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Quotes of the Day:
“Tolerance will reach such a level that intelligent people will be banned from thinking so as not to offend the imbeciles.”
– Fyodor Dostoevsky
"If you wish to become a philosopher, the first thing to realise is that most people go through life with a whole world of beliefs that have no sort of rational justification, and that one man's world of beliefs is apt to be incompatible with another man's, so that they cannot both be right. People's opinions are mainly designed to make them feel comfortable; truth, for most people, is a secondary consideration."
~Bertrand Russell, ‘The Art of Philosophizing: And Other Essays’
"Politicians always think they know what people feel. It's a fallacy, because there is no such thing as 'the people.' It is a discursive device for summoning the people that you want. You're constructing the people, you're not reflecting the people."
– Stuart Hall
1. Hegseth Wins Praise But Asia Still Has Strong Doubts About Trump
2. Hegseth Warns of ‘Devastating Consequences’ Should China Seek to ‘Conquer’ Taiwan
3. Chinese general fires back at US defence chief over Shangri-La Dialogue remarks
4. Harvard Has Trained So Many Chinese Communist Officials, They Call It Their ‘Party School’
5. To Protect Taiwan, Don’t Prepare to Defend It
6. United States wondered how China had made such progress in the field of microchips. Huawei and Xiaomi are the answer, with massive development.
7. State Department seeking to create an "Office of Remigration" in wide restructuring
8. Can Japan fill the leadership void as America steps back from Asia?
9. Hegseth says the U.S. will reposition military amid threat from China
10. Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Tactics Target the Baltics
11. A US cavalier talks 'imminent' war in Singapore
12. NATO faces make-or-break decision on a post-US future
13. Spheres of Influence Are Not the Answer
14. Seven dead after two Russian bridges collapse in regions near Ukraine
15. How SE Asia can break China's rare earth monopoly
16. ‘A massive headache’: State Department tries to figure out how to handle Chinese student visa reviews
17. Far From Home: Uyghur Workers in Factories Supplying Global Brands
1. Hegseth Wins Praise But Asia Still Has Strong Doubts About Trump
Kudos to Defense Minister Teodoro from the Philippines. He was not afraid to address Chinese human rights to their face.
Excerpts:
Last year, China’s delegation surprised observers by repeatedly calling unscheduled press briefings. This year they surprised delegates by barely appearing at all. When they did engage, China’s representatives pushed back at Hegseth’s accusation that Beijing was destabilizing Asia and sparred with other speakers more broadly.
The Pentagon chief aimed to “provoke, divide, instigate confrontations, stir up the region,” said Rear Admiral Hu Gangfeng, vice president of China’s National Defense University. Another official, Senior Colonel Lu Yin, decried the atmosphere at the forum, saying that “labeling China, blaming China, verbally attacking China are politically right here.”
In one of the sharpest exchanges of the weekend, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro had a testy exchange with two senior colonels in the People’s Liberation Army, receiving applause after he thanked them for “propaganda spiels disguised as questions.” Referring to China, Teodoro said he couldn’t trust a country that “represses its own people.”
Yet although China’s presence was diminished, most countries still wanted to balance ties between Beijing and Washington.
“If we have to choose sides, may we choose the side of principles,” Singapore Defense Minister Chan Chun Sing said on Sunday at the final panel of the weekend. “Principles that uphold a global order, where we do not descend into the law of the jungle, where the mighty do what they wish and the weak suffer what they must.”
Hegseth Wins Praise But Asia Still Has Strong Doubts About Trump
Pete Hegseth, US secretary of defense, during the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.Photographer: Ore Huiying/Bloomberg
By Alberto Nardelli, Philip Heijmans, and Josh Xiao
June 1, 2025 at 5:00 AM EDT
After US military allies in Europe were torched by Vice President JD Vance in March over military spending, free speech and the war in Ukraine, America’s partners in Asia warily awaited Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s arrival at a security conference in Singapore.
Turns out there was little reason to worry, apart from the perpetual anxiety over President Donald Trump’s social media feed.
While Hegseth delivered Trump’s demands for higher security spending on par with Europe, he couched it as necessary to prepare for a potentially “imminent” Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The US wouldn’t be pushed out the region, he said, nor let allies and partners “be subordinated and intimidated” — a commitment lauded by many in attendance.
But in the hallways of the Shangri-La Hotel, Hegseth couldn’t dispel concerns about the erratic policymaking of his boss. Many of the generals, defense ministers and intelligence officers from Asia and Europe — who are key to helping the US counter China — were still reeling from the shock of Trump’s sectoral levies and “reciprocal” tariffs.
Hegseth “offered a needed level of reassurance to allies and partners that the United States will remain present in the Indo-Pacific and committed to countering China’s coercive threats,” said Rory Medcalf, head of the National Security College at the Australian National University. “But this message will remain discounted by the dysfunction we are seeing in Washington.”
On his second trip to Asia since March, the Pentagon chief displayed some diplomatic nuance that surprised some officials who expected more grandstanding from the former television personality. Hegseth was also able to capitalize on a huge absence at the annual gathering: China didn’t send a defense minister for the first time since 2019, putting Beijing’s lower-level officials on the back foot.
That void gave US officials space to set the tone and work the room, vowing greater cooperation with countries like Cambodia, Thailand and Indonesia. And it gave America’s traditional partners even more room to criticize Beijing, despite their dependence on trade with China.
Yet even if Hegseth was more reassuring than Vance, it still wasn’t enough to overcome the uncertainty created by Trump’s trade policies. That’s particularly the case in Southeast Asia, which was among the hardest hit by Trump’s tariffs in April.
“Trade is not a soft power indulgence — it is part of our strategic architecture,” Malaysia Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said, referring to Southeast Asia. “It must be protected, not from competition but from the onslaught of arbitrary imposition of trade restrictions.”
Trump’s barrage of tariffs and general volatility — he announced a doubling of steel and aluminum tariffs over the weekend — was the subject of much of the chatter on the sidelines of the annual conference, according to several officials who asked not to be identified, citing private discussions.
The officials said they were unsure whether the US president would stand by their side in a moment of need and that any deal reached with him could unravel moments later in a social media post.
That uncertainty appeared to be pushing Indo-Pacific nations and Europe toward each other in a stronger sense of shared security and free-trade opportunities based on longstanding global rules. It also sparked pushback against what several nations saw as efforts to establish “spheres of influence” where the US or China can dominate.
“Our shared responsibility is to ensure with others that our countries are not collateral victims of the imbalances linked to the choices made by the superpowers,” French President Emmanuel Macron said at the conference’s opening on Friday.
Macron’s words about “strategic autonomy” and his call for Europe and Asia to join forces to “de-risk” supply chains struck a chord with many attendees. Several countries in the region are already having similar debates in their own capitals, some of the officials said.
Many governments in the region rely on China economically and on the US for security, and are keen to not antagonize either. However, there’s also a desire to be more autonomous and less dependent on either of the world’s two-biggest economies, opening up new space for middle powers in Europe and Asia to join hands.
Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s top diplomat, made that pitch to Asian nations throughout the weekend.
“If you reject unilateralism, bullying and aggression, and instead choose cooperation, shared prosperity and common security, the European Union will always be by your side,” she said.
Amid the US-China turbulence, smaller nations sought to build ties. Japan’s defense minister, Gen Nakatani, touted efforts to build closer relations with India and the Philippines. Lithuanian Defense Minister Dovile Sakaliene said on Sunday that her country was working with partners in the region to counter Russian and Chinese cyber threats, as well as Beijing’s dominance of drone manufacturing and ship building.
Even one of America’s closest partners in the region, Australia, signaled some independence from its ally.
Hegseth’s outreach to the region “is deeply welcome,” Australia’s Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles said. But he quickly added that “liberal trade has been the lifeblood of the Asian region, and the shock and disruption to trade from high tariffs has been costly and destabilizing.”
During his remarks, Hegseth was pressed on the trade concerns and whether there was a contradiction in the Trump administration’s message. He sidestepped the question with a smile, saying he was “in the business of tanks, not trade.”
Last year, China’s delegation surprised observers by repeatedly calling unscheduled press briefings. This year they surprised delegates by barely appearing at all. When they did engage, China’s representatives pushed back at Hegseth’s accusation that Beijing was destabilizing Asia and sparred with other speakers more broadly.
The Pentagon chief aimed to “provoke, divide, instigate confrontations, stir up the region,” said Rear Admiral Hu Gangfeng, vice president of China’s National Defense University. Another official, Senior Colonel Lu Yin, decried the atmosphere at the forum, saying that “labeling China, blaming China, verbally attacking China are politically right here.”
In one of the sharpest exchanges of the weekend, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro had a testy exchange with two senior colonels in the People’s Liberation Army, receiving applause after he thanked them for “propaganda spiels disguised as questions.” Referring to China, Teodoro said he couldn’t trust a country that “represses its own people.”
Yet although China’s presence was diminished, most countries still wanted to balance ties between Beijing and Washington.
“If we have to choose sides, may we choose the side of principles,” Singapore Defense Minister Chan Chun Sing said on Sunday at the final panel of the weekend. “Principles that uphold a global order, where we do not descend into the law of the jungle, where the mighty do what they wish and the weak suffer what they must.”
— With assistance from Alastair Gale, Courtney McBride, and Alfred Cang
2. Hegseth Warns of ‘Devastating Consequences’ Should China Seek to ‘Conquer’ Taiwan
Just as an aside, if Taiwan is so important to the US we should consider this. What if the PRC/CCP is successful in its subversion campaign against Taiwan and creates the political conditions wherein Taiwan decides to peacefully unify with the PRC? What actions would the US take to prevent that if maintaining an independent Taiwan is so important to US interests? What if the US is more interested in an independent Taiwan than the majority of the Taiwan people? I think this is a long way off now especially after Hong Kong in 2019 but I think we should consider that it may be possible at some point that the US wants an independent Taiwan more than the Taiwan people. What do we do in that case?
Hegseth Warns of ‘Devastating Consequences’ Should China Seek to ‘Conquer’ Taiwan
The defense secretary said Asia is the administration’s priority region
https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/hegseth-pledges-u-s-support-to-taiwan-in-case-of-chinese-aggression-bfae306c
By Nancy A. Youssef
Follow and Chun Han Wong
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Updated May 31, 2025 5:55 pm ET
The threat China poses is real, and it could be eminent.
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Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said China’s threat to Taiwan ‘could be imminent,’ in what was his most assertive statement to date on Taiwan during a security conference in Singapore. Photo: Ore Huiying/Bloomberg News
Key Points
What's This?
- Defense Secretary Hegseth vowed ’devestating consequences’ if China seeks to conquer Taiwan.
- Hegseth warned that threats to Taiwan from China “could be imminent,” and said Asia is the U.S. priority.
- Hegseth urged Asian allies to spend more on defense and warned against China’s economic influence.
SINGAPORE—Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth vowed that there would be “devastating consequences” should China seek to “conquer” Taiwan, in a speech that appeared aimed at easing concerns in Asia over the U.S. commitment to its allies in the region.
In what was his most assertive statement to date on Taiwan, Hegseth issued a stark warning that threats to the island from China “could be imminent.”
Hegseth said that the U.S.’s goal is “to prevent war” through deterrence with allies. “But if deterrence fails, and if called upon by my commander in chief, we are prepared to do what the Department of Defense does best, to fight and win decisively,” he said.
He also said Asia is the Trump administration’s priority region. The U.S. has long struggled to recalibrate its commitments in Europe and the Middle East to focus on Asia. President Trump came into office promising to end the conflict in Ukraine, but his efforts have so far been frustrated.
Hegseth made the remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, a security conference attended by many top defense officials from Asian and Western countries.
“To be clear: Any attempt by Communist China to conquer Taiwan by force would result in devastating consequences for the Indo-Pacific and the world. We are not going to sugarcoat it. The threat China poses is real. And it could be imminent,” Hegseth said without outlining what those consequences would be.
an unprecedented number of troops
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Beijing’s new ships can land on beaches and link to form massive mobile piers. Analysts say they are intended to rapidly unload military equipment, setting the stage for a D-Day-style invasion of Taiwan. Photo Illustration: WSJ
At the same time, he said that “Communist China will not invade Taiwan on [President Trump’s] watch.”
The defense secretary didn’t elaborate as to how the U.S. would respond to Chinese aggression against Taiwan. Beijing claims Taiwan as its territory and has refused to rule out using force to take control of the self-governed island.
“Hegseth’s remarks on Chinese pressure against Taiwan and the South China Sea claimants were the most strident from a U.S. defense secretary in a Shangri-La dialogue speech,” said Bonnie Glaser, managing director of the Indo-Pacific program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. “The main message is that Trump wants peace through strength and the U.S. thinks stepping up in the region can ensure Chinese use of force doesn’t take place on Trump’s watch.”
Rear Admiral Hu Gangfeng, China’s top delegate at the Shangri-La Dialogue, pushed back against what he called “groundless accusations against China” made at the conference, without specifying what comments he was responding to.
“Some of the content was fabricated from nothing, some of it inverted black and white,” Hu, vice president of China’s National Defense University, told delegates in a breakout session after Hegseth’s speech. “They were basically meant to provoke disturbances, create divisions, instigate confrontation and cause disorder in the Asia Pacific.”
China’s Foreign Ministry later issued a more direct riposte to Hegseth, saying the defense secretary had “smeared and attacked China and hyped up the ‘China threat theory.’ ”
“In fact, the U.S. is the world’s true hegemonic country and the biggest factor undermining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region,” a ministry spokesperson said in a statement published just after midnight in Asia. Washington should stop “exacerbating tensions in the region,” it said.
Despite Hegseth’s tough comments, it was unclear whether the speech would be enough to reassure anxious partners, particularly as the Trump administration has proposed stiff tariffs across the region and its movement of some military equipment out of the region.
“The message of painting China as a security threat is going to receive a mixed reception” in the Asia Pacific, said Dylan Loh, an assistant professor at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University. “Even as countries here want to be reassured of an enduring U.S. presence, not all of them are willing to accept or agree with Washington’s threat perceptions.”
The prospect of an armed conflict with China—whether over Taiwan or the contested shipping lanes of the South China Sea, where Beijing has aggressively asserted illegal territorial claims—has increasingly consumed U.S. military planning. In recent years, China built up the world’s biggest navy—a title once held by the U.S.—and a formidable arsenal of missiles aimed at making swaths of the Pacific off-limits to its adversaries.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said China’s threat to Taiwan ‘could be imminent.’ Photo: Edgar Su/Reuters
Meanwhile, Taiwan is racing to overhaul its military in preparation for what it sees as a potential invasion by China. Beijing has intensified its military exercises around the island, including by staging simulated blockades that Taiwan and the U.S. both say could turn without notice into an actual attack—an event that would trigger a global crisis.
Nonetheless, Hegseth’s presence at the Shangri-La Dialogue will offer some comfort to governments seeking signals of continuity in U.S. policy toward the Indo-Pacific region, notwithstanding the lack of details, Loh said.
China, which had sent its defense minister to the last four editions of the Shangri-La Dialogue, downgraded the level of its representation this year by sending a senior military academic—a one-star rear admiral—to lead its delegation, the lowest-ranking chief delegate from China in nearly two decades.
Hegseth, during his speech, appeared to note the Chinese defense minister’s absence, saying the U.S. was at the dialogue while “somebody else isn’t.”
