thursday.

Kim extended his "warm congratulations and comradely greetings" to Putin in the message celebrating the 79th anniversary of the Soviet Union's World War II victory over Nazi Germany, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

Kim touted Putin as leading efforts to defend Russia's sovereignty against "vicious challenges and threats of the hostile forces," apparently pointing to Moscow's war with Ukraine.

"I express firm support and solidarity with the sacred cause of Russia, hoping that you and the brave Russian army and people would win fresh victory in the struggle to defeat the imperialists' hegemonic policy," Kim was quoted as saying by the KCNA.


This file image, captured from footage of North Korea's state-run Korean Central Television on Sept. 14, 2023, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (L) meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Earlier this week, the North Korean leader sent a congratulatory message to Putin for formally starting his fifth term as Moscow's leader. Putin began his fifth term Tuesday, extending his 24-year rule for another six years after a landslide victory in the March election.

North Korea and Russia have been deepening military cooperation and bolstering bilateral ties after Kim and Putin held the summit in September last year.

Seoul's unification ministry said Kim has sent a Victory Day congratulatory message to Putin for the third straight year since Russia's war with Ukraine in 2022. Previously, the North did so only on Russia's anniversaries whose final numbers end in a five or zero.

"North Korea appears to be trying to show off its close ties with Russia and creating the atmosphere (to prepare for) Putin's trip to North Korea," a ministry official told reporters on condition of anonymity.

The Kremlin earlier said Putin had accepted Kim's invitation to visit North Korea during the summit held at Russia's Vostochny spaceport.

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 9, 2024


9. Unification ministry to install artwork symbolizing N.K. abductees at Seoul festival


It is good to see that the never returned ROK POWs are included and not forgotten.


As an aside on ROK POWs:

During the Korean War, approximately 82,000 South Korean soldiers were estimated to be missing in action, according to the UN forces. However, only a final count of 8,343 South Korean POWs were repatriated from April 1953 to January 1954.
The significant discrepancy suggests that a substantial number of South Korean POWs were likely forcibly detained in North Korea. At least 50,000 POWs from South Korea were not repatriated, according to the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea.
But North Korea has never officially recognized the existence of POWs, except for the ones who were repatriated.
On the contrary, the South Korean and UN forces followed the principle of respecting the free will of POWs and repatriated all North Korean and Chinese POWs who wished to return. A total of 75,823 North Korean POWs were sent home.



Unification ministry to install artwork symbolizing N.K. abductees at Seoul festival | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · May 9, 2024

SEOUL, May 9 (Yonhap) -- The unification ministry in charge of inter-Korean affairs said Thursday it will install an artwork inspired by three forget-me-nots at an upcoming garden show in efforts to raise awareness of South Koreans being held in North Korea.

In February, the ministry disclosed an image of three forget-me-nots as a symbol for South Korean abductees, detainees and prisoners of the 1950-53 Korean War to draw people's attention to the long pending issue in hope of their safe repatriations.

The artwork by Nanan Kang, comprising a glass greenhouse filled with the floral symbols, will go on display at the Seoul International Garden Show from May 16 to Oct. 8, according to the ministry.


This March 27, 2024, photo shows a pin of three forget-me-nots as a symbol for South Korean abductees, detainees and prisoners of the 1953-53 Korean War in North Korea. (Yonhap)

The ministry will hold an opening ceremony of the display on May 16 to be attended by Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho, Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon, officials from civic groups and families of the victims, it added.

Currently, six South Koreans are being detained in North Korea, including three missionaries whose whereabouts and fates are unknown.

Separately, 516 South Koreans have yet to return home among an estimated 3,835 people who were kidnapped by North Korea after the 1950-53 Korean War, according to government data. A total of 80 prisoners of war have returned home since 1994 but only nine had survived as of March.


This compilation image, provided by the unification ministry on May 9, 2024, shows an artwork by Nanan Kang inspired by a symbol for South Korean abductees, detainees and prisoners of the 1953-53 Korean War in North Korea. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · May 9, 2024



10. Yoon apologizes for wife's 'unwise conduct'


(3rd LD) Yoon apologizes for wife's 'unwise conduct' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · May 9, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with details of press conference; ADDS photo)

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, May 9 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol apologized Thursday for what he called the "unwise conduct" of first lady Kim Keon Hee, referring to allegations she illegally accepted a luxury bag in 2022.

It was his clearest expression of regret yet since video emerged online last year appearing to show the first lady accepting a Christian Dior handbag, valued at around 3 million won (US$2,200), from a Korean American pastor armed with a hidden camera.

"I apologize for causing concern to the people with the unwise conduct of my wife," Yoon said during a press conference marking the second anniversary of his presidency, which falls on Friday.

He said he would refrain from commenting further, however, given that a prosecution investigation is already under way into the allegations and his remarks could be misconstrued as trying to influence the probe.

The handbag scandal has been a headache for the Yoon administration for months. It featured prominently in the political discourse ahead of the April 10 parliamentary elections, and though Yoon spoke to the issue in an interview with KBS TV in February -- claiming the problem was that his wife was "unable to cold-heartedly reject" the pastor -- the ruling People Power Party was routed in the elections, leaving the National Assembly under the control of the main opposition Democratic Party.


President Yoon Suk Yeol answers reporters' questions during a press conference marking the second anniversary of his presidency at the presidential office in Seoul on May 9, 2024. (Yonhap)

"I think the people's assessment of my running of state affairs until now was that it was greatly lacking," Yoon said during the press conference, referring to the election outcome.

