Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Frustrated that the Services were not taking their unconventional capabilities seriously, Senators William Cohen (Maine) and Sam Nunn (Georgia) took matters into their own hands and pursued legislation that went much further than just forming a task force or advisory panel."

"But reforming special operations would be tricky, Locher said. It was not included as a provision in Goldwater-Nichols because so few lawmakers understood the issue, Cohen and Nunn were afraid the provisions would get lost during debate. That is why it became an amendment to the 1987 National Defense Authorization Act instead."

“I think the overall reason was the kind of missions that special operations forces were going to take on — counterterrorism, counter-insurgency, peacekeeping, contingency operations — those were the kinds of things that the Pentagon really did not want to get involved with,” Locher said. “We had the American way of war, which was really conventional force-on-force. Indirect aggression, for a long time, we had treated as lesser-included cases. So the kinds of things the Cohen-Nunn amendment were trying to improve our ability to address were things that the mainstream Pentagon officers and officials did not want to be part of the Pentagon’s responsibility.”

– From multiple sources

1. 'Battle of the Bay' underway in Tampa as part of military showcase

2. Masters of irregular warfare: U.S. Special Forces eye complex mission in ‘decisive decade’

3. Uncrewed systems are 'changing the character of war': top USSOCOM officials

4. USSOCOM seeks to expand industry ecosystem, wants more prototyping submissions

5. Spectrum dominance and counter-UAS at SOF Week

6. SEALs want loitering munitions aboard insert/extract patrol boats

7. Submarine delays push SEALs to find new underwater approaches

8. Budget strain pauses MC-130J amphibious project for special forces

9. Little Bird helicopter replacement in question after Army cancels FARA

10. Special operators set to pick light machine gun in new caliber

11. “Will to Fight” – Twenty-First-Century Insights from the Russo-Ukrainian War

12. An Overlooked War – In Myanmar, poets, doctors and lawyers have traded life in the cities for jungle warfare.

13. NGA director pushes back at criticisms of agency, touts 'wetware,' tradecraft (EXCLUSIVE)

14. How disinformation works—and how to counter it

15. Information Advantage – A Combined Arms Approach

16. War Games Risk Stirring Up Troubled Waters as Philippines - Emboldened by US - Squares Up to Beijing at Sea

17. Israeli forces mass on Rafah's outskirts as US warns a major assault could halt arms

18. US Drone Warfare Faces Questions of Legitimacy, Study of Military Chaplains Shows

19. Defending Taiwan By Defending Ukraine

20. Russia’s Pro-Putin Elites

21. The East and South China Seas: One Sea, Near Seas, Whose Seas?

22. In Brief: The U.S.-Chinese Relationship

23. Marine Special Operations Paragliding Capabilities Emerge At Demonstration In Tampa

24. How the Kremlin's Information Warfare Influence U.S. Policymakers

25. CONCLUDING CONFLICT: WHY ENDING WAR IS NEVER AN EASY STRATEGY

26. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 8, 2024

27. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, May 8, 2024

28. 490. Future Dynamics of Warfare: Everyone is a Player, Everything is a Target

29. Top Army general in Pacific says Asian nations moving toward NATO-like cooperation to counter China

30. A Unit Syllabi to Professional Discourse

1. 'Battle of the Bay' underway in Tampa as part of military showcase

The SOF Week demonstration in Tampa. A 52 minute video that showcases the very impressive US and International SOF capabilities.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FZsjAjckg9g

'Battle of the Bay' underway in Tampa as part of military showcase

20,644 views Streamed live 17 hours ago

You might hear explosions, simulated gunfire and helicopters if you are near the Tampa Convention Center on Wednesday.

The U.S. Special Operations Command is hosting a military showcase from noon to 1 p.m. Wednesday in downtown Tampa.

The public is encouraged to attend and watch this "rare display of military-tactical-might." The event called "Battle of the Bay" is part of the Special Operations Forces Week annual conference with more than 170 service members taking part in a mock scenario defending Tampa from invaders.

MORE: https://www.wtsp.com/article/news/loc...

2. Masters of irregular warfare: U.S. Special Forces eye complex mission in ‘decisive decade’

My thesis is that strategic competition is characterized by the national government conducting political warfare in the gray zone in the space between peace and war (all elements of national power employed to achieve national objectives short of war). Irregular warfare is the military contribution to political warfare. Special Warfare is the special operations contribution to irregular warfare.

It is nice to see Small Wars Journal mentioned for an article on wicked problems.

Excerpts:

“In this decisive decade, autocrats and terrorists alike seek to upend the free and open international system,” Gen. Fenton said during a keynote address.

Those adversaries want to “divide and weaken the power” of America and its partners, he said.

...

Adversaries’ goals, the commander said, will be to “erode our national will and our national cohesion in the hopes that we will put up the weakest fight possible.”

“Our role is to impose those wicked problems on our adversaries,” the commander said. “So, as we think of the other side of that coin, we’ve got to be able to deny our adversaries the ability to impose wicked costs on us.”

The phrase “wicked problems” has been repeated in speeches and sessions at the conference and has been used for decades within military circles. A 2014 article in the online Small Wars Journal said, “Wicked problems have no definable problem statement, no objectively correct answer, and layers of uncertainty and unpredictability that make efforts to ‘solve’ them, especially through bureaucratic consensus, naive.”

...

Current and former officials said U.S. special operations forces could be at the center of those “irregular warfare” missions to undermine a foreign adversary from within and compromise its ability to wage war.

“We’re also the masters of these irregular warfare capabilities that right now seem to be used mostly by our adversaries against us,” said retired Army Lt. Gen. Kenneth Tovo, former commander of the Army Special Operations Command.

“But at some point, I expect that we, the West, will get serious about competing in a more aggressive and offensive manner. And those irregular warfare capabilities will serve us well to create dilemmas for our adversaries, to create issues for them to deal with on their peripheries,” Gen. Tovo said at the panel discussion Tuesday, naming China, Russia and Iran as specific U.S. enemies.

“The thing they fear most is internal instability,” he said of those nations. “When you look for cracks we can put a lever into, one of those is our ability to create unconventional warfare efforts.”

Masters of irregular warfare: U.S. Special Forces eye complex mission in ‘decisive decade’

washingtontimes.com · by Ben Wolfgang

Premium

By - The Washington Times - Updated: 5:49 p.m. on Wednesday, May 8, 2024

Members of U.S. Special Operations Command Korea and South Korea's Army Special Warfare Command take part in a joint maritime infiltration training as part of the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise, at a shore in Yangyang, northern South Korea, Monday, Aug. 28, 2023. (Kim Hong-ji/Pool Photo via AP) ** FILE **

TAMPA, Fla. — The U.S. faces a “decisive decade” as it stares down great power challenges from China and Russia, regional threats from Iran and North Korea, and the resurgence of extremist groups such as ISIS and al Qaeda — and U.S. Special Forces will play a central role in confronting each, said Army Gen. Bryan P. Fenton, the head of U.S. Special Operations Command.

Gen. Fenton, speaking Tuesday to an audience at the Special Operations Forces Week convention, said he expects the number of Special Forces missions to increase dramatically over the next decade. Underscoring his comments are global competitions and conflicts that have expanded far beyond traditional battlefields and deep into the economic, cyberspace, information and space domains.

U.S. Special Forces are often tasked with highly secretive missions that never make headlines. The role they will play in the 21st century’s great power competition is a key topic at the convention.

Current and retired military officials predicted deepening partnerships with allies abroad to stave off enemy influence in Europe, Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere.

They said U.S. special operations forces are working intently to counter Chinese and Russian economic, information and influence campaigns to weaken America’s standing in North America, particularly in the increasingly competitive Arctic region.

One former military official said special operations forces could play a leading role in “irregular warfare” to weaken enemies from within and chip away at their ability to conduct traditional and nontraditional warfare against the U.S.

The scope of the threats and the rapidly evolving technological battlespace — defined by drone swarms, autonomous systems and artificial intelligence — have created one of the most consequential periods in American history.

“In this decisive decade, autocrats and terrorists alike seek to upend the free and open international system,” Gen. Fenton said during a keynote address.

Those adversaries want to “divide and weaken the power” of America and its partners, he said.

Military analysts envision threats from China, Russia and other state actors primarily in theaters beyond U.S. shores. The most immediate threat from China could be an invasion of Taiwan. Russia’s direct military action against Ukraine has now stretched into its third year. Malign activities by Iran and its proxy network seem mostly confined to the Middle East, targeting U.S. assets and key allies, most notably Israel.

North America and the broader theater could also become a major battlespace.

“In the event of a conflict, we would expect them to try to isolate us in the homeland, to not allow us to project forces to whatever region might be driving some sort of global conflict. And really, to diminish our domain awareness, take away our ability to see their strategic capabilities so they can increase the perception or the reality of holding the homeland at risk should they seek to impose a direct cost on the homeland itself,” a special operations forces commander told a handful of reporters.

Adversaries’ goals, the commander said, will be to “erode our national will and our national cohesion in the hopes that we will put up the weakest fight possible.”

“Our role is to impose those wicked problems on our adversaries,” the commander said. “So, as we think of the other side of that coin, we’ve got to be able to deny our adversaries the ability to impose wicked costs on us.”

More ‘aggressive and offensive’

The phrase “wicked problems” has been repeated in speeches and sessions at the conference and has been used for decades within military circles. A 2014 article in the online Small Wars Journal said, “Wicked problems have no definable problem statement, no objectively correct answer, and layers of uncertainty and unpredictability that make efforts to ‘solve’ them, especially through bureaucratic consensus, naive.”

Such problems grow even more difficult to tackle on a modern battlefield that extends beyond land, sea and air domains.

“I can make an argument for anywhere from five to eight different domains. It was hard enough taking three domains and combining those,” Air Force Lt. Gen. Dagvin Anderson, director for joint force development for the Pentagon’s Joint Staff, said Tuesday at a panel discussion.

“It gets exponentially more difficult with how you look at seven, eight domains and how you bring forces to bear,” said Gen. Anderson, citing space, cyberspace and other modern domains.

The U.S. often views it through a defensive lens: How can America defend against Russian disinformation campaigns or Chinese economic coercion, cyberattacks by Iran or North Korea-linked hackers, or influence operations to weaken the population’s faith in its government?

Current and former officials said U.S. special operations forces could be at the center of those “irregular warfare” missions to undermine a foreign adversary from within and compromise its ability to wage war.

“We’re also the masters of these irregular warfare capabilities that right now seem to be used mostly by our adversaries against us,” said retired Army Lt. Gen. Kenneth Tovo, former commander of the Army Special Operations Command.

“But at some point, I expect that we, the West, will get serious about competing in a more aggressive and offensive manner. And those irregular warfare capabilities will serve us well to create dilemmas for our adversaries, to create issues for them to deal with on their peripheries,” Gen. Tovo said at the panel discussion Tuesday, naming China, Russia and Iran as specific U.S. enemies.

“The thing they fear most is internal instability,” he said of those nations. “When you look for cracks we can put a lever into, one of those is our ability to create unconventional warfare efforts.”

• Ben Wolfgang can be reached at bwolfgang@washingtontimes.com.

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washingtontimes.com · by Ben Wolfgang

3. Uncrewed systems are 'changing the character of war': top USSOCOM officials

Uncrewed systems are 'changing the character of war': top USSOCOM officials - Military Embedded Systems

militaryembedded.com · by OpenSystems Media

Uncrewed systems are 'changing the character of war': top USSOCOM officials

News

May 07, 2024

Dan Taylor

Technology Editor

Military Embedded Systems

SOF WEEK 2024 -- TAMPA BAY, Florida. The rapidly evolving world of uncrewed systems has upended modern warfare and is leading to generational changes on the battlefield in a matter of months rather than decades, top U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) officials said at SOF Week.

In a joint keynote address Tuesday, USSOCOM Commander Bryan P. Fenton and Command Sergeant Major Shane W. Shorter warned of a "David and Goliath" dynamic where smaller actors are more dangerous with access to rapidly evolving uncrewed systems that are affordable at their disposal.

"When you think about a 'great power' war, you think about a large state over here and a large state over there, and they have exquisitely expensive equipment, and they're going back and forth and whoever has the best exquisitely expensive equipment ... is going to be the winner," Shorter said. But today, uncrewed systems have upended that dynamic.

Shorter noted that in 1991, he was still outfitted with equipment similar to what was used in the Vietnam War decades before. In contrast, the battlefield of today changes in a matter of months.

"When you think about one-way strike, when you think about loitering munitions, when you think about swarming, when you think about 3D printing -- that has truly changed the character of war for the future," Shorter said.

Artificial intelligence is also contributing to this rapid shift. "Whatever you know about artificial intelligence 6 months ago, forget about it," Fenton said. "It's just moving at such a rate of speed. ... It's pretty frightening."

This will make Special Operations Forces all the more essential in the future, Shorter said.

"I think we're going to be a larger answer in the wars of the future," he said.

The challenge for SOCOM will be to figure out how to rapidly produce and field uncrewed systems rather than rely on larger, bespoke platforms that take years to develop, Shorter said.

"I think it's going to be that affordable mass that is going to play [a big role]," he said.

militaryembedded.com · by OpenSystems Media

4. USSOCOM seeks to expand industry ecosystem, wants more prototyping submissions

USSOCOM seeks to expand industry ecosystem, wants more prototyping submissions - Military Embedded Systems

militaryembedded.com · by OpenSystems Media

USSOCOM seeks to expand industry ecosystem, wants more prototyping submissions

News

May 07, 2024

Dan Taylor

Technology Editor

Military Embedded Systems

SOF WEEK 2024 -- TAMPA, Florida. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is trying to expand the industry ecosystem it relies on for the development of new technology and platforms, said SOCOM Acquisition Executive Melissa A. Johnson at SOF Week.

"We're bringing in the investment capital community," Johnson said. "We have a very diverse industry ecosystem, but there's definitely more to be done."

The service has received more than 22,000 submissions through its Vulcan program, which it uses to develop innovative solutions. There have also been a total of 1,273 submissions through its Engage SOF (eSOF) program that helps with conducting market research.

"The amount of people that are submitting ideas for prototyping technology is phenomenal," she said. "That's what we need. Keep bringing it on."

There have also been more than 200 technical experiments. These experiments "help us to learn really early," Johnson said.

"If we're going to iterate fast and get capability to the field, we have to ruthlessly experiment," she said. "This is just an indicator that we're doing that very well."

militaryembedded.com · by OpenSystems Media

5. Spectrum dominance and counter-UAS at SOF Week

Spectrum dominance and counter-UAS at SOF Week - Military Embedded Systems

militaryembedded.com · by OpenSystems Media

Spectrum dominance and counter-UAS at SOF Week

News

May 07, 2024

John McHale

Editorial Director

Military Embedded Systems

Pete Gallagher, CACI International Inc. & Maj. Gen., U.S. Army (Ret.)

SOF WEEK 2024--TAMPA, Fla. Dominance in the spectrum domain is goal of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and especially of USSOCOM [United States Special Operations Command]. In an interview I did with Pete Gallagher, Maj. Gen., U.S. Army (Ret.) and Senior Vice President for Technology and Solutions, CACI International Inc. at SOF Week 2024 in Tampa, he and I discussed the capabilities CACI delivers to USSOCOM for dominating the electromagnetic spectrum. Pete also covered the counter-UAS [uncrewed aerial system] solutions his team is showcasing at SOF Week. Edited excerpts follow.

SOF Week Show Daily: What is your role within CACI and your background within the defense community?

Gallagher: I am Senior Vice President for Technology and Solutions of the National Security and Innovative Solutions sector for CACI International Inc., which is a sector focused heavily on the mission technology side. I also spent more than 30 years in the U.S. Army, retiring as a Major General. During my career I commanded troops at the Platoon, Company, Troop, Battalion, Squadron, and Brigade, and at the Army Direct Reporting Unit levels. My assignments included United States Special Operations Command units, including Commander of the Joint Communications Unit, Battalion Commander for the 112th Signal Battalion, Squadron Commander of a Special Mission Unit. I also served as the Brigade Commander for Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Central Field Command.

SOF Week Show Daily: Why is the Special Operations community important to CACI?

Gallagher: We provide high-end expertise and technology to the entire U.S. government, including the Department of Defense (DoD). DoD is a primary customer, and helping them fight and win against any adversary anywhere on the planet is a priority. For the last two decades we've been supporting USSOCOM and special mission units and special operations forces globally.

Ever since we've been supporting SOF [Special Operations Forces], we have been heavily involved in acquiring capabilities – very bespoke, very unique capabilities – that support the special operations forces deployed. That's everything from high-end intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR] capability to electronic warfare (EW) and electronic effects capability. We have a very special relationship with Gen. Fenton and with the leaders across the SOF community.

SOF Week Show Daily: What are you showcasing at SOF Week 2024?

Gallagher: There is a variety of things that we bring to bear, starting with our spectrum solutions such as the Spectrum Guard System that allows us to analyze and see the electromagnetic spectrum. Our Magpie RF signature decoy systems enables [end users to leverage] decoys in the electromagnetic spectrum. It’s really a low-cost emitter that plays back raw signal capabilities and allows you to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum by confusing the adversaries.

We are also demonstrating our gimbal technology, which provides low size, weight, and power (SWaP) capabilities on a variety of platforms –where you can provide ELINT [electronic intelligence] capability and the ability to analyze signals through imaging. We're demonstrating tactical EW capabilities as well.

For the Army’s Terrestrial Layer System-Brigade Combat Team Manpack (TLS-BCT) program we are leveraging a couple of products – Kraken and Beast – from a company we acquired called Mastodon. These are combat-proven SIGINT receivers with wideband scan that enables direction-finding over multiple channels simultaneously.

SOF Week Show Daily: What is CACI doing for the counter-UAS applications?

Gallagher: For counter-UAS we are showcasing the BEAM, a man-packable counter-UAS system [that has] the longest detection and mitigation range available. It delivers detect, track, identify, and defeat capability. We recently had a contract awarded for the BEAM with the Canadian Armed Forces.

Our CORIAN solution has fixed and mobile options for countering the drone threat. We also have payloads that go on unmanned systems such as our Spectral Sieve, a real-time passive, single- and multi-platform RF detection and direction-finding capability. It enables us to geolocate tactical uncrewed systems and also provides automated detection, processing, and modulation classification.

We team that up with another effort called Pit Viper, which allows us to not only do passive sensing of the environment, but also generate electronic effects. These are low-SWaP solution sets that can go on a variety of uncrewed weapons systems.

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militaryembedded.com · by OpenSystems Media

6. SEALs want loitering munitions aboard insert/extract patrol boats

SEALs want loitering munitions aboard insert/extract patrol boats

Defense News · by Todd South · May 8, 2024

TAMPA, Fla. — Special operators are testing ways to add loitering munitions and other payloads to the medium-size, 60-foot watercraft used to insert and extract SEAL teams on special missions.

Over the past four years, Special Operations Command troops have been working through ways to add a launcher kit to the Combatant Craft Medium, or CCM, a 60-foot-long boat with a top speed of 52 knots that carries a crew of four and has space for 19 more passengers and a total load of 10,000 pounds.

The project aims to give boat operators an onboard “standoff, loitering, man-in-the-loop weapons system” that can target “individuals, groups, vehicles and small, oceangoing craft,” according to program materials.

But, the launcher can also carry other “effects” such as surveillance drones, electromagnetic warfare pods or sensor packages for a variety of missions, according to Navy Cmdr. Marty Burns, program manager for maritime surface systems.

Driverless boats, enduring sensors on the special ops maritime menu

Sensors that can run for weeks or month are on the wish list.

An illustration of the launcher at SOF Week showed a multi-pod system with eight or more pods available to house munitions or other payloads.

Final testing and a live fire of the launcher kit are planned for late fiscal 2024 or early fiscal 2025, officials said during the Special Operations Forces Week conference, an annual gathering of the special operations community here.

When it comes to CCM payloads, a key concern is reducing the heat signature of any launcher added to the platform, to help it avoid adversary detection, Wyrick said.

The command has 31 combatant craft medium boats in its inventory.

Once testing concludes and the government-owned design for the kit is approved for installation, the command’s 31 CCMs will take turns going offline to install the kits as the rest of the fleet continues operations, Burns said.

The CCM patrol boat, made by shipbuilder Vigor Industrial, was first commissioned in 2015 to replace the rigid hull inflatable boat.

Navy Capt. Jared Wyrick, SOCOM program executive officer for maritime, said Tuesday that the command is also working on building a boat replacement, called the CCM Mk2.

About Todd South

Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.

7. Submarine delays push SEALs to find new underwater approaches

Submarine delays push SEALs to find new underwater approaches

Defense News · by Todd South · May 8, 2024

TAMPA, Fla. — U.S. Navy special operators are upgrading their underwater fleet to continue reaching their objectives amid a looming gap in submarine capabilities, according military officials.

Navy SEALs have used the dry deck shelter with modified Ohio-class submarines for decades. The shelter, attached to a submarine, allows divers to remain dry as they transport to their launch site, don wetsuits and dive gear, then exit and later return to the sub undetected.

But the shelters require 10 sailors to operate and get six SEALs out of the platform, Navy Capt. Burt Canfield said Tuesday at the Special Operations Forces conference. Canfield overseas dry deck shelter acquisitions for Special Operations Command. There are five shelters in service, the oldest of which has been in use for nearly 50 years.

The Dry Deck Shelter Next program, launched in fiscal 2024, is currently in a multiyear research and development phase, Canfield said.

The shelters were expected to shift to working with the upcoming Virginia-class submarines. However, as Ohio-class subs go out of service, production delays for the Virginia boats could limit how SEALs use the two platforms to reach their destinations.

That target is still in the Navy’s sights and will include optimizing a topside hangar for the platform that will allow users to launch crewed submersibles, large unmanned undersea vehicles, and smaller unmanned underwater and aerial vehicles.

Petty Officer 1st Class Daniel Brien, a Navy diver, rigs the dry deck shelter for a dive aboard the guided-missile submarine Ohio. (Petty Officer 1st Class Barry Hirayama/U.S. Navy)

Canfield said SOCOM hopes to add automation to some of the shelter’s functions and remote operations to reduce the crewing from 10 sailors to operate down to six or fewer.

“We want to operate inside the hull, get the [SEAL Delivery Vehicle] out remotely, increase safety and increase capacity,” the captain noted.

In the meantime, advances to some other systems are helping SEALs find workarounds to traveling farther underwater. Navy Capt. Jared Wyrick, SOCOM program executive officer for maritime systems, said they are “finding ways that we’re going to still get those missions done even if we don’t have that submarine underneath us to support us.”

SOCOM reached full operational capability on its dry combat submersible in fiscal 2024, said Cmdr. Jonathan Connelly, program executive officer for the command’s maritime undersea systems. The dry submersible is a 39-foot long submarine built by Lockheed Martin that weighs 28 tons with a full load, uses a crew of two sailors and can carry eight SEALs.

The submersible can travel up to 60 miles and remain submerged for 24 hours.

That range and time, paired with recent advancements in combat diver gear, including individual jet propulsion systems, is allowing SEALs to travel farther underwater.

Wyrick said that SOCOM personnel are meeting with partners such as the United Kingdom and Norway to find other approaches to filling the undersea mobility gaps.

About Todd South

8. Budget strain pauses MC-130J amphibious project for special forces

A rendering of the system is at the link: https://www.defensenews.com/smr/sofic/2024/05/08/budget-strain-pauses-mc-130j-amphibious-project-for-special-forces/

Excerpts:

But on Tuesday at the Special Operations Forces Week conference here, Air Force Col. Justin Bronder, the program executive officer for fixed wing programs at USSOCOM, said the MC-130J Amphibious Capability project had been paused due to budget constraints. In the Pentagon’s budget request, unveiled in March, the military asked for $11.5 million for the project.

Bronder said that work on the project, including a “very successful, technical deep dive” with industry had allowed the military to “come up with a real rich, data-driven model” on how to make an amphibious version of the large tanker/transport plane operational. He added it is a capability the force could field if needed.

Budget strain pauses MC-130J amphibious project for special forces

Defense News · by Todd South · May 8, 2024

TAMPA, Fla. — U.S. Special Operations Command has paused an ambitious program to make its MC-130J transport plane capable of water landings and takeoff.

Air Force Special Operations Command first announced the project in 2021, with plans to demonstrate the capability the following year, Military Times previously reported.

But on Tuesday at the Special Operations Forces Week conference here, Air Force Col. Justin Bronder, the program executive officer for fixed wing programs at USSOCOM, said the MC-130J Amphibious Capability project had been paused due to budget constraints. In the Pentagon’s budget request, unveiled in March, the military asked for $11.5 million for the project.

Bronder said that work on the project, including a “very successful, technical deep dive” with industry had allowed the military to “come up with a real rich, data-driven model” on how to make an amphibious version of the large tanker/transport plane operational. He added it is a capability the force could field if needed.

A rendering shows a twin-float amphibious modification to an MC-130J Commando II. (Courtesy of the U.S. Air Force)

Officials previously stated the aim of the program was to give the aircraft options to take off and land on bodies of water and runway-independent locations. That capability would broaden and deepen the range of options in various regions, but specifically in the Pacific.

“That’s going to give us the ability to turn any large body of water into a landing zone where we can insert [or] extract special operations forces and the equipment and other things that might cause dilemmas for our adversaries,” then-Lt. Gen. Jim Slife, at the time serving as AFSOC commander, told reporters in 2022.

Designers started with digital designs, Slife said. They worked through testing to decide what kind of configuration would work including a catamaran, pontoon and entire applique attached to the bottom of the aircraft, Slife added.

The design they settled on was a kit that could be added to the aircraft in the field when needed, rather than a complete redesign or permanent feature of the plane.

The aircraft, first built in the 1950s, has served generations of troops in combat across the globe. But it’s now facing threats in a more contested airspace.

In 2022 officials announced a series of experiments with the aircraft — both the MC-130J special operations version and the KC-130J Super Hercules version used by the Air Force. Those involved high-energy lasers, amphibious landing and takeoff capabilities, crewless operations, and fully automated cockpits, Military Times previously reported.

About Todd South

9. Little Bird helicopter replacement in question after Army cancels FARA

Little Bird helicopter replacement in question after Army cancels FARA

Defense News · by Todd South · May 8, 2024

TAMPA, Fla. — One of the signature helicopters of special operations forces won’t get the expected relief from a major replacement program now that it was canceled earlier this year.

U.S. Special Operations Command has relied on versions of the A/MH-6 Little Bird helicopter for decades. But while the commercial-turned-military aircraft has received a series of upgrades to keep flying, it will struggle to keep up with the formation in the coming years.

The Army’s Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft program, or FARA, was seen as the solution. Planners expected that aircraft to begin replacing the Little Bird by the mid-2030s.

But the service canceled FARA in February.

“That changed our equation because that was going to become the armed platform that was going to take the role of the [Little Bird],” said Steven Smith, USSOCOM’s program executive officer for rotary wing programs.

Speaking here Tuesday during the Special Operations Forces Week conference, Smith said the move would also push the use of the MH-60M Black Hawk helicopter into the 2050s or longer.

“So now we don’t have that solution available. We are going to be sustaining those aircraft for a long time,” Smith said.

The Little Bird is built by personnel at the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

Defense News reported as early as 2016 that USSOCOM was examining the strain and capability gaps of the aircraft. Only that command uses the aircraft, so it must pay the bill for any work on the platform. For other military aircraft, such as the Black Hawk or the Chinook, the command can benefit from regular Army upgrades.

In 2022, officials at this conference noted the Little Bird’s speed was slowing existing formations and could not keep up with future aircraft. To fill the gap, the rotary wing program director at the time, Geoff Downer, said the military would pursue hybrid power, or electrification, which would push speeds beyond the current maximum speed of 80 knots.

But that’s no longer a near-term option. “I just don’t think the funding’s there to support that electrification work,” Smith said Tuesday.

Smith added that he’s looking to industry for improvements to the drivetrain and rotor blades that could help with speed.

The aircraft is in the midst of receiving a next-generation tactical radio system, improved sensor systems and a new fuselage. The Boeing-built fuselage raises the gross weight limit to 5,000 pounds, up from the previous 4,700 pounds, which required multiple integrated kits, Smith said.

Those previously planned upgrades will keep the Little Bird flying until 2034, according to timelines shared during Smith’s presentation.

Beyond that date, USSOCOM is looking for new solutions, he added.

About Todd South

10. Special operators set to pick light machine gun in new caliber

24-26 pounds (a lightweight machine gun).

Special operators set to pick light machine gun in new caliber

Defense News · by Todd South · May 8, 2024

TAMPA, Fla. — U.S. special operations officials are set to select a new machine gun in the coming months to give shooters .50-caliber-like performance in a lightweight machine gun package, according to the program manager for special operations lethality.

Army Lt. Col. Tosh Lancaster said here Tuesday during the Special Operations Forces Week conference that Special Operations Command will select its so-called Lightweight Medium Machinegun, or LWMMG, by Oct. 1.

First announced in 2017, the project focused on the .338 Norma Magnum to provide shooters with more distance and lethal punch in a weapon that one person could carry and use. The .338 Norma Magnum is a new entry into military operations.

The three companies competing for the contract are Ohio Ordnance Works; Sig Sauer; and a True Velocity and Lonestar Future Weapons team.

Lancaster previously said the weapon is scheduled for fielding in fiscal 2026.

Sig Sauer in recent years won the Modular Handgun System contract to provide a 9 mm sidearm to all military branches as well as the Army’s Next Generation Squad Weapon rifle and automatic rifle contract.

Companies delivered three weapons each in February and a total of a dozen each in late April for endurance testing, according to documents.

Basic specifications of the Lightweight Medium Machinegun from the competitors are:

Sig Sauer’s MG 3r38:’ Recoil Enhanced Automatic Precision Rifle, or REAPR: a 26.8-pound, 54.5-inch weapon with a rate of fire of 550 rounds to 660 rounds per minute.
Sig Sauer’s MG 338: a 24.1-pound, 50-inch weapon with a rate of fire of 600 rounds per minute.
True Velocity’s Recoil Mitigation 338: a 25-pound, 49-inch weapon with a rate of fire exceeding 500 rounds per minute.

U.S. troops began noticing range limitations in Afghanistan with their M240 machine guns, chambered in 7.62 mm, that reached about 1,500 meters. The M2 .50-caliber machine gun could reach farther, up to 2,000 meters, but weighs 84 pounds.

Weapons and ammunition experts in the Army, Marine Corps and other government groups began evaluating the small arms suite of ammunition and platforms as those reports emerged.

One specific effort on the .338 included the Irregular Warfare Technical Support Directorate.

In 2021, Army snipers began using the .338 Norma Magnum for the MK22 Precision Sniper Rifle; SOCOM has fielded an advanced sniper rifle that can fire the .338 Norma Magnum, .300 Norma Magnum or 7.62 mm with barrel changes.

About Todd South

11. “Will to Fight” – Twenty-First-Century Insights from the Russo-Ukrainian War

Graphics at the link.

Note the emphasis on the psychological and resistance.

Excerpts:

Implications for the U.S. Army

The psychological element of the will to fight is a tipping point. The psychological will to fight, intrinsically tied to physical capacity, is paramount. When external support is held constant, internal resolve becomes the game-changer. Even for the U.S. Army, material support alone is not sufficient; fostering psychological resilience is an intrinsic and vital factor in achieving objectives during large-scale combat operations (LSCO). Partnering with allies like Ukraine potentially offers valuable insights for the U.S. Army to bolster its training and morale-building strategies.

Ukraine’s staunch resistance, even when outmatched, underscores that facing an existential threat sparks a deep-seated will to fight. The U.S. Army can address such fervent resistance in future exercises and engagements and consider approaches to recalibrate strategies when facing or supporting forces motivated by this variable.

While numerically disadvantaged forces like Ukraine may struggle in a prolonged personnel attrition war, they can potentially succeed in eroding an adversary’s resolve. It is important for the U.S. Army to understand the benefits of targeting an opponent’s will, especially by factoring in aspects of foreign material support and psychological operations, as well as anticipating how adversaries may use similar tactics against them.