Zhou Bo, a senior fellow at Beijing’s Tsinghua University and a retired senior colonel in the Chinese military, said that China traditionally hasn’t regarded the Shangri-La Dialogue as a particularly important event, as the discussions have tended to be negative toward Beijing. China instead places more value on its own security conference—the Xiangshan Forum—held in Beijing, said Zhou, a member of the Chinese delegation in Singapore.
Some analysts say China’s decision to not send its defense minister might be intended to avoid complications that could arise from unscripted and potentially fractious interactions with Western counterparts like Hegseth.
“The political risk to the defense minister himself and to the state outweighs any ‘rewards’ that may be had,” Loh said. While there is a missed opportunity to meet with other top defense officials, “they do not want to go off script or be construed as going off script in what is a sensitive period for U.S.-China relations.”
Despite words of support to Asian allies, Hegseth urged them to spend more on their own defense, pointing out current efforts in Europe to spend more to combat a less formidable threat. “It doesn’t make sense for countries in Europe to do [more on defense] while key allies and partners in Asia spend far less in the face of a far more formidable threat, not to mention North Korea,” Hegseth said.
Hegseth also warned against the economic influence Beijing wields over many Asian countries, whose largest trading partner is often China.
“We know that many countries are tempted by the idea of seeking both economic cooperation with China and defense cooperation with the United States. Now that is a geographic necessity for many,” Hegseth said. “Beware the leverage the [Chinese Communist Party] seeks with that entanglement. Economic dependence on China only deepens their malign influence and complicates our decision space during times of tension.”
Some allies were eager to amplify the U.S. message of support for Asia. Singaporean officials titled a press release after a discussion between the U.S. and Singaporean leadership as “U.S. Secretary of Defense Reaffirms Strong Ties.”
Write to Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com and Chun Han Wong at chunhan.wong@wsj.com
3. Chinese general fires back at US defence chief over Shangri-La Dialogue remarks
The SECDEF has their attention. He struck a nerve, "Do the Chinese "doth protest too much?"
This kind of criticism and pushback means the SECDEF's remarks were on target.
Shangri-La Dialogue
ChinaDiplomacy
Chinese general fires back at US defence chief over Shangri-La Dialogue remarks
Hegseth’s comments involved ‘groundless accusations against China’, PLA major general leading Chinese side at annual Singapore event says
Amber Wangin SingaporeandHayley Wongin Singapore
Published: 10:02pm, 31 May 2025Updated: 6:10pm, 1 Jun 2025
A PLA major general leading the Chinese delegation at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue has accused the United States of “destabilising the Asia-Pacific” – after US defence chief Pete Hegseth called for collective deterrence against what he characterised as Chinese aggression in the region.
In a panel session at Asia’s premier annual security conference on Saturday afternoon, Hu Gangfeng, vice-president of China’s National Defence University, said Hegseth’s address earlier in the day involved “groundless accusations against China”.
This came after the US defence secretary claimed that China was “destabilising” the region as it “harasses its neighbours” in the South China Sea while rapidly building up its military.
Addressing Asia-Pacific defence chiefs in a morning session at the Singapore event, Hegseth also warned of a possibly “imminent” risk that the People Liberation Army (PLA) would take over Taiwan by force.
Hu said that some of Hegseth’s claims were fabricated and “aimed at stirring up trouble, creating division, inciting confrontation, and destabilising the Asia-Pacific”.
“Some countries are promoting exclusive and confrontational small circles and [have] drastically increased their military presence” in the region, Hu said, adding that China was opposed to “the use of the Asia-Pacific waters as an arena for seeking hegemony”.
“The frequent violation of others’ sovereignty and maritime rights in the name of freedom of navigation and support of Taiwan separatist forces has destabilised ... the Taiwan Strait, and disrupted the Indo-Pacific maritime security cooperation,” he countered.
Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary. The US, like most countries, does not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, but it is opposed to any attempt to take the self-governed island by force and is committed to arming it for defence.
Meanwhile, the Chinese embassy in Singapore expressed veiled discontent against the keynote speech delivered by French President Emmanuel Macron on Friday.
In a warning against double standards in condemning conflicts, Macron said: “If we consider that Russia could be allowed to take a part of the territory of Ukraine without any restriction, without any constraint, without any reaction of the global order, how would you phrase what could happen in Taiwan?”
In a Facebook post on Saturday with a picture of Macron speaking in the main hall of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the embassy said: “Comparing the Taiwan question with the Ukraine issue is unacceptable”.
It said the Taiwan issue was entirely China’s internal affair, and “if one tries to denounce ‘double standard’ through the lens of double standard, the only result we can get is still [more] double standard”.
Amber Wang
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Amber Wang is a reporter for the China desk, and focuses on Chinese politics and diplomacy. She joined the Post in 2021, and previously worked for The New York Times and Southern Metropolis Daily.
Hayley Wong
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Hayley joined the Post as a reporter on the China Desk in 2022. She graduated from the Chinese University of Hong Kong and previously wrote for Bloomberg News.
4. Harvard Has Trained So Many Chinese Communist Officials, They Call It Their ‘Party School’
All the politics aside, it only makes sense for China to want to send its people to the institution that educates so many of the best and brightest in the US. I am sure they think (from the Chinese perspective) that by attending the Kennedy School they are on an equal footing with the elite Americans who attend and are in US government positions.
But I am sure that classroom/seminar dynamics are much different when there are CCP members in the class than when there are none present. On the one hand we want to engage with them to get Chinese views to better understand them. But you most likely we only get the "party line" while they are soaking up the views, opinions, and expertise of their fellow American students as well as planning for future engagement with American students in their future jobs.
Harvard Has Trained So Many Chinese Communist Officials, They Call It Their ‘Party School’
Kennedy School of Government is favored by party cadres seeking career boosts
https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-communist-party-harvard-f855112b
By Chun Han Wong
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Updated June 1, 2025 12:02 am ET
Harvard, which held its commencement Thursday, has long been popular among rising stars in Chinese politics. Photo: rick friedman/AFP/Getty Images
Key Points
What's This?
- The U.S. plans to tighten criteria for visa applications from China.
- Some Chinese observers describe Harvard University as the top “party school” outside China.
- Some U.S. politicians say China’s Communist Party is harvesting expertise in American academia to harm U.S. interests.
U.S. schools—and one prestigious institution in particular—have long offered up-and-coming Chinese officials a place to study governance, a practice that the Trump administration could end with a new effort to keep out what it says are Chinese students with Communist Party ties.
For decades, the party has sent thousands of mid-career and senior bureaucrats to pursue executive training and postgraduate studies on U.S. campuses, with Harvard University a coveted destination described by some in China as the top “party school” outside the country.
Alumni of such programs include a former vice president and Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s top negotiator in trade talks with the first Trump administration.
In an effort announced Wednesday by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, U.S. authorities will tighten criteria for visa applications from China and “aggressively revoke visas for Chinese students, including those with connections to the Chinese Communist Party or studying in critical fields.”
The statement didn’t say how the Trump administration would assess Communist Party ties or what degree of connection would result in revocation of visas. In China, party membership is widely seen as helpful for career advancement—in government and the private sector—and is typically a prerequisite for officials seeking high office.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said Thursday that the U.S. move “seriously damaged the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese students.”
They've taken five plus, by the way,
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President Trump said Harvard should cap the amount of foreign students it admits at 15%, and ensure that those it does accept “are people that can love our country.” Photo: Andrew Harnik/Getty Images
Alleged ties with the Communist Party have emerged as a leading line of attack in President Trump’s pressure campaign against Harvard. The Trump administration said on May 22 it was revoking Harvard’s authorization to enroll foreign students, accusing the university of working with the Communist Party, though it later gave Harvard 30 days to contest the decision. Harvard has filed a lawsuit to keep its foreign enrollments.
Harvard didn’t respond to questions for this article.
Some U.S. politicians have said that China’s Communist Party is harvesting expertise in American academia to ultimately harm U.S. interests. The Trump administration has cited these criticisms among others to back its efforts to force a major cultural shift in U.S. colleges, which many conservatives regard as bastions of liberal and left-wing ideology.
American universities have played leading roles in shaping China’s overseas training programs for mid-career officials, which Beijing started arranging at scale in the 1990s as a way to improve governance by exposing its bureaucrats to Western public-policy ideas and practices.
Other U.S. colleges that have offered executive training to Chinese officials include Syracuse, Stanford, the University of Maryland and Rutgers, according to publicity materials and other disclosures. Syracuse’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, for instance, helped set up postgraduate programs in public administration at Chinese universities in the early 2000s.
Beyond the U.S., Chinese officials have also flocked to leading universities in countries including Singapore, Japan and the U.K. Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University is among the most popular, having trained thousands of Chinese officials since the early 1990s, mostly through postgraduate programs colloquially known as the “Mayors’ Class.”
Li Yuanchao, shown during his time as China’s vice president, went to Harvard Kennedy School in 2002. Photo: jason lee/Reuters
Harvard enjoys a sterling reputation among Chinese officials thanks to its record in training highflying bureaucrats who went on to take senior government roles and, in some cases, join the party’s elite Politburo. Some observers dubbed Harvard a de facto “party school,” as the party’s own training academies for promising bureaucrats are known.
“If we were to rank the Chinese Communist Party’s ‘overseas party schools,’ the one deserving top spot has to be Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government in the U.S.,” said a 2014 commentary published by Shanghai Observer, an online platform run by the city’s main party newspaper.
Li Yuanchao, a former Politburo member and China’s vice president from 2013 to 2018, attended a mid-career training program at Harvard Kennedy School in 2002. He was the party boss of the central city of Nanjing at the time, and his first class at the school focused on crisis management, he recalled in a speech when visiting Harvard in 2009.
The training proved invaluable when Li, after his return to Nanjing, had to deal with a mass poisoning in the city that killed dozens of people. “More than 200 lives were saved in time, and the suspect was captured within 36 hours. We were praised by the local people and the central government for this,” Li said in the 2009 speech. “So, when I come here again today, I want to say: ‘Thank you, Harvard!’”
Liu He, a retired vice premier who was Xi’s top trade negotiator in talks with the first Trump administration, earned a master’s degree in public administration from Harvard Kennedy School in 1995. Current Politburo member and senior legislator Li Hongzhong attended a short-term program at Harvard in 1999.
Liu He, seen during a 2023 meeting with then-Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, attended Harvard in the 1990s. Photo: DENIS BALIBOUSE/REUTERS
While Harvard Kennedy School hosted Chinese students as early as the 1980s, Beijing started sending officials for mid-career training there in a more organized manner in the following decade, according to Chinese media reports. One program, launched in 1998, offered fellowships and executive training courses to around 20 senior officials each year.
In the early 2000s, Harvard launched another program, “China’s Leaders in Development,” through which Chinese officials would undergo a weekslong training course split between Harvard and Beijing’s prestigious Tsinghua University.
The program was designed to “help prepare senior local and central Chinese government officials to more effectively address the ongoing challenges of China’s national reforms,” according to Harvard.
According to newsletters published by the Kennedy School’s Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, the Harvard segment of the program has featured classes on subjects including public management, economic development and social policy, as well as visits to U.S. government organizations.
Some children of top Communist Party officials have also attended Harvard for undergraduate and postgraduate studies.
Xi’s daughter, Mingze, attended Harvard as an undergraduate in the early 2010s under an assumed name, though Harvard administrators and some faculty members were aware of her identity. She had enrolled while her father was China’s vice president and leader-in-waiting and graduated after he took power.
Other Harvard alumni with elite backgrounds include Alvin Jiang, a grandson of former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin, as well as Bo Guagua, the son of the former Politburo member Bo Xilai.
Bo Guagua, son of former politician Bo Xilai, walks offstage after receiving his Harvard master’s degree in 2012. Photo: brian snyder/Reuters
Bo Guagua attended Harvard Kennedy School from 2010 to 2012 and earned a master’s degree in public policy. His father was purged in 2012 and was sentenced to life imprisonment the following year on charges of bribery, embezzlement and abuse of power.
Harvard’s China connections have also helped some of its top scholars gain access in Beijing. Graham Allison, a former dean of Harvard Kennedy School, has been granted meetings with Xi and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi over the past year, during which the professor spoke about his views on U.S.-China relations.
Write to Chun Han Wong at chunhan.wong@wsj.com
5. To Protect Taiwan, Don’t Prepare to Defend It
My friend Doug Bandow may not believe in the adage: "Si vis pacem, para bellum," which translates to "If you want peace, prepare for war."
Excerpts:
Nevertheless, Americans need not choose between abandoning and defending Taiwan. Washington should pursue a dialogue with Beijing directed at defusing the military situation in the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. should press mutual restraint, with reductions to America’s regional military activity, Washington’s political and military contacts with Taipei, Beijing’s coercive military operations and threats, and Taipei’s independence-oriented diplomatic activity. The goal of such a diplomatic initiative, Kavanagh and Wertheim explained, is that China “would see the threat subside as Washington takes greater care not to publicly challenge the legitimacy of Beijing’s territorial claim and aspiration for eventual unification.”
The U.S. also should organize allied plans for economic and political retaliation in the event of Chinese aggression. The commercial consequences would be especially great for China, which is highly dependent on international trade. A failed attack also would likely end Xi’s rule and perhaps that of the Chinese Communist Party.
...
While Taiwan may be the most dangerous spot on earth, Kavanagh and Wertheim urge U.S. officials to downplay the island state’s significance, rejecting “the misguided idea that the United States’ survival and prosperity turn on Taiwan’s political status.” America need not commit potential national suicide on Taipei’s behalf.
Both the U.S. and PRC should determine to avoid war over the island’s status. That would require them to compromise and moderate their ambitions. Control of Taipei does not justify a clash between the two most important and powerful countries on earth, armed with nuclear weapons and capable of destroying each other. Only very rarely is war necessary. And not in this case. Especially by America.
To Protect Taiwan, Don’t Prepare to Defend It
The U.S. should defuse tensions with Beijing to prevent war over the faraway island.
The American Conservative · by Doug Bandow · May 29, 2025
The Russo-Ukrainian War may be the world’s most urgent crisis. However, the world’s greatest danger is a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan.
Moscow, despite possessing nuclear weapons, is a declining power. Moreover, Washington has no cause for war with Russia. Ukraine has never been a military ally nor even security interest of America, and Moscow has carefully avoided clashing with NATO. No one in the nation’s capital, other than wildly reckless hawks like Mississippi Sen. Roger Wicker, favors war with Russia, which would almost certainly go nuclear and result in catastrophic destruction.
In contrast, the People’s Republic of China is a rising global power, a potential peer competitor of the U.S. with rapidly expanding conventional and nuclear forces. And Taiwan has become an increasingly sensitive flashpoint. Although Beijing would prefer to gain control of the island through intimidation, it continues to prepare for war.
Virtually every American security analyst reflexively insists that the U.S. also must be ready to fight on behalf of Taipei. Indeed, despite Washington’s formal policy of “strategic ambiguity,” former President Joe Biden repeatedly stated that he would defend the island state. His administration increased the U.S. military presence in Taiwan, stationing several hundred American personnel in the country—more than ten times the number reported last year—and cooperating in other ways. Mark Montgomery of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies recently told Congress, “If we’re going to give them billions of dollars in assistance, sell them tens of billions of dollars’ worth of U.S. gear, it makes sense that we’d be over there training and working.” He advocated doubling the U.S. military’s presence.