"I think from now on, what's important is ultimately the economy. And while structural things, such as the growth of businesses and job creation, are important, I think it's important to actively find and solve the difficulties and inconveniences felt by each and every person in the field of people's livelihoods," he said.

On the opposition's calls for a special counsel investigation into separate allegations the first lady was involved in stock price manipulation, Yoon said such investigations should come only after those of the prosecution and other agencies are deemed insufficient.

Calling for another investigation when enough has been done is a "political offensive," he said.

Yoon expressed a similar position on the opposition's push to appoint a special counsel to investigate the military's response to a Marine's death last year, saying if the ongoing investigation by the police and the Corruption Investigation Office For High-ranking Officials is insufficient, he "will be the first to call for a special counsel probe."

On why he appointed former Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup as ambassador to Australia, when Lee was under a travel ban in connection with the Marine's case, Yoon said not even the government knows about who is under a travel ban, as such details of an investigation are confidential.

Yoon fielded questions on a wide range of economic, social and foreign policy issues as well.

When asked to respond to the possibility the United States will ask South Korea to pay more for the stationing of 28,500 American troops on the peninsula under a potential second Donald Trump presidency, Yoon said it would be inappropriate to answer based on a hypothesis.

"What's clear is that there is strong support for the South Korea-U.S. alliance from across the public and private sectors in the U.S., both parties, the Senate, the House, and the executive branch, and I am certain the firm alliance between South Korea and the U.S. will not change," he said. "If we tackle issues based on that, I believe we will be able to smoothly resolve various negotiations and problems."


Senior presidential aides (rear) observe President Yoon Suk Yeol's news conference at the presidential office in Seoul on May 9, 2024. (Yonhap)

On Ukraine, Yoon said South Korea is doing its best to provide humanitarian and reconstruction aid to the war-torn country but stands by its policy of not providing offensive, lethal weapons to any nation.

He added that South Korea is in an "uncomfortable" relationship with Russia due to its war in Ukraine and purchase of North Korean weapons, but aims to cooperate with Moscow in the economy and other areas where there is a common interest.

On Japan, he acknowledged differences in opinion between the two countries on their shared history. Still, he stressed the need for cooperation for the sake of their future generations.

Other topics he addressed during the press conference included the government's plans to further support the semiconductor industry, complete a pension system reform plan before the end of his term and employ all possible means to tame inflation, especially in the groceries and dining sectors.

In addition, he vowed to continue to persuade doctors to accept the government's decision to increase admissions to medical schools to address the country's shortage of doctors.

The press conference was Yoon's first since August 2022 and was seen as a demonstration of his commitment to improving his communication style in the wake of the recent election defeat.

Before entering the presidential office briefing room, Yoon gave an address to the nation from his office to reflect on the first two years of his term and present a plan for the remaining three years.

In the address, he said he will create a new ministry to tackle the country's low birth rate.

"In order to overcome the low birth rate, which can be considered a national emergency, we will fully mobilize all of the state's capabilities," he said.

The head of the new ministry, tentatively named the "low birth response planning ministry," will double as the deputy prime minister for social affairs and draw up policies across the education, labor and welfare sectors that will become the national agenda, he said.

Yoon requested the active cooperation of the opposition-controlled National Assembly in revising the government organization law to enable the launch of the new ministry.

He further pledged to raise the basic monthly pension for senior citizens to the 400,000 won level from the current 330,000 won within his term.


A man watches President Yoon Suk Yeol's address to the nation marking the second anniversary of his presidency at Seoul Station in Seoul on May 9, 2024. (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)


en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · May 9, 2024


11. Ruling party praises Yoon's 'frank' press conference; opposition criticizes lack of 'self-reflection'


Self reflection? Sounds like the opposition wants a communist style self confession session.


Ruling party praises Yoon's 'frank' press conference; opposition criticizes lack of 'self-reflection' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · May 9, 2024

SEOUL, May 9 (Yonhap) -- The ruling People Power Party (PPP) said Thursday that President Yoon Suk Yeol "frankly" admitted his shortcomings and vowed for improvement in people's livelihoods and better communication with the opposition parties in his press conference.

The main opposition Democratic Party (DP), however, criticized Yoon's press conference as "full of self-praise."

During the press conference marking the second anniversary of his presidency earlier in the day, Yoon apologized for what he called the "unwise conduct" of first lady Kim Keon Hee, referring to allegations she illegally accepted a luxury bag in 2022.

On the opposition's calls for a special counsel investigation into separate allegations that the first lady was involved in stock price manipulation, he stressed such probes should be launched only after the prosecution and other agencies are determined inadequate.

"It has been confirmed once again that first lady Kim is an inviolable sanctuary," Han Min-soo, the DP spokesperson, said in a press briefing.

He added that Yoon's "self-reflection" on his management of state affairs was "nowhere to be found" in his press conference.

Han also criticized Yoon's position on the opposition's push to appoint a special counsel to investigate the military's response to a Marine's death last year.

Meanwhile, PPP spokesperson Jung Hee-yong released a commentary, saying Yoon had frankly admitted his weaknesses in the past two years of his administration and expressed his commitment for improvement throughout the remainder of his term.

"On issues with differing views, such as those on special counsel probes, he emphasized the fundamental nature and purpose of the special probes, and asked for cooperation for a thorough and impartial investigation to uncover the truth," he said.

The minor opposition Rebuilding Korea Party, led by former Justice Minister Cho Kuk, also criticized Yoon's press conference, saying "no one among the public will have gained confidence that Yoon will do well in the future."