The Russo-Ukrainian War reinforces the efficacy of mission command against a more centralized, top-driven command structure in LSCO. Initiative and innovation at all levels of command breed success and contribute to the will to fight. While still learning to take fuller advantage of combined arms tactics, the UAF has effectively employed mission command, especially in its counteroffensives. The U.S. Army can capitalize and generate gains by reinforcing its mission command principles, especially as they might be employed in LSCO.

The conflict illustrates that superior training, leadership, and equipment can counterbalance numerical advantages. By investing strategically in enhancing the quality of its training and equipment, the U.S. Army may benefit from the ability to offset numerical deficits in future LSCO scenarios. Moreover, observing the contrast between the UAF’s successes and Russian setbacks, the U.S. Army can further refine its focus on producing well-trained, well-equipped forces, ensuring readiness and adaptability.

“Will to Fight”

Twenty-First-Century Insights from the Russo-Ukrainian War

Benjamin A. Okonofua, PhD

Nicole Laster-Loucks, PhD

Lt. Col. Andrew Johnson, U.S. Army, Retired

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2024/MJ-24-Will-to-Fight/

Download the PDF

A member of a Ukrainian special police unit falls after firing a D-30 howitzer toward Russian positions near Kreminna, Ukraine, on 7 July 2023. (Photo by Libkos via Associated Press)

We are waging a war against the country whose size is 28 times larger than ours, whose population is 4 times larger than ours, and whose military capabilities are many times greater than ours. We are waging a war by land, air, sea, cyberspace, etc. We have been at war not for 8 months, but for 8 years and 8 months. All this testifies to our resilience, courage to defend our own, and the will to win. Would other countries withstand such pressure? … I don’t know about others, but we are holding on, regrouping, building up reserves, strengthening the defence, and gradually liberating our homeland. The victory is given to us very hard. But it will definitely be secured.

—Valerii Zuluzhnyi, Former Commander in Chief, Armed Forces of Ukraine, 31 October 2022

The 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War is a complex and enduring confrontation that warrants a nuanced exploration of the forces driving the determination, capacity, and narrative of the warring parties. These forces coalesce to produce a “will to fight,” an often underestimated component in the annals of warfare and strategic defense. It develops at the individual level, extends to the national level, and is necessary to win.1

At its core, the will to fight in this conflict can be understood as a composite of psychological resilience, physical capability and capacity, and ideological conviction (see figure 1). These dimensions continually evolve or change because of the interplay between unique opposing forces. Each of these dimensions plays a pivotal role in shaping the dynamics of the conflict, influencing both the strategies employed and the tenacity displayed by the involved nations.

Figure 1. Analytic Elements of Will to Fight

(Figure from Global Cultural Knowledge Network)

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The historical significance of a resolute will to fight is vividly illustrated by the United States’ strategic evolution during World War II. Upon entering the conflict, the United States lacked a clear vision of victory. A crucial shift occurred in 1942 when U.S. leadership, considering military strengths, the global strategic context, and a moral imperative to overcome fascism, committed to the ambitious goal of the complete and unconditional surrender of the Axis powers. This resolve was publicly affirmed at the 1943 Casablanca Conference, where President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill announced there would be no peace negotiations, only the pursuit of unconditional surrender. This stance, reinforcing the national will to fight alongside superior military resources, was instrumental in securing victory.2 Conversely, the conflicts in Vietnam and Iraq highlight the critical role of assessing the will to fight within both allies and adversaries. In Vietnam, the United States encountered tenacious resistance from the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, who were deeply committed to defending their country and opposing foreign forces. This determination significantly contributed to the protraction of the conflict, despite the United States’ superior military resources.3 Similarly, in Iraq, the resilience and dedication to the cause of insurgent groups, combined with unclear strategic goals by the United States and its allies, led to extended engagements and mixed results.4

These cases emphasize the complexity of military engagements, where the psychological and ideological components of warfare are as crucial as the physical aspects. They underscore the crucial role of the will to fight alongside military capabilities in determining conflict outcomes. This concept, embodying determination, resilience, and resolve, often decisively influences engagement results beyond mere military strength.5 Recognizing the multifaceted nature of the will to fight—spanning psychological, physical, and ideological aspects—is essential for leaders, policymakers, planners, and scholars. The subsequent analysis of these dimensions within the Russo-Ukrainian War context aims to dissect the complex interplay of factors driving this protracted conflict, illustrating how these elements of resolve, which are not static, evolve over time and dynamically interact to impact the ongoing military engagements. Understanding these dynamics is vital for comprehending the motivations and actions of involved parties, highlighting the significance of the will to fight in shaping conflict trajectories.

Psychological Will to Fight

The psychological will to fight or the determination to persist in combat plays a crucial role in maintaining resolve beyond the limits of territorial divisions. It encompasses a range of interactive factors, including morale, leadership, cohesion, and motivation, which collectively drive militaries and civilians to persevere amid adversity.

In any conflict, the strength of a nation’s resolve is often propelled by psychological factors. Morale, the sense of purpose, and individual determination play critical roles in enabling forces to transcend physical limitations. Leadership and cohesion further enhance the mental fortitude and cognitive determination of soldiers and civilians, fostering resilience in the face of combat adversity. For example, facing difficult odds at the Battle of Stalingrad, Soviet soldiers displayed unyielding determination, fortified by leaders like Gen. Georgy Zhukov, which increased their resilience and eventually shifted the battle in their favor.6

Various internal and external factors continually influence the psychological will to fight. Understanding this dimension provides essential insights into the dynamics that determine the endurance and success of military engagements, making it a pivotal aspect of resolve and occasionally the tipping point in any conflict.

Russia’s psychological will to fight. Understanding the psychological dimension of Russia’s will to fight in the ongoing conflict is crucial for comprehending the dynamics of the war. Initially, Moscow framed the war as a “special military operation” (SMO) to propagate Kremlin narratives of denazification and demilitarization, downplay the risks to Russian forces and Ukrainian society, and bolster confidence in Russian military superiority. However, battlefield realities shattered these expectations. Russian troops faced significant casualties and equipment losses, particularly among elite units like Spetznaz (special operations) and airborne troops. Some soldiers were misled; believing they were deploying for exercises, they found themselves in combat in Ukraine. Additionally, SMO objectives such as the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine were revealed as Kremlin disinformation. These factors likely contributed to a diminishing psychological will to fight among Russian troops.

Moreover, Russia’s informational asymmetry (overestimating its strength and underestimating Ukrainian capabilities) created a significant expectancy violation (see breakout box on page 39).7 The Kremlin’s narratives of military power, backed by visible displays of forces and equipment, initially boosted confidence but were challenged by the realities of combat in Ukraine.8 Over time, many Russians began questioning the war’s rationale and their belief in Russian military prowess.9 Information discrepancies between the official narratives and soldiers’ experiences on the battlefield further eroded the will to fight, leading to a desire to surrender or escape combat.10

The Kremlin’s efforts to mobilize citizen support by framing the conflict as defending the motherland against an “evil” foreign threat faced challenges in maintaining control over the information space.11 Reports of Russian “barrier troops” to stop unauthorized withdrawals underscored command anxiety over the will to fight.12 While domestic Russian support has eroded gradually from its high in the mid-80 percent of people polled, a majority still backs the war (see figure 2).13 However, growing awareness of the war’s realities has dampened public confidence, increased disenchantment, and caused troops’ will to fight to decline.14 Despite ongoing efforts by President Vladimir Putin, heavy-casualty-producing attacks continue to impact troop morale, hindering their effectiveness.15

Figure 2. Percentage of Russians Who Support the So-Called “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine

(Figure from the ANO Levada Center)

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Ukraine’s psychological will to fight. The psychological dimension of Ukraine’s will to fight in the ongoing conflict showcases a remarkable resilience and determination among Ukrainian forces and civilians. The war, which began with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the conflict in the Donbas region, profoundly influenced Ukrainian national identity and resolve. Ukrainians confronted Russian aggression and aspirations to reestablish regional dominance, galvanizing a collective war mentality against an existential threat to Ukrainian statehood.16

Numerous polls indicate that nearly all Ukrainians believe in victory over Russia. This support is particularly robust in regions farther from the front lines, the west and center, and slightly weaker in areas closer to the conflict in the south and east. Opposition to Russian aggression existed long before the 2022 invasion, as a majority consistently demanded the liberation of all Russia-occupied territories.17

As Russia’s military operation in Ukraine continues, Russian radiation, chemical, and biological defense troops of the Southern Military District watch an online broadcast of President Vladimir Putin’s annual address to the Federal Assembly on a laptop at an unknown location. (Photo by RIA Novosti/Sputnik via Associated Press)

However, it is essential to acknowledge that the initial enthusiasm for volunteering to fight Russia has waned as the war has entered has entered its third year with escalating casualities and no clear end in sight. This shift led the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to depend more on conscription and to relax certain nonqualifying conditions for enlistment.18 While these changes reflect the evolving nature of the conflict, they do not diminish the overall psychological will to fight.

Physical Will to Fight

The physical will to fight is critical to a country’s determination to persist during conflict, transcending national boundaries. It encompasses the capability and capacity to initiate and sustain engagements underpinned by factors such as training, leadership, equipment, personnel, and logistics. In any armed confrontation, effectively employing military resources is a crucial and decisive component for victory.

Russian versus Ukrainian Military Strength

Prior to the February 2022 invasion, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were significantly weaker in terms of materiel and troop strength than Russia. Since the invasion, Ukraine has steadily moved up in the Global Firepower Index Military Strength Ranking, while Russia’s position has remained firm. Ukraine underwent a military modernization program after Russia’s seizure of Crimea and the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine in 2014–2015. By January 2023, Ukraine improved its global ranking by ten spots because of its whole-of-nation response to Russia’s invasion and the corresponding massive military and economic support from the West. Russia held steady in the rankings because of its massive manpower and materiel resources, even despite its limitations related to preparedness, leadership, training, and supply issues.

Source: “2023 Russia Military Strength,“ Global Firepower, 19 January 2023, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia.

Capability includes training and leadership, while capacity includes personnel and materiel. Both are pivotal in shaping the physical will to fight by enhancing combat effectiveness, bolstering resources, and increasing the resolve of military personnel. Militaries are capable when resourced with a proper level of competence to compete. Additionally, adequate personnel, equipment, logistics, and support contribute to a nation’s physical capacity to engage in protracted conflicts. The Battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC exemplifies this, wherein a vastly outnumbered Spartan army led by King Leonidas demonstrated exceptional physical resilience and combat acumen against a vastly superior Persian foe.19 Yet, as shown by the Islamic State’s triumph over a better-resourced Iraqi Army in 2015, physical capacity—in isolation—will not ensure victory.20

Thus, understanding the physical will to fight offers invaluable insights into a nation’s ability to persevere in the face of adversity. It underscores the intricate dynamics that determine the success or failure of military endeavors, making it an essential dimension of resolve in any conflict scenario.

Russia’s physical will to fight. Russia’s excessive confidence in its military superiority in terms of forces, firepower, and information control, relative to its smaller but well-led, trained, and motivated Ukrainian adversary, led to the failure of its initial objectives and necessitated a reassessment of strategy and tactics. The SMO exposed significant deficiencies in Russian military capabilities spanning tactics, training, logistics, and leadership. These shortcomings resulted in substantial casualties and equipment losses, ultimately eroding the Russian military’s will to fight.

Figure 3. Global Firepower Military Strength Ranking of Russia and Ukraine, 2021–2023

(Figure from Global Firepower)

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Since the February 2022 invasion, Russian forces have consistently underperformed against their Ukrainian counterparts despite having superior resources and firepower (see figure 3).21 Russia’s military had engaged in a decade-long modernization program, allocating a substantial portion of its military budget to arms procurement and a significant share of its GDP to defense.22 However, persistent deficiencies, including inadequate war planning, resourcing, and execution, have resulted in battlefield failures.23 Russia reverted to Soviet-style tactics after its initial failure to rapidly force Kyiv’s capitulation through environment preparation followed by swift military actions.24 Russian tactics have since shifted toward identifying weak points in Ukrainian lines and exploiting them, with some success. However, Russian reliance on brute-force tactics combined with the determined resistance of Ukrainian forces, lack of initiative by low-level leadership, and insufficient training contributed to significant Russian casualties and equipment losses. Additionally, the combination of poor logistics and limited medical support has kept the Russian military’s will to fight in a weakened state, predominantly bolstered by military leadership from the top-down rather than at the troop level.25

Russian Command and Control versus Mission Command

Russia does not employ the U.S. concept of “mission command“ in its version of the military decision-making process (MDMP) and has no equivalent to “commander’s intent.“ In practice, the Russian system of decision-making requires a somewhat rigid system of tactics. Russian tactics at battalion level and below can best be described as battle drills that are standardized for ground forces, naval infantry, and airborne units. According to U.S. and Western officers who have interacted with their Russian counterparts, there appear to be several main distinctions in the Russian approach to MDMP. First, Russian military leaders appear to use a shortened and largely informal MDMP. Second, Russian commanders intentionally wait until the last possible moment before making decisions, when they are confident they have gathered as much information as needed. Third, the Russian system is designed to support a highly capable commander and relatively small staff. Thus, Russian MDMP is much more commander-centric than in Western militaries, and the personality of an individual commander plays a major role.

Source: Roger N. McDermott and Charles K. Bartles, The Russian Military Decision-Making Process & Automated Command and Control (Hamburg, DE: German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, 29 October 2020), https://gids-hamburg.de/the-russian-military-decision-making-process-automated-command-and-control/#.

The absorption of substantial personnel and equipment losses, even among elite units like Spetznaz and airborne troops, sends the message that the Russian command is willing to accept these costs, potentially undermining the will to fight among both troops and the broader public.26 A recent reorganization of Russian infantry forces aimed at conserving more elite troops has bolstered the will to fight in higher-tier formations but undermined the lower-tier infantry’s resolve, as they perceive themselves as expendable.27 Despite heavy casualties, Russia’s significant population advantage over Ukraine has provided a larger pool of replacements for battlefield losses. However, increasing casualty figures have placed political pressure on Putin and impacted soldier morale.28

Inadequately trained new troops, particularly conscripts and hastily mobilized mobiki (Russian reservists), have contributed to the high casualty figures. Both Russian and Ukrainian soldiers have reported that Russian replacements arrive on the battlefield with as little as two weeks of training and often with outdated weapons and equipment. Intercepted communications record Russian soldiers and leaders complaining about ammunition shortages, lack of spare parts, inadequate food, and insufficient battlefield medical support.29 In peacetime, the absence of adequate training, equipment, and support already negatively affects morale, which is further amplified in combat situations, occasionally resulting in Russian troops refusing to fight.30

Ukraine’s physical will to fight. Over the years, the UAF’s transformation has been a remarkable evolution from a Soviet-style, command-heavy force with antiquated equipment into a modern, adaptable Western-style force. While still militarily weaker than Russia in measurable capacity, Ukraine’s commitment to rebuilding its armed forces, with support from the United States and NATO, has significantly boosted its physical will to fight.31

Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine has received substantial foreign support in terms of training, weaponry, and institution building, especially from the United States and other NATO countries. This assistance has enabled Ukraine to develop a professional military with enhanced institutional capacity, leadership, and access to modern equipment.32 However, external support before the invasion did not immediately result in battlefield success. Initially, heavy casualties, logistical issues, delays in weapon deliveries, poor communication, and reliance on outdated Soviet-style leadership and tactics by senior leaders dampened morale.33

Nonetheless, continued support from the West has augmented and improved UAF capacity and capability. Training programs encompassing advanced weapon systems (e.g., Patriot, HIMARS, M-1 Abrams tanks, and Leopard tanks), combined arms tactics, and mission command principles provided Ukrainian soldiers with a diverse skill set for modern warfare.34 Notably, transitioning from a rigid top-down command structure to a more flexible mission command approach has empowered field- and company-grade leaders to show initiative and make quicker decisions on the battlefield.35

Another critical factor contributing to the UAF’s success and elevated morale is the development of a competent Ukrainian noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. This transformation aligns with Western military practices, promoting independence and initiative among smaller units. The newfound agency of individual Ukrainian soldiers, fostered by NCO-led units employing mission command principles, has notably boosted morale when compared to the rigid, centralized approach favored by the Russian military.36

The Russian Orthodox Church

or generations, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has played a significant role in Moscow’s ability to project influence domestically and internationally. The Kremlin spends considerable resources using the ROC to promote Moscow’s concept of a global “Russian world” comprised not only of ethnic Russians but also Russian speakers, their families, and others whose cultural, familial, or business connections to Russia make them Russia’s “compatriots” (Sootechestvenniki). Russia is the largest Orthodox majority country, with ninety million church members, and its Moscow Patriarchate oversees the world’s largest community of Orthodox Christians: 150 million, which is half of the total number of Orthodox Christians worldwide.

Sources: Robert Kurz, Foreign Military Studies Office, as part of Ukrainian Senior National Defense Personnel Studies Group Consultation conducted in Kyiv, Ukraine, in May 2016 and from within the United States in November 2017; Vera Zakem, Paul Saunders, and Daniel Antoun, Mobilizing Compatriots: “Russia’s Strategy, Tactics, and Influence in the Former Soviet Union” (Arlington, VA: CNA, November 2015), https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DOP-2015-U-011689-1Rev.pdf; J. Eugene Clay, “Invasion of Ukraine Has Split 200 Million Orthodox Christians,” Greek Reporter, 29 March 2022, https://greekreporter.com/2022/03/29/ukraine-split-300-million-orthodox-christians/; Laurence Peter, “Orthodox Church Split: Five Reasons Why It Matters,” BBC, 17 October 2018, https://bbc.com/news/world-europe-45877584; “Orthodox Church,” WorldData.info, accessed 21 March 2024, https://www.worlddata.info/religions/orthodoxes.php.

Nevertheless, Ukraine still faces physical challenges. Heavy casualties continue to attrit its experienced soldiers and leaders. As time passes and casualties rise, addressing troop shortages becomes increasingly difficult as Ukraine’s population is a quarter that of Russia’s (see figure 4).37 The conflict’s protracted nature has led to a shortage of seasoned troops, with replacements often lacking experience and adequate training due to the exigencies of the conflict.38 Estimates reveal staggering figures of casualties, both killed and wounded, underscoring the toll war has taken on Ukraine.39

Figure 4. Comparison of the Populations of Russia and Ukraine

(Figure from PopulationPyramid.net)

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Supply shortages remain a concern. Despite becoming the third-largest global arms importer in 2022, Ukraine still grapples with Soviet-era equipment, ammunition shortages, and the challenge of integrating modern weaponry effectively.40 These factors, when combined with the lack of combat experience among new troops, can impact their will to fight and overall effectiveness.41

Ideological Will to Fight

The ideological will to fight is a distinct and vital factor in perseverance during conflicts, surpassing the limits imposed by national identity. It is the combatant’s science of ideas from a particular political or religious belief system from which narratives are constructed to justify and motivate engagement in armed conflicts.42 These narratives often portray combatants as defenders against perceived threats, invoking historical sentiments and reinforcing beliefs that underpin the cause and emanate from social conditions that are vulnerable to protest. In this sense, religious institutions often play a pivotal role in providing ideological justifications for conflicts, framing them as sacred struggles. Thus, whether religious, as seen in some of the Crusades of the Middle Ages or the Islamic State’s pursuit of an Islamic caliphate, or politically driven such as the Russian Revolution or Nazi Fascism, this element can be the primary motivator in conflict.43

However, the extent to which an ideological narrative resonates with the population as a belief system can vary widely, with the depth of religious or political commitment influencing individual and collective resolve. Understanding the ideological will to fight offers valuable insights into the complexities of resolve, shedding light on the delicate interplay between narratives, historical sentiments, and religious influences in the context of armed conflicts.

Russia’s ideological will to fight. The ideological dimension of the Russian will to fight is closely intertwined with the narrative of the conflict and the role of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). The Kremlin’s justification for the SMO portrays Russian soldiers as defenders of their motherland against an evil enemy, framed within the context of preserving Russian identity and Orthodox Christian civilization. This narrative effectively stirs historical Russian hatred of Nazism and reinforces perceptions of the threat to Russian citizens in Ukraine and Russia from the West. The ROC plays a pivotal role in this narrative, providing religious legitimization for the conflict and framing it as a holy struggle akin to the Great Patriotic War (World War II). The narratives from the Kremlin and the ROC likely have bolstered domestic support for the SMO.44

Despite the Kremlin’s efforts to cultivate ideological support for the war, there exists a significant gap between identification with these narratives and religious practice within Russia, particularly within the Russian military. While the ROC endorses the government’s narrative and encourages the faithful to endorse the “holy” war, the skepticism toward religion within the Russian military remains relevant. This skepticism is rooted in the historical association of the ROC leadership with the Kremlin, which often leads soldiers to view religious promises as hollow and insincere.45

Ukraine’s ideological will to fight. The Ukrainian will to fight is less ideological than it is psychological. The ideological element is rather small comparatively. Ukrainians are primarily motivated to fight Russian forces for political, social, and rational reasons instead of religious reasons (see figure 5). The Kremlin’s attempts to use the ROC to sway Ukrainian sentiment and gather intelligence on the Ukrainian military have yielded an unexpected outcome. It has led to a rejection of the Moscow Patriarchate’s control of Orthodox Christianity in Ukraine by the Ukrainian government and a significant portion of the population.

Figure 5. UAF Video from #FreedomIsOurReligion Social Media Campaign

(Figure courtesy of the Ukraine Ministry of Defense)

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The Kremlin’s strategy of advancing the concept of a greater ethnocultural Russian state, Russkiy Mir (Russian World), to unite Russians and their compatriots has faced staunch resistance in Ukraine.46 The Ukrainian Security Service has conducted investigations into pro-Russian Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) entities, accusing them of spreading Russian propaganda and disinformation, potentially collecting intelligence on the Ukrainian military. This scrutiny has led the Ukrainian government to limit UOC influence and bolstered popular anti-Russian sentiment.47

In response to Russia’s aggression, Orthodox Ukrainians have distanced themselves from the Moscow Patriarchate, transferring their allegiance to churches not under its authority, including the growing UOC. Markedly, Kyiv’s decision to shift the celebration of Christmas from the traditional Orthodox date of 7 January to 25 December further underscores the resistance to Moscow Patriarchate tradition. This shift represents a direct response by Ukrainians to Russia’s attack on their territory, ethnic identity, and values.48

Conclusion

The Russo-Ukrainian War offers a vivid lesson on the dynamics of the will to fight. While material capabilities are crucial in modern warfare, the spirit, resilience, and commitment of a people to defend their homeland, as Ukraine has demonstrated, can profoundly shape the course of a conflict. Policymaking and planning must go beyond mere assessments of Russian and Ukrainian military capacity and capability and incorporate a deeper understanding of the psychological and social factors that drive their will to fight, especially as both nations exhibit significant, albeit diverse, motivations in their desire to prevail.

Russian Influence through the Church

Ukraine has been a direct target of Russian influence through the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Next to Russia, Ukraine has the largest Orthodox population in the northern hemisphere, with approximately 65 percent of its 27.8 million people identifying as members of the Orthodox Church.Until the 2018 formation and official recognition of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), the majority of the country’s Orthodox communities fell under the Moscow Patriarchate, the Kyiv Patriarchate (which split from the former in 1992),1 and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.2 Until recently, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), under the Moscow Patriarchate, formed the largest Orthodox community in the country and was the most highly integrated with Moscow’s politically influenced church leadership. Today, the OCU has grown to significantly erode and eclipse the size and influence of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine, a development that has only gained momentum as the Russia-Ukraine war continues.

1. The Kyiv Patriarchate was not officially recognized by the greater Orthodox community until 2018, when Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew in Istanbul, of the Constantinople Patriarchate—whose overarching position in the Orthodox Church community authorizes him to recognize and endorse Orthodox churches—revoked a seventeenth-century ruling that places Ukraine’s Orthodox Church under the Moscow patriarch. The Kyiv Patriarchate then combined nearly all non-Moscow Patriarchate churches in Ukraine into a new “Orthodox Church of Ukraine,” which Bartholomew subsequently recognized. For most Ukrainians, this symbolized a final step in their country’s independence from Moscow. Valery Kalinosvsky, “Russian Orthodox Church Cuts Ties with Constantinople,” MSN, 15 October 2018, https://www.msn.com/enus/news/world/russianorthodoxchurchcytstieswithconstantinople/arBBOqBy2; Carlotta Gall, “Ukrainian Orthodox Christians Formally Break from Russia,” New York Times (website), 6 January 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/19/01/06/world/europe/orthodoxchurchukrainerussia.html.

2. “Autocephalous” means that the church has its own head.

Source: Vera Zakem, Paul Saunders, and Daniel Antoun, Mobilizing Compatriots: “Russia’s Strategy, Tactics, and Influence in the Former Soviet Union” (Arlington, VA: CNA, November 2015), https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DOP-2015-U-011689-1Rev.pdf.

Russia’s will to fight originates mainly from the top down, influenced by a Kremlin-controlled information milieu and bolstered by its vast resources. Although the Kremlin exploits the Russian Orthodox Church, ideological motivations are not the primary driving force for either side in this war.

Ukraine’s will to fight emanates from a profound psychological and nationalistic source, supported by both its military and populace. The existential threat posed by Russia fuels Ukraine’s determination, amplified by the reality of defending its homeland. Ukraine holds the psychological upper hand, but it grapples with tangible challenges to its will to fight, particularly in materiel and troop reinforcement, whereas Russia’s larger economy and population provide it an advantage. Ukraine’s ability to continue to fight hinges on the West’s continued materiel support and its dwindling pool of recruitable citizens. The unfolding Russo-Ukrainian War suggests several lessons that can guide U.S. and allied military decision-makers in planning for future large-scale combat operations and other types of conflict:

Underestimating resilience. One of the significant lessons from the conflict is the danger of underestimating a nation’s resilience and will to fight based on material assessments. Russia, with its superior military might, faced stiffer resistance than anticipated due to the strong will of the Ukrainian defense forces and citizens.

Moral high ground. A nation or group that believes it holds the moral high ground can demonstrate an outsized will to fight. For many Ukrainians, the defense of their homeland is seen in moralistic terms, which further fuels their resolve.

International solidarity. The will to fight is not just a domestic phenomenon. International support, both moral and material, can bolster the spirit of a nation under threat. Ukraine’s ability to garner international sympathy and support plays a role in sustaining its will to fight.

Limitations of soft power. While “soft power” strategies like information warfare, propaganda, and economic pressure are essential in modern conflicts, the Russo-Ukrainian War underscores that these cannot easily erode a determined will to fight.

Implications for the U.S. Army

The psychological element of the will to fight is a tipping point. The psychological will to fight, intrinsically tied to physical capacity, is paramount. When external support is held constant, internal resolve becomes the game-changer. Even for the U.S. Army, material support alone is not sufficient; fostering psychological resilience is an intrinsic and vital factor in achieving objectives during large-scale combat operations (LSCO). Partnering with allies like Ukraine potentially offers valuable insights for the U.S. Army to bolster its training and morale-building strategies.

“Expectancy Violation Theory” Explains Russia’s and Ukraine’s Disparate Wills to Fight

The difference in Russian and Ukrainian will to fight can be explained with the concept of expectancy violation. This refers to situations in which an individual’s thoughts or beliefs about a particular event or outcome are not what they expected and are instead violated or challenged. An expectancy violation can be both positive and negative. In the context of military conflicts, expectancy violations can have both positive and negative effects on the psychological will to fight.

Russia. Repeated failures, setbacks, or unmet expectations eroded morale and weakened Russian soldiers’ psychological will to fight. Sustained disappointments led to a loss of confidence, demoralization, and a diminished belief in the likelihood of success. Further, expectancy violation introduced doubt and uncertainty regarding the feasibility of achieving the objectives of the special military operation. As Russia repeatedly encountered unexpected challenges from Ukrainian forces, its strategic plans began to fail, which undermined Russian forces’ confidence and created skepticism about the likelihood of victory, weakening the psychological will to fight.

Ukraine. Ukrainian soldiers experienced an expectancy violation in terms of unexpected success or achievement on the battlefield against Russian forces. Surpassing initial expectations created a sense of empowerment and reinforced their belief that victory is possible. Further, expectancy violation fostered greater cohesion and trust within Ukrainian forces. As soldiers witnessed their comrades’ surpassing expectations or displaying exceptional bravery, it enhanced their belief in the collective strength and capabilities of their units. This shared experience strengthened bonds, boosted morale, and increased their psychological will to fight as a cohesive force.

Source: Judee K. Burgoon and Jerold L. Hale, “Nonverbal Expectancy Violations: Model Elaboration and Application to Immediacy Behaviors,” Communication Monographs 55, no. 1 (1988): 58–79, https://doi.org/10.1080/03637758809376158.

Ukraine’s staunch resistance, even when outmatched, underscores that facing an existential threat sparks a deep-seated will to fight. The U.S. Army can address such fervent resistance in future exercises and engagements and consider approaches to recalibrate strategies when facing or supporting forces motivated by this variable.

While numerically disadvantaged forces like Ukraine may struggle in a prolonged personnel attrition war, they can potentially succeed in eroding an adversary’s resolve. It is important for the U.S. Army to understand the benefits of targeting an opponent’s will, especially by factoring in aspects of foreign material support and psychological operations, as well as anticipating how adversaries may use similar tactics against them.

The Russo-Ukrainian War reinforces the efficacy of mission command against a more centralized, top-driven command structure in LSCO. Initiative and innovation at all levels of command breed success and contribute to the will to fight. While still learning to take fuller advantage of combined arms tactics, the UAF has effectively employed mission command, especially in its counteroffensives. The U.S. Army can capitalize and generate gains by reinforcing its mission command principles, especially as they might be employed in LSCO.

The conflict illustrates that superior training, leadership, and equipment can counterbalance numerical advantages. By investing strategically in enhancing the quality of its training and equipment, the U.S. Army may benefit from the ability to offset numerical deficits in future LSCO scenarios. Moreover, observing the contrast between the UAF’s successes and Russian setbacks, the U.S. Army can further refine its focus on producing well-trained, well-equipped forces, ensuring readiness and adaptability.

Contributors to this article include Robert Kurz (FMSO/GCKN); Susan Littleton (FMSO/GCKN); Charles Raymond (TRADOC G-2); Marcus Griffin, PhD (GCKN); Ray Finch (FMSO); Peter Wood (FMSO); Charles Bartles (FMSO); Cindy Hurst (FMSO); and Neil Sleevi (CAC).

Notes

Epigraph. Valerii Zaluzhnyi (CinCAFofUkraine), “We are waging a war against the country whose size is 28 times larger than ours, whose population is 4 times larger than ours, and whose military capabilities are many times greater than ours. …,” Facebook, 31 October 2022, https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid02Zk9Qo8oe4xJnUeXL3w8U8V54n91TMdAZsqp89M7JSAPuQJTSHwFJaTShMorSKSWxl.