The political pressure on any president to intervene in a conflict between Beijing and Taipei would be strong, as Jennifer Kavanagh of Defense Priorities and Stephen Wertheim of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace observed in Foreign Affairs. “By staying out, the president could expect to be blamed not only for permitting the economic meltdown that China’s invasion would trigger but also for losing Taiwan after a decades-long battle of wills between Washington and Beijing over the island’s future,” they wrote.
Moreover, America’s formal armed presence, increased military cooperation, regional force build-up, and continuing military threats would tempt the PRC, if it decided to act against Taipei, to launch a preemptive strike.
Oddly, Taiwan has become an argument for ramping up America’s Ukrainian proxy war. Observed The Daily Telegraph: “Like Ukrainians, [the Taiwanese] live under constant threat from a neighbor that believes it has a right to their territory. They also rely on Western support to keep that threat at bay.” Taipei’s foreign minister, Joseph Wu, argued that China would treat a U.S. withdrawal from Ukraine as a victory. He warned that China would think: “OK, since Russia could do that, we can do that as well.”
In fact, Washington’s Ukraine policy of weapons not war may undermine U.S. threats to intervene militarily on behalf of Taipei. The U.S. and its allies refused to fight for Ukraine even though they could deploy substantial ground and air forces against Russia. Intervening on Taiwan’s behalf would be far more difficult. NATO would play no meaningful combat role, and even America’s Asian allies might remain aloof—South Korea very likely, Japan and Australia uncertain. Which would greatly impede U.S. operations.
Trump so far has refused to commit to defend Taiwan. His criticisms of Taipei’s military and trade practices suggest he would be reluctant to jump into the abyss against the PRC. As a result, observed the Telegraph, in Taiwan “a sense of unease has turned into panic.” Predictably, the island’s political and business leaders “are scrambling to appease the U.S. president.” Instead, they should concentrate on developing Taipei’s military capabilities. Its failure to deploy a serious military and the Taiwanese people’s reluctance to defend themselves have been truly shocking. Far more brazenly than the Europeans and Japanese, the island’s residents presume Washington will risk nuclear war on their behalf.
Maintaining sufficient military force and projecting it thousands of miles to contain the PRC within its borders would consume ever more of the U.S. military budget. The consequences of combat between Washington and Beijing would be serious and most likely catastrophic. Even a purely conventional conflict would look more like the Korean War than the Iraq War. And the outcome would be much worse if the U.S. homeland became a battlefield and nuclear weapons magnified the destruction.
The outcome of multiple war games suggests that neither combatant could expect victory, and much would depend on the willingness of America’s allies to intervene. In these games, Washington often loses. Even when Beijing fails to conquer the island, the officially victorious U.S. typically loses a couple carriers, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of personnel. And these exercises often stop before nuclear weapons are used, yet neither side could easily accept defeat and the temptation to escalate would be enormous. Nor would it be enough for America to triumph. If thwarted, China likely would immediately begin preparing for a rematch. The U.S. might have to defend Taiwan continually—and for decades.
Such a policy deserves a serious debate involving the American people, who would be doing the paying and dying. They felt betrayed by the Iraq War, in which U.S. casualties, though tragic, were modest compared to numbers in past conflicts. In a battle between China and America the economic costs would be far higher, and the number of casualties would be many times greater. Imagine if the U.S. homeland came under attack—nuclear attack. Hawkish policymakers should level with the American people and allow the latter to decide if they support such a policy.
Any map demonstrates that Taiwan is not vital for U.S. security. Washington enjoys military dominance off the PRC’s coast, but that is useful, not existential. Possession of Taiwan would aid the Chinese military, but not fundamentally transform America’s strategic position. Chinese control would discomfit Japan and the Philippines, but little suggests that Beijing desires to or even could stage a Pacific blitzkrieg. U.S. sovereignty, security, prosperity, and liberty all would remain secure irrespective of Taipei’s fate.
Another claim, repeated by the Telegraph, is that “Taiwan is the crucible for the production of the world’s most advanced semiconductors and, as a result, a full-blown war on the island would threaten a global economic meltdown. This threat of mutually assured economic destruction has provided what analysts have dubbed a ‘silicon shield’—it is in the U.S.’s interests to protect the island.” However, for centuries the West engaged in destructive warfare for mercantile purposes. Taiwan’s chip factories are not worth inaugurating mass slaughter, regional chaos, and nuclear war. Loss of semiconductor production would be costly. A Sino-American conflict would be beyond expensive.
Indeed, Taiwan’s dominant semiconductor chip industry should be an incentive against American intervention since war, not a Chinese takeover, poses the greatest threat. Even successful defense of Taiwan would likely ruin the industry, whether inadvertently by the winner or intentionally by the loser. As for guaranteeing access to semiconductor chips, Washington already is promoting a mix of increased domestic production and friend-shoring, both of which are far better responses to the threat than war.
Moreover, if China acts militarily, it will do so despite the deleterious economic consequences. Few wars make economic sense. Observed Sean King of Park Strategies: “The whole population of Taiwan is basically about the size of Shanghai. If the mainland goes for Taiwan, it’s not going to be for economics. It’s really going to be about nationalism and strategy.”
Taiwan is a vibrant democracy, but that also doesn’t justify the U.S. going to a war with China. Argued the Hudson Institute’s Jason Hsu: “During Biden’s administration the discussions were value-based, about allyship, partnership or even democracy.” Yet bringing destruction upon the American republic and sacrificing American lives would be a high price to pay for protecting Taiwanese democracy. Moreover, expected U.S. belligerence would encourage the PRC to preempt Washington with a broader and more savage attack.
Nevertheless, Americans need not choose between abandoning and defending Taiwan. Washington should pursue a dialogue with Beijing directed at defusing the military situation in the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. should press mutual restraint, with reductions to America’s regional military activity, Washington’s political and military contacts with Taipei, Beijing’s coercive military operations and threats, and Taipei’s independence-oriented diplomatic activity. The goal of such a diplomatic initiative, Kavanagh and Wertheim explained, is that China “would see the threat subside as Washington takes greater care not to publicly challenge the legitimacy of Beijing’s territorial claim and aspiration for eventual unification.”
The U.S. also should organize allied plans for economic and political retaliation in the event of Chinese aggression. The commercial consequences would be especially great for China, which is highly dependent on international trade. A failed attack also would likely end Xi’s rule and perhaps that of the Chinese Communist Party.
Kavanagh and Wertheim also suggest a broader strategy to empower Taiwan by promoting the island’s ability to defend itself, which “allows the U.S. to assist from a distance, and keeps the U.S. position in Asia intact regardless of how a cross-strait conflict concludes.” In particular, Washington should sell those weapons, such as anti-ship mines and missiles, most useful to prevent a Chinese attack. More important to America, as well as much more defensible against Beijing, are Japan and other Asian states. The U.S. should encourage them to bolster their militaries, including by increasing intra-Asian cooperation, especially with India. Moreover, threatened states should consider acquiring nuclear weapons, controversial though that would be. So-called extended deterrence, with the U.S. threatening to fight nuclear war against the enemies of its allies, is a terrible game of chicken made much riskier by China’s ongoing nuclear build-up. Far better that allied states control their own defense destinies.
While Taiwan may be the most dangerous spot on earth, Kavanagh and Wertheim urge U.S. officials to downplay the island state’s significance, rejecting “the misguided idea that the United States’ survival and prosperity turn on Taiwan’s political status.” America need not commit potential national suicide on Taipei’s behalf.
Both the U.S. and PRC should determine to avoid war over the island’s status. That would require them to compromise and moderate their ambitions. Control of Taipei does not justify a clash between the two most important and powerful countries on earth, armed with nuclear weapons and capable of destroying each other. Only very rarely is war necessary. And not in this case. Especially by America.
The American Conservative · by Doug Bandow · May 29, 2025
6. United States wondered how China had made such progress in the field of microchips. Huawei and Xiaomi are the answer, with massive development.
Excerpt:
China may not yet have won the semi-conductor war, but it has shown that an embargo, far from putting the brakes on, can become a driving force for innovation. Huawei and Xiaomi are the visible faces of a national strategy to win back technology. And this time, the United States knows that the response is real.
United States wondered how China had made such progress in the field of microchips. Huawei and Xiaomi are the answer, with massive development.
farmingdale-observer.com · May 30, 2025
The United States has long dominated the semiconductor market, putting China under pressure with trade restrictions on companies such as Huawei and Xiaomi. But in just a few years, Beijing has made a spectacular comeback.
The embargo that triggered the offensive
Since 2019, sanctions imposed by Washington on Chinese tech giants have prohibited Huawei, among other things, from accessing advanced components from US companies such as Qualcomm or Intel. The aim: to curb China’s technological expansion and preserve its strategic lead in the semiconductor sector.
But far from paralysing the sector, these restrictions have accelerated China’s investment in its electronics industry. The government has injected billions of yuan into research, training and, above all, the local manufacture of chips, even if they are technically less advanced than the 3 or 5 nanometre chips produced in Taiwan or Korea.
Huawei and Xiaomi: the bridgeheads
Huawei’s return with its in-house Kirin 9000S processor – integrated into the Mate 60 Pro – has caused surprise, if not concern, in Washington. This system-on-a-chip, produced in SMIC factories, is tangible proof that China can produce advanced chips locally, despite embargoes. Xiaomi followed suit with the development of its own semiconductors, notably for cameras and energy management.
Even if these chips do not yet fully rival the latest generations from Qualcomm or Apple, they mark a strategic turning point: the end of China’s total dependence on foreign technologies. The industry is also reorganising around national standards and alternative architectures such as RISC-V, which are open and less subject to Western control than ARM or x86 architectures.
Read More
This catch-up is based on an all-out development strategy: creation of research institutes, massive funding for local foundries such as SMIC, support for etching machine manufacturers, and even encouragement for reverse engineering. Beijing assumes that innovation can be achieved through imitation, then improvement.
Growing concern on the American side
Faced with this dynamic, the United States fears losing the competitive advantage it once held. Some reports are already raising the possibility that, within a decade, China will be able to produce its own high-end chips without any dependence on foreign suppliers. A prospect that would upset the global technological balance.
China may not yet have won the semi-conductor war, but it has shown that an embargo, far from putting the brakes on, can become a driving force for innovation. Huawei and Xiaomi are the visible faces of a national strategy to win back technology. And this time, the United States knows that the response is real.
farmingdale-observer.com · May 30, 2025
7. State Department seeking to create an "Office of Remigration" in wide restructuring
I had never heard of such a concept before.
Excerpts:
Yes, but: "The way that it worked before, Population Refugee Migration was basically an entire bureau dedicated to bringing people into the United States," said the State Department official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
- "It had the migration function — it's in the name — we're just reversing the flow of migrants who shouldn't be here to go out of the country."
State Department seeking to create an "Office of Remigration" in wide restructuring
Axios · by Russell Contreras,Marc Caputo · May 30, 2025
May 29, 2025 - Politics & Policy
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on May 22, 2025. Photo: Drew Angerer/AFP via Getty Images
The State Department plans to create an "Office of Remigration" in a sweeping reorganization drive tied to the Trump administration's efforts to deport millions of immigrants, a department official told Axios Thursday.
The big picture: The proposed new office would signal the State Department's shift from helping refugees to removing immigrants, even as it employs the term "remigration" — a concept that critics say has a troubled history in Europe, where it's used by far-right groups.
Driving the news: The State Department on Thursday announced a proposed overhaul that would cut various programs and staff.
- The Office of Remigration would be part of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, a State Department official said.
- The proposal calls for an even deeper cut to domestic staffing than the 15% reduction that was floated in April.
- The department also intends to eliminate several divisions overseeing America's 20-year presence in Afghanistan, including an office responsible for resettling Afghan allies who supported U.S. military operations.
Context: In Europe, the concept of remigration calls for the mass deportation or coerced repatriation of non-white immigrants and their European-born descendants.
-
It's a term that's been used by far-right politicians, such as Austria's Herbert Kickl and Germany's Alternative for Germany (AfD) party leader, Alice Weidel.
-
Liberal and moderate critics in Europe say "remigration" has historically been used as a euphemism for ethnic cleansing. The term was popularized by Martin Sellner, a millennial influencer of Europe's far-right.
Yes, but: "The way that it worked before, Population Refugee Migration was basically an entire bureau dedicated to bringing people into the United States," said the State Department official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
- "It had the migration function — it's in the name — we're just reversing the flow of migrants who shouldn't be here to go out of the country."
Zoom in: A more detailed proposal sent to Congress proposes prioritizing migration and border issues over refugee resettlement.
- The Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration's "existing migration functions will be consolidated into three new functional offices under a (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State) for Migration Matters."
- "Reflecting core administration priorities, these offices will be substantially reorganized to shift focus towards supporting the Administration's efforts to return illegal aliens to their country of origin or legal status," the document said.
- The Office of Remigration would be one of these new "functional offices" and is described as a "hub for immigration issues and repatriation tracking."
What they're saying: "Over the past quarter century, the domestic operations of the State Department have grown exponentially, resulting in more bureaucracy, higher costs, and fewer results for the American people," Rubio said in a statement.
- "The reorganization plan will result in a more agile department, better equipped to promote America's interests and keep Americans safe across the world."
- Rubio didn't mention the Office of Remigration in his statement, and the office is not listed on a new chart on the department's website.
Zoom out: The Trump administration has faced court challenges in attempts to remove immigrants from the U.S. without due process.
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Go deeper
May 4, 2025 - Politics & Policy
Illustration of a chain link fence with columns instead of metal posts.
Illustration: Lindsey Bailey/Axios
The Trump administration is tapping multiple agencies for a whole-of-government campaign to achieve its goal of deporting millions.
Why it matters: Controversial tactics — ensnaring even legal U.S. residents and citizens — have raised alarm and triggered court battles over executive power.
8. Can Japan fill the leadership void as America steps back from Asia?
Is the US stepping back?
Excerpts:
However, China’s effort to position itself as a responsible stakeholder is complicated by its assertive behaviour in the South and East China Seas, the Taiwan Strait, and its opaque alignment with Russia. For many countries in the Indo-Pacific – particularly Southeast Asian nations – these actions have raised serious concerns. Despite scepticism about Washington’s global conduct under Trump, the US remains a key security partner and a symbol of the rules-based order. Regional states, therefore, face a dilemma: growing wariness of both great powers but continuing dependence on US strategic assurances and China’s economic relations.
Ishiba’s visit to Washington in February aimed to reaffirm continuity in the alliance, even as Trump criticised its asymmetry and imposed reciprocal tariffs.
This evolving strategic environment presents Japan with a pressing diplomatic challenge. As American leadership becomes more erratic and Chinese influence expands, Tokyo must navigate an increasingly fluid regional order. The erosion of US legitimacy does not merely affect bilateral ties; it also disrupts the foundation of Japan’s post-war foreign policy of creating and maintaining a rules-based order. Whether Japan chooses to reinforce the alliance, hedge through multilateral, regional and minilateral institutions, or adopt a more autonomous leadership role will shape the contours of Indo-Pacific diplomacy in the years ahead.
...