President Yoon Suk Yeol responds to reporters' questions during a news conference at the presidential office in Seoul on May 9, 2024, to commemorate his two-year tenure. (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)


en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · May 9, 2024


12. Washington’s willingness to engage Pyongyang exposes rare rift with Seoul


It is not about engagement per se. It is the fear that interim steps are coude for arms control negotiations that would allow the Kim family regime to maintain nuclear weapons. While that is a problem my fear is that doing so would cause Kim to assess that his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies are a success and he will double down. And we will never get an arms control agreement that he would ever live up to.


In this excerpt Dr. Cha provides a logical explanation of "interim steps" but I do not think those who are concerned with appeasement through arms control will be satisfied.

Victor Cha, senior vice president for Asia and Korea chair at CSIS, however, said that Rapp-Hooper's reference to "the formulation of interim measures to reduce the threat on the peninsula" in March "reflects the same pragmatic view that any negotiation has to start at step 1 — whether you call that interim measures or initial denuclearization."
"As a former negotiator, I can say that any pragmatic implementation of denuclearization would have to include such steps, which I do not think would represent de facto acceptance of DPRK nuclear status — that is neither Washington, nor Seoul's policy," he said.



Washington’s willingness to engage Pyongyang exposes rare rift with Seoul

May 08, 2024 5:16 AM

voanews.com · May 8, 2024

WASHINGTON —

The Biden administration’s apparent willingness to engage North Korea is causing a rare public rift with one of Washington’s key allies in Asia over how to achieve Pyongyang’s denuclearization.

Last week, the two allies, on separate occasions, showed differences about whether to consider “interim steps” toward North Korea’s complete denuclearization.

South Korean national security adviser Chang Ho-jin said, “U.S. senior officials confirmed several times that there are no such thing as interim steps” toward denuclearization. He made the remarks in an interview with South Korean media outlet KBS, aired on April 27.

A U.S. National Security Council spokesperson confirmed in an email to VOA’s Korean Service on April 30 that “by saying that the United States is willing to consider interim steps, we are making clear that we recognize that building trust with the DPRK and making progress toward denuclearization will take time.”

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is North Korea’s official name.

In response to the NSC spokesperson’s comments, a South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson told VOA Korean on May 1 that Chang’s remarks “reaffirm that the U.S. will not put aside complete denuclearization while it settles for a stopgap measure limiting [negotiations] to a nuclear freeze in return for sanctions relief.”

Taking interim steps toward denuclearization involves reciprocal concessions or corresponding measures that both sides are willing to make to reach that goal.

Interim steps toward denuclearization are not a new approach. The approach was tried and failed by the former Clinton and George W. Bush administrations when North Korea was engaged in negotiations with the U.S.

In March of this year, senior U.S. officials expressed Washington’s interest in considering “interim steps” amid talks that remained stalled with Pyongyang since October 2019.

A State Department spokesperson told VOA Korean in April that it made multiple attempts to communicate with North Korean officials, but that Pyongyang has not shown interest in engaging.

SEE ALSO:

US remains committed to diplomacy despite North Korea’s nuclear escalation

Experts said Seoul is concerned that Washington’s mention of interim steps and measures that could be included in those steps, especially threat reduction, could hinder Pyongyang from making a commitment toward complete denuclearization in future negotiations.

Andrew Yeo, the SK-Korea Foundation chair in Korea Studies at Brookings Institution’s Center for Asia Policy Studies, said, “Seoul prefers not to engage in any diplomatic negotiations without a DPRK commitment to denuclearization and wants to appear resolute.”

“Washington has signaled to North Korea that it’s willing to be more flexible when it comes to restarting diplomatic engagement with North Korea. Seoul may not want to give the appearance of that flexibility so is perhaps denying any legitimacy behind an ‘interim steps’ approach,” he added.

Seoul has taken a tough stance on North Korea under President Yoon Suk Yeol since he took office two years ago by focusing on deterrence and alignment with Washington and U.S.-led trilateral security cooperation with Japan.

Evans Revere, a State Department official with extensive experience negotiating with North Korea, said some critics and officials in Seoul and Tokyo are worried that the U.S. will focus on other goals Washington mentioned such as confidence building and tension reduction rather than on denuclearization.

“There is also concern that Washington may be prepared to engage in arms control talks with Pyongyang — a move that would generate deep concern among U.S. allies, in large part because it would effectively accept North Korea’s nuclear arsenal as permanent,” he said.

Talks over arms control or “nuclear freeze” that Seoul said it is concerned about or “threat reduction” or “risk reduction” mentioned by U.S. officials in March — which could be included in the interim steps — are considered equivalent to accepting North Korea as a nuclear state and opposed by some officials and analysts.

At an event held by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on March 3, Mira Rapp-Hooper, senior director for East Asia and Oceania at the National Security Council, said the U.S. will discuss threat reduction with North Korea as it considers interim steps on the "pathway to denuclearization."

Also at an event by CSIS on March 18, Jung Pak, a U.S. senior official for North Korea, said Washington wants North Korea to take risk reduction steps and discuss sanctions and confidence-building measures.

SEE ALSO:

US Seeks Engagement With North Korea Amid Heightened Tensions

Victor Cha, senior vice president for Asia and Korea chair at CSIS, however, said that Rapp-Hooper's reference to "the formulation of interim measures to reduce the threat on the peninsula" in March "reflects the same pragmatic view that any negotiation has to start at step 1 — whether you call that interim measures or initial denuclearization."