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Rebekah Koffler, Putin’s Playbook: Russia’s Secret Plan to Defeat America (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2021), 135.
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To compare Ukrainian polling, see the following: “Ukrainians Still Committed to Victory, Staying in Ukraine—New Survey,” New Voice of Ukraine, 23 April 2023, https://english.nv.ua/life/new-survey-reveals-most-ukrainians-desire-for-victory-and-to-remain-in-ukraine-news-50319726.html; “Public Opinion on the War, Victory, and Security Guarantees,” Razumkov Centre, 24 April 2023, https://razumkov.org.ua/en/sociology/press-releases/public-opinion-on-the-war-victory-and-security-guarantees; “Symbols, Events, and Personalities Shaping Ukrainians’ National Memory of Russia’s War against Ukraine,” Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 16 May 2023, https://dif.org.ua/en/article/symbols-events-and-personalities-shaping-ukrainians-national-memory-of-russias-war-against-ukraine#_Toc134379502; “What Ukrainians Think about Future of Crimea,” Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 23 August 2021, https://dif.org.ua/en/article/what-ukrainians-think-about-future-of-crimea; Tobias Bunde, Sophie Eisentraut, and Leonard Schutte, “Auch bei Russischem nuklearschlag 89 prozent der Ukrainer wollen weiterkampfen” [Even in the event of a Russian nuclear strike, 89 percent of Ukrainians want to continue fighting], Tagesspiegel [Daily Mirror] (website), 2 July 2023, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/internationales/auch-bei-russischem-nuklearschlag-89-prozent-der-ukrainer-wollen-weiterkampfen--bis-zur-ruckeroberung-der-krim-9299993.html; Anton Hrushetskyi, “Dynamics of Readiness for Territorial Concessions for the Earliest Possible End of the War: Results of a Telephone Survey Conducted on September 7-13, 2022,” Kyiv International Institute of Sociology press release, https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1133&page=1; Anton Hrushetskyi, “Dynamics of Readiness for Territorial Concessions for the Earliest Possible End to the War: Results of a Telephone Survey Conducted on February 14-22, 2023,” Kyiv International Institute of Sociology press release, https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1192&page=1; “Понад 90% українців вірять у перемогу Понад 90% українців вірять у перемогу” [More than 90% of Ukrainians believe in victory], Ukrinform, 25 August 2023, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3689814-ponad-90-ukrainciv-virat-u-peremogu.html; “Reconstruction of Ukraine and International Aid (November 2022),” Rating Group, 13 December 2022, https://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/v_dbudova_ukra_ni_ta_m_zhnarodna_dopomoga_20-21_listopada_2022.html; R. J. Reinhart, “Ukrainians Support Fighting until Victory,” Gallup, 18 October 2022, https://news.gallup.com/poll/403133/ukrainians-support-fighting-until-victory.aspx; Peter Dickinson, “Poll: 86% of Ukrainians Want to Fight on despite Russian Terror Bombing,” UkraineAlert (blog), Atlantic Council, 25 October 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-defiant-as-putins-terror-bombing-plunges-cities-into-darkness/.
Tom Mutch, “A Terrifying Secret in Putin’s War Is Now Impossible to Hide,” Daily Beast, 7 June 2023, https://www.thedailybeast.com/ukraine-fears-military-recruitment-crisis-in-the-war-against-russias-army.
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Jake Epstein, “Russia and Ukraine Have a Lot of the Same Tanks and Jets, but Kyiv Has a Decisive ‘Flesh and Bone’ Advantage, Top US Enlisted Leader Says,” Business Insider, 1 March 2023, https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-decisive-flesh-bone-edge-over-russia-top-us-leader-2023-3; Seth G. Jones, Riley McCabe, and Alexander Palmer, “Ukrainian Innovation in a War of Attrition,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 27 February 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukrainian-innovation-war-attrition.
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Jones, McCabe, and Palmer, “Ukrainian Innovation”; Julius Lasin, “‘Unprecedented’ Casualties for Russian Troops,” USA Today (website), 28 February 2023, https://www.usatoday.com/story/nletter/ukraine-russia-crisis/2023/02/28/ukraine-russia-crisis-unprecedented-casualties-russian-troops/11365763002/. Regarding personnel losses, after one full year of battling (February 2022–February 2023), CSIS estimates that Russia has suffered roughly 200,000 to 250,000 casualties—personnel killed, wounded, or missing—since the Kremlin invaded Ukraine in February 2022, with 60,000 to 70,000 of those reportedly dead.
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Brennan, “How Russian Forces in Ukraine Are Learning to Fight”; Sommerville, “Bakhmut”; Watling and Reynolds, Meatgrinder. The Royal United Services Institute (see Watling and Reynolds) has labeled these categories by function: line infantry holds ground in defense; assault infantry attacks weak points; disposable infantry are skirmishers and probe for weak points; and specialized troops, including airborne and Spetznaz, are used for raiding and special operations.
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H. M Drucker, “Marx’s Concept of Ideology,” Philosophy 47, no. 180 (April 1972): 152–61, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100040882.
Jonathan Leader Maynard, “Identity and Ideology in Political Violence and Conflict,” St. Antony’s International Review 10, no. 2 (February 2015): 18–52.
“Рождественское интервью Святейшего Патриарха Кирилла телеканалу Россия 1” [Christmas interview of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill to the TV channel Russia 1], Patriarch.ru, 7 January 2023, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5992951.html; Olesya Pavlenko, “Патриарх Кирилл считает, что желание уничтожить Россию приведет к концу мира” [Patriarch Kirill believes that the desire to destroy Russia will lead to the end of the world], Kommersant (website), 19 January 2023, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5774586; Anastasia Koskello, “Церковь не очень-то нужна армии” [The church is not really needed by the army], Nezavisimaya Gazeta (website), 15 November 2022, https://www.ng.ru/ng_religii/2022-11-15/9_540_army.html; Andrei Melnikov, “О великодержавном богословии патриарха Кирилла” [On the great power theology of Patriarch Kirill], Nezavisimaya Gazeta (website), 6 November 2022, https://www.ng.ru/kartblansh/2022-11-06/3_8582_kartblansh.html; NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence (STRATCOM COE), Analysis of Russia’s Information Campaign against Ukraine (Riga, LV: NATO STRATCOM COE, 2015), https://stratcomcoe.org/cuploads/pfiles/russian_information_campaign_public_12012016fin.pdf; “Disinformation and Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine: Threats and Governance Responses,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 3 November 2022, https://www.oecd.org/ukraine-hub/policy-responses/disinformation-and-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-37186bde/.
Koskello, “The Church Is Not Really Needed by the Army.”
Patriarch.ru, “Christmas Interview of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill”; Pavlenko, “Patriarch Kirill Believes”; Koskello, “The Church Is Not Really Needed by the Army”; Melnikov, “On the Great Power Theology of Patriarch Kirill”; NATO STRATCOM COE, Analysis of Russia’s Information Campaign; OECD, “Disinformation and Russia’s War of Aggression”; Alexandra Markovich, “As More Ukrainians Choose Kyiv Patriarchate, Push Intensifies for Unified National Orthodox Church,” Kyiv Post (website), 23 June 2016, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/10788.
МИХАЙЛО ТКАЧ, “Московська церква має ‘скласти зброю’ в Україні” [The Moscow Church must lay down its arms in Ukraine], Ukrainska Pravda, 11 April 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2023/04/11/7397428/; Robert Kurz, Foreign Military Studies Office, in conversation with author Andrew Johnson as part of Ukrainian Senior National Defense Personnel Studies Group Consultation conducted in Kyiv, Ukraine, in May 2016 and email correspondence in November 2017; Valentyna Romanenko, “СБУ оглянула 350 споруд УПЦ МП: знайшли підозрілих росіян, гроші і літературу для промивання мізків” [Security Service of Ukraine searches 350 buildings of Ukrainian Orthodox Church or Moscow Patriarchate], Ukrainska Pravda, 23 November 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/11/23/7377563/; Valentyna Romanenko, “Крім Лаври СБУ завітала до церковників УПЦ МП на Рівненщині: шукають ДРГ і зброю” [In addition to Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, Ukraine’s Security Service visits monastery in Rivne Oblast: Looking for sabotage and reconnaissance groups and weapons], Ukrainska Pravda, 22 November 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/11/22/7377416/; Valentyna Romanenko, “До Києво-Печерської Лаври прийшли СБУ, поліція і Нацгвардія” [Ukraine’s security forces, police and National Guards conduct counterintelligence operations in Kyiv monastery], Ukrainska Pravda, 22 November 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/11/22/7377385/; “SBU Finds Propaganda Materials Denying Existence of Ukraine in Moscow Patriarchate Churches in Western Ukraine,” Interfax-Ukraine, 28 November 2023, https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/875101.html.
“З початку року 63 церкви перейшли до ПЦУ, ще 8,5 тисяч залишаються в УПЦ МП” [63 religious organisations have joined Orthodox Church of Ukraine since beginning of 2023], Ukrainska Pravda, 10 April 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/04/10/7397195/; “Yet Another Orthodox Parish in Ukraine Snubs Moscow-Run Church,” Ukrinform, 11 April 2023, https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-society/3694255-yet-another-orthodox-parish-in-ukraine-snubs-moscowrun-church.html; Asami Terajima, “Ukrainians Celebrate ‘Double Christmas’ in the Shadow of Russia’s Brutal War,” Kyiv Independent, 7 January 2023, https://kyivindependent.com/national/ukrainians-celebrate-double-christmas-in-the-shadow-of-russias-brutal-war; Karina Levitska, “Вже цього року. Українська греко-католицька церква переходить на новий календар” [Already this year. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church is switching to a new calendar], RBC-Ukraine, 6 February 2023, https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/vzhe-tsogo-roku-ukrayinska-greko-katolitska-1675698015.html.
Figure 5 from Ukraine Ministry of Defense (@DefenceU), “There is no force in the world that can stop this nation from achieving its sacred goal of living in freedom on its God-given land. #FreedomIsOurReligion,” X (formerly Twitter), 27 May 2023, 5:05 a.m., https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1662399743514005505.

Benjamin A. Okonofua, PhD, is the project manager for the strategic-level security cooperation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation program at U.S. Africa Command J-5. He is a Global Cultural Knowledge Network subject-matter expert on Africa and an adjunct professor at National Intelligence University. He received his PhD from Georgia State University and is a member of the editorial board of Sage Open.

Nicole Laster-Loucks, PhD, is the lead social scientist for U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command G-2’s Global Cultural Knowledge Network. She deployed to Afghanistan as a social scientist from 2011 to 2012 with the Human Terrain System in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. She earned her PhD from the University of Texas at Austin and is the chief architect of the Exploitable Conditions Framework.

Lt. Col. Andrew Johnson, U.S. Army, retired, is a senior research analyst for the U.S. Army Global Cultural Knowledge Network. Johnson is the author of multiple studies and training courses focused on analysis of sociocultural aspects of the operational environment. He is a retired Special Forces officer and earned a BA from the University of Washington and an MA from Kansas State University.

12. An Overlooked War – In Myanmar, poets, doctors and lawyers have traded life in the cities for jungle warfare.

Will we commit resources and forces to assist the ethnic resistance groups? This is a country that falls within the sphere of strategic competition.

Maps and graphics at the link.

Of course the question is with success, what comes next? Consolidation and transition to a new government will be a tall order with the splintered resistance groups.

Excerpts:

Even without foreign intervention, or much Western aid at all, the Myanmar resistance has pushed back the junta. Rebels are now within 150 miles of the capital, Naypyidaw.

But that may have been the easy part. The resistance is — perhaps hopelessly — splintered. More than a dozen major armed ethnic groups are vying for control over land and valuable natural resources.

For now, they’re fighting a common enemy. But some of these militias are just as likely to battle each other. Last month, the rebels captured a key border town, only to relinquish it after one armed group withdrew its full support.

Already, much of Myanmar is fractured between different groups, all heavily armed. In other parts of the country, no one is fully in charge. Crime is flourishing. The country is now the world’s biggest producer of opium. Jungle factories churn out meth and other synthetic drugs that have found their way to Australia. Cybercriminals have proliferated, targeting Americans, Asians and Europeans with scams.

Myanmar’s civil war may be overshadowed by other global conflicts. But to the Burmese who live with uncertainty and chaos, the war has never been more urgent or real.

An Overlooked War

In Myanmar, poets, doctors and lawyers have traded life in the cities for jungle warfare.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/08/briefing/myanmar-civil-war.html

In southern Karenni, Myanmar.Credit...Adam Ferguson for The New York Times

May 8, 2024

Updated 1:59 p.m. ET

You’re reading The Morning newsletter. Make sense of the day’s news and ideas. David Leonhardt and Times journalists guide you through what’s happening — and why it matters. Get it sent to your inbox.

By Hannah Beech

I’m a roving Asia correspondent based in Bangkok.

A people take to arms and fight for democracy. A military terrorizes civilians with airstrikes and land mines. Tens of thousands are killed. Millions are displaced.

Yet it is all happening almost completely out of view.

Recently, I spent a week on the front lines of a forgotten war in the Southeast Asian nation of Myanmar. Since a military junta overthrew a civilian administration there three years ago, a head-spinning array of pro-democracy forces and ethnic militias have united to fight the generals. The resistance includes poets, doctors and lawyers who traded life in the cities for jungle warfare. It also includes veteran combatants who have known no occupation but soldier.

Now, for the first time, the rebels claim control of more than half of Myanmar’s territory. In recent weeks they have overrun dozens of towns and Myanmar military bases.

Today’s newsletter will explain how civil war has engulfed Myanmar — and why the world has ignored a country that less than a decade ago was lauded as a democratic success story.

A coup defied

In February 2021, a military junta, led by Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, arrested the nation’s civilian leaders and returned the country to full dictatorship. If the generals expected the populace to cower in response to their coup, they were wrong. With military snipers shooting unarmed protesters and bystanders, including dozens of children, an armed resistance coalesced. Tens of thousands of professionals and members of Gen Z decamped to the jungle. Rappers, Buddhist monks and politicians, among others, learned how to shoot guns and arm drones. Their hands grew callused.

This unlikely resistance has repelled the junta’s forces from wide swaths of the country, including most of Myanmar’s borderlands. (Here are several useful charts that explain how the civil war is unfolding.)

A map of Myanmar shows which parts of the country are largely under military control or resistance control. The resistance now controls more than half of Myanmar’s territory.

Areas of control in Myanmar

Largely military junta control

Largely resistance control

Contested

INDIA

CHINA

BANGLADESH

Mandalay

MYANMAR

LAOS

Naypyidaw

Bay of Bengal

Yangon

THAILAND

Source: The map is a simplified adaptation based on an effective control map produced by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M). The original map provides more granular details of the situation of control.By Weiyi Cai

A lady tarnished

If there is one name from Myanmar that people in the West might recognize it’s that of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the long-imprisoned democracy advocate who won the Nobel Peace Prize for her nonviolent resistance. (Her name is pronounced Daw Ong Sahn Soo Chee.)

In 2015, Aung San Suu Kyi’s political party routed the military’s candidates in nationwide elections. With her civilian government sharing power with the army, Myanmar seemed like a rare counterpoint to the Arab Spring and other foiled democracy movements. President Obama visited twice.

Image

A portrait of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Credit...Athit Perawongmetha/Reuters

Yet within a year, the military, which still controlled the most important levers of power, had intensified its persecution of Rohingya Muslims, culminating in 2017 with the expulsion of three-quarters of a million people within a few weeks. The United States designated the campaign a genocide. Rather than condemn the violence, however, Aung San Suu Kyi went to The Hague and defended the military in an international court. Her refusal to stand up for a persecuted minority knocked off her halo. The United States and other Western governments distanced themselves from her.

The tarnishing of this simple morality tale — the lady versus the generals, democracy versus dictatorship — helps answer a question I was asked dozens of times during my week of reporting in Myanmar: Why doesn’t the world care about us? Allies in the West feel betrayed by a politician who, it turned out, would not meet her own high moral standard. (Aung San Suu Kyi is again imprisoned by the military.)

A fractured reality

Even without foreign intervention, or much Western aid at all, the Myanmar resistance has pushed back the junta. Rebels are now within 150 miles of the capital, Naypyidaw.

But that may have been the easy part. The resistance is — perhaps hopelessly — splintered. More than a dozen major armed ethnic groups are vying for control over land and valuable natural resources.

Ethnic groups in Myanmar

A map of Myanmar shows how the country is split up into many ethnic groups. Officially, 135 ethnic groups live in the country, and practically the only thing they agree on is that this figure is wrong.

Kachin

Naga

Monewon

Kokang

Ta’ang

Danu

Shan

Chin

Shan

Rohingya

Inn

Pa-O

Lahu

Kayan

Karenni

Rakhine

Karen

Mon

Bamar (majority)

No data

Note: The Karenni are also known as the Kayah, the Karen as the Kayin, the Rakhine as the Arakan, and the Ta’ang as the Palaung.Source: General Administration Department, MyanmarBy Weiyi Cai

For now, they’re fighting a common enemy. But some of these militias are just as likely to battle each other. Last month, the rebels captured a key border town, only to relinquish it after one armed group withdrew its full support.

Already, much of Myanmar is fractured between different groups, all heavily armed. In other parts of the country, no one is fully in charge. Crime is flourishing. The country is now the world’s biggest producer of opium. Jungle factories churn out meth and other synthetic drugs that have found their way to Australia. Cybercriminals have proliferated, targeting Americans, Asians and Europeans with scams.

Myanmar’s civil war may be overshadowed by other global conflicts. But to the Burmese who live with uncertainty and chaos, the war has never been more urgent or real

13. NGA director pushes back at criticisms of agency, touts 'wetware,' tradecraft (EXCLUSIVE)

Excerpts:

JMMC will further serve as a place “where people actually can look each other in the eye and work this tough issue of prioritization. It’s all about at the end of the day, if people might get emotional on this, it’s going to be on priorities.”

In his GEOINT presentation, Whitworth said collaboration is crucial in the space domain. “It’s no place for a stovepipe, or multiple stovepipes. It requires a joint or integrated approach, where we all work together.”

Instead, Whitworth told Breaking Defense, he is a big fan of “teaming” at all levels. “I like the human and machine teaming. I like the interagency teaming. I like the international teaming, and I like the commercial teaming. And that’s, that’s the best way I can approach to anyone who thinks that we can do this without one agency.”

In a roundtable with reporters after his presentation, Whitworth echoed those comments, avoiding any direct confrontation with Space Force officials.

“I don’t fight in public. I just defend in public,” he said.

NGA director pushes back at criticisms of agency, touts 'wetware,' tradecraft (EXCLUSIVE) - Breaking Defense

In an exclusive sit down with Breaking Defense, Vice Adm. Frank Whitworth defended his agency's role in moving commercial and government satellite data to the field in a timely manner.

breakingdefense.com · by Theresa Hitchens · May 8, 2024

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency head Vice Admiral Frank Whitworth speaks at the 2024 GEOINT conference. (Courtesy GEOINT)

GEOINT 2024 — Vice Adm. Frank Whitworth, the director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), wants to bust some “myths” about his agency — in particular that NGA’s analysts are a speedbump to rapid delivery of critical decision-making intelligence from satellites, both commercial and government, to US military commanders in the field.

In an exclusive interview Monday during the US Geospatial Intelligence Foundation’s annual GEOINT conference in Kissimmee, Fla., Whitworth argued that not only is his agency delivering timely intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to users, it also performs other critical functions — especially validating the authenticity of incoming sensor data and making sense out of that data.

“I would just also caution, that if someone thinks that just raw data [sent to that] edge node is going to solve everything, I would ask them to put themselves in the position of maybe being that pilot or being that submarine captain, skipper or … the land component commander. Is the image going to help that individual without some level of analysis, fusion, [and] validation?” he told Breaking Defense.

Whitworth’s comments come as NGA has been caught up in a swirling interagency debate, primarily with the Space Force, about respective roles in managing ISR assets and capabilities — a debate has led to questions from some involved about the agency’s continued relevance in the age of more satellites, more sensor data, more automated processing, and the increased pace of the battlefield.

In his GEOINT keynote speech on Monday, Whitworth explained that NGA personnel are actually embedded at US combatant commands around the world and thus “have a deep understanding of operational priorities.” Further, he said, it is a “complete myth” that NGA’s actions and products are “not moving as rapidly as possible” to those needs.

He acknowledged to Breaking Defense that military commanders always want more information, more quickly. However, he said, it is “another myth” that they are dissatisfied with NGA’s performance.

“But if you ask them, ‘Well, are you unhappy with what NGA is providing in the way of dissemination and the way that we do our tasking?’ I don’t think you’re gonna get that many complaints,” Whitworth added. “I know I don’t. My email should be exploding if we’re doing a bad job.”

NGA started its life as the primary mapmaker for the US government, a job that now includes modeling not just topography but all sorts of terrestrial characteristics such as the planet’s magnetic fields. It further serves as the US “GEOINT functional manager,” charged with making sense of incoming sensor data (such as imagery and radar tracks) from all sources and deciding which users get priority access the information gleaned.

NGA’s mission set also includes tasking US spy satellites owned and operated by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to cover priority areas of interest for US government agencies, the president and military commanders. NGA is authorized to buy, and disseminate, analysis from commercial remote sensing satellite operators.

Whitworth — along with NGA’s Director of Capabilities Trey Treadwell and Director of Commercial Operations Devin Brande — told Breaking Defense that in an era of increasing threats from space, the agency’s complex role is more important than ever. This is especially true with regard to validating the authenticity of incoming data, including for training new automated systems for spotting potential threats, the officials said.

“We’ve got some pretty resourceful adversaries and challenges out there who are gonna make at least training data really difficult. And so having wetware available — and I’m talking about, obviously, humans here — to ensure that the training data remains clean and not affected in an age of potential deception I think is very important,” Whitworth said.

Treadwell elaborated that decision-makers need certainty about intelligence, perhaps to a lesser degree in some cases when speedy reaction is of the essence, but with much greater certainty in other cases where the consequences of a mistake are larger. But in both cases, users need to be able to trust what they are seeing and hearing and that is what NGA does with its standard setting for data processing.

“Somebody’s got to put a ‘Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval’ on algorithms,” he said. “You want to make sure that you understand the machines that were used and the techniques and tools that were used [to] give you that level of certainty.”

Commercial ISR And Meeting The Need For Speed

On the question of “immediacy” of user access to commercial ISR, Whitworth pushed back on assertions that NGA’s process causes delays.

“There are some perceptions out there that there’s an interlocutor, that somebody is receiving the commercial data, looking at it and then deciding what to disseminate. It’s not that way. So, all the commercial data goes into G-EDG and then goes out as quickly as possible — meaning the only thing slowing it down … is the pipe,” he said.

G-EDG is the agency’s data lake and computerized delivery system for unclassified, commercial GEOINT first introduced in 2011. Whitworth noted that there are more than 400,000 G-EGD users.

“There are a lot of people who count on G-EGD from a lot of different walks of life,” he said.

Whitworth added that people need to understand there is no possible way for data to move from one place to another in real-time, “because ones and zeros take time to move through a pipe.”

And NGA is already taking action to try to improve that “pipe” via an IT modernization program called Joint Regional Edge Node, or J-REN, he said.

“At its core, it’s an IT construct, but it’s more than that. The idea here is to have a mesh network of mesh networks, so that you don’t have a hub and spoke model, for your ground data especially,” Whitworth explained. “You don’t just have a hub and a bunch of spokes, because if something happens to the hub, the spokes are left wanting. You need to have a mesh that’s constantly replicating and constantly interacting with other meshes. That’s what J-REN will provide, and most importantly, in a way that a disadvantaged user at the far end the edge will still get their data.”

At the moment, NGA is looking to be put J-REN into operations on a rolling basis beginning in late summer or early fall, Treadwell said.

Better With Teamwork

J-RENS will be coupled with NGA’s new Joint Mission Management Center (JMMC), being stood up as a collaborative space for satellite-based ISR collection and decision-making and open to all 18 members of the Intelligence Community, Whitworth told Breaking Defense.

That center — which the agency is funding “out of hide” — is expected to be working, at least in an initial form, by the end of May, he said.

Coupled with J-REN, the JMMC will help the NGA and the IC figure out “how we doing on our requirements versus what’s come in from international sources — which, by the way, is growing — what’s coming in from commercial sources, and what’s coming in from government sources … and to help the process of prioritization,” he said.

JMMC will further serve as a place “where people actually can look each other in the eye and work this tough issue of prioritization. It’s all about at the end of the day, if people might get emotional on this, it’s going to be on priorities.”

In his GEOINT presentation, Whitworth said collaboration is crucial in the space domain. “It’s no place for a stovepipe, or multiple stovepipes. It requires a joint or integrated approach, where we all work together.”

Instead, Whitworth told Breaking Defense, he is a big fan of “teaming” at all levels. “I like the human and machine teaming. I like the interagency teaming. I like the international teaming, and I like the commercial teaming. And that’s, that’s the best way I can approach to anyone who thinks that we can do this without one agency.”

In a roundtable with reporters after his presentation, Whitworth echoed those comments, avoiding any direct confrontation with Space Force officials.

“I don’t fight in public. I just defend in public,” he said.

breakingdefense.com · by Theresa Hitchens · May 8, 2024

14. How disinformation works—and how to counter it

Conclusion:

The dangers of disinformation need to be taken seriously and studied closely. But bear in mind that they are still uncertain. So far there is little evidence that disinformation alone can sway the outcome of an election. For centuries there have been people who have peddled false information, and people who have wanted to believe them. Yet societies have usually found ways to cope. Disinformation may be taking on a new, more sophisticated shape today. But it has not yet revealed itself as an unprecedented and unassailable threat.

Leaders | Truth or lies?

How disinformation works—and how to counter it

More co-ordination is needed, and better access to data

May 2nd 2024

https://www.economist.com/leaders/2024/05/02/how-disinformation-works-and-how-to-counter-it?f

id you know that the wildfires which ravaged Hawaii last summer were started by a secret “weather weapon” being tested by America’s armed forces, and that American ngos were spreading dengue fever in Africa? That Olena Zelenska, Ukraine’s first lady, went on a $1.1m shopping spree on Manhattan’s Fifth Avenue? Or that Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, has been endorsed in a new song by Mahendra Kapoor, an Indian singer who died in 2008?

These stories are, of course, all bogus. They are examples of disinformation: falsehoods that are intended to deceive. Such tall tales are being spread around the world by increasingly sophisticated campaigns. Whizzy artificial-intelligence (ai) tools and intricate networks of social-media accounts are being used to make and share eerily convincing photos, video and audio, confusing fact with fiction. In a year when half the world is holding elections, this is fuelling fears that technology will make disinformation impossible to fight, fatally undermining democracy. How worried should you be?

One person’s fact...

The dangers of disinformation need to be taken seriously and studied closely. But bear in mind that they are still uncertain. So far there is little evidence that disinformation alone can sway the outcome of an election. For centuries there have been people who have peddled false information, and people who have wanted to believe them. Yet societies have usually found ways to cope. Disinformation may be taking on a new, more sophisticated shape today. But it has not yet revealed itself as an unprecedented and unassailable threat. ■

For subscribers only: to see how we design each week’s cover, sign up to our weekly Cover Story newsletter.

This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "Truth or lies?"

15. Information Advantage – A Combined Arms Approach

Key points:

The 2022 revision of FM 3-0 is driving change to how Army forces train and fight. The most significant update is the introduction of multidomain operations as the Army’s operational concept. Multidomain operations, as defined in FM 3-0, are “the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages to achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders.”5 Multidomain operations are the way Army forces employ ground-based Army capabilities with capabilities from air, sea, space, and cyberspace in mutually supporting ways to create and exploit relative advantages. Information is central to the idea of relative advantage.

FM 3-0 defines a relative advantage as “a location or condition, in any domain, relative to an adversary or enemy that provides an opportunity to progress towards or achieve an objective.”6 Relative advantages are characterized as human, information, or physical. They complement each other. Physical actions, particularly involving the use of force, create information and generate psychological effects. When exploited, these effects can lead to information advantages as friendly forces use information to influence enemy behavior. When combined over time, these physical and information advantages can lead to a collapse of the enemy’s morale and will—a human advantage.

This phenomenon was once well understood by military professionals across our Army, but we increasingly made information considerations the purview of specialists and specific staff sections over time. The unintended consequence was intellectual atrophy among many noninformation specialists who planned and led the operations Army forces conducted. ADP 3-13 supports FM 3-0 by ensuring we all adequately consider the desirable cognitive effects we want our operations to achieve. Linking interrelated advantages in the physical, information, and human dimensions addresses that shortcoming since they apply to every echelon, warfighting function, branch, and occupational specialty.

Information Advantage

A Combined Arms Approach

Col. Richard Creed, U.S. Army, Retired

Lt. Col. Michael Flynn, U.S. Army, Retired

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2024/MJ-24-Information-Advantage/

Download the PDF

Soldiers with the 1st Multi-Domain Effects Battalion (1st MDEB) train 13 February 2023 at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. 1st MDEB demonstrated a wide array of capabilities during the training event, highlighting the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force’s progress toward becoming fully operationally capable and contributing to the Army’s goal of achieving information advantages. (Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Henrique De Holleben, U.S. Army)

Information is central to everything we do—it is the basis of intelligence, a fundamental element of command and control, and the foundation for communicating thoughts, opinions, and ideas.

—Lt. Gen. Milford H. Beagle Jr.,

foreword to ADP 3-13, Information

Army doctrine on information changed with the November 2023 publication of Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-13, Information. This new doctrine represents an informed consensus about the role information plays during the range of operations Army forces conduct across the competition continuum. It addresses the informational aspects of multidomain operations found in Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, by describing a framework for creating and exploiting information advantages to achieve objectives. It provides fundamental considerations for how Army forces use, protect, and attack data and information while affecting the threat’s (adversary or enemy) ability to do the same.1 Most importantly, it makes clear that everyone in the Army plays some role in achieving information advantages relative to our adversaries worldwide.

As a keystone publication, ADP 3-13 links the Army’s application of information to all warfighting functions and methods of warfare in ways previous doctrine did not. It represents an evolution in how Army forces think about the military uses of data and information, emphasizing that everything Army forces do, including the information and images it creates, generates effects that contribute to or hinder the achievement of objectives. ADP 3-13 addresses information as a dynamic of combat power and stresses a combined arms approach to creating and exploiting information advantages.

Background

The more you employ stratagems and ruses, the more advantages you will enjoy over the enemy. You must deceive him and induce him to make mistakes in order to take advantage of his faults.

—Frederick the Great2

Historically, successful military leaders understood the importance of using information to create and exploit an advantage—a condition that puts a force in a favorable geographical, psychological, or moral position. They understood that knowing more than the enemy and acting effectively on that knowledge faster than their opponent provides an advantage. They understood denying the enemy information or affecting the enemy’s ability to communicate enhances friendly chances of success. Successful commanders also understood that using information combined with action or inaction to mislead the enemy creates favorable conditions for the friendly force.

Army Doctrine Publication 3-13, Information, can be found online via the Army Publishing Directorate at https://www.armypubs.army.mil/.

Some of the Army’s earliest doctrine finds references of the importance of information to achieve objectives. The Army’s first combined arms doctrine, the 1905 Field Service Regulations, dedicated a chapter to the “Service of Information,” which focused on reconnaissance and communications.3 Army doctrine throughout World War II, Korea, and Vietnam emphasized security, deception, psychological operations, and electromagnetic warfare to protect friendly intentions, deceive enemy forces, and disrupt enemy command and control (C2). The 1991 Gulf War demonstrated the benefit of employing these elements together in a synchronized fashion to disrupt enemy C2 and to deceive Iraqi leaders about the coalition’s plan of attack. Successes in the Gulf War and accelerated growth of information technologies (military and civilian) led to the Army’s first comprehensive field manual on information operations, FM 100-6, in 1996.4

A lot has changed since the publication of the Army’s first information operations manual. Today, military operations are influenced by the exponential growth of information technologies that accelerate and expand the ability of the joint force to collect, process, analyze, store, and communicate data and information at a scale previously unimaginable. A proliferation of satellites, advanced computing and automated systems, mobile networks, and social media are some of the technologies affecting how forces use and employ data and information to achieve objectives. Our primary adversaries now have the same capabilities as the United States. These adversaries can degrade joint force information advantages we may have held in the past, so it is time to start thinking differently.

Multidomain Operations and Information Advantage

The 2022 revision of FM 3-0 is driving change to how Army forces train and fight. The most significant update is the introduction of multidomain operations as the Army’s operational concept. Multidomain operations, as defined in FM 3-0, are “the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages to achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders.”5 Multidomain operations are the way Army forces employ ground-based Army capabilities with capabilities from air, sea, space, and cyberspace in mutually supporting ways to create and exploit relative advantages. Information is central to the idea of relative advantage.

FM 3-0 defines a relative advantage as “a location or condition, in any domain, relative to an adversary or enemy that provides an opportunity to progress towards or achieve an objective.”6 Relative advantages are characterized as human, information, or physical. They complement each other. Physical actions, particularly involving the use of force, create information and generate psychological effects. When exploited, these effects can lead to information advantages as friendly forces use information to influence enemy behavior. When combined over time, these physical and information advantages can lead to a collapse of the enemy’s morale and will—a human advantage.