While questions about US reliability have long shaped allied security thinking, the current debate is no longer simply about trust. For Japan, the issue is less one of willingness and more a question of how much strategic uncertainty it can afford to absorb and how much responsibility it is willing to take.
Can Japan fill the leadership void as America steps back from Asia? | Lowy Institute
lowyinstitute.org · by Ryosuke Hanada
The presidency of Donald Trump posed serious challenges to the legitimacy of America’s global leadership. A recent Lowy Institute Poll found that 64 per cent of Australians expressed diminished trust in the United States. In Japan, a Yomiuri Shimbun survey conducted on 18 May reported that 73 per cent of respondents were concerned about the future of US–Japan relations. These numbers point to a broader reputational deficit facing the United States among key allies.
China has sought to exploit this credibility gap. President Xi Jinping has portrayed Beijing as a defender of global multilateralism in contrast to Washington’s unilateralism. The Global Times cited the Democracy Perception Index, which suggested that a significant proportion of surveyed countries viewed China more favourably than the US. While the veracity of these claims is questionable, they underscore a perceptual shift that Beijing is actively encouraging.
However, China’s effort to position itself as a responsible stakeholder is complicated by its assertive behaviour in the South and East China Seas, the Taiwan Strait, and its opaque alignment with Russia. For many countries in the Indo-Pacific – particularly Southeast Asian nations – these actions have raised serious concerns. Despite scepticism about Washington’s global conduct under Trump, the US remains a key security partner and a symbol of the rules-based order. Regional states, therefore, face a dilemma: growing wariness of both great powers but continuing dependence on US strategic assurances and China’s economic relations.
Ishiba’s visit to Washington in February aimed to reaffirm continuity in the alliance, even as Trump criticised its asymmetry and imposed reciprocal tariffs.
This evolving strategic environment presents Japan with a pressing diplomatic challenge. As American leadership becomes more erratic and Chinese influence expands, Tokyo must navigate an increasingly fluid regional order. The erosion of US legitimacy does not merely affect bilateral ties; it also disrupts the foundation of Japan’s post-war foreign policy of creating and maintaining a rules-based order. Whether Japan chooses to reinforce the alliance, hedge through multilateral, regional and minilateral institutions, or adopt a more autonomous leadership role will shape the contours of Indo-Pacific diplomacy in the years ahead.
In the first six months of his leadership, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has prioritised bilateral stability with Washington. The administration has focused on advancing the military alliance, separating economic tensions from broader strategic cooperation, and maintaining direct channels of communication with the Trump administration. His ambition for an Asian NATO is shelved. Ishiba’s visit to Washington in February aimed to reaffirm continuity in the alliance, even as Trump criticised its asymmetry and imposed reciprocal tariffs.
Japan has also continued to operationalise its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision through practical initiatives. The defence budget increased to $70 billion in the financial year 2025, and Official Security Assistance grew from ¥2 billion in FY2023 to ¥8 billion. The Japan International Cooperation Agency has delivered over ¥145 billion (approximately US$28 billion) in aid to Southeast Asia since 2013, including 24 patrol vessels. Institutional reforms such as the establishment of a Joint Operations Command, and increased multilateral exercises, including the recent Quad table-top logistical exercise have further reinforced Japan’s regional presence.
Nonetheless, many of these developments are extensions of trajectories set by previous administrations. While they reflect continuity, they may not be sufficient to counteract the broader disruption caused by US unpredictability. For example, several proposals for minilateral institutionalisation – such as AUKUS Pillar Two Plus Japan, the more advanced US–Japan–South Korea trilateral, and NATO’s IP4 initiative – were largely shaped by institutional advocates in the Biden administration. With those figures having left office, sustaining and adapting these frameworks may require more proactive leadership from Tokyo.
Thus far, Japan has been cautious in articulating a broader strategic vision. Unlike Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, who has publicly addressed the implications of US retreat from multilateralism, Tokyo has largely refrained from making forward-looking or critical statements. The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” continues to serve as a useful conceptual anchor, but as US commitment to liberal norms becomes less consistent, the concept demands further policy elaboration.
There are, however, opportunities for Japan to assert a more ambitious role. With USAID scaling back its operations, Japan could propose a trilateral development mechanism with Australia and New Zealand to coordinate infrastructure and capacity-building in the Pacific Islands. Similarly, Japan might take a leading role in revitalising multilateral platforms where US disengagement has stalled progress, particularly in trade and rule-making fora. Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi’s remarks at the Munich Security Conference – that “Russia must not be the victor in the Ukraine conflict” – reflect a principled stance aligned with the rules-based order while the question remains how Japan will operationalise such commitments within material and legal constraints.
Japan can provide previous lessons from American and Chinese unilateralism. Though people tend to forget the US unilateral actions against Japan in the late 1980s and 1990s, the United States applied the Super 301 provision against Japan, restricting trade in supercomputers, satellites, and wood products in 1989. Japan had faced and dealt with China’s assertive maritime expansion since the early 2000s, especially after 2007. Japan’s historical experiences provide intellectual lessons for many governments that face great power’s unilateral actions.
Notwithstanding these opportunities, it is unlikely that Tokyo will promulgate an ambitious foreign policy vision. The Ishiba administration’s approval rate hit a record low 27.4 per cent in May, and little sign of potential recovery by the upper house election in July. Though still uncertain, the election dramas watched in Canada and Australia may not be screened in Japan.
While questions about US reliability have long shaped allied security thinking, the current debate is no longer simply about trust. For Japan, the issue is less one of willingness and more a question of how much strategic uncertainty it can afford to absorb and how much responsibility it is willing to take.
lowyinstitute.org · by Ryosuke Hanada
9. Hegseth says the U.S. will reposition military amid threat from China
I know there are those in the Pentagon who are solely focused on fighting a war over Taiwan but we really need to get our narrative right so as not to undermine our alliances (which is perhaps the objective of some). In the statement of nearly every official and pundit about moving US forces from Korea there is such an underlying tone that indicates a lack of knowledge of and concern for US interests in Northeast Asia and on the Korean peninsula. It is as if many of these officials and pundits view Korea as a wasteful distraction for US strategic interests and the US military. And they continue to demonstrate a lack of understanding of what US forces do in terms of deterrence, defense and support to the ROK/US Combined Forces Command which is the warfighting command charged with deterrence and defense in Korea. They also do not understand how forces in Korea can contribute to US strategic agility throughout the Indo-Pacific when properly focused and employed.
The people who are advocating for force posture changes have given no indication of the strategic, operational, or tactical rationale for such changes other than saying we have to focus on the "pacing threat." Please tell me what putting a 4,500 person Brigade Combat Team in Guam from Korea does for us - how does an Army BCT in Guam help us with the feared "pacing threat?" Please provide what effects that you think it will achieve. And then please provide the method for how a BCT will maintain readiness on the island of Guam (especially as Marines are moving in from Okinawa)?
The bottom line is what does moving 4,500 troops from Korea to Guam really do for the US? Do we understand that the US will foot the entire taxpayer bill for the move and for support in Guam and will forgo great support they get from Korea while in Korea? This of course is a minor consideration if the move will achieve significant strategic, operational, and tactical effects. But there has been no official who has presented an adequate description of thoise effects.
As I have written, I want all US forces with our allies properly focused on deterrence and defense throughout the Indo-Pacific with the strategic agility to respond to multiple contingencies. We can no longer afford to view the myriad threats as stovepiped for compartmented, especially since our intelligence community has assessed the new emerging threat as "adversarial cooperation" with the CRInK providing mutual support to its members. We need to take a holistic view to deterrence and defense.
Optimizing U.S. and Allied Forces for Deterrence and Defense Throughout Indo-Pacom: From Korea to Australia and Everywhere in Between
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/24/us-allies-deterrence-indo-pacific/
Excerpts:
U.S. interests could diverge from those of South Korea, as the South sees its primary threat coming from North Korea.
"I do think we're likely to see a change in force posture on the peninsula. I think the administration has been starting to signal that pretty openly," says Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C., who was attending the Shangri-La dialogue.
"I think the message from the Trump administration," he added, "is that all that matters is what South Korea does on China. And the reality is that U.S.-South Korea interests go far beyond what South Korea does on China."
Hegseth says the U.S. will reposition military amid threat from China
NPR · by Anthony Kuhn
U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth delivers an address at the Shangri-La Dialogue Summit in Singapore on Saturday. Mohd Rasfan/AFP via Getty Images
SINGAPORE — Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth gave a stark warning Saturday about China's threat to the status quo in Asia. He said the U.S. is refocusing its strength and policies on deterring China, and coaxed China's neighbors and U.S. allies to help.
"It has to be clear to all that Beijing is credibly preparing to potentially use military force to alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific," Hegseth told civilian and military officials at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia's top defense summit.
The U.S. does not seek conflict, nor intend to "dominate or strangle China, to encircle or provoke," Hegseth insisted. "We do not seek regime change."
Previous U.S. administrations have offered similar reassurances to Beijing. But retired Chinese Senior Col. Zhou Bo, now a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University in Beijing, says he thought Hegseth's speech was "far more hostile than any of his predecessors made at the Shangri-La Dialogue," and were infused with "ideological rivalry."
Zhou adds that Hegseth's Singapore speech was more supportive of U.S. allies than Vice President Vance's starkly critical remarks at the Munich Security Conference in February. So, Zhou asks, "which one should we really believe?"
Refocusing U.S. military posture on China
Hegseth said the U.S. is "reorienting toward deterring aggression by Communist China."
One implication of this is that the U.S. could withdraw some of the 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea to deal with China, including in a case of a potential conflict between mainland China and Taiwan, which the Pentagon calls its "sole pacing scenario." The Pentagon says it has no plans to pull its forces out of South Korea, but insists it must have the "strategic flexibility" to put troops where it needs them.
U.S. interests could diverge from those of South Korea, as the South sees its primary threat coming from North Korea.
"I do think we're likely to see a change in force posture on the peninsula. I think the administration has been starting to signal that pretty openly," says Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C., who was attending the Shangri-La dialogue.
"I think the message from the Trump administration," he added, "is that all that matters is what South Korea does on China. And the reality is that U.S.-South Korea interests go far beyond what South Korea does on China.
"America first" defense policies
Hegseth's emphasis on U.S. priorities echoed much of President Trump's "America First" rhetoric. The defense secretary slammed the Biden administration's policies as "feckless," while praising President Trump's acumen as a dealmaker and efforts to seal its borders to an "invasion" of illegal immigrants.
"We are not here to pressure other countries to embrace and adopt our politics or ideology," Hegseth told the assembled leaders and military officials.
Hegseth conceded that geography makes it necessary for Asian nations to rely on China economically, while seeking defense cooperation with the U.S.
"But beware the leverage that the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] seeks with that entanglement," he warned. "Economic dependence on China only deepens their malign influence and complicates our defense decision space during times of tension."
Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said his country would remain non-aligned, and against major powers carving out spheres of influence. He said Malaysia would continue to welcome the U.S. presence in the region, but also continue to value it ties with China.
"What Southeast Asia needs is a dynamic equilibrium," he said, "that enables cooperation without coercion, and balance without bloc politics."
European leader warns of double standards
In a speech at the forum the evening before Hegseth spoke, French President Emmanuel Macron offered a critique of U.S. policies, and encouraged nations to maintain strategic autonomy amid the U.S.-China rivalry.
"We want to cooperate. But we don't want to be instructed on a daily basis what is allowed, what is not allowed and how our life will change because of the decision of a single person," he said, apparently alluding to Trump.
Macron also rejected the double standard of rushing to defend Taiwan — a self-governing island that China claims as part of its territory — while abandoning Ukraine, a move which he said would undermine the U.S.' own credibility.
China's embassy in Singapore shot back on its Facebook page that "comparing the Taiwan question with the Ukraine issue is unacceptable," as the Taiwan issue is China's internal affair.
"If we use a double standard to look at a double standard," it argued, "we still end up with a double standard."
in response to Hegseth's remarks, the embassy said in a separate Facebook post that the U.S. "claims to safeguard peace and not to seek conflicts. We've heard it. Let's see what moves will it take."
NPR · by Anthony Kuhn
10. Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Tactics Target the Baltics
Conclusion:
Russia ultimately views the Baltic region as a key battleground in its broader conflict with the European Union and NATO, a stance reinforced by, but not limited to, its war against Ukraine. With military superiority in Kaliningrad and Pskov, Moscow can pressure NATO while exploiting political, economic, and cyber tactics to weaken the Baltic States. Thus far, the Baltic States have limited Russia’s success, despite intensified hybrid threats, with strong societal resilience and strategic coordination. As the Baltics withstand these pressures, these frontline states serve as a model for democratic resistance to foreign influence.
Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Tactics Target the Baltics
jamestown.org · by Eitvydas Bajarūnas · May 27, 2025
We are publishing this piece because Ambassador Eitvydas Bajarūnas has a wide range of governmental experiences that give him unique insight into modern political warfare. Among his many overseas postings, Ambassador Bajarūnas served as the Ambassador of Lithuania to Russia and as Deputy Ambassador of Lithuania’s delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He previously served as Ambassador-at-Large for Hybrid Threats and regularly provides analysis on Russian informational warfare against the Baltics. In 2016, when he finished his posting as the Lithuanian Ambassador to Sweden, the then-Minister for Foreign Affairs nominated him as Ambassador-at-Large for Hybrid Threats. His main tasks were, first, to serve as the focal point within the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this topic, and second, to promote understanding of hybrid threats and the need to counter them among EU and NATO allies.
Ambassador Bajarūnas participated in various EU and NATO working groups and initiatives (e.g., the NATO-Ukraine Hybrid Platform, the EU Working Group on Countering Hybrid Threats). He also negotiated and signed the memorandum establishing the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats on behalf of Lithuania. Additionally, Bajarūnas took part in numerous seminars and working meetings, wrote numerous articles, and gave interviews to promote understanding of this phenomenon. Ambassador Bajarūnas’s piece helps place these developments into a larger context and explains why Russian political warfare is a decisive threat to frontline states. This essay builds upon Beniamino Irdi’s previous Perspectives article “Hybrid Threats and Modern Political Warfare: The Architecture of Cross-Domain Conflict,” highlighting the themes of dispersion across domains and gradualness in timing.
Executive Summary:
- Hybrid threats describe a complex strategy combining military tools with unconventional methods. Addressing hybrid threats in the Baltics is a continuous, never-ending process centered around developing resilience at the societal, national, European, and trans-Atlantic levels.
- With Russia’s frontline in Ukraine nearly stagnant, Moscow’s efforts yielding limited results despite enormous casualty rates and physical destruction, and peace efforts so far have made no progress, the prospects of a prolonged conflict have become apparent.
- The Kremlin is now preparing for a long battle both on the frontline and beyond. Consequently, Russia’s use of hybrid strategies, alongside military ones, has become more evident.
- The Baltic States have effectively countered Russia’s continuously escalating hybrid threats through resilience and strategic cooperation with the European Union and NATO. Their ability to withstand pressure highlights their strength in defending democracy and resisting foreign interference.
On May 9, 2024, a fire broke out at an IKEA warehouse in Vilnius, Lithuania (Lrytas, May 20, 2024). Subsequent investigations revealed that the arson was orchestrated by Russia’s military intelligence agency, the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU), and that the suspects were also planning similar attacks in Latvia (LRT, March 17). The Lithuanian Prosecutor General’s Office classified the incident as an act of terrorism aimed at intimidating the societies of Lithuania and pressuring them to reduce support for Ukraine (LRT, March 17).
Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy extends beyond its war against Ukraine as it also targets other European frontline states through influence operations, election interference, and intimidation. The Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are targeted by Russian hybrid tactics as a daily reality and direct challenge to their sovereignty.
Historically, Moscow has used political, economic, energy, and cyber tactics to undermine the Baltics. Recent efforts, however, are markedly more aggressive, particularly as they involve military pressure. Understanding the origins of Russia’s hybrid strategy is crucial to recognizing its evolving influence in the region.
Background on Russian Hybrid Warfare
Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, many observers anticipated that Russia’s pressure on Ukraine would resemble a form of Russian-led hybrid warfare, like that seen in 2014, which combined “little green men,” cyber weapons, influence operations, and military force (Official Website of Ukraine, January 20, 2024; Kuzio, Crimea: Where Russia’s War Started and Where Ukraine Will Win, July 8, 2024). The likelihood of conventional warfare was “relatively low” in Lithuania’s 2015 national security threat assessment (Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Lithuania, 2015). After February 2022, Western attention shifted to the conventional aspects of the war. This included supporting Ukraine with ammunition, weapons, and military training, strengthening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) deterrence and defense posture, and increasing conventional national defense efforts (see Jamestown, February 24). As Moscow has failed to achieve its objectives in its war against Ukraine, with Russia’s progress severely limited despite heavy casualties and widespread destruction, Moscow’s reliance on hybrid strategies has become noticeably prevalent both in Ukraine and in the West.
The Baltic States are members of NATO, meaning a clear act of military aggression would trigger Article 5, which stipulates that an attack against one ally is considered an attack against them all (NATO, April 4, 1949). Hybrid threats, however, are designed to operate below this threshold, avoiding confrontation and allowing Russia to disrupt the Baltics without triggering a military response from NATO. Hybrid tactics, therefore, escalate slowly, often giving the perception of isolated incidents rather than coordinated attacks, which prevents a full-scale military response. Only in the 2024 NATO Washington Summit Declaration, however, were hybrid threats addressed as a key security concern for the Alliance. The declaration emphasized that hybrid operations could reach a level that might trigger Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (NATO, July 10, 2024).
Russian Hybrid Warfare Tactics in the Baltics Today
Russia’s hybrid tactics have evolved from Soviet-era “active” influence methods (Активные Mероприятия, Aktivniye Meropriyatiya) to prioritize non-military strategies alongside conventional warfare (see EDM, May 13, 2024). Moscow exploits globalization, digital technologies, and democratic freedoms to spread false information, destabilize societies, and undermine trust in institutions. These efforts include propaganda, cyber operations, proxy groups, and cultural diplomacy, all coordinated across multiple sectors (McDermott, 2022; see EDM, April 10, August 1, 2024, February 5, 27, March 5, April 9). In 2018, this author, together with Lithuanian analyst Vytautas Keršanskas, comprehensively assessed the hybrid threats facing Lithuania (Bajarūnas and Keršanskas, December 9, 2018). We found that hybrid threats in the Baltic States can be understood by categorizing them into several areas, as presented in the following sections: 1) information warfare and propaganda, 2) subversion, covert violent action, and conventional aggression, 3) societal weakness, 4) influencing elections, 5) cyber activity, 6) energy, and 7) illegal migration.
Information Warfare and Propaganda
Russia has intensified its information warfare and propaganda against the Baltics to sow fear and disrupt institutions (LRT, February 27). Propaganda efforts target the political process, historical narratives, NATO membership, and support for Ukraine, with social media platforms such as Telegram and TikTok playing a key role (LRT, August 5, 2024; see Jamestown Perspectives, May 2). Additionally, sophisticated AI-driven misinformation and deepfake technologies further enhance its informational warfare efforts (LRT, November 14, 2023). Groups such as ethnic minorities, Soviet nostalgics, and lower-income communities are primary targets (Equal Times, October 8, 2024). Investigations reveal Kremlin-backed narratives aimed at undermining Baltic security and Western alliances (VSQUARE, April 25, 2023). More coercive tactics are observed in Estonia and Latvia, where Russian media and diplomatic channels push aggressive disinformation using Russian-speakers (GLOBSEC, February 2022).
Subversion, Covert Violent Action, and Conventional Aggression
Experts have identified various hybrid warfare tactics Russia could use against the Baltic States: from non-violent subversion, covert violent action, to conventional aggression with political subversion.
Since late 2023, Russia has ramped up sabotage, vandalism, and intelligence activities in the Baltic States, increasingly relying on locals with criminal or financial vulnerabilities after mass expulsions of Russian agents across Europe (Hybrid CoE, May 2024). In Estonia, thirteen individuals were arrested for vandalizing Soviet-era monuments and attacking the Interior Minister’s car, and in Latvia, pro-Russian activists targeted national security sites, vandalized public spaces in Riga, and attacked the Museum of the Occupation of Latvia.
In July 2024, fires broke out at DHL logistics hubs in Leipzig, Germany, and Birmingham, United Kingdom, due to incendiary devices hidden in parcels. Investigations revealed that these parcels were sent from Lithuania (Delfi, November 5, 2024). The devices, camouflaged as everyday items such as massage cushions, contained magnesium-based incendiaries designed to ignite during air transport, posing significant risks to aircraft and cargo. Western security officials suspect that the GRU orchestrated this operation as part of a broader campaign to test vulnerabilities in Western logistics and aviation security. The use of Lithuania as a dispatch point suggests an attempt to exploit the country’s logistical infrastructure without direct attribution (LRT, November 5, 2024).
While non-violent and covert actions have limited destabilization potential, Russia employs aforementioned sabotage, assassinations, and support for extremist groups to create internal chaos (Leiden University, January 20). Intelligence agencies such as the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), GRU, and Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) focus on espionage and disinformation to weaken NATO and EU influence.
Russia has been using GPS jamming as part of its hybrid warfare tactics in the Baltic States, particularly since the start of its war in Ukraine (see EDM, May 15, 2024). Both Estonia and Lithuania have accused Russia of jamming GPS navigation near their airports, causing airplanes to lose GPS signal, thereby endangering passengers and crews (LRT, May 12, 2024). The Lithuanian government suspects that Russian GPS jamming is aimed at testing the resilience of the EU and undermining strategically important communications (Ministry of Transport and Communications, March 27).
In the Baltic Sea, Russia is increasingly suspected of conducting sabotage operations and targeting critical undersea infrastructure such as internet and power cables while also employing Russia’s “shadow fleet” for transporting sanctioned oil products (see EDM, February 5).
Targeting Societal Groups
Russia’s hybrid operations seek to undermine democratic stability by exploiting vulnerabilities in civil infrastructure, governance, and societal cohesion. Cyberattacks on critical sectors such as energy and finance further test resilience, often in coordination with other hybrid threats (State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania, February 15). In the Baltic States, Russia strategically manipulates Russian-speaking minorities and diasporas to amplify influence, often through media control and cultural institutions such as the Russian Orthodox Church (see EDM, February 13, 2024). The Kremlin has also sought to destabilize regional support for Ukraine, weaponizing refugee-related tensions (see EDM, October 2, 2024).
Influencing Elections
Russia’s election interference in the Baltic region relies on information operations rather than direct cyberattacks. It exploits ethnic and political divisions on traditional and social media, in turn undermining trust in institutions (Posttimees, January 8, 2019; Propastop, February 19, 2019). Cyber operations, while secondary, amplify these efforts by leaking sensitive data. The real threat lies in manipulating public perception and fragmenting society, as vulnerabilities often stem from weak digital hygiene among media and political actors (Defense Intelligence and Security Service Under the Ministry of National Defense of Lithuania, February 15, 2024)
One of the most notable examples of Russian interference in Lithuania’s political process was the case of former President Rolandas Paksas. During the 2003 Lithuanian presidential election, Paksas’s campaign received significant financial support from Yuri Borisov, a businessman with ties to Russia’s military-industrial complex. This connection was viewed as an attempt by Russian-linked actors to influence Lithuania’s internal political decisions. The scandal ultimately led to Paksas’s impeachment and removal from office in 2004 (LRT, April 4, 2024).
Cyber Attacks
Lithuania’s Annual National Threat Assessment highlighted Russia as a major source of hostile cyber activity, with groups linked to the GRU conducting aggressive attacks (State Security Department of Lithuania, 2025). Private sector information technology (IT) firms supporting critical infrastructure have been prime targets due to their access to sensitive data. For example, the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius faced cyber disruptions, including Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks and publishing false information (LRT, July 13, 20, 2024).
Targeting Energy Infrastructure
The Baltics face persistent Russian hybrid threats to their energy security, particularly toward critical infrastructure (CEPA, December 9, 2024). In 2022, Ignitis, Lithuania’s state-owned energy group, suffered “the biggest cyber attack in a decade” (LRT, July 7, 2022). The attack, known as a DDoS, affected the Ignitis website’s operation and digital services. In 2024, hackers stole personal data and financial details of 20,000 Ignitis customers using the group’s electric car charging service (Delfi; LRT, February 12, 2024).
Russian-backed Killnet hackers have claimed responsibility for most of Lithuania’s cyber attacks (LRT, July 7, 2022). Disinformation campaigns aim to undermine trust in alternative energy sources such as liquefied natural gas (LNG). Lithuania has significantly reduced its reliance on Russian energy through projects such as the Klaipėda LNG terminal, enhancing regional energy independence (KN Energies, April 4, 2022). All three Baltic states strengthened their energy security by disconnecting from the Russian BRELL system and integrating into the European grid in February. This marked a departure from reliance on Russia to a “second independence” for the Baltics (see EDM, February 20).
Illegal Migration
In 2021, Belarus, with Russia’s support, initiated a mass illegal migration crisis against Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland by exploiting migrants from third countries (mostly from Iraq) and facilitating illegal border crossings (see EDM, June 17, 2021; LRT, July 15, 2021). Migrants were transported to Belarus and escorted to the borders with Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland (Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense, September 13, 2021). This operation aimed to overwhelm these countries’ border security and asylum systems and exert political pressure on the European Union while creating a humanitarian crisis (LRT, July 15, 2021). Lithuanian authorities worked together with NATO experts to monitor the crisis and counter any threats to Lithuanian security (Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense, September 13, 2021).
Conclusion
Russia ultimately views the Baltic region as a key battleground in its broader conflict with the European Union and NATO, a stance reinforced by, but not limited to, its war against Ukraine. With military superiority in Kaliningrad and Pskov, Moscow can pressure NATO while exploiting political, economic, and cyber tactics to weaken the Baltic States. Thus far, the Baltic States have limited Russia’s success, despite intensified hybrid threats, with strong societal resilience and strategic coordination. As the Baltics withstand these pressures, these frontline states serve as a model for democratic resistance to foreign influence.
jamestown.org · by Eitvydas Bajarūnas · May 27, 2025
11. A US cavalier talks 'imminent' war in Singapore
A US cavalier talks 'imminent' war in Singapore - Asia Times
Hegseth’s Shangri-La Dialogue address rang the alarm on China but may have worried US allies more than it assured them
asiatimes.com · by Francesco Sisci · June 1, 2025
In his recent speech in Singapore, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth pledged to defend the region against Chinese aggression and encroachment.
This should have reassured the audience presumed to be concerned about China’s assertiveness. Yet, possibly, the room listening to him wasn’t quite ready to believe what they were hearing.
The past few months have been full of surprises for Asia.
Technically, Japan is still at war with Russia, just as South Korea is with North Korea. And yet, both Russia and North Korea are fighting in Ukraine— a country that has been left hanging by the US because Washington is (was?) seeking to turn Russia (and maybe also North Korea?) against China.
This situation is spreading anxiety in Asia. China may suddenly look more straightforward, reliable and easier to talk to. Plus, Chinese jet fighters look more formidable than French fighters because the French aircraft (adopted by the Indian Air Force) performed poorly compared to the Chinese ones (adopted by Pakistan) in the recent bilateral clash.
Furthermore, everyone in the region— starting with the US’s closest allies— is scrambling to understand what kind of trade deal they can make with America. It is all creating huge uncertainty in the region. So far, no one feels they have a clear picture, and no one has a deal.
Then, America doesn’t address these issues, but comes and lambasts China.
Maybe Japanese, or Thai or South Korean, could say: “Sure, China is my biggest concern in the long term. But geography doesn’t change, and what if America doesn’t have my back in one or two years? It dropped me about Russia and North Korea, it bugs me about my trade surplus, but it wants me to push harder on China. Sure, I’ll do it, but I’ll need to hedge my bets— at the very least.”
These contradictory statements and actions are causing massive unease in Asia.
Many (maybe all) American regional allies are getting cold feet about the US. Their feet are getting even colder because, despite many warnings, America doesn’t seem to realize the gravity of the situation and that Asia can’t be separated from what is happening in Europe. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Korean and Vietnam Wars had a massive impact on Europe.
To cap it all, the Chinese—and thus true believers in conspiracy theories—could see this erratic US behavior as evidence that the US administration is caught in a loop of irrationality or is penetrated by Russia.
Moscow could likely fuel those suspicions. And still, the pragmatic Chinese would be puzzled: if the Russians are so good at plotting in Washington, why didn’t they get a peace deal in Ukraine already?
Thus, short of certainty, Beijing would not sensibly talk to Washington without a clear picture of what was happening. It would realistically wait to see the developments with the US and the world.
This also impacts Europe, now closely following Asian developments, and Russia. Moscow has fewer incentives to seek peace in Ukraine when the whole American fabric seems to be unraveling.
America can decide to be cavalier about all of this, and the problems will certainly fester and rot transpacific and transatlantic trust, weakening US clout in the regions and the world. Or it can decide to address these concerns, which need profound rethinking.
This article first appeared on Appia Institute and is republished with kind permission. Read the original here.
asiatimes.com · by Francesco Sisci · June 1, 2025
12. NATO faces make-or-break decision on a post-US future
Excerpts:
The task is colossal, and not without risks. NATO does not want an overnight abdication of the US, as it currently relies far too heavily upon US capabilities, such as long-range precision missiles, and crucially, heavy-lift aircraft, which are vital in shifting armored forces around the continent rapidly.
NATO also wants a clear plan, which new member Finland has emphasized as crucial, to prevent an abrupt and disjointed transition that Russia could exploit.
A new vision must be set out by the end of June in order to deal sensibly with ongoing defense spending commitments, reworked governance structures, and possible planned responses to the war in Ukraine.
Scrapping NATO is unnecessary and leaves Europe – and the US, if the White House could but see far enough ahead – open to innumerable threats and consequences. Even without the US, NATO provides a valuable structure for security cooperation in Europe.
Strengthening European capabilities within NATO, rather than creating an entirely new defense structure, makes sense.
NATO faces make-or-break decision on a post-US future - Asia Times
Scrapping NATO is unnecessary and would leave Europe – and the US – open to innumerable threats and consequences
asiatimes.com · by Amelia Hadfield · May 30, 2025
NATO is facing a pivotal moment in its history.
Ahead of its June 24-25 summit in The Hague, NATO is weighing up whether it can truly continue to count on US support (and membership), whether it will become a European-only organization, or whether it has a future at all.
This suggests a massive shift for the intergovernmental organization that sits at the heart of defense and security for Europe, and beyond.