"As a former negotiator, I can say that any pragmatic implementation of denuclearization would have to include such steps, which I do not think would represent de facto acceptance of DPRK nuclear status — that is neither Washington, nor Seoul's policy," he said.

Cha formerly served as deputy head of delegation for the U.S. at six-party denuclearization talks.

voanews.com · May 8, 2024



13. Hundreds of North Koreans enter Russia in first quarter amid burgeoning ties


Data at the link: https://www.nknews.org/2024/05/hundreds-of-north-koreans-enter-russia-in-first-quarter-amid-burgeoning-ties/?utm



Hundreds of North Koreans enter Russia in first quarter amid burgeoning ties

Data reveals new quarterly high since pre-pandemic times, while number of Russians entering DPRK also surged

Anton Sokolin May 9, 2024


A North Korean man at Sunan International Airport in Pyongyang in Sept., 2018 | Image: NK News

Close to a thousand North Koreans entered Russia in the first quarter of 2024, according to official data from Moscow, while a similar number of Russian nationals visited the DPRK amid burgeoning tourism and bilateral exchanges. 

A total of 812 North Korean citizens crossed the Russian border between January to March, according to immigration data from Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). This marks a new high since the first quarter of 2020, after which the number of DPRK visitors dropped to near zero due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions.

Similarly, 870 Russians entered North Korea in the first three months of 2024, according to FSB statistics, marking another high since the third quarter of 2019, when 888 Russian citizens traveled to the DPRK.

In the fourth quarter of 2023, FSB immigration data showed that 382 North Koreans entered Russia, while 472 Russians crossed into North Korea. The same data showed that 1,117 North Koreans and 1,238 Russians visited each other’s countries in the whole of 2023.

Most North Koreans (471) entering Russia cited “business” as the purpose of their visit, followed by “private reasons” (95). Thirty-eight North Koreans visited Russia for “education,” nine for “tourism” and three for “work.” Twenty-one North Koreans used Russia as a transit point on their way to other countries.

One-hundred-seventy-five North Koreans visited Russia as “vehicle maintenance personnel” also entered Russia in Q1, FSB data shows, although they likely returned to North Korea after their respective trips.

A large majority (519) entered the country via air, followed by 148 who traveled via waterways and 121 who used cars. Notably, 17 went by train while seven DPRK citizens crossed the border on foot.

Peter Ward, a North Korean economy expert, told NK News that the uptick in the number of DPRK visitors in Russia may be related to Pyongyang’s increasing interest in obtaining technical and humanitarian assistance from Moscow.

“There’s lots of technical cooperation in the agricultural space that I think Russia can probably help them with,” the expert said, suggesting that Russia may offer its knowledge to improve “agricultural methods, irrigation systems or seed varieties.”

He added that North Korea could also be hoping for Russia’s help with munitions production and other technical assistance as the two countries seek to develop their ties to also include humanitarian areas spanning from agriculture to IT.

Since the start of the year, North Korea has sent multiple delegations to Russia, with the latest including agricultural and healthcare officials, who discussed food production and medical cooperation with their Russian counterparts last month.

The North Korean education minister who traveled to Russia in early April signaled that Pyongyang wants to send as many students as possible to Russian schools, stating that over 100 DPRK nationals have already signed up for admission for the new academic year.

Of the nearly 900 Russians who went to the DPRK between January and March, 334 traveled for “business” and 84 for private reasons, with 734 of them using aircraft to reach North Korea and 136 crossing into the country by train.

FSB data shows that 155 Russian tourists visited North Korea during the period, reflecting the revival of foreign tourism after the DPRK welcomed the first group of 100 Russian travelers in early February. 

However, North Korea is still far from becoming a popular tourist spot among Russian travelers, FSB statistics suggest, as Russians still prefer more familiar destinations like Abkhazia, Turkey, UAE, Kazakhstan and Thailand.

Edited by Alannah Hill 



14. Canada to deploy aircraft to monitor illegal North Korean ship-to-ship transfers



Again, we hear very little about actual sanctions enforce operations. However, we need more than monitoring.



Canada to deploy aircraft to monitor illegal North Korean ship-to-ship transfers

Tokyo says plane will operate from Okinawa air base as part of regular surveillance of DPRK efforts to evade sanctions

https://www.nknews.org/2024/05/canada-to-deploy-aircraft-to-monitor-illegal-north-korean-ship-to-ship-transfers/?popup=signin&login=auth_code

Shreyas Reddy May 9, 2024


CP-140 Aurora long-range patrol aircraft | Image: Government of Canada/Royal Canadian Air Force

Canada will deploy a patrol aircraft to Japan from early May to early June to monitor illegal ship-to-ship transfers by North Korean vessels, Tokyo’s foreign ministry announced on Wednesday.

According to a ministry press release, the aircraft will operate out of the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa as part of regular surveillance of North Korea’s illicit maritime activities aimed at circumventing U.N. sanctions, marking the 11th time Canada is contributing to these international efforts since 2018.

“Japan welcomes these activities from the viewpoint of ensuring effective implementation of the relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions in solidarity with the international community toward the realization of North Korea’s dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner,” the press release said.

Tokyo also stated that it is continuing its own efforts and cooperating with international organizations and countries, including Canada, to gather information about ships suspected of violating sanctions. 

Canada last deployed its CP-140 Aurora long-range patrol aircraft to monitor possible DPRK sanctions violations in October, a move Pyongyang condemned as an “act of wrecking peace and security” on the Korean Peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region. 