This phenomenon was once well understood by military professionals across our Army, but we increasingly made information considerations the purview of specialists and specific staff sections over time. The unintended consequence was intellectual atrophy among many noninformation specialists who planned and led the operations Army forces conducted. ADP 3-13 supports FM 3-0 by ensuring we all adequately consider the desirable cognitive effects we want our operations to achieve. Linking interrelated advantages in the physical, information, and human dimensions addresses that shortcoming since they apply to every echelon, warfighting function, branch, and occupational specialty.

Expanding on relative advantages, ADP 3-13 defines information advantage and describes how creating and exploiting information advantages contribute to achieving objectives.7 When describing information advantage, ADP 3-13 emphasizes three points. The first is the importance of understanding informational considerations of an operational environment as a precursor to developing effective ways to create and exploit advantages. Informational considerations are those aspects of the human, information, and physical dimensions that affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, use, act upon, and are impacted by information.8 ADP 3-13 describes how leaders analyze informational considerations from friendly, threat, and neutral perspectives to aid them in developing ways to use, protect, and attack data, information, and capabilities. This analysis enhances several aspects of planning, including the selection of targets and objectives, approaches to influence threats and other foreign relevant actors, and identification of force protection measures.

The second point is the recognition that there are many forms of information advantage—not just a single overarching condition relating to all things information.9 For example, a force that collects, processes, analyzes, and uses information to understand, decide, and act more effectively than an opponent has an advantage. However, that same force may be at an information disadvantage because the opposing force effectively uses information to influence relevant actor behavior in opposition to friendly-force objectives.

A third point of emphasis is the temporary and relative nature of an information advantage.10 Like physical and human advantages, information advantages are often temporary and vary over time relative to an adaptive opponent and changes in an operational environment. While friendly forces seek information advantages, threat forces are doing the same. An information advantage is something to gain, protect, and exploit below and above the threshold of armed conflict.

Information Advantage Framework

ADP 3-13 provides an organizational framework to assist commanders and staffs with integrating capabilities and synchronizing actions to create and exploit information advantages. As shown in figure 1, the framework describes how Army forces integrate all relevant military capabilities by executing five information activities (enable, protect, inform, influence, attack).11 Each information activity incorporates several tasks and subtasks from the warfighting functions to achieve various friendly and threat-based objectives. Guided by the principles of information advantage, Army leaders plan, prepare, execute, and assess information activities as part of the operations process.

Figure 1. Information Advantage Logic Chart

(Figure from Army Doctrine Publication 3-13, Information)

Enlarge the figure

The enable information activity includes tasks to enhance situational understanding, decision-making, and communications. The protect information activity includes tasks that deny threat access to friendly data and information while preserving friendly communications capabilities. The inform information activity includes tasks that foster informed perceptions of military operations and activities among various audiences. This activity focuses on maintaining the trust and confidence of internal (members of U.S. Army, Department of the Army civilians, contractors, and family members) and external audiences (U.S. domestic and international audiences). The influence information activity includes tasks that affect the thinking and, ultimately, the behavior of threats and other foreign audiences. This activity focuses on reinforcing or changing how individuals and groups think, feel, and act in support of objectives. The attack information activity includes tasks that affect the threat’s ability to exercise C2. This activity focuses on affecting threat data and their physical capabilities used to communicate and conduct information warfare. This includes the data and communications between automated systems, such as the communications among radars, fire control systems, and firing systems.

Information activities are interdependent. For example, the protect and inform information activities help defend the force against malign influence. The influence and attack information activities affect the threat’s ability to C2 but employ different means. Synchronizing military information support operations (an influence means) to enhance the effects of a cyberspace attack (an attack means) represents a combined arms approach to degrading threat C2.

Figure 2. Information Activities Contributions to Agility

(Figure from Army Doctrine Publication 3-13, Information)

Enlarge the figure

ADP 3-13 illustrates how combining and executing all the information activities to achieve both friendly and threat-focus objectives contributes to agility and the ability to understand, decide, and act more effectively than the threat. As shown in figure 2, the enable and protect information activities increase the effectiveness of the friendly decision cycle.12 The influence and attack information activities decrease the effectiveness of the threat’s decision cycle. The inform information activity is used to both enhance friendly C2 and to degrade the threats decision cycle. The combined effects of enhancing the friendly decision cycle while degrading the threats create a significant information advantage for Army forces.

Principles of Information Advantage

To help guide the thinking about the use of information and the employment of capabilities to create information advantages, ADP 3-13 introduces four principles (see figure 3).13 The first principle—offensively oriented—is focused on initiative. Any information advantage not sought or actively defended is potentially ceded to the threat. Army leaders maintain an offensive mindset and anticipate events in pursuit of various information advantages. The combined arms principle is tied to the idea that all military activities have inherent informational effects and that all military capabilities can be employed for information advantage. Army leaders combine available organic, joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities in complementary and reinforcing ways to enable C2, protect information and networks, inform audiences, influence threats and other relevant actors, and attack threat C2.

The third principle—commander driven—is related to the idea that information is central to all activity Army forces undertake. Therefore, commanders must understand information and thoughtfully integrate it into operations through the command and control, fires, maneuver, protection, and sustainment warfighting functions during planning. Commanders think of information as a resource to achieve situational understanding, a tool to induce ambiguity and uncertainty in the threat, and the primary means to direct Army forces. Commanders direct the use of information and capabilities to penetrate threat decision-making processes, exploit information dependencies, achieve surprise, and disrupt the threat from within.

Figure 3. Principles of Information Advantage

(Figure by authors; information from Army Doctrine Publication 3-13, Information)

Enlarge the figure

Finally, all soldiers have a role in gaining and exploiting information advantages, which is the focus of the fourth principle. All soldiers must protect information. Considerations such as operations security, physical security, noise and light discipline, and electromagnetic emissions control apply to everyone in a formation. Every soldier consumes, communicates, and relies on information to accomplish the mission. Soldiers must retain their digital literacy and readiness as they operate various information systems essential to communications. As representatives of the U.S. Army and the United States, soldiers understand that their presence, posture, and actions always communicate a message open to interpretation. High visibility offers great opportunity as well as potential risk. Effective soldiers at all levels understand the impact that their actions and messages communicate—and that all their activities communicate a message to some audience. This requires all soldiers to understand the broader purpose of operations. It also requires practicing operations security and disciplined communication through all forms of media—including personal media accounts—both in operations and while at home station.

Warfighting Function Contributions

A significant difference from past doctrine is the idea that all military capabilities can be employed for an information advantage—not just a select list of information-related capabilities synchronized with each other as part of information operations.14 The information advantage framework is based on the idea that information is essential to all warfighting functions, and all warfighting functions can contribute to friendly or threat-focused information advantages. Based on this understanding, the Army did not establish an information warfighting function.15 Additionally, because of the disparate nature of capabilities and multiple tasks used to create information advantages, ADP 3-13 does not assign a single staff section overall responsible for information advantage; rather, it assigns a staff lead for each activity and identifies staff leads for each task within each information activity.16

Information activities organize various tasks and capabilities from the six warfighting functions (C2, intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment). The C2 warfighting function directly contributes to the enable information activity. The entire C2 system (people, processes, networks, and command posts) is designed to support commanders in their abilities to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess faster and more effectively than their opponents.

The intelligence warfighting function contributes to the integration of all the information activities by providing relevant information and intelligence. It directly contributes to the enable information activity by providing information and intelligence for situational understanding that informs decision-making concerning all aspects of operations. The movement and maneuver warfighting function contributes to the enable, protect, influence, and attack information activities. Through reconnaissance, forces gain information on the enemy and terrain facilitating friendly decision-making. Security operations protect friendly information and C2 nodes. The positioning and maneuver of forces signals intent, demonstrate capability, and drive tempo that influence threats and assure partners. Raids and other attacks contribute to the capture or destruction of enemy C2 systems and infrastructure. The fires warfighting function contributes to the protect, influence, and attack information activities. The delivery of fires ranging from surface to surface to cyberspace and electromatic attacks can protect friendly data and information, influence threats, and affect threat C2. Several tasks within the protection warfighting function directly contribute to the protect information activity to include survivability, air and missile defense support, electromagnetic protection, operations security, and cybersecurity and defense. The sustainment warfighting function contributes to all information activities by ensuring the friendly force is healthy, manned, equipped, maintained, and supplied. Sustainment activities also contribute to the influence information activity. Providing sustainment to relevant actors can reinforce or change their behavior. The position of sustainment forces and their activities can contribute to both deception and the communication of a will to fight.

Way Ahead

In his foreword, Lt. Gen. Milford H. Beagle Jr. writes, “ADP 3-13 provides the intellectual underpinnings that describe how Army forces will gain, protect, and exploit information advantages. But doctrine is only the beginning. The hard work begins when we incorporate these ideas into leader development, education, and training. As leaders, it is our obligation to study, understand, and implement the doctrine in ADP 3-13.”17 The publication of ADP 3-13 is just the start of a sustained education campaign from the Combined Arms Center.

As with FM 3-0, the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate is developing a series of products to help soldiers understand the new doctrine. Articles, videos, and podcasts devoted to ADP 3-13 are in the works and will be announced via the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate’s social media channels. The team will also work closely with the centers of excellence, Army University, and the combat training centers to ensure this information is incorporated into professional military education and training. Mobile training teams will also visit select installations and organizations to further integrate the ideas outlined in the manual.

Notes

Epigraph. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-13, foreword to Information (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2023).

Ibid., 1-1. Data and information are related but are not the same. ADP 3-13 defines data as “any signal or observation from the environment.” Information is defined as “data in context that a receiver (human or automated) assigns meaning.”
Jay Luvaas, ed. and trans., Frederick the Great on the Art of War (Boston: Da Capo Press, 1999), 334.
General Staff, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, Field Service Regulations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1905), 38–48.
Field Manual (FM) 100-6, Information Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), iii–vi.
FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2022), 3-1. The 2022 edition of FM 3-0 formally established multidomain operations as the Army’s operational concept. It describes the tenets and imperatives that guide Army forces in competition below armed conflict, crisis, and armed conflict.
Ibid., 1-3.
ADP 3-13, Information, 2-3.
Ibid., 1-8.
Ibid., 2-3.
Ibid.
Ibid., viii.
Ibid., 2-12.
Ibid., 2-14–2-15.
Based on changes to joint information doctrine, Army doctrine no longer use the terms information operations, information-related capabilities, or information superiority.
Change 1 to Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2017), added information to the joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment) in 2017. JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2022), expands doctrine on the joint information function. JP 3-04 describes the joint information function as the management and application of information to change or maintain perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of behavior, and to support human and automated decision-making. Combined with the other joint functions the information joint function helps joint force commanders and staffs effectively use information to create information advantages and achieve objectives.
ADP 3-13 highlights both the chief of staff (executive officer) and G-3 (S-3) as having responsibilities for overall integration and synchronization of information activities. The chief of staff ensures staff integration where the G-3, as operations officer, ensures information activities are integrated and synchronized into the concept of operations in accordance with the commander’s intent and guidance.
ADP 3-13, Information, foreword.

Col. Richard Creed, U.S. Army, retired, is the director of the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and one of the authors and editors of Army Doctrine Publication 3-13, Information. He holds a BS from the U.S. Military Academy, an MS from the School of Advanced Military Studies, and an MS from the Army War College. His previous assignments include G-3 of the 2nd Infantry Division, and he has completed tours in Germany, Korea, Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He commanded at company, battalion, and brigade levels.

Lt. Col. Michael Flynn, U.S. Army, retired, is a doctrine author and analyst in the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate and one of the authors of Army Doctrine Publication 3-13, Information. As a veteran doctrine writer, he has helped shape Army operations, command and control, and planning doctrine for over twenty years. He served in multiple infantry and staff assignments to include service in Germany, Kuwait, and Afghanistan. He has a master’s degree from the School of Advanced Military Studies.

16. War Games Risk Stirring Up Troubled Waters as Philippines - Emboldened by US - Squares Up to Beijing at Sea

A quote from a few months ago:

“The West Philippine Sea, not Taiwan, is the real flashpoint for an armed conflict,”

– Ambassador Jose Manuel Romualdez February 28, 2024

War Games Risk Stirring Up Troubled Waters as Philippines - Emboldened by US - Squares Up to Beijing at Sea

military.com · by The Conversation | By Fred H. Lawson Published May 07, 2024 at 5:41pm ET · May 7, 2024

U.S. Marines joined Filipino counterparts on May 5, 2024, for a mock battle at a telling location: a small, remote territory just 100 miles off the southern tip of the contested island of Taiwan.

The combat drill is part of the weekslong Exercise Balikatan that has brought together naval, air and ground forces of the Philippines and the United States, with Australia and France also joining some maneuvers.

With a planned “maritime strike” on May 8 in which a decommissioned ship will be sunk and exercises at repelling an advancing foreign army, the aim is to display a united front against China, which Washington and Manila perceive as a threat to the region. Balikatan is Tagalog for “shoulder to shoulder.”

Joint Philippines-U.S. naval drills have become an annual event. But as an expert in international relations, I believe this year’s drills mark an inflection point in the regional politics of the South China Sea.

For the first time, warships taking part in the exercise ventured outside the 12-mile boundary that demarcates the territorial waters of the Philippines. This extends military operations into the gray area where the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone rubs up against the territory claimed by China and designated by its “nine-dash line.”

Also for the first time, the U.S. deployed an advanced mobile launcher for medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles of a type that had been banned under the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. In addition, the Philippine navy is showing off its newest acquisition, a South Korean-built missile frigate.

The South China Sea has long been the source of maritime disputes between China, which claims the vast majority of its waters, and nations including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. In addition, heightened tensions over the status of Taiwan – a territory that the Biden administration has pledged to defend militarily in the event of a Chinese invasion – have made the South China Sea even more strategically important.

U.S. troopers prepare to board a U.S. Army CH-47s at Paredes Air Station at Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte province as it carries U.S. and Philippine troops during a joint military exercise in northern Philippines on Monday, May 6, 2024. (AP Photo/Aaron Favila)

Containment at sea

The latest joint maneuvers come amid two developments that could go some way to influence the future trajectory of tensions in the South China Sea. First, the Philippines has grown increasingly assertive in countering China’s claims in the region; and second, the U.S. is increasingly intent on building up regional alliances as part of a strategy to contain China.

The Philippines-U.S. alignment is more robust than ever. After a brief interval during the 2016-22 presidency of Rodrigo Duterte, U.S. warships and military aircraft once again operate out of bases in the Philippines.

Joint naval patrols resumed in early 2023. At the same time, Manila granted U.S. troops unprecedented access to facilities on the northern Batanes islands, which have become the focus of current joint operations.

Meanwhile, Washington has become more vocal in condemning challenges to the Philippines from China.

U.S. officials had carefully avoided promising to protect the far-flung islands, atolls and reefs claimed by Manila for seven decades following the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines in 1951.

Only in March 2019 did then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo assert that the treaty covers all of the geographical area over which the Philippines asserts sovereignty.

In February 2023, Presidents Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Joe Biden doubled the number of bases in the Philippines open to the U.S. military. That May, the two leaders affirmed that the Mutual Defense Treaty applies to armed attacks that take place “anywhere in the South China Sea.”

Causing waves, rocking the boat

Firmer ties to the U.S. have been accompanied by more combative behavior on the part of the Philippines. In May 2023, the Philippines coast guard introduced demarcation buoys around Whitsun Reef – the site of an intense confrontation with China’s maritime militia a year earlier.

Reports circulated three months later that Philippine marines planned to construct permanent outposts in the vicinity of the hotly contested Scarborough Shoal. And a Philippine coast guard ship, with the commander of the country’s armed forces aboard, approached Scarborough Shoal in November, before being forced to retreat by Chinese maritime militia vessels.

Then in January 2024, the Philippines broke with its adherence to a prohibition on erecting structures on disputed territory, which was part of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, by installing electronic surveillance equipment on Thitu Island, which sits beyond Scarborough Shoal in the heart of a cluster of disputed formations. This was followed by announced plans to put water desalination plants on Thitu, Nanshan Island and Second Thomas Shoal, making it possible to maintain permanent garrisons on these isolated outposts.

Manila has continued to assert its maritime rights by announcing that armed forces would escort exploration and mining activities in the exclusive economic zone.

Further acts that could be seen as provocative in Beijing followed, including the stationing of a Philippine navy corvette at nearby Palawan Island and a joint flyover by Philippine warplanes and a U.S. Air Force B-52 heavy bomber.

A raft of Chinese responses

It is clear that the deepening of Philippines-U.S. ties has given Manila the confidence to undertake a variety of combative acts toward China. The question is, to what ends?

A more assertive Philippines may end up contributing to the U.S. strategy to deter Beijing from extending its presence in the South China Sea and launching what many in Washington fear: an invasion of Taiwan.

But it is possible that heightened truculence on the part of the Philippines will goad Beijing into being more aggressive, diminishing the prospects for regional stability.

As the Philippines-U.S. alignment has strengthened, Beijing has boosted the number of warships it deploys in the South China Sea and escalated maritime operations around Thitu Island, Second Thomas Shoal and Iroquois Reef – all of which the Philippines considers its sovereign territory.

In early March 2024, two Chinese research ships moved into Benham Rise, a resource-rich shelf situated on the eastern coast of the Philippines, outside the South China Sea. Weeks later, a Philippines coast guard cutter surveying a sandbar near Thitu was harassed not only by Chinese coast guard and maritime militia ships but also by a missile frigate of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, which for the first time launched a helicopter to shadow the cutter.

Washington has taken no public steps to dampen tensions between Manila and Beijing. Rather, Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed full-throated support for “our ironclad defense commitments” during a mid-March 2024 stopover in Manila.

Reassured of U.S. backing, Marcos has amped up the rhetoric, proclaiming that Manila would respond to any troublemaking on Beijing’s part by implementing a “countermeasure package that is proportionate, deliberate and reasonable.” “Filipinos,” he added, “do not yield.”

Such an approach, according to Marcos, was now feasible due to the U.S. and its regional allies offering “to help us on what the Philippines requires to protect and secure our sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction.”

The danger is that as the Philippines grows more assured by U.S. support, it may grow reckless in dealing with China.

Rather than deterring China from further expansion, the deepening Philippines-U.S. alignment and associated Filipino assertiveness may only ramp up Beijing’s apprehensiveness over its continued access to the South China Sea – through which virtually all of its energy imports and most of its exports flow.

And there is little reason to expect that Washington will be able to prevent an emboldened Manila from continuing down the path of confronting China in the South China Sea.

To Beijing, the prospect of an emboldened Philippines forging active strategic partnerships with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and – most troublesome of all – Taiwan makes the situation all the more perilous.

Fred H. Lawson is Professor of Government Emeritus at Northeastern University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

military.com · by The Conversation | By Fred H. Lawson Published May 07, 2024 at 5:41pm ET · May 7, 2024

17. Israeli forces mass on Rafah's outskirts as US warns a major assault could halt arms

Israeli forces mass on Rafah's outskirts as US warns a major assault could halt arms

By Nidal Al-Mughrabi, Mohammad Salem and Jarrett Renshaw

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-warns-israel-that-rafah-invasion-will-jeopardise-weapons-supply-assault-2024-05-09/?utm

May 9, 20247:04 AM EDTUpdated 4 min ago

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Biden: US to deny Israel weapons if Rafah attacked

Summary

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS:Medics say three killed in Israeli tank fire in eastern RafahGaza health ministry says Rafah crossing closure halts supplies needed for hospitals

CAIRO/RAFAH, Gaza Strip/WASHINGTON, May 9 (Reuters) - Israeli forces massed tanks and opened fire close to built-up areas of Rafah on Thursday, residents said, after U.S. President Joe Biden vowed to withhold weapons from Israel if its forces launch a major invasion of the southern Gaza city.

As ceasefire talks continued in Cairo, Palestinian militant groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad said their fighters struck Israeli forces on the eastern outskirts of Rafah, firing anti-tank rockets and mortars at Israeli positions.

Residents and medics in Rafah, the only major urban area in Gaza not yet invaded by Israeli ground forces, said Israeli tank fire killed three people and wounded others near a mosque in the eastern neighbourhood of Brazil.

On the city's eastern edge, residents said a helicopter opened fire, while drones hovered above houses in several areas, some close to rooftops.

Israel says Hamas militants are hiding in Rafah, where hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have sought refuge after fleeing combat elsewhere in Gaza, and it needs to eliminate them for its own security.

CIA Director William Burns, back in the Egyptian capital after talks in Jerusalem, resumed meetings on Thursday with mediators trying to secure a ceasefire, two Egyptian security sources said.

Biden, who says Israel has not produced a convincing plan to safeguard civilians in Rafah, issued his starkest warning yet against a full ground invasion.

"I made it clear that if they go into Rafah, ... I'm not supplying the weapons," Biden told CNN in an interview on Wednesday.

AID ROUTE CUT

Israeli tanks seized the Gaza side of the Rafah border crossing with Egypt on Tuesday, cutting off a vital aid route and forcing 80,000 people to flee the city this week, according to the United Nations.

"The toll on these families is unbearable. Nowhere is safe," the U.N. agency for Palestinian refugees said in a post on X.

An Israeli military statement on Gaza operations on Thursday morning did not refer to Rafah.

The United States is by far the biggest supplier of weapons to Israel, and it accelerated deliveries after the Hamas attacks on Oct. 7 that triggered Israel's offensive in Gaza. Biden acknowledged that U.S. bombs have killed Palestinian civilians in the seven-month-old offensive.

U.S. officials have said Washington paused delivery of a shipment of 1,800 2,000-pound bombs and 1,700 500-pound bombs to Israel because of the risk to civilians in Gaza.

Israel's United Nations ambassador Gilad Erdan said the U.S. decision to pause some weapons deliveries to Israel will significantly impair the country's ability to neutralise Hamas' power, according to Israeli public radio.

Israel kept up tank and aerial strikes across Gaza on Thursday, however. Tanks advanced in the Zeitoun neighbourhood of Gaza City in the north, forcing hundreds of families to flee, residents said. The Israeli military said it was securing Zeitoun, starting with a series of intelligence-based aerial strikes on approximately 25 "terror targets".

Item 1 of 9 Israeli soldiers walk near a tank, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, near the Israel-Gaza Border, in southern Israel, May 9, 2024. REUTERS/Amir Cohen

[1/9]Israeli soldiers walk near a tank, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, near the Israel-Gaza Border, in southern Israel, May 9, 2024. REUTERS/Amir Cohen Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

Deir Al-Balah in central Gaza was heaving with thousands of people who had fled Rafah in recent days. Palestinian medics said two people, including a woman, were killed when a drone fired a missile at a group of people there.

CEASEFIRE TALKS

In Cairo, delegations from Hamas, Israel, the U.S., Egypt and Qatar have been meeting since Tuesday.

Citing a source familiar with the matter, Egypt's state-affiliated Al Qahera TV said early on Thursday that areas of disagreement were being resolved and there were signs a deal would be reached, without giving details.

But Izzat El-Reshiq, a member of Hamas' political office in Qatar, said in a statement late on Wednesday the group would not go beyond a ceasefire proposal it accepted on Monday.

That would also entail the release of some Israeli hostages in Gaza and Palestinian women and children detained in Israel.

"Israel isn't serious about reaching an agreement and it is using the negotiation as a cover to invade Rafah and occupy the crossing," said Reshiq.

The CIA's Burns has shuttled between Cairo and Jerusalem, meeting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Wednesday.

Earlier this week Israel declared the three-phase truce proposal approved by Hamas unacceptable, saying terms had been watered down. It did not respond immediately to the Hamas statement.

Just a few hours earlier Washington reiterated that the two sides were not far apart.

"The two sides are close enough they should do what they can to get to a deal," U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan told reporters.

The war began when Hamas militants attacked Israel on Oct. 7, killing about 1,200 people and abducting 252, of whom 128 remain hostage in Gaza and 36 have been declared dead, according to the latest Israeli figures.

Israel's assault on Gaza has killed 34,904 Palestinians, most of them civilians, the health ministry in Hamas-run Gaza said.

A U.N. official said no fuel or aid had entered Gaza due to the military operation, a situation "disastrous for the humanitarian response" in the enclave, where more than half the population is suffering catastrophic hunger.

After fleeing combat further north, Palestinians have crammed into tented camps and makeshift shelters in Rafah.

The closure of the Rafah crossing with Egypt had prevented the evacuation of the wounded and sick and the entry of medical supplies, food trucks and fuel needed to operate hospitals, the Gaza health ministry said on Thursday.

The ministry said that the only kidney dialysis centre in the Rafah area had stopped operating due to the shelling.

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Additional reporting by Maytaal Angel in JERUSALEM, Ahmed Mohamed Hassan in CAIRO and other Reuters bureaux; Writing by Ros Russell; Editing by Philippa Fletcher

18. US Drone Warfare Faces Questions of Legitimacy, Study of Military Chaplains Shows

Excerpts:

Yet what shapes perceptions of legitimate drone warfare, how these perceptions vary across audiences, and the implications for the U.S. drone program are not well understood. This gap is surprising, given that “over-the-horizon” drone strikes – firing missiles at targets many miles away – have defined U.S. counterterrorism policy in Afghanistan and elsewhere, despite being routinely criticized.

Drone strikes differ from other uses of force in the remoteness of the operators firing the weapons. Drone operators are typically hundreds or thousands of miles away from their targets, which they view through drone- and satellite-based cameras and sensors. In the worst-case scenario, this can lead to target misidentification and civilian casualties.

Part of the problem is that scholars disagree on what constitutes drone warfare, which has implications for how they understand variations in public perceptions of legitimacy. As military scholars who study the topic, we define drone warfare as a function of strike attributes, meaning how and why they are used abroad.

Using this definition, we have found that how a country uses and constrains the use of drones shapes how people perceive their legitimacy. We’ve also found that perceptions of legitimacy differ between U.S. citizens and soldiers, particularly chaplains, who guide the moral use of force. We are scheduled to present our study of the attitudes of military chaplains on drone strikes at both the U.S. Army’s Institute for Religious Leadership and the American Political Science Association’s annual meeting in September 2024.

...

We compared these results with the beliefs of U.S. Army chaplains, offering the first evidence for how these key advisers to military commanders perceive the legitimacy of drone warfare.

The U.S. Army conducts the most strikes of any service. Chaplains in the Army are “moral advocates” during conflict who “provide professional advice, counsel, and instruction on religious, moral, and ethical issues,” according to regulations. Many commanders in the military have strong religious beliefs, suggesting they may draw on chaplains’ counsel. Similarly, chaplains minister to drone operators, who are vulnerable to moral injury, meaning the emotional or psychological damage people suffer when they transgress their moral boundaries.

Some experts suspect that chaplains’ advisory role may be exaggerated. These scholars often study chaplains during interstate war, however. Our research sheds new light on chaplains’ attitudes toward the use of drones against nonstate adversaries such as terrorist organizations.

We found that, in contrast to the U.S. public, chaplains perceive over-the-horizon drone strikes as illegitimate. Rather, chaplains perceive tactical-level strikes on the battlefield as most legitimate, especially when they are tightly constrained by policy.

US Drone Warfare Faces Questions of Legitimacy, Study of Military Chaplains Shows

military.com · May 8, 2024

Are drone strikes legitimate, meaning on sound moral and legal footing? How people perceive the legitimacy of U.S. drone strikes – firing missiles from remotely piloted aircraft at terrorist and insurgent leaders – is central to whether and how the government can continue to use them.

The American public tends not to question military action it perceives as rightful, and U.S. policymakers often reference the legitimacy of U.S. drone strikes. The U.S. military, responsible for conducting most drone strikes globally, has also adopted legitimacy as a principle of counterterrorism operations.

Yet what shapes perceptions of legitimate drone warfare, how these perceptions vary across audiences, and the implications for the U.S. drone program are not well understood. This gap is surprising, given that “over-the-horizon” drone strikes – firing missiles at targets many miles away – have defined U.S. counterterrorism policy in Afghanistan and elsewhere, despite being routinely criticized.

Drone strikes differ from other uses of force in the remoteness of the operators firing the weapons. Drone operators are typically hundreds or thousands of miles away from their targets, which they view through drone- and satellite-based cameras and sensors. In the worst-case scenario, this can lead to target misidentification and civilian casualties.

Part of the problem is that scholars disagree on what constitutes drone warfare, which has implications for how they understand variations in public perceptions of legitimacy. As military scholars who study the topic, we define drone warfare as a function of strike attributes, meaning how and why they are used abroad.

Using this definition, we have found that how a country uses and constrains the use of drones shapes how people perceive their legitimacy. We’ve also found that perceptions of legitimacy differ between U.S. citizens and soldiers, particularly chaplains, who guide the moral use of force. We are scheduled to present our study of the attitudes of military chaplains on drone strikes at both the U.S. Army’s Institute for Religious Leadership and the American Political Science Association’s annual meeting in September 2024.

Uses and constraints

Countries use drones for different purposes.

Tactical strikes are designed to achieve battlefield objectives, such as destroying an enemy compound.

Strategic strikes destroy terrorist organizations to achieve overall war aims. They are used to remove key terrorist leaders. The goal of such “decapitation operations” is to hasten a terrorist group’s collapse.

Countries also constrain drone use differently. Some use self-imposed constraints. These include targeting standards, which are calibrated to balance effectiveness against anticipated civilian casualties. Others use externally imposed constraints such as international approval for drone strikes.

US citizens’ beliefs

Drawing on our definition of drone warfare as a matter of varying uses and constraints of drones, we reviewed and analyzed public perceptions of the legitimacy of drone strikes.

We found that U.S. citizens perceive over-the-horizon drone strikes, where drones are used strategically without external oversight, as most legitimate. This pattern of drone warfare characterizes the United States’ approach globally.

However, we also found that U.S. citizens’ perceptions of legitimacy are affected by civilian casualties, which lead Americans to reconsider reliance on internal constraints such as targeting standards. Given civilian casualties, U.S. citizens’ perceptions of legitimacy are shaped by international, rather than national, oversight, reflecting a belief that international approval is central to the appropriate use of force.

US Army chaplains’ beliefs

We compared these results with the beliefs of U.S. Army chaplains, offering the first evidence for how these key advisers to military commanders perceive the legitimacy of drone warfare.

The U.S. Army conducts the most strikes of any service. Chaplains in the Army are “moral advocates” during conflict who “provide professional advice, counsel, and instruction on religious, moral, and ethical issues,” according to regulations. Many commanders in the military have strong religious beliefs, suggesting they may draw on chaplains’ counsel. Similarly, chaplains minister to drone operators, who are vulnerable to moral injury, meaning the emotional or psychological damage people suffer when they transgress their moral boundaries.

Some experts suspect that chaplains’ advisory role may be exaggerated. These scholars often study chaplains during interstate war, however. Our research sheds new light on chaplains’ attitudes toward the use of drones against nonstate adversaries such as terrorist organizations.

We found that, in contrast to the U.S. public, chaplains perceive over-the-horizon drone strikes as illegitimate. Rather, chaplains perceive tactical-level strikes on the battlefield as most legitimate, especially when they are tightly constrained by policy.

Even then, chaplains voice less support for these drone strikes than their perceptions of legitimacy might suggest. Why would chaplains not support drone strikes they perceive as legitimate? We found that this “legitimacy paradox” reflects underlying concerns. Chaplains in our survey often questioned the legality of strikes, the veracity of intelligence, the territorial integrity of targeted countries and the implications for national security.

The future of US drone warfare

These findings have implications for policy, strategy and military readiness. In order to increase perceptions of legitimacy of the U.S. drone program among citizens and soldiers, our findings suggest that elected and military leaders would need to take several steps.

First, elected officials would need to transparently discuss the program. Specifically, they would need to justify a transgression of a country’s sovereignty, especially in terms of anticipated security gains.

Second, military leaders would need to explain the intelligence driving drone operations, measures to protect civilians, and how strikes comply with international law.