The past year has changed everything. Trump’s anti-NATO rhetoric has become increasingly vociferous and disrespectful, undermining both the organization itself, and the other 31 NATO member countries, which include Germany, France, Canada, Turkey, the UK, Sweden and Norway.
Add to this the Trump administration’s embrace of international isolationism, and the potential, consequential loss of clear US backing for the alliance, all of which highlight the organization’s historical dependence on the US.
This is what makes the June 2025 summit so critical. It is a make-or-break opportunity to unveil a plan for NATO’s wholesale transformation, or an event conclusively marking its obsolescence. The plan itself is simple: build – or rebuild – NATO as a possible Europe-only endeavor.
If this plan becomes reality, historians of European security and defense may spot earlier parallels for NATO with the original Western European Union (WEU). The WEU was the European defense security structure established in 1954 under the Paris Accords, which helped to redefine relations with West Germany.
Ultimately subsumed into both NATO and EU governance structures, the WEU’s prime goal at the time was to bolster the European content of the Atlantic alliance.
US never wanted Europe to lead
There is a deep irony in Trump’s bluster about NATO states paying more towards their defense. The US has, for decades, been sanguine at best, and hostile at worst on almost every form of European defense autonomy, from basic operationss established by the EU to more ambitious strategies.
Instead, the US has insisted almost exclusively on increased defense spending by other NATO members, improved interoperability between the various national forces, but all “in furtherance of a US-dominated alliance”, rather than a more authentically US-European approach to safeguarding both European and American interests, according to Max Bergman, a former senior adviser to the US State Department.
What is the future of NATO?
If the US is now reducing its involvement in NATO, or abdicating entirely, the only option for NATO is to reduce its dependence on the US, and in doing so, to focus more on Europe. A clear mandate is needed to ensure that being US-less does not render NATO itself useless. Without a mandate, opportunistic space would quickly open up for an aggressive Russia.
Trump made clear early in his first administration that he was no fan of NATO, and argued that its funding structure should no longer overburden the US.
In his second administration, Trump has been even clearer, has variously threatened to pull US troops from NATO joint exercises, reduce US security commitments to NATO as a whole, remove some or all of the 80,000 US troops on permanent rotation in Europe and vastly reduce the US’s contribution to NATO’s central budget of US$5 billion.
These threats are now repeated routinely by US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and others in the Trump administration. This has profoundly rattled NATO as an institution and its individual member states.
As NATO’s own records show, from 2023 onward, there have been major increases in European defense spending. But the opportunity to keep spending commitments high, as well as overhaul the organzsation to meet Ukraine’s demands and defense opportunities for the EU as a whole – which could have been nailed onto NATO’s 75th anniversary summit in 2024 – did not materialize.
There are pros and cons of a new Europe-focused approach for NATO, and these will work themselves out in the final five-to-ten-year plan, which is being prepared ahead of the June summit.
For some, building a European defense mission within NATO is an opportunity to plot a new and more sustainable course for NATO, rather than trying to shore up an expanding US-shaped hole. Spending increases that reduce NATO’s perceived helplessness, or reliance on the US, may also be a benefit.
For others, the removal of US command and control, hardware, software, intelligence and much more from NATO is a futile endeavor that will leave the organization in pieces at best, and present Russia with a golden opportunity for continued eastern aggression at worst.
The signals from Washington remain confusing. Trump’s suggestion of a sudden and total US withdrawal from European defense was tempered in April by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s suggestion that Trump remained supportive of NATO but also demanding expanded spending commitments (these demands vary from 2.5% to 5% of GDP), and for other members to take on far greater responsibility for developing NATO’s capabilities.
An emerging European coalition
Many members now support the emerging “coalition of the willing”, led by France and Britain, to underwrite a force and secure a post-conflict deal for Ukraine.
In figuring out the current provision of military force, including logistics and intelligence capacities in addition to air, land and sea forces, NATO members are aiming to remove the US’s presence and fill the vacuum with European assets over a decade.
The task is colossal, and not without risks. NATO does not want an overnight abdication of the US, as it currently relies far too heavily upon US capabilities, such as long-range precision missiles, and crucially, heavy-lift aircraft, which are vital in shifting armored forces around the continent rapidly.
NATO also wants a clear plan, which new member Finland has emphasized as crucial, to prevent an abrupt and disjointed transition that Russia could exploit.
A new vision must be set out by the end of June in order to deal sensibly with ongoing defense spending commitments, reworked governance structures, and possible planned responses to the war in Ukraine.
Scrapping NATO is unnecessary and leaves Europe – and the US, if the White House could but see far enough ahead – open to innumerable threats and consequences. Even without the US, NATO provides a valuable structure for security cooperation in Europe.
Strengthening European capabilities within NATO, rather than creating an entirely new defense structure, makes sense.
Amelia Hadfield is head of Department of Politics, University of Surrey
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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asiatimes.com · by Amelia Hadfield · May 30, 2025
13. Spheres of Influence Are Not the Answer
From the Quincy Institute.
Excerpts:
Cross-regional integration, currently very weak, could also get a fillip. The fast-expanding BRICS, an interests-driven coalition between Russia, China, and a set of global south states, could be the hook for such integration. Its rapid expansion and growing attraction are a demand signal for plugging acute failures in the international system. BRICS is not designed to be, and will never become, a security club. But with the United States perceived as an unreliable partner, geopolitical cooperation beyond narrower economic issues is emerging as a common interest for BRICS’s middle powers.
While spheres of influence largely kept peace in Europe for most of the 19th century, the arrangement did not last. As states rise, their interests expand. When a new state—Germany—rose and tried to become a great power, Britain and France could not tolerate it. The resultant disputes, fought over the colonies, acted as major destabilizers. Sordid deals such as the Berlin Conference delayed the denouement but not for long. The concert’s collapse unleashed a horrific world war in 1914.
If territorial control and partitioning became the new benchmark of power and success, any prior understandings between today’s great powers could be short-lived. There are several middle powers in the current order whose ambitions will naturally expand as they rise. Some may even desire their own enhanced zones of control. The promise of peace in a new spheres-of-influence world may ultimately also be illusory.
Spheres of Influence Are Not the Answer
Even if the great powers could carve up an interconnected world, Washington may not get the result it wants.
May 28, 2025, 10:09 AM
By Sarang Shidore, the director of the Quincy Institute’s Global South Program.
Foreign Policy · by Sarang Shidore
The Oval Office clash between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky before a full-court media, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stating that Ukraine is “not our war,” and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s acquiescence to any U.S. annexation of Greenland have increased speculation on whether the United States is jettisoning the decades-old model based on allies and partners and adopting a spheres-of-influence approach in its grand strategy. These signals have been buttressed by Trump’s recent speech in Saudi Arabia, in which the president rejected what he saw as previous U.S. presidents’ tendencies to “look into the souls of foreign leaders and use U.S. policy to dispense justice for their sins.”
The big promise with spheres of influence is the reduction, if not elimination, of the risk of world war. As great powers carve up the world, limit their defined interests, and respect one another’s backyards, they have less disputes and less reasons to engage in conflict. Or so goes the claim.
This promise should not be dismissed lightly. In our nuclear and hypersonic age, great-power wars count as among the existential threats to humankind. We are in a world more dangerous than the later phases of the Cold War in many respects. The last few years have seen growing risks of a direct Russia-NATO clash in Ukraine and a deterioration of security relations with China over Taiwan and the South China Sea, not to mention great power-magnified tensions in the Sahel and the Middle East. Arms control hangs by a thread, and the decline of unipolarity has Washington anxious. If spheres of influence dramatically reduce chances of a world war, that can only be a good thing.
But in the final analysis, spheres of influence cannot be the solution in our times. Washington’s conceptualization of its own sphere is too expansive and will not be acceptable to China; in an interconnected world, geographic partitioning is extremely challenging; and the global south is not what it once was and could resist such a configuration in direct and indirect ways.
An illustration with a man standing and others kneeling holding scissors
An 1899 illustration depicts Uncle Sam standing on a map of China amid foreign rulers labeled Germany, Italy, England, Austria, Russia, and France, each holding large scissors. The caption at the time it ran read: “Gentlemen, you may cut up this map as much as you like; but remember that I am here to stay, and you can’t divide me up into spheres of influence!“Niday Picture Library/Alamy Stock Photo
Spheres of influence are a type of great-power arrangement to order the world. Traditionally, they involve an implicit territorial partitioning among the great powers coupled with a shared understanding of how to maintain the arrangement and resolve differences. (The partitioning is about delineating zones of dominance, rather than merely influence, so perhaps “spheres of control” is a better name.) The term was first used in the context of the Great Game (a 19th-century struggle between the British and Russian empires), when in 1869 Russian diplomat Alexander Gorchakov assured Lord Clarendon, Britain’s foreign secretary at the time, that Afghanistan lay “completely outside the sphere within which Russia might be called upon to exercise her influence.” A series of great-power consultations had begun with the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15, followed by the infamous Berlin Conference of 1884-85, which apportioned Africa among European powers. These great-power concerts aimed to achieve a balance of power on the European continent as well as delineate zones of control in territories beyond.
In the current context, we can imagine an implicit partitioning scheme among the three great powers—the United States, Russia, and China—as follows: Washington would be preeminent in the Americas, Europe, parts of the Middle East, Japan, and Australia; Moscow in the Russian “near abroad”; and, perhaps, Beijing would hold sway in a part of East Asia and most of Southeast Asia. Other arrangements are also imaginable.
To be clear, the United States has no formal spheres-of-influence policy, and there’s unlikely to be a pronouncement to that effect anytime soon, if ever. But there are multiple signs that a very different grand strategy is being experimented with than during the decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War.
The Biden administration strived valiantly to maintain U.S. primacy. Though it occasionally gave a rhetorical nod to multipolarity, its policies on the ground were to maintain U.S. domination globally and in all dimensions of power: military, economic, and institutional. The new administration’s clearer acknowledgement of multipolarity is a promising beginning to reforming U.S. foreign policy.
Beyond more definitive rhetoric, the Trump administration’s policies are in keeping with this understanding of a multipolar world. Its skepticism toward multilateralism and globalism, near-elimination of foreign aid, embrace of territorial expansion in the Western Hemisphere, and willingness to cede a backyard to Russia are all major breaks from the past. After a short trade war, the United States and China have now announced what appears to be a breakthrough agreement. Previously, Trump himself has expressed skepticism about defending Taiwan and shown an eagerness for a grand bargain with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Trump has also shown a willingness for a nuclear arms reduction deal with Russia and China, with defense budgets on each side cut by half. And whereas former President Joe Biden played it safe and refused to reenter the Obama era-negotiated Iran nuclear deal, Trump has initiated major talks with Tehran that could avoid the specter of regional war in the Middle East and effectively recognize the country as a player.
While showing signs of dealmaking elsewhere, the administration has zeroed in on the Western Hemisphere as a focus; Rubio has spoken of it as a “common home.” The expressed desire to acquire the Panama Canal, Greenland, and Canada indicates that the United States is focusing on the Americas more intensely than it has in decades. These moves suggest a return to the Monroe Doctrine and perhaps even its 1904 Roosevelt Corollary, in which Washington arrogated itself the right to intervene in the Americas. In addition, Washington’s high tariff policies have treated Latin American states less harshly than most others—a nod toward a “Fortress Americas” model that creates both a place at the table for Latin American states and a buffer against Chinese encroachments.
If the United States were to limit its zone of domination to its backyard and a set of allies and partners in Europe and Asia, Russia and China would likely find it quite acceptable. But Washington’s gaze is turning out to be much broader. Trump’s lecturing of South African President Cyril Ramaphosa in the Oval Office on false claims of genocide of white South Africans was a deep intrusion into the sovereignty of Africa’s leading power. The Trump administration has also taken aim at the BRICS grouping and decided to boycott the upcoming G-20 summit in Johannesburg. And the prospect of control over valuable cobalt reserves probably explains its sudden interest in diplomatic mediation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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Donald Trump at the G-20 Summit in Osaka, Japan, on June 28, 2019.Donald Trump at the G-20 Summit in Osaka, Japan, on June 28, 2019.
At a time of declining unipolarity, America Firsters will find it advantageous to forge a new bargain with the global south.
Most recently, the United States is pressuring much of the world to exclude China from their economies using its tariff policy as a tool. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s recent trip to the Philippines and Japan showcased continuity with the Biden administration’s focus of countering China in Beijing’s neighborhood. Manila is now an increasingly critical node in that strategy, which includes a focus on Taiwan. Last but not the least, Washington’s assertion on mining rights to valuable seabed resources in the international waters of the high seas—in contravention of the international norm—indicates that the United States may even be doubling down on its domination of the global commons.
Clearly, the United States’ desired sphere of influence ranges far and wide, well beyond its own hemisphere and core alliances. What we are likely witnessing is not an attempt for a roughly balanced partitioning of the world among the great powers but rather limited geographic and other concessions to Russia (and perhaps China, as signified by concessions in the recent trade deal)—all in pursuit of expanded U.S. control over important global minerals, supply chains, and key geographies across the global south as well as a souped-up domination of the global commons.
Would Moscow and Beijing be amenable to such a scenario? If its energy and defense sales are mostly unaffected, and an understanding reached with Washington over the Arctic, Russia will likely be reasonably pleased. After all, Moscow is the weakest of the three great powers, with a limited security horizon. But China has emerged as a peer competitor to the United States across practically all domains. Beijing is now a player with a truly global reach when it comes to trade, investment, technology, and supply chains. With the country’s rapid rise, China’s security perimeter of interest has also expanded. Beijing has long chafed at U.S. attempts to confine it to within the first island chain. China is unlikely to sign on to an assigned sphere of influence limited only to its coastal waters.
The great-power competition explicitly embraced by the United States in the first Trump term also securitized global trade and investment. This marked a rejection of the “flat world” thesis of the 1990s—the heyday of the unipolar era. Championed by geopolitical analyst Thomas L. Friedman among others, this theory posited that frictionless movement of goods, people, and ideas would increasingly be our future. Borders would become porous, arbitrage would drive economics, security would be collectivized, and Western military interventions would mainly be humanitarian. Instead, the revenge of geopolitics, inaugurated in 2017 with Trump’s first presidency, revealed the world to be lumpy rather than flat. Geography, along with nationalism and sovereignty, turned out to matter hugely.
But it would be a mistake to overcompensate for the errors of the flat world thesis and adopt the opposite view—that interdependence can be reconfigured at will, and at low costs, by powerful states. Trade, investment, and supply chains have gone so thoroughly global in the 21st century that it is hard to imagine even the current tariff war partitioning them neatly. When it comes to critical resources and manufactured products, no country is even close to self-sufficient.
Unwinding, reshaping, and stabilizing new supply chains along geopolitically preferred lines could take many years, probably decades, to realize, with significant scarcities and inflation as the price to be paid along the way. And many of these supply chains also run across the global south, which has also changed dramatically in recent decades.
An illustration shows two men seated at a table carving up the globe like a roast.
An 1805 illustration depicts British Prime Minister William Pitt and French Emperor Napoleon I carving the world into spheres of influence.GL Archive/Alamy Stock Photo
The 19th century’s spheres-of-influence project was forged over the heads of a mostly colonized global south, which had practically no say in how the great powers of the day determined the destiny of its various peoples. But a contemporary great-power concert to carve up the world will be greatly resented by the wide swath of developing states stretching from Mexico City to Manila. And the difference today is that some of them can do something about it.