North Korea was not the only country that took issue with the Canadian operation over the Yellow Sea, as a Chinese jet reportedly came as close as 16 ft (5 meters) to the CP-140 aircraft and at one point also fired flares near it.

China justified its actions as “necessary measures” against what it deemed an “illegal intrusion” threatening its national security, but Canada stated that its aircraft was flying over international waters and condemned Beijing’s “dangerous and reckless” moves.

Ottawa also previously accused China of harassing its patrol aircraft during a similar monitoring mission in June 2022 as part of Operation NEON, Canada’s contribution to the multinational initiative to monitor DPRK maritime sanctions evasion activities. However, Beijing denied that it endangered the aircraft and instead claimed Canada was harassing China.

Earlier this week, Canberra similarly condemned China for firing flares near an Australian helicopter contributing to DPRK sanctions enforcement in the Yellow Sea area, stating that the act endangered the aircraft and its crew.

In response, China’s foreign ministry accused Australia of coming “within close range of China’s airspace” and endangering its security “in the name of enforcing U.N. Security Council’s resolutions.”

Edited by Alannah Hill



15. Seoul to pursue amicable ties with Moscow despite North Korean arms trade: Yoon




Seoul to pursue amicable ties with Moscow despite North Korean arms trade: Yoon

Expert says president’s remarks are aimed at maintaining ties with Russia for leverage to influence Pyongyang’s actions

https://www.nknews.org/2024/05/seoul-to-pursue-amicable-ties-with-moscow-despite-north-korean-arms-trade-yoon/?popup=signin&login=auth_code

Jeongmin Kim | Joon Ha Park May 9, 2024


South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol during a press conference marking two years in office on May 9, 2024 | Image: ROK Presidential Office


South Korea will pursue an “amicable” relationship with Russia despite being in a difficult place due to the arms trade between Pyongyang and Moscow, President Yoon Suk-yeol said Thursday. 

During his first comprehensive press conference in 21 months at the Presidential Office, Yoon was asked why Seoul has taken limited action against Moscow despite Russia funding North Korea through arms trade and providing Pyongyang with an opportunity to test its weapons in Ukraine. 

“Recently, we have had diverging positions and our relationship with Russia has been uncomfortable due to its import and usage of North Korean weapons in relation to the war in Ukraine,” Yoon responded, adding that Seoul will take ROK-Russia ties on a case-by-case basis and “cooperate on issues that are needed on the one hand, but also disagree or be on guard on things we must.”

“By doing this, we will manage relations with Russia as amicably as possible — pursuing economic cooperation and common interests” in areas that apply, Yoon stated. 

The president avoided answering how South Korea would react should Vladamir Putin visit North Korea, which DPRK state media reported he agreed to do during his meeting with Kim Jong Un in Russia’s Far East last September. 

When asked about his administration’s policy of not supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine in light of evidence that North Korean weapons have been used to kill Ukrainian civilians, Yoon emphasized Seoul’s focus on providing humanitarian aid and reconstruction support for Ukraine.

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol faces a pool of journalists during a press conference marking two years in office on May 9, 2024 | Image: ROK Presidential Office

Lim Eul-chul, a professor at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University, told NK News that he was surprised by Yoon’s remarks, which were markedly lenient toward Russia compared to the past. 

He interpreted that there appears to be an “unspoken agreement between the ROK and Russia,” wherein South Korea pledges not to supply lethal weapons to Ukraine, while Russia reciprocates by refraining from transferring military technology to North Korea, thus “setting clear boundaries and commitments between the two nations.”

“Essentially, if ties between Korea and Russia deteriorate, it may hinder Seoul’s ability to use Russia as leverage to influence Pyongyang’s actions. Therefore, by maintaining friendly communication with Russia, Seoul aims to exert influence over Pyongyang,” Lim explained.

The expert suggested Yoon’s lack of strong remarks aimed at North Korea reflects the current state of inter-Korean relations, which he described as being at their “lowest point.”

“It doesn’t seem like there’s any intention to restore North-South relations, but rather a recognition of the need to manage tensions on the Korean Peninsula,” Lim said. 

US AND JAPAN

Yoon’s 20-minute keynote speech largely focused on the reasons behind the government’s waning public support — citing inflation and communication failures. 

He briefly noted significant foreign and security policy achievements with the U.S. and Japan, emphasizing stronger bilateral ties with Washington as instrumental in achieving what he described as “true peace” on the Korean Peninsula.

“We have established a true peace through power, based on the nuclear-based extended deterrence capabilities. With the Washington Declaration in April last year, we upgraded the ROK-U.S. alliance to a nuclear-based security alliance,” Yoon said, repeating his past talking points regarding the establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group.

However, he avoided discussing domestic U.S. politics in detail, particularly concerning the upcoming U.S. presidential elections and Donald Trump’s potential return to the White House. 

When asked about Trump’s remarks in a recent interview with Time magazine, in which he questioned why the U.S. should pay to defend a “wealthy” country like South Korea, Yoon sidestepped the question. 

“You ask me a lot of questions that are difficult for me to answer publicly,” he said when asked if Seoul would be willing to make concessions on defense cost-sharing and whether he would be open to the U.S. Forces Korea expanding its role beyond the Korean Peninsula. 

“Even as allies, we are very cautious, and it is not appropriate for the president of a country to predict the outcome of another country’s presidential election and make assumptions,” he answered.

“One thing is clear: I am confident that the solid alliance between the two countries will not change, with strong support from U.S. experts, the House and the Senate, and the administration, on our alliance.”