Finally, military leaders would need to research the potential for differences in perceptions of legitimacy held by other soldiers, especially with the emergence of fully autonomous drones that can identify, track and engage targets without human oversight. Military lawyers, for instance, also fulfill a key advisory role to commanders. Lawyers’ training, shaped more by their understanding of the laws of armed conflict rather than moral considerations, suggests that it is possible they may interpret the legitimacy of drone strikes differently than chaplains.

In our expert opinion, taking these steps would bring the necessary transparency and reflection to address questions of legitimacy that are fundamental to civilian and military support for the U.S. drone program.

Paul Lushenko is Assistant Professor and Director of Special Operations, US Army War College and Keith L. Carter is Associate Professor of Political Science, US Naval War College

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

military.com · May 8, 2024

19. Defending Taiwan By Defending Ukraine

This is the kind of thinking we need versus China as the pacing threat. I wonder how Elbridge Colby will feel about the Foreign Minister's views (Colby would willingly sacrifice Ukraine and Korea to defend Taiwan) that we have to do more than one thing and that the world's democracies must work together to combat a world order of authoritarians.

Conclusion:

Taiwan is a responsible member of the international community, and its position on maintaining the cross-Strait status quo will not change. But it needs the world’s democracies to do their utmost to help maintain peace through strength and unity. By continuing to support Ukraine in its fight for survival in the face of Russian aggression, the world’s democracies have demonstrated exactly the kind of resolve and moral clarity that Taiwan also needs from them. We cannot allow this century to witness the birth of a world order in which authoritarians can stamp out justice and freedom. In the coming years, the fate of Taiwan, like that of Ukraine, will be a crucial test that the world’s democracies must not fail.

Defending Taiwan By Defending Ukraine

The Interconnected Fates of the World’s Democracies

By Jaushieh Joseph Wu

May 9, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Jaushieh Joseph Wu · May 9, 2024

The Russian invasion of Ukraine was a wake-up call: it was time to move past the vision of a post‒Cold War world in which regimes in Moscow and Beijing would become responsible stakeholders in a rules-based international order. What has emerged, instead, is an increasingly contentious world plagued by authoritarian aggression, most dangerously exemplified by the “no-limits partnership” between China and Russia, through which the two countries have bolstered each other’s repressive, expansionist agendas.

This remains, however, a globalized world of interconnected economies and societies: a single, indivisible theater in which the security of every country is intimately linked to the security of every other. That is particularly true of the world’s democracies, whose alliances and partnerships have come under assault by authoritarian powers intent on splitting and dividing the democratic world.

Some have argued that international support for defending Ukraine from Russian aggression is draining attention and resources away from the task of standing up to Chinese aggression. According to this view, the defense of Ukraine has left democracies such as Taiwan more vulnerable.

But that argument underestimates the extent to which the geostrategic interests of the world’s democracies are linked—as are the agendas of Moscow and Beijing. U.S. officials have concluded that since at least the second half of 2023, China has been providing military support short of lethal arms to Russia, a significant shift since the initial phase of Russia’s war on Ukraine, when Beijing took a somewhat more neutral stance. China has clearly decided that it has a strong interest not just in propping up Russia but in reshaping the geopolitical landscape in Europe.

With China and Russia in such close alignment, it is all the more imperative for democracies to act in coordination. To that end, the democracies of the world, led by the United States, must sustain their military, economic, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. The objective of this support goes beyond returning to the status quo ante in the European continent. By helping Ukraine, democracies can increase their relative strength against the Chinese-Russian coalition.

In this spirit, Taiwan welcomes the U.S. Congress’s recent decision to continue American military support for Ukraine. Such a display of unabated and unquestionable resolve to safeguard democracy does not detract from the defense of places such as Taiwan: in fact, it is a key deterrent against adventurism on Beijing’s part.

WHY TAIWAN MATTERS

Just as the fight to protect democracy in Ukraine has global implications, so, too, does the defense of Taiwan. According to Bloomberg Economics, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would cost the global economy around $10 trillion, the equivalent of nearly ten percent of global GDP—dwarfing the impacts of the war in Ukraine, the COVID pandemic, and the global financial crisis of 2008-9. A Chinese blockade of Taiwan would result in less immediate destruction but would still cost the global economy around $5 trillion.

The reason is simple: over 90 percent of advanced chips are produced in Taiwan, and approximately half of the global fleet of ships that carry shipping containers pass through the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan is an indispensable and irreplaceable part of the global supply chain, and defending it requires a global effort. But the value of Taiwanese security is not merely economic; it is also geostrategic. Preserving the status quo in the strait is vital to maintaining the U.S. alliance system, the regional balance of power, and nuclear nonproliferation. These three critical pillars have kept the Indo-Pacific region stable and prosperous for generations and would be threatened were China to gain control of Taiwan. Economic losses and supply chain disruptions could be mitigated over time. But a geostrategic shift to the advantage of China’s authoritarian expansionism would harm the world for decades to come.

In April, as Taiwan endured its biggest earthquake in the last 25 years, China continued to send warships and aircrafts across the strait—even as its delegation to the UN had the audacity to thank the world for expressions of sympathy about the earthquake, as if Beijing spoke on Taiwan’s behalf. In sharp contrast to China’s feigned concern, over 80 countries expressed support for Taiwan, for which I extended my sincerest gratitude.

By helping Ukraine, democracies can increase their relative strength against the Chinese-Russian coalition.

This is what Taiwan faces every day. But when China seeks to sow fear among the people of Taiwan through military coercion, diplomatic isolation, and information warfare, the Taiwanese people respond with a whole-of-nation effort. Taiwan is particularly proud to have multiple grassroots organizations dedicated to strengthening civil defense and countering Chinese disinformation. They are emblematic of Taiwan’s democracy and resilience.

Taiwan’s government has made great strides in meeting the security challenge posed by China. Under President Tsai Ing-wen’s leadership, Taiwan has ramped up its efforts to enhance its self-defense. Last year, Taiwan increased its defense budget by around 14 percent, to approximately $19 billion, or 2.5 percent of national GDP. Eight years ago, the defense budget equaled less than 2.0 percent of GDP.

Taiwan spends its resources on its most pressing needs. The primary focus has been on developing asymmetric warfare capabilities, implementing civil-defense reforms, and accelerating the indigenous defense industry. With broad public support, Taiwan also extended its training period for military conscripts from four months to one year.

Taiwan can expect robust support from like-minded countries only if it makes a strong commitment to self-defense. That was the first and most important lesson Taiwan learned from Ukraine’s defense against Russia; because the Ukrainians were willing to fight for their democracy, the rest of the world was willing to help. And our determination to defend ourselves will grow only stronger under our new president, William Lai.

HOW TAIWAN PERSEVERES

China has already altered the status quo in several ways in the Indo-Pacific region. For starters, Beijing has militarized the South China Sea despite its public pledge not to do so. The Chinese have built ports with potential military uses under its “string of pearls” strategy, including in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Last year, Beijing signed a security pact with the Solomon Islands and similar agreements with other Pacific island countries.

China’s strategy rests on two assumptions. The first is that China must lower the potential cost of annexing Taiwan by force by making it harder for the United States to carry out a military deployment to defend the island in the event of a Chinese attack. The second is that controlling Taiwan would help Beijing project power beyond the so-called first island chain, threatening access to shipping lanes and reducing the security of many U.S. allies in the region.

Preventing those developments will require an unprecedented level of determination and coordination on the part of the world’s democracies. The long-standing trilateral security relationship among Australia, Japan, and the United States, and the emerging AUKUS partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, provide an anchor of stability. The nascent partnership among Japan, the Philippines, and the United States will complement those arrangements. And the recently upgraded security cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the United States will ensure stability in Northeast Asia, which is closely linked to peace in the Taiwan Strait. These interconnected coalitions are the strongest guarantor of a favorable geostrategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region.

Indeed, peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait can be maintained only by viewing and treating it as an international issue. Leaders on the other side of the strait claim otherwise, of course, and tirelessly frame the future of Taiwan as an issue to be resolved among “the Chinese.” But the harder Beijing pushes that false narrative, the more Taiwan is proved to be on the right track.

WHAT TAIWAN NEEDS

Still, the international community could do even more to deter Chinese aggression. There are three areas that like-minded countries could address more assertively to preserve the status quo.

The first is China’s gray-zone coercion, which involves activities such as disinformation campaigns, election interference plots, and military provocations such as jet sorties that routinely cross the median line of the Taiwan Strait. Such operations pose a daily psychological and security challenge to Taiwan that is no less dire than the threat of a blockade or an invasion, and failing to respond to them would have a disastrous impact on Taiwan’s morale. In addition to providing Taiwan with political and moral support in the face of this coercion, other democracies should also put a price tag on such Chinese tactics, demonstrating to Beijing that provocations have consequences.

The second area where Taiwan needs more help is economic integration. China must not be allowed to dictate Taiwan’s economic ties with the world. And strengthening economic partnerships with Taiwan would help other democracies foster resilient supply chains for their own economies. Taipei and Washington are currently negotiating the second phase of the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade, a trade deal that will help Taiwan’s small and medium-sized enterprises integrate into the global trading system. Once that agreement is completed, Taiwan hopes to sign an economic partnership agreement with the European Union and to join the trade deal known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). These agreements will not only strengthen the economies of Taiwan and its partners but demonstrate to Beijing that the world’s democracies are making long-term investments in Taiwan’s future.

The third area where Taiwan’s friends could do still more is in pushing back against the misinterpretation of a UN resolution that Beijing promulgates to justify its encroachments on Taiwan’s rights. Taiwan urges like-minded countries to join the United States in rejecting China’s distortion of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, which was adopted in 1971 and gave the so-called Chinese seat at the UN to the government in Beijing—but did not, as China claims, enshrine into international law the false idea that Taiwan is a mere province of China. More countries should also exercise their right to freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait, which Beijing refuses to recognize as international waters. When China sees countries keeping their ships out of the strait, it concludes that its bullying tactics are working.

Taiwan is a responsible member of the international community, and its position on maintaining the cross-Strait status quo will not change. But it needs the world’s democracies to do their utmost to help maintain peace through strength and unity. By continuing to support Ukraine in its fight for survival in the face of Russian aggression, the world’s democracies have demonstrated exactly the kind of resolve and moral clarity that Taiwan also needs from them. We cannot allow this century to witness the birth of a world order in which authoritarians can stamp out justice and freedom. In the coming years, the fate of Taiwan, like that of Ukraine, will be a crucial test that the world’s democracies must not fail.

JAUSHIEH JOSEPH WU is Foreign Minister of Taiwan. Later this month, he will become Secretary-General of Taiwan’s National Security Council.

Foreign Affairs · by Jaushieh Joseph Wu · May 9, 2024

20. Russia’s Pro-Putin Elites

Excerpts:

Among Russian elites, the prevailing belief is that only a military defeat or a prolonged, severe financial crisis could halt their country’s momentum. Right now, neither seems imminent. Against this backdrop, the Crocus City Hall attack is perceived as merely a minor incident in a broader existential conflict with the U.S.-led international order, of which Islamic terrorism is seen as a byproduct. The Kremlin’s insistence that challenging the West—and revising the flawed and dangerous global order—will make the world safer has proved remarkably persuasive. Many Russians see defeating Ukraine as a crucial step in the Kremlin’s anti-Western agenda. Forget territorial gains or even preventing NATO expansion—establishing a political regime in Ukraine that is friendly to Russia, thereby denying the West a beachhead on Ukrainian soil, would mark a significant defeat for the West. Although this objective is on its face unrealistic and hard to attain, it drives Putin’s military strategy.

Neither terrorist attacks nor the prospect of Western boots on the ground in Ukraine can deter this broadly shared commitment to an anti-Western strategy. Attempting to appease Putin is futile, and wishfully seeking for fragmentation within Russia is unlikely to be effective as long as the country remains financially robust, maintains the upper hand over Ukraine, and secures total domestic control. The authorities are rapidly becoming more hawkish, the elites are increasingly embracing Putin’s war agenda, and the broader society is unable (or indeed unwilling) to exert the kind of pressure that might push Russia in a different directions. Western leaders face the unenviable task of determining how to engage with a Russia that has grown increasingly self-confident, bold, and radical.

Russia’s Pro-Putin Elites

How the Dictator Recruited Them to His Anti-Western Agenda

By Tatiana Stanovaya

May 9, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Tatiana Stanovaya · May 9, 2024

In March, a group of terrorists attacked the Crocus City Hall, a music venue and vast shopping complex on the outskirts of Moscow. Four gunmen shot into crowds indiscriminately and started a fire that caused the building to collapse, killing over 140 people. Islamic State Khorasan, or ISIS-K, an Afghanistan-based branch of the militant group, claimed responsibility for the attack. But the Russian government blamed Ukraine for the carnage, and, by extension, the West.

Many outside Russia saw the deadly terrorist attack—the worst in Russia since the 2004 Beslan school siege—as a major failure of the country’s supposedly infallible secret services, and a humiliation for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Western media speculated about how the event could influence the military campaign in Ukraine, erode the unity among Russia’s elites, potentially turn the broader public away from the government, and undermine the president’s image as the guarantor of a powerful, unified state.

Russians would not be blamed if the killings in Moscow provoked them to anger at the Kremlin. In the weeks leading up to the atrocity, Russian leaders received warnings not only from the United States, an adversary, but also from Iran, a Russian partner, that such an attack might take place. U.S. intelligence even specified that Crocus City Hall was a likely target. And yet Russian authorities did little to head off the terrorists. In a democratic state, the fact that the government had advance warning of a terrorist attack of this magnitude would have caused major outrage, leading to inquests and repercussions for officials who failed to keep the public safe.

But not in today’s Russia. Rather than fragmenting, Russia’s elites are becoming increasingly bellicose and marching in lockstep with the regime. The terrorist attack and its aftermath have demonstrated the country’s imperturbability. Russian society is aligned with the state and broadly accepts Putin’s resolute hostility to Ukraine and the West.

IF YOU CAN’T BEAT THEM

Before the March attack, many top Russian officials had in fact pronounced at length on the threat posed by Islamist groups and from ISIS-K in Afghanistan. Alexander Bortnikov, director of the Federal Security Service, Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Security Council, and Sergei Shoigu, the defense minister, had warned about the escalating threat of ISIS-K, insisting that the organization sought to establish new militant training camps and recruit supporters with the intention of striking Russia. But after the massacre in March, they swiftly pivoted away from Islamist terrorism. Instead, they spewed speculative vitriol about a “Ukrainian trail,” suggesting that Kyiv had some involvement in the attack. Fortunately for them, this narrative turned out to be the only storyline palatable to Putin: the president’s fixation with Ukraine allowed the Russian security services an opportunity to obscure their failure to prevent the terrorist attack.

During a period when officials and the media might have focused on addressing the threat of Islamist violence and exploring effective countermeasures, they instead directed attention toward possible Ukrainian aggression. This deflection is not altogether surprising. The conflict with Ukraine and, more broadly, the existential confrontation with the West have profoundly reinforced a sense of tunnel vision among the Russian elites. The truth is secondary to the Kremlin’s fictions. Those who were aware that Ukraine was not to blame were compelled to remain silent, while others parroted the most politically safe narrative. If you were to ask a high-profile individual in Moscow off the record whether they genuinely believed that Ukraine was responsible for the violence, you might hear speculative comments suggesting that Americans are waging war against Russia, with Ukraine and even radical Islamists involved as the West’s opportunistic tools. In Russia, many observers see a connection between the West and Islamist militants. Pro-war Russian channels on the social media platform Telegram have widely propagated the notion that U.S. actions and the West’s mishandling of regional conflicts are responsible for the emergence of ISIS, al Qaeda, and other extremist groups.

The truth is secondary to the Kremlin’s fictions.

Many within Russia’s elites readily blur the distinctions between Islamist terrorists, Ukrainians, and Americans, viewing them as components of a world system defined by its hostility to Russia. In their view, it makes no difference who perpetrated the Crocus City Hall attack. The important thing is that the attack was further evidence of a broad conspiracy against Russia, emanating from a global order that must be transformed.

More than two years of war have made the Russian elites more anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian than ever, binding them to Putin as their sole assurance of survival. The anti-Western narrative is now pervasive across all segments of the elite, including the siloviki (members of the security services), technocrats within the administration, former liberals now serving Putin, and hawks. This uniformity significantly narrows the potential for future dialogue with the West. The very idea of compromise with the West is repellent to many in the elite. Putin’s reelection in March, in which he won an unprecedented 87 percent of the vote, has reinforced among many the belief that change is impossible, fostering a sense of both powerlessness and dependency. In this situation, all one can do is accept reality: a Russia that is repressive, aggressive, jingoistic, and merciless. It’s not that elites trust Putin—it’s that to survive they have to reconcile themselves to the implacable, tightening grasp of the regime. Those who hoped to simply wait out this period of repression and zealotry now realize that there is no returning to the way things were. The only escape from despair and hopelessness that seems viable requires them to join the ranks of Putin’s devotees: becoming pro-war, radically anti-Western, and often gleeful about anything that hints at the crumbling of the U.S.-led international rules-based order.

The war and Putin’s escalating confrontation with the West are foreclosing the space for internal divisions and disagreements. In matters of national security and geopolitics, Putin has managed to forge an impressively homogenous political landscape where nothing can challenge the commitment to the war in Ukraine and hostility to the West. The regime has denied the dissenting segment of society—which accounts for approximately 25 percent of the population, a significant proportion, according to the surveys conducted by the Levada Center, Russia’s most reliable independent polling agency—any meaningful political infrastructure and the ability to express antiwar sentiment without risking imprisonment.

TO THE BITTER END

Many Western observers assumed that war fatigue, resource shortages, and intelligence failures would spur public dissatisfaction, internal conflicts among elite, and disillusionment with Putin. That has demonstrably not happened. A centripetal force is bearing down on Russia, with the Kremlin exerting greater control over state and society. Both the Russian elite and the broader public desire peace, but strictly on terms favorable to Russia—ideally with the de facto capitulation of Ukraine. They want Russia at a minimum to evade suffering a strategic defeat in Ukraine, but what constitutes an acceptable victory remains a matter of debate. Even to that nebulous end, they appear ready to fight forever.

Judging by off-the-record talks I had with contacts in Moscow, it became clear that nobody is looking for an exit strategy from the war or an opportunity to initiate dialogue with the West; nobody is concerned with persuading the West to ease sanctions; nobody is hungry for compromise with Ukraine, at least under its current leadership. There is no conjecture about what would constitute an acceptable deal to end this conflict. Instead, the Russian leadership and elites are proceeding on the basis that Russia cannot afford to lose the war, and that to ensure it does not the country must keep up the pressure on Ukraine, for no matter how long. The exact nature of that victory remains vague in the minds of Russian elites, who instead seem to find more safety in Russia’s posture of aggression alone. The war has become a goal in and of itself, serving multiple purposes: it staves off defeat, creates new opportunities for career growth and business ventures, and boosts the economy. Critiquing the war makes you an enemy of the state (and by extension, the public) and hoping for its imminent end is too wishful; a Russian defeat, after all, could make many in the country vulnerable to being held accountable for complicity in war crimes perpetrated in Ukraine.

Some observers argue that Ukraine should acknowledge that it cannot retake all the territories conquered by Russia and that Kyiv should be willing to cede land to Moscow to pave the way to peace. But that may not be enough for the Kremlin and the elites that serve it. Putin’s dispute over territory is a strategy rather than a final objective; his ultimate goal is not the seizure of a few provinces but the disbanding of Ukraine as a state in its present political form.

A centripetal force is bearing down on Russia, with the Kremlin exerting greater control over state and society.

In this context, French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent comments about the necessity of sending Western troops to Ukraine “if the Russians were to break through the front lines” have significant implications. France’s decision to intensify Western discussions about boots on the ground in Ukraine, along with giving Ukraine greater license to use Western arms to strike targets in Russian territory, have made the Kremlin more willing to escalate. This week, Putin ordered his forces to carry out exercises related to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, explicitly signaling that Moscow will not hesitate to use such arms if the Western presence in Ukraine grows more threatening.

As Russian leaders weigh which nuclear options might best deter the West from taking bolder steps in Ukraine, many within the Russian elite welcome the escalation. “How does Europe not understand this?” one Moscow source in policymaking circles told me. “There’s noticeable excitement among the elites and the military: the prospect of engaging NATO soldiers is far more motivating than confronting Ukrainians. For Putin, any form of intervention would be a welcome scenario.”

In addition, there is a belief in Moscow’s corridors of powers that the deployment of Western soldiers to Ukraine would actually work in Russia’s favor, since it would inevitably result in Western casualties and consequently exacerbate divisions within Western societies and political classes, leading to the weakening of Western support for Ukraine. Many in Russia are in fact eagerly anticipating the further escalation of the conflict, confident in their country’s invincibility.

FOREVER WAR

Among Russian elites, the prevailing belief is that only a military defeat or a prolonged, severe financial crisis could halt their country’s momentum. Right now, neither seems imminent. Against this backdrop, the Crocus City Hall attack is perceived as merely a minor incident in a broader existential conflict with the U.S.-led international order, of which Islamic terrorism is seen as a byproduct. The Kremlin’s insistence that challenging the West—and revising the flawed and dangerous global order—will make the world safer has proved remarkably persuasive. Many Russians see defeating Ukraine as a crucial step in the Kremlin’s anti-Western agenda. Forget territorial gains or even preventing NATO expansion—establishing a political regime in Ukraine that is friendly to Russia, thereby denying the West a beachhead on Ukrainian soil, would mark a significant defeat for the West. Although this objective is on its face unrealistic and hard to attain, it drives Putin’s military strategy.

Neither terrorist attacks nor the prospect of Western boots on the ground in Ukraine can deter this broadly shared commitment to an anti-Western strategy. Attempting to appease Putin is futile, and wishfully seeking for fragmentation within Russia is unlikely to be effective as long as the country remains financially robust, maintains the upper hand over Ukraine, and secures total domestic control. The authorities are rapidly becoming more hawkish, the elites are increasingly embracing Putin’s war agenda, and the broader society is unable (or indeed unwilling) to exert the kind of pressure that might push Russia in a different directions. Western leaders face the unenviable task of determining how to engage with a Russia that has grown increasingly self-confident, bold, and radical.

TATIANA STANOVAYA is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center and the Founder and CEO of the political analysis firm R.Politik.

Foreign Affairs · by Tatiana Stanovaya · May 9, 2024

21. The East and South China Seas: One Sea, Near Seas, Whose Seas?

Map and graphic at the link. https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/the-east-and-south-china-seas-one-sea-near-seas-whose-seas/

Excerpts:

Conclusion: Several Seas, Many Problems, New Solutions?

China does not have one “best strategy” in its near seas, but employs several interrelated strategies: establish de factocontrol over territory, bargain when possible, escalate when necessary, accommodate when it serves other strategic purposes, and shape (or ignore) regional and international institutions involved in dispute resolution. For those who follow the South China Sea, it feels like we are watching the movie Groundhog Day, with the same issues being re-hashed year after year. The China-Association of Southeast Asian Nations Declaration of Conduct is supposed to lead to a formal Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, but negotiations continue to be bogged down by significant disagreements over its purpose and whether decisions would be binding. Critics of the negotiations argue that China is deliberately slowing the process to consolidate its military gains. But China might not be the only problem. Over 82 percent of Southeast Asians believe that “[the Association of Southeast Asian Nations] is slow and ineffective,” based on a survey conducted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Studies Centre at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.

The United States is not a claimant state, and because of the intractability of the underlying maritime and territorial disputes, U.S. policymakers should expect more déjà vu in the South China Sea. Many policy recommendations have already been implemented, such as increasing partner capacity (for example U.S. donations of patrol vessels to the Philippines) and enhancing regional maritime domain awareness. Other key steps, such as U.S. Senate ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, have yet to occur. For Washington, supporting partners with the most at stake allows those countries to exercise their own agency. Japan has updated its defense policies because of concerns about the risks of conflict in the Taiwan Strait, as well as other regional issues. Vietnam has deployed its own vessels to monitor China Coast Guard activities in the South China Sea. In January, the Philippines and Vietnam signed two memorandums of understanding to “enhance coordination on maritime issues,” illustrating that it is up to claimant states to figure out how to resolve these disputes. The United States can increase assistance to those partners, as the current administration has emphasized, but cannot solve the disputes themselves.

Yet, enabling partners and allies provides evidence of the U.S. commitment to the rules-based international order and highlights the potential of minilateral solutions. Beijing often criticizes countries, such as Japan, of “ganging up to form cliques and fanning bloc confrontation” against China. But this narrative places too much focus on antiquated Cold War narratives and allows too little acknowledgement of the frustrations of those nations around China’s expansive definitions of what constitutes “Chinese territory.” Enduring U.S. rhetorical and material support to partners may, at times, increase tensions around specific hot spots, such as Taiwan or Second Thomas Shoal. But occasional tensions are preferable to the costs of inaction. Beijing’s incremental approach to strengthen the People’s Liberation Army and Coast Guard posture in the South China Sea has allowed China to overwhelm the military and law enforcement capacity of other claimants. In the East China Sea, China’s patrols risk more incidents, but the close proximity to Taiwan further complicates decision-making for Japan, the United States, and Taiwan. Living up to U.S. rhetoric on maintaining the rules-based international order means reinforcing partners and institutions that allow all nations access to the East and South China Seas and contest Beijing’s efforts to consolidate these seas into “One China Sea.”

The East and South China Seas: One Sea, Near Seas, Whose Seas? - War on the Rocks

APRIL A. HERLEVI AND BRIAN WAIDELICH

warontherocks.com · by April A. Herlevi · May 9, 2024

Editor’s Note: This is part of a short series examining maritime geography and strategic challenges in specific bodies of water, ranging from the Arctic Ocean to the Gulf of Guinea and the South China Sea.

One Sea, Two Seas, Far Seas, Near Seas? For all the attention they receive as contested Indo-Pacific maritime regions, the strategic differences between East and South China Seas do not always get their due. Each of these bodies of water contains land features claimed by the People’s Republic of China and at least one ally or partner of the United States. To Beijing, the East and South China Seas are all part of its “near seas,” and China continues to take steps to assert control over this space as one unified maritime periphery — which we refer to colloquially as China’s “One Sea.” The disputed land features in these seas are small — islands, reefs, and rocks — but the economic, maritime, and security stakes associated with them are large. Countries around the East and South China Seas, however, are not taking China’s actions passively. In their own unique ways that reject the notion of a single “One China Sea,” these countries are adapting and exploring new methods to assert their own maritime rights.

For those who view this region from afar, understanding the differences between the East and South China Seas is an important first step toward addressing the challenges posed by Beijing. Disputes in the East China Sea are primarily bilateral. Japan has expressly denied that China has any legitimate claims to the Senkaku Islands. In the South China Sea, disputes are inherently multilateral because of the large number of claimants and role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It is also important to appreciate the rapidly evolving responses from nations contesting China’s claims, each of which employs unique approaches. In the Philippines, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has noted the need for a “paradigm shift” in terms of diplomatic approaches to the disputes — this stark rhetoric contributes to increased tension between Manila and Beijing, with the most recent incidents occurring in March. Vietnam has continued land reclamationactivities, but also signed agreements to increase cooperation with the Philippines. Malaysia states that its “position on the South China Sea is consistent and remains unchanged” while quietly resolving some issues with neighbors such as Brunei. In the Taiwan Strait, which sits between the East and South China Seas, tensions between China and Taiwan continue to concern neighbors that could be drawn into a potential conflict. In the long term, understanding each country’s approach will be necessary for fully resolving the disputes. In the near term, U.S. policymakers will need to continue to tailor their approach in a way that acknowledges these differences while recognizing that the United States is not a claimant state.

With all this in mind, we argue that U.S. policymakers should maintain realistic expectations for dispute resolution, while also pushing for the (long overdue) Senate ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Law of Sea. The United States should continue to enable partners to ensure that all nations have access to the East and South China Seas.

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East and South China Seas: Parallels

Clear similarities exist between the East and South China Seas. First, the two bodies of water have comparable geographies, and each play a key role in maritime shipping. Both are bound in one direction by mainland China and in the other by the first island chain, a series of archipelagoes extending from Russia’s Kamchatka Peninsula in the northeast down through Japan and Taiwan to the Malay Peninsula in the southwest.

Second, the East and South China Seas are rich in biological and energy resources. Both contain valuable fishing grounds that support the economic growth and food security of East and Southeast Asian countries. According to one estimate, the value of these fisheries is over $7 billion in the East China Sea and more than $15 billion in the South China Sea. In terms of oil and gas resources, the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that the hydrocarbon reserves in the East China Sea comprise at least 200 million barrels of oil and up to 2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. In the South China Sea, the estimate is considerably higher: 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Yet, due to increasing exploitation of their rich resources, the two seas face significant environmental concerns, facing challenges from pollution, natural habitat destruction, and severe depletion of fish stocks. In the South China Sea, coral reef cover is declining at a rate of 16 percent per decade.

Third, the two seas have seen increasing militarization, as countries competing for resources have more assertively enforced their maritime claims. In the South China Sea, this has included nations reclaiming land, constructing artificial islands, building military outposts on land features, conducting intelligence gathering and sovereignty patrols, and engaging in occasional altercations such as the 2014 China-Vietnam oil rig crisis. Although the East China Sea has not seen disputants build military infrastructure on contested land features, waters around the Senkaku Islands (which China calls the Diaoyu Islands) are increasingly the site of patrols by military and paramilitary forces. As tensions continue to simmer over Taiwan — which Beijing views as an inherent part of China — the waters in and around the Taiwan Strait have become stages for frequent presence and deterrence operations with escalatory potential.

“One China Sea”?

From Beijing’s perspective, both the East and South China Seas should be controlled in a unified manner as part of China’s territorial sea. China has employed diverse legal and military means to attain this objective despite longstanding objections and countermeasures from other claimants.

Beijing’s legal tactics to assert control over its maritime periphery have included a selective approach to international maritime law buttressed by Chinese domestic law. In 1992, China’s government passed the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the People’s Republic of China “to exercise its sovereignty over its territorial sea” — defined as encompassing all islands in the East and South China Seas. In 1996, China ratified the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea but declared that its own domestic law affirmed its sovereignty over “all its archipelagoes and islands,” including those outlined in the 1992 law. Since China did not agree with the exclusive economic zone provisions of the convention, Beijing also passed a domestic law in 1998 specifying that China “exercises its sovereign rights and jurisdiction over its exclusive economic zone and its continental shelf.” Beijing continues to make claims about “historic rights” to the South China Sea, though most legal scholars agree that these claims are either inconsistent with the convention or undermine international maritime law. After the July 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling in favor of the Philippines, China issued a white paper outlining an extensive list of reasons why the Chinese government thought the ruling was wrong.

For Beijing, these seas represent critical access to maritime power. The People’s Liberation Army Navy, China Coast Guard, and China Maritime Militia regularly patrol these waters. The world’s 6 busiest container ports are located on the shores of one of these seas, including Shanghai, Ningbo, and Qingdao (East China Sea) and Singapore, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou (South China Sea). Global trade passing through the South China Sea alone each year is worth over 3 trillion dollars, and China continues to drive intra-Asian container traffic despite changes in supply chains after the COVID-19 pandemic.

For many years, China has employed its armed forces to enforce its sovereignty claims and deter foreign military intervention. Beijing has steadily modernized its military and employed a diverse range of tactics in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait to intimidate the forces of smaller militaries and complicate U.S. military operations in these areas. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, since the fall of 2021 the Chinese military has exhibited an increasing trend of coercive and risky operational behavior against U.S. and allied military ships and aircraft. Examples from the past year include a Chinese destroyer crossing a U.S. destroyer’s bow at dangerously close distance in the Taiwan Strait and a Chinese fighter’s unsafe and unprofessional intercept of a U.S. bomber flying over the South China Sea.

East versus South China Seas: Divergence

Sovereignty disputes in the East China Sea are primarily bilateral. The argument between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands is largely distinct from tensions between China and Taiwan although the dividing line between the two disputes has begun to blur. In the South China Sea, the issue is fundamentally multilateral because of the important role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, even if individual features may be disputes bilaterally or trilaterally.