More than five decades after decolonization, the global south’s middle powers take great pride in their hard-won autonomy. They have become savvier through the socialization induced by globalization. Most now also have major regional reach. They don’t have the power to reorder the world to their liking. But they do have ways of complicating the spheres-of-influence project. And it is quite likely that many of these states, while they face short-term headwinds due to Washington’s strategic shift, will emerge more resilient in the longer term.
In the shorter term, there is no doubt that the shifts in Washington are bad news for the global south, even among its most dynamic regions. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) could lose a quarter of its projected growth over the next couple of years due to new U.S. trade barriers. The so-called least developed countries, most of them in Africa, could suffer greater humanitarian crises and increased instability.
On the surface, global south states, from Mexico to Vietnam, have responded to America’s turn away from globalism on an individual, not collective, basis. But the stream of government delegations making a beeline for Washington is less a sign of surrender than an indicator of the inherent pragmatism of the new global south. Countries within it want to limit the damage from this new protectionism.
On the other hand, the world is better prepared to weather Washington’s trade revolt than it would have been in the 1990s; the world trading order is already multipolar and getting more so. For instance, ASEAN’s fraction of exports to the United States has steadily reduced since 2000 from about 24 percent to now under 15 percent. In Africa, the United States accounts for only a small fraction of its exports when measured against African imports.
Washington is now widely perceived to be an unreliable partner, and longer-term cost-benefit calculations of global south states have radically changed as a result. Unreliability and volatility will naturally energize strategies of diversification. The appeal of new economic poles—ASEAN, India, Turkey, and the Gulf states, among others—has dramatically increased, even as established middle powers such as the European Union, Canada, and Japan continue to act as stabilizers of the global trading system.
Global south states do not favor either a new cold war between the great powers or a sphere-of-influence carve-up of the world. A strategy of hedging has long been their response. But now Washington is using the tariff tool to force countries to exclude China.
One logical response to this test is bandwagoning. Global south states could choose either the United States or China (or Russia in a few cases) as their chief geopolitical anchor. If bandwagoning became the new trend in the global south, this would be a shot in the arm for a spheres-of-influence world. But Washington may not end up as a net beneficiary. Despite the wariness of some global south states (especially in Asia) toward Beijing, many could end up picking China as the lesser of two risks, if forced to make a choice. Beijing is already among their biggest economic partners and can now also sell itself as being more dependable than Washington.
There is also the intriguing possibility that global south states avoid picking a single great-power patron and instead turn toward deepening ties with one another. This could take the form of stronger regional architectures. Chile and Brazil are leading this charge in Latin America. But it is in Asia where regionalism could truly thrive, with ASEAN already a successful example. In recent weeks, ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea have announced a strengthening of their regional financial stability mechanism, the Chiang Mai Initiative. The Philippines, threatened by illegal Chinese incursions, continues to see the United States as its core ally. But Manila is increasingly deepening security partnerships with other Asian powers as long-term insurance against U.S. volatility.
Cross-regional integration, currently very weak, could also get a fillip. The fast-expanding BRICS, an interests-driven coalition between Russia, China, and a set of global south states, could be the hook for such integration. Its rapid expansion and growing attraction are a demand signal for plugging acute failures in the international system. BRICS is not designed to be, and will never become, a security club. But with the United States perceived as an unreliable partner, geopolitical cooperation beyond narrower economic issues is emerging as a common interest for BRICS’s middle powers.
While spheres of influence largely kept peace in Europe for most of the 19th century, the arrangement did not last. As states rise, their interests expand. When a new state—Germany—rose and tried to become a great power, Britain and France could not tolerate it. The resultant disputes, fought over the colonies, acted as major destabilizers. Sordid deals such as the Berlin Conference delayed the denouement but not for long. The concert’s collapse unleashed a horrific world war in 1914.
If territorial control and partitioning became the new benchmark of power and success, any prior understandings between today’s great powers could be short-lived. There are several middle powers in the current order whose ambitions will naturally expand as they rise. Some may even desire their own enhanced zones of control. The promise of peace in a new spheres-of-influence world may ultimately also be illusory.
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Foreign Policy · by Sarang Shidore
14. Seven dead after two Russian bridges collapse in regions near Ukraine
Coincidence or sabotage?
Seven dead after two Russian bridges collapse in regions near Ukraine
Russia’s top investigative body is opening criminal probes into the collapses in Kursk and Bryansk. Over 70 people were injured, they said.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/06/01/russia-bridge-collapse-bryansk-kursk/
UpdatedJune 1, 2025 at 9:24 a.m. EDT43 minutes ago
3 min
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Emergency responders gather Sunday near the scene of a road bridge that collapsed onto railway tracks, derailing a train in Russia's Bryansk region. (Reuters)
By Leo Sands
Russian officials said Sunday that seven people were killed and at least 76 others injured after two bridges collapsed in neighboring regions, derailing a freight train and a passenger train.
The incidents occurred within hours of each other overnight in Russia’s Kursk and Bryansk regions, both of which border Ukraine. It was not immediately clear whether they were linked.
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Russia’s top investigative body said it was treating both bridge collapses as criminal acts. In an earlier statement, later amended without explanation, it said explosions had caused the bridges to collapse.
The incidents come the day before Russian and Ukrainian negotiators are due to meet in Istanbul for peace talks, although the date of the U.S.-backed meeting was already in doubt.
Around 11 p.m., the Investigative Committee said, an overpass collapsed in the western region of Bryansk as a Moscow-bound passenger train traveled underneath. Local governor Alexander Bogomaz said falling debris caused the train to derail, killing seven and injuring at least 73 others, including three in serious condition. He said the train had 388 passengers aboard when three of its carriages derailed.
Hours later, the Investigative Committee said, a train collapsed onto a road after crossing a damaged railway bridge in Kursk, injuring three train workers at around 3 a.m. No deaths were reported in the second incident.
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Alexander Khinshtein, Kursk’s acting governor, said in a post on Telegram that one of the freight train’s drivers sustained leg injuries. A photograph released by Khinshtein showed the derailed train jutting off the collapsed bridge. “The cause of the bridge collapse will be established,” he said.
In Bryansk, where the first collapse occurred, photographs showed a large rescue operation underway Sunday morning at the site of the explosion, with debris strewn widely under a collapsed highway bridge. Rail officials said the train’s driver was among those killed, while nine crew members were also hospitalized.
Bogomaz, the governor, said five victims, including a 4-month-old baby in serious condition, were transported to Moscow to receive medical treatment.
Photographs of the scene released by Russian officials, which The Washington Post could not independently verify, showed a twisted passenger railcar resting on its side beside a collapsed highway overpass.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Sunday that Russian President Vladimir Putin had received reports from Russian intelligence officials and the Emergency Ministry on the overnight blasts.
Some Russian officials accused Ukraine of playing a role in the Bryansk bridge collapses. Andrey Klishas, a top Russian lawmaker, described Ukraine’s government as a “terrorist group” in a post on social media Sunday morning.
Ukraine’s foreign and defense ministries did not respond to requests for comment early Sunday.
The incidents come amid growing uncertainty over the next round of peace talks between Russia and Ukraine. After Moscow refused to produce its promised peace terms before a meeting scheduled for Monday in Istanbul, Ukraine has declined to commit to a date set by Russia for the U.S.-backed talks.
Last month, Russia launched some of its largest airstrikes against Ukraine since it invaded the country over three years ago, killing 12 people in a barrage of overnight drone and missile strikes, according to authorities.
Ukraine has lost most of the territory it captured last summer across the border in Russia’s Kursk region and has said Russian troops are amassing ahead of a planned offensive this summer. Analysts have said that the Kremlin plans to carry out a main push into the eastern Donetsk region, which it has been trying to conquer in full since the beginning of its invasion in 2022, as well as smaller attacks along the border of Ukraine’s northeast Sumy and Kharkiv regions.
What readers are saying
The comments overwhelmingly express support for Ukraine's actions against Russia, viewing them as justified retaliation for Russia's ongoing aggression and atrocities in Ukraine. Many commenters highlight the hypocrisy of Russia labeling Ukraine's actions as terrorism while... Show more
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By Leo Sands
Leo Sands is a breaking-news reporter and editor in The Washington Post’s London Hub, covering news as it unfolds around the world. follow on Xleo_sands
15. How SE Asia can break China's rare earth monopoly
Excerpts:
Still, Southeast Asia’s potential REE suppliers face substantial challenges: (1) environmental concerns, notably the management of radioactive byproducts like thorium; (2) a lack of technical expertise and processing infrastructure, with China still controlling key separation technologies; and (3) market and geopolitical pressures, as these countries navigate a landscape dominated by Chinese pricing power, potential retaliation and complex export dynamics.
If Southeast Asia—especially Vietnam and Malaysia—can overcome these challenges, the region could emerge as a critical node in global REE supply chains, offering the US, Europe, Japan and others an alternative to China’s near-monopoly.
However, this will require more than favorable geology; it demands investment in refining capacity, strict environmental standards, and strategic partnerships that ensure technology transfer and long-term market access.
For the West, the stakes are clear: support Southeast Asia’s rare earth ambitions—or remain perilously dependent on a single Chinese supplier.
How SE Asia can break China's rare earth monopoly - Asia Times
Region has the resources but still needs technical expertise, infrastructure and strategic insulation against Chinese retaliation
asiatimes.com · by Patricio Faundez · May 29, 2025
Last week, Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths produced heavy rare earth elements (HREEs) at a commercial scale in Malaysia, marking the first time this has ever happened outside of China.
This breakthrough, which includes elements like dysprosium and terbium, is no small feat in a market dominated by China, which is responsible for around 60% of global rare earth production and virtually 100% of the world’s HREE supply.
Rare earth elements (REEs) are critical for the US and other advanced economies: they power technologies from electric vehicles to defense systems. The US Department of Defense, for instance, has identified HREEs as vital for missile systems, radar and advanced communications.
Yet, the US itself produces only about 12% of global REEs—and almost none of the heavy types. Without secure access to these materials, Western industries risk supply chain disruptions that could slow the clean energy transition and compromise national security.
It is for these reasons that the US recently signed an agreement with Ukraine to secure preferential access to its mineral resources—including, notably, REEs—in exchange for establishing a Ukraine reconstruction fund, as well as certain payback for the estimated US$150 billion the US has provided Ukraine since the war started.
However, a significant portion of Ukraine’s known REE reserves lies in the Donetsk region, which remains under Russian control, highlighting the fragility of relying on politically contested sources.
In this context, Lynas’ progress is not just a technical achievement but a geopolitical shift. It positions not only Malaysia, but also Southeast Asia, as a key hotspot for the future of sourcing REEs.
Until recently, there were few incentives to produce REEs in the region. But market shifts, the strategic push for supply chain diversification and the growing capacity of Southeast Asian countries to process REEs domestically promise to unlock vast potential.
Vietnam, in particular, holds some of the world’s largest REE reserves—estimated at around 3.5 million tonnes (with some sources suggesting as much as 20 million tonnes), nearly twice the size of US reserves.
Yet its production today is negligible, representing less than 1% of global output. Major deposits in the country’s northwest, such as Dong Pao and Nam Xe, remain largely untapped, while significant areas across the country are still unexplored.
Still, Southeast Asia’s potential REE suppliers face substantial challenges: (1) environmental concerns, notably the management of radioactive byproducts like thorium; (2) a lack of technical expertise and processing infrastructure, with China still controlling key separation technologies; and (3) market and geopolitical pressures, as these countries navigate a landscape dominated by Chinese pricing power, potential retaliation and complex export dynamics.
If Southeast Asia—especially Vietnam and Malaysia—can overcome these challenges, the region could emerge as a critical node in global REE supply chains, offering the US, Europe, Japan and others an alternative to China’s near-monopoly.
However, this will require more than favorable geology; it demands investment in refining capacity, strict environmental standards, and strategic partnerships that ensure technology transfer and long-term market access.
For the West, the stakes are clear: support Southeast Asia’s rare earth ambitions—or remain perilously dependent on a single Chinese supplier.
Patricio Faúndez is country manager at GEM Mining Consulting
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asiatimes.com · by Patricio Faundez · May 29, 2025
16. ‘A massive headache’: State Department tries to figure out how to handle Chinese student visa reviews
Massive headaches come with the complexities of the job.
‘A massive headache’: State Department tries to figure out how to handle Chinese student visa reviews
Politico
State Department has yet to issue instructions on its visa ban, which could affect tens of thousands of Chinese students.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio testifies on Capitol Hill on May 21. | Jose Luis Magana/AP
By Felicia Schwartz, Phelim Kine and Robbie Gramer
05/29/2025 07:32 PM EDT
05/29/2025 07:32 PM EDT
People both inside and outside the State Department were struggling Thursday to understand how a new plan to revoke Chinese students’ visas will work — and whether it will end up being a blanket ban on Chinese nationals studying in the United States.
While the administration could begin voiding visas imminently, a State Department official familiar with consular issues, granted anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly, said embassies had yet to receive official instructions on how to implement the plan, which also includes revising visa criteria to increase scrutiny of future applicants from China and Hong Kong.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced late Wednesday that the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security will “aggressively revoke” visas for Chinese students with connections to the Chinese Communist Party or studying in “critical fields.”
But that isn’t easy to put into practice, and the manner in which it is done will say a lot about the Trump administration’s ultimate goals.
Reviewing all Chinese student visas could be a daunting task for the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security. There were around 277,000 Chinese students in the United States during the 2023 to 2024 school term, government data shows.
“It’s wild,” said one State Department official involved in the discussions about how to implement the directives. “It’s going to be a massive headache for us.” The person, and others, were granted anonymity to discuss sensitive internal processes.
The administration may be hoping the threat alone will prompt students to reconsider attending U.S. institutions, in the same way that it has encouraged undocumented migrants to self-deport.
“That’s the only reason why you would put that out there — is because you want the Chinese families who are impacted potentially by this to know,” said Carl Risch, who was assistant secretary of State for consular affairs during the first Trump administration. “And you want to terrify them.”
Risch said it’s likely the administration doesn’t yet know who the policy would apply to, but that even when guidelines are established, the general public still won’t know because the State Department doesn’t usually advertise new vetting standards.
“You’re going to implement it inside the bureau, change the guidance for adjudicating officers — often this information isn’t publicly available,” said Risch, who’s now a partner at the Kurzban, Kurzban, Tetzeli and Pratt law firm.
State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce declined to give details on the visa review, including how many Chinese students would be affected, the timing of the review, or the specific merits of how ties to the CCP would be assessed. “We don’t give details about what our methods are regarding visas,” she told reporters Thursday, adding “we’re not going to speculate on where this would go.”
Simply losing a student visa probably would not make a student ineligible to continue their studies on a college campus, though it could make it impossible for them to leave the U.S. without being effectively locked out.
However, if Immigration and Customs Enforcement terminates a student’s record in its Student and Exchange Visitor Information System, it would likely force universities to bar them from continuing to attend and could be a step toward deportation proceedings. ICE’s power to quickly terminate students’ SEVIS records is the subject of intense ongoing litigation, and a federal judge in California last week issued a nationwide injunction preventing the administration from imposing “adverse legal effect” on those whose SEVIS records have been terminated.