Edited by Alannah Hill



16. [INTERVIEW] 'Trump's possible return will be mixed bag for South Korea'



Moon Chung In will support former President Trump's desire to withdraw US troops.



[INTERVIEW] 'Trump's possible return will be mixed bag for South Korea'

The Korea Times · by 2024-05-09 18:06 | Foreign Affairs · May 9, 2024

Moon Chung-in, professor emeritus at Yonsei University and former special adviser for foreign affairs and national security during the previous Moon Jae-in government, speaks during an interview with The Korea Times at the newspaper's office in Seoul, Tuesday. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul

Former security adviser expects Trump to visit Pyongyang to leave political legacy

By Lee Hyo-jin

The U.S. presidential election is six months away. U.S. allies worldwide, including South Korea, are closely monitoring the race, which appears to be a tight contest between the incumbent President Joe Biden and his predecessor Donald Trump.

The potential return of Trump, who perceives many U.S. allies as "free-riding" on its military power, adds an extra layer of concern for South Korea. In particular, given the Yoon Suk Yeol administration's focus on strengthening its alliance with Washington and extended deterrence against North Korean threats, the return of Trump could force South Korea to recalibrate its diplomatic strategies.

In light of these pressing issues, The Korea Times sat down with Moon Chung-in, former special adviser for foreign affairs and national security during the previous Moon Jae-in government, Tuesday, to discuss the implications of the U.S. presidential election and foreign policy of the Yoon administration.

Below are excerpts from the interview. It has been edited for brevity and clarity.

Then-U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un talk during a meeting in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Panmunjeom in Paju, Gyeonggi Province in this June 30, 2019 photo. Joint Press Corps.

Q: If Trump were to be re-elected, what would his approach be toward North Korea? Would we witness another Trump-Kim bromance?

A: In a potential second term, Trump will prioritize solidifying his political legacy. His foreign policies would be greatly influenced by media attention and personal ego, as he values how history will remember him. Striking a "big deal" with Pyongyang and contributing to peace on the Korean Peninsula could serve as a pathway to fulfilling such an ambition, potentially earning him a Nobel Peace Prize nomination. While resolving the war in Ukraine or the Gaza crisis could also enhance his Nobel Prize prospects, negotiations with North Korea are likely to be a key agenda for Trump.

In that sense, Trump will actively engage North Korea, potentially even considering a visit to Pyongyang for a summit with Kim Jong-un, where Trump could present surprising offers. However, the success of such endeavors ultimately depends on Kim's response.

Q: What would Kim want from Trump? And considering that their previous attempts did not yield favorable results, does that mean they will have to start from square one?

A: Kim has little to lose by fostering a close relationship with Trump, as showcasing friendship with a global leader sends a powerful message both domestically and internationally.

However, the problem is that Kim's trust in Trump was shattered when the former president did not keep his promise made during the Panmunjeom summit in June 2019. To mend that fractured trust, Trump would need to extend significant overtures this time. This could include pledges on immediate sanctions relief that would visibly improve North Korea's economy, followed by the normalization of bilateral relations between Pyongyang and Washington. Additionally, Trump might propose halting joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States, or even reducing the number of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) troops. In exchange, he could seek commitments from North Korea to cease nuclear and missile activities, along with a gradual reduction of its nuclear arsenal.

Q: There are concerns here that the potential return of Trump could result in a weakened South Korea-U.S. alliance. Would his return be a curse or a blessing for South Korea?

A: It would be both. It could prove to be a curse for the conservatives in Seoul, while progressives might see it as a chance for blessing. For conservatives, there are concerns that Trump could use the presence of USFK as a bargaining chip in negotiations over a defense cost-sharing deal. Such a move could potentially weaken the longstanding South Korea-U.S. alliance. Also, under Trump, there's a significant possibility of decreased trilateral cooperation between Seoul, Washington and Tokyo, along with a weakened U.S. security commitment to South Korea. This scenario could create a power vacuum on the Korean Peninsula, heightening the risks of war in the region.

Moon Chung-in, professor emeritus at Yonsei University and former special adviser for foreign affairs and national security during the previous Moon Jae-in government, speaks during an interview with The Korea Times at the newspaper's office in Seoul, Tuesday. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul

On the other hand, progressives could leverage Trump's eagerness to engage North Korea, if they play their cards right. His desire to establish a political legacy might open the door to unexpected breakthroughs in inter-Korean relations. Trump's potential initiatives, such as pursuing a reduction of USFK forces and halting the deployment of U.S. strategic assets, could become useful cards for progressives in agendas such as an end-of-war declaration. This could potentially pave the way for them to form a new security architecture in the North Asian region led by South Korea.

Q. There is a lot of talk about the scenario of Trump's re-election. But what if Biden wins the race? Do you think he might readjust North Korea policies?


Rapport between Kim Jong-un and Trump

A. I don't foresee any significant changes coming from Team Biden. His security advisers maintain a traditional approach toward North Korea, focusing on status-quo management. Their aim is to avoid provoking Pyongyang, while also refraining from pursuing major diplomatic negotiations. So their strategy involves maintaining deterrence, while keeping the door open for dialogue.

However, in response to criticism that the Biden administration has placed the North Korean issue on the back burner, some U.S. officials have recently floated the idea of so-called "interim steps" to revive dialogue with the North. But this suggestion was apparently rejected by the South Korean government. Nevertheless, if Biden secures another term, this agenda may be pushed further by his administration. But it would still be difficult to get a positive response from the North, especially considering the virtual absence of direct communication channels between Washington and Pyongyang. There may be a need for assistance from either Russia or China, but the likelihood of this is very low.