In the bilateral disputes between China and Japan, tensions have alternated between periods of restraint and escalatory conduct. For example, during the administration of Junichiro Koizumi in Japan (2001–2006), Japan strengthened its claims and China showed restraint, as described by Andrew Taffer. Later, between 2008 and 2010, Beijing undertook a more coercive strategy prompted, in part, by an incident between a Chinese trawler and Japan Coast Guard ship. The latest escalatory wave began in 2020, as China Coast Guard vessels moved from “normalizing” operations around the islands to attempting to “exercise control” by patrolling these waters without interruption. In 2022, the China Coast Guard once again increased the regularity of its presence, conducting operations for an unprecedented 336 days.

The Taiwan Strait: It’s Complicated

While East China Sea disputes remain primarily bilateral (with the potential for U.S. intervention), the status of Taiwan has complicated national security planning for adjacent countries. A major escalation in the strait followed then-U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan, which received strong opposition from Beijingcontributing to what some have called the “Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis.” Beijing responded to the Pelosi visit by having the People’s Liberation Army engage in a series of major exercises that included missile overflights of Taiwan with five ballistic missiles landing in Japan’s exclusive economic zone. Although the military exercises died down after several days, China’s armed forces continue to conduct frequent patrols across the Taiwan Strait median line and in other waters and airspace near Taiwan. In February, the China Coast Guard boarded a sightseeing cruise in the vicinity of the island of Kinmen (Jinmen) within days of an incident involving the Taiwan Coast Guard and a Chinese fishing vessel.

Amid growing regional security concerns, Japan released three major strategic documents in December 2022 that laid the groundwork for an unprecedented increase in military spending and the development of offensive capabilities. These documents — Japan’s National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program — have significant implications for a Senkaku Islands contingency, as well as implications for any potential conflicts in the Taiwan Strait. These policies build upon a line of public rhetoric first seen in Japan’s 2021 defense white paper in which Tokyo links the security of Taiwan to Japan’s own security. Tokyo’s greenlighting of increased defense spending and commitment to purchase “stand-off defense capability” has likely affected Beijing’s calculus.

South China Sea disputes are largely multilateral because Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei are all Association of Southeast Asian Nations member states. Three or more parties claim sovereignty over many of the land features in the South China Sea. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam contest sovereignty over the Paracel Islands in the sea’s north and the Spratly Islands in its south. The Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei also claim sovereignty over some of the Spratly Islands. Brunei, considered the “quietest claimant nation” because it does not engage in public debates on the disputes, has abandoned some territorial claims with Malaysia in the interests of joint development between the two countries. Taiwan has its own claims in the South China Sea, which grew out of policies prior to 1949, when the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) still controlled mainland China.

Unlike the Senkaku Islands, which are uninhabited, a distinguishing feature of the South China Sea is that all sovereignty claimants (except Brunei) militarily occupy multiple disputed land features. South China Sea claimants have pursued multilateral mechanisms — via the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration — to manage territorial sovereignty disputes. Yet, those multilateral efforts have not stopped the military build-up. Most countries’ military footprints are relatively austere, but China’s large-scale land reclamation activities transformed several features of the disputed Spratly Islands into bases with military capabilities far outstripping the facilities of other claimants. Building military facilities could be viewed as inconsistent with the China-Association of Southeast Asian Nations Declaration of Conduct, which was agreed to in 2002. The Declaration of Conduct, while technically non-binding and meant to lead to an actual Code of Conduct, expressly stated that claimants should “exercise self-restraint” by not inhabiting features.

China’s military efforts to consolidate anti-ship, anti-air, and other capabilities on its Spratly outposts has not deterred other states, such as the Philippines, from their own claims. Despite significant differences in combat power, confrontations have recently occurred around Second Thomas Shoal (a submerged reef in the Spratly Islands) and Scarborough Shoal (a rock in the eastern part of the South China Sea). In December 2023, China Coast Guard cutters used water cannons against Philippine resupply vessels at Second Thomas Shoal and rammed one of the vessels. Tensions around those land features continue to simmer, and in March, a collision between “Chinese and Philippine coast guard vessels” resulted in injuries to four Filipino crew members.

Conclusion: Several Seas, Many Problems, New Solutions?

China does not have one “best strategy” in its near seas, but employs several interrelated strategies: establish de factocontrol over territory, bargain when possible, escalate when necessary, accommodate when it serves other strategic purposes, and shape (or ignore) regional and international institutions involved in dispute resolution. For those who follow the South China Sea, it feels like we are watching the movie Groundhog Day, with the same issues being re-hashed year after year. The China-Association of Southeast Asian Nations Declaration of Conduct is supposed to lead to a formal Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, but negotiations continue to be bogged down by significant disagreements over its purpose and whether decisions would be binding. Critics of the negotiations argue that China is deliberately slowing the process to consolidate its military gains. But China might not be the only problem. Over 82 percent of Southeast Asians believe that “[the Association of Southeast Asian Nations] is slow and ineffective,” based on a survey conducted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Studies Centre at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.

The United States is not a claimant state, and because of the intractability of the underlying maritime and territorial disputes, U.S. policymakers should expect more déjà vu in the South China Sea. Many policy recommendations have already been implemented, such as increasing partner capacity (for example U.S. donations of patrol vessels to the Philippines) and enhancing regional maritime domain awareness. Other key steps, such as U.S. Senate ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, have yet to occur. For Washington, supporting partners with the most at stake allows those countries to exercise their own agency. Japan has updated its defense policies because of concerns about the risks of conflict in the Taiwan Strait, as well as other regional issues. Vietnam has deployed its own vessels to monitor China Coast Guard activities in the South China Sea. In January, the Philippines and Vietnam signed two memorandums of understanding to “enhance coordination on maritime issues,” illustrating that it is up to claimant states to figure out how to resolve these disputes. The United States can increase assistance to those partners, as the current administration has emphasized, but cannot solve the disputes themselves.

Yet, enabling partners and allies provides evidence of the U.S. commitment to the rules-based international order and highlights the potential of minilateral solutions. Beijing often criticizes countries, such as Japan, of “ganging up to form cliques and fanning bloc confrontation” against China. But this narrative places too much focus on antiquated Cold War narratives and allows too little acknowledgement of the frustrations of those nations around China’s expansive definitions of what constitutes “Chinese territory.” Enduring U.S. rhetorical and material support to partners may, at times, increase tensions around specific hot spots, such as Taiwan or Second Thomas Shoal. But occasional tensions are preferable to the costs of inaction. Beijing’s incremental approach to strengthen the People’s Liberation Army and Coast Guard posture in the South China Sea has allowed China to overwhelm the military and law enforcement capacity of other claimants. In the East China Sea, China’s patrols risk more incidents, but the close proximity to Taiwan further complicates decision-making for Japan, the United States, and Taiwan. Living up to U.S. rhetoric on maintaining the rules-based international order means reinforcing partners and institutions that allow all nations access to the East and South China Seas and contest Beijing’s efforts to consolidate these seas into “One China Sea.”

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April A. Herlevi is a senior research scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses and a non-resident fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research. She was in Beijing in 2010 when China signaled its desire to build facilities in the South China Sea. From 2020 to 2022, she lived in Okinawa in the East China Sea and watched firsthand as Japan’s defense posture changed. She now resides on O‘ahu in the Hawaiian Islands and analyzes China’s foreign policy in its near and far seas.

Brian Waidelich is a research scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses’s China and Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division and president of the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. His research interests include politics and security in East Asia, with a focus on maritime and space issues involving China and Japan.

The authors’ opinions are theirs alone and do not represent the opinions of the Center for Naval Analyses or any of its sponsors.

Image: Rumsey Map Collection

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by April A. Herlevi · May 9, 2024

22. In Brief: The U.S.-Chinese Relationship

Excerpt:

We asked four experts to evaluate the state of the U.S.-Chinese relationship and whether it’s headed for a detente or an escalation in tensions. Read more below.

In Brief: The U.S.-Chinese Relationship - War on the Rocks

HTTPS://WARONTHEROCKS.COM/2024/05/IN-BRIEF-THE-U-S-CHINESE-RELATIONSHIP/

COLLIN MEISEL, MIKE STUDEMAN, YUN SUN, AND RORRY DANIELS

MAY 8, 2024

MEMBERS

A lot happens every day. Alliances shift, leaders change, and conflicts erupt. With In Brief, we’ll help you make sense of it all. Each week, experts will dig deep on a single issue happening in the world to help you better understand it.

***

Last month, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken traveled to Beijing in the latest of a series of high-level meetings between Chinese and U.S. leadership to ease tensions. After the meeting, Blinken said that the United States and China were focusing on “areas where we’re working to cooperate,” but also highlighted that competition and differences persist. He also warned that there was evidence that China had attempted to interfere in U.S. elections later this year.

We asked four experts to evaluate the state of the U.S.-Chinese relationship and whether it’s headed for a detente or an escalation in tensions. Read more below.

Collin Meisel

Associate Director of Geopolitical Analysis

Pardee Institute at the University of Denver

A recent Pew poll highlighted just how much U.S. public opinion has soured on China in recent years, with eight in ten respondents having an unfavorable view of the People’s Republic of China versus four or five in ten a decade ago. Several Republican lawmakers also appear interested in giving new life to a U.S.-Chinese trade war — and they may get a chance if Donald Trump is elected to a second presidential term in November. Meanwhile, in the lead-up to the general election, the Biden administration has little incentive to work toward improved ties with Beijing, lest Biden’s political opponents use it as evidence that he is “soft on China” and out of step with American public opinion.

Regardless, structural trends will likely contribute to an increasingly tense U.S.-Chinese relationship over the next several years. Despite recent downgrades in China’s economic growth forecasts from the International Monetary Fund, China’s economy is still forecast to grow faster than that of the United States for at least the next five years. This means continued convergence in relative U.S. and Chinese economic power, and likely relative national power more broadly. If, on the other hand, the downgrades in China’s economic growth prospects continue, then “peak China” may come sooner than Chinese leaders likely expected. If and when that peak comes, every year thereafter will be the least bad year to attempt a forceful reunification with Taiwan, assuming President Xi Jinping or his successor(s) truly believe reunification “must be fulfilled.”

Mike Studeman

Former Indo-Pacific Command Director of Intelligence

Former Commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence

National Security Fellow, MITRE

Current U.S.-Chinese efforts to strategically “stabilize” are turning superpower relations back to a status quo ante that largely favors China while consuming the finite energy of U.S. leadership with process-heavy engagements that generate marginal gains. The United States should have open communication channels with Beijing to prevent miscalculation and avoid a total collapse of the U.S.-Chinese relationship, but recent diplomatic interactions represent little more than kabuki theater and political fakery. China has curtailed none of its direct and comprehensive challenges to U.S. interests, security, prosperity, or values. The United States should not deceive itself into thinking that rejuvenated engagement will actually temper Beijing’s ambitions. The best the United States will get is token support on peripheral issues, while China gets a tranquilized White House even more reluctant to enumerate Chinese dangers to the American people along with resumed flows of American investment dollars and more time to build up its power to the United States. China continues to play the United States better than the U.S. government is playing them.

Yun Sun

Senior Fellow &

Director of the China Program

Stimson Center

Since the Woodside summit in November 2023, U.S.-China relations are being stabilized but remain fundamentally unstable. The efforts by Washington to address some of the most pressing issues in bilateral relations have seen some progress, such as on the resumption of military-to-military communications and on fentanyl. Intergovernmental dialogues on AI and consultation on regional issues are expected to resume. Given that both countries have higher priorities to pursue this year, any change to the current effort to stabilize relations will be likely to happen after the November U.S. presidential elections. While the direction of growing competition is unlikely to change, the result of the November elections will have a significant impact on the format, scope, style, tempo, and intensity of that competition. The Chinese expect continuity under a second Biden presidency, which will be tough on China but still largely stable. But if Donald Trump wins the election, China expects nothing but volatility and that another rollercoaster ride will begin.

Rorry Daniels

Managing Director

Asia Society Policy Institute

The recent trip by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to China appears to have been successful given the low expectations for serious diplomatic breakthroughs. Readouts of the trip focused on tough messages delivered to the other side, suggesting that managing domestic audiences remains a high priority. Still, the fact that Secretary Blinken held what were described as particularly candid meetings with a range of officials — including Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong; Blinken’s counterpart, Wang Yi; and the man himself, Chairman Xi — underscores some political will for continued stability from the Woodside summit last November to now.

Mutual mistrust will continue to characterize the relationship and each country sees the other as not only a competitor but increasingly a threat to their own ambitions. Even areas ripe for short-term cooperation, such as people-to-people exchange, increased investment, or clean energy transition, are seen by some in each system as long-term liabilities.

Looking ahead, the greatest risk to establishing a predictable pattern of interaction under these conditions of mistrust will be how these threat assessments are amplified by domestic politics and international events. A flare-up over Taiwan as its new administration comes into office, an escalation of the South China Sea stand-offs, a hyper-focus on China in the U.S. election campaigns, or a spy balloon-like incident could all radically test the current tentative, probing diplomatic exercises, including senior leader trips.

23. Marine Special Operations Paragliding Capabilities Emerge At Demonstration In Tampa

Marine Special Operations Paragliding Capabilities Emerge At Demonstration In Tampa

Paragliding Marines went on a mock drone hunt at the event, but this is a capability that could be valuable for a host roles.

HOWARD ALTMAN, JOSEPH TREVITHICK

PUBLISHED MAY 8, 2024 3:45 PM EDT

twz.com · by Howard Altman, Joseph Trevithick · May 8, 2024

The ability of Marine special operators to ride into combat on paragliders has been put front and center at an annual show-and-tell event in Tampa. This is part of their toolkit that does not look to have been previously shown publicly. In this particular instance, the scenario also involved the airborne special operations forces hunting down a swarm of enemy drones.

One of the paraglider Marine special operators. Jamie Hunter

Paragliders are a tool that special operations forces could use in various contexts, especially to infiltrate into denied or otherwise sensitive areas. Hamas terrorists notably used paragliders in their unprecedented surprise attacks on southern Israel last October and North Korean commandos have trained to employ them to infiltrate across the DMZ and attack critical sites.

The paragliding Marine special operators, who were seen using both backpack and tricycle buggy designs, appeared in the skies over Tampa yesterday and again today as part of the capabilities demonstration, or CAPEX, held during the annual SOF Week conference. This looks to be the first time paragliders of any kind have taken part in this event, which has become a yearly tradition in the city.

Marine special operators using backpack and tricycle buggy-type paragliders descend on Tampa's harbor area on May 7 as part of a rehearsal for the annual SOF Week CAPEX. Jamie Hunter

The CAPEX offers a unique chance to see U.S. and foreign special operators show off their skills, as well as get a glimpse of various special operations aircraft, ground vehicles, and other materiel. For years its focus has been on things relevant to counter-terrorism and similar low-intensity operations, reflecting real-world U.S. special operations forces activities in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq.

This year, the demonstration has changed in ways that reflect a broader shift in the U.S. military toward preparing for higher-end conflicts, especially a potential major fight in the Pacific against China. The counter-drone swarm paraglider scenario is certainly indicative of this in many ways.

Jamie Hunter

"The parafoils are a MARSOC [U.S. Marine Forces Special Operations Command] capability. And in this scenario today, during the [capabilities] demo, they'll be bringing electronic warfare capabilities, as well as anti-drone [capabilities]," Army Sgt. Maj. Jason Baker, a U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) spokesperson, told The War Zone. "We're just demonstrating some of what could be possible. And so, out there ... the notional adversary has an electronic warfare capability, [that is] shutting down our [communications]. And so they're [the MARSOC operators are] coming down and shutting down that."

Baker declined to elaborate on the counter-drone electronic warfare capability being simulated in this instance. Jammers are a common means of attempting to defeat uncrewed aerial systems, especially smaller types that rely on line-of-sight control links, including weaponized commercial designs.

As The War Zone regularly highlights, the threats posed by drones to U.S. military forces on and off traditional battlefields, as well as critical non-military targets, are real now and are only set to grow in the future. Uncrewed systems on the ground and at sea, as well as in the air, are increasingly part of this overall threat picture, too. Near-peer competitors, especially China, which has been very actively working on swarming technologies to go along with its uncrewed platform developments, as well as smaller countries and even non-state actors, are all steadily increasing their use of drones in all domains. The U.S. military continues to be very much playing catch-up in addressing these threats.

Jamie Hunter

Just how viable a tactic paragliding Marine special operators with electronic warfare suites hunting for enemy drones me be is unclear. There are other potential real-world applications for how paragliders might be used to support special operations and conventional military missions.

"The parafoil, in general, is a great special operations platform that the Marines are taking advantage of. It's something that's easily deployable, it's light, it's inexpensive, it uses unleaded gasoline, so you can find that anywhere," Jim Gregory, the Deputy Director of SOCOM's Office of Communications, also told The War Zone about the paragliders at the CAPEX. "And it's something that can take off from say a ship or you know an otherwise fairly inaccessible area for air capability. So they can get operators up off the ground and take advantage of that other [air] dimension of warfare ... that they might not otherwise be able to."

Gregory further highlighted how paragliders have a very low operational footprint, further increasing their overall flexibility and utility.

Jamie Hunter

Perhaps most importantly, paragliders and similar systems like powered hang gliders also offer aerial capabilities with very low radar, infrared, sound, and other signatures that make them very hard for defenders to detect.

How long MARSOC, as well as any other U.S. military units, have already been using or at least testing and evaluating paragliders is unknown. This very well could been an older lapsed capability brought back for modern day applications, as well. In 2020, the U.S. Navy put out a contracting notice expressing interest in demonstrating the feasibility of using paragliders in airborne surveillance and ship-to-shore mobility roles in support of Marine Corps requirements.

Paragliding equipment company BlackHawk Paramotors USA also has a video on YouTube from 2013, seen below, showing U.S. Army special operators receiving paraglider training.

U.S. special operators are known to have operationally employed uncrewed paraglider systems called CQ-10A SnowGooses on at least a limited basis to help resupply personnel in remote and austere forward locations. An autogyro version of the Snowgoose designated the CQ-10B was also developed.

A CQ-10A SnowGoose seen after touching down somewhere in Iraq. DOD

Regardless, as already noted, paragliders are a capability that other armed forces and non-state militant groups have in their arsenals.

Hamas terrorists very notably used paragliders to infiltrate into southern Israel as part of their attacks on October 7, 2023.

North Korea has also included paragliders in exercises meant to simulate attacks on the South. The North Korean armed forces famously maintain a fleet of archaic An-2 biplanes, which offer another very low-signature way to support infiltration and other special operations activities, as The War Zone has highlighted in the past.

North Korean troops parachute from An-2 biplanes. North Korean State Media

Drug cartels have also used similar capabilities to get illicit narcotics from Mexico into the United States.

Altogether, it is not hard to see how the U.S. special operations community, which is always on the lookout for new and discreet ways to increase operator mobility, as well as the Marine Corps (and not just MARSOC), would be interested in using paragliders in various capacities. For the Marines, such a capability could be well aligned with the service's new and still evolving expeditionary and distributed concepts of operations, which are heavily centered on island-hopping scenarios in the Pacific.

While it remains to be seen whether or not MARSOC ever actually sends out paraglider teams to hunt enemy drones remains to be seen, the core capability here is something that could have various real-world applications for U.S. special operations and conventional forces.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

twz.com · by Howard Altman, Joseph Trevithick · May 8, 2024

24. How the Kremlin's Information Warfare Influence U.S. Policymakers

Excerpts:

As these fake messages exploit social divisions and fears that appear on seemingly credible sites, they are likely to be picked up by influential voices. For example, Tucker Carlson claimed that President Zelensky “banned a Christian faith in his country and arrested nuns and priests,” which was later echoed by Marjorie Taylor Green (R., Ga.) who said, “The Ukrainian government is attacking Christians; the Ukrainian government is executing priests. Russia is not doing that; they're not attacking Christianity. As a matter of fact, they seem to be protecting it.” Vivek Ramaswamy and Sen. Rand Paul (R., Ky.) also repeated the same message making distorted truths an inseparable part of the mainstream public debate. This is an intentional goal of Russian disinformation campaigns to get influencers to unwittingly repeat lies, known as misinformation.

The last two steps are straightforward: the Kremlin denies involvement and plays the long game.

America’s vulnerability to information operations is critically high. Most especially in an election year, when billions of dollars of foreign aid are at stake. Policymakers in Washington must not be complacent. They must be more aware, fact and source check vigilantly, promote better digital literacy, and call out these tactics for what they are—a cunning attempt to undermine Western values and, yes, religious freedom, too. Failure to do so is a betrayal of fundamental American values.

Again I offer this from the 2017 NSS:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

How the Kremlin's Information Warfare Influence U.S. Policymakers

By Michelle C. Watson & Mónika Palotai , Kristóf György Veres

May 09, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/05/09/how_the_kremlins_information_warfare_influence_us_policymakers_1030518.html?mc_cid=c35c5e0dcd&mc_eid=70bf478f36

To combat Russian disinformation, policymakers in Washington DC must approach this critical threat as a nonpartisan national security issue and take proactive measures to identify and counter the Kremlin's operations. Once manipulated stories enter the mainstream public discourse, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish falsehoods from facts. As a result, the damage has already been done. We have witnessed during the months-long debate on the Ukraine-aid package, that allegations of Ukrainian religious freedom violations were able to play a significant role in stalling the agreement in the House for months. The passage of the $61B package does not negate Putin’s disinformation operation’ national security implications.

Recently, Michael McCaul (R. Tx.), head of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Mike Turner (R., Oh.), House Intelligence Committee Chair, accurately highlighted the Kremlin's influence on decision-makers in Washington DC. Russia, China and Iran have exponentially increased their targeted deception campaigns since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine to create narratives that promote their agenda. Russia spends $1.5B on influencing foreign audiences annually, while China allocates $7B to the same purpose. The soft power strategies of these authoritarian regimes often overlap, amplifying each other’s messages that are tailor-made for specific regions and countries.

The Kremlin’s main objective is to disrupt Western unity from supporting Ukraine. As uncertainties arose around aiding Kyiv, the Kremlin moved quickly to bring them to the forefront by injecting a disinformation narrative into the US public discourse. One of the central topics that has been weaponized is the false claim that Ukraine restricts religious freedom while Russia protects it.

A typical information warfare attack has several essential elements. According to the Influence Operations Kill Chain, market research is the adversaries’ first step. This crucial component allows foes to find divisions, weaknesses, and hot-button issues in the targeted country or region to exploit it for their own agenda. A 2023 Russian document obtained by a European intelligence service and analyzed by the Washington Post proves this “It’s important to create a mechanism for finding the vulnerable points of their external and internal policies with the aim of developing practical steps to weaken Russia’s opponents.” The Foreign Policy Concepts and National Security Strategies of the Russian Federation since Putin assumed power in 2000 increasingly portray Russia as a quasi-messiah committed to protect Christianity from the declining West. However, the true reality is that Russia has been identified by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom as one of the world's worst violators of religious freedom. The persecution of evangelical Christians is well-documented in the occupied territories. This did not stop Putin’s regime instantly capitalizing on the doubts formed around Kyiv’s efforts limiting the political and spiritual influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Once again, the truth is different: the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has made it a national security necessity for Kyiv to legally limit the influence of the Kremlin-proxy Russian Orthodox Church, which essentially has been operating as Russia’s local agents during the war. Regardless, the Kremlin’s propaganda machine has found a vulnerable spot.

The second step is to build up audiences and platforms. Ben Walters, a spokesperson for Meta, which owns WhatsApp, Facebook and Instagram said, “The Russian operations targeting Ukraine are aggressive and persistent.” An April 17 report by Microsoft revealed that in the U.S. claimed that “Messaging regarding Ukraine - via traditional media and social media - picked up steam over the last two months with a mix of covert and overt campaigns from at least 70 Russia-affiliated activity sets.” The power of persuasion lies in repetition. Russia floods multiple channels with similar and rapid content instead of relying on just one platform. In this case to conceal its religious persecution, repression, torture of religious personnel in the occupied territories, as well as the large-scale destruction of over 600 spiritual and cultural heritage sites by falsely accusing Kyiv doing the same.

Once these channels are established, the next step is to create alternative narratives, fake news, and deepfakes. Russian propaganda is notoriously masking kernels of truth with falsehoods. The twisted alternative Russian narrative is portraying Ukraine as an “anti-Christian dictatorship” a country where “satanism” flourishes, or as Russian presidential press secretary Peskov said is prosecuting a “war against Russian orthodoxy.” Meanwhile, Russia is presented as the “protector of Christianity.” The (kernel of) truth is the existence of the Ukrainian draft law to limit the Kremlin’s use of church as a soft power in time of war.

The next step is to make it seem as if the stories came from somewhere else. One way to do it is through a so-called Doppelganger operation, which mimics well-known news outlets like The Guardian and political entities like the French Ministry of Defence to spread disinformation. According to the EU Disinfo lab Russia has created at least 17 such media providers to publish fabricated articles, videos, and polls. The aim is to make fake news seem more credible and to spread them faster on social media.

As these fake messages exploit social divisions and fears that appear on seemingly credible sites, they are likely to be picked up by influential voices. For example, Tucker Carlson claimed that President Zelensky “banned a Christian faith in his country and arrested nuns and priests,” which was later echoed by Marjorie Taylor Green (R., Ga.) who said, “The Ukrainian government is attacking Christians; the Ukrainian government is executing priests. Russia is not doing that; they're not attacking Christianity. As a matter of fact, they seem to be protecting it.” Vivek Ramaswamy and Sen. Rand Paul (R., Ky.) also repeated the same message making distorted truths an inseparable part of the mainstream public debate. This is an intentional goal of Russian disinformation campaigns to get influencers to unwittingly repeat lies, known as misinformation.

The last two steps are straightforward: the Kremlin denies involvement and plays the long game.

America’s vulnerability to information operations is critically high. Most especially in an election year, when billions of dollars of foreign aid are at stake. Policymakers in Washington must not be complacent. They must be more aware, fact and source check vigilantly, promote better digital literacy, and call out these tactics for what they are—a cunning attempt to undermine Western values and, yes, religious freedom, too. Failure to do so is a betrayal of fundamental American values.

Michelle C. Watson is an American Business Executive, Visiting Senior Fellow at the Danube Institute in Budapest, Hungary, Co-creator of the Cyber Statecraft and Corporate Statecraft programs at the Institute of World Politics in Washington D.C. and former founder, CEO of Cyber Intelligent Partners in Mclean, Virginia.

Mónika Palotai is a Senior Fellow at the Religious Freedom Institute, Washington DC, Non-Resident Expert at the Warsaw Institute, Warsaw, jurist, PhD candidate at the National University of Public Services, Budapest in International Criminal Law

Kristóf György Veres is a Hungarian Historian, International Director of the Danube Institute, Budapest, Visiting Research Fellow at the Center for National Interest, Washington DC, and Non-Resident Expert at the Warsaw Institute, Warsaw.

25. CONCLUDING CONFLICT: WHY ENDING WAR IS NEVER AN EASY STRATEGY

Conclusion:

Former Pentagon senior advisor Rosa Brooks asserted that throughout the Global War on Terror, the United States increasingly defined foreign policy through the framework of conflict. As this trend continues the military has transformed into the nation’s primary mechanism of statecraft. If Brooks’ assertation is correct, which evidence clearly supports despite the 2022 National Security Strategy’s attempt to reprioritize diplomacy, then knowing how to plan for war’s termination becomes more important. Strategists must ensure that war, as a tool of statecraft, supports political objectives enabling the cessation of hostilities and optimizing post conflict outcomes. To overcome the myriad obstacles associated with ending wars and beginning peace processes, strategists must always focus on the primacy of policy to overcome decoupling war from warfare, avoid tactically focused strategic objectives, and defeat victory disease. In doing so strategists can use reason and logic to overcome primordial violence, hatred, and enmity to enable a nation to achieve a better peace, if and when force is required.

CONCLUDING CONFLICT: WHY ENDING WAR IS NEVER AN EASY STRATEGY

JAMES P. MICCICHE MAY 9, 2024 8 MIN READ

https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/concluding-conflict/?mc_cid=c35c5e0dcd&mc_eid=70bf478f36

To end war in a manner that brings long-term benefits, states must adopt an objective approach in defining political objectives and in designing military operations to achieve them.

As the world transitions to multipolarity, nations are increasingly turning to force to achieve political objectives, and while nations go to war expecting quick decisive results they habitually find themselves mired in protracted conflict. A primary reason nations can find themselves in conflicts lasting far longer than expected is the immense emotion related to war. War’s human nature affects all strata of society from political elites to the general populace creating three obstacles preventing states from ending conflict. The first is decoupling war from political goals, the second is an excessive focus on tactics, and the last is succumbing to victory disease.

The challenges associated with ending conflict are neither new nor a secret. Speaking in 2014 on ending the war in Afghanistan, President Barrack Obama warned, “I think Americans have learned that it’s harder to end wars than it is to begin them.” His warning proved true as the United States’ involvement lasted seven more years and ended in a Taliban victory. To end war in a manner that brings long-term benefits, states must adopt an objective approach in defining political objectives and in designing military operations to achieve them. A failure to do so can result in a state that excels at warfare, defined as the organization and employment of military power, but fails at war, which is the use of the military instrument of power to achieve positive political objectives.

Losing the Objective: War for War’s Sake

While a state’s political elites declare and end war, it is the people who provide the political support and fill the ranks to sustain conflict. In On War , Carl von Clausewitz states that the people’s role in war “mainly concerns…primordial violence, hatred, and enmity,” factors that only increase in intensity as war persists. Indeed, as Clausewitz notes, “If war is an act of force, the emotions cannot fail to be involved.” War and emotions are interdependent, and, if uncontrolled, will lead to increasing levels of violence, making war termination difficult. The First World War provides an example of how collective emotions prevented a durable peace. A reason the Entente powers failed to achieve enduring outcomes during the peace process was their public’s demand for harsh reparations from Germany. This demand for revenge was a contributing factor to an even bloodier war some three decades later or even, in the view of some scholars, a continuation of the same conflict.

In contrast to passion, the government represents reason; it is also a mechanism to harness the emotions of the people towards a goal. A role of government is to employ war as a tool to achieve policy goals. Clausewitz describes this imperative by stating, “war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object.” Thus, the primacy of policy must always be at the forefront for strategists during any application of force; this includes war’s termination. British theorist B.H. Liddell Hart also saw war as a means to achieve political outcomes, but also asserted that “the object in war is to attain a better peace, even if only from your own point of view.”

Is thus dangerous and an impediment to war termination when the prosecution of war is decoupled from policy. Gideon Rose highlights the tendency for policymakers to emphasize the negative aims of war, such as defeating enemy forces or winning individual battles, rather than prioritize the actions required to achieve positive political outcomes. This emphasis on the tactical and operational impedes the planning for war to achieve policy objectives, through such means as setting termination criteria, establishing conditions for peace talks, and defining how military victories are supporting political objectives.

Policymakers’ overemphasis on tactical execution can create a gap between war and policy. This gap can result in the military prosecuting a conflict detached from the other instruments of national power with little understanding of warfare’s impact on postwar conditions. The growing gap between the act of war and the desired results has become so common that General Tommy Franks, who oversaw the 2003 invasion of Iraq, bragged to policymakers, “You pay attention to the day after, I’ll pay attention to the day of.” Franks’ comments highlight the acceptance of a segregated planning process for war and peace that prioritizes the means over the ends, or, stated another way, prioritizes the war over the peace. This very act makes ending wars increasingly more difficult, as one can see from almost two decades of American involvement in Afghanistan where the Department of State and the Department of Defense regularly diverged on policy ranging from governance to security force assistance.

The United States remained undefeated in all major battles throughout the war, but failed because its strategy focused on tactical actions and never established defined and feasible outcomes against an opponent fighting an unlimited conflict.