John Sandweg, a former head of ICE under the Obama administration, said Rubio’s reference in his Wednesday statement to DHS and State working together on visa reviews indicates that the Trump administration would “do both.”
Much of the initial vetting of Chinese students could be done via software maintained by ICE, CBP and the State Department, Sandweg said. But the CCP cases will require analysts to investigate further, he said.
Some students would leave while others, he said, might try to claim asylum or disappear in the U.S., he argued. Chinese students outside of the U.S. who are denied visas won’t have much chance to protest the decision but those in the country do have the right to challenge their visa revocations in the court system, Sandweg said.
The policy could implicate tens of thousands of students and could potentially become a blanket ban on Chinese students on American campuses depending on how it is enforced.
Rick Waters, the inaugural coordinator of the State Department’s China House, said he is skeptical the U.S. can “surgically go after” parts of the Chinese student population because it would stretch the time and resources of visa-issuing consular officers.
“When we talk about the question of [determining CCP] connections, that’s not something that, in my view, is workable. Even membership in the Party is not something people put on their social media,” Waters said. “So whatever they do is going to be just changing the incentive structure for visa officers where they just reject a lot more people based on very arbitrary criteria.”
Nahal Toosi, Kyle Cheney and Josh Gerstein contributed to this report.
Politico
17. Far From Home: Uyghur Workers in Factories Supplying Global Brands
Far From Home: Uyghur Workers in Factories Supplying Global Brands
NY Times · May 29, 2025
This barren land is what one Uyghur woman saw when she left her home in Xinjiang and began traveling thousands of miles to work in central China.
She and others who traveled with her arrived in Wuhan, where they would be making refrigerators for a Chinese electronics brand, Midea.
They were wearing matching hats with the name and logo of a state-run human resources company. That was a clue that this was no ordinary journey in search of work.
May 29, 2025
China’s mass detention and surveillance of ethnic Uyghurs turned its far western region of Xinjiang into a global symbol of forced labor and human rights abuses, prompting Congress to ban imports from the area in 2021.
But the Chinese government has found a way around the ban — by moving more Uyghurs to jobs in factories outside Xinjiang.
A joint investigation by The New York Times, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Der Spiegel found that state-led programs to ship Uyghur workers out of Xinjiang are much more extensive than previously known.
China has placed Uyghurs in factories across the country that make a wide range of goods used in brand-name products around the world, the investigation found. And it has done so with little to no visibility for supply-chain auditors or border and customs officials charged with spotting labor abuses and blocking the import of tainted goods.
Both the United States and the European Union have adopted laws aimed at preventing consumers and businesses from funding the persecution of Uyghurs in China. These state-run labor transfer programs pose a significant challenge. It may be possible to target imports from Xinjiang, but tracking the relocation and treatment of workers from Xinjiang to factories across China is a much more difficult endeavor.
By the best available estimates, tens of thousands of Uyghurs now toil in these programs. The workers are paid, but the conditions they face are unclear. And U.N. labor experts, scholars and activists say the programs fit well-documented patterns of forced labor.
Our investigation found that the Chinese government has relocated Uyghurs as far as 2,600 miles from Xinjiang.
We documented their presence at 75 factories across 11 provinces in at least five major industries.
Videos on Chinese social media show they have been placed with suppliers for some of the world’s biggest car brands.
Factories making electronics.
Footwear.
And home appliances.
As well as facilities processing poultry.
These companies supply brands such as Tesla, Mercedes-Benz, BMW, McDonald’s, KFC, Samsung, LG and Crocs.
China makes no secret of these labor transfer programs. It says that participation is voluntary and argues that moving Uyghurs into jobs across the country gives them economic opportunities and helps address chronic poverty in Xinjiang.
But experts and activists say Uyghurs usually have no choice but to accept the job assignments, and that the programs are part of Beijing’s efforts to exert control over a minority population that has historically resisted Chinese rule. As many as 12 million Uyghurs, a Central Asian, Muslim people, reside in Xinjiang, located on the border with Kazakhstan.
In the United States, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act bars imports from Xinjiang, unless the importer can prove that they were not made with forced labor. Forced labor has been reported in different forms in Xinjiang, in prisons, mass internment camps and large-scale relocation programs within the region, and, the U.S. government says, in the production of cotton, textiles, critical minerals and solar panels.
The U.S. law also bars imports from companies outside Xinjiang that work with the government to receive workers from Xinjiang who are Uyghur or members of other persecuted groups.
But that provision is difficult to enforce, leaving a blind spot for those trying to root out forced labor from supply chains.
The transfer of Uyghur workers from Xinjiang is a potential flashpoint in the trade war between China and the Trump administration, which has accused Beijing of “ripping off” the United States and producing goods at artificially low costs, including through exploitative labor conditions. Marco Rubio, the secretary of state, was one of the 2021 law’s lead authors when he was a Florida senator.
Our findings are based on an examination of publicly available government and corporate announcements, state media reports, social media posts and research papers. Among them are local government notices describing the number of Uyghurs transferred to factory sites, and state media reports on meetings in which officials discuss how to manage Uyghur workers. Some show photos of workers in neat rows at train stations before departing Xinjiang.
A sendoff ceremony for a group of migrant workers from the city of Hotan in Xinjiang in 2020.
Source: gov.cn
The scale of the labor transfers is evident on Chinese social media, where Uyghurs have posted videos of themselves leaving home, working on factory lines and posing outside dormitories. We determined where the videos were shot by comparing the features of buildings and streets with satellite imagery, street-view maps and publicly available photographs of factories.
Some videos show other Central Asian minorities from Xinjiang, including Kazakhs and Kyrgyz people, who also face persecution and are covered by the U.S. law.
Reporters from The Times and Der Spiegel visited the areas around two dozen factories linked to Uyghur labor in eight cities in the central province of Hubei and the eastern province of Jiangsu, and spoke to more than three dozen workers as well as the owners of restaurants and other businesses frequented by them.
We did not ask interviewees for their names to minimize the risk of retaliation by the authorities, who consider the treatment of Uyghurs to be a national security issue. (We are also not disclosing the names of the people whose social media videos we found and we have blurred their faces to avoid exposing them.)
Several workers suggested, with some hesitation, that they labored under close supervision. They said their jobs had been arranged for them and that they sometimes needed permission to leave factory grounds, usually upon arrival. Security guards at some factories also confirmed they had been sent Uyghur workers by government agencies.
Other workers said that they had taken the jobs willingly and were staying in them on their own accord.
One worker in Hubei Province told The Times that he and about 300 other Uyghurs lived in a dormitory separated from staff identified as from the majority Han Chinese population. He said they were assigned minders from their home counties in Xinjiang, were allowed to leave the factory premises and could return to Xinjiang if they gave a month’s notice.
He said he worked up to 14 hours a day, and earned a monthly salary of up to 6,000 yuan, or $827, about the national average for a factory worker in China. The interview ended abruptly when several men surrounded the worker and demanded to know who he was and why he was not at work.
Human rights advocates argue that Uyghurs have little choice but to accept such job assignments outside Xinjiang. If they refuse, they risk being labeled a “troublemaker,” a serious charge in a region where people have been subjected to lengthy detentions for even the faintest signs of dissent or religious expression, like owning a Quran. At the same time, the jobs offer the promise of a higher wage, in contrast to the limited opportunities and tight surveillance that Uyghurs face in Xinjiang.
The vast majority of Xinjiang’s labor transfers take place inside the region. The government said there were 3.2 million transfers in 2023, a figure that includes workers being transferred more than once, and the tens of thousands sent to other provinces.
The International Labor Organization, a U.N. agency, said in a February report that the labor transfer programs appeared to use measures “severely restricting the free choice of employment.”
The reach of these programs, and China’s dominant role in the global economy, mean a wide range of multinational companies rely on suppliers that have received Uyghur workers.
Some of these suppliers produce goods for the Chinese market, including those we found processing chicken for McDonald’s and KFC restaurants in China. Others make products for export, such as washing machines for LG Electronics and footwear for Crocs.
The risk of Chinese suppliers using Uyghur workers is sensitive for German automakers, including Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz and BMW, which have tried to address their history of using forced labor in the Nazi era by apologizing and compensating victims.
Our investigation identified more than 100 companies that appeared to receive Uyghur workers or parts or goods produced by them. Most did not respond to multiple requests for comment, including LG, Tesla, Midea and KFC. Others such as McDonald’s declined to comment, or provided statements that only emphasized corporate policies prohibiting forced labor in their supply chains.
A handful of companies, including Crocs, denied their suppliers used forced labor, but did not address the question of whether their suppliers had hired ethnic minority workers who had been transferred by the government from Xinjiang.
“Based on recent audits, we do not have reason to believe that any of our suppliers are in violation of our policies,” the Broomfield, Colo.-based footwear company said.
Companies risk having their imported goods seized by customs officials in the United States if their suppliers are found to have been using forced labor. The European Union enacted legislation similar to the American law last year, but will not begin enforcing it until 2027 to give member nations time to prepare.
China detained more than 1 million Uyghurs in internment camps from 2017 to 2019 in the name of fighting extremism. After the camps closed, an estimated half a million Uyghurs were sentenced to prison, rights groups say.
State-directed labor transfer programs have been part of Beijing’s efforts to assimilate Uyghurs since the early 2000s, with China’s Communist Party promoting the notion that labor is honorable.
Sources: Xinjiang Airport Group; gov.cn; China Daily; Yangtse Evening Post
But the programs grew significantly around the time internment camps were introduced in 2017, said Adrian Zenz, an anthropologist and a leading expert on Uyghur forced labor. Since the U.S. ban on imports from Xinjiang came into force in 2022, the number of Uyghurs transferred out of the region has grown.
Speaking at a press briefing in 2022, Chen Lei, an inspector from Xinjiang’s Rural Revitalization Bureau, indicated that the authorities aimed to increase the number of workers moved to other parts of China by a third in 2023 to more than 38,000, according to a government report posted online.
Labor transfer “is the only measure I see that has become more intense,” said Mr. Zenz, the director of China Studies for the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation in Washington. “And the reason for that is that this is a long term mechanism of social control and indoctrination.”
In 2023, Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, told officials during a visit to Xinjiang that they should be vigilant against threats to stability and “encourage and guide Xinjiang people to go to the Chinese interior to find employment.”
Uyghur activists accuse Beijing of relocating Uyghurs in an attempt to change the demographic composition of Xinjiang and erase expressions of Uyghur and Muslim identity.
“This is not about poverty alleviation. This is about dispersing Uyghurs as a group and breaking their roots,” Rayhan Asat, a human rights lawyer at the Atlantic Council whose brother has been imprisoned in Xinjiang since 2016.
If multinational brands cannot guarantee that their suppliers are free of forced labor, then they should find other suppliers that they can guarantee are, or pull out of China altogether, Ms. Asat said.
In a written response, the Chinese Embassy in Washington denied that forced labor is used in Xinjiang, saying that such allegations were “nothing but vicious lies concocted by anti-China forces.” It said that China rejected the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, calling it an interference in China’s internal affairs.
The statement also asserted that all residents in Xinjiang “enjoy happy and fulfilling lives” and that the government’s policies are focused on making the region safer. “Xinjiang-related issues are not human rights issues at all, but in essence about countering violent terrorism and separatism,” it said.
Jobs as Social Control
Little is known about the lives of the Uyghurs sent to work in factories across China.
Censors frequently scrub the internet of anything deemed critical or unflattering of the government. Still, social media provides a window.
Some videos show workers raising their right fists and pledging allegiance before a Chinese flag, evidence of the ideological training that experts say is often mandatory for Uyghur workers on such job programs.
A poultry processing plant in Dalian, Liaoning
A poultry processing plant in Suizhou, Hubei
The activity is about “showing loyalty to the Communist Party,” said Yalkun Uluyol, the China researcher at Human Rights Watch.
Some videos posted by workers hint at feelings of homesickness, at times using Uyghur poetry.
In a video posted by a Uyghur worker looking out of a train window, a voice-over in the background says: “What separates us from our parents and our home … and lures us into slavery? Yes, money.”
Another worker, at a poultry processor, posted a clip with a voice-over in Chinese that said: “The place with a home has no work. The place with work has no home. ”
In another clip, the footage is accompanied by a Uyghur song with the lyrics: “In my eyes, tears of sorrow …”
Thwarting a Law Aimed at Protecting Uyghurs
From outside, the sprawling white and blue factory complex in the central Chinese city of Jingmen looks like a giant sheet cake.
Behind its walls, workers make automotive and aerospace equipment, specializing in lightweight aluminum chassis parts and brake systems.
The Hubei Hangte Equipment Manufacturing Company’s website displays the logos of customers such as Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz, General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Mazda and Hyundai. But it says nothing about the pipeline of Uyghur workers from Xinjiang that the company relies on.
News releases posted elsewhere say government officials visited the factory to check on workers sent from Xinjiang as recently as April last year.
And a video posted by a state-owned human resources company that helps facilitate labor transfers, Xinjiang Zhengcheng Minli Modern Enterprise Services, indicates that the firm recruited workers for the factory in August 2023.
The previous year, Hubei Hangte hosted a meeting with Communist Party officials and educators from Xinjiang and described measures it had taken to better manage workers from the region. That included ensuring that their activities were “controllable” and that they refrained from “laxity,” “drinking” and, curiously, “swimming in groups.”
“We will strive to make Hangte a model unit for employment of Xinjiang people in Jingmen City,” Chen Yun, the company’s deputy general manager, said in a statement posted online at the time.
Xinjiang Zhengcheng Minli Modern Enterprise Services and Hubei Hangte did not respond to requests for comment.
BMW acknowledged that Hubei Hangte may provide parts to one of its direct suppliers. It said it has asked that supplier to investigate. Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz and Chrysler’s parent company, Stellantis, also said they had opened investigations.
Mazda said it had no “direct” relationship with Hubei Hangte, and General Motors, Ford and Hyundai said they prohibited forced labor in their supply chains but declined to answer questions about Hubei Hangte.
It is not uncommon for global brands to have several layers of suppliers, explaining why companies may not have a direct relationship with a factory.
Shipment records provided by a trade data firm show that, since May 2021, Hubei Hangtei’s parts have been shipped to India, Indonesia, Mexico, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Canada, as well as the United States, where shipments would be subject to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.
One U.S. customer of the Chinese company is a subsidiary of the German auto parts manufacturer Mahle Industrial Thermal Systems, which said in a statement that it prohibits the use of forced labor by its suppliers. Mahle did not answer questions about Hubei Hangte.
Another transaction that may violate the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act occurred last July, when a Chinese manufacturer of computer equipment known as Transimage sent at least two shipments to a San Diego address for Samsung America Electronics, according to trade data.
Transimage, also known as Jiangsu Chuanyi Technology Company Ltd., received help recruiting workers from a labor dispatch center in Akqi County in Xinjiang in 2023, according to a post on a local government social media account. Social media posts by workers show employees at the factory who appear to be Kyrgyz wearing teal jackets embroidered with the company’s name.
Transimage did not respond to requests for comment. Samsung said in a statement that it found no evidence of forced labor at Jiangsu Chuanyi Technology, adding that it “prohibits its suppliers from using all forms of forced labor.”
This article was produced with support from the Pulitzer Center.
NY Times · May 29, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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