Q. How would you evaluate the Yoon Suk Yeol administration's North Korea policies? How about the Biden administration?

A. The Yoon government views North Korea as a weak nation, even though it possesses nuclear weapons, and sees it as a regime on the brink of collapse. Consequently, they believe that applying maximum pressure — both militarily and economically — would compel North Korea to either surrender or collapse.

However, such a belief is flawed. There is no reason to anticipate North Korea's immediate collapse. The ineffectiveness of economic sanctions have been proven. North Korea's economy, thanks to support from China and Russia, is not as weak as we think. Specifically, we should consider the strengthening partnership between North Korea and Russia. For Russia, providing food and energy to support 20 million North Koreans is a relatively minor effort.

President Yoon Suk Yeol and his U.S. counterpart Joe Biden shake hands during a joint press conference at the White House in Washington, April 26, 2023. EPA-Yonhap

Q. What do you think about the deterrence strategy employed by South Korea and the U.S.? Has it proven to be effective?

A. The deterrence strategy employed by South Korea and the U.S., ostensibly aimed at altering North Korea's behavior, has instead provoked further aggression from the North, escalating the risk of war.

The U.S. treatment of China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran as an axis of evil has solidified their relationships on the contrary. Such development will help North Korea find ways to survive more easily. For example, crises in Ukraine or the Middle East could unexpectedly provide North Korea with a lifeline.

In that sense, the current North Korea policies adopted by the government are not achieving anything; they are only making things worse. I believe the South Korean government should consider various aspects of the rapidly changing international environment, where its policies may not always be effective.

Q. Let's talk about another important neighbor of South Korea — Russia. Diplomatic relations with Russia remain tense. Moscow has warned Seoul not to cross certain redlines. What do you think these redlines are?

A. From Russia's perspective, providing lethal weapons to Ukraine would certainly cross the red line. If South Korea were to do so, it would be considered an enemy state by Russia. Additionally, with President Vladimir Putin expected to visit Pyongyang soon, any interference regarding Moscow's partnership with North Korea would also be viewed unfavorably. Russia's official stance is clear: exchanges with North Korea should focus on providing daily necessities and support for the energy sector, not transferring technology that could threaten South Korea's security. Russia is also concerned about Seoul’s unilateral and multilateral sanctions.

Q. What about China? Do you believe that an upcoming trilateral summit between South Korea, China and Japan can serve as a breakthrough in strained Seoul-Beijing ties?

A. China has two expilict redlines. One is the Taiwan issue, and the other trilateral military cooperation with Japan and the US that threatens China’s core interests. The trilateral summit is likely to take place soon, but It's doubtful that China would see significant benefits from the trilateral talks. Instead, it may perceive South Korea and Japan as forming a united front against it. For instance, discussions on environmental issues might involve China's discontent about Japan's release of wastewater from Fukushima, which South Korea has found little problem with. In the economic security realm, both South Korea and Japan have joined the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), a U.S.-led initiative that excludes China from the global supply chain. Regarding people-to-people exchanges, the scale of interaction between South Korea and Japan is much larger than that between Seoul and Beijing or Tokyo and Beijing.

The Korea Times · by 2024-05-09 18:06 | Foreign Affairs · May 9, 2024




17. Rapport between Kim Jong-un and Trump


Rapport between Kim Jong-un and Trump

koreatimes.co.kr

Then-U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un talk during a meeting at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Panmunjeom in Paju, Gyeonggi Province in this June 30, 2019 photo. Joint Press Corps

By Oh Young-jin

“It is not the end of the world.”

Professor Moon Chung-in made that comment during a recent interview when asked whether a second Trump presidency would spell disaster.

If those words were not spoken by the progressive political scientist who has laid the foundation of Korea’s current liberal North Korea policy architecture, I might have interpreted the response as an expression of hopelessness, suggesting an inability to change what seems inevitable.

During his first term from 2017 to 2021, Trump demonstrated a disruptive force that completely upended the global status quo with his “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) mantra.

Now, the Republican candidate, who is leading in some polls over the incumbent President Joe Biden, whom he will likely face in the upcoming Nov. 5 U.S. presidential election, is back with a vengeance and vowing to disrupt the global order. The world appears to be collectively concerned about the increasing possibility of a Trump re-election and is in a state of denial about the potential disruption to the existing world order.

So I combed through a three-hour conversation I previously had with Moon for clues that might shed light on why he made those remarks. (Disclaimer: We have known each other for more than 10 years and have mostly maintained a friendly relationship.)

If he saw the potential viability of a new Trump presidency, even dyed-in-the-wool skeptics like us might adopt his reasoning and feel somewhat less despondent.

Then, I remembered Moon’s remark that the Biden administration had been a disappointment for lacking its own policy and for being influenced by advocates of maximum pressure from within the Yoon Suk Yeol administration.

Clearly, he anticipates a repeat of the three unprecedented summits between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who are the leaders of two old adversaries dating back to the 1950-53 Korean War. These summits took place during the previous liberal Moon Jae-in government.

INTERVIEW‘Trump’s possible return will be mixed bag for South Korea’

During the period from the start of the Moon government in 2017 to 2022, the escalating tensions and exchanges between Trump and Kim became so intense that a second Korean War seemed imminent.

That standoff was alleviated as Trump circumvented bureaucratic red tape and resistance to directly engage with the North Korean leader in an attempt to resolve the Korean problem. This effort culminated in their summit at the truce village of Panmunjeom, where the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed seven decades ago. During this time, Korea seemed on the verge of achieving previously elusive and sustainable peace, as inter-Korean relations also improved.