Tactics sans Strategy

Despite their primacy in the creation of strategy, directed political objectives can be inappropriately tactically focused and impede the prosecution and termination of conflict, even when generated from outside the military. Political objectives that are inherently tactical will likely lack some larger theory of victory, resulting in protracted wars in which the best possible outcome is a stalemate. During the Vietnam War, the Johnson administration’s flawed policy of attrition within a limited conflict was translated by Pentagon officials into a series of essentially tactical tasks, such as killing more enemy troops or bombing certain targets. As a technologically superior force with over 500,000 servicemembers deployed to Vietnam, the United States was able to conduct these tasks with impunity, generating scores of data and analytics in doing so. The United States remained undefeated in all major battles throughout the war, but failed because its strategy focused on tactical actions and never established defined and feasible outcomes against an opponent fighting an unlimited conflict. The United States’ failure in Vietnam is an example of the pithy quotation often incorrectly attributed to Sun Tzu, “tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.” It is essential for strategists to collaborate with policymakers to inform the best use of military force, including identifying political objectives obtainable through military power. Only then can a state work towards termination criteria and know when to end a conflict.

Victory Disease

Counterintuitively, winning might impede long-term success through the condition of so-called “victory disease,” which Colin Gray defines as “the extreme, almost euphoric, condition of overconfidence.” Victory disease can occur before or during a conflict. In its pre-conflict manifestation, a nation believes so highly in its capabilities that it begins the war with little concern for the enemy, the environment, and, most importantly, potential long-term outcomes. For example, Adolf Hitler, emboldened by his victories culminating in the fall of France, launched Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union opening a second front against a state with latent power magnitudes larger than Germany. This condition still affects contemporary states. In 2003, the United States, encouraged by its unipolar status and recent victory over the Taliban, believed its 2003 invasion of Iraq would last less than five months. Similarly, Russia after the annexation of Crimea and later successful intervention in Syria expected a quick and decisive victory against Ukraine but is now entering the third year of a conflict some are calling a stalemate.

When victory disease occurs during war, nations ignore political objectives and delay termination under the false hope that there is more to be had due to recent success. Starting in 425 BC, Athens rejected multiple Spartan peace offerings to end the Peloponnesian War despite having achieved its political objectives, a choice based on overconfidence and greed that could have avoided Athens’ ultimate demise. Some 2300 years later, Imperial Japan’s arrogance after victories in 1941 and 1942 created a condition known as senshoubyou, which led to strategic overreach, operational overconfidence, and tactical complacency, all major factors in Japan’s subsequent defeat.

To overcome victory disease, or at least reduce its impact, policymakers and strategists must continually assess war conditions and ensure assessments are both informing policy and tied to termination criteria. Accepting hard truths is no easy task, as multiple cognitive biases exist forcing individuals to seek affirmation, avoid contradictory information, and ignore or downplay unwelcome news. More recently, this was evident as both the executive and the legislative branches ignored countless reports from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) outlining the dire state of affairs in the latter half of the nearly twenty-year war in Afghanistan despite consistent tactical success. Heeding or addressing these warnings could have potentially led policymakers to realize the United States was not turning the corner but rather stuck in a maze mired with tactically focused strategy and opaque objectives.

No discussion of victory disease is complete without mention of Clausewitz’s analogy, of war being “nothing but a duel on an extensive scale.” A more colloquial modern version is to note that “the enemy always gets a vote.” In war, no belligerent has sole agency in determining when a war ends, further complicating the ability for warring parties to end a conflict even if and when one wishes.

Conclusion

Former Pentagon senior advisor Rosa Brooks asserted that throughout the Global War on Terror, the United States increasingly defined foreign policy through the framework of conflict. As this trend continues the military has transformed into the nation’s primary mechanism of statecraft. If Brooks’ assertation is correct, which evidence clearly supports despite the 2022 National Security Strategy’s attempt to reprioritize diplomacy, then knowing how to plan for war’s termination becomes more important. Strategists must ensure that war, as a tool of statecraft, supports political objectives enabling the cessation of hostilities and optimizing post conflict outcomes. To overcome the myriad obstacles associated with ending wars and beginning peace processes, strategists must always focus on the primacy of policy to overcome decoupling war from warfare, avoid tactically focused strategic objectives, and defeat victory disease. In doing so strategists can use reason and logic to overcome primordial violence, hatred, and enmity to enable a nation to achieve a better peace, if and when force is required.

James P. Micciche is a U.S. Army Strategist (FA59) currently assigned to XVIII Airborne Corps. He holds degrees from The Fletcher School at Tufts University and Troy University. He can be found on Twitter @james_micciche and LinkedIn

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.

Photo Description: A C-17 departing Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan

Photo Credit: Matt Hecht via flickr

26. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 8, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2024

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces conducted large-scale missile and drone strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of May 7 to 8, continuing to exploit Ukraine's degraded air defense umbrella ahead of the arrival of US and Western security assistance at scale.
Recent satellite imagery of depleted Russian military vehicle and weapons storage facilities further indicates that Russia is currently sustaining its war effort largely by pulling from storage rather than by manufacturing new vehicles and certain weapons at scale.
Russia is relying on vast Soviet-era stores of vehicles and other equipment to sustain operations and losses in Ukraine at a level far higher than the current Russian DIB could support, nor will Russia be able to mobilize its DIB to replenish these stores for many years.
The Georgian State Security Service (SUS) is employing standard Kremlin information operations against Georgians protesting Georgia's Russian-style "foreign agents" bill following the lead of Georgian Dream party founder and former Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili.
Armenia's efforts to distance itself from Russia are increasingly forcing the Kremlin to acknowledge issues in the bilateral relationship.
Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė stated that the Lithuanian government has granted permission for Lithuania to send troops to Ukraine for training missions in the future.
Reports indicate that there is an available open-source tool that allows people to search by specific coordinates for Telegram users who have enabled a certain location-sharing setting.
Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Kreminna, and Avdiivka and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu continues to highlight Russian formations involved in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 8, 2024

May 8, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 8, 2024

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

May 8, 2024, 7:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on May 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces conducted large-scale missile and drone strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of May 7 to 8, continuing to exploit Ukraine's degraded air defense umbrella ahead of the arrival of US and Western security assistance at scale. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported on May 8 that Russian forces launched 21 Shahed-136/131 drones and 55 missiles, including 45 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles, four Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles, two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, an Iskander-K ballistic missile, two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and a Kh-47 "Kinzhal" aeroballistic missile.[1] Oleshchuk reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted 33 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles, all four Kalibr cruise missiles, both Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 20 Shaheds.[2] Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko reported that Russian forces struck electricity generation and transmission facilities in Poltava, Kirovohrad, Zaporizhia, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Vinnytsia oblasts.[3] Ukraine’s largest private energy operator DTEK reported that Russian forces attacked three unspecified thermal power plants (TPPs) in Ukraine and seriously damaged unspecified equipment.[4] Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo spokesperson Maria Tsaturyan stated that regional energy authorities will implement shutdowns evenly across all oblasts in Ukraine due to energy shortages and warned that the Ukrenergo control center will issue a command for emergency shutdowns throughout Ukraine if consumption continues to grow in the evening.[5] Ukrainian state railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported that Russian forces also targeted railway infrastructure in Kherson Oblast, forcing railway administrators to reduce train travel along the Kyiv-Kherson and Kyiv-Mykolaiv routes.[6] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that it targeted Ukrainian energy facilities and defense industrial enterprises in order to reduce Ukraine's ability to produce military materiel and transfer Western materiel to the frontline.[7]

This is the fifth large scale Russian missile and drone strike targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure since March 22, 2024, as the Russian military has attempted to exploit degraded Ukrainian air defense capabilities in spring 2024 to collapse Ukraine's energy grid and constrain Ukraine's defense industrial capacity.[8] Russian forces will likely continue to conduct mass strikes to cause long-term damage to Ukrainian energy infrastructure as degraded Ukrainian air defense capabilities persist until the arrival of US-provided air defense missiles and other Western air defense assets at scale.[9] Russian forces have also intensified strikes against Ukrainian transportation infrastructure in recent weeks in an apparent effort to disrupt Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and constrain the flow of expected US security assistance to the frontline.[10] Russian forces have continued to heavily target Ukrainian energy facilities in limited larger missile and drone strike series, however, suggesting that Russia is either prioritizing the effort to collapse the energy grid over interdiction efforts or must use a larger number of missiles to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses near energy facilities and cause significant damage to these facilities.

Recent satellite imagery of depleted Russian military vehicle and weapon storage facilities further indicates that Russia is currently sustaining its war effort largely by pulling from storage rather than by manufacturing new vehicles and certain weapons at scale. Newsweek reported on May 8 that a social media source tracking Russian military depots stated that satellite imagery indicates that Russia's vehicle stores have significantly decreased from pre-war levels by nearly 32 percent from 15,152 in 2021 to 10,389 as of May 2024.[11] The military depot tracker noted that Russia has pulled most from its stores of MT-LB multipurpose armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), which are down from 2,527 prewar to 922 remaining; BMD airborne amphibious tracked infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), which are down from 637 prewar to 244 remaining; and BTR-50 armored personnel carriers (APCs), down from 125 prewar to 52 remaining. The military depot tracker noted that Russia no longer has newer model BTR-60s, 70s, and 80s in storage and that only 2,605 remain — likely referring to vehicles currently fielded — from its prewar stocks of 3,313. The military depot tracker noted that Russia is currently fielding 1,000–2,000 of its remaining MT-LBs in Ukraine. Another open-source account on X (formerly Twitter) cited satellite imagery dated May 27, 2020 and March 26, 2024 and concluded that Russia has pulled roughly 60 percent of its artillery systems at an unspecified towed artillery storage base, reportedly one of Russia's largest.[12] The source reported that about half of the remaining artillery systems at this base are likely unusable due to degradation while in storage and because many of the remaining systems are Second World War era artillery systems incompatible with modern ammunition.[13]

Russia is relying on vast Soviet-era stores of vehicles and other equipment to sustain operations and losses in Ukraine at a level far higher than the current Russian DIB could support, nor will Russia be able to mobilize its DIB to replenish these stores for many years. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank reported on February 12 that Russia is likely able to sustain its current rate of vehicle losses (over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles annually) for at least two or three years by mainly reactivating vehicles from storage.[14] The IISS also estimated that Russia has lost over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles in 2023 and close to 8,000 armored fighting vehicles since February 2022, and that Russia likely reactivated at least 1,180 main battle tanks and about 2,470 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers pulled from storage in 2023.[15] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on February 4 that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce 250–300 new and modernized tanks per year and repair an additional 250–300 tanks per year.[16] Russia will likely struggle to adequately supply its units with materiel in the long term without transferring the Russian economy to a wartime footing — a move that Russian President Vladimir Putin has sought to avoid thus far.[17]

The Georgian State Security Service (SUS) is employing standard Kremlin information operations against Georgians protesting Georgia's Russian-style "foreign agents" bill following the lead of Georgian Dream party founder and former Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili. The SUS claimed on May 8 that "certain groups of people" funded by foreign countries, party leaders, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are trying to organize provocations at protests against the "foreign agents" law.[18] The SUS claimed that Georgian citizens living abroad, particularly those fighting in Ukraine, are planning to conduct acts of violence against Georgian law enforcement and block and burn government buildings. The SUS further claimed that the alleged provocateurs are attempting to cause riots and chaos to cause "Maidanization" and that these methods have been used to organize "color revolutions." The SUS' references to Ukraine's Euromaidan Revolution in 2014, which drove out Ukraine's Russia-friendly president Viktor Yanukovych, and its reference to color revolutions — attempts at democratization in post-Soviet countries — mirror boilerplate Russian rhetoric attempting to blame the West for inciting and directing perceived anti-Russian protests to frame domestic dissent and calls for democratization as illegitimate.[19] The SUS made similar claims in September 2023 and alleged that former Georgian officials, Ukrainian military intelligence officials of Georgian descent, and Georgians fighting with Ukrainian forces in Ukraine were plotting a violent coup.[20] Ivanishvili recently reiterated a series of standard anti-Western and pseudohistorical Kremlin narratives during his first public speech since announcing his return to Georgian politics.[21] Ivanishvili's and the SUS' intensified use of established Kremlin information operations and increasing rhetorical alignment with Russia against the West indicate that Georgian Dream actors likely intend to purposefully derail long-term Georgian efforts for Euro-Atlantic integration, which plays into continued Russian hybrid operations to divide, destabilize, and weaken Georgia.[22]

Armenia's efforts to distance itself from Russia are increasingly forcing the Kremlin to acknowledge issues in the bilateral relationship. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met in Moscow on May 8 following a meeting of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).[23] Putin claimed that Russian-Armenian bilateral relations are "developing successfully," but noted that there are "questions" regarding security in the South Caucasus that the two will discuss privately. Pashinyan stated that "questions have accumulated that need to be discussed" since the two met in December 2023. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that there are "problematic issues" in the bilateral relationship in response to a question about how difficult the meeting would be but claimed that both Putin and Pashinyan are willing to discuss these issues.[24] Peskov claimed that Russia is "rather optimistic" about the future of the bilateral relationship. Peskov and Putin have previously publicly attempted to downplay tension in Russian–Armenian relations, although Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has made several frank assessments of the deteriorating relationship and issued public threats against Armenia in recent months.[25] Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Ani Badalyan told Radar Armenia on May 7 that Armenia will not contribute to the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization's (CSTO) budget in 2024.[26] An unnamed source within the CSTO told Kremlin newswire TASS that the CSTO is aware of Armenia's decision but noted that Armenia remains a member of the CSTO.[27] Armenia's decision to stop financing CSTO activities is the latest in a series of decisions to pivot away from Russian-led political and security organizations, including continuing to make Armenia's involvement in the CSTO increasingly nominal, over the past eight months.[28]

Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė stated that the Lithuanian government has granted permission for Lithuania to send troops to Ukraine for training missions in the future.[29] Šimonytė stated during an interview with the Financial Times (FT) published on May 8 that Ukraine has not requested Lithuanian troops and noted that Russia would likely see the deployment of Lithuanian troops to Ukraine as a provocation. Šimonytė stated that if Europe only considered Russia's response to manpower and materiel assistance to Ukraine, Europe would not send anything and stated that "every second week you hear that somebody will be nuked [by Russia]." French President Emmanuel Macron called on Europe to build a strategic concept of "credible European defense" during a speech on April 25 and has previously urged the West to not "rule out" the possibility of sending Western troops to Ukraine in the future.[30]

Reports indicate that there is an available open-source tool that allows people to search by specific coordinates for Telegram users who have enabled a certain location-sharing setting. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on May 8 that this tool allows people to input coordinates to discover all Telegram users who have enabled the "find people nearby" setting located within 50–100 meters of the coordinates.[31] Meduza noted that the "find people nearby" setting usually only allows users to find other Telegram users within 50–100 meters of their current location. Users can enable or disable this location-sharing setting in the "contacts" settings of the application.

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces conducted large-scale missile and drone strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of May 7 to 8, continuing to exploit Ukraine's degraded air defense umbrella ahead of the arrival of US and Western security assistance at scale.
Recent satellite imagery of depleted Russian military vehicle and weapons storage facilities further indicates that Russia is currently sustaining its war effort largely by pulling from storage rather than by manufacturing new vehicles and certain weapons at scale.
Russia is relying on vast Soviet-era stores of vehicles and other equipment to sustain operations and losses in Ukraine at a level far higher than the current Russian DIB could support, nor will Russia be able to mobilize its DIB to replenish these stores for many years.
The Georgian State Security Service (SUS) is employing standard Kremlin information operations against Georgians protesting Georgia's Russian-style "foreign agents" bill following the lead of Georgian Dream party founder and former Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili.
Armenia's efforts to distance itself from Russia are increasingly forcing the Kremlin to acknowledge issues in the bilateral relationship.
Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė stated that the Lithuanian government has granted permission for Lithuania to send troops to Ukraine for training missions in the future.
Reports indicate that there is an available open-source tool that allows people to search by specific coordinates for Telegram users who have enabled a certain location-sharing setting.
Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Kreminna, and Avdiivka and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu continues to highlight Russian formations involved in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a 10-person squad-sized Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group on the Kharkiv Oblast-Russia border near Pylna (northeast of Kharkiv City) on May 8.[32]

Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Svatove amid continued ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove line. Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows that Russian forces recently advanced south of Novoselivske (northwest of Svatove).[33] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 8 that Russian forces seized Kyslivka (northwest of Svatove) after Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces had seized the settlement on May 7.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in Kyslivka are preparing for further attacks on Stepova Novoselivka and Ivanivka (both northwest of Svatove and immediately northwest of Kyslivka).[35] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced up to the outskirts of Berestove (northwest of Svatove).[36] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these Russian claims. Russian forces also continued ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and northwest of Svatove near Pishchane and Stelmakhivka.[37] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are attacking near Kyslivka and Kotlyarivka (immediately south of Kyslivka) and that elements of the Russian 1st and 15th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA) are fighting near Tabaivka (northwest of Svatove).[38]

Mashovets reported that elements the 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) regrouped near Synkivka, and a Russian milblogger posted footage allegedly showing an element of the 11th AC providing drone and artillery support to Russian assaults near Kyslivka.[39] Mashovets has previously reported that elements of the 11th AC will deploy to the northern Russia-Ukraine border in Belgorod, Kursk, or Bryansk oblasts to join the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces.[40] The appearance of elements of the 11th AC in the Kupyansk direction is not immediately inconsistent with these reports as other elements may be redeploying to the Northern Grouping of Forces and elements of this regiment may redeploy at a later date.

Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Kreminna. Geolocated footage published on May 7 and 9 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced east of Yampolivka (west of Kreminna) and north of Bilohorivka (south of Kreminna).[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 1.5 kilometers in depth east of Novosadove (northwest of Kreminna), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[42] Russian forces also continued ground attacks northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Nevske, and Novolyubivka; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka and the Serebryanske forest area.[43] Mashovets reported that Russian forces have committed most elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) to combat near Kreminna, including elements of its 59th Tank Regiment and elements of its 254th, 283rd, and 488th motorized rifle regiments.[44]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in occupied Luhansk City with ATACMS missiles overnight on May 7 to 8.[45] Geolocated footage published on May 7 shows a large fire at a fuel depot in the city.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that the strike damaged several fuel tanks.[47] The Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) claimed that it does not expect the strike to cause severe fuel disruptions due to the LNR's reserve of fuel.[48]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction (northeast of Bakhmut) on May 8, but there were no changes to the frontline in the area. Russian forces conducted assaults east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Spirne, and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka.[49] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division's 51st VDV Regiment are attacking near Rozdolivka and that elements of the 106th VDV Division's 119th and 137th VDV regiments are attempting to advance between Vesele (southeast of Siversk) and Rozdolivka.[50] Mashovets stated that elements of the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) 2nd Army Corps' (AC) 6th, 7th, and 123rd motorized rifle brigades are operating near Verkhnokamyanske, Spirne, and Vyimka.[51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Chasiv Yar on May 8, but there were no changes to the frontline in the area. Russian forces continued offensive operations near the Novyi Microraion in eastern Chasiv Yar, east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, southwest of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Shumy and Niu York.[52] The chief of staff of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Chasiv Yar area stated on May 7 that Russian forces are increasingly fielding tanks and armored vehicles with welded metal plates for additional protection (colloquially referred to as "turtle tanks") and regularly attack at dawn and dusk.[53] The Ukrainian officer also stated that small Russian assault groups periodically approach and attempt to cross the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal near Chasiv Yar but that Ukrainian forces destroy or capture these groups.[54] The commander of another Ukrainian battalion operating near Chasiv Yar stated on May 8 that Russian forces have a 10-to-one manpower advantage in the area.[55] Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating near the Kanal Microraion in easternmost Chasiv Yar.[56]

Russian forces recently made significant tactical gains northwest of Avdiivka and recently advanced elsewhere west of Avdiivka. Geolocated footage published on May 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced roughly four kilometers north of Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka) towards the eastern outskirts of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka and Ocheretyne) and that Ukrainian forces do not maintain positions on the northwestern outskirts of Ocheretyne.[57] Additional geolocated footage published on May 8 indicates that Russian forces advanced to a windbreak south of Solovyove (northwest of Avdiivka) and northwest of Tonenke (west of Avdiivka).[58] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces seized Novokalynove (north of Avdiivka), and ISW assessed that Russian forces likely seized the settlement as of May 4.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further west of Ocheretyne towards Prohres and up to 1.5 kilometers in depth towards Novopokrovske, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[60] Russian forces also continued offensive operations north of Avdiivka near Oleksandropil; northwest of Avdiivka near Ocheretyne, Arkhanhelske, Yevhenivka, and Sokil; west of Avdiivka near Semenivka, Novoselivka Persha, Umanske, and Netaylove; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske, Pervomaiske, and Vodyane.[61] Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] 1st AC) are reportedly operating near Netaylove.[62]

Russian forces reportedly made marginal gains west of Donetsk City on May 8, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline west and southwest of Donetsk City. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces broke through Ukrainian defenses in eastern Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) and completely seized Pershe Travnia Street, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[63] Russian forces also continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka, Novomykhailivka, Pobieda, Paraskoviivka, and Vodyane.[64] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[65]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and reportedly made further gains in the area on May 8. Geolocated footage published on May 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Tsentralna Street in southern Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka).[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) advanced 500 meters in depth southwest of Urozhaine.[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka) and seized up to half of the settlement, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[68] Elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating west of Staromayorske.[69]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 8, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 700 meters in depth from southeastern Robotyne, although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[70] The milblogger may be referring to recent geolocated footage indicating that Russian forces recently advanced along Skidhna Street to new positions in southeastern Robotyne.[71] Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne).[72]

Positional engagements continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on May 8.[73] Ukrainian Navy and Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on May 8 that Russian forces attempt to assault Nestryha Island in the Dnipro River Delta daily and used jet skis to try to approach the island on May 7. Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo claimed on May 8 that Russian forces established control over unspecified islands in the Dnipro River.[74]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu continues to highlight Russian formations involved in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Shoigu thanked the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) for its involvement in seizing Solovyove (northwest of Avdiivka) and the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA]) for its involvement in seizing Kotlyarivka (northwest of Svatove).[75]

A Russian milblogger lamented bureaucratic issues with seizing private boats for the Russian military's "Dnepr River Flotilla" on May 8 amid Ukrainian reports that the "flotilla" is not a threat to Ukrainian forces in Kherson Oblast. The milblogger claimed that Russian servicemen are constrained by rules against using civilian means of transport that could risk the life and health of a serviceman and that a Russian unit must submit a detailed list of non-military equipment for approval by the Russian MoD.[76] The milblogger claimed that most Russian commanders are unwilling to deal with the paperwork necessary to approve private boats for military use and that military personnel, in turn, are unwilling to use the seized boats because the Russian military will refuse to provide compensation to their families if they are wounded or killed while using unapproved boats. The milblogger criticized the Russian MoD and the Russian General Staff for failing to address these rules or purchase the necessary boats for Russian forces. Ukraine's Navy and Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on May 7 that Russia's "Dnepr River Flotilla" is currently not a threat due to under-resourcing.[77] ISW continues to assess that the "Dnepr River Flotilla" likely lacks the manpower and equipment necessary to establish an enduring large-scale Russian presence in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast.[78]

Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec announced on May 8 that Rostec-subsidiary United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) delivered a new batch of Su-35S aircraft to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[79]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Ukraine's Army of Drones initiative stated on May 8 that Russia is developing a variant of Ukraine's Baba Yaga drone.[80]

The United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on May 8 that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) modified Russia's Kh-101 cruise missile by fitting a subset with a secondary warhead.[81] UK MoD assessed that the modification likely reduces the Kh-101 missile's range by half but noted that Russian forces will still be able to strike targets throughout Ukraine with the missile's reduced range. UK MoD reported that Russia designed the secondary warhead for increased fragmentation when a target is struck and stated that this will likely make the Kh-101 missile more effective when striking non-hardened targets.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

A prominent Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger continued to seize on innocuous events and allegations to criticize the Kazakh government for alleged anti-Russian actions and perceived weakness against the West. The milblogger continued to seize on alleged Ukrainian government documents outlining Ukraine's interest in cooperation with Central Asia and providing cultural resources to ethnic Ukrainians in Central Asia.[82] ISW cannot assess the veracity of the documents. Ukraine likely wants to maintain relations with Central Asian countries and seeks to provide support for its diaspora community in Central Asia, just as many countries' governments support their diaspora communities living abroad. Another milblogger claimed that the alleged documents show that the West is attempting to use Ukraine to exert soft-power influence in Central Asia.[83] The Kremlin-awarded milblogger also continued to seize on an Almaty-based exhibit showing photos of victims of the January 2022 Kazakh protests and claimed that the organizers of the exhibit had previously worked with organizations that received Western funding, thereby demonstrating the West's influence over Kazakhstan and the weakness of Kazakh authorities.[84]

The same Kremlin-awarded milblogger postured perceived strong Russian-Kyrgyz relations while continuing to frame any efforts to promote titular cultures in post-Soviet states as inherently Western-influenced and anti-Russian. The milblogger praised Kyrgyzstan for "remembering the Soviet Union and what [it] gave to the Kyrgyz people" and claimed that Kyrgyzstan is one of the few countries in Central Asia where Russian language, culture, and media play a "dominant" role in society.[85] The milblogger claimed that Kyrgyzstan has maintained its "pro-Russian" sentiments despite local initiatives to "cultivate national chauvinism" and claimed that the West already succeeded in influencing Armenia, Moldova, and Kazakhstan.[86]

The same milblogger also claimed that Russia is planning on conducting snap nuclear exercises in response to several NATO exercises in Europe.[87] ISW continues to assess that Russia is highly unlikely to use a tactical nuclear weapon on the battlefield in Ukraine or anywhere else and that Russian officials and Kremlin mouthpieces continue to misrepresent ongoing NATO exercises as a threat against Russia despite the exercises’ defensive response to real Russian aggression against Ukraine and overt Russian threats against NATO states.[88]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

27. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, May 8, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-8-2024

IRAN UPDATE, MAY 8, 2024

May 8, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, May 8, 2024

Andie Parry, Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Kathryn Tyson, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Hamas’ leaders have very likely calculated that Hamas will survive a Rafah operation and that Hamas should therefore pursue its maximalist ceasefire demands without major concessions. Hamas’ maximalist ceasefire demands appear to have solidified as the IDF drew down its forces in the Gaza Strip beginning in late December 2023.[1] The drawdown indicated to Hamas that the group was winning by forcing the IDF from the Strip. Sinwar indicated to senior Hamas officials in February 2024 that the Hamas was “doing fine” and were “ready for...Rafah.”[2] Sinwar did not fear a Rafah operation because the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the northern Gaza Strip meant Hamas‘ remaining forces in the north would survive. Sinwar’s position almost certainly solidified in April after the remainder of IDF units withdrew from Khan Younis, permanently leaving only one brigade south of Gaza City in the Netzarim Corridor.[3] The withdrawal from Khan Younis will enable Hamas fighters to flee north as the Israeli operation begins.

Hamas introduced a ceasefire counterproposal on May 6 with two key changes that Israel had not accepted. The Hamas-proposed ceasefire includes two key stipulations that would satisfy Hamas’ maximalist demands: an end to the Israeli “blockade” and a permanent end to the war.[4] These conditions were not in the purported original text that Israel helped Egypt craft on April 26.[5] Hamas “accepted” the deal with the new stipulations after meeting with mediators in a series of meetings from May 3 to May 5.[6] Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar weighed in on the proposed deal on May 3 to raise several desired edits according to Arab mediators speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[7] A senior Hamas official spoke negatively about the proposal on May 2 before Hamas added the stipulations.[8] Israeli officials were not part of these early May meetings and only received the edited text an hour after Hamas “agreed” to the deal.[9] US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller characterized Hamas’ May 6 response as ”a counterproposal” that contained amendments to the original framework on May 7.[10]

The additional demands that Hamas introduced in the May 6 ceasefire counterproposal secure both Hamas’ survival and its ability to reconstitute by limiting Israel’s ability to disrupt supplies bound for Hamas. Hamas could use the end of an aid inspections regime to smuggle in new weapons and supplies to repair the parts of the tunnel system destroyed during the war.[11] A “permanent” truce would provide Hamas the time and space to reconstitute itself militarily and reassert its political authority in the Gaza Strip.[12] Hamas would break a ceasefire of any length at a time and for reasons of its own choosing because it desires to destroy Israel.[13] Hamas sees control of the Gaza Strip as a prerequisite to the destruction of Israel. Hamas’ survival as a military and political entity remains an unacceptable outcome to this war.

Hamas will likely survive a major Israeli operation in Rafah if a major operation occurs. Hamas infiltrated and then rebuilt itself in areas that the IDF withdrew from in December 2023 and April 2024.[14] Hamas units in these areas have conducted dozens of attacks targeting Israeli forces attempting to re-clear areas that the IDF had previously cleared.[15] Hamas and other militias have also mortared Israeli forces holding static positions in the central Gaza Strip’s Netzarim Corridor.[16] Hamas units outside of Rafah have also reportedly coordinated among themselves to conduct operations against the IDF by coordinating meetings between brigade and battalion commanders.[17] Hamas will survive a Rafah operation because it continues to operate from and control other territory in the Gaza Strip outside of Rafah.

This map displays engagements between Israeli and Palestinian ground forces across the Gaza Strip. The locations depicted are not exact.

A decapitation strategy aimed at killing Hamas’ senior leaders will not defeat or destroy Hamas. Israel may kill Yahya Sinwar during a major operation in Rafah, but his death will not achieve Israeli objectives. The United States pursued a decapitation strategy in its campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. This US strategy was not successful in destroying terrorist organizations in either country. ISIS and al Qaeda retained the ability to reconstitute themselves multiple times in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.[18] A decapitation strategy can degrade a terrorist organization, but cannot destroy one, particularly one as large, established, and well-organized as Hamas.[19]

Israel and Hamas said separately on May 8 that ceasefire negotiations are stalled after new talks in Cairo. Unspecified Israeli officials told Reuters that Israel sees no sign of a breakthrough in ceasefire talks, but that their delegation will remain in Cairo "for now.”[20] A media advisor to Hamas’ Political Bureau accused Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of “procrastinating” in ceasefire talks.[21] The Hamas official also said that the Hamas delegation left Cairo for Doha to assess the situation.

US Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns discussed ceasefire and hostage negotiations with Netanyahu in Israel on May 7.[22] Burns also met with Israeli Mossad Director David Barnea in Israel.[23] Burns was recently in Cairo for the latest round of ceasefire negotiations.

Key Takeaways:

Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas’ leaders have very likely calculated that Hamas will survive a Rafah operation and that Hamas should therefore pursue its maximalist ceasefire demands without major concessions. Both Hamas and Israel said on May 8 that talks are stalled.
Hamas After Rafah: Hamas will likely survive a major Israeli operation in Rafah if a major operation occurs because Hamas continues to control and operate from territory in the Gaza Strip outside of Rafah.
United States-Israel Relations: The limited Israeli operation to seize the Rafah crossing does not require a shift in US policy toward the war, according to US officials. The US Secretary of Defense confirmed that the United States paused a munitions shipment bound for Israel, however.
Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued a limited operation targeting Hamas fighters and infrastructure in eastern Rafah on May 8.
Iraq: The IDF confirmed that it intercepted an “aerial target” approaching Israel from the east after Iranian-backed militias in Iraq claimed a drone attack targeting southern Israel.
Yemen: CENTCOM reported that the Houthis conducted four attacks targeting maritime shipping on May 6 and 7.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Palestinian militias conducted four indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces along the Netzarim corridor north of the central Gaza Strip on May 8.[24] Six Palestinian militias have participated in daily indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces along the corridor since April 28.[25] Israeli forces have established forward operating bases along the Netzarim corridor to facilitate future raids into areas of the Gaza Strip.[26]

Israeli forces continued a limited operation targeting Hamas fighters and infrastructure in eastern Rafah on May 8.[27] Israeli forces advanced into eastern Rafah overnight on May 7 and seized control of the Rafah crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt.[28] The IDF 401st Brigade is at the Rafah crossing following IDF intelligence that Palestinian militias were using the crossing for military activity.[29] Israeli media reported on May 6 that the IDF chose to capture the crossing given its role in smuggling advanced weapons between the Gaza Strip and Egypt in the past.[30] Geolocated footage taken by Israeli soldiers and shared on social media shows that Israeli forces have advanced to areas northeast of the Rafah crossing.[31] The IDF Givati Brigade engaged Palestinian fighters in the area and began to destroy underground tunnel shafts.[32] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on May 7 shows flattened terrain west of Shokat al Sufi, indicating that Israeli tanks or bulldozers operated near the town. CNN reported on May 8 that satellite imagery shows Israeli forces forming possible forward operating bases near some bulldozed areas.[33]

Israeli forces engaged several Palestinian militias, including Hamas, in clashes in eastern Rafah. Palestinian fighters fired small arms, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), and mortars targeting Israeli forces as they advanced east of Rafah City.[34] The IDF said on May 8 that Israeli forces have conducted 100 airstrikes and killed 30 fighters in Rafah since they advanced into the area.[35]

US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller revised his May 7 statement on Israel’s seizure of the Rafah crossing.[36] Miller said on May 7 that that the Israeli operation to the Rafah crossing appears to be limited at this time, but that it does ”look like a prelude of a major military operation.” Miller revised his statement on May 8 saying, “we don’t know if it’s a prelude or not.”

Two US officials told Axios that the White House does not think that the Israeli operation to seize the Rafah crossing requires a shift in US policy toward the war.[37] The officials said that the Biden administration has been considering suspending weapons shipments to Israel or conditioning their use if Israel conducts a major military operation in Rafah. Two senior US officials said the Israelis made clear they wanted to capture the Rafah crossing to put pressure on Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar in the hostage talks. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last week that a major military operation into Rafah would harm US-Israeli relations.[38]

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin confirmed that the United States has paused a shipment of “high-payload munitions” to Israel due to concerns over Israeli ground operations in Rafah.[39] Austin said at a Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee hearing that the United States is reviewing “near-term security assistance shipments in the context of unfolding events in Rafah.” An unspecified senior US official told Axios that the munitions in the shipment include 1,800 2,000-pound bombs and 1,700 500-pound bombs.[40] The official said that the Biden administration is especially focused on the preventing the use of the 2,000-pound bombs in Rafah because of the "devastating impact they could have in dense urban settings." Israeli officials have privately expressed to US officials “deep frustration” over the paused shipment, according to a source briefed on the matter speaking to CNN.[41] The officials said the decision may jeopardize the hostage deal negotiations at a critical moment.

The IDF reopened the Kerem Shalom crossing on May 8 to allow humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip.[42] The IDF closed the Kerem Shalom crossing on May 5 after a Hamas rocket attack that killed four IDF soldiers near the crossing.[43] The Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), which is the Israeli military body responsible for facilitating the flow of aid into the Gaza Strip, said on May 8 that aid trucks had arrived at Kerem Shalom for inspection.[44] The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) said on May 8 that no aid has entered the Gaza Strip from the crossing on May 8. UNRWA added that there are no workers to receive the aid due to Israel’s incursion into the area.[45] Egyptian officials told the Wall Street Journal that Egypt blocked all aid trucks in Egypt from entering the Strip by way of the Kerem Shalom crossing after Israel announced that it was reopening the crossing.[46] Egypt’s move cuts off the ability for aid trucks originating in Egypt to enter the Gaza Strip.

An Israeli Army Radio reporter said that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant approved the opening of the Kerem Shalom crossing after US pressure to do so.[47] US officials have repeatedly called for Israel to increase the flow of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip in recent weeks.[48] The reporter added that Israel assured the United States that aid flows would not be affected by the Kerem Shalom closure, but COGAT failed to implement the directive and to distribute aid.

Unspecified individuals fired small arms targeting trucks carrying Palestinian workers to the Kerem Shalom crossing on May 8.[49] The IDF said that the attack wounded several workers and that the IDF is investigating the attack.[50] The IDF emphasized that it opened the Kerem Shalom crossing to allow the entry of aid into the Gaza Strip.[51] Palestinian sources claimed that the IDF was responsible for the attack, adding that the workers helped to facilitate the entry of aid into the Strip.[52] Several Palestinian militias claimed small arms clashes targeting Israeli forces east of Rafah on May 8.[53]

The US military finished construction of an offshore pier on May 7 that will help increase the amount of aid brought into the Gaza Strip.[54] US Defense Department Deputy Press Secretary Sabrina Singh said that the pier is not yet operational due to inclement weather.[55] Singh said that the pier can facilitate the entry of 150 trucks into the Gaza Strip daily when operating at full capacity.

Palestinian fighters conducted two indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on May 8.[56] Hamas fighters fired a barrage of eight rockets targeting Israeli forces near Kerem Shalom in southern Israel.[57] This is the third attack targeting the area since May 5.[58] The IDF has said that rocket and mortar fire targeting the Kerem Shalom area is preventing the entry of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip.[59] The IDF Air Force also struck rocket launchers in Rafah that Hamas fighters used to fire rockets at an Israeli military site in Reim on May 7.[60] An Israeli military correspondent noted that Palestinian militias have repeatedly fired rockets into Israel as Israeli ground forces approached launch sites in eastern Rafah.[61]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's data cut off on May 7.[62]

Israeli forces destroyed a new Palestinian fighter group in Qalqilya on May 8.[63] A man named Alaa Nizal formed the group within the last few months. The IDF referred to the group as the Qalqilya Battalion. Nizal is not affiliated with any “terrorist organization” according to the IDF Ephraim Region Brigade’s intelligence officer. The Qalqilya Battalion received “hundreds of thousands of shekels” from an unspecified source to conduct attacks according to the intelligence officer.[64] Israeli forces targeted and killed Nizal and arrested almost 30 fighters from the Qalqilya Battalion in an operation on May 8.

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least 11 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on May 7.[65]

The IDF struck over 20 Hezbollah targets in Ramiya in southern Lebanon on May 8.[66] The IDF said that it targeted military buildings and infrastructure. Hezbollah mourned the deaths of two of its fighters on May 8 who were presumably killed in Israeli strikes.[67]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Israeli is determined to facilitate the return of residents to northern Israel during a visit to the area on May 8.[68] Gallant said Israel has pushed Hezbollah further from the border, but that Israel is prepared to “activate” heavy firepower against Hezbollah “if there is a need.”[69]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Shia Coordination Framework—a coalition of Iranian-aligned Shia political parties—and allied Sunni parties are attempting to sideline the Sunni Taqqadum party’s candidate for parliament speaker. The Iraq Supreme Federal Court rejected a lawsuit on May 8 that two Iranian-backed Badr Organization members of parliament (MP) and one Kataib Hezbollah MP filed against Taqqadum MP Shalan al Karim.[70] The lawsuit claimed that Karim does not meet the prerequisites to be a MP and that the Supreme Federal Court should therefore suspend Karim from Parliament. The Federal Supreme Court said there is “nothing that would require revoking or dropping [Karim’s] membership.” Karim is the Taqqadum party’s candidate to replace interim speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi, a Shia Kurd allied with the Shia Coordination Framework.[71] Mandalawi has served as interim speaker of Parliament since November 2023 when the Federal Supreme Court removed former speaker and leader of the Taqqadum party Mohammad al Halbousi from office.[72] The Shia Coordination Framework filed a separate lawsuit against Karim in January 2024 in an attempt to sideline Karim’s candidacy for speaker in January 2023.[73]

The Siyada Alliance, al Azm Alliance, and al Watani party released a statement supporting the Shia Coordination Framework’s call to select a new Parliament speaker by May 14.[74] These three Sunni parties currently back Siyada Alliance member Salem Matar al Issawi for Speaker of Parliament.[75]

Halbousi rejected the Shia Coordination Framework’s deadline to select a new speaker.[76] Head of the Taqqadum Party Muhammad al Alawi called for parliament to reopen nominations for the speakership. Alawi said that the Taqqadum party rejects any candidate that is not from the Taqqadum party. He claimed that the other Sunni parties are attempting to marginalize 75% of Sunnis represented by the Taqqadum party.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—an umbrella organization of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed one drone attack on May 7 targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat, southern Israel.[77] The IDF intercepted a ”suspicious aerial target” near Eilat that was approaching from the east.[78]

Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali discussed Russo-Iranian relations with Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian in Tehran on May 8.[79] Jalali and Abdollahian discussed Russo-Iranian transit, financial, and banking cooperation, as well as the status of the Iran-Russia comprehensive cooperation agreement. Iranian and Russian officials have repeatedly claimed in recent months that Iran and Russia have finalized this agreement.[80]

An Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry delegation attended a meeting to discuss Caspian Sea maritime boundary lines in Baku, Azerbaijan, on May 6 and 7.[81] Delegations from Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan also attended the meeting. The Caspian littoral states have long disputed maritime boundaries in the Caspian Sea, in large part due to the presence of vast oil and gas reserves in the sea.[82]

US CENTCOM reported that the Houthis conducted three drone attacks and one anti-ship ballistic missile attack in the Gulf of Aden on May 6 and May 7.[83] CENTCOM and a coalition ship intercepted two Houthi drones over the Gulf of Aden on May 6. A third Houthi drone landed in open water. CENTCOM reported that the Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile attack on May 7 did not damage any vessels.[84] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported on May 7 that the crew of a merchant vessel reported two explosions close to the vessel in the Gulf of Aden.[85] The Houthis have not claimed the attacks at this time of writing.

28. 490. Future Dynamics of Warfare: Everyone is a Player, Everything is a Target

MAY 9, 2024 BY USER

490. Future Dynamics of Warfare: Everyone is a Player, Everything is a Target

https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/490-future-dynamics-of-warfare-everyone-is-a-player-everything-is-a-target/

[Editor’s Note: The Army’s Mad Scientist Laboratory is pleased to feature the first in a series of posts from the United States Army War College (USAWC) Team Sullivan’s Travels‘ Future Dynamics of Warfare: Everyone is a Player, Everything is a Target Final Report. This report documents the findings from their group Strategic Research Requirement that occurred over the academic year (from October 2023 to April 2024).

Team Sullivan’s Travels consisted of LTC Joseph “Joe” Bell (USA, Aviation), COL John Cooper (USA, Human Resources), LTC Kristine “Kris” Hinds (USAR, Logistics), LtCol Erik Keim (USMC, Communications), and LTC Michael “Neal” Miller (USAR, Logistics), with Dr. Kathleen Moore as their USAWC Faculty Advisor. Multiple methodologies were used to determine its key findings — including a review of scholarly publications, open-source reporting, and nominal group technique — in response to the following strategic question posed by Ian Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, TRADOC G-2:

How will innovations from contemporary conflicts likely shape the future dynamics of warfare, and what does it mean for Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) and pacing threats by 2035?

Today’s post excerpts the aforementioned Final Report’s Executive Summary; future Mad Scientist Laboratory blog posts and The Convergence podcasts will feature sections from the report highlighting findings by individual members from Team Sullivan’s Travels — Read on!]

Key Findings

How will innovations from contemporary conflicts likely shape the future dynamics of warfare, and what does it mean for Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) and pacing threats by 2035?

What are likely potential changes to future warfighting functions?
What are the likely impacts on future regional alliances, partnerships, and relationships?

Summarized Conclusion

It is highly likely (71-86% — Note: The Kesselman List of Estimative Words legend may be found at the conclusion of this blog post, above the disclaimer statement) that innovations from recent conflicts will more fully integrate diverse actors into future conflict due to increased entry points enabled by Unprecedented Visibility, Rapid Technology Implementation, Lower Barriers to Entry, and Vulnerable Homelands. Despite the traditional role of militaries during the conflict, the ubiquity of technology and the treatment of Conflict as a Sandbox (i.e., testing bed) increases the rapid implementation of materiel and non-materiel applications by any party.

1. Unprecedented Visibility

Advancements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), including inexpensive and rapid equipment production and accessibility of space and communications, are highly likely (71-85%) to create an environment of unprecedented visibility, making operations increasingly challenging.

Primary innovations influencing this outcome:

Adaptive Integration (Blending, not Hiding). Hiding is the static act of concealing one’s presence. Blending is a proactive and dynamic process that involves assimilating into the environment to take advantage of its inherent patterns, behaviors, and characteristics. This requires altering visual, digital, or electromagnetic signatures.
Hybrid Warfare. The cost-effectiveness, anonymity, reach, and capacity to directly engage with a target population through digital platforms in a connected world increases the number of actors actively engaging in disinformation and propaganda campaigns, manipulating social media, radicalizing individuals online, and directly recruiting and mobilizing for grey zone conflicts.

In Ukraine, local companies produce approximately three thousand drones daily for deployment against Russian forces. The $27 billion global commercial drone market sustains this effort, ensuring a near-constant supply for both sides of any future conflict. To counter this, both countries resorted to countermeasures, including anti-air missiles; Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) systems; networked acoustic sensors, and a variety of Electronic Warfare (EW) suites.

Over the last decade, companies like SpaceX revolutionized space accessibility through the rapid increase in space launches. This resulted in decreased costs of launching payloads into space and a surge in commercial satellite launches, increasing civilian access to satellite imagery and the ability to task satellites, giving anyone an unprecedented ability to influence conflict.

Map showing concentrations of GPS PNT signals jamming occurring over the Baltic region, Ukraine, and the Levant on 06 May 2024 / Source: GPSJam.org

In communications, military-specific radio transmissions are easily detected, located, jammed, and intercepted. Ukrainians adopted digital camouflage to counter this, blending their transmissions with civilian communications. They exploited Russian vulnerabilities using agile software-defined radio systems for their EW efforts. The U.S. Marine Corps is testing a method that involves shifting transmissions from easily detected radio frequencies to nearly undetectable laser beams, increasing the digital bandwidth for further technological advances.

Image shows the comparison of signal dispersion between laser and microwave (https://effectphotonics.com/insights/free-space-optics-for-access-networks/)

In Ukraine, the role of civilians in the intelligence apparatus grew significantly, with nearly everyone carrying a device capable of capturing and transmitting images or video. Oryx’s reporting of Russian equipment losses highlights the potential of crowdsourcing in the future.

2. Rapid, Technology Enhanced Warfare

It is highly likely (71-85%) that the rapid implementation and enhanced technological capabilities may increase the employment of information warfare, precision targeting, and tactical maneuver execution.

Primary innovations influencing this outcome:

Artificial Intelligence: Generative and predictive artificial intelligence accelerate and guide tactical and operational decision-making. This increases visibility and targetability across all domains for various actors.
Autonomous Systems: Human-in-the-loop, human-on-the-loop, and human-out-of-the-loop systems enhance the coordination and effectiveness of multi-domains, capabilities, and access points for all participants. The availability of autonomous systems provides a low-cost entry into conflict.

AI allows for rapid employment of information warfare by increasing the speed and potential influence sphere for information. At the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia used AI-guided technology to implore Ukrainians to surrender via a deep-fake video of President Zelensky. This demonstrates an AI-enabled tactic that can influence narratives rapidly.

Image depicting the use of Lavender and Gospel for AI Generated Kill List (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4RmNJH4UN3s)

Israel uses two AI systems, Lavender and Gospel, for precision targeting. Together, these systems enabled Israel to go from identifying 50 targets annually to over 100 daily, thus shortening kill chains.

Video still captured from a Ukrainian Armed Force’s Saker Heavy Bomber Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) — its Full Automatic Machine Vision (i.e., AI) spots, locates, identifies, and selects targets automatically / Source: Still captured from X (tweet) posted by Ukrainian Front (@front_ukrainian)

In the Ukraine-Russia war, both sides deployed millions of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) equipped with AI-powered capabilities for surveillance, reconnaissance, and direct attacks. These drones can autonomously navigate complex environments, identify targets, and assess damage after attacks. The demand for these capabilities is only growing. Drones have many applications in military operations and commercial uses. In the military, they are employed for ISR and targeted strikes. Their prevalence in the commercial sector provides increased availability of commercial off-the-shelf items and increased research and development on this technology.

3. Lower Barriers to Entry and Blurred Lines of Conflict

Private sector, non-state actors, and individual citizens are highly likely (71-85%) to play pivotal roles in conflict and pre-conflict dynamics by leveraging commercially available technologies to conduct operations, gather intelligence, and influence public opinion. This allows broader conflict participation and agenda-driven actors to develop innovative technologies rapidly.

Primary innovations influencing this outcome:

Fifth Generation Warfare: This loosely defined term describes contemporary conflicts in which tactics like social media influence operations, and cyberattacks play a more prominent role in warfare.
Sixth Domain (Private Sector Involvement): Described by the Atlantic Council as the “sphere of activities” of the private sector in warfare. Private sector expertise, reach, and economic strength enable them to participate through cybersecurity, information, logistics, technology, infrastructure, and financial innovations and warfare.

Access to affordable technology, connectivity, and anonymity allows average citizens to indirectly participate in cyberattacks, crowdsource information, analyze data from battlefield environments, share intelligence, engage in disinformation campaigns, and disseminate or encounter state-sponsored propaganda. With the rise of “digital dopamine,” discussed by Dr. Anna Lembke, author of Dopamine Nation, digital media increases the accessibility to receive and influence content. This, coupled with the rise of digital nodes, allows hackers to conduct offensive cyber-attacks or influence a narrative. At the corporate level, companies like Twitter, Facebook, and Google can police content or steer search results to portray a narrative deemed acceptable by that company.

In Ukraine, the private sector actively leverages cyber, space, and AI to support its chosen side. American tech companies Palo Alto and Microsoft contributed to safeguarding data and protecting Ukrainian networks by setting up firewalls, protecting critical infrastructure, and safeguarding Ukrainian data by migrating the data to foreign servers. Companies offered help based on their own interests, not due to government mandates, and this influenced the course of the war between Ukraine and Russia.

Image depicting the role of private sector in conflict. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2023/10/358306/corporate-silence-examining-major-companies-response-to-israels-air-raids-in-gaza

Challenges can arise as companies provide “goodwill” support since they wield the power to turn that support off as they deem fit. SpaceX, for example, provided Starlink to the Ukrainians but later denied the service, preventing a Ukrainian drone from attacking a Russian naval fleet.

4. Vulnerable Homelands

Kinetic and non-kinetic attacks are highly likely (71-85%) to disrupt critical infrastructure and destabilize security in a homeland environment during a future conflict. Vulnerable homelands complicate the security paradigm due to the increased accessibility of targets, the information sphere, and the ability for anyone to impact them.

Primary innovations influencing this outcome:

Water Warfare: Emerging concerns over scarcity in new regions, expanded economic utilization of water, and innovations in artificial intelligence (Internet of Things [IoT]) and autonomous systems broadened capabilities and access to impact water systems.

https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Critical-Infrastructure-Interdependencies_fig3_257560357

Essential services depend on Information and Communication Technology (ICT), enabling networked programs and processes through the IoT. The rapid growth of the IoT increased the number of entry points for adversaries to find and exploit vulnerabilities. Physical objects now have digital sensors, making everything a potential cyber target. These vulnerabilities transform civilian spaces into conflict zones, where the distinction between combatants and non-combatants blurs.

Image depicts increase of water-related events. (https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-03883-w)

Cyberattacks have obstructed access to telecommunications and internet services, limited access to money, interrupted access to news, and disrupted or denied access to electricity, heating, and water. A hacker in Oldsmar, Florida, targeted the water supply and remotely altered the amount of sodium hydroxide in the water. Employees detected and thwarted a potentially deadly attack.

The use of conventional weapons in combination with these cyber operations amplifies the risks to the civilian population. Russia has focused on inflicting damage to the civilian population through a combination of cyber and kinetic attacks – for example, by targeting energy infrastructure during winter. The hacking of Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, demonstrates the deliberate targeting of critical civilian infrastructure essential to populations.

The increased access within the information sphere creates a more vulnerable homeland. The spread of disinformation and propaganda undermines trust in institutions through information manipulation. The compromise of data, either hacked or leaked, leads to vast volumes of data on organizations and individuals published online with unknown long-term implications.

5. Conflict as a Sandbox

The future dynamics of warfare are highly likely (71-85%) to be shaped by the concept of “conflict as a sandbox.” This environment allows for the minimally restrictive application (testing) of new or immature strategies, concepts, and capabilities by militaries, the private sector, or citizens, thus impacting the trajectory of any conflict.

Conflict as a sandbox offers indirect participation into conflict, without direct escalation, and offers a testbed environment for countries and businesses to participate, often without loss of life or “boots on the ground.” This truly creates a future where everything is visible, everything is targetable, everyone is available, and everyone is accessible.

If you enjoyed today’s post, check out the Team Sullivan’s Travels‘ Future Dynamics of Warfare: Everyone is a Player, Everything is a Target Final Report in its entirety here.

29. Top Army general in Pacific says Asian nations moving toward NATO-like cooperation to counter China

Hmmm.... please do not scare away our allies. I think the silk web of the 5 bilateral treaty allies and the interconnected webs strands of the "mini-laterals" (e.g, QUAD, AUKUS, AUKUS Pillar 2, etc., plus the AP4 [Japan, ROK, Australia, New Zealand] connected to NATO) is more likely to to work for eh Asia Pacific region and the US than a NATO structure.

Top Army general in Pacific says Asian nations moving toward NATO-like cooperation to counter China

Stars and Stripes · by Gary Warner · May 8, 2024

Gen. Charles Flynn, commander of the U.S. Army Pacific, speaks at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I., in 2023. (U.S. Army)

Chinese military expansion is pushing Asian nations into closer strategic partnership with the United States that has parallels to NATO in Europe, the top Army commander for the region said Wednesday.

“We can help them protect and defend their territorial integrity and national sovereignty,” Gen. Charles Flynn said during a teleconference with reporters.

Flynn, 60, is commander of the U.S. Army Pacific, which has 107,000 soldiers and civilian workers spread across 9,000 miles including Alaska, Japan, South Korea, Guam, American Samoa, and Saipan.

Chinese military and commercial operations throughout the Pacific region have other nations worried about counterbalancing Beijing’s influence and power, he said.

“The sense of the insidious, incremental and irresponsible behavior -- and that’s how I frame the way the Chinese are acting out there -- has created a groundswell on the work that we do,” Flynn said.

Chinese actions have created a more receptive attitude in many Asian and Pacific nations to work with the U.S. Army on shoring up their own forces and cooperating in mutual defense with neighboring states.

“They appreciate a stable and secure region,” Flynn said.

U.S. Army Pacific has its headquarters at Fort Shafter in Hawaii, where there will be a meeting of army commanders from 15 nations and representatives of more than 15 others next week at the LANPAC Symposium & Exposition. The event could help cement the military cooperation between the United States, its allies in the Pacific, and other nations.

Flynn said he has pointed out in previous forums that three of the largest land wars in the past 60 years -- World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War – have all happened in the U.S. Army Pacific’s area of operations.

Now the command is being asked to assist in ways to build resistance to Chinese dominance and increased Russian military presence in Asia, he said. The stability of the region is also challenged by the regime in North Korea.

From wargames in Thailand to improved infrastructure in the Philippines to training security forces in Mongolia, Flynn said Wednesday that the region allows the U.S. military to practice major logistical moves -- taking equipment and troops from the West Coast, Alaska and Hawaii to Southeast Asia, northern Japan and the Arctic Circle.

“This is just a massive piece of Earth,” he said.

It’s also a testing ground for weapons, which face sopping humidity and saltwater corrosion in Thailand during exercises there and sub-zero temperatures and wilderness conditions during multinational wargames in Alaska.

“We’re building new capabilities into the region, from intelligence capabilities to long-range precision fire to integrated air and missile defense,” Flynn said. “We can sustain that capability.”

He said year-round training exercises in different nations and environments teach practical lessons on what works, what needs improvement, and what needs to be changed.

“When we put that capability out there, really in a very granular way, from the maintainers to the commanders, to the noncommissioned officers and warrant officers, the effects of those conditions on the equipment” can be repeatedly challenged, Flynn said. “When we introduce our soldiers and their leaders and these capabilities into the environment and those conditions, there’s great insights and lessons from that.”

He said military cooperation between nations in the Pacific region will take time to integrate in a way comparable to the NATO. The ability to move troops, weapons, and supplies across vast distances, weather, and terrain is a work in progress.

“Does it mean we have everything we need?” Flynn asked. “No. But what it does mean is that the Army recognizes that the investments out here are incredibly important.”

Flynn pointed to American help in improving airfields in the Philippines and a plan to deploy more supplies across the region to sustain troops in a protracted conflict as signs of progress in weaving together a unified response, particularly to China.

“The sum total of our structures, I would say, impacts in a very positive way out here,” he said.

Stars and Stripes · by Gary Warner · May 8, 2024

30. A Unit Syllabi to Professional Discourse

A Unit Syllabi to Professional Discourse

https://www.hardingproject.com/p/a-unit-syllabi-to-professional-discourse?utm

Report from a Harding Project Workshop

LEYTON SUMMERLIN

MAY 09, 2024

What if an idea in your unit led to winning the next war? Or perhaps more practically, what if one of your soldiers had an idea that sparked a thought that facilitated a discussion that eliminated a bureaucratic process that led to winning the next war? Can you see where I’m going with this? Professional discourse is the key to linking leaders to winning wars.

As we look towards the next conflict, we ready the Army by renewing our professional discourse and its professional journals. We must bring good ideas into the conversation.

Subscribed

The Harding Project and Military Review partnered to publish a special “how-to” issue to foster this professional discourse across the Army. On May 2, 2024, these two teams convened at the Army War College’s new Root Hall. The authors in this issue, who range from Command and General Staff College professors to graduate students and battalion to platoon-level leaders, aim to publish a practical and succinct guide to professional writing.

This issue, with thirteen articles, is designed to provide leaders with a progressive syllabus to generate professional discourse at the unit level and arm individuals with publishing advice and practical writing tools. The articles in this guide will also be published as stand-alone pieces.

The guides

Below are some of the articles that will be included.

Unit:

Articles like “Drink, Think, Link: Guiding Online Mentorship” by Nicholas Frazier and Erik Davis teach us how we can inspire small communities of stewards to discuss ideas and share insights–the perfect primer for clear writing.

Max Ferguson’s “A Catalyst for Writing” shows how we can encourage these stewards to pen their thoughts in an informal and non-intimidating format, such as a white paper.

Then, Jay Ireland and Ryan Van Wie’s article, “Aligning Incentives: Professional Writing in the Army’s Operational Domain,” gives leaders a framework to establish their own unit writing program, similar to a traditional Leader Professional Development program.

Working with others:

Professionals like John Amble–the editor-in-chief of the first-class outlet Modern War Institute, and Rebecca Segal–a volunteer editor at the esteemed From the Green Notebook publication, share their insights and advice for both editing and being edited.

Individual tools:

Theo Lipsky, a recurring author in and out of the Army’s journals, walks a new writer through his process of writing an article and explains the difference between this and a traditional essay.

We all need a first step. Something that eases us into the field we want to approach. Zachary Griffiths, a frequent book reviewer and founder of the Harding Project, provides a simple guide to writing a book review.

In the Army’s Primary Military Education courses, students dedicate their time to writing essays. The problem with these academic papers is they often stay locked in the institutions. Whether it is your persuasive essay in the Basic Leader Course or your capstone assignment at the Sergeant Major Course, Gordon Richmond and Brennan Deveraux (recent author of Lessons Learned & Unlearned: The Drivers of US Indirect-Fire Innovation) understand the importance of sharing these insights and show us how to take this paper and turn it into a thoughtful article.

Dr. Trent Lythgoe, the writing powerhouse at CGSC, teaches us how to write simply and clearly to reduce the noise, keep our readers engaged, and convey our message succinctly.

History to remember:

Additionally, another piece reminds us of the vital role the Army’s journals play in linking leaders to winning wars by helping the Army learn and adapt faster—a critical role that others cannot.

Finally, JP Clark, a professor at the Army War College and editor-in-chief of War Room, shares with us the legacy of the Army’s journals—lest they be forgotten.

Out this summer

Military Review, Army University Press, and the Combined Arms Center will publish this special issue electronically and aim to send copies of this special issue to every battalion in the Army. This means every company-level leader and higher will be armed with a guide to generating professional discourse, capturing it in clearer writing, and sharing it with the rest of the Army. This is how we stay ahead. This is how we win the next war.

What other articles would you like to see in this “How-to” guide? Leave your thoughts in the comments below.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

'Battle of the Bay' underway in Tampa as part of military showcase

Masters of irregular warfare: U.S. Special Forces eye complex mission in ‘decisive decade’

Uncrewed systems are 'changing the character of war': top USSOCOM officials - Military Embedded Systems

Uncrewed systems are 'changing the character of war': top USSOCOM officials

USSOCOM seeks to expand industry ecosystem, wants more prototyping submissions - Military Embedded Systems

USSOCOM seeks to expand industry ecosystem, wants more prototyping submissions

Spectrum dominance and counter-UAS at SOF Week - Military Embedded Systems

Spectrum dominance and counter-UAS at SOF Week

SEALs want loitering munitions aboard insert/extract patrol boats

Submarine delays push SEALs to find new underwater approaches

​Budget strain pauses MC-130J amphibious project for special forces

Little Bird helicopter replacement in question after Army cancels FARA

Special operators set to pick light machine gun in new caliber

Implications for the U.S. Army

“Will to Fight”

Psychological Will to Fight

Physical Will to Fight

Russian versus Ukrainian Military Strength

Russian Command and Control versus Mission Command

The Russian Orthodox Church

Ideological Will to Fight

Conclusion

Russian Influence through the Church

Implications for the U.S. Army

“Expectancy Violation Theory” Explains Russia’s and Ukraine’s Disparate Wills to Fight

Notes

An Overlooked War

A coup defied

A lady tarnished

A fractured reality

Ethnic groups in Myanmar

NGA director pushes back at criticisms of agency, touts 'wetware,' tradecraft (EXCLUSIVE) - Breaking Defense

In an exclusive sit down with Breaking Defense, Vice Adm. Frank Whitworth defended his agency's role in moving commercial and government satellite data to the field in a timely manner.

Commercial ISR And Meeting The Need For Speed

Better With Teamwork

How disinformation works—and how to counter it

More co-ordination is needed, and better access to data

May 2nd 2024

One person’s fact...

Information Advantage

Background

Multidomain Operations and Information Advantage

Information Advantage Framework

Principles of Information Advantage

Warfighting Function Contributions

Way Ahead

Notes

War Games Risk Stirring Up Troubled Waters as Philippines - Emboldened by US - Squares Up to Beijing at Sea

Containment at sea

Causing waves, rocking the boat

A raft of Chinese responses

Israeli forces mass on Rafah's outskirts as US warns a major assault could halt arms

AID ROUTE CUT

CEASEFIRE TALKS

US Drone Warfare Faces Questions of Legitimacy, Study of Military Chaplains Shows

Uses and constraints

US citizens’ beliefs

US Army chaplains’ beliefs

The future of US drone warfare

Defending Taiwan By Defending Ukraine

The Interconnected Fates of the World’s Democracies

By Jaushieh Joseph Wu

WHY TAIWAN MATTERS

HOW TAIWAN PERSEVERES

WHAT TAIWAN NEEDS

Russia’s Pro-Putin Elites

How the Dictator Recruited Them to His Anti-Western Agenda

By Tatiana Stanovaya

IF YOU CAN’T BEAT THEM

TO THE BITTER END

FOREVER WAR

The East and South China Seas: One Sea, Near Seas, Whose Seas? - War on the Rocks

In Brief: The U.S.-Chinese Relationship - War on the Rocks

Marine Special Operations Paragliding Capabilities Emerge At Demonstration In Tampa

How the Kremlin's Information Warfare Influence U.S. Policymakers

CONCLUDING CONFLICT: WHY ENDING WAR IS NEVER AN EASY STRATEGY

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 8, 2024

IRAN UPDATE, MAY 8, 2024

490. Future Dynamics of Warfare: Everyone is a Player, Everything is a Target

Top Army general in Pacific says Asian nations moving toward NATO-like cooperation to counter China

Budget strain pauses MC-130J amphibious project for special forces