The professor, who was a special adviser to former President Moon, played a key role in Seoul’s intensified policy of reconciliation with Pyongyang. He took credit for orchestrating the Panmunjeom summit, revealing that he had proposed the idea to Ivanka Trump, Trump’s daughter and trusted adviser, through an intermediary. This intermediary cleverly created a composite photo of Trump and Kim together at the truce village to enhance the appeal to the publicity-conscious former TV personality turned U.S. president.

So, is he confident that Trump 2.0 and Kim can return to their previous friendly relationship?

Moon believes that a return to their previous relationship could happen, but it would not be as straightforward as before. Five years ago, Kim Jong-un was a young leader who believed in the doctrine that North Korea’s survival depended on maintaining a relationship with the United States, a principle upheld by his father Kim Jong-il and grandfather Kim Il-sung, the founder of the Kim dynasty.

The younger Kim had the opportunity to interact with Trump on the world stage, a feat that his ancestors could only have dreamed of. However, Kim has also learned important lessons from his experience, including the realization that he cannot fully trust the U.S., particularly after the “no-deal” outcome with Trump.

However, Kim can afford to apply these lessons differently now, especially as China and Russia compete to court him. China, in particular, has come to appreciate North Korea as a crucial buffer against the U.S., especially amid rising tensions between the two superpowers. Additionally, Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly befriending Kim with the aim of supplying weapons for his war against Ukraine.

What about Trump? His problem is his short attention span and eagerness to attain the spotlight. Now, the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas wars are sure to be higher priorities than North Korea.

Moon suggests that Trump may prioritize intervening in global conflicts based on which ones offer him the best chance of achieving a Nobel Peace Prize through a successful resolution. “He would be anxious to have a legacy to show off,” said Moon.

It seems that Moon has concluded that South Korea can now adapt to and cope with the consequences, regardless of whether Trump or Biden becomes the next U.S. president.

This represents a notable departure from South Korea of 20 years ago when the late President Roh Moo-hyun adopted the professor’s proposition that the South should serve as a balancing force between the great powers in the region.

Roh’s policy of seeking to play an active role in international rule-setting was seen as ahead of its time and too ambitious for South Korea. His direction faced fierce opposition and appeared to be at risk of being derailed.

The professor’s “not-the-end-of-the-world” comment has allowed me to reflect and compare the past with the present. My conclusion is that Moon’s proposition has been largely fulfilled, thanks to his tireless efforts to promote it.

 


koreatimes.co.kr

18. N. Korea's monitoring of political tendencies won't work



Young people choose capitalism over the Socialist Workers' Paradise? Does this indicate the potential for internal instability and resistance?




N. Korea's monitoring of political tendencies won't work - Daily NK English

North Korean authorities appear to be concerned about young people’s tendency to prioritize money over loyalty to the party

By Jo Hyon, PhD, Kyungnam University - May 9, 2024



dailynk.com · by Jo Hyon, PhD, Kyungnam University · May 9, 2024

A screenshot from a music video of the song "Friendly Father." (KCTV)

In late April, North Korea’s ruling party ordered all organizations to place the highest priority on monitoring trends among the general public, and among students and young people in particular.

A source in South Pyongan Province said that the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the provincial party committee had ordered officials to bear in mind the importance and urgency of monitoring public trends and to track and report every movement among students and young people with fresh determination and vision.

As a result, spot checks of mobile phones at schools and workplaces have become a routine occurrence.

The Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) made the following remarks in a second seminar for officials responsible for propaganda operations. “We must strive to obtain a high political consciousness and a broad skill set with a firm resolution to take responsibility, before the Party and the fatherland, for the ideological life of party members and workers and for the psychological growth of the younger generation. Unless we do that, we cannot obtain the effective prescriptions produced by changes in people’s consciousness.”

The seminar remarks suggest the North Korean authorities are concerned about young people’s tendency to prioritize money over loyalty to the party.

The WPK regards ideological changes in young people over the past few years as due to exposure to South Korean and Western culture. The party’s leadership has consequently been focusing on controlling the youth by enacting a series of bizarre laws with no precedent in the history of jurisprudence: the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act (2020), the Youth Education Guarantee Act (2021) and the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act (2023). These laws and norms are surely some of the most ridiculous in the world, given their complete disregard for public needs and social reality.

Nevertheless, Kim Jong Un and the WPK have poured massive amounts of money and resources into justifying these absurd norms. They also say that citizens should sacrifice their lives to defend norms that embody ethical values and loyalty to the regime. Thus, the false idea that changing one’s mind and abandoning one’s ideology are dangerous activities has been established as a social norm.

While most people are busy making a living, it’s natural for those who want to make a good impression in the corridors of power to try to flatter the upper class. And because of such people, others come to the same conclusion that they must become “loyal elements.”

But there’s something important that the WPK is overlooking: North Koreans have gone nearly a century without asking or seeking the truth. Surely the North Korean government should be a little grateful to the cold and hungry people who have kept the country running despite lacking the basic necessities of life, instead of viewing them as subjects to be monitored and controlled.

North Koreans cooperate with the laws and norms created by the WPK with little thought of correcting their ignorance, learning about the world, or taking steps for change. They must break out of the collective delusion of treating these laws and norms as gospel and instead join the wave of change, both for themselves and for their descendants.

Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jo Hyon, PhD, Kyungnam University · May 9, 2024




De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161


If